Shebaits & Mahants and Law of Trustees

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

Shebait (शेबैत ) is the person entrusted to administer a temple. The responsibilities undertaken by Shebaits, in different parts of India, are similar. But, those persons are identified by different names.

  • Shebait (Shebaite) is the name used in Bengal & North India.
  • It is Dharmakarthas in Tamil and Telungu area.
  • And, Uralens/Ooralans in Kerala.[1] 

Because of the fiduciary position, their liability equates that of trustees.[2] With regard to status of Shebaits, Indian Law differ from that of trustees in English Law, on details.[3]

Under true English concepts, a trustee is the legal owner of the trust property; and the beneficial ownership thereof vests in the beneficiary (the cestuique trust).  Though Shebaits have certain limited proprietary rights, as shown below, they are essentially managers or persons in charge of administration of the temple and its property; and, the property do not vest in them as the legal-owners as in English Law.

Status of Shebaits and Mahanths – Concept and History of Origin, Unique

Mahant is the head and superior of the spiritual fraternity attached to a Mutt. The concept of Shebaiti and Mahanthship is deep-rooted in past Indian history, and has its own unique history of origin and development. When compared to ‘trustees’ in Law of Trusts, the status and position of Shebaits and Mahanths may appear anomalous.[4]

  • Because,
    1. Viewing through the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, Shebaits and Mahanths are not trustees; mainly because the property dedicated to a temple vest in the idol (as a juristic person), and that to a Mutt in Mutt itself.
    2. Despite the fact that property will not vest in the Shebaits/ Mahanths, they have certain proprietary rights (though in one sense they are mere managers or administrators).
    3. In the conception of Shebaiti and Mahanthship, both the elements of office and property are mixed up; and duties and personal interest are blended together.[5]
    4. Shebait is the human ministrant and the authorised representative of the idol[6].

In Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Chorone Requitte (1979)[7] it was observed by our Apex Court that the legal character of a Shebait cannot be defined with precision and exactitude in the English standards, though the concept of Shebaiti and Mahanthship is precise, and bounded by definite contours..

The legal status of a Mahant and Shebait is similar in certain characteristics and different in certain others.

Appointment of Shebait

The debutter property is dedicated by its prior owner for carrying into effect the pious purpose he envisioned.  It is accomplished through the actions of a human agent; that is the shebait. Ordinarily, a deed of dedication will not recite the duties of the shebait in detail. Public trust property being invariably vest in the Idol,  an express stipulation in the deed of foundation that the property of the idol will vest in the shebait will stand otiose; and it will not change the character.[8]

Shebait and Mahants are not Trustees in Strict Legal Sense; only Managers

The person in charge of administration of a temple and its properties, as per the above ratio, may be termed as a ‘manager’[9]  alone. But, in State Wakf Board Vs. Subramanyam[10] Madras High Court had observed as under:

  • “The word ‘Manager’ in relation to a religious or charitable endowment is not a term of art. The said word denotes the person who is in charge of the administration of the endowment or manages the property or supervises the performance of the charity and the word is one of very wide and general import.”

The property of a temple belongs to, or vests in, the Idol.[11] Shebaites are only managers in charge of administration of the temple and its property; and they cannot be recognised, in the strict legal sense, as trustees under strict English principles for the main reason that the property does not vest in them.[12]In Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Chorone Requitte (1979)[13] it was observed by our Apex Court that a Shebait is the human ministrant and custodian of the idol so also its earthly spokesman and its authorised representative entitled to deal with all its temporal affairs and to manage its property.

In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Vs. Balusami Ayyar(1922)[14] the Privy Council held that a ‘trust’ in the sense in which the expression is used in English Law, was unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple. Justice Ameer Ali held:

  • “It is also to be remembered that a ‘trust’ in the sense in which the expression is used in English Law, is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple. Hindu piety found expression in gifts to idols and images consecrated and installed in temples, to religious institutions of every kind….Religious institutions, known under different names, and regarded as possessing the same ‘juristic’ capacity, and gifts are made to them eo nomine …When the gift is directly to an idol or a temple, the seisin to complete the gift is necessarily effected by human agency. Called by whatever name, he is only the manager and custodian of the idol of the institution. In no case was the property conveyed to or vested in him, nor is he a ‘trustee’ in the English sense of the term, although in view of the obligations and duties vesting on him, he is answerable as a trustee in the general sense, for maladministration… it would follow that an alienation by a manager or superior by whatever name called cannot be treated as the act of a “trustee” to whom property has been “conveyed in trust’ and who by virtue thereof has the capacity vested in him which is possessed by a “trustee’ in English law.”
  • …Neither under the Hindu law nor in the Mahomedan system is any property ‘conveyed’ to a shebait or a mutavalli in the case of a dedication. Nor is any property vested in him, whatever property he holds for the idol or the institution he holds as manager with certain beneficial interest regulated by custom and usage.”

Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. On The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust explains as under:

  • “In English law the legal estate in the trust property vests in the trustee who holds it for the benefit of the cestui que trust. In a Hindu religions endowment, the entire ownership of the dedicated property is transferred to the deity or the institution itself as a juristic person, and the Shebait or Mahant is a mere manager.”[15]

It is also a distinctive characteristic of Hindu Law. Privy Council, in Vidya  Varuthi  Thirtha  Swamigal  Vs.  Baluswami  Ayyar(1922)[16] it was held:

  • “It is to be remembered that a ‘trust’ in the sense in which the expression is used in English Law is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple. When the gift is directly to an idol or a temple, the seisin to complete the gift is necessarily effected by human agency. Called by whatever name, the agent is only the manager and custodian of the idol or the institution. In no case is the property conveyed to or vested in him; nor is he a ‘trustee’ in the English sense of the term although in view of the obligations and duties resting on him, is answerable as a trustee in the general sense for maladministration.”

Madras High Court, in Sree Siddhi Budhi  Vinayakagar  Sree  Sundar-eswarar  Vs. SV Marimuthu[17] it was held that the trusteeship of a Hindu temple was an honorary office, with a mere right of management of the institution and its property.

Position of Shebait or Mahanth is Analogous to that of a Trustee

Though Shebaites are only managers in charge of administration of the temple and its property and they cannot be recognised, in the strict legal sense, as trustees under strict English principles, for the property does not vest in them, as regards the administration of the debutter, the position of a shebait is analogous to that of a trustee.

In Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Choron Requitte (1979)[18] it was observed by the Supreme Court that as under:

  • “20. … As regards the administration of the debutter, his position is analogous to that of a trustee; yet, he is not precisely in the position of a trustee in the English sense, because under Hindu Law, property absolutely dedicated to an idol, vests in the idol, and not in the shebait. Although the debutter never vests in the shebait, yet, peculiarly enough, almost in every case, the shebait has a right to a part of the usufruct, the mode of enjoyment, and the amount of the usufruct depending again on usage and custom, if not devised by the founder.”

This passage is quoted with approval in M.  Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (2019)[19] and Marthanda Varma Vs. State of Kerala (2020).[20]

Vesting Property with Idol, in an Ideal Sense; Management with Shebait

The possession and management of the dedicated property of a temple, which is vested with the idol, being in actual possession and management of the human-being, Shebait, he is entitled to deal with all the temporal affairs of the idol. Therefore, the vesting of property with the Idol, as legal owner thereof, is qualified to be:

  • (a) in an ideal sense (Jogadinadra  Nath  Vs.  Hemanta  Kumari Debi),
  • (b) secondary/general character (Bhupathi  Nath Vs. Ramlal Maitra) or
  • (c) in a figurative sense (Yogendranath  Vs. IT Commr).

Dr. BK Mukherjea on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, reads as under:

  • “(1) According to these sages the deity or idol is the owner of the dedicated property but in a secondary sense. The ownership in its primary sense connotes the capacity to enjoy and deal with the property at one’s pleasure. A deity cannot hold or enjoy property like a man; hence the deity is not the owner in its primary sense;
  • (2) ownership is, however, attributed to the deity in a secondary or ideal sense; this is a fiction but not a mere figure of speech, it is a legal fact; otherwise the deity could not be described as owner even in the secondary sense;
  • (3) the fictitious ownership which is imputed to the deity is determined by the expressed intentions of the founder; the debutter property cannot be applied or used for any purpose other than that indicated by the founder. The deity as owner, therefore, represents nothing else but the intentions of the founder…..
  • Neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law. So far as the deity stands as the representative and symbol of the particular purpose which is indicated by the donor, it can figure as a legal person and the correct view is that in that capacity alone the dedicated property vests in it.”

The Supreme Court, in Deoki  Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar (1957), after considering various decisions and Sanskrit texts, observed as under:

  • “Thus, according to the texts, the Gods have no beneficial enjoyment of the properties, and they can be described as their owners only in a figurative sense (Gaunartha), and the true purpose of a gift of properties to the Idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship.”

It is expressed in another way by the Apex Court in Yogendranath  Vs. IT Commissioner as under:

  • “The juristic person in the idol is not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that the image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated. … It is also not correct that the Supreme Being of which the idol is a symbol or image is the recipient and owner of dedicated property. … Thus according to texts, the Gods have no beneficial enjoyment of properties, and they can be described as their owners in a figurative sense (though the assets are called ‘properties of the Gods’ or ‘Devaswam’)”.

Our Apex Court followed the proposition that the property vests in idol in an ideal sense only, in the following decisions.

  • Bishwanath Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji (1967)
  • Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (1969)
  • Profulla  Chorone  Requitte Vs. Satya  Choron  Requitte (1979)
  • Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar (1999)
  • M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case) (2019).

It is held by the Supreme Court in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case) as under:

  • “322. Courts recognise a Hindu idol as the material embodiment of a testator’s pious purpose. Juristic personality can also be conferred on a Swayambhu deity which is a self-manifestation in nature. An idol is a juristic person in which title to the endowed property vests. The idol does not enjoy possession of the property in the same manner as do natural persons. The property vests in the idol only in an ideal sense. The idol must act through some human agency which will manage its properties, arrange for the performance of ceremonies associated with worship and take steps to protect the endowment, inter alia by bringing proceedings on behalf of the idol. The shebait is the human person who discharges this role.”

