Transfer of Property To or By Trust & S. 5 of the TP Act
Can transfer be made to or by Unregd. Associations
Effect of Common Law in Sec. 5 TP Act
Alienation for Necessity
No Power to Alienate the Site of the Temple
Variation of Trust
Trustee Cannot Sell and Invest Price for Larger Income
Fundamental Principles Cannot Be Altered
Degree of Prudence Expected in Sale
Alienation of Shebaitship
Whether Similar to Management of Estate of an Infant Heir
Alienation: Doctrine of ‘Conditions of Modern Life’
Abuse of Trust – Dedication Will Remain Valid
Is Mortgage Valid Beyond Period-of-office of Transferor
Perpetuities and Alienation of Trust Property
Sale in Public Auction
Shifting of a church
Introduction
Trust is a relationship arising out of confidence reposed in trustee and it casts upon the trustee a special duty of loyalty to the purpose or object of the trust. There is no principle of law or precedent which permits transfer of a public trust (as such) in favour of another trustee or body of persons not intended by the founder, even if it may appear profitable to the institution in certain respects.[1] The trustee himself has to manage the trust property, prudently, for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust. He stands in a fiduciary position.[2]The endowment and its dedication will remain valid even if there is misappropriation or abuse of trust by the trustees subsequent to a valid dedication.[3]
Alienation for Necessity
In certain circumstances the trustee holds the power to dispose of the property entrusted to his management,[4] though it can be exercised sparingly and cautiously.As a general rule, immovable trust properties entrusted to the trustee are, by their very nature,[5] inalienable.[6] A trustee including a Shebait can alienate trust property only in exceptional cases,such as legal necessity,[7]for the benefit or preservation of the property etc.[8] In Prosunno Kumari Debya Vs. Golab Chand Baboo,[9]the Privy Council, as early as in 1875, it was observed as under:
“But, notwithstanding that property devoted to religious purposes is, as a rule, inalienable, it is, in their Lordships’ opinion, competent for the shebait of property dedicated to the worship of an idol, in the capacity as shebait and manager of the estate, to incur debts and borrow money for the proper expenses of keeping up the religious worship, repairing the temples or other possessions of the idol, defending hostile litigious attacks, and other like objects. The power, however, to incur such debts must be measured by the existing necessity for incurring them.”
A Shebait can sell the property only for benefit of the estate.[10]An alienation or permanent lease of lands dedicated to a religious endowment is valid only if it is made for a legal necessity[11]It is not justified by a local custom, or by a practice of the institution, to grant lands in a particular manner.[12]
The Privy Council, in Hanoomanh Persaudh Panday Vs. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1856)[13] considered the power of the manager for alienation of the joint family property and held that the lender is bound to inquire into the necessities of the loan. In Sri Krishan Das Vs. Nathu Ram (1927)[14] it was held by the Privy Council that where the purchaser acted in good faith and after due enquiry, and was able to show that the sale itself was justified by legal necessity, he was under no obligation to enquire into the application of any surplus and was, therefore, not bound to make repayment of such surplus to the members of the family challenging the sale.
Mulla’s Treatise on ‘Principles of Hindu Law’ states as under:
“As a general rule of Hindu Law, property given for the maintenance of religious worship, and all charities connected with it, is inalienable. It is competent, however, for the Shebait or Mahanth in charge of the property, in his capacity of Shebait or Mahanth and as Manager of the property, to incur debts and borrow money on a mortgage of the property for the purpose of keeping up the religious worship, and for the benefit and preservation of the property. The power, however, to incur debts must be measured by an existing necessity for incurring them.”[15]
Shebait or Mahant is only a custodian of property.He has no beneficial interest pertaining to the owner, in the endowment and in the property entrusted to him. His right in the property is not unqualified so that he could pass title over the same in favour of a vendee or to a lessee. The vendee or lessee derives right to the property of the temple or Math if only there is legal necessity.[16]
A Shebait or Mahant will not be justified in selling land owned by the temple or Mutt, solely for the purpose of getting capital to embark in the money-lending business, even if such an act will be benefited by larger returns by way of interest.[17] But, the sale of an inconveniently situated, encumbered and unprofitable property to purchase in its stead another property,[18] or for the construction of a temple for the better housing of the idols,[19] may be justified on the principle, ‘benefit the estate’.
The common law in this regard requires that the extent of the property subjected to sale or encumbrance should not be beyond the limit sufficient to meet the necessity.[20]
Alienation by Mahanth as Personal Property
An alienation of a trust property by the Mahant as his personal property is also void ab initio. In Hemanta Kumari Vs. Iswar Sridhar Jiu[21] Mukherjea, J., held:
“If the manager transfers the property beloning to the deity as his own property asserting his own personal interest in the same, his act is adverse to the trust. The transferee in such cases would acquire no title to the property and his possession would be unlawful from the beginning. A long line of cases has clearly expressed the distinction between alienations made by the trustee in his professed capacity as a trustee and alienations by the trustee of trust property treating it as his personal property”.[22]
Public Trust Depends on Charity and Donatins
Referring Sec. 14 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, it is observed in Khasgi (Devi Ahilyabai Holkar Charities) Trust, Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022-11 SCALE 1, 2022-17 SCR 173, as under:
“A Public Trust invariably depends on charity done by individuals by donating immovable property or by making cash donations. Though in law, the assets and properties of a Public Trust vest in its Trustees, they hold the Trust property in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the Trust. They hold the property for giving effect to the objects of the Public Trust. A Trust property cannot be alienated unless it is for the benefit of the Trust and/or its beneficiaries. The Trustees are not expected to deal with the Trust property, as if it is their private property. It is the legal obligation of the Trustees to administer the Trust and to give effect to the objects of the Trust. Therefore, the statutes dealing with the Public Trusts which are operating in various States, provide for limited control of the activities of a Public Trust. The control is exercised by providing for the submission of the annual accounts by the Trustees and filing of returns with the concerned charity organization or other authority under the law. There are statutory constraints on the power of the Trustees to alienate the property of a Public Charitable Trust. There are provisions in such statutes for penalizing the Trustees for misappropriation of the property of the Trust. Many such Statutes empower the authorities under the Statutes to remove a Trustee of a Public Trust, on account of misbehaviour or acts of misappropriation, etc. The Trustees are the custodians of Trust properties. The Trustees have a duty to safeguard the interests of the beneficiaries of the Public Trust. That is how, a provision in Public Trust Law, like Section 14 of the Public Trusts Act, is of importance. This provision seeks to protect the Trust property in the hands of the Trustees from unwarranted alienations. In the present case, the transactions of sale in favour of the appellant in Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition 19063 of 2021, have been effected admittedly without obtaining prior permission under Section 14. The Division Bench of the High Court has gone into the question whether the alienations were null and void. However, the purchasers were not parties to the proceedings before the High Court. Hence, final adjudication could not have been made on the issue of nullity of the alienations made by the Trustees of the Khasgi Trust in absence of the necessary parties. However, there is no manner of doubt that the alienations could not have been made without prior sanction of the Registrar.”
Eventhough the above observation is made invoking Sec. 14 of the BPT Act, it is clear that it is a common law principle applicable to all Public Trusts.
Legal Obligations of Trustees to Administer and Give Effect to Objects of Trust
It is held further in Khasgi (Devi Ahilyabai Holkar Charities) Trust, Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022-11 SCALE 1, as under:
“Though in law, the assets and properties of a Public Trust vest in its Trustees, they hold the Trust property in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the Trust. They hold the property for giving effect to the objects of the Public Trust. A Trust property cannot be alienated unless it is for the benefit of the Trust and/or its beneficiaries. The Trustees are not expected to deal with the Trust property, as if it is their private property. It is the legal obligation of the Trustees to administer the Trust and to give effect to the objects of the Trust. …. There are statutory constraints on the power of the Trustees to alienate the property of a Public Charitable Trust. …. The Trustees are the custodians of Trust properties. The Trustees have a duty to safeguard the interests of the beneficiaries of the Public Trust. That is how, a provision in Public Trust Law, like Sec. 14 of the Public Trusts Act, is of importance. This provision seeks to protect the Trust property in the hands of the Trustees from unwarranted alienations.”
Sale by Mahanth Otherwise Than for Legal Necessity
A Mahant is only the custodian of property and not the owner thereof. He has no right to pass, title or interest in favour of the vendee by execution of a sale-deed unless it is shown that there was legal necessity of the same. The purchaser of such property has the duty to discharge the burden of proof that the sale-deed executed by Mahant in his favour was for legal necessity of such institution and, hence, the sale-deed will be a void document if the duty is not discharged. Therefore, cancellation of such a document is not necessary as it is clearly without title and authority.[23]
Can be Equated to Sale of Property of a Minor
Alienation of debenture property can be equated to the sale of the property of a minor.[24]Mulla’s ‘Treatise on Principles of Hindu law’reads as under:
“The power of a Shebait or a Mohunt to alienate debutter property is analogous to that of a manager for an infant heir as defined by the Judicial Committee in Hanooman Pershand Vs. Mt. Babooee, (1856) 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC). As held in that case, he has no power to alienate dubutter property except in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate. He is not entitled to sell the property for the purpose of investing the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than that derived from the property itself. Nor can he, except for legal necessity grant a permanent lease of debutter property, though he may create proper derivative tenures and estates conformable to usage.”[25]
No Power to Alienate the Temple or its Site
The endowment as a whole can never be the subject-matter of alienation. It cannot be permitted even pointing out the ground, legal necessity. Such a step will destroy the basic principles upon which the trust is founded. A trust is what designed by the founder. It will annihilate the very purpose and the object for which the endowment was created.[26] Under any circumstance, a Shebait or Mahant has no power to alienate the institution they hold. Such attempts, if any, will be void ab initio.[27]
The Calcutta High Court in Panna Banerjee Vs Kali Kinkor Ganguli[28] held that the legal necessity of the deity was not so unruly that it could rule over the deity.Such transfers are illegal and void in its inception. Hindu law does not permit transfer of religious endowments for pecuniary consideration.It is held in this decision as under:
“The deity is entitled to be worshipped in its permanent abode. Its permanent residence cannot be disturbed. The idol cannot be removed like a chattel from such a temple by its shebaits. That temple cannot be vivisected. It is impartible. No part of it can be sold even for the deity’s legal necessity. It is res extra commercium.
To sell a part of the temple is to endanger the very existence of the consecrated idol and to put an end to the sanctity attached to it. If saleable, it can be sold to any non-Hindu. He, being a disbeliever in the Hindu faith and religion, shall have no respect or regard for the sanctity attached to the place of worship. If saleable, it can be passed on from hand to hand in the open market. The very argument of Mr. Roy is a shocking inroad to the Hindu Philosophy and the Faith. It is opposed to the basic concept of the Hindu Jurisprudence. If there is any such custom it must be held to be unreasonable, illegal and opposed to public policy and should be treated as null and void.”
The Supreme Court, in Kali Kinkor Ganguly Vs. Panna Banerjee,[29]setting aside the appeal, it is held that neither the temple nor the deities nor the Shebaiti right can be transferred, invoking the doctrine of transfer for the benefit of the deity.[30]
Transfer of Institution Itself
An institution like math, temple, mosque, church or school cannot be transferred by a transfer deed. Untwalia, J., in Bishop SK Patro Vs. State of Bihar[31] observed as under:
“To all intents and purposes, the transfer of the trusteeship or the properties of the institution may vest the right to administer the school in the transferee. Yet it is difficult to take the view that the educational organisation which was founded, created or brought into existence and thus established by one founder by such transfer becomes transferred to, and re-established by, the transferee. If I may draw an analogy from our experience of religious institutions like math, temple, mosque or church, it has never been heard that the institution has ever been transferred by a transfer deed.What can be the subject-matter of transfer is the property appertaining to the institution including the right of management. But in a continuing institution when its property or trusteeship or right to management is transferred, I cannot persuade myself to take the view that by such transfer, the transferee brings into existence or re-brings into existence, to quote the phrase used by the learned counsel for the petitioners, and establishes the institution within the meaning of Article 26 or 30 of the Constitution.”
Sale of Math properties in execution of decree against Mahant
Sale of the properties of a Math in execution of a decree against the Mahant is also void.[32] A Mahanth is not the owner of the surplus income of a Mutt. It is clear from the fact that after his death the savings are not regarded as his personal property and cannot be proceeded against for satisfaction of his personal debts.[33] A Mahant is therefore accountable if he uses the surplus fund for purposes alien to those for which the institution was founded.
