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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Death of a Party Before Judgment: When Does It Invalidate the Decree?

Also read:

Jojy George Koduvath.

Introduction

If a party to a civil suit dies before the hearing, and the court pronounces judgment without the death being brought to its notice, the judgment is not automatically invalid.

  • It need not necessarily be a nullity merely because the court was unaware of the death.
  • There is an important distinction between a party who dies before the hearing and one who dies after the hearing has concluded but before judgment is pronounced  (Order XXII Rule 6).
  • Whether it is a nullity depends on the circumstances, including
  • whether the deceased was the plaintiff or defendant,
  • whether the right to sue survived, and
  • whether a statutory exception applies.

Part I

The important exception: Order XXII Rule 6 CPC

If a party dies after the hearing has concluded but before judgment is pronounced, Order XXII Rule 6 provides that the judgment may be pronounced and will have the same force and effect as if it had been pronounced before the death.

  • This provision does not ordinarily save a judgment where the party died before the hearing and the proceedings were continued without the necessary substitution of legal representatives.

The Supreme Court affirmed this distinction in Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2025 SC 5437.

Supreme Court: T. Gnanavel v. T.S. Kanagaraj

In T. Gnanavel v. T.S. Kanagaraj, (2009) 14 SCC 294; AIR 2009 SC 2367, the sole defendant died during the pendency of the suit. The plaintiff did not inform the court, and the court passed an ex parte decree without knowing of the death.

The Supreme Court held –

  • In the absence of an exemption granted under Order XXII Rule 4(4) CPC before pronouncement of judgment, the decree was a nullity.
  • An exemption obtained after judgment could not cure the defect.

Duty on the pleader

Order XXII Rule 10-A CPC places a duty on the pleader appearing for a party to inform the court when the pleader learns of that party’s death.

Does the failure to intimate the death change the position?

Not automatically. The failure to intimate the death does not, by itself, validate an otherwise legally unsustainable decree. The precise consequence depends on the procedural circumstances, including whether the deceased was a plaintiff or defendant and whether the suit had abated or was saved by a specific provision.

Specific Provisions

The principal provisions are found in Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). They deal with

  • the effect of the death of a party during the pendency of a suit or appeal,
  • the effect of (i) a decree passed against a deceased person, and (ii) a decree passed after a party dies during the proceedings but the death is not brought to the court’s notice.
  • the substitution of legal representatives,
  • abatement, and
  • the circumstances in which proceedings may continue despite the death.

SPECIFIC PROVISIONS under Order XXII CPC

Rule 1 — The death of a plaintiff or defendant does not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives.

Rule 2 — Where the right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff or against the surviving defendant alone, the court records that fact and proceeds with the suit.

Rule 3 — Where a plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives, the legal representatives must be brought on record within the prescribed period; otherwise, the suit abates as against the deceased plaintiff.

Rule 4 — Where a defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the legal representatives must be brought on record; otherwise, the suit abates as against the deceased defendant, subject to the Rule’s exceptions.

Rule 4(4) — In the specified circumstances, the court may exempt the plaintiff from substituting the legal representatives of a defendant who failed to file a written statement or, having filed it, failed to appear and contest the suit.

Rule 6 — Death after the conclusion of the hearing does not cause abatement; the judgment may be pronounced notwithstanding the death.

Rule 9 — Provides for setting aside abatement or dismissal and permits restoration on sufficient cause, subject to its conditions.

Rule 11 — Extends the relevant provisions of Order XXII to appeals, so far as applicable.

The most important provision in this matter is Order XXII Rule 6. It expressly provides that death after the conclusion of the hearing does not cause abatement and that judgment may be pronounced notwithstanding the death.

Order XXII Rule 6 — Death after conclusion of hearing

This rule applies only where death occurs between the conclusion of the hearing and the pronouncement of judgment. It expressly authorises the court to pronounce judgment notwithstanding the death.

Thus, if the hearing had concluded before the party died the mere failure to intimate the death does not invalidate the judgment.

Order XXII Rule 4(4) — Death of a defendant – Failed to File a Written Statement

Where a defendant falls within the specified category—having failed to file a written statement or, having filed one, having failed to appear and contest the suit—the court may exempt the plaintiff from substituting that defendant’s legal representatives. The court may then pronounce judgment notwithstanding the death.

This specific statutory exception does not apply automatically merely because the death was not reported.

Order XXII Rule 4A — No legal representative

Where a party dies during the suit and has no legal representative, the court may, on an application, proceed in the absence of a person representing the estate or appoint a person to represent it. The resulting judgment can bind the estate to the extent prescribed by the rule.

Order XXII Rules 3 and 4 — Abatement

If the deceased plaintiff’s or defendant’s legal representatives were required to be substituted, but no application was made within the prescribed period, the suit ordinarily abates to the extent specified in the applicable rule. Rule 9 provides the procedure for seeking to set aside abatement.

Order XXII Rule 10A — Duty of the pleader

This rule requires the pleader appearing for a party to inform the court of the party’s death as soon as it comes to the pleader’s knowledge. The rule addresses the failure to communicate the death; it does not, by itself, declare every judgment subsequently pronounced void.

An important distinction

Failure to intimate the death and failure to bring the legal representatives on record are not necessarily the same procedural defect.

  • If the party died after conclusion of the hearing, Rule 6 may validate the pronouncement of judgment.
  • If a defendant died during the hearing, Rule 4(4) may apply in the specified circumstances.
  • If the deceased was a necessary party and substitution was required, but the suit abated, the mere failure to report the death does not ordinarily cure that abatement.
  • If the suit had already abated, Rule 9 provides the relevant remedy; the court must consider the applicable statutory requirements.

Part II

Death of a Party Before Judgment: When Is the Decree Valid?

It has to be considered under the following heads:

  • A. Death before conclusion of the hearing
  • B. Death after hearing but before judgment
  • C. Failure to Intimate Death, by itself, does not affect Validity

A. Death before conclusion of the hearing

Where a plaintiff or defendant dies before the hearing is concluded, the court must consider the consequences under Order XXII CPC before proceeding to judgment.

1. Death of a Plaintiff

If the right to sue survives, Order XXII Rule 3 ordinarily requires the legal representatives to be brought on record. If no application is made within the prescribed period, the suit abates as against the deceased plaintiff, subject to the statutory provisions governing abatement and its setting aside.

If the right to sue does not survive, the consequences depend on the nature of the claim. Substitution cannot, invariably, be ordered merely because the deceased plaintiff has heirs.

2. If Necessary Defendant, Decree may be Unsustainable

Under Order XXII Rule 4, where the right to sue survives against the deceased defendant, the legal representatives ordinarily have to be brought on record.

If the suit abates against a necessary defendant and the proceedings nevertheless continue to judgment, the decree may be legally unsustainable. However, the extent of the invalidity depends on whether the suit can proceed against the remaining parties and whether the decree is severable.

3. Failure to report the death: Decree may be valid

If substitution was legally necessary and the suit abated (became invalid), the mere fact that the court remained unaware of the death does not, by itself, prevent abatement (that is the decree may by ineffective or invalid against that person or his legal hairs).

In other words, it would be too broad to say that every decree pronounced after the unreported death of a party is automatically a nullity. The nature of the right, the necessity of the deceased party, the effect of abatement and the applicable exceptions must be examined.

B. Death after conclusion of hearing but before judgment

This situation is expressly governed by Order XXII Rule 6 CPC. It provides:

  • “Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing rules, whether the cause of action survives or not, there shall be no abatement by reason of the death of either party between the conclusion of the hearing and the pronouncing of the judgment, but judgment may in such case be pronounced notwithstanding the death and shall have the same force and effect as if it had been pronounced before the death took place.”

What Constitutes Conclusion of the Hearing?

The hearing must actually have concluded.

  • If the matter is reopened for further hearing – the hearing is not concluded.

See:  Kanaran Nambiar v. Ramunni Nambiar, AIR 1961 Kerala 290, Uma Andarjanam v. Neelakandan Namboodiri, AIR 2001 Kerala 314.

In N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115, the plaintiff died after the arguments in the appeal and judgment reserved. The Court held – judgment was not a nullity.

In Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 1283, both appellants had died before the appeal was heard in the first appellate court. Their deaths had not been brought to the appellate court’s notice; but decided the appeal on merits.The Supreme Court held that the appellate decree was a nullity.

C. Failure to Intimate Death by itself, Does Not Affect Validity of Decree

The statutory provisions distinguish between the obligation to report a death and the legal consequences of the death itself.

Order XXII Rule 10A imposes a duty on the pleader appearing for a party to inform the court of the party’s death as soon as it comes to the pleader’s knowledge. But a breach of that duty does not itself supply the statutory conditions required to validate a decree.

Substitution of LRs, Abatement etc. Governed Uner Order XXII

The requirements relating to substitution of legal representatives, abatement and the survival of the right to sue must be examined under the applicable provisions of Order XXII.

The proper analysis is therefore:

  • 1. Determine when the party died.
  • 2. Determine whether the hearing had concluded before the death.
  • 3. If the hearing had concluded, examine the application of Rule 6.
  • 4. If the hearing had not concluded, determine whether substitution was required and whether the proceedings had abated or could lawfully continue.
  • 5. Determine whether the defect affects the whole proceeding or only the adjudication concerning the deceased party (where there are several plaintiffs or defendants).

In short, the failure to intimate the death of a party to the court does not, by itself, determine the validity of a decree subsequently pronounced. The legal consequence depends primarily on the stage at which the death occurred and the applicable provisions of Order XXII CPC.

Accordingly, the failure to intimate the death cannot be treated as an independent ground for validating an otherwise legally unsustainable decree. Nor should every decree pronounced after an unreported death be characterised as a nullity without examining the governing statutory provisions and the circumstances of the case.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

•• Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy in a Nutshell
•• Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell
•• Exempted Plantation Land – In whom Ownership Vests
•• Plantation-Exemption Does Not Confer Ownership over the Land
•• Can the Ownership of (Exempted) Plantation (Above Ceiling Limit) be Changed? Can Plantation be Fragmented?
•• Do the Plantation-Tenants have a Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land, beyond the Ceiling Limit (under Purchase Certificates)?
•• Government is the OWNER of All Leasehold-Plantation-Lands in Kerala.
•• Liability of Certain Plantation Tenants to Pay Rent To the Government: New Rules can be Made for its Effective Implementation
•• Law on Acquisition of Private (Leasehold) Plantation Land in Kerala
•• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
•• Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board
•• Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy; TLB to Fix Plantation-Exemption
•• Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land-Owners/Tenants?
•• Civil Court to Adjudicate Title; Land Tribunal to Fix Tenancy; Taluk Land Board to Determine Plantation Exemption
•• Relevant Provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act – on Purchase Certificate,  Plantation Exemption & Ceiling Area – in a Nutshell

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

No Binding Precedent -If the Court Failed to Consider Relevant Statutory Provision, in Earlier Decision

Saji Koduvath

Read Also:

No Binding Force – If Judgment failed to notice a plain statutory provision

In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal, (1975) 2 SCC 232 (Krishna Iyer, J.), the Supreme Court recognised that, in an exceptional case, an obvious inadvertence or oversight resulting in failure to notice a plain statutory provision may deprive a judgment of its binding precedential force. The omission must be glaring, not merely an alleged error of interpretation. The Court held as under:

  • “7. Certainty of the law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts—all flowering from the same principle—converge to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must later bind like cases. We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission. No such situation presents itself here and we do not embark on the principle of judgment per incuriam.” (Quoted in: Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti, 2026-5 SCC 201; Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2025 3 SCC 95).

No Binding precedent if Earlier Decision Demonstrably Wrong

In A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak , (1988) 2 SCC 602 the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court made the following observations:

  • “42. It appears that when this Court gave the aforesaid directions on 16-2-1984, for the disposal of the case against the appellant by the High Court, the directions were given oblivious of the relevant provisions of law and the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar case [ State of W.B. vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar , (1952) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1952 SC 75]. See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 26, p. 297, Para 578 and p. 300, the relevant Notes 8, 11 and 15; Dias on Jurisprudence, 5th Edn. pp. 128 and 130; Young vs. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [ Young vs. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. , 1944 KB 718 (CA)] Also see the observations of Lord Goddard in [ Moore vs. Hewitt , 1947 KB 831] and Nicholas vs. Penny [Nicholas vs. Penny, (1950) 2 KB 466]. “Per incuriam” are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong. See Morelle Ltd. vs. Wakeling , (1955) 2 QB 379 : (1955) 2 WLR 672 (CA).” (Quoted in: Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti, 2026-5 SCC 201).

In State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan , (2011) 7 SCC 639:

  • “67. Thus, “per incuriam” are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some statutory provision or authority binding on the court concerned, or a statement of law caused by inadvertence or conclusion that has been arrived at without application of mind or proceeded without any reason so that in such a case some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong.” (Quoted in: Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti, 2026-5 SCC 201).

Subsequently, in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. , (2001) 6 SCC 356, it is observed as under:

  • “A prior decision of the Supreme Court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same points of law in a latter case. In exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, the principle of per incuriam may apply. Unless it is a glaring case of obtrusive omission, it is not desirable to depend on the principle of judgment “per incuriam.” It has to be shown that some part of the decision was based on a reasoning which was demonstrably wrong, for applying the principle of per incuriam.” (Quoted in: Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti, 2026-5 SCC 201).

In State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer , (2003) 5 SCC 448, it was found as under:

  • “10…….Easy course of saying that earlier decision was rendered per incuriam is not permissible and the matter will have to be resolved only in two ways — either to follow the earlier decision or refer the matter to a larger Bench to examine the issue, in case it is felt that earlier decision is not correct on merits.” (Quoted in: Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti, 2026-5 SCC 201).

In Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra , (2014) 16 SCC 623, the Court expanded the definition of per incuriam in the Indian context and noted as under:

  • “19……A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench; or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the views of this Court. It must immediately be clarified that the per incuriam rule is strictly and correctly applicable to the ratio decidendi and not to obiter dicta.” (Quoted in: Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti, 2026-5 SCC 201).

In a recent decision in Shah Faesal vs. Union of India , (2020) 4 SCC 1, a five-Judge Bench of this Court reiterated that the principle of per incuriam only applies on the ratio of the case.

No Binding precedent if relevant statutory BAR was Not considered

In N. Bhargavan Pillai vs. State of Kerala , (2004) 13 SCC 21, it was noted that a judgment cannot be treated as a binding precedent, if it fails to notice a specific statutory bar.

  • “14. Coming to the plea relating to benefits under the Probation Act, it is to be noted that Section 18 of the said Act clearly rules out application of the Probation Act to a case covered under Section 5(2) of the Act. Therefore, there is no substance in the accused-appellant’s plea relating to grant of benefit under the Probation Act. The decision in [ Bore Gowda vs. State of Karnataka , (2000) 10 SCC 260 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1244] does not even indicate that Section 18 of the Probation Act was taken note of. In view of the specific statutory bar the view, if any, expressed without analysing the statutory provision cannot in our view be treated as a binding precedent and at the most is to be considered as having been rendered per incuriam. Looked at from any angle, the appeal is sans merit and deserves dismissal which we direct.” (Quoted in: Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti, 2026-5 SCC 201; Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2025 3 SCC 95).

Not everything Said by a Judge Constitute a Precedent

In Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti, 2026-5 SCC 201, it is held as under:

  • “29.2. This Court held that it is not everything said by a judge while giving judgment that constitute a precedent. The only thing in a judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided. It is for this reason that it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates:
  • (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential;
  • (ii) statement of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and
  • (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above.
  • 29.3. This Court held that a decision (including judgment) is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is an issue constitutes the ratio. A precedent by long recognition may mature into a stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi.”

