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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Channappa v. Parvatewwa Criticised: Suit Dismissed for Order II Rule 2 Bar and Constructive Res Judicata – For No ‘Consequential Declaration’ on Title, in the Earlier Suit 

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Points Decided in Channappa v.  Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343

1. Adverse IA Orders can be challenged in Appeal from Decree: Once an Order is passed in an Interlocutory Application in a suit, it stands as res judicata at its subsequent stages, including the appeal, revision, etc.

  • However, adverse IA Orders (including Order II Rule 2, CPC petition) can be challenged in an appeal from the (final) decree. Section 105 Code of Civil Procedure provides – when an appeal is filed against the decree, any error, defect or irregularity in an Order can be raised as a ground in the memorandum of appeal.

2. Order II Rule 2, CPC: A subsequent suit claiming a relief that ought to have been claimed in an earlier suit, on the same cause of action, is barred under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC.

3. Constructive Res Judicata: The second suit may also be barred by constructive res judicata.

  • Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.

Principle (Ratio Decidendi) Laid Down in Channappa v. Parvatewwa

If two suits are filed by the same plaintiff against the same defendant, the relief of declaration of title, and consequential relief of possession cannot be claimed in the subsequent suit in the following circumstances:

  • in the earlier suit, the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant was asserting title over the suit property;
  • in the earlier suit, the relief of declaration of title with consequential possession was available; and
  • in the earlier suit, these reliefs were not claimed.

Facts of the First  Suit

  • Parvatewwa adopted Channappa in 1961.
  • The defendant told the plaintiff that he is the absolute owner of the properties.
  • In 2002, Parvatewwa filed a suit for a declaration that the 1961 adoption deed was null and void, and for an injunction.
  • [No consequential declaration of title on property sought for.]
  • The suit was dismissed.
  • Parvatewwa filed appeal in 2006.
  • The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal.
  • It confirmed the judgment on the ground of limitation, though the finding on the validity of the adoption deed was reversed.
  • The Regular Second Appeal of Parvatewwa was allowed and the cross-objections were dismissed.

Facts of the Second Suit

  • During the pendency of the appeal Parvatewwa instituted a second suit in 2007.
  • In that suit she alleged that Channappa had illegally dispossessed her; and sought declaration of her ownership and recovery.
  • The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court holding that it was barred by limitation and hit by the principles of res judicata, constructive res judicata and Order II Rule 2, CPC.
  • The First Appellate Court held that the suit was not barred by limitation.
  • However, it confirmed the dismissal of the suit on the grounds of res judicata, constructive res judicata and under Order II Rule 2 of CPC.
  • The High Court allowed the Regular Second Appeal. The Suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff.
Read Also:
•    Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
•   Res Judicata and Judicial Precedent
•    What is Binding Judicial Precedent – In a Nutshell
•    No Res Judicata on Finding on Title in an Injunction Suit
•    Res Judicata: ‘Same issue’ must have been ‘Adjudicated’
•    Res Judicata and Appeal: No Res Judicata on Adverse Findings
•    Order II, Rule 2 CPC – Not to Vex Defendants Twice
•    A Landmark Decision on Order II rule 2, CPC – Cuddalore Powergen Corpn .
•    Termination of Tenancy (& Grant) by Forfeiture (for Claiming Title)
•    SUIT on TITLE: Landlord can Recover Property on GENERAL TITLE
•   Recovery of Possession Based on Title and on Earlier Possession
•   Recovery of Possession (Based on Title) and Eviction (of Tenants)
•    Applicability of Res Judicata on IA Orders (at Different Stages)

The Issues Considered

The issues considered in this case were the following –

  • 1. Whether the principles of res judicata apply where an interlocutory application (raising a plea of bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC) has been dismissed?
  • 2. Whether the second suit is barred under the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC?
  • 3. Whether the second suit is barred by the principles of Constructive res judicata?

SC Findings – on IA Filed under Order II Rule 2 CPC

An Interlocutory Application was filed by the defendant under Order II Rule 2, CPC. He prayed that the suit was liable to be dismissed for (i) the causes of action in both suits were the same, and (ii) the plaintiff omitted, in the first suit, to sue for the relief of declaration of title (sought for in the second suit).

The maintainability petition under Order II Rule 2, CPC, was dismissed by the trial court. It held that the causes of action in both suits were different. Revision against the same (before the High Court) was also dismissed.  After the trial, the trial court dismissed the second suit. The First Appellate Court confirmed the dismissal. But, the High Court allowed the Second Appeal in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit.

 Before the Supreme Court, the defendant contended that the second suit was barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC. The plaintiff argued that the issue had attained finality in view of the revisional order passed on the Order II Rule 2 application, which had been decided in his favour. This argument was not accepted by the Supreme Court. The Apex Court pointed out the following:

  • The Order in I.A. filed under Order II Rule 2, CPC, is not independently appealable. (Whether an appeal would lie or not from an Order on an IA is determined under  Section 104 read with Order 43, CPC.)
  • Section 105 CPC provides that when an appeal is filed against the decree, any error, defect or irregularity in an Order (though no appeal lies from an Order) can be raised as a ground in the memorandum of appeal.

Section 105 reads as under:

  • ‘105. Other orders – (1) Save as otherwise expressly providedno appeal shall lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction; but, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal.
  • (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any party aggrieved by an order of remand made after the commencement of this Code from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness.’

Defendants Can Urge in Appeal – The Suit is Barred Under O II r 2 CPC ; No Res judicata

In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993, it is held that this proposition is subject to Sec. 105.

After quoting Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar (supra), it is held in Channappa v.  Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343, it is observed – notwithstanding the earlier rejection of the application raising the plea on Order II Rule 2 CPC, it is open to the defendants to urge before the Appellate Court that the suit was barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC. Thereafter, it is held as under:

  • “Therefore, the contention that the dismissal of the application would operate as a bar to re-agitate the issue is misconceived.”

It was explained by Das Gupta, J. in Satyadhan Ghosal v. Smt Deorajin Debi, (1960) 3 SCR 590, as under:

  • Does this, however, mean that because an earlier stage of the litigation a court had decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again? …
    • It is clear therefore that an interlocutory order
      • which had not been appealed from
      • either because no appeal lay or
      • even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken
    • could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order.’ (Quoted in: Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993)

SC Findings – on Order II Rule 2

The doctrine underlying Order II Rule 2, CPC, is founded upon the salutary principle that a defendant ought not to be vexed twice for the same cause of action. The plaintiff must also claim all reliefs arising from a single cause of action in one proceeding. Where a plaintiff omits to claim a relief, he is precluded from instituting a subsequent suit in respect of such omitted relief.

The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal AIR 1964 SC 1810, held as follows:

  • “6. In order that a plea of a Bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out; (i) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed.”

Pleadings in the first suit

It was stated in the plaint –

  • “The defendant told the plaintiff that he is the absolute owner of all the properties of the plaintiff mentioned above ….The plaintiff also came to know that the defendant has created document to show that he is the adopted son and the said document of adoption is registered in the office of Sub-Registrar, Bijapur on 23.3.1961 itself.”

The Court pointed out – Despite being fully aware that Channappa (defendant) had denied her ownership and had asserted rights based on the family arrangement deed of 1998, Parvatewwa chose to institute Suit–I, ‘without seeking the necessary and consequential relief of declaration of title’.

The Apex Court held –

  • “Once Channappa had clearly contested Parvatewwa’s ownership in the pleadings, it became incumbent upon Parvatewwa to seek the comprehensive relief of declaration of title along with the consequential relief of injunction”.

The court relied on Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 82, which clarified that the rule under Order II Rule 2, CPC is founded on the principle that a person should not be vexed twice for the same cause of action and that the object of this rule is to prevent harassment of the defendant through successive litigation.

The Apex Court finally pointed out –

  • “The omission to seek such relief in Suit–I is significant and cannot be cured through a subsequent suit”.
  • “27. In the present case, Parvatewwa (plaintiff) herself had pleaded in the earlier proceedings that Channappa (defendant) was asserting rights over the suit properties on the basis of the adoption. The dispute as to the parties’ respective rights over the property was, therefore, already in existence at the time of institution of Suit–I. In such circumstances, the relief of declaration of title and the consequential relief relating to possession could and ought to have been claimed in the earlier proceedings.”
  • “The subsequent institution of Suit–II seeking declaration of ownership and recovery of possession in respect of the same property and between the same parties is, therefore, clearly hit by the provisions of Order II Rule 2, CPC.”

SC Findings – on Constructive res judicata

The principle of constructive res judicata is embodied in Explanation IV to Section 11. A matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack in the former proceedings shall be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue in such proceedings. The Apex Court held as under:

  • “Parvatewwa having omitted to seek appropriate relief in Suit–I despite being aware of Channappa’s claim, cannot be permitted to agitate the same issue by way of a subsequent suit”.

The Court quoted from the following three decisions:

(i)  Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal,(1986) 1 SCC 100: It observed as under:

  • “20. So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court in our opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the present petition was conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition.
  • Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. The first reason, therefore, has absolutely no force.”

(ii) Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta, 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1085: It observed as under:

  • “25. The principle underlying Explanation IV to Section 11 becomes clear from Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA)] thus:
  •  “… it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.”

(iii)  Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715: It observed as under:

  • “35. … an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence.”

Earlier SC Decisions – O II r 2: “Cause of Action” Chosen, or ‘Forms the Foundation’

It is important to note:

  • Order II Rule 2 bars – to sue for any relief omitted. Order II Rule 2 reads -“Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action…”

Pointing out that the term “cause of action” is not defined in the CPC, it has been explained by the Apex Court, in Kandimalla Raghavaiah v. National Insurance Co., 2009-7 SCC 768: AIR 2010 SC Supp 880, as under:

  • “13.The term “cause of action” is neither defined in the Act nor in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but is of wide import. It has different meanings in different contexts, that is when used in the context of territorial jurisdiction or limitation or the accrual of right to sue. Generally, it is described as “bundle of facts”, which if proved or admitted entitle the plaintiff to the relief prayed for. Pithily stated, “cause of action” means the cause of action for which the suit is brought. “Cause of action” is cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. (See: Sidramappa Vs. Rajashetty, 1970-1 SCC 186). In the context of limitation with reference to a fire insurance policy, undoubtedly, the date of accrual of cause of action has to be the date on which the fire breaks out”.

In Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian, AIR 1949 PC 78, it was pointed out – what would constitute the cause of action in a suit must always depend on the particular facts of each case, and the true difficulty in each instance arises only upon the application of this rule. It is held as under:

  • “As pointed out in Moonshee Bazloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum (11 M.I.A. 551 at p. 605) “The correct test in all cases of this kind is, whether the claim in the new suit is, in fact, founded on a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation of the former suit.” (Quoted in: Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd. J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, JJ., Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 73)

Referring various decisions it is observed in Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd. J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, JJ., Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 73, to the following effect:

  • the omission in the first suit must have been “deliberate
  • the relief in the second suit must have been “available” at the time of the first suit.
  • cause of action in both suits must have been “identical” in substance and not merely technically.
  • evidence required” to support the claims must have been the same.

Read Also:

The Apex Court held in Cuddalore Powergen Corporation as under:

  • “These observations show that in considering whether the cause of action in the subsequent suit is the same or not as the cause of action in the previous suit, the test to be applied is, are the causes of action in the two suits in substance-not technically-identical?
  • Applying this test the learned Judges came to the conclusion that the causes of action in the two suits in Brunsden v. Humphrey[(14 Q.B.D. 141). were distinct. Observations to the same effect appear in certain decisions of this Board. In Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanund [12 Beng. [(1873) 12 Beng L.R. 304, 315], their Lordships stated as follows:-
  • “Their Lordships are of opinion that the term “cause of action” is to be construed with reference rather to the substance than to the form of action.”
  • In Krishna Behari Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdranne [(1875) LR 2.I.A. 283, 285.], Sir Montague Smith in delivering the judgment of the Board observed:- “their Lordships are of opinion that the expression “cause of action” cannot be taken in its literal and most restricted sense. But however that may be.”

Earlier SC Decisions – INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law

It is also important to note:

It is a trite law that courts protect settled possession. The person claiming the injunction needs to prove prove possession only (and not title).

See:

  • Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813,
  • Aarthi v. Aruna Gautham. 2015 -1 RCR (Civil) 160,
  • Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, 2004-1 SCC 769.
  • Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131.
  • Ram Rattan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 188.
  • Puran Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 518.
  • Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration, (1968) 2 SCR 455.

Criticism  and Conclusion

The necessary ingredients to attract Order II rule 2 are (i) the same causes of action in two suits and (ii) a fair requirement of making a relief in the earlier suit. The earlier suit in Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343, was one for a declaration regarding adoption and injunction. It was decreed in favour the plaintiff. The subsequent suit was for relief of declaration of title and the consequential possession.

The bar of constructive res judicata, as well as that under Order II Rule 2 CPC, was held to apply to the second suit, since Channappa (the defendant) had already disputed the plaintiff’s rights in the property in the first suit, and asserted his own title on the basis of adoption. The Apex Court held as under:

  • “In the present case, Parvatewwa (plaintiff) herself had pleaded in the earlier proceedings that Channappa (defendant) was asserting rights over the suit properties on the basis of the adoption. The dispute as to the parties’ respective rights over the property was, therefore, already in existence at the time of institution of Suit–I. In such circumstances, the relief of declaration of title and the consequential relief relating to possession could and ought to have been claimed in the earlier proceedings.”

Traditionally, a claim for declaration of title coupled with recovery of possession arises only upon dispossession. In the present case, it may be argued – had the plaintiff been actually dispossessed on the date of the cause of action for the first suit, the relief of injunction would not have been granted in that proceeding. On that view, no fault can be found with the plaintiff for not seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession in the earlier suit.

Further, the omission in the first suit was not “deliberate”; the relief claimed in the second suit was not “available” at the time of the first suit; the causes of action in the two suits were not identical in substance; and the evidence required to support the claims in the two suits was not the same.

Therefore, the facts of this case seem to present a real and arguable difficulty in treating the second suit as defective.

Nevertheless, the answer to the above can be derived from the very facts of Channappa v. Parvatewwa, following the Court’s own formulation, as follows:

  • (i) the relief of declaration as to adoption and the consequential injunction (sought in the first suit) were closely connected with the relief of declaration on title sought in the second suit, even if both declarations were not essential in the first suit;
  • (ii) the plaintiff was “entitled to make” relief of ‘declaration of title’ in the earlier suit; and
  • (iii) the decision aligns with the objective of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.

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Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic)

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Applicability of Res Judicata on IA Orders (at Different Stages of the Same Suit) 

Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract

  • The principles of res judicata apply to Orders on Interlocutory Applications.
  • A stay, injunction, or receiver order does not operate as res judicata when the case is taken up for final judgment. But Orders as to the issuance of commissions, amendment of pleadings, impleadment of parties, condonation of delay, etc., operate as res judicata.
  • Once an Order is passed in a suit, it stands as res judicata at its subsequent stages, that is, in appeal, revision, etc.
  • As per Section 105 CPC, adverse IA Orders (such as issuance of commissions, amendment of pleadings, impleadment, condonation of delay) can be challenged in an appeal from the (final) decree.
  • The Revision Order in the IA can also be challenged before the Appellate Court when an appeal is taken against the decree in that case. (Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343).
  • If an appeal is provided from the IA Order and a pronouncement has come from the appeal court, the decision on the specific issue (directly and substantially in issue) definitely stands as res judicata.
  • If an earlier finding is liable to be varied based on evidence adduced at trial, it will not operate as res judicata. (E.g., granting leave under Sections 91 or 92 CPC, permitting publication under Order I Rule 8).

IA Orders are Conclusive Determination of the Issue Raised

In Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941, it was observed as under:

  • “The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the Trial Court or a Higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings.” (Quoted in: Barkat Ali v. Badri Narain, AIR 2008 SC 1272; 2008-4 SCC 615.)

In Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade, 1999 (5) SCC 590, it was held that if an issue has been decided at an earlier stage against a party, it cannot be allowed to be re-agitated by him at a subsequent stage in the same suit or proceedings. (Referred to in: C. V. Rajendran v. N. M. Muhammed Kunhi, AIR 2003 SC 649; 2002-7 SCC 447).

In Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co. Ltd. v. Bapuna Alcobrew Private Ltd., 2024 INSC 829; 2024 KLT(Online) 2638; 2024-6 KLT(SN) 23, it is held as under:

  • “To recount, the order of the High Court dated 14th February, 2001, though interim in the sense that it disposed of an interlocutory application, was a conclusive determination of the issue raised by the first respondent itself and which went against it.”
Read Also:
•    Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
•   Res Judicata and Judicial Precedent
•    What is Binding Judicial Precedent – In a Nutshell
•    No Res Judicata on Finding on Title in an Injunction Suit
•    Res Judicata: ‘Same issue’ must have been ‘Adjudicated’
•    Res Judicata and Appeal: No Res Judicata on Adverse Findings
•    Order II, Rule 2 CPC – Not to Vex Defendants Twice
•    A Landmark Decision on Order II rule 2, CPC – Cuddalore Powergen Corpn .
•    Termination of Tenancy (& Grant) by Forfeiture (for Claiming Title)
•    SUIT on TITLE: Landlord can Recover Property on GENERAL TITLE
•   Recovery of Possession Based on Title and on Earlier Possession
•   Recovery of Possession (Based on Title) and Eviction (of Tenants)
•    Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343: Suit Dismissed for Order II Rule 2 Bar: For No ‘Consequential Declaration’ on Title, in the Earlier Suit 

Interlocutory Orders – Various kinds; No Res Judicata on Certain Orders

Interlocutory orders are of various kinds.

  • No res judicata: Orders of stay, injunction, or appointment of a receiver do not operate as res judicata when the case is taken up for final judgment, as they are intended merely to preserve the status quo.
  • Operate as res judicata: However, orders relating to the issuance of commissions, amendment of pleadings, impleadment of parties, condonation of delay, etc., stand on a different footing.

If an earlier finding is liable to be varied on the basis of evidence adduced at trial, it will not operate as res judicata. For example, findings rendered while granting leave under Sections 91 or 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or while permitting publication under Order I Rule 8, are not final determinations and do not attract res judicata.

In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar: AIR 1964 SC 993, the Apex Court has held as follows:

  • “It is needless to point out that interlocutory orders are of various kinds; some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceeding before the court usually take. They do not in that sense decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders are based, though if applications were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been disposed of the Court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of Court”.
  • (Quoted in: Shalini Agarwal v. Shandar Industries Private Ltd., AIR2021 (Uchal) 26;
  • Kalapala Narendra Babu v. Kalapala Chennakrishniah, 2020-3 ALD 197; 2020-6 ALT 25;
  • A. Sengoda Gounder v. P. Malliga, 2019-5 CTC 541;
  • Saibinnisha v. Abdul Vahab, 2018-3 ILR(Ker) 716; 2018-3 KHC 818; 2018-3 KLT 449;
  • Sunshine India Pvt. Ltd. v. Bhai Manjit Singh, 2013-8 AD 189; 2014 2013-202 DLT 777; 2013-138 DRJ 223; 2014-7 RCR (Civ) 8084 (Del);
  • N. Narayana v. Ramesh Kumar, ILR 2010 (Kar) 2446; 2010-2 KCCR 1464).