Burden on the Alienee
In all cases where a public trust property is sold or mortgaged, the burden will be on the alienee to prove that it was for the benefit of the institution or was for legal necessarily.[34]In Sri Raghavendra Swami Mutt Vs. Panchapakesa Iyer[35] it is observed by the Madras High Court as under:
“It is well-settled that the trustee is not prevented from alienating the trust property, but the alienation of the mutt property should be bona fide and there must be actual pressure on the estate or there must be some danger which was sought to be averted or there must be benefit to be conferred upon the trust by such transaction. The transaction is challenged nearly after a period of 44 years and that is also a relevant fact in considering the question of validity of the transaction and the burden is on the alienee to show that the alienation was for the benefit of the trust. The alienee must establish that the alienation was for the benefit of the trust.”
Burden of Proof and Recitals in The Deeds
Our Apex Court in Iswar Gopal Vs. Pratapmal Bagaria (1951)[36] it was observed that if all the original parties to the transfer, and those who could have given evidence on the relevant points such as legal necessity, have passed away, a recital consisting of the principal circumstances of the case assumes importance and cannot be lightly set aside.
However, in Rani Vs. Santa Bala (1971)[37] the Supreme Court held that though the recitals are admissible in evidence, their value would vary according to the circumstances in which the transaction was entered into and the weight to be attached to the recitals varies according to the circumstances. The Supreme Court also held that where the evidence which could be brought before the Court is within the special knowledge of the person who seeks to set aside the sale and is withheld by him, such evidence being normally not available to the alienee, the recitals go to his aid with greater force and the court may be justified in appropriate cases in raising an inference against the party seeking to set aside the sale on the ground of absence of legal necessity wholly or partially when he withholds evidence in his possession.
Voidable Alienations
Where an alienation of endowed properties is for valuable consideration, but not for legal necessity or benefit to the institution, the same enures for the lifetime of the Mahant alone and becomes voidable at the instance of the succeeding Mahant.[38]
Trustee Cannot Sell Property and Invest Price for Larger Income
A trustee is not entitled to sell trust property for the purpose of investing the price so as to bring income larger than that derived from the property itself.[39]
Mayne’s Treatise on Hindu Law reads on this point as follows:
“It is beyond the powers of a manager to grant a permanent lease at a fixed rent in the absence of unavoidable necessity (See: Talaniappa Chetty Vs. Streemath Devasikamony, AIR 1917 PC 33); for, to fix the rent, though adequate at the time, in perpetuity in lieu of giving the endowment the benefit of an augmentation of a variable rent from time to time would be a breach of duty on the part of the manager.”[40]
Degree of Prudence Expected in Sale
Our Apex Court pointed out in Cyrus Rustom Patel VS Charity Commissioner, Maharashtra[41] that ordinarily, the trust property is to be protected; and that ‘in case its condition was not good, there could be several other ways to improve it; it could not have been achieved by virtually throwing away the property’.
It was observed in Jagat Narain Vs. Mathura Das[42] that the degree of prudence expected from a manager of an endowment would be the prudence which an ordinary man would exercise with the knowledge available to him and the transaction would have to be judged not by the result, but by what might have been expected to be its results at the time it was entered into.
While considering the sale of an old house by the manager of a temple, which was not in a dilapidated condition but it required extensive repairs, it was held in BehariLal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji[43] that the sale was neither a prudent act nor it was for the benefit of the estate.
In KPLS Palaniappa Chetty Vs. Shreenath Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi[44] it was laid down that a Shebait would not be justified in selling debutter land solely for the purpose of getting capital to embark in the money lending business. Mulla’s Hindu Law reads:
“He (Shebait) is not entitled to sell the property for the purpose of investing the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than that derived from the property itself.”[45]
Alienation: Doctrine of ‘Conditions of Modern Life’
In KC Kappor Vs. Radhika Devi,[46] the Supreme Court has held that the expression ‘compelling necessity’ (qua alienation of property held by a trustee-Kartha) must be interpreted with due regard to the ‘conditions of modern life’. The Apex Court quoted from with approval the Bombay decision, Nagindas Maneklal Vs. Mahomed Yusuf Mithcella[47].
Is Mortgage Valid Beyond Period-of-office of Transferor Shebait?
In Iswar Radha Kanta Jew Thakur Vs. Gopinath Das[48] it was held that the mortgage effected by the Shebait without legal necessity and not for the benefit of the deity was not void and the mortgagor acquires some interest in the mortgaged property, that is, the interest of the Shebait which enures only during the incumbency of the Shebait. It was further held that the Shebait may alienate by way of lease, mortgage or sale the debutter property even without legal necessity and not for the benefit of the deity but in such a case the purchaser would not acquire title in the debutter property beyond the period during which the Shebait continues in office.
Dr. B K Mukherjea “On The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts” enlightens us as under:
“The sale of a Debutter property by a Shebait is prima facie an act amounting to a breach of trust, and to make it binding on the endowment, imperative necessity must be proved, or else it must be established that the purchaser did make enquiries and satisfy himself in good faith that such necessity existed. When there is no justifying necessity for a sale of Debutter property, is the transaction void altogether and the purchaser acquires no interest in the purchased property. The answer is the same as has been given already in the case of alienation by way of permanent lease. The transfer is valid during the lifetime or the tenure of office of the alienating manager, and the possession of the alienee becomes adverse to the endowment when the alienating Shebait ceases to be manager by reason of death, retirement or otherwise.”[49]
Similarly in H. S. Gour’s Hindu Code[50] the legal position has been explained in the following words:
“An alienation of such property, made by its manager for a purpose other than legal necessity or benefit is not valid beyond the term of the manager’s office, or his death, nor can such alienation, if consented to by his successor, inure beyond his own term.”[51]
Perpetuities and Alienation of Trust Property
S.14 of the TP Act lays down rule against perpetuity as under:
“No transfer of property can take operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the life time of one or more persons living at the date of such transfer, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the interest created is to belong.”
Apart from S. 18 of the T.P. Act (which states that the restrictions in S. 14 shall not apply in a case of transfer for the benefit of public), Mayne’s Hindu Law[52] speaks that S. 14 of the T.P. Act, and similarly worded S. 114 of the Indian Succession Act, do not apply to gifts or bequests for religious and charitable purposes.
Sale in Public Auction
In R. Venugopal Naidu Vs. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities[53] the Apex Court has held that property belonging to religious and charitable endowments should not be sold in private negotiations and the same can be sold in public auction after giving wide publicity.
Alienation and (State) Public Trusts Acts
(State) Public Trusts Acts impose restrictions for sale, mortgage, exchange, lease etc. of immovable properties of public trust. From Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act it is apparent that sale, exchange or gift of any immovable property or lease, extending beyond ten years in the case of agricultural land, or for a period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or a building, belonging to a public trust shall not be valid without previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner. It is also open to the Charity Commissioner, in exercise of power of Section 36(2) of the Act, to revoke the sanction, given under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 36 of the Act, on the ground that the sanction had been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation or those material facts have been suppressed while obtaining sanction. The intendment of the revocation provision is also to sub-serve the interest, benefit, and protection of the Trust and its property.
Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act reads as under:
“Alienation of immovable property of public trust:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of trust –
(a) no sale, exchange or gift of any immovable property, and
(b) no lease for a period exceeding ten years in the case of agricultural land or for a period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or a building, belonging to a public trust, shall be valid without the previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner. Sanction may be accorded subject to such conditions as the Charity Commissioner may think fit to impose, regard being had to the interest, benefit or protection of the trust;
(c) if the Charity Commissioner is satisfied that in the interest of any public trust any immovable property thereof should be disposed of, he may, on application, authorise any trustee to dispose of such property subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose, regard being had to the interest or benefit or protection of the trust.
(2) The Charity Commissioner may revoke the sanction given under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) on the ground that such sanction was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation made to him or by concealing from the Charity Commissioner, facts material for the purpose of giving sanction; and direct the trustee to take such steps within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the date of revocation (or such further period not exceeding in the aggregate one year as the Charity Commissioner may from time to time determine) as may be specified in the direction for the recovery of the property.
(3) No sanction shall be revoked under this section unless the person in whose favour such sanction has been made has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the sanction should not be revoked.
(4) If, in the opinion of the Charity Commissioner, the trustee has failed to take effective steps within the period specified in sub-section (2), or it is not possible to recover the property with reasonable effort or expense, the Charity Commissioner may assess any advantage received by the trustee and direct him to pay compensation to the trust equivalent to the advantage so assessed.
In Cyrus Rustom Patel VS Charity Commissioner Maharashtra (2017)[54] our Supreme Court pointed out that ‘the power to grant sanction has to be exercised by the Charity Commissioner, taking into consideration three classic requirements i.e. “the interest, benefit, and protection” of the Trust. The expression that sanction may be accorded subject to such conditions as Charity Commissioner may think fit under section 31(1)(b) and Section 36 (1)(c). The Charity Commissioner has to be objectively satisfied that property should be disposed of in the interest of public trust; in doing so, he has right to impose such conditions as he may think fit, taking into account aforesaid triple classic requirements’.
Transfer of Property To or By Trust & S. 5 of the TP Act
See Chapter: Vesting of Property in Trusts
Limitationto Challenge Voidable Sale
See: Chapter Limitation
[1] Abdul Kayua Vs. Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309: Referred to in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982-1 Del 11.
[3] ILR 1936 Cal. 420.Kuldip Chand Vs.A G Government of H P (AIR 2003 SC 1685); AIR 1954 M. 1110.
[4] RK Joshi Vs. State of Karnataka: 1984-1 KantLJ 158.
[5] Ratilal Panachand Gandhi Vs. State of Bombay: AIR 1954 SC 388.
[6] Hanooman Persaud Panday v. Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1856) 6 MIA 393 (PC) Referred to in: Sri Raghavendra Swami VS Panchapakesa Iyer: AIR 2005 Mad 129
[7] Ramchandraji Maharaj. Vs. Lalji Singh: AIR 1959 Pat 305; Referred to in: Ranjit Mullick VS Aparesh Mullick: 2018 0 Supreme(Cal) 483;
[8] Iswar Gopal Vs. Pratapmal Bagaria: AIR 1951 SC 214, Palanniappa Chetty Vs. Sreemath Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi: AIR 1917 PC 33; Balmukand Vs. Kamla Wati: AIR 1964 SC 1385; Radhakrishnadas Vs. Kaluram: AIR 1967 SC 574; Jagat Narain Vs. Mathura Das: AIR 1928 All 454; A. Subrahmanian Asari Vs. Jayadevan Nair: AIR 1985 , Mad 372; B Ranga Rao Vs. G Venkata Krishna Rao: AIR1996 AP 5; D. J. Prasad Vs. D. Vs. Subbaiah: AIR 1973 A P 214; Durga Prasad Vs. Jewdhari Singh: AIR 1936 Cal 116; Ram Sundar Vs. Lachhmi Narain: AIR 1929 PC 143; SurajBhan Singh Vs. Sah Chain Sukh: AIR 1927 PC 244; In the matter of A. T. Vasudevan: AIR 1949 Mad 260; Sengoda Goundan Vs. Muthu Vellappa Goundan: AIR 1955 Mad 531; Medikendhri Vs. Venkatayya: AIR 1953 Mad 210; Krishnamoorthi Vs. Nataraja Iyer, AIR 1949 Mad 67; Sengoda Goundan Vs. Muthu Vellappa Goundan, AIR 1955 Mad 531; Chheda Lai Vs. Ujiarey Lal, AIR 1987 All 127.
[10] Bhagauti Prasad KhetanVs. LaxminathjiMaharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.
[11] Shridhar Vs. Jagannathji Temple, A I R 1976 S C 1860. Ram Chandraji Maharaj Vs. Lalji Singh, AIR 1959 Pat 305. Refered to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228. See also: JagatNarain Vs. Mathura Das, AIR 1928 All 454, Ram Chandraji Maharaj Vs. Lalji Singh, AIR 1959 Pat 305; Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji, AIR 1961 All 73; KPLS Palaniappa Chetty Vs. Shreenath vasikamonyndarannadhi: AIR 1917 PC 33, Sridhar Vs. Sri Jagannath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; IswarRadhaKanta Jew Thakur Vs. Gopinath Das, AIR 1960 Cal 741.
[12] Palaniappa Chetty Vs. Devasikamony Pandara, 44 Ind App 147: AIR 1917 PC 33; Shibessouree Debai Vs. Mothooranath Acharjo, (1869) 13 Moo Ind. App 270 (PC); Sridhar Suar Vs. Jagannath Temple: AIR1976 SC 1860.
[16] Sridhar Suar Vs. ShriJagan Nath Temple: AIR 1976 SC 1860. Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal MohallaVs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 All LR 591
[17] Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony, 11 IA 147; Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 All LR 591
[18] Sadhu Saran Prasad Vs. Brahmadeo Prasad: AIR 1921 Pat 99; Jado Singh Vs. Nathu Singh: AIR 1926 All 511; Sital Prasad Singh Vs. Mander: AIR 1939 Pat 370
[19] Ramsaroop Dass Vs. Ramnachhaya: AIR 1945 Pat 326
[20] Muttu Swamy Vs. M. Swamiyar: AIR 1916 Madras 332; Swamy Hathiramjee Mutt Vs. Komma Venkatamuni: 2018 5 ALD 428; 2018 4 ALT 354
[25] Quoted in Sridhar Suar Vs. Jagannath Temple: AIR1976 SC 1860.
