Succession Certificate (relating to the deceased plaintiff) is required to get a decree for payment of ‘debt’, so also to execute such a decree.
The surviving decree holder could execute decree without a Succession Certificate (relating to the co-plaintiff).
It is not needed for partition, easement, rent – cases.
Succession Certificate will Not to establish Title.
It is not a condition precedent for impleadment.
It is not needed if EP had been filed by the DH himself.
‘Legal heirship certificate’ is issued by revenue officers.
It is not referred to in Indian Succession Act
It can be used for certain limited and specified purposes only.
Various States promulgated Rules or GOs for issuing the same.
Introduction
The law requires production of Succession Certificate by the legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff, to get a decree for payment of ‘debt’ (to be paid) by a defendant, so also to execute such a decree.
Succession Certificate – Relevant Provision of Law
Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is the relevant provision of law.
This provision applies to both continuation of trial for, and execution of, a decree:
1. for ‘payment of debt’ (to be paid) by the defendant; and
2. in an execution proceeding initiated by the legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff/decree-holder.
This provision will not apply to:
1. Any decree other than that for ‘payment of debt’ – such as: for partition, easement, rent.
2. Appeal.
3. Execution of an appellate decree, even if the death of the plaintiff was after the decree by the trial court.
4. Decree holder dies after deposit of the entire decree debt by the judgment debtors.
5. Execution petition had been filed by the decree-holder himself.
6. Surviving decree holder could execute decree on his own behalf and on behalf of the legal representative of the deceased.
7. Adjudication of the title of the deceased.
Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act reads as under:
214. Proof of representative title a condition precedent to recovery through the Courts of debts from debtors of deceased persons:
(1) No Court shall—
(a) pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof, or
(b) proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled, to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt, except on the production, by the person so claiming of—
(i) a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant to him of administration to the estate of the deceased, or
(ii) a certificate granted under S.31 or S.32 of the Administrator General’s Act, 1913 (3 of 1913) and having the debt mentioned therein, or
(iii) a succession certificate granted under Part X and having the debt specified therein, or
(iv) a certificate granted under the Succession Certificate Act, 1889 (7 of 1889) or
(v) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No.VIII of 1827, and, if granted after the first day of May, 1889, having the debt specified therein.
(2) The word “debt” in sub-section (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes.”
Decisive Judgments – Succession Certificate is Not Needed
Following cases it is held that the Succession certificate contemplated in Sec. 214 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is needed only in respect of ‘debts’ or ‘securities’, and not required in a suit for partition, compensation, maintenance etc:
Vishalakshi v. Bank of India, 2006 (2) KLT 488 – in respect of immovable property
Khader Bee v. Mohammad Vazir, 2001 (2) ALT 513 – for execution of the decree in the suit for partition.
Rukhsana v. Nazrunnisa , 2000 (9) SCC 240 – compensation on account of the death of the deceased.
Rama Seshagiri Rao vs. N. Kamalakumari – AIR 1982 AP 107 – for executing the decree for maintenance and for execution of a decree for costs.
Resilikutty Chacko v. State of Kerala, AIR 1999 Ker. 56 – claimant in compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. (Contra view in Sangappa Mallappa Kuri v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bagalkot, AIR 2003 Kar. 142; Mallappa v. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer, ILR 1999 Kant 4411)
Sabnam v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2014 ACJ 2501 (Rajasthan High Court) – compensation in motor accident cases.
Object of a Succn. Certificate – Facilitate collection of debts; Not to establish Title
The Supreme Court explained the object in Shri Banarsi Dass v. Mrs. Teeku Dutta, 2005(4) SCC 449, as under:
“The main object of a Succession Certificate is to facilitate collection of debts on succession and afford protection to parties paying debts to representatives of deceased persons. All that the Succession Certificate purports to do is to facilitate the collection of debts, to regulate the administration of succession and to protect persons who deal with the alleged representatives of the deceased persons.
Such a certificate does not give any general power of administration on the estate of the deceased. The grant of a certificate does not establish title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased.
A Succession Certificate is intended as noted above to protect the debtors, which means that where a debtor of a deceased person either voluntarily pays his debt to a person holding a Certificate under the Act, or is compelled by the decree of a Court to pay it to the person, he is lawfully discharged.
The grant of a certificate does not establish a title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased, but only furnishes him with authority to collect his debts and allows the debtors to make payments to him without incurring any risk. In order to succeed in the succession application the applicant has to adduce cogent and credible evidence in support of the application. The respondents, if they so chooses, can also adduce evidence to oppose grant of succession certificate.”
Surviving Decree Holder Can Execute Decree on His Own Behalf
In M.C. Sreedharan v. Pattieri Kumaran, AIR 1981 Ker 51, it is held that in a case involving ‘debt’ as contemplated under Section 214(1)(b) of the Succession Act, when one of the decree holders had been died, the surviving decree holder could execute decree on his own behalf and on behalf of the legal representative of the deceased decree holder and in such case, succession certificate as per Section 214(1)(b) of the Succession Act was not necessary.
Succession Certificate is not condition precedent
Elsy v. State of Kerala, 2008 (1) KHC 615 : 2008 (1) KLT 904 it is held that the restriction in Sec. 214 of the Indian Succession Act being “not to proceed with the application”, it is not a condition precedent to file a Succession Certificate along with the application for impleadment.
It was also held in this case that after deposit of the entire decree debt by the judgment debtors, if the decree holder dies, the legal-heirs of the decree holder need not produce succession certificate.
Succession certificate needed in succession; not in survivorship in a Joint Hindu Family
It is held in Sreeram Rangaiah v. Gajula Krisnaiah, 2006 (1) ALT 186, that the Succession certificate would be necessary only in case of succession but not in a case of survivorship (birth-right) in a Joint Hindu (also:K. Laxminarayan v V. Gopalaswami, AIR 1963 AP 438; L.I.C. Of India v. T. Tirupathayya, AIR 1963 AP 353; Radhamma v. H.N. Muddukrishna, AIR 2019 SC 643; Devireddy Suryanarayana Reddy v. Kusum Kasturamma, 2015 (5) ALT 802; B. Chandrakala v. A. Anuradha, 2015 (5) ALT 383.
Where Execution petition is already filed by the decree-holder
In Akula Mabukhan vs Rajamma, AIR 1963 AP 69 the execution petition had been filed by the decree-holder himself. It was held that for continuing the execution petition the legal representative need not obtain a succession certificate. (Also in:Akula Rangappa v. Narayana Swamy, AIR 1988 AP 314;Ramanatha Reddy v. K.V. Kuppuswami Mudaliar, AIR 1971 Mad 419)
Cannot be Waived by the parties
In Abdul v. Shamseali, AIR 1942 Bom 285 , the Bombay High Court held that the necessity for obtaining a succession certificate cannot be waived by the parties.
No limitation
In Vishalakshi v. Bank of India, AIR 2006 Ker 255, it is held as under:
“As in the case of probate or letters of administration [vide Francis v. Antony -1991 (1) KLT 62] there is no limitation for approaching the court for the grant of a Succession Certificate. (See Janaki v. Kesavalu – ILR 8 Madras 207)”
An Overview
It is high time to change the law in this subject. It might have been justifiable in the past – for the protection from bogus claims. But, now-a-days the directions in Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is redundant and superfluous. It is clear from the fact that such a certificate is not needed when an appeal is filed; or, when a legal hair or legal representative is impleaded in trial.
Legal Heirship Certificate
Indian Succession Act, 1925 does not speak about ‘legal heirship certificate’. It is issued by revenue officers such as Tahsildars, Revenue Divisional Officers. A legal heirship certificate can be used for certain limited purposes only, such as:
Property Transfer
Transfer of the electricity connection
House tax transfer
Telephone connection transfer
To change bank account to a family member
Insurance claims
Retirement benefit claims
Pension claims
Provident fund claims
Gratuity claim.
Such certificates are not conclusive when disputes arise as to lawful legal heirs of a deceased person or as to the validity of the title of the deceased. When such disputes arise, the revenue authorities have to direct the claimants to approach proper civil court.
Rules, Guidelines and Government Orders
Various States in India have promulgated particular Rules and/or Government Orders with respect to issuance of Legal Heir (Heirship) Certificates – e.g. Kerala Information Technology (Electronic Delivery of Services) Rules, 2010; Kerala Village Manual and G.O. (MS) No. 359/67/RD dated 10.08.1967 ; TN Revenue Department G.O. (Ms) No. 2906, dated 4.11.1981 read with Government Letter No. 1534, dated 28.11.1991; The Revenue Manual issued by the CRA on 14.9.2001 Circular Instructions No. 11/2017, RA 5(3)/180/2017, dated 9.8.2017; Odisha Miscellaneous Certificate Rules, 1984.
See: Premalatha Subhash v. State of Kerala, 2021 5 Ker HC 736: 2021 4 Ker LJ 612;
Vishalakshi v. Bank of India, AIR 2006 Ker 255;
Mymoonath v. District Officer, State Life Insurance District Office, Thrissur, AIR 2021 Ker 83;
M. V. Suprabha v. Tahsildhar, Taluk Office, Velachery Taluk, Tharamani, 23 Sep 2021 (Madras);
V. Devan v. Tahsildar, Office of the Tahsildar, Chennai, 22 Dec 2020;
J. Babu v. Tahsildar, Tharangampadi Taluk, Nagapattinam, 2021-3 CTC 79.
End Notes
Section 370 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925
370. Restriction on grant of certificates under this Part.—
(1) A succession certificate (hereinafter in this Part referred to as a certificate) shall not be granted under this Part with respect to any debt or security to which a right is required by section 212 or section 213 to be established by letters of administration or probate: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to prevent the grant of a certificate to any person claiming to be entitled to the effects of a deceased Indian Christian, or to any part thereof, with respect to any debt or security, by reason that a right thereto can be established by letters of administration under this Act.
(2) For the purposes of this Part, “security” means—
(a) any promissory note, debenture, stock or other security of the Central Government or of a State Government;
(b) any bond, debenture, or annuity charged by Act of Parliament 1[of the United Kingdom] on the revenues of India;
(c) any stock or debenture of, or share in, a company or other incorporated institution;
(d) any debenture or other security for money issued by, or on behalf of, a local authority;
(e) any other security which the 2[State Government] may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a security for the purposes of this Part.
Section 372 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925
372. Application for certificate. —
(1) Application for such a certificate shall be made to the District Judge by a petition signed and verified by or on behalf of the applicant in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the signing and verification of a plaint by or on behalf of a plaintiff, and setting forth the following particulars, namely:—
(a) the time of the death of the deceased;
(b) the ordinary residence of the deceased at the time of his death and, if such residence was not within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Judge to whom the application is made, then the property of the deceased within those limits;
(c) the family or other near relatives of the deceased and their respective residences;(d) the right in which the petitioner claims;
(e) the absence of any impediment under section 370 or under any other provision of this Act or any other enactment, to the grant of the certificate or to the validity thereof if it were granted; and
(f) the debts and securities in respect of which the certificate is applied for.
(2) If the petition contains any averment which the person verifying it knows or believes to be false, or does not believe to be true, that person shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 198 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).
(3) Application for such a certificate may be made in respect of any debt or debts due to the deceased creditor or in respect of portions thereof.
Note: S.388 of the Act confers power on the State government to invest any inferior court with the power to exercise the functions of a District Judge (See: Vishalakshi v. Bank of India, AIR 2006 Ker 255).
Proper authorisation is essential for signing a plaint.
A person may be authorised to sign pleadings by a resolution.
Procedural defects should not be permitted to defeat a just cause.
Secretary or any Director or other Principal Office can sign pleadings.
Any Authorised Person Can Continue the proceedings for the Company.
A person may be authorised to sign pleadings by a power of attorney also.
If pleadings were signed by officers, a Company can ratify it; impliedly also.
Even if there was initially no authority, the Company can rectify that defect ‘by sending a competent person’.
Suits by a Company
Company is a Juristic Person. Under Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of a Company can sign pleadings by virtue of his office.
A Company can ratify the act of signing the pleading, also.
It is held by our Apex Court in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3 that a Court can, after taking all the circumstances of the case, come to the conclusion that the Company must have ratified the act of signing the pleading. It is pointed out that the courts below must have, in any case, directed the company to produce a proper power of attorney, or they must have allowed a competent person to be examined to prove the apparent ratification. The Court’s own words in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3, read as under:
“10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and de hors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement or its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. ”
In a subsequent decision, in State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers, 2011-11 SCC 524, it is held by our Apex Court as under:
“14. In our view, the judgment under challenge is liable to be set aside because the Respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was appointed as a Director of the company and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the company to file suit against the Appellant and authorized Shri Ashok K. Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K. Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers to Shri Raj K. Shukla to authorise another person to file suit on behalf of the company.”
In this decision (of Kingston Computers) there had been no scope to ponder on the doctrines as to ‘technical or procedural defects’ (as done in the earlier decision in Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3). The decision, in Kingston Computers may be distinguishable from Naresh Kumar on the ground that there was no evidence in Kingston Computers to show that the signatory was a Director of the Company, and no resolution of the Board of Directors was produced to prove that the signatory was authorised to file the suit.
A De Facto Complainant to Represent the Company in Criminal Proceedings
Pointing out that a complaint can be filed in the name of a juristic person because it is also a person in the eye of law, it is observed in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshavanand, 1998-1 SCC 687: AIR 1998 SC 596, as under:
“Section 200 (CrPC) as the starting provision of that chapter (Chapter XV) enjoins on the magistrate, who takes cognizance of an offence on complaint, to examine the complainant on oath. Such examination is mandatory as can be discerned from the words ‘shall examine on oath the complainant…’ The magistrate is further required to reduce the substance of such examination to writing and it ‘shall be signed by the Complaint’. ….. The above scheme of the new Code makes it clear that complainant must be a corporeal person who is capable of making physical presence in the court. Its corollary is that even if a complaint is made in the name of an incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court and it is that natural person who is looked upon, for all practical purposes to be the complainant in the case. In other words, when the component to a body corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessarily associate a human being as de facto complainant to represent the former in court proceedings.”
Proper authorisation is essential for signing a plaint
Proper authorisation is essential for signing a plaint on behalf of a Company. Though, the Secretary or any Director or other Principal officer can sign pleadings by virtue of their office, as per Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, the view taken in some decisions was that neither the directors nor the managing director would have the right to represent the Company, in a suit unless they were duly authorised by a resolution taken by the Board of Directors at a meeting duly constituted for the said purpose. B. Mookerjee Vs State Bank of India: AIR1992 Cal 250; Nibro Limited Vs National Insurance Co: AIR 1991 Del 25.
The Delhi High Court, in Nibro Limited Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., AIR 1991 Delhi 25 (Quoted in: United India Periodicals Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CMYK Printech Ltd.: 2018-248 DLT 227), it is observed, with regard to the source of power of the Directors, as under:
“25. It is well-settled that under Section 291 of the Companies Act except where express provision is made that the powers of a company in respect of a particular matter are to be exercised by the company in general meeting-in all others cases the Board of Directors are entitled to exercise all its powers. Individual directors have such powers only as are vested in them by the Memorandum and Articles. It is true that ordinarily the court will not unsuit a person on account of technicalities. However, the question of authority to institute a suit on behalf of a company is not a technical matter. It has far-reaching effects. It often affects policy and finances of the company. Thus, unless a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on a particular director, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of the company. Needless to say that such a power can be conferred by the Board of Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard.”
It was observed by in Nibro Limited that a director or a secretary of a Company could certainly give the authority to institute a suit to another person, as provided under Order III Rule 1 CPC, if the director or secretary was authorised by law to file a suit on behalf of the company.
Order III Rule 1 provides that ‘any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. Provided, that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person’.
If an authority is given to a pleader or a recognised agent, under Order III Rule 1, that recognised agent or pleader can, certainly, file an appearance as authorised.
The Bombay High Court, in Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd Vs. Celem (2015), 2015-1MhL852, observed, with respect to the source of power of the Directors, as under:
“The essential requirement of this provision is that the Company which is a juristic person must itself decide to sue. Once that is done, it would authorise one of its Directors who is the agent of the Company or its principal officers the Secretary of the Company or the Managing Director to file the Suit. The suing in each case is a separate act. The Company acts only through its meetings. Hence the Board of Directors in the day to day management of the company must decide and resolve to sue or not to sue. A blanket authority cannot be given to a particular Managing Director or Director to sign the papers and document/s, including the power to sue. The power to sue requires application of mind upon the particular cause of action. It requires the Company to pay the requisite Court fee. It requires the Company to be represented by a legal officer being an Advocate of the Court. It is an act which, therefore, is not a part of the day to day management of the Company. A Company would decide in a given case upon legal advice or otherwise whether or not it would sue upon a given cause of action. Such exercise is imperatively required to be performed if the intention of the Company, which is only a juristic person, is to be deciphered. That act, of course, may be undertaken even after the filing of the Suit and ratified by the Board as all other acts of management. However, the seminal requirement is to see the act of the Company though its Board or members (dependent upon whether the resolution is passed in the Board meeting or a general meeting) or is given by the Company itself (under its Articles of Association).”
The Delhi High Court pointed out in Radico Khaitan Limited Vs. JD Wines (2020), 2020-2 AD(Del) 421, that the impropriety, if any, in signing the pleadings by the officers of a Company can be ratified.
Even if Initially No Authority, the Company can Rectify the Defect
A Company being a juristic entity, Board of Directors can authorise any person to sign pleadings, by passing a resolution or giving a power of attorney, by virtue of Order 6 Rule 14 read with Order 29 Rule 1 CPC. If pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, the Company can ratify it. Such ratification can be express or implied.
In Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta Versus Union of India AIR 1973 SC 2389 (See also: Punjab University Vs. VN Tripathi: AIR 2001 SC 3672), it is held by Our Apex Court that the ratification would relate back to the date of the act ratified.
It is held in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3, as under:
“In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, a Corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.”
In Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, (2022) 2 SCC 355, held as under:
“Not only that, even if there was initially no authority, the Company can at any stage rectify that defect by sending a competent person.”
Effect of Complaint in the name of MD followed by the post (MD)
In Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, (2022) 2 SCC 355, in a Criminal Complaint under Sec. 138 of the NI Act, name of the Managing Director was stated first followed by the post (Managing Director) he held in the Company. An affidavit was filed by the Managing Director stating that the Company had authorised him to file the complaint. A copy of the Board Resolution was also presented. In the body of the complaint it was not stated that he was the MD. The respondent contended that the complaint was filed in the personal capacity not on behalf of the Company. It is pointed out in Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasia that there cannot be a fundamental defect merely because the name of the Managing Director was stated first; and that the format itself cannot be said to be defective though it may not be perfect (The Apex Court followed: Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshavanand, (1998-1 SCC 687: AIR 1998 SC 596).
The Supreme Court held as under:
“The body of the complaint need not be required to contain anything more in view of what has been set out at the inception coupled with the copy of the Board Resolution.”
“It would be too technical a view to take to defeat the complaint merely because the body of the complaint does not elaborate upon the authorisation. The artificial person being the Company had to act through a person/official, which logically would include the Chairman or Managing Director. Only the existence of authorisation could be verified.”
Our Apex Court explained that a Manager or a Managing Director ordinarily by the very nomenclature can be taken to be the person in-charge of the affairs Company for its day-to-day management and within the activity would certainly be calling the act of approaching the court either under civil law or criminal law for setting the trial in motion.
Any Authorised Person Can Continue the proceedings for the Company
It is observed in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshavanand, 1998-1 SCC 687: AIR 1998 SC 596, as under:
“Be that so, we suggest as a pragmatic proposition that no magistrate shall insist that the particular person, whose statement was taken on oath at the first instance, alone can continue to represent the company till the end of the proceedings. There may be occasions when a different person can represent the company e.g. the particular person who represents the company at the first instance may either retire for, the company’s service or may otherwise cease to associate therewith or he would be transferred to a distant place. In such cases it would be practically difficult for the company to continue to make the same person represent the company in the court. In any such eventuality it is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission of the court for sending any other person to represent the company in the court.” (Referrd to in Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, 2022-2 SCC 355)
Procedural Defects Should Not Defeat a Just Cause
It is trite law that one should not be non-suited for technical reasons, and that the procedural defects or procedural irregularities which are curable, or which do not go to the root of the matter, should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. (United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar: AIR 1997 SC 3; Uday Shankar Triyar Vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh: AIR 2006 SC 269; VarunPahwa Vs. Mrs. RenuChaudhary: AIR 2019 SC 1186: 2019-3 JT 109.)
It is pointed out in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3, by our Apex Court that there is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case.
How to Establish the Validity of Resolutions of a Company: Are Minutes Essential?
Yes. Relevant provision is Section 118 of Companies Act, 2013.
Section 118 reads as under:
118: Minutes of proceedings of general meeting, meeting of Board of Directors and other meeting and resolutions passed by postal ballot.
.(1) Every company shall cause minutes of the proceedings of every general meeting of any class of shareholders or creditors, and every resolution passed by postal ballot and every meeting of its Board of Directors or of every committee of the Board, to be prepared and signed in such manner as may be prescribed and kept within thirty days of the conclusion of every such meeting concerned, or passing of resolution by postal ballot in books kept for that purpose with their pages consecutively numbered.
(2) The minutes of each meeting shall contain a fair and correct summary of the proceedings thereat.
(3) All appointments made at any of the meetings aforesaid shall be included in the minutes of the meeting.
(4) In the case of a meeting of the Board of Directors or of a committee of the Board, the minutes shall also contain–
(a) the names of the directors present at the meeting; and
(b) in the case of each resolution passed at the meeting, the names of the directors, if any, dissenting from, or not concurring with the resolution.
(5) There shall not be included in the minutes, any matter which, in the opinion of the Chairman of the meeting,–
(a) is or could reasonably be regarded as defamatory of any person; or
(b) is irrelevant or immaterial to the proceedings; or
(c) is detrimental to the interests of the company.
(6) The Chairman shall exercise absolute discretion in regard to the inclusion or non-inclusion of any matter in the minutes on the grounds specified in sub-section (5).
(7) The minutes kept in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein.
(8) Where the minutes have been kept in accordance with sub-section (1) then, until the contrary is proved, the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly called and held, and all proceedings thereat to have duly taken place, and the resolutions passed by postal ballot to have been duly passed and in particular, all appointments of directors, key managerial personnel, auditors or company secretary in practice, shall be deemed to be valid.
(9) No document purporting to be a report of the proceedings of any general meeting of a company shall be circulated or advertised at the expense of the company, unless it includes the matters required by this section to be contained in the minutes of the proceedings of such meeting.
(10) Every company shall observe secretarial standards with respect to general and Board meetings specified by the Institute of Company Secretaries of India constituted under section 3 of the Company Secretaries Act, 1980 (56 of 1980), and approved as such by the Central Government.
(11) If any default is made in complying with the provisions of this section in respect of any meeting, the company shall be liable to a penalty of twenty-five thousand rupees and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of five thousand rupees.
(12) If a person is found guilty of tampering with the minutes of the proceedings of meeting, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees.
Only way to prove a resolution is proving the Minutes Book
In Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos , (1991) 72 Comp Cas. 483 (Delhi); 42(1990) DLT 446, it was held, referring Section 194 of Companies Act, 1956, that the only way to prove a resolution at a meeting of Board of Directors of a Company is proving the minutes book in which said Resolution was recorded, and it should have been produced in the court. (Referred to in: Havells India Ltd. v. Dilip Rathi, 16 Feb 2018, Delhi High Court; Manoj Kumar Kanuga v. Marudhar Power Pvt. Ltd. , 23 Apr 2013, AP High Court).
In Shri Kishan Rathi v. Mondal Bros, and Co. (Private) Ltd. [1967] 37 Comp Cas 256 (Cal), it is held as under:
“Whether there was a resolution by the board of directors delegating power on the manager to borrow money is a fact which is within the special knowledge of the company and its directors. They can easily produce the resolution book or the minute bookand show that there was no such delegation. If they do not do so an adverse inference must be drawn against them that had they produced them, the books would have shown such delegation to the manager.” (Quoted in: Hoshiarpur Azad Transport Co. Ltd. v. Sutlej Land Finance Pvt. Ltd., 2001-103 CC 969; 1995-109 PLR 506 (P&H).
Shri Kishan Rathi v. Mondal Brothers And Co. (Private) Ltd. , AIR 1967 (Cal) 75, it is held as under:
“The minute books and the book of resolution of the board of directors are books of the company and are not open to strangers and outsiders. This was also within the special knowledge of the defendant company. If the defendant company was trying to prove that its manager and director had no authority to borrow money, then it was for the company to prove from its own books of minutes and resolutions that no authority was given to Naresh Chandra Mondal, its manager and director. Section 106 of the Evidence Act says that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. It is strange that neither the defendant company nor its witness, director Sambhu Nath Mondal, produced the minute book or the book of resolutions in this case. The only inference that can be drawn from such non-production on the facts and circumstances of this case is that, had they been produced, they would have shown that there was good authority and resolution in favour of Naresh Chandra Mondal. That presumption is irresistible in this case. Articles 103 and 114 of the articles of association of this company cast a mandatory duty upon the directors to record minutes of the proceedings of all meetings of the directors in the minute book. The defendant company or its director witness, Sambhu Nath Mondal, being in possession of such minute book and being in special knowledge of the contents of that minute book, it was their duty to produce them and not the duty of the plaintiff.”
Cheque Dishonour Case against a Company, Firm or Society
Sec. 141 of the NI Act is the relevant provision. It reads as under:
141 Offences by companies — (1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence:
Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—
(a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.
Following are clear from Sec. 141 of the NI Act-
Company, Firm and Society are treated alike (under Sec. 141).
A partner in a firm or Governing Body member in a Society is treated like a director in a Company.
Every person (director, partner or Governing Body member) who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible (to the company, firm or society for the conduct of its business), shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Apart from the director, partner or Governing Body member, the company, firm or society shall be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
The company, firm or societyshall be a necessary party.
If the director, partner or Governing Body member proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, such person will not be liable to punishment.
The nominated Director of a Government company or a financial corporation shall not be liable for prosecution.
If the offence has been committed by a company, firm or society and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of any any director, manager, secretary or other officer, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished.
Relevant Decisions
Pawan Kumar Goel v. State of U.P., (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1598,
Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, 2022 SC OnLine SCC 945,
Secretary to Govt of Kerala v. james Varghese, (2022) 9 SCC 593,
S.P. Mani v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2022) SCC Online SC 1238,
Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, (2022) 10 SCC 152
P. Saravana Kumar v. S.P. Vijaya Kumar, (2022) SCC Online Mad 1387,
P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258,
Dr. Shah Faesal v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 1,
Peerless General Finance v. Commissioner of IT, (2020) 18 SCC 625,
Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi (2020) 2 SCC 514,
G.J. Raja v. Tejraj Surana (2019) 19 SCC 469,
Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi (2019) 11 SCC 341,
Nandkishor Prallhad Vyvhare v. Mangala, (2018) 3 MhLJ 913,
Rodger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma, (2017) 14 SCC 1,
Eerra Through Dr. Manjula v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133,
South Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society v. B. Yashodabai (2015) 2 SCC 727,
Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129,
Pooja Ravinder Devidsani v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 1,
Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 623,
Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661,
Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours, 2012-5 SCC 661,
National Small-Scale Industries v. Harmeet Singh, (2010) 3 SCC 330,
K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48,
N. Harihara v. J Thomas, (2008) 13 SCC 663,
Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal, (2005) 2 SCC 638,
S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) SCC 89,
S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2007) 4 SCC 70,
The leading case, Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786, beholds the whole law on the topic.
Key Takeaways from this Decision, Udit Narain
Necessary Party
A necessary party is one without whom no order can be madeeffectively.
The parties whose rights are directly affected are the necessary parties.
A tribunal exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial act cannot decide against the rights of one person without giving him a hearing or an opportunity to present his case in the manner known to law.
If the provisions of a particular statute or rules made thereunder do not provide for it, principles of natural justice demand it.
Any order that may be issued behind the back of such a party can be ignored by the said party.
Any such order made without hearing the affected parties would be void.
Proper Party
A proper party is one whose presence is not necessary for making an effective order; but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding, or whose presence may facilitate the settling of all the questions that may be involved in the controversy.
The question of making such a person as a party to a writ proceeding depends upon the judicial discretion of the High Court in the circumstances of each case.
Either one of the parties to the proceeding may apply for the impleading of such a party or such a party may suo motu approach the court for being impleaded therein.
Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar
In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar AIR 1963 SC 786 our Apex Court held, in para 7 and 9, as under:
“7. To answer the question raised it would be convenient at the outset to ascertain who are necessary or proper parties in a proceeding. The law on the subject is well settled: it is enough if we state the principle. A necessary partyis one without whom no order can be made effectively’; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.”
“A tribunal, therefore, exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial act cannot decide against the rights of one party without giving him a hearing or an opportunity to represent his case in the manner known to law. If the provisions of a particular statute or rules made thereunder do not provide for it, principles of natural justice demand it. Any such order made without hearing the affected parties would be void.
9. The next question is whether the parties whose rights are directly affected are the necessary parties to a writ petition to quash the order of a tribunal. As we have seen, a tribunal or authority performs a judicial or quasi- judicial act after hearing parties. Its order affects the right or rights of one or the other of the parties before it. In a writ of certiorari, the defeated party seeks for the quashing of the order issued by the tribunal in favour of the successful party. How can the High Court vacate the said order without the successful party being before it? Without the presence of the successful party the High Court cannot issue a substantial order affecting his right. Any order that may be issued behind the back of such a party can be ignored by I the said party, with the result that the tribunal’s order would be quashed but the right vested in that party by the wrong order of the tribunal would continue to be effective. Such a party, therefore, is a necessary party and a petition filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari without making him a party or without impleading him subsequently, if allowed by the court, would certainly be incompetent. A party whose interests are directly affected is, therefore, a necessary party. In addition, there may be parties who may be described as proper parties, that is parties whose presence is not necessary for making an effective order but whose presence may facilitate the settling of all the questions that may be involved in the controversy. The question of making such a person as a party to a writ proceeding depends upon the judicial discretion of the High Court in the circumstances of each case. Either one of the parties to the proceeding may apply for the impleading of such a party or such a party may suo motu approach the court for being impleaded therein.”
