Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Part I

Legal Persons

‘Persons’ are of two kinds: human beings and legal persons. The second class is the institutions and associations of persons upon which the law incorporates or attributes legal personality. They are formed either on registration under a statute like Companies Act, or under a particular enactment such as English East India Company, Municipal Corporations, Life Insurance Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, etc. Apart from companies, corporations etc. our system accept idols in temples also as legal persons. 

Salmond reads:

  • “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases. Those which are actually recognised by our own system, however, are of comparatively few types. Corporations are undoubtedly legal persons, and the better view is that registered trade unions and friendly societies are also legal persons though not verbally regarded as corporations.”(Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., Page 305).

Though the legal personality of an unregistered association may not be a matter in dispute, the legal status of registered associations under Societies Registration Act remained as a potential question for quite long time. 


Part II

Idol as Representing “Pious Purpose” of Donor Is the Juristic Person

The Supreme Court, in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das, concluded the rationale of conferring legal personality to Idol as under:

  • “123. The recognition of the Hindu Idol as a legal or ‘juristic’ person is therefore based on two premises employed by courts. The first is to recognise the pious purpose of the testator as a legal entity capable of holding property in an ideal sense (absent the creation of a trust-sic). The second is the merging of the pious purpose itself and the Idol which embodies the pious purpose to ensure the fulfillment of the pious purpose. So conceived, the Hindu Idol is a legal person. The property endowed to the pious purpose is owned by the Idol as a legal person in an ideal sense. The reason why the court created such legal fictions was to provide a comprehensible legal framework to protect the properties dedicated to the pious purpose from external threats as well as internal maladministration. Where the pious purpose necessitated a public trust for the benefit of all devotees, conferring legal personality allowed courts to protect the pious purpose for the benefit of the devotees.”

Idol is the Embodiment of Pious Purpose

Relying mainly upon one of the oldest decisions in this subject, Manohar Ganesh Tambekar  Vs.  Lakhmiram (1887), ILR (1888) 12 Bom 247, our Apex Court held in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that juristic personality could not be conferred upon Ram Janmabhumi.  It is held as under:

  • “138. …The decision (Manohar Ganesh Tambekar  Vs.  Lakhmiram) clarifies that an Idol as a juridical person is the ‘ideal embodiment’ of a pious or benevolent idea. The status of a juristic person was conferred on the Idol as an entity which encompasses the purpose itself in which capacity the properties and offerings vest. The observations in this case affirm the position that juridical personality was conferred on the pious purpose and the property endowed or accumulated did not itself become a juristic entity. It is not the property endowed which is a juridical person – it is the Idol which as an embodiment of a pious purpose which is recognised as a juristic person, in whom the property stands vested.”

Intention of Founder stand Constant and Definite

A temple is founded on dedication of property and consecration of an Idol to indwell and reign. These intends of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the worshippers or their ardency.  (It stands contradistinct to the worship of Muslims in a mosque and of Christians in a church.)

Courts Recognises ‘Legal Personality’ to Idol to Give Effect to the Dedication

The Supreme Court observed in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case: 2020-1 SCC 1) that courts recognised the legal personality of the Hindu Idol to give effect to the dedication of the founder of the endowment. The ‘recognition of juristic personality’ was ‘devised by the courts to give legal effect to the Hindu practice of dedicating property for a religious or ‘pious’ purpose’. When the founder was not alive and the shebait was not the owner of the lands, the courts (and through them, the State) give effect to the original dedication conferring the legal personality to the idol. The legal personality of the idol, and the rights of the idol over the property endowed and the offerings of devotees, are guarded by the law to (a) protect the endowment against mal-administration by the human agencies entrusted with the day to day management of the idol,and (b) protect the interests of devotees. It was also found that legal rights entitled to by the idol was not dependent on the existence of an express trust.

Doctrine on ‘Merger’ – ‘Entity of the Idol’ Is Linked With ‘Pious Purpose’

It is pointed out in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that, as established in earlier decisions, neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law; and it is not correct that the idol or image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated. Juristic personality of an Idol stands connected to the ‘pious purpose’ of the founder. Therefore, to give a logical proposition as to the ‘juristic personality’ of idol, the ‘entity of the idol’ has to be linked with the ‘pious purpose’. 

It is obvious that the Court brings-forth the doctrine of “merger” based on the following well accepted jurisprudential notions:

  1. Legal entity of an idol is conceived only in an ideal sense.
  2. The idol is chosen as the centre for legal relations.
  3. Idol is the embodiment of the pious purpose of its founder.
  4. A material object that represents a ‘purpose’ can be a legal person.

The Supreme Court, in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1), quoted the following from Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1969): AIR 1969 SC 1089:

  • “6. …It should however be remembered that the juristic person in the idol is not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that the image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated and vivified by the Pran Pratishta ceremony. It is not also correct that the Supreme Being of which the idol is a symbol or image is the recipient and owner of the dedicated property.
  • …The correct legal position is that the idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests. As observed by Mr. Justice B.K. Mukherjea:
    • “With regard to the debutter… It is not only a compendious expression but a material embodiment of the pious purpose and though there is difficulty in holding that property can reside in the aim or purpose itself, it would be quite consistent with sound principles of Jurisprudence to say that a material object which represents or symbolises a particular purpose can be given the status of a legal person, and regarded as owner of the property which is dedicated to it. … The legal position is comparable in many respects to the development in Roman Law.”

Beneficiaries of Endowments Are Not Idols but Worshippers

The Supreme Court, in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya case: 2020-1 SCC 1), quoted the following from Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar (1957): AIR 1957 SC 133:  

  • “6. …The true purpose of a gift of properties to the idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship. In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v Ram Lal Maitra (1910) it was held on a consideration of these and other texts that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a ‘sentient being‘, and that the dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment of the owner of his dominion over them for the purpose of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J at p. 138 that “the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected” and that “the dedication to a deity” may be “a compendious expression of the pious purpose for which the dedication is designed”.
  • 7. When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof.”

Destruction of Idol Does Not Affect Legal Personality

Our Apex Court, explained in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) further as under:  

  • “127. … In the case of Hindu idols, legal personality is not conferred on the idol simpliciter but on the underlying pious purpose of the continued worship of the deity as incarnated in the idol. Where the legal personality is conferred on the purpose of a deity’s continued worship, moving or destroying the idol does not affect its legal personality. The legal personality vests in the purpose of continued worship of the idol as recognised by the court. It is for the protection of the continued worship that the law recognises this purpose and seeks to protect it by the conferral of juristic personality.”

Part III

Sri Guru Granth Sahib – Accepted as a Juristic Person

Guru Granth Sahib revered in a Gurudwara, has been held to be a juristic person by the Supreme Court in Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass, AIR 2000 SC 1421. The Apex Court explained that it was not necessary to equate Guru Granth Sahib with an Idol, for declaring it to be a juristic person. When belief and faith of two religions are different, there is no question of equating one with the other. In this case the Apex Court held that Guru Granth Sahib possessed all the qualities to be recognised as a Juristic Person; and observed that holding otherwise would be giving ‘too restrictive a meaning to a ‘juristic person’ and that would erase the very jurisprudence which gave birth to it’.

In Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee it was observed further that ‘installation’ of ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ was the nucleus of any Gurudwara; and that  without ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ the Gurudwara was only a building, and that therefore, ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ could be regarded as a juristic person. One of the reasons based on which Guru Grandh Sahib was not treated as a juristic person by the High Court was that if Guru Grandh Sahib was regarded as a juristic person, every copy of the same should also be regarded as a juristic person. In this context the Apex Court observed that an Idol became a juristic person only when it was consecrated and installed in a public place for the public at large. In other words, the emphasis was on the ‘installation’ of ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ for the benefit of the public at large.

It is held in Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee Amritsar v. Shri Som Nath Dass (AIR 2000 SC 1421) as under:

  • “There may be an endowment for a pious or religious purpose. It may be for an idol, mosque, church etc.. Such endowed property has to be used for that purpose. The installation and adoration of an idol or any image by a Hindu denoting any god is merely a mode through which his faith and belief is satisfied. This has led to the recognition of an idol as a juristic person.
  • In Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar & Ors, AIR 1957 SC 137, this Court held:
    • In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha Vs. Ram Lal Maitra, ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), it was held on a consideration of these and other text that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a sentient being, and that dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment by the owner of his demoinion over them for the purpoe of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J. at p. 138 that the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected and that the dedication to a deity may be a compendious expression of the pious purposes for which the deciation is designed. Vide also the observations of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at p. 155. In Hindu Relgious Endowments Board V. Veeraraghavacharlu, AIR 1937 Mad 750 (G), Varadachariar J. dealing with this question, referred to the decision in ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), and observed:
    • As explained in the case, that purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner. This is the sense in which a temple and its endowments are regarded as a public trust.
  • In Som Prakash Rekhi Vs. Union of India & Anr., 1981 (1) SCC 449, this Court held that a legal person is any entity other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. It was stated: Let us be clear that the jurisprudence bearing on corporations is not myth but reality. What we mean is that corporate personality is a reality and not an illusion or fictitious construction of the law. It is a legal person. Indeed, a legal person is any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of personalityis one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination. Corporations are one species of legal persons invented by the law and invested with a variety of attributes so as to achieve certain purposes sanctioned by the law.
  • This Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, 1969 (1) SCC 555, held that the consecrated idol in a Hindu temple is a juristic person and approved the observation of West J. in the following passage made in Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakshmiram, ILR 12 Bom 247;
    • The Hindu Law, like the Roman Law and those dervied from it, recognises not only incorporate bodies with rights of property vested in the Corporation apart from its individual members but also juridical persons called foundations. A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may according to his law express his purpose and endow it and the ruler will give effect to the bounty or at least, protect it so far at any rate as is consistent with his own Dharma or conception or morality. A trust is not required for the purpose; the necessity of a trust in such a case is indeed a peculiarity and a modern peculiarity of the English Law. In early law a gift placed as it was expressed on the altar of God, sufficed it to convey to the Church the lands thus dedicated. It is consistent with the grants having been made to the juridical person symbolised or personified in the idol. {Emphasis supplied} Thus, a trust is not necessary in Hindu Law though it may be required under English Law.
  • In fact, there is a direct ruling of this Court on the crucial point. In Pritam Dass Mahant Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1984 (2) SCC 600, with reference to a case under Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 this Court held that the central body of worship in a Gurdwara is Guru Granth Sahib, the holy book, is a Juristic entity. It was held:
    • From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the sine qua non for an institution being a Sikh gurdwara is that there should be established Guru Granth Sahib and the worship of the same by the congregation, and a Nishan Sahib as indicated in the earlier part of the judgment. There may be other rooms of the institution meant for other purposes but the crucial test is the existence of Guru Granth sahib and the worship thereof by the congregation and Nishan Sahib.
  • Tracing the ten Sikh gurus it records:
    • They were ten in number each remaining faithful to the teachings of Guru Nanak, the first Guru and when their line was ended by a conscious decision of Guru Gobind Singh, the last Guru, succession was invested in a collection of teachings which was given the title of Guru Granth Sahib. This is now the Guru of the Sikhs.
    • xx xx
    • he holiest book of the Sikhs is Guru Granth Sahib compiled by the Fifth Master, Guru Arjan. It is the Bible of Sikhs. After giving his followers a central place of worship, Hari-Mandir, he wanted to give them a holy book. So he collected the hymns of the first four Gurus and to these he added his own. Now this Sri Guru Granth Sahib is a living Guru of the Sikhs. Guru means the guide. Guru Granth Sahib gives light and shows the path to the suffering humanity. Where a believer in Sikhism is in trouble or is depressed he reads hymns from the Granth.”

The Supreme Court held as under:

  • “Thus, we unhesitantly hold Guru Granth Sahib to be a Juristic Person.”

Part IV

Mosque and Juristic Personality

Muslims worship the God Almighty. It is difficult to pin-point a tangible-nucleus or a core-element for a Mosque (as in the case of Gurugrantha Sahib in a Gurudwara or an Idol in a temple) so as to clinch the legal personality upon (See: Shriomani Gurudwara  Vs.   Shri Som Nath Dass: AIR 2000 SC 1421). 

For Muslims, worship in accordance with the tenets is important.  (It stands contradistinct to dedication and worship in a temple. A temple is founded on dedication of property, and consecration of an Idol to indwell and reign. These intends of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the worshippers or their ardency.)

In ‘Law of Endowments (Hindu and Mohammedan)’ by A. Ghosh Quoted in: Mahmood Hussain Vs. State Of UP:  2018-10 ADJ 249; 2018-128 All LR 71 with respect to ‘Mosque’as under:

  •  “A Mosque does not belong to any particular sect; for once it is built and consecrated, any reservation for people of a particular locality or sect is void, and persons not belonging to that locality or sect are entitled to worship in it, whether or not any particular sect had contributed towards the site or the building of the Mosque and had been saying their prayers in it and every person who believes in the unity of God and the mission of Mahammad as a prophet is a Mussalman, to whatever sect he may belong, and that the Shias satisfy the test; and that there is no such thing as a Sunni or a Shia Mosque though the majority of the worshippers at any particular Mosque may belong to one or other sect either generally or at various times.”

It is also added that in Mahomedan law there cannot be any private Mosque. When once a place is dedicated to be a Mosque, it becomes public property, it is property of God. But, it is pointed out that‘there can be right of exclusion in case of Mosques belonging to a particular sect’.

The Privy Council, in Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 PC 116, neither supported nor rejected the view that a mosque is a legal person, though it observed that ‘the argument that the land and buildings of a mosque are not property at all because they are a ‘juristic person’ involves a number of misconceptions’. The Privy Council specifically held as under:

  • “A gift can be made to a madrasah in like manner as to a masjid. The right of suit by the Mutawali or other manager or by any  person entitled to a benefit (whether individually or as a member of the public or merely in common with certain other persons) seems hitherto to have been found sufficient for the purpose of maintaining Mahomedan endowments. At best the institution is but a caput mortum, and some human agency is always required to take delivery of property and to apply it to the intended purposes. Their Lordships, with all respect to the High Court of Lahore, must not be taken as deciding that a ‘juristic personality’ may be extended for any purpose to Muslim institutions generally or to mosques in particular. On this general question they reserve their opinion.”

Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case – 2020-1 SCC 1

In Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Som Nath Dass, AIR 2000 SC 1421, the Supreme Court had (earlier) observed that it was held in ,  AIR 1940 P C 116, that a mosque was a juristic person.

After analysing, in detail, the same decision , Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 P C 116,  the Supreme Court affirmed in M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that the Privy Council ‘rejected’ the contention that a mosque was a juristic person. It is observed as under:

  • 195. This distinction, which highlights the features of immovable property received articulation by the Privy Council in The Mosque, Masjid Shahid Ganj v Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar. AIR 1940 PC 116. In that case, a mosque was dedicated in 1722 by one Falak Beg Khan. By the deed of dedication, Sheikh Din Mohammad and his descendants were appointed as Mutawallis. Since 1762, however, the building together with the court-yard, well and adjacent land, was in the occupation and possession of the Sikhs. The land adjacent to the mosque became the site of a Sikh shrine. At the time of the annexation by the British in 1849, the Sikhs were in possession of both the mosque and the adjacent lands.
  • 196. Thereafter, the building was demolished ‘by or with the connivance of its Sikh custodians’. A suit was instituted in 1935 against Shiromani Gurdawara Parbandhak Committee – who were in possession of the disputed property, seeking a declaration that the building was a mosque in which the plaintiffs and all the followers of Islam had a right to worship along with a mandatory injunction to reconstruct the building. One of the 18 plaintiffs was the mosque itself – the site and the building. The Privy Council assessed the contention that the mosque and the adjoining properties were a juristic person. Rejecting the contention, Justice George Rankin held:
    • “The argument that the land and buildings of a mosque are not property at all because they are a ‘juristic person’ involves a number of misconceptions. It is wholly inconsistent with many decisions whereby a worshipper or the mutwalli has been permitted to maintain a suit to recover the land and buildings for the purposes of the wakf by ejectment of a trespasser…
    • That there should be any supposed analogy between the position in law of a building dedicated as a place of prayer for Muslims and the individual deities of the Hindu religion is a matter of some surprise to their Lordships… the procedure in India takes account necessarily of the polytheistic and other features of the Hindu religion and recognizes certain doctrines of Hindu law as essential thereto, e.g. that an idol may be the owner of property…
    • The decisions recognising a mosque as a ‘juristic person’ appear to be confined to the Punjab : 153 PR 1884; Shankar Das v. Said Ahmad (1884) 153 PR 1884 59 PR 1914; Maula Bux v. Hafizuddin (1926) 13 AIR Lah 372: AIR 1926 Lah 372.
    • 6 In none of those cases was a mosque party to the suit, and in none except perhaps the last is the fictitious personality attributed to the mosque as a matter of decision. But so far as they go these cases support the recognition as a fictitious person of a mosque as an institution – apparently hypostatizing an abstraction. This, as the learned Chief Justice in the present case has pointed out, is very different from conferring personality upon a building so as to deprive it of its character as immovable property.” (Emphasis supplied)
  • 197. The Privy Council noted that if the mosque was a juristic person, this may mean that limitation does not apply to it and that ‘it is not property but an owner of property.’ Underlying the line of reasoning adopted by the Privy Council is that the conferral of legal personality on immovable property could lead to the property losing its character as immoveable property. “

In para 421 it is pointed out as under:

  • “421. In The Mosque, Masjid Shahid Ganj v Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar AIR 1940 PC 116, the Privy Council considered whether a mosque can be considered a juristic person and can be subject to adverse possession. Sir George Rankin observed:
    •  “That there should be any supposed analogy between the position in law of a building dedicated as a place of prayer for Muslims and the individual deities of the Hindu religion is a matter of some surprise to their Lordships. The question whether a British Indian Court will recognise a mosque as having a locus standi in judicio is a question of procedure. In British India the Courts do not follow the Mahomedan law in matters of procedure [cf. Jafri Begum v. Amir Muhammad Khan [I.L.R. 7 All. 822 at pp. 841, 842 (1885).], per Mahmood, J.] any more than they apply the Mahomedan criminal law of the ancient Mahomedan rules of evidence. At the same time the procedure of the Courts in applying Hindu or Mahomedan law has to be appropriate to the laws which they apply. Thus the procedure in India takes account, necessarily, of the polytheistic and other features of the Hindu religion and recognises certain doctrines of Hindu law as essential thereto, e.g., that an idol may be the owner of property. The procedure of our Courts allows for a suit in the name of an idol or deity though the right of suit is really in the sebait [Jagadindranath v. Hemmta Kumari [L.R. 31 I.A. 203: s.c. 8 C.W.N. 609 (1605).] ]. Very considerable difficulties attend these doctrines—in particular as regards the distinction, if any, proper to be made between the deity and the image [cf. Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lal [I.L.R. 37 Cal. 128, 153: s.c. 14 C.W.N. 18 (1910).] , Golapchandra Sarkar, Sastri’s ‘Hindu Law’,  7th Ed., pp. 865 et seq.]. But there has never been any doubt that the property of a Hindu religious endowment— including a thakurbari—is subject to the law of limitation [Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das [L.R. 37 I.A. 147 : s.c. 14 C.W.N. 889 (1810).] and Sri Sri Iswari Bhubaneshwari Thakurani v. Brojo Nath Dey [L.R. 64 I.A. 203 : s.c. 41 C.W.N. 968 (1937).] ]. From these considerations special to Hindu law no general licence can be derived for the invention of fictitious persons…” (Emphasis supplied).
  • It was concluded thus:
    • The property now in question having been possessed by Sikhs adversely to the waqf and to all interests thereunder for more than 12 years, the right of the mutawali to possession for the purposes of the waqf came to an end under Art. 144 of the Limitation Act and the title derived under the dedication from the settlor or wakif became extinct under sec. 28. The property was no longer, for any of the purposes of British Indian Courts, ―a property of God by the advantage of it resulting to his creatures…”

The Rajasthan High Court in Mohamed Shafindeen Vs. Chatur Bhaj (1958), 1958 Raj. LW 461 definitely held that mosque was not a juristic person. A similar view was taken by various High Courts including the Madras High Courtin Sunnath Jamath Mosque Committee, Puliampatti Vs. Land Administration Commissioner, 1998 (1) LW 69 (See also: Babu Vs. Khudial Qayum: 2013 0 ACJ 1614; 2013 8 ADJ 259; 2013 99 AllLR 123; 2013 2 ARC 839), and Gauhatti High Court in Sahida Khatun  Vs. Secretary, Tezpur Hindustani Muslim Panchayat, 2000 3 GauLJ 485; 2000 3 GauLT 152 .