[26] Panna Banerjee Vs. Kali Kinkor Ganguli (AIR 1974 Cal 126). It relied on: Gnannsambanda Pandara Samadhi Vs. Velu Pandaram: (1900) 27 Ind App 69 (PC); Damodar Das Vs. Adhikari Lakhan (1910) 37 Ind App 147 (PC); Hemanta Kumari Bose Vs. Sree SreeIswar Sridhar Jew reported: AIR 1946 Cal 473. See also Bairagi Das Vs. Sri Uday Chandra Mahatab: AIR 1965 Ori 201; GovindaJiew Thakur Vs. Surendra Jena: AIR 1961 Ori 102 .
[27] Gnaansambanda Vs. Velu: 23 Mad 271 (PC). Damodar Das Vs. Lakahan Das: ILR (1910) 37 Cal 885; Bisseshwar Dass Vs. SashinathJha: AIR 1943 Pat 289; Balmukund Vs. Kamalwati: AIR 1964 SC 1385; Jagat Narain Vs. Mathurada: (1928) ILR 50 All 969: Sital Prasad Vs. AjvelMander: (1939) ILR 18 Pat 306; Manikka Narasimhachari Vs. Ramasubbier: (1970) 1 MLJ 337; Gurbux Singh Vs. Bishan Dass: AIR 1970 Punj 182; Sree Siddhi Budhi Vinayakagar Sundareswarar Vs. SV Marimuthu: AIR 1963 Mad 369. MurtiShivjiMaharajBirajmanAsthalMohallaVs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 All LR 591
[28] AIR 1974 Cal 126. Appeal Judgment: Kali Kinkor Ganguly Vs. Panna Banerjee AIR 1974 SC 1932
[30] See: Raja Vurmah Vs. Ravi Vurmah: (1877) ILR 1 Mad 235: (1876-77) 4- Ind App 76(PC); Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Choron Requitte: AIR 1979 SC 1682; Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. LaxminathjiMaharaj: AIR 1985 All 228; JagatNarainVs. Mathura Das, AIR 1928 All 454 (FB).
[42] AIR 1928 All 454 (FB). Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.
[43] AIR 1961 All 73. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.
[44] AIR 1917 PC 33. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.
[45] Quoted with approval in Sridhar Vs. Sri Jagannath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad KhetanVs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.
Faith, hope, confidence, entrustment, obligation, conviction, expectation, belief, assurance, care etc.
Derivative:
Reposition of confidence in trustee, by the founder;
Obligationof trustee to administer the trust property;
Unconditional responsibility undertaken by the trustee.
Associationinvolved in the affairs of the trust.
Endowment or property held in trust;
Institution managed under the trust;
TRUST – In Law
Trust is an ‘obligation’-
that arises from the reposition of confidence by the author
upon the trustee
to deal with or administer the trust-property
for the benefit the beneficiaries.
Trustee is the person who is-
entrusted by the founder
to deal with or administer the trust property
for the benefit the beneficiaries..
Trust-property is the property –
that is endowed by the founder
with a particular object that would benefit
the specified beneficiaries.
Thus, the constituents for a valid trust are the following:
Founder, Property,
Object, Trustee,
Obligation,
Reposition of confidence, and
Beneficiary.
Definitions Given by Jurists
Underhill in ‘Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees’ defines trust as under:
“A trust is an equitable obligation binding a person (who is called a trustee) to deal with property over which he has control (which is called the trust property) for the benefit of persons (who are called the beneficiaries) of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom may enforce the obligation.”[1]
Halsbury’s Laws of England describes ‘trust’ as a confidencereposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power, to the intent, that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object.[2]
Salmond on Jurisprudence[3] refers to trust as under:
“A trust is a very important and curious instance of duplicate ownership. Trust property is that which is owned by two persons at the same time, the relation between the two owners being such that one of them is under an obligation to use his ownership for the benefit of the other. The former is called the trustee, and his ownership is trust ownership: the latter is called the beneficiary, and his is beneficial ownership. As between trustees and beneficiary, the law recognises the truth of the matter: as between these two, the property belongs to the latter and not to the former. But as between the trustee and third persons, the fiction prevails. The trustee is clothed with the rights of his beneficiary, and is so enabled to personate or represent him in dealings with the world at large.”[4]
TRUST: Definition in Indian Trusts Act
Definition of ‘trust’ in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 contains the quintessence and spirit of the definitions given by Underhill, Halsbury and Salmond. Sec. 3 of the Trusts Act defines trust as under:
“Trust:
A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner:
‘Author of the trust’: ‘trustee’; ‘beneficiary’;‘trust property’;‘beneficial interest’;‘instrument of trust’: –
The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’;
the person who accepts the confidence is called the ‘trustee’;
the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the ‘beneficiary’;
the subject-matter of the trust is called ‘trust property’ or ‘trust money’;
the ‘beneficial interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property; and
the instrument, if any, by which the trust is declared is called the ‘instrument of trust’.”
Definition of ‘Trust’: Simplified
The definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 can be simplified as under:
1. A ‘trust’ is anobligation upon the trustees.
2. It arises from the reposition of confidence, upon the trustees, by the author.
3. It is to deal with or administer the trust property, as if he (trustee) himself is the owner, for the benefit the beneficiaries.
Definition of ‘Trust’: Analysed
Sec. 3 presents the definition in a ‘noncompound’ expression; that is, ‘trust is an obligation’. It is only qualified further, as shown under:
A ‘trust’ is an obligation-
(i) annexed to the ownership of property (to administer), and
(ii)(a) arising out of a confidence reposed in (trustee, by the author) and accepted by the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner), or
(ii)(b) declared and accepted by him (that is, trustee),#
(iii) for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner).
# The words “by him” denote that the obligation is “declared and accepted” by the same person. This situation comes-up only when the author himself declares to act as trustee. See notes below under the head: ‘Obligation … Declared And Accepted By Him’.
In simple terms, trust is the legal obligation of the Trustees to deal with (Arjan Singh v Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; Arjan Singh Vs Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; P. Elumalai v Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board, 2017-8 MLJ 529) or administer (Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173) the trust property and to give effect to the objects of the Trust.
A Drill Required to Appreciate the Definition – Taking Aid from other Provisions
The definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act is complicated. Not only certain courts but some learned authors of treatises also went completely wrong while explaining the definition.
An exercise is necessary to understand the purport and implication of the definition. For that effort we have to take aid from other sections of the Act; though, usually, definitions are tools for explaining the substantive provisions of a statute, and not vice-versa.
(i) ‘A Trust is An Obligation’
According to the Indian ‘Trusts Act’, ‘a trust is an obligation’ (arises from the reposition of confidence by the author).
It casts a responsibility upon the trustees to deal with or administer the trust property (as he himself is the owner). The word ‘trust’ is used in law as an ‘abstract[5]-countable[6] noun’, similar to ‘a business’, ‘an idea’ or ‘a duty’.[7]
(ii) ‘Obligation Annexed to the Ownership’ refers ‘Administration‘
As per the definition, trust is an obligation ‘annexed to the ownership’ of the trust-property. By the very nature of ‘Trust’, the obligation ‘annexed’ to the trust-property is for administration.[8] It is made clear in Sec. 11 of the Indian Trust Act.
Sec. 11 casts duty on trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling ‘the purpose of the trust’, and obeying ‘the directions of the author of the trust’.[9] Sec. 34, 35 and 60 also refer to ‘administration’ or ‘management’ by trustee.
Sec. 11 Says – The trustee is bound to fulfil the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author
Sec. 34 says – Right to apply to Court for opinion in managementof trust-property
Sec. 60 says – Right to proper trustees.—The beneficiary has a right that the trust-property shall be properly protected and held and administered by proper persons …
(iii) Confidence is ‘Reposed’ by the Author ‘in the Owner’ – Owner is Trustee
Trust is defined to be an obligation arising out of a confidence ‘reposed in’ and ‘accepted by’ the owner. When the ‘author of the trust’ is defined, it is stated:
“The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’.”
Therefore, it is definite that the words, ‘confidence reposed in the owner’, denote the confidence that is ‘reposed’ by the author[10] ‘in the owner’.
(iv) The ‘Owner’ who ‘Accepts’ the Confidence is Trustee.
As we have seen, it is the author who ‘reposes’ the confidence; and the confidence is ‘reposed in’, and ‘accepted by’, the owner. Who is the ‘owner’?
It is trustee.[11] The observations in some decisions[12] that the word ‘owner’ refers to the ‘author’ is absolutely incorrect.
The nexus between owner and trustee is clear from the definitions of ‘trust’ and ‘trustee’ – when ‘trust’ is defined, it is stated: the confidence is ‘accepted by the owner’; when ‘trustee’ is defined, it is stated: the confidence is ‘accepted by the trustee’.
According to the definition of trust, the ‘obligation’ stands ‘annexed to the ownership’ of the trust-property. Sec. 6 of the Trusts Act makes it clear that ‘a trust is created when the author of the trust transfers the trust property to the trustee’. Therefore, the ‘obligation’ upon the trustee casts a duty upon him to deal with or administer the trust-property as if he is its ‘owner’.
From Sec. 6 of the Trusts Act, it is further clear that a trust cannot be said to have been constituted, unless the trustee is constituted as the ‘owner’ of the endowed property.[13] For due administration,[14] such transfer[15] and vesting[16] of property in the trustee, as its (legal) owner,[17]is inevitable.
To find the answer, who is the ‘owner’ referred to in the definition of trust,we can also refer to the definition of ‘beneficial interest or interest’, in Sec. 3. The definition reads:
“The ‘beneficial interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.”
The endowed property of a trust stands vested in trustee as its (sole) ‘owner’.[18] In RP Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Educational Trust[19] it is held by Delhi High Court that ‘obligation’ in trust refers to a ‘tie of equity’ (viniculum-juris), whereby the trustee accepts the confidence reposed in him by the author to hold or apply the trust property for the purposes of the trust.
(v) ‘Obligation … Declared And Accepted By Him’
Going by the definition, the pronoun ‘him’ stands for ‘owner’. The definition reads:
“A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him …..”
As we have found in the notes just above, the confidence is ‘reposed and declared’ by the author;[20] and the confidence is ‘reposed in’, and ‘accepted by’, the trustee[21] (trustee is referred to in the definition as ‘owner’ – since trustee is the ‘legal owner’).
The expression, ‘obligation … declared and accepted by him’, is applied only when the declaration and the acceptance are made by the same person – it is Trustee. Rajasthan High Court observed in Heeralal Vs. Firm Ratanlal Mahavir Prasad[22] as under:
“If only the trustee himself is the author, then only the trustee can make a declaration of trust.”
Therefore it is clear that this expression is attracted when the author declares ‘himself to be the trustee’.[23] (In such cases, the requirement of a formal ‘reposition of confidence upon the trustee’ does not arise.)
Section 6 of the Trusts Act expressly states that an author can be a founder-trustee. Clause (e) of Sec. 6 indicates that the formal ‘transfer of the trust-property to the trustee’ is not required where the author ‘indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts’ that he himself would be the trustee.
Our Apex Court held in Tulsidas Kilachand Vs. CIT Bombay City[24] as under:
“No doubt, under Ss. 5 and 6 of the Indian Trusts Act if the declarer of the trust is himself the trustee also, there is no need that he must transfer the property to himself as trustee; but the law implies that such a transfer has been made by him, and no overt act except a declaration of trust is necessary. The capacity of the declarer of trust and his capacity as trustee are different, and after the declaration of trust, he holds the assets as a trustee. Under the Transfer of Property Act, there can be a transfer by a person to himself or to himself and another person or persons. In our opinion, there was, in this case, a transfer by Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand to himself as a trustee, though there was no formal transfer.”
(vi) ‘Confidence (Reposed in and) Accepted by the Owner’
We have seen, on analysis of the definition, that:
the confidence is ‘reposed in’ and ‘declared by’ by the author; and
the confidence is ‘accepted’ by the trustee.
From the definition, it is clear that the clause, ‘Confidence Reposed in and Accepted by the Owner’ manifest that (i) the ‘Obligation‘ on trustee is that enjoined bythe author, and (ii) the Obligation must have been accepted by the trustee, on his own.
“Accepted by the Owner” denotes Unconditional Obligation undertaken by the Trustee
The words, “accepted by the owner (trustee)” is used in the definition with the deliberate object of denoting the unconditional obligation undertaken by the trustee, ‘on his own’; if not, the words “and accepted by” stand superfluous; inasmuch as a trust will not endure without a trustee.