Following are the recent Supreme Court Judgments that followed Udit Narain Singh
(1) Vishal Ashok Thorat v. Rajesh Shrirambapu Fate, 2019 AIR SC 3616
(2) Swapna Mohanty v. State of Odisha, 2018 17 SCC 621
(3) Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das, 2018 AIR SC 682
(4) Poonam v. State of U. P. , 2016 2 SCC 779
(5) Asstt. G.M State Bank of India v. Radhey Shyam Pandey, 2015 (3) SCALE 39
(6) Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji VS State of Gujarat, 2015 AIR SC 3623
(7) Census Commissioner v. R. Krishnamurthy, 2015 2 SCC 796
(8) H. C. Kulwant Singh v. H. C. Daya Ram, 2014 AIR SC 3083,
(9) Ranjan Kumar v. State Of Bihar, 2014 16 SCC 187
(10) State of Rajasthan v. Ucchab Lal Chhanwal, (2014) 1 SCC 144
(11) Manohar v . State of Maharashtra, 13 Dec 2012
(12) Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India, (2012) 7 SCC 610
(13) Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma, AIR 2011 SC 428
(14) State of Assam v. Union of India, 30 Sep 2010
(15) Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. , (2010) 10 SCC 744
(16) Public Service Commission v. Mamta Bisht, (2010) 12 SCC 204
(17) JS Yadav v. State of UP (2011) 6 SCC 570
(18) T. Vijendradas v. M. Subramanian , 09 Oct 2007
(19) Avtar Singh Hit v. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Mangt. Comte., (2006) 8 SCC 487
(20) Assam Small Scale Ind. Dev. Corp. v. J. D. Pharmaceuticals, 2005 (13) SCC 19
Non-joinder of a Party – Relevant Provision of CPC
Section 99 of the CPC reads as under:
99. No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction: No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party.
Rule 9 of Order I CPC reads as under:
9. Misjoinder and nonjoinder: No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it: Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to nonjoinder of a necessary party.
Non-joinder or misjoinder of Parties – Objection
13. Objections as to non-joinder or misjoinder. All objections on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, unless the ground of objection has subsequently arisen, and any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived.
Necessary Party – for Effectually and Completely settle the questions
In Razia Begum vs. Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886, our Apex Court observed as under:
“The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights.”Quoted in: Poonam VS State of UP, 2016-2 SCC 779
Court has Discretion to add a Necessary Party or Proper Party
Order I Rule 10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.
.(1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted thought a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just.
(2) Court may strike out or add parties– The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
(3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent.
In Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417, it is held as under:
“The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party.
A ‘necessary party‘ is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a ‘necessary party’ is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed.
A ‘proper party‘ is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made.
If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.”
It is pointed out in Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd. that the Apex Court held in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, 2005 (6) SCC 733, that a purchaser of the suit property subsequent to the suit agreement would be a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased it with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims a title adverse to that of the defendant-vendor will not be a necessary party. If the owner of a tenanted property enters into an agreement for sale of such property without physical possession, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party.
No Pleading – who are necessary parties; suit cannot be dismissed
In Laxmishankar Harishankar Bhatt v. Yashram Vasta, AIR 1993 SC 1587, it was observed that the suit for recovery of possession-plaintiff purchaser claiming to have acquired entire ownership of suit property and the plea by defendant-tenant that suit is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of co-owners. No averments, however, in written statement as to who are other co-owners and what rights they claim the suit cannot be dismissed for non-joinder on such vague plea. (Referred to (1991) 4 SCC 17, AIR 1989 SC 758, AIR 1977 SC 1599, AIR 1976 SC 2335, AIR 1973 Gujarat 131 (FB).
In Meghavaranam v. Md. Mohideen Sahib, AIR 1936 Mad. 782, Wadsworth, J., also held that if the defendants wish to object to a suit on the ground of non-joinder of parties, it is incumbent upon them to state who are the parties. (Referred to in : Durvasula Dakshina Murthy v. Vajjala Vijaya Kumari, 2008 1 AndLD 347)
Defendant Pleaded the land belonged to Municipal Council. It became a necessary party
In Subbaraya v. Seetha Ramaswami, AIR 1933 Mad. 664, Walsh, 1., the learned Judge of the Madras High Court, observed that if a person has a right to defend, it is the same thing as saying that he is a necessary defendant, for it is not within the discretion of the Court to say whether it will add him or not. Plaintiff brought a suit to eject the defendant from a site and to remove a pial erected by him thereon. The plea of the defendant was that the land belonged to the Municipal Council, that he put up a pial with its permission and that the Municipal Council was a necessary party to the suit. The trial Court held that, as plaintiff claimed the suit property as his, it was unnecessary to implead the Municipality on the contention of the defendant, and it was held that the Municipality was a necessary party to the suit and not having been made one, in spite of objection taken from the staI1, the suit must be dismissed.
Non-Joinder Of A Necessary Party Cannot, By Itself, Be A Ground For Dismissing
In Mt. Zabaishi Begam v. Naziruddin Khan, AIR 1935 All. 110, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court observed that the non-joinder of a necessary party cannot, by itself, be a ground for dismissing the suit, and the Court is bound to adjudicate on the rights of the parties actually before it. A Court will refrain from passing a decree which would be ineffective and infructuous and the reason for this rule is obvious. It would be idle for a Court to pass a decree which would be of no practical utility to the plaintiff, and be a waste paper in the sense that the relief that it purports to grant to the plaintiff cannot be vouchsafed to him because of the objection of some person who is not bound by that decree. But this rule has no application to cases in which, notwithstanding the fact that some of the persons interested in the subject-matter of the suit are not parties to the suit, the Court is in a position to pass a decree that is capable of execution and cannot be rendered nugatory at the instance of persons not made parties to the suit. . (Referred to in : Durvasula Dakshina Murthy v. Vajjala Vijaya Kumari, 2008 1 AndLD 347)
Plea As To Non Joinder Not Allowed To Be Raised At Later Point Of Time
In Ramachandran v. Valliammal, 1992 (1) MLJ 188, Srinivasan, J., the learned Judge of Madras High Court, observed that where the defendant has not raised a specific plea as to existence of co-owners at the time of filing suit and raising the said question at later point of time should not be allowed.
Necessary Party – Persons Likely to be Affected must be parties
In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar AIR 1963 SC 786
“35. ………. It is well-settled principle consistent with natural justice that if some persons are likely to be affected on account of setting aside a decision enuring to their benefit, the Court should not embark upon the consideration and the correctness of such decision in the absence of such persons.” (Quoted in Poonam VS State of U. P. , 2016 2 SCC 779; State of Assam v. Union of India [2010] 12 S.C.R. 413)
The Court of Appeal of California in California C.C. Corp. v. Superior Court, (1932) 122 Cal.App. 404 it is held as under:
“In Powell v. People (1905), 214 Ill. 475 [105 Am. St. Rep. 117, 2 Ann. Cas. 551, 73 N.E. 795], it is directly held that mandamus will not lie where it appears upon the face of the petition or the face of the record that a necessary party, or a party whose interests are directly affected has been omitted, the court of its own motion will decline to issue the writ. There, as here, the want of the necessary party appeared upon the record, and it was there held that a plea of such want of the necessary party was not necessary to bring the fact to the attention of the court.”
In Ranjan Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2014-16 SCC 187, it is held as under:
4. On a perusal of the orders impugned, we find that only 40 persons were made respondents before the High Court and hardly a few appointees filed applications for intervention. It is well settled in law that no adverse order can be passed against persons who were not made parties to the litigation.
The court referred the following decisions:
Prabodh Verma and others v. State of UP, (1984) 4 SCC 251;
Indu Shekhar Singh and others v. State of UP, (2006) 8 SCC 129;
Km. Rashmi Mishra v. M.P. Public Service Commission, (2006) 12 SCC 724;
Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCC 768;
Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal v. Mamta Bisht, (2010) 12 SCC 204, referred to – Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 SC 786, Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153, Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706, Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT, (1987) 1 SCC 5;
State of Rajasthan v. Ucchab Lal Chhanwal, (2014) 1 SCC 144;
Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India, (2012) 7 SCC 610;
J.S. Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 6 SCC 570;
Union of India v. S. Vinod Kumar, AIR 2008 SC 5;
Chandra Prakash Tiwari and others v. Shakuntala Shukla, (2002) 6 SCC 127;
Madan Lal v. State of J & K, (1995) 3 SCC 486;
Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, 1986 (Supp) SCC 285.
Easement – owners of properties who obstruct alone are necessary parties
If easement right is claimed over a way that passes through various (servient) properties, the owners of properties who obstruct the way alone are necessary parties; and those who do not raise any obstruction are not necessary parties.
Madan Mohan Chakravarthy v. Sashi Bhusan, AIR 1915 Cal 403 (19 Cal WN 1211);
Lal Mohammad Biswas v. Emajuddin Biswas, AIR 1964 Cal 548;
Varkey Joseph v. Mathai Kuriakose, (1992) 2 Ker LJ 135; (1992) 2 Ker LT 169.
Owners Of Other Servient FieldsAre Not Necessary Parties
In K.Palaniappa Moopan v. Angammal, (1967) I M.L.J. 177, it was held as under:
“It may be that the owners of other fields over which the channel flows are proper parties, but certainly they are not necessary parties. Their non- joinder cannot be fatal to the suit. There are several servient tenements over which the channel passes, but the defendants alone have obstructed according to the plaintiffs. There has been no obstruction from the State or from the owner of field S.No.15 of the exercise of the right claimed by the plaintiffs. I am unable to appreciate the contention that the plaintiffs cannot have effectual relief in their absence. If any of them should interfere with the mamool flow of water or at any subsequent period, that would give a fresh cause of action to the plaintiffs and a cause of action to the defendants also if they are inconvenienced and injured. In my view, it would be unreasonable to compel the plaintiffs to implead the owners of the servient lands all along the course of the channel whether they had any cause of action against them or not and even though there was no obstruction to or denial of the plaintiffs right by these persons. “
All persons interested in Easement are not Necessary Parties
In S. Narain Bera v. Chandra Bera, AIR 1924 Cal. 1050, the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court observed that all persons interested in the right of easement are not necessary parties to the suit where the cause of action on the pleadings is against those persons only who are alleged to have interfered with the plaintiffs right. The persons who have the right of easement cannot be held to be necessary parties so long as their right is not interfered with. In order to determine whether a suit is maintainable and whether certain parties are necessary parties or not, it is necessary to ascertain the nature of the plaintiffs case as set out in the plaint. . (Referred to in : Durvasula Dakshina Murthy v. Vajjala Vijaya Kumari, 2008 1 AndLD 347)
In Mukherjj v. Kalipada Bhattacharji, A. I. R. 1936 Cal. 534, it was held that every owner of servient tenement denying the plaintiffs right and every person obstructing the use of the right were necessary parties. (Referred to in: Ram Singh Sharma v. Parmod Kumari, 1992-102 PujLR 396)
Not Necessary To Add Who Are Not Parties To Obstruction
Justice B.K.Mukherjea in Kedaruddin Ahamad v. Sm. Samsur Mata, (41 Cal.WN 769) took the view that it was not necessary to add as defendants those persons who are not parties to the act of obstruction complained of.
In Varkey Joseph v. Mathai Kuriakose, 1992-2 KerLJ 135; 1992-2 KerLT 169, it is held as under:
“The said decision (Kedaruddin Ahamad v. Sm. Samsur Mata) also took note of the decision reported in Surja Narain V. Chandra Bera (AIR 1924 Cal.1050) to hold that the absence of other servient owner is in no way fatal to the plaintiffs suit complaining of obstruction by a servient land owner. These authorities were considered elaborately by his Lordship P.B. Mukharji, J. in the decision reported in Lal Mohd. v. Emajuddin (AIR 1964 Cal.548). After noticing the conflict of authorities the learned judge preferred to follow the view expressed in the decision reported in 19 Cal.WN 1211 which was affirmed by a Division Bench of which Chief Justice Jenkins himself was a party and that of B.K. Mukherjea, J. in the decisions reported in 41 Cal WN. 769. His Lordship Justice P.B. Mukharji observed:
“The actual complaint in this case against the defendants is that they put two obstructions at two places on the road over which a right of way was claimed by the plaintiffs. The real nature of the suit is for removal of those obstructions. The persons who obstruct in my judgment are the only proper and necessary persons to be joined as defendants in such a suit, Hundred and thousand of villagers who have done nothing to obstruct such a way are neither necessary nor proper parties.
If that were so then a single obstruction by a single villager will make it necessary to make the whole village,. i.e., all the villagers, parties. In that view a person who suffers has to join all other numerous persons as defendants although they have done nothing and there is no cause of action or grievance against them. I do not think that is the law….”
Read in the light of 0.1 R.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the practical considerations put forward by Mr. Justice P.B. Mukharji I respectfully agree with the view taken by Mr. Justice P.B. Mukharji in the decision reported in AIR 1964 Cal.548.”
Owner Of The Servient Tenement – Not Necessarily a Party
In Varkey Joseph v. Mathai Kuriakose, 1992-2 KerLJ 135; 1992 2 KerLT 169, it is observed as under:
In Thayappan v. Kunhahammed (S.A, No.629 of 1986) considered this question in the light of the decision reported in AIR 1964 Cal. 548 and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Udti Narain Singh Malpharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar (1963(1) SCR 676) and has held as follows:
“…The learned counsel for the appellant raised a contention that the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary parties, as the owner of the servient tenement is not made a party to the suit and therefore it is contended that no effective decree for declaration could be passed in this case and the lower appellate court erred in reversing the findings of the trial court. The respondent’s counsel contended that the owner of the servient tenement is not a necessary party and it is pointed out that the appellant has not raised this contention in the written statement. Who is a ‘necessary party’ has been explained by the Supreme Court in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar (1963-1 SCR 676) wherein it was held,
“Necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding”.
It is true that if the owner of the servient tenement is a necessary party and whose presence is necessary for passing an effective decree, he is to be impleaded as a party and the non-joinder of such a party may entail the dismissal of the case. I do not think that the owner of the servient tenement is a necessary party in all cases where a declaration of easement right is claimed by the plaintiff. In the present case the real dispute is between the plaintiff and the defendant. Defendant is the owner of an adjacent property and according to the plaintiff he is causing obstruction to the pathway. The plaintiff has no case that the owner of the servient tenement caused any obstruction to the use of the pathway. Even if the court passed a declaration of his easement right in respect of the plaint schedule pathway it would bind only the defendant, who allegedly caused the obstruction. Therefore, the owner of the servient tenement is not a necessary party in all suits for declaration of easement right. An effective decree can be passed even without impleading the owner of the servient tenement as a party to the suit,…”
Necessary Party – Person Likely to Suffer has to be Impleaded
Census Commissioner v. R. Krishnamurthy, 2015-2 SCC 796, it is observed as under:
19. As we evince from the sequence of events, the High Court in the earlier judgment had issued the direction relating to carrying of census in a particular manner by adding certain facets though the lis was absolutely different. The appellant, the real aggrieved party, was not arrayed as a party-respondent. The issue was squarely raised in the subsequent writ petition where the Census Commissioner was a party and the earlier order was repeated. There can be no shadow of doubt that earlier order is not binding on the appellant as he was not a party to the said lis. This view of ours gets fructified by the decision in
H.C. Kulwant Singh v. H.C. Daya Ram JT 2014 (8) SC 305 wherein this Court,
after referring to the judgments in
Khetrabasi Biswal v. Ajaya Kumar Baral, (2004) 1 SCC 317
UditNarain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 SC 786
Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. (1984) 4 SCC 251 and
Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. (2009) 1 SCC 768
has ruled thus:
‘….. if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of the court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice’.”
Necessary parties in suit on Partial destruction of Stair Case and its Removal
Smt. Subhra Sinha Roy v. Iman Kalyan Dey, (2011) 2 CalHN 959, considered it and stated as under:
“In CWN (19) 1211 (Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J., Justice D. Chatterjee Madan Mohan Chakravarty v. Sashi Bhusan Mukherji, (1915) 31 Ind. Cas. 549 : 19 C.W.N. 1211) it is held, inter alia, that a dominant owner has no cause of action against servant owners who have neither caused obstruction nor raised any objection to the exercise of his right of easement. In a suit for declaration of his right of way he is not bound to make parties any servant owners other than those who have so obstructed or challenged his right. The said case relates to a suit for declaration of right of way, for restoration of the path to its former condition and for perpetual injunction. The said suit was decreed against which appeal was preferred with the contention that the suit ought to have failed as the owners of all the servant tenements over which the way is claimed have not been made parties to the suit. The instant case relates to removal of partial obstruction from the existing pathway in terms of a compromise decree which has been waived or relinquished. There is no denial of the fact that the said staircase is now in occupation of the tenants inducted by co-sharers. If such a staircase is to be removed affecting the rights of all the co-owners, they must be treated as necessary party and in such case in absence of all the co-owners no effective decree can be passed. From this point of view the learned Trial Court as well as the Hon”ble Division Bench has not committed any error apparent on the face of record which may be reviewed and the ratio in the aforesaid case is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
Claim of possessory right over Govt. land: State need not be a party
In Vavvakkavu Muslim Thaikkavupally v. Narayanan Purushan, ILR 1992-1 Ker 221; 1991-2 KLJ 526; 1991-2 KLT 477, it was held as under:
“Regarding the first question it is clear from the pleadings and evidence in the case that the plaintiffs have not claimed either possession of the plaint B schedule property or even an easement right over it as against the State. The gist of their claim in the plaint is that as the owners of the property abutting plaint B schedule property they are using the same as a passage to have access from their residential house in plaint B schedule property to N.H. 47. Of course they have also stated that they have no other pathway to have access to any public road. However, they have not even alleged and proved any of the ingredients to establish an easement right of way through the plaint B schedule property. Learned counsel for the respondents has also not advanced any such contention before me. Probably being land kept for the purpose of N.H. 47 State has also not chosen to obstruct the plaintiffs in the matter of using plaint B schedule property as a passage so far. In these circumstances, I do not think that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to have impleaded the State as a party to the suit. In a more or less similar case, a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in the decision reported in Girish Chandra v. Nagendranath (AIR 1978 Orissa 211) has held that the owner of land is not a necessary party to the suit so long as none of the parties to the suit have claimed any right specifically against the owner. In the said decision, the Division Bench has actually referred to two earlier decisions of the Calcutta High Court reported in Sabirer Ma v. Behari Mohan Lai (AIR 1928 Cal. 23) and in Kedaruddin v. Asrafali (AIR 1937 Cal. 355) in support of thier view. In AchutKalsai v. MadhuKalsai (1972) 38 Cut.LT 105) the Orissa High Court in a more or less similar case has held thus:
“In this case there is no allegation of any resistance from the State of Orissa to the flow of Avatar over the Government land intervening between the plaintiffs premises and the channel by the side of the village road. The entire obstruction came from the defendants and the plaintiffs really aggrieved by the defendants action. There may be cases where the owner of the servant tenement would not resist and the resistance would come from quite a different quarter. In such cases the Owner of the servant tenement would certainly not be required to be before the Court as a necessary party to the litigation. The present case seems to be one of that type and the State of Orissa which is the owner of the intervening plot not being before the Court would not affect the suit in any manner”.
I am in agreement with the view expressed in the above decisions and would hold that the State is not a necessary party to the suit and the suit is not liable to be dismissed on that ground.”
In Ramachandran v. Omanakuttan, 2021-4 KLJ 204, it is held as under:
“In Vavvakkavu Muslim Thaikkavupally v. Narayanan Purushan, 1991 (2) KLT 477, Packiyam Ammal v. Pattu Ammal, 1999 KHC 3552, and Appukuttan Chettiyar v. Lathikadevi Amma, 2005 (1) KLT 260, it was held that the possessory right can be claimed as between persons who assert rival claims over Government land and that in such actions the State need not be a party subject to the rider that the Government will not be bound by any such decrees.
Such being the legal position, the view of the first appellate court that the Government ought to have been made a party to the suit is untenable particularly in view of the decisions in Philip’s case (supra), Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathai, 1966 KLT 1, Rev.Fr.K.C.Alexander v. N.S.S. Ltd., 1966 KLT 333, Rame Gowda v. M.Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769, Pathukutty v. Aisakutty, 2014 (2) KHC 212, and Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813. All the above cases, dealing with dispossession of the persons in occupation of the property without title by trespassers, considered and affirmed the above legal position. Hence it is settled law that even before the acquisition of statutory title by adverse possession for the requisite period under the Limitation Act, the possessory owner has well defined rights in the property. This possessory right is heritable, divisible and transferable as distinct from proprietary title. The Land Conservancy Act, 1957 prohibits only regarding matters for in the Act and the Rules. In Packiyam Ammal’s case (supra) this position has been unmistakably clarified in paragraph 14 of the judgment as hereunder:-
“14. In regard to item No.10, the only reason for dismissing the suit was that the family is not having title to the property. Under Ext.A2, it is found that the family is in possession. It could be a Government land. The possessory right continues in the family. Any arrangement between the members of the family may not bind the Government. But, as between them, it has to be treated as a family asset and available for partition. A preliminary decree also will have to be passed with regard to item No.10.”
Order behind the back, in Violation of Natural Justice, can be ignored
JS Yadav v. State of UP, (2011) 6 SCC 570, it is held as under:
“32. No order can be passed behind the back of a person adversely affecting him and such an order if passed, is liable to be ignored being not binding on such a party as the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The principles enshrined in the proviso to Order I Rule 9, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provide that impleadment of a necessary party is mandatory and in case of non-joinder of necessary party, the plaintiff/petitioner may not be entitled for the relief sought by him. The litigant has to ensure that the necessary party is before the Court, be it a plaintiff or a defendant, otherwise the proceedings will have to fail. In Service Jurisprudence if an unsuccessful candidate challenges the selection process, he is bound to implead at least some of the successful candidates in representative capacity. In case the services of a person is terminated and another person is appointed at his place, in order to get relief, the person appointed at his place is the necessary party for the reason that even if the plaintiff/petitioner succeeds, it may not be possible for the Court to issue direction to accommodate the petitioner without removing the person who filled up the post manned by plaintiff/petitioner. (Vide:
Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. , AIR 1985 SC 167;
Ishwar Singh v. Kuldip Singh, 1995 (supp) 1 SCC 179;
Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of WB, (2009) 1 SCC 768;
State of Assam v Union of India, (2010) 10 SCC 408; and
PSC, Uttaranchal v. Mamta Bisht , AIR 2010 SC 2613.)”
Who are Entitled to Defend the Orders, are Necessary Parties
In Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat, 2015 AIR SC 3623, it is observed as under:
“Every adjudicating authority may be nomenclatured as a tribunal but the said authority(ies) are different that pure and simple adjudicating authorities and that is why they are called the authorities. An Income Tax Commissioner, whatever rank he may be holding, when he adjudicates, he has to be made a party, for he can defend his order. He is entitled to contest. There are many authorities under many a statute. Therefore, the proposition that can safely be culled out is that the authorities or the tribunals, who in law are entitled to defend the orders passed by them, are necessary parties and if they are not arrayed as parties, the writ petition can be treated to be not maintainable or the court may grant liberty to implead them as parties in exercise of its discretion. There are tribunals which are not at all required to defend their own order, and in that case such tribunals need not be arrayed as parties.”
In Poonam v. State of UP, 2016-2 SCC 779, referring Savitri Devi Vs. District Judge, Gorakhpur, AIR 1999 SC 976, it is held as under:
“17. The term “entitled to defend” confers an inherent right to a person if he or she is affected or is likely to be affected by an order to be passed by any legal forum, for there would be violation of natural justice. The principle of audi alteram partem has its own sanctity but the said principle of natural justice is not always put in strait jacket formula. That apart, a person or an authority must have a legal right or right in law to defend or assail.
34. … If a non-selected candidate challenges the selection, he is under legal obligation to implead the selected candidates as they are necessary parties and there can be no two opinions as regards such a proposition of law.”
Representative action
In Poonam v. State of UP, 2016-2 SCC 779, it is observed as under:
“39. The aforesaid decisions do not lay down as a proposition of law that in every case when a termination is challenged, the affected person has to be made a party. What has been stated is when one challenges a provision as ultra vires the persons who are likely to be affected, some of them should be made parties in a representative capacity. That has been the consistent view of this Court in service jurisprudence.”
Necessary Party – Each case has to be understood in proper perspective
In Savitri Devi Vs. District Judge, Gorakhpur, AIR 1999 SC 976, the Court took exception to courts and tribunals being made parties. It is apposite to note here that propositions laid down in each case has to be understood in proper perspective. (Referred to in Poonam v. State of UP, 2016-2 SCC 779)
In Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat, 2015 AIR SC 3623, referring Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233, Udit Narain Singh (supra) and Savitri Devi (supra) it is observed as under:
“It is apposite to note here that propositions laid down in each case has to be understood in proper perspective. Civil courts, which decide matters, are courts in the strictest sense of the term. Neither the court nor the Presiding Officer defends the order before the superior court it does not contest. If the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction, as the case may be, calls for the records, the same can always be called for by the High court without the Court or the Presiding Officer being impleaded as a party. Similarly, with the passage of time there have been many a tribunal which only adjudicate and they have nothing to do with the lis. We may cite few examples;
the tribunals constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985,
the Custom, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal,
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunals,
the Sales Tax Tribunal and such others.
Every adjudicating authority may be nomenclatured as a tribunal but the said authority(ies) are different that pure and simple adjudicating authorities and that is why they are called the authorities. An
Income Tax Commissioner,
whatever rank he may be holding, when he adjudicates, he has to be made a party, for he can defend his order. He is entitled to contest. There are many authorities under many a statute. Therefore, the proposition that can safely be culled out is that the authorities or the tribunals, who in law are entitled to defend the orders passed by them, are necessary parties and if they are not arrayed as parties, the writ petition can be treated to be not maintainable or the court may grant liberty to implead them as parties in exercise of its discretion. There are tribunals which are not at all required to defend their own order, and in that case such tribunals need not be arrayed as parties. To give another example:-in certain enactments, the
District Judges function as Election Tribunals
from whose orders a revision or a writ may lie depending upon the provisions in the Act. In such a situation, the superior court, that is the High Court, even if required to call for the records, the District Judge need not be a party. Thus, in essence, when a tribunal or authority is required to defend its own order, it is to be made a party failing which the proceeding before the High Court would be regarded as not maintainable.”
In Poonam v. State of UP, 2016-2 SCC 779, it is observed as under:
“40. In this regard, we may refer to the rule stated by Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem[37]:-
“Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but govern and are qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.”
41. A three-Judge Bench in Union of India and others v. Dhanwanti Devi and others[38] while discussing about the precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution, held that:
“….. 10. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents……”
Pro forma Party
A pro forma party to a litigation is one against whom no relief is sought for in a legal proceeding (at its beginning) on the posit that he is a proper party. It is usually done with a view to seek reliefs in future, amending the pleading, if the changed situation so warrants.
Plaintiff claims Ownership; Suit against Trespasser – Not Necessary to Implead ‘Previous Owners’ (Alleged by the Defendants)
R. K. S. Builders v. Bhupinder Kumar , 2001-2 Punj LR 804, 2001-2 RCR (Civil) 497.
Facts of the Case
Plaintiff alleged that he is owner of the property and that the said property is in the illegal possession of the defendants.
The defendants contended that they have purchased the same from its rightful owners.
During the pendency of the suit, the defendants have further sold the property to various persons.
Application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC read with Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was filed.
This application was resisted by the defendants, inter alia, on the ground that the plaintiff had not added the previous owners of the property from whom the defendants purchased it. The trial court allowed the Petition.
The High Court, dismissing the Revision Petition, held as under:
When the case of the plaintiff is that he is the owner of the property which has been illegally occupied by the defendants, it is not necessary to implead previous (rightful) owners (alleged by the defendants).
Land Reforms ActConferred Title on Tenants: Previous Owners, Not Necessary Parties
Bir Singh v. Kishan Chand, AIR 2007 HP 24
Non-joinder of the previous owners, divested of their ownership by virtue of the Land Reforms Act, and the ownership rights stood conferred upon the tenants, are not necessary parties.
Original Owner Not Necessary Party, When Dispute is Solely Between Purchaser and another
Kaleem Pasha v. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka Vidhana, ICC 2018 4 810,
In the absence of the plaintiff claiming any relief against the previous owners of a vehicle nor their participation in the suit was in any manner of help in the proper adjudication of the matter and also the disputed fact was solely between the plaintiff and defendant in the original suit, the original owner and the auction purchaser were not necessary parties.
Agreement for sale – Prior owner Necessary Party
Pamujula Narayana v. Ramachandruni Malakondaiah, 2006-3 ALD 278, ALT 2006 4 247.
Facts of the case
Suit was for specific performance.
Agreement was executed by the defendant as Power of Attorney holder of the Owner.
Owner died even prior to the filing of the suit.
Plaint was silent about the owner; and read as if PoA was the owner.
Court held:
It is well known that the owner of the property agreed to be sold is a necessary party to the suit (and PoA not sufficient).
Suit dismissed if Prior owner, a Necessary Party, is not impleded within Limitation
In the above case, Pamujula Narayana v. Ramachandruni Malakondaiah, 2006-3 ALD 278, ALT 2006 4 247, it was further held –
The suit will be barred, in view of Sec. 21 of Limitation Act, if prior owner (or successor) is not impleaded within time prescribed.
Vendee Becomes the Sole Owner
In Hardeva v. Ismail, AIR 1970 Raj 167, it was held – if it is possible to determine the rights and interests of the parties, not to dismiss a suit. It was also observed as under:
“When the vendor has sold his property and has delivered the possession of the property to the vendee, the vendee becomes the sole owner of the property and it is upto the vendee to defend his title against any person who claims any right in the property. The vendor may be a proper party, but he is not a necessary party inasmuch as an effectual decree can be passed in favour of third person against the vendee.”
Two tests for determining who is a necessary party
It was laid down in the Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1947 All 18 (FB), there were two tests –
Firstly, there must be a right to some relief against the defendant, and
Secondly, in the absence of such a party it could not be possible to pass an effective decree. (Approved in Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain, AIR 1953 SC 521)
It was further pointed out in the Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1947 All 18 (FB) – where the plaintiff files a suit against a defendant who is not the full owner of the property and has only a limited right, the owner is a necessary party as no effectual decree could be passed against the defendant (Subbaraya Sastri v. Seetha Rama-swami, AIR 1933 Mad 664; Rahima Bi v. Vellore Municipal Council, AIR 1954 Mad 495, Brojanath Bose v. Durga Prosad Singh. (1907) ILR 34 Cal 753, Narahari Mohanti v. Ghanshyam Bel, AIR 1963 Orissa 186, Chenthiperumal Pillai v. D. M. Devasa-hayam, AIR 1956 Trav-Co. 181 (FB), and Chandra Nath Sarma v. Guna Ram Kalita, AIR 1949 Assam 21).
Foot Note
Section 99, and Rule 9 to 13 of Order I, CPC are the relevant provisions. They read as under:
Section 99 of the CPC reads as under:
99. No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction: No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party.
Rule 9 to 13 of Order I CPC read
9. Misjoinder and nonjoinder: No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it: Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to nonjoinder of a necessary party.
10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff
(1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted thought a bona fide mistake, and that it is
necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, Order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just.
(2) Court may strike out or add parties.-
The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, Order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in Order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
(3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent.
(4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended-
Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant.
(5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons.