Read Blog: Hindu Temples & Law of Trusts

Management Entrusted to Shebaites,  Ex Necessitas

In Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Chorone Requitte (1979) it was observed by our Apex Court that the property dedicated to an idolvests in it in an ideal sense only;the possession and management has to be (ex necessitas) entrusted to some human agent. The legal character of a shebait cannot be defined with precision and exactitude. Broadly described, he is the human ministrant and custodian of the idol, its earthly spokesman, its authorised representative entitled to deal with all its temporal affairs and to manage its property

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

It is trite law that dedicated property of a temple will be vested with the idol as the legal owner thereof, though such vesting is qualified to be in an ‘ideal or secondary sense’ (Bhupathi Nath v. Ramlal Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128) and the possession and management thereof will be with some human being identified as Shebait or Manager, though in the strict legal sense, they cannot be accepted as trustees.

In Wali Mohammed v. Rahmat Bee, (1999- 3 SCC 145), to the question whether the Mutawalli of a Wakf would be a trustee, our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “35. It will be seen that the main part of Sec. 10 (Limitation Act) states that no period of limitation applies for recovery of property from a trustee in whom the property is vested for a specific purpose, unless such a person is an assignee for valuable consideration. The Explanation further states that it shall be deemed that a person managing the property of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is to be deemed to be a trustee in whom such property has vested for a specific purpose. We shall explain these provisions in some detail.
  • 36. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] the Privy Council held that property comprised in a Hindu or Mohammedan religious or charitable endowment was not property vested in trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of the said words in the main section. The reason was that according to the customary law, where property was dedicated to a Hindu idol or mutt or to a Mohammedan wakf, the property vested in the idol or the institution or God, as the case may be, directly and that the shebait, mahant, mutawalli or other person who was in charge of the institution was simply a manager on behalf of the institution. As Sec. 10 did not apply unless these persons were trustees this judgment made recovery of properties of the above trusts from donees, from these managers, rather difficult.
  • 37. The legislature therefore intervened and amended Sec. 10 for the purpose of getting over the effect of the above judgment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill of 1929 makes this clear. It says: “The (Civil Justice) Committee’s recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] and Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das Aurora [(1922) 50 IA 84] which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutawalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Mohammedan religious endowment is vested, are not trustees within the meaning of the words as used in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in them. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person, not being an assignee for valuable consideration, endowments of this nature are not protected. The Committee’s recommendation is that Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Mohammedan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee.” (Quoted in: Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482).

In Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482, the Apex Court held that the Mutawalli is not a trustee in its true sense. The Supreme Court formulated a crucial question and answered it as under:

  • “127. Thus, the Mutawalli is treated as a trustee. But would the amendment made to Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make a Mutawalli a trustee generally?
  • Our answer is an emphatic No. This is for the reason that the change in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act was effected to overcome the judgment of the Privy Council, when it held that a Mutawalli would not be a trustee and when in view of the requirement in Sec. 10 that the suit must be one against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose and as a Mutawalli would not be a trustee in law per se, the legislature brought in the explanation. But what is striking are two features. Firstly, the change is brought by way of an Explanation. More importantly, the explanation begins with words “For the purpose of this section  and proceeds to declare that “any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be properly vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”
  • Therefore, apart from it being an Explanation, it also on its very terms, limits the deeming fiction to the purpose sought to be attained in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act.”

Shebaitship: Office and Property Blended-Regulated by Custom & usage

It has been held in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar, (1928)[21], Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954)[22], M. Siddiq  Vs. Mahant Suresh Das(2019)[23] Marthanda Varma Vs. State of Kerala (2020)[24] etc. that the office and property are both blended in the conception of shebaitship.

In Manohar Mukherji Vs. Bhupendranath Mukherji (1932)[25] it was enquired by the Calcutta High Court whether shebaitship in Hindu law was property or an office to which the founder of an endowment was competent to appoint or nominate persons in any order of succession. Surveying the precedent, Justice Mukerji held:

  • “…I can find no authority for the proposition that the limited ownership which a shebait, in ordinary cases, exercises over debuttor property is not property in the eye of Hindu law… having regard to the rights which ordinarily attach to the office of a shebait, the office and the property of the endowment go together and that when it is a question between two persons one claiming and the other disputing a right to be the shebait, the question is a question of property.”[26]

In Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Choron  Requitte (1979)[27]it was observed as under:

  • “21. As regards the service of the temple and the duties that appertain to it, he is rather in the position of the holder of an office; but even so, it will not be quite correct to describe shebaitship as a mere office. ‘Office and property are both blended in the conception of shebaitship’.”[28]

It is noticed by Patna High Court in Baijaynanda Giri Vs. State of Bihar[29] that the combination of office and proprietary right in a mahant or a shebait was an anomaly. It was observed as under:

  • “These authorities emphasise that the position or a mahant or shebait is a combination of office and proprietary right and though the position is anomalous, it is an anomaly which has been recognised and accepted in Hindu law from a very early date.”[30]

Right to appropriate a part of the usufruct of the entrusted property, depending upon usage and custom, is peculiar to the office of shebaitship. Thus it is an honorary office with special rights of management of institution and its property.[31]

In Kunjamani Dassi Vs. Nikunja Bihari Das (1915)[32] it was observed that both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest, are mixed up and blended together in the conception of shebaitship; and that one of the elements cannot be detached from the other. In Sm. Angur Bala Mullick Vs. Debabrata Mullick (1951)[33] the Supreme Court followed these observations.[34]

In Angurbala Mullick Vs. Debabrata Mullick[35]the Supreme Court (Mujherjea, J.)  referring to the extract from the Privy Council decision in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Vs. Balusami Ayyar[36] observed further that though the shebait is a manager and not a trustee, shebaitship is not a ‘mere office’; as under:

  • “11. The exact legal position of a shebait may not be capable of precise definition but its implications are fairly well established. It is settled by the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Vidya Varuti v. Balusami [48 I.A. 302] that the relation of a shebait in regard to debutter property is not that of a trustee to trust property under the English law. In English law the legal estate in the trust property vests in the trustee who holds it for the benefit of cestuique trust. In a Hindu religious endowment on the other hand the entire ownership of the dedicated property is transferred to the deity or the institution itself as a juristic person and the shebait or mahant is a mere manager. But though a shebait is a manager and not a trustee in the technical sense, it would not he correct to describe the shebaitship as a mere office. The shebait has not only duties to discharge in connection with the endowment, but he has a beneficial interest in the debutter property. As the Judicial Committee observed in the above case, in almost all such endowments the shebait has a share in the usufruct of the debutter property which depends upon the terms of the grant or upon custom or usage. Even where no emoluments are attached to the office of the shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the endowed property which partially at least has the character of a proprietary right. Thus, in the conception of shebaiti both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest, are mixed up and blended together; and one of the elements cannot be detached from the other. It is the presence of this personal or beneficial interest in the endowed property which invests shebaitship with the character of proprietary rights and attaches to it the legal incidents of property. This was elaborately discussed by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Manohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath Mukherji [I.L.R. 60 Cal. 452] and this decision of the Full Bench was approved of by the Judicial Committee in Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary [63 I.A. 448] and again in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata [70 I.A. 57]. The effect of the first two decisions, as the Privy Council pointed out in the last case, was to emphasize the proprietary element in the shebaiti right, and to show that though in some respects anomalous, it was an anomaly to be accepted as having been admitted into Hindu law from an early date.
  • “According to Hindu law,” observed Lord Hobhouse in Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee v. Rumanlolljee Gossamee [16 I.A. 137] “when the worship of a Thakoor has been founded, the shebaitship is held to be vested in the heirs of the founder, in default of evidence that he has disposed of it otherwise, or there has been some usage, course of dealing, or some circumstances to show a different mode of devolution.” Unless, therefore, the founder has disposed of the shebaitship in any particular manner – and this right of disposition is inherent in the founder – or except when usage or custom of a different nature is proved to exist, shebaitship like any other species of heritable property follows the line of inheritance from the founder.”[37]

Shebait has Rights of a Limited Owner – Regulated by Custom & usage

Shebaites have, to some extent, the rights of a limited owner. In Profulla  Chorone  Requitte  Vs.  Satya  Choron  Requitte (1979)[38] it is held as under:

  • “20. Before dealing with these contentions, it will be appropriate to have a clear idea of the concept, the legal character and incidents of shebaitship. Property dedicated to an idol vests in it in an ideal sense only; ex necessitas, the possession and management has to be entrusted to some human agent. Such an agent of the idol is known as shebait in Northern India. The legal character of a shebait cannot be defined with precision and exactitude. Broadly described, he is the human ministrant and custodian of the idol, its earthly spokesman, its authorised representative entitled to deal with all its temporal affairs and to manage its property. …
  • 21. As regards the service of the temple and the duties that appertain to it, he is rather in the position of the holder of an office; but even so, it will not be quite correct to describe shebaitship as a mere office. “Office and property are both blended in the conception of shebaitship”. Apart from the obligations and duties resting on him in connection with the endowment, the shebait has a personal interest in the endowed property. He has, to some extent, the rights of a limited owner.”

Our Apex Court relied on the afore-stated observations, in Marthanda Varma Vs. State of Kerala.[39]In Marthanda Varma the Apex Court also quoted with approval the following passage of Dr. B K Mukherjea J. in ‘Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’:

  • “5.5. Shebaitship is not a mere office, it is property as well.- But though a Shebait is a manager and not a trustee in the technical sense, it would not be correct to describe shebaitship as a mere office. The Shebait has not only duties to discharge in connection with the endowment, he has also a personal interest in it. As the Judicial Committee pointed out in the above case, in almost all Debutter endowments, the Shebait has a share in the usufruct of the Debutter property, which depends either on the terms of the grant or upon custom or usage. Even when no emoluments are attached to the office of a Shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the endowed property which has partially at least the characteristics of a proprietary right. You shall see later on [Chapter 6 (Administration of Debutter: Rights, Duties and Powers of a Shebait)] that although the Shebait’s power to alienate the Debutter property is very much limited and can be exercised only when there is a justifying legal necessity or benefit to the deity, yet he can create derivative tenures in respect of the endowed property, which even if not supported by legal necessity cannot be impeached so long as he is alive and remains in office. The Shebait therefore has to some extent the rights of a limited owner. It has now been decided by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court (supra) after an elaborate review of all authorities that shebaitship is property, with regard to the disposition of which the rule in Tagore vs. Tagore, 9 BLR. 377 is applicable, and this decision has been approved of by the Privy Council in Ganesh Chandra vs. Lal Behari (supra) and again in Bhabatarini vs. Ashalata(supra). In Janki Raman vs. Koshalyanandan, A.I.R. 1961 Pat. 293 the founder of an endowment had provided that the office of shebaitship should be held by three brothers and that it should devolve on their heirs. One of the brothers having relinquished his right in favour of the other two brothers, it was held that the devolution of the office was governed by the general law of succession relating to property, and that a relinquishment by the holder of an office was not binding upon his heirs and could not enure beyond his lifetime.”