The definition of Trust can be explained, in a nutshell, as under:
A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and
Trust is an obligation (upon trustee[25]). It is to deal with or administer[26]the trust-property as its (legal) owner.
arising out of a confidence
Duty of a Trustee is fiduciary[27]in nature.[28] It is moral as well as legal.[29] (It must have been arisen from the confidence reposed in by the author.)
reposed in
Confidence is reposed in Trustee (by the Author[30]).
and accepted by the owner, or
Trustee,[31]the (legal) owner,[32] must have (unconditionally) accepted the confidence (reposed in by the author).
declared and accepted by him
The obligation is ‘declared and accepted‘ by the trustee. (Only when the author himself is the trustee,[33] the obligation canbe ‘declared and accepted’ by one person.)
for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner.
Author creates trust for the benefit of others. Trustee can be one among the beneficiaries.
Essential Requirements for a Valid Trust
Sec. 4 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 speaks as to creation of trust for ‘lawful purpose’. It reads as under:
4. Lawful purpose. A trust may be created for any lawful purpose. The purpose of a trust is lawful unless it is
(a) forbidden by law, or
(b) is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law, or
(c) is fraudulent, or
(d) involves or implies injury to the person or property of another, or
(e) the Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy.
Every trust of which the purpose is unlawful is void. And where a trust is created for two purposes, of which one is lawful and the other unlawful, and the two purposes cannot be separated, the whole trust is void.
Explanation. In this section, the expression “law” includes, where the trust property is immovable and situate in a foreign country, the law of such country.
The essential elements for creation of a trust, enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act, reads as under:
6. Creation of trust: Subject to the provisions of section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts
(a) an intention on his part to create thereby a trust,
(b) the purpose of the trust,
(c) the beneficiary, and
(d) the trust-property, and
(e) (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust-property to the trustee.
Trust and Endowment
For a valid trust there should be certainty[34] as to:
These are the ingredients of an endowment also. Appointment of a trustee[39] and transfer[40] of property to trustee for administration make Trust different from an Endowment.
The word ‘endow’[41] expresses the idea of giving, bequeathing or dedicating something for some purpose.[42] An ‘endowment’ is founded by dedication of property for the purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[43] There may be dedication (granting) of property for subjecting it to an ‘easement’. But, in ‘law of trusts’, dedication involves the extinguishment of the rights of the original owner of the lands.[44] By ‘dedication’, the owner divests all his rights, title and interest in the property which becomes the property of the deity[45] or other endowment.
An ‘endowment’ can be public or private.[46] It is a corporeal reality to which social concepts are adhered to; whereas, a trust is primarily a legal concept attached to the administration of the endowed property.[47]
Property Vests in Trustee, by Transfer; But no Proprietary Interest
According to the definition of ‘Trust’, in the Indian Trusts Act, ‘a trust is an obligation (a) annexed to the ownership of property, and (b) arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner/trustee. To establish a valid trust, the author must have completely parted with all his interest in the trust-property, and the property must have been transferred[48] to the trustee. But, the trustee acquires only ‘legal ownership’ over the trust-property, under the law in India. And, the beneficiaries have no proprietary-interest, or ‘beneficial interest’ pertaining to owners, as they have no ownership in the trust property.
In WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1957),[49] referring to the definition of trust, it is laid down by our Apex Court that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such. It is held in this decision as under:
“22. Whatever be the position in English Law, the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (II of 1882) is clear and categoric on this point. Sec. 3 of that Act defines a Trust as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another or of another and the owner : the person who accepts the confidence is called the ‘trustee’ : the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the ‘beneficiary’ : ‘the beneficial Interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property; the subject-matter of the trust is called ‘trust property’ or ‘trust money’.”
Following WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,[50] it is observed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Special Secretary Land and Land Revenue[51] that Sec. 3 of the Trusts Act emphasises the fact that the beneficiary has a right to obtain his beneficial interest or interest against the trustee as owner of the trust property and that the trustee would become trust property’s owner for the purpose of effectively executing or administering the trust.
It is observed by the Calcutta High Court in Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jew Vs. Commr. of IT[52] as under:
“Three parties are necessary to the constitution of a trust, namely, the settlor, the trustee and the beneficiary. A trust is not completely constituted until the trust property is vested in trustees for the benefit of the cestui que trust.”
In Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal (1957)[53] the Allahabad High Court had held as under:
“A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property (vide Sections 3 and 5 of the Trusts Act). It is an essential condition of trust that property must vest in the trustee. Unless, therefore, the trustee is constituted as the owner of the property entrusted to him, a trust cannot be said to have been constituted. Reference in this connection might be made to cases reported in Hussain Ali v. Baqir Ali, AIR 1946 Mad 116 (A); Shri Mahadeoji v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1941 Nag 181 (B) and Khemchand Ramdas v. Girdharidas Radhakishaindas, AIR 1947 Sind 187 (C); Ma Thein May v. U Po Kin, AIR 1925 Rang 289 (D) and Secretary of State for India v. Guru Proshad Dhur, ILR 20 Cal 51 (FB) (E). … The mere fact that a person is holding the property on behalf of another, will not constitute him a trustee, unless the ownership of the property is also vested in him.”
The definitions of ‘trust’, ‘trustee’ and ‘beneficiary’ lay down that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.
The obligation upon the trustee, to administer,[54] being ‘annexed to the ownership of property’, the property has to be administered by the trustee as if he is the ‘owner’ of the same;[55] and, for such administration, the property must have been vested upon him as its (legal) owner.
Under Sec. 6 of the Trusts Act, a trust is created when the author of the trust transfers[56] the trust-property to the trustee.[57] Holding that the trustee is the legal owner of the trust property, it is observed in Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi (1940)[58] as under:
“In short, it is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and before there can be a trust the trustee must be the owner. The matter is made abundantly clear in Section 6, Trusts Act, 1882, which is in these terms:
‘Subject to the provisions of Section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts an intention on his part to create thereby a trust, the purpose of the trust, the beneficiary, and the trust property, and (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust property to the trustee.’
In short, there must be a transfer of the property to the trustee before a trust is created.”
Orissa High Court held in Narasingh Charan Mohapatra Vs. Radhakanta Mohapatra[59] as under:
“A trust in the accepted sense of the word is the creation of an obligation by the owner to the intent that he may hold the property for the benefit of some other person or object. As soon as the trust is declared according to the requirements of the law, the legal ownership passes to the trustee and he is bound to apply the income arising out of the property to the use and benefit of ‘cestuique trust’. As a general rule, it may be laid down that in order to make a voluntary declaration of trust binding upon the author of the trust he must have completely parted with all his interest in the property to the trustee or declared himself to be a trustee of the property for the benefit of the ‘cestuique trust’ –See: Agnew’s Trusts, p. 53.”
Sec. 10 and 75 of the Indian Trusts Act implies ‘vesting of property in trustees’.
Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:
10. ….. Disclaimer of trust—Instead of accepting a trust, the intended trustee may, within a reasonable period, disclaim it, and such disclaimer shall prevent the trust property from vesting in him. A disclaimer by one of two or more co-trustees vests the trust property in the other or others and makes him or them sole trustee or trustees from the date of the creation of the trust.
Sec. 75 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:
75. Vesting of trust property in new trustees.—Whenever any new trustee is appointed under section 73 or section 74, all the trust property for the time being vested in the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, or in the legal representative of any trustee, shall become vested in such new trustee, either solely or jointly with the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, as the case may require.
A Compny can be a Trustee of a Public Trust
It was held in See M.Gomathinarayagam Pillai v. Sri.Manthramurthi High School Committee, Tirunelveli, AIR 1963 Mad 387, as under:
“For the application of that section (Section 92 CPC) it makes no difference whether the trustees is an individual or a company, nor is there any distinction between a company in whom the office of trustee vests and one which is specially formed for the purpose of executing the trust.” (Referred to in: S.N.D.P. Yogum v. G. Krishnamoorthy, ILR 2022-3 Ker 494; 2022-4 KHC 168; 2022-4 KLT 36)
Duel Ownership, as comprehended by Salmond is Not accepted in Indian Law
Trustee is full and Sole Owner, under Indian law.
Under English law, there is ‘duel ownership’ on trust property. First is the ‘legal ownership’ which is vested with trustee; and the second, the ‘equitable or beneficial ownership’ vested with the beneficiary. Salmond on Jurisprudence[60] refers it as under:
“A trustee is the legal owner of the property, the actual owner thereof having lost title thereto by the creation of a trust. The equitable ownership in the trust property vests in the beneficiaries. The trust is thus an incident of dual ownership in which the creator of the trust no longer figures.”[61]
The Law of Trust in India does not follow the ‘doctrine of dual ownership’; because, it does not recognise legal and equitable estates. The trustee ‘holds’ and administers the trust property as its (sole[62]) ‘legal owner’[63] or the ‘full (legal) owner’. The Privy Council, in Chhatra Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram (1931),[64] held as under:
“The Indian Law does not recognise legal and equitable estates. By that law, therefore, there can be but one owner; and where the property is vested in a trustee, the owner must, their Lordship think, be the trustee. This is the view embodied in the Indian Trusts Act: See Sec. 3, 55, 56, etc. … “[65]
If more than one trustee, the trustees altogether are (joint) owners of the trust property.[66]
Out Apex Court, referring, Mount Royal/Walsh Inc. v. Jensen Star, the Ship, (1990) 1 FC 199, of Federal Court of Appeal in Canada, observed in Ahmed Abdulla Ahmed Al Ghurair Vs. Star Health and Allied Insurance Co. Ltd.[67] as under:
“49. The term ‘Beneficial interest’ is defined under Section 3 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 which is reproduced hereunder:
‘Beneficial interest’ or ‘interest of the beneficiary’ is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.’
50. As it can be discerned from the definition of ‘Beneficial interest’ provided in Section 3 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882, there are two parties involved in an issue governing beneficial interest. One is a beneficiary named as ‘beneficial owner’ and the other is the owner named as ‘registered owner’ being the trustee of the property or the asset in question. Thus, one can deduce the underlining principle that the ownership is nonetheless legal over the trust property, which vests on him but he also acts as a trustee of the beneficiary. A beneficial owner may include a person who stands behind the registered owner when he acts like a trustee, legal representative or an agent.”
It is beyond doubt that the Canadian law that follows the English principles is not applicable in India, in these aspects.
‘Beneficiaries’have Merely Beneficial Interest; ‘Legal Ownership‘ with Trustees
In The Province of Bihar v. FR Hayes, 1946-14 ITR 326 (Patna), Fazl Ali, CJ (as he then was) while interpreting Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1938, referring the definition of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, held as under:
“The framers of the Act must be assumed to have known the accepted legal meaning of the expression and also known that the term ‘beneficiary’ in law is not generally used with reference to a full legal owner but with reference to a person who has ‘beneficial interest’ in some property which is usually in the possession and control of another person. The distinction between beneficial interest and legal ownership is one of the most notable features of a trust and in my judgment ‘beneficiaries’ referred to in Section 11 are those persons who have merely beneficial interest in a property while the legal ownership of the property vests in a person or persons who hold the property for their benefit.”
Trustee Holds ‘On His Own Right’; Not ‘On Behalf Of’ the Beneficiaries
In WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh[68] it is laid down by our Apex Court as under:
“23. These definitions emphasise that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary only has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property. The trustee is thus, the legal owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such. He, no doubt, holds the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries but he does not hold it on their behalf. The expressions ‘for the benefit of’ and ‘on behalf of’ are not synonymous with each other. They convey different meanings.”
Our Apex Court observed in Comm. Wealth Tax Vs. Kirpashanker Dayashankar[69] that the trustee holds the trust property ‘on his own right’ and not ‘on behalf of’ someone else though he holds it ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.
Indian Trusts Act, 1882 does not accept the doctrine of ‘duel ownership’. ‘Legal ownership’ of the trust property is ‘vested’ with the trustee. Indian Trusts Act expounds that the trustee ‘holds’ the trust property as its (sole[70]) owner. These obligations are casted upon trustees only to manage the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[71] It is beyond doubt that the trustee has no ‘proprietary interest’ inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’[72] in the property itself. In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[73]The Act refers only to ‘beneficial interest’ entitled to by the beneficiaries; and, not ‘beneficial ownership’.
It is clear from the following statements in the definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882:
(i) “A ‘trust’ is an obligation … arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner… for the benefit of another….”
(ii) “(T)he ‘beneficial interest’… is his (beneficiary’s) right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.”
The Common Law of Trust predicated by the courts in India,[74] in the matters of public trusts, has disfavoured the doctrine of ‘duel ownership’;[75] and followed the Trusts Act.