11. Conduct of suit The Court may give the conduct of 1[a suit] to such persons as it deems proper.
12. Appearance of one of several plaintiffs or defendants for others
(1) Where there are more plaintiffs than one, any one or more of them may be authorized by any other of them to appear, plead or act for such other in any proceeding; and in like manner, where there are more defendants than one, any one or more of them may be authorized by any other of them to appear, plead or act for such other in any proceeding.
(2) The authority shall be in writing signed by the party giving it and shall be filed in Court.
13. Objections as to non-joinder or misjoinder.
All objections on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, unless the ground of objection has subsequently arisen, and any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived.
1. An unregistered society or a club is not a legal person; and therefore, it has to sue or be sued only in the name of all its members. It can be done by invoking Order I Rule 8CPC. 2. For ordering notice under OI r 8 CPC, by a court, the following two essential conditions are to be satisfied. i. numerous persons ii. having same (or common) interest (or community of interest). 3. A society registered under the Societies Registration Act, does not become distinct from its members and does not become a separate legal person like a company. 4. Even a (registered) society cannot sue or be sued in its name. It is peremptory that the suit by or against a registered society should be brought as provided under Sec. 6 of the So. Regn. Act. 5. Sec. 6 enables ‘to sue or be sued‘ every registered society in the name ofits president, secretary, etc., as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society (or through such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion)
How to Sue an Unregistered Society or a Club
An unregistered society or a club is not a legal person; and therefore, it has to sue or be sued only in the name of all its members. It can be done by invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC which enables one or more of ‘numerous’ persons having common (community of) interest to sue or be sued in a representative character. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State, AIR 1962 SC 458; Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India, AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata, AIR 2010 SC 2943.)
When an Association be represented by the Plaintiff; when by the Defendants?
When a suit is filed by a member seeking reliefs concerning the society or a club, relating to a matter common to all members, he has to file it (also) as representing other members of the society other than the defendants (usually office-bearers of the society or club); and if it is a personal matter of the plaintiff, seeking relief against all other members, the plaintiff has to sue against one or two members (usually office-bearers) as representatives of others.
Order I Rule 8 CPC
The objective of the enabling provision, Order I Rule 8 CPC, is avoidance of multiplicity in litigation; and the decision in such a suit binds all present and future members. (TN Housing Board Vs. TN Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1990 SC 642; Jamiat Ulama Vs. Maulana Mahmood Asad Madni: ILR 2008-17 Dlh 1950).
TN Housing Board Vs. TN Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608, was a case where the suit was filed by allottees of plots of low-income groups against the appellant-Housing Board seeking injunction from demanding and collecting any additional price and the suit was held maintainable under Order I Rule 8, even though separate demand notices were issued to each allottees (Referred to in Manish Kumar v. Union of India, 2021-5 SCC 1).
Decision Binds all Represented, and Constitute Res Judicata
The condition necessary for the application of Order I Rule 8 is that the persons on whose behalf the suit is brought must have the same interest and the decision in a representative suit would bind all the persons sought to be represented, and constitute res judicata, under Section 11, CPC. (Mahboob Sahab Vs. Syed Ismail: AIR1995 SC 1205; T N Housing Board Vs. T N Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1990 SC 642; Venugopala Naidu Vs. Venkatarayulu: (1989) Supp 2 SCC 3 56: AIR 1990 SC 444. Ahmed Adam Sait Vs. M. E. Makhri AIR 1964 SC 107. C Arumughathan Vs. S Muthusami Naidu: 1993-1 CivCC 79: 1992-1 Mad LJ 532
Registration does not Confer Juristic Personality
In Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State, AIR 1962 SC 458, it is held that the registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status.
In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India: AIR 2003 SC 3397, it is held that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act as a society even after registration does not become distinct from its members and does not become a separate legal person like a company. (Referred to in Vivek Narayan Sharma Vs. Union of India, 2023-3 SCC 1)
In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India, AIR2003 SC 3397, says as under:
i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
ii) A Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. (Para 21)
iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)
Society is the Compendium of its Members
A society or a club, both registered and unregistered, is the compendium of its members. When it sues or is sued all its members should be made parties. Registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458. Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India: AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata, AIR 2010 SC 2943)
‘Property Belonging to a Society’, “Merely Describes” Property Vests in Gover. Body
Expressions in the Societies Registration Act, ‘property belonging to a society’ (Societies Registration Act: Sec. 5) and ‘property of the society’, (Societies Registration Act: Sec. 8 and 10) do not give the society a corporate status; and it “merely describes the property which vests in trustees or Governing Body”. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458)
‘Suit By or Against a Regd. So.’ is Virtually Suit By or Against Entire Members
Following the above propositions, it can be legitimately concluded that the common expression, ‘suit by or against a society’, legally and virtually denotes suit by or against its entire members.
How Sec. 6 is an Enabling Provision
The earlier view taken by various courts in India was that the registered societies were legal persons and they could sue or be sued in their own name; and that Sec. 6 was only an enabling (or added) provision to sue or be sued in the name of the president, secretary, etc.. (Shanti Sarup Vs. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha, Dayalbagh Agra: AIR 1969 All. 248; K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook, AIR 1970 Pat 163; Khiri Ram Gupta and Another versus Nana Lal: AIR 1964 Pat. 114, Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay : AIR 1946 Bom. 516; Nabadwip Bhajan Asram Vs. Commissioner of Nabadwip Municipality : AIR 1959 Cal 361; Sonar Bangala Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College: AIR 1960 Cal 409)
This view does not hold good in the light of Unani Tibia College case, AIR 1962 SC 458, Illachi Devi case, AIR 2003 SC 3397, and Tata Vs. Tata, AIR 2010 SC 2943.
Suing entire members of the society, either in person or invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC, is the normal rule. But, Sec. 6 enables ‘to sue or be sued’ every registered society in the name of its president, secretary, etc., as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society (or through such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion).
Suit shall be in the Personal Name of President, Chairman, etc.
From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ as President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees.
Sec. 6 Impliedly Bars Filing a Suit in the Name of Society
As already stated, our Apex Court has repeatedly made it clear that Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act provides that a registered society must sue or be sued through the office bearer or a nominee, as provided in that section. Therefore, it can be concluded that Sec. 6 impliedly bars filing a suit in the name of the society, otherwise than through its President, Secretary or the nominated person. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata, AIR 2010 SC 2943.)
Procedural Defects Should Not Defeat A Just Cause
It is trite law that one should not be non-suited for technical reasons, and that procedural defects or curable procedural irregularity which is curable or which does not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. (United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar: AIR 1997 SC 3; Uday Shankar Triyar Vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh: AIR 2006 SC 269; Varun Pahwa Vs. Mrs. Renu Chaudhary: AIR 2019 SC 1186: 2019-3 JT 109.)
It was pointed out in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3, by our Apex Court that there is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case.
Supreme Court Expanded Powers of Authorities of Companies in Filing Pleadings
Under Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, Secretary or any Director or other Principal officer of a Corporation can sign pleadings by virtue of their office. A company being a juristic entity, Board of Directors can authorise any person to sign pleadings by passing a resolution or giving a power of attorney, by virtue of Order 6 Rule 14 read with Order 29 Rule 1 CPC. If pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, a Company can ratify it. Such action can be express or implied.
It is held in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar (1997), AIR 1997 SC 3, that a Court can, after taking all the circumstances of the case, come to the conclusion that the company must have ratified the act of signing the pleading. It was pointed out that the courts below should have, in any case, directed the company to produce a proper power of attorney or they must have allowed a competent person to be examined to prove ratification.
United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar (1997), AIR 1997 SC 3, reads as under:
“10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and de hors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement or its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a Corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.”
Proper Authorisation Essential
It is beyond doubt that a proper authorisation is essential for filing suit by a Company. Though, Secretary or any Director or other Principal officer can sign pleadings by virtue of their office, as per Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, the view followed in some earlier decisions was that neither the directors nor the managing director would have the right to represent the Company in the suit unless duly authorised by a resolution taken by the Board of Directors to that effect, at a meeting duly constituted for the said purpose.(B. Mookerjee Vs State Bank of India: AIR 1992 Cal 250; Nibro Limited Vs National Insurance Co: AIR 1991 Del 25)
In State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers, 2011-11 SCC 524, it is held by our Apex Court as under:
“14. In our view, the judgment under challenge is liable to be set aside because the Respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was appointed as a Director of the company and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the company to file suit against the Appellant and authorised Shri Ashok K. Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K. Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers to Shri Raj K. Shukla to authorise another person to file suit on behalf of the company.”
In this decision (State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers) there was no scope to ponder on the doctrines as to ‘technical or procedural defects’ as done in the earlier decision in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3.
The decision, State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers may be distinguishable from United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar. In State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers there was no evidence to show that the signatory was a Director of the Company, and no resolution of the Board of Directors was produced to prove that the signatory was authorized to file the suit.
It was observed by Delhi High Court in Nibro Limited Vs National Insurance Co., AIR 1991 Del 25, that if a director or a secretary was authorised by law to file a suit on behalf of a company, then he could certainly give the authority to another person as provided under Order III Rule 1 CPC. Order III Rule 1 provides that ‘any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. Provided, that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person’. However, if there is an express provision of law, then that will prevail. Thus, if an authority is given to a pleader or a recognised agent as provided by law, the recognised agent or pleader can file an appearance or file a suit in court if the party himself is not in a position to file it.
The Bombay High Court held, in Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd Vs. (2015), 2015-1 Mh L 852, with respect to the source of power of the Directors, as under:
“The essential requirement of this provision is that the Company which is a juristic person must itself decide to sue. Once that is done, it would authorise one of its Directors who is the agent of the Company or its principal officers the Secretary of the Company or the Managing Director to file the Suit. The suing in each case is a separate act. The Company acts only through its meetings. Hence the Board of Directors in the day to day management of the company must decide and resolve to sue or not to sue. A blanket authority cannot be given to a particular Managing Director or Director to sign the papers and document/s, including the power to sue. The power to sue requires application of mind upon the particular cause of action. It requires the Company to pay the requisite Court fee. It requires the Company to be represented by a legal officer being an Advocate of the Court. It is an act which, therefore, is not a part of the day to day management of the Company. A Company would decide in a given case upon legal advice or otherwise whether or not it would sue upon a given cause of action. Such exercise is imperatively required to be performed if the intention of the Company, which is only a juristic person, is to be deciphered. That act, of course, may be undertaken even after the filing of the Suit and ratified by the Board as all other acts of management. However, the seminal requirement is to see the act of the Company though its Board or members (dependent upon whether the resolution is passed in the Board meeting or a general meeting) or is given by the Company itself (under its Articles of Association).”
In Nibro Limited Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., AIR 1991 Delhi 25, it is observed, with regard to the source of power of the Directors, as under:
“25. It is well-settled that under Section 291 of the Companies Act except where express provision is made that the powers of a company in respect of a particular matter are to be exercised by the company in general meeting–in all others cases the Board of Directors are entitled to exercise all its powers. Individual directors have such powers only as are vested in them by the Memorandum and Articles. It is true that ordinarily the court will not unsuit a person on account of technicalities. However, the question of authority to institute a suit on behalf of a company is not a technical matter. It has far-reaching effects. It often affects policy and finances of the company. Thus, unless a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on a particular director, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of the company. Needless to say that such a power can be conferred by the Board of Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard.” Quoted in: United India Periodicals Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CMYK Printech Ltd. : 2018-248 DLT 227
The law as to the authority of ratification of the act of the officers in signing pleadings, by a Company is detailed by the Delhi High Court in Radico Khaitan Limited Vs. J D Wines, 2020-2 AD(Del) 421, .
Persons Represented need not have “same cause of action“; must have “common interest”
In Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madras vs. T. N. Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608, it was held by this Court that the persons who may be represented in a suit under Order 1 Rule 8 of Civil Procedure Code need not have the same cause of action and all that is required for application of said provision is that the persons concerned must have common interest or common grievance. What is required is sameness of interest. Paragraphs 7 and 9 of the decision says as under:
7. On the question of maintainability of the suit in a representative capacity under Order I, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been contended that since the injury complained of is in regard to demand of money and that too by a separate demand against each of the allottees, giving rise to different causes of action, Rule 1 has no application. … The provisions of Order I of Rule 8 have been included in the Code in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The condition necessary for application of the provisions is that the persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must have the same interest. In other words either the interest must be common or they must have a common grievance which they seek to get redressed. In Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar (ILR 1955 Mad 339: AIR 1955 Mad 281) a Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed that on the plain language of Order I Rule 8, the principal requirement to bring a suit within that rule is the sameness of interest of the numerous persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is instituted. The court, while considering whether leave under the rule should be granted or not, should examine whether there is sufficient community of interest to justify the adoption of the procedure provided under the rule. The object for which this provision is enacted is really to facilitate the decision of questions, in which a large number of persons are interested, without recourse to the ordinary procedure. The provision must, therefore, receive an interpretation which will subserve the object for its enactment. There are no words in the rule to limit its scope to any particular category of suits or to exclude a suit in regard to a claim for money or for injunction as the present one. … … …
9. It is true that each of the allottees is interested individually in fighting out the demand separately made or going to be made on him and, thus, separate causes of action arise in the case, but, that does not make Order I Rule 8 inapplicable. Earlier there was some doubt about the rule covering such a case which now stands clarified by the Explanation introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, which reads as follows:
“Explanation.— For the purpose of determining whether the persons who sue or are sued, or defend, have the same interest in one suit, it is not necessary to establish that such persons have the same cause of action as the persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or defend the suit, as the case may be.” (Quoted in: Anjum Hussain Vs. Intellicity Business Park Pvt. Ltd., 2019-6 SCC 519)
Doctrine of Substantial Representation
Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act provides that a registered society must sue or be sued through the office bearer or a nominee, as provided in that section. Therefore, as shown above, it can be concluded that Sec. 6 impliedly bars filing a suit in the name of the society, otherwise than through its President, Secretary or the nominated person.
It is noteworthy that the diktats in Sec. 6 of the So. Registration Act are not invariably followed by our courts; but, adopted the doctrine of ‘substantial representation’ (Subramania Pillai Vs. Masterly, AIR1976 Mad 303).
In Singhai Lal Chand Jain Vs. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, Panna, AIR 1996 SC 1211, the High Court had held that the objection was sustainable as to the maintainability of representative suit for eviction against an unregistered association, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), without Order 1 Rule 8 CPC steps; and that the decree was a nullity and non est; and the execution was not maintainable. Our Apex Court observed as under:
“Procedure is the handmaid to the substantive justice. …. It is true that no permission of the Court was taken to be sued in a representative capacity by or on behalf of the Sangh. But Clause (b) of Order 1, Rule 8 indicates that it may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of all persons so interested. Clause (b) clearly applies to the facts in this case. The President of the Sangh, the Manager of the Sangh and a Member have duly represented the Sangh and defended the suit for the benefit of all the persons so interested in the Sangh.”
It was also pointed out:
“Thus it could be held that the Sangh having been duly represented in the previous proceedings and conducted the litigation on behalf of the Sangh bona fide and were unsuccessful in the suit, no one on behalf of the Sangh can lay any objection in the execution nor plead nullity of the decree. The doctrine of res judicata prohibited the members of the Sangh to obstruct the execution of the decree. The decree of ejectment binds every member of the Sangh and, therefore, the appellant is entitled to have the decree executed and possession taken.”
In this decision the following passage from Surayya Begum Vs. Mohd. Usman, (1991) 3 SCC 114, was quoted:
“The principle of representation of the interest of a person, not impleaded by name in a judicial proceeding, through a named party is not unknown. A karta of a Joint Hindu Family has always been recognised as a representative of the other members of the Joint Hindu Family, and so has been a trustee. In cases where the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code are attracted a named party in a suit represents the other persons interested in the litigation, and likewise a receiver appointed in one case represents the interest of the litigating parties in another case against a stranger. Similarly the real owner is entitled to the benefits under a decree obtained by his benamidar against a stranger and at the same time is also bound by the decision. Examples can be multiplied. It is for this reason that we find Explanation VI in the following words in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure: ‘Explanation VI. – Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating’.”
Note:
1. RSS was a defendant in Singhai Lal Chand Jain Vs. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, Panna (supra); and the suit was for eviction of RSS through its Manager, its President; and the Head Master of Saraswati Shishu Mandiras a member of the Sangh.
2, It is not legitimate to take this decision as an authority for ‘substantial representation’ in an internal matter of an association in which all members of the association may be ‘interested’ or ‘affected’.
In Ramubai v. Jiyaram Sharma, AIR 1964 Bom 96, it was held as under:
“18. Another aspect of the question may be considered so far as the facts of the case are concerned. The interest claimed is an interest in the leasehold property. That interest is claimed by defendants 9 to 11 who are admittedly residing out of the town in which the premises are located. The nexus which creates a relationship between the lessors and the defendants claiming interest in the leasehold is the leasehold property which is occupied by defendants 1 to 8. The question is whether there could be implied in such circumstances a jointness in interest which would clothe the persons in occupation the capacity to receive notice or to do acts which will be binding on all those joint tenants. It is urged on behalf of the defendants that the moment it is held that the leasehold interest is inherited as ten-ants-in-common with defined shares inter se among them, the capacity of any one of those tenants-in-common to represent the other is at an end. Such a capacity to represent others could only be assumed or inferred in the case of persons who own only as joint tenants, but never in case of persons who hold as tenants-in-common. I find it difficult to accept this interpretation. If there is a unity of interest, common enjoyment and possession of the property, if all these joint tenants hold qua landlord as one tenant, if each of these joint tenants had an interest in the whole of the leasehold, if the acts of any one of them are the acts of all such tenants, such as act of re-entry or act of wrongful conversion, then it is difficult to hold why a notice received by one of them should not have the effect of a valid notice in respect of all on whom the notice is meant to operate. There is sufficient community of interest and joint interest inter se in them which clothes everyone of them with a representative, character vis-a-vis the landlord. I therefore hold agreeing with the Court below, that notice to one ; of them was enough and served as a good notice I to all as the notice was meant to be/ operative against all the joint tenants.”
Who is a Necessary Party
The ‘necessary party’ is not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. But, from the judicial dicta following are the matters that come for consideration:
There must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceedings in question, and
It will not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such a party (The Banaras Bank Ltd. Vs. Bhagwan Das: AIR 1947 All 18; Udit Narain Singh, Malpatharia vs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786).
Whether such a party is directly affected by the decision (Udit Narain Singh, Malpatharia vs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786).
In Udit Narain Singh, Malpatharia vs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786, the Constitution Bench held as under:
“7. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be madeeffectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.
9. The next question is whether the parties whose rights are directly affected are the necessary parties to a writ petition to quash the order of a tribunal. … Without the presence of the successful party the High Court cannot issue a substantial order affecting his right. Any order that may be issued behind the back of such a party can be ignored by the said party, with the result that the tribunal’s order would be quashed but the right vested in that party by the wrong order of the tribunal would continue to be effective. Such a party, therefore, is a necessary party and a petition filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari without making him a party or without impleading him subsequently, if allowed by the court, would certainly be incompetent. A party whose interests are directly affected is, therefore, a necessary party.”
Suit to protect or recover property
The Privy Council in Jagadinadra Nath Vs. Hemanta Kumari Debi, (1904) 31 Ind App 203 (PC), and our Apex Court in Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddi Vs. Kondaru Seshu Reddi, AIR 1967 SC 436, (Referring: Pramathanath Nath Vs. Pradyumna: AIR 1925 PC 139) held that Shebait of a temple has the authority to institute a suit in his own name to protect and recover property belonging to the deity. (Also see: Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joo Deo, AIR 1978 All 1 – Referring: Jagadindra Nath Vs. Hemanta Kumari, (1904) 31 Ind App 203.)
By various authoritative decisions, it is made clear that when the trust is admitted, or where the right or title over the property is not in dispute the deity will not be a necessary party, in suits for protection of the property and the rights of the trust (Hangi Mal Vs. Panna Lal: AIR 1957 All 743).
The same is the case for framing a scheme also (Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar Radha Ealla: AIR 1937 Cal 338).
In Monindra Mohan Vs. Shamnagar Jute Factory, AIR 1939 Cal 699, a Division Bench held that the deity is not a necessary party in a suit filed on behalf of the Hindu public for declaration that the land in question was a debasthan of the idol and that it is a public place of warship.
It is appropriate to import this analogy to matters of societies also. Where the right or title over the property is not in dispute, and the suit is filed by a person who is bound to protect the property of a society, it can be concluded that the suit is not liable to be dismissed holding that the society as such (that is, all its members) is a necessary party.
It is observed in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez, 2013(4) Ker LT 283, that, though, as per the Canon Law the church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar, the parish being by law a public juridic person, and the plaintiffs (the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church) were entitled to represent the juridic person, the plaintiffs were competent to initiate civil proceedings (with the ultimate aim of protecting the property belonging to the church) before a Civil Court.
Is Society, a Necessary Party?
Kania, J., in AS Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram, AIR 1941 Bom. 312, laid down (earlier view) as under:
“In my opinion as the position of the members of this society is similar to that of the share holders of the company and as the acts of the defendants which are challenged are in respect of the society it is necessary that the society should be a party to this litigation. I do not think it is competent to the plaintiff either alone or representing himself and the other members of the society other than defendants to bring a suit. …… In the absence of the society as a party to this litigation, I am of opinion that the suit as framed is not maintainable and the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in the absence of the society.”
Since it is unequivocally held by our Apex Court in Illachi Devi case, AIR 2003 SC 3397, that a (registered) society cannot sue or be sued in its name, it is peremptory that the suit by or against a society should be brought as provided under Sec. 6 of the So. Regn. Act.
Notice to a Society, Notice to all Members
The notice to a Co-operative Society will be deemed as notice to all its members. In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana, AIR1985 SC 973, it is pointed out by our Apex Court, with respect to a Co-operative Society, that S. 13(9)(a) provides for the issue of notice to the societies and not to individual members and that S. 13(9)(b), however, gives the members an opportunity to be heard.
It is legitimate to maintain that, in appropriate cases, it may be proper to extend these principles as to service of notice, to both registered and unregistered societies, and a club also, with regard to the matters-touching-rights-or-duties of the society ‘as a body’; for example, notice as to nonpayment of tax or revenue. The notice to the society or a proper office bearer will be deemed as notice to all its members.
Our Law Does Not Favour ‘Corporation Sole’
Our law does not favour characterising a ‘Corporation Sole’ as a Juristic Person except officials such as President of India, District Collectors, Secretaries/Office-Heads of various Departments of Government, Village Officers, etc. [See: Samatha Hyderabad Abrasives And Minerals Vs. State of AP: AIR 1997 SC 3297; T.K. Santhanagopala Chettiar Vs. Thimmi M. Seetharama Chettiar 1968-2 Mad LJ 41; S Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India: AIR 1967 SC 1274; S C Sreemanavikraman Raja Vs. Controller of Estate Duty: 1957-2 Mad LJ 226].
S Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India: AIR 1967 SC 1274
Our Apex Court held in S Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India: AIR 1967 SC 1274 as under:
“It was also contended by the appellant in this connection that as the Commissioner was made a Corporation sole under s. 80 of the Act as a separate and independent personality, he was not subject to the control of the Government and no disciplinary proceedings ‘Could be initiated against him. We do not think there is any substance in this argument. It is true that the Commissioner has been made a Corporation sole under s. 80 of the Act which states that the Commissioner shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be sued in his corporate name. Section 81(1) of the Act provides for the establishment of a Fund called ‘The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Administration Fund’ and further states that the Fund shall vest in the Commissioner. It was argued for the appellant that the corporate entity created by s. 80 of the Act has a separate legal personality. But there is a juristic distinction between a Corporation sole and a Corporation aggregate, and the Corporation sole is not endowed with a separate legal personality as the Corporation aggregate. As Maitland said:
“If our corporation sole really were an artificial person created by the policy of man we ought to marvel at its incompetence. Unless custom or statute aids it, it cannot (so we are told) own a chattel, not even a chattel real. A different and an equally inelegant device was adopted to provide an owning ‘subject’ for the ornaments of the church and the minister thereof-adopted at the end of the Middle Ages by lawyers who held themselves debarred by the theory of corporations from frankly saying that the body of parishioners is a corporation aggregate. And then, we are also told that in all probability a corporation sole ‘Cannot enter into a contract except with statutory authority or as incidental to an interest in land ………. Be that as it may, the ecclesiastical corporation sole is no juristic person‘; he or it is either natural man or juristic abortion.” (See ‘Selected Essays of’ Maitland” pp. 100 & 103).
Keeton has also observed as follows
“It was a device for transmitting real property to a, succession of persons without the necessity for periodic. conveyances. It was never intended that this device should’ be erected into a psychological person with a developed existence of its own In dealing with a corporation sole, the courts have never treated it as a conception similar in essential characteristics to a corporation aggregate. They have restricted its utility to the transmission of real, or exceptionally, by custom, as in Byrd v. Wilford, and now by statute, personal property from one holder of an office, lay or ecclesiastical, to his successor” (See ‘Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence’ by Keeton, 2nd Edn. pp. 155 & 162).”
We accordingly reject the contention of the appellant that the Commissioner has a separate legal personality as corporation sole under s. 80 of the Act and that he is exempt from disciplinary proceedings for any act or omission committed in his capacity as. Commissioner. In our opinion, the object of the legislature in enacting ss. 80 and 81 of the Act was to constitute a separate Fund and to provide for the vesting of that Fund in the Commissioner as a corporation sole and thereby avoid the necessity of periodic conveyances in the transmission of title to that Fund.”
“88. The last of two inconsistent clauses prevails.–Where two clauses of gifts in a Will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail.
The Illustrations given in this Section make it clear what is an ‘inconsistent clause‘. It reads as under:
(i) The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.
(ii) If a man, at the commencement of his Will gives his house to A, and at the close of it directs that his house shall be sold and the proceeds invested for the benefit of B, the latter disposition will prevail.”
Section 138 of Indian Succession Act, which reads as under:
“Direction that fund be employed in particular manner following absolute bequest of same to or for benefit of any person.
Where a fund is bequeathed absolutely to or for the benefit of any person, but the will contains a direction that it shall be applied or enjoyed in a particular manner, the legatee shall be entitled to receive the fund as if the will had contained no such direction.”
From the above, it comes out that when a Will is construed, it must be considered:
Whether ‘on a whole-reading‘, there is irreconcilable inconsistency between two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – the last of two inconsistent clauses prevails – in earlier clause property was given to A; latter clause, to B) so that harmonious interpretation is not possible?
Contingent transfers are legal and valid. Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B … (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)
Under Sec. 11 of the TP Act also, the latter condition is taken into consideration if only there is an ‘absolute‘ transfer. Under Sec. 11 of the TP Act (which reads: 11.Restriction repugnant to interest created– Where transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, …. ) the earlier ‘irreconcilable’ clause will prevail.
An attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible. It is only when this is not possible, e.g, where an absolute title is given is in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void.(Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain, AIR 1963 SC 890.).
‘Reconciliation of Apparent Inconsistent Provisions’and ‘Harmonious interpretation‘
Section 11 of Transfer of Properties Act makes it clear that where a property is transferred absolutely, subsequent restraints are invalid. Therefore, the questions in such matters would be (i) whether the transfer effected stands ‘absolute’ or not and (ii) whether the restriction brings-up is one that canvases the section or not.
Section 11 of Transfer of Properties Act reads as under:
11. Restriction repugnant to interest created– Where transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.
Where any such direction has been made in respect of one piece of immoveable property for the purpose of securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property, nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any right which the transferor may have to enforce such direction or any remedy which he may have in respect of a breach thereof.
Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder
What is ‘Legal Remainder’ is explained in “Modern Law of Real Property” by Chesire, Twelfth Edition as under:
“Legal Remainders. Common law permitted future interests, called remainders, to be carved out of a legal estate, though as we shall see presently, there were several restrictive rules which had to be observed. If a stellar decided to create two or more successive estates in his land, and drafted the desired limitations in one instrument, as for instance by a fulfilment to A for life and then to B, for life and then to C, in fee simple, the first estate which preceded the next following remainder was called the “particular estate” and those which followed were denominated “remainders”. (Quoted in Bomi Munchershaw Mistry v. Kesharwani Co-Operative Housing Society, 1993 (2) BomCR 329.)
Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder in TP Act
Transfer of Property Act does not specifically speak about ‘Legal Remainder’. But, the illustrations in Sections 13, 24, 27 and 126 (mentioned below) clearly lay down this right. Indian courts apply the doctrine of ‘legal remainder’, inasmuch it hold – both the reversioner (future right that accrues by operation of law) and the legal remainder (future right that accrues by act of persons – executing documents) have the right to protect their (future) right, through court [Yellarayhala Surayya v. Yellaraghahs Subbamma, (1920) ILR 43 Mad 4].
Can a property be ‘transferred’ (successively) to one, and after his death (or on happening an event) to another?
Yes. It is clear from the following illustrations in the TP Act.
No.
Sec.
Illustration
1
13. Transfer for benefit of unborn person
A transfers property of which he is the owner to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for their lives, and, after the death of the survivor, for the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death for A’s second son. The interest so created for the benefit of the eldest son does not take effect, because it does not extend to the whole of A’s remaining interest in the property.
2
24. Transfer to such of certain persons as survive at some period not specified
A transfers property to B for life, and after his death to C and D, equally to be divided between them, or to the survivor of them. C dies during the life of B. D survives B. At B’s death the property passes to D.
3
27. Conditional transfer to one person coupled with transfer to another on failure of prior disposition
A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B that which he had transferred to her. A and his wife perish together, under circumstances which make it impossible to prove that she died before him. The disposition in favour of B does not take effect.
4
126. When gift may be suspended or revoked.
A gives a field to B, reserving to himself, with B’s assent, the right to take back the field in case B and his descendants die before A. B dies without descendants in A’s lifetime. A may take back the field.
Note: Illustration in Sec. 24 given above lays down ‘Vested Remainder’; and that in Sec. 27 lays down lays down an instance of ‘Contingent Remainder’.
Vested Remainder
Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B …. (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)
A ‘vested remainder’ has to satisfy following ingredients:
(i) the person to whom the property is given must be a living person,
(ii) the estate must be (when the transfer is effected) with another,
(iii) the (actual) transfer is to take effect as soon as the estate with whom its remained (when the transfer is effected) is terminated,
(iv) the person in enjoyment (when the transfer is effected) holds the property subject to the rights of ‘vested remainder’ (in other words, it is one which is ready from its commencement to its end).