IA Orders can be Challenged in Appeal from Decree under S. 105 CPC

However, Interlocutory Orders (such as issuance of commissions, amendment of pleadings, impleadment, condonation of delay) are open for adjudication by an appellate authority in an appeal against the final judgment. (Prahlad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1987 SC 1145; 1987-1 SCC 727). It is not necessary that an interlocutory order must be challenged immediately by an appeal. It can be challenged when an appeal is filed against the final decree. The proposition – principles of res judicata apply to IA Orders (at different stages of the same suit) – is subject to Section 105 CPC.

Section 105 CPC provides that when an appeal is filed against the decree in a suit, any error, defect or irregularity in an Order can be raised as a ground in the memorandum of appeal. It applies to IA Orders which had not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken. The dismissal of the Revision application, against the Order on IA, also makes no difference.

Section 105 reads as under:

  • ‘105. Other orders – (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction; but, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal.
  • (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any party aggrieved by an order of remand made after the commencement of this Code from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness.’

It was explained by Das Gupta, J. in Satyadhan Ghosal v. Smt Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941, (1960) 3 SCR 590, as under:

  • Does this, however, mean that because an earlier stage of the litigation a court had decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again? …
    • It is clear, therefore, that an interlocutory order
    • which had not been appealed from, either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken.
    • could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order.’ (Quoted in: Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993; Channappa v.  Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343).

Whether an appeal would lie or not from an Order on an IA is determined under Section 104 read with Order 43, CPC.

Effect of Earlier Appeal from the IA Order

Where an appeal lies from an interlocutory order, and the appellate court finally adjudicates an issue directly and substantially in issue, such a determination operates as res judicata in a subsequent appeal from the decree.

Order of Remand is an Interlocutory in Characterv

In Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Sm. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941, (1960) 3 SCR 590, it was held as under:

  • “In our opinion, the order of remand was an interlocutory judgment which did not terminate the proceedings and so the correctness thereof can be challenged in an appeal from the final order.” 
  • (Referred to in: Mangal Prasad Tamoli v.Narvedshwar Mishra, AIR 2005 SC 1964; 2005-3 SCC 422;
  • C. V. Rajendran v. N. M. Muhammed Kunhi, AIR 2003 SC 649; 2002-7 SCC 447;
  • Lonankutty v. Thomman, AIR 1976 SC 1645; 1976-3 SCC 528;
  • Management of The Northern Railway Co Operative Credit Society Ltd., Jodhpur v. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1182; 1967-2 SCR 476)

Revision Order Passed by the High Court will Not Operate as Res Judicata

Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the High Court may call for the record of any case and make such order as it thinks fit where the subordinate court has (i) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, (ii) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Revisional jurisdiction is thus confined to jurisdictional errors, illegality, and material irregularity, and does not extend to a full reconsideration of the merits as in an appeal. Consequently, a decision rendered in a revision against an interlocutory order (such as an order on an interlocutory application) will not, in principle, operate as res judicata at the stage of final adjudication.

Therefore, by virtue of Section 105 of the CPC, the order on the interlocutory application, even as modified in revision, remains open to challenge before the appellate court in an appeal against the final decree. (See: Channappa v.  Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343)

“Save as otherwise expressly provided”

It is interesting to note that no statute in India bars an appellant from questioning IA Orders when he files an appeal against the decree (provided it was not appealed earlier and a pronouncement had been invited, as stated in Section 105, CPC).

In Maharaja Moheshur Singh v. Bengal Government, (1859) 7 Moore’s Indian Appeals 283, the Privy Council said it as under:

  • “We are not aware of any law or regulation prevailing in India which renders it imperative upon the suitor to appeal from every interlocutory order by which he may conceive himself aggrieved, under the penalty, if he does not so do, of forfeiting forever the benefit of the consideration of the appellate court. No authority or precedent has been cited in support of such a proposition, and we cannot conceive that anything would be more detrimental to the expeditious administration of justice than the establishment of a rule which would impose upon the suitor the necessity of so appealing; whereby on the one hand he might be harassed with endless expense and delay, and on the other inflict upon his opponent similar calamities.” (Quoted in: Channappa v.  Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343)

Arjun Singh v.Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993

In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993, it is held that the proposition – Applicability of Res Judicata on IA Orders (at Different Stages of the Same Suit) – is subject to Sec. 105. The Apex Court held as under:

  • “If an application made under the provisions of that rule is dismissed and an appeal were filed against the decree in the suit in which such application were made, there can be no doubt that the propriety of the order rejecting the reopening of the proceeding and the refusal to relegate the party to an earlier stage might be canvassed in the appeal and dealt with by the appellate court. In that sense, the refusal of the court to permit the defendant to ‘set the clock back’ does not attain finality. But what we are concerned with is slightly different and that is whether the same Court is finally bound by that order at later stages so as to preclude its being reconsidered. Even if the rule of res judicata does not apply, it would not follow that on every subsequent day which the suit stands adjourned for further hearing, the petition could be repeated, and fresh orders sought on the basis of identical facts.” (Quoted in: Channappa v.  Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343)

Channappa v.  Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343

Effect of dismissal of I.A. No. 4 questioning the maintainability of the suit under Order II Rule 2, CPC  was came for consideration in Channappa v.  Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343.

It was argued in I.A. No. 4 that the cause of action in both suits was the same.  In the petition, the maintainability of the second suit was questioned. It was prayed that the suit was liable to be dismissed. The trial court found that the cause of action in both suits was different. The revision petition preferred against the same before the High Court was also dismissed. Hence, it was contended that the Order has attained finality and cannot be re-agitated. This submission was not accepted.

After quoting Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar (supra), it is observed in Channappa v.  Parvatewwa – notwithstanding the earlier rejection of the application raising the plea on Order II Rule 2 CPC, it is open to the defendants to urge before the Appellate Court that the suit was barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC. Thereafter, it is held as under:

  • “Therefore, the contention that the dismissal of the application would operate as a bar to re-agitate the issue is misconceived.”

Notwithstanding the earlier rejection of the application raising the plea on Order II Rule 2 CPC, it is held in this decision that it is open to the defendants to urge before the Appellate Court that the suit was barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC. Thereafter, it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “Therefore, the contention that the dismissal of the application would operate as a bar to re-agitate the issue is misconceived.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

M.V. Ramachandrasa v.  Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 INSC 348: Decision on Subletting Without Consent of Landlord

Jojy George Koduvath

In M.V. Ramachandrasa v.  Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 INSC 348, the Supreme Court of India (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, R. Mahadevan, JJ.), considered two questions of substantial importance.

  • First, whether, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, the Court is entitled to reassess the evidence and substitute its own conclusions; and
  • Second, what constitutes “subletting” under the Rent Act, and in what manner the burden of proving the same is to be discharged by the landlord.

‘No’ was the answer given by the Apex Court in the first question.

The findings, on eviction on the ground ‘sub-letting’, in a nutshell, is that the Initial burden of proving sub-letting is on the landlord, and once it is done, the onus shifts to the tenant.   

The findings on sub-letting can be summarised as under:

(i) Eviction on the ground sub-letting – Two Ingredients: For eviction under rent control laws on the ground sub-letting, two ingredients have to be established-

  • (one) parting with possession in favour of a third party, and
  • (two) such parting has been done without the consent of the landlord.

(ii) Inducting a partner not amount to sub-letting: Inducting a partner by a tenant by itself does not amount to sub-letting. However, the court may tear the veil of partnership to find out the real nature of transaction.

(iii) The existence of deed of partnership would not preclude the landlord from bringing on record, by adducing evidence or by means of cross-examination, making out a case of sub-letting or parting with possession.

(iv) If the tenant is actively associated with the partnership business and retains the control over the tenancy premises with him, may be along with partners, the tenant may not be said to have parted with possession.

(v) Initial burden of proving sub-letting is on the landlord: Initial burden of proving sub-letting is on the landlord but once he is able to establish that a third party is in exclusive possession of the premises and that tenant has no legal possession of the tenanted premises, the onus shifts to the tenant to prove the nature of occupation of such third party and that he (tenant) continues to hold legal possession in tenancy premises.

  • In other words, initial burden lying on the landlord would stand discharged by adducing prima facie proof of the fact that a party other than the tenant was in exclusive possession of the premises. A presumption of sub-letting may then be raised and would amount to proof unless rebutted.
  • The court held – the determinative test, is whether the tenant retains legal possession. That is – whether he retired from the business or he has ceased to have any role in the business or the premises.
  • Once such exclusive possession by third parties is established, the burden shifts to the respondents to prove the genuine partnership.

The rent receipts in the name of the original tenant does not support the respondents’ case, as it is legal possession and control, and not the formality of rent payment, which is determinative.

The Apex Court relied on the folloing earlier decisions:

1.  Associated Hotels of India Ltd v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh (AIR 1968 SC 933) – It was held in this decision – the landlord must prove parting with possession. Once exclusive possession of a third party is established, the burden shifts to the tenant.

2. In Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur, (2005) 1 SCC 31, and Mahendra Saree Emporium v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy, (2005) 1 SCC 481, it was held that once a prima facie case of exclusive possession by a stranger is made out, a presumption of sub-letting arises, thereby shifting the onus onto the tenant.

3. In Ram Murti Devi v. Pushpa Devi, (2017) 15 SCC 230, it was pointed out that direct evidence of sub-letting is seldom available, because of the clandestine arrangements, and it has to be inferred from surrounding circumstances, particularly where exclusive possession of a third party is established.

Also Read:

The following decisions were referred to in M.V. Ramachandrasa v.  Mahendra Watch Company (supra) while considering ‘unlawful sub-letting / assignment’:

  • .(a) Kala v. Madho Parshad Vaidya, (1998) 6 SCC 573
  • (b) Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur, (2005) 1 SCC 31
  • (c) Shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpatrao, (2000) 7 SCC 522
  • (d) Bharat Sales Ltd. v. LIC, (1998) 3 SCC 1
  • (e) Amar Nath Agarwalla v. Dhillon Transport Agency, (2007) 4 SCC 306
  • (f) Murlidhar v. Chuni Lal, 1969 Ren CR 563 : 1970 Ren CJ 922 (SC)
  • (g) Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali, (1998) 7 SCC 608
  • (h) Celina Coelho Pereira v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar, (2010) 1 SCC 217
  • (i) Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri, (1987) 3 SCC 538
  • (j) Jagan Nath v. Chander Bhan, (1988) 3 SCC 57
  • (k) Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayana, (1989) 3 SCC 56
  • (l) Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma, (1988) 1 SCC 70
  • (m) Gundalapalli Rangamannar Chetty v. Desu Rangiah, AIR 1954 Mad 182
  • (n) Jackson v. Simons, (1923) 1 Ch 373 : 1922 All ER Rep 583
  • (o) Chaplin v. Smith, (1926) 1 KB 198 (CA)
  • (p) Vishwa Nath v. Chaman Lal Khanna, AIR 1975 Del 117
  • (q) G.K. Bhatnagar v. Abdul Alim, (2002) 9 SCC 516
  • (r) Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam, (2004) 4 SCC 794
  • (s) Krishnawati v. Hans Raj, (1974) 1 SCC 289
  • (t) Vaishakhi Ram v. Sanjeev Kumar Bhatiani, (2008) 14 SCC 356
  • (u) Nirmal Kanta v. Ashok Kumar, (2008) 7 SCC 722

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Illegal, Mistaken or Fraudulent Registration of Deed, and Subsequent Mutation: No Adverse Possession

Adverse Possession is the Denial of Title of the True Owner. Mistaken or Fraudulent Possession will Not be ‘Adverse’.

Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract

Illegal, mistaken or fraudulent registration of a deed, and subsequent mutation will not perfect adverse possession. Because,

  • If a fraudulent act, no denial. 
  • There will be no hostile animus.
  • A registered deed, is a paper transaction.
  • The Sub Registrar does not enquire title .
  • Mutation of Govt. land – no adverse possession.
  • Adverse Possession must have commenced in wrong
  • Registration of a deed is not a ‘notice’ to the true owner or the Government.
  • Payment of tax on “Government” property – no “adverse” claim can be raised.
  • Registration of the title deed by itself will not cure the inherent defect in the title.

Part I

Adverse Possession: When Attracted

1. To attract title by adverse possession, the acts of possession must be –

  • peaceful, notorious, open and hostile to the true owner
  • for 12 years,
  • commenced in wrong and aimed against right
  • admitting the title of the true owner.

2. Adverse possession is expressed in the classical formulation of adverse possession in the Latin maxim: “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario

  • That is –
    • not by force: nec vi,
    • not in secrecy: nec clam
    • not by permission: nec precario.

3. Mere possession, however long, will not give rise to title by adverse possession.

4. Claim of title by adverse possession cannot be validly raised based (i) on a defective (for nemo dat quod applies) title or (ii) on a fraudulent title deed, for

  • the claim of title on adverse possession is based on “adverse” claims against the true owner, accepting his title and
  • the claim presupposes the claimant has no subsisting or legally recognisable title and no title deed in support thereof.

5. Under the changed law in the 1963 Limitation Act, what is in the mind (animus) of the claimant of the Adverse Possession is decisive.

Also Read: How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept.

Illegal, Mistaken or Fraudulent Registration of Deed, and Subsequent Mutation: No Adverse Possession

Illegal, mistaken or fraudulent registration of a deed, subsequent mutation and possession on that basis, however long, will not perfect title by adverse possession. Because there will be no hostile animus, and denial of the title of true owner, admitting the title of the true owner. ‘Animus possidendi’ must be to hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner and commenced in wrong and aimed against right. See: Shri Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, AIR 2020 SC 461; 2020-11 SCC 263, where the following decisions were relied on –

  • 1. T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570 (Commenced in wrong and is aimed against right; Possession is not adverse if referred to a lawful title.).
  • 2. Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya v. Galla Jani Kamma, (2008) 15 SCC 150 (Payment of tax on behalf of someone else and mere possession, insufficient. Required: hostile possession, denying the title of the true owner. Possession of the defendant, holding that the plaintiff was not the true owner, is insufficient.)
  • 3. Brijesh Kumar v. Shardabai, (2019) 9 SCC 369 (Assertion of a hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner, demonstrating a wrongful ouster of the rightful owner with continuous open and undisturbed possession over 12 years .)
  • 4. Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, (2010) 14 SCC 316, (Mere possession does not ripen into possessory title, required to establish the date on which he came in possession, nature of possession, the factum of possession, knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour as he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner; it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. The courts always take an unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights.)
  • 5. Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729. (Possession must be visible, notorious and peaceful, to the knowledge of the owner (if due diligence he would have known it). Cannot be decreed if not pleaded. Trespasser’s long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession. The owner can take possession of a trespasser at any point in time. Trespasser’s possession is construed to be on behalf of the owner.)
  • 6. M. Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1 (Ram Janmabhumi Temple case). (Claim of adverse possession would amount to an acceptance of a title in another. The possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner, and a clear and cogent basis must be made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence.)
  • In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779 (It is held – A person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed.)

Fraudulent Regn. of deeds & Mutation will Not Give Rise to Adv. Possession

If the deed is fraudulently registered and mutation entries were caused to be made, they will not ripen into adverse possession. The same will be the position (even) with respect to the government property. The following are the reasons:

  • 1. Registration of a deed is not a ‘notice’ to the true owner (even against the Government when a deed is executed on Government property, as if it were private property) to commence adverse possession. The Sub Registrar has no right to require the executant to satisfy the executant’s title to the property while registering a deed (Satya Pal Anand v. State of MP, AIR 2016 SC 4995; 2016-10 SCC 767).
    • The Sub-Registrar’s duty under the Registration Act, 1908 is formal, not adjudicatory. He does not certify title.
    • Even if some scrutiny occurs, it does not validate the title, and it does not amount to a ‘notice to Government’ to commence the adverse possession. It is clear from Explanation I to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It says – registration operates as constructive notice only to subsequent transferees, not to the true owner whose title is being denied.
  • 2. What is required in adverse possession is – open and hostile acts to the knowledge (actual or inferable) of the true owner; not indirect or implied attribution.
    • A unilateral or inter se transaction between private parties does not bind or notify the true owner. There must be overt acts of possession that are – visible, hostile and attributable to knowledge of the true owner.
    • A registered deed, in this regard, by itself, is a paper transaction that does not prove actual and hostile possession against the Government. That is, it does not prove hostility communicated to the Government.
  • 3. Mutation based on a registered deed presupposes a lawful claim on property. Because the existence of a deed presupposes a lawful right. A void or fraudulent deed on Government property (shown in the deed as private property) also cannot open the doors for adverse possession, for the commencement will not be in denial of the title of the rightful owner, admitting the title of the ‘true owner’.
  • 4. Mutation or payment of tax will not confer title.
  • 5. A taxpayer of a particular “Government” property cannot validly raise any “adverse” claim against that Government property (for he could not have lawfully mutated it by admitting it to be the Government property).
  • 6. The ingredients of adverse possession will not be attracted – such as: OPEN, actual, and NOTORIOUS (visible, not secret) exclusive possession, hostile to the true owner (Government). A sham/void/fraudulent transaction will not satisfy these ingredients. (See: Madhavrao Waman Saundal Gekar v. Raghunath Venkatesh Desh Pande, AIR 1923 PC 205; Lakshmi Dutt v. Gopal Dutt, AIR 1974 (All) 316; Radhabai and Ram Chandra Konher v. Anantray Bhagvant Despande, ILR (1885) 9 Bom 198).
  • 7. Courts must be cautious to apply adverse possession where public property is sought to be grabbed.
  • 8. Fraud vitiates everything. It cannot be used as the beginning of adverse possession. One cannot base adverse possession on a fraudulent foundation.
  • 9. Courts strictly scrutinise adverse possession in cases involving public property.

In Vishwa Vijai Bharti v. Fakhrul Hasan, AIR 1976 SC 1485, it is held as to the presumption of correctness on revenue-records as under:

  • “It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry in to their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry is the revenue record states but the entry is open to the attack that it was Made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title.”

Registration of Title deed Insignificant; Inherent defect in title Will Not be Cured

The inherent defects in the title of a party to a suit will not stand cured by the existence of a lawfully registered sale deed (P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023  INSC 1009; 2023 14 SCR 796). The title of the executant does not automatically stand confirmed, even if the subsistence of a deed is proved. It is also a trite law that if the vendor had no pre-existing rights, a document could not convey any interest (Neelakantan Damodaran Namboothiri v. Velayudhan Pillai Narayana Pillai, AIR 1958 SC 832; K. Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024(2) KLT 789 (SC).

‘Slept-over Rights’ – No Meaning in Argument, If No case on Adv. Possn.