In this decision the discussion on binding precedent and per incuriam is summed up as under:

  • “34. In summation, what is binding in a judgment is the principle upon which the case is decided. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which the question before a court is decided is alone binding as a precedent. The final outcome or decision is binding between the parties only but it is the abstract ratio decidendi ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision which alone has the force of law and constitutes a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. To be precise, it is the rule deductible from the application of the law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. Not everything said in the judgment or any observation made by the judge, can be said to be binding. Thus, ratio decidendi of a case is the rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him. It is the ratio which is binding on subsequent Benches, coordinate or smaller. The conclusion does not operate as a ratio decidendi.
  • 34.1. The principle of per incuriam would be attracted only when a decision is rendered in ignorance of some statutory provision(s) or a precedent binding on the court. Ordinarily, a ruling of a coordinate Bench is binding on subsequent coordinate Benches or on Benches of lesser strength. However, there is an exception to this rule. A decision which is rendered per incuriam has no precedential value. Such a decision would not be binding as a judicial precedent. A coordinate Bench can disagree with it and decline to follow it. The per incuriam rule is applicable to the ratio decidendi only and not to obiter dicta. The subsequent decision shall be declared per incuriam only if there exists a conflict in the ratio decidendi of the pertinent judgments.”

No Binding precedent if relevant statutory provision was Not considered

A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Indian Ceramic House, Langra-Ki-Chowki, Agra v. Sales Tax Officer, II Sector, Agra : 1970 SCC OnLine All 193, observed as under:

  • “A Judgment is authoritative only as to that part of it which is considered to have been necessary to the decision of the case, and not that part which was not necessary to its decision. The first is called ‘ratio decidendi’. Which is binding as a precedent. The other called ‘obiter dicta’ cannot be treated as a binding precedent though the opinion so expressed is entitled to respect.” (Quoted in Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543)

Allen in ‘Law in the Making’ said as under:

  • “Any judgment of any Court is authoritative only as to that part of it, called the ‘ratio decidendi’, which is considered to have been necessary to the decision of the actual issue between the litigants. It is for the Court, of whatever degree, which is called upon to consider the precedent, to determine what the true ‘ratio decidendi’ was…………..Judicial opinions upon such matters, whether they be merely casual, or wholly gratuitous or (as is far more usual) of what may be called collateral relevance, are known as ‘obiter dicta or simply ‘dicta’, and it is extremely difficult to establish any standard of their relative weight.” (Quoted in : Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543). (Quoted in : Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543).

The Supreme Court in Jayant Verma v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 743, quoted the dissenting judgement of A.P. Sen, J. in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCC 745, with approval :

  • “54. This question is answered by referring to authoritative works and judgments of this Court. In Precedent in English Law by Cross and Harris (4th edn.), ‘ratio decidendi’ is described as follows: “The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him, or a necessary part of his direction to the jury.”

In Union of India v. Maniklal Banerjee, AIR 2006 SC 2844, the Apex Court has held as under:

  • “It is now well-settled that if a decision has been rendered without taking into account the statutory provision, the same cannot be considered to be a binding precedent. This Court, in Pritam Singh, while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, might have refused to interfere with the decision. The same, therefore, did not constitute any binding precedent.” (Referred to in: Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain (Arun Misra, J.), ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472)

Arun Misra, J., referred to the House of Lords’ decision in Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain, ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472, and said as under:

  • “(35) Another decision relied upon is rendered by the House of Lords in Watt vs. Ahsan (2007) UKHL 51. In the aforesaid case, question arose on Section 12 of the Race Relations Act, 1976. The submission was made that they were party and that All vs. Mcdonagh (2002) ICR 1026 was wrongly decided. In any case, the interpretation given to Section 12 by the EAT in Sawyer v. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 is res judicata between him and the Labour Party, not only for the purposes of his first complaint but for the other two as well. It was opined that the EAT was wrong in Sawyer vs. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 to hold that the Labour Party was a qualifying body, but there was no appeal against the decision of EAT; it was held that decision was binding upon the parties, though wrong in law. When the Tribunal was-having the jurisdiction to decide the question, it is binding upon the parties though erroneous.
  • There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition, but here we are concerned with the fresh cause of action on which suit is based and previously relevant statutory provision of Section 111 (d) of TP Act was not taken into consideration, question of determination of tenancy was also not decided.”

In Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2025-3 SCC 95, the following English decisions were referred to, to explain “Per Incurium”.

  • Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., , 1944 KB 718: (1944) 2 All ER 293 —  a decision is given per incuriam when the court acts in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction.
  • Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., , (1941) 1 KB 675 : (1941) 2 All ER — a decision is per incuriam when given in ignorance of a House of Lords decision or a statutory provision having statutory force.
  • Bryers v. Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd., , (1957) 1 QB 134 : (1956) 3 All ER 560 (CA) — a decision should not be treated as per incuriam simply because of a deficiency of parties or because the court had not the benefit of the best argument.
  • Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd. v. Bryers1958 AC 485 : (1957) 3 All ER 572 — a Court of Appeal must follow its own previous decision even if it misinterpreted a House of Lords decision.
  • J. Mucklow Ltd. v. IRC, , 1954 Ch 615 : (1954) 2 All ER 508 (CA) — only cases in which decisions should be held per incuriam are those given in ignorance of some inconsistent statute or binding authority.
  • Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling, (1955) 2 QB 379 : (1955) 1 All ER 708 (CA)
  • Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union, , 1954 Ch 479 : (1954) 1 All ER 822 (CA) — a decision is per incuriam only when given in ignorance of some inconsistent statute or binding authority, not merely because of a deficiency of parties.
  • Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling, , (1955) 2 QB 379 : (1955) 1 All ER 708 (CA) —  per incuriam applies where a decision is given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or binding authority.

In Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2025 3 SCC 95, the following earlier decisions of our Supreme Court were referred to, to explain “Per Incurium”.

  • Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, , AIR 1955 SC 661 –while Article 141 binds all courts, it does not bind the Supreme Court itself which remains free to reconsider its judgments.
  • Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal (1975) 2 SCC 232 — a decision is per incuriam only in exceptional instances of obvious inadvertence or oversight where the judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision, and it must be a glaring case.
  • A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 — the definition of per incuriam as decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or binding authority, where some part of the reasoning is demonstrably wrong.
  • MCD v Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101 — a decision should be treated as per incuriam when given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having the force of a statute.
  • N. Bhargavan Pillai v. State of Kerala (2004) 13 SCC 217 — a judgment cannot be treated as a binding precedent if it fails to notice a specific statutory bar, and that per incuriam applies only to the ratio decidendi.
  • State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan (2011) 7 SCC 639 — per incuriam applies to decisions given in ignorance of statutory provisions or authority binding on the court, and that the doctrine applies strictly to the ratio.
  • Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd. (2001) 6 SCC 356 — per incuriam applies only in exceptional instances of obvious inadvertence or oversight, and it must be shown that some part of the decision was based on demonstrably wrong reasoning.
  • State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer (2003) 5 SCC 448 — saying an earlier decision was rendered per incuriam is not permissible and the matter must be resolved either by following the earlier decision or referring it to a larger Bench.
  • Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 623 — per incuriam in the Indian context, including that a decision can be per incuriam if it cannot be reconciled with a previously pronounced judgment of a Co-equal or Larger Bench.
  • Shah Faesal v. Union of India (2020) 4 SCC 1 — the principle of per incuriam applies only on the ratio of the case and not to obiter dicta.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

•• Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy in a Nutshell
•• Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell
•• Exempted Plantation Land – In whom Ownership Vests
•• Plantation-Exemption Does Not Confer Ownership over the Land
•• Can the Ownership of (Exempted) Plantation (Above Ceiling Limit) be Changed? Can Plantation be Fragmented?
•• Do the Plantation-Tenants have a Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land, beyond the Ceiling Limit (under Purchase Certificates)?
•• Government is the OWNER of All Leasehold-Plantation-Lands in Kerala.
•• Liability of Certain Plantation Tenants to Pay Rent To the Government: New Rules can be Made for its Effective Implementation
•• Law on Acquisition of Private (Leasehold) Plantation Land in Kerala
•• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
•• Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board
•• Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy; TLB to Fix Plantation-Exemption
•• Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land-Owners/Tenants?
•• Civil Court to Adjudicate Title; Land Tribunal to Fix Tenancy; Taluk Land Board to Determine Plantation Exemption
•• Relevant Provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act – on Purchase Certificate,  Plantation Exemption & Ceiling Area – in a Nutshell

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

No Relief if No Prayer; No Relief outside Pleadings

Jojy George Koduvath.

See also:

No Relief if No Prayer

It is well settled that reliefs not specifically prayed for cannot be granted merely on the basis of evidence or incidental observations, particularly when such reliefs involve substantive civil rights. The Trial Court, by granting findings on notional partition clearly acted contrary to the mandate of Order VII Rule 7 CPC, thereby travelling beyond both the pleadings and the relief clause of the plaint.

In Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Rm. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235, it is held as under:

  • “22. …. It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plain, the court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case.” (Quoted in: Akella Lalitha v. Konda Hanumantha Rao, AIR 2022 SC 3544)

In Fertilizer Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Sarat Chandra Rath, AIR 1996 SC 2744, 1996-10 SCC 331 held as under:

  • “The High Court ought not to have granted reliefs to the respondents which they had not even prayed for.”

The Apex Court in Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi, AIR 2010 SC 475, it is held as under:

  • “Though the Court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the Court, however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner.”

In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436, it is held that without pleadings, relief could not be granted.

In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 149, it is observed as under:

  • “77. This Court while dealing with an issue in Kalyan Singh Chouhan V C. P. Joshi (2011) 11 SCC 786), after placing reliance on a very large number of it earlier judgments including Trojan & Co v. Nagappa Chettiar (AIR 1953 SC 235), Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B Goyal (2002) 2 SCC 256), Ishwar Dutt v. Collector (LA) (2005) 7 SCC 190) and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co Ltd (2010) 4 SCC 518), held that relief not founded on the pleadings cannot be granted. A decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. No evidence is permissible to be taken on record in the absence of the pleadings in that respect. No party can be permitted to travel beyond it pleading and that all necessary and materials facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. It was further held that where the evidence was not in the line of the pleadings, the said evidence cannot be looked into or relied upon.
  • 85.6. The court cannot travel beyond the pleadings as no party can lead the evidence on an issue/point not raised in the pleadings and in case, such evidence has been adduced or a fining of fact has been recorded by the court, it is just to be ignored. Though it may be a different case where in spite of specific pleadings, a particular issue is not framed and the parties having full knowledge of the issue in controversy lead the evidence and the court records a finding on it.”

In Akella Lalitha v. Konda Hanumantha Rao, AIR 2022 SC 3544, 2022 SCC Online SC 928, it is held that it is settled law that relief not found on pleadings should not be granted. If a Court considers or grants a relief for which no prayer or pleading was made depriving the respondent of an opportunity to oppose or resist such relief, it would lead to miscarriage of justice.

See Also:

  • Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow, (1984) 1 SCC 307; AIR 1984 SC 186
  • State v. M. Maridoss, (2023) 4 SCC 338.

No Relief outside Pleadings

Generally, courts cannot grant relief completely outside the scope of the pleadings or surprise litigants without a fair opportunity to be heard . Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, (1987) 2 SCC 555, it was observed that it is well settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by a party in support of the case set up by it.

In Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Rm. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, (1953) 1 SCC 456, the Apex Court held as under:

  • “It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the Court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case.”

In Chinta Lingam v. The Govt. of India, AIR 1971 SC 474, this it is held that unless factual foundation has been laid in the pleadings no argument is permissible to be raised on that particular point.

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242, it is held as under:

  • “…… in the absence of pleadings, evidence if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered…… no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it.”

In Syed and Company v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 422, it is held as under:

  • “Without specific pleadings in that regard, evidence could not be led in since it is settled principle of law that no amount of evidence can be looked unless there is a pleading. Therefore, without amendment of the pleadings merely trying to lead evidence is not permissible.”

In J. Jermons v. Aliammal, (1999) 7 SCC 382, it is held held as under:

  • “…… there is a fundamental difference between a case of raising additional grounds based on the pleadings and the material available on record and a case of taking a new plea not borne out of the pleadings. In the former case no amendment of pleading is required, whereas in the latter it is necessary to amend the pleadings…The respondents cannot be permitted to make out a new case by seeking permission to raise additional grounds in revision.” (Quoted: The National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad, AIR 2012 SC 264; 2011-12 SCC 695).

In Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, 2008 (17) SCC 491 it is observed as under:

  • “13. The object of issues is to identify from the pleadings the questions or points required to be decided by the courts so as to enable parties to let in evidence thereon. When the facts necessary to make out a particular claim, or to seek a particular relief, are not found in the plaint, the court cannot focus the attention of the parties, or its own attention on that claim or relief, by framing an appropriate issue. As a result the defendant does not get an opportunity to place the facts and contentions necessary to repudiate or challenge such a claim or relief. Therefore, the court cannot, on finding that the plaintiff has not made out the case put forth by him, grant some other relief. The question before a court is not whether there is some material on the basis of which some relief can be granted. The question is whether any relief can be granted, when the defendant had no opportunity to show that the relief proposed by the court could not be granted. When there is no prayer for a particular relief and no pleadings to support such a relief, and when the defendant has no opportunity to resist or oppose such a relief, if the court considers and grants such a relief, it will lead to miscarriage of justice. Thus it is said that no amount of evidence, on a plea that is not put forward in the pleadings, can be looked into to grant any relief.” (Quoted in: Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026-4 ALD (SC) 261; 2026 INSC 705)

It is further held as under:

  • “16. It is fundamental that in a civil suit, relief to be granted can be only with reference to the prayers made in the pleadings. That apart, in civil suits, grant of relief is circumscribed by various factors like court fee, limitation, parties to the suits, as also grounds barring relief, like res judicata, estoppel, acquiescence, non- joinder of causes of action or parties, etc., which require pleading and proof. Therefore, it would be hazardous to hold that in a civil suit whatever be the relief that is prayed, the court can on examination of facts grant any relief as it thinks fit. In a suit for recovery of rupees one lakh, the court cannot grant a decree for rupees ten lakhs. In a suit for recovery possession of property ‘A’, court cannot grant possession of property ‘B’. In a suit praying for permanent injunction, court cannot grant a relief of declaration or possession. The jurisdiction to grant relief in a civil suit necessarily depends on the pleadings, prayer, court fee paid, evidence let in, etc.” (Quoted in: R.M. Sundaram @ Meenakshisundaram v. Sri Kayarohanasamy And Neelayadhakshi Amman Temple, 2022-11 SCR 475; J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, 2011-1 SCC 429)

In Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594, it is held as under:

  • “No amount of evidence or arguments can be looked into or considered in the absence of pleadings and issues, is a proposition that is too well settled.” (Quoted in: J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, 2011-1 SCC 429)

In Kalyan Singh Chouhan v C. P. Joshi , (2011) 11 SCC 786, the Court stated, after noticing various earlier pronouncements:

  • “19. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is settled legal proposition that “as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted”. Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho [(1897-98) 25 IA 195], Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar [(1953) 1 SCC 456: AIR 1953 SC 235], Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh [AIR 1961 SC 1097], Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal [(2002) 2 SCC 256: AIR 2002 SC 665], Ishwar Dutt v. Collector (L.A.) [(2005) 7 SCC 190: AIR 2005 SC 3165] and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. [(2010) 4 SCC 518: (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 207]) xxx
  • 28. Therefore, in view of the above, it is evident that the party to the election petition must plead the material fact and substantiate its averment by adducing sufficient evidence. The court cannot travel beyond the pleadings and the issue cannot be framed unless there are pleadings to raise the controversy on a particular fact or law. It is, therefore, not permissible for the court to allow the party to lead evidence which is not in the line of the pleadings. Even if the evidence is led that is just to be ignored as the same cannot be taken into consideration.” (Quoted in: A. Raja v. D. Kumar, 2025 INSC 629; 2025 KLT(Online) 1888 ; 2025 KHC(Online) 6440)

In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, 2011-3 SCC 436, it is held as under:

  • “55. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is a settled legal proposition that “as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted.” Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide : Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho, (1898) 25 Ind. App. 195; M/s. Trojan & Co. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235; Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 3165; and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 518.)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

•• Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy in a Nutshell
•• Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell
•• Exempted Plantation Land – In whom Ownership Vests
•• Plantation-Exemption Does Not Confer Ownership over the Land
•• Can the Ownership of (Exempted) Plantation (Above Ceiling Limit) be Changed? Can Plantation be Fragmented?
•• Do the Plantation-Tenants have a Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land, beyond the Ceiling Limit (under Purchase Certificates)?
•• Government is the OWNER of All Leasehold-Plantation-Lands in Kerala.
•• Liability of Certain Plantation Tenants to Pay Rent To the Government: New Rules can be Made for its Effective Implementation
•• Law on Acquisition of Private (Leasehold) Plantation Land in Kerala
•• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
•• Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board
•• Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy; TLB to Fix Plantation-Exemption
•• Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land-Owners/Tenants?
•• Civil Court to Adjudicate Title; Land Tribunal to Fix Tenancy; Taluk Land Board to Determine Plantation Exemption
•• Relevant Provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act – on Purchase Certificate,  Plantation Exemption & Ceiling Area – in a Nutshell

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Can the Appeal Court Allow a Relief Not Appealed Against?