The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 repeatedly lays down – trustees are ‘holding’ trust property(Sec. 10, 29 and Chap. IX: Sec. 80 onwards). It is subject to the obligation to use his ownership ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.
Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:
10. Who may be trustee.—Every person capable of holding property may be a trustee; but, where the trust involves the exercise of discretion, he cannot execute it unless he is competent to contract.
Sec. 29 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads as under:
29. Liability of trustee where beneficiary’s interest is forfeited to Government.—When the beneficiary’s interest is forfeited or awarded by legal adjudication to the Government, the trustee is bound to hold the trust property to the extent of such interest for the benefit of such person in such manner as the State Government may direct in this behalf.
‘Obligation’ in Trustee: Moral & Legal Duty
A trust being an ‘obligation’ (i) for administration and (ii) arising out of a ‘confidence’ reposed in the trustee, the trustee has to discharge the ‘obligation’ and ‘confidence’ faithfully.[76]It must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries. He has to fulfill the object and the purpose of the trust and obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation.[77]It is his moral as well as legal duty.[78]
As pointed out by our Apex Court, in WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,[79] the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 declares vesting legal ownership with trustees. The vesting of ownership of trust property with the trustee is under an obligation to manage it for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[80] Though, in a trust, the trust property must have been transferred to the trustees, and the trust property vests in the trustee as owner thereof, it does not absolutely belong to any individual. The property is vested in trustees subject to the obligations upon which the trustees accepted the trust.[81] The trustee deals with the property in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust.[82] In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[83]The legal ownership which vests in the trustee is for the purposes of the trust and to administer[84] the same.
It is observed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Special Secretary Land and Land Revenue[85] that the trustee would become the owner of the trust property for the purpose of effectively executing or administering the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries and for due administration thereof, and not for any other purpose. Merely because the property is vested in the trustee as the legal owner, he has no ‘proprietor interest’, inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’ in the property itself. The trustee is not the full owner of the property in the real sense of the term.
Trustee has to perform these duties gratuitously.[86] No remuneration can be claimed from the trust property or income unless the terms of the trust do not specifically allow it. But, the trustee is entitled to get reimbursement out of the trust property for all expenses properly incurred in relation to the execution of the trust and for preservation of the trust property.[87]
Distinguishing Particularities of Trust from Other Legal-Relations
Trust imposes obligation upon trustees.[88]The whole edifice of trust rests upon the acceptance of ‘confidence’ by the trustee, reposed in by the author.[89] It is for administration[90] as desired by the author. As soon as the trust is validly declared by the author and duly accepted by the trustee, the legal ownership passes to the trustee[91]and the property vests[92] in him. The trustee holds the endowed property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[93] The distinguishing particularities of trust from other legal-relations lie in ‘obligation’, ‘confidence’ and ‘entrustment of ownership in trustee’.
Entrustment with Banker
The trustee administers the property as its (legal) owner (Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan: AIR 1919 Mad 555; In Re Sabnis, Goregaonkar Senjit Vs. Shivramdas: AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan: AIR 1938 Cal818; Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Life Insurance Corp. of India Vs. Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1) with exclusive rights. (Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma: 2010-85 AIC 762; 2009-6 ALT 197, 2009-6 ALD 269). In N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh (13.12.2021) the Supreme Court held as under:
“The money that a customer deposits in a bank is not held by the latter on trust for him. It becomes a part of the banker’s funds who is under a contractual obligation to pay the sum deposited by a customer to him on demand with the agreed rate of interest. Such a relationship between the customer and the Bank is one of a creditor and a debtor. The Bank is liable to pay money back to the customers when called upon, but until it’s called upon to pay it, the Bank is entitled to utilize the money in any manner for earning profit.”
‘Once a (Public) Trust Always a Trust’
A public trust is perpetual. Rule against perpetuities does not apply to it. It can never be put to an end though its nature may be changed.[94] Once a public endowment is made, even the former owners or founders cannot revoke it.[95]Subsequent conduct of the founder or his descendants contrary to such dedication would amount to a breach of trust.[96] Tudor on Charities,[97] while dealing with creation of charitable trusts, explains it as under:
“When a charity has been founded and trusts have been declared, the founder has no power to revoke, vary or add to the trusts. This is so irrespective of whether the trusts have been declared by an individual, or by a body of subscribers, or by the trustees. “[98]
In Halsbury’s Laws of England,[99]it is stated as under:
“Charitable trusts have sometimes been declared subject to express powers of revocation, but there has apparently been no decision on the validity of such a power except as regards the rule against perpetuities.”[100]
Underhill in ‘Law relating to Trusts and Trustees’ has explained it,with respect to associations, thus:
“However, the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the Association for the time being. The members for the time being cannot under the Association rules Appropriate Trust property for themselves for there would then be no property held on trust as intended by the testator for those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the Association for the time being.”[101]
When the author/settlor creates or establishes the trust reserving his power to terminate the trust, or change the beneficiaries and trustees, or the terms of the trust, as he likes, such trust at the will and pleasure of the author is called revocable trust (See: Jyotendrasinhji v. SI Tripathi, AIR 1993 SC 1991).
Such trusts are possible only in private trusts. In case of revocable trusts, there will not be complete dedication of trust property.
77. Trust how extinguished.—A trust is extinguished
(a) ….(b) …..(c) ….. or
(d) when the trust, being revocable, is expressly revoked.
A Trust or An Endowment Shall Not Fail for Want of Trustees.
It is a principle of equity that no trust shall fail for want of trustees.[102] It applies in three occasions: First, though a trust was clearly intended, the settler did not or could not appoint trustees owing to a mere omission or the trustee who was named either refused or was unable to act.[103] Secondly, when a vacancy of trustee occurs. Thirdly, in dedication to a juristic person like temple, or to a well identified institution or purpose though it is not regarded as juristic person.
Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act shows that, generally, a trust is created by transfer of trust-property to a trustee; and that a trust can also be created otherwise than ‘by any words or acts’ as to appointment of trustee when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts that he himself would be the trustee.
Dedication of property is like a rocket fired. As long as it is in private realm it retains the character of a private property.[104] Once dedication is complete, it cannot be revoked.[105] It is a trite law that ‘once a trust always a trust’.[106] In Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Som Nath Dass[107] the Supreme Court has described ‘Endowment’ as under:
“Endowment is when donor parts with his property for it being used for a public purpose and its entrustment is to a person or group of person in trust for carrying out the objective of such entrustment. Once endowment is made, it is final and it is irrevocable. It is the onerous duty of the persons entrusted with such endowment, to carry out the objectives of this entrustment. They may appoint a manager in the absence of any indication in the trust or get it appointed through Court.”
Sec. 92, CPC, applicable to public trusts, expressly authorizes court to appoint a new trustee.[108] Section 59 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, applicable to public trusts, deals[109] with the principle ‘A Trust shall not fail for want of a trustee’. It reads:
59. Right to sue for execution of trust.—Where no trustees are appointed or all the trustees die, disclaim or are discharged, or where for any other reason the execution of a trust by the trustee is or becomes impracticable, the beneficiary may institute a suit for the execution of the trust, and the trust shall, so far as may be possible, be executed by the Court until the appointment of a trustee or new trustee.
Public Trusts & Indian Trusts Act
The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 is enacted primarily to govern private trusts; and ‘public or private charitable or religious endowments’ are expressly excluded from its ambit.
In Sec. 1, under the head, ‘Savings’, it is stated:
But nothing herein contained affects the rules of Mohammedan law as to waqf, or the mutual relations of the members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law, or applies to public or private religious or charitable endowments, or to trusts to distribute prizes taken in war among the captors; and nothing in the Second Chapter of this Act applies to trusts created before the said day.
Though the Indian Trusts Act does not apply, in terms, to the public trusts, the common legal principles,[110] which cover matters of both public and private trusts, especially the Sections that speak as to the Duties and Liabilities of Trustees (Chapter III), Disabilities of Trustees (Chapter V), and Chapter IX pertaining to implied trusts, apply to public trusts also.[111]They ‘cannot become untouchable’[112] merely because they find a place in the Trusts Act.
Our courts apply the general law of trusts, and the universal rules of equity and good conscience upheld by the English judges in this subject, in appropriate cases.
Registration of Public Trusts
Various State Public Trusts Acts require registration of all public trusts with the authorities appointed under the said Acts. In New Noble Educational Society v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax-1, 2023-6 SCC 649, it is held with reference to Andhra Pradesh Charitable andHindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, as under:
“67. In the event of failure to comply with Section 43(1), or failure to intimate changes in the trust, or for supplying false information, the trustee or other person in charge, can be penalized by Section 43 (11). Section 44 empowers the Commissioner to direct charitable organizations and trusts to comply and register under the Act.
68.The assessees had argued that since they were registered under the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 or were trusts duly registered, they could not be compelled to comply with state laws as a condition for consideration of their application as charitable institutions, under Section 10 (23C).
69. This court is of the opinion that the findings in the impugned judgment on this aspect are sound. The requirement of registration of every charitable institution is not optional. Aside from the fact that the consequences of non-registration are penal, which indicates the mandatory nature of the provisions of the A.P. Charities Act, such local laws provide the regulatory framework by which annual accounts, manner of choosing the governing body (in terms of the founding instrument: trust, society, etc.), acquisition and disposal of properties, etc. are constantly monitored. Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution reads as follows:
“32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, and universities; unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations; cooperative societies.”
By Entry 28, List III of the Seventh Schedule, the states have undoubted power to enact on the subject of charities:
“28. Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions.”
Private Religious Trusts
So far as private religious trusts are concerned, there are no specific statutory enactments to regulate their affairs. Such trusts are governed by the foundational principles upon which they are established, as evidenced by documents, if any; customs and usages;general law of contract and transfer of property, etc; apart from the Common Law of the Land applicable to such trusts.
In Hindu Endowments, Managers are Trustees in a General Sense
Three parties are necessary to constitute a trust; namely, the settlor, the trustee and the beneficiary, as laid down in Sree SreeIswar Gopal Jew Vs. CIT[113]. Trustee holds the property for the benefit of the beneficiaries or cesti que trust. In Hindu religious endowments, the trustees hold the endowed properties for the institution. It is laid down in Ram Parkash Dass Vs. Anant Das (1916)[114] as under:
“He (Mahanth) sits upon the gadi, he initiates candidates into the mysteries of the cult; he superintends the worship of the idol and the accustomed spiritual rites; he manages the property of the institution; he administers its affairs; and the whole assets are vested in him as the owner thereof in trust for the institution itself.”
This decision was noticed by the Board in Vidya Varuthi Vs. Baluswami[115] (1922) and it was observed:
“They thus concur with the first court that there was no “specific trust” which was the foundation of the plaintiff’s case. But after examining some of the judgments of their own court, they apparently felt constrained to hold that the decision of his Board in Ram Parkash Das Vs. Anand Das had crystallised the law on the subject, and definitely declared the Mahant to be a trustee. It is to be observed that in that case the decision related to the office of Mahant, but in the course of their judgment their Lordships conceived it desirable to indicate inter alia what, upon the evidence of the usages and customs applicable to the institution with which they were dealing, and similar institutions, were the duties and obligations attached to the office of superior: and they used the term trustee in a general sense, as in previous decisions of the Board, by way of a compendious expression to convey a general conception of those obligations. They did not attempt to define the term or to hold that the word in its specific sense is applicable to the laws and
In Pratap Singhji Vs. Charity Commissioner[116] our Apex Court held as under:
“ ‘Endowment’ is dedication of property for purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment. It is to be remembered that a trust in the sense in which the expression is used in English law is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple. Hindu piety found expression in gifts to idols and images consecrated and installed in temples, to religious institutions of every kind and for all purposes considered meritorious in the Hindu social and religious system. Under the Hindu law the image of a deity of the Hindu pantheon is, as has been aptly called, a ‘juristic entity’, vested with the capacity of receiving gifts and holding property. The Hindu law recognises dedications for the establishment of the image of a deity and for maintenance and worship thereof. The property so dedicated to a pious purpose is placed extra-commercium and is entitled to special protection at the hands of the Sovereign whose duty it is to intervene to prevent fraud and waste in dealing with religious endowments. Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. It would be a legitimate inference to draw that the founder of the temple had dedicated it to the public if it is found that he had held out the temple to be a public one: Pujari Lakshmana Goundan Vs. Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44.”
The same is the position with respect to Wakf property held by Sajadahnashin who controls and manages the same.[117]
In Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakhmiram,[118] it was held that ‘the Hindu Law like the Roman law and those derived from it recognizes not only corporate bodies with rights or property-vested in the corporation’ apart from its individual members, but also juridical persons and subjects called foundations.’ The religious institutions like mutts and other establishments obviously answer to the description of foundations in Roman law. The idea is the same, namely, when property is dedicated for a particular purpose, the property itself upon which the purpose is impressed, is raised to the category of a juristic person so that the property which is dedicated would vest in the person so created.