Assuming (or even if), the true owner slept-over its rights for a long period and accepted the title deeds of the claimant (executed long back), such sleeping-over or acceptance gets relevance or meaning, only if –

  • the claimant has founded its case on ‘adverse possession’ (and not title); and the claimant raised adverse possession in his pleadings
  • “admitting the State to be the rightful owner
    • (Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461;
    • Ayodhya case Judgment, M Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1) and
  • stating that the claimant had come into possession of the land by “a wrongful dispossession of the State (under Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963)
    • (Karnataka Board of Wakaf v. Govt of India – (2004) 10 SCC 779;
    • T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa – [(2006) 7 SCC 570];
    • PT Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma – AIR 2007 SC 1753;
    • Government of Kerala v. Joseph,AIR 2023 SC 3988).

As shown above, a trespasser’s long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession. (Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729). If no adverse possession, mere possession of a claimant (of adverse possession) or trespasser,  however long, will not lose the right of the true owner (on the ground of limitation) to recover property on the basis of his title (Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988; Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461 etc.). For the above, under Art. 65 (which is based on title alone; and not previous possession), time-length of previous possession – or its lose – of true owner (or even the claimant) is immaterial. What matters is the ‘dispossession’ within 12 years by the claimant. It is to be pleaded and proved by him. (Ramiah v. M. Narayana Reddy, AIR 2004 SC 4261, 2004(7) SCC 541).

Nemo Dat Qod Non Habet and Title

If the vendors had ex facie no ownership rights (under any prior document) to convey the same to the transferee, the doctrine Nemo Dat Qod Non Habet applies (Kavita Kanwar v. Pamela Mehta, (2021) 11 SCC 209; Rusoday Securities v. National St. Exchange 2021-3 SCC 4017; Umadevi Nambiar v. Thamarasseri Diocese, AIR 2022 SC 1640; P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K Patkar, 2024-1 CTC 547; Chandra Gopiv. U. K. Gopalakrishnan, 2013-1 KHC 174, Sarojini v. Santha Trading Co., 1969 KLT 412).

Claim of title by Adverse Possession based on a Fraudulent Title Deed

Adverse possession presupposes –

  • (i) the claimant has no subsisting or legally recognisable title and no title deed in support thereof, and
  • (ii) hostility against the true owner.
  • See:
    • Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (1996) 1 SCC 639
    • Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant (1995) 2 SCC 543
    • L.N. Aswathama v. P. Prakash (2009) 13 SCC 229
    • Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India (2004) 10 SCC 779
    • M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya case) (2020) 1 SCC 1
    • Nand Ram v. Jagdish Prasad (2020) 9 SCC 393

The claim of adverse possession is based on “adverse” claims against the true owner, accepting his title. It cannot be founded on possession traceable to any title deed. Because, this doctrine presupposes absence of title and requires hostile assertion against the true owner. Hence, the claim of title by adverse possession cannot validly be founded on a defective (for nemo dat quod applies) or on a fraudulent title deed.

Until prescriptive rights are brought in question, they are inchoate

Until prescriptive rights are brought in question, they are inchoate only. In Siti Kantapal v. Radha Gobindaen, AIR 1929 Cal 542,

Part II

Ingredients of Adverse Possession

  • (a) hostile animus,
  • (b) denial of title of true owner – admitting the title of the true owner,
  • (c) wrongful dispossession of true owner,
  • (d) placing the date of starting of wrongful dispossession,
  • (e) some overt act,
  • (f) hostile (or notorious) acts must be peaceful, open and hostile to the true owner.
    • It is expressed in the classical formulation of adverse possession in the Latin maxim: “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario
    • That is –
      • not by force: nec vi,
      • not in secrecy: nec clam
      • not by permission: nec precario.

Note:

  • (i) For perfecting adverse possession, the statutory requirement of ’12 years’ in the Limitation Act, 1963 (particularly Article 65) must also be satisfied.
  • (ii) It starts only – “when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff” (Art. 65).
Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779;
T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570;
PT Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, AIR 2007 SC 1753

Drastic Change on Adverse Possession

Drastic change has been made, on the law on Adverse Possession, by 1963 Limitation Act. It introduced the words – “when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff“.

  • Under the changed law in the 1963 Limitation Act, what is in the mind (animus) of the claimant of the Adverse Possession is decisive; knowledge of the actual situation by the true owner is not a point at all.
  • Under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the true owner would have lost his right to recover the property from a trespasser if he failed to file a suit within the period of 12 years; otherwise, there would have been adverse possession.
  • The burden lies solely on the claimant of adverse possession to establish hostile animus, denial of the title of the true owner, wrongful dispossession, and other overt acts constituting adverse possession.
  • Bar of limitation arises, in a title suit (by the true owner), if only the defendants have a sustainable claim of adverse possession, after the 1963 Limitation Act.

Effects of the Drastic Change

  • The limitation starts ‘when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff‘ (Art. 65, Limitation Act).
  • Mere possession, however long, will not be adverse.
  • Even if Plaintiff has knowledge of defendants’ possession (however long) – no relevance.
  • Adverse possession and title claim will not go together.
  • The claimant must (first) admit the ownership of the true owner.
  • An issue as to ‘adverse possession’ necessary.
  • Proper animus (pleading and proof) needed.
  • The ‘mindset/attitude’ (animus) of the true-owner is immaterial.
  • Defendants must have relinquished the title claim, if raised, to prop up adverse possession.
Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander, 1984-2 SCC 286,
Thakur Kishan Singh v. ArvindKumar, 1994-6 SCC 591,
Ramiah v. M. Narayana Reddy,  AIR 2004 SC 4261,
T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, 2006-7 SCC 570,
P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59,
Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, 2010-14 SCC 316,
Ram NaginaRai v. DeoKumarRai, 2019-13 SCC 324,
Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, 2019-15 SCC 756, 
Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263,
Govt of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988.

Suit on Title – No Limitation Unless Defendant has Claim of Adverse Possession

  • No question of limitation arises unless the defendant substantiates his plea of adverse possession. This is because, after the significant change brought about by the Limitation Act, 1963, mere possession—however long—does not, by itself, become ‘adverse’.
Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta, AIR 2024 SC 5374
Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021; 2024 KLT(Online) 3051,
K.J. Abraham v. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98;
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; 2007-14 SCC 183
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549,
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808.

Acquiescence, Inaction, etc.

  • The same is the position even if – acquiescence, inaction, etc. on the part of true owner.
  • Even if the plaintiff admits that the defendant has been a trespasser for a hundred years, there will be no bar of limitation to a recovery suit based on title, if the defendant does not claim adverse possession.

It is held in T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, 2006-7 SCC 570, as under:

  • “12. The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e. a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other’s rights but denies them. The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of the owner’s right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property.” (Quoted in: Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263)

No Adverse Possession, Unless Claimant ‘Admits Title of the True Owner

  • There can be no adverse possession where the claimant does not admit the title of the true owner.
Shri Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, AIR 2020 SC 461; 2020-11 SCC 263,
M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1 (Ram Janmabhumi Temple case)
Raghavan, v. Devayani, 2024-2 KHC 417,
M. Radheyshyamlal v. V Sandhya, 2024 INSC 214,
Nand Ram v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2020 SC 1884; 2020-9 SCC 393,
Brijesh Kumar v. Shardabai, (2019) 9 SCC 369,
Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729,
Dagadabai v. Abbas alias Gulab Rustum Pinjari, (2017) 13 SCC 705,
T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570,
Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779,
Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao v. Galla Jani Kamma, (2008) 15 SCC 150.
  • Our Apex Court, in Ayodhya case Judgment, M Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1 (Ram Janmabhumi Temple case), it is held as under:
    • “747. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other.”
  • If the defendant (effectively) pleads adverse possession, admitting the plaintiff’s title, the plaintiff need not prove title.
  • Similarly, if the plaintiff (effectively) pleads adverse possession, the defendant, true owner, need not prove title.

Burden is on the Claimant

  • The burden to prove adverse possession is on the claimant (of adverse possession).
Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021; 2024 KLT(Online) 3051,
Janata Dal Party v. Indian National Congress, 2014-16 SCC 731,
C. Natrajan v. AshimBai, AIR 2008 SC 363; 2007-14 SCC 183,
Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan, 2009-16 SCC 517,
Mohammad Ali v. Jagdish Kalita, 2004-1 SCC 271,
Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1996) 1 SCC 639.

Adverse Possession – Irrational, Illogical Claim

In Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan, 2009-16 SCC 517, it was pointed out that the claim of adverse possession must be read in the context of human rights. The law which ousts an owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is found in this case to be irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate.

Part III

Sec. 3 of the TP Act

Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act defines the expression – “a person is said to have notice”.

S. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act

The relevant portion of S. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:

  • ” ‘a person is said to have notice‘ of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligencehe would have known it.
  • Explanation I – Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrumentsany person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or (where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share of interest is being acquired, is situated ).
  • Provided that- (1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908, and the rules made thereunder,
  • (2) the instrument (or memorandum) has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under S. 51 of that Act, and
  • (3) the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under S. 55 of that Act.

Explanation I to Section 3 of the TP Act is explained in Ranjit Singh v. Punjab State, 2014-4 LawHerald 3533; 2014-3 RCR(Civ) 766,  as under:

  • “19. Explanation I to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act clarifies that where any transaction relating to immovable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such party shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration

The Privy Council applied this Doctrine with ‘Some Modification’

In Tilakdhari Lal v. Khedan Lal, AIR 1921 PC 112, while dealing with notice of registered mortgages, it was held that ‘it would not be reasonable to hold that registration was notice to the world of every deed which the register contained’ and that ‘the doctrine must be subject to some modification.  The Privy Council further observed on the doctrine ‘registration as notice to the world’ as under:

  • “Their Lordships find it difficult to understand how such a difference can cause the register to be notice in the one case and not in the other. In either instance the doctrine of notice must necessarily depend upon the fact that there is a public register open for inspection, to which all persons having dealings with the property can have access; in each case they have before them the means of acquiring knowledge. In India that knowledge may afford complete protection even if notice be otherwise obtained of an unregistered deed. In England and Ireland that is not the case. But the completion of the register and the penal effect of non-registration do not appear to their Lordships to be any reason for causing the register to be notice in the one case and not in the other.
  • For these reasons their Lordships think that notice cannot in all cases be imputed from the mere fact that a document is to be found upon the register under the Indian Registration Act.”

An alienee, expected to make inquiry, presumed to have constructive notice

The Kerala High Court, in Gomathy Ammal v. Padmavathi Amma, AIR 1967 Ker 58, observed as under:

  • “Under S. 3 of the Act as amended, registration of a document by itself imports notice thereof. The law prior to the amendment has been laid down by the Privy Council in Tilakdhari Lal v. Khedan Lal AIR. 1921 P. C. 112, and in the concerned area by the Travancore High Court in Mariyadumperumal Chidambarathanu v. Namasivayom Sivakami 17 Trv.LJ 321 at p. 329.
  • The Privy Council said:
    •  “…. but nonetheless it shows that it would not be reasonable to hold that registration was notice to the world of every deed which the register contained. The doctrine must be subject to some modification. There may be circumstances in which omission to search the register would, even under the definition already given, result in notice being obtained and the circumstances necessary for this purpose may be very slight, but in the present case no such circumstances are found.
  • In Mariyadumperumal Chidambarathanu v. Namasivayom Sivakami, 17 Trv. LJ. 321 at p. 329 after a consideration of previous decided cases on the subject, the court said:
    • ‘without going so far as to lay down as an absolute proposition that registration is notice to subsequent alienees, we would hold that a subsequent alienee, who is expected as a prudent person to make inquiry or inspection in the Registry Officer, should be presumed to have had constructive or imputed notice of the prior registered deed, and consequently also of its contents as notice of the existence of a deed affecting title is notice of its contents’.”

Deems (only) ‘Constructive Notice’ of (earlier) Deed

That too to one who Subsequently Acquired the Property

In R. Ravichandran v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 2002-2-LW 590, it is held as under:

  • “37. The legal position is well settled in that every document affecting an immovable property as provided in section 17 has to be registered so that any person who wants to deal or desire to acquire interest with such property could find out encumbrances if any, the legal obligations, rights and ownership or claim over such property, and registration acts as constructive notice to a person who subsequently acquires such property or interest or any part thereof or interest or fraction of interest thereof”.

Proposition ‘as to Notice to entire world’ is Not accepted in Adv. Possn. Claim

In Arabia Bibi v. Sarbunnisa (2011, R. Subbiah, J.), the suit property was sold only within the family members. Therefore, the co-owner against whom adverse possession was claimed was not in a position to know about the sale. She knew only at a later point of time. Hence it was held – that the registration is only a constructive notice to the person who has subsequently acquired such property; and that if the proposition  that the registration is a notice to the entire world is accepted, it would defeat the legitimate right of the co-sharers.

Explanation I of Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act is Explained in this decision as under:

  • “29. On going through the dictum laid down in the above judgments relied on either side, I am of the opinion that the registration of document isonly constructivenotice to a person, who subsequently acquired that property or interest or any part thereof or interest or fraction of interest thereof. In this regard, it would be proper to refer Explanation I of Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, which reads as follows:
    • “Where any transaction relating to immovable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, …..”
  • Thus, it is clear that the registration is only a constructive notice to the person who has subsequently acquired such propertyIf the submission of the learned counsel for defendants 1, 3, 5 and 7 that the registration is a notice to the entire world is accepted, it would defeat the legitimate right of the co-sharers when the property was sold without their knowledge. Further, I find that the subject property was sold only within the family members and therefore, as contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, she might have been in a position to know about the same only at a later point of time. Moreover, the judgments relied upon by the appellants deal with the alienation of the property to the strangers. Further, I do not find any evidence in this case with regard to open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of other co-owner, namely, the plaintiff in this case so as to constitute ouster. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the principle of ouster cannot be applied in this case. The courts below have correctly appreciated the evidence and the documents adduced by the parties. The concurrent findings of the courts below reflect the evidence on record.”

In KS Natraj v. NIL, 2020-2 KarLJ 356 (B.V. Nagarathna, Suraj Govindaraj, JJ.) it is observed as under:

  • “20. The most important purpose of registration is to secure that persons dealing with the property, where such dealings require registration, may rely upon the statements contained in the register of the Registrar of Assurances with confidence that the full and complete account of all transactions relating to or affecting the property is covered in such register.”

Apply When Wilful Abstention from Making (expected) Enquiry

In Godhan Son of Pola v. Ram Bilas, AIR 1995 All. 357, it is observed as under:

  • (22) FROM the reading of this provision along with Explanation-I, it comes out that the person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when but for wilful abstention from making such enquiry which a person normally ought to have made he would have known it. In such cases the persons can also be deemed to have notice. According to Explanation-I, where law requires a transaction to be recorded or to be entered in, completed by registered deed then in respect of such transactions which satisfy two conditions i. e. a requirement of law that transaction is to be entered into by registered instrument only and the same has been completed by registered document, then persons shall be deemed to have knowledge of that instrument from the date of registration. The registration of the document has (sic) taken to complete notice to world at large. The agreement to sale immoveable property of value of more than Rupees One Hundred, under the Transfer of Property Act, is required to be entered into by the registered document.”

Sec. 3 TP Act Notice is on immovable property; & It is not a Notice In Rem

In truth, the proposition, ‘registration of a document gives notice to the world‘ is not followed in India. In  Parganas Lawyers Clerks Association  v. State, AIR 1986  Cal. 205, it is held as under:

  • “(30) THE notice contemplated under Explanation 1 of S. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act by registration of a document relates to transactions with regard to immovable propertywhich is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument and that also for a person acquiring such property or any part or share or interest in such property. It is not a notice in rem. Testamentary documents do not come within the purview of the notice as contemplated by the said section.

As regards the object of the Explanation to Section 3, it is observed as under:

  • It enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability. (Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2009) 7 SCC 363).
  • The object of the Explanation to Section 3 is to safeguard the interests of a third party who has (already) acquired a good title under a previous registered instrument. (Kuldip Singh v. State, AIR 1954 P&H 31).

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Admissibility of Electronic Evidence: Section 61 of the BSA Permits Oral Evidence (Overriding Arjun Panditrao)

Proof by way of S. 63(4) Certificate is Optional.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

Section 61 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, is a new provision. It was not in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 61, Adhiniyam says – the “admissibility” of evidence shall not be ‘denied’ merely on the ground that it is in electronic form. It is largely declaratory in nature. It binds the sections on electronic evidence to follow.

The Supreme Court decision in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1: AIR 2020 SC 4908, established a strict interpretation. It laid down (before promulgation of Adhiniyam, 2023) that the proof by the certificate under Section 65B (Section 63, Adhiniyam) was mandatory for admitting a computer output (copy) in evidence.

Drastic Legislative Change to Arjun Panditrao

Section 61, Adhiniyam made a drastic legislative change to the deliberation placed by Arjun Panditrao Khotkar. By virtue of Section 61, a computer output (i.e., a copy of an electronic record) is capable of being proved by any mode of proof recognised under the Adhiniyam, and is not restricted to proof solely through the certificate.

Section 61, Adhiniyam reads as under:

  • 61. Electronic or digital record. Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital record and such record shall, subject to section 63, have the same legal effect, validity and enforceability as other document.”

Section 63(4) BSA reads as under:

  • “(4) In any proceeding where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things shall be submitted along with the electronic record at each instance where it is being submitted for admission, namely:—
    • (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    • (b) … (c) ….

Arjun Panditrao Overlooked Two Aspects

It appears that Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal overlooked two significant aspects:

  • First, the deeming fiction in Section 65B (Section 63 of the Adhiniyam). It provides that a computer output (copy), upon compliance with the prescribed conditions, shall be deemed to be ALSO a document (original document).
  • Secondly, the requirement of a certificate under sub-section (4) applies only “where it is desired to give a statement in evidence“. That is, Section 63(4) is attracted only where a party elects to prove a statement by resorting to the certificate.

Note 1: By virtue of Section 63(4), proof by way of a certificate

  • is confined to statements—that is, matters involving oral or written assertions—such as call detail records, bank statements, or statements of a witness recorded by the court directly into the ‘computer’,
  • cannot be given as regards other electronic materials —such as photographs or video recordings stored in digital media (e.g., pen drives or CDs).

Note 2: Sections 61 to 63 deal only with the mode of proof required for the admissibility of computer outputs (copies); and they do not address the truth or correctness of their contents.

  • Sec. 63(1) reads – “(….computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied …. and shall be admissible in any proceedings,….. without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.”

In appropriate cases, the court may, however, draw a presumption as to the truth or correctness of the contents.

Following decisions say – the photographs/videos speak for itself.

  • Rajendra Sail v. M P High Court Bar Association, AIR 2005 SC 2473; 2005-6 SCC 109, Y.K. Sabharwal & Tarun Chatterjee, JJ. (Video)
  • Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, R. Banumathi, Kurian Joseph, Anil R. Dave, JJ. (CCTV footage – best evidence)
  • Swami Vivekanandnagar Co-op. Housing So. Ltd. v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2022-3 GLH 122; 2022-4 GLR 2732 (Photograph)
  • Madhavnagar Coop. Housing So. Ltd v. Joint Registrar, 2020-2 GLR 1437, J.B. Pardiwala, J. (Photograph)
  • Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai v. Kogila, 2021-3 CTC 118; 2021-2 LW 28  (Photographs)
  • Jetunben v. State of Gujarat, 2017-2 GLR 1640, J.B. Pardiwala, J. (Video)
  • New India Assurance Company v. Mohd. Akram Bhat, 2016-2 JKJ 12 (Photograph)
  • Shakuntala Bhadouria v. M. P. Griha Nirman Mandal, 2014-3 MPHT 62; 2014-1 MPJR 131 (DB) (Photographs)
  • Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Bhagirathi Ganapathy, 2010-2 CCR 1041 (Photograph)
  • Pawan Kumar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007-6 ADJ 551 (Photographs)
  • Raghuveer Singh v. Shiv Kumar Swami, 2006-3 RDD 1653; 2006-3 RLW(Raj) 2266; 2006-4 WLC 210 (Video)
  • Taran Parkash Mohan Lal v. State, 1962 CrLJ 189 (P&H) (Photograph).