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

It is trite law that dedicated property of a temple will be vested with the idol as the legal owner thereof, though such vesting is qualified to be in an ‘ideal or secondary sense’ (Bhupathi Nath v. Ramlal Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128) and the possession and management thereof will be with some human being identified as Shebait or Manager, though in the strict legal sense, they cannot be accepted as trustees.

In Wali Mohammed v. Rahmat Bee, (1999- 3 SCC 145), to the question whether the Mutawalli of a Wakf would be a trustee, our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “35. It will be seen that the main part of Sec. 10 (Limitation Act) states that no period of limitation applies for recovery of property from a trustee in whom the property is vested for a specific purpose, unless such a person is an assignee for valuable consideration. The Explanation further states that it shall be deemed that a person managing the property of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is to be deemed to be a trustee in whom such property has vested for a specific purpose. We shall explain these provisions in some detail.
  • 36. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] the Privy Council held that property comprised in a Hindu or Mohammedan religious or charitable endowment was not property vested in trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of the said words in the main section. The reason was that according to the customary law, where property was dedicated to a Hindu idol or mutt or to a Mohammedan wakf, the property vested in the idol or the institution or God, as the case may be, directly and that the shebait, mahant, mutawalli or other person who was in charge of the institution was simply a manager on behalf of the institution. As Sec. 10 did not apply unless these persons were trustees this judgment made recovery of properties of the above trusts from donees, from these managers, rather difficult.
  • 37. The legislature therefore intervened and amended Sec. 10 for the purpose of getting over the effect of the above judgment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill of 1929 makes this clear. It says: “The (Civil Justice) Committee’s recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] and Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das Aurora [(1922) 50 IA 84] which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutawalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Mohammedan religious endowment is vested, are not trustees within the meaning of the words as used in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in them. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person, not being an assignee for valuable consideration, endowments of this nature are not protected. The Committee’s recommendation is that Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Mohammedan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee.” (Quoted in: Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482).

In Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482, the Apex Court held that the Mutawalli is not a trustee in its true sense. The Supreme Court formulated a crucial question and answered it as under:

  • “127. Thus, the Mutawalli is treated as a trustee. But would the amendment made to Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make a Mutawalli a trustee generally?
  • Our answer is an emphatic No. This is for the reason that the change in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act was effected to overcome the judgment of the Privy Council, when it held that a Mutawalli would not be a trustee and when in view of the requirement in Sec. 10 that the suit must be one against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose and as a Mutawalli would not be a trustee in law per se, the legislature brought in the explanation. But what is striking are two features. Firstly, the change is brought by way of an Explanation. More importantly, the explanation begins with words “For the purpose of this section  and proceeds to declare that “any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be properly vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”

Therefore, apart from it being an Explanation, it also on its very terms, limits the deeming fiction to the purpose sought to be attained in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act.”


Part V

Legal personality of Churches

Halbury’s Laws of England,[1] gives the meaning of ‘Church’, as under:

  • “Church, when used in relation to a religious body, has two distinct meanings; it may mean either the aggregate of the individual members of the church or it may mean the quasi-corporate institution which carries on the religious work of the denomination whose name it bears.”

Blacks Law Dictionary defines church as under:

  • “Church. In its most general sense, the religious society founded and established by Jesus Christ, to receive, preserve, and propagate His doctrines and ordinances. It may also mean a body of communicants gathered into church order; body or community of Christians, united under one form of government by the profession of the same faith andthe observance of the same ritual and ceremonies; place where persons regularly assemble for worship; congregation; organization for religious purposes; religious society or body; the clergy or officialdom of a religious body.”

In the New International Bible Dictionary, Church is defined as under:

  • “Church. The English word derives from the Greek Kuriakos (belonging to the Lord), but it stands for another Greek word ekklesia (where “ecclesiastical’), denoting an assembly. This is used in its general sense in Acts 19:32, but had already been applied in the LXX as an equivalent for the “congregation” of the OT Stephen’s speech makes this equation (Acts 7:38), and in this sense it is adopted to describe the new gathering or congregation of the disciples of Jesus Christ”.

Juristic Personality of churches: Why Law Hesitates?

The ‘church’ being essentially associated with believers, and it is possessed with an endowment (church-building), technically, it can be recognised as a legal person. Salmond has emphasised that the law may attribute legal personality to a group of individuals; or, if it pleases (i.e. if it stands well-accepted), regard an institution also, as a legal person. But, our legal system does not uniformly accept church as a legal person. Following the Privy Council decision, Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar,[2]  the Supreme Court observed in M. Siddiq (Ayodhya Case) [3]  that a mosque is not a juristic person. The same principles apply to churches also. (See notes above – Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case.)

The following are the apparent reasons:

  • It is difficult to point out a tangible-nucleus[4] as Gurugrantha Sahib or Idol,for a church (building), to clinch the juristic personality upon. In this respect a church resembles Mosque. Christians also worship the invisible God Almighty.
  • As in the case of Muslims, for Christians also, worship is important, rather than the place where they worship. As pointed out earlier, juristic personality is conferred to the idol for its‘identity’on installation.The intentions of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the ardency of the worshippers.
  • Christians join together in churches in accordance with the divine command:
    • “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, I am there in the midst of them” (Mathew 18: 20).
  • The Bible elsewhere (Acts 17: 24) expresses the point more emphatically, as under:
    • “God that made the world and all things therein, since he is the Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands”

Are Churches and Dioceses Juridic persons it being so accepted in Canon Law

As shown by Salmond[5] and explained by the Supreme Court in Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass,[6] the law may, if it pleases, regard a church, a hospital, a university or a library as a legal person.

In James Chinnamma v. Joseph Abraham, ILR 1962-1 Ker 591; 1962 KLT 240, referring ‘Civil Ecclesiastical Law’ by Jerome A. Saldanha, it was pointed out that the provisions of canon depicted the diocese and church as legal or moral persons; without recording a definite finding on this point it was held by the High Court that there was no “legal impediment” to treat the parish church as a legal person. It was held that it could claim to be an ‘agriculturist’, inasmuch as the church was capable of holding property (of course, acting through human agency). The judge considered the postulation whether the church could be a voluntary association. It also referred to the theory that the church was under the authority of a corporation-sole, either Vicar or Bishop. It was pointed out that so long as the church retains the status of a Roman Catholic Church, the Diocesan Bishop alone would have the right in both the spiritual and the temporal matters in respect of the church and its property. (This decision is referred to in: Daisy AP  v. Bishop Dr.  Thomas Mar Koorilose, 2015-5 KHC 914; 2016-1 KLT 268).

In Seline Fernandez v. Bernard Francis, ILR 2013-1 Ker 56; 2012-4 KHC 427; 2012-4 KLT 283, it is held that on examining the Canon as a whole, what is discernible is that the temporal goods belonging to a parish which, by law, is a public juridic person do not belong to the diocese. It is observed in Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan (2016  AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51), also that a (parish) church is a legal person.

But, in M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case – 2020-1 SCC 1) our apex Court held that Mosque is not a legal person. The Apex Court rejected the the contention that mosque was held to be a juristic person by the Privy Council in Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 P C 116. In the light of the Supreme Court decision on Mosque, legally it is difficult to support the the view that churches are juristic persons.

Law may, if it pleases‘ (i.e. if it stands well-accepted) being the basis for determining a body or entity as a legal person, it is definite that the dioceses can never be treated as a juridic persons even though the Canon declares so.

Even if a (parish) church can be taken as comparable to a temple or Gurudwara (temple and Gurudwara are accepted by our law as juristic persons), a Diocese can never be taken as a juristic person; especially in the light of our Apex Court decision, Illachi Devi v. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397, which authoritatively held that even a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  Parish churches and trusts created for the benefit of a Church are public religious trusts (as detailed below).

As detailed in the notes below (under the heading – Juristic Personality in Canon), merely because Cannon law declares a church or a diocese as a legal person, it should not be assumed that the courts are bound by the assertion. It is a jurisprudential issue reigned by the common law. In the light of the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School (AIR 1958 MP 362) M. Hidayatullah, J. observed as under:

  • “In matters of property there is always a secular angle which is supplied by the law of the country, and that no religious denomination can make a law about its own property and thus nullify the law of the land.”

In the light of this decision it is illogical to go deep to search an authority to see whether the church or diocese is a legal person for it is so described in the Canon.

Churches are Usually Arrayed as Parties to Suits

Now, we see that our courts including the Supreme Court and High Courts make pronouncements with respect to matters of churches wherein they are arrayed as parties (represented by vicars, trustees etc.). But, when this matter is raised as a specific legal point, the opinion of courts are different.

As stated above, the Kerala High Court, in James Chinnamma Vs.  Joseph Abraham[7], while considering a question whether a Catholic church can claim to be ‘an agriculturist’ under a Debt Relief Act, it was observed that there was no ‘legal impediment’ in treating the church as a person.

It is also noteworthy that after analysing, in detail, Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 PC 116,  the Supreme Court affirmed in M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that the Privy Council ‘rejected’ the contention that a mosque was a juristic person. (See notes above – Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case.)

Church: Voluntary Association

Congregation of a church is a voluntary association in the eye of law.[8] The properties are also really vested with the congregation subject to the Bylaws or Cannons.

A Division Bench of Madras High Court in Gaspari Louis Vs. Gonsalves[9] pointed out that the Roman Catholic Church was described as a voluntary association in the English cases.

Catholic Church differs from the Church of England which is described as ‘established church’. Relying on the cases, Long Vs. The Bishop of Cape Town[10] and Merriman Vs. Williams,[11]it was observed in Gaspari Louis Vs. Gonsalves that the members who joined the church were ‘bound by any rules which it had framed for its internal discipline and for the management of its affairs’.

The Supreme Court held in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma[12] as under:

  • “A church is formed by the voluntary association of individuals. And the churches in the commonwealth are voluntary body organised on a consensual basis – their rights apart from statutes will be protected by the courts and their discipline enforced exactly as in the case of any other voluntary body whose existence is legally recognised. Therefore, all religious bodies are regarded by courts of law in the same position in respect of the protection of their rights and the sanction given to their respective organisations.”

ED Devadason in his book on Christian Law in India states as under:

  • “In regard to the Roman Catholic Church the Canon Law is to be recognised by the Courts of India as customary law binding on the members. However, since 1918 when the Canon Law was codified by the Vatican Council, the Canon Law cannot be regarded as customary law. Such a set of rules which lend themselves to change from time to time by the deliberations of a competent body cannot be classified as customary law. As the Canon Law can be changed by the Vatican, perhaps under recommendations of the curia or a General Council, there is a machinery which can effect the necessary changes in the Canon Law from time to time. Therefore, such a body of rules cannot any longer be treated as customary law. They can be recognised by the Courts in India only as the rules of voluntary associations binding on the members. They are like ‘Club Rules’. When a person becomes a member of a club, he not only subscribes to the existing rules and regulations but also agrees to accept the rules as they may be changed from time to time provided the procedure prescribed for changing them has been followed. As long as a person continues to be a member of a club he is bound by the rules of the club as they are amended from time to time. The rules are binding among the members interse and also between the members of the club. In fact the rules of the club are applicable as though each member has entered into an agreement between himself and the club by which he accepts the rules of the club as terms of the contract he has entered into to become a member of the club. Similarly in accepting membership in the Church a person binds himself with the rules and the regulations of the Church concerned as though he has entered into a contract with the Church binding himself with the rules and regulations of the Church on which conditions alone he has been admitted into membership of the Church.”[13]

Church: Impressed with Principles of Public Trust

Parish churches[14] and trusts created for the benefit of a Church[15]are public religious trusts. The parishioners or members are its beneficiaries. The parishioners have no right to take away the property on the basis of a majority decision or create a new system of administration. Our Apex Court, in KS Varghese v. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church,[16] held that the properties of a Church will ‘remain in trust, as it has for thetime immemorial, for the sake of the beneficiaries’.

The courts in India, from the early times, took the consistent view that the religious institutions, where people worship as of right in large number, have the characteristics of ‘public trust’[17] and that the properties thereof vest in the institution.[18]

S. 92 CPC Applies to Churches

Courts have jurisdiction and duty[19] to administer and enforce public trusts.[20] Interest of public is paramount in any religious trust.[21]  It is held by Privy Council in Ram Dulari Dularey Vs. Ram Lal[22] that ‘court has a duty, once it finds that it is a trust for public purposes, to consider what is best in the interest of the public’. This ruling is applied in a Church Case by our Apex Court in Varghese  Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church.[23]

As in the case of English Law, Indian Law also accepts court as the ultimate protector of all charities.[24] It is the guardian of the public charitable trusts/ institutions.[25] In In-Re, Man Singh,[26] it is held that in legal theory the Court is the guardian of charity, as it is of an infant. Courts in India, from the early times, took the view that the religious institutions, the persons who worship there as of right are large in number, have the characteristics of ‘public trust’. Sec. 92 CPC expressly authorises designated courts to give directions for administration of trusts.

But, in Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan[27] Kerala High Court held that the trust attached to Catholic (parish) church considered in that case was not a public trust to attract Sec. 92 CPC. It is observed that the properties of the (parish) church were vested with church authorities, and the (parish) church was a legal person. As shown above, our Apex Court, in Varghese  v. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church it is held that Parish churches and trusts created for the benefit of a Church are public religious trusts.

Vesting of Property – Congregational and Episcopal Churches

It is held in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan v.  Moran Mar Marthoma.[28]

  • “A Church is either Episcopal or congregational. It cannot be Episcopal in spiritual matters and congregational in temporal matters. …. That is the fundamental difference in congregational and Episcopal. In the former it vests in the parishioners. But in the latter, in endowment. …. The right to manage such property vests in the trustees under the bye-law subject to the control by the Catholicos and Metropolitan in accordance with the Constitution.”

Canon Law and Catholic Church

Canon law refers to the law internal to the church.[29] In disputes relating to spiritual or temporal affairs of a Roman Catholic Church, the parties should be presumed to be governed by the general law relating to the administration of churches, namely the Canon Law.[30]

The Canon Law postulates a detailed procedure for the administration of the Church and its properties; and so long as the church retains the status of a Roman Catholic Church the diocesan Bishop alone would have the right, in both the spiritual and the temporal matters, in respect of the church and its properties.[31] The rights in respect of the Roman Catholic churches and its property, in both the spiritual and the temporal matters, vest in the Diocesan Bishop alone.[32]

Madras High Court, in CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan,[33] held as under:

  • “Therefore we hold that once the church in question was constructed and consecrated by Arch Bishop of Trichy Diocese, the church and its properties would vest in the Pope and the fourth respondent, Arch Bishop as a delegate of the Pope, is entitled to the spiritual and temporal powers over the church and its properties. As already observed, though the church was constructed with the funds mostly provided by the Roman Catholic public of Vakkampatti Village, when the church was consecrated according to the Roman Catholic rites, the church and its properties would vest in the fourth respondent.”

It is held further as under:

  • “Therefore, on the basis of the law, particularly, the law governing the church in question, we hold that the church and its properties vest only in the fourth respondent herein and it is open to him to exercise his power through his delegates, namely, respondents 2 and 3. It is true that it would be open to the fourth respondent to authorise Villagers to administer the secular affairs of the church, but the plaintiffs have not established that they were authorised by the fourth respondent to administer the secular affairs of the church and even if they were so authorised, they would exercise the power of administration as authorised agents of the fourth defendant and not de hors the authorisation. Equally, it would have been open to the Villagers to form a trust to retain the administrative control over the church and its properties at the time of consecration of church subject to the grant of consent by the fourth respondent for retaining such a control. ….. It is, no doubt, true that it is open to the plaintiffs to show that notwithstanding the provisions of the Canon Law, the temporal affairs of the church are being governed by the custom of the Roman Catholic public of Vakkampatti Village. If the custom is established, then, the Roman Catholic people of Vakkampatti Village can claim right over the church and its properties by way of custom.”

A Division Bench of Madras High Court, as early as in the year 1915, in Michel Pillai  Vs. Rt. Rev. Bartle[34] held as under:

  • “According to Canon Law a Roman Catholic Church becomes, as soon as it is consecrated, the property of the church authorities, irrespective of the fact that any particular worshipper or worshippers contributed to its construction.  The Bishop and other church authorities have the exclusive right to the internal management of the church, whether relating to secular or religious matters, such as accommodating the congregation inside the church and prescribing the part to be taken by the congregation in the services and the ceremonies.”

Roman Catholic Churches are governed under Canon Law.[35] The Canon Law postulates a detailed procedure for the administration of the Church and its property. In disputes relating to spiritual or temporal affairs of a Roman Catholic Church, the parties should be presumed to be governed by the general law relating to the administration of churches, namely the Canon Law.[36] But, it will not nullify the law of the land.