Trustee Represents Beneficiaries
The beneficiaries do not have right of ownership over the trust property. But, Order XXXI, Rule 1 CPC lays down that the Trustee shall represent the persons interested in the trust in suits concerning property vested in the Trustee. Apart from providing an enabling stipulation, it indicates the significance of obligation casted on the trustees. And, it also asserts the paramount importance of the beneficiaries in a trust.
Vesting of Ownership of Trust Property
While establishing a trust the author completely parts with all his interest in the trust-property, and the property has to be transferred[119] to the trustee. But, the trustee acquires only ‘legal ownership’ over the trust-property, under the law in India. And, the beneficiaries have mere ‘beneficial interest’, as they have no proprietary-interest or ownership. Then, an interesting question arises: In whom the actual ownership vests?
The following propositions can be presented as to the vesting of ownership of the trust-property.
In most cases of public trusts, the ‘ultimate vesting’ may not be a matter of practical importance; because, the endowment will be permanent and indivisible; and court takes cognizance, when practical difficulties are faced while carrying out the object of the trust, by applying cy pres doctrine, or by invoking its inherent jurisdiction.
The terms of dedication (as revealed from the deed of dedication, if any, or on other substantial evidence) determine the person or body of persons in whom/which such property ultimately vest in.
If the ownership of the property of a trust vests in a legal person, such vesting is permanent (thereby it cannot be put to an end), and such vesting is subject to the object and purpose envisaged by the founder.
If the subject matter of the trust is dedicated to public at large or a section of public, the title of such subject matter stands separated from the owner and vests in public or the section of public who are the beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation.
If the property is that of an unregistered association and the members thereof are ascertainable (as in the case of an unregistered society) the actual ownership of the property will be presumed to be vested with those members (from time-to-time), only as joint owners (contra-distinct to ownership under tenants-in-common).
If the property is one stands dedicated to a Political Party, unregistered Association or a Church, and the beneficiaries thereof are unascertainable, the property vests with the entire members (of such Party, Association or Church), from time to time, subject to its objectives Such vesting is permanent, whereby it cannot be put to an end even by a majority decision of the members of a particular time.
In case such unregistered association or church becomes defunctive and it is impossible to carry on the affairs of the trust as intended by the founders, the court will apply the trust-property to a charitable purpose, ‘as nearly as possible’[120]to the objects of the original Trust, invoking ‘cy pres’ doctrine.
If the subject matter of a trust is one partially dedicated to public at large or a section of public (as in the case of a waiting shed or a public well) by a known person and administered and maintained by himself or through another person, the property will remain vested with the owner, when the purpose of dedication is extinguished.
Two (Kinds of) “Trusts” over the Parish or Branch Property
One Property, Several Trusts Possible
Trust is a general term used in wider sense in law. Therefore –
If a property is acquired by a branch of a larger body, or a parish of a Church, the entire members of the larger body, from time to time, will be presumed to be the owners, subject to (i) the byelaws of the (entire) association or trust and (ii) the purposes or objectives ‘aimed to achieve’ by that particular property.
If the bylaws (expressly or by necessary implication) provides for special beneficial enjoyment by the members of the branch or parish, over the branch/parish properties, definitely there will be two (kinds of) “trusts” over the same property – one, trust for the beneficial enjoyment of whole body; and the other, for the members of the branch/parish.
Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?
‘A Trust’ is ‘an obligation’ according to the definition in the Trusts Act. In common law also it does not convey the idea that it is a tangible or a corporeal property. Grammatically speaking, as pointed out earlier, it is an ‘abstract[121]-countable[122] noun’. Therefore, it can neither be a juristic person[123] nor an association of persons.[124]
‘Trust’ is essentially a legal concept attached to the endowed property. It arises by the appointment of a trustee. For creation of a trust, the trust-property must have been transferred to the trustee.[125]The Delhi High Court held in Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Sham Lal[126] as under:
“A trust is primarily a legal concept, a mode of transfer of property and of holding property. On the other hand, an institution is primarily a social concept. It is not a legal concept at all. For, there is established legal method by which an institution may come into being. It may be established by way of an organisation which may assume any or no legal form. It may be a trust or a company or a statutory corporation or a mere unincorporated association or a society registered or otherwise. It is its work and place in the society that is the hall-mark of an institution. As observed by Lord Macnaghten in Mayor, etc. of Manchester V. Mcadam,3 Tax Cases 491 at 497, ‘it is the body (so to speak) called into existence to translate the purpose as conceived in the mind of the founders into a living and active principle.’ In the present case, the founders of the trust may have transferred their property to a charitable purpose and thus created a public trust. But the body to translate the trust into a living and active principle has not yet come into existence. It is that body which will be entitled to be called an institution. It is not a mere legal arrangement like a trust but an active working body with a social impact which can be called an institution.”
‘Trust’ is Used as Synonym to Endowment/Association
Inasmuch as the ‘trust’ has no existence without its trust property, and it is an ‘obligation’ ‘annexed to’ the trust property, the endowment or institution, upon which the obligation of ‘trust’ is pervaded, is personified as a ‘trust’. Certain public institutions established or dedicated with philanthropic view are also generally described as ‘trusts’.
In the inclusive definition of ‘trust’ in the Public Trusts Acts enacted by various States and in several Tax-Laws, Trust ‘means and includes’ a temple, a math, wakf, a dharmada or any other religious or charitable endowment, and even a society. It is interesting to note that the word ‘trust’ is used as an ‘entity’ even in Illustration (b) of Sec. 15 of the Trusts Act –it is the only one place in this Act where the term ‘trust’ is used in this manner.
The Illustration (b) of Sec. 15 reads:
“(b) A, trustee of lease-hold property, directs the tenant to pay the rents on account of the trust to a banker, B, ….”
Life is Bestowed upon Endowment When Trustee is Appointed
An ‘endowment’ is arisen by the dedication of a specified property for purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[127]
The differentiating particularity of a trust from an endowment is, the ‘transfer[128] of the trust-property to the trustee’.[129]The other ingredients for creation of trust as stated in the clauses (a) to (d) of Section 6 of the Act (Intention to create trust, Purpose, Beneficiary, and Property) are the requisites for endowments also.
The author endows the property with a definite purpose, beneficial to the beneficiaries. Trust arises when a trustee is appointed for administration of the endowment.[130] For the formation of a trust, the trust-property must have been vested in trustees.[131]The administration by the trustee must be to accomplish the purpose intended by the founder. The ‘obligation’ upon trustee arises only when the trustee accepts the confidence reposed-in by the author. The duty accepted by the trustee is ‘fiduciary’ in character. The administration by the trustee must be carried on with prudence,[132] and as a reasonable man.[133]
The Trustee of a Charitable Trust is enjoined with the duty to preserve and protect the property of the Trust as if the Manager of an infant, but such power of the Trustees cannot be read as that of a pleasure doctrine or a sweet will of the Trustees to dispose of the property. The degree of obligation is coupled with their fiduciary capacity to preserve and protect the property for the larger interest of the Trust and to be made available to the beneficiaries of the Trust to the maximum possible extent.[134]
Therefore, a legal identity is renowned, or life is bestowed, upon the endowment when a trustee is appointed. An endowment, sans trustee, remains static.
Trust Property must be one “Transferable to the Beneficiary”: Import
It must not be merely beneficial interest.
Section 8 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads:
8. Subject of Trust. The subject-matter of a trust must be property transferable to the beneficiary. It must not be merely beneficial interest under a subsisting trust.
Subject matter[135] of an endowment and a trust will, normally, be a corporeal property. Sections 5 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 speaks as to ‘trust of’ movable and immovable properties. Under Section 8 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, the subject-matter of a (private) trust must be property transferable(note:- not, ‘be transferred’, ultimately)to the beneficiary, and it must not be merely beneficial interest under a subsisting trust. It conveys us two ideas:
(i) those who created the trust must be owners of the trust property and must be capable of transferring their interest in the trust properties[136] and
(ii) a Trust cannot be created only for a beneficial interest, (Note: Not the ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner; it is the interest pertaining to beneficiaries.) or there is no trust upon a trust. In Pestonji Jalbhoy Chichgar Vs. Jalbhoy Jehangir Chichgar[137] it is observed by the Privy Council: “What the S. 8 forbids is a trust upon a trust– a trust of a mere right of the beneficiary to proceed against the trustee, and if the Will of Gulbai amounts to a declaration of a trust of her beneficial interest, that is, of her right to go against the trustees of Kaka’s will, then the trust offends against S.8.”
(Note: Section 8 does not postulate that the property should be transferred to the beneficiaries, ultimately.)
Salmond’s Jurisprudence (while describing “property”) refers to corporeal property as, ‘the right of ownership in a material object, or that object itself’.[138]A founder can also be a beneficiary of a trust after its dedication. (But, he cannot claim any special right on that score, unless he reserved the same positively.)
Progressive Jurists Accept Trust in a ‘General Sense’
Indian law of trusts follows the progressive view of jurists like Halsbury. They preferred investing principles of trust, in a ‘wider’ or ‘general’ form. They see principles of trust in all matters of fiduciary relationships under which one holds property on behalf of, or for the benefit of, others. Halsbury’s Laws of England defines ‘trust’ as a confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power, to the intent, that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object. Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 substantially follow this definition.
Our Common Law imports still wider meaning to ‘trust’ in the matters of religious trusts.
Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?
It is trite law that dedicated property of a temple will be vested with the idol as the legal owner thereof, though such vesting is qualified to be in an ‘ideal or secondary sense’;[139] and the possession and management thereof will be with some human being identified as Shebait or Manager, though in the strict legal sense, they cannot be accepted as trustees.
In Wali Mohammed v. Rahmat Bee, (1999- 3 SCC 145), to the question whether the Mutawalli of a Wakf would be a trustee, our Apex Court observed as under:
“35. It will be seen that the main part of Sec. 10 (Limitation Act) states that no period of limitation applies for recovery of property from a trustee in whom the property is vested for a specific purpose, unless such a person is an assignee for valuable consideration. The Explanation further states that it shall be deemed that a person managing the property of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is to be deemed to be a trustee in whom such property has vested for a specific purpose. We shall explain these provisions in some detail.
36. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] the Privy Council held that property comprised in a Hindu or Mohammedan religious or charitable endowment was not property vested in trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of the said words in the main section. The reason was that according to the customary law, where property was dedicated to a Hindu idol or mutt or to a Mohammedan wakf, the property vested in the idol or the institution or God, as the case may be, directly and that the shebait, mahant, mutawalli or other person who was in charge of the institution was simply a manager on behalf of the institution. As Sec. 10 did not apply unless these persons were trustees this judgment made recovery of properties of the above trusts from donees, from these managers, rather difficult.
37. The legislature therefore intervened and amended Sec. 10 for the purpose of getting over the effect of the above judgment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill of 1929 makes this clear. It says: “The (Civil Justice) Committee’s recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] and Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das Aurora [(1922) 50 IA 84] which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutawalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Mohammedan religious endowment is vested, are not trustees within the meaning of the words as used in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in them. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person, not being an assignee for valuable consideration, endowments of this nature are not protected. The Committee’s recommendation is that Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Mohammedan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee.” (Quoted in: Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482).
In Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482, the Apex Court held that the Mutawalli is not a trustee in its true sense. The Supreme Court formulated a crucial question and answered it as under:
“127. Thus, the Mutawalli is treated as a trustee. But would the amendment made to Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make a Mutawalli a trustee generally?
Our answer is an emphatic No. This is for the reason that the change in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act was effected to overcome the judgment of the Privy Council, when it held that a Mutawalli would not be a trustee and when in view of the requirement in Sec. 10 that the suit must be one against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose and as a Mutawalli would not be a trustee in law per se, the legislature brought in the explanation. But what is striking are two features. Firstly, the change is brought by way of an Explanation. More importantly, the explanation begins with words “For the purpose of this section and proceeds to declare that “any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be properly vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”
Both Express and Constructive Trusts Differ from Contract
Trust differs from contract. Trust is a concept derived by law to give effect to a pious or philanthropic wish of a generous man, and to ensure the benefits thereof to the beneficiaries intended by its founder. But, contract is the result of positive acts of two persons. There is no intermediary in contract, as trustees in a trust. A contract without consideration is void. In ‘trust’, trustee undertakes an obligation; and there is no question of consideration.
In express trust there must be a deliberate intention on the part of the author to create a trust.[140] Constructive trust emerges without regard to the intention of the parties to create a trust. It is an equitable remedy exercises by court of law. In both cases, there no direct involvement of beneficiaries. In a contract, the claims of one party against the other are personal in nature;[141] whereas, trust is governed by obligation and fiduciary relation. Fiduciary relationship for trustees and beneficial interest for beneficiaries in the trust property are the characteristics of trust; they are absent in contract.[142] Trustee deals with the property in a discretionary manner applying his prudence.[143]The beneficiaries of a trust have the right to get the trust enforced. Beneficiary of a contract has merely a personal claim against the promisor.