Arjun Panditrao: Statements’ Embrace even Video and Photograph

In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, the Supreme Court adopted an expansive interpretation of the expression “statements.” It pressed the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B as a general condition for the admissibility of all forms of computer output (copies).

In other words, the term “statement” was construed to embrace all forms of computer output, regardless of their nature—whether a video, a photograph, or any other digital record. However, such an expansive construction does not appear to be supported either by the text of the provision or by its underlying rationale and intended scope.

Section 63, Adhiniyam, now requires expert opinion or hash value certification over and above the Certificate laid down in the former provision under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act.

UK Courts Did Not Expand the Phrase- “Desired to Give a Statement in Evidence

The Civil Evidence Act, 1968, contained strict provisions governing computer evidence. Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) dealt with the admissibility of computer records in criminal proceedings.

  • Note: It has been observed in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal that the provisions relating to electronic evidence in Indian law were, in substance, a “poor reproduction” of Section 5 of the 1968 UK Act.

Subsequently, the legal position in the UK underwent a significant change:

  • Section 69 of the PACE Act, 1984, which imposed strict conditions for admitting electronic evidence in criminal cases, was abolished in 1999.
  • The 1968 Act was replaced by the Civil Evidence Act 1995, which did not retain the earlier strict and technical requirements for electronic evidence.

Section 69(2) of the PACE Act read as under:

  • “(2) Provision may be made by rules of court requiring that in any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section such information concerning the statement as may be required by the rules shall be provided in such form and at such time as may be so required.”

The UK courts adhered to the textual limitation as regards the expression “statements” under both these Acts (when it existed); they did not expand the expression into a broader rule to enfold all forms of computer outputs (copies).

Present Position: After the repeal of the provisions relating to electronic evidence in the UK Acts, the UK courts have effectively reverted to the common law approach, under which electronic evidence is admitted based on general principles of relevance and reliability, rather than rigid or technical admissibility requirements.

US (Supreme Court of Georgia) Decision: In State v. Gilmore (2021), Supreme Court of Georgia, S20G1430, it held as under:

  • “The conduct the video depicts does not constitute a statement”.

Also Read Article:

Section 63, BSA Certificate – an Enabling Provision

Section 63, Adhiniyam enables a computer output (copy) to be treated as an original document—because of the words: “the computer output shall be deemed to be ALSO a document”. Therefore, an electronic document can be dealt with in accordance with the general principles applicable to documentary evidence in other provisions of the Evidence Act/ Adhiniyam. The certificate requirement (which allows marking a document without citing any witness) operates as an enabling or facilitative provision.

S. 61 is Enacted to Override Arjun Panditrao Khotkar

Section 61, BSA appears to be a legislative response to the rigid evidentiary stance established in Arjun Panditrao. Section 61 affirms that electronic evidence is not inherently inadmissible. By this section, the legislature has sought to:

  • prevent exclusion of ‘electronic evidence’ on technical grounds,
  • prove computer output (copy) otherwise than through a certificate (including oral evidence),
  • align evidentiary rules with technological realities, and
  • promote a more pragmatic approach.

This reflects a broader policy shift towards substantive justice over procedural rigidity.

The Supreme Court, in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, held –

  • Proof by way of the certificate under Section 65B (Section 63, Adhiniyam) is mandatory to admit all or any computer output (copy) in evidence. 
  • Section 65B is a ‘complete code’.

It is plain—the expression, “Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital record,” in Section 61 is enacted with a view to override the effect (certificate is mandatory) of the Supreme Court decision in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (otherwise, Section 61 would stand redundant).

In any event, Section 61 is worded with a view that it must be understood as a provision intended to secure alternative routes for admitting computer outputs (copies of electronic records); that is, otherwise than through the certificate contemplated under Section 63.

Does “Subject to S. 63” Suggest Admissibility on Certificate Alone

An argument may yet be possible against the construction stated above, based on the words “subject to Section 63” in Section 61 – that these words signify that the admissibility of a computer output depends upon the compulsory production of the certificate under Section 63.

This argument can be responded as under:

  • The above interpretation (based on the words “subject to Section 63”) would defeat the very purpose of introducing the new provision (Section 61), which expressly states – “Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital record”.
  • If the certificate under Section 63 were to remain as an inflexible rule, Section 61 would be rendered surplusage or otiose.

The harmonious construction would therefore be the following-

  • Section 61 seeks to mitigate the rigidity of the earlier position (as reflected in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal), which was understood to require that a computer output be proved only through a certificate under Section 63(4). And, Section 61 permits proof through any recognised mode, while retaining Section 63 as one of the available methods of proof.

Viewed in this light, Section 61 can be seen –

  • (i) as a legislative rebuttal to the strict and mandatory approach adopted in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, and
  • (ii) as an attempt to ensure flexibility in the law relating to electronic evidence to align with global trends in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.

Conclusion

Section 61 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, has been introduced with following clear and purposeful objectives:

  • 1. To clarify that a computer output (i.e., a copy of an electronic record) can be proved by examining a competent witness, and not exclusively by producing a certificate under Section 63(4).
  • 2. To make it clear that the procedural requirements under Section 63(4), such as furnishing a certificate and hash value without examining a witness, apply only when a party opts to rely on that mode of proof.

In essence, Section 61 restores flexibility by recognising alternative modes of proof, while reserving Section 63 for a specific, certificate-based method of admissibility.


End Notes

Videos Speak for Themselves – English Decision

It is laid down by the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in R v. Downey, [1995] 1 Cr.App.R. 547 CA and R v Blenkinsop, [1995] 1 Cr.App.R. 7, CA as regards a video –

  • It “should be shown without comment, since it was for the jury to decide what they revealed.”

In R v. Downey, [1995] 1 Cr.App.R. 547, the principle accepted was that a video can “speak for itself” if properly proved. In this case, the same type of offence was committed at different places. Both were video recorded. The similarities were well identified. This led to an acceptance of the video by the court. It was found that the perpetrator of one of the crimes was likewise guilty of the other.

CCTV Footage – The Best Evidence

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it is held that the CCTV footage is the best evidence (R. Banumathi, Kurian Joseph, Anil R. Dave, JJ.). It was a case concerning two Italian nationals. They were accused of the murder of another Italian national. The place of occurrence was a hotel room. All were on their trip to Varanasi. It was a case of circumstantial evidence. Symptoms of strangulation were absent in the medical reports. The defence was that the death occurred during their absence. They relied on the non-production of the digital evidence – CCTV footage and SIM card details. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, pointing out –

  • “The courts below have ignored the importance of best evidence, i.e. CCTV camera in the instant case.”
  • “Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, prosecution in possession of the best evidence– CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced.”
  • Note: Tomaso Bruno is overruled in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, on the point – whether computer output can be proved otherwise than invoking Section 65(4) of the Evidence Act; that is, under Section 65. In Tomaso Bruno it was held that secondary evidence of the contents of CCTV footage can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. Hence the CCTV footage was found admissible. In this regard Tomaso Bruno followed Navjot Sandhu. It is held in Arjun Panditrao that in the teeth of Anvar P. V., it could not have been said to be a correct statement of the law.

Photographs/Videos Speak for Themselves – Indian Decisions

In Rajendra Sail v. M P High Court Bar Association, AIR 2005 SC 2473; 2005-6 SCC 109; (Y.K. Sabharwal & Tarun Chatterjee, JJ.), it is held that the video exhibited in that case speaks for itself.

The Madras High Court in Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai v. Kogila,
2021-3 CTC 118; 2021-2 LW 28, while dealing with a suit for damages, filed by the legal heirs of a person who died due to the fall of an electrical pole on him, held as under:

  • “Ex. A-10 photos and CD clearly show that the pole was heavily damaged. One could also to see the iron rods exposed and rusted. The cement concrete covering peeled off. The broken electrical pole on the ground with live wire seen in the photographs speak for itself.”

In Pawan Kumar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007-6 ADJ 551, Allahabad High Court held as under:.

  • “The photographs of the constructions which were given at that point of time, show that it was semi finished construction, and the photographs appended with this Review Application, show that constructions have been completed and they speak in volumes for itselfPhotographs, which have been filed as Annexure-16 to the writ petition, and the photographs, which have been annexed along with this Review Application clearly speak that the applicant had full knowledge of the pendency of the aforementioned writ petition and in spite of the same constructions were carried on and completed.”

Following decisions also say – the photographs/videos speak for itself.

  • Swami Vivekanandnagar Co-op. Housing So. Ltd. v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2022-3 GLH 122; 2022-4 GLR 2732 (Photograph)
  • Madhavnagar Coop. Housing So. Ltd v. Joint Registrar, 2020-2 GLR 1437, J.B. Pardiwala, J. (Photograph)
  • Jetunben v. State of Gujarat, 2017-2 GLR 1640, J.B. Pardiwala, J. (Video)
  • New India Assurance Company v. Mohd. Akram Bhat, 2016-2 JKJ 12 (Photograph)
  • Shakuntala Bhadouria v. M. P. Griha Nirman Mandal, 2014-3 MPHT 62; 2014-1 MPJR 131 (DB) (Photographs)
  • Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Bhagirathi Ganapathy, 2010-2 CCR 1041 (Photograph)
  • Raghuveer Singh v. Shiv Kumar Swami, 2006-3 RDD 1653; 2006-3 RLW(Raj) 2266; 2006-4 WLC 210 (Video)
  • Taran Parkash Mohan Lal v. State, 1962 CrLJ 189 (P&H) (Photograph)

Seizure Of Heroine Non-Production of CCTV Footage – Not Invite Acquittal

It is also relevant to note the following decision of the Madras High Court on seizure of the contraband, a commercial quantity of 1 kg. of Heroine, in Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, Chennai v. Rasool Mydeen, 2023-1 MLJ(Cri) 19, which reads as under:

  • “Though the prosecution could have also produced the CCTV footage from the Central Railway Station, the very absence by itself will not entitle the accused for acquittal. The principle that non-production of the best evidence in the case of the prosecution could not be employed, as the CCTV cannot be said to be a best evidence when the seizing officer and the witnesses have deposed and the mahazar is produced and the CCTV footage can at best be termed as a corroborative material. Therefore, the mere non-production thereof will not entitle the appellant for an acquittal.”

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Law on Electronic Evidence in India: A Comparative Analysis with Other Jurisdictions

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Indian Law in a Nutshell

  • Electronic evidence cannot be ignored on any technicality.

Section 61 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) reads as under:

  • “61. Electronic or digital record: Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital record and such record shall, subject to section 63, have the same legal effect, validity and enforceability as other document.”
    • Note: Section 63 speaks about the proof of the copy of the electronic record (computer output) through the certificate provided under this section.

In Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2018 SC 714; 2018-2 SCC 801, our Supreme Court observed as under:

  • “21. ….. Reliability of the piece of evidence is certainly a matter to be determined in the facts and circumstances of a fact situation. However, threshold admissibility of an electronic evidence cannot be ruled out on any technicality if the same was relevant”. (Quoted in: Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1; AIR 2020 SC 4908)

S. 63 of the BSA Speaks about Admissibility of Electronic Records

Sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 63, Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 speak about the admissibility of electronic records. They read as under:

  • “63. Admissibility of electronic records: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given. computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.”
  • “(4) In any proceeding where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things shall be submitted along with the electronic record at each instance where it is being submitted for admission, namely:—
    • (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication device referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3);
    • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate,
  • and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.”

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Proof on Electronic Evidence – UK, US and Canada 

United Kingdom: In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, 2006 reissue, Vol. 11(3) Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure, the English law is explained, while dealing with “Documentary and Real Evidence”, as under:

  • “1471. Audio and video recordings. – An audio recording is admissible in evidence provided that the accuracy of the recording can be proved, the recorded voices can be properly identified, and the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible [R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1965) 2 All ER 464, R v. Ashiq Hussain [1966] 1 QB 688, 49 Cr. App. Rep 230, CCA. …. ” (Quoted in: P.  Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1; 2020-9 SCC 161)

In the UK, the admissibility of electronic evidence is governed predominantly by common law principles. It gives broad discretion to the courts and requires a case-by-case judicial calibration. Section 5 of the UK Civil Evidence Act, 1968, which governed the admissibility of copy of the electronic evidence, was repealed by the Civil Evidence Act, 1995.

  • Note: As pointed out in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1; AIR 2020 SC 4908), Section 65B, Evidence Act (Section 63 of the BSA), is a poor reproduction of Section 5 of the UK Act. Section 65B was incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act, by Act 21 of 2000. (By that time, Section 5 itself was not there in the UK statute book.)

The following are the well-accepted UK authorities on proof of electronic evidence.

  • (i) R. v. Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688)
  • (ii) R v. Clare and Peach (1995] 2 Cr App R 333) 
  • (iii) R v. Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876

United States: US law on Electronic Evidence codifies a structured, certification-based proof for admitting electronic records—without the need to call a live witness. Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE – introduced in 1975) provide specific provisions relating to electronic records, under Rules 901 and 902. (Entire Rules 901 and 902 are quoted in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1; AIR 2020 SC 4908.)

Sub-rule (13) and (14) of Rule 902 (incorporated by amendment in 2017) read as under:

  • Rule 902(13): “Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System. A record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate result, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).”
  • Rule 902(14): “Certified Data Copied from an Electronic Device, Storage Medium, or File. Data copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or file, if authenticated by a process of digital identification, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent also must meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).”

Together sub-rules (13) and (14) –

  • eliminate the need for foundational oral evidence in routine cases,
  • reduce litigation costs and delays, and
  • recognize the reliability of modern electronic systems and forensic practices.

The following are important US authorities on the admissibility of electronic evidence without formal oral testimony.

  • (i) State of Nevada v. Archanian, 145 P 3d 1008 (2006), decision of Supreme Court of Nevada (a U.S. state)
  • (ii) United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014), decision of U.S. Court of Appeals (Second Circuit)
  • (iii) United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 2016), decision of U.S. Court of Appeals (Third Circuit).

Canadian Law: A similar facilitative approach, akin to Indian law, is discernible in Canadian law. Both the Canada Evidence Act and the Ontario Evidence Act also recognise a presumption as to the “integrity of an electronic documents system”, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

The following are the well-accepted Canadian authorities on proof of videos.

  • (i)  R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251 – Alberta Court of Appeal (Western Canada).
  • (ii) Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790 –  Ontario Court of Justice (Canada).
  • (iii) R v Penney, (2002) 163 CCC (3d) 329 –  Supreme Court of Canada.

These decisions consistently laid down the following as to the admissibility of a video in evidence:

  • (a) The video must be relevant to the issues at trial.
  • (b) The video must be authentic – that it accurately represents the events depicted.

English Decisions: 1 – R. v. Maqsud Ali – tape recordings

R v. Maqsud Ali, (Court of Appeal, England and Wales, Criminal Division [1966] 1 QB 688), considered the admissibility of tape recordings. It is a foundational case on audio recordings. The accused were charged with murder. During the investigation, police secretly recorded their conversation in a police station. It was held as under:

  • “We can see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we must not be taken as saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the circumstances, but it does appear to this court wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly identified; provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, we are satisfied that a tape recording is admissible in evidence. Such evidence should always be regarded with some caution and assessed in light of all the circumstances of each case.” (Quoted in: Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3; 1985 Supp1 SCC 611; Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2011-4 SCC 143)

2 – R v. Clare and Peach – video recordings

In R v. Clare and Peach (Court of Appeal, England and Wales, Criminal Division, [1995] 2 Cr App R 333), a Police Constable Fitzpatrick had filmed supporters arriving at the football ground before the match. Also filmed them whilst they were in the stadium and as they left. Those colour films were of good quality. The video recordings made in the street were filmed in black and white. By studying the film, viewing the recording many times, the Police Constable was able to follow the movements of individuals and see what actions they took. By comparing the individuals performing violent acts with the colour pictures, he claimed to be able to identify not only the violent acts in the street but who was committing them. The court found that he had “special knowledge that the court did not possess”. His identifications were held to be ‘no more secondary evidence than any oral identification made from a photograph’.

3 – R v. Atkins – CCTV footage

R v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA Crim 1876, of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), England and Wales, is an often quoted decision on visual evidence (CCTV). It is a case where a team of three men committed two armed robberies at the homes of targeted victims in west London. The evidence included CCTV footage of violent attacks and murder. The faces of the culprits were not clearly visible in the footage. The prosecution relied on CCTV images and still photographs to identify the accused. They presented an expert who compared features from the CCTV images with photographs of the accused. The Court of Appeal held that expert evidence is admissible in such cases, for it helps the jury on matters beyond their ordinary experience. However, the Court stressed an important condition – the expert’s opinion must be based on a reliable and demonstrable method.

US Decisions: 1 – State of Nevada v. Archanian – surveillance digital video

State of Nevada v. Archanian, 145 P 3d 1008 (2006), was a murder case before the Supreme Court of Nevada (a U.S. state). A key piece of evidence was the digital video recorded by the store’s surveillance system. The accused questioned the authenticity of the video footage. It was argued that the VHS tape given to the police video technician was not the original. In the trial, the prosecution admitted that it could not authenticate the images as accurately transferred from the surveillance system. However, it claimed that it had been taken from the digital surveillance system itself. The Supreme Court of Nevada accepted the video evidence, holding as under:

  • “There is no evidence suggesting that the composite videotape was inaccurate, that any relevant or exculpatory information had been deleted from it, or that the modifications made to it adversely affected or obscured the content.”

2 – United States v. Vayner – social networking website

United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014), is rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The evidence included a printout of a social-networking page allegedly belonging to the accused. It showed that he used the false name “Mark V.” The government did not offer any “direct” evidence. The court considered the ‘authentication’ of the electronic evidence under Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It was pointed out that anyone could create a similar page. Therefore, it was held that sufficient proof of authorship should be provided. The conviction was vacated, and a new trial was ordered.

3 – United States v. Browne – Facebook chat

The rise of social media has created new challenges. The US Court of Appeals (Third Circuit), in United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 2016), put it as under:

  • “The authentication of social media evidence in particular presents some special challenges because of the great ease with which a social media account may be falsified or a legitimate account may be accessed by an imposter.” 