Jojy George Koduvath

Summary

  • Two reliefs prayed for in the suit.
  • One is granted, and the other is refused.
  • Appeal filed by the defendant alone – against the relief allowed.
  • Can the refused relief be allowed by the appeal court, even though it is not appealed against?
  • Answer — Normal rule is that a party aggrieved by a decree should file appeal against him. But in certain rare cases it may be necessitated to allow certain reliefs even if it is not appealed against invoking O. 41 r. 33 CPC. Instances include:
    • (i) it may become necessary to readjust the rights of other parties
    • (ii) some times the other (un-appealed) relief may be inseparably connected with the appealed reliefs and it may also have to be modified
    • (iii) to avoid contradictory and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit.

Relevant Provisions – Order XLI Rule 33

R. 33 of O. 41 says that the Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree notwithstanding that the appeal is not filed. R. 33 is, avoiding a situation of conflicting decrees coming into existence in the same suit. material portion of Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:

  • “33 Power of Court of Appeal: The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, w here there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees.”
  • Illustration. —A claims a sum of money as due to him from X or Y, and in a suit against both, obtains a decree against X. X appeals, and A and Y are respondents. The Appellate Court decides in favour of X. It has the power to pass a decree against Y.”

Normal Rule: Independent Appeal or Cross-objection Necessary

In Nirmala Bala Ghose v. Balai Chand Ghose, AIR 1965 SC 1874: (1965) 3 SCR 550, while dealing with the scope of Order 41 Rule 33, it is observed as under:

  • “The rule is undoubtedly expressed in terms which are wide, but it has to be applied with discretion, and to cases where interference in favour of the appellant necessitates interference also with a decree which has by acceptance or acquiescence become final so as to enable the Court to adjust the rights of the parties. Where, in an appeal, the Court reaches a conclusion which is inconsistent with the opinion of the Court appealed from, and in adjusting the right claimed by the appellant, it is necessary to grant relief to a person who has not appealed, the power conferred by Order 41 Rule 33 may properly be invoked. The rule, however, does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from.”
  • “When a party allows a decree of the Court of first instance to become final, by not appealing against the decree, it would not be open to another party to the litigation, whose rights are otherwise not affected by the decree, to invoke the powers of the appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 33, to pass a decree in favour of the party not appealing so as to give the latter a benefit which he has not claimed. Order 41 Rule 33 is primarily intended to confer power upon the appellate Court to do justice by granting relief to a party who has not appealed, when refusing to do so, would result in making inconsistent, contradictory or unworkable orders.”.

in Giani Ram v. Ramji Lal, (1969) 1 SCC 813, it is said as under:

  • “12. The object of this Rule is to avoid contradictory and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit. As the power under this rule is in derogation of the general principle that a party cannot avoid a decree against him without filing an appeal or cross-objection, it must be exercised with care and caution. The Rule does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate court does not agree with the opinion of the court appealed from.
  • 13. Ordinarily, the power conferred by this Rule will be confined to those cases where, as a result of interference in favour of the appellant, further interference with the decree of the lower court is rendered necessary in order to adjust the rights of the parties according to justice, equity and good conscience. While exercising the power under this Rule, the court should not lose sight of the other provisions of the Code itself nor the provisions of other laws, viz., the law of limitation or the law of court fees, etc.”

In Choudhary Sahu v. State of Bihar, AIR 1982 S.C. 98; (1982) 1 SCC 232, it is cautioned that the power under Rule 33 of Order 41 CPC is in derogation of the general principle that a party cannot avoid a decree against him without filing an appeal or cross-objection. The Court will exercise the power according to justice, equity and good conscience. In this decision it is held that while exercising the power conferred under Order 41 Rule 33, the Court should not lose sight of the provisions of the other laws, viz., the law of limitation or the law of court fees etc. It is said as under:

  • “12. The object of this rule is to avoid contradictory and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit. As the power under this rule is in derogation of the general principle that a party cannot avoid a decree against him without filing an appeal or cross-objection, it must be exercised with care and caution. The rule does not confer an unrestricted right to reopen decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from.
  • 13. Ordinarily, the power conferred by this rule will be confined to those cases where as a result of interference in favour of the appellant further interference with the decree of the lower Court is rendered necessary in order to adjust the rights of the parties according to justice, equity and good conscience. While exercising the power under this rule the Court should not lose sight of the other provisions of the Code itself nor the provisions of the other laws viz. The Law of Limitation or the Law of Court-fees etc.
  • 14. In these appeals the Collector on the basis of the material placed before him allowed certain units to the various appellants. In the absence of any appeal by the State of Bihar, there was no justification for the Commissioner to have interfered with that finding in favour of the appellants. The facts and circumstances of these appeals are not such in which it would be appropriate to exercise the power under Order 41, Rule 33. The Commissioner as well as the High Court committed a manifest error in reversing the finding regarding allotment of units to the various appellants in the absence of any appeal by the State of Bihar when the same had become final and rights of the State of Bihar had come to an end to that extent by not filing any appeal or cross-objection within the period of limitation.”

Banarsi v. Ram Phal, (2003) 9 SCC 606, is an authority on this matter.

Paras 6, 7 and 15 read thus:

  • “6. The appeals raise a short but interesting question of frequent recurrence as to the power of the appellant court to interfere with and reverse or modify the decree appealed against by the appellants in the absence of any cross-appeal or cross-objection by the respondent under Order 41, Rule 22 CPC and the scope of power conferred on the appellate court under Rule 33 Order 41 CPC.
  • 7. The first question is whether without cross-objection by the respondent, could the appellate court have set aside the decree passed by the trial court and instead granted straight away a decree for specific performance of contract. This would require reference to the principles underlying right to file an appeal and right to prefer cross-objection or when does it become necessary to prefer cross-objection without which decree under appeal cannot be altered or varied to the advantage of the respondent and/or to the disadvantage of the appellant. It has also been held by this Court in Samundra Devi v. Narendra Kaur SCC (2008-9 SCC 100: para 21), that this power under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict.
  • 15. Rule 4 seeks to achieve one of the several objects sought to be achieved by Rule 33, that is, avoiding a situation of conflicting decrees coming into existence in the same suit. The abovesaid provisions confer power of widest amplitude on the appellate court so as to do complete justice between the parties and such power is unfettered by consideration of facts like what is the subject matter of appeal, who has filed the appeal and whether the appeal is being dismissed, allowed or disposed of by modifying the judgment appealed against. While dismissing an appeal and though confirming the impugned decree, the appellate court may still direct passing of such decree or making of such order which ought to have been passed or made by the court below in accordance with the findings of fact and law arrived at by the court below and which it would have done had it been conscious of the error committed by it and noticed by the Appellate Court. While allowing the appeal or otherwise interfering with the decree or order appealed against, the appellate court may pass or make such further or other, decree or order, as the case would require being done, consistently with the findings arrived at by the appellate court. The object sought to be achieved by conferment of such power on the appellate court is to avoid inconsistency, inequity, inequality in reliefs granted to similarly placed parties and unworkable decree or order coming into existence. The overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. Wider the power, higher the need for caution and care while exercising the power. Usually the power under Rule 33 is exercised when the portion of the decree appealed against or the portion of the decree held liable to be set aside or interfered by the appellate court is so inseparably connected with the portion not appealed against or left untouched that for the reason of the latter portion being left untouched either injustice would result or inconsistent decrees would follow.
  • The power is subject to at least three limitations:
    • firstly, the power cannot be exercised to the prejudice or disadvantage of a person not a party before the Court;
    • secondly, a claim given up or lost cannot be revived; and
    • thirdly, such part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against or objected to by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party.
  • A case where there are two reliefs prayed for and one is refused while the other one is granted and the former is not inseparably connected with or necessarily depending on the other, in an appeal against the latter, the former relief cannot be granted in favour of the respondent by the appellate court exercising power under Rule 33 Order 41.” (Quoted in: Lakshmanan v. G. Ayyasamy, 2016-13 SCC 165; State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Ranga Reddy, 2020-15 SCC 681).

In Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 10 SCC 458, it is held that in the absence of an independent appeal or cross-objection (under Order 41 Rule 22) being filed by the aggrieved party, the relief which was denied by the courts below cannot be granted in the second appeal filed by the appellant. (Referred to in: Lakshmanan v. G. Ayyasamy, 2016-13 SCC 165.)

In Lakshmanan v. G. Ayyasamy, 2016 (13) SCC 165, it is observed as under:

  • “7… Usually the power under Rule 33 is exercised when the portion of the decree appealed against or the portion of the decree held liable to be set aside or interfered by the appellate court is so inseparably connected with the portion not appealed against or left untouched that for the reason of the latter portion being left untouched either injustice would result or inconsistent decrees would follow. The power is subject to at least three limitations: firstly, the power cannot be exercised to the prejudice or disadvantage of a person not a party before the court; secondly, a claim given up or lost cannot be revived; and thirdly, such part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against or objected to by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party. A case where there are two reliefs prayed for and one is refused while the other one is granted and the former is not inseparably connected with or necessarily depending on the other, in an appeal against the latter, the former relief cannot be granted in favour of the respondent by the appellate court exercising power under Rule 33 of Order 41 .” (Banarsi v. Ram Phal , (2003) 9 SCC 606] , SCC p. 619, para 15).
  • 8 . In support of the same proposition of law, the learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance upon another judgment of this Court in Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra [Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 10 SCC 458 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 212] , wherein this Court after interpretation of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC has clearly held that in the absence of an independent appeal or cross-objection being filed by the aggrieved party, the relief which was denied by the courts below cannot be granted in the second appeal filed by the appellant.”

In Vaibhav Jain v. Hindustan Motors (P) Ltd., (2025) 2 SCC 208, it is observed as under:

  • “32. From the decision above, which has been consistently followed, it is clear that for exercise of the power under Rule 33 of Order 41 CPC the overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice; and one of the limitations on exercise of the power is that that part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against, or objected to, by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party.

In Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi v. Syeda Arifa Parveen , (2026) 3 SCC 460 it is held as under:

  • “30. By applying the ratio in Banarsi [Banarsi v. Ram Phal, (2003) 9 SCC 606, we notice that the impugned judgment [Dharmrao v. Arifa Parveen, 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 1671] has not considered whether a ground is made out for modifying a decree or not. The High Court has disturbed a finding of fact, leading to modifying the decree of the trial court in OS No. 212 of 2013 without there being an appeal/cross-appeal. To this extent, the findings of the High Court are not tenable in the facts and circumstances of this case. The other reasons assigned by the High Court are independently examined while considering the plea of Hiba and the plaintiff as the daughter of Khadijabee. The finding on this point, noted as an illegality, may not conclude the consideration of other issues.”

O. 41 r. 33 is an Enabling Provision for Adjusting the Right claimed by the Appellant.

As shown above, the normal rule is that a party aggrieved by a decree should file appeal. If he fails to do so, Order 41, Rule 33 cannot be invoked. This rule does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from — even where an appeal Court reaches a conclusion inconsistent with the opinion of lower court. (Nirmala Bala Ghose v. Balai Chand Ghose , 1965-3 SCR 550).

But, for adjusting the right claimed by the appellant it may become necessary to grant relief to a person who has not appealed, invoking O. 41 r. 33. In Nirmala Bala Ghose v. Balai Chand Ghose, 1965-3 SCR 550, it was held that the rule however does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final. (See also: Banarsi v. Ram Phal, AIR 2003 SC1989, (2003) 9 SCC 606; Kok Singh v. Deokabai AIR 1976 S.C. 634.)

Order 41 Rule 33 has Limited Application

In Samundra Devi v. Narendra Kaur, AIR 2008 SC 3205, 2008-9 SCC 100 (SB Sinha, J.), it is held that Order 41 Rule 33 CPC has limited application. In that case it was found that the High Court went wrong in reducing compensation, awarded to the claimant in a Motor Vehicles Claim, without a proper Appeal. The claimant was given liberty to recover the amount of compensation from the owner of the vehicle. The insurance company has been held to have no statutory liability as the driver was not holding a valid driving licence. It was found that in the fact situation, even Order 41 Rule 33 was not applicable as the Insurance Company ordinarily could not have maintained an independent appeal on the quantum of compensation and that no appeal had been preferred by the owner or driver of the vehicle as also the insurance company. The Apex Court relied on S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore, (2007) 11 SCC 75.

In S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore, (2007) 11 SCC 75, it is stated:

  • “8. We also see considerable force in the submission of learned Counsel for the appellants that the High Court has misconceived the object of Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code and has erred in invoking it for the purpose of granting the plaintiff Bank a decree. This is a case where the suit filed by the plaintiff Bank had been dismissed by the trial court. The plaintiff Bank had come up in appeal. It was entitled to challenge all the findings rendered against it by the trial court and seek a decree as prayed for in the plaint, from the appellate court. Once it is found entitled to a decree on the basis of the reasoning of the appellate court, the suit could be decreed by reversing the appropriate findings of the trial court on which the dismissal of the suit was based. For this, no recourse to Order XLI Rule 33 is necessary. Order XLI Rule 33 enables the appellate court to pass any decree that ought to have been passed by the trial court or grant any further decree as the case may require and the power could be exercised notwithstanding that the appeal was only against a part of the decree and could even be exercised in favour of the respondents, though the respondents might not have filed any appeal or objection against what has been decreed. There is no need to have recourse to Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code, in a case where the suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed and the plaintiff has come up in appeal claiming a decree as prayed for by him in the suit. Then, it will be a question of entertaining the appeal considering the relevant questions and granting the plaintiff the relief he had sought for if he is found entitled to it. In the case on hand therefore there was no occasion for applying Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code. If the view of the High Court was that the suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code, it is difficult to see how it could have resorted to Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code to grant a decree to the plaintiff in such a suit. In that case, a decree has to be declined. That part of the reasoning of the High Court is therefore unsustainable.”