The Calcutta High Court(Asutosh Mookerjee, J.) held the following as to the limited ownership vested with the shebaits, in Manohar Mukherjee Vs. Bhupendra Nath Mukherjee (1933)[40]:

  • “15. The deity is the recipient of the gift only in an ideal sense; the dedicated property belongs to the deity in a similar sense; in reality the property dedicated is in the nature of an ownerless thing. In ancient times, except in cases of property dedicated to a brotherhood of sanyasis, all endowments ordinarily were administered by the founder himself and after him his heirs. The idea of appointing a shebait is of more modern growth. When a Hindu creates an endowment its management is primarily in him and his heirs, and unless he appoints a shebait, he himself fills that office and in him rests that limited ownership,-notwithstanding that, on the one hand, he is the donor and, on the other, the recipient on behalf of the deity, the juridical person-which has to be exercised until the property offered to the deity has been suitably disposed of. ……… This idea of limited ownership is the essence of the position of the manager or custodian of a dedicated property, by whatever name he may be called. That this idea is the only basis on which decisions of the highest authority as regards the rights and powers of shebaits may be justified will be seen hereafter when some of these decisions will be referred to.
  •  26. Shebaitship in its true legal conception involves two ideas: The ministrant of the deity and its manager; it is not a bare office but an office together with certain rights attached to it. A shebait’s position towards the debutter property is not similar to that in England of a trustee towards the trust property; it is only that certain duties have to be performed by him which are analogous to those of trustees…….”

Manohar Mukherjee Vs. Bhupendra Nath Mukherjee is also quoted with approval in Marthanda Varma Vs. State of Kerala.[41]

Shebaits/Dharmakartas have Vide Discretion

In Silambani Chidambara Vinayar Devasthanam Vs.  Chidambaram Chettiar (1943)[42] it is observed by the Madras High Court as under:

  • “The property of a temple belongs to the Idol and does not vest in the Dharmakarta although he has a wide discretionin the spending of the funds of the institution. The Dharmakarta of a temple therefore is not a trustee of its property and therefore Section 10 (Limitation Act) as it stood before the amendment of 1929 does not apply to him.”[43]

Right of Suit in the Shebait; and Not in the Idol

The Privy Council, in Jagadinadra  Nath  Vs.  Hemanta  Kumari  Debi,[44] held that the right of suit for protection of property was vested in the Shebait; and not in the Idol. The Privy Council held:

  • “There is no doubt that an idol may be regarded as a juridical person capable as such of holding property, though it is only in an ideal sense that property is so held. … . It still remains that the possession and management of the dedicated property belong to the Shebait. Add this carries with it the right to bring whatever suits are necessary for the protection of the property. Every such right of suit is vested in the Shebait, not in the idol.”[45]

Succession of Office of Shebait-Regulated by Custom& Usage

According to Hindu Law, when the trust is founded, the trusteeship vests in the founder and his heirs, and if the founder had prescribed a line of succession to the office of the trust but the succession to the office had entirely failed, the right of management reverts to the founder and his heirs.[46]

Our Apex Court held in Sital Das Vs. Sant Ram[47] that the law is well settled that succession to Mahantship of a Mutt or religious institution is regulated by custom or usage of the particular institution, except where a rule of succession is laid down by the founder himself who created the endowment.

It is well settled rule of Hindu Law that when there is no provision in the deed of endowment about the succession of office of Shebait, or the succession provided therein comes to an end, the management and control of the property follows the ordinary rule of inheritance, in other words it follows the line of inheritance from the founder and passes to his heirs.[48]

Shebaitship also Property for Devolution

In viw of the special rights and interest of shebaits over the debutter property and usufruct, a shebaitship is also a property for the purposes of devolution as affirmed[49] by Privy Council in Ganesh Chunder Dhur v Lal Behary Dhur[50], and Bhabatarini Debi v Ashalata Debi[51] and our Apex Court in Angurbala Mullick Vs. Debabrata Mullick.[52] Justice BK Mukherjea considered whether the appellant, as the widow of the shebait, was entitled to act as the shebait of the idol instead of the minor son of the shebait borne from his first marriage who was the respondent. It was contended that the office of shebaitship would devolve in accordance with the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act 1937. Justice BK Mukherjea held as under:

  • “But though a shebait is a manager and not a trustee in the technical sense, it would not be correct to describe the shebaitship as a mere office. The shebait has not only duties to discharge in connection with the endowment, but he has a beneficial interest in the debutter property. As the Judicial Committee observed in the above case, in almost all such endowments the shebait has a share in the usufruct of the debutter property which depends upon the terms of the grant or upon custom or usage. Even where no emoluments are attached to the office of the shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the endowed property which partially at least has the character of a proprietary right. Thus, in the conception of shebaiti both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest, are mixed up and blended together; and one of the elements cannot be detached from the other. It is the presence of this personal or beneficial interest in the endowed property which invests shebaitship with the character of proprietary rights and attaches to it the legal incidents of property.”

Whether Similar to Management of Estate of an Infant Heir[53]

The management and administration of property by Shebait or manager is described to be similar to that of a manager of the estate of an infant heir.[54] The property can be said to belong to an idol, and the possession and management of it be entrusted to Shebait or manager.[55]

But, Dr. B K Mukherjea J., ‘On Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’ has taken the view that the analogy as to infant heir does not ‘in terms at least apply’ to an idol.[56]

Shebait – Legal Status: Analogous to that of the Manager for an Infant Heir

Hindu Idol is a juristic person. Property dedicated to an Idol vests in it. The possession and management thereof have to be with some human being.Such a person is known as Shebait. He is qualified as ‘authorised representative’ of the Idol,and as ‘manager’ on analogy similar to that of the estate of an infant heir. He is not a ‘full trustee’ as understood in English Law.

In Prosunno Kumari Debya Vs. Golab Chand Baboo,[57] the Privy Council, as early as in 1875, it was observed as under:

  • “The authority of the sebait of an Idol’s estate would appear to be in this respect analogous to that of the manager for an infant heir.”

In Pramatha  Nath  Mullick  Vs.  Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, the Privy Council (1925)[58] laid down as under:

  • “One of the questions emerging at this point is as to nature of such an idol, and the services due thereto. A Hindu idol is, according to long established authority, founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus, and the recognition thereof by Courts of law, a ‘juristic entity’. It has a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued. Its interests are attended to by the person who has the deity in his charge and who is in law its manager with all the powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manager of the estate of an infant heir. It is unnecessary to quote the authorities; for this doctrine, thus simply stated, is firmly established.”[59]

Management Entrusted with Shebait

Our Apex Court, in Profulla  Chorone  Requitte  Vs.  Satya  Choron  Requitte (1979)[60] it is observed as under:

  • “The legal character of a Shebait cannot be defined with precision and exactitude. Broadly described, he is the human ministrant and custodian of the idol, its earthly spokesman, its authorised representative entitled to deal with all its temporal affairs and to manage its property.”

De Facto Shebait

In M. Siddiq (D) Thr. Lrs.  VS Mahant Suresh Das[61] it has been observed by our Apex Court that ‘in the vast majority of cases, a shebait is appointed in accordance with the terms of a deed of dedication by which property is endowed to an idol and that in the absence of an expressly appointed or identified shebait, the law has ensured the protection of the properties of the idol by the recognition of a de facto shebait. Where a person is in complete and continuous management of the deity’s affairs coupled with long, exclusive and uninterrupted possession of the appurtenant property, such a person may be recognised as a shebait despite the absence of a legal title to the rights of a shebait’.[62]

Shebaitship is Heritable Property

It is well-settled by the authorities that Shebaitship is a property which is heritable. In Shambhu  Charan  Shukla  Vs. Shri  Thakur Ladli  Radha Chandra Madan  Gopalji  Maharaj [63] Sabyasachi  Mukharji, J. it is held as under:

  • “The devolution of the office of Shebait depends on the terms of the deed or the Will or on the endowment or the act by which the deity was installed and property consecrated or given to the deity, where there is no provision in the endowment or in the deed or Will made by the founder as to the succession or where the mode of succession in the deed or the Will or endowment comes to an end, the title to the property or to the management and control of the property as the case may be, follows the ordinary rules of inheritance according to Hindu law.”

Nominating Successor by a Will

When one Shebait has the right to nominate his successor, nomination of successor by will is valid in law.[64]

Transfer to One in the Line of Succession of Shebait

It is observed by our Apex Court in Kali Kinkor  Ganguly Vs. Panna Banerjee[65] that the reason, why transfer in favour of the next Shebait or one in the line of succession[66] or a co-Shebaits is permissible, is that if anyone of the Shebaits intends to get rid of the duties the proper thing for him to do would be to surrender his office in favour of the remaining Shebaits. In such a case no policy of Hindu Law is likely to be affected nor can such transaction be said to be against the presumed intentions of the founder. A transfer of Shebaiti by will is not permitted because nothing which the Shebait has can pass by his will which operates only at his death. A Shebait cannot delegate his duties to another person, but he is not bound to accept his office. If he renounces his duties the renunciation in the form of a transfer in favour of the next heir can be valid in law.

In Bameswar Bamdev Shiva Vs Anath Nath Mukherjee[67] it was pointed out that if only a Shebait transfered his entire rights in favour of the next heir in succession then only such transaction became valid. It should amount to relinquishment resulting in acceleration of the interest of the next heir in succession. But if the transferor retained a portion of his rights as Shebait and transfered the remaining portion, even if such transaction be to the next heir in succession such a transfer could not be upheld.

Shebait’s Right of Nominating His Successor

Dr. B.K. Mukherjea in his Tagore Law Lectures, on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, observed as to Shebait’s right of nominating his successor as under:

  • “The founder of an endowment can always confer upon a Shebait appointed by him the right of nominating his successor. Without such authority expressly given to him, no Shebait can appoint a successor to succeed to him in his office. The power of nomination can be exercised by the Shebait either during his lifetime or by a will, but he cannot transfer the right of exercising this power to another person.”[68]

Alienation of Shebaitship by Will and Inter-Vivos

In Prosunna  Kumari  Vs.  Golap Chand (1874-75)[69] the Judicial Committee laid down that a Shebait must, out of necessity, be empowered to do whatever might be required for the services of the idol and for benefit and preservation of the property. But, in Kali Kinkor  Ganguly Vs. Panna Banerjee (1974)[70]the Supreme Court took a reverse turn observing that Dr. BK Mukherjea  had pointed out[71] that the Privy Council in Prosunna  Kumari’s case dealt with the rule of necessity and extended only to an alienation of the temporality of the idol and it did not and could not apply to alienation to the spiritual rights and duties.