In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School[37] it was observed that in matters of property there was always a secular angle which is supplied by the law of the country, and that no religious denomination could make a law about its own property and thus nullify the law of the land.[38]

In Molly Joseph Vs. George Sebastian[39] it is held by the Apex Court that the personal law (Canon Law) ‘cannot have any legal impact’ in view of the enacted law – Divore Act.[40]

Juristic Personality in Canon

The Catholic Community in India is governed[41] by either ‘Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches’ (CCEC) or ‘Code of Canon Law’ (CIC).The first one is applicable to Syro Malabar Rite and Syro Malankara Rite; and the second, to the Latin Rite.  The Canon Law recognises three categories of personalities; viz., the moral person, the physical person and the juridic person. The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See have the character of a moral person (Canon 113). By baptism an individual or physical person is incorporated into the Church of Christ (Canon 208-223). Both ‘parish’ and the ‘diocese’ are public juridic persons. Canon 1256 stipulates that,‘under the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff’, ownership of goods ‘belongs to’ that juridic person which has acquired them legitimately.

As shown above, in the light of the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School (supra), merely because Cannon law declares a church or a diocese as a legal person, it cannot be assumed that the courts that deal with the matters of those entities will be bound by the assertion. It is a jurisprudential issue reigned by the common law.

In CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan[42] it is pointed out that Can.1254 and 1257 make it clear that the Catholic Church has the inherent right, independently of any secular power to acquire, retain, administer and alienate temporal goods, in pursuit of its proper objectives, and all temporal goods would be regulated by the Canons as well as by their own statutes. Sub-clause (2) of Can.1257 provides that unless it is otherwise expressly provided, temporal goods belonging to a private juridical person are regulated by its own statutes, not by these Canons.

Fundamental Rights as to Religion & Administration of Trusts

Church Could Administer Property, Only in Conformity With Law

The secular aspect of the management of the property of a religious trust is to be carried out in accordance with the law of the land. The Supreme Court in Ratilal Panach and Gandhi Vs. State of Bombay: AIR 1954 SC 388: observed that a religious denomination was entitled to own and acquire property and administer the same; ‘but only in accordance with law’ and that the State could ‘regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws validly enacted’. Also See: Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333

In Rev. Father Farcisus Mascarenhas Vs. The State of Bombay,[43] it was contended that the Roman Catholic Churches were governed by the canon law and that the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which mandated registration  under the provisions of the Act contravened the fundamental rights of the Catholics; but, it was observed in the judgment that the provisions of the Bombay Act did not affect the fundamental rights of the Roman Catholics to hold property but they could only administer the property of the Church in conformity with law.

Right of Parishioners to Sue against Third Parties

As per the Canon Law of the Catholic Church the church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar.  But, in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez[44]  it is found, the parish being by law a public juridic person, that the plaintiffs (the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church) were competent to represent the juridic person and that they were competent to initiate civil proceedings before a Civil Court with the ultimate aim of protecting the property belonging to the church.  It is further held that by reading the Canon as a whole, the sanction of the ordinary was not necessary for initiation of such proceedings.

Registration of Church as a Society or Trust

Parish church properties vest in trust. Majority of parishioners have no right to take away the same or create a new system of administration.[45]

The functioning of a Church or other religious trust under a written (registered or unregistered) or unwritten bylaws is recognised by the Constitution of India under various Articles including Ar. 19(1)(c), 25, 26, etc. And, in various States, there is no law at all – such as Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 and Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 – that enables or requires registration of the Church or other religious trust, as a Trust. In such States, the registration of such an already existing Church, as a society, under the Societies Regn. Act for legal recognition, is inapt and uncalled for; because,

  • Every  member of such an existing Church has the Fundamental-Right, guaranteed by the Constitutional of India, to remain as a member of the Church even if he does not join, or refuses to join, the proposed society, as a member (assuming a society is formed officially by the church); and
  • The properties of such a Church will ‘remain in trust, as it has for the time immemorial, for the sake of the beneficiaries’ as held by our Apex Court in Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church.[46]

The registration of a Trust Deed or bye laws at a Sub Registry, under the Registration Act, is not ‘Registration of Trust’ as such.

Part VI

Registered Societies are NOT Juridical Persons

The enquiry as to the legal personality of an association of persons is essentially the enquiry whether it has the right of perpetuity in its own name, apart from its members. The basic tests to be applied for determining the same are the following:

  • (i)   Whether it can sue or be sued in its own name.
  • (ii)  Whether its property vests in itself.

Applying these tests authoritative decisions have definitively held that even the registered societies are also not juridical persons in law.

Unani Tibia College Case

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had unequivocally held in the celebrated Unani Tibia College Case,Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic &Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458, that a registered society was not a corporation and that the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 gave only certain privileges to a society registered under that Act. It is held that (i) the society, being unincorporated, is unable to sue or be sued in its own name and (ii) the phrase ‘property belonging to a society’in Sec. 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 did not give the society a corporate status as this phrase merely described the property which had been vested in trustees or governing body.It had been held by several High Courts earlier, giving undue importance to the expression ‘property belonging to a society’ in Sec. 5, that the registered societies possess juristic personality or status.

  • See also: Benares Hindu University Vs. Gauri Dutt Joshir AIR 1950 All 196. Also see: K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook: AIR 1970 Pat 163; Inder Chand Vs. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha: AIR 1977 Del 34.

Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society

The law on this point is further expounded by our Apex Court in Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397, as under:

  • i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
  • ii) A Society registered under the Societies Regn. Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  (Para 21)
  • iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22)
  • iv) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)

[1]      4th Edition

[2]      AIR 1940 PC116.

[3] M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1.

[4]      ShriomaniGurudwara  v.   ShriSomNathDass: AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[5]      Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th  Edition, page 307.

[6]      ShriomaniGurudwaraPrabandhak Committee, Amritsar v.   ShriSomNathDass: AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[7]      1962 Ker LT 240.

[8] CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; James Chinnamma Vs.  Joseph Abraham: 1962 Ker LT 240; Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725: 2012-1 KCCR 503, Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283; Major Arcbishop, Angamaly Vs. PA LalanTharakan: 2016  AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51.

[9]      35 Mad LJ 407; referred to in CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan: 2003-2 Mad LJ 254

[10]    (1863) 1 Moo. P.C.(N.S.) 411

[11]    (1882) L.R.7 A.C.484

[12]    AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[13] Quoted in: Major Arcbishop, Angamaly Vs. PA LalanTharakan: 2016  AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51

[14] Varghese Vs. St. Peters and  Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333; Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhas  Vs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790.

[15] Christopher Karkada, Bangalore Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725: 2012-1 KCCR 503

[16]    Para 184-xvii: (2017) 15 SCC 333. 

[17] Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhasVs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790; CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; Varghese Vs. St. Peters and  Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333; Sony Markose Vs. OusephCherian: ILR 2018-4 Ker 1056; Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. MaganlalMangaldasGameti: 2013-15 SCC 394; Fr.John Jacob Vs Fr.  N. I.  Paulose: AIR 2014  Ker 95; GheevargheseKoshyVsChacko Thomas: AIR 1963 Ker 191.

[18]M.M. Kathanar Vs. K.E. Kathanar: AIR 1954 TC 51; Referred to in: ThakurjiShrijiLaxmanji VS Shyama Devi: 1970 0 WLN 473

[19]    AG Vs. Pearson: (1817) 3 Mer 353; Referred to in Varghese  Vs. St. Peters and St. Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[20]    C.K. Rajan Vs. GuruvayoorDevaswom Managing Committee: AIR 1994 Ker 179 [Appeal Judgment: GuruvayoorDevaswom Managing Committee Vs. CK Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546]; Fakhuruddin Vs. Mohammad Rafiq: AIR  1916 All 115 (PC);  C  ChikkaVenkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915; Sridhar Vs. ShriJaganNath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; YogendraNathNaskar   Vs. Commr. of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089. ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265;  I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. MullaAlibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309. See also: Mulla’s Hindu Law (11th Ed. Page 489) Dr. B.K. Mukherjea: Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Fifth Ed, Page 407 and 412).

[21]    RambakeshwarDevasthan Trust Vs. President PurohitSangh: AIR  2012 SC 139.

[22]    AIR1946 PC 34.

[23]    (2017) 15 SCC 333: Para 181. Ram DulariDulareyVs. Ram Lal : Referred to in NarasimhiahVs. Y H Venkataramanappa: AIR 1976 Kar 43.

[24]    C ChikkaVenkatappaVs.DHanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Narayan   Krishnaji  Vs.  Anjuman E Islamia:  AIR 1952 Kar 14; Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier: AIR 1968 SC 915.

[25]    Ch. Hoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009-19 Dlh -265. See also Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam  Pastorate  AIR 2007 SC 1337; SubramoniaPillaiChellamPillai Vs. SubramoniaPillai: AIR 1953 TC 198;  M.G. Narayanaswami Naidu Vs. M. Balasundaram Naidu: AIR 1953 Mad 750.

[26]AIR 1974 Del. 228

[27] 2016(2) Ker LT 791

[28]    AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[29]Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001

[30] Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[31]    CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[32]    CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; James Chinnamma Vs.  Joseph Abraham: 1962 Ker LT 240.

[33]2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[34]ILR 39 Mad. 1056. Quoted in 2003-2 Mad LJ 254

[35]    Major Arch Bishop Vs. LalanTharakan, 2016(2) Ker LT 791.

[36]    Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[37]AIR 1958 MP 362

[38]    See also: Rev. Fr. Farcisus Mascarenhas Vs. State of Bombay: 1960-62 Bom LR 790 (Mudholkar& VM Tharkunde, JJ.); Gnanamuthu Udayar Vs. Anthoni: AIR  1960 Mad 430.

[39] AIR  1997 SC 109

[40] See also: Saly Joseph Vs. Baby Thomas: AIR 1999 Ker 66; Varkey Vs. Thresia: AIR  1955 Ker 255

[41]    See: Seline Fernandez Vs. Bernard Francis: ILR 2013-1 Ker 56

[42]2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[43]    62 Bom LR 790

[44]    2013(4) Ker LT 283

[45]    Varghese Vs. St. Peters and  Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[46]    Para 184-xvii: (2017) 15 SCC 333.  Churches are public religious trusts: Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhasVs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Principles and Procedure

Land Laws

Evidence Act – General

Contract Act

Easement

Stamp Act

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Clubs and Societies: General Features

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

1.Introduction

Clubs and Societies are voluntary associations of persons. Article 19(1)(c) of our Constitution guarantees freedom to form associations and unions.  It includes in itself the right of effective functioning so as to achieve its lawful objectives.[1]

The Clubs and Societies, as understood in our legal system, are identified in English Common Law as ‘Members’ Clubs’ and ‘Friendly Societies’.

2. Differentiating Features Between Clubs and Societies

It is difficult to pinpoint the differentiating features. Nomenclature of an Association, as Club or Society, by itself, may not be a decisive factor. For distinguishing Clubs from Societies, following characteristics, seen generally attached to Clubs, can be relied on.

  • (i)  Recreation, or social interaction for mutual benefit of the members, is prime object.
  • (ii) Funded by equal contribution of members, as membership-fee and subscriptions.
  • (iii) Property is joint property of the members, and not encumbered with obligations of ‘trust’ so as to benefit outsiders; and, therefore, they are freely dealt with by the members as they wish (subject to the bye laws).
  • (iv) Interaction between members being higher, compared to Societies, new membership is given on a serious scrutiny. The membership fee and rate of subscriptions are comparatively high.
  • (v) Usually registered under the Companies Act, for getting legal identity.

General features of Societies can be summarised, for the purpose of distinguishing them from Clubs, as under:

  • (i )  Societies are formed for accomplishing social, charitable or benevolent objectives.
  • (ii)  They are funded, mainly, on voluntary donations from members or outsiders.
  • (iii) Property of a Society (though theoretically joint property of the members) is maintained for benefit of persons other than the members also (and therefore encumbered with obligations pertaining to ‘trust’).
  • (iv) Acquisition of membership in Societies will be easier and membership fee and rate of subscriptions thereof will be comparatively low.
  • (v) Societies are registered under the Central or State Societies Registration Act, for acquiring legal identity and recognition.

3. Club: Definitions

Halsbury’s Laws of England: ‘Club’ is defined in the Halsbury’s Laws of England[2] as under:

  • “A club, except a proprietary club or an investment club, may be defined as a society of persons associated together, not for the purposes of trade, but for social reasons, the promotion of politics, sport, art, science or literature, or for any other lawful purpose; but trading activities will not destroy the nature of a club if they are merely incidental to the club’s purposes.”

Black’s Law Dictionary

  • In the Black’s Law Dictionary club is expounded as ‘a voluntary, incorporated or unincorporated association of persons for purposes of a social, literary, or political nature, or the like.’[3]

Daly’s Club Law

  • Daly’s Club Law[4] describes a club as ‘essentially an association of individuals in a way that involves to some degree the factors of free choice (which connotes a power of exclusion), permanence, corporate identity and the pursuit as a common aim of some joint interest other than the acquisition of gains.’

4. Members’ Club and Proprietary Club

Clubs are categorised into two main classes: ‘Members’ Club’ and ‘Propriety Club’.

  • Members’ Club: A ‘Members’ Club’ is a voluntary association of persons joining together in accordance with the rules and bye-laws of the club fundamentally for enjoying certain facilities or for availing specified mutually beneficial objectives and purposes.
    • Halsbury’s Laws of England[5] describes Members’ Club as a society of persons each of whom contributes to the funds out of which the expenses of conducting the society are paid. The contribution is generally made by means of membership fees or subscriptions, or both. 
    • In Members’ Club, subject to any rule to the contrary, members of the time being are joint owners, in equal shares, of all the properties of the Club. The relationship between the Club and the members is governed by the doctrine of mutuality; every member is a shareholder and every shareholder is a member.[6]
    • On the dissolution of a Members’ Club the property and assets are sold and realised, and after the discharge of the debts and liability of the club the surplus is divisible equally amongst the members for the time being, other than the honorary members, subject to any provision in the rules to the contrary.[7]
  • Proprietary Club: Propriety Club is controlled and administered by proprietor. The members are customers of proprietor; and they are not the owners of or interested in the property of the club.[8] The proprietor utilizes surplus income as profit and appropriates the same for his own benefit. There are wide variation in the nature and activity of propriety club and many of them are purely commercial undertakings. In India, Proprietary Clubs are usually seen established by Companies.

5. Unincorporated and Incorporated Clubs

Clubs can be incorporated under the Companies Act;[9] and on that basis, there are two classes: Unincorporated Clubs and Incorporated Clubs.

An incorporated company has a separate existence and the law recognises it as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. This new personality emerges from the moment of its incorporation and its rights and obligations are different from those of its shareholders. The company is holding its property and carrying on its business is not agent of its shareholders.[10]

Sec. 8 of the Companies Act, 2013 deals with companies with charitable objects, etc. It reads:

  • 8. Formation of companies with charitable objects, etc
  • (1) Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Central Government that a person or an association of persons proposed to be registered under this Act as a limited company—
    • (a) has in its objects the promotion of commerce, art, science, sports, education, research, social welfare, religion, charity, protection of environment or any such other object;
    • (b) intends to apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects; and
    • (c) intends to prohibit the payment of any dividend to its members, the Central Government may, by licence issued in such manner as may be prescribed, and on such conditions as it deems fit, allow that person or association of persons to be registered as a limited company under this section without the addition to its name of the word “Limited”, or as the case may be, the words “Private Limited” and thereupon the Registrar shall, on application, in the prescribed form, register such person or association of persons as a company under this section.

6. Societies Registered under Societies Registration Act

Societies predicated in the Societies Registration Act, 1860 are the ‘associations of persons for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose’; and no recreation club can be registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Acts.

A society formed for religious purposes can also be registered under the Societies Registration Act as the society formed for religious purposes would also ordinarily be a Society for charitable purposes.[11] But, it is held by the Patna High Court in Md. Yunus Vs. The Inspector General of Registration[12] that the Societies Registration Act does not embrace purposes which are religious or predominantly religious. It is explained in Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate by our Apex Court that when the Church, indisputably, carries on secular activities also, keeping in view the interest of the general public, there is no reason as to why in a case of mismanagement of such (registered) charitable organisations, although run by minorities, the Court cannot oversee its functions.[13]

Sec. 1 and 20 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 deal with registration of societies, etc. It reads:

  • 1. Societies formed by memorandum of association and registration
    •      Any seven or more persons associated for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose, or for any such purpose as is described in section 20 of this Act, may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association, and filing the same with Registrar of Joint-stock Companies form themselves into a society under this Act.
  • 20. To what societies Act applies
    •      The following societies may be registered under this Act: Charitable societies, the military orphan funds or societies established at the several presidencies of India, societies established for the promotion of science, literature or the fine arts, for instruction, the diffusion of useful knowledge (the diffusion for political education), the foundation or maintenance of libraries or reading-rooms for general use among the members or open to the public museums and galleries of paintings and other works or art, collections of natural history,

See Blog (Click): Effect of Registration of Societies and Incorporation of Clubs

7. Can a Literary/Charitable Club be Registered under So. Regn Act

Sec. 14 of the So. Regn. Act provides the provisions for dissolution. It lays down that upon the dissolution of a society registered under this Act, the property of that society shall not be distributed among the members, but shall be given to some other society, as directed in this Section. In the proviso to this Section, it is stated:

  • “Clause not to apply to Joint-stock Companies: Provided, however, that this clause shall not apply to any society which has been founded or established by the contributions of share-holders in the nature of a Joint-stock Company.”

It is clear from the Proviso to Sec. 14 of the So. Regn. Act that Associations ‘in the nature of a Joint-stock Company’ can also be registered under the So. Regn. Act. Therefore, it is legitimate to state that an Association in the nature of a club – not for recreation but, ‘for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose’ (and not encumbered with obligations of ‘trust’ so as to benefit outsiders) too can be registered under the Societies Registration Act. Property of such an Association/society is the joint property of the members; and, therefore, they are entitled to freely deal with the same as they wish (subject to the bye laws).

8. Unincorporated Clubs and Unregistered Societies

General principles as to the individual membership rights (so also the rights and responsibilities of the governing body members) of unincorporated clubs and unregistered societies are similar. Halsbury’s Laws of England describe Unincorporated members’ club as under:

  • “205. Unincorporated Members’ Clubs. – An unincorporated members’ club is a society of persons each of whom contributes to the funds out of which the expenses of conducting the society are paid. The contribution is generally made by means of entrance fees or subscriptions, or both. The society is not a partnership, because the members are not associated with a view to profit, nor, for the same reason, is it an association requiring registration as a company. It is not recognised as having any legal existence apart from the members of which it is composed. Subject to any rule to the contrary, the property and funds of the club belong to the members of the time being jointly in equal shares; and if provisions are supplied to a member, at a given price, this does not constitute a sale, but is in effect a release by the other members of their interest in the goods supplied. The transaction is not of a commercial nature and, consequently, is not controlled by the provisions of the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968. The peculiar nature of the transaction is of particular significance in relation to the supply of intoxicating liquor.”