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End Notes

No Relief if No Prayer; No Relief if No Pleading

No Relief if No Prayer

It is well settled that reliefs not specifically prayed for cannot be granted merely on the basis of evidence or incidental observations, particularly when such reliefs involve substantive civil rights. The Trial Court, by granting findings on notional partition clearly acted contrary to the mandate of Order VII Rule 7 CPC, thereby travelling beyond both the pleadings and the relief clause of the plaint.

In Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Rm. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235, it is held as under:

  • “22. …. It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plain, the court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case.” (Quoted in: Akella Lalitha v. Konda Hanumantha Rao, AIR 2022 SC 3544)

In Fertilizer Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Sarat Chandra Rath, AIR 1996 SC 2744, 1996-10 SCC 331 held as under:

  • “The High Court ought not to have granted reliefs to the respondents which they had not even prayed for.”

The Apex Court in Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi, AIR 2010 SC 475, it is held as under:

  • “Though the Court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the Court, however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner.”

In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436, it is held that without pleadings, relief could not be granted.

In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 149, it is observed as under:

  • “77. This Court while dealing with an issue in Kalyan Singh Chouhan V C. P. Joshi (2011) 11 SCC 786), after placing reliance on a very large number of it earlier judgments including Trojan & Co v. Nagappa Chettiar (AIR 1953 SC 235), Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B Goyal (2002) 2 SCC 256), Ishwar Dutt v. Collector (LA) (2005) 7 SCC 190) and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co Ltd (2010) 4 SCC 518), held that relief not founded on the pleadings cannot be granted. A decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. No evidence is permissible to be taken on record in the absence of the pleadings in that respect. No party can be permitted to travel beyond it pleading and that all necessary and materials facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. It was further held that where the evidence was not in the line of the pleadings, the said evidence cannot be looked into or relied upon.
  • 85.6. The court cannot travel beyond the pleadings as no party can lead the evidence on an issue/point not raised in the pleadings and in case, such evidence has been adduced or a fining of fact has been recorded by the court, it is just to be ignored. Though it may be a different case where in spite of specific pleadings, a particular issue is not framed and the parties having full knowledge of the issue in controversy lead the evidence and the court records a finding on it.”

In Akella Lalitha v. Konda Hanumantha Rao, AIR 2022 SC 3544, 2022 SCC Online SC 928, it is held that it is settled law that relief not found on pleadings should not be granted. If a Court considers or grants a relief for which no prayer or pleading was made depriving the respondent of an opportunity to oppose or resist such relief, it would lead to miscarriage of justice.

See Also:

  • Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow, (1984) 1 SCC 307; AIR 1984 SC 186
  • State v. M. Maridoss, (2023) 4 SCC 338.

No Relief outside Pleadings

Generally, courts cannot grant relief completely outside the scope of the pleadings or surprise litigants without a fair opportunity to be heard . Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, (1987) 2 SCC 555, it was observed that it is well settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by a party in support of the case set up by it.

In Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Rm. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, (1953) 1 SCC 456, the Apex Court held as under:

  • “It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the Court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case.”

In Chinta Lingam v. The Govt. of India, AIR 1971 SC 474, this it is held that unless factual foundation has been laid in the pleadings no argument is permissible to be raised on that particular point.

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242, it is held as under:

  • “…… in the absence of pleadings, evidence if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered…… no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it.”

In Syed and Company v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 422, it is held as under:

  • “Without specific pleadings in that regard, evidence could not be led in since it is settled principle of law that no amount of evidence can be looked unless there is a pleading. Therefore, without amendment of the pleadings merely trying to lead evidence is not permissible.”

In J. Jermons v. Aliammal, (1999) 7 SCC 382, it is held held as under:

  • “…… there is a fundamental difference between a case of raising additional grounds based on the pleadings and the material available on record and a case of taking a new plea not borne out of the pleadings. In the former case no amendment of pleading is required, whereas in the latter it is necessary to amend the pleadings…The respondents cannot be permitted to make out a new case by seeking permission to raise additional grounds in revision.” (Quoted: The National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad, AIR 2012 SC 264; 2011-12 SCC 695).

In Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, 2008 (17) SCC 491 it is observed as under:

  • “13. The object of issues is to identify from the pleadings the questions or points required to be decided by the courts so as to enable parties to let in evidence thereon. When the facts necessary to make out a particular claim, or to seek a particular relief, are not found in the plaint, the court cannot focus the attention of the parties, or its own attention on that claim or relief, by framing an appropriate issue. As a result the defendant does not get an opportunity to place the facts and contentions necessary to repudiate or challenge such a claim or relief. Therefore, the court cannot, on finding that the plaintiff has not made out the case put forth by him, grant some other relief. The question before a court is not whether there is some material on the basis of which some relief can be granted. The question is whether any relief can be granted, when the defendant had no opportunity to show that the relief proposed by the court could not be granted. When there is no prayer for a particular relief and no pleadings to support such a relief, and when the defendant has no opportunity to resist or oppose such a relief, if the court considers and grants such a relief, it will lead to miscarriage of justice. Thus it is said that no amount of evidence, on a plea that is not put forward in the pleadings, can be looked into to grant any relief.” (Quoted in: Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026-4 ALD (SC) 261; 2026 INSC 705)

It is further held as under:

  • “16. It is fundamental that in a civil suit, relief to be granted can be only with reference to the prayers made in the pleadings. That apart, in civil suits, grant of relief is circumscribed by various factors like court fee, limitation, parties to the suits, as also grounds barring relief, like res judicata, estoppel, acquiescence, non- joinder of causes of action or parties, etc., which require pleading and proof. Therefore, it would be hazardous to hold that in a civil suit whatever be the relief that is prayed, the court can on examination of facts grant any relief as it thinks fit. In a suit for recovery of rupees one lakh, the court cannot grant a decree for rupees ten lakhs. In a suit for recovery possession of property ‘A’, court cannot grant possession of property ‘B’. In a suit praying for permanent injunction, court cannot grant a relief of declaration or possession. The jurisdiction to grant relief in a civil suit necessarily depends on the pleadings, prayer, court fee paid, evidence let in, etc.” (Quoted in: R.M. Sundaram @ Meenakshisundaram v. Sri Kayarohanasamy And Neelayadhakshi Amman Temple, 2022-11 SCR 475; J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, 2011-1 SCC 429)

In Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594, it is held as under:

  • “No amount of evidence or arguments can be looked into or considered in the absence of pleadings and issues, is a proposition that is too well settled.” (Quoted in: J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, 2011-1 SCC 429)

In Kalyan Singh Chouhan v C. P. Joshi , (2011) 11 SCC 786, the Court stated, after noticing various earlier pronouncements:

  • “19. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is settled legal proposition that “as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted”. Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho [(1897-98) 25 IA 195], Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar [(1953) 1 SCC 456: AIR 1953 SC 235], Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh [AIR 1961 SC 1097], Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal [(2002) 2 SCC 256: AIR 2002 SC 665], Ishwar Dutt v. Collector (L.A.) [(2005) 7 SCC 190: AIR 2005 SC 3165] and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. [(2010) 4 SCC 518: (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 207]) xxx
  • 28. Therefore, in view of the above, it is evident that the party to the election petition must plead the material fact and substantiate its averment by adducing sufficient evidence. The court cannot travel beyond the pleadings and the issue cannot be framed unless there are pleadings to raise the controversy on a particular fact or law. It is, therefore, not permissible for the court to allow the party to lead evidence which is not in the line of the pleadings. Even if the evidence is led that is just to be ignored as the same cannot be taken into consideration.” (Quoted in: A. Raja v. D. Kumar, 2025 INSC 629; 2025 KLT(Online) 1888 ; 2025 KHC(Online) 6440)

In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, 2011-3 SCC 436, it is held as under:

  • “55. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is a settled legal proposition that “as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted.” Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide : Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho, (1898) 25 Ind. App. 195; M/s. Trojan & Co. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235; Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 3165; and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 518.)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

•• Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy in a Nutshell
•• Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell
•• Exempted Plantation Land – In whom Ownership Vests
•• Plantation-Exemption Does Not Confer Ownership over the Land
•• Can the Ownership of (Exempted) Plantation (Above Ceiling Limit) be Changed? Can Plantation be Fragmented?
•• Do the Plantation-Tenants have a Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land, beyond the Ceiling Limit (under Purchase Certificates)?
•• Government is the OWNER of All Leasehold-Plantation-Lands in Kerala.
•• Liability of Certain Plantation Tenants to Pay Rent To the Government: New Rules can be Made for its Effective Implementation
•• Law on Acquisition of Private (Leasehold) Plantation Land in Kerala
•• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
•• Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board
•• Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy; TLB to Fix Plantation-Exemption
•• Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land-Owners/Tenants?
•• Civil Court to Adjudicate Title; Land Tribunal to Fix Tenancy; Taluk Land Board to Determine Plantation Exemption
•• Relevant Provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act – on Purchase Certificate,  Plantation Exemption & Ceiling Area – in a Nutshell

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Plaintiff Institutes a Suit against a Person Who Had Already Died: Legal Consequences

Also Read:

Jojy George Koduvath.

1. Where the deceased was the sole defendant:

  • The suit is a nullity and the decree passed therein is ordinarily void.

2. Where the deceased was one among several defendants:

  • The suit is a nullity insofar as it was instituted against the deceased person. The suit does not necessarily become a nullity against the surviving defendants.

3. Where the relief granted is inseparable from the rights of the deceased defendant:

  • The entire decree may be rendered unsustainable if it cannot legally or effectively stand independently of the deceased defendant. This consequence depends on the nature of the relief and the relationship between the parties.

4. Where the plaintiff deliberately conceals the death and thereby practises fraud on the court:

  • The decree may be liable to be set aside on the ground of fraud. If the fraud vitiates the entire adjudication, the entire decree may be set aside. However, the mere fact of concealment does not automatically establish that the entire suit is a nullity in every case.

Following matters are Noteworthy:

  • Inapplicability of Order 22 Rule 4: Provisions that allow for bringing legal representatives on record apply only when a defendant dies during the pendency of an already active, validly instituted suit. They cannot be used to rescue a suit filed against someone who was already dead.
  • No Jurisdiction for Substitution or Amendment: Courts lack the jurisdiction to amend the plaint or substitute legal heirs in place of a pre-deceased defendant.
  • Permission to Withdraw: Because the initial filing is a physical and legal defect, courts generally permit the plaintiff to withdraw the suit (under Order 23 Rule 1 of the CPC) with the liberty to file a fresh, proper suit against the legal representatives or the estate of the deceased person, subject to limitation laws.

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Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic)

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

•• Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy in a Nutshell
•• Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell
•• Exempted Plantation Land – In whom Ownership Vests
•• Plantation-Exemption Does Not Confer Ownership over the Land
•• Can the Ownership of (Exempted) Plantation (Above Ceiling Limit) be Changed? Can Plantation be Fragmented?
•• Do the Plantation-Tenants have a Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land, beyond the Ceiling Limit (under Purchase Certificates)?
•• Government is the OWNER of All Leasehold-Plantation-Lands in Kerala.
•• Liability of Certain Plantation Tenants to Pay Rent To the Government: New Rules can be Made for its Effective Implementation
•• Law on Acquisition of Private (Leasehold) Plantation Land in Kerala
•• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
•• Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board
•• Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy; TLB to Fix Plantation-Exemption
•• Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land-Owners/Tenants?
•• Civil Court to Adjudicate Title; Land Tribunal to Fix Tenancy; Taluk Land Board to Determine Plantation Exemption
•• Relevant Provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act – on Purchase Certificate,  Plantation Exemption & Ceiling Area – in a Nutshell

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

‘Rateable Distribution’: Law Designed to Ensure Fairness. Insights from Koshy Abraham v. Shaji, 2026:KER:20267.

Jojy George Koduvath.

Abstract

  • Section 73 CPC mandates Rateable Distribution among various Decree Holders. It is designed to ensure fairness.
  • The decree-holder who brings the property to sale does not get a preferential share of the entire proceeds.
  • There should be a Pending Execution Petition for getting Rateable Distribution.
  • It is not obligatory for decree-holders to file an application to obtain a rateable distribution.
  • If attached by several courts, according to Section 63(1) of the CPC, the Court of highest grade, or the Court under whose decree the property was first attached, has to sell it.
  • “Assets … held by a Court” in Section 73 conveys the idea – assets held within the ‘power and control’ of the court.

Koshy Abraham v. Shaji, 2026:KER:20267; 2026 KHC(Online) 232; 2026 KLT(Online) 1508 (Sathish Ninan & P. Krishna Kumar, JJ.) considered the following points:

Pending Execution Petition

  • 1. Should there be a pending Execution Petition before the Court for getting Rateable Distribution?
    • Answer: Yes.
      • Cheriyan v. Acheyamma Mathen, 1961 KLT 531, relied on.
      • (Also See: Shaji v. Dinesan, 1999-1 CivCC 102; 1998-2 KLJ 647; 1998-2 KLT 917; 1998 KHC 483
      • Achuri Narayana v. Mamidi Eshwaraiah, 2017-1 ALD 207 ; 2017-1 ALT 211)

It is Not Obligatory for a DH Entitled Rateable Distribution to File an Application

  • 2. Is it obligatory for the decree-holders who claim rateable distribution under Section 73 to specifically apply for such rateable distribution
    • Answer: No.
      • (Suraj Lal Bal Krishna Das vs Padrauna Raj Krishna Sugar Works, AIR 1961 All. 371 relied on).

Pendency of an Application for Restoration

  • 3. Does the pendency of an application for restoration of the execution petition suffice for claiming rateable distribution?
    • Answer: Strictly speaking ‘Not’.
      • However, in Bincy Scaria v. Joseph @ Josemon (2024 (3) KHC 102) and Danish Varghese v. Jancy Danish (2021 (1) KHC 1), it was held that a sale will not become absolute until the ancillary proceedings to set aside the sale are ultimately disposed of, either at the original side or at the appellate side.

The Court of highest grade, or that Attached the property First, has to sell it

  • 4. If attached by several courts, according to Section 63(1) of the CPC, the Court of highest grade, or the Court under whose decree the property was first attached, has to sell it.

DH who Purchased the Property has to Deposit the Balance Sale Price (Deducting his Decree Amount) in Court

  • 5. Should a decree holder who purchased the property at a sale is liable to deposit the Balance Sale Price (deducting his decree amount) for rateable distribution?
  • Answer: Yes.
    • (E.P. Abdul Latheef v. K. Vinodan, 2007 (1) KHC 624, relied on.)
      • As per Section 63(2) of the Code, a decree holder who has purchased the property at a sale held in execution of a decree is entitled to set off the purchase money against the which he is entitled to realise under the decree. The balance has to be deposited in the court.

End Notes 1

What is meant by “assets are held by a Court” in Section 73 when it says – “Where assets are held by a Court …. shall be rateably distributed”? Does it include ‘money’?

  • Answer: “Assets are held by a Court” in Section 73 conveys the idea – assets “held within the authority of the court (to control and to exercise the power to give orders and make decisions)”.
  • “Assets … held by a Court” does not include “money” (Nachiappa Chettiar v. Subbier AIR 1923 Mad 505).

Does money deposited to set aside a sale, under Order XXI, Rule 89 CPC, override the general rule of rateable distribution?

  • Answer: Yes, because it dictates a specific mode of distribution.