It was observed by the Calcutta High Court in Nagendra Nath Vs. Rabindra Nath (1926)[72] that in the absence of custom or usage to the contrary or any terms to that effect in the deed of endowment, a religious trust or the right of management of a religious or charitable endowment or a religious office attached to a temple or any other endowment cannot be alienated by the holder.[73]

In Rajeswar Vs. Gopeswar[74] it was stated that such alienations are not regarded with much favour and that shebaitship cannot be transferred by will. As to the question whether shebaitship can be transferred inter vivos, Maclean CJ held that it cannot be transferred except under special circumstances.[75]

Dr. Mukherjea in his Tagore Law Lectures ‘On The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’ observes that the doctrine of alienation of Shebaitship on the ground of necessity or benefit to the deity is of doubtful authority and based upon a misconception of certain pronouncements of the Judicial Committee.

Assignment of Religious Office –  Against Public Policy

In Raja Vurmah Vs. Ravi Vurmah,[76] Rajah paid certain sum to the Urallers (managers) of the religious foundation who transferred all their rights to the Rajah. The Judicial Committee held that the assignment was void in law and could not create any rights in favour of the Rajah. In this case the doctrine of delegatus non potest delegate was pointed out and held that an assignment of religious office for the pecuniary benefit of the holder of the office was held to be against public policy and contrary to the intentions of the founder. Such transfer[77] amounted to delegation of delegated authority and could not have been sanctioned even on the footing of a custom[78] because it would be against public policy.

‘Dr. B K Mukherjea On Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’ has pointed out:

  • “Although Shebaiti right is heritable like any other property, it lacks the other incident of proprietary right, viz., capacity of being freely transferred by the person in whom it is vested. The reason is that the personal proprietary interest which the Shebait has got is ancillary to and inseparable from his duties as a ministrant of the deity, and a manager of its temporalities.
  • As the personal interest cannot be detached from the duties the transfer of Shebaitship would mean a delegation of the duties of the transferor which would not only be contrary to the express intentions of the founder but would contravene the policy of law. A transfer of Shebaitship or for the matter of that of any religious office has nowhere been countenanced by Hindu lawyers.”[79]

Exceptions to the Rule – No Alienation of Shebaitship

The Supreme Court in Profulla  Chorone  Requitte  Vs. Satya  Chorone  Requitte (1979)[80] it was observed:

  • “Although Shebaitship is heritable property[81] yet, it cannot be freely transferred by the Shebait. But there are exceptions to this general rule. Some of such exceptions recognised in several decisions, are:
    • alienation in favour of next Shebait, or
    • one in favour of the heir of the transferor, or
    • in his line of succession, or
    • infavour of a co-Shebait,
  • particularly when it is not against the presumed intention of the founder.”[82]

The Privy Council decision in Raja VurmahVs. Ravi Vurmah[83] laid down following exceptions to the rule as to transfer of Shebaitship:

  • (1) Where transfer is not for any pecuniary benefit and the transferee is the next heir of the transferor or stands in the line of succession of Shebaits and suffers from no disqualification;
  • (2) When the transfer is made in the interest of the deity itself and to meet some pressing necessity; and
  • (3) When a valid custom is proved sanctioning alienation of Shebaiti right within a limited circle of purchasers.

The Bombay High Court has pointed out in Raghu Nath Vs. Purnanand[84] that if any one of the Shebaits intends to get rid of his duties, the proper things for him to do would be to surrender his office in favour of the remining Shebaits. In the case of such a transfer in favour of co-shebait, no policy of Hindu Law is likely to be affected, much less the presumed intentions of the founder.

The Appointment of Archakas by Shebaits is Essentially a Secular  Function

Shebaits and Managers of temples exercise essentially a secular function in choosing and appointing the Archaka.[85]

Pujaris  and Right of Shebaits

Adverting to Gauri Shankar Vs. Ambika Dutt[86] and Sree Sree Kalimata Thakurani of Kalighat Vs. Jibandhan Mukherjee,[87]it is pointed out in M. Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das[88] that a pujari who conducts worship at a temple is not merely, by offering worship to the idol, elevated to the status of a shebait. A pujari is a servant or appointee of a shebait and gains no independent right as a shebait despite having conducted the ceremonies for a long period of time. Thus, the mere presence of pujaris does not vest in them any right to be shebaits.

The Legal Status of Mahant

The legal status of Mahant is still confusing and not settled.[89] In the conception of Mahantship, both the elements of office and property, duties and personal interest are blended together and neither can be detached from the other. Accepting this conception it is laid down by our courts that a Mahant’s duty is not simply to manage the temporalities of a Math. He is the head and superior of spiritual fraternity also. The purpose of Math is to encourage and foster spiritual training by maintenance of a competent line of teachers who could impart religious instructions to the disciples and followers of the Math and try to strengthen the doctrines of the particular school or order, of which they profess to be adherents.[90]

Property Vestin Mahant; But, Not True Trustee

A math is an institutional sanctum presided over by a superior, Mahant, who combines in himself the dual office, or two capacities, of being the religious or spiritual head of the particular cult of religious fraternity and of the manager of the secular properties of the institution of the math.[91] He is spiritual head of the Mutt and administrator of its properties. Both are closely intermingled.[92]The whole assets are vested in him as the owner thereof in trust[93] for the institution itself.  But, he is neither a corporation nor a life tenant in respect of Mutt property.[94]

In Srimath Deivasikamani Nataraja Vs. Valliammai Achi (1918)[95] it was held by the Madras High Court that the contra observations in Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami Vs. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami were ‘no longer of binding force’. A Mahant is also not a trustee in the sense in which the term is understood in English law. In view of the obligations and duties, Mahant is answerable as a trustee in the general sense for proper administration.[96]

In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954)[97] the Supreme Court analysed the conception of Mahantship and declared that both the elements of office and property, duties and personal interest are blended together in his status and neither can be detached from the other. The Apex Court heldfurther as under:

  • “He is certainly not a trustee in the strict sense. He may be as the Privy Council says, a manager or custodian of the institution who has to discharge the duties of a trustee and is answerable as such; but he is not a mere manager and it would not be correct to describe Mahantship as a mere office. It will not be correct to say that a Mathadhipati holds the Math property as a life-tenant[98] or that his position is similar to that of a Hindu widow in respect to her husband’s estate or of an English Bishop holding a benefice.”

Our Apex Court, in Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar Vs. Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore(1963)[99] added as under:

  • “Mahant is not a mere manager or custodian nor is he a trustee in the strict sense holding the office of Mahant by custom and usage of the institution. He has besides large powers of management and disposal, certain proprietary rights over the property of the Math.”

In Shri Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir (1980)[100] our Apex Court held that the property belongs to a Mutt is in fact attached to the office of Mahant, and passed by inheritance to no one who does not fill the office. The Head of a Mutt, as such, is not a trustee in the sense in which that term is generally understood, but in legal contemplation he has an estate for life in its permanent endowments and an absolute property in the income derived from the offerings of his followers, subject only to the ‘burden of maintaining the institution’. He is bound to spend a large part of income derived from the offerings of his followers on charitable or religious objects. The words ‘the burden of maintaining the institution’ must be understood to include the maintenance of Mutt, the support of its Head and his disciples and the performance of religious and other charities in connection with it, in accordance with usage.

After considering the previous decisions on this subject the Allahabad High Court observed in Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi (2018)[101] that it is sufficiently clear that a Math is an institutional sanctum presided over by a superior who combines in himself the dual office of being the religious or spiritual head of the particular cult or religious fraternity, and of the manager of the secular properties of the institution of the Math.

Mahant has Large Powers; But, Answerable as a Trustee

In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar, (1928)[102] the Judicial Committee observed as under:

  • “These men (spiritual teachers under whom were founded Hindu colleges and monasteries under the names of Mutt) had and have ample discretion in the application of the funds of the institutions, but always subject to certain obligations and duties equally governed by custom and usage…called by whatever name, he is only the manager and custodian of the idol or the institution.”[103]

A Mahant has large powers[104] with respect to the administration[105]of the Mutt. He is the head of the institution. He represents the entire Mutt.[106] He has ample discretion in the application of the funds of the institution. Nevertheless, he is subject to certain fiduciary obligations and duties.He has to manage the property of the Mutt for the objects for which it exists.[107] A Mahanth is, in view of the obligations and duties resting on him, answerable, as a trustee in the general sense, for the proper administration of the institution. Apart from the directives in the deed of foundation he is also governed by custom and usage.[108]

Mulla, ‘Hindu Law’[109]lays down as under:

  • “The property of a Math is held by Mahant as spiritual head of the institution, but the property may by the usage and custom of the institution vest in trustees other than the spiritual head. In any case, the property is held solely in trust for the purposes of the institution; surplus income must be added to the endowment and not applied for the personal enjoyment of the head of the Math. A Mahant is not a trustee in the English legal sense of the term. His functions and duties are regulated by custom. His very wide discretion as to application of the income is subject to the obligation to manage the property so as to serve effectively the objects for which the Math exists. In the conception of Mahantship as in Shebaitship, both the elements of an office and property are blended together and neither can be detached from the other. The personal or beneficial interest of the Mahant in the endowment attached to an institution is manifested in his large powers and disposal and his right to create derivative tenures in respect of endowed properties and these and other rights of a similar character of proprietary right which, though anomalous to some extent, is still a genuine legal right. A Mahant, as a superior of a Math has in addition to his duties, a personal interest of a beneficial character which is much larger than that of a Shebait in a debutter property.”[110]

Sale by Mahanth Otherwise Than for Legal Necessity

A Mahant is only the custodian of property and not the owner thereof. He has no right to pass, title or interest in favour of the vendee by execution of a sale-deed unless it is shown that there was legal necessity of the same. The purchaser of such property has the duty to discharge the burden of proof that the sale-deed executed by Mahant in his favour was for legal necessity of such institution and, hence, the sale-deed will be a void document if the duty is not discharged.  Therefore, cancellation of such a document is not necessary as it is clearly without title and authority.[111]