9. Guarantees of Freedom to Form Associations, not Absolute

Right to form associations or unions is guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. But, it is  subjected to the restrictions in clause (4) of Article 19.[14]

Article 19 lays down:

  • Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. – 
  • (1) All citizens shall have the right- 
    • (a)….  (b) …. 
    • (c) to form associations or unions, co-operative societies; 
    • (d) … (e) … (f) … (g) . … 
  • (2) …. (3) … 
  • (4) Nothing in Sub -clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause. 
  • (5) …  (6) ….”

10. Enactments Governing Trusts, Societies and Clubs in India

‘Trust and Trustees’ and ‘Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions’ are subjects of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, under Entry No.10  and  28, respectively; thereby both the Centre and the States are competent to legislate on these subjects. A non-profit association can be formed under Section 8 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013.

The legal form of a charitable institution is identified by the nature  of business it undertakes. Charitable organisations in India are registered, mainly, under three laws:

  1. Societies Registration Act
  2. (State) Public Trusts Act
  3. Companies Act, 2003.

The Societies Registration Act, 1860 and various State-Societies-Registration-Acts (Rajasthan, Karnataka, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Jammu – Kashmir) do not require compulsory registration of Societies.Nevertheless, Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 requires compulsory registration of certain societies.

All public charitable trusts in the state of Maharashtra are governed by the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. States like Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh etc. also have Public Trusts Act. Several other states in India have no Trust Act at all. Wakf Acts and Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Acts also govern various religious public organisations.

11. Associations Attracted S. 8(1) of the Companies Act, 2013

Section 8 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013, lays down that an association of persons with charitable objects can be registered under this Act. It should have ‘in its objects the promotion of commerce, art, science, sports, education, research, social welfare, religion, charity, protection of environment or any such other object’ and it should be one which ‘intends to apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects’.

12. Unlike a Company, a Registered Society is not a Juristic Person[15]

 ‘Persons’ are of two kinds: human beings and legal persons. The second class is the institutions and associations of persons upon which the law incorporates or attributes legal personality. They are formed either on registration under a statute like Companies Act, or under a particular enactment such as English East India Company, Municipal Corporations, Life Insurance Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, etc. Apart from companies, corporations etc. our system accept idols in temples also as legal persons. 

A Company is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold property.  It is held by our Apex Court in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi[16]  that the vesting of legal ownership of the property of a society in the governing body is merely a method or mechanism permitted by the law; and, it was pointed out that the very resort to the machinery of trustees or the governing body for the time being acquiring and holding the properly showed that there was no intention to incorporate the society or union so as to give it a corporate capacity for the purpose of holding and acquiring property and that they confer certain privileges on a registered Society, which would be wholly unnecessary if the registered society were a corporation.

See Blog: Juristic Personality of Societies and Clubs

Bye Laws Bind as Contract

The members of a club or society, both registered and unregistered, are bound by the memorandum of association and its rules and regulations. The bye laws bind its members as a contract. Even the formation of a society itself is based on a contract. When a person becomes a member of the society, he would have no independent rights, and lose his individuality qua the society except those that are given to him by the statutes concerned and bye laws; and the rights of members merge in the rights of the society. In State of UP Vs. CD Chheoki Employees Co-operative Society, AIR 1997  SC  1413, our Apex Court explicated it with the analogy that the stream cannot rise higher than the source. It reads:

  •  “Thus, it is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) to become a member of a Cooperative Society. His right is governed by the provisions of the statute. So, the right to become or to continue being a member of the society is a statutory right. On fulfillment of the qualifications prescribed to become a member and for being a member of the society and on admission, he becomes a member. His being a member of the society is subject to the operation of the Act, Rules and bye-laws applicable from time to time. A member of the society has no independent right qua the society and it is the society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, Rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, Rules and the bye-laws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot rise higher than the source.”
  • (Quoted in Zoroastrian Co-op. H. Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar: AIR 2005  SC  2306; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774; Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. Devinder Singh: AIR 2007 SC 1723.)

See Blog: Bye Laws Fundamental

Acts Reasonably Ancillary or Conducive to the Objects

An act beyond the powers conferred by law, or an act violative of the objects envisaged in the foundational document or memorandum of a company, an association or a trust, is termed ‘ultra vires’ act.  But, if the act done by a company, association or trust is fairly incidental or reasonably ancillary to its main business or conducive to the statement of the objects of the company, association or trust, unless such an act is expressly prohibited, cannot be held to be ultra vires.

No Alteration of Fundamental Principles of Foundation and Trust

It is not open for the majority of the members of an association to alter the fundamental principles upon which it is founded, unless such a power is specifically reserved. This principle explained in Prasanna Venkiaesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao. (AIR 1931 Mad. 12; Relied on: Milligan Vs. Mitchel: 40 ER 852; Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun: (1904) AC 515. See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh (2007-4 Raj LW 3547).

In Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun, House of Lords (by a majority of 5-2) found that the minority was entitled to the assets of the Free Church. It was observed that when men subscribe money for a particular object, and leave it behind them for the promotion of that objecttheir successors have no right to change the object endowed. It was held that, by adopting new standards of doctrine (and particularly by abandoning its commitment to ‘the establishment principle’, which was held to be fundamental to the Free Church), the majority had violated the conditions on which the property of the Free Church was held.

Ultra Vires Acts are Void

Though the configuration of a society differs from that of a company, general principles as to various administrative affairs of a registered society are similar to that of a company.

A company is a juristic person. The actions and functioning of a company differ from that of a natural person who is free to act on his whims and fancies. The actions and functioning of a company are limited by the Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of Company. A corporation or a company has no inherent common law rights. Any act of a company (save a case of indoor management) ultra vires its Memorandum and Articles of Association, even if backed by the Resolution of the Board of Directors, is void and not enforceable. A contract made by the Directors of a company upon a matter not included in the Memorandum of Association is ultra vires and is not binding on the company. Such a contract does not become binding on the company even though afterwards expressly assented to at a General Meeting of shareholders, being void in its inception. A company is competent to carry out its objects specified in the Memorandum of Association and cannot travel beyond the objects. An ultra vires contract by a company is analogous to and stands on the same footing as a contract by an infant or a minor and in which case there is total incapacity. Just like a consent decree founded on the incompetency of an infant or minor is void and a nullity, a contract founded on the incompetency of the company is void and a nullity. These principles are recapped in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. Vs. Riche.

The principles in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. Vs. Riche  have been followed in A. Lakshmana-swami Mudaliar Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India,  In Re – Steel Equipment and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. etc.

See blog: Management – Powers of General Body and Governing Body

13. Co-Operative Societies, Creatures of the Statute

Co-operative Societies Acts provide for juristic personality to Co-operative societies. In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana[18] our Apex Court held ‘a co-operative society is a corporation as commonly understood’ inasmuch as the same has the status of a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold property, enter into contracts, institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purposes for which it is constituted.[19]

Co-operative societies being creatures of the statute, once a Co-operative Society is formed and registered, the rights of the society and that of its members stand abridged by the provisions of the Act. The activities of the societies are controlled by the statute. Therefore, there cannot be any objection to statutory interference with their composition or functioning merely on the ground of contravention of individual’s right of freedom of association by statutory functionaries.[20]

But, when the association has an option/choice to get it registered under a particular (Co-operative Societies’) statute,[21] if there are more than one statute operating in the field, the State cannot force the society to get itself registered under a statute for which the society has not applied. If the State does so, it will ‘violate Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India’.Ninety Seventh Amendment of our Constitution provided constitutional status to the Co-operative Societies and it has brought out radical changes in the concept of Co-operative Societies. Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a Co-operative Society.

Vesting of property

In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India,[17] reiterating the earlier view, it is held by our Apex Court that a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate,and that the mere fact of registration of a Society under the Societies Registration Act will not make the said Society distinct from association of persons.In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. A society, whether registered or unregistered, is not capable of owning any property or of suing or being sued in its own name.

See Blog: Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs

14. Regd. Society:  Members do not have any Beneficial Interest

Members have no interest other than that of bare trustees

During the subsistence of a registered society, or on its dissolution, the members do not have any proprietary or beneficial enjoyment/interest (that is, ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner) in the property the society holds.[22]  But, in companies, the share-holders hold the property as their own.

In Pamulapati  Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu  Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[23] it is held as under:

  • “The Societies Registration Act, therefore, does not create in the members of the registered society any interest other than that of bare trustees. What all the members are entitled to, is the right of management of the properties of the society subject to certain conditions.”

Underhill, in his treatise, ‘Law of Trusts and Trustees’, explained:

  • “However, the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the Association for the time being. The members for the time being cannot under the Association rules appropriate trust property for themselves for there would then be no property held on trust as intended by the testator for those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the Association for the time being.” [24]

See Blog: Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies

15. Formation of Associations and Running Business

A fundamental right to form the association cannot be coupled with the fundamental right to carry on any trade or business.[25] The right of the citizens to form the association is different from running the business by that association. Therefore, right of individuals to form a society has to be understood in a completely different context.

Expulsion of a Member from Society or Club

The associations have the right to manage their affairs by themselves. They have the right to enforce the internal discipline even by expelling an erring member. Since expulsion of a member from society or club visits him with harsh adversities, it will always be an exceptional decision and it has to be taken only in exceptional circumstances. It has to be done cautiously and after due considerations. And, it should also be strictly in accordance with law.

See blog: Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers

‘Suit By or Against a Regd. So.’ is Virtually Suit By or Against Entire Members

A society or a club, both registered and unregistered, is the compendium of its members. When it sues or is sued all its members should be made parties. Registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status. The common expression, ‘suit by or against a society’, legally and virtually denotes suit by or against its entire members.

From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act, that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ “as” President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees.

See Blogs: Suits By or Against Societies, Clubs and Companies

Civil Courts’ Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs of a Society or Club

Unless by express mode or by necessary implication barred, civil courts’ jurisdiction permeates into every civil matter including that of the private associations and even clubs. When the affairs of such institutions, associations etc. are governed by statutes, the courts test the validity of their actions on the touch stone of such statutes. If such bodies are not directly governed by any statute but being administered under their own rules, bye laws etc., their impugned actions are tested in the light of those rules or bye laws. The courts enquire whether their acts were in conformity with those rules and bye laws, and following the principles of natural justice.
See Blog: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs

How to Sue Societies, Clubs

An unregistered society or a club is not a legal person; and therefore, it has to sue or be sued only in the name of all its members. It can be done invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC which enables one or more of ‘numerous’ persons having common interest to sue or be sued in a representative character.

When a suit is filed by a member seeking reliefs concerning the society or a club, relating to a matter common to all members, he has to file it (also) as representing other members of the society other than the defendants (usually office-bearers of the society or club); and if it is a personal matter of the plaintiff, seeking relief against all other members, the plaintiff has to sue against one or two members (usually office-bearers) as representatives of others.

Suit Against Regd. Societies shall be in the Personal Name of President, Chairman, etc.

Suing entire members of the society, either in person or invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC, is the normal rule. But, Sec. 6 enables to sue or be sued every registered society in the name of its president, secretary, etc., as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society (or through such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion).

From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ as President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees.
See Blog: How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies

16. General Principles in Company Law Apply to Regd. Society.

The principal difference between a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and a company corporate is that a company is a juristic person by virtue of it being a body corporate, whereas the society, even when it is registered, is not possessed of these characteristics.[26]

The general principles governing rights of a member in a registered society, and the right of suit of a member, would be similar to that of an individual share holder’s rights in a company. Following are recognised by Courts as individual membership rights in a company:   (i) Right to vote,  (ii) right to stand as a candidate for election as a director and (iii) set-right illegal acts.[27] The general principles as to the rights and responsibilities of the directors of a company also apply to the governing body members of a society.

17. Role of Societies in society

After laying down the legal status of the Societies, our Apex Court observed in Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India[28] that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act play an important role in society. They discharge various functions which are beneficial to the society. They run educational and other institutions. They sometimes work in public interest and act in aid of State functions. They have their own accountability. They sometimes incur liabilities. Public interest litigations filed by Societies are galore.


[1]      AP Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298;

DharamDuttVs. Union of India: AIR 2004 SC 1295.

[2]      Fourth Edition, Vol. 6, Para 201, Page 56: 

Quoted in H R Club Vs. State: AIR 1986 Pat 182.

[3]      Quoted in Delhi Gymkhana Club Limited Vs. Union of India: ILR 2009-5 Del 625.

[4]      Page 1

[5]      IV Edition, Vol. 6, Para 205, 206, and 208

[6]      Harbour Division II, Madras Vs. Young Men’s Indian Association, Madras: AIR 1970 SC 1212

[7]      Halsbury’s Laws of England: IV Edition, Vol. 6, Paras 209,217, 220, 232, 247, 256 and 261

[8]      Harbour Division II, Madras Vs. Young Men’s Indian Association, Madras: AIR 1970 SC 1212.

[9]      Under Section 8 (1) Companies Act, 2013.     

[10]    Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC 3397.

[11]    Hindu Public Vs. Rajdhani Puja Samithee: AIR 1999 SC 964.

[12]    AIR 1980 Pat 138.

Referred to in: Fazul Rabbi Pradhan Vs. State of WB: AIR 1965 SC 1722.

[13]    AIR 2007 SC 1337.

[14]    Board of Control for Cricket Vs. Cricket Association of Bihar: AIR 2015 SC 3194; 

AP Dairy Development Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298;

Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India AIR 2004 SC 1295;

M/s. Raghubar Dayal Jai Prakash Vs.The Union of India   AIR 1962 SC 263.

[15]    See Chapter: ‘Juristic Personality of  Societies and Clubs’

[16]    AIR 1962 SC 458 

[17]    AIR 2003 SC 3397

[18]    AIR 1985 SC 973

[19]    R Jaivel Vs. State of Tamil Nadu: AIR  2006 Mad 215.

State of Punjab Vs. Kesari Chand: AIR 1987 P&H 216;

Sonepat Co Op Sugar Mills Ltd Vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court:   AIR  1986 P&H 386;

Mulshanker  Kunverji  Gor Vs. Juvansinhji  Shivubha  Jadeja:   AIR  1980Guj 62.

[20]    A P Dairy Develpmt.  Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[21]    A P Dairy Develpmt. Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[22]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College Vs.  The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Dharam  Dutt Vs. Union of India: AIR 2004 SC 1295;

Pamulapati  Buchi Naidu College Committee, Vs. Govt. of A P: AIR 1958 AP 773.

[23]    AIR 1958 AP 773. See also: Raj Kumar Gaba Vs. State of UP: 2012-49 VST 252;

Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Merchant Navy Club: 1974-96 ITR 261;

Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee Vs. Jagmonan Singh: ILR  1971-2 Del 515.

[24]    Quoted in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001- Para 69.

[25]    Tata Engineering and Locomotives Vs. The State of Bihar:  AIR 1965 SC 40; 

A P Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[26]    Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans: AIR 2003 SC 3397

[27]    Nagappa Chettiar Vs. Madras Race Club: AIR 1951 Mad 831;

Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516; 

ShridharMisra Vs. Jaihandra, AIR 1959 All 598;

CL Joseph Vs. Jos AIR 1965 Ker 68;

Star Tiles Works Vs. N. Govindan: AIR 1959 Ker  254.

[28]    AIR 2003 SC 3397.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

What is Trust in Law?

‘Trust’, in Law, Simplified.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

TRUST: Word Meaning

  • Primary:
    • Faith, hope, confidence, entrustment, obligation, conviction, expectation, belief, assurance, care etc.
  • Derivative:
    • Reposition of confidence in trustee, by the founder;
    • Obligation of trustee to administer the trust property;
    • Unconditional responsibility undertaken by the trustee.
    • Association involved in the affairs of the trust.
    • Endowment or property held in trust;
    • Institution managed under the trust;

TRUST – In Law

  • Trust is anobligation’-
    • that arises from the reposition of confidence by the author
    • upon the trustee
    • to deal with or administer the trust-property
    • for the benefit the beneficiaries.
  • Trustee is the person who is-
    • entrusted by the founder
    • to deal with or administer the trust property
    • for the benefit the beneficiaries..
  • Trust-property is the property –
    • that is endowed by the founder
    • with a particular object that would benefit
    • the specified beneficiaries.

Thus, the constituents for a valid trust are the following:

  • Founder, Property,
  • Object, Trustee,
  • Obligation
  • Reposition of confidence, and
  • Beneficiary.

Definitions Given by Jurists

Underhill in ‘Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees’ defines trust as under:

  • “A trust is an equitable obligation binding a person (who is called a trustee) to deal with property over which he has control (which is called the trust property) for the benefit of persons (who are called the beneficiaries) of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom may enforce the obligation.”[1]

Halsbury’s Laws of England describes ‘trust’ as a confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power, to the intent, that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object.[2]

Salmond on Jurisprudence[3] refers to trust as under:

  • “A trust is a very important and curious instance of duplicate ownership. Trust property is that which is owned by two persons at the same time, the relation between the two owners being such that one of them is under an obligation to use his ownership for the benefit of the other. The former is called the trustee, and his ownership is trust ownership: the latter is called the beneficiary, and his is beneficial ownership. As between trustees and beneficiary, the law recognises the truth of the matter: as between these two, the property belongs to the latter and not to the former. But as between the trustee and third persons, the fiction prevails. The trustee is clothed with the rights of his beneficiary, and is so enabled to personate or represent him in dealings with the world at large.”[4]

TRUST: Definition in Indian Trusts Act

Definition of ‘trust’ in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 contains the quintessence and spirit of the definitions given by Underhill, Halsbury and Salmond. Sec. 3 of the Trusts Act defines trust as under:

  • Trust:
    • A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner:
  • ‘Author of the trust’: ‘trustee’;beneficiary’; ‘trust property’; ‘beneficial interest’; ‘instrument of trust’: –
    • The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’;
    • the person who accepts the confidence is called the ‘trustee’;
    • the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the ‘beneficiary’;
    • the subject-matter of the trust is called ‘trust property’ or ‘trust money’;
    • the ‘beneficial interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property; and
    • the instrument, if any, by which the trust is declared is called the ‘instrument of trust’.”

Definition of ‘Trust’: Simplified

The definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 can be simplified as under:

  • 1. A ‘trust’ is an obligation upon the trustees.
  • 2. It arises from the reposition of confidence, upon the trustees, by the author.
  • 3. It is to deal with or administer the trust property, as if he (trustee) himself is the owner, for the benefit the beneficiaries.