In Law of Property by Strahan – 4th Edition at page 152, it is observed as follows:
“A vested remainder is a remainder of the more ancient kind, that is, one of the owner which is living and ascertained, and which is an actual estate in the land, complete in interest though deferred to the precedent estate in enjoyment. Being complete, it is ready, and must continue ready, from its commencement as a vested remainder till its expiration in natural course, to come into possession immediately on the determination of the preceding interest, the existence of which is the only thing which prevents it being complete not merely in interest, but also in enjoyment. It is true it may fail, or, rather, determine before the period arrives, when it would vest in possession, but such determination must arise from its own natural expiration, not from any outside event or contingency.
Thus, take a limitation to A. for life and then to B. for life – B. being a living person. If B. predeceases A., his life estate will never become an interest in possession; but as long as B. lives, his estate is ready to come into possession the moment A.’s life estate determines.” (quoted in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36)
In Law of Property by GC Venkata Subbarao – 2nd Edition, at page 130, it is observed as under:
“Vested Remainder is Heritable.- Vested remainders and reversions are treated as future interests only for the reason that they do not carry immediate possession of the property. They are for all practical purposes present proprietary interests. As such they are heritable. Even if the person entitled to the vested remainder dies before the determination of the particular estate, his interest does not lapse but is transmitted to his heir. Of course, if the remainderman’s estate is a life-estate this rule can have no application. Where, he has an estate of inheritance, notwithstanding his death, before the estate falls in possession, his representative in interest can claim possession as soon as it becomes vacant by the expiration of the precedent interests. In this respect the vested estate resembles the reversion which is also a heritable or transmissible interest in property.” (quoted in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36)
Contingent Remainder
Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B ….. (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)
The principle of ‘Contingent Remainder’ is seen applied extensively, in India. It is usually applied in the following instances:
Property is given to A for life; then to B, if A dies unmarried.
Property is given to A (with saleable rights), then to B if property (or any part) remains unsold/un-transferred by A.
A ‘contingent remainder’ must have the following ingredients:
(i) the person to whom the property has to reach, finally, must be a living person,
(ii) the estate must be (when the transfer is effected) with another,
(iii) there will be a chance only to get the property to the (final) transferee; the transfer being contingent upon the stipulations or conditions (in other words, it is one which is not ready from its commencement to its end),
(iv) the (actual) transfer takes effect
(a)only on satisfying the conditions, and
(b) as soon as the estate with whom it is remained is terminated.
It is clearly laid down in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36) it is observed in Para 32, 38 and 41 as under:
“32. The principle that can be carved out from the above literature is that a vested remainder is one which is ready from its commencement to its end, to take effect as soon as a particular estate shall determine. … … In the case of vested interest, the distribution is predetermined while in contingent interest, it may or may not. A contingent remainder is one which is not ready from its commencement to its end and it is to take effect as soon as particular estate is terminated.”
“38. In the decision reported in Narayani v. Sreedharan (2011(4) K.L.T. SN 107) it is held as follows:
“Even if by a document, the property which exclusively belongs to the executant is settled in favour of another, retaining his life interest in the property and providing that on his death the other would get absolute right in the property, it cannot be said that there was no transfer of interest in praesenti because of the retention of the life interest of the executant as there was divesting of the rights of the executant, except his life interest.”
“41. … But certain propositions emerge from a reading of the above decisions (Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi, 1996 Ker HC 1200, Kokilambal v. N. Raman. AIR 2005 SC 2468) and they are ;
i) There is no straight jacket formula to ascertain the nature of interest created.
ii) Each case depends upon the facts of that case and the deed that comes up for interpretation.
iii) Merely because the enjoyment or possession is postponed by itself is not a ground to hold that no vested interest is created.
iv) If interest in praesenti is created with condition, the transfer becomes effective immediately. But the interest is to take effect after the condition is satisfied, then it becomes a contingent(sic – vested) interest.”
PART – 2
Discordant Knots
It is a serious question – whether the observation in the following decisions as to ‘conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses’ (in Wills) stand unsusceptible to (i) the doctrine of ‘harmonious interpretation’ and (ii) the following illustration in Sec. 27 of the TP Act: A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B …
The decisions are:
Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727
Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya Kantham, AIR 2011 SC 294
Madhuri Ghosh v. Debobroto Dutta, AIR 2016 SC 5242.
I. In Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727 (two Judge Bench) considered a will containing the following provision –
“The first part of the Will provided that after the death of the testator or author of the Will, his wife whose name is Smt. Sona Devi would be entitled to the entire assets and properties of Jamuna Prasad with the right of transfer.
The second part of the Will is that after the death of Smt. Sona Devi nine sons of daughters’ would inherit the property.”
The Apex Court held that latter clause will not take effect observing as under:
“Where a testator having conferred an absolute right on anyone, the subsequent bequest for the same property in favour of other persons would be repugnant to the first bequest in the will and has to be held invalid.”
The Apex Court referred to Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim wherein it was held that where there was conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses and it was not possible to give effect to all of them, then the rule of construction was well established that it was the earlier clause that must override the later clauses and not vice versa. It was also pointed out that in Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj Kuar it was laid down that where an absolute estate was created by a will in favour of devisee, the clauses in the will which were repugnant to such absolute estate could not cut down the estate; but they must be held to be invalid. The Court held:
“In Ramkishorelal and another vs. Kamalnarayan, 1963 Suppl. (2) SCR 417, AIR 1963 SC 890, it was held that in a disposition of properties, if there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion, in such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded. In Radha Sundar Dutta Vs. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim & others (AIR 1959 SC 24 ), it was held where there is conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses and it is not possible to give effect to all of them, then the rule of construction is well established that it is the earlier clause that must override the later clauses and not vice versa.”
II. In Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya Kantham, AIR 2011 SC 294, the two Judge Bench had to find whether the following clause in the will expressed an unequivocal intention of the Testatrix to make an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters. The relevant clause read as under:
“2nd item … shall devolve to my 2nd daughter … and the Western wing 2 rooms shall devolve upon my elder daughter … with absolute rights of Sale, Gift, Mortgage etc., and this will come into force after my demise. After demise of my daughters the retained and remaining property shall devolve upon their female children only.”
Referring (i) Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad (supra – AIR 2002 SC 727) (ii) Ramki shore lal v. Kamalnarayan (supra – AIR 1963 SC 890) and (ii) Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahimheld (supra – AIR 1959 SC 24), it is held in Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya Kantham as under:
“We are, on the contrary, dealing with a case where the intention of the Testatrix to make an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters is unequivocal. Secondly, the expression “after demise of my daughters the retained and remaining properties shall devolve on their female children only” does not stricto sensu amount to a bequest contrary to the one made earlier in favour of the daughters of the Testatrix. The expression extracted above does not detract from the absolute nature of the bequest in favour of the daughters. All that the Testatrix intended to achieve by the latter part of clause 6 was the devolution upon their female offsprings all such property as remained available in the hands of the legatees at the time of their demise. There would obviously be no devolution of any such property upon the female offsprings in terms of the said clause if the legatees decided to sell or gift the property bequeathed to them as indeed they had every right to do under the terms of the bequest. Seen thus, there is no real conflict between the absolute bequest which the first part of clause 6 of the Will makes and the second part of the said clause which deals with devolution of what and if at all anything that remains in the hands of the legatees.”
III. Madhuri Ghosh v. Debobroto Dutta AIR 2016 SC 5242(Two Judge Bench): The testator bequeathed his property jointly to his wife and daughter. It was provided that in the event of the death of his wife the property would stand vested with the daughter as “exclusive owner”; and, in the event of the death of his daughter the property would stand vested with the wife as “exclusive owner”. Thereafter, it was provided that various other lineal descendants would become owners of specified parts of the property. The Apex Court held that the will provided for ‘absolute’ bequest and not ‘limited interest’. Therefore, the direction that the lineal descendants would become owners of specified parts had no effect. The Court, inter alia, relied on Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad (2002) 2 SCC 468.
Analysis of the Above Three Decisions
Following doubts, legitimately, come up for Consideration:
The common law in India requires reading the whole document, and give effect to the provisions on a harmonious interpretation. The apparent conflict mooted in the above cases can be harmonised on reading the document as a whole.
Illustrations in Sections 24 and 27 make it clear that Indian law recognises ‘vested remainder’ and ‘contingent remainder‘. (See illustrations given in these Sections.)
It is also beyond doubt that such a transfer is not hit by Sec. 10 and 11 of the TP Act; inasmuch as Sec. 10 and 11 cumber only when ‘conditions’ impose ‘Absolute Restraint’ or ‘Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’. It does not invite Sec. 138 of the Indian Succession Act also, for the same reasons.
Following decisions relied on in Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727 (and the subsequent decisions followed it) were not applicable in the fact-situation (that emerged) inasmuch as they dealt with independent earlier transfers; and not two parts of the same deed. The decisions are:
Ramkishore lal v. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890 (Constitution Bench)
Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR 1959 SC 24 (three judge bench)
It is noteworthy that the Apex Court (in Mauleshwar Mani – in the matter of a Will) considered cases (Ramkishore lal and Radha Sundar Dutta) in which Sec. 11, TP Act is attracted- for Sec. 138 of the Indian Succession Act is pari materia to Sec. 11 of the TP Act.
In K. S. Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017 SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.) the joint Will executed by a couple created a Trust; but, it had been indicated that after the death of one of the spouse, the other (survivor) had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same. Certain alienations were made by the wife after death of the husband. Our apex Court held as under:
“49. The intention in testamentary disposition has to be primarily found out from the actual words used in the Will. The court is not entitled to ignore clear words or add something of its own or dilute the meaning of any clear word used in the Will. The solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention.”
57. We, thus, are of the view that giving absolute right to the survivorduring his lifetime to deal with the properties in no manner cannot be said to be right given in disregard of object of trust. The charitable purpose of the Will is not lost even if survivor is given absolute right.”
Why Ramkishore lal and Radha Sundar Dutta Do Not Apply
In Ramkishore lal v. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890 (Constitution Bench), dealt with the matter of a partition-award and the question arose was as to independent earlier dedication of property to a temple. It was held as under:
“We are inclined to agree with the contention of the learned Attorney-General that Mr. Bagchi’s award gives the property to Ramsaran Lal absolutely with only a charge on the property for the expenses of the temple and did not make an absolute dedication of the village to the temple. We are of opinion however that Mr. Bagchi’s award can have no legal effect in respect of thededication already made. Once an absolute dedication of the property had been made in December 1896 in favour of Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple the former owners of the property had no legal authority to go behind that dedication.”
Similarly, in Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR 1959 SC 24 (three judge bench), considered was an independent earliergrant. It was held as under:
“But it is open to the parties to agree that the Chaukidari Chakaran lands should form a new and distinct Patni, and the result of such an agreement will be that while the grantee will hold those lands in Patni right, that is to say, the tenure will be permanent, heritable and alienable so far as his liability to pay jama and the corresponding right of the Zamindar to sell it under the Regulation if there is any default in the payment thereof are concerned, the now grant will be an entity by itself independent of the original Patni.”
‘Reconciliation of Apparent Inconsistent Provisions’ and ‘Repugnant Provisions’
As stated already, if only there is irreconcilable inconsistencybetween two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – that is, in earlier clause, property was given to A; latter clause, to B – whereby a harmonious interpretation is not possible) then only the principle, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away‘ (or, the last of two inconsistent clauses prevails), be applied. It is emphasised by our Supreme Court (Constitution Bench consisting of BP Sinha (CJ), KC Das Gupta, PB Gajendragadkar, KN Wanchoo, JC Shah, JJ.) in Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain, AIR 1963 SC 890, as under:
“Sometimes it happens in the case of documents as regards disposition of properties, whether they are testamentary or non-testamentary instruments, that there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another. A familiar instance of this is where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion. What is to be done where this happens? It is well settled that in case of such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title already given (See: Sahebzada Mohd. Kamgar Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo, (1960) 3 SCR 604. It is clear, however, that an attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible. It is only when this is not possible, e.g, where an absolute title is given is in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void.” (quoted in : H B Yeshwant Rao Ghorpade v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bangalore, AIR 1967 SC 135)
In Ramachandra Shenoy v. Mrs. Hilda Brite, AIR 1964 SC 1323, our Apex Court (N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, JJ) observed with respect to a will as under:
“5. If the said Julia does not marry or if she has no issues, the said Julia should enjoy the said property up to her deathand thereafter this property of mine should be enjoyed by my eldest daughter, Severina obina Coelho and after her by her male descendants with permanent rights”.
“It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interest, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will. It if for this reason that where there is a bequest to A even though it be in terms apparently absolute followed by a gift of the same to B absolutely “on” or “after” or “at” A’s death, A is prima facie held to take a life interest and B an interest in remainder, the apparently absolute interest of A being cut down to accommodate the interest created in favour of B.”
It is held in Navneet Lal alias Rangi v. Gokul, AIR 1976 SC 794, as under:
“It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy,so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will.”
In K. S. Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017 SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.), Palaniappa Chettiar and his wife by registered Will created a Trust. The Will indicated that after the death of one of the testators, the survivor had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same. Certain alienations were made by Rangammal after death of Palaniappa Chettiar. Relying on Navneet Lal alias Rangi v. Gokul, AIR 1976 SC 794 it is held that the solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention. The Court held as under:
“41. The above in plain words provides that on the death of any of the spouse, survivor shall enjoy the entire properties absolutely with all the rights. What is the connotation of words ‘absolutely with all the rights?’, whether the above provision in the Will can be read as only life estate i.e. right of enjoyment and receiving of rent, income or absolute right indicates the exercise of all the rights including the right of alienation.”
42. The High Court after noticing the contention of Learned Counsel for the defendants formed the opinion that expression ‘absolutely’ should be read to mean that the surviving testator, namely, Rangammal would have only the life interest.
50. We do not find any word or any indication in the Will to give a life estate to survivor. The Will clearly intended that survivor shall have absolute right to the properties and after his/her death; the charity shall be carried out from the income of the properties without alienation of the properties.
“57. We, thus, are of the view that giving absolute right to the survivor during his lifetime to deal with the properties in no manner cannot be said to be right given in disregard of object of trust. The charitable purpose of the Will is not losteven if survivor is given absolute right. The obligation of survivor to act in furtherance of object as agreed by both the testators survives and binds the survivor. Although the Will was irrevocable after the death of survivor but the Will expressly granted absolute right to survivor.
58. In view of the foregoing discussion, we endorse the view of High Court that the Will dated 27.9.1968 was a joint and mutual Will, but with a rider that said joint and mutual Will was with an express condition that survivor shall have absolute right to deal with the property keeping the object of trust alive.”
Followed in : Prabhakumari v. S. Mohanarajan 2021-4 Ker HC 514
PART – 3
If only ‘Absolute‘ Bequest or Transfer, then only Adversities in S. 11 TP Act and S. 138 Succn. Act Attracted
‘Inconsistency’ and ‘absolute transfer’ are explained in Sec. 88 of the Indian Succession Act. First illustration reads as under:
“The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.”
The law on this point is eruditely explained in Rajinder Singh Chowdhary v. Sardar Manjit Singh Chowdhary, AIR 2002 Del 135 (Vijender Jain, J.). The facts of the case, in a nutshell, are the following:
(a) The father of the parties executed a Willbequeathing all his properties in favour of his wife ‘as the sole and absolute(in the sense, saleable) owner with full powers of disposal in any manner she likes’.
(b) The will further provided how the properties were to be distributed ‘in case she expires intestate and without disposing of the properties’.
(c) The mother died intestate.
It was contended by the plaintiff that the bequest to the mother was ‘absolute‘ and anything which was repugnant to the absolute bequest was void and inconsequential under Section 138 of Indian Succession Act.
Plaintiffs relied on
Gopala Menon v. Sivaraman Nair, AIR 1979 SC 1345
Lalit Mohan Mondal v. Profulla Kumar Mondal, AIR 1982 Cal 52.
Shantilal babubhai v. Bai Chhani, AIR 1973 Gujarat 146,
The defendants contended that will had to be read as a whole and different parts of the will should be considered harmoniously. The defendants further contended that provision of Section 138 of the Act was not applicable to the present case and further contended that even if there was inconsistency, Section 88 of the Indian succession Act saves such inconsistency as the last clause prevails. Section 88 of the Indian succession Act reads as under:
“The last of two inconsistent clauses prevails. Where two clauses of gifts in a will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail.”
“The principles enunciated in Gopala Menon s case (supra), Shantilal Babubhai (supra) and Lalit Mohan Mondal s case (supra) are well established principles that once a bequest has been made which is absolute and anything which is inconsistent would be repugnant and that has to be ignored.
But can it be said that the present case while interpreting the will at hand in view of the concern and anxiety of the testator with regard to his two sons and his intention to bequeath the property after the demise of Smt. Ved Kaur and words which are used signifying the concern and well being of aforesaid two sons are superfluous it is in this context court has to see as to whether bequest made in favour of Smt. Ved Kaur was absolute?
The answer is in the negative.
From the well laid down principle regarding interpretation of will and harmonious construction of the same, I hold that what was intended by the testator was to create a life estate in favour of Smt. Ved Kaur and not an absolute interest. The issue is answered accordingly.”
Theory of ‘Dominant Intention’
The will considered in Ramasreenivasa Iyengar v. Padmasani Ammal, (1973) 1 MLJ 34, provided that the two daughters of the testator should take the properties in equal shares with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights, but the share of the lady without issues would, however, after her death, be taken by the daughter with issues along with her children. It was found that the testator intended only a life estate if no issue to anyone. It was held that the dominant intention was to preserve the estate to his grandchildren.
Deeds must be read as a whole
House of Lords (Lord Davey) in North-Eastern Railway Company v. Hastings, (1900) AC 260, held as under:
“The deed must be read as a whole in order to ascertain the true meaning of its several clauses, and the words of each clause should be so interpreted as to bring them into harmony with the other provisions of the deed if that interpretation does no violence to the meaning of which they are naturally susceptible.”
After quoting the House of Lords, our Supreme Court held in Provash Chandra Dalui v. Biswanath Banerjee, AIR1989 SC 1834, as under:
“In construing a contract the Court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the Court can do about it. In the construction of a written instrument’ it is legitimate in order to ascertain the true meaning of the words used and if that be doubtful it is legitimate to have regard to the circumstances surrounding their creation and the subject matter to which it was designed and intended they should apply.”
After referring Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi, 1996 Ker HC 1200, and Kokilambal v. N. Raman. AIR 2005 SC 2468, it is observed in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36) that there is no straight jacket formula to ascertain the nature of interest created and that each case depends upon the facts of that case and the deed that comes up for interpretation.
If only ‘Absolute Transfer’ or ‘Irreconcilable Inconsistency’, the doctrine ‘once granted cannot be taken away’, applied
Same principles as to ‘irreconcilable inconsistency’ apply to ‘absolute’ transfer, when the doctrine, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away’, is applied.
The Supreme Court has explained in Sahebzeda Mohammad Kamgarh Singh v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb, AIR1960 SC 953, that if only there is irreconcilable inconsistency between two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – that is, in earlier clause, property was given to A; latter clause, to B – whereby a harmonious interpretation is not possible) then only the principle, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away‘, be applied.
“The task being to ascertain the intention of the parties, the cases have laid down that that intention has to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves. In doing so the parties must be presumed to have used the words in their strict grammatical sense. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be out down by later clause. Where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the Court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantor’s document it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee.”
PART – 4
‘Absolute‘ Transfer with stipulation: ‘if property remains’ on death of transferee, it will go to another – If Valid?
Yes.
Following important points gain consideration in this regard:
In Indian practice, though the words used in the deeds might be ‘absolute transfer’, on a true construction, on a reading of entire document, it might only be a salable/transferable right during life time; and the left-over property might be given to another.
The common law in India requires reading the whole document altogether, and give effect to the document on a harmonious interpretation, rather than giving effect to the legal terms used in a deed.
Illustrations in Sections 24 and 27 make it clear that Indian law recognises ‘vested remainder’ and ‘contingent remainder‘ (as detailed in the notes above).
It is also beyond doubt that such a transfer is not hit by Sec. 10 and 11 of the TP Act; inasmuch as Sec. 10 and 11 cumber only when ‘conditions’ impose ‘Absolute Restraint’ or ‘Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’.
First illustration in Sec. 88 of the Indian Succession Act reads as under:
“The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.”
Various court decisions make it clear that one can validly transfer or bequeath a property to another, with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights, with the stipulation that after that (first) transferee’s lifetime, if whole or any part remains, it (contingent remainder) may go to another.
In K. S. Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017 SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.), Palaniappa Chettiar and his wife by registered Will created a Trust. The Will indicated that after the death of one of the testators, the survivor had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same. Certain alienations were made by Rangammal after death of Palaniappa Chettiar. It is held as under:
“49. The intention in testamentary disposition has to be primarily found out from the actual words used in the Will. The court is not entitled to ignore clear words or add something of its own or dilute the meaning of any clear word used in the Will. The solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention. On the reading of the Will, the intendment of testator/testatrix is clear that survivor shall have absolute right of enjoyment of properties. There is no reason not to give effect to said intendment on the ground that the testator and testatrix have mutually intended to set apart the property for charity and holding that survivor shall have right of disposition be not in the interest of the trust.”
Other Erudite Decisions on the Topic
In Sanford v. Sanford, (1901) 1 Ch. 939, the gift to the wife conferred a power of disposal limited explicitly to her lifetime. But, the gift-over to sonwas of a quite absolute estate. The gift did not include a power of disposition by will, but allowed power of disposition inter vivos. It was provided in the gift deed that if any property remained at her death it was to pass ‘from father to son, from generation to generation’. Therefore, it was held that the widow was conferred with only a limited right; and the gift-over, which was ‘the will of the testator’ was to ‘settle its destination’. (This decision is referred to in Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, 1976-2 MLJ 381.)
In Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381, the Madras High Court rendered a well-read decision in this topic. The facts of this case, in a nutshell, are as under:
(i) The settlement deed considered in the case provided:
(a) the wife of the settlor should enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights.
(b) the respondent should take the properties remained at the time of her death, with absolute rights.
(ii) the appellant contended that the clause providing for the respondent taking absolutely such of the properties as at the time of the death of the settler’s wife was repugnant to the earlier clause conferring an absolute estate on her, and has, therefore, to be ignored as void.
(iii) the respondent contended that if the settlement deed had to be read as a whole and the effect would be:
there was no absolute transfer to the wife of the settler as stated in Sec. 11 of the TP Act.
It is seen that the High Court accepted the contentions of the respondent that the settlement deed was to be read as a whole and that the respondent had taken absolutely such of the properties covered by the settlement deed as remained undisposed of by the settlee, the wife of the settlor; as she had only a right to enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) powers of disposal during her lifetime. The clause as to acquiring property by respondent was not repugnant and void.
The High Court relied on the following cases. The facts of these were ‘very near’ to the facts of that case.
Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247,
Ramasreenivasa Iyengar v. Padmasani Ammal, (1973) 1 MLJ 34.
In Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247, it was held, as regards a Will, as under:
“After giving an absolute estate to his wife over the two items of scheduled properties, he provided that these scheduled properties, after the wife’s lifetime should devolve – item 1 on the first daughter and item 2 on the second daughter – who would have absolute rights. When the testator took care to indicate that the properties without any distinction even after his wife’s lifetime should go to each of the daughters, it should be presumed that it was clearly in his mind that the wife’s estate was only to be a limited estate or life estate, and not an absolute one.” (Quoted in: Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381).
Legal Remainders arise when two or more future successive estates are created in a land (E.g. transfer to A for life and then to B).
Transfer of Property Act does not specifically speak about ‘Legal Remainder’. But, the illustrations in Sections 13, 24, 27 and 126 clearly lay down this right.
A ‘Transfer’ with Right of Alienation and a stipulation: ‘If property remains’ on death of transferee, it will go to another – Valid.
PART – 1
Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder
What is ‘Legal Remainder’ is explained in “Modern Law of Real Property” by Chesire, Twelfth Edition as under:
“Legal Remainders. Common law permitted future interests, called remainders, to be carved out of a legal estate, though as we shall see presently, there were several restrictive rules which had to be observed. If a stellar decided to create two or more successive estates in his land, and drafted the desired limitations in one instrument, as for instance by a fulfilment to A for life and then to B, for life and then to C, in fee simple, the first estate which preceded the next following remainder was called the “particular estate” and those which followed were denominated “remainders”. (Quoted in Bomi Munchershaw Mistry v. Kesharwani Co-Operative Housing Society, 1993 (2) BomCR 329.)
Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder in TP Act
Transfer of Property Act does not specifically speak about ‘Legal Remainder’. But, the illustrations in Sections 13, 24, 27 and 126 (mentioned below) clearly lay down this right. Indian courts apply the doctrine of ‘legal remainder’, inasmuch it hold – both the reversioner (future right that accrues by operation of law) and the legal remainder (future right that accrues by act of persons – executing documents) have the right to protect their (future) right, through court [Yellarayhala Surayya v. Yellaraghahs Subbamma, (1920) ILR 43 Mad 4].
Can a property be ‘transferred’ (successively) to one, and after his death (or on happening an event) to another?
Yes. It is clear from the following illustrations in the TP Act.
No.
Sec.
Illustration
1
13. Transfer for benefit of unborn person
A transfers property of which he is the owner to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for their lives, and, after the death of the survivor, for the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death for A’s second son. The interest so created for the benefit of the eldest son does not take effect, because it does not extend to the whole of A’s remaining interest in the property.
2
24. Transfer to such of certain persons as survive at some period not specified
A transfers property to B for life, and after his death to C and D, equally to be divided between them, or to the survivor of them. C dies during the life of B. D survives B. At B’s death the property passes to D.
3
27. Conditional transfer to one person coupled with transfer to another on failure of prior disposition
A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B that which he had transferred to her. A and his wife perish together, under circumstances which make it impossible to prove that she died before him. The disposition in favour of B does not take effect.
4
126. When gift may be suspended or revoked.
A gives a field to B, reserving to himself, with B’s assent, the right to take back the field in case B and his descendants die before A. B dies without descendants in A’s lifetime. A may take back the field.
Note: Illustration in Sec. 24 given above lays down ‘Vested Remainder’; and that in Sec. 27 lays down lays down an instance of ‘Contingent Remainder’.
Vested Remainder
Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B …. (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)
A ‘vested remainder’ has to satisfy following ingredients:
(i) the person to whom the property is given must be a living person,
(ii) the estate must be (when the transfer is effected) with another,
(iii) the (actual) transfer is to take effect as soon as the estate with whom its remained (when the transfer is effected) is terminated,
(iv) the person in enjoyment (when the transfer is effected) holds the property subject to the rights of ‘vested remainder’ (in other words, it is one which is ready from its commencement to its end).
In Law of Property by Strahan – 4th Edition at page 152, it is observed as follows:
“A vested remainder is a remainder of the more ancient kind, that is, one of the owner which is living and ascertained, and which is an actual estate in the land, complete in interest though deferred to the precedent estate in enjoyment. Being complete, it is ready, and must continue ready, from its commencement as a vested remainder till its expiration in natural course, to come into possession immediately on the determination of the preceding interest, the existence of which is the only thing which prevents it being complete not merely in interest, but also in enjoyment. It is true it may fail, or, rather, determine before the period arrives, when it would vest in possession, but such determination must arise from its own natural expiration, not from any outside event or contingency.
Thus, take a limitation to A. for life and then to B. for life – B. being a living person. If B. predeceases A., his life estate will never become an interest in possession; but as long as B. lives, his estate is ready to come into possession the moment A.’s life estate determines.” (quoted in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36)
In Law of Property by GC Venkata Subbarao – 2nd Edition, at page 130, it is observed as under:
“Vested Remainder is Heritable.- Vested remainders and reversions are treated as future interests only for the reason that they do not carry immediate possession of the property. They are for all practical purposes present proprietary interests. As such they are heritable. Even if the person entitled to the vested remainder dies before the determination of the particular estate, his interest does not lapse but is transmitted to his heir. Of course, if the remainderman’s estate is a life-estate this rule can have no application. Where, he has an estate of inheritance, notwithstanding his death, before the estate falls in possession, his representative in interest can claim possession as soon as it becomes vacant by the expiration of the precedent interests. In this respect the vested estate resembles the reversion which is also a heritable or transmissible interest in property.” (quoted in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36)
Contingent Remainder
Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B ….. (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)
The principle of ‘Contingent Remainder’ is seen applied extensively, in India. It is usually applied in the following instances:
Property is given to A for life; then to B, if A dies unmarried.
Property is given to A (with saleable rights), then to B if property (or any part) remains unsold/un-transferred by A.
A ‘contingent remainder’ must have the following ingredients:
(i) the person to whom the property has to reach, finally, must be a living person,
(ii) the estate must be (when the transfer is effected) with another,
(iii) there will be a chance only to get the property to the (final) transferee; the transfer being contingent upon the stipulations or conditions (in other words, it is one which is not ready from its commencement to its end),
(iv) the (actual) transfer takes effect
(a)only on satisfying the conditions, and
(b) as soon as the estate with whom it is remained is terminated.
It is clearly laid down in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36) it is observed in Para 32, 38 and 41 as under:
“32. The principle that can be carved out from the above literature is that a vested remainder is one which is ready from its commencement to its end, to take effect as soon as a particular estate shall determine. … … In the case of vested interest, the distribution is predetermined while in contingent interest, it may or may not. A contingent remainder is one which is not ready from its commencement to its end and it is to take effect as soon as particular estate is terminated.”
“38. In the decision reported in Narayani v. Sreedharan (2011(4) K.L.T. SN 107) it is held as follows:
“Even if by a document, the property which exclusively belongs to the executant is settled in favour of another, retaining his life interest in the property and providing that on his death the other would get absolute right in the property, it cannot be said that there was no transfer of interest in praesenti because of the retention of the life interest of the executant as there was divesting of the rights of the executant, except his life interest.”
“41. … But certain propositions emerge from a reading of the above decisions (Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi, 1996 Ker HC 1200, Kokilambal v. N. Raman. AIR 2005 SC 2468) and they are ;
i) There is no straight jacket formula to ascertain the nature of interest created.
ii) Each case depends upon the facts of that case and the deed that comes up for interpretation.
iii) Merely because the enjoyment or possession is postponed by itself is not a ground to hold that no vested interest is created.
iv) If interest in praesenti is created with condition, the transfer becomes effective immediately. But the interest is to take effect after the condition is satisfied, then it becomes a contingent(sic – vested) interest.”
PART – 2
‘Reconciliation of Apparent Inconsistent Provisions’and ‘Harmonious interpretation‘
Section 11 of Transfer of Properties Act makes it clear that where a property is transferred absolutely, subsequent restraints are invalid. Therefore, the questions in such matters would be (i) whether the transfer effected stands ‘absolute’ or not and (ii) whether the restriction brings-up is one that canvases the section or not.
Section 11 of Transfer of Properties Act reads as under:
11. Restriction repugnant to interest created– Where transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.
Where any such direction has been made in respect of one piece of immoveable property for the purpose of securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property, nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any right which the transferor may have to enforce such direction or any remedy which he may have in respect of a breach thereof.