Removal of Mahants

See Chapter: Breach of trust and Removal of Trustees

Mahant: Beneficial or Personal Interest in the Properties

In Sm. Angur Bala Vs. Debabrata[112] our Apex Court held that the right of a Mahant was not that of a bare trustee but that the right of the Mahant carried with it the element of beneficial or personal interest in the properties.[113]

Mahant: Office and Property Blended Together

The property belonging to a math is attached to the office of the Mahant and passes by inheritance. The succession to mahantship of a math or religious institution is regulated by custom or usage of the particular institution, except where a rule of succession is laid down by the founder himself who created the endowment.[114] In Angurbala Vs. Debabrata (1951),[115] Mukherjea, J. pointed out that the exact legal position of a Shebait might not be capable of precise definition, but its implications were fairly well established. But, it was settled that the relation of a Shebait in regard to debutter property was not that of a trustee to trust property under the English law.[116] As in the case of a Shebait, Mahantship also involves both elements of office and property blended together.[117] It is noticed in Baijaynanda Giri Vs. State of Bihar[118] that this combination was an anomaly. It was observed as under:

  • “These authorities emphasise that the position or a mahant or shebait is a combination of office and proprietary right and though the position is anomalous, it is an anomaly which has been recognised and accepted in Hindu law from a very early date.”[119]

The head of a Mutt (Mahant) is not a trustee in the sense in which that term is generally understood. But, Mahant has an estate for life in its endowments.  His position can be equated with that of Shebait to a large extent. It is explained by our Apex Court in Krishna Singh Vs.  Mathura Ahir (1980)[120] thus:

  • “The property belonging to a Math is in fact attached to the office of the mahant, and passed by inheritance to no one who does not fill the office. The head of a math, as such, is not a trustee in the sense in which that term is generally understood, but in legal contemplation he has an estate for life in its permanent endowments and an absolute property in the income derived from the offerings of his followers, subject only to the burden of maintaining the institution. He is bound to spend a large part of the income derived from the offerings of his followers on charitable or religious objects. The word ‘the burden of maintaining the institution’ must be understood to include the maintenance of the math, the support of its head and his disciples and the performance of the religious and other charities in connection with it, in accordance with usage. From these principles, it will be sufficiently clear that a Math is an institutional sanctum presided over by a superior who combines in himself the dual office of being the religious or spiritual head of the particular cult or religious fraternity, and of the manager of the secular properties of the institution of the math.”[121]

Our Apex Court in Sarangadeva  Periya  Matam  Vs.  Ramaswami  Goundar (1966)[122] held that the Mutt was the owner of the endowed property; and that, like an Idol, the Mutt is a juristic person  having the power of acquiring, owning and possessing property and having the capacity of suing and being sued. It was also held by the Apex Court that a Matadipathi was the manager and custodian of the institution; and that his office  carried the right to manage and possess the endowed property on behalf of Mutt and the right to sue for protection of the property. 

A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt,[123] speaking through Chief Justice BK Mukherjea, relying on an earlier decision of the Spreme Court, Angurbala Mullick Vs. Debabrata Mullick (1951),[124] elaborately considered the legal status and position of Mathadhipati.[125]  The following can be brought up from this decision:

  • It is not correct that Mathadhipati holds the Math property as a life tenant or that his position is similar to that of a Hindu widow in respect to her husband’s estate.
  • The status of a Mathadhipati is not similar to an English Bishop holding a benefice also.
  • Mathadhipati is not a trustee in the strict sense.
  • He may be, a manager or custodian of the institution who has to discharge the duties of a trustee and is answerable as such (as observed by the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi Vs. Balusami[126]). 
  • Though Mathadhipati may be a manager, he is not a mere manager.
  • It would not be right to describe Mahantship as a mere office.
  • A superior of a Math has not only duties to discharge in connection with the endowment but he has a personal interest of a beneficial character which is sanctioned by custom.
  • Personal interest of a Mathadhipati is much larger than that of a Shebait in the debutter property.
  • Though the proprietary element in the Shebaiti right, that is Shebaitship itself is property, is in some respects an anomaly, it has to be accepted as admitted into Hindu law from an early date.[127]
  • Shebaiti right could, with equal propriety, be applied to the office of a Mahant.
  • Thus, in the conception of Mahantship, as in Shebaitship, both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest, are blended together and neither can be detached from the other.
  • The personal or beneficial interest of the Mahant in the endowments attached to an institution is manifested in his large powers of disposal and administration and his right to create derivative tenures in respect to endowed properties;
  • These and other rights of a similar character invest the office of the Mahant with the character of proprietary right which, though anomalous to some extent, is still a genuine legal right.
  • It is true that the Mahantship is not heritable like ordinary property, but that is because of its peculiar nature and the fact that the office is generally held by an ascetic, whose connection with his natural family being completely cut off, the ordinary rules of succession do not apply.

Mahant: Not Accountable

In Sammantha Pandara Vs. Sellappa Chetti (1878-81)[128] the Madras High Court discussed origin of ‘Matts’ and observed as under:

  • “It is in a certain sense trust property; it is devoted to the maintenance of the establishment, but the superior has large dominion over it, and is not accountable for its management nor for the expenditure of the income, provided he does not apply it to any purpose other than what may fairly be regarded as in furtherance of the objects of the institution. Acting for the whole institution he may contract debts for purposes connected with his mattam, and debts so contracted might be recovered from the mattam property and would devolve as a liability on his successor to the extent of the assets received by him.”

De Facto Mahant is Entitled to Maintain a Suit

A person in actual possession of a Mutt is entitled to maintain a suit to recover property appertaining to it not for his own benefit but for the benefit of the Mutt.[129]

Decree passed against Mahant binding on the Mutt and Succeding Mahant

In the absence of proof of collusion or fraud, a decree passed against the Mahant of a Math is binding on the succeeding Mahant and the institution as well.[130]

Validity of Transfer ofMutt for Pecuniary Consideration

While considering validity of transfer of a Mutt for pecuniary consideration (that is, gift/transfer subject to condition that the defendants should maintain first plaintiff), it was held in D Krishna Murthy Vs. C Ramana[131] that the transfer was illegal.

Mahant: Succession

When a mutt is endowed, it vests, for administration, in the Mahant. Succession of Mahant will be according to the custom, or usages that evolve in the particular mutt, except where a rule of succession is laid down by the founder himself who created the endowment.[132]The general rule is that mahantship descends from Guru to Chela, i.e., the existing mahant alone appoints his successor, and the mahants having a common origin acknowledge one of the members as a Head.[133]If the grantor has laid down any particular rule of succession to the office of a Mahant, that is to be given effect to. The onus lies on the person who asserts the custom as to succession.[134]

In Ram Parkash Das Vs. Anand Das (1916)[135] the Judicial Committee observed that the custom in the matter of succession of a Mahant is nothing but usage[136] of each institution with respect to the manner of appointing a Mahant or nominating a successor and the performance of other functions and duties relating to the Math. The Privy Council in Rama Muthuramalingam Vs. Periyanayakam[137] pointed out that the Court should try to ascertain the special laws and usages, if any, of the particular institution whose affairs had become the subject of litigation.

With respect to the succession of a Mahant it was further statedin Ram Parkash Das Vs. Anand Dasas under:

  • “Upon the death or abdication he (Mahant) is succeeded by one of the bairagi chelas. These bairagi chelas are, as stated, celibates; or if they have ever been married they must prior to their initiation as bairagi chelas, have renounced their wives and families and have conformed to the practice of the muth. This practice is ascetic; it involves a separation from all worldly wealth and ties, and a self dedication to the services and rites of the asthal …..this property is held by the mahant as its owner, and the succession to him in such property follows with the succession to the office. The nature of the ownership is, as has been said, an ownership in trust for the muth or institution itself, and it must not be forgotten that although large administrative powers are undoubtedly vested in the reigning mahant, this trust does exist, and that it must be respected.”[138]

In Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs. Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi (2018)[139] Allahabad High Court observed that the a Guru of a Matt gathers around him three classes of persons namely: Chelas, Sisyas and disciples. The disciples will be the general public who are attached to the tenet to which the Matt may belong. The sishyas are part of the establishment and are admitted as sisyas by the guru. A Chela is the nominee of the guru for succession to the gaddi.[140]In very many institutions it is the practice.[141]Therefore, normally, there can be only one Chela in a Math.[142]       

Mahant is not a life-tenant

A Math is an institutional sanctum presided over by a superior who combines in himself the dual office of being the religious or spiritual head of the particular cult or religious fraternity, and of the manager of the secular properties of the institution of the Math. In Vidyapurana Vs. Vidyanidhi[143] the Madras High Court stated that the head of the Math was a corporation sole having an estate for life in the endowments and that head of the Math is like a Bishop. The decision was doubted and there was a reference to the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Kailasam Pillai Vs. Nataraja.[144] The Full Bench held that it could not be predicated of the head of the Math that he held the properties as a life tenant or a trustee but that the question was to be determined in each case upon usage and custom.

The Privy Council in Ram Prakash Vs. Ananda Das[145], observed as under:

  • “The Mahant is the head of the institution. He sits upon the gaddi, he initiates candidates into the mysteries of the cult, he superintends the worship of the idol and the accustomed spiritual rights; he manages the properties of the institution, he administers its affairs and the whole assets are vested in him as the owner thereof in trust for the institution itself.”

In Vidyavaruthi Vs. Baluswamy[146] the Privy Council clarified that the real position of the Mahant is neither a corporation sole nor a life tenant. He is also not a trustee in the English sense. It had been observed that ‘called by whatever name, he is the manager or custodian of the institution and the property which he holds is not vested in him: it is vested in the institution and is held by him as manager on behalf of the same.’ In view of the obligations and duties resting on him Mahant is answerable as a trustee in the general sense for proper administration.

The Supreme Court in Commr., HR and CE Vs. LT Swamiar (Shirur Mutt Case)[147] observed as under:

  • “He is certainly not a trustee in the strict sense. He may be as the Privy Council says, a manager or custodian of the institution who has to discharge the duties of a trustee and is answerable as such; but he is not a mere manager and it would not be correct to describe Mahantship as a mere office. It will not be correct to say that a Mathadhipati holds the Math property as a life-tenant or that his position is similar to that of a Hindu widow in respect to her husband’s estate or of an English Bishop holding a benefice.”
  • “Mahant is not a mere manager or custodian nor is he a trustee in the strict sense holding the office of Mahant by custom and usage of the institution. He has besides large powers of management and disposal, certain proprietary rights over the property of the Math.”

In Shri Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir[148] the Supreme Court observed as under.