Definition of ‘Trust’: Analysed

Sec. 3 presents the definition in a ‘noncompound’ expression; that is, ‘trust is an obligation’. It is only qualified further, as shown under:

  • A ‘trust’ is an obligation-
    • (i) annexed to the ownership of property (to administer), and
    • (ii)(a) arising out of a confidence reposed in (trustee, by the author) and accepted by the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner), or
    • (ii)(b) declared and accepted by him (that is, trustee),#
    • (iii) for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner).
      • # The words “by him” denote that the obligation is “declared and accepted” by the same person. This situation comes-up only when the author himself declares to act as trustee. See notes below under the head: ‘Obligation … Declared And Accepted By Him’.

In simple terms, trust is the legal obligation of the Trustees to deal with (Arjan Singh v Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; Arjan Singh Vs Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; P.  Elumalai v Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board, 2017-8 MLJ 529) or administer (Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173) the trust property and to give effect to the objects of the Trust.

A Drill Required to Appreciate the Definition – Taking Aid from other Provisions

The definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act is complicated. Not only certain courts but some learned authors of treatises also went completely wrong while explaining the definition.

An exercise is necessary to understand the purport and implication of the definition. For that effort we have to take aid from other sections of the Act; though, usually, definitions are tools for explaining the substantive provisions of a statute, and not vice-versa.

(i) ‘A  Trust is An Obligation’

According to the Indian ‘Trusts Act’, ‘a trust is an obligation’ (arises from the reposition of confidence by the author).

It casts a responsibility upon the trustees to deal with or administer the trust property (as he himself is the owner). The word ‘trust’ is used in law as an ‘abstract[5]-countable[6] noun’, similar to ‘a business’, ‘an idea’ or ‘a duty’.[7]

(ii)  ‘Obligation Annexed to the Ownership’ refers ‘Administration

As per the definition, trust is an obligation ‘annexed to the ownership’ of the trust-property. By the very nature of ‘Trust’, the obligation ‘annexed’ to the trust-property is for administration.[8] It is made clear in Sec. 11 of the Indian Trust Act.

Sec. 11 casts duty on trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling ‘the purpose of the trust’, and obeying ‘the directions of the author of the trust’.[9] Sec. 34, 35 and 60 also refer to ‘administration’ or ‘management’ by trustee.

  • Sec. 11 Says – The trustee is bound to fulfil the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author
  • Sec. 34 says – Right to apply to Court for opinion in management of trust-property
  • Sec. 60 says – Right to proper trustees.—The beneficiary has a right  that the trust-property shall be properly protected and held and administered by proper persons …

(iii) Confidence is ‘Reposed’ by the Author ‘in the Owner’ – Owner is Trustee

Trust is defined to be an obligation arising out of a confidence ‘reposed in’ and ‘accepted by’ the owner. When the ‘author of the trust’ is defined, it is stated:

  • “The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’.”

Therefore, it is definite that the words, confidence reposed in the owner’, denote the confidence that is ‘reposed’ by the author[10] ‘in the owner’.

(iv) The ‘Owner’ who  ‘Accepts’ the Confidence is Trustee.

As we have seen, it is the author who ‘reposes’ the confidence; and the confidence is ‘reposed in’, and ‘accepted by’, the owner.  Who is the ‘owner’?

It is trustee.[11] The observations in some decisions[12] that the word ‘owner’ refers to the ‘author’ is absolutely incorrect.

The nexus between owner and trustee is clear from the definitions of ‘trust’ and ‘trustee’ – when ‘trust’ is defined, it is stated: the confidence is ‘accepted by the owner’; when ‘trustee’ is defined, it is stated: the confidence is ‘accepted by the trustee’.

According to the definition of trust, the ‘obligation’ stands ‘annexed to the ownership’ of the trust-property. Sec. 6 of the  Trusts Act makes it clear that ‘a trust is created when the author of the trust transfers the trust property to the trustee’.  Therefore, the ‘obligation’ upon the trustee casts a duty upon him to deal with or administer the trust-property as if he is its ‘owner’.

From Sec. 6 of the  Trusts Act, it is further clear that a trust cannot be said to have been constituted, unless the trustee is constituted as the ‘owner’ of the endowed property.[13]  For due administration,[14] such transfer[15] and vesting[16] of property in the trustee, as its (legal) owner,[17]is  inevitable. 

To find the answer, who is the ‘owner’ referred to in the definition of trust,we can also refer to the definition of ‘beneficial interest or interest’, in Sec. 3. The definition reads: 

  • “The ‘beneficial interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.”

The endowed property of a trust stands vested in trustee as its (sole) ‘owner’.[18] In RP Kapur  Vs. Kaushalya Educational Trust[19]  it is held by Delhi High Court that  ‘obligation’ in trust refers to a ‘tie of equity’ (viniculum-juris), whereby the trustee accepts the confidence reposed in him by the author to hold or apply the trust property for the purposes of the trust.

(v) ‘Obligation … Declared And Accepted By Him’

Going by the definition, the pronoun ‘him’ stands for ‘owner’. The definition reads:

  • “A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him …..”

As we have found in the notes just above, the confidence is ‘reposed and declared’ by the author;[20] and the confidence is ‘reposed in’, and ‘accepted by’, the trustee[21] (trustee is referred to in the definition as ‘owner’ – since trustee is the ‘legal owner’).

The expression, ‘obligation … declared and accepted by him’, is applied only when the declaration and the acceptance  are  made by the same person – it is Trustee. Rajasthan High Court observed in Heeralal  Vs. Firm Ratanlal Mahavir Prasad[22] as under:

  • “If only the trustee himself is the author, then only the trustee can make a declaration of trust.”

Therefore it is clear that this expression is attracted when the author declares ‘himself to be the trustee’.[23] (In such cases, the requirement of a formal ‘reposition of confidence upon the trustee’ does not arise.)

Section 6 of the Trusts Act expressly states that an author can be a founder-trustee. Clause (e) of Sec. 6 indicates that the formal ‘transfer of the trust-property to the trustee’ is not required where the author ‘indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts’ that he himself would be the trustee.

Our Apex Court held in Tulsidas Kilachand Vs. CIT Bombay City[24]  as under:

  • “No doubt, under Ss. 5 and 6 of the Indian Trusts Act if the declarer of the trust is himself the trustee also, there is no need that he must transfer the property to himself as trustee; but the law implies that such a transfer has been made by him, and no overt act except a declaration of trust is necessary. The capacity of the declarer of trust and his capacity as trustee are different, and after the declaration of trust, he holds the assets as a trustee. Under the Transfer of Property Act, there can be a transfer by a person to himself or to himself and another person or persons. In our opinion, there was, in this case, a transfer by Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand to himself as a trustee, though there was no formal transfer.”

(vi) ‘Confidence (Reposed in and) Accepted by the Owner’

We have seen, on analysis of the definition, that:

  • the confidence is ‘reposed in’ and ‘declared by’ by the author; and
  • the confidence is ‘accepted’ by the trustee.

From the definition, it is clear that the clause, ‘Confidence Reposed in and Accepted by the Owner’ manifest that (i) the ‘Obligation‘ on trustee is that enjoined by the author, and (ii) the Obligation must have been accepted by the trustee, on his own.

“Accepted by the Owner” denotes Unconditional Obligation undertaken by the Trustee

The words, “accepted by the owner (trustee)” is used in the definition with the deliberate object of denoting the unconditional obligation undertaken by the trustee, ‘on his own’; if not, the words “and accepted by” stand superfluous; inasmuch as a trust will not endure without a trustee.

The definition of Trust can be explained, in a nutshell, as under:

A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, andTrust is an obligation (upon trustee[25]). It is to deal with or administer[26] the trust-property as its (legal) owner.
arising out of a confidenceDuty of a Trustee is fiduciary[27] in nature.[28]  It is moral as well as legal.[29] (It must have been arisen from the confidence reposed in by the author.)
reposed inConfidence is reposed in Trustee (by the Author[30]).
and accepted by the owner, orTrustee,[31]the (legal) owner,[32] must have (unconditionally) accepted the confidence (reposed in by the author).
declared and accepted by himThe obligation is ‘declared and accepted‘ by the trustee.
(Only when the author himself is the trustee
,[33] the obligation can be ‘declared and accepted’ by one person.)
for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner.Author creates trust for the benefit of others. Trustee can be one among the beneficiaries.

Essential Requirements for a Valid Trust

Sec. 4 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 speaks as to creation of trust for ‘lawful purpose’. It reads as under:

  • 4. Lawful purpose. A trust may be created for any lawful purpose. The purpose of a trust is lawful unless it is
    • (a) forbidden by law, or
    • (b) is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law, or
    • (c) is fraudulent, or
    • (d) involves or implies injury to the person or property of another, or
    • (e) the Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy.
  • Every trust of which the purpose is unlawful is void. And where a trust is created for two purposes, of which one is lawful and the other unlawful, and the two purposes cannot be separated, the whole trust is void.
  • Explanation. In this section, the expression “law” includes, where the trust property is immovable and situate in a foreign country, the law of such country.

The essential elements for creation of a trust, enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act, reads as under:

  • 6. Creation of trust: Subject to the provisions of section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts
    • (a) an intention on his part to create thereby a trust,
    • (b) the purpose of the trust,
    • (c) the beneficiary, and
    • (d) the trust-property, and
    • (e) (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust-property to the trustee.  

Trust and Endowment

For a valid trust there should be certainty[34] as to:

  • Intention to create trust,[35]
  • Purpose,[36]
  • Beneficiary,[37]  and
  • Property.[38]

These are the ingredients of an endowment also. Appointment of a trustee[39] and transfer[40] of property to trustee for administration make Trust different from an Endowment.

The word ‘endow’[41] expresses the idea of giving, bequeathing or dedicating something for some purpose.[42] An ‘endowment’ is founded by dedication of property for the purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[43]  There may be dedication (granting) of property for subjecting it to an ‘easement’. But, in ‘law of trusts’, dedication involves the extinguishment of the rights of the original owner of the lands.[44] By ‘dedication’, the owner divests all his rights, title and interest in the property which becomes the property of the deity[45] or other endowment.

An ‘endowment’ can be public or private.[46] It is a corporeal reality to which social concepts are adhered to; whereas, a trust is primarily a legal concept attached to the administration of the endowed property.[47]

See Blog: Dedication of Property in Public Trusts

Property Vests in Trustee, by Transfer; But no Proprietary Interest

According to the definition of ‘Trust’, in the Indian Trusts Act, ‘a   trust is an obligation (a) annexed to the ownership of property, and (b) arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner/trustee. To establish a valid trust, the author must have completely parted with all his interest in the trust-property, and the property must have been transferred[48] to the trustee. But, the trustee acquires only ‘legal ownership’ over the trust-property, under the law in India. And, the beneficiaries have no proprietary-interest, or ‘beneficial interest’ pertaining to owners, as they have no ownership in the trust property.

In WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1957),[49] referring to the definition of trust, it is laid down by our Apex Court that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such.  It is held in this decision as under:

  • “22. Whatever be the position in English Law, the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (II of 1882) is clear and categoric on this point. Sec. 3 of that Act defines a Trust as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another or of another and the owner : the person who accepts the confidence is called the ‘trustee’ : the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the ‘beneficiary’ : ‘the beneficial Interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property; the subject-matter of the trust is called ‘trust property’ or ‘trust money’.”

Following WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,[50] it is observed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Special Secretary Land and Land Revenue[51] that Sec. 3 of the Trusts Act emphasises the fact that the beneficiary has a right to obtain his beneficial interest or interest against the trustee as owner of the trust property and that the trustee would become trust property’s owner for the purpose of effectively executing or administering the trust. 

It is observed by the Calcutta High Court in Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jew Vs. Commr. of IT[52] as under:

  • “Three parties are necessary to the constitution of a trust, namely, the settlor, the trustee and the beneficiary. A trust is not completely constituted until the trust property is vested in trustees for the benefit of the cestui que trust.”

In Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal (1957)[53] the Allahabad High Court had held as under:

  • “A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property (vide Sections 3 and 5 of the Trusts Act). It is an essential condition of trust that property must vest in the trustee. Unless, therefore, the trustee is constituted as the owner of the property entrusted to him, a trust cannot be said to have been constituted. Reference in this connection might be made to cases reported in Hussain Ali v. Baqir Ali, AIR 1946 Mad 116 (A); Shri Mahadeoji v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1941 Nag 181 (B) and Khemchand Ramdas v. Girdharidas Radhakishaindas, AIR 1947 Sind 187 (C); Ma Thein May v. U Po Kin, AIR 1925 Rang 289 (D) and Secretary of State for India v. Guru Proshad Dhur, ILR 20 Cal 51 (FB) (E). … The mere fact that a person is holding the property on behalf of another, will not constitute him a trustee, unless the ownership of the property is also vested in him.”

The definitions of ‘trust’, ‘trustee’ and ‘beneficiary’ lay down that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.

The obligation upon the trustee, to administer,[54] being ‘annexed to the ownership of property’, the property has to be administered by the trustee as if he is the ‘owner’ of the same;[55]  and, for such administration, the property must have been vested upon him as its (legal) owner.

Under Sec. 6 of the Trusts Act, a trust is created when the author of the trust transfers[56] the trust-property to the trustee.[57] Holding that the trustee is the legal owner of the trust property, it is observed in Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs.   Badrun Nisa Bibi (1940)[58] as under:

  • “In short, it is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and before there can be a trust the trustee must be the owner. The matter is made abundantly clear in Section 6, Trusts Act, 1882, which is in these terms:

‘Subject to the provisions of Section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts an intention on his part to create thereby a trust, the purpose of the trust, the beneficiary, and the trust property, and (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust property to the trustee.’

In short, there must be a transfer of the property to the trustee before a trust is created.”

Orissa High Court held in Narasingh Charan Mohapatra Vs. Radhakanta Mohapatra[59] as under:

  • “A trust in the accepted sense of the word is the creation of an obligation by the owner to the intent that he may hold the property for the benefit of some other person or object. As soon as the trust is declared according to the requirements of the law, the legal ownership passes to the trustee and he is bound to apply the income arising out of the property to the use and benefit of ‘cestuique trust’. As a general rule, it may be laid down that in order to make a voluntary declaration of trust binding upon the author of the trust he must have completely parted with all his interest in the property to the trustee or declared himself to be a trustee of the property for the benefit of the ‘cestuique trust’ –See: Agnew’s Trusts, p. 53.”

Sec. 10 and 75 of the Indian Trusts Act implies ‘vesting of property in trustees’.

Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 10. ….. Disclaimer of trust—Instead of accepting a trust, the intended trustee may, within a reasonable period, disclaim it, and such disclaimer shall prevent the trust property from vesting in him. A disclaimer by one of two or more co-trustees vests the trust property in the other or others and makes him or them sole trustee or trustees from the date of the creation of the trust.

Sec. 75 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 75. Vesting of trust property in new trustees.—Whenever any new trustee is appointed under section 73 or section 74, all the trust property for the time being vested in the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, or in the legal representative of any trustee, shall become vested in such new trustee, either solely or jointly with the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, as the case may require.

A Compny can be a Trustee of a Public Trust

It was held in See M.Gomathinarayagam Pillai v. Sri.Manthramurthi High School Committee, Tirunelveli, AIR 1963 Mad 387, as under:

  • “For the application of that section (Section 92 CPC)  it makes no difference whether the trustees is an individual or a company, nor is there any distinction between a company in whom the office of trustee vests and one which is specially formed for the purpose of executing the trust.” (Referred to in: S.N.D.P.  Yogum v. G.  Krishnamoorthy, ILR 2022-3 Ker 494; 2022-4 KHC 168; 2022-4 KLT 36)

Duel Ownership, as comprehended by Salmond is Not accepted in Indian Law

Trustee is full and Sole Owner, under Indian law.

Under English law, there is ‘duel ownership’ on trust property. First is the ‘legal ownership’ which is vested with trustee; and the second, the ‘equitable or beneficial ownership’ vested with the beneficiary. Salmond on Jurisprudence[60]  refers it as under:

  • “A trustee is the legal owner of the property, the actual owner thereof having lost title thereto by the creation of a trust. The equitable ownership in the trust property vests in the beneficiaries. The trust is thus an incident of dual ownership in which the creator of the trust no longer figures.”[61]

The Law of Trust in India does not follow the ‘doctrine of dual ownership’; because, it does not recognise legal and equitable estates. The trustee ‘holds’ and administers the trust property as its (sole[62]) ‘legal owner’[63] or the ‘full (legal) owner’. The Privy Council, in Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram (1931),[64] held as under:

  • “The Indian Law does not recognise legal and equitable estates. By that law, therefore, there can be but one owner; and where the property is vested in a trustee, the owner must, their Lordship think, be the trustee. This is the view embodied in the Indian Trusts Act: See Sec. 3, 55, 56, etc. … “[65]

If more than one trustee, the trustees altogether are (joint) owners of the trust property.[66]

Out Apex Court, referring, Mount Royal/Walsh Inc. v. Jensen Star, the Ship, (1990) 1 FC 199, of Federal Court of Appeal in Canada, observed in Ahmed Abdulla Ahmed Al Ghurair Vs. Star Health and Allied Insurance Co. Ltd.[67] as under:

  • “49. The term ‘Beneficial interest’ is defined under Section 3 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 which is reproduced hereunder:
  • ‘Beneficial interest’ or ‘interest of the beneficiary’ is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.’
  • 50. As it can be discerned from the definition of ‘Beneficial interest’ provided in Section 3 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882, there are two parties involved in an issue governing beneficial interest. One is a beneficiary named as ‘beneficial owner’ and the other is the owner named as ‘registered owner’ being the trustee of the property or the asset in question. Thus, one can deduce the underlining principle that the ownership is nonetheless legal over the trust property, which vests on him but he also acts as a trustee of the beneficiary. A beneficial owner may include a person who stands behind the registered owner when he acts like a trustee, legal representative or an agent.”

It is beyond doubt that the Canadian law that follows the English principles is not applicable in India, in these aspects.

‘Beneficiaries’ have Merely Beneficial Interest; ‘Legal Ownershipwith Trustees

In The Province of Bihar v. FR Hayes,  1946-14 ITR 326 (Patna), Fazl Ali, CJ (as he then was) while interpreting Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1938, referring the definition of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, held as under:

  • “The framers of the Act must be assumed to have known the accepted legal meaning of the expression and also known that the term ‘beneficiary’ in law is not generally used with reference to a full legal owner but with reference to a person who has ‘beneficial interest’ in some property which is usually in the possession and control of another person. The distinction between beneficial interest and legal ownership is one of the most notable features of a trust and in my judgment ‘beneficiaries’ referred to in Section 11 are those persons who have merely beneficial interest in a property while the legal ownership of the property vests in a person or persons who hold the property for their benefit.”