Breach of trust by itself is punishable under law; whereas breach of a contract, without fraud or cheating, raises civil liability alone. Every breach of contract is not breach of trust or cheating. A breach of contract is different from the offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust under IPC. In the absence of illegal motives or intention at the very inception, no offence of cheating would be made out in a contract.[144]
The service of a person agreeing to collect rent for another[145] with the undertaking to render accounts thereof does not create a trust even constructively or impliedly.[146] A mortgagee in possession is also not a trustee in the strict sense, and a constructive or implied trust is legally recognised, as in cases governed by S. 90 and 95 of the Trusts Act, for he holds a fiduciary character in certain respects.[147]
Courts have jurisdiction and duty[149] to administer and enforce public trusts.[150] As in the case of English Law, Indian Law also accepts court as the ultimate protector of all charities.[151] It is the guardian of the public charitable trusts or institutions[152] and its property.[153] In legal theory the Court is the guardian of charity, as it is of an infant.[154]In P. Elumalai Vs. Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board[155] the Madras High Court while passing an order exercising the ‘Parens Patriae’ jurisdiction over the trust held that, as ‘Parens Patriae’, the Courts were empowered to protect the sanctity of public trust in case of breach of trust on account of irregularities committed in trust. In this decision it was held that the Court could not remain a mute spectator when illegality had been committed against a public Trust in front of its own eyes.[156]
Public Trust Doctrine
Who is the owner of the sea, sky, air, rivers, sea shore etc.? Roman Law thought about it first. They found the answer and declared: either owned by no one (res nullius) or by everyone in common (res communious). The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life.
The Public Trust Doctrine rests on the principle that the resources made available by the nature are of immense importance to the people as a whole and that it will stand wholly unjustified if made them an object of private ownership.
This doctrine envisages that the natural resources such as lakes, ponds (water bodies)etc. are held by the State as a ‘trustee’ of the public. The State is the trustee of all natural resources. The public trust doctrine[157]enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes.[158]It requires the State to protect, conserve and augment the gift of nature including the traditional water retaining structures.
The Government cannot ignore the fiduciary duty of care and responsibility casted upon it. If a water body has been fallen into disuse or forest is burnt up, that by itself, would not be a good ground for the Government to regularise the encroachments therein; as it amounts to breach of the public trust.
Any act or attempt made by the Government, or even the legislature, that derogate the object for which such land air or water exists, has to be held illegal by the higher authority, if any, which is equipped to scrutinise the illegality of such acts.
MC Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath
The Doctrine of Public Trust, by that name, is introduced to our legal system by our Apex Court in MC Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath.[159] It was a public interest litigation. It arose from a news item appeared in the Indian Express. It was stated that a private company, Span Motels, had built a motel at the bank of River Beas in Kullu Valley, by encroaching forest land. The major shares of the company were with the relatives of one Kamal Nath. The encroachment was later regularized by the government; and the land was leased out to the company, when Kamal Nath was the Minister for Environment and Forests.
The Motel used earth-movers and bulldozers to turn the course of river Beas. It was found to be illegal and constituted ‘callous interference with the natural flow of river Beas’; and that it resulted in the degradation of the environment. In this case the Supreme Court found that the Motel was liable to pay compensation by way of cost for the restitution of the environment and ecology of the area and issued various directions to restore the original position.
The Apex Court observed that the public had a right to expect certain lands and natural areas to retain their natural characteristics. It was declared in the judgment that the public trust doctrine, ‘as discussed by in this judgment is a part of the law of the land’.
In this trailblazing landmark decision, the Apex Court quoted Joseph L. Sax, Professor of Law, University of Michigan – proponent of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine -from his erudite article ‘Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention’, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, Part 1 p. 473, which gave the historical background of the Public Trust Doctrine,[160] as under :
“The source of modern public trust law is found in a concept that received much attention in Roman and English law – the nature of property rights in rivers, the sea, and the seashore. That history has been given considerable attention in the legal literature, need not be repeated in detail here. But two points should be emphasized. First, certain interests, such as navigation and fishing, were sought to be preserved for the benefit of the public; accordingly, property used for those purposes was distinguished from general public property which the sovereign could routinely grant to private owners. Second, while it was understood that in certain common properties – such as the seashore, highways, and running water – ‘perpetual use was dedicated to the public’, it has never been clear whether the public had an enforceable right to prevent infringement of those interests. Although the State apparently did protect public uses, no evidence is available that public rights could be legally asserted against a recalcitrant government.”
“Three types of restriction on governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the public trust; first the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purposes but it must be held available for use by the general public; second, the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third the property must be maintained for particular types of uses:”
The Supreme Court held further as under:
“Our legal system – based on English common law – includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership.”[161]
In Tehseen Poonawalla Vs. Union of India[162] it is pointed out that the principles such as the ‘polluter pays’ and the public trust doctrine have evolved during the adjudication of public interest petitions. (Also See: In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 1955.)
Expansion of the Concept
In Fomento Resorts & Hotels Vs. Minguel Martins[163] our Apex Court held that the heart of the public trust doctrine is that it imposes limits and obligations upon government agencies and their administrators on behalf of all the people; especially future generations. It is pointed out in Noida Entrepreneurs Association Vs. Noida[164]that the doctrine has been developed from Article 21 of the Constitution. (Referred to in Bikramchatterji Vs. Union Of India: 2019 5 Supreme 3; 2019 0 Supreme(SC) 768).
It is held by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Kerala (2014 AIR SC 2407, Referred to in In Re: The Punjab Termination of Agreement Act, 2004: AIR 2016 SC 5145) that the judicial function is also a very important sovereign function of the State and the foundation of the rule of law, and that the legislature cannot indirectly control the action of the courts and directly or indirectly set aside the authoritative and binding finding of fact by the court, by invoking ‘public trust doctrine’ or ‘precautionary principle’.
Our Apex Court held in Tata Housing Development Company Vs. Aalok Jagga (2020) 15 SCC 784; 2019 0 Supreme(SC) 1228) that the housing project, setting up of high-rise buildings up to 92 meters, fell within the catchment area of Sukhna Lake and 123 meters away from the boundary of Sukhna Wildlife Sanctuary, could not be allowed to come up. 95 MLAs were to be the recipients of the flats in the buildings. The State of Punjab was required to act on the basis of Doctrine of Public Trust.
In Bikram Chatterji Vs. Union of India(2019 (8) SCC 527; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 901.) our Apex Court pointed out that the Public Trust Doctrine imposes on the State and its functionaries a mandate to take affirmative action for effective management, and the citizens are empowered to question its ineffectiveness. When the land of the farmers had been acquired for the purpose of housing and infrastructure needs by the State Government and handed over to the concerned authorities for construction, they were bound to ensure that builders acted in accordance with the objective behind the acquisition of land and the conditions on which allotment had been made. The concerned officials were not only enjoined to ensure protection of the rights of the home buyers, but also the interests of the authorities and bankers. The public authorities are duty-bound to observe that the leased property is not frittered away along with the money of the home buyers.
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[1] Quoted in: Shanmughan Vs. Vishnu Bharatheeyan: AIR 2004 Ker 143.
[2] Quoted in: Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar. 72
[3] Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th Edition, page 256.
[4] Quoted in: Assn. of University Teachers Vs. AICTE: AIR 1999 Mad 164.
[5] Contra-distinct to ‘concrete noun’ like God, earth, man, president etc.
[6] Contra-distinct to ‘uncountable noun’ like poverty, wealth, kindness, innocence etc.
[7] Grammatically, ‘a trust is attached to a property’, as ‘a business is done by a man’.
[8] State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.
[9] Sec. 11 reads: “11. Trustee to execute trust.—The trustee is bound to fulfil the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation ….”
[10] Allahabad Bank Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460; Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.
[11] Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553; Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co Vs. CIT: 1966-61 ITR 572 (Bom); Christopher Karkada VS Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725; Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR 1969 SC 569; Rajah SagiJanaki Vs. Appururu Bhukta: 1976-2 AndWR 117, 1976-1 APLJ 312; Special Secy Govt of WB Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; CIT Vs. K Shyamaraju: 1991-1 KantLJ 233; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460.
[12] C. Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma Association: 2010-85 AIC 762, 2009-6 ALD 269, B Vasudeva Rao Vs. K Laxminarayana : AIR 1985 Kar 129,
[13] Khairul Bashar Vs. ThannuLal: AIR1957 All 553; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725;.
[14] State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30.
[15] Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revn. Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass Ahluwalia: AIR 1972 Del 128; Pankumari Kochar Smt Vs. Controller Of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.
[16] Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-52 DTR 89. Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460
[17] Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan: AIR 1919 Mad 555; Chhatra Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; In Re Sabnis, Goregaonkar Senjit Vs. Shivramdas: AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan: AIR 1938 Cal818; Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; WO Holdsworth Vs. State of UP: AIR1957 SC 887, Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR 1969 SC 569; Comm. Wealth Tax Vs. Kirpashanker Dayashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463; Controller of Estate Duty Lucknow Vs. Aloke Mitra: AIR 1981SC 102; Life Insurance Corp. of India Vs. Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1. Special Secy. Govtof W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725; PrabhakarGonesPrabhu Vs. Saradchandra Suria Prabhu: 2019-11SCALE 381.
[18] Chhatra Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth Vs. State of UP: AIR1957 SC 887; Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR 1969 SC 569.
[25] Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act casts duty on the trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling ‘the purpose of the trust’, and obeying ‘the directions of the author of the trust’.
[26] Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; State Bank of India Vs. Spl. Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529; Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173.
[27] R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Edl Trust: 1982-21 DLT 46: ILR 1982-1Del 801, Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid: AIR1944 Cal 163.
[28] Paru Vs. Chiruthai: 1985 KerLJ 480, 1985 KerLT 563: Referred: UN Mitra’s Law of Limitation and Prescription, 9th Edn., Vol. II, at page 1574, Para 66; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529, CBSE Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay: AIR 2011 SCW 4888: 2011-8 SCC 497; Reserve Bank of India Vs. Jayantilal N. Mistry: AIR 2016 SC 1.
[29] Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557
[30] Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Canara Bank Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1982 Ker 1: ILR 1981-2 Ker 649; R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR 1982-1Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460.
[31] Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR 1982-1Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460; Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.
Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram Shah: AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887; Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553; Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW (Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-52 DTR 89. Benafasilal Rajgorhia Vs. Central Bank of India: 1971-76 CalWN 807; BomiMunchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993 BCR 301; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460.
[34] Life Insurance Corp. of India VS Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1; Patel Chhotabhai Vs. Gian Chandra Basak: AIR 1935 PC 97; Chambers Vs. Chambers: AIR 1944 PC 78.
[35] Chambers Vs. Chambers, AIR 1944 PC 78, Benafasilal Rajgorhia Vs. Central Bank of India: 1971-76 CalWN 807; Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Badri: 1966 2 DLT 294. Khub Narain Missir Vs. Ramchandra Narain Dass: AIR 1951 Pat 340; Patel Chhotabhai Vs.Jnan Chandra Bank: AIR 1935 PC 97.
[36] Laxman Balwant Bhopatkar Vs. Charity Commr, Bombay: AIR 1962 SC 1589, Banwarilal Vs. Edwin Bhagirathi: AIR 1981 MP 116.
[38] Cambay Municipality Vs. Ratilal Ambalal Reshamwala: 1995 Supp2 SCC 591. Mahabir Prasad Mishra Vs. Shyama Dev : 2013 9 ADJ 46; 2013 101 AllLR 402; Hardinge Memorial Fund Trust Vs. St. of Bihar: 2008 1 BLJR 28; 2007 3 PLJR 553, LIC of India Vs. Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1.
[40]Sec. 6 Clause (e) of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.
[41] Vidarbha and Marathwada, Nagpur Vs. Mangala: 1982 MhLJ 686; Maria Antonica Rodrigues Vs. DR Baliga: AIR 1967 Bom 465.
[42] Idol of Sri Renganathaswamy Vs. PK Thoppulan: (2020) 5 Mad LJ 331(SC); MJ Thulasiraman Vs. Comr, HR & CE: AIR 2019 SC 4050.
[43] Pratap Singhji Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064
[44]Gulam Mohideen Khan Vs. Abdul Majid Khan: AIR 1957 AP 941.