  • “The property belonging to a Math is in fact attached to the office of the Mahant, and passed by inheritance to no one who does not fill the office. The head of a Math, as such, is not a trustee in the sense in which that term is generally understood, but in legal contemplation he has an estate for life in its permanent endowments and an absolute property in the income derived from the offerings of his followers, subject only to the burden of maintaining the institution. He is bound to spend a large part of the income derived from the offerings of his followers on charitable or religious objects. The words ‘the burden of maintaining the institution’ must be understood to include the maintenance of the Math, the support of its head and his disciples and the performance of religious and other charities in connection with it in accordance with usage.”

Shebaitship and Mahantship Heritable Property?

Shebaits and Mahants have proprietary interest in the properties of the trust. Such a right to receive beneficial interest creates proprietary interest in them.[149]But, in most other cases, the trustees are ‘bare trustees’ to administer the trust property and to perform their duties without any proprietary interest.[150]

In Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami Vs. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami(1904)[151]it was laid down that the management of religious foundations known as debuther, devastanams or temples is vested in one or more persons, variously known in this Presidency as Dharmakartas, Panchayets, Uralans, &c., but referred to as trustees, managers or superintendents; and that their office was either hereditary or for life and, as a general rule, they have beneficial interest in the endowments or their income.

In Sm. Angur Bala Mullick Vs. Debabrata Mullick (1951)[152] the Supreme Court laid down as under:

  • “Even where no emoluments are attached to the office of the shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the endowed property which partially at least has the character of a proprietary right. Thus, in the conception of shebaiti both the elements of office and property of duties and personal interest, are mixed up and blended together, and one of the elements cannot be detached from the other. It is the presence of his personal or beneficial interest in the endowed property which invests shebaitship with the character of proprietary right and attaches to it the legal incidents of property. “[153]

In ProfullaChorone  Requitte  Vs.  Satya  Choron  Requitte (1979),[154] it is held that Shebaitship is property and that it devolves like any other species of heritable property. It is further held in this decision:

  • “It follows that, where the founder does not dispose of the Shebaiti rights in the endowment created by him, the Shebaitship devolves on the heirs of the founder according to Hindu Law, if no usage or custom of a different nature is shown to exist.”[155]

Female Shebait

The mode of administration of an endowment or a trust is destined by the founder. Therefore, primarily, answer to the question whether a female is entitled to be a shebait is depended upon the intention of the founder.

VK Varadachari in ‘Law of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments’ states as under:

  • “Shebaitship is property within the meaning of Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act (Act xviii of 1937), and succession to it will follow the line for the ordinary or secular property. It is the general law of succession that governs Shebaitship (Angur Bala v. Deba Bratha, AIR 1951 SC 293:1951 SCR 1125 ). Hence a female is entitled to succeed to the office of a shebait (Angur Bala v. Deba Bratha, AIR 1951 SC 293:1951 SCR 112), ‘both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest are blended together and neither can be detached from the other. “The duties are primary and the rights and emoluments are appurtenant to the duties. Hence when a female succeeds to a priestly office, where she cannot discharge her duties personally, it is competent for her to get the duties performed by a deputy. It is not opposed to any rule of Hindu Law or Public Policy (Raja Kali Kuer v. Ram Rattan Pandey) AIR 1955 SC 493 :1955 (2) SCR 186 ). “[156]

Mukherjea on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable trust, Tagore Law Lectures lays down this subject as under:

  • “Devolution of Shebaitship, disability of successor by reason of caste, sex, age or other disqualification: — in Southern India, Sudras are managers of several public temples and it seems that there is no restriction regarding the appointment of a female. The question whether a person is incompetent to succeed to shebaitship by reason of sex, age or any other disqualification has come up for consideration before our Courts on more occasions than one. So long as shebaitship was regarded as an office pure and simple, divergent opinions seem to have been expressed by the Courts on these points. Now that shebaitship has been definitely held to be property, much of there discussions would have no more than academic value at present; and barring exceptional cases arising out of special customs or usages, we may take it that the,right of management of an idol follows the same line of succession as any other private property.

Woman’s right to succeed to shebaitship. As succession to shebaitship is governed by the ordinary law of inheritance, it scarcely admits of any doubt that a woman can succeed to shebaitship. The Supreme Court of India has held that shebaitship is ‘property’ within the meaning of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property act. Consequently, in a case to which the Act applies, the widow and the son of the last shebait would succeed jointly to the shebaiti rights held by the latter. It has been held further that even if the expression ‘property’ in the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act is to be interpreted as meaning property in its common or accepted sense and is not to be extended to any special type of property which ‘shebaitship’ admittedly is, as succession to shebaitship follows succession to ordinary secular property the general law of succession under Hindu Law to the extent that it has been modified by the Hindu women’s Right to Property Act would also be attracted to devolution of shebaiti right (Angurbala v. Debabrata, AIR 1951 SC 293 ).”[157]

In Seth Soorajmull Jalan Trust Vs. Tolaram Jalan,[158] the Calcutta High Court observed that ‘he embargo to female succession is done away with’. The High Court relied on the following decisions:

  • Monohar Mukherji v. Bhupendranath Mukherji, 1932 AIR(Cal) 791,
  • Ganpat Dhaku Telivs Tulsiram Ukha Dhangar,  ILR 36 Bom 88,
  • Khub Lal Singh v. Ajodhya Misser, 22 CLJ 345,
  • Ramanathan Chetty Vs. Muragappa Chetty ILR 29 Mad 288,
  • Angur Bala v. Deba Bratha, AIR 1951 SC 293,
  • Thakurani Shree Shree Durga Mata Vs. Sibani Dutta, 2014 2 Cal LJ 112.

Samadhies

Many saints who have lived in this world showed spiritual path to the people and endowments for worship were created over the mortal remains of such saints, it is known as Samadhi. Samadhies are places of public worship. Statutory recognition has been given to the saints in some States like Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments at 1987.[159]

Legal Necessity and Sale of Temple Property

See Chapter: alienation of trust property

Alienation of Trust Property

See Chapter: Alienation of Public Trust Property


Read Blogs:Common Law of TRUSTS in India


[1]      Page 201- Dr. BK Mukherjea, Tagore Law Lecturers; Vidyapurna  Tirtha Swami Vs.  Vidyanidhi  Tirtha Swami (1904): 27 ILR Mad 435.

[2]      See AIR 1952 Mad 613.

[3]      See: Chhatra  Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram Shah: AIR 1931 PC 196.

[4]Baijaynanda Giri Vs. State of BiharAIR 1954 Pat 266; Quoted in: Mahanth Motilal Goswami Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1993 Pat 171(SB Sinha,J).

[5]Sm. Angur Bala Mullick Vs. Debabrata Mullick:AIR 1951 SC 293.

[6]Profulla Chorone Requitte  Vs.  Satya Choron Requitte: AIR 1979 SC 1682.

[7]      AIR 1979 SC 1682; See also:  Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228

[8]M. Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das: 2020-1 SCC 1.

[9]Arulmigu  Kolavizhi Amman Temple Vs. R Shamughamthat: 2008-3-Mad LJ 732

[10] AIR 1977 Mad 79

[11]    Profulla  Chorone  Requitte Vs. Satya  Chorone  Requitte: AIR 1979 SC 1682:  Also See: Jagadinadra  Nath Vs.  Hemanta  Kumari Debi: (1904) 31 Ind App 203 (PC); Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228; M. Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das: 2020-1 SCC 1.

[12]    Sri Ganapathi Dev Temple Trust VS Balakrishna Bhat: 2019 0 Supreme(SC) 1025; Bishwanath  Vs. Sri Thakur Radha  Ballabhji: AIR 1967 SC 1044; Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1999 SC 2131; Dipti Narayan Srimani Vs. Controller Of Estate Duty:  AIR 1988 SC  1511; Badri Nath VS Punna: AIR 1979 SC 1314: Mahant Ram Krishna Das Vs S. P. Sahi, The Special Officer: AIR 1959  SC 942; Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick: AIR1951 SC 293; Arulmigu  Kolavizhi  Amman Temple Vs. R Shamugham: 2008-3 Mad LJ 732; Kalankadevi Sansthan VS Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal: AIR1970  SC 439;  State Wakf Board Vs. Subramanyam : AIR 1977 Mad 79

[13]    AIR 1979 SC 1682; See also:  Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228

[14]    AIR 1922 PC 123.Relied on in M. Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das: 2020-1 SCC 1.

[15]    At page 204. Quoted in: M.  Siddiq (D) Thr.  Lrs.  VS Mahant Suresh Das:2020-1 SCC 1.

[16]    AIR 1922 PC 123

[17]    AIR 1963 Mad 369.

[18]    AIR 1979 SC 1682

[19] 2020-1 SCC 1

[20] 2020-7 JT 200: 2020-4 Ker LT 490.

[21]   AIR 1922 PC 123; (1928) LR 48 IndAp 302: 1928-41 Mad LJ 346:

[22]   AIR 1954 SC 282

[23]   2020-1 SCC 1.

[24]   JT 2020 7 200 

[25]   ILR 60 Cal 452: AIR 1932 Cal 791.

[26]   Quoted in: M.  Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das:2020-1 SCC 1.

[27]   AIR 1979 SC 1682

[28]   Quoted in: Marthanda Varma Vs. State of Kerala: 2020-7 JT 200: 2020-4 Ker LT 490

[29]   AIR 1954 Pat 266

[30]   Quoted in: Mahanth Motilal Goswami VS State of Bihar, AIR 1993 Pat 171(SB Sinha,J.)

[31]    Sree Siddhi Budhi  Vinayakagar  Sundareswarar Vs. S V Marimuthu: AIR 1963 Mad 369.

[32] 1915-20 CWN 314

Referred to in:  Bhabatarini Debi Vs Ashalata Debi: AIR 1943  PC 89

[33] AIR 1951 SC 293

[34]    See also: Badri Nath Vs. Punna: AIR 1979 SC 1314; Sree Sree Kalimata Thakurani Vs. Jibandhan Mukherjee: AIR 1962 SC 1329

[35]AIR1951 SC 293

[36]AIR 1922 PC 123

[37] Quoted in: In Seth Soorajmull Jalan Trust Vs. Tolaram Jalan, 2015 AIR (CC) 3225, 2015-4 Cal LT  1;  Pran Krishna Das Vs. Controller of Estate Duty: AIR 1968  Cal 496; M.  Siddiq (D) Thr.  Lrs.  VS Mahant Suresh Das:2020-1 SCC 1.