Read Blog: Indian Law Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership

Trustee Holds ‘On His Own Right’; Not ‘On Behalf Of’ the Beneficiaries

In WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh[68]  it is laid down by our Apex Court as under:

  • “23. These definitions emphasise that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary only has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property. The trustee is thus, the legal owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such. He, no doubt, holds the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries but he does not hold it on their behalf. The expressions ‘for the benefit of’ and ‘on behalf of’ are not synonymous with each other. They convey different meanings.”

Our Apex Court observed in Comm. Wealth Tax Vs. Kirpashanker Dayashankar[69] that the trustee holds the trust property ‘on his own right’ and not ‘on behalf of’ someone else though he holds it ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.

Indian Trusts Act, 1882 does not accept the doctrine of ‘duel ownership’.  ‘Legal ownership’ of the trust property is ‘vested’ with the trustee. Indian Trusts Act expounds that the trustee ‘holds’ the trust property as its (sole[70]) owner.  These obligations are casted upon trustees only to manage the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[71] It is beyond doubt that the trustee has no ‘proprietary interest’ inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’[72] in the property itself.  In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[73]The Act refers only to ‘beneficial interest’ entitled to by the beneficiaries; and, not ‘beneficial ownership’.

It is clear from the following statements in the definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882:

  • (i) “A ‘trust’ is an obligation … arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner… for the benefit of another….”
  • (ii) “(T)he ‘beneficial interest’…  is his (beneficiary’s) right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.”

The Common Law of Trust predicated by the courts in India,[74] in the matters of public trusts, has disfavoured the doctrine of ‘duel ownership’;[75] and followed the Trusts Act.

The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 repeatedly lays down – trustees are ‘holding’ trust property(Sec. 10, 29 and Chap. IX: Sec. 80 onwards).  It is subject to the obligation to use his ownership ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.

Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 10. Who may be trustee.—Every person capable of holding property may be a trustee; but, where the trust involves the exercise of discretion, he cannot execute it unless he is competent to contract.

Sec. 29 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 29. Liability of trustee where beneficiary’s interest is forfeited to Government.—When the beneficiary’s interest is forfeited or awarded by legal adjudication to the Government, the trustee is bound to hold the trust property to the extent of such interest for the benefit of such person in such manner as the State Government may direct in this behalf.

‘Obligation’ in Trustee: Moral & Legal Duty

A trust being an ‘obligation’ (i) for administration and (ii) arising out of a ‘confidence’ reposed in the trustee, the trustee has to discharge the ‘obligation’  and ‘confidence’ faithfully.[76]It must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries. He has to fulfill the object and the purpose of the trust and obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation.[77]It is his moral as well as legal duty.[78]

As pointed out by our Apex Court, in WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,[79]  the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 declares vesting legal ownership with trustees. The vesting of ownership of trust property with the trustee is under an obligation to manage it for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[80]  Though, in a trust, the trust property must have been transferred to the trustees, and the trust property vests in the trustee as owner thereof, it does not absolutely belong to any individual. The property is vested in trustees subject to the obligations upon which the trustees accepted the trust.[81] The trustee deals with the property in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust.[82]  In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[83]The legal ownership which vests in the trustee is for the purposes of the trust and to administer[84] the same.

It is observed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Special Secretary Land and Land Revenue[85] that the trustee would become the owner of the trust property for the purpose of effectively executing or administering the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries and for due administration thereof, and not for any other purpose. Merely because the property is vested in the trustee as the legal owner, he has no ‘proprietor interest’, inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’ in the property itself.  The trustee is not the full owner of the property in the real sense of the term.

Trustee has to perform these duties gratuitously.[86] No remuneration can be claimed from the trust property or income unless the terms of the trust do not specifically allow it.  But, the trustee is entitled to get reimbursement out of the trust property for all expenses properly incurred in relation to the execution of the trust and for preservation of the trust property.[87]

See Blog: Trustees and Administration of Public Trusts

Distinguishing Particularities of Trust from Other Legal-Relations

Trust imposes obligation upon trustees.[88]The whole edifice of trust rests upon the acceptance of ‘confidence’ by the trustee, reposed in by the author.[89] It is for administration[90] as desired by the author.  As soon as the trust is validly declared by the author and duly accepted by the trustee, the legal ownership passes to the trustee[91]and the property vests[92] in him. The trustee holds the endowed property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[93] The distinguishing particularities of trust from other legal-relations lie in ‘obligation’, ‘confidence’ and ‘entrustment of ownership in trustee’. 

Entrustment with Banker

The trustee administers the property as its (legal) owner (Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan:  AIR 1919 Mad 555; In Re Sabnis, Goregaonkar Senjit  Vs.  Shivramdas:  AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan:   AIR   1938 Cal818; Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Life Insurance Corp.  of India Vs.   Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1) with exclusive rights. (Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma: 2010-85 AIC 762; 2009-6 ALT 197, 2009-6 ALD 269).  In N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh (13.12.2021) the Supreme Court held as under:

“The money that a customer deposits in a bank is not held by the latter on trust for him. It becomes a part of the banker’s funds who is under a contractual obligation to pay the sum deposited by a customer to him on demand with the agreed rate of interest. Such a relationship between the customer and the Bank is one of a creditor and a debtor. The Bank is liable to pay money back to the customers when called upon, but until it’s called upon to pay it, the Bank is entitled to utilize the money in any manner for earning profit.”

‘Once a (Public) Trust Always a Trust’

A public trust is perpetual. Rule against perpetuities does not apply to it. It can never be put to an end though its nature may be changed.[94] Once a public endowment is made, even the former owners or founders cannot revoke it.[95]Subsequent conduct of the founder or his descendants contrary to such dedication would amount to a breach of trust.[96]  Tudor on Charities,[97]  while dealing with creation of charitable trusts, explains it as under:

  •  “When a charity has been founded and trusts have been declared, the founder has no power to revoke, vary or add to the trusts. This is so irrespective of whether the trusts have been declared by an individual, or by a body of subscribers, or by the trustees. “[98]

In Halsbury’s Laws of England,[99]it is stated as under:

  • “Charitable trusts have sometimes been declared subject to express powers of revocation, but there has apparently been no decision on the validity of such a power except as regards the rule against perpetuities.”[100]

Underhill in ‘Law relating to Trusts and Trustees’ has explained it,with respect to associations, thus:

  • “However, the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the Association for the time being. The members for the time being cannot under the Association rules Appropriate Trust property for themselves for there would then be no property held on trust as intended by the testator for those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the Association for the time being.”[101]

Revocable Trust

When the author/settlor creates or establishes the trust reserving his power to terminate the trust, or change the beneficiaries and trustees, or the terms of the trust, as he likes, such trust at the will and pleasure of the author is called revocable trust (See: Jyotendrasinhji v. SI Tripathi, AIR 1993 SC 1991).

Such trusts are possible only in private trusts. In case of revocable trusts, there will not be complete dedication of trust property.

  • 77. Trust how extinguished.—A trust is extinguished
  • (a) ….(b) …..(c) ….. or
  • (d) when the trust, being revocable, is expressly revoked.

Read Blog: Extinction, Discharge, Revocation, etc. of Public Trusts

A Trust or An Endowment Shall Not Fail for Want of Trustees.

It is a principle of equity that no trust shall fail for want of trustees.[102]  It applies  in three occasions: First, though a trust was clearly intended, the settler did not or could not appoint trustees owing to a mere omission or the trustee who was named either refused or was unable to act.[103]  Secondly, when a vacancy of trustee occurs.  Thirdly, in dedication to a juristic person like temple, or to a well identified institution or purpose though it is not regarded as juristic person.

Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act shows that, generally, a trust is created by transfer of trust-property to a trustee; and that a trust can also be created otherwise than ‘by any words or acts’ as to appointment of trustee when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts that he himself would be the trustee.

Dedication of property is like a rocket fired.  As long as it is in private realm it retains the character of a private property.[104] Once dedication is complete, it cannot be revoked.[105] It is a trite law that ‘once a trust always a trust’.[106]  In Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Som Nath Dass[107] the Supreme Court has described ‘Endowment’ as under:

  • “Endowment is when donor parts with his property for it being used for a public purpose and its entrustment is to a person or group of person in trust for carrying out the objective of such entrustment. Once endowment is made, it is final and it is irrevocable. It is the onerous duty of the persons entrusted with such endowment, to carry out the objectives of this entrustment. They may appoint a manager in the absence of any indication in the trust or get it appointed through Court.”

Sec. 92, CPC, applicable to public trusts, expressly authorizes court to appoint a new trustee.[108] Section 59 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, applicable to public trusts, deals[109] with the principle ‘A Trust shall not fail for want of a trustee’.  It reads:

  • 59. Right to sue for execution of trust.—Where no trustees are appointed or all the trustees die, disclaim or are discharged, or where for any other reason the execution of a trust by the trustee is or becomes impracticable, the beneficiary may institute a suit for the execution of the trust, and the trust shall, so far as may be possible, be executed by the Court until the appointment of a trustee or new trustee.

Public Trusts &  Indian Trusts Act

The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 is enacted primarily to govern private trusts; and ‘public or private charitable or religious endowments’ are expressly excluded from its ambit. 

In Sec. 1, under the head, ‘Savings’, it is stated:

  • But nothing herein contained affects the rules of Mohammedan law as to waqf, or the mutual relations of the members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law, or applies to public or private religious or charitable endowments, or to trusts to distribute prizes taken in war among the captors; and nothing in the Second Chapter of this Act applies to trusts created before the said day.

Though the Indian Trusts Act does not apply, in terms, to the public trusts, the common legal principles,[110] which cover matters of both public and private trusts, especially the Sections that speak as to the Duties and Liabilities of Trustees (Chapter III), Disabilities of Trustees (Chapter V), and Chapter IX pertaining to implied trusts, apply to public trusts also.[111]They ‘cannot become untouchable’[112] merely because they find a place in the Trusts Act.

Our courts apply the general law of trusts, and the universal rules of equity and good conscience upheld by the English judges in this subject, in appropriate cases.

Registration of Public Trusts

Various State Public Trusts Acts require registration of all public trusts with the authorities appointed under the said Acts. In New Noble Educational Society v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax-1, 2023-6 SCC 649, it is held with reference to Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, as under:

  • “67. In the event of failure to comply with Section 43(1), or failure to intimate changes in the trust, or for supplying false information, the trustee or other person in charge, can be penalized by Section 43 (11). Section 44 empowers the Commissioner to direct charitable organizations and trusts to comply and register under the Act.
  • 68.The assessees had argued that since they were registered under the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 or were trusts duly registered, they could not be compelled to comply with state laws as a condition for consideration of their application as charitable institutions, under Section 10 (23C).
  • 69. This court is of the opinion that the findings in the impugned judgment on this aspect are sound. The requirement of registration of every charitable institution is not optional. Aside from the fact that the consequences of non-registration are penal, which indicates the mandatory nature of the provisions of the A.P. Charities Act, such local laws provide the regulatory framework by which annual accounts, manner of choosing the governing body (in terms of the founding instrument: trust, society, etc.), acquisition and disposal of properties, etc. are constantly monitored. Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution reads as follows:
    • “32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, and universities; unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations; cooperative societies.”
  • By Entry 28, List III of the Seventh Schedule, the states have undoubted power to enact on the subject of charities:
    • “28. Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions.”

Private Religious Trusts

So far as private religious trusts are concerned, there are no specific statutory enactments to regulate their affairs. Such trusts are governed by the foundational principles upon which they are established, as evidenced by documents, if any; customs and usages;general law of contract and transfer of property, etc; apart from the Common Law of the Land applicable to such trusts.

See Blog (click): Public & Private Trusts in India.

In Hindu Endowments, Managers are Trustees in a General Sense

Three parties are necessary to constitute a trust; namely, the settlor, the trustee and the beneficiary, as laid down in Sree SreeIswar Gopal Jew Vs. CIT[113]. Trustee holds the property for the benefit of the beneficiaries or cesti que trust. In Hindu religious endowments, the trustees hold the endowed properties for the institution. It is laid down in Ram Parkash Dass Vs. Anant Das (1916)[114] as under:

  • “He (Mahanth) sits upon the gadi, he initiates candidates into the mysteries of the cult; he superintends the worship of the idol and the accustomed spiritual rites; he manages the property of the institution; he administers its affairs; and the whole assets are vested in him as the owner thereof in trust for the institution itself.”

This decision was noticed by the Board in Vidya Varuthi Vs. Baluswami[115] (1922) and it was observed:

  • “They thus concur with the first court that there was no “specific trust” which was the foundation of the plaintiff’s case. But after examining some of the judgments of their own court, they apparently felt constrained to hold that the decision of his Board in Ram Parkash Das Vs. Anand Das had crystallised the law on the subject, and definitely declared the Mahant to be a trustee. It is to be observed that in that case the decision related to the office of Mahant, but in the course of their judgment their Lordships conceived it desirable to indicate inter alia what, upon the evidence of the usages and customs applicable to the institution with which they were dealing, and similar institutions, were the duties and obligations attached to the office of superior: and they used the term trustee in a general sense, as in previous decisions of the Board, by way of a compendious expression to convey a general conception of those obligations. They did not attempt to define the term or to hold that the word in its specific sense is applicable to the laws and

In Pratap Singhji   Vs. Charity Commissioner[116] our Apex Court held as under:

  • “ ‘Endowment’ is dedication of property for purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment. It is to be remembered that a trust in the sense in which the expression is used in English law is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple. Hindu piety found expression in gifts to idols and images consecrated and installed in temples, to religious institutions of every kind and for all purposes considered meritorious in the Hindu social and religious system. Under the Hindu law the image of a deity of the Hindu pantheon is, as has been aptly called, a ‘juristic entity’, vested with the capacity of receiving gifts and holding property. The Hindu law recognises dedications for the establishment of the image of a deity and for maintenance and worship thereof. The property so dedicated to a pious purpose is placed extra-commercium and is entitled to special protection at the hands of the Sovereign whose duty it is to intervene to prevent fraud and waste in dealing with religious endowments. Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. It would be a legitimate inference to draw that the founder of the temple had dedicated it to the public if it is found that he had held out the temple to be a public one: Pujari Lakshmana Goundan Vs. Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44.”

The same is the position with respect to Wakf property held by Sajadahnashin who controls and manages the same.[117]

Roman Law and Hindu Law

In Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakhmiram,[118] it was held that ‘the Hindu Law like the Roman law and those derived from it recognizes not only corporate bodies with rights or property-vested in the corporation’ apart from its individual members, but also juridical persons and subjects called foundations.’ The religious institutions like mutts and other establishments obviously answer to the description of foundations in Roman law. The idea is the same, namely, when property is dedicated for a particular purpose, the property itself upon which the purpose is impressed, is raised to the category of a juristic person so that the property which is dedicated would vest in the person so created.

Trustee Represents Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries do not have right of ownership over the trust property.  But, Order XXXI, Rule 1 CPC lays down that the Trustee shall represent the persons interested in the trust in suits concerning property vested in the Trustee. Apart from providing an enabling stipulation, it indicates the significance of obligation casted on the trustees. And, it also asserts the paramount importance of the beneficiaries in a trust. 

Vesting of Ownership of Trust Property

While establishing a trust the author completely parts with all his interest in the trust-property, and the property has to be transferred[119] to the trustee. But, the trustee acquires only ‘legal ownership’ over the trust-property, under the law in India. And, the beneficiaries have mere ‘beneficial interest’, as they have no proprietary-interest or ownership. Then, an interesting question arises: In whom the actual ownership vests?

The following propositions can be presented as to the vesting of ownership of the trust-property.

  1. In most cases of public trusts, the ‘ultimate vesting’ may not be a matter of practical importance; because, the endowment will be permanent and indivisible; and court takes cognizance, when practical difficulties are faced while carrying out the object of the trust, by applying cy pres doctrine, or by invoking its inherent jurisdiction.
  2. The terms of dedication (as revealed from the deed of dedication, if any, or on other substantial evidence) determine the person or body of persons in whom/which such property ultimately vest in.
  3. If the ownership of the property of a trust vests in a legal person, such vesting is permanent (thereby it cannot be put to an end), and such vesting is subject to the object and purpose envisaged by the founder.
  4. If the subject matter of the trust is dedicated to public at large or a section of public, the title of such subject matter stands separated from the owner and vests in public or the section of public who are the beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation.
  5. If the property is that of an unregistered association and the members thereof are ascertainable (as in the case of an unregistered society) the actual ownership of the property will be presumed to be vested with those members (from time-to-time), only as joint owners (contra-distinct to ownership under tenants-in-common).
  6. If the property is one stands dedicated to a Political Party, unregistered Association or a Church, and the beneficiaries thereof are unascertainable, the property vests with the entire members (of such Party, Association or Church), from time to time, subject to its objectives Such vesting is permanent, whereby it cannot be put to an end even by a majority decision of the members of a particular time.
  7. In case such unregistered association or church becomes defunctive and it is impossible to carry on the affairs of the trust as intended by the founders, the court will apply the trust-property to a charitable purpose, ‘as nearly as possible’[120]to the objects of the original Trust, invoking ‘cy pres’ doctrine.  
  8. If the subject matter of a trust is one partially dedicated to public at large or a section of public (as in the case of a waiting shed or a public well) by a known person and administered and maintained by himself or through another person, the property will remain vested with the owner, when the purpose of dedication is extinguished.

Two (Kinds of) “Trusts” over the Parish or Branch Property

One Property, Several Trusts Possible

Trust is a general term used in wider sense in law. Therefore –

  1. If a property is acquired by a branch of a larger body, or a parish of a Church, the entire members of the larger body, from time to time, will be presumed to be the owners, subject to (i) the byelaws of the (entire) association or trust and (ii) the purposes or objectives ‘aimed to achieve’ by that particular property. 
  2. If the bylaws (expressly or by necessary implication) provides for special beneficial enjoyment by the members of the branch or parish, over the branch/parish properties, definitely there will be two (kinds of) “trusts” over the same property – one, trust for the beneficial enjoyment of whole body; and the other, for the members of the branch/parish.

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

Read Blog: Vesting of Property in Trusts

Trust is a Legal Concept ; Not a Juristic Person

‘A Trust’ is ‘an obligation’ according to the definition in the Trusts Act. In common law also it does not convey the idea that it is a tangible or a corporeal property. Grammatically speaking, as pointed out earlier, it is an ‘abstract[121]-countable[122] noun’. Therefore, it can neither be a juristic person[123] nor an association of persons.[124]

‘Trust’ is essentially a legal concept attached to the endowed property. It arises by the appointment of a trustee. For creation of a trust, the trust-property must have been transferred to the trustee.[125]The Delhi High Court held in Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Sham Lal[126] as under:

  • “A trust is primarily a legal concept, a mode of transfer of property and of holding property. On the other hand, an institution is primarily a social concept. It is not a legal concept at all. For, there is established legal method by which an institution may come into being. It may be established by way of an organisation which may assume any or no legal form. It may be a trust or a company or a statutory corporation or a mere unincorporated association or a society registered or otherwise. It is its work and place in the society that is the hall-mark of an institution. As observed by Lord Macnaghten in Mayor, etc. of Manchester V. Mcadam,3 Tax Cases 491 at 497, ‘it is the body (so to speak) called into existence to translate the purpose as conceived in the mind of the founders into a living and active principle.’ In the present case, the founders of the trust may have transferred their property to a charitable purpose and thus created a public trust. But the body to translate the trust into a living and active principle has not yet come into existence. It is that body which will be entitled to be called an institution. It is not a mere legal arrangement like a trust but an active working body with a social impact which can be called an institution.”