End Notes 2

Section 73 of the CPC reads as follows:

“73. Proceeds of execution-sale to be rateably distributed among decree-holders—
(1) Where assets are held by a Court and more persons than one have, before the receipt of such assets, made application to the Court for the execution of decrees for the payment of money passed against the same judgment-debtor and have not obtained satisfaction thereof, the assets, after deducting the costs of realisation, shall be rateably distributed among all such persons:
Provided as follows:–
(a) where any property is sold subject to a mortgage or charge, the mortgagee or incumbrancer shall not be entitled to share in any surplus arising from such sale;
(b) where any property liable to be sold in execution of a decree is subject to a mortgage or charge, the Court may, with the consent of the mortgagee or incumbrancer, order that the property be sold free from the mortgage or charge, giving to the mortgagee or incumbrancer the same interest in the proceeds of the sale as he had in the property sold;
(c) where any immovable property is sold in execution of a decree ordering its sale for the discharge of an incumbrance thereon, the proceeds of sale shall be applied–
First, in defraying the expenses of the sale;
Secondly, in discharging the amount due under the decree;
Thirdly, in discharging the interest and principal monies due on subsequent incumbrances (if any); and Fourthly, rateably among the holders of decrees for the payment of money against the judgment-debtor, who have, prior to the sale of the property, applied to the Court which passed the decree ordering such sale for execution of such decrees, and have not obtained satisfaction thereof.
(2) Where all or any of the assets liable to be rateably distributed under this section are paid to a person not entitled to receive the same, any person so entitled may sue such person to compel him to refund the assets.
(3) Nothing in this section affects any right of the Government.”

Section 63 of the CPC reads as under:

63. Property attached in execution of decrees of several Courts –
(1) Where property not in the custody of any Court is under attachment in execution of decrees of more Courts than one, the Court which shall receive or realise such property and shall determine any claim thereto and any objection to the attachment thereof shall be the Court of highest grade, or, where there is no difference in grade between such Courts, the Court under whose decree the property was first attached.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any proceeding taken by a Court executing one of such decrees.
[Explanation – For the purposes of sub-section (2), “proceeding taken by a Court” does not include an order allowing, to a decree-holder who has purchased property at a sale held in execution of a decree, set off to the extent of the purchase price payable by him.]

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Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic)

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

•• Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy in a Nutshell
•• Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell
•• Exempted Plantation Land – In whom Ownership Vests
•• Plantation-Exemption Does Not Confer Ownership over the Land
•• Can the Ownership of (Exempted) Plantation (Above Ceiling Limit) be Changed? Can Plantation be Fragmented?
•• Do the Plantation-Tenants have a Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land, beyond the Ceiling Limit (under Purchase Certificates)?
•• Government is the OWNER of All Leasehold-Plantation-Lands in Kerala.
•• Liability of Certain Plantation Tenants to Pay Rent To the Government: New Rules can be Made for its Effective Implementation
•• Law on Acquisition of Private (Leasehold) Plantation Land in Kerala
•• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
•• Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board
•• Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy; TLB to Fix Plantation-Exemption
 •• Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land-Owners/Tenants?
•• Civil Court to Adjudicate Title; Land Tribunal to Fix Tenancy; Taluk Land Board to Determine Plantation Exemption
•• Relevant Provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act – on Purchase Certificate,  Plantation Exemption & Ceiling Area – in a Nutshell

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Law on Overruling: Principles Established in an ‘Overruled’ Decision Remain Good Law If Left Untouched

Also Read:

Jojy George Koduvath

Introduction

A decision is an authority for what it actually decides (Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 (HL); State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647; Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1073; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav, 2005-2 SCC 42), and not every observation contained in it. This principle helps determine which proposition of an earlier decision has been displaced and which propositions were not affected. But, an earlier judgment cannot be relied upon to revive a proposition that is inconsistent with the later judgment that impliedly (for it did not expressly mention the earlier decision) overruled.

Courts Overrule Earlier Decisions Sparingly

It is observed by our Supreme Court in Dr. Shah Faesal v. Union Of India,  2020-4 SCC 1, as under:

  • “17. This Court’s jurisprudence has shown that usually the Courts do not overrule the established precedents unless there is a social, constitutional or economic change mandating such a development.”

The Apex Court then pointed out the words of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, John Roberts, during his Senate confirmation hearing, which reads as under:

  • “It is a jolt to the legal system when you overrule a precedent. Precedent plays an important role in promoting stability and even­handedness [Congressional Record—Senate, Vol. 156, Pt. 7, 10018 (June 7, 2010)].”

In this context, the Supreme Court, in Dr. Shah Faesal v. Union Of India, 2020-4 SCC 1, quoted a five ­Judge Bench decision in Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P., (2002) 4 SCC 234, which reads as under:

  • “22. … The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court.”

House of Lords, did Not Overrule its Earlier Decisions Until 1966

In Dr. Shah Faesal v. Union of India, 2020-4 SCC 120, it is shown that until 1966 the House of Lords never overruled its decisions but only distinguished them. Referring Street Tramways v. London County Council, [1898] A.C. 375, and Radcliffe v. Ribbel Motor Service Ltd., [1939] A.C. 215, it is pointed out that an erroneous decision of the House of Lords could only be set right by an Act of Parliament. After 1966, due to pressure and the prevailing socio­ economic structure that the House of Lords finally decided to exercise the power of overruling. From then on the House of Lords could overrule its earlier decisions.

Overruling is intended to Take Away the Precedent Value

It is observed in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, as under:

  • “Overruling when made by a larger Bench of an earlier decision of a smaller one is intended to take away the precedent value of the decision without affecting the binding effect of the decision in the particular case.”

Larger Bench Alone can Overrule; Lesser Bench can Rectify Mistake

It is further observed in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, as under:

  • “In the instant case, the appellant is, therefore, not entitled to take advantage of the matter being before a larger Bench. In fact, if it is a case of exercise of inherent powers to rectify a mistake it was open even to a five-Judge Bench to do that and it did not require a Bench larger than the Constitution Bench for that purpose. [89D] Per Oza, J.”

The Court pointed out the difference in Indian Law compared to English law as under:

  • “The principle in England that the size of the Bench does not matter, is clearly brought out in the decision of Evershed M.R. in the case of Morelle v. Wakeling (supra). The law laid down by this Court is somewhat different. There is a hierarchy within the Court itself here, where larger Benches overrule smaller Benches. See the observations of this Court in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, [1975] 1 SCR 127, Union of India & Anr. v. K.S. Subramanian, [1977] 1 SCR 87 at page 92 and State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi, [1977] 1 SCR 462 at 473. This is the practice followed by this Court and now it is a crystallised rule of law. See in this connection, as mentioned hereinbefore, the observations of the State of Orissa v. Titagarh Paper Mills (supra) and also Union of India and others v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., [1985] Suppl 3 SCR 123 at 145.”

Salmond on Jurisprudence [P.J. Fitzgerald (Ed.), 12th Edn., 1966 , p. 147.] delineated as to the authority to overrule by two courts of equal strength and as to the non-consideration of an earlier precedent by a coordinate Bench as under:

  • “… A refusal to follow a precedent, on the other hand, is an act of coordinate, not of superior, jurisdiction. Two courts of equal authority have no power to overrule each other’s decisions. Where a precedent is merely not followed, the result is not that the later authority is substituted for the earlier, but that the two stand side by side conflicting with each other. The legal antinomy thus produced must be solved by the act ofa higher authority, which will in due time decide between the competing precedents, formally overruling one of them, and sanctioning the other as good law. In the meantime the matter remains at large, and the law uncertain.” (Quoted in: Maya Banerjee v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 959)

A Co-ordinate bench can Disagree and Decline to Follow the Previous Decision

A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, proceeded further as under:

  • “A co-ordinate bench can disagree with it and decline to follow it. A larger bench can over rule such decision. When a previous decision is so overruled it does not happen—nor has the overruling bench any jurisdiction so to do—that the finality of the operative order, inter-parties, in the previous decision is overturned. In this context the word ‘decision’ means only the reason for the previous order and not the operative-order in the previous decision, binding inter-parties.”
    I respectfully agree.”

Overruling does Not Affect the finality of the Operative Order, Inter-parties

A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, proceeded further to observeas under:

  • “38.1 …. When a previous decision is so overruled it does not happen nor has the overruling bench any jurisdiction so to do that the finality of the operative order, inter-parties, in the previous decision is over- turned. In this context the word ‘decision’ means only the reason for the previous order and not the operative-order in the previous decision, binding inter-parties. Even if a previous decision is overruled by a larger-bench, the efficacy and binding nature, of the adjudication expressed in the operative order remains undisturbed interparties.
  • 38.2 Even if the earlier decision of the five judge bench is perincuriam the operative part of the order cannot be interfered with in the manner now sought to be done.”
  • “But the point is that the circumstance that a decision is reached per-incuriam, merely serves to denude the decision of its precedent value. Such a decision would not be binding as a judicial precedent.”

Two Types of Propositions in Overruled Decisions

An overruled decision may contain two types of propositions:

  • – First, overruled propositions. It loses its binding precedential force to the extent of the overruling.
  • – Second, propositions not overruled: The independent propositions laid down in the earlier judgment (other than the particular overruled propositions) will continue to be good law

“Overruled on Another Point”

In several decisions we see: “overruled on another point”. See:

  • Daiichi Sankyo Company Limited v. Oscar Investments Limited, 2023-7 SCC 641;
  • Gas Authority of India Ltd. v. Keti Construction Ltd., AIR 2007 SC 378; 2007-5 SCC 38;
  • Zee Tele Films Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2677; 2005-4 SCC 649;
  • Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 1597; 1982 SCR 81, etc.

A Note of Caution: To determine whether a proposition remains as the independent binding proposition, the overruled judgment is to be examined after analysing its original reasoning and determining the precise extent of the overruling. In certain cases the particular observation as to the ‘overruling may be an “obiter” having no binding force.

‘Virtually Overruled’ & ‘In Substance Overruled’

In Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat, (1986) 1 SCC 581; AIR 1986 SC 468, it is held as under:

  • “Expressions like ‘virtually overruled’ or ‘in substance overruled’ are expressions of inexactitude. In such circumstances, it is the duty of a Constitution Bench of this Court which has to consider the effect of the precedent in question to read it over again and to form its own opinion instead of wholly relying upon the gloss placed on it in some other decisions. It is significant that none of the learned Judges was decided the subsequent cases has held that the Act had become void on account of any constitutional informity. They allowed the Act to remain in force and the State Governments concerned have continued to implement the provisions of the Act. What cannot be overlooked is that the decision in Shantilal Mangaldas’s case (State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaladas and Ors.[1969] 3 S.C.R. 341) was quoted in extenso with approval and relied on by the very same judge while deciding the Bank Nationalistion case (R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530). He may have arrived at an incorrect or contradictory conclusion in striking down the Bank Nationalisation Act. The result achieved by him in the subsequent case may be wholly wrong but it cannot have any effect of the efficacy of the decision in Shantilal Mangaldas case (supra). An inappropriate purpose for which a precedent is used at a later date does not take away its binding character as a precedent. In such cases there is good reason to disregard the later decision. Such occasions in judicial history are not rare.”

End Notes:

What is binding is ‘Ratio and the Principle’; not, Conclusion

Ratio decidendi literally means “reason for deciding”.

In B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1480, it was observed that a decision is binding not because of its (final) conclusion but with regard to its ratio and the principle laid down therein.  (Referred to in: Secunderabad Club v. CIT, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004, 2023-457 ITR 263 (SC).

Ratio decidendi, Precedents, Obiter Dicta, etc.

Ratio decidendi
               •➧ Ratio decidendi alone is the Binding Precedent.
               •➧ Ratio decidendi is statements of principles of law.
               •➧ Ratio decidendi is the vital element in the decision.
               •➧ Ratio decidendi literally means “reason for deciding”.
               •➧ Ratio decidendi is the essence, and not every observation.
               •➧ Ratio Decidendi is declaration of the law in a speaking order.
              •➧ Ratio Decidendi is the Legal Principles Guiding the Decision.
               •➧ Ratio decidendi alone binds under Article 141 of the Constitution. 
              •➧ What is binding is discernable Ratio and the Principle; not, Conclusion.
              •➧ A case is only an authority for what it decides, and not from what logically follows from it.
             •➧ It is important to Read and analyse Entire Judgment, and the ratio decidendi is to be isolated.
              •➧ Words in a Judgment are Not to be Interpreted as a Statute; Words in it are Not to be Taken Literally.
              •➧ The abstract ratio decidendi (ascertained on a consideration of the judgment)  alone has the force of law.
             •➧ For, the Legal Principles Guiding the Decision constitute ‘Ratio Decidendi’, it is always necessary to see what were the facts.

Precedents
              •➧ A Case is only an Authority for what it Actually Decides.
              •➧ Decision Applicable Only to Facts Cannot be a Binding Precedent.
              •➧ Binding Precedent Helps in Promoting Certainty and Consistency.
              •➧ A decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law.
              •➧ An order made merely to dispose of the case cannot have the value or effect of a binding precedent.
              •➧ No Binding Precedent if a decision is without taking into account the statutory provision or if it is wrong in law.
              •➧The precedential value is attached only to orders which are preceded by a detailed judgment.

Obiter Dicta
              •➧ Obiter dictum is the passing expression or opinion in a judgement.
              •➧ The obiter dicta of the Supreme Court are taken with considerable weight.
              •➧ In India, obiter dictum of a High Court may have to be followed by the lower courts in its jurisdiction.

Stare decisis
              •➧ Stare decisis is a legal doctrine that requires courts to follow precedents

Stare Decisis

The Latin term, Stare decisis, means – “to stand by that which is decided.” It is accepted as a legal doctrine that requires courts to follow precedents, the previous decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on public policy. The basis of Article 141 of the Constitution is the doctrine of stare decisis.

In Raj Narain Pandey v. Sant Prasad Tewari (1973 (2) SCR 835 , H.R. Khanna, J. observed as under:

  • “In the matter of the interpretation of a local statute, the view taken by the High Court over a number of years should normally be adhered to and not disturbed. A different view would not only introduce and element of uncertainty and confusion, it would also have the effect of unsettling transactions which might have been entered into on the faith of those decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis can be aptly invoked in such a situation. As observed by Lord Evershed M.R. in the case of Brownsea Haven Properties v. Poole Corpn., there is well established authority for the view that a decision of long standing on the basis of which many persons will in the course of time have arranged their affairs should not lightly be disturbed by a superior court not strictly bound itself by the decision.” (quoted in: Mishri Lal v. Dhirendra Nath, AIR 1999 SC 2286, 1999-4 SCC 11)

The principles of `Stare Decisis’ is explained in Halsbury’s Laws of England as under:

  • “Apart from any question as to the Courts being of co-ordinate jurisdiction, a decision which has been followed for a long period of time, and has been acted upon by persons in the formation of contracts or in the disposition of their property, or in the general conduct of affairs, or in legal procedure or in other ways, will generally be followed by courts of higher authority than the court establishing the rule, even though the court before whom the matter arises afterwards might not have given the same decision had the question come before it originally. But the supreme appellate Court will not shrink from overruling a decision, or series of decisions, which establish a doctrine plainly outside the statute and outside the common law, when no title and no contract will be shaken, no persons can complain, and no general course of dealing be altered by the remedy of a mistake”. (quoted in: Mishri Lal v. Dhirendra Nath, AIR 1999 SC 2286, 1999-4 SCC 11)

This doctrine is described in Corpus Juris Secundum as under:

  • “Under the stare decisis rule, a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions generally is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases. This rule is based on expediency and public policy, and, although generally it should be strictly adhered to by the courts, it is not universally applicable.” (quoted in: Mishri Lal v. Dhirendra Nath, AIR 1999 SC 2286, 1999-4 SCC 11)

In Mishri Lal v. Dhirendra Nath, after quoting Halsbury’s Laws of England and Corpus Juris Secundum it is pointed out as under:

  • “Be it noted however that Corpus Juris Secundum, adds a rider that “previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that grievous wrong may result; and, accordingly, the courts ordinarily will not adhere to a rule or principle established by previous decisions which they are convinced is erroneous. The rule of stare decisis is not so imperative or inflexible as to preclude a departure therefrom in any case, but its application must be determined in each case by the discretion of the court, and previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that error may be perpetuated and grievous wrong may result.”