‘Irreconcilable/Inconsistent’ clauses in a Will
Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act says:
“88. The last of two inconsistent clauses prevails.–Where two clauses of gifts in a Will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail.
The Illustrations given in this Section make it clear what is an ‘inconsistent clause‘. It reads as under:
(i) The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.
(ii) If a man, at the commencement of his Will gives his house to A, and at the close of it directs that his house shall be sold and the proceeds invested for the benefit of B, the latter disposition will prevail.”
Section 138 of Indian Succession Act, which reads as under:
“Direction that fund be employed in particular manner following absolute bequest of same to or for benefit of any person.
Where a fund is bequeathed absolutely to or for the benefit of any person, but the will contains a direction that it shall be applied or enjoyed in a particular manner, the legatee shall be entitled to receive the fund as if the will had contained no such direction.”
From the above, it comes out that when a Will is construed, it must be considered:
Whether ‘on a whole-reading‘, there is irreconcilable inconsistency between two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – the last of two inconsistent clauses prevails – in earlier clause property was given to A; latter clause, to B) so that harmonious interpretation is not possible?
Contingent transfers are legal and valid. Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B … (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)
Under Sec. 11 of the TP Act also, the latter condition is taken into consideration if only there is an ‘absolute‘ transfer. Under Sec. 11 of the TP Act (which reads: 11.Restriction repugnant to interest created– Where transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, …. ) the earlier ‘irreconcilable’ clause will prevail.
An attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible. It is only when this is not possible, e.g, where an absolute title is given is in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void.(Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain, AIR 1963 SC 890.)
In K. S. Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017 SC 1473 the joint Will executed by a couple created a Trust and indicated further that after the death of one of the spouse, the other (survivor) had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same. Certain alienations were made by the wife after death of the husband. It is held in the decision as under:
“41. The above in plain words provides that on the death of any of the spouse, survivor shall enjoy the entire properties absolutely with all the rights. What is the connotation of words ‘absolutely with all the rights?’, whether the above provision in the Will can be read as only life estate i.e. right of enjoyment and receiving of rent, income or absolute right indicates the exercise of all the rights including the right of alienation.”
42. The High Court after noticing the contention of Learned Counsel for the defendants formed the opinion that expression ‘absolutely’ should be read to mean that the surviving testator, namely, Rangammal would have only the life interest.
50. We do not find any word or any indication in the Will to give a life estate to survivor. The Will clearly intended that survivor shall have absolute right to the properties and after his/her death; the charity shall be carried out from the income of the properties without alienation of the properties.
“57. We, thus, are of the view that giving absolute right to the survivor during his lifetime to deal with the properties in no manner cannot be said to be right given in disregard of object of trust. The charitable purpose of the Will is not losteven if survivor is given absolute right. The obligation of survivor to act in furtherance of object as agreed by both the testators survives and binds the survivor. Although the Will was irrevocable after the death of survivor but the Will expressly granted absolute right to survivor.
58. In view of the foregoing discussion, we endorse the view of High Court that the Will dated 27.9.1968 was a joint and mutual Will, but with a rider that said joint and mutual Will was with an express condition that survivor shall have absolute right to deal with the property keeping the object of trust alive.”
Discordant Knots
It is a serious question – whether the observation in the following decisions as to ‘conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses’ stands unsusceptible to (i) the doctrine of ‘harmonious interpretation’ and (ii) the following illustration in Sec. 27 of the TP Act: A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B …
The decisions are:
Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727
Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya Kantham, AIR 2011 SC 294
Madhuri Ghosh v. Debobroto Dutta, AIR 2016 SC 5242.
I. In Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727 (two Judge Bench) considered a will containing the following provision –
“The first part of the Will provided that after the death of the testator or author of the Will, his wife whose name is Smt. Sona Devi would be entitled to the entire assets and properties of Jamuna Prasad with the right of transfer.
The second part of the Will is that after the death of Smt. Sona Devi nine sons of daughters’ would inherit the property.”
The Apex Court held that latter clause will not take effect observing as under:
“Where a testator having conferred an absolute right on anyone, the subsequent bequest for the same property in favour of other persons would be repugnant to the first bequest in the will and has to be held invalid.”
The Apex Court referred to Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim wherein it was held that where there was conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses and it was not possible to give effect to all of them, then the rule of construction was well established that it was the earlier clause that must override the later clauses and not vice versa. It was also pointed out that in Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj Kuar it was laid down that where an absolute estate was created by a will in favour of devisee, the clauses in the will which were repugnant to such absolute estate could not cut down the estate; but they must be held to be invalid. The Court held:
“In Ramkishorelal and another vs. Kamalnarayan, 1963 Suppl. (2) SCR 417, AIR 1963 SC 890, it was held that in a disposition of properties, if there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion, in such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded. In Radha Sundar Dutta Vs. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim & others (AIR 1959 SC 24 ), it was held where there is conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses and it is not possible to give effect to all of them, then the rule of construction is well established that it is the earlier clause that must override the later clauses and not vice versa.”
II. In Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya Kantham, AIR 2011 SC 294, the two Judge Bench had to find whether the following clause in the will expressed an unequivocal intention of the Testatrix to make an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters. The relevant clause read as under:
“2nd item … shall devolve to my 2nd daughter … and the Western wing 2 rooms shall devolve upon my elder daughter … with absolute rights of Sale, Gift, Mortgage etc., and this will come into force after my demise. After demise of my daughters the retained and remaining property shall devolve upon their female children only.”
Referring (i) Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad (supra – AIR 2002 SC 727) (ii) Ramki shore lal v. Kamalnarayan (supra – AIR 1963 SC 890) and (ii) Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahimheld (supra – AIR 1959 SC 24), it is held in Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya Kantham as under:
“We are, on the contrary, dealing with a case where the intention of the Testatrix to make an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters is unequivocal. Secondly, the expression “after demise of my daughters the retained and remaining properties shall devolve on their female children only” does not stricto sensu amount to a bequest contrary to the one made earlier in favour of the daughters of the Testatrix. The expression extracted above does not detract from the absolute nature of the bequest in favour of the daughters. All that the Testatrix intended to achieve by the latter part of clause 6 was the devolution upon their female offsprings all such property as remained available in the hands of the legatees at the time of their demise. There would obviously be no devolution of any such property upon the female offsprings in terms of the said clause if the legatees decided to sell or gift the property bequeathed to them as indeed they had every right to do under the terms of the bequest. Seen thus, there is no real conflict between the absolute bequest which the first part of clause 6 of the Will makes and the second part of the said clause which deals with devolution of what and if at all anything that remains in the hands of the legatees.”
III. Madhuri Ghosh v. Debobroto Dutta AIR 2016 SC 5242(Two Judge Bench): The testator bequeathed his property jointly to his wife and daughter. It was provided that in the event of the death of his wife the property would stand vested with the daughter as “exclusive owner”; and, in the event of the death of his daughter the property would stand vested with the wife as “exclusive owner”. Thereafter, it was provided that various other lineal descendants would become owners of specified parts of the property. The Apex Court held that the will provided for ‘absolute’ bequest and not ‘limited interest’. Therefore, the direction that the lineal descendants would become owners of specified parts had no effect. The Court, inter alia, relied on Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad (2002) 2 SCC 468.
Analysis of the Above Line of Decisions
The common law in India requires ‘reading the documentas a whole‘, and give effect to the provisions on a harmonious interpretation. The apparent conflict mooted in the above cases can be harmonised reading the document as a whole.
Illustrations in Sections 24 and 27 make it clear that Indian law recognises ‘vested remainder’ and ‘contingent remainder‘. (See illustrations given in these Sections.)
It is also beyond doubt that such a transfer is not hit by Sec. 10 and 11 of the TP Act; inasmuch as Sec. 10 and 11 cumber only when ‘conditions’ impose ‘Absolute Restraint’ or ‘Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’. It does not invite Sec. 138 of the Indian Succession Act also, for the same reasons.
Following decisions relied on in Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727 (and the subsequent decisions followed it) were not applicable in the fact-situation (that emerged) inasmuch as they dealt with independent earlier transfers; and not two parts of the same deed. The decisions are:
Ramkishore lal v. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890 (Constitution Bench)
Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR 1959 SC 24 (three judge bench)
It is noteworthy that the Apex Court (in Mauleshwar Mani – in the matter of a Will) considered cases (Ramkishore lal and Radha Sundar Dutta) in which Sec. 11, TP Act is attracted- for Sec. 138 of the Indian Succession Act is pari materia to Sec. 11 of the TP Act.
In KS Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017 SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.) the joint Will executed by a couple created a Trust; but, it had been indicated that after the death of one of the spouse, the other (survivor) had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same. Certain alienations were made by the wife after death of the husband. Our apex Court held as under:
“49. The intention in testamentary disposition has to be primarily found out from the actual words used in the Will. The court is not entitled to ignore clear words or add something of its own or dilute the meaning of any clear word used in the Will. The solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention.”
57. We, thus, are of the view that giving absolute right to the survivorduring his lifetime to deal with the properties in no manner cannot be said to be right given in disregard of object of trust. The charitable purpose of the Will is not lost even if survivor is given absolute right.”
Why Ramkishore lal and Radha Sundar Dutta Do Not Apply
In Ramkishore lal v. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890 (Constitution Bench), dealt with the matter of a partition-award and the question arose was as to independent earlier dedication of property to a temple. It was held as under:
“We are inclined to agree with the contention of the learned Attorney-General that Mr. Bagchi’s award gives the property to Ramsaran Lal absolutely with only a charge on the property for the expenses of the temple and did not make an absolute dedication of the village to the temple. We are of opinion however that Mr. Bagchi’s award can have no legal effect in respect of thededication already made. Once an absolute dedication of the property had been made in December 1896 in favour of Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple the former owners of the property had no legal authority to go behind that dedication.”
Similarly, in Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR 1959 SC 24 (three judge bench), considered was an independent earliergrant. It was held as under:
“But it is open to the parties to agree that the Chaukidari Chakaran lands should form a new and distinct Patni, and the result of such an agreement will be that while the grantee will hold those lands in Patni right, that is to say, the tenure will be permanent, heritable and alienable so far as his liability to pay jama and the corresponding right of the Zamindar to sell it under the Regulation if there is any default in the payment thereof are concerned, the now grant will be an entity by itself independent of the original Patni.”
‘Reconciliation of Apparent Inconsistent Provisions’ and ‘Repugnant Provisions’
As stated already, if only there is irreconcilable inconsistencybetween two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – that is, in earlier clause, property was given to A; latter clause, to B – whereby a harmonious interpretation is not possible) then only the principle, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away‘ (or, the last of two inconsistent clauses prevails), be applied. It is emphasised by our Supreme Court (Constitution Bench consisting of BP Sinha (CJ), KC Das Gupta, PB Gajendragadkar, KN Wanchoo, JC Shah, JJ.) in Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain, AIR 1963 SC 890, as under:
“Sometimes it happens in the case of documents as regards disposition of properties, whether they are testamentary or non-testamentary instruments, that there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another. A familiar instance of this is where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion. What is to be done where this happens? It is well settled that in case of such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title already given (See: Sahebzada Mohd. Kamgar Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo, (1960) 3 SCR 604. It is clear, however, that an attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible. It is only when this is not possible, e.g, where an absolute title is given is in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void.” (quoted in : H B Yeshwant Rao Ghorpade v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bangalore, AIR 1967 SC 135)
In Ramachandra Shenoy v. Mrs. Hilda Brite, AIR 1964 SC 1323, our Apex Court (N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, JJ) observed with respect to a will as under:
“5. If the said Julia does not marry or if she has no issues, the said Julia should enjoy the said property up to her deathand thereafter this property of mine should be enjoyed by my eldest daughter, Severina obina Coelho and after her by her male descendants with permanent rights”.
“It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interest, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will. It if for this reason that where there is a bequest to A even though it be in terms apparently absolute followed by a gift of the same to B absolutely “on” or “after” or “at” A’s death, A is prima facie held to take a life interest and B an interest in remainder, the apparently absolute interest of A being cut down to accommodate the interest created in favour of B.”
It is held in Navneet Lal alias Rangi v. Gokul, AIR 1976 SC 794, as under:
“It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy,so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will.”
In K. S. Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017 SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.), Palaniappa Chettiar and his wife by registered Will created a Trust. The Will indicated that after the death of one of the testators, the survivor had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same. Certain alienations were made by Rangammal after death of Palaniappa Chettiar. Relying on Navneet Lal alias Rangi v. Gokul, AIR 1976 SC 794 it is held that the solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention. The Court held as under:
“57. We, thus, are of the view that giving absolute right to the survivor during his lifetime to deal with the properties in no manner cannot be said to be right given in disregard of object of trust. The charitable purpose of the Will is not lost even if survivor is given absolute right. The obligation of survivor to act in furtherance of object as agreed by both the testators survives and binds the survivor. Although the Will was irrevocable after the death of survivor but the Will expressly granted absolute right to survivor.”
Followed in : Prabhakumari v. S. Mohanarajan 2021-4 Ker HC 514
PART – 3
If only ‘Absolute‘ Bequest or Transfer, then only Adversities in S. 11 TP Act and S. 138 Succn. Act Attracted
‘Inconsistency’ and ‘absolute transfer’ are explained in Sec. 88 of the Indian Succession Act. First illustration reads as under:
“The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.”
The law on this point is eruditely explained in Rajinder Singh Chowdhary v. Sardar Manjit Singh Chowdhary, AIR 2002 Del 135 (Vijender Jain, J.). The facts of the case, in a nutshell, are the following:
(a) The father of the parties executed a Willbequeathing all his properties in favour of his wife ‘as the sole and absolute(in the sense, saleable) owner with full powers of disposal in any manner she likes’.
(b) The will further provided how the properties were to be distributed ‘in case she expires intestate and without disposing of the properties’.
(c) The mother died intestate.
It was contended by the plaintiff that the bequest to the mother was ‘absolute‘ and anything which was repugnant to the absolute bequest was void and inconsequential under Section 138 of Indian Succession Act.
Plaintiffs relied on
Gopala Menon v. Sivaraman Nair, AIR 1979 SC 1345
Lalit Mohan Mondal v. Profulla Kumar Mondal, AIR 1982 Cal 52.
Shantilal babubhai v. Bai Chhani, AIR 1973 Gujarat 146,
The defendants contended that will had to be read as a whole and different parts of the will should be considered harmoniously. The defendants further contended that provision of Section 138 of the Act was not applicable to the present case and further contended that even if there was inconsistency, Section 88 of the Indian succession Act saves such inconsistency as the last clause prevails. Section 88 of the Indian succession Act reads as under:
“The last of two inconsistent clauses prevails. Where two clauses of gifts in a will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail.”
“The principles enunciated in Gopala Menon s case (supra), Shantilal Babubhai (supra) and Lalit Mohan Mondal s case (supra) are well established principles that once a bequest has been made which is absolute and anything which is inconsistent would be repugnant and that has to be ignored.
But can it be said that the present case while interpreting the will at hand in view of the concern and anxiety of the testator with regard to his two sons and his intention to bequeath the property after the demise of Smt. Ved Kaur and words which are used signifying the concern and well being of aforesaid two sons are superfluous it is in this context court has to see as to whether bequest made in favour of Smt. Ved Kaur was absolute?
The answer is in the negative.
From the well laid down principle regarding interpretation of will and harmonious construction of the same, I hold that what was intended by the testator was to create a life estate in favour of Smt. Ved Kaur and not an absolute interest. The issue is answered accordingly.”
Theory of ‘Dominant Intention’
The will considered in Ramasreenivasa Iyengar v. Padmasani Ammal, (1973) 1 MLJ 34, provided that the two daughters of the testator should take the properties in equal shares with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights, but the share of the lady without issues would, however, after her death, be taken by the daughter with issues along with her children. It was found that the testator intended only a life estate if no issue to anyone. It was held that the dominant intention was to preserve the estate to his grandchildren.
Deeds must be read as a whole
House of Lords (Lord Davey) in North-Eastern Railway Company v. Hastings, (1900) AC 260, held as under:
“The deed must be read as a whole in order to ascertain the true meaning of its several clauses, and the words of each clause should be so interpreted as to bring them into harmony with the other provisions of the deed if that interpretation does no violence to the meaning of which they are naturally susceptible.”
After quoting the House of Lords, our Supreme Court held in Provash Chandra Dalui v. Biswanath Banerjee, AIR1989 SC 1834, as under:
“In construing a contract the Court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the Court can do about it. In the construction of a written instrument’ it is legitimate in order to ascertain the true meaning of the words used and if that be doubtful it is legitimate to have regard to the circumstances surrounding their creation and the subject matter to which it was designed and intended they should apply.”
After referring Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi, 1996 Ker HC 1200, and Kokilambal v. N. Raman. AIR 2005 SC 2468, it is observed in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36) that there is no straight jacket formula to ascertain the nature of interest created and that each case depends upon the facts of that case and the deed that comes up for interpretation.
If only ‘Absolute Transfer’ or ‘Irreconcilable Inconsistency’, the doctrine ‘once granted cannot be taken away’, applied
Same principles as to ‘irreconcilable inconsistency’ apply to ‘absolute’ transfer, when the doctrine, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away’, is applied.
The Supreme Court has explained in Sahebzeda Mohammad Kamgarh Singh v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb, AIR1960 SC 953, that if only there is irreconcilable inconsistency between two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – that is, in earlier clause, property was given to A; latter clause, to B – whereby a harmonious interpretation is not possible) then only the principle, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away‘, be applied.
“The task being to ascertain the intention of the parties, the cases have laid down that that intention has to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves. In doing so the parties must be presumed to have used the words in their strict grammatical sense. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be out down by later clause. Where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the Court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantor’s document it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee.”
PART – 4
‘Absolute‘ Transfer with stipulation: ‘if property remains’ on death of transferee, it will go to another – If Valid?
Yes.
Following important points gain consideration in this regard:
In Indian practice, though the words used in the deeds might be ‘absolute transfer’, on a true construction, on a reading of entire document, it might only be a salable/transferable right during life time; and the left-over property might be given to another.
The common law in India requires reading the whole document altogether, and give effect to the document on a harmonious interpretation, rather than giving effect to the legal terms used in a deed.
Illustrations in Sections 24 and 27 make it clear that Indian law recognises ‘vested remainder’ and ‘contingent remainder‘ (as detailed in the notes above).
It is also beyond doubt that such a transfer is not hit by Sec. 10 and 11 of the TP Act; inasmuch as Sec. 10 and 11 cumber only when ‘conditions’ impose ‘Absolute Restraint’ or ‘Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’.
First illustration in Sec. 88 of the Indian Succession Act reads as under:
“The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.”
Various court decisions make it clear that one can validly transfer or bequeath a property to another, with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights, with the stipulation that after that (first) transferee’s lifetime, if whole or any part remains, it (contingent remainder) may go to another.
In K. S. Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017 SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.), Palaniappa Chettiar and his wife by registered Will created a Trust. The Will indicated that after the death of one of the testators, the survivor had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same. Certain alienations were made by Rangammal after death of Palaniappa Chettiar. It is held as under:
“49. The intention in testamentary disposition has to be primarily found out from the actual words used in the Will. The court is not entitled to ignore clear words or add something of its own or dilute the meaning of any clear word used in the Will. The solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention. On the reading of the Will, the intendment of testator/testatrix is clear that survivor shall have absolute right of enjoyment of properties. There is no reason not to give effect to said intendment on the ground that the testator and testatrix have mutually intended to set apart the property for charity and holding that survivor shall have right of disposition be not in the interest of the trust.”
Other Erudite Decisions on the Topic
In Sanford v. Sanford, (1901) 1 Ch. 939, the gift to the wife conferred a power of disposal limited explicitly to her lifetime. But, the gift-over to sonwas of a quite absolute estate. The gift did not include a power of disposition by will, but allowed power of disposition inter vivos. It was provided in the gift deed that if any property remained at her death it was to pass ‘from father to son, from generation to generation’. Therefore, it was held that the widow was conferred with only a limited right; and the gift-over, which was ‘the will of the testator’ was to ‘settle its destination’. (This decision is referred to in Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, 1976-2 MLJ 381.)
In Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381, the Madras High Court rendered a well-read decision in this topic. The facts of this case, in a nutshell, are as under:
(i) The settlement deed considered in the case provided:
(a) the wife of the settlor should enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights.
(b) the respondent should take the properties remained at the time of her death, with absolute rights.
(ii) the appellant contended that the clause providing for the respondent taking absolutely such of the properties as at the time of the death of the settler’s wife was repugnant to the earlier clause conferring an absolute estate on her, and has, therefore, to be ignored as void.
(iii) the respondent contended that if the settlement deed had to be read as a whole and the effect would be:
there was no absolute transfer to the wife of the settler as stated in Sec. 11 of the TP Act.
It is seen that the High Court accepted the contentions of the respondent that the settlement deed was to be read as a whole and that the respondent had taken absolutely such of the properties covered by the settlement deed as remained undisposed of by the settlee, the wife of the settlor; as she had only a right to enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) powers of disposal during her lifetime. The clause as to acquiring property by respondent was not repugnant and void.
The High Court relied on the following cases. The facts of these were ‘very near’ to the facts of that case.
Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247,
Ramasreenivasa Iyengar v. Padmasani Ammal, (1973) 1 MLJ 34.
In Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247, it was held, as regards a Will, as under:
“After giving an absolute estate to his wife over the two items of scheduled properties, he provided that these scheduled properties, after the wife’s lifetime should devolve – item 1 on the first daughter and item 2 on the second daughter – who would have absolute rights. When the testator took care to indicate that the properties without any distinction even after his wife’s lifetime should go to each of the daughters, it should be presumed that it was clearly in his mind that the wife’s estate was only to be a limited estate or life estate, and not an absolute one.” (Quoted in: Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381).
Section 19 of Transfer of Properties Act reads as under:
“19. Vested interest.- Where, on a transfer of property , an interest therein is created in favour of a person without specifying the time when it is to take effect, or in terms specifying it is to take effect forthwith or on the happening of an event which must happen, such interest is vested, unless a contrary intention appears from the terms of the transfer.
A vested interest is not defeated by the death of the transferee before he obtains possession.
Explanation.- An intention that an interest shall not be vested is not to be inferred merely from a provision whereby the enjoyment thereof is postponed, or whereby a prior interest in the same property is given or reserved to some other person, or whereby income arising from the property is directed to be accumulated until the time of enjoyment arrives, or from a provision that if a particular event shall happen the interest shall pass to another person.”
Section 21 of Transfer of Properties Act reads as under:
“21. Contingent interest.- Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created in favour of a person to take effect only on the happening of a specified uncertain event, or if a specified uncertain event shall not happen, such person thereby acquires a contingent interest in the property. Such interest becomes a vested interest, in the former case, on the happening of the event, in the latter, when the happening of the event becomes impossible.”
Instances of ‘vested right‘ and that on ‘condition’
Usually (absolute) vested right is invested in the following two circumstances:
Allow to enjoy property, absolutely, on attaining majority.
Absolutely giving property to one, subject to a right to enjoy for life of another.
Section 119 and 120 of the Indian Succession Act speaks about vesting of legacy.
Section 119 of the Indian Succession Act reads as follows:
“119. Date of vesting of legacy when payment or possession postponed – Whereby the terms of a bequest the legatee is not entitled to immediate possession of the thing bequeathed, a right to receive it at the proper time shall, unless a contrary intention appears by the will, become vested in the legatee on the testator’s death, and shall pass to the legatee’s representatives if he dies before that time and without having received the legacy, and in such cases the legacy is from the testator’s death said to be vested in interest.
Explanation : An intention that a legacy to any person shall not become vested in interest in him is not to be inferred merely from a provision whereby the payment or possession of the thing bequeathed is postponed, or whereby a prior interest therein is bequeathed to some other person, or whereby the income arising from the fund bequeathed is directed to be accumulated until the time of payment arrives, or from a provision that, if a particular event shall happen, the legacy shall go over to another person”.
Section 120 of the Indian Succession Act reads as follows:
“120. Date of vesting when legacy contingent upon specified uncertain event. – (1) A legacy bequeathed in case a specified uncertain event shall happen does not vest until that event happens.
(2) A legacy bequeathed in case a specified uncertain event shall not happen does not vest until the happening of that event becomes impossible.
(3) In either case, until the condition has been fulfilled, the interest of the legatee is called contingent.
Exception. Where a fund is bequeathed to any person upon his attaining a particular age, and the will also gives to him absolutely the income to arise from the fund before he reaches that age, or directs the income, or so much of it as may be necessary, to be applied for his benefit, the bequest of the fund is not contingent.”
Even in cases of ‘Contingent interest’, Interest in praesenti may be created
In transfers with ‘contingent interest’, though the interest would take effect only after satisfying the condition, the transfer becomes effective immediately. Therefore, the interest created may be in praesenti with the condition; and on satisfying the condition, it becomes a vested interest.
In Arumugham Chettiar v. A. Vallinayagam Pillai, (1975) 2 MLJ 46, the point considered was whether ‘absolute’ rights had been given to Sivagnanathammal in the will so that subsequent direction in the will that the property will go to sons of Sivagnanathammal was repugnant and it could not at all be sustained. The Madras High Court held as under:
“I have been taken through Exhibit A-2 the will dated 12th June, 1931 created by Thiruvengadathammal. It is clear from paragraph 6 of the will that the suit properties have been absolutely given to the sonsof Sivagnanathammal with a right to Sivagnanathammal to enjoy for life only the income from the properties without in any way encumbering the same. Thus, it is clear that the argument advanced by T.R. Mani as though absolute right has been given to Sivagnanathammal and that the subsequent direction in the will is repugnant, cannot at all be sustained.”
The court observed that a vested right being created absolutely on Surianarayana Chettiar, it was not ‘expectancy of succession by survivorship or other merely contingent or possible right or interest‘.
An Inquisition based on the Provisions of Transfer of Property Act.
Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.
Inquisition in a Nutshell
Inquisition (TP Act)
Provision TP Act
Answer in Nutshell
Can a property be transferred with conditions?
Sec. 10
Yes.
What all conditions will be void?
Sec. 10 & 11
Sec. 10 – Conditions that are ‘absolutely restraining‘ disposal of (his) interest. Sec. 11 – Enjoyment ‘in a particular manner’.
What is ‘absolute restraint’?
Sec. 10
Absolutely restrainingdisposal of his interest.
What is the effect of ‘absolute restraint’?
Sec. 10
Condition, void.
What is the effect of ‘terms’ for enjoyment ‘in a particular manner’?
Sec. 11
Terms can be ignored.
What is Vested Interest?
Sec. 19
Interest is created ‘in praesenti‘.
What is Contingent Interest?
Sec. 21
Interest takes effect only on the happening of a specified uncertain event.
What is Vested Remainder?
No provision in TP Act
Creation of future interests .
What is Contingent Remainder?
No provision in TP Act
Future interest created takes effecton termination of an estate.
What is preemption?
.…
Right of Substitution – to rub out vendee’s name and substitute the preemptor’s name.
Law on Restrictions in Transfer of Property
Section 10 of Transfer of Properties Act reads as under:
“10. Condition restraining alienation: Where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee or any person claiming under him from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property, the condition or limitation is void, except in the case of a lease where the condition is for the benefit of the lessor or those claiming under him:provided that property may be transferred to or for the benefit of a women (not being a Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist), so that she shall not have power during her marriage to transfer or charge the same or her beneficial interest therein.”
Section 11 of Transfer of Properties Act reads as under:
11. Restriction repugnant to interest created– Where transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.
Where any such direction has been made in respect of one piece of immoveable property for the purpose of securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property, nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any right which the transferor may have to enforce such direction or any remedy which he may have in respect of a breach thereof.
Section 19 of Transfer of Properties Act reads as under:
“19. Vested interest.- Where, on a transfer of property , an interest therein is created in favour of a person without specifying the time when it is to take effect, or in terms specifying it is to take effect forthwith or on the happening of an event which must happen, such interest is vested, unless a contrary intention appears from the terms of the transfer.
A vested interest is not defeated by the death of the transferee before he obtains possession.
Explanation.- An intention that an interest shall not be vested is not to be inferred merely from a provision whereby the enjoyment thereof is postponed, or whereby a prior interest in the same property is given or reserved to some other person, or whereby income arising from the property is directed to be accumulated until the time of enjoyment arrives, or from a provision that if a particular event shall happen the interest shall pass to another person.”
Section 21 of Transfer of Properties Act reads as under:
“21. Contingent interest.- Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created in favour of a person to take effect only on the happening of a specified uncertain event, or if a specified uncertain event shall not happen, such person thereby acquires a contingent interest in the property. Such interest becomes a vested interest, in the former case, on the happening of the event, in the latter, when the happening of the event becomes impossible.”
PART – 1
Section 10 and 11, TP Act
Section 10 TP Act – Instances of “Absolute Restraint”
Sale or gift (transfer) – direction – transferee should not sell (absolute restraint) – void.
Sale or gift (transfer) – direction – transferee should sell to a particular person alone (in-effect absolute restraint) – void.
Sale or gift (transfer) – direction – transferee should not sell outside family (in-effect absolute restraint) – void.
Sale or gift (transfer) – direction – transferee should not sell for 3 years (reasonable restraint) valid.
Zoroastrian Housing Society – not be sold other than Zoroastrians – (reasonable restraint) valid.
In Gayasi Ram v. Shahabuddin, AIR 1935 All 493, the sale deed contained a clause that the vendee shall not transfer the house by mortgage, gift or sell to any one except the vendor or his heirs and if in contravention of the clause, the property is sold the vendor or his heir would have a right to get back the house by paying Rs. 175/- and if the property was to be sold in court auction sale, the sale would be invalid. The sale consideration for the house was Rs. 150/-. It was held (relying on Dal Singh v. Khub Chand, AIR 1921 All 97, Asghari Begam v. Maula Bakhsh, AIR 1929 All 381, and Gomti Singh v. Anari Kuar, AIR 1929 All 492) that this impugned clause in a sale between strangers was an absolute restrainton alienation; and therefore the same was void, in view of Section 10 of Transfer of Property Act; and that in such cases question of pre-emption did not arise. (See also: Manohar Shivram Swami v. Mahadeo Guruling Swami, AIR 1988 Bom 116)
In Trichinopoly Varthaga Sangam Ltd. v. T. N. Shanmughasundaram, AIR 1939 Mad. 769, the Clause in the Partition deed – the property should not be sold to any stranger; and lease only to brothers or their heirs for a sum not exceeding Rs. 1000/-. The court found that there was “no obligation” for a member to buy “even at Rs. 1000/-“. Hence it was held – Restriction is ‘absolute’, and hence, void. (See also: Rosher v. Rosher, (1884) 26 Ch D 801).
Similarly, it was held in Manohar Shivram Swami v. Mahadeo Guruling Swami, AIR 2008 Bom 116, that the condition in the Sale Deedprohibiting sale ‘outside family’ was void – as it was absolute restraint.