Read Blog: Trust is ‘An Obligation’; Not a Legal Entity

‘Trust’ is Used as Synonym to Endowment/Association

Inasmuch as the ‘trust’ has no existence without its trust property, and it is an ‘obligation’ ‘annexed to’ the trust property, the endowment or institution, upon which the obligation of ‘trust’ is pervaded, is personified as a ‘trust’. Certain public institutions established or dedicated with philanthropic view are also generally described as ‘trusts’.

In the inclusive definition of ‘trust’ in the Public Trusts Acts enacted by various States and in several Tax-Laws, Trust ‘means and includes’ a temple, a math, wakf, a dharmada or any other religious or charitable endowment, and even a society.  It is interesting to note that the word ‘trust’ is used as an ‘entity’ even in Illustration (b) of Sec. 15 of the Trusts Act –it is the only one place in this Act where the term ‘trust’ is used in this manner.

The Illustration (b) of Sec. 15 reads: 

  • “(b) A, trustee of lease-hold property, directs the tenant to pay the rents on account of the trust to a banker, B, ….”

See Blog: Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies

Life is Bestowed  upon Endowment When Trustee is Appointed

An ‘endowment’ is arisen by the dedication of a specified property for purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[127]

The differentiating particularity of a trust from an endowment is, the ‘transfer[128] of the trust-property to the trustee’.[129]The other ingredients for creation of trust as stated in the clauses (a) to (d) of Section 6 of the Act (Intention to create trust,  Purpose,  Beneficiary,  and Property) are the requisites for endowments also.

The author endows the property with a definite purpose, beneficial to the beneficiaries. Trust arises when a trustee is appointed for administration of the endowment.[130]  For the formation of a trust, the trust-property must have been vested in trustees.[131]The administration by the trustee must be to accomplish the purpose intended by the founder. The ‘obligation’ upon trustee arises only when the trustee accepts the confidence reposed-in by the author. The duty accepted by the trustee is ‘fiduciary’ in character. The administration by the trustee must be carried on with prudence,[132] and as a reasonable man.[133]

The Trustee of a Charitable Trust is enjoined with the duty to preserve and protect the property of the Trust as if the Manager of an infant, but such power of the Trustees cannot be read as that of a pleasure doctrine or a sweet will of the Trustees to dispose of the property. The degree of obligation is coupled with their fiduciary capacity to preserve and protect the property for the larger interest of the Trust and to be made available to the beneficiaries of the Trust to the maximum possible extent.[134]

Therefore, a legal identity is renowned, or life is bestowed, upon the endowment when a trustee is appointed. An endowment, sans trustee, remains static.

Trust Property must be one “Transferable to the Beneficiary”: Import

It must not be merely beneficial interest.

Section 8 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads:

  • 8. Subject of Trust. The subject-matter of a trust must be property transferable to the beneficiary. It must not be merely beneficial interest under a subsisting trust.

Subject matter[135] of an endowment and a trust will, normally, be a corporeal property. Sections 5 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 speaks as to ‘trust of’ movable and immovable properties. Under Section 8 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, the subject-matter of a (private) trust must be property transferable(note:- not, ‘be transferred’, ultimately)to the beneficiary, and it must not be merely beneficial interest under a subsisting trust. It conveys us two ideas:

  • (i) those who created the trust must be owners of the trust property and must be capable of transferring their interest in the trust properties[136] and
  • (ii) a Trust cannot be created only for a beneficial interest, (Note: Not the ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner; it is the interest pertaining to beneficiaries.) or there is no trust upon a trust.  In Pestonji Jalbhoy Chichgar Vs. Jalbhoy Jehangir Chichgar[137] it is observed by the Privy Council: “What the S. 8 forbids is a trust upon a trust– a trust of a mere right of the beneficiary to proceed against the trustee, and if the Will of Gulbai amounts to a declaration of a trust of her beneficial interest, that is, of her right to go against the trustees of Kaka’s will, then the trust offends against S.8.”

(Note: Section 8 does not postulate that the property should be transferred to the beneficiaries, ultimately.)

Salmond’s Jurisprudence (while describing “property”) refers to corporeal property  as, ‘the right of ownership in a material object, or that object itself’.[138]A founder can also be a beneficiary of a trust after its dedication. (But, he cannot claim any special right on that score, unless he reserved the same positively.)

Progressive Jurists Accept Trust in a ‘General Sense’

Indian law of trusts follows the progressive view of jurists like Halsbury.  They preferred investing principles of trust, in a ‘wider’ or ‘general’ form.  They see principles of trust in all matters of fiduciary relationships under which one holds property on behalf of, or for the benefit of, others.  Halsbury’s Laws of England defines ‘trust’ as a confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power, to the intent, that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object. Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 substantially follow this definition.

Our Common Law imports still wider meaning to ‘trust’ in the matters of religious trusts.

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

It is trite law that dedicated property of a temple will be vested with the idol as the legal owner thereof, though such vesting is qualified to be in an ‘ideal or secondary sense’;[139] and the possession and management thereof will be with some human being identified as Shebait or Manager, though in the strict legal sense, they cannot be accepted as trustees.

In Wali Mohammed v. Rahmat Bee, (1999- 3 SCC 145), to the question whether the Mutawalli of a Wakf would be a trustee, our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “35. It will be seen that the main part of Sec. 10 (Limitation Act) states that no period of limitation applies for recovery of property from a trustee in whom the property is vested for a specific purpose, unless such a person is an assignee for valuable consideration. The Explanation further states that it shall be deemed that a person managing the property of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is to be deemed to be a trustee in whom such property has vested for a specific purpose. We shall explain these provisions in some detail.
  • 36. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] the Privy Council held that property comprised in a Hindu or Mohammedan religious or charitable endowment was not property vested in trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of the said words in the main section. The reason was that according to the customary law, where property was dedicated to a Hindu idol or mutt or to a Mohammedan wakf, the property vested in the idol or the institution or God, as the case may be, directly and that the shebait, mahant, mutawalli or other person who was in charge of the institution was simply a manager on behalf of the institution. As Sec. 10 did not apply unless these persons were trustees this judgment made recovery of properties of the above trusts from donees, from these managers, rather difficult.
  • 37. The legislature therefore intervened and amended Sec. 10 for the purpose of getting over the effect of the above judgment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill of 1929 makes this clear. It says: “The (Civil Justice) Committee’s recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] and Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das Aurora [(1922) 50 IA 84] which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutawalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Mohammedan religious endowment is vested, are not trustees within the meaning of the words as used in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in them. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person, not being an assignee for valuable consideration, endowments of this nature are not protected. The Committee’s recommendation is that Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Mohammedan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee.” (Quoted in: Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482).

In Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482, the Apex Court held that the Mutawalli is not a trustee in its true sense. The Supreme Court formulated a crucial question and answered it as under:

  • “127. Thus, the Mutawalli is treated as a trustee. But would the amendment made to Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make a Mutawalli a trustee generally?

Our answer is an emphatic No. This is for the reason that the change in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act was effected to overcome the judgment of the Privy Council, when it held that a Mutawalli would not be a trustee and when in view of the requirement in Sec. 10 that the suit must be one against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose and as a Mutawalli would not be a trustee in law per se, the legislature brought in the explanation. But what is striking are two features. Firstly, the change is brought by way of an Explanation. More importantly, the explanation begins with words “For the purpose of this section  and proceeds to declare that “any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be properly vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”

Both Express and Constructive Trusts Differ from Contract

Trust differs from contract. Trust is a concept derived by law to give effect to a pious or philanthropic wish of a generous man, and to ensure the benefits thereof to the beneficiaries intended by its founder. But, contract is the result of positive acts of two persons. There is no intermediary in contract, as trustees in a trust. A contract without consideration is void. In ‘trust’, trustee undertakes an obligation; and there is no question of consideration.

In express trust there must be a deliberate intention on the part of the author to create a trust.[140] Constructive trust emerges without regard to the intention of the parties to create a trust.  It is an equitable remedy exercises by court of law. In both cases, there no direct involvement of beneficiaries. In a contract, the claims of one party against the other are personal in nature;[141] whereas, trust is governed by obligation and fiduciary relation. Fiduciary relationship for trustees and beneficial interest for beneficiaries in the trust property are the characteristics of trust; they are absent in contract.[142] Trustee deals with the property in a discretionary manner applying his prudence.[143]The beneficiaries of a trust have the right to get the trust enforced. Beneficiary of a contract has merely a personal claim against the promisor.

Breach of trust by itself is punishable under law; whereas breach of a contract, without fraud or cheating, raises civil liability alone. Every breach of contract is not breach of trust or cheating. A breach of contract is different from the offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust under IPC. In the absence of illegal motives or intention at the very inception, no offence of cheating would be made out in a contract.[144]

The service of a person agreeing to collect rent for another[145] with the undertaking to render accounts thereof does not create a trust even  constructively or impliedly.[146]  A mortgagee in possession is also not a trustee in the strict sense, and a constructive or implied trust  is legally recognised, as in cases governed by S. 90 and 95 of the Trusts Act, for he holds a fiduciary character in certain respects.[147]

Court is the Ultimate Protector of Charities[148]

Courts have jurisdiction and duty[149] to administer and enforce public trusts.[150]  As in the case of English Law, Indian Law also accepts court as the ultimate protector of all charities.[151] It is the guardian of the public charitable trusts or institutions[152] and its property.[153] In legal theory the Court is the guardian of charity, as it is of an infant.[154]In P. Elumalai Vs. Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board[155] the Madras High Court while passing an order exercising the ‘Parens Patriae’ jurisdiction over the trust held that, as ‘Parens Patriae’, the Courts were empowered to protect the sanctity of public trust in case of breach of trust on account of irregularities committed in trust. In this decision it was held that the Court could not remain a mute spectator when illegality had been committed against a public Trust in front of its own eyes.[156]

Public Trust Doctrine

Who is the owner of the sea, sky, air, rivers, sea shore etc.? Roman Law thought about it first. They found the answer and declared: either owned by no one (res nullius) or by everyone in common (res communious).  The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life.

The Public Trust Doctrine rests on the principle that the resources made available by the nature are of immense importance to the people as a whole and that it will stand wholly unjustified if made them an object of private ownership.

This doctrine envisages that the natural resources such as lakes, ponds (water bodies)etc. are held by the State as a ‘trustee’ of the public. The State is the trustee of all natural resources. The public trust doctrine[157]enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes.[158]It requires the State to protect, conserve and augment the gift of nature including the traditional water retaining structures.

The Government cannot ignore the fiduciary duty of care and responsibility casted upon it. If a water body has been fallen into disuse or forest is burnt up, that by itself, would not be a good ground for the Government to regularise the encroachments therein; as it amounts to breach of the public trust.

Any act or attempt made by the Government, or even the legislature, that derogate the object for which such land air or water exists, has to be held illegal by the higher authority, if any, which is equipped to scrutinise the illegality of such acts.

MC Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath

The Doctrine of Public Trust, by that name, is introduced to our legal system by our Apex Court in MC Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath.[159]  It was a public interest litigation. It arose from a news item appeared in the Indian Express.  It was stated that a private company, Span Motels, had built a motel at the bank of River Beas in Kullu Valley, by encroaching forest land. The major shares of the company were with the relatives of one Kamal Nath. The encroachment was later regularized by the government; and the land was leased out to the company, when Kamal Nath was the Minister for Environment and Forests.

The Motel used earth-movers and bulldozers to turn the course of river Beas. It was found to be illegal and constituted ‘callous interference with the natural flow of river Beas’; and that it resulted in the degradation of the environment. In this case the Supreme Court found that the Motel was liable to pay compensation by way of cost for the restitution of the environment and ecology of the area  and  issued various directions to restore the original position.

The  Apex  Court observed that the public had a right to expect certain lands and natural areas to retain their natural characteristics.  It  was  declared in the judgment that the public trust doctrine, ‘as discussed by in this judgment is a part of the law of the land’.

In this   trailblazing landmark decision, the Apex Court quoted Joseph L. Sax, Professor of Law, University of Michigan – proponent of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine -from his  erudite article ‘Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention’, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, Part 1 p. 473, which gave the historical background of the Public Trust Doctrine,[160] as under :

  • “The source of modern public trust law is found in a concept that received much attention in Roman and English law – the nature of property rights in rivers, the sea, and the seashore. That history has been given considerable attention in the legal literature, need not be repeated in detail here. But two points should be emphasized. First, certain interests, such as navigation and fishing, were sought to be preserved for the benefit of the public; accordingly, property used for those purposes was distinguished from general public property which the sovereign could routinely grant to private owners. Second, while it was understood that in certain common properties – such as the seashore, highways, and running water – ‘perpetual use was dedicated to the public’, it has never been clear whether the public had an enforceable right to prevent infringement of those interests. Although the State apparently did protect public uses, no evidence is available that public rights could be legally asserted against a recalcitrant government.”
  • “Three types of restriction on governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the public trust; first the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purposes but it must be held available for use by the general public; second, the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third the property must be maintained for particular types of uses:”

The Supreme Court held further as under:

  • “Our legal system – based on English common law – includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership.”[161]

In Tehseen Poonawalla  Vs. Union of India[162] it is pointed out that the principles such as the ‘polluter pays’ and the public trust doctrine have evolved during the adjudication of public interest petitions. (Also See: In Re: T. N.  Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, AIR 2024  SC 1955.)

Expansion of the Concept

In Fomento Resorts & Hotels Vs. Minguel Martins[163] our Apex Court held that the heart of the public trust doctrine is that it imposes limits and obligations upon government agencies and their administrators on behalf of all the people; especially future generations. It is pointed out in Noida Entrepreneurs Association Vs. Noida[164]that the doctrine has been developed from Article 21 of the Constitution. (Referred to in Bikramchatterji Vs. Union Of India: 2019 5 Supreme 3; 2019 0 Supreme(SC) 768).

It is held by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Kerala (2014  AIR SC 2407, Referred to in  In Re: The Punjab Termination of Agreement Act, 2004: AIR 2016  SC 5145) that the judicial function is also a very important sovereign function of the State and the foundation of the rule of law, and that the legislature cannot indirectly control the action of the courts and directly or indirectly set aside the authoritative and binding finding of fact by the court, by invoking ‘public trust doctrine’ or ‘precautionary principle’.

Our Apex Court held in Tata Housing Development Company  Vs.  Aalok Jagga (2020) 15 SCC 784; 2019 0 Supreme(SC) 1228) that the housing project,  setting up of high-rise buildings up to 92 meters, fell within the catchment area of Sukhna Lake and 123 meters away from the boundary of Sukhna Wildlife Sanctuary, could not be allowed to come up. 95 MLAs were to be the recipients of the flats in the buildings. The State of Punjab was required to act on the basis of Doctrine of Public Trust.

In Bikram Chatterji Vs. Union of India (2019 (8) SCC 527; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 901.) our Apex Court pointed out that the Public Trust Doctrine imposes on the State and its functionaries a mandate to take affirmative action for effective management, and the citizens are empowered to question its ineffectiveness. When the land of the farmers had been acquired for the purpose of housing and infrastructure needs by the State Government and handed over to the concerned authorities for construction, they were bound to ensure that builders acted in accordance with the objective behind the acquisition of land and the conditions on which allotment had been made. The concerned officials were not only enjoined to ensure protection of the rights of the home buyers, but also the interests of the authorities and bankers. The public authorities are duty-bound to observe that the leased property is not frittered away along with the money of the home buyers.

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[1]     Quoted in: Shanmughan  Vs. Vishnu Bharatheeyan:  AIR  2004 Ker 143.

[2]     Quoted in: Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar. 72

[3]     Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th  Edition, page 256.

[4]     Quoted in: Assn. of University Teachers Vs. AICTE: AIR 1999 Mad 164.

[5]     Contra-distinct to ‘concrete noun’ like God, earth, man, president etc.

[6]     Contra-distinct to ‘uncountable noun’ like poverty, wealth, kindness, innocence etc.

[7]    Grammatically, ‘a trust is attached to a property’, as ‘a business is done by a man’.

[8]     State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106. 

[9] Sec. 11  reads: “11. Trustee to execute trust.—The trustee is bound to fulfil the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation ….”

[10]   Allahabad    Bank  Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.

[11]   Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553; Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co Vs. CIT: 1966-61 ITR 572 (Bom); Christopher Karkada VS Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569;       Rajah SagiJanaki Vs. Appururu Bhukta: 1976-2 AndWR 117, 1976-1 APLJ 312;       Special Secy Govt of WB Vs. State Bank of India: AIR  1989 Cal 40; CIT Vs. K Shyamaraju: 1991-1 KantLJ 233; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[12]   C. Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma Association: 2010-85 AIC 762, 2009-6 ALD 269, B Vasudeva Rao Vs. K Laxminarayana : AIR 1985 Kar 129,

[13]   Khairul Bashar Vs. ThannuLal: AIR1957 All 553; Christopher Karkada  Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725;.

[14]   State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30.

[15]   Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revn. Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass Ahluwalia: AIR 1972 Del 128; Pankumari Kochar Smt Vs. Controller Of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.

[16]   Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460

[17]   Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan:  AIR 1919 Mad 555; Chhatra  Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram:  AIR 1931 PC 196; In Re Sabnis, Goregaonkar Senjit  Vs.  Shivramdas:  AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan:   AIR   1938 Cal818; Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of UP: AIR1957 SC 887, Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569; Comm. Wealth Tax Vs. Kirpashanker Dayashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463; Controller of Estate Duty Lucknow Vs. Aloke Mitra: AIR 1981SC 102; Life Insurance Corp.  of India Vs.   Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1. Special Secy. Govtof W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; Christopher Karkada  Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; PrabhakarGonesPrabhu  Vs. Saradchandra Suria Prabhu: 2019-11SCALE 381.

[18]   Chhatra Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of UP: AIR1957 SC 887; Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569.

[19]   1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801

[20]   Definition of Author: “The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’.”

[21]   Definition of Trustee: “The person who accepts the confidence is called the ‘trustee’.

[22]   Heeralal  Vs. Firm Ratanlal Mahavir Prasad:1964 Raj LW  33

[23]   As stated in Sec. 6.