[38]    AIR 1979 SC 1682

[39] 2020-7 JT 200: 2020-4 Ker LT 490,

[40]ILR 1933-60-Cal 452

[41] 2020-7 JT 200: 2020-4 Ker LT 490,

[42]    AIR 1943 Mad 691.

[43]    Quoted in: Balram  Chunnilal Vs. Durgalal  Shivnarain: AIR1968 MP 81

[44]    (1904) 31 Ind App 203 (PC)

[45]    Quoted in: Bishwanath  Vs. Sri Thakur Radha  Ballabhji: AIR 1967 SC 1044.

[46]Vadivelu Mudaliar Vs. CN  Kuppuswami Mudaliar: ILR1971-3 Mad142.

[47]AIR 1954 SC 606; Mahanth Motilal Goswami VS State Of Bihar: AIR 1993 Pat 171

[48]    Bhagauti Prasad Khetan  Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[49] See: M. Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das: 2020-1 SCC 1.

[50] (1935-36) 63 IA 448

[51] (1942-43) 70 IA 57

[52]AIR1951 SC 293

[53]    See Chapter: RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF TRUSTEES

[54]    See: PramathaNathMullick Vs. Pradumna Kumar Mullick, (AIR 1925 PC 139); Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915; YogendraNathNaskar Vs. Commr. of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089.

[55]    YogendraNathNaskar Vs. Commr. of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089; ProsunnoKumariDebya Vs. Golab Chand Baboo, (1874-75) 2 Ind App 145 (PC)

[56]    Fifth Edition: Pages: 257, 265 & 271; See also: ChamelibaiVallabhadasVs. Ramchandrajee, AIR 1965 MP 167.

See Chapter: Suit against Deity: Appointment of Next Friend.

[57]    (1875)  LR 2 Ind. App. 145

[58]    AIR 1925 PC 139

[59]    Quoted in: Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1999 SC 2131.          

[60]    AIR 1979 SC 1682

[61]2020-1 SCC 1.

[62]M. Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das: 2020-1 SCC 1.

[63]    (1985) 2 SCC 524.

[64]    S Rathinam Alias KuppamuthuVs. L S Mariappan AIR 2007 SC 2134; Shyam Sunder Vs. Moni Mohan AIR 1976 SC 977; See also: Nandlal Vs. Kesharlal AIR 1975 Raj. 226; Relied on Rajeshwar Vs. Gopeshwar, (1908) 35 Cal. 226. But a different view was taken by the same High Court in SovabatiDassiVs. KashiNath AIR 1972 Cal. 95. Also see: MancharamVs. Pranshankar (1882) 6 Bom. 298.

[65]    AIR 1974 SC 1932

[66]Bameswar Bamdev Shiva Vs Anath Nath Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal 490; Mancharam v. Pranshankar, 6 Bom. 298; Rajeswar v. Gopeswar, 35 Cal. 226

[67]Bameswar Bamdev Shiva Vs Anath Nath Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal 490

[68]    Quoted in S Rathinam Alias Kuppamuthu Vs. L S Mariappan: AIR 2007 SC 2134

[69] (1874-75) 2 Ind App 145 (PC); Relied on in:  Kheter  Chunder  Ghosh  Vs. Hari Das (1890) ILR 17 Cal 557

[70] AIR 1974 SC 1932

[71] Nagendra  Nath: AIR 1926 Cal 490 and Rajeswar Vs. Gopeswar: 35 Cal. 226: 7 CLJ 315

[72] AIR 1926 Cal. 490; Quoted in:  Bameswar Bamdev Shiva Vs Anath Nath Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal 490

[73] Mahamaya Debi vs. Haridas: AIR 1915 Cal. 161; Monohar Mukherji vs. Bhupendra Nath: AIR 1932 Cal. 791; Bameswar Bamdev Shiva Vs Anath Nath Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal 490

[74]35 Cal. 226 : 7 CLJ 315

[75] Referrred to in: Bameswar Bamdev Shiva Vs. Anath Nath Mukherjee: AIR 1951 Cal 490.

[76]    (1877) ILR 1 Mad 235: (1876-77) 4- Ind App 76 (PC).

[77]    In Kali Kinko  rGanguly Vs. Panna Banerjee (AIR 1974 SC 1932) it is observed that this doctrine has been applied on transactions by way of lease or mortgage also.

[78]    See also: Kali Kinkor  Ganguly  Vs. Panna Banerjee: AIR 1974 SC 1932; Sunderambal Vs. Yogavanagurukkal: AIR 1915 Mad 561.

[79]    Quoted in: Kali Kinkor  Ganguly Vs. Panna Banerjee: AIR 1974 SC 1932

[80]    AIR 1979 SC 1682 at 1687

[81]    Also: Angurbala  Vs. Debabrata: AIR 1951 SC 293; Kali Kinkor  Ganguly Vs. Panna Banerjee: AIR 1974 SC 1932. Partition of shebaiti right is possible: Mahamaya Vs. Haridas, AIR 1915 Cal 161 ; Kheter  Chunder  Ghosh Vs. Hari Das (1890) ILR 17 Cal 557

[82]    Quoted in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228; See: Nirad Mohini v. Shiba Das (1909) ILR 36 Cal 975; Mancharan Vs. Pranshankar: (1883) ILR 6 Bom 298.

[83]    (1877) ILR 1 Mad 235: (1876-77) 4- Ind App 76(PC). Referred to in: D Krishna Murthy Vs. C Ramana: 1993-2 ALT 414; Kali KinkorGanguly Vs. Panna Banerjee: AIR 1974 SC 1932; K. Manathunainatha  Desikar Vs. Sundaralingam AIR 1971  Mad  1. Same principle is laid down in: Tagore Vs. Tagore (1872) L.R. IndAp 47. Also see: S Rathinam Alias KuppamuthuVs. L S Mariappan: AIR 2007 SC 2134.

[84](1923) ILR 47 Bom 529

[85]    Seshammal Vs. State of TN: AIR 1972  SC 1586; AS Narayana   Deekshitulu v. State of AP: AIR 1996  SC 1765; KS Varghese Vs St.  Peter’s & Paul’s Syrian Church: 2017-15 SCC 333.

[86] AIR 1954 Pat 196

[87] AIR 1962 SC 1329

[88]2020-1 SCC 1.

[89]    Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 AllLR 591.

[90]    Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 AllLR 591.

[91]    Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir: AIR 1980 SC 707

[92]    Ram Prakash Vs. Ananda Das (1916)AIR 1916 PC 256: ILR (1916) 43 Cal 707; Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Vs. Mathura Das: 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 All LR 591;

[93]    Baijaynanda Giri Vs. State of Bihar:AIR 1954 Pat 266; Ram Parkash Das Vs. Anand Das: AIR 1916 PC 256.

[94]    Vidya Varuthi Vs. Baluswami Ayyar: AIR 1922 PC 123; Baijaynanda Giri Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1954  Pat 266; Lakshmi Narayan Vs. State: AIR 1978 Pat. 303; Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Vs. Mathura Das: 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 All LR 591; Jatindra Nath Singha Vs. Assam Board of Revenue: 1983-1 GauLR 87.

[95]    52 IndCas 914

[96]    Pramod Nautiyal Vs. State of Uttarakhand: 2016 1 UD 419; Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar Vs.The Commr. r HR and CE, Mysore:  AIR 1963 SC 966; Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Vs. Mathura Das: 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 All LR 591; CR Shivananda Vs. HC Gurusiddappa: ILR 2011 Kar 4624;

[97]    AIR 1954 SC 282

[98]    Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi (2018); 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 All LR 591; Commr. HR Endnts Vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar Sri Shirur Mutt: AIR 1954 SC 282

[99]    AIR 1963 SC 966

[100]  AIR 1980 SC 707

[101]2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 All LR 591

[102]AIR 1922 PC 123; (1928) LR 48 IndAp 302: 1928-41 Mad LJ 346:

[103] Quoted in: Sri La Sri Somasundara Gnana Vs. Sri Krishnandaswami: ILR 1968-2 Mad 231: 1966-2 Mad LJ 551; Ramamohan Das  Vs. Basudeb Dass: AIR  1950 Ori 28

[104] Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar Vs. Commr For HR And CE: AIR 1963 SC 966; Commr. HR Endnts Vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar Sri Shirur Mutt: AIR 1954 SC 282; Lakshamana Yatendrulu Vs. State of A. P: AIR 1996  SC 1414.

[105] Basudeo Roy Vs. Jugal Kishwar Das: AIR 1918 PC 37; Ram Prakash Das v. Anand Das [1916] 43 Cal. 707: 33 I.C. 583: 43 I. A. 73 (P.C.).

[106]Satya Charan Sarkar v. Mohanta Rudrananda Giri, AIR 1953 Cal 716; P.  Natesa Achar VS Parasamaya Kolerinatha Madam: 1999 2 MLJ 585;  Swami Harbansa Chari Ji v. State: AIR 1981 MP 82

[107]Kesho Das v. Amar Dasji: AIR 1935 Pat 111.

[108]  Sri Vidya Varuthi Thirth Swamigal Vs. Baluswami Ayyar: AIR 1922 PC 123; Baijaynanda Giri VS State Of Bihar:  AIR 1954 Pat 266

[109]13th Edn.para. 414

[110] Quoted in: Mahadeo Nath Vs. Meena Devi: AIR 1976  All 64

[111]Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591

[112] AIR 1951 SC 293

[113]Baijaynanda  Giri Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1954  Pat 266.

[114]Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir AIR 1980 SC 707.

[115]AIR1951 SC 293

[116] See: Mahant Ram Krishna Das VS S. P. Sahi, The Special Officer in charge of Hindu Religious Trust: AIR 1959 SC 942.

[117]Commr. HR Endnts Vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar Sri Shirur Mutt: AIR 1954 SC 282

[118]AIR 1954 Pat 266

[119] Quoted in: Mahanth Motilal Goswami VS State of Bihar, AIR 1993 Pat 171(SB Sinha,J.)

[120]  AIR 1980 SC 707

[121]  Quoted in: Yelandau  Arasikere  Deshikendra  Sammthana Vs. Gangadharaiah: 2007-5 AIR Kar R 565: 2008-4 Kat LJ 323.

[122]  AIR 1966 SC 1603

[123]AIR 1954 SC 282

[124]AIR1951 SC 293

[125] See: M SiddiqVs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1.

[126]48 IA 302

[127]Monahar Vs. Bhupendra: 60 Cal 452; Ganesh Vs. Lal Behary: 63 IA 448; Bhabatarini Vs. Ashalata: 70 IA 57; Angurbala vs. Debabrata 1951 SC  .