Reasonable Restraint is Allowed in Law
The words ‘absolute restraint‘ in Sec. 10 of the TP Act makes it clear that ‘reasonable restraint’ is allowed in law. Hence, it is clear that the cases in this subject has to be dealt with on the facts of each case.
Therefore, it is not possible to place a hard and fast rule on the validity of the restrictions of enjoyment for a particular period, enjoyment in a particular manner, restrictions on transfer etc. In Renand v. Tourangeaon, (1867) LR 2 PC 4, it was held that a condition prohibitingtransfer the property for twenty years was held to be an absolute restraint and hence void. But it was opined that if it were for a period of 3 years, it would have been a partial restraint and valid. This decision is referred to in Athmaram Rao v. Shanthan Phawar (2018 Madras High Court).
Our Apex Court held in Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Urban ), AIR 2005 SC 2306, that in the matter of a Housing Society, the restriction imposed in the light of the byelaws of the Society that the property should not be sod to others, other than Zoroastrians, was a valid condition.
Section 11, TP Act
Instances of ‘Absolute Transfer‘ & ‘enjoyment in a particular manner’ (Similar provision in Section 138 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925)
Absolute sale or gift – direction – transferee should reside there – invalid.
Absolute sale or gift – direction – transferee should not cut trees – invalid.
Sale or gift – subject to a condition – transferee should reside there or look after transferor – valid. See Notes below under the Head: PART – 4 : ‘Reconciliation of Apparent Inconsistent Provisions’and ‘Harmonious interpretation’
Life interest alone created – direction – assignee should not cut trees –valid.
In Bhavani Amma Kanakadevi v. CSI, Dakshina Kerala Maha Idavaka, AIR 2008 Kerala 38, the question came for consideration was whether a provision in a sale deed that in the event of failure to construct a private college in the property sold thereunder, the property shall be re-conveyedby the vendee to the vendor for the same sale consideration is barred under the provisions of Sections 10 or 11 of Transfer of Property Act. Observing that (though) Ext.A2 did not contain a specific clause prohibiting respondent from alienating the property to third parties, the implied clause – that in the event of failure to construct a college, the property shall be reconveyed to the assignor at the same price – shut out any other option. The High Court held that it was an absolute restrainton the right of respondent to deal with the property including alienation, which was void as provided under Section 10.
The court referred to the following decisions:
Jatru Pahan v. Mahatma Ambikajit Prasad ( AIR 1957 Patna 570),
Instances of ‘vested right‘ and that on ‘condition’
Usually (absolute) vested right is invested in the following two circumstances:
Allow to enjoy property, absolutely, on attaining majority.
Absolutely giving property to one, subject to a right to enjoy for life of another.
Section 119 and 120 of the Indian Succession Act speaks about vesting of legacy.
Section 119 of the Indian Succession Act reads as follows:
“119. Date of vesting of legacy when payment or possession postponed – Whereby the terms of a bequest the legatee is not entitled to immediate possession of the thing bequeathed, a right to receive it at the proper time shall, unless a contrary intention appears by the will, become vested in the legatee on the testator’s death, and shall pass to the legatee’s representatives if he dies before that time and without having received the legacy, and in such cases the legacy is from the testator’s death said to be vested in interest.
Explanation : An intention that a legacy to any person shall not become vested in interest in him is not to be inferred merely from a provision whereby the payment or possession of the thing bequeathed is postponed, or whereby a prior interest therein is bequeathed to some other person, or whereby the income arising from the fund bequeathed is directed to be accumulated until the time of payment arrives, or from a provision that, if a particular event shall happen, the legacy shall go over to another person”.
Section 120 of the Indian Succession Act reads as follows:
“120. Date of vesting when legacy contingent upon specified uncertain event. – (1) A legacy bequeathed in case a specified uncertain event shall happen does not vest until that event happens.
(2) A legacy bequeathed in case a specified uncertain event shall not happen does not vest until the happening of that event becomes impossible.
(3) In either case, until the condition has been fulfilled, the interest of the legatee is called contingent.
Exception. Where a fund is bequeathed to any person upon his attaining a particular age, and the will also gives to him absolutely the income to arise from the fund before he reaches that age, or directs the income, or so much of it as may be necessary, to be applied for his benefit, the bequest of the fund is not contingent.”
Even in cases of ‘Contingent interest’, Interest in praesenti may be created
In transfers with ‘contingent interest’, though the interest would take effect only after satisfying the condition, the transfer becomes effective immediately. Therefore, the interest created may be in praesenti with the condition; and on satisfying the condition, it becomes a vested interest.
In Arumugham Chettiar v. A. Vallinayagam Pillai, (1975) 2 MLJ 46, the point considered was whether ‘absolute’ rights had been given to Sivagnanathammal in the will so that subsequent direction in the will that the property will go to sons of Sivagnanathammal was repugnant and it could not at all be sustained. The Madras High Court held as under:
“I have been taken through Exhibit A-2 the will dated 12th June, 1931 created by Thiruvengadathammal. It is clear from paragraph 6 of the will that the suit properties have been absolutely given to the sonsof Sivagnanathammal with a right to Sivagnanathammal to enjoy for life only the income from the properties without in any way encumbering the same. Thus, it is clear that the argument advanced by T.R. Mani as though absolute right has been given to Sivagnanathammal and that the subsequent direction in the will is repugnant, cannot at all be sustained.”
The court observed that a vested right being created absolutely on Surianarayana Chettiar, it was not ‘expectancy of succession by survivorship or other merely contingent or possible right or interest‘.
Death of a life-tenant is not a contingency but an event certain
The Madras High Court in Ernest William Adams v. Mrs. H. S. F. Gray, AIR 1925 Mad 599 held as under:
“It is perfectly clear from all the text-books and the decided cases that if a bequest is to a person for life and after his death to his children, the bequest becomes vested in each child as and when he or she is born and the vesting is not postponed till the death of the life tenant. The expression after his death is taken to indicate merely the time when the gift over becomes reduced to possession and not the time when the right to such possession and not the time when the right to such possession vest. . . . . . The principle underlying this rule is that no contingency is imported by the mere fact that the legacy is given after a life-estate in the property bequeathed. As nothing is more certain than that every person who lives must due, the death of a life tenant is an event not contingent but certain; and therefore a gift on the death of a life-tenant is a bequest to take effect not on a contingency but on an event certain to happen. . . ” (Quoted in: Chilamakuri Chinna Pullappa VS Guruka Chinna Bayanna, AIR 1962 AP 554)
PART – 3
Legal Remainders: Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder
What is ‘Legal Remainder’ is explained in “Modern Law of Real Property” by Chesire, Twelfth Edition as under:
“Legal Remainders. Common law permitted future interests, called remainders, to be carved out of a legal estate, though as we shall see presently, there were several restrictive rules which had to be observed. If a stellar decided to create two or more successive estates in his land, and drafted the desired limitations in one instrument, as for instance by a fulfilment to A for life and then to B, for life and then to C, in fee simple, the first estate which preceded the next following remainder was called the “particular estate” and those which followed were denominated “remainders”. (Quoted in Bomi Munchershaw Mistry v. Kesharwani Co-Operative Housing Society, 1993 (2) BomCR 329.)
Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder in TP Act
Transfer of Property Act does not specifically speak about ‘Legal Remainder’. But, the illustrations in Sections 13, 24, 27 and 126 (mentioned below) clearly lay down this right. Indian courts apply the doctrine of ‘legal remainder’, inasmuch it hold – both the reversioner (future right that accrues by operation of law) and the legal remainder (future right that accrues by act of persons – executing documents) have the right to protect their (future) right, through court [Yellarayhala Surayya v. Yellaraghahs Subbamma, (1920) ILR 43 Mad 4].
Can a property be ‘transferred’ (successively) to one, and after his death (or on happening an event) to another?
Yes. It is clear from the following illustrations in the TP Act.
No.
Sec.
Illustration
1
13. Transfer for benefit of unborn person
A transfers property of which he is the owner to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for their lives, and, after the death of the survivor, for the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death for A’s second son. The interest so created for the benefit of the eldest son does not take effect, because it does not extend to the whole of A’s remaining interest in the property.
2
24. Transfer to such of certain persons as survive at some period not specified
A transfers property to B for life, and after his death to Cand D, equally to be divided between them, or to the survivor of them. C dies during the life of B. D survives B. At B’s death the property passes to D.
3
27. Conditional transfer to one person coupled with transfer to another on failure of prior disposition
A transfers property to his wife; but,in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B that which he had transferred to her. A and his wife perish together, under circumstances which make it impossible to prove that she died before him. The disposition in favour of B does not take effect.
4
126. When gift may be suspended or revoked.
A gives a field to B, reserving to himself, with B’s assent, the right to take back the field in case B and his descendants die before A. B dies without descendants in A’s lifetime. A may take back the field.
Note: Illustration in Sec. 24 given above lays down ‘Vested Remainder‘; and that in Sec. 27 lays down lays down an instance of ‘Contingent Remainder‘ (though our TP Act does not expressly say as to vested remainder and contingent remainder)
Vested Remainder
Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B …. (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)
A ‘vested remainder’ has to satisfy following ingredients:
(i) the person to whom the property is given must be a living person,
(ii) the estate must be (when the transfer is effected) with another,
(iii) the (actual) transfer is to take effect as soon as the estate with whom its remained (when the transfer is effected) is terminated,
(iv) the person in enjoyment (when the transfer is effected) holds the property subject to the rights of ‘vested remainder’ (in other words, it is one which is ready from its commencement to its end).
In Law of Property by Strahan – 4th Edition at page 152, it is observed as follows:
“A vested remainder is a remainder of the more ancient kind, that is, one of the owner which is living and ascertained, and which is an actual estate in the land, complete in interest though deferred to the precedent estate in enjoyment. Being complete, it is ready, and must continue ready, from its commencement as a vested remainder till its expiration in natural course, to come into possession immediately on the determination of the preceding interest, the existence of which is the only thing which prevents it being complete not merely in interest, but also in enjoyment. It is true it may fail, or, rather, determine before the period arrives, when it would vest in possession, but such determination must arise from its own natural expiration, not from any outside event or contingency.
Thus, take a limitation to A. for life and then to B. for life – B. being a living person. If B. predeceases A., his life estate will never become an interest in possession; but as long as B. lives, his estate is ready to come into possession the moment A.’s life estate determines.” (quoted in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36)
In Law of Property by GC Venkata Subbarao – 2nd Edition, at page 130, it is observed as under:
“Vested Remainder is Heritable.- Vested remainders and reversions are treated as future interests only for the reason that they do not carry immediate possession of the property. They are for all practical purposes present proprietary interests. As such they are heritable. Even if the person entitled to the vested remainder dies before the determination of the particular estate, his interest does not lapse but is transmitted to his heir. Of course, if the remainderman’s estate is a life-estate this rule can have no application. Where, he has an estate of inheritance, notwithstanding his death, before the estate falls in possession, his representative in interest can claim possession as soon as it becomes vacant by the expiration of the precedent interests. In this respect the vested estate resembles the reversion which is also a heritable or transmissible interest in property.” (quoted in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36)
Contingent Remainder
Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B ….. (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)
The principle of ‘Contingent Remainder’ is seen applied extensively, in India. It is usually applied in the following instances:
Property is given to A for life; then to B, if A dies unmarried.
Property is given to A (with saleable rights), then to B if property (or any part) remains unsold/un-transferred by A.
A ‘contingent remainder’ must have the following ingredients:
(i) the person to whom the property has to reach, finally, must be a living person,
(ii) the estate must be (when the transfer is effected) with another,
(iii) there will be a chance only to get the property to the (final) transferee; the transfer being contingent upon the stipulations or conditions (in other words, it is one which is not ready from its commencement to its end),
(iv) the (actual) transfer takes effect
(a)only on satisfying the conditions, and
(b) as soon as the estate with whom it is remained is terminated.
It is clearly laid down in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36) it is observed in Para 32, 38 and 41 as under:
“32. The principle that can be carved out from the above literature is that a vested remainder is one which is ready from its commencement to its end, to take effect as soon as a particular estate shall determine. … … In the case of vested interest, the distribution is predetermined while in contingent interest, it may or may not. A contingent remainder is one which is not ready from its commencement to its end and it is to take effect as soon as particular estate is terminated.”
“38. In the decision reported in Narayani v. Sreedharan (2011(4) K.L.T. SN 107) it is held as follows:
“Even if by a document, the property which exclusively belongs to the executant is settled in favour of another, retaining his life interest in the property and providing that on his death the other would get absolute right in the property, it cannot be said that there was no transfer of interest in praesenti because of the retention of the life interest of the executant as there was divesting of the rights of the executant, except his life interest.”
“41. … But certain propositions emerge from a reading of the above decisions (Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi, 1996 Ker HC 1200, Kokilambal v. N. Raman. AIR 2005 SC 2468) and they are ;
i) There is no straight jacket formula to ascertain the nature of interest created.
ii) Each case depends upon the facts of that case and the deed that comes up for interpretation.
iii) Merely because the enjoyment or possession is postponed by itself is not a ground to hold that no vested interest is created.
iv) If interest in praesenti is created with condition, the transfer becomes effective immediately. But the interest is to take effect after the condition is satisfied, then it becomes a contingent(sic – vested) interest.”
PART – 4
‘Reconciliation of Apparent Inconsistent Provisions’and ‘Harmonious interpretation‘
Section 11 of Transfer of Properties Act makes it clear that where a property is transferred absolutely, subsequent restraints are invalid. Therefore, the questions in such matters would be (i) whether the transfer effected stands ‘absolute’ or not and (ii) whether the restriction brings-up is one that canvases the section or not.
Section 11 of Transfer of Properties Act reads as under:
11. Restriction repugnant to interest created– Where transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.
Where any such direction has been made in respect of one piece of immoveable property for the purpose of securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property, nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any right which the transferor may have to enforce such direction or any remedy which he may have in respect of a breach thereof.
‘Irreconcilable/Inconsistent’ clauses in a Will
Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act says:
“88. The last of two inconsistent clauses prevails.–Where two clauses of gifts in a Will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail.
The Illustrations given in this Section make it clear what is an ‘inconsistent clause‘. It reads as under:
(i) The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.
(ii) If a man, at the commencement of his Will gives his house to A, and at the close of it directs that his house shall be sold and the proceeds invested for the benefit of B, the latter disposition will prevail.”
Section 138 of Indian Succession Act, which reads as under:
“Direction that fund be employed in particular manner following absolute bequest of same to or for benefit of any person.
Where a fund is bequeathed absolutely to or for the benefit of any person, but the will contains a direction that it shall be applied or enjoyed in a particular manner, the legatee shall be entitled to receive the fund as if the will had contained no such direction.”
From the above, it comes out that when a Will is construed, it must be considered:
Whether ‘on a whole-reading‘, there is irreconcilable inconsistency between two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – the last of two inconsistent clauses prevails – in earlier clause property was given to A; latter clause, to B) so that harmonious interpretation is not possible?
Contingent transfers are legal and valid. Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B … (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)
Under Sec. 11 of the TP Act also, the latter condition is taken into consideration if only there is an ‘absolute‘ transfer. Under Sec. 11 of the TP Act (which reads: 11.Restriction repugnant to interest created– Where transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, …. ) the earlier ‘irreconcilable’ clause will prevail.
An attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible. It is only when this is not possible, e.g, where an absolute title is given is in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void.(Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain, AIR 1963 SC 890.)
In K. S. Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017 SC 1473 it is held as under:
“41. The above in plain words provides that on the death of any of the spouse, survivor shall enjoy the entire properties absolutely with all the rights. What is the connotation of words ‘absolutely with all the rights?’, whether the above provision in the Will can be read as only life estate i.e. right of enjoyment and receiving of rent, income or absolute right indicates the exercise of all the rights including the right of alienation.”
42. The High Court after noticing the contention of Learned Counsel for the defendants formed the opinion that expression ‘absolutely’ should be read to mean that the surviving testator, namely, Rangammal would have only the life interest.
“57. We, thus, are of the view that giving absolute right to the survivor during his lifetime to deal with the properties in no manner cannot be said to be right given in disregard of object of trust. The charitable purpose of the Will is not lost even if survivor is given absolute right. The obligation of survivor to act in furtherance of object as agreed by both the testators survives and binds the survivor. Although the Will was irrevocable after the death of survivor but the Will expressly granted absolute right to survivor.
58. In view of the foregoing discussion, we endorse the view of High Court that the Will dated 27.9.1968 was a joint and mutual Will, but with a rider that said joint and mutual Will was with an express condition that survivor shall have absolute right to deal with the property keeping the object of trust alive.”
Followed in : Prabhakumari v. S. Mohanarajan 2021-4 Ker HC 514
Discordant Knots
It is a serious question – whether the observation in the following decisions as to ‘conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses’ stands unsusceptible to (i) the doctrine of ‘harmonious interpretation’ and (ii) the following illustration in Sec. 27 of the TP Act: A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B …
The decisions are:
Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727
Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya Kantham, AIR 2011 SC 294
Madhuri Ghosh v. Debobroto Dutta, AIR 2016 SC 5242.
I. In Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727 (two Judge Bench) considered a will containing the following provision –
“The first part of the Will provided that after the death of the testator or author of the Will, his wife whose name is Smt. Sona Devi would be entitled to the entire assets and properties of Jamuna Prasad with the right of transfer.
The second part of the Will is that after the death of Smt. Sona Devi nine sons of daughters’ would inherit the property.”
The Apex Court held that latter clause will not take effect observing as under:
“Where a testator having conferred an absolute right on anyone, the subsequent bequest for the same property in favour of other persons would be repugnant to the first bequest in the will and has to be held invalid.”
The Apex Court referred to Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR 1959 SC 24, wherein it was held that where there was conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses and it was not possible to give effect to all of them, then the rule of construction was well established that it was the earlier clause that must override the later clauses and not vice versa. It was also pointed out that in Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj Kuar, (1935) 37 Bom LR 862, it was laid down that where an absolute estate was created by a will in favour of devisee, the clauses in the will which were repugnant to such absolute estate could not cut down the estate; but they must be held to be invalid. The Court held:
“In Ramkishorelal and another vs. Kamalnarayan, 1963 Suppl. (2) SCR 417, AIR 1963 SC 890, it was held that in a disposition of properties, if there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion, in such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded. In Radha Sundar Dutta Vs. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim & others (AIR 1959 SC 24 ), it was held where there is conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses and it is not possible to give effect to all of them, then the rule of construction is well established that it is the earlier clause that must override the later clauses and not vice versa.”
II. In Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya Kantham, AIR 2011 SC 294, the two Judge Bench had to find whether the following clause in the will expressed an unequivocal intention of the Testatrix to make an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters. The relevant clause read as under:
“2nd item … shall devolve to my 2nd daughter … and the Western wing 2 rooms shall devolve upon my elder daughter … with absolute rights of Sale, Gift, Mortgage etc., and this will come into force after my demise. After demise of my daughters the retained and remaining property shall devolve upon their female children only.”
Referring (i) Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad (supra – AIR 2002 SC 727) (ii) Ramki shore lal v. Kamalnarayan (supra – AIR 1963 SC 890) and (ii) Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahimheld (supra – AIR 1959 SC 24), it is held in Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya Kantham, AIR 2011 SC 294, as under:
“We are, on the contrary, dealing with a case where the intention of the Testatrix to make an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters is unequivocal. Secondly, the expression “after demise of my daughters the retained and remaining properties shall devolve on their female children only” does not stricto sensu amount to a bequest contrary to the one made earlier in favour of the daughters of the Testatrix. The expression extracted above does not detract from the absolute nature of the bequest in favour of the daughters. All that the Testatrix intended to achieve by the latter part of clause 6 was the devolution upon their female offsprings all such property as remained available in the hands of the legatees at the time of their demise. There would obviously be no devolution of any such property upon the female offsprings in terms of the said clause if the legatees decided to sell or gift the property bequeathed to them as indeed they had every right to do under the terms of the bequest. Seen thus, there is no real conflict between the absolute bequest which the first part of clause 6 of the Will makes and the second part of the said clause which deals with devolution of what and if at all anything that remains in the hands of the legatees.”
III. Madhuri Ghosh v. Debobroto Dutta AIR 2016 SC 5242(Two Judge Bench): The testator bequeathed his property jointly to his wife and daughter. It was provided that in the event of the death of his wife the property would stand vested with the daughter as “exclusive owner”; and, in the event of the death of his daughter the property would stand vested with the wife as “exclusive owner”. Thereafter, it was provided that various other lineal descendants would become owners of specified parts of the property. The Apex Court held that the will provided for ‘absolute’ bequest and not ‘limited interest’. Therefore, the direction that the lineal descendants would become owners of specified parts had no effect. The Court relied on Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad (2002) 2 SCC 468.
Analysis of the Above Three Decisions
Following doubts, legitimately, come up for Consideration:
The common law in India requires reading the whole document, and give effect to the provisions on a harmonious interpretation. The apparent conflict mooted in the above cases can be harmonised on reading the document as a whole.
Illustrations in Sections 24 and 27 make it clear that Indian law recognises ‘vested remainder’ and ‘contingent remainder‘. (See illustrations given in these Sections.)
It is also beyond doubt that such a transfer is not hit by Sec. 10 and 11 of the TP Act; inasmuch as Sec. 10 and 11 cumber only when ‘conditions’ impose ‘Absolute Restraint’ or ‘Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’. It does not invite Sec. 138 of the Indian Succession Act also, for the same reasons.
Following decisions relied on in Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727 (and the subsequent decisions followed it) were not applicable in the fact-situation (that emerged) inasmuch as they dealt with independent earlier transfers; and not two parts of the same deed. The decisions are:
Ramkishore lal v. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890 (Constitution Bench)
Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR 1959 SC 24 (three judge bench)
It is noteworthy that the Apex Court (in Mauleshwar Mani – in the matter of a Will) considered cases (Ramkishore lal and Radha Sundar Dutta) in which Sec. 11, TP Act is attracted- for Sec. 138 of the Indian Succession Act is pari materia to Sec. 11 of the TP Act.
In K. S. Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017 SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.) the joint Will executed by a couple created a Trust; but, it had been indicated that after the death of one of the spouse, the other (survivor) had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same. Certain alienations were made by the wife after death of the husband. Our apex Court held as under:
“49. The intention in testamentary disposition has to be primarily found out from the actual words used in the Will. The court is not entitled to ignore clear words or add something of its own or dilute the meaning of any clear word used in the Will. The solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention.”
57. We, thus, are of the view that giving absolute right to the survivorduring his lifetime to deal with the properties in no manner cannot be said to be right given in disregard of object of trust. The charitable purpose of the Will is not lost even if survivor is given absolute right.”
Why Ramkishore lal and Radha Sundar Dutta Do Not Apply
In Ramkishore lal v. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890 (Constitution Bench), dealt with the matter of a partition-award and the question arose was as to independent earlier dedication of property to a temple. It was held as under:
“We are inclined to agree with the contention of the learned Attorney-General that Mr. Bagchi’s award gives the property to Ramsaran Lal absolutely with only a charge on the property for the expenses of the temple and did not make an absolute dedication of the village to the temple. We are of opinion however that Mr. Bagchi’s award can have no legal effect in respect of thededication already made. Once an absolute dedication of the property had been made in December 1896 in favour of Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple the former owners of the property had no legal authority to go behind that dedication.”
Similarly, in Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR 1959 SC 24 (three judge bench), considered was an independent earliergrant. It was held as under:
“But it is open to the parties to agree that the Chaukidari Chakaran lands should form a new and distinct Patni, and the result of such an agreement will be that while the grantee will hold those lands in Patni right, that is to say, the tenure will be permanent, heritable and alienable so far as his liability to pay jama and the corresponding right of the Zamindar to sell it under the Regulation if there is any default in the payment thereof are concerned, the now grant will be an entity by itself independent of the original Patni.”
‘Reconciliation of Apparent Inconsistent Provisions’ and ‘Repugnant Provisions’
As stated already, if only there is irreconcilable inconsistencybetween two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – that is, in earlier clause, property was given to A; latter clause, to B – whereby a harmonious interpretation is not possible) then only the principle, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away‘ (or, the last of two inconsistent clauses prevails), be applied. It is emphasised by our Supreme Court (Constitution Bench consisting of BP Sinha (CJ), KC Das Gupta, PB Gajendragadkar, KN Wanchoo, JC Shah, JJ.) in Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain, AIR 1963 SC 890, as under:
“Sometimes it happens in the case of documents as regards disposition of properties, whether they are testamentary or non-testamentary instruments, that there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another. A familiar instance of this is where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion. What is to be done where this happens? It is well settled that in case of such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title already given (See: Sahebzada Mohd. Kamgar Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo, (1960) 3 SCR 604. It is clear, however, that an attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible. It is only when this is not possible, e.g, where an absolute title is given is in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void.” (quoted in : H B Yeshwant Rao Ghorpade v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bangalore, AIR 1967 SC 135)
In Ramachandra Shenoy v. Mrs. Hilda Brite, AIR 1964 SC 1323, our Apex Court (N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, JJ) observed with respect to a will as under:
“5. If the said Julia does not marry or if she has no issues, the said Julia should enjoy the said property up to her death and thereafter this property of mine should be enjoyed by my eldest daughter, Severina Obina Coelho and after her by her male descendants with permanent rights”.
“It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interest, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will. It if for this reason that where there is a bequest to A even though it be in terms apparently absolute followed by a gift of the same to B absolutely “on” or “after” or “at” A’s death, A is prima facie held to take a life interest and B an interest in remainder, the apparently absolute interest of A being cut down to accommodate the interest created in favour of B.”
It is held in Navneet Lal alias Rangi v. Gokul, AIR 1976 SC 794, as under:
“It is one of the cardinal principles of construction ofwills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy,so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will.”
In K. S. Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017 SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.), Palaniappa Chettiar and his wife by registered Will created a Trust. The Will indicated that after the death of one of the testators, the survivor had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same. Certain alienations were made by Rangammal after death of Palaniappa Chettiar. Relying on Navneet Lal alias Rangi v. Gokul, AIR 1976 SC 794 it is held that the solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention. The Court held as under:
“57. We, thus, are of the view that giving absolute right to the survivor during his lifetime to deal with the properties in no manner cannot be said to be right given in disregard of object of trust. The charitable purpose of the Will is not lost even if survivor is given absolute right. The obligation of survivor to act in furtherance of object as agreed by both the testators survives and binds the survivor. Although the Will was irrevocable after the death of survivor but the Will expressly granted absolute right to survivor.”
PART – 5
‘Absolute‘ Transfer/Bequest alone attracts S. 11 TP Act & S. 138 Sucn. Act
(S. 11 TP Act & S. 138 Succession Act are Pari Materia. The doctrine of Pari Materia is a useful tool employed in interpretation of statutes that reign to gain same objective. See: Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association v. Administrative Officer, 2004-1 SCC 755)
Sec. 11 of the TP Act (Restriction repugnant to Absolute interest created) cautions that the terms, in an absolute transfer, that direct enjoyment of interest in a particular manner, is invalid. It reads:
“Where transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.”
S. 138 of the Succession Act says the same thing as under:
“Where a fund is bequeathed absolutely to or for the benefit of any person, but the will contains a direction that it shall be applied or enjoyed in a particular manner, the legatee shall be entitled to receive the fund as if the will had contained no such direction.”
The law on this point is eruditely explained in Rajinder Singh Chowdhary v. Sardar Manjit Singh Chowdhary, AIR 2002 Del 135 (Vijender Jain, J.). The facts of the case, in a nutshell, are the following:
(a) The father of the parties executed a Willbequeathing all his properties in favour of his wife ‘as the sole and absolute(in the sense, saleable) owner with full powers of disposal in any manner she likes’.
(b) The will further provided how the properties were to be distributed ‘in case she expires intestate and without disposing of the properties’.
(c) The mother died intestate.
It was contended by the plaintiff that the bequest to the mother was ‘absolute‘ and anything which was repugnant to the absolute bequest was void and inconsequential under Section 138 of Indian Succession Act.
Plaintiffs relied on
Gopala Menon v. Sivaraman Nair, AIR 1979 SC 1345
Lalit Mohan Mondal v. Profulla Kumar Mondal, AIR 1982 Cal 52.
Shantilal babubhai v. Bai Chhani, AIR 1973 Gujarat 146,
The defendants contended that will had to be read as a whole and different parts of the will should be considered harmoniously. The defendants further contended that provision of Section 138 of the Act was not applicable to the present case and further contended that even if there was inconsistency, Section 88 of the Indian succession Act saves such inconsistency as the last clause prevails. Section 88 of the Indian succession Act reads: “The last of two inconsistent clauses prevails. Where two clauses of gifts in a will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail.”
“The principles enunciated in Gopala Menon s case (supra), Shantilal Babubhai (supra) and Lalit Mohan Mondal s case (supra) are well established principles that once a bequest has been made which is absolute and anything which is inconsistent would be repugnant and that has to be ignored.
But can it be said that the present case while interpreting the will at hand in view of the concern and anxiety of the testator with regard to his two sons and his intention to bequeath the property after the demise of Smt. Ved Kaur and words which are used signifying the concern and well being of aforesaid two sons are superfluous it is in this context court has to see as to whether bequest made in favour of Smt. Ved Kaur was absolute?
The answer is in the negative.
From the well laid down principle regarding interpretation of will and harmonious construction of the same, I hold that what was intended by the testator was to create a life estate in favour of Smt. Ved Kaur and not an absolute interest. The issue is answered accordingly.”
‘Inconsistency’ and ‘absolute transfer’
‘Inconsistency’ and ‘absolute transfer’ are explained in Sec. 88 of the Indian Succession Act. First illustration reads as under:
“The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.”
Theory of ‘Dominant Intention’
The will considered in Ramasreenivasa Iyengar v. Padmasani Ammal, (1973) 1 MLJ 34, provided that the two daughters of the testator should take the properties in equal shares with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights, but the share of the lady without issues would, however, after her death, be taken by the daughter with issues along with her children. It was found that the testator intended only a life estate if no issue to anyone. It was held that the dominant intention was to preserve the estate to his grandchildren.
Deeds must be read as a whole
House of Lords (Lord Davey) in North-Eastern Railway Company v. Hastings, (1900) AC 260, held as under:
“The deed must be read as a whole in order to ascertain the true meaning of its several clauses, and the words of each clause should be so interpreted as to bring them into harmony with the other provisions of the deed if that interpretation does no violence to the meaning of which they are naturally susceptible.”
After quoting the House of Lords, our Supreme Court held in Provash Chandra Dalui v. Biswanath Banerjee, AIR1989 SC 1834, as under:
“In construing a contract the Court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the Court can do about it. In the construction of a written instrument’ it is legitimate in order to ascertain the true meaning of the words used and if that be doubtful it is legitimate to have regard to the circumstances surrounding their creation and the subject matter to which it was designed and intended they should apply.”