[24]   AIR 1961SC  1023

[25]   Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act casts duty on the trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling ‘the purpose of the trust’, and obeying ‘the directions of the author of the trust’.

[26]   Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; State Bank of India Vs. Spl. Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529; Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173.

[27]   R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Edl Trust: 1982-21 DLT 46: ILR  1982-1Del 801, Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid: AIR1944  Cal 163.

[28]   Paru Vs. Chiruthai: 1985 KerLJ 480, 1985  KerLT 563: Referred: UN Mitra’s Law of Limitation and Prescription, 9th Edn., Vol. II, at page 1574, Para 66; Bhavna Nalinkant  Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529, CBSE Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay: AIR 2011 SCW  4888:  2011-8 SCC 497; Reserve Bank of India Vs. Jayantilal N.  Mistry: AIR 2016 SC 1.

[29]   Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557

[30]   Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Canara Bank Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1982 Ker 1: ILR 1981-2 Ker 649; R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[31]   Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.

[32]   Trustee is the owner.

      Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram   Shah:  AIR 1931 PC 196;       WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887; Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553; Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW (Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Benafasilal Rajgorhia Vs. Central Bank of India: 1971-76 CalWN 807; BomiMunchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993 BCR 301; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[33]   Heeralal  Vs. Firm Ratanlal Mahavir Prasad: 1964 Raj LW  33

[34]   Life Insurance Corp.  of India VS Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1; Patel Chhotabhai Vs. Gian Chandra Basak: AIR 1935 PC 97; Chambers Vs. Chambers: AIR 1944 PC 78.

[35]   Chambers Vs. Chambers, AIR 1944 PC 78, Benafasilal Rajgorhia Vs. Central Bank of India: 1971-76 CalWN 807; Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Badri: 1966 2 DLT 294. Khub Narain Missir Vs. Ramchandra Narain Dass: AIR 1951  Pat 340; Patel Chhotabhai Vs.Jnan Chandra Bank: AIR 1935 PC 97.

[36]   Laxman Balwant Bhopatkar Vs. Charity Commr, Bombay: AIR 1962  SC 1589, Banwarilal  Vs. Edwin Bhagirathi:  AIR 1981 MP 116.

[37]   Allahabad Bank Ltd.  Vs. CIT: 1952 21 ITR 169

[38]   Cambay Municipality Vs. Ratilal Ambalal Reshamwala: 1995 Supp2 SCC 591. Mahabir Prasad Mishra Vs. Shyama Dev : 2013 9 ADJ 46; 2013 101 AllLR 402; Hardinge Memorial Fund Trust Vs. St. of Bihar: 2008 1 BLJR 28; 2007 3 PLJR 553, LIC of India Vs. Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1.

[39]Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[40]Sec. 6 Clause (e) of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[41]   Vidarbha and Marathwada, Nagpur Vs. Mangala: 1982 MhLJ 686; Maria Antonica Rodrigues Vs. DR Baliga: AIR 1967 Bom 465.

[42]   Idol of Sri Renganathaswamy Vs. PK Thoppulan: (2020) 5 Mad LJ 331(SC); MJ  Thulasiraman Vs. Comr, HR & CE: AIR 2019 SC 4050.

[43]   Pratap Singhji Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064

[44]Gulam Mohideen Khan Vs. Abdul Majid Khan: AIR  1957 AP 941.

[45] SM Manorama Dasi Vs. Dhirendra Nath Busu: AIR  1931 Cal 329,

[46]   Deoki Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar:  AIR 1957 SC 133, Quoted in: M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1, Pratap Singhji  Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064

[47]Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Sham Lal: ILR 1973-1 Del  144,

[48]   Sec. 6(e) of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[49]   AIR1957 SC 887; Referred to in: Commr W. Tax Vs. Kirpashanker  : AIR 1971 SC 2463; Shyam Sunder Kejriwal Vs. Usha: 2011-97 AIC 910: 2010-4 CalHN 782; Shyam Sunder Kayal Vs. Mist Valley: 2008-1 CalHN 900: 2007-3 CalLT 560. The Nizams Jewellery Trust Vs. Asst Commr: 1997-1 ALD 4: 1996-4 ALT 852, CIT Vs. A N Chowdhury: AIR  1970 Cal 124, See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[50]   AIR1957 SC 887.

[51]   1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30;  Followed in: Shyam Sunder Kayal Vs. Mist Valley Binimoy: CalHN 2008 1 900,CalLT 2007 3 560.

[52]   AIR 1951  Cal 309

[53]   Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553.

[54]   Arjan Singh Vs Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; P.  Elumalai v Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board, 2017-8 MLJ 529; Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173; State Bank of India v. Special Secretary Land, [1995] Suppl 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529; Mathura Bai Vs. Regional Provident Fund: 1992 WLN 206(Raj); Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106

[55]   Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[56]   Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass Ahluwalia: AIR  1972 Del  128; Pankumari KocharSmt Vs. Controller Of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.

[57]   Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan:  AIR 1919 Mad 555, Goregaonkar Senjit  Vs.  Shivramdas:  AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan:   AIR   1938 Cal818; Rajah Sagi Janaki Vs.Appururu Bhukta: 1976-2 And WR 117, 1976-1 APLJ 312; Life Insurance Corp.  of India VS Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1.

[58]   AIR 1940 Pat 90

[59]   AIR 1951 Ori  132

[60]   Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th  Edition, page 256

[61]   See: Baba Badri Dass  Vs. Dharma: ILR 1982(1) P&H 491;       Govordhanhari Devasthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: 1982 Mh.L.J 390.

[62]   Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Himansu Kumar Roy Chowdhury Vs. Moulvi Hasem: AIR1938 Cal 818, Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid Ostagar: AIR1944 Cal163, Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329.

[63]   Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569, Birendra Kumar Datta Vs. Commr IT: AIR 1960 Cal 323: 1961-42 ITR 661, Shantiniketan Co Op Hsg. Society Vs. Dist.  Regr Co Op So: AIR 2002  Guj 428; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329; Mohammed Basheer Vs. Ahmed Kutty: 2011 (3) Ker LJ 767.

[64]   AIR 1931 PC 196. Referred to in: A S Krishna Murthy Vs. C N Revanna: AIR 2009KarRep 2692 , Raja Baldeodas Birla Santatikosh Vs. C I T: 1991-190ITR 578; Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid Ostagar: AIR1944 Cal 163, Himansu Kumar Roy Chowdhury Vs. MoulviHasem Ali Khan: AIR 1938 Cal 818.

[65]   Quoted in Special Secy. Govt of W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar. 72; Raja Sir Muthiah Chettiar Vs. CIT: 1984-38 CTR 76: 1984-148 ITR532: Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Ganga Properties Ltd: 1970-77 ITR 637; Sardarilal Vs. Shrimati Shakuntla Devi: AIR 1961 P&H 378.

[66]   Rakesh Arora Vs. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories: 2019-261 DLT 307; Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 145.

[67] AIR 2019 SC 413

[68]   AIR1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[69]   AIR 1971 SC 2463.

[70]   Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329 , Uma Roy VS Mehamala Dey: 1988 2 Cal HN 128.

[71]   Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin Vs. Trustees Maniar: AIR 1968 Guj 184

[72]   Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Special SecyGovtof W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40.

[73]   Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Kumar Jain Vs. ParasnathDigambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199

[74]   Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram Shah:  AIR 1931 PC 196;       WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887 ,       Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Kripashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463,       Bai Dosabai Vs. Mathuradas: AIR 1980 SC 1334;        Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2BCR301;       Hem Chandra Vs. Suradham Debya: AIR 1940 PC 134;      Ramabai Govind Vs. RaghunathVasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.        Deoki Nandan  Vs.  Murlidhar:  AIR 1957 SC 133;      Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73.

[75]   Smith Vs. Anderson, (1880) 15 Ch. D. 247;Quoted in: Bengal Luxmi Cotton Mills  Vs. State: 1964-69 CalWN 137; 1965-35 CC 187

[76]   Allahabad    Bank  Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476.

[77]Sec. 11.

[78]   Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557

[79]   AIR1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[80]   Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin  Vs. Trustees Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184. See also: RamabaiGovind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj).

[81]   Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj)

[82]   Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106

[83]   Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Vs. Parasnath Digambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199

[84]   Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529.

[85]   1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30.

[86]   Scott on Trusts Vol. II Sec. 170. The leading case on the subject is Kench  Vs. Gandford (1726) (White and Tudor Leading Cases in Equity page 693) , Referred to in: Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

[87]   Kishore Joo Vs. Guman BehariJoo Deo: AIR  1978 All 1; Bapalal Godadbhai Kothari Vs. Charity Commissioner Gujarat: 1966  GLR 825

[88]   Allahabad    Bank  Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476.

[89]   S Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma Association: 2009-6 ALD 269; 2009-6 ALT 197

[90]   State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30.

[91] Narasingh Charan Mohapatra Vs. Radhakanta Mohapatra: AIR1951 Ori  132

[92]   Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460

[93]WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh:AIR 1957 SC887 .

[94]   In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228

[95]   Ramkishorelal vs. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890;  Agasthyar Trust Vs. CIT ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;(1998) 5 SCC 588). Krishnaswamy Pillai Vs. Kothandarama Naicken: AIR 1915 Mad 380; Dasami Sahu Vs. Param Shameshwar, AIR 1929 All 315

[96]   Agasthyar Trust Madras Vs. CIT ; 1998 AIR (SCW) 3945 ; (1998) 5 SCC 588).     

[97]   (6th edn. ). at p. 131

[98]   Quoted in: Agasthyar Trust Vs. CIT ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;(1998) 5 SCC 588). Sri Gasthyar Trust vs. CIT: [1999] 236 ITR 23:103 Taxman 363

[99]   4th Edn., Vol. 5, para. 624

[100]  See also: Radhika Mohan Nandy Vs. Amrita LalNandy, AIR 1947 Cal 301

[101]  Quoted in: Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar: AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[102]  Silvy George Vs. Anna Joseph: 2014-2 KerLJ 462;       Commr. of Wealth Tax Vs. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali:1983-139 ITR 517;      Vadivelu Mudaliar Vs. CN  Kuppuswami Mudaliar: ILR1971-3 Mad142;      Mahadulal Vs. Chironji Lal: AIR 1963 MP 51;      Chidambaranatha Thambiran Vs. Psnallasiva Mudaliar: AIR 1918 Mad 464.

[103]  Shanti Devi Vs. State : AIR1982Del453

[104]  See: MAppala Ramanujacharyulu Vs. M Venkatanarasimha: 1974 AP 316; Siva Kanta Barua Vs. RajaniramNath:AIR 1950 Ass. 154: ILR 51 All. 626.

[105]   Radhika Mohan Nandy v. Amrita LalNandy: AIR1947 Cal  301, Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17;       M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; T C Chacko Vs. Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107. Virbala K. Kewalram Vs. Ramchand Lalchand: AIR 1997 Bom 46

[106]   See: Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17; M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; TC ChackoVs. Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107. KS Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333

[107]AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[108]  Deelipkumar And Co.  Vs. Mulla Gulamali: 1998-1 Mad LJ 773; Ramdas Bhagat vs. Krishna Prasad: AIR 1940Pat425.

[109]  Thangachi Nachial Vs. Ahmed Hussain Malumiar: AIR 1957 Mad 194;      AS Krishna Murthy Vs. CN Revanna: AIR 2009 Kar 2692

[110]  Thayarammal Vs. Kanakammal: AIR 2005 SC 1588; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309.

[111]  Bai Dosabai  Vs. Mathurdas Govinddas: AIR 1980 SC 1334.

[112]  State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Bansi Dhar:  AIR 1974 SC 1084.

[113]  AIR 1951  Cal 309

[114]  AIR 1916 PC 256

[115]  AIR 1922 PC 123

[116]  AIR 1987 SC 2064

[117]  Mir Ghulam Hassan Shah Geelani Vs. Mir Maqbool: AIR 1975 J&K 57

[118]  ILR 12 Bombay 247.

[119]  Sec. 6(e) of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[120]  In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228

[121]  Contradistinct to ‘concrete noun’.

[122]  Contradistinct to ‘uncountable noun’ like poverty, wealth, kindness, innocence etc.

[123]  Govt. of the Province of Bombay Vs. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia:  AIR 1949 PC 143; Thiagesar Dharma Vs.  CIT: AIR 1964 Mad 483: [1963] 50 ITR 798  (Mad);  Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas 1967 Raj LW 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144; Thanthi Trust Vs. W. Tax Officer: (1989) 45 TAXMAN 121: (1989) 178  ITR 28; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Kishorelal AseraVs. Haji Essa Abba: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367; Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. Commner. of IT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-336  ITR 611; Sambandam Died Vs. NatarajaChettiar: 2012-1 Mad LW 530.

[124]  Canara Bank Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1982 Ker 1: ILR 1981-2 Ker 649.

[125]  Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass: AIR  1972 Del  128; Pankumari Kochar Smt Vs. Controller of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.

[126]ILR 1973-1 Del  144,

[127]  Pratap Singh ji Vs. Charity Commissioner: 1987 AIR SC 2064.

[128]  CIT Vs. P. Bhandari 1984 -47 ITR 500 (Mad); L Gouthamchand  Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1989-176 442(Mad).

[129]  Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, reads as under:  “6. Creation of trust: Subject to the provisions of section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts: … … … (e) (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust-property to the trustee.”

[130]  Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553.

[131]  Padmavathi Vs. Raghu Tippanna Ruge: 1968(1) MysLJ 583; Relied on: Shivramdas Vs. Nerukar: 39 Bom LR 633; Sree SreeIswar Gopal Jew Vs. Commr of IT: AIR 1951  Cal 309; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Mgr. St. Bnk Mysore: AIR1988 Kar 1

[132]  Shanti Vijay and Company Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR 1980  SC 17; P Parthasarathy   Vs. Kee Pee Yes: 2016-1 MLJ 267; Neelam  Tirupatirayudu  Vs. Vinjamuri: 1912-17 Ind Cas 597; 1912-23 MLJ 599.

[133]  Shanti Vijay And Company VS Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR1980  SC 17.

[134]Ramdev Developers Vs. Jt. Chrity Commissioner: 2009-1Guj LR 337,

[135]  See Sec. 8 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[136]  A D Vehvalwala Vs. M C H Rustomji: 1970 Cal LJ 312;1970-1 Cal LT 292.

[137]AIR 1934 Bom 64

[138]Quoted in: Maharashtra St. Co Op Bank Vs. Asst. Provt. Fund Commr: AIR  2010 SC 868; Santhoshkumar Vs. Shaji: AIR  2013 Ker 184; Ans Gopal heo Narain Vs. PK Banerji: AIR  1949 All 433.

[139]  Bhupathi Nath Vs. Ramlal Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128

[140]  Cambay Municipality Vs. Ratilal Ambalal: 1995 Supp2 SCC 591.

[141]  LT Overseas, North America Vs. Sachdeva : 2018 252 DLT 270

[142]  The Travancore Bank Ltd.  Vs. Abraham: AIR 1955  TC 131; Rama Rao Vs. V Chandra Gopal: 1969-82 LW 738: 1969-2 MLJ 460

[143]  Shanti Vijay and Company Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR 1980  SC 17; P Parthasarathy Vs. Kee Pee Yes: 2016 1 MLJ 267; Neelam Tirupatirayudu Vs. Vinjamuri: 1912-17 Ind Cas 597; 1912-23 MLJ 599.

[144]  Uma Shanker Gopalika Vs. State of Bihar (2006)2 SCC (Crl.) 49, Referred to in: Ranbaxy Vs. State of Telangana: 2016 2 ALT(Cri) 165.

[145]  Mussamat Basso Kuar Vs. Lala Dhum Singh: 1887-15 Law Rep. Ind.App. 211

[146]  BL Rai Vs. Bhaiyalal: AIR 1920 PC 8; Mahabir Prasad Mishra Vs. Shyama Devi: 2013-9 ADJ 46; 2013-101 AllLR 402

[147]  Jagannath Vs. Sripathi Babu: AIR 1945 Mad. 297.      Relied on in Narayani Amma Vs. Eyo Poulose: AIR 1982 Ker 198.

[148]  See Chapter: State & Court – Protectors of All Charities

[149]  AG Vs. Pearson: (1817) 3 Mer 353; Ram Dularey Vs. Ram Lal: AIR 1946 PC 34. Quoted in KS  Varghese Vs. St. Peters and St. Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333. Rajendra Gupta VS Corporation of Chennai, rep. by its Commissioner: 011 4 LW 633, Rajagopal v. Balachandran: 2002 (2) CTC 527, See also: Narasimhiah Vs. Y H Venkataramanappa: AIR 1976 Kar 43.

[150]  C.K. Rajan Vs. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee: .AIR 1994 Ker 179. [Appeal Judgment: Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee Vs. C.K. Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546]; Fakhuruddin Vs. Mohammad Rafiq: AIR  1916 All 115 (PC);  Sridhar Vs. ShriJagan Nath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner Of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089. Ch Hoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265;  I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. MullaAlibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309. See also: Mulla’s Hindu Law (11th Ed. Page 489) and Dr. B.K. Mukherjea: Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Fifth Ed, Page 407 and 412).

[151]  C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296: Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia:  AIR 1952 Kar 14; Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915; Subramonia Pillai Chellam Pillai Vs. Subramonia Pillai Chathan Pillai: AIR 1953 TC 198;  M.G. Narayanaswami Naidu Vs. M. Balasundaram Naidu: AIR 1953 Mad 750.

[152]  ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh Laws(Dlh)-2009-4-105 ILR (Dlh)- 2009-19-265], See also Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate  AIR 2007 SC 1337. 

[153]Sujan Mohinder Charitable Trust  Vs. Mohinder Kaur: 2019 0 Supreme(Del) 281, AM Shamsudeen Vs AM Mohamed Salihu: 2004 2 LW 487; 2003 2 MLJ 526.

[154]In-Re, Man Singh AIR 1974 Del. 228

[155]2017-8 MadLJ 529

[156] Referred to in: Thatha Sampath Kumar Vs. Vupputur Alwar: 2019-3MadLW 705

[157]  Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Union of India: (1996) 5 SCC 281; T.K. Shanmugam Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu: AIR 2016 Mad 25.

[158]  Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. Vs. Minguel Martins (2009) 3 SCC 571. Quoted in  Association for Environment Protection Vs. State of Kerala: AIR  2013 SC 2500; Navi Mumbai Environt. Preservation Society Vs. Ministry of Environment: 2019-1 BCR 39.

[159]  1997-1 SCC 388; Referred to in T. N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India , AIR 1997 SC 1228; In re T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2022) 4 SCC 289.

[160] Rajeev Suri Vs. Delhi Development Authority: 2021 SCC Online 7

[161]Jayant Etc Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh: AIR 2021 SC 496.

[162]  AIR 2018 SC 5538

[163]  (2009) 3 SCC 571

[164]  (2011) 6 SCC 508.



Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India