No Binding Precedent if relevant statutory provision was Not considered; It Must be ‘Ratio Decidendi’ also

In Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti, (2026) 5 SCC 201, it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “29.2. This Court held that it is not everything said by a judge while giving judgment that constitute a precedent. The only thing in a judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided. It is for this reason that it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates:
    • (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential;
    • (ii) statement of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and
    • (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above.”

It is pointed out further in this decision as under:

  • “29.3.  … A precedent by long recognition may mature into a stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi.
  • 32. A five-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in Dr. Shah Faesal Vs. Union of India , (2020) 4 SCC 1, was examining the challenge to two constitution orders issued by the President of India under Article 370 of the Constitution of India. It is not necessary to delve into the factual controversy of that case but confine to the principle of ratio decidendi and per incuriam as deliberated therein. The Bench highlighted the importance of a binding decision and noted that usually courts do not overrule the established precedents unless there is a social, constitutional or economic change mandating such a development. Doctrines of precedents and stare decisis are the core values of our legal system. They form the tools which further the goal of certainty, stability and continuity in our legal system. Arguably, judges owe a duty to the concept of certainty of law. Therefore, they often justify their holdings by relying upon the established tenets of law. The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system.”

In Union of India v. Maniklal Banerjee, AIR 2006 SC 2844, the Apex Court has held as under:

  • “It is now well-settled that if a decision has been rendered without taking into account the statutory provision, the same cannot be considered to be a binding precedent. This Court, in Pritam Singh, while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, might have refused to interfere with the decision. The same, therefore, did not constitute any binding precedent.” (Referred to in: Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain (Arun Misra, J.), ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472)

The Supreme Court in Jayant Verma v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 743, quoted the dissenting judgement of A.P. Sen, J. in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCC 745, with approval :

  • “54. This question is answered by referring to authoritative works and judgments of this Court. In Precedent in English Law by Cross and Harris (4th edn.), ‘ratio decidendi’ is described as follows: “The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him, or a necessary part of his direction to the jury.”

In State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647, wherein after relying on British authorities it was held:

  • “13….A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein, nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic, this is what Earl of Halsbury L.C. said in Quinn v. Leathem [[1901] AC 495]:
  • “Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, [1898] AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it.”

The Supreme Court, in Krishena Kumar v. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 207, said as under::

  • “19. The doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain “propositions wider than the case itself required”. This was what Lord Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker’s Trustees [(1882) 7 App Cas 259 : 46 LT 826 (HL)] and Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495, 502 : 17 TLR 749 (HL)]. Sir Frederick Pollock has also said :
  • “Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision.”

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Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic)

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Critical Analysis of Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur (2026 INSC 983)

Taken from: Bhag Singh Vs. Basant Kaur: ‘Plaintiff to Win on His Own Title’ Vs. ‘Each Party Must Succeed on the Strength of Its Own Title’

Jojy George Koduvath.

Introduction

In Bhag Singh (D) Thr. Mahant Kashmir Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 INSC 983; 2026 KHC(Online) 6699; 2026 KLT(Online) 4549, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “Where rival claims of ownership are asserted, EACH PARTY must succeed on the STRENGTH OF ITS OWN TITLE and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case.”

It marks a deviation from the earlier strict precedents which emphasized that a plaintiff asserting title must succeed on the strength of its own case, independently of the defendant’s evidence — even when the defence raised a rival claim.

Though a clear-cut pronouncement had not been made earlier as to ‘the burden on either side’ when a rival claim of title is raised on a land, a long line of Supreme Court decisions paved the way for the present definitive proposition.

The March of Law in this Subject

Plaintiff Seeking Declaration of Title Must Establish His Own Case:

  • Moran Mar Basselios Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526.

Adverse Inference is drawn if a party withholds documents:

  • Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413.

Once the plaintiff creates a High Degree of probability, the onus shifts to the defendant:

  • R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752.

Burden of Proof Loses Significance if both parties adduced evidence:

  • Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 673.

Burden of Proof Loses Significance if both parties adduced evidence, and it remains academic:

  • Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan v. Nawab Kazim Ali Khan, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1593.

Sec. 114 Evidence Act (Sec. 119 BSA) allows the Court to Presume certain facts.

  • State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar, AIR 2000 SC 2988

Court to Require the Facts to be Proved, in its discretion.

  • Balraj Taneja  v. Sunil Madan, AIR 1999 SC 3381; 1999 8 SCC 396

Even if no plea, Propounder has to Clear Suspicion, if any:

  • Sridevi v. Jayaraja Shetty, AIR 2005 SC 780, 2005-2 SCC 784.

The Courts consider the rival title set up by the defendants:

  • Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale, AIR 2007 SC 2577; (2007) 6 SCC 737.

Burden of Proof in Title Suits

This matter falls for consideration under the following three categories:

I: Obdurate Stand

Traditionally, the Supreme Court adhered to a strict approach concerning the standard of proof in title suits, holding as follows:

  • A Plaintiff has to win the title-suit on his evidence, not on the weakness of the adversary — Moran Mar Basselios Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526.

II: Malleable Position

The Apex Court softened its stand and took a malleable position in certain other cases taking the followoing views:

  • Court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants.
  • Once the plaintiff has created a high degree of probability, the defendant must discharge his onus.
  • Even if a party to the suit has no burden, the Court can draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession.
  • The burden of proof loses significance if both parties have adduced evidence; it remains academic.

III: Doctrinal Expansion in the Law of Rival Claims

  • Now, in Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, the Supreme Court (Prashant Kumar Mishra, Shree Chandrashekhar, JJ.) held – where rival claims of ownership are asserted, EACH PARTY must succeed on the STRENGTH OF ITS OWN TITLE and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case.

Critical Appreciation of Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur (2026 INSC 983)

Facts of the Case

  • The suit was for declaration and injunction.
  • Plaintiff’s claim was founded upon a registered sale deed.
  • Principal defence raised by the defendants were –
    • 1. Suit property had been dedicated in favour of the Dera long before the execution of the sale deed.
    • 2. The vendors of the plaintiffs had only one-half share.
    • 3. The revenue entries showed possession with Attar Singh Chela Bhai Gulab Singh as “gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth”, signifying possession without payment of rent for religious purposes, and that such possession was held not in his individual capacity but on behalf of the Dera.
    • 4. The defendants claimed possession through the successive Mahants of the Dera.
    • 5. The Dera had remained in continuous, open and uninterrupted possession of the suit property for several decades and had acquired ownership thereof.

Findings of the Apex Court

1. The defendants/appellants sought title on two juristic bases (a) dedication/title and (b) adverse possession. Both proceed on different legal premises.

2. Doctrine of adverse possession is not attracted in this case [Relied on: T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570; Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 961]. For attracting adverse Possession –

  • (i) The claimant has to admit the title of the true owner, for it proceeds on the assumption that the title initially vested in another.
  • (ii) Mere long possession or an entry in the revenue records is insufficient.
  • (iii) Pleading of overt acts asserting hostility to the knowledge of true owners is necessary.
  • (iv) Pleadings and evidence as to the time (date) at which the title of the true owner was repudiated and a hostile assertion of ownership was raised in denial of his title (a lawful or permissive origin cannot be adverse merely by lapse of time) are also essential.
Note: 1. Without making a definite finding on the title of the plaintiff (whether the vendors of the plaintiff had only a one-half share), the Court considered the Adverse title claim raised by the defendants.
2. The Court formulated the legal doctrine: where rival claims of ownership are asserted, each party must succeed on the strength of its own title and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case.
3. The title dispute raised in this case is between (i) the alleged ‘true title holder’ and (ii) one who claimed title by adverse possession; and not between two claimants of ‘true title’. Because a plea of adverse possession concedes the opponent’s title, the Court emphasized: “The real issue is whether the appellants (defendants) established a better and superior title (by raising a claim of adverse possession) to defeat the respondents’ (plaintiff’s) claim altogether”.

3. A Doctrinal Explanation in the Law of Rival Claims of Title

In Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, the Supreme Court expounded a shift in the law by explaining the burden of proof, comprehensively tracing the lineage of prior precedents on this issue. It is held as under:

  • “37. The present Appeal does not merely concern the extent of the interest conveyed under the sale deed. The real issue is whether the appellants established a better and superior title so as to defeat the respondents’ claim altogether. It is a settled principle that where rival claims of ownership are asserted, each party must succeed on the strength of its own title and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case.[See: Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan vs. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale (Dead) and Others, (2007) 6 SCC 737 at Para 13.]”

Supporting Precedents

The above Doctrinal Explanation of law as enunciated by the Court draws reflection from the following decisions:

  • 1. Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale, AIR 2007 SC 2577; (2007) 6 SCC 737: In this decision, it is held that the Court is entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants while adjudicating the plaintiff’s claim of title.
    • Note: It is added further in this decision: “But the weakness of the defence or the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these proposition.”
  • 2. R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752: The Supreme Court explained in this decision that, once the plaintiff establishes a high degree of probability sufficient to shift the onus, it is for the defendant to discharge that onus.
  • 3. Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413: The Apex Court held that an adverse inference may be taken against a party to the suit if he withholds material documents in his possession, even if he has no ‘burden of proof’ .
  • 4. Raghunathi v. Raju Ramappa Shetty, AIR 1991 SC 1040; 1991 Supp2 SCC 267; M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, AIR 2011 SC 146; 2010-9 SCC 712: It is held in these decisions that the burden of proof loses significance if both parties adduced evidence; and it remains academic.

A Caution worth Noting:

  • A defendant who simply denies the plaintiff’s title is differently situated from one who affirmatively asserts an independent title in himself (still, it may entail an adverse inference for withholding material documents).
  • The failure of the plaintiff’s case does not, by itself, establish the defendant’s title; equally, the failure of the defendant to establish an independent title does not, by itself, entitle the plaintiff to a decree.

Conclusion

Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur stands as a landmark decision in property law that advances the cause of substantive justice by ensuring that property rights are adjudicated on merits rather than procedural defaults.

The Supreme Court makes it clear that where competing claims of ownership are raised, neither party can rest merely on the weakness of the opponent’s case; instead, rival claims must be adjudicated upon the intrinsic strength of the evidence adduced by both sides—thereby safeguarding true ownership from being defeated by technical flaws and unsupported pleas. This proposition is designed to ensure fairness. Ultimately, it ensures that the majesty of the law aligns with the demands of equity and substantive truth.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

‘Each Party Must Succeed on the Strength of Its Own Title’: A Doctrinal Explanation of the Law of Rival Claims on Title – Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur

Read also:

Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract

•• Traditional Rule in a suit for recovery: Established jurisprudence in a suit for recovery of possession based on title dictates that ‘a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of its own case’, independent of the defendant’s shortcomings.

•• The Explanation of Law in Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur: In Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur (2026 INSC 983), the Supreme Court held that where both parties assert rival claims of ownership, “each party must succeed on the strength of its own title.”

•• Founded upon Principles of Substantive Justice: Compulsory judicial evaluation of rival claims is founded upon the principles of equity and substantive truth.

Introduction

In Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 INSC 983; 2026 KHC(Online) 6699; 2026 KLT(Online) 4549 (Prashant KumarMishra and Shree Chandrashekhar, JJ.), the Supreme Court held:

  • “Where rival claims of ownership are asserted, each party must succeed on the strength of its own title and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case.”

This pronouncement marks a significant doctrinal evolution. While earlier strict precedents emphasized that a plaintiff seeking a declaration or recovery of title must independently establish their case without exploiting weakness of the defendants, the Court, in Bhag Singh has crystallized a comprehensive framework governing competing proprietary claims.

Though a clear-cut pronouncement had not been made earlier as to the burden on either side when a rival claim of title is raised on a land, a long line of Supreme Court decisions paved the way for the present definitive proposition.

The March of Law in this Subject

Plaintiff Seeking Declaration of Title Must Establish His Own Case:

  • Moran Mar Basselios Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526.

Adverse Inference is drawn if a party withholds documents:

  • Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413.

Once the plaintiff creates a High Degree of Probability Onus Shifts to the defendant:

  • R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752.

Burden of Proof Loses Significance if both parties adduced evidence:

  • Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 673.

Burden of Proof Loses Significance if both parties adduced evidence, and it remains academic:

  • Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan v. Nawab Kazim Ali Khan, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1593.

Sec. 114 Evidence Act (Sec. 119 BSA) allows the Court to Presume certain facts.

  • State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar, AIR 2000 SC 2988

Court to Require the Facts to be Proved, in its discretion.

  • Balraj Taneja  v. Sunil Madan, AIR 1999 SC 3381; 1999 8 SCC 396

Even if no plea, Propounder has to Clear Suspicion, if any:

  • Sridevi v. Jayaraja Shetty, AIR 2005 SC 780, 2005-2 SCC 784.

The Courts consider the rival title set up by the defendants:

  • Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale, AIR 2007 SC 2577; (2007) 6 SCC 737

If Rival Claims, EACH PARTY to succeed on STRENGTH OF ITS OWN TITLE:

  • Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 INSC 983; 2026 KHC(Online) 6699; 2026 KLT(Online) 4549.

The Case Law on the Subject

1. The Decisions that Took Obdurate Stand – EACH PARTY TO SUCCEED ON STRENGTH OF ITS OWN TITLE

Plaintiff to Win Recovery Suit, on Strength of his Title.

Following are the often cited decisions on this subject:

  • Moran Mar Basselios Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526,
  • Brahma Nand Puri v. Neki Puri, AIR 1965 SC 1506,
  • City Municipal Council Bhalki v. Gurappa, 2016-2  SCC 200
  • Bajaranglal Shivchandrai Ruia v. Shashikant N. Ruia, (2004) 5 SCC 272
  • Vijay Pullarwar v. Shri Hanuman Deostan, (2019) 11 SCC 718,
  • Ratnagiri Nagar Parishad v. Gangaram Narayan Ambekar, (2020) 7 SCC 275.