[45] SM Manorama Dasi Vs. Dhirendra Nath Busu: AIR 1931 Cal 329,
[46] Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar: AIR 1957 SC 133, Quoted in: M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1, Pratap Singhji Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064
[47]Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Sham Lal: ILR 1973-1 Del 144,
[49] AIR1957 SC 887; Referred to in: Commr W. Tax Vs. Kirpashanker : AIR 1971 SC 2463; Shyam Sunder Kejriwal Vs. Usha: 2011-97 AIC 910: 2010-4 CalHN 782; Shyam Sunder Kayal Vs. Mist Valley: 2008-1 CalHN 900: 2007-3 CalLT 560. The Nizams Jewellery Trust Vs. Asst Commr: 1997-1 ALD 4: 1996-4 ALT 852, CIT Vs. A N Chowdhury: AIR 1970 Cal 124, See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.
[53] Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553.
[54] Arjan Singh Vs Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; P. Elumalai v Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board, 2017-8 MLJ 529; Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173; State Bank of India v. Special Secretary Land, [1995] Suppl 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529; Mathura Bai Vs. Regional Provident Fund: 1992 WLN 206(Raj); Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106
[55] Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460.
[56] Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass Ahluwalia: AIR 1972 Del 128; Pankumari KocharSmt Vs. Controller Of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.
[57] Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan: AIR 1919 Mad 555, Goregaonkar Senjit Vs. Shivramdas: AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan: AIR 1938 Cal818; Rajah Sagi Janaki Vs.Appururu Bhukta: 1976-2 And WR 117, 1976-1 APLJ 312; Life Insurance Corp. of India VS Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1.
[60] Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th Edition, page 256
[61] See: Baba Badri Dass Vs. Dharma: ILR 1982(1) P&H 491; Govordhanhari Devasthan Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: 1982 Mh.L.J 390.
[62] Chhatra Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Himansu Kumar Roy Chowdhury Vs. Moulvi Hasem: AIR1938 Cal 818, Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid Ostagar: AIR1944 Cal163, Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329.
[63] Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR 1969 SC 569, Birendra Kumar Datta Vs. Commr IT: AIR 1960 Cal 323: 1961-42 ITR 661, Shantiniketan Co Op Hsg. Society Vs. Dist. Regr Co Op So: AIR 2002 Guj 428; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329; Mohammed Basheer Vs. Ahmed Kutty: 2011 (3) Ker LJ 767.
[64] AIR 1931 PC 196. Referred to in: A S Krishna Murthy Vs. C N Revanna: AIR 2009KarRep 2692 , Raja Baldeodas Birla Santatikosh Vs. C I T: 1991-190ITR 578; Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid Ostagar: AIR1944 Cal 163, Himansu Kumar Roy Chowdhury Vs. MoulviHasem Ali Khan: AIR 1938 Cal 818.
[65] Quoted in Special Secy. Govt of W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar. 72; Raja Sir Muthiah Chettiar Vs. CIT: 1984-38 CTR 76: 1984-148 ITR532: Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Ganga Properties Ltd: 1970-77 ITR 637; Sardarilal Vs. Shrimati Shakuntla Devi: AIR 1961 P&H 378.
[66] Rakesh Arora Vs. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories: 2019-261 DLT 307; Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 145.
[70] Chhatra Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329 , Uma Roy VS Mehamala Dey: 1988 2 Cal HN 128.
[71] Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin Vs. Trustees Maniar: AIR 1968 Guj 184
[72] Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Special SecyGovtof W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40.
[73] Govardhandhari Devsthan Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982 Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Kumar Jain Vs. ParasnathDigambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199
[74] Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram Shah: AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887 , Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Kripashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463, Bai Dosabai Vs. Mathuradas: AIR 1980 SC 1334; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2BCR301; Hem Chandra Vs. Suradham Debya: AIR 1940 PC 134; Ramabai Govind Vs. RaghunathVasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106. Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar: AIR 1957 SC 133; Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73.
[75] Smith Vs. Anderson, (1880) 15 Ch. D. 247;Quoted in: Bengal Luxmi Cotton Mills Vs. State: 1964-69 CalWN 137; 1965-35 CC 187
[76] Allahabad Bank Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476.
[78] Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557
[79] AIR1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.
[80] Chhatra Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin Vs. Trustees Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184. See also: RamabaiGovind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN 206(Raj).
[81] Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN 206(Raj)
[82] Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106
[83] Govardhandhari Devsthan Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982 Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Vs. Parasnath Digambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199
[84] Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529.
[86] Scott on Trusts Vol. II Sec. 170. The leading case on the subject is Kench Vs. Gandford (1726) (White and Tudor Leading Cases in Equity page 693) , Referred to in: Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.
[87] Kishore Joo Vs. Guman BehariJoo Deo: AIR 1978 All 1; Bapalal Godadbhai Kothari Vs. Charity Commissioner Gujarat: 1966 GLR 825
[88] Allahabad Bank Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476.
[89] S Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma Association: 2009-6 ALD 269; 2009-6 ALT 197
[90] State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30.
[91] Narasingh Charan Mohapatra Vs. Radhakanta Mohapatra: AIR1951 Ori 132
[92] Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-52 DTR 89. Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460
[93]WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh:AIR 1957 SC887 .
[94] In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228
[95] Ramkishorelal vs. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890; Agasthyar Trust Vs. CIT ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;(1998) 5 SCC 588). Krishnaswamy Pillai Vs. Kothandarama Naicken: AIR 1915 Mad 380; Dasami Sahu Vs. Param Shameshwar, AIR 1929 All 315
[96] Agasthyar Trust Madras Vs. CIT ; 1998 AIR (SCW) 3945 ; (1998) 5 SCC 588).
[100] See also: Radhika Mohan Nandy Vs. Amrita LalNandy, AIR 1947 Cal 301
[101] Quoted in: Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar: AIR 1995 SC 2001.
[102] Silvy George Vs. Anna Joseph: 2014-2 KerLJ 462; Commr. of Wealth Tax Vs. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali:1983-139 ITR 517; Vadivelu Mudaliar Vs. CN Kuppuswami Mudaliar: ILR1971-3 Mad142; Mahadulal Vs. Chironji Lal: AIR 1963 MP 51; Chidambaranatha Thambiran Vs. Psnallasiva Mudaliar: AIR 1918 Mad 464.
[104] See: MAppala Ramanujacharyulu Vs. M Venkatanarasimha: 1974 AP 316; Siva Kanta Barua Vs. RajaniramNath:AIR 1950 Ass. 154: ILR 51 All. 626.
[105] Radhika Mohan Nandy v. Amrita LalNandy: AIR1947 Cal 301, Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17; M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; T C Chacko Vs. Annamma: AIR 1994 Ker. 107. Virbala K. Kewalram Vs. Ramchand Lalchand: AIR 1997 Bom 46
[106] See: Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17; M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; TC ChackoVs. Annamma: AIR 1994 Ker. 107. KS Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333
[122] Contradistinct to ‘uncountable noun’ like poverty, wealth, kindness, innocence etc.
[123] Govt. of the Province of Bombay Vs. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia: AIR 1949 PC 143; Thiagesar Dharma Vs. CIT: AIR 1964 Mad 483: [1963] 50 ITR 798 (Mad); Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas 1967 Raj LW 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-52 DTR 89. Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144; Thanthi Trust Vs. W. Tax Officer: (1989) 45 TAXMAN 121: (1989) 178 ITR 28; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460; Kishorelal AseraVs. Haji Essa Abba: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367; Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. Commner. of IT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-336 ITR 611; Sambandam Died Vs. NatarajaChettiar: 2012-1 Mad LW 530.
[124] Canara Bank Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1982 Ker 1: ILR 1981-2 Ker 649.
[125] Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass: AIR 1972 Del 128; Pankumari Kochar Smt Vs. Controller of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.
[127] Pratap Singh ji Vs. Charity Commissioner: 1987 AIR SC 2064.
[128] CIT Vs. P. Bhandari 1984 -47 ITR 500 (Mad); L Gouthamchand Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1989-176 442(Mad).
[129] Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, reads as under: “6. Creation of trust: Subject to the provisions of section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts: … … … (e) (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust-property to the trustee.”
[130] Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553.
[131] Padmavathi Vs. Raghu Tippanna Ruge: 1968(1) MysLJ 583; Relied on: Shivramdas Vs. Nerukar: 39 Bom LR 633; Sree SreeIswar Gopal Jew Vs. Commr of IT: AIR 1951 Cal 309; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Mgr. St. Bnk Mysore: AIR1988 Kar 1
[132] Shanti Vijay and Company Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR 1980 SC 17; P Parthasarathy Vs. Kee Pee Yes: 2016-1 MLJ 267; Neelam Tirupatirayudu Vs. Vinjamuri: 1912-17 Ind Cas 597; 1912-23 MLJ 599.
[133] Shanti Vijay And Company VS Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR1980 SC 17.
[134]Ramdev Developers Vs. Jt. Chrity Commissioner: 2009-1Guj LR 337,
[138]Quoted in: Maharashtra St. Co Op Bank Vs. Asst. Provt. Fund Commr: AIR 2010 SC 868; Santhoshkumar Vs. Shaji: AIR 2013 Ker 184; Ans Gopal heo Narain Vs. PK Banerji: AIR 1949 All 433.
[139] Bhupathi Nath Vs. Ramlal Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128
[140] Cambay Municipality Vs. Ratilal Ambalal: 1995 Supp2 SCC 591.
[141] LT Overseas, North America Vs. Sachdeva : 2018 252 DLT 270
[142] The Travancore Bank Ltd. Vs. Abraham: AIR 1955 TC 131; Rama Rao Vs. V Chandra Gopal: 1969-82 LW 738: 1969-2 MLJ 460
[143] Shanti Vijay and Company Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR 1980 SC 17; P Parthasarathy Vs. Kee Pee Yes: 2016 1 MLJ 267; Neelam Tirupatirayudu Vs. Vinjamuri: 1912-17 Ind Cas 597; 1912-23 MLJ 599.
[144] Uma Shanker Gopalika Vs. State of Bihar (2006)2 SCC (Crl.) 49, Referred to in: Ranbaxy Vs. State of Telangana: 2016 2 ALT(Cri) 165.
[145] Mussamat Basso Kuar Vs. Lala Dhum Singh: 1887-15 Law Rep. Ind.App. 211
[146] BL Rai Vs. Bhaiyalal: AIR 1920 PC 8; Mahabir Prasad Mishra Vs. Shyama Devi: 2013-9 ADJ 46; 2013-101 AllLR 402
[147] Jagannath Vs. Sripathi Babu: AIR 1945 Mad. 297. Relied on in Narayani Amma Vs. Eyo Poulose: AIR 1982 Ker 198.
[148] See Chapter: State & Court – Protectors of All Charities
[149] AG Vs. Pearson: (1817) 3 Mer 353; Ram Dularey Vs. Ram Lal: AIR 1946 PC 34. Quoted in KS Varghese Vs. St. Peters and St. Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333. Rajendra Gupta VS Corporation of Chennai, rep. by its Commissioner: 011 4 LW 633, Rajagopal v. Balachandran: 2002 (2) CTC 527, See also: Narasimhiah Vs. Y H Venkataramanappa: AIR 1976 Kar 43.
[150] C.K. Rajan Vs. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee: .AIR 1994 Ker 179. [Appeal Judgment: Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee Vs. C.K. Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546]; Fakhuruddin Vs. Mohammad Rafiq: AIR 1916 All 115 (PC); Sridhar Vs. ShriJagan Nath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner Of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089. Ch Hoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate: AIR 2007 SC 1337; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. MullaAlibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309. See also: Mulla’s Hindu Law (11th Ed. Page 489) and Dr. B.K. Mukherjea: Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Fifth Ed, Page 407 and 412).
[151] C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296: Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia: AIR 1952 Kar 14; Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915; Subramonia Pillai Chellam Pillai Vs. Subramonia Pillai Chathan Pillai: AIR 1953 TC 198; M.G. Narayanaswami Naidu Vs. M. Balasundaram Naidu: AIR 1953 Mad 750.
[152] ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh Laws(Dlh)-2009-4-105 ILR (Dlh)- 2009-19-265], See also Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate AIR 2007 SC 1337.
[153]Sujan Mohinder Charitable Trust Vs. Mohinder Kaur: 2019 0 Supreme(Del) 281, AM Shamsudeen Vs AM Mohamed Salihu: 2004 2 LW 487; 2003 2 MLJ 526.
[156] Referred to in: Thatha Sampath Kumar Vs. Vupputur Alwar: 2019-3MadLW 705
[157] Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Union of India: (1996) 5 SCC 281; T.K. Shanmugam Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu: AIR 2016 Mad 25.
[158] Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. Vs. Minguel Martins (2009) 3 SCC 571. Quoted in Association for Environment Protection Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 2013 SC 2500; Navi Mumbai Environt. Preservation Society Vs. Ministry of Environment: 2019-1 BCR 39.
[159] 1997-1 SCC 388; Referred to in T. N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India , AIR 1997 SC 1228; In re T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2022) 4 SCC 289.
[160] Rajeev Suri Vs. Delhi Development Authority: 2021 SCC Online 7
[161]Jayant Etc Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh: AIR 2021 SC 496.