The accused in this case was convicted of serious offences, including child pornography and sexual offences involving minors. The conviction was based partly on Facebook chat records. The accused challenged the admissibility of the chat logs. He argued that the chats were not properly authenticated by oral testimony. The Government argued that the chats were self-authenticating. The Court did not accept this argument. However, it upheld the conviction, finding that the Government had produced more than sufficient “extrinsic evidence” to authenticate the chat logs under Rule 901(a). Because the evidence showed that the disputed Facebook records reflected real online conversations that took place between the accused and three of the four minors. The standard applied was proof by a “preponderance of the evidence”.

Canadian Decisions: 1 – R. v. Bulldog – surveillance camera video footage

R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251, is a case that dealt with the video footage from surveillance cameras. In this case, it was alleged that the accused forcefully entered a residence, assaulted the occupants, and committed robbery. One of the main questions that arose was whether a digital video can only be authenticated by an eyewitness. The court answered it negatively. It is held – a video can be proved by any one of the following –

  • (1) the camera operator;
  • (2) an eye-witness present when the video is taken who can testify that the video accurately represents what he or she saw;
  • (3) a person qualified to state that the representation is accurate; or
  • (4) an expert witness.

Should there be Proof – Video not been Altered or Changed?

This was another main question in this appeal. The finding, in a nutshell, was as under:

  • 1. When the accuracy of the video is satisfied, evidence regarding the absence of alteration is not necessary.
  • 2. The mere fact of alteration did not automatically render a video recording inadmissible.
  • 3. The Crown’s failure to establish that the DVD was not altered was not fatal if it is proved that the DVD was a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purported to show.

2 – Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi Hesurveillance camera

Acceptance of video taken by surveillance cameras was the main issue in the Ontario Court of Justice in Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790. An officer found that two surveillance cameras of a company had captured the events of the crime on video. He watched the videos from those cameras. The manager in charge of the cameras copied the video from their system to a DVD. At the trial, the Crown had not called anyone from the company that kept the surveillance system. KENKEL J., relying on R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251, held – so long as there is evidence which shows the video is accurate, no evidence regarding the absence of any change or alteration is necessary, and circumstantial evidence may be used to authenticate real evidence. It was also found that no particular evidence or a particular witness is essential to prove the video taken by surveillance cameras.

3 –  R v Penney – CCTV

In R v Penney, (2002) 163 CCC (3d) 329, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the legal effect of the jury’s comparison of a poor-quality video with the accused, without cogent supporting evidence.

The case was related to a robbery at a video store. The incident was captured on a security video (CCTV). The quality of the video was poor, and the offender’s face was not clearly visible. At trial, the jury had to compare the person in the video with the accused in court and decide if they were the same person. There was little or no additional evidence to connect the accused to the crime beyond the video. The core issue was whether a conviction can safely rest on a jury comparison of a poor-quality video image with the accused, without strong supporting evidence. The appeal court found a risk of mistaken identity. Conviction was set aside.

Indian Law Compared to other Jurisdictions

The US and Canada have specific statutory provisions for proving electronic evidence. Our legal position is closer to these jurisdictions. It differs from the position under UK common law, where courts exercise a wide discretion and decide each case on its own facts.

Indian law adopts a comparatively liberal approach. It relaxes the evidentiary burden for admitting electronic evidence. This approach is reflected in specific provisions under Section 63(4) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. It is also supported by the general presumptions contained in Section 119 of the Adhiniyam. This aligns with the Canadian presumption regarding the integrity of an electronic document system, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

The Madras High Court, in State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P. Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019-2 CTC 391; 2019-3 CTC 391; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129), referring Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He (supra) and State of Nevada v. Archanian (supra), said as under:

  • “We have referred to these decisions in order to reiterate that a pragmatic and purposive interpretation of the law governing the admission of electronic evidence is consistent with the development of the law in international jurisdictions as well.
  • 116. We, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the photos and videos in M.Os. 45, 49, 50, 51, 52 and 53 were taken contemporaneously when the attack was taking place and have not been doctored and can be read in evidence.”

Videos Speak for Themselves – English Decision

It is laid down by the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in R v. Downey, [1995] 1 Cr.App.R. 547 CA and R v Blenkinsop, [1995] 1 Cr.App.R. 7, CA as regards a video –

  • It “should be shown without comment, since it was for the jury to decide what they revealed.”

In R v. Downey, [1995] 1 Cr.App.R. 547, the principle accepted was that a video can “speak for itself” if properly proved. In this case, the same type of offence was committed at different places. Both were video recorded. The similarities were well identified. This led to an acceptance of the video by the court. It was found that the perpetrator of one of the crimes was likewise guilty of the other.

CCTV Footage – The Best Evidence

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it is held that the CCTV footage is the best evidence (R. Banumathi, Kurian Joseph, Anil R. Dave, JJ.). It was a case concerning two Italian nationals. They were accused of the murder of another Italian national. The place of occurrence was a hotel room. All were on their trip to Varanasi. It was a case of circumstantial evidence. Symptoms of strangulation were absent in the medical reports. The defence was that the death occurred during their absence. They relied on the non-production of the digital evidence – CCTV footage and SIM card details. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, pointing out –

  • “The courts below have ignored the importance of best evidence, i.e. CCTV camera in the instant case.”
  • “Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, prosecution in possession of the best evidence– CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced.”
  • Note: Tomaso Bruno is overruled in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, on the point – whether computer output can be proved otherwise than invoking Section 65(4) of the Evidence Act; that is, under Section 65. In Tomaso Bruno it was held that secondary evidence of the contents of CCTV footage can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. Hence the CCTV footage was found admissible. In this regard Tomaso Bruno followed Navjot Sandhu. It is held in Arjun Panditrao that in the teeth of Anvar P. V., it could not have been said to be a correct statement of the law.

Photographs/Videos Speak for Themselves – Indian Decisions

In Rajendra Sail v. M P High Court Bar Association, AIR 2005 SC 2473; 2005-6 SCC 109; (Y.K. Sabharwal & Tarun Chatterjee, JJ.), it is held that the video exhibited in that case speaks for itself.

The Madras High Court in Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai v. Kogila,
2021-3 CTC 118; 2021-2 LW 28, while dealing with a suit for damages, filed by the legal heirs of a person who died due to the fall of an electrical pole on him, held as under:

  • “Ex. A-10 photos and CD clearly show that the pole was heavily damaged. One could also to see the iron rods exposed and rusted. The cement concrete covering peeled off. The broken electrical pole on the ground with live wire seen in the photographs speak for itself.”

In Pawan Kumar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007-6 ADJ 551, Allahabad High Court held as under:.

  • “The photographs of the constructions which were given at that point of time, show that it was semi finished construction, and the photographs appended with this Review Application, show that constructions have been completed and they speak in volumes for itselfPhotographs, which have been filed as Annexure-16 to the writ petition, and the photographs, which have been annexed along with this Review Application clearly speak that the applicant had full knowledge of the pendency of the aforementioned writ petition and in spite of the same constructions were carried on and completed.”

Following decisions also say – the photographs/videos speak for itself.

  • Swami Vivekanandnagar Co-op. Housing So. Ltd. v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2022-3 GLH 122; 2022-4 GLR 2732 (Photograph)
  • Madhavnagar Coop. Housing So. Ltd v. Joint Registrar, 2020-2 GLR 1437, J.B. Pardiwala, J. (Photograph)
  • Jetunben v. State of Gujarat, 2017-2 GLR 1640, J.B. Pardiwala, J. (Video)
  • New India Assurance Company v. Mohd. Akram Bhat, 2016-2 JKJ 12 (Photograph)
  • Shakuntala Bhadouria v. M. P. Griha Nirman Mandal, 2014-3 MPHT 62; 2014-1 MPJR 131 (DB) (Photographs)
  • Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Bhagirathi Ganapathy, 2010-2 CCR 1041 (Photograph)
  • Raghuveer Singh v. Shiv Kumar Swami, 2006-3 RDD 1653; 2006-3 RLW(Raj) 2266; 2006-4 WLC 210 (Video)
  • Taran Parkash Mohan Lal v. State, 1962 CrLJ 189 (P&H) (Photograph)

Seizure Of Heroine Non-Production of CCTV Footage – Not Invite Acquittal

It is also relevant to note the following decision of the Madras High Court on seizure of the contraband, a commercial quantity of 1 kg. of Heroine, in Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, Chennai v. Rasool Mydeen, 2023-1 MLJ(Cri) 19, which reads as under:

  • “Though the prosecution could have also produced the CCTV footage from the Central Railway Station, the very absence by itself will not entitle the accused for acquittal. The principle that non-production of the best evidence in the case of the prosecution could not be employed, as the CCTV cannot be said to be a best evidence when the seizing officer and the witnesses have deposed and the mahazar is produced and the CCTV footage can at best be termed as a corroborative material. Therefore, the mere non-production thereof will not entitle the appellant for an acquittal.”

Conclusion

Section 61 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, prevents the exclusion of electronic evidence on purely technical grounds. In this sense, Section 61 responds to, and softens, the approach adopted in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal.

The expression “subject to Section 63” in Section 61 requires that certain procedural requirements—such as certification and related safeguards— must be followed. These requirements apply when a party chooses to prove a computer output under this special statutory method. It is therefore arguable that Section 63 is enabling rather than exhaustive.

This construction aligns Indian law more closely with the law in this matter in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.


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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Can the Court Issue a Second Commission without Setting Aside the First Commission Report?

Answer: Yes.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Part I

Apparent Legal Position

1. There is no bar to issuing a second commission if the court finds –

  • (i) the earlier Report was not satisfactory, and
  • (ii) there is a need for a further enquiry.

2. For issuing a second commission, the first commission report need not be set aside.

Because,

  • O26 r10(3) Code of Civil Procedure expressly allows the Court to direct such further inquiry as it thinks fit, if it is dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Commissioner, for any reason; and
  • Commission report is only a piece of evidence (A. Narayani v. Kittan, ILR 1997-1 Ker 726; 1996-2 KLJ 489; Subramonian v. K.S.E. Board, AIR 1988 Ker 169: 1987-1 KLT 355), and the court is not ‘bound by’ it.

Divergent Views Settled in Laly Joseph v. K.U. Francis

Laly Joseph @ Laly Sebastian v. K.U. Francis, 2023-3 KHC 678; 2023-2 KLT 516 (A. Muhamed Mustaque, Shoba Annamma Eapen, JJ.) has been rendered on a reference, as a Single Judge observed that a Division Bench, in Francis Assissi v. Sr. Breesiya, 2017-1 KLT 1041 (P.R. Ramachandra Menon, P. Somarajan, JJ.), held that a commission report could not be set aside [and that it can be set aside or varied only under Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 14 of Order XXVI of the CPC]. The reference was answered, finding that the observation in Francis Assissi’s case, on the point under consideration, was an obiter and was not a good law as it was rendered overlooking the statutory provisions. It is held in Laly Joseph v. K.U. Francis –

  • 1. “There is no embargo, according to us, for setting aside a commission report if the court is totally dissatisfied with the commission report.”
    • [contra to DB decision, Francis Assissi v. Sr. Breesiya, 2017-1 KLT 1041]
  • 2. “It is also open for the court to remit the commission report for further inquiry, so also to appoint a fresh commission without setting aside the earlier commission report.”
    • [contra to DB decision, Swami Premananda Bharathi v. Swami Yogananda Bharathi (K.K. Narendran, Paripoornan, JJ.), AIR 1985 Ker 83: 1985 KLT 144; and Yudathadevus  v. Joseph, 2021-5 KHC 668: 2021-6 KLT SN 36.]

Laly Joseph v. K.U. Francis is followed in Sreedevi v. State of Kerala, 2024 (2) KLT 645 (Anil K. Narendran, G. Girish, JJ.)

Sreedevi v. State of Kerala

In Sreedevi v. State of Kerala, 2024 (2) KLT 645 (DB), following Laly Joseph @ Laly Sebastian v. K. U. Francis, it is held as under:

  • “Of course, it is true that as per Order XXVI Rule 10(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Tribunal is expected to remit back the commission report and order further enquiry, if only it is dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Commissioner. Howeverwhen a party requests for further enquiry on the basis of the new aspects brought out in the pleadings by way of amendment, and seeks to have a commission report on the matters related to such new aspects which are relevant for the just disposal of the case, the court is expected to allow such application even though the commission report which is already on record does not contain anything objectionable for the court to be dissatisfied.”

Two Divergent Observations, on Close Scrutiny of Law on ‘Binding Precedent’

1. In Shajitha v. Akbar, 2023-6 KHC 297: 2023-5 KLT 503 (Single Judge), it is observed –

  • A commission report cannot be set aside as (rightly) held in Francis Assissi v. Sr. Breesiya (DB). (But, without setting aside the first CR, a fresh commission can be appointed.)
  • The finding in Laly Joseph v. Francis (DB) — that there is no embargo for setting aside a CR — cannot claim the sanctity of binding precedent. Francis Assissi v. Sr. Breesiya (DB) forms the binding precedent.

2. In T. K. Vijayakumari v. Subhash Mohan, ILR 2024-4 Ker 411; 2024 KER 60761 (Single Judge), it is observed –

  • It is held in Swami Premananda Bharathi’s case – “The appointment of the second commissioner and the reports filed by him without setting aside the first commissioner’s report is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction”.
  • The ratio in Swami Premananda Bharathi’s case (supra) is the “binding precedent followed” in –
    • Yudathadevus’s case (SB),
    • Laly Joseph’s case (DB) and
    • Sreedevi’s case (DB).
  • And the following contra decisions “have no binding effect” –
    • Francis Assissi’s case (DB),
    • Gopalakrishnan v. V. Ponnappan [2021-5 KHC 548 : 2021-5 KLT 751] and
    • Shajitha v. Akbar [2023-6 KHC 297: 2023-5 KLT 503].

Conclusion

1. The issuance of a commission is, in most property-related civil disputes, almost inevitable. It is therefore important that the law on remitting commission reports, setting them aside, and calling for fresh reports is clearly settled and applied consistently.

2. The findings of the Division Bench in Laly Joseph v. K.U. Francis and Sreedevi v. State of Kerala are seemingly legally sound. Still, Shajitha v. Akbar (SB) and T.K. Vijayakumari v. Subhash Mohan (SB) do not accept the authoritative nature of these Division Bench decisions. Referring to certain earlier decisions, the single Judges say that those earlier decisions are the binding judgments. Therefore, in view of the observations in the above single bench decisions, an authoritative clarification is required, by an appropriate Bench, on the following (apparently ‘settled’) aspects:

  • (i) There is no embargo for setting aside a commission report .
  • (ii) It is open to the court to remit a commission report for further inquiry, as also to appoint a fresh commission without setting aside the earlier report.

Part III

Effect of Two Commission Reports in File

Assume, rightly or wrongly, two commission reports were brought to file; then, should the first report be discarded totally?

  • Since (i) the commission reports are pieces of evidence, (ii) it forms part of evidence and (iii) no express legal provision permits to discard such a report, it may not be proper to totally discard the first report.

Is it mandatory to set aside the Commission Report – where the report suffered only some “deficiency or omission”?

  • No.
  • It is to be remitted-back to the commissioner to cure the lacuna. Yudathadevus  v.  Joseph, 2021-5 KerHC 668; 2021-4 KerLJ 415; 2021-6 KerLT(SN) 42. Followed Joy Cherian v. George Cherian, 2009-3 KerLT 64.

Can the partiess be pushed to suffer for the Mistake of the Commissioner

In Yudathadevus  v.  Joseph, 2021-5 KerHC 668; 2021-4 KerLJ 415; 2021-6 KerLT(SN) 42, it is held as under:

  • “21. In a case where the court finds that the commission report is totally unacceptable as it is not in accordance with the true state of affairs, it can always attempt to get at the truth by deputing another commissioner and its power to act under sub rule (3) cannot be minimised or overlooked on the ground that the contesting party has not filed any objection to it. It is always the endeavour of the court to arrive at the correct decision in a given case and whenever it is found that the commission report is unacceptable for any valid reason it can legitimately exercise its power under sub rule (3). It is well within the competence of the appellate court also to exercise in appropriate cases power under Order 26 Rule 10(3) to set aside the commission report and call for fresh report by deputing another commissioner.”

It is beyond doubt that above observation is made on the principle that the parties should not be pushed to suffer for the lapse or mistake of the commissioner. We can take cue from the proposition that ‘a party should not be pushed to suffer a wrong occasioned by the inaction or fault on the part of the Court’. See :

  • (i) Jang Sing v. Brij Lal, AIR 1966 SC 1631;
  • (ii) A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Naik, 1988-2 SCC 602;
  • (iii) Mudit Verma v. Co-operative Tribunal, 2006 (63) ALR 208 (All)(LB)

When a commission report is set aside, is the court bound to remit it back to the Commissioner for getting a fresh report?

  • Yes.
  • Yudathadevus  v.  Joseph, 2021-5 KerHC 668; 2021-4 KerLJ 415; 2021-6 KerLT(SN) 42. The reason behind it is obvious –
  • Court can appoint a commissioner suo motu (Dinesh Chandra Gaur v. Abhay Sood, 2015 (2) ARC 243).
  • In Retnamma v. Mehaboob, 2013-3 Civil CC 65 it is held that the court should go through the report and see whether it was in Order, irrespective of whether any objection is filed or not; and that the Order 26 Rule 10(3) C.P.C. laid down that where the Court was dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Commissioner, for any reason, it might direct the commissioner to make such further inquiry as it thought fit.

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Res Judicata and Appeal: No Res Judicata on Adverse Findings, in a Favourable Decree

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Abstract

There will be no res judicata on adverse findings if the suit or appeal is ultimately decided in favour of a party.  Because an appeal lies against a decree in terms of Section 96 of the Code (State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Ranga Reddy, 2020-15 SCC 681), and not merely against findings.

No Res judicata if Appeal could not have been filed

In State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Ranga Reddy, 2020-15 SCC 681, it is held as under:

  • The defendants-State could not file an appeal against a decree which was of a dismissal of a suit simpliciter. The findings on Issue No. 1 against the State could be challenged by way of cross-objections in terms of amended provisions of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code but such filing of cross-objections is not necessary to dispute the findings recorded on Issue No. 1 as the defendants have a right to support the ultimate decree passed by the trial court of dismissal of suit on grounds other than which weighed with the learned trial court. Even in terms of Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code, the Appellate Court has the jurisdiction to pass any order which ought to have been passed or made in proceedings before it.

In PMA Metripolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, it is observed as under:

  • “48. Last but not the least reason to hold that the finding in the Vattipanam Suit recorded by the High Court in its original judgment on canon etc. could not operate as res judicata is where a decree is one of dismissal in favour of the defendants, but there is an adverse finding against him, a plea of res judicata cannot be founded upon that decision because the defendant having succeeded on the other plea had no occasion to go further in appeal against the adverse finding recorded against him [see Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd. vs. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1922 PC 241 ] …..
  • Similarly, in the decision of the Patna High Court in Arjun Singh v. Tara Das Ghosh, AIR 1974 Pat 1 the primary question was whether a party against whom a finding is recorded has got a right of appeal even though the ultimate decision was in his favour and it was held that there was no bar, but what was necessary was that the finding so recorded should operate as res judicata. On facts it was found that the Appellate Court while maintaining the order of dismissal of the suit on preliminary issue recorded findings on other issues which were against the plaintiff, yet the plaintiff was not entitled to file an appeal as the findings on merits which were adverse to him could not operate as res judicata.
  • In Sham Nath’s case (Sham Nath Madan vs. Mohammad Abdullah, AIR 1967 J&K 85) the learned Single Judge rejected the plea of res judicata raised on behalf of the plaintiff, but while considering the alternative argument, observed that an adverse finding recorded against a defendant in a suit dismissed could not operate as res judicata unless the adverse finding formed a fundamental part of the decree itself.”

In Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam, AIR 1999 SC 3571, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “23. The respondents before us are, therefore, entitled to contend that the finding of the High Court in regard to absence of reasonable and probable cause or malice – (upon which the decree for pecuniary damages in B and C Schedules was based) can be attacked by the respondents for the purpose of sustaining the decree of the High Court refusing to pass a decree for non-pecuniary damages as per the A Schedule. The filing of cross-objections against the adverse finding was not obligatory. There is no res judicata. …” (Quoted in: Mohammed v. Chandrika, ILR 2010-3 Ker  358; 2010-3 KHC 233;  2010-3 KLT 306)

In Balu Mahadeo Randhir v. Nabilal Haji Habib Gadiwale, 1997-2 BomCR 462; 1997-1 MhLJ 302, it is oheld as under:

  • “Where a suit is dismissed, the defendant against whom an adverse finding might have come to be recorded on some issue has no right of appeal and he canot question those findings before the Appellate Court. Inasmuch as the defendant could not have filed an appeal, the decision in the aforesaid Regular Civil Suit No. 298 of 1971 cannot act as res judicata…”

In Bakerbag Subhanbeg Vs. Shrikant Laxminarayan Zanwar: 2008-3 All MR 656 it is pointed out that an appeal would lie against only those findings that amount to a ‘decree’ or ‘order’ that falls under Section 96 or Section 100 CPC. Similarly, no appeal lies against an Order under Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1. In Bakerbag Subhanbeg earlier decisions were referred to in detail. It includes the following:

  • Midanpur Zamindari Co. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1922 PC 241; 
    Run Bahadur Singh v. Lucnokoer,  ILR (1885)11 Cal 301 (PC); 
    Pateswari Din v. Mahant Sarjudass, AIR 1938 Oudh 18;
    Bansi Lal Ratwa v. Laxminarayan, 1969-2 AWR 246,
    Arjun Singh v. Tara Das Ghosh, AIR 1974 Pat 1.

Res Judicata: The issue should have been necessary to be decided

In PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, it is held as under:

  • “57. It is fairly settled that the finding on an issue in the earlier suit to operate as res judicate should not have been only directly and substantially in issue but it should have been necessary to be decided as well.”

It is the appellate decision that operates as res judicata

PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, continued as under:

  • “When a decision is taken in appeal the rule is that it is the appellate decision and not the decision of the Trial Court that operates as res judicata.”

Appeal dismissed on limitation; Trial Court decision on merits ceases to be final

PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, further continued as under:

  • “Where a suit is decided both on merits and on technical grounds by the Trial Court, and the appellate court maintains it on technical ground of limitation or suit being not properly constituted then the decision rendered on merits by the Trial Court ceases to have finality.
  • In Abdullah Ashgar Ali Khan v. Ganesh Dass AIR 1917 PC 201 the Court while considering the expression, `heard and finally decided’ in Section 10 of the British Baluchistan Regulation IX of 1896 held that where the suit was dismissed by two courts on merits but the decree was maintained in second appeal because the suit was not properly constituted then the finality on merits stood destroyed.”  (The apex Court also referred to Sheosagar Singh & Ors. v. Sitaram Singh ILR 1897 Cal. Vol. XXIV. )
  • “58. The rationale of these decisions is founded on the principle that if the suit was disposed of in appeal not on merits but for want of jurisdiction or for being barred by time or for being defectively constituted then the finality of the findings recorded by the Trial Court on merits stands destroyed as the suit having been found to be bad for technical reasons it becomes operative from the date the decision was given by the trial court thus rendering any adjudication on merits impliedly unnecessary. “

Finding in Review Sustains; Other Earlier Findings Not Res Judicate

PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, proceeded further as under:

  • “58. …. On the same rationale, once the Royal Court of Appeal allowed the Review Petition and dismissed the appeal as the ex-communication of Dionysius was contrary to principles of natural justice and he had not become heretic then the finding on authenticity of the canon etc. rendered in the original order was rendered unnecessary. Therefore, the finding recorded on the authenticity of the canon and power of the Patriarch etc. recorded in the earlier order could not operate as res judicate in subsequent proceedings.”

No Res Judicata on a Finding on Title, in an Injunction Suit and in Probate Action

An incidental finding will not constitute res judicata.

In Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350, it is observed as under:

  • “24. Before parting with this point, we would like to refer to two more rulings. In Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair [(1994) 2 SCC 14] this Court held that a finding as to title given in an earlier injunction suit would be res judicata in a subsequent suit on title. On the other hand, the Madras High Court, in Vanagiri Sri Selliamman Ayyanar Uthira-soma-sundareswarar Temple v. Rajanga Asari [AIR 1965 Mad 355 : ILR (1965) 1 Mad 232] held (see para 8 therein) that the previous suit was only for injunction relating to the crops. Maybe, the question of title was decided, though not raised in the plaint. In the latter suit on title, the finding in the earlier suit on title would not be res judicata as the earlier suit was concerned only with a possessory right. These two decisions, in our opinion, cannot be treated as being contrary to each other but should be understood in the context of the tests referred to above. Each of them can perhaps be treated as correct if they are understood in the light of the tests stated above. In the first case decided by this Court, it is to be assumed that the tests above-referred to were satisfied for holding that the finding as to possession was substantially rested on title upon which a finding was felt necessary and in the latter case decided by the Madras High Court, it must be assumed that the tests were not satisfied. As stated in Mulla, it all depends on the facts of each case and whether the finding as to title was treated as necessary for grant of an injunction in the earlier suit and was also the substantive basis for grant of injunction. In this context, we may refer to Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 50, para 735, p. 229) where a similar aspect in regard to findings on possession and incidental findings on title were dealt with. It is stated:
  • “Where title to property is the basis of the right of possession, a decision on the question of possession is res judicata on the question of title to the extent that adjudication of title was essential to the judgment; but where the question of the right to possession was the only issue actually or necessarily involved, the judgment is not conclusive on the question of ownership or title.””
  • (Quoted and followed in: M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 273; 27.02.2025)

The Apex Court (Sulochana Amma Vs. Narayanan Nair, (1994) 2 SCC 14) also pointed out as under:

  • “The decision in earlier case on the issue between the same parties or persons under whom they claim title or litigating under the same title, it operates as a res-judicata. A plea decided even in a suit for injunction touching title between the same parties, would operate as res-judicata. It is a settled law that in a Suit for injunction when title is in issue, for the purpose of granting injunction, the issue directly and substantially arises in that suit between the parties when the same is put in issue in a later suit based on title between the same parties or their privies in a subsequent suit, the decree in injunction suit equally operates as a res-judicata.”

In the locus classicus, Anathula Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2033, the Supreme Court held that where the issue of title involves complicated or complex questions of fact and law, or where court feels that parties had not proceeded on the basis that title was at issue, the court should not decide the issue of title in a suit for injunction. It is clear that findings of title in such suits are redundant so far as res judicata is concerned, the Court proceeded to hold as under:

  • “21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under:
  • (a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff’s title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff’s title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff’s lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter.
  • (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession.
  • (c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar [Annaimuthu Thevar v. Alagammal, (2005) 6 SCC 202] ). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction.
  • (d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.”
  • (Quoted and followed in: M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 273; 27.02.2025)

(Both, Sulochana Amma and Anathula Sudhakar are referred to in T. Ravi Vs. B. Chinna Narasimha, 2017-7 SCC 342)

In Hem Nolini Judah v. Isolync Saroibashini Bose, AIR 1962 (SC) 1471, it was held that questions of title are not decided in proceedings for the grant of probate or letters of administration.

Appellate Decision Operates As Res Judicata

Decree of a lower court merges with the decree of the appellate court. Hence appellate decree is to be looked into to determine res judicata. In PMA Metripolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, it is observed as under:

  • “If the ex-communication of Dionysius was invalid for violation of principles of natural justice, as was found by the Bench reviewing the order, then the findings on earlier issues were rendered unnecessary and it is fairly settled that the finding on an issue in the earlier suit to operate as res judicata should not have been only directly and substantially in issue but it should have been necessary to be decided as well. For instance, when a decision is taken in appeal the rule is that it is the appellate decision and not the decision of the Trial Court that operates as res judicata. Consequently where a suit is decided both on merits and on technical grounds by the Trial Court, and the appellate court maintains it on technical ground of limitation or suit being not properly constituted then the decision rendered on merits by the Trial Court ceases to have finality. In Abdullah Ashgar Ali Khan v. Ganesh Dass AIR 1917 PC 201 the Court while considering the expression, `heard and finally decided’ in Section 10 of the British Baluchistan Regulation IX of 1896 held that where the suit was dismissed by two courts on merits but the decree was maintained in second appeal because the suit was not properly constituted then the finality on merits stood destroyed. In Sheosagar Singh & Ors. v. Sitaram Singh ILR 1897 Cal. Vol. XXIV where parentage of defendant was decided in his favour by the Trial Court but the High Court maintained the order as the suit was defective the claim of the defendant in the latter suit that the finding on parentage operated as res judicata was repelled and it was held, that the question of parentage had not been heard and finally decided in the suit of 1885. The appeal in that suit had put an end to any finality in the decision of the first Court, and had not led to a decision on the merits.”

Res Judicata on Ex Parte Decree

An ex-parte decree might also will constitute res judicata if the defendant  had express notice of the pleadings and the prayer that a particular issue or matter would be decided.

  • (State of UP v. Jagdish Saran Agrawal: AIR  2008 SC 817;
  • Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen – AIR 1953 SC 33;
  • Ram Gobinda Dawan v. Bhaktabala – AIR 1971 SC 664;
  • Pandurang v. Shantabai – AIR 1989 SC 2240;
  • Thiruvengadam Mammad v. Chathamkara Ammad – AIR 1929 Madras 89;   
  • H.R  C.E. Commissioner v. V. Krishnaswami – AIR 1975 Madras 167).

Whether a Consent/Compromise Decree Operates as Res judicata

In Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao, AIR 1967 SC 591, the Supreme Court observed as under:

  • “….A compromise decree is not a decision by the Court. It is acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties had agreed. The decree merely sets the seal of the Court on the agreement of the parties. The Court does not decide anything. Nor can it be said that the decision of the Court was implicit in it. Only that decision by the Court can be res judicata where the case has been heard and decided on merit . … the statutory prohibition under Sec. 11 of the code of civil procedure or that of constructive res judicata would apply as a matter of public policy ….. Such a decree cannot strictly be regarded as a decision on the matter which was heard and finally decided, and cannot operate as res judicata. ..”. 
  • See also: Daryao v. State of UP, 1962- I SCR 574;
  • Vidya Sagar v. Sudesh Kumari, 1976-1 SCC 115;
  • Jamia Masjid v. K. V.  Rudrappa, AIR 2021 SC 4523; 2022-9 SCC 225.

It is held in Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (I) P. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 406, that ‘a matter in contest in a suit may operate as res judicata only if there is an adjudication by the Court’. 

Ratio Decidendi is the Binding Precedent; Not  Findings on Facts or Issues

In Jagdish Prasad v. State of MP, 2004(4) MPLJ 537, it was held by the Supreme Court as under:

  • “Any observation made or relief given by a Court, out of sympathy, compassion, sentiments and not based on any discernible principle of law or de hors the merits of the case, cannot be a binding precedent. A judgment of a Court contains three parts :
    • (i) finding of facts;
    • (ii) statement of principle of law applicable to the legal problem raised on the facts, based on which the case is decided; and
    • (iii) decision which is based on the finding of fact, applicable principles of law, and in some cases, discretion and the need to mould the relief in a particular manner.
  • Out of the three parts, it is only the second part, that is ratio decidendi or statement of law applied and acted upon by the Court, that is a binding precedentNeither the findings on facts nor the ultimate decision, that is, the relief given or the manner adopted to dispose of the case, is a precedent.” (Quoted in: Satpura Narmada Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Chhindwara v. A. K.  Chaturvedi, 2012-1 JLJ 78; 2012-1 MPLJ 282)

In A-One Granites v. State of U.P. [(2001)3 SCC 537], the Supreme Court observed that where no consideration was given to the question, the decision cannot be said to be binding; and precedents sub silentio and without arguments are of no moment. (Referred to in: Satpura Narmada Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Chhindwara v. A. K.  Chaturvedi, 2012-1 JLJ 78; 2012-1 MPLJ 282.)

Res Judicata Binds Parties; Ratio Decidendi (as Binding Precedent) Binds Courts

In The Modern English Legal System (4th Edition) by Smith, Bailey and Gunn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), pages 518-519, says as under:

  • “…. Thus the Court’s order is binding on the parties under the res judicata doctrine; the ratio decidendi is binding on other Courts in accordance with the principles outlined above under the doctrine of binding precedent. A startling illustration of the distinction was provided by the following series of cases. A testator, John Arkle Waring, left annuities to Mr. Howard and Mrs. Louie Burton-Butler ‘free of income tax’. In 1942 the Court of Appeal in Re warning, Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Awdry : (1942) Ch. 426 on an appeal in which Howard was a party, held that income tax had to be deducted. Louie was not a party as she was in an enemy occupied country. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. Four years later the House of Lords in Berke¬ley v. Berkeley : (1946) A.C. 555 overruled the Awdry case. Subsequently, Jenkins J. held that the Awdry case was res judica¬ta so far as Howard was concerned notwithstanding that its ratio had been overruled in Berkeley v. Berkeley and that Louie’s annuity would be dealt with in accordance with the later case. (See Re Warning, Westminster Bank v. Burton-Butler : (1948) Ch. 221).”
  • (Quoted in: Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India (AK Ganguly, CJ, then) 2007-104 CLT 737, Ori)

Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley’s Commentary on the Doctrine of res judicata (Butterworths: London, Edinburgh, Dublin – 1996, pages 8 and 9), explains the concept of res judicata as under:

  • “There is an essential difference between res judicata estoppel and the doctrine of judicial precedent. Under the former a final decision in fact or law by any Court having jurisdiction precludes either party (except on appeal) from again raising the same issue against the other in any Court. The doctrine of judicial precedent, on the other hand, is not concerned with issues between parties. …
  • The difference is illustrated by the cases of Re Waring decided in 1942 and 1948. In the first Farwell J held that Section 25 of the Finance Act 1941 was not applicable (1942) Ch. 309 to an annuity; but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision. (1942) Ch. 426. The effect was two-fold; it decided as res judicata between the parties that Section 25 applied, and it bound Courts up to the Court of Appeal in other cases. In Berkeley v. Bekeley (1946) AC 555, the House of Lords overruled Re Waring. In 1948 the trustees sought a decision as between themselves and the annuitant who had not been joined in the first proceedings. (1948) Ch. 221. The other annuitant remained bound by the earlier decision, but the result (see Duke of Bedford v. Elliz : (1901) AC 1 at 8), was otherwise governed by Berkeley v. Berkeley: Gisborne Sheepfarmers’ Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. IRC : (1962) NZLR 810 at 814.” (Quoted in: Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India (AK Ganguly, CJ, then) 2007-104 CLT 737, Ori)

In State of M.P. v. Mulam Chandi, AIR 1973 MP293, it has been held as under:

  • “As between a decision which operates a s res judicata and a decision which is binding as a precedent but not res judicata, the former must prevail.”

Interpretation of a Document can Be A Binding Judicial Precedent

In Sahu Madho Dass v. Mukand Ram, 1955 AIR SC 481, it was observed out as under:

  • “Mukand Ram was not a party to that litigation and the decision does not bind him but it operates as a judicial precedent about the construction of that document, a precedent with which we respectfully agree.”
  • (Referred to in: Syed Hafiz Mir v. Abdul Nayeemkhan, AIR 1960  MP 50; Potluri Saraswathi v. Vallabhaneni Veerabhadra Rao, 2004-7 ALT 120; Harabati v. Jasodhara Debi, AIR 1977  Ori  143; Ramachandra Bhat v. Srideviamma, AIR 1976 Kar 217; Katragadda China Anjaneyulu v. Kattragadda China Ramayya, 1965  AIR AP 177.)

In R. V. Bhupal Prasad v. Saleha Begum, 2002 Supp2 ALD 735; 2001-5 ALT 770, it is pointed out that in Anjaneyulu v. Ramaiah, 1965-1 ALT 149, a Full Bench of the Andhra High Court held that interpretation of a material document in a prior proceeding between the same parties even if does not operate as res judicata would be a binding judicial precedent in a subsequent proceeding between the parties based on that document.

Even an erroneous decision operates as Res Judicata

In Bindeswari v. Bageshwari, AIR 1936 PC 46, it was held as under:

  • “Where the decision of the Court in a previous suit determined that the section had never applied to a transaction, a Court in a new suit between the same parties with regard to the same transaction cannot try a new the issue as to its applicability in face of the express prohibition in Section 11 of the Code. “

In Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna, AIR 1953 SC 65 it was laid down  as under:

  • “(23) There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as res judicata. A decision in the previous execution case between the parties that the matter was not within the competence of the executing court even though erroneous is binding on the parties; see Abhoy Kanta Gohain v. Gopinath Deb Goswami AIR 1943 Cal. 460.”

Erroneous decision on a Question of Law does not Operate as Res Judicata

In Canara Bank v. N. G. Subbaraya Setty, AIR 2018 SC3395; 2018-16 SCC 228, (relying on S.P.A. Annamalay Chetty v. B.A. Thornhill AIR 1931 PC 263) it is held as under:

  • “An erroneous judgment on a question of law, which sanctions something that is illegal, also cannot be allowed to operate as res judicata.”

In Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman, (1996) 6 SCC 424, it is held that when the previous decision was found to be erroneous on its face, such judgment cannot operate as res judicata (referred to in: Canara Bank v. N. G. Subbaraya Setty, AIR 2018 SC3395; 2018-16 SCC 228).

In Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla, (2005) 5 SCC 390, it is held that in view of the changed position in law consequent to a contrary interpretation put on Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddy, (1977) 3 SCC 99, the earlier decree based on judgments that were overruled cannot operate as res judicata (referred to in: Canara Bank v. N. G. Subbaraya Setty, AIR 2018 SC3395; 2018-16 SCC 228).