Suit on Title & Weakness of the Defence

A Plaintiff has to win the title-suit on his evidence; not on the weakness of the adversary. See:

  • Baha Kartar Singh Bedi v. Dayal Das, AIR 1939 PC 201 (Referred to in: K. M. Paul v. K. Pradeep, ILR 2006-2 Ker 19),
  • Jagdish Narain v. Nawab Said Ahmed Khan, AIR 1946 PC 59 (Referred to in: Dinesh Jain v. Jeewanlal Lala, AIR 2013 MP 85)
  • Moran Mar Basselios Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 (ejectment suit must succeed on the strength of Plaintiffs’ own title)
  • Heera Devi v. Official Assignee Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 448.
  • Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira, AIR  1959 SC 31 (referred to in: Paturu Sundaraiah v. Suri Ranganayakamma, AIR 2022 AP 71),
  • Brahmanand Puri v. Nek Puri, AIR 1965 SC 1506.
  • Nagar Palika, Jind v. Jagat Singh, Advocate, (1995) 3 SCC 426.
  • Sayed Muhammed Mashur Kunhi Koya Thangal v. Badagara Jumayath Palli Dharas Committee, 2004-7 SCC 708.
  • Yamuna Nagar Improvement Trust v. Khairati Lal, (2005) 10 SCC 30.
  • Anil. Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558; City Municipal. Council, Bhalki v. Gurappa, (2016) 2 SCC 200),
  • Rangammal v. Kuppuswamy, (2011) 12 SCC 220
  • Union of India v. Vasavi Co-operative Housing Society Limited, (2014) 2 SCC 269,
  • Jagdish Prasad Patel v. Shivnath, (2019) 6 SCC 82,
  • Vijay Pullarwar v. Shri Hanuman Deostan, (2019) 11 SCC 718,
  • City Municipal Council Bhalki v. Gurappa, 2016-2 SCC 200,
  • Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 9,
  • P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2024-1 CTC 547; 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278,
  • Ratnagiri Nagar Parishad v. Gangaram Narayan Ambekar, (2020) 7 SCC 275
  • Kishan Chand v. Gautam Gaur Hitkarak Sabha, Kota, 2026 INSC 448

2. IF RIVAL CLAIMS, court is Also entitled to consider the title set up by the defendants

In Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak, AIR 2007 SC 2577; (2007) 6 SCC 737, it is observed –

  • “11. The suit is for recovery of possession on the strength of title. Obviously, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that title. No doubt in appreciating the case of title set up by the plaintiff, the court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants. But the weakness of the defence or the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these propositions.”

The Supreme Court’s observation that the ‘court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants‘ represented a notable doctrinal explanation in judicial approach.

3. Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 INSC 983

In Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, the Supreme Court expounded a shift in the law by explaining the burden of proof, comprehensively tracing the lineage of prior precedents on this issue. It is held as under:

  • “37. The present Appeal does not merely concern the extent of the interest conveyed under the sale deed. The real issue is whether the appellants established a better and superior title so as to defeat the respondents’ claim altogether. It is a settled principle that where rival claims of ownership are asserted, each party must succeed on the strength of its own title and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case.[See: Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale (Dead) and Others, (2007) 6 SCC 737 at Para 13.]”

Critical Appreciation of Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur (2026 INSC 983)

Facts

  • Suit was for declaration and injunction.
  • Plaintiff’s claim was founded upon a registered sale deed.
  • Principal defence raised by the defendants were –
    • 1. Suit property had been dedicated in favour of the Dera long before the execution of the sale deed.
    • 2. The vendors of the plaintiffs had only one-half share.
    • 3. The revenue entries showed possession with Attar Singh Chela Bhai Gulab Singh as “gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth”, signifying possession without payment of rent for religious purposes, and that such possession was held not in his individual capacity but on behalf of the Dera.
    • 4. The defendants claimed possession through the successive Mahants of the Dera.
    • 5. The Dera had remained in continuous, open and uninterrupted possession of the suit property for several decades and had acquired ownership thereof.

Findings of the Apex Court

1. The defendants/appellants sought title on two juristic bases (a) dedication/title and (b) adverse possession. Both proceed on different legal premises.

2. Doctrine of adverse possession is not attracted in this case [Relied on: T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570; Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 961]. For attracting adverse Possession –

  • (i) The claimant has to admit the title of the true owner, for it proceeds on the assumption that the title initially vested in another.
  • (ii) Mere long possession or an entry in the revenue records is insufficient.
  • (iii) Pleading of overt acts asserting hostility to the knowledge of true owners is necessary.
  • (iv) Pleadings and evidence as to the time (date) at which the title of the true owner was repudiated and a hostile assertion of ownership was raised in denial of his title (a lawful or permissive origin cannot be adverse merely by lapse of time) are also essential.
Note: 1. Without making a definite finding on the title of the plaintiff (whether the vendors of the plaintiff had only a one-half share), the Court considered the Adverse title claim raised by the defendants.
2. The Court formulated the legal doctrine: where rival claims of ownership are asserted, each party must succeed on the strength of its own title and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case.
3. The title dispute raised in this case is between (i) the alleged ‘true title holder’ and (ii) one who claimed title by adverse possession; and not between two claimants of ‘true title’. Because a plea of adverse possession concedes the opponent’s title, the Court emphasized: “The real issue is whether the appellants (defendants) established a better and superior title (by raising a claim of adverse possession) to defeat the respondents’ (plaintiff’s) claim altogether”.

3. Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, made a doctrinal explanation. It cast burden of proof on both plaintiff and defendant if a rival claim of ownership is raised over the suit land. It is held that ‘each party must succeed on the strength of its own title and neither can succeed merely pointing out the weakness of the opposite party’s case.

Supporting Precedents

The above Doctrinal Explanation as enunciated by the Court draws reflection from the following decisions:

  • 1. Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale, AIR 2007 SC 2577; (2007) 6 SCC 737: In this decision, it was held that while adjudicating a plaintiff’s claim of title, the court is entitled to consider any rival title set up by the defendants.
    • Note: It was further clarified: “But the weakness of the defence or the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these proposition.”
  • 2. R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752: The Supreme Court explained that once a plaintiff creates a high degree of probability sufficient to shift the onus, the burden shifts onto the defendant to establish their competing claim.
  • 3. Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413: The Apex Court established that an adverse inference may be drawn against a party who withholds vital documents in their possession, even if that party does not bear the burden of proof.
  • 4. Raghunathi v. Raju Ramappa Shetty, AIR 1991 SC 1040; 1991 Supp2 SCC 267; M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, AIR 2011 SC 146; 2010-9 SCC 712: It was held that the question of the burden of proof loses its significance and remains purely academic once both parties have adduced evidence.

A Caution Worth Noting:

  • A defendant who simply denies the plaintiff’s title is differently situated from one who affirmatively asserts an independent title in himself (still, it may entail an adverse inference for withholding material documents).
  • The failure of the plaintiff’s case does not, by itself, establish the defendant’s title; equally, the failure of the defendant to establish an independent title does not, by itself, entitle the plaintiff to a decree.

Conclusion

Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur (2026 INSC 983) stands as a landmark decision in property law that advances the cause of substantive justice by ensuring that property rights are adjudicated on merits rather than procedural defaults.

The Supreme Court makes it clear that where competing claims of ownership are raised, neither party can rest merely on the weakness of the opponent’s case; instead, rival claims must be adjudicated upon the intrinsic strength of the evidence adduced by both sides—thereby safeguarding true ownership from being defeated by technical flaws and unsupported pleas. Ultimately, this ensures that the majesty of the law aligns with the demands of equity and substantive truth.



End Notes – 1

Decisions that Made a Shift in law

(i) Suit on Title – If High Degree of Probability Established, Onus Shifts.

In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003 SC 4548: (2003) 8 SCC 752, the law is stated in the following terms :

  • “In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff’s title.
  • … Being a civil case, the plaintiff cannot be expected to proof his title beyond any reasonable doubt; a high degree of probability lending assurance of the availability of title with him would be enough to shift the onus on the defendant and if the defendant does not succeed in shifting back the onus, the plaintiff’s burden of proof can safely be deemed to have been discharged. …”.
  • … A high degree of preponderance of probability proving title to the suit property was raised in favour of the appellant and the courts below rightly concluded the burden of proof raised on the plaintiff having been discharged while the onus shifting on the defendant remaining undischarged. ..”
  • (Quoted in: Anil. Rishi vs. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558; City Municipal. Council, Bhalki Vs. Gurappa, (2016) 2 SCC 200)

In Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 9,it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “31. …. Onus of proof, no doubt shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence, but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the onus on the defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and can be discharged only when he is able to prove title.[See R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami V.P. Temple and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 752.] ….”

(ii) Burden of Proof Loses Significance: Burden of proof loses its importance –

  • if both parties adduced evidence
  • if there is sufficient evidence on an issue.

In such a situation, the ‘burden of proof’ remains academic. See:

  • Seturatnam Aiyar v. Venkatachala Gounden, (1919)   47 IA 76,
  • Chidambara Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhigal v. Veerama Reddi, 49 IA 286 303: AIR 1922 PC 292
  • Kumbham Lakshmanna v. Tangirala Venkateswarlu, AIR 1949 PC 278;
  • Mohd.  Abdullah Azam Khan Vs. Nawab Kazim Ali Khan,(1976) 3 SCC 32
  • Raghunathi v. Raju Ramappa Shetty, AIR 1991 SC 1040;
  • Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 673,

(iii) When evidence has been led by both sides, “Onus” is out of place

In Kalwa Devadattam v. Union, AIR 1964 SC 880, it is held – where evidence has been led by the contesting parties, abstract considerations of onus are out of place and truth or otherwise must always be adjudged on the evidence led by the parties. The Court held as under:

  • “The question of onus probandi is certainly important in the early stages of a case. It may also assume importance where no evidence at all is led on the question in dispute by either side; in such a contingency the party on whom the onus lies to prove a certain fact must fail. Where however evidence has been led by the contesting parties on the question in issue, abstract considerations of onus are out of place; truth or otherwise of the case must always be adjudged on the evidence led by the parties.”

This decision is referred to in:

  • Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan v. Nawab Kazim Ali Khan, 2022-20 SCC 233
  • Vinod Kumar Dhall v. Dharampal Dhall, 2018-16 SCC 645
  • Bibi Sidique Fatima v. Saiyed Mohammad Mahmood Hasan, AIR 1978 SC 1362; 1978-3 SCC 299
  • Union of India v. Moksh Builders and Financiers Ltd. (1977) 1 SCR 967

(iv) Court Can Draw Adverse Inference If Important Documents are Withheld

In the important decision, Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v.  Mahomed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413, it is held as under:

  • “Even if a party to the suit has no burden, the Court can draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession.”

In National Insurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi v. Jugal Kishore, 1988-1 SCC 626, Our Apex Court stated the law as under:

  • “This Court has consistently emphasized that it is the duty of the party which is in possession of a document which would be helpful in doing justice in the cause to produce the said document and such party should not be permitted to take shelter behind the abstract doctrine of burden of proof.” (Quoted in: Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 673)

End Notes – 2

Non-production of the Sale Deed and the Principle of Burden of Proof

Question: A defendant claims title on a registered sale deed. Can the defendant argue – there should not be adverse presumption for not peoducing the sale deed , for the plaintiff can get a certified copy from the Sub-Registrar’s Office?

Answer:

  • The mere fact that the plaintiff could have obtained a certified copy of the registered sale deed from the Sub-Registrar’s Office does not, by itself, absolve the defendant of the consequences of withholding the document on which the defendant relies to establish title. The availability of secondary evidence to the plaintiff and the defendant’s failure to produce the deed are distinct matters.
  • However, even if no adverse inference is drawn against the defendant, the question remains: who must fail if neither party produces evidence sufficient to establish the fact in issue? The answer is governed by the fundamental principle of the law of evidence that the party who bears the burden of proof must fail if no evidence is adduced on the issue. As explained by the Supreme Court in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752, the initial burden of proof and the evidential burden that may shift during trial are distinct concepts.
  • Therefore, if the defendant asserts title under a registered sale deed but fails to produce it, the defendant cannot necessarily succeed merely by pointing out that the plaintiff could have obtained a certified copy. If the defendant’s title depends upon establishing the transaction evidenced by that deed, the defendant must prove the relevant facts in accordance with law. Conversely, if the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing his own title and fails to do so, the plaintiff cannot succeed merely because the defendant’s evidence is deficient.
  • Ultimately, the court must determine not merely against whom an adverse inference should be drawn, but also which party must fail if the evidence as a whole is insufficient to establish the title asserted by that party.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Company, University, Society, etc. Act on ‘Resolutions’

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Jojy George Koduvath.

Introduction

A company is a legal entity. It can act in its own name. All acts of the companies are done under its ‘resolutions’ of its General Body or Director Board. The acts are carried on through its authorised persons – directors or persons authorised under its Memorandum or under the resolutions of its General Body or Director Board.

Similar is the position of University, Associations etc. also.

It is held in Vice Chancellor, Utkal University v. S.K. Ghosh (Vivian Bose, Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan, JJ.), AIR 1954 SC 217, to the following effect:

  • “Though an incorporated body like an University is a legal entity it has neither living mind nor voice. It can only express its will in formal way by a formal resolution and. so can only act in its corporate capacity by resolutions properly considered, carried and duly recorded in the manner laid down by its constitution.
  • If its rules require such resolutions to be moved and passed in a meeting called for the purpose, then every member of the body entitled to take part in the meeting must be given notice so that he can attend and express his views.
  • Individual assents given separately cannot be regarded as equivalent to the assent of a meeting because the incorporated body is different from the persons of which it is composed. Hence, an omission to give proper notice even to a single member in these circumstances would invalidate the meeting and that in turn would invalidate resolutions which purport to have been passed at it.”

Section 118 of the Companies Act, 2013 speaks about ‘Minutes’. It reads as under:.

  • 118:  Minutes of proceedings of general meeting, meeting of Board of Directors and other meeting and resolutions passed by postal ballot.
  • .(1) Every company shall cause minutes of the proceedings of every general meeting of any class of shareholders or creditors, and every resolution passed by postal ballot and every meeting of its Board of Directors or of every committee of the Board, to be prepared and signed in such manner as may be prescribed and kept within thirty days of the conclusion of every such meeting concerned, or passing of resolution by postal ballot in books kept for that purpose with their pages consecutively numbered.
  • (2) The minutes of each meeting shall contain a fair and correct summary of the proceedings thereat.
  • (3) All appointments made at any of the meetings aforesaid shall be included in the minutes of the meeting.
  • (4) In the case of a meeting of the Board of Directors or of a committee of the Board, the minutes shall also contain–
    • (a) the names of the directors present at the meeting; and
    • (b) in the case of each resolution passed at the meeting, the names of the directors, if any, dissenting from, or not concurring with the resolution.
  • (5) There shall not be included in the minutes, any matter which, in the opinion of the Chairman of the meeting,–
    • (a) is or could reasonably be regarded as defamatory of any person; or
    • (b) is irrelevant or immaterial to the proceedings; or
    • (c) is detrimental to the interests of the company.
  • (6) The Chairman shall exercise absolute discretion in regard to the inclusion or non-inclusion of any matter in the minutes on the grounds specified in sub-section (5).
  • (7) The minutes kept in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein.
  • (8) Where the minutes have been kept in accordance with sub-section (1) then, until the contrary is proved, the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly called and held, and all proceedings thereat to have duly taken place, and the resolutions passed by postal ballot to have been duly passed and in particular, all appointments of directors, key managerial personnel, auditors or company secretary in practice, shall be deemed to be valid.
  • (9) No document purporting to be a report of the proceedings of any general meeting of a company shall be circulated or advertised at the expense of the company, unless it includes the matters required by this section to be contained in the minutes of the proceedings of such meeting.
  • (10) Every company shall observe secretarial standards with respect to general and Board meetings specified by the Institute of Company Secretaries of India constituted under section 3 of the Company Secretaries Act, 1980 (56 of 1980), and approved as such by the Central Government.
  • (11) If any default is made in complying with the provisions of this section in respect of any meeting, the company shall be liable to a penalty of twenty-five thousand rupees and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of five thousand rupees.
  • (12) If a person is found guilty of tampering with the minutes of the proceedings of meeting, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees.

‘Minutes’ must be “Proved” by Producing the Original

From Sec. 118(8) it is clear that the ‘Minutes’ must be “proved” by a competent witness like signatory or a person who wrote or who has seen it recording.

There is no provision in the Companies Act or in any other Act which allows ‘extracts’ of the board minutes, or a certified copy to be given in evidence without producing the original. Therefore only way to prove a ‘resolution’ is to prove the ‘minutes’.