After referring Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi, 1996 Ker HC 1200, and Kokilambal v. N. Raman. AIR 2005 SC 2468, it is observed in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36) that there is no straight jacket formula to ascertain the nature of interest created and that each case depends upon the facts of that case and the deed that comes up for interpretation.
If only ‘Absolute Transfer’ or ‘Irreconcilable Inconsistency’, the doctrine ‘once granted cannot be taken away’, applied
Same principles as to ‘irreconcilable inconsistency’ apply to ‘absolute’ transfer, when the doctrine, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away’, is applied.
The Supreme Court has explained in Sahebzeda Mohammad Kamgarh Singh v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb, AIR1960 SC 953, that if only there is irreconcilable inconsistency between two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – that is, in earlier clause, property was given to A; latter clause, to B – whereby a harmonious interpretation is not possible) then only the principle, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away‘, be applied.
“The task being to ascertain the intention of the parties, the cases have laid down that that intention has to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves. In doing so the parties must be presumed to have used the words in their strict grammatical sense. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be out down by later clause. Where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the Court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantor’s document it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee.”
PART – 6
‘Absolute‘ Transfer with stipulation: ‘if property remains’ on death of transferee, it will go to another – If Valid?
Yes.
Following important points gain consideration in this regard:
In Indian practice, though the words used in the deeds might be ‘absolute transfer’, on a true construction, on a reading of entire document, it might only be a salable/transferable right during life time; and the left-over property might be given to another.
The common law in India requires reading the whole document altogether, and give effect to the document on a harmonious interpretation, rather than giving effect to the legal terms used in a deed.
Illustrations in Sections 24 and 27 of the TP Act make it clear that Indian law recognises ‘vested remainder‘ and ‘contingent remainder‘ (as detailed in the notes above).
It is also beyond doubt that such a transfer is not hit by Sec. 10 and 11 of the TP Act; inasmuch as Sec. 10 and 11 cumber only when ‘conditions’ impose ‘Absolute Restraint’ or ‘Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’.
First illustration in Sec. 88 of the Indian Succession Act reads as under:
“The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.”
Various court decisions make it clear that one can validly transfer or bequeath a property to another, with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights, with the stipulation that after that (first) transferee’s lifetime, if whole or any part remains, it (contingent remainder) may go to another.
In K. S. Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017 SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.), Palaniappa Chettiar and his wife by registered Will created a Trust. The Will indicated that after the death of one of the testators, the survivor had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same. Certain alienations were made by Rangammal after death of Palaniappa Chettiar. It is held as under:
“49. The intention in testamentary disposition has to be primarily found out from the actual words used in the Will. The court is not entitled to ignore clear words or add something of its own or dilute the meaning of any clear word used in the Will. The solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention. On the reading of the Will, the intendment of testator/testatrix is clear that survivor shall have absolute right of enjoyment of properties. There is no reason not to give effect to said intendment on the ground that the testator and testatrix have mutually intended to set apart the property for charity and holding that survivor shall have right of disposition be not in the interest of the trust.”
Other Erudite Decisions on the Topic
In Sanford v. Sanford, (1901) 1 Ch. 939, the gift to the wife conferred a power of disposal limited explicitly to her lifetime. But, the gift-over to sonwas of a quite absolute estate. The gift did not include a power of disposition by will, but allowed power of disposition inter vivos. It was provided in the gift deed that if any property remained at her death it was to pass ‘from father to son, from generation to generation’. Therefore, it was held that the widow was conferred with only a limited right; and the gift-over, which was ‘the will of the testator’ was to ‘settle its destination’. (This decision is referred to in Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, 1976-2 MLJ 381.)
In Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381, the Madras High Court rendered a well-read decision in this topic. The facts of this case, in a nutshell, are as under:
(i) The settlement deed considered in the case provided:
(a) the wife of the settlor should enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights.
(b) the respondent should take the properties remained at the time of her death, with absolute rights.
(ii) the appellant contended that the clause providing for the respondent taking absolutely such of the properties as at the time of the death of the settler’s wife was repugnant to the earlier clause conferring an absolute estate on her, and has, therefore, to be ignored as void.
(iii) the respondent contended that if the settlement deed had to be read as a whole and the effect would be:
there was no absolute transfer to the wife of the settler as stated in Sec. 11 of the TP Act.
It is seen that the High Court accepted the contentions of the respondent that the settlement deed was to be read as a whole and that the respondent had taken absolutely such of the properties covered by the settlement deed as remained undisposed of by the settlee, the wife of the settlor; as she had only a right to enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) powers of disposal during her lifetime. The clause as to acquiring property by respondent was not repugnant and void.
The High Court relied on the following cases. The facts of these were ‘very near’ to the facts of that case.
Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247,
Ramasreenivasa Iyengar v. Padmasani Ammal, (1973) 1 MLJ 34.
In Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247, it was held, as regards a Will, as under:
“After giving an absolute estate to his wife over the two items of scheduled properties, he provided that these scheduled properties, after the wife’s lifetime should devolve – item 1 on the first daughter and item 2 on the second daughter – who would have absolute rights. When the testator took care to indicate that the properties without any distinction even after his wife’s lifetime should go to each of the daughters, it should be presumed that it was clearly in his mind that the wife’s estate was only to be a limited estate or life estate, and not an absolute one.” (Quoted in: Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381).
In law, preemption is the right of a person to (re)purchase an immovable property (which has been sold to another) without a regular sale deed – but, merely by substituting the name of (re)purchaser in the sale deed.
In Audh Bihari Singh v. Gajadhar,AIR 1954 SC 417,our Apex Court (BKMukherjea, J.) accepted the actual practice as to pre-emption explained in the decision, Govinda Dayal v. Inayatulla, ILR 7 A1l 775, which reads as under:
“It (right of pre-emption) is simply a right of substitution entitling the preemptor by means of a legal incident to which the sale itself was subject, to stand in the shoes of the vendee, in respect of the rights and obligations arising from the sale under which he has derived his title. It is in effect, as if in a sale deed, the vendee’s name was rubbed out and the pre- emptors’s name was substituted in his place.”
The other view is that a trespasser also is entitled for injunction (even against the true owner), for, he cannot be evicted otherwise than on “due process of law” (by the true owner).
See: Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, 2004-1 SCC 769 (Three Judge Bench).
Legal principles have to be evolved and an authoritative judicial pronouncement has to be penned-down taking note of conflicting views on this subject and laying down cogent and rationale reasoning.
It is not necessary for the person claiming injunction, to prove his title.
It would suffice if he can prove his lawful possession and that his possession is invaded or threatened to be invaded (Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, 2004-1 SCC 769).
Usually, Injunction is not ordered against a true owner.
It is not passed to favour a trespasser or a person in unlawful possession.
Person in ‘lawful possession’ may get injunction even against true owner – not to disposes, except in due process of law; But, Not After Cancellation (by Court) of the Sale Deed he relied (2022 SCC OnLine SC 258).
Possession is a Substantive Right
Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law. It is heritable and transferable.
Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179;
Phirayalal Kapur v. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186;
Nallammal v. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864).
Injunction is a Possessory Remedy
It is trite law that courts protect settled possession. It is trite law that courts protect settled possession. Person claiming injunction, need to prove Lawful Possession only.
Ladies Corner, Bangalore vs State of Karnataka, ILR 1987 Kar 1710, 1987 (1) KarLJ 402.
Patil Exhibitors (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Corporation of The City (M Venikatachaliah, J.) : AIR 1986 Kar 194, ILR 1985 Kar 3700, 1985 (2) KarLJ 533.
Chetak Constructions Vs. Om Prakash, AIR 2003 MP 145
Rame Gowda Case –Person claiming injunction, Need to prove Lawful Possession only
The law on these subjects are clearly laid down in Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, 2004-1 SCC 769. Following were the fact situation of the case:
The suit filed by the plaintiff was based on his title.
Declaration of title was not sought for though it was in dispute.
The defendant contended that (i) the suit being based on title and (ii) the plaintiff failed in proving his title, the suit should be dismissed without regard to (a) the fact that the plaintiff was in possession and (b) ‘whether the defendant had succeeded in proving his title or not’.
Our Apex Court held that there was no merit in the contentions of the defendant and observed that no one would be permitted to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court, as the law respects possession even if there is no title to support it.
Finally it was held that it was not necessary for the person claiming injunction, to prove his title to the suit land, and it would suffice if he proved that he was in lawful possession of the same and that his possession was invaded or threatened to be invaded by a person who has no title thereof. Our Apex Court held as under:
“Salmond states in Jurisprudence (Twelfth Edition),
“few relationships are as vital to man as that of possession, and we may expect any system of law, however primitive, to provide rules for its protection. . . . . . . Law must provide for the safeguarding of possession. Human nature being what it is, men are tempted to prefer their own selfish and immediate interests to the wide and long-term interests of society in general. But since an attack on a man’s possession is an attack on something which may be essential to him, it becomes almost tantamount to an assault on the man himself; and the possessor may well be stirred to defend himself with force. The result is violence, chaos and disorder.” (at pp. 265, 266).
“In English Law possession is a good title of right against anyone who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who takes his own, may be forced in this way to restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law.” (Salmond, ibid, pp. 294-295)
“Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit).” (Salmond, ibid, p.295)
The law in India, as it has developed, accords with the jurisprudential thought as propounded by Salmond. In Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and Ors. 1924 PC 144, Sir John Edge summed up the Indian law by stating that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court.
The thought has prevailed incessantly, till date, the last and latest one in the chain of decisions being Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani (2003) 7 SCC 350. In-between, to quote a few out of severals, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his legal representative Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh and others (1968) 2 SCR 203, this Court has held that a landlord did commit trespass when he forcibly entered his own land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. The Court turned down the submission that under the general law applicable to a lessor and a lessee there was no rule or principle which made it obligatory for the lessor to resort to Court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee. The court quoted with approval the law as stated by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Yar Mohammad Vs. Lakshmi Das (AIR 1959 All. 1,4),
“Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause.”
In the oft- quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. K.C. Alexander and Ors. (1968) 3 SCR 163, this Court held that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. The court quoted Loft’s maxim ‘Possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis (He that hath possession hath right against all but him that hath the very right)’ and said,
“A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff’s and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time”.
In M.C. Chockalingam and Ors. Vs. V. Manickavasagam and Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 48, this Court held that the law forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title. In Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his Lrs. Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao (1989) 4 SCC 131, it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs. Jagat Singh, Advocate (1995) 3 SCC 426, this Court held that disputed questions of title are to be decided by due process of law, but the peaceful possession is to be protected from the trespasser without regard to the question of the origin of the possession. When the defendant fails in proving his title to the suit land the plaintiff can succeed in securing a decree for possession on the basis of his prior possession against the defendant who has dispossessed him. Such a suit will be founded on the averment of previous possession of the plaintiff and dispossession by the defendant.
It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of he cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.
It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of decisions.
Illustratively, we may refer to Munshi Ram and Ors. Vs. Delhi Administration (1968) 2 SCR 455, Puran Singh and Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 518 and Ram Rattan and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1977) 1 SCC 188. The authorities need not be multiplied.
In Munshi Ram & Ors.’s case (supra), it was held that no one, including the true owner, has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But merely stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession, extending over a sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than is necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as resistance to an intrusion upon his possession which has never been lost. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. In Puran Singh and Ors.’s case (supra), the Court clarified that it is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. The ‘settled possession’ must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase ‘settled possession’ does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a strait-jacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession. The court laid down the following tests which may be adopted as a working rule for determining the attributes of ‘settled possession’:
i) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period;
ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case;
iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced to by the true owner; and
iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession.
In the cases of Munshi Ram and Ors. (supra) and Puran Singh and Ors. (supra), the Court has approved the statement of law made in Horam Vs. Rex AIR 1949 Allahabad 564, wherein a distinction was drawn between the trespasser in the process of acquiring possession and the trespasser who had already accomplished or completed his possession wherein the true owner may be treated to have acquiesced in; while the former can be obstructed and turned out by the true owner even by using reasonable force, the latter, may be dispossessed by the true owner only by having recourse to the due process of law for re-acquiring possession over his property.
In the present case the Court has found the plaintiff as having failed in proving his title. Nevertheless, he has been found to be in settled possession of the property. Even the defendant failed in proving his title over the disputed land so as to substantiate his entitlement to evict the plaintiff. The Trial Court therefore left the question of title open and proceeded to determine the suit on the basis of possession, protecting the established possession and restraining the attempted interference therewith. The Trial Court and the High Court have rightly decided the suit. It is still open to the defendant-appellant to file a suit based on his title against the plaintiff-respondent and evict the latter on the former establishing his better right to possess the property.”
Finally, the Supreme Court held as under:
“In Kallappa Rama Londa’s case, the learned Single Judge has upheld the maintainability of a suit merely seeking injunction, without declaration of title, and on dealing with several decided cases the learned Judge has agreed with the proposition that where the suit for declaration of title and injunction is filed and the title is not clear, the question of title will have to be kept open without denying the plaintiff’s claim for injunction in view of the fact that the plaintiff has been in possession and there is nothing to show that the plaintiff has gained possession by any unfair means just prior to the suit. That is the correct position of law. In Fakirbhai Bhagwandas and Anr. Vs. Maganlal Haribhai and Anr. AIR 1951 Bombay 380 a Division Bench spoke through Bhagwati, J. (as his Lordship then was), and held that it is not necessary for the person claiming injunction to prove his title to the suit land. It would suffice if he proves that he was in lawful possession of the same and that his possession was invaded or threatened to be invaded by a person who has no title thereof. We respectfully agree with the view so taken.”
In Kantappa v. Krishnabai, AIR 1995 Kant 213, a decision of the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court (consisting of M.N. Venkatachaliah and N.R. Kudoor, JJ.), has held as under:
“An intending transferee under a contract for sale of immovable property, who is put in possession of the properly in part performance of the contract, can as a plaintiff bring an action for the possessory remedy of an injunction in protection of his possession against the transferor”. (Quoted in Chetak Constructions Vs. Om Prakash, AIR 2003 MP 145)
CHANGE IN THE VIEW OF THE APEX COURT
A person may get injunction against true owner – not to disposes, except in due process of law, If in ‘lawful possession’;
But, Not After Cancellation of the Sale Deed (by Court) he relied on.
Our Apex Court held in Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji vs Maniben Jagmalbhai: 2022-2 RCR (Civil) 395; 2022 SCC OnLine SC 258 (M.R. Shah, B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.) as under:
“9.3 In the case of A. Subramanian Vs. R. Pannerselvam, (2021) 3 SCC 675, it is observed by this Court that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction and/or protect his possession against the rightful owner, more particularly, when he fails to get the declaratory relief and the dispute with respect to the title comes to an end.
10. Now, so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Anathula Sudhakar (supra) by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff in support of his submission that in a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant to interfere with the plaintiff’s possession, the only thing the plaintiff will have to establish is that as on the date of the suit, he was in lawful possession of the suit property and the defendant has tried to interfere or disturb his possession is concerned, what is observed by this Court in paragraph 15 is the “lawful possession” of the plaintiff. In the present case the plaintiff, who has failed to get any declaratory relief and the defendant No.1 is held to be a true and absolute owner on the basis of the registered sale deed on payment of full sale consideration thereafter the plaintiff’s possession cannot be said to be “lawful possession”. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any permanent injunction against the true owner in the instant case.
“11.1 … Where once a suit is held not maintainable, no relief of injunction can be granted. Injunction may be granted even against the true owner of the property, only when the person seeking the relief is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the property and also legally entitled to be in possession, not to disposes him, except in due process of law.
12. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the plaintiff that even if the plaintiff failed to get the declaratory relief and relief for cancellation of registered sale deed and her suit for the said reliefs came to be dismissed and the plaintiff is found to be in possession and therefore, the only remedy available to the defendant No.1 would be to file a substantive suit to get back the possession is noticed only to be rejected outright. It is the contention on behalf of the plaintiff that once the plaintiff is found to be in possession, her possession cannot be disturbed except in due process of law and the defendant No.1 though may be the true owner has to file a substantive suit for recovery of possession. While considering the aforesaid submission, the decision of this Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes Vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370 is required to be referred to. What is meant by due process of law has been explained by this court in paragraph 79, which reads as under:-
“79. Due process of law means that nobody ought to be condemned unheard. The due process of law means a person in settled possession will not be dispossessed except by due process of law. Due process means an opportunity to the defendant to file pleadings including written statement and documents before the court of law.
It does not mean the whole trial. Due process of law is satisfied the moment rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a competent court.”
In the said decision, this Court has approved the following findings of the High Court of Delhi in Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. Vs. Hotel Imperial (2006) 88 DRJ 545:-
“28. The expressions ‘due process of law’, ‘due course of law’ and ‘recourse to law’ have been interchangeably used in the decisions referred to above which say that the settled possession of even a person in unlawful possession cannot be disturbed ‘forcibly’ by the true owner taking law in his own hands. All these expressions, however, mean the same thing—ejectment from settled possession can only be had by recourse to a court of law.
Clearly, ‘due process of law’ or ‘due course of law’, here, simply mean that a person in settled possession cannot be ejected without a court of law having adjudicated upon his rights qua the true owner.
Now, this ‘due process’ or ‘due course’ condition is satisfied the moment the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the action to court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in unlawful possession. It could be the person who is sought to be ejected, in an action preventing the owner from ejecting him. Whether the action is for enforcement of a right (recovery of possession) or protection of a right (injunction against dispossession), is not of much consequence. What is important is that in either event it is an action before the court and the court adjudicates upon it. If that is done then, the ‘bare minimum’ requirement of ‘due process’ or ‘due course’ of law would stand satisfied as recourse to law would have been taken. In this context, when a party approaches a court seeking a protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails in setting up a good case, can it then say that the other party must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing his rights i.e. for taking back something from the first party who holds it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the injunction action must grant an injunction anyway? I would think not. In any event, the ‘recourse to law’ stipulation stands satisfied when a judicial determination is made with regard to the first party’s protective action. Thus, in the present case, the plaintiff’s failure to make out a case for an injunction does not mean that its consequent cessation of user of the said two rooms would have been brought about without recourse to law.”
12.1 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision to the facts of the case on hand and once the rights of the parties are adjudicated and the defendant No.1 is held to be the true owner on the basis of the registered sale deed and on payment of full sale consideration, it can be said that due process of law has been followed and thereafter the plaintiff is not entitled to any permanent injunction against the true owner.
13. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated above, all the Courts below have erred in granting permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant No.1, who is the true owner. After having held that the plaintiff had no title and after dismissing the suit qua the cancellation of the registered sale deed and the declaration, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief of permanent injunction against defendant No.1 – the true owner.”
Note: It is not specifically stated in this decision (Prahladji Chenaji v. Maniben Jagmalbhai) that one can resume possession using force.
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act allows one to file a suit for recovery of property, on the strength of his prior possession, if he had lost his possession within 6 months of the suit. In such a case, he need not prove his title; and he can succeed on establishing that he has been dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law within six months.
Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 reads as under:
6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.
(1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit.
(2) No suit under this section shall be brought
(a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or
(b) against the Government.
(3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.
(4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.
If Title not Perfected by Adver. Posn, Can one eject a Trespasser After 6 Months
High Courts differ, as pointed out in Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179.
Now it is settled that if one fails to exercise his option by filing a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act within six months, he is at liberty to file a suit to recover his possession (with or without declaration) by a regular suit for recovery of possession. It can be based on title or on his possession in assumed or presumed character of ownership (even if title not perfected by doctrine of adverse possession) on the principle that possession is good title against all the world but the rightful owner.
The law on this matter is laid down in detail in Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179. It is observed as under:
“6.Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law and has legal incidents attached to it apart from ownership. Even before the acquisition of statutory title by adverse possession for the requisite period under the Limitation Act, the possessory owner has well defined rights in property. It is now settled beyond all dispute that this interest is heritable, devisable and transferable. This interest is referred to as possessory title as distinct from proprietary title. A person having such interest must be allowed to enforce those rights against all the world except those who have a better title or better right than himself.
Salmond on Jurisprudence, Eleventh edition, observes at page 345 :
“In English law possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself.”
and at pages 473 and 474 it is observed:
“On the other hand, the thing of which possession is taken may already be the property of some one else. In this case the title acquired by possession is good, indeed, against all third persons, but is of no validity at all against the true owner. Possession, even when consciously wrongful, is allowed as a title of right against all persons who cannot show a better, because a prior title in themselves. Save with respect to the rights of the original proprietor, my rights to the watch in my pocket are much the same whether. I bought it honestly, or found it, or abstracted it from the pocket of some one else. If it is stolen from me, the law will help me to the recovery of it. I can effectually sell it, lend it, give it away, or bequeath it, and it will go on my death intestate to my next of kin. Whoever acquires it from me, however, acquires in general nothing save my limited and imperfect title to it, and holds if, as I do, subject to the superior claims of the original owner.
XX XX XX
If a possessory owner is wrongfully deprived of the thing by a person other than the true owner he can recover it. For the defendant cannot set up as a defence his own possessory title since it is later than and consequently inferior to, the possessory title of the plaintiff. Nor can he set up as a defence the title of the true owner–the jus tertii as it is called; the plaintiff has a better, because an earlier, title than the defendant, and it is irrelevant that the title of some other person, not a party to the suit, is better still. The expediency of this doctrine of possessory ownership is clear. Were it not for such a rule, force and fraud would be left to determine all disputes as to possession, between persons of whom neither could show an unimpeachable title to the thing as the true owner of it.”
Pollock & Wright in their book ‘Possession in the Common Law’ expressed themselves thus at page 91:
“Existing possession, however acquired, is protected against any interference by a mere wrongdoer; and the wrongdoer cannot defend himself by showing a better title than the plaintiff’s in some third person though or under whom he docs not himself claim or justify. ‘Any possession is a legal possession‘–i.e. lawful and maintainable–against a wrong doer.”
and at page 95:
“It would be possible at first sight to suppose that, as between a succession of independent occupiers who were all wrongdoers as against the true owner, the law must be indifferent, with the result of conferring an absolute title upon the person who happens to he in possession when the time of limitation expires. Reflection, however, shows this to be contrary to the reason and principles of the law. Possession being once admitted to be a root of title, every possession must create a title which, as against all subsequent intruders, has all the incidents and advantages of a true title. In the language of the modern authorities, ‘Possession is good title‘– nothing less–‘against all but the true owner‘.”
7. The English doctrine of possessory title is expressed in the following terms by Cockburn, C. J., in Asher v. Whitelock, (1865) 35 LJQB 17:
“I take it to be established by authority that possession is good against all the world except the person who can show a better title than the one in possession Doe d Hughes v. Dyeball, (1829 Moo & M 346) shews that possession, even for a year, is sufficient against a mere subsequent possession. The whole law of disseisin was founded upon the principle that the desseisin gives title to the disorder against all the world but the disseisee.”
8. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Perry v. Clissold, 1907 AC 73 at p. 79 decided:
“It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the Statute of Limitations applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.”
9. The above is certainly the doctrine of English Law. The rule of English Law that possession is good title against all but the true owner has been adopted by the decisions of the Indian High Courts and also by the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Councilin the Indian cases. In Khajah Enaetoollah Chowdhry v. Kishen Soondur Surma, (1867) 8 Suth WR 386 at pp. 387 and 388, Dwarkanath Mitter, J. posed the question thus:
”Can the Civil Courts give a decree for immovable property on the bare ground of illegal dispossession in a suit brought after six months from the date of such dispossession, it being borne in mind, however, that the defendant has failed to prove his own title to the same?”
and answered the same in the following terms:
But we do not see any reason why a mere wrongful dispossess or should require proof from his adversary of anything beyond the illegal dispossession complained of. He himself has not got and never had any title to the land. The act of dispossession committed by him has been entirely without any sanction from law. Justice and equity require that he should be compelled to restore the party wronged by him to the same position which the latter enjoyed before the dale of the illegal ejectment. To adopt the contrary view appears to us to be tantamount to holding out a premium in favour of wrong and violence”
and in Hari v. Dhondi, (1906) 8 Bom LR 96 Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C. J. said:
“Possession is evidence of ownership, and is itself the foundation of a right to possession.”
and Subramania Ayyar, J. in Mustapha Saheb v. Santha Pillai, (1900) ILR 23 Mad 179 at p. 182 said:
“that the rule of law that a party ousted by a person who has no better right is, with reference to the person so ousting, entitled to recover by virtue of the possession he had held before the ouster even though that “possession was without any title” is so firmly established as to render a lengthened discussion about it quite superfluous.”
10. In Sundar v. Parbati, (1890) ILR 12 All 61 (PC) decided by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the suit was for partition and recovery of possession filed by the junior widow of a deceased Hindu against the senior widow who denied the junior widow’s right to separate possession and contended that she was entitled to manage the whole estate. The Subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiff’s suit. A Bench of the Allahabad High Court reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the suit. Lord Watson delivering the Judgment of the hoard, observed at page 57:
“If it were necessary to determine the point, their Lordships would probably have little difficulty in accepting the opinion of the High Court that a Hindu Brahman cannot lawfully adopt his own sister’s son. But apart from that question, and also from any question touching the legal effect of Baldeo Sahai’s will the fact of joint possession by the two widows of the estates which belonged to the testator, ever since the death of Premsukh in 1879, appears to them to be sufficient for disposing of this suit in favour of the appellant. Their Lordships are at a loss to understand, at all event to appreciate, the grounds upon which the Chief Justice endeavours to differentiate between the authorities which he cites, the import of which he correctly states, and the position of the parties to this action. Their possession was lawfully attained, in this sense, that it was not procured by force or fraud, but peaceably, no one interested opposing. In these circumstances, it does not admit of doubt that they were entitled to maintain their possession against all coiners except the heirs of Premsukh or of Baldco Sahai, one or other of whom (it is unnecessary to say which) is the only person who can plead a preferable title. But neither of these possible claimants is in the field, and the widows have therefore, each of them, an estate or interest in respect of her possession, which cannot be impaired by the circumstance that they may have ascribed their possession to one or more other titles which do not belong to them. It is impossible to hold that a joint estate is not also partible; and their Lordships will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty that the judgment of the High Court ought to be reversed, and that of the Subordinate Judge restored.”
The above principle was reiterated by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghous, (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC). At page 843 their Lordships observed:
“It appears to their Lordships that there is here a misapprehension of the nature of the plaintiff’s case upon the facts stated in the judgment. The possession of the plaintiff was sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant. By Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (Act 1 of 1877), if the plaintiff had been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, he could, by a suit instituted within six months from the date of the dispossession, have recovered possession, notwithstanding any other title that might be set up in such suit. If he could thus recover possession from a person who might be able to prove a title, it is certainly right and just that he should be able, against a person who has no title and is a mere wrongdoer, to obtain a declaration of title as owner, and an injunction to restrain the wrong-doer from interfering with his possession. Die Appellate Court, in accordance with the judgment above quoted, has dismissed the suit. Consequently, the defendant may continue to wilfully, improperly and illegally interferes with the plaintiff’s possession, as the learned Judge say he has done, and the plaintiff has no remedy. Their Lordships are of opinion that the suit should not have been dismissed; and that the plaintiff was entitled in it to a declaration of his title to the land.”
The principle underlying the rule that possession is a good title against all the world except the person who can show a better title is staled thus in Narayana Row v. Dharma-char, (1903) ILR 26 Mad 514 at p. 518:
“The principle underlying the rule of law in question seems to be that acquisition of title by operation of the law of limitation being a lawful mode of acquiring title, the person in peaceable possession is entitled to maintain such possessionagainst all but the true owner and that therefore a third party who has no better title than the person in possession has no right to invade upon the possession of the latter and interrupt or arrest his lawful acquisition of title by his continuing to remain in possession for the statutory period. It is the true owner alone that is entitled to assert his title as against the person wrongfully in possession, and prevent such wrongful possession ripening into prescriptive title. But a third party who without deriving title under the true owner and without his authority, interrupts such possession before it has ripened into prescriptive title, is a trespasser, not only against the true owner, but also against the party actually in possession; and, subject to the law of limitation, either of them is entitled to maintain a suit in ejectment against such intruder as a trespasser.”
11. We are therefore of the view that a person in juridical possession, if dispossessed by a trespasser without title, can recover possession on the sole ground of his prior possession even beyond six months from the date of dispossession and this is enough to dispose of the second appeal.
12. But the learned advocate for the appellant relying on the decision in Nisa Chand Gaita v. Kanchiram Bagani, (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 submitted that mere previous possession for any period short of the statutory period of twelve years will not entitle a plaintiff to a decree for recovery of possession in a suit brought more than six months after dispossession, even if the defendant could not establish any title to the disputed land. The point which arose for decision in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 was whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree merely upon proof of previous possession for a period less than twelve years, on the ground that the defendant has established no title, the suit having been brought more than six months after the date of dispossession. (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) was distinguished thus:
“There (in 1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) the plaintiff was in possession when he brought his suit, whereas in the present case the plaintiff is out of possession. What the plaintiff asked for in the case of Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghous (1893-20 Cal 834 PC) was a decree declaring his right, and an injunction restraining the defendant from disturbing his possession; what the plaintiff asks for in this case is only recovery of possession; and what was said by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee with reference to the plaintiff’s right to obtain this relief is to be found in the following passage of their judgment:
“It appears to their Lordships that there is here a misapprehension of the nature of the plaintiff’s case upon the facts stated in the judgment. The possession of the plaintiff was sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant. By Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (1 of 1877), if the plaintiff had been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, he could by a suit instituted within six months from the date of the dispossession, have recovered possession, notwithstanding any other title that might be set up in such suit. If he could thus recover possession from a person who might be able to prove a title, it is certainly right and just that he should he able, against a person who has no title and is a mere wrongdoer, to obtain a declaration of title as owner, and an injunction to restrain the wrong-doer from interfering with his possession.”
This shows, as we understand the judgment, that the reason for their Lordships’ decision was this that as the plaintiff, had his position been rendered somewhat worse by his being dispossessed, could, by instituting a suit within six months for recovery of possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, have recovered possession even as against a person who might establish a better title, it was only right and just that if he brought his suit before he was dispossessed he could be declared entitled to retain possession as against a mere wrong-doer, and should obtain an injunction restraining the wrong-doer from interfering with his possession. But, though that was so in the case of a plaintiff who was in possession, and had, therefore, a possibility open to him of being restored to possession upon mere proof of possession, by instituting a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act upon being dis-possessed, it does not follow that it should be so in the case of a plaintiff who had been in possession, and allowed more than six months to elapse after his dispossession, and therefore, lost the possibility of recovering possession, by a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, upon mere proof of previous possession.”