In Canara Bank v. N. G. Subbaraya Setty, AIR 2018 SC3395; 2018-16 SCC 228it is held – Where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata

Erroneous decision on Jurisdiction of Court – Not Operate as Res Judicata

In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613, it is observed as under:

  • “9. A question of jurisdiction of the Court, or of procedure, or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. Rankin, C.J., observed in Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee’s case:
    • “The object of the doctrine of res judicata is not to fasten upon parties special principles of law as applicable to them inter se, but to ascertain their rights and the facts upon which these rights directly and substantially depend; and to prevent this ascertainment from becoming nugatory by precluding the parties from reopening or recontesting that which has been finally decided.”
  • 10. A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise.
  • 11. It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent Court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of law i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression “the matter in issue” in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the parties i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.” (Quoted in: Canara Bank v. N. G. Subbaraya Setty, AIR 2018 SC3395; 2018-16 SCC 228)

In Canara Bank v. N. G. Subbaraya Setty, AIR 2018 SC3395; 2018-16 SCC 228, it is pointed out that Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613, has been followed in a number of cases. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193, following Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal, it is held that where there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction, which depends upon a wrong decision, the earlier wrong decision cannot be res judicata. In Isabella Johnson (Smt.) v. M.A. Susai (1991) 1 SCC 494, after setting out the law contained in Mathura Prasad, stated that a Court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with jurisdiction by applying the principle of res judicata, as it is well settled that there is no estoppel on a pure question of law which relates to jurisdiction.

No Binding Precedent if relevant statutory provision was Not considered

In Union of India v. Maniklal Banerjee, AIR 2006 SC 2844, the Apex Court has held as under:

  • “It is now well-settled that if a decision has been rendered without taking into account the statutory provision, the same cannot be considered to be a binding precedent. This Court, in Pritam Singh, while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, might have refused to interfere with the decision. The same, therefore, did not constitute any binding precedent.” (Referred to in: Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain (Arun Misra, J.), ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472)

Arun Misra, J., referred to the House of Lords’ decision in Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain, ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472, and said as under:

  • “(35) Another decision relied upon is rendered by the House of Lords in Watt vs. Ahsan (2007) UKHL 51. In the aforesaid case, question arose on Section 12 of the Race Relations Act, 1976. The submission was made that they were party and that All vs. Mcdonagh (2002) ICR 1026 was wrongly decided. In any case, the interpretation given to Section 12 by the EAT in Sawyer v. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 is res judicata between him and the Labour Party, not only for the purposes of his first complaint but for the other two as well. It was opined that the EAT was wrong in Sawyer vs. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 to hold that the Labour Party was a qualifying body, but there was no appeal against the decision of EAT , it was held that decision was binding upon the parties though wrong in law. When the Tribunal was-having the jurisdiction to decide the question, it is binding upon the parties though erroneous.
  • There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition, but here we are concerned with the fresh cause of action on which suit is based and previously relevant statutory provision of Section 111 (d) of TP Act was not taken into consideration, question of determination of tenancy was also not decided.”

Exceptions to the Rule of Res Judicata

Arun Misra, J., pointed out as regards Rule of Res Judicata, in Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain, ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472 (referring to State of MP. v. Mulamchand 1973 MPLJ 832), as under:

  • ( 36 ) …. The rule admits of certain exceptions.
    • One is that where the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, it will not operate as res judicata if in the subsequent suit it is found to be erroneous because the question of jurisdiction is unrelated to rights claimed by one party and denied by other.
    • Another exception is where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties.
    • Third exception is that a decision of a Court sanctioning something which is illegal does not operate as res judicata, and a party affected by the decision is not precluded from challenging its validity.
  • In the instant case, the earlier decisions rendered by this Court were not on the question of law of merger of tenancy into co-ownership and section 111 (d) of the TP Act was not considered, thus, it cannot be said to be operating as res judicata in the present suit based on fresh cause of action of ejectment of tenant and title. Tenant has protection under Rent Act, he can be evicted only on availability of ground under Section 12 of the Act. It is a question pertaining to jurisdiction to evict. There is no finding of fact which is coming in the way in the instant suit. The main question is that of the status of the defendants and beyond iota of doubt, they are tenants and tenancy is not determined by the fact that only portion of the property had been purchased by one of the heirs of the original tenant.”

Whether O. I, r. 8 Decree is Res Judicata 

Order I rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, enables the plaintiffs to file a suit in a representative capacity for the benefit of a class of (numerous) persons.

Whether the decree in such a suit operates as res judicata against the persons who are represented remains as a controversy.  In any event, by the insertion of Sub-rule (6) to rule 8 of Order I, in 1976, it became legitimate to say that the decree stands as res judicata. Sub-rule (6) lays down that a decree passed in a suit under rule 8 shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is instituted or defended.

Therefore, the view taken in Srinivasa Aiyankar v. Aryar Srinivasa Aiyankar, (1910) ILR 33 Mad 483 : 6 IC 229, that the decisions do not bind on those who were not actually (eo nominee)  parties (and hence not res judicata and not enforceable in execution)  does not hold good at present. This view in Srinivasa Aiyankar had been taken in following cases (prior to 1976) also:

  • Sahib Thampi v. Hamid, 36 Mad. 414
  • Walker v. Sur, 1914-2 KB 930
  • Hardie and Lane Limited v. Chiltern, 1928-1 KB 663
  • Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar. AIR 1955 Mad 281

It is noteworthy that even when Sub-r. (6) of r. 8 of O. I was not available in the Code, it was observed in Waryam Singha v. Sher Singh, AIR 1942 Lah 136, that the decree for injunction could be executed against any of the persons who were represented under O. 1 r. 8 CPC; because,  all the persons who were represented must be held to be parties as the decree obtained in such a suit was binding on all of them. This view is taken in following cases also:

  • Mool Chandra Jain v. Jagdish Chandra Joshi, AIR 1955 All 385
  • Abdulla v. Parshotam Singh, AIR  1935 Lah 33
  • Jatindra Mohan Banerje v. Kali Charan, AIR 1960 Cal 623

Relying on Shri V. J. Thomas v. Shri Pathrose Abraham, AIR 2008 SC 1503, and Kodia Goundar Vs. Velandi Goundar, AIR 1955 Mad 281, the Kerala High Court has in Narayanan V. Periyadan Narayanan Nair, 2021 (3) KHC 211 (FB) held that execution of a decree is not possible if he was not impleaded as a defendant. The Full Bench overruled James Vs. Mathew (ILR 2012-4 Ker 753, 2012-4 Ker 640, 2012-4 Ker LT 666, 2012-4 KHC 604 ), which held that a decree for injunction obtained in a representative suit is binding on all persons for whose benefit the suit was defended, though they were not eo nomine parties to the suit; and that in case of wilful disobedience of such a decree by those persons for whose benefit the suit was defended, it is enforceable against them under r. 32 of O. XXI of the Code.

See Blog: Decree in OI R8 CPC-Suit & Eo-Nomine Parties

Res Judicata, Order II Rule 2 Bar and Sec. 10 CPC

Sec. 11 CPC and Order II rule 2 CPC bar suit/relief. But, Sec. 10 CPC bars trial only. Because:

  • Sec. 11 CPC (Res Judicata) begins as – “No Court shall try any suit or issue”.
  • Order II Rule 2 bars to – “sue for any relief omitted“.
  • Sec. 10 CPC (Res sub judice – Latin: ‘under judgment’) begins as – “No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit“.

See Blog: Order II, Rule 2 CPC – Not to Vex Defendants Twice for the Same Cause of Action

Change of Law and Res judicata

When the law has been changed, subsequent to a decision rendered by a Court, it is held in Alimunnissa Chowdharani v. Shyam Charan Roy, 1905-1 CLJ 176, that the earlier decision would not operate as res judicata.

In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, 1970-1 SCC 613, it is observed that when the law has undergone a change, there would be no question of res judicata or constructive res judicata. It is observed as under:

  • “5. But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure: it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative direction between the parties so as to determine the question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and relating to the right in dispute between the parties has been determined thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties: the “matter in issue” may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be reopened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are not res judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is the right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A previous decision of a competent Court on facts which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transaction which is the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transactions which is the soured of the right is res judicata. A previous decision on a matter in issue is a composite decision: the decision of law cannot be dissociated from the decision on facts on which the right is founded. A decision on an issue of law will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, if the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous proceeding, but not when the cause of action is different, nor when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is prohibited by law. …….
  • 7. Where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same, parties: Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee’s case. It is obvious that the matter in issue in a subsequent proceeding is not the same as in the previous proceeding, because the law interpreted is different.”

Can res judicata be raised as a preliminary point/issue

The Kerala High Court in V. Narayana Bhakthan v. The President, Anantha Narayanapuram, 2008-3 Ker LT 840 it is held as under:

  • “The question of res judicata can be raised as a preliminary point in certain circumstances. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order XIV of the CPC states that where issues, both of law and of fact, arise in the same suit, and the Court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to: (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by law for the time being in force. The said sub-rule also provides that the Court may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue. In ML Sethi v. RP Kapur, AIR 1972 SC 2379, it was held that it is well settled that a plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the court and a finding on the plea in favour of the party raising it would oust the jurisdiction of the court. If the question of res judicata can be decided without reference to the disputed questions of fact and without the necessity of there being any evidence to be adduced, the Court would be justified in dealing with the said contention as a preliminary issue. However, if the Court finds that disputed questions of fact are involved or that the plea of res judicata is a mixed question of law and fact, the Court is not bound to decide the said question as a preliminary issue.”

Effect of failure to raise bar of res judicata as a preliminary issue

In V. Narayana Bhakthan v. The President, Anantha Narayanapuram, 2008-3 Ker LT 840, it is held, further as under:

  • Even if a party, who is entitled to request the court to consider the contention of res judicata as a preliminary issue, fails to make a request in that behalf at the appropriate time, that does not operate as a bar for him to raise the contention of res judicata at the final stage of the suit. Such a contention would not be barred by res judicata by his not requesting the same to be considered as a preliminary issue. On the other hand, if such a question is raised as a preliminary issue and a decision is rendered against the party raising it, he would be precluded at a later stage of the same proceeding from raising the very same contention that the suit is barred by res judicata except by challenging the final decision in Appeal.”

S. Nagaraj (dead) by LRs. VS B. R. Vasudeva Murthy, 08 Feb 2010
2010 2 AIR(Kar)(R) 274; 2010 Supp AIR(SC) 551; 2010 0 AIR(SCW) 1519; 2010 2 JT 185; 2010 3 KarLJ 513; 2010 Supp1 KLT 95; 2010 2 Scale 232; 2010 3 SCC 353; 2010 1 SCC(Civ) 695; 2010 4 SCJ 258; 2010 2 SCR 586; 2010 2 SLT 441; 2010 0 Supreme(SC) 140;

Correctness of the Finding has no bearing

Rankin, C.J. of the Calcutta High Court in Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee v. Kedar Nath Haldar,AIR 1928 Cal. 777 held as under:

  • “The question whether decision is correct or erroneous has no bearing upon the question whether it operates or does not operate as res judicata.”

Res Judicata in Writ Proceedings

Our Apex Court observed in State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala, AIR 2014 SC 2407; 2014-12 SCC 696as under:

  • “156. The rule of res judicata is not merely a technical rule but it is based on high public policy. The rule embodies a principle of public policy, which in turn, is an essential part of the rule of law. In Duchess of Kingston; 2 Smith Lead Cas 13 Ed. Pp. 644, 645, the House of Lords (in the opinion of Sir William de Grey) has observed:
    • “From the variety of cases relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suits, these two deductions seem to follow as generally true: first, that the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question in another court; secondly, that the judgment of a court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in question in another court, for a different purpose.”
  • 157. Corpus Juris explains that res judicata is a rule of universal law pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds, embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation; and the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.
  • 158. In Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Prashad Narayan Singh; [AIR 1916 PC 78], Sir Lawrence Jenkins noted the statement of law declared by Lord Coke, ‘interest reipublica ut sit finis litium,’ otherwise great oppression might be done under colour and pretence of law. – (6 Coke, 9A.)
  • 159. In Daryao and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors.; [AIR 1961 SC 1457], P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. while explaining the rule of res judicata stated that on general considerations of public policy there seems to be no reason why rule of res judicata should be treated as inadmissible or irrelevant while dealing with the petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. referred to earlier decision of this Court in Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and Ors.; [AIR 1960 SC 1186] wherein the application of the rule of res judicata to a petition filed under Article 32 was considered and it was observed that the question determined by the previous decision of this Court cannot be reopened and must govern the rights and obligations of the parties which are subsequently the same.
  • 160. In Gulab Chand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay; [(1965) 2 SCR 547], this Court stated that a decision in a writ petition is res judicata in a subsequent suit.
  • 161. In Union of India v. Nanak Singh; [(1968) 2 SCR 887 : AIR 1968 SC 1370] the question whether the decision in a writ petition operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit filed on the same cause of action has been settled. In Nanak Singh, this court observed that there is no good reason to preclude decisions on matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and, thus, to give limited effect to the principle of finality of decision after full contest.
  • 162. Union of India v. Nanak Singh; [(1968) 2 SCR 887 : AIR 1968 SC 1370] has been followed by a three Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal; [ (1970) 3 SCC 656]. In our view, the rule of res judicata which is founded on public policy prevents not only a new decision in the subsequent suit but also prevents new investigation. It prevents the defendant from setting up a plea in a subsequent suit which was decided between the parties in the previous proceedings. The legal position with regard to rule of res judicata is fairly well-settled that the decision on a matter in controversy in writ proceeding (Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution) operates as res judicata in subsequent suit on the same matters in controversy between the same parties. For the applicability of rule of res judicata it is not necessary that the decision in the previous suit must be the decision in the suit so as to operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. A decision in previous proceeding, like under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution, which is not a suit, will be binding on the parties in the subsequent suit on the principle of res judicata.
  • 163. For the applicability of rule of res judicata, the important thing that must be seen is that the matter was directly and substantially in issue in the previous proceeding and a decision has been given by the Court on that issue. A decision on issue of fact in the previous proceeding – such proceeding may not be in the nature of suit – constitutes res judicata in the subsequent suit.
  • 164. In light of the above legal position, if the 2006 judgment is seen, it becomes apparent that after considering the contentions of the parties and examining the reports of Expert Committee, this Court posed the issue for determination about the safety of the dam to increase the water level to 142 ft. and came to a categorical finding that the dam was safe for raising the water level to 142 ft. and, accordingly, in the concluding paragraph the Court disposed of the writ petition and the connected matters by permitting the water level of Mullaperiyar dam being raised to 142 ft. and also permitted further strengthening of the dam as per the report of the Expert Committee appointed by the CWC. The review petition filed against the said decision was dismissed by this Court on 27.7.2006. The 2006 judgment having become final and binding, the issues decided in the said proceedings definitely operate as res judicata in the suit filed under Article 131 of the Constitution.
  • 165. Shri Harish Salve, learned senior counsel for Kerala, placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in N.D. Jayal and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.; [(2004) 9 SCC 362]. In N.D. Jayal69 Dharmadhikari, J. made general observations on the dam safety aspect that plea like res judicata on the earlier decisions passed by the Supreme Court cannot be allowed to be raised. The observations made by Dharmadhikari, J. in N.D. Jayal have to be read as an exception to the res judicata rule in the matters where, by their very nature, the factual situation has drastically changed in course of time. If substantial changes in the circumstances occur and such circumstances are shown to the Court necessitating departure from the earlier finding on the issue of safety, the Court can be approached and in that event the Court itself may exercise its discretion to reopen the safety aspect having regard to the drastic change in circumstances or in emergent situation as to the safety of dam. In our view, a judicial decision, having achieved finality, becomes the last word and can be reopened in the changed circumstances by that Court alone and no one else.
  • 166. On behalf of Kerala, it is contended that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution is ousted or excluded in respect of disputes between two or more States: since such disputes fall within the ambit of the original jurisdiction of this Court under Article 131 of the Constitution or jurisdiction of a tribunal constituted under the provisions of Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 read with the provisions of Article 262 of the Constitution. Thus, it was submitted that the 2006 judgment is not binding and that the rule of res judicata can hardly be attracted in this situation.
  • 167. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel for Kerala. The label of jurisdiction exercised by this Court is not material for applicability of principles of res judicata if the matter in issue in the subsequent suit has already been concluded by the earlier decision of this Court between the same parties. The 2006 judgment was the result of judicial investigation, founded upon facts ascertained in the course of hearing. The plea of lack of jurisdiction of this Court was taken in the earlier proceedings on both the grounds, viz.,
  •        (1) whether the jurisdiction of this Court is barred in view of Article 262 read with Section 11 of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, and
  •        (2) whether Article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of this Court. On both these questions the findings were recorded against Kerala. It is too much for Kerala to say that the 2006 judgment is without jurisdiction and not binding.
  • xxxxx
  • 169. Explanations VII and VIII were inserted in the above provision by Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 w.e.f. 1.2.1977. Explanation VIII in this regard is quite relevant. The principles of res judicata, thus, have been made applicable to cases which are tried by Courts of limited jurisdiction. The decisions of the Courts of limited jurisdiction, insofar as such decisions are within the competence of the Courts of limited jurisdiction, operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, although, the Court of limited jurisdiction that decided the previous suit may not be competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such question is subsequently raised. If a decision of the Court of limited jurisdiction, which was within its competence, operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit even when the subsequent suit is not triable by it, a fortiori, the decision of the highest Court of the land in whatever jurisdiction given on an issue which was directly raised, considered and decided must operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit triable exclusively by the highest Court under Article 131 of the Constitution. Any other view in this regard will be inconsistent with the high public policy and rule of law. The judgment of this Court directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question before this Court, though, label of jurisdiction is different.
  • 170. The principles of res judicata are clearly attracted in the present case. The claim of Kerala in the earlier proceeding that water level cannot be raised from its present level of 136 ft. was expressly not accepted and the obstruction by Kerala to the water level in the Mullaperiyar dam being raised to 142 ft. on the ground of safety was found untenable. The judgment dated 27.2.2006 of this Court, thus, operates as res judicata in respect of the issue of safety of the dam by increasing its water level from 136 ft. to 142 ft.”

End Notes 1:

Sec. 11 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, reads as under:

  • Res Judicata -No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
  • Explanation I– The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
  • Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court.
  • Explanation III.- The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.
  • Explanation IV.- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
  • Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.
  • Explanation VI– Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
  • Explanation VII.- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to proceedings for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.
  • Explanation VIII.-An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in as subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.

End Notes 2:

A party cannot challenge the findings without filing a Cross-Appeal.

In Laxman Tatyaba Kankate v. Taramati Harishchandra Dhatrak [(2010) 7 SCC 717], the Supreme Court held that though a party is entitled to support the decree on other grounds, he cannot challenge the findings without filing a cross appeal.

Also see:


  • Union of India v. Vijay Krishna Uniyal, (2018)11 SCC 382. (referred to in Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Madanlal,2019-2 JLJ 568; 2019 3 MPLJ 353)
  • Banarsi v. Ram Phal, (2003)9 SCC 606 (referred to in Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Madanlal,2019-2 JLJ 568; 2019 3 MPLJ 353)
  • Hardevinder Singh v. Paramjit Singh, 2014(2) Mh.L.J. (S.C.) 126 (referred to in Indrakumar v. Atmaram, 2015-3 MhLJ 613)
  • Choudhary Sahu v. State of Bihar, AIR 1982 SC 98 (referred to in Indrakumar v. Atmaram, 2015-3 MhLJ 613)
  • Tummalla Atchaiah v. Venka Narasingarao, AIR 1978 SC 725 (referred to in Indrakumar v. Atmaram, 2015-3 MhLJ 613)
  • Hasanate Taheriyyah Fidayyiah vs. Mahesh, 2014(2) Mh.L.J. 884, (6) Surjansingh s/o Mohansingh v. Jasbir Kaur, 2008(2) Mh.L.J. 763.