Only way to prove a resolution is “Proving” the Minutes

In Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos , (1991) 72 Comp Cas. 483 (Delhi); 42(1990) DLT 446, it is observed as under:

  • “(14) The manner in which such a resolution of the Board of Directors of Companies are to be proved, is clearly stated by Hardayal Hardy, J. in a judgment passed in Suit No. 469 of 1986 in M/s. Oberoi Hotels (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Observer Publications (P) Ltd. and others (Suit No. 469/1966: Delhi High Court decided on 26.11.1988). In this judgment it has been stated that “the ONLY WAYto prove that a particular resolution was passed at a meeting of the Board of Directors of a company is that the minutes book in which the said resolution was recorded as having been passed should be produced in Court as that alone can form evidence of the fact under section 194 of the Act”. Section 194 of the Companies Act reads as under :
    • “194. Minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of section 193 shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein”.
  • (Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos is referred to in: Havells India Ltd.  v. Dilip Rathi, 16 Feb 2018, Delhi High Court;  Manoj Kumar Kanuga v. Marudhar Power Pvt.  Ltd. , 23 Apr 2013, AP High Court).

Even when exhibit number is given, it cannot be treated as proved

In Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd., CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506, it is held as under:

  • “Section 194 of the Companies Act provides that the minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of section 193 shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein. However, no provision in the Companies Act is brought to my notice which provides that the certified copy or extract of the minutes would be admissible in evidence without proof of the original. Section 65(f) of the Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition and contents of the document when the original is the document of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence. As no provision from the Companies Act is brought to my notice under which the certified copy of the minutes of the meetings of the board of directors is admissible in evidence without proof of the original, it must be said that the copy of the minutes cannot be admitted in evidence directly unless the original is proved or the copy is admitted by opposite party. Therefore, even though that document is given exhibit number, it cannot be treated to have been proved unless the  complainant leads appropriate evidence to prove the minutes.”

Minute Books Not open for inspection to the Strangers

In Shri Kishan Rathi v.  Mondal Brothers And Co. (Private) Ltd. , AIR 1967 (Cal) 75, [1967] 37 Comp Cas 256, it is held as under:

  • “The minute books and the book of resolution of the board of directors are books of the company and are not open to strangers and outsiders. This was also within the special knowledge of the defendant company. If the defendant company was trying to prove that its manager and director had no authority to borrow money, then it was for the company to prove from its own books of minutes and resolutions that no authority was given to Naresh Chandra Mondal, its manager and director. Section 106 of the Evidence Act says that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. It is strange that neither the defendant company nor its witness, director Sambhu Nath Mondal, produced the minute book or the book of resolutions in this case. The only inference that can be drawn from such non-production on the facts and circumstances of this case is that, had they been produced, they would have shown that there was good authority and resolution in favour of Naresh Chandra Mondal. That presumption is irresistible in this case. Articles 103 and 114 of the articles of association of this company cast a mandatory duty upon the directors to record minutes of the proceedings of all meetings of the directors in the minute book. The defendant company or its director witness, Sambhu Nath Mondal, being in possession of such minute book and being in special knowledge of the contents of that minute book, it was their duty to produce them and not the duty of the plaintiff.”

It continued as under:

  • “Whether there was resolution by Board of Directors delegating such power again is a fact within the special knowledge of the defendant company and its Directors. They could have easily produced the resolution book or the minute book to show that there was no such delegation But they had not done so and therefore, an adverse inference must be drawn against them to the effect that had they produced them, they would have shown such delegation to the Manager, Naresh Chandra Mondal.” (Quoted in: Hoshiarpur Azad Transport Co. Ltd.  v. Sutlej Land Finance Pvt. Ltd., 2001-103 CC 969; 1995-109 PLR 506 (P&H).

It is held in Hoshiarpur Azad Transport Co. Ltd.  v. Sutlej Land Finance Pvt. Ltd. (P&H, Ashok Bhan, J.), 2001-103 CC 969; 1995-109 PLR 506, (quoting above passage in Shri Kishan Rathi v.  Mondal Brothers And Co. (Private) Ltd. , AIR 1967 (Cal) 75, [1967] 37 Comp Cas 256) as under:

  • “The petitioner-company did not produce its book of resolution. The minutes regarding the resolution passed are in possession of the company and are not open for inspection to the strangers. Since the petitioner had taken the stand that its general manager had no authority to borrow the money, it was for the company to prove from its own books of minutes and resolution that no authority was given to its general manager to borrow any money. The only inference which under the circumstances can be drawn from the non-production of these books would be that had these books been produced then the same would have shown that there was a resolution passed by the company authorising its general manager to borrow the money.”

Unpleasant and Inharmonious Judgment of Kerala High Court

Kerala High Court (Single Judge) in Sree Gokulam Chit & Finance Co.(P) v. P.R. Balakrishnan on 8 November, 2024,Crl. A No. 1029 of 2008, 2024: KER:82742, distinguished (i) Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos, (1991) 72 Comp Cas. 483 (Delhi); 42(1990) DLT 446, and (ii) Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd., CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506, saying as under:

  • “8. Learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 would contend that, Ext.P8 extract of the minutes is not admissible in evidence and the minutes has to be proved by producing the original. He would rely on a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Others reported in [CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506], to say that, Section 194 of the Companies Act provides that, the minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of Section 193, shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein. No provision in the Companies Act was brought to the notice of that court(see End Notes) which provides that, certified copy or extract of the minutes would be admissible in evidence, without proof of the original. Section 65(f) of the Evidence Act provides that, secondary evidence may be given, of the existence, condition and contents of the document, when the original is the document, of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India, to be given in evidence.
  • He would rely on another decision of the Delhi High Court in Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos and Others [1991 Company Cases Volume 72 Page 483] to say that, copy of resolution was not enough and the original of the minutes book, containing the resolution relied on, has to be brought to the court.
  • 9. Section 119 of the Companies Act, 2013 which corresponds to Section 196 of the Companies Act, 1956 says that, the books containing the minutes of the proceedings of any general meeting of a company or of a resolution passed by postal ballot shall be kept at the registered office of the company, and it shall be open for inspection by any member during business hours and if any member make a request, for a copy of the minutes, it shall be furnished within seven days, on payment of prescribed fees. So, Section 119 of the Companies Act provides for copy of the minutes, and moreover, learned counsel for the appellant would say that, copy of every resolution shall be sent to the Registrar for recording the same within 30 days of passing the same.
  • Moreover, as per Section 54 of the Companies Act, 1956, a document which requires authentication by a company may be signed by a director, the manager, the secretary or other authorised officer of the company, and need not be under its common seal. So, according to the appellant, Ext.P8 extract of the minutes, which contains the resolution authorising the Assistant Manager to file criminal or civil cases or to give evidence etc., signed by the director of Sree Gokulam Chit & Finance Co. (P) Ltd., was sufficient authority for PW1, to file the complaint and to give evidence, on behalf of the company.

The Single Judge took the stand – the requirement that some law must have been “permitted” to give certified copy in evidence, as provided in Sec. 65 (f), is satisfied (and a resolution or extract can be exhibited), for the Companies Act “provides for copy of the minutes” to “any member“. The stance is totally baseless. Because, a member’s right to to get copy of the minutes is different from the right to “be given“ in evidence the certified copy, as “permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India“.

  • The minutes is not a document “open for inspection to the strangers” as held by Ashok Bhan, J. in Hoshiarpur Azad Transport Co. Ltd.  v. Sutlej Land Finance Pvt. Ltd., 2001-103 CC 969; 1995-109 PLR 506).

And, the aforesaid legal position has no connection at all with Section 54 of the Companies Act, 1956, also.

In any event, if Sec. 65 (f) is attracted, “a certified copy of document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible”; and the certified extract or copy of “resolution” (other than the certified copy of the “minutes”) is insufficient.

End Notes I

Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd., CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506, observed as under:

  • “15. Next comes the document No.1 – the certified true copy of the resolution dated 16.2.2009, whereby the complainant company had allegedly resolved to give consent of the Board of Directors to execute power of attorney in favour of Ashwin Sheth, Managing Director and/or Sharad Doshi, Executive Assistant to the Managing Director to institute or defend any suit or criminal proceedings. The learned trial Court observed in the impugned order that there is no clear-cut provision about issuance of certified copy of extract of minutes book but if sub-sec. (2) of Section 196 of the Companies Act is read, it may be stated that certified copy of the minutes can be given. The learned trial Court observed that the witness Sharad Doshi in his affidavit had deposed about the said document and thereby he has proved the genuineness of the document. Under Section 195 of the Companies Act, where minutes of the proceedings of any general meeting of the company have been kept in accordance with the 17 WP-40-11.sxw provisions of section 193, then, until the contrary is proved, the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly called and held, and all proceedings thereat to have duly taken place. Section 194 of the Companies Act provides that the minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of section 193 shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein. However, no provision in the Companies Act is brought to my notice which provides that the certified copy or extract of the minutes would be admissible in evidence without proof of the original. Section 65(f) of the Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition and contents of the document when the original is the document of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence. As no provision from the Companies Act is brought to my notice under which the certified copy of the minutes of the meetings of the board of directors is admissible in evidence without proof of the original, it must be said that the copy of the minutes cannot be admitted in evidence directly unless the original is proved or the copy is admitted by opposite party. Therefore, even though that document is given exhibit number, it cannot be treated to have been proved, unless the 18 WP-40-11.sxw complainant leads appropriate evidence to prove the minutes.”

In Escorts Limited vs Sai Autos, (1991)72 Comp Cas 483 (Delhi), 42(1990) DLT 446, it is observed as under:

  • “(16) The next question that arises is what amount is due from defendants No. to 3 to the plaintiff company. For this purpose, copies of accounts have been produced by the plaintiff company. Copies of the accounts produced by the plaintiff company deals with the transaction between the plaintiff defendants No. to 3. In none of the affidavits filed by the plaintiff, have these accounts been proved in accordance with the provision of section 34 of the Evidence Act, which sets out the manner in which any person can be charged with liability on accounts, and how the liability is to be proved.
  • (17) Section 34 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
    • “Entries in books of account regularly kept in the course of business are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to inquire, but each statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability”.
  • (18) In view of the provisions of section 34 of the Evidence Act, entries in the books of account are not alone sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability. Nor can copies of entries in the books of account be sufficient to charge any person with liability. The manner in which entries in the books df account are to be proved to charge any person with liability, has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in (Chandradhar Goswami & others v. Gauhati Bank Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1058), the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the entries in the books of account are not primary evidence of indebtedness. A plaintiff has to lead evidence in the shape of vouchers, bills etc. to prove the entries in the books of account.
  • (19) In this view of the matter, neither the copy of the ledger account, nor the ledgers themselves, in respect of account of defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 is enough evidence to charge them with liability, and no decree can be passed against the defendants on the basis thereof.”

End Notes

Section 193 in The Companies Act, 1956

193. Minutes of proceedings of general meetings and of Board and other meetings .-

(1) Every company shall cause minutes of all proceedings of every general meeting and of all proceedings of every meeting of its Board of Directors or of every committee of the Board, to be kept by making within [thirty][days of the conclusion of every such meeting concerned, entries thereof in books kept for that purpose with their pages consecutively numbered.

(1A) Each page of every such book shall be initialled or signed and the last page of the record of proceedings of each meeting in such books shall be dated and signed-

  • .(a) in the case of minutes of proceedings of a meeting of the Board or of a committee thereof, by the Chairman of the said meeting or the Chairman of the next succeeding meeting;
  • (b) in the case of minutes of proceedings of a general meeting, by the Chairman of the same meeting within the aforesaid period of thirty days or in the event of the death or inability of that Chairman within that period, by a Director duly authorised by the Board for the purpose.

(1B) In no case the minutes of proceedings of a meeting shall be attached to any such book as aforesaid by pasting or otherwise.] [ Substituted by Act 65 of 1960, Section 52, for sub-Section (1) (w.e.f. 28.12.1960).]

(2) The minutes of each meeting shall contain a fair and correct summary of the proceedings thereat.

(3) All appointments of officers made at any of the meetings aforesaid shall be included in the minutes of the meeting.

(4) In the case of a meeting of the Board of Directors or of a committee of the Board, the minutes shall also contain-

  • .(a) the names of the Directors present at the meeting; and
  • (b) in the case of each resolution passed at the meeting, the names of the Directors, if any, dissenting from, or not concurring in the resolution.

(5) Nothing contained in sub-sections (1) to (4) shall be deemed to require the inclusion in any such minutes of any matter which, in the opinion of the Chairman of the meeting,-

  • .(a) is, or could reasonably be regarded as defamatory of any person;
  • (b) is irrelevant or immaterial to the proceedings; or
  • (c) is detrimental to the interests of the company.

Explanation .-The Chairman shall exercise an absolute discretion in regard to the inclusion or non-inclusion of any matter in the minutes on the grounds specified in this sub-section.

(6) If default is made in complying with the foregoing provisions of this section in respect of any meeting, the company, and every officer of the company who is in default, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to [five hundred rupees] [ Substituted by Act 53 of 2000, Section 81, for ” fifty rupees” (w.e.f. 13.12.2000).].

Section 118 in The Companies Act, 2013

118. Minutes of proceedings of general meeting, meeting of Board of Directors and other meeting and resolutions passed by postal ballot.—(1) Every company shall cause minutes of the proceedings of every general meeting of any class of shareholders or creditors, and every resolution passed by postal ballot and every meeting of its Board of Directors or of every committee of the Board, to be prepared and signed in such manner as may be prescribed and kept within thirty days of the conclusion of every such meeting concerned, or passing of resolution by postal ballot in books kept for that purpose with their pages consecutively numbered.

(2) The minutes of each meeting shall contain a fair and correct summary of the proceedings thereat.

(3) All appointments made at any of the meetings aforesaid shall be included in the minutes of the meeting.

(4) In the case of a meeting of the Board of Directors or of a committee of the Board, the minutes shall also contain—

(a) the names of the directors present at the meeting; and

(b) in the case of each resolution passed at the meeting, the names of the directors, if any, dissenting from, or not concurring with the resolution.

(5) There shall not be included in the minutes, any matter which, in the opinion of the Chairman of the meeting,— (a) is or could reasonably be regarded as defamatory of any person; or (b) is irrelevant or immaterial to the proceedings; or (c) is detrimental to the interests of the company.

(6) The Chairman shall exercise absolute discretion in regard to the inclusion or non-inclusion of any matter in the minutes on the grounds specified in sub-section (5).

(7) The minutes kept in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein.

(8) Where the minutes have been kept in accordance with sub-section (1) then, until the contrary is proved, the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly called and held, and all proceedings thereat to have duly taken place, and the resolutions passed by postal ballot to have been duly passed and in particular, all appointments of directors, key managerial personnel, auditors or company secretary in practice, shall be deemed to be valid.

(9) No document purporting to be a report of the proceedings of any general meeting of a company shall be circulated or advertised at the expense of the company, unless it includes the matters required by this section to be contained in the minutes of the proceedings of such meeting.

(10) Every company shall observe secretarial standards with respect to general and Board meetings specified by the Institute of Company Secretaries of India constituted under section 3 of the Company Secretaries Act, 1980 (56 of 1980), and approved as such by the Central Government.

(11) If any default is made in complying with the provisions of this section in respect of any meeting, the company shall be liable to a penalty of twenty-five thousand rupees and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of five thousand rupees.

(12) If a person is found guilty of tampering with the minutes of the proceedings of meeting, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees.

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