13. Distinguishing (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) in the above manner, the Calcutta High Court in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 sought support for the dictum in the following observations of the Privy Council in J. P. Wise v. Ameerunnissa Khatoon, (1879-80) 7 Ind App 73 at p. 80 (PC):
“It is quite clear that the plaintiffs have failed to make out a title. The Defendants were put into possession by the Government, who were entitled to the lands, and they were ordered by the Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure to be retained in possession. If the Plaintiffs had wished to contend that the Defendants had been wrongfully put into possession and that the Plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the strength of their previous possession without entering into a question of title at all, they ought to have brought their action within six months under Section 15 of Act XIV of 1859; but they did not do so. The High Court, with reference to this point say (and in their Lordships’ opinion, correctly say) : “Further, de facto possession having been given to the Defendants under Section 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in accordance with the Deputy Collector’s award, the plaintiff will not be entitled to a decree until and unless he can show a better title to these lands than the Defendants. The fact that the Plaintiffs’ posses sion as regards B, C, and D was confirmed under Act IV of 1840, and that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 unsuccessfully endeavoured to dis-turb them by regular suit, does not bar the right of Government. Section 2 of Act IV of 1840 only affects persons concerned in the dispute. If Kalkini-hud belonged to a private individual he might have reduced into his own possession lands which had accreted to the estate and which undoubtedly were his. But lands to which he is unable to make out a title cannot he recovered on the ground of previous possession merely, except in a suit under Section 15 of Act XIV of 1859, which must be brought within six months from the time of that dispossession.”
The Calcutta High Court on an interpretation of (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) and (1879 80) 7 Ind App 73 (PC) has therefore taken the view that Section 9 of the Act operates as a bar to the institution of suits in which the claim for possession of any immovable property is based on anything but proprietary title.
14. On the other hand, the decision in (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) was relied on by the other High Courts for the position that possessory title can be made the foundation for suits in ejectment filed after six months from the date of dispossession against trespassers who have no title.
15. The effective answer to the basis of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 has been furnished by Subra-mania Ayyar and O’ Farrell JJ. in (1900) ILR 23 Mad 179 at p. 183. Subramania Ayyar, J. at page 183 observed:
“And with reference to the grounds on which decision in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 seems to rest, it is necessary to make but two observations. The first is that Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act cannot possibly be held to take away any remedy available with reference to the well-recognised doctrine expressed in Pollock and Wright on Possession thus:–Possession in law is a substantive right or interest which exists and has legal incidents and advantages apart from the true owners title, (at page 19). The second observation is that in (1879-80) 7 Ind App 73 (PC) relied on in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 the defendant had a better right than the plaintiff, since the possession of the former was authorised by the Government whose properly the land in dispute was and consequently nothing said by their Lordships in a case wherein such were the facts can rightly be con-strued as intended to lay down the law differently from what it bad been all along understood to be.” and O’ Farrell, J. observed:
“All the dictum of the Privy Council in (1879-80) 7 Ind App 73 (PC) appears to amount to is this, that where a plaintiff in possession without any title seeks to recover possession of which be has been forcibly deprived by a defendant having a good title, he can only do so under the provisions of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and not otherwise.”
16. The Madras High Court again in (1903) ILR 26 Mad 514 relying on (1893 ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) took the view that Section 9 of the Act is in no way inconsistent with the position that as against a wrong-doer, prior possession of the plaintiff in an action of ejectment is sufficient title, even if a suit is brought more than six months after the date of dispossession and the wrong-doer cannot successfully resist the suit by showing that the title and right to possession are in a third person, and a plea of jus tertii is no defence unless the defendant can show that the act complained of was done by authority of the true owner and it is immaterial however short or recent the plaintiff’s possession was. The only effect of Section 9 of the Act is that if a summary suit be brought within the time prescribed by that Section, the plaintiff therein who was dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law will be entitled to be reinstated even if the defendant who thus dispossessed him be the true owner or a person authorised by or claiming under him, but a decree in such a suit will not have the force of res judicata on the question of title.
17. We are in respectful agreement with the observations in (1900) ILR 23 Mad 179 and hold that the decision in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 has proceeded on an incorrect interpretation of the decisions in (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) and (1879-80) 7 Ind App 73 (PC):
18. There remains only to consider the decision of Mr. Justice Raman Nayar in Vasudeva Kurup v. Ammini Amma 1964 Ker LT 468 where it was held that a person in possession without title is entitled to remain in possession even as against the lawful owner until evicted in due course of law and is therefore entitled to get an order of injunction restraining the true owner from disturbing his possession. The right of a person in possession without title to get an injunction on the basis of possessory title against the true owner is not a point arising in the second appeal and we are not expressing any opinion on that aspect. The point decided in 1964 Ker L. T. 468 has no direct bearing on the question to be decided in the second appeal except that possessory title is recognised as the foundation of a claim for maintaining one’s possession. This only sup ports the view we are taking in this appeal.”
‘Possession is good against all but the True Owner’ & Sec. 6 of the Sp. Relief Act
The principle ‘Possession is Good against all but the True Owner’ is declared in Parry v. Clissold, (1907) AC 73. In this decision it was also pointed out that if the rightful owner did not come forward and assert his title within the period of limitation, his right would be extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.
The Supreme Court of India while accepting this principle in Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, pointed out that the law in India allows a plaintiff to maintain a possessory suit under Sec. 9 (preset Sec. 6) of the Specific Relief Act. Such a suit can be filed against a title holder, if he had dispossessed the plaintiff ‘otherwise than in due course of law’.
In Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, it is observed as under:
“17. … To express our meaning we may begin by reading 1907 AC 73 (Perry V. Clissold), to discover if the principle that possession is good against all but the true owner has in any way been departed from.
1907 AC 73 reaffirmed the principle by stating quite clearly:
“It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.”
Therefore, the plaintiff who was peaceably in possession was entitled to remain in possession and only the State could evict him. The action of the Society was a violent invasion of his possession and in the law as it stands in India the plaintiff could maintain a possessory suit under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act in which title would be immaterial or a suit for possession within 12 years in which the question of title could be raised.”
In Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813, our Apex Court explained the principle ‘possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better’ as under:
“9. The law in India, as it has developed, accords with jurisprudential thought as propounded by luminaries like Salmond. Salmond on Jurisprudence states:
“These two concepts of ownership and possession, therefore, may be used to distinguish between the de facto possessor of an object and its de jure owner, between the man who actually has it and the man who ought to have it. They serve also to contract the position of one whose rights are ultimate, permanent and residual with that of one whose rights are only of a temporary nature.
x x x x x
In English law possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who takes his own, may be forced in this way to restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law.
Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit).”
10. As far back as 1924, in the case of Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144, the learned Judge observed that in India, persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a court. Later, in the case of Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, this Court ruled that when the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. It was further held that if Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (corresponding to the present Section6) is employed, the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. When, however, the period of six months has passed, questions of title can be raised by the defendant, and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words, such a right is only restricted to possession in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (corresponding to the present Section 6) but does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years from the date of dispossession, and title need not be proved unless the defendant can provide one.
11. It was also observed by this Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. (supra) that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against the entire world except the rightful owner. In such a case, the defendant must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title and probably a possession prior to the plaintiff’s, and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time.”
Settled Possession and Established Possession
In A. Subramanian v. R. Pannerselvam, AIR 2021 SC 821, the Supreme Court held that even a trespasser, who is in established possession of the property could obtain injunction. But, it was cautioned that the matter would be different, if the plaintiff himself elaborated in the plaint about title dispute and fails to make a prayer for declaration of title along with injunction relief.
In Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813, it was pointed out in a case where there was no document to prove settled possession that ‘merely on doubtful material and cursory evidence, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was ever in possession of the property, and that too in settled possession’. It held further as under:
“13. The crux of the matter is that a person who asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. Settled possession means such possession over the property which has existed for a sufficiently long period of time, and has been acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. Settled possession must be (i) effective,(ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. There cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine settled possession. Occupation of a property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual legal possession. The possession should contain an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser is to be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case.”
Possessory title
In Somnath Barman v. Dr. S. P. Raju, AIR 1970 SC 846, 1969-3 SCC 129 (KS Hegde & JC Shah, JJ.), it was observed as under:
“In our opinion the possession of the plaintiff prior to 1945 is a good title against all but the true owner. The defendants who are mere trespassers cannot defeat the plaintiff’s lawful possession by ousting him from the suit property. Possessory title is a good title as against everybody other than the lawful owner. In Ismail’ Ariff v. Mohamed Ghouse(I.L.R.20 1.A.99), the Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that a person having possessory title can get a declaration that he was the owner of the land in suit and an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. Therein it was observed that the, possession of the plaintiff was a sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant.”
Possession is Good Title
In Somnath Barman v. Dr. S. P. Raju AIR 1970 SC 846, 1969-3 SCC 129 our Apex Court relied on Narayana Row v. Dharmachar, ILR XXVI Mad. 514, where the Madras High Court consisting of Bhashyam Ayyangar and Moore, JJ., held that possession was, under the Indian, as under the English law, good title against all but the true owner.
A Trespasser Cannot Resist Recovery Showing Title in a Third Person
A trespasser on a property in possession of another cannot successfully resist the suit by showing that the title and right to possession are in a third person. Our Apex Court, in Somnath Barman v. Dr. SP Raju, AIR 1970 SC 846, 1969-3 SCC 129, approved the above view following the following decisions:
Krishnarav Yashvant v. Vasudev Apaji Ghotikat, ILR 8, Bom. 371;
Umrao Singh v. Ramji Das, ILR 36 All. 51;
Wali Ahmad Khan v. Ahjudhia Khandu, ILR XIII All 537;
Subodh Gopal Bose v. Province of Bihar, AIR 1950 Pat. 222;
Narayana Row v. Dharmachar, ILR XXVI Mad. 514.
The Apex Court, in Somnath Barman v. Dr. SP Raju, AIR 1970 SC 846, 1969-3 SCC 129, held that the contrary view taken by the Calcutta High Court in the following decisions were incorrect –
Debi Churn Boldo v. Issur- Chunder Manjee(ILR IX Cal. 39),
Ertaza Hossein and Anr. v. Bany Mistry(ILR IX Cal. 130.)
Puremeshur Chowdhry and Ors. v. Brijo Lall Chowdhry(ILR XVII Cal. 256;
Nisa Chana Goita and Ors. v. Kanchiram Bagani, ILR XXVI Cal. 579.
Mandatory Injunction – To Preserve Status Quo of the Last Non-Contested Status
Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR 1990 SC 867 : (1990) 2 SCC 117, is the laudable decision on interim mandatory injunction. It is laid down in this decision that interlocutory mandatory injunctions are granted to:
(i) preserve or restore the status quo ante, of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy, or
(ii) to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done, or
(iii) the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining.
It is also pointed out that the court would consider the prospect of granting of a mandatory injunction finally, after trial; and delineated that a fresh state of affairs cannot be allowed to be created by the grant of such an injunction.
Gratuitous Possession – Owner can Reclaim Even Without Knowledge of the Other
In Anima Mallick v. Ajoy Kumar Roy, (2000) 4 SCC 119, our Apex Court held that where the sister gave possession as gratuitous to her brother, the sister could reclaim such possession even without knowledge of the brother; and that ‘no one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. (Relied on in Maria Margadia Sequeria v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria 2012 (5) SCC 370, Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129; AIR 2020 SC 1496.)
Person in possession can use Reasonable Force to keep out a Trespasser
In Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769, our Apex Court Court, observed as under:
“8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.”
It is held in MS Jagadambal v. Southern Indian Education Trust, 1988 (Supp) SCC 144 that the possession continues with the title holder unless and until the defendant acquires title by adverse possession (possession follows title). In LN Aswathama v. P Prakash, 2009-13 SCC 229, the Supreme Court held as under:
“In law, possession follows title. The plaintiffs having established title to the suit property, will be entitled to decree for possession, unless their right to the suit property was extinguished, by reason of defendant being in adverse possession for a period of twelve years prior to the suit.”
Adverse Possession Inchoate until title is upheld by a Competent Court
One can acquire right of easement and adverse possession by prescription. But, prescriptive rights are said to be inchoate (started; but, not full-blown) until the such title is upheld by a competent court. It was observed in Sultan Ahmad v. Valiullah (1912) 10 ALJ 227, that the result of the Easements Act and the similar provisions of the Limitation Act was that a right of easement could not be said to be perfected until the right was declared by a decree of court. See also:
Sultan Ahmad v. Valiullah (1912) 10 ALJ 227 is referred to in: Nachiparayan v. Narayana Goundan, (1920): 60 Ind Cas 171, (1920) 39 MLJ 574; Arjuna Udayar v. Manuswamy Naicker, 1999-1 CurCC 97;
D. Ramanatha Gupta vs S. Razaack, AIR 1982 Kant 314..
See also: Tradesh and Miners, Ltd v. Dhirendra Nath Banerjee, AIR 1944 Pat 261.
Possession is heritable and transferable
Possession is a heritable and transferable right. [See: Nallammal Vs. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864; Phirayalal Kapur Vs. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186]. A settled possession can be protected by court-injunction.
When Plaintiff Claims Title, He has to Prove Title in Injunction Suit
In Yamuna Nagar Improvement Trust v. Khariati Lal, AIR 2005 SC 2245; (2005) 10 SCC 30, it is held as under:
“In our opinion, when the plaintiff had approached the court for permanent injunction claiming to be owner of the property, it was his duty to prove that he was the owner of the property, the said property remained in his possession and that the defendant had no right title or interest therein. Since the plaintiff failed to prove his case the suit was liable to be dismissed.”
Plaintiff has to plead – Who the owner is, if he claims possession
In Maria Margadia Sequeria v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria, AIR 2012 SC 1727, it is held as under:
“63. Possession is important when there are no title documents and other relevant records before the Court, but, once the documents and records of title come before the Court, it is the title which has to be looked at first and due weightage be given to it. Possession cannot be considered in vacuum. (Quoted in: Ibrahim v. Saythumuhammed, 2013 (4) KLT 435.)
“70. It would be imperative that one who claims possession must give all such details as enumerated hereunder. They are only illustrative and not exhaustive.
.(a) who is or are the owner or owners of the property;
(b) title of the property;
(c) who is in possession of the title documents
(d) identity of the claimant or claimants to possession;
(e) the date of entry into possession;
(f) how he came into possession – whether he purchased the property or inherited or got the same in gift or by any other method;
(g) in case he purchased the property, what is the consideration; if he has taken it on rent, how much is the rent, license fee or lease amount;
(h) If taken on rent, license fee or lease – then insist on rent deed, license deed or lease deed;
who are the persons in possession/occupation or otherwise living with him, in what capacity; as family members, friends or servants etc.;
(j) subsequent conduct, i.e., any event which might have extinguished his entitlement to possession or caused shift therein; and
(k) basis of his claim that not to deliver possession but continue in possession.”
An Association of Knanites, consisting of persons who married non-Knanites, filed civil suits questioning the practice of endogamy and ‘expulsion’ of a member from the Knanaya Diocese. It was argued that this practice is unconstitutional. They claimed right to continue in their parent churches despite their marriage with a non-Knanite Christian.
The Association claimed that they had the Fundamental Right under Art. 25 of the Constitution of India to continue, despite their marriage. Art. 25 of the Constitution says –
“all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, PRACTICE and propagate religion.”
The Association pointed out that the Apex Court held that the rights protected under Art. 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India were LIMITED toESSENTIAL andINTEGRAL part of religion and no other (Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402).
The Association argued that the practice of endogamy or ‘expulsion’ of a member on marriage with a non-Knanite would not come within ESSENTIALreligious practices of religious denomination or right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion.
Knanaya/Catholic Church, resisting the suit of the Knanaya Association, founded their argument upon the verdict in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
Knanaya/Catholic Church claimed that it was a religious DENOMINATION or any SECTION THEREOF entitled to MANAGEits own affairs in matters of religion under Article 26.
Therefore, their practice of endogamy and ‘expulsion’ come within rights of DENOMINATION to MANAGE its own affairs in matters of religion.
Knanaya/Catholic Church pointed out that the Apex Court held that the protection of Articles 25 and 26 is not limited to matters of doctrine or belief; but, they extend also to ACTS donein pursuance of religion.
(Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388;
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853).
Knanaya/Catholic Church further brought up that the Apex Court had denoted – what constituted an ‘essential partof a religion‘ or ‘religious practice’ had to be decidedwith reference to thedoctrines of the particular religion and the practices which were REGARDED by the COMMUNITY as a part of its religion.
(Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255;
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853;
Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. St. of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638).
Genuine Legal questions
1. Whether Knanites/Diocese constitute a COMMUNITY or religious DENOMINATION so as to claim rights under Art. 26 to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (as claimed by the Catholic Church)?
2. Whether Endogamy is REGARDED by the COMMUNITY an ESSENTIAL or INTEGRAL part of Religion, so as to get protection under Art. 25 and 26 (as claimed by the Catholic Church)?
3. Rights guaranteed under Article 26 is ‘subject to public order, morality and health’. Does it include the whole ‘Constitutional morality’ in the teeth of Article 14, 15, 17, 21 etc. (as claimed by the Knanaya Association)?
PART I
Knanaya Community in Kerala
Knanites constitute a well-known Christian community in Kerala. The members of this fraternity believe that they are the endogamous-descendants of Syrian-Jewish group who sailed from Syria and landed Kerala in the 4th or 8th century under the leadership of a merchant, Knayi Thoma. In any case, it is a fact that this sect follows certain cultural and religious practices of their own, for the past several centuries. It is also a fact that this community steadfastly stick on to endogamy; and marriage of a Knanaya person with a non-Knanaya is not conducted in known Knanaya churches.
Majority of Knanites are Roman Catholic. A portion is with the Syrian Orthodox Church. Distinctiveness of this group is recognised by the Roman Pontiff in 1911 by giving a separate Vicariate (Bishop from their own community, with an independent Diocese), taking note of the century old feud between the Knanites and non-Knanites.
A large number of Knanites in Kerala are migrated to west, especially, USA. A group of these migrants and some progressive youth in Kerala today argue that endogamy is archaic and that it is opposed to Divine law and Cannons of the Church.
Suits in Courts.
Several Knanites filed civil suits claiming rights in their parent churches despite their marriage with a non-Knanite Christian (in a non-Knanite church). Now, an Association of Knanites won the comprehensive suit filed in Subordinate Court, Kottayam wherein they claimed that the practice of expulsion of Knanites from the Knananya churches for marrying non-knanite is against the Divine law, Canon and various Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Article 25 of the Constitution of India. The appeal therefrom is dismissed by the District Court, Kottayam (on 2. 9. 2022), affirming the decision of the Subordinate Court.
PART II
Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India
The association filed the suit on the claim that endogamy is outmoded and irrational. They based their claims on Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India. Article 25(1) reads as under:
“25(1). Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion.”
The Knanaya Church that opposed the suit relied on Article 26(b). It reads as under:
“26. Freedom to manage religious affairs – Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right
(a) … …. ;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) … …. ; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.”
Nexus between Art. 25 and 26.
Article 25(1) secures fundamental right to ‘persons’. Article 26 protects right of the ‘denomination or any section thereof’. Clause (b) of Article 26 provides right ‘to manage its own affairs in matters of religion’.
CONTENTIONS OF THE ASSOCIATION That Stands For Declaring Endogamy, Illegal
Endogamy is not an ESSENTIAL or INTEGRAL part of Religion.
The teachings of Christ, Divine Law etc. stand against endogamy
Even if Knanaya community can maintain ‘endogamy’, that cannot be made use by the Diocese.
Canon and common law do not allow expulsion of the members in a Diocese for marrying a catholic from another Diocese.
Endogamy is an unpleasant practice, and it is opposes to Constitutional Morality and Individual Rights affirmed in the Constitution of India.
1.Endogamy is not an ESSENTIAL or INTEGRAL partof Religion
It is held in The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282, as under:
“Under article 26(b), therefore, a religious DENOMINATION or organisation enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are ESSENTIALaccording to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters.”
The rights protected under Art. 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India are LIMITED toESSENTIALandINTEGRAL part of religion and no other, as held in Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402. It is held in this decision as under:
“Whilst we are dealing with this point it may not be out of place incidentally to strike a note of caution and Observe that in order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an essential and integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of Art. 26. Similarly, even practices though religious may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself. Unless such practices are found to constitute an essential and integral part of a religion their claim for the protection under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other words, the protection must beconfined to such religious practices as are an essential and integral partof it and no other.”
2.The teachings of Christ, Divine Law etc.
The teachings of Christ, Divine Law (The Bible), provisions of Canon etc. unequivocally stand against the practice of endogamy. Bible (Galatians – 3: 28) proclaims that ‘there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus‘. Devine law is fundamental; no one can disdain Divine law.
When a new vicariat (diocese) was formed in 1911 for Southists (Knanaya), no whisper at all was made in the Bull of Pope to the effect that the people of new vicariat can ignore any basic principle that made fundamentals of Catholic Church.
Canon says that the membership of a Catholic is in his ‘sui juris’ church – that is, in the Rite which he joins or is included. The Knanites in Kerala are under the Syro Malabar Rite. No independent claim can be raised by Knanites as to the very fundamental matters including the membership in the Church.
3. Even if there is ‘Knanaya Community’, the members cannot be estranged from ‘Diocese’
Even if it is assumed that there is ‘Knanaya Community’ with their own characteristic practices, no one can be expelled from the ecclesiastical ‘Diocese’ under which Knanites are are grouped-in (for he/she had married a non-Knanite); because, it is not supported by any of the provision of Canon and other laws applicable to the Church.
4. Constitutional Morality and Individual Rights
Rights guaranteed under Article 26 is ‘subject to public order, morality and health’. Therefore, the ‘Constitutional morality’, and individual rights that gain primacy, enshrined and projected in Article 14, 15, 17, 21 etc. are to be aptly regarded while considering the rights of ‘religious denomination or any section thereof’ in Article 26. They make it clear that endogamy is opposed to Constitutional morality. In any event, it is illegal, in the teeth of Article 14, 15, 17, 21 etc, to estrange a catholic from a Knanaya church for he married a non-knanaya.
PART IV
CONTENTIONS OF THE KNANAYA DIOCESE That Stands For Endogamy
Article 25(1) is subject to Article 26.
For a denomination no ‘distinctive’ faith is needed.
Denomination Enjoys Complete Autonomy.
Religious Practices are as important as Faith.
Excommunication on Religious Grounds – part of Management by the Community.
Durgah Committee verdict is an Odd Decision.
1. Article 25(1) is ‘subject to’ Article 26
Article 25(1) speaks about fundamental right secured to ‘persons’. Article 25(1) begins with the words – ‘subject to other provisions of this part’. It includes Article 26(b). Therefore, the right of denomination or section thereof prevails over the personal right under Article 25(1).
From the above, it is clear that the argument on ‘Constitutional morality’, with reference to other Articles in the Constitution, has to be looked into in the light of of the clause in Art. 25 that it is ‘subject to’ Art. 26.
2. For a denomination no ‘distinctive’ faith is needed
Knanites constitute a denomination. They can claim rights under Art. 26. It is admitted by the parties to the suit that the Knanites have common spiritual organization and distinctive name. It is noteworthy (from Shirur Mutt case) that to acquire the denominational-status, ‘distinctive faith’ is not needed.
In The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282)it is observed –
(1) Article 26 contemplates not merely a religious denomination, but also a section thereof.
(2) Denomination contemplates the Mutt or the spiritual fraternity, Organization, sect or sub-sect.
(3) Definition of denomination in Oxford Dictionary is referred to in this decision. It defines denomination as – collection of individuals having a
distinctive name,
common faith and
common spiritual organization.
In Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commr. of Police, AIR 1984 SC 51, referring earlier decisions, including Shirur Mutt, it is held as under:
“Ananda Marga appears to satisfy all the three conditions, viz., it is a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being; they have a common organisation and the collection of these individuals has a distinctive name. Ananda Marga, therefore, can be appropriately treated as a religious DENOMINATION, within the Hindu religion.”
In S.P. Mittalv. Union of India, AIR 1883 SC 1, Chinnappa Reddy, J. (Minority) observed:
“Any Freedom or Right involving the conscience must naturally receive a wide interpretation and the expression ‘religion’ and ‘religious DENOMINATION‘ must therefore, be interpreted in no narrow, stifling sense but is a liberal, expansive way”. (Indhu Malhotra, J. quoted this portion in Sabarimala case, Indian Young Lawyers Assn. Vs. State of Kerala: 2019-1 SCC 1, observing that the judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J. was a ‘concurring’ one.)
The majority judgment in S.P. Mittal referred to the argument of Soli Sorabji, Senior Advocate, as to show how the ‘common faith’ doctrine was placed – the argument was that the followers of Aurobindo ‘shared’ common faith (within their denomination).
In other words, to acquire the denominational status, the ‘faith’ of ‘denomination’ need not be distinctive from the faith of others in the same religion.
3. Denomination Enjoys Complete Autonomy
It is held in The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282) as under:
“Under article 26(b), therefore, a religious DENOMINATION or organisation enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters.”
In the Review Judgment, Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, 2020-2 SCC 1, the Apex Court analysed Shirur Mutt case and said as under:
“7. In this context, the decision of the Seven Judges bench of this Court in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt (Shirur Mutt) holding that what are essential religious practices of a particular religious denomination should be left to be determined by the DENOMINATION ITSELF ….”
4. ‘Religious Practices’ are as Important as ‘Faith‘
In The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282) it is held as under:
“A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual wellbeing, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and dress.”
In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388, it is observed as under:
“Religious practices or performances of ACTS, in pursuance of religious belief are AS MUCH A PART of religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines.”
In Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255, it is held as under:
“It being thus settled that matters of religion in Art. 26 (b) include even practices which are regarded by the COMMUNITY as part of its religion ….”
5. Excommunication on Religious Grounds – part of Management by the COMMUNITY
In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853, it is held as under:
“What appears however to be clear is that where an excommunication is itself based on religious grounds such as lapse from the orthodox religious creed or doctrine (similar to what is considered heresy, apostasy or schism under the Canon Law) or breach of some practice considered as an essential part of the religion by the Dawoodi Bohras in general, excommunication cannot but be held to be for the purpose of maintaining the strength of the religion. It necessarily follows that the exercise of this power of excommunication on religious grounds forms part of the management by the COMMUNITY, through its religious head, “of its own affairs in matters of religion.” The impugned Act makes even such excommunications invalid and takes away the power of the Dai as the head of the community to excommunicate even on religious grounds. It therefore, clearly interferes with the right of the Dawoodi Bohra community under cl. (b) of Art. 26 of the Constitution.”
That excommunication of a member of a COMMUNITY will affect many of his civil rights is undoubtedly true. This particular religious DENOMINATION is possessed of properties and the necessary consequence of excommunication will be that the excommunicated member will lose his rights of enjoyment of such property. It might be thought undesirable that the head of a religious community would have the power to take away in this manner the civil rights of any person. The right given under Art. 26 (b) has not however been made subject to preservation of civil rights. The express limitation in Art. 26 itself is that this right under the several clauses of the article will exist subject to public order, morality and health. It has been held by this Court in Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore (1) that the right under Art. 26(b) is subject further to cl. 2 of Art. 25 of the Constitution.”
“We shall presently consider whether these limitations on the rights of a religious community to manage its own affairs in matters of religion can come to the help of the impugned Act. It is clear however that apart from these limitations the Constitution has not imposed any limit on the right of a religious community to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The fact that civil rights of a person are affected by the exercise of this fundamental right under Art. 26(b) is therefore of no consequence. Nor is it possible to say that excommunication is prejudicial to public order, morality and health.”
6. Durgah Committee verdict is an Odd Decision; All five judges in Durgah Committee changed their Views
In Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402, it was held as under:
The ‘essential practices’ of RELIGION alone is considered.
The religious practices ‘that may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs’ and ‘unessential accretions to religion’ may have to be carefully scrutinised by theCOURT.
All five judges in Durgah Committee (PB Gajendragadkar, AK Sarkar, KN Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Aiyankar JJ.) changed their views by two subsequent decisions, as to (i) the ‘essential practices’ of RELIGION and (ii) the ‘role of COURT‘ in determining the essential religious practice. It was observed in the subsequent decisions that ‘what was regarded by the COMMUNITY‘ on essential religious practice was important.
Justice Gajendragadkar himself (who authored Dargah Committee Case) explained, as to the enquiry on integral part of religion, in a subsequent Five Judge Bench decision, in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj Vs. St. of Rajasthan (BP Sinha, CJ, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C Shah JJ.), AIR 1963 SC 1638. (The bench consisted also of two Judges – K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta JJ. – in Dargah Committee Case, other than Gajendragadkar, J.). It is held in Tilkayat Case as under:
“In deciding the question as to whether a given religious practice is an integral part of the religion or not, the test always would be whether it is REGARDED as such by the COMMUNITY following the religion or not.”
“This question (as to essential religious practice) will always have to be decided by the Court and in doing so, the Court may have to enquire whether the practice in question is religious in character and if it is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion, and the finding of the Court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the CONSCIENCE of the COMMUNITY and the tenets of its religion.”
In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853, (BP Sinha, CJ, A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Mudholkar, JJ.) it was held by a Constitution Bench (Sinha, C. J. dissenting) of five Judges (consisted of three Judges in Dargah Committee Case – A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.) as under:
“The content of Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution came up for consideration before this Court in the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Matt; Mahant Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa; Sri Venkatamana Devaru v. The State of Mysore; Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali and several other cases and the main principles underlying these provisions have by these decisions been placed beyond controversy. The first is that the protection of these articles is not limited to matters of doctrine or belief they extend also to ACTS done in pursuance of religion and therefore contain a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of religion. The second is that what constitutes an essential part of a religious or religious practice has to be decided by the courts with reference to the doctrine of a particular religion and include practices which are REGARDED by the COMMUNITYas a part of its religion.
In the Sabarimala review-reference (to higher Bench) Judgment, Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, 2020-2 SCC 1, it is pointed out that there is apparent conflict between the Shirur Mutt Case and Durgah Committee Case.
It is observed –
Seven Judges bench of the Apex Court, in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt (Shirur Mutt), held that what were essential religious practices of a particular religious denomination should be left to be determined by the DENOMINATION itself.
The subsequent Five Judges bench in Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors. carved out a ROLE FOR THE COURT in this regard to exclude what the courts determine to be secular practices or superstitious beliefs.Both these decisions ‘seem to be in APPARENT CONFLICT‘.
It requires consideration by a larger Bench.
It is further contended that the circumstances that led to issuance of the 1911 Bull is clear from the words of the Bull as well as the documents referred to therein – that is, the letters of the Bishops in Kerala and the representative of Pope. These documents refer to the need of special consideration of Knanites. The subsequent conduct of the Church also is important. It is a fact that Bishops from their own community is ordained for Knanites. Knanaya Diocese has no territorial limit in jurisdiction whereas all other Catholic Dioceses (within Kerala) has territorial limit.