End Notes 3:

No Modification of Decree if No Cross Appeal

In Banarsi v. Ram Phal, (2003)9 SCC 606, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the absence of cross appeal preferred or cross objection taken by the plaintiff-respondent the First Appellate Court did not have jurisdiction to modify the decree in the manner in which it has done. Within the scope of appeals preferred by the appellants the First Appellate Court could have either allowed the appeals and dismissed the suit filed by the respondent in its entirety or could have deleted the latter part of the decree which granted the decree for specific performance conditional upon failure of the defendant to deposit the money in terms of the decree or could have maintained the decree as it was passed by dismissing the appeals. What the First Appellate Court has done is not only to set aside the decree to the extent to which it was in favour of the appellants but also granted an absolute and out and out decree for specific performance of agreement to sell which is to the prejudice of the appellants and to the advantage of the respondent who has neither filed an appeal nor taken any cross objection.
    The learned counsel for the respondent forcefully argued that even in the absence of appeal preferred by the plaintiff or cross objection taken by the plaintiff-respondent the Appellate Court was not powerless to grant the decree which it has done in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 33 of Order 41 of the CPC. Rule 33 of Order 41 as also Rule 4 thereof, which have to be read necessarily together, are set out hereunder:
    ORDER 41 Appeals from Original Decrees
    • “33. Power of Court of Appeal.-The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees:
      Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order.
      Illustration A claims a sum of money as due to him from X or Y, and in a suit against both obtains a decree against X. X, appeals and A and Y are respondents. The Appellate Court decides in favour of X. It has power to pass a decree against Y.
      4. One of several plaintiffs or defendants may obtain reversal of whole decree where it proceeds on ground common to all.-Where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit, and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants, any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole decree, and thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

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Sabarimala Review: Supreme Court to Decide the Contours of Constitutional Morality

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Preface

Constitutional morality is triggered when human dignity is impaired. It is a constitutional tool employed by constitutional courts to override prevailing social morality whenever such intervention is found necessary.

The Sabarimala Temple review reference, along with other connected matters, is scheduled to be heard by a Nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India, from 7 April 2026. The Court will determine, on the touchstone of constitutional morality, whether (i) the practice of ‘female genital mutilation’ in the Dawoodi Bohra community, and (ii) the ‘social exclusion of women’ from certain religious places on the basis of faith or custom, are unconstitutional. The issues of exclusion include:

  • (i) women between the age group of 10 to 50 years from the Sabarimala temple;
  • (ii) Muslim women from dargahs/mosques; and
  • (iii) Parsi women married to non-Parsis from the holy fire place of an Agyari.

Sabarimala Decision

The Supreme Court of India held by Majority (4:1), on 28 September 2018, in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2019-1 SCC 1), that the exclusion of women between the age group of 10 to 50 years from the Sabarimala temple was unconstitutional.

Findings in the Majority Judgement

The pivotal findings that ultimately tilted the majority decision (Dipak Misra, CJI , A.M. Khanwilkar, Rohinton Fali Nariman, D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.) were the following:

  • .(i) The exclusion of women, based on a biological factor unique to the female sex, could not be sustained as a matter of ‘faith’ under Article 25 of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion.
  • (ii) The exclusion of women could not be held as an ‘essential religious practice’ required under Article 25.
  • (iii) The devotees of Lord Ayyappa, were not separate religious ‘denomination’ so as to claim the benefits of Article 26, which guarantees the freedom to manage religious affairs.
  • (iv) The exclusion of women violated Article 14, which ensures equality.
  • (v) The conscience (faith) in Article 25 did not override Article 14.
  • (vi) Both Articles 25 and 26 begin with the words—‘subject to public order, morality and health’. This ‘morality’ includes constitutional morality. It renders the exclusion of women unconstitutional.

Minority Judgement

Justice Indu Malhotra handed down a dissenting Judgment. She held, inter alia, the following:

  • .(i) The Ayyappans constituted a religious denomination. They could claim the benefits of Article 26.
  • (ii) Article 14 would not override Article 25.
  • (iii) The Constitutional Morality implied harmonisation.
  • (iv) A working formula to be adopted to decide religious denomination.
  • (v) Notions of Court should not be the criterion.
  • (vi) Supreme Court must be a balancing wheel.
  • (vii) What was permitted by Article 25(2)(b) was a State made law and not judicial Intervention.
  • (viii) The proper forum to decide the point in issue was civil court.
  • (ix) Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules, made under Section 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Act, 1965 (imposing limited restriction on the entry of women during the notified age group), was not ultra vires.
  • (x) The limited restriction on the entry of women did not fall within the purview of Article 17 that pertained to doctrine of untouchability.

Review Petitions: To a Larger Bench

Several review petitions were filed against the findings in the Sabarimala case. After hearing the petitions, by the Five-Judge Bench, in Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, 2020-2 SCC 1, the majority (Ranjan Gogoi, A.M. Khanwilkar, Indu Malhotra, JJ.) found that there was a conflict of opinion as regards the role of the court in matters of ‘essential religious practices’, between two earlier Judgments of the Supreme Court. They were the following:

  • .1. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282).
  • 2. Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (AIR 1961 SC 1402).

The majority found it necessary to resolve the conflict between these decisions for the proper determination of the review applications. It framed seven issues. The majority were of the opinion that it was proper to place these issues before a Larger Bench. It is held further that the review petitions will “remain pending until determination of the questions” by the larger bench.

Durgah Committee case: Court has an Active Role

The Five-Judge Bench in Durgah Committee case emphasied that the Court has an active role to decide andto exclude what are secular practices or superstitious beliefs while considering the impact of Article 25 and 26.

Shirur Mutt case: Prerogative of Religious Denomination

But, it has been found in the locus classicus decision of Seven Judges, in Shirur Mutt case that a religious denomination or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold; and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters. It was also observed in this decision that the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion is a fundamental right which no legislature can take away. It was further held – what are essential religious practices of a particular religious denomination is to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion, and they should be left to be determined by the denomination itself.

These review applications are now placed before a Nine-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. 

Review-Reference: Minority Findings

R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ. (minority) held that no grounds had been made out for reviewing the majority judgments. They emphasised that the proper inquiry required in this matter was whether the impugned practice of exclusion of women between the ages of 10 and 50 from Hindu temples constituted an essential practice relatable to the Hindu religion, and not the practice of one particular temple. They further noted that no material—textual or otherwise—had been placed to demonstrate that such exclusion of women from Hindu temples forms an essential practice of the Hindu religion. The minority further held as under:

  • “The position under our constitutional scheme is that the Supreme Court of India is the ultimate repository of interpretation of the Constitution. Once a Constitution Bench of five learned Judges interprets the Constitution and lays down the law, the said interpretation is binding not only as a precedent on all courts and tribunals, but also on the coordinate branches of Government, namely, the legislature and the executive. What follows from this is that once a judgment is pronounced by the Constitution Bench and a decree on facts follows, the said decree must be obeyed by all persons bound by it.”

Nine-Judge Bench Reframed the Issues

On 10.02.2020, the Nine-Judge Bench reframed the issues (Quoted in the Order, Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, dated 11 May 2020: 2020-9 SCC 121) referred to it, as under:

  1. What is the scope and ambit of right to freedom of religion under Article 25 of the Constitution of India?
  2. What is the inter-play between the rights of persons under Article 25 of the Constitution of India and rights of religious denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution of India?
  3. Whether the rights of a religious denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution of India are subject to other provisions of Part III of the Constitution of India apart from public order, morality and health?
  4. What is the scope and extent of the word ‘morality’ under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India and whether it is meant to include Constitutional morality?
  5. What is the scope and extent of judicial review with regard to a religious practice as referred to in Article 25 of the Constitution of India?
  6. What is the meaning of expression “Sections of Hindus” occurring in Article 25 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India?
  7. Whether a person not belonging to a religious denomination or religious group can question a practice of that religious denomination or religious group by filing a PIL?

Other Cases Considered in the Review Matter

The following three cases have also been referred for the consideration of the Nine-Judge Bench:

1. Female Genital Mutilation

In the public interest litigation, Sunita Tiwari v. Union of India, filed before the Supreme Court, under Article 32 of the Constitution, prayed for a direction to impose complete ban on the inhuman practice of female genital mutilation and for making it punishable. It is argued that the Dawoodi Bohra community outside of India, in the United States of America, Australia and Kenya, consider female circumcision an illegal practice.

The Attorney General, KK Venugopal, pointed out that the FGM practice had been banned in 42 countries.  27 countries thereof are in Africa. AG further indicated that the World Health Organisation had called for banning this practice.

Dawoodi Bohra community claimed that it is an essential age-old practice going back to 1400 years and also claimed to have the support of over 80,000 Dawoodi Bohra women. It is further argued that ‘a minor’s consent can be presumed when family members take a decision for them’; and that the ‘family enjoys a zone of privacy and autonomy with respect to a minor child’. The Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court, on 24.09.2018, found it necessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench; and it is now tagged for hearing with the Sabarimala review petitions.

2. Ban on Certain Parsi Women from Entering the Holy Place

The Gujarat High Court, by a 2:1 majority, dismissed the writ petition in Ms. Goolrokh Gupta v. Burjor Pardiwala, AIR 2012 CC 3266. The petition challenged a practice within the Parsi community whereby a Parsi woman, upon marrying a non-Parsi, is considered to have lost her religious identity and is consequently denied entry into the holy fire temple (Agyari). In contrast, a Parsi man marrying a non-Parsi does not face such exclusion.

The petitioner sought the right to perform the funeral rites of her parents. It was contended that the tenets of Zoroastrianism do not deprive a Parsi-born woman of her religious identity, dignity or associated rights even if she married a non-Parsi. The impugned practice was argued to be discriminatory and violative of the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was further contended that such exclusion amounted to excommunication raising serious social and constitutional concerns.

Accepting the submissions of the Parsi Trust, the High Court upheld the practice, holding that the exclusion constituted an “essential religious practice.” The appeal filed against this decision is also listed for consideration along with Sabarimala Review matter.

3. Prohibition of Muslim Women in Mosques

 The Writ Petition, Yasmeen Zuber Ahmad Peerzade  v. Union of  India, is filed before the Supreme Court, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, challenging the practices on entry of Muslim Women to Mosques in India. It is pointed out that women are allowed to enter mosques that have a separate space for them, but most mosques in India do not have such separate enclosures. The petitioner argues that this exclusion of women is illegal and unconstitutional. It violates the fundamental rights to equality, life and liberty and freedom of religion, proclaimed under Articles 14, 15, 21, 25 and 29 of the Constitution. It is claimed that the historical sources showed that Prophet Muhammad himself had encouraged women to actively participate in mosque congregations and prayer. The most sacred mosque in the world, Masjid-al-Haram in Mecca, always invites Muslim women from every part of the world to pray in it.  The petitioner also argues that the Quran does not prohibit women entry.

The stance of the respondents, as reflected in the counter affidavit filed by the All India Muslim Personal Law Board, is that the alleged rights cannot be enforced against non-state entities like Mosques. The Friday Namaz in congregation is not obligatory for women. As per doctrines of Islam, a woman is entitled to the same religious reward (Sawab) for praying as per her option either in Masjid or at home. The matters involved are religious practices based upon beliefs of the religion. It is not appropriate for the Court to interfere in religious beliefs and the practice of the essential features of any religion protected under Article 26. In the absence of any state action, it is not appropriate for the Court to judicially determine or interfere in, or to seek resolution of, various aspects on ‘faith and belief’, and essential religious practices of faith, through judicial process.  It is further stated that it should be left to be resolved through the processes of social transformation within the religious denomination itself.

Read also:

Conclusion

The significance of the Nine-Judge Bench decision in the Sabarimala case may extend beyond choosing between the Shirur Mutt case and the Durgah Committee case. One thing is certain—the approach the Court adopts will be firmly rooted in our constitutional jurisprudence, while also being practical and solution-oriented.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar [Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 219]: The SC Struck Down Legislation Relating to a Trust as Violative of Article 14 and 300A

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

The State of Bihar passed an enactment to take over the Trust – Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library. The Act was named: ‘Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015‘. The professed object of the legislation is: “better management and development” of the Trust. The Act was struck down by the Supreme Court of India.

The Supreme Court found:

  • The Act is manifestly arbitrary. It is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
  • It deprives property without adherence to fairness and due process. Because Article 300A of the Constitution permits deprivation of property only under the methods permitted by law. Here, no compensation is paid.  It underscores the arbitrary character.
  • The law must be fair, reasonable and non-confiscatory. The impugned Act transgress these constitutional requirements.
  • There was an observation that the trust was a private trust. But that was not determinative as the judgment proceeded ‘assuming arguendo’ (meaning: “assuming for the sake of argument”) that it was a ‘public trust’.

Facts in Brief

The Trust was settled under a trust deed. It was founded according to the wish of Smt. Radhika Sinha to establish an institution for “providing the public of Patna and its neighbourhood with a place for intellectual and social intercourse.” The High Court concluded that the dedication was in favour of the general public. Therefore, the Trust must be treated as a public trust.

Finding of the Supreme Court as regards Public Trust

The Apex Court held – “A public-facing object, standing alone, is not determinative.” The reasons pointed out are the following:

  • 1. “The fact that an institution is intended to serve a public purpose or is open to public use does not, by itself, conclusively determine that the trust is a public trust in law”.
  • 2. The legal character of a trust depends on several factors, including
    • i)   the manner in which the dedication is made,
    • ii)  the structure of the trust,
    • iii) the nature of control and management, and
    • iv) the rights reserved by the Settlor and his successors under the trust deed.
  • 3. “It is also significant that neither party before the High Court pleaded or argued that the Trust was a public trust.”
  • 4. “The case was argued on the common assumption that the Trust was a private trust governed by the Indian Trusts Act. In such circumstances, the High Court could not have proceeded to decide the case on an entirely different basis without affording an opportunity to address that issue.”

The above finding is not decisive: The Supreme Court proceeded “Assuming Arguendo”. It held – even assuming it to be a public trust, state action was unconstitutional. The Court observed as under:

  • “22. In any event, even if it were assumed that the Trust has a public character, that fact alone does not legitimise the State’s action in acquiring the Institute & Library or dissolving the existing trust arrangements. Whether the Trust is public or private, any legislative measure resulting in compulsory acquisition and vesting must satisfy constitutional requirements, particularly those flowing from Article 14. The question of public or  private character, therefore, is not determinative of the validity of the impugned Act.”

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The Legislation is Unconstitutional

The Apex Court tested the validity of the enactment on two principal touchstones –

  • (i) Whether the Act is manifestly arbitrary and violates Article 14 and
  • (ii) whether it offends Article 300A, which declares the ‘constitutional right to property’.

Article 14 of the Constitution: This Article mandates – “the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”

The Apex Court found – though mismanagement was the basis for the acquisition, the record did not disclose that any notice was ever issued to the Librarian. He was the appointee of the State, who was charged with the general administration.  No inquiry was ever initiated against him. The State failed to act against its own appointee’s management. Therefore, the State is not in a position to support the action it now seeks to impugn.

It is held further as under:

  • “This guarantee strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures that the exercise of legislative power is informed by reason, fairness and non-discrimination. Equality before the law is not a mere formal concept; it embodies the principle that State action, whether legislative or executive, must be based on rational criteria and must not operate in an arbitrary or capricious manner. From an early stage, this Court has interpreted this guarantee not merely as a prohibition against formal discrimination, but as a constitutional injunction against arbitrariness in State action. The evolution of this principle is traceable through a consistent line of authorities.”

The Supreme Court pointed out as under –

  • “38. Section 3 of the impugned Act effects a complete vesting of the Institute & Library, together with all rights, title and interest therein, in the State Government. Section 4(2) simultaneously dissolves the Deed of Trust, the Agreement, the Lease of land, and all committees and sub-committees constituted thereunder. The cumulative effect of these provisions is not regulatory supervision, but total displacement of a legal and institutional framework that has governed the Institute & Library for nearly a century.”
  • 39. Such a drastic assumption of control represents the most intrusive form of State intervention. Yet, the record before this Court discloses no finding of abandonment, failure of purpose, or established mismanagement of the Institute & Library. No inquiry appears to have preceded the enactment. No contemporaneous material has been placed to demonstrate that the objectives of the Trust were being  defeated or that lesser measures were inadequate. In the absence of demonstrated necessity, compulsory acquisition coupled with dissolution of trust arrangements is plainly disproportionate.”

The following decisions were relied on-

  • S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427, 
  •  State of Mysore v. S.R. Jayaram, (1968) 1 SCR 349,
  • E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,  (1974) 4 SCC 3,
  • Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 
  • Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981)1 SCC 722 ,
  • Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India,  (1985) 1 SCC 641,
  • K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu,  (1996) 2 SCC 226,
  • A.P. Dairy Development Corpn. Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy. (2011)9 SCC 286,
  • Shayara Bano v. Union of India. (2017)9 SCC 1 (wherein considered – Mithu v. State of Punjab(1983) 2 SCC 277,   Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494 and State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co. (1996) 3 SCC 709), 
  • Joseph Shine v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4898,    
  • Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 11324. 

Article 300A of the Constitution: Our Apex Court pointed out – while this Article permits deprivation of property by authority of law, such law must nevertheless be just, fair and reasonable, and not arbitrary or confiscatory in effect.

The Court then held as under:

  • “A statutory provision that enables acquisition of property while reducing compensation to a token amount lacks the basic attributes of fairness. The confiscatory nature of the vesting contemplated under the impugned Act therefore reinforces the conclusion that the enactment is manifestly arbitrary and fails constitutional scrutiny.”

The Court had gone deep into the legislative history preceding the impugned enactment and found as under:

  • “An earlier attempt by the State to take over the Institute & Library through ordinances in 1983 did not pass muster of judicial scrutiny, and the consequences of those ordinances were set aside by this Court in 1996 upon their lapse, restoring the Trust to its prior legal position. The legislature is, of course, competent to enact a fresh law. However, the impugned Act, enacted more than three decades later, seeks to achieve substantially the same outcome as the failed ordinance of 1983, without any intervening change in circumstances and without any fresh material justifying acquisition being placed on record. The mere passage of time does not supply any justification. When a legislature re-enacts substantially the same measure that has previously failed, without  placing any new or cogent material before the Court to justify the same, the legislative history becomes a relevant consideration. Viewed in light of this, the history of this enactment reinforces the findings of manifest arbitrariness in the impugned Act.”

The Court summed up as under:

  • “Viewed cumulatively, the scheme of the impugned Act reveals a pattern of arbitrariness: complete vesting of property in the State, dissolution of long-standing trust arrangements, absence of any finding of necessity or mismanagement, provision for illusory compensation, and lack of guiding principles or safeguards. Each of these features, taken individually, raise serious constitutional concern; taken together, they render the enactment manifestly arbitrary in its conception and operation.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India