[128]  ILR 2 Mad 175

[129]  Parshvanath Jain Temple Vs. L.Rs of Prem  Dass: 2009-3-RCR (CIVIL) 133. Mahadeo  Prosad Vs. Karia: L.R.62 I.A.47: 39 CWN 433(PC) ;  Ram Chandra Vs. Nawrangi, L.R.60 I.A.124: 37 C.W.N.541. See also: Vikramadas Vs. Daulat Ram, 1956 S.C.R.826; JawaharLalVs. Sri Thakur Radha  Gopaljee  Maharaj: AIR1945 All 169.

[130]Kuber Singh v. Phunnan Rai, AIR 1935 All 255

Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR.

[131]  1993-2  ALT  414

[132]  Shri Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir: AIR 1980 SC 707; Genda Puri v. Chatar Puri: (1886) 13 Ind App 100 (PC); Sital Das v. Sant Ram: AIR 1954 SC 606; Mahalinga Thambiran Vs. La Sri Kasivasi Arulnandi Thambiran: AIR 1974 SC 199

[133]Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir AIR 1980 SC 707.

[134]Mahant Bhagwan Bhagat Vs. G.N. Bhagat: (1972) 1 SCC 486; Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi (2018)[134] 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 All LR 591

[135] AIR 1916 PC 256

[136]Mahant Bhagwan Bhagat Vs. G.N. Bhagat: (1972) 1 SCC 486

[137]1 IA 209; Referred to in: Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi (2018)[137] 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 All LR 591.

[138]Quoted in: Baijaynanda Giri Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1954 Pat 266

[139]  2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 All LR 591

[140]Srinivasa Das v. Surajanarayan Dass, AIR 1967 SC 256

[141] Bihar State Board of Religious Trust VS Mahanth Ramgun Dasjee Chela: 2013  AIR Pat 106; The Bihar State Board of Religious Trust, (Patna) Vs. Mahanth Sri Biseshwar Das, AIR 1971 SC 2057

[142]Prithi Nath v. Birkha Nath, AIR 1956 SC 192

[143]  ILR 27 Mad 435

[144]  ILR 33 Mad 205

[145]  ILR (1916) 43 Cal 707.

[146]  AIR 1922 PC 123.

[147]AIR 1954 SC 282

[148](1981) 3 SCC 689

[149]  Bai  Zabu  Khima vs. Amardas  Balakdas A. I. R. 1967 Guj. 214; Ram Nath Das Vs. Ram Nagina  Choubey; AIR 1962 Pat. 481; Sm. Angurbai  Mullick  Vs.Debabrate  Mullick: AIR 1951 SC 293; Banku B. Das Vs. Kashi N. Das: AIR 1963 Cal. 88; Tulsidas  Kalichand Vs. Commr. of Income Tax: AIR 1961 SC 1023.

[150]  Bai  Zabu  Khima Vs. Amardas  Balakdas: AIR 1967 Guj. 214; Ram Nath Das Vs. Ram Nagina  Choubey; AIR 1962 Pat. 481; Sm. Angurbai  Mullick  Vs.  Debabrate  Mullick: AIR 1951 SC 293; Banku B. Das Vs. Kashi N. Das: AIR 1963 Cal. 88; Tulsidas  Kalichand Vs. Commr. of Income Tax: AIR 1961 SC 1023.

[151]  27 ILR Mad 435

[152] AIR 1951 SC 293

[153] Quoted in: Pran Krishna Das Vs. Controller of Estate Duty: AIR 1968  Cal 496.

[154]  AIR 1979 SC 1682

[155]  Quoted in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan  Vs.Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[156]Sankar Nath Mullick Vs Lakshmi Sona Oatta: 2004 2 CalLJ 393; 2004 2 CalLT 535; 2005 1 CalLT 1; 2005 109 CalWN 600

[157]Sankar Nath Mullick Vs Lakshmi Sona Oatta: 2004 2 CalLJ 393; 2004 2 CalLT 535; 2005 1 CalLT 1; 2005 109 CalWN 600.

[158] 2015 AIR (CC) 3225, 2015-4 Cal LT  1

[159]  Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 AllLR 591



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

What is Trust in Law?

‘Trust’, in Law, Simplified.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

TRUST: Word Meaning

  • Primary:
    • Faith, hope, confidence, entrustment, obligation, conviction, expectation, belief, assurance, care etc.
  • Derivative:
    • Reposition of confidence in trustee, by the founder;
    • Obligation of trustee to administer the trust property;
    • Unconditional responsibility undertaken by the trustee.
    • Association involved in the affairs of the trust.
    • Endowment or property held in trust;
    • Institution managed under the trust;

TRUST – In Law

  • Trust is anobligation’-
    • that arises from the reposition of confidence by the author
    • upon the trustee
    • to deal with or administer the trust-property
    • for the benefit the beneficiaries.
  • Trustee is the person who is-
    • entrusted by the founder
    • to deal with or administer the trust property
    • for the benefit the beneficiaries..
  • Trust-property is the property –
    • that is endowed by the founder
    • with a particular object that would benefit
    • the specified beneficiaries.

Thus, the constituents for a valid trust are the following:

  • Founder, Property,
  • Object, Trustee,
  • Obligation
  • Reposition of confidence, and
  • Beneficiary.

Definitions Given by Jurists

Underhill in ‘Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees’ defines trust as under:

  • “A trust is an equitable obligation binding a person (who is called a trustee) to deal with property over which he has control (which is called the trust property) for the benefit of persons (who are called the beneficiaries) of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom may enforce the obligation.”[1]

Halsbury’s Laws of England describes ‘trust’ as a confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power, to the intent, that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object.[2]

Salmond on Jurisprudence[3] refers to trust as under:

  • “A trust is a very important and curious instance of duplicate ownership. Trust property is that which is owned by two persons at the same time, the relation between the two owners being such that one of them is under an obligation to use his ownership for the benefit of the other. The former is called the trustee, and his ownership is trust ownership: the latter is called the beneficiary, and his is beneficial ownership. As between trustees and beneficiary, the law recognises the truth of the matter: as between these two, the property belongs to the latter and not to the former. But as between the trustee and third persons, the fiction prevails. The trustee is clothed with the rights of his beneficiary, and is so enabled to personate or represent him in dealings with the world at large.”[4]

TRUST: Definition in Indian Trusts Act

Definition of ‘trust’ in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 contains the quintessence and spirit of the definitions given by Underhill, Halsbury and Salmond. Sec. 3 of the Trusts Act defines trust as under:

  • Trust:
    • A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner:
  • ‘Author of the trust’: ‘trustee’;beneficiary’; ‘trust property’; ‘beneficial interest’; ‘instrument of trust’: –
    • The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’;
    • the person who accepts the confidence is called the ‘trustee’;
    • the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the ‘beneficiary’;
    • the subject-matter of the trust is called ‘trust property’ or ‘trust money’;
    • the ‘beneficial interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property; and
    • the instrument, if any, by which the trust is declared is called the ‘instrument of trust’.”

Definition of ‘Trust’: Simplified

The definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 can be simplified as under:

  • 1. A ‘trust’ is an obligation upon the trustees.
  • 2. It arises from the reposition of confidence, upon the trustees, by the author.
  • 3. It is to deal with or administer the trust property, as if he (trustee) himself is the owner, for the benefit the beneficiaries.

Definition of ‘Trust’: Analysed

Sec. 3 presents the definition in a ‘noncompound’ expression; that is, ‘trust is an obligation’. It is only qualified further, as shown under:

  • A ‘trust’ is an obligation-
    • (i) annexed to the ownership of property (to administer), and
    • (ii)(a) arising out of a confidence reposed in (trustee, by the author) and accepted by the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner), or
    • (ii)(b) declared and accepted by him (that is, trustee),#
    • (iii) for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner).
      • # The words “by him” denote that the obligation is “declared and accepted” by the same person. This situation comes-up only when the author himself declares to act as trustee. See notes below under the head: ‘Obligation … Declared And Accepted By Him’.

In simple terms, trust is the legal obligation of the Trustees to deal with (Arjan Singh v Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; Arjan Singh Vs Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; P.  Elumalai v Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board, 2017-8 MLJ 529) or administer (Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173) the trust property and to give effect to the objects of the Trust.

A Drill Required to Appreciate the Definition – Taking Aid from other Provisions

The definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act is complicated. Not only certain courts but some learned authors of treatises also went completely wrong while explaining the definition.

An exercise is necessary to understand the purport and implication of the definition. For that effort we have to take aid from other sections of the Act; though, usually, definitions are tools for explaining the substantive provisions of a statute, and not vice-versa.

(i) ‘A  Trust is An Obligation’

According to the Indian ‘Trusts Act’, ‘a trust is an obligation’ (arises from the reposition of confidence by the author).

It casts a responsibility upon the trustees to deal with or administer the trust property (as he himself is the owner). The word ‘trust’ is used in law as an ‘abstract[5]-countable[6] noun’, similar to ‘a business’, ‘an idea’ or ‘a duty’.[7]

(ii)  ‘Obligation Annexed to the Ownership’ refers ‘Administration

As per the definition, trust is an obligation ‘annexed to the ownership’ of the trust-property. By the very nature of ‘Trust’, the obligation ‘annexed’ to the trust-property is for administration.[8] It is made clear in Sec. 11 of the Indian Trust Act.

Sec. 11 casts duty on trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling ‘the purpose of the trust’, and obeying ‘the directions of the author of the trust’.[9] Sec. 34, 35 and 60 also refer to ‘administration’ or ‘management’ by trustee.

  • Sec. 11 Says – The trustee is bound to fulfil the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author
  • Sec. 34 says – Right to apply to Court for opinion in management of trust-property
  • Sec. 60 says – Right to proper trustees.—The beneficiary has a right  that the trust-property shall be properly protected and held and administered by proper persons …

(iii) Confidence is ‘Reposed’ by the Author ‘in the Owner’ – Owner is Trustee

Trust is defined to be an obligation arising out of a confidence ‘reposed in’ and ‘accepted by’ the owner. When the ‘author of the trust’ is defined, it is stated:

  • “The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’.”

Therefore, it is definite that the words, confidence reposed in the owner’, denote the confidence that is ‘reposed’ by the author[10] ‘in the owner’.

(iv) The ‘Owner’ who  ‘Accepts’ the Confidence is Trustee.

As we have seen, it is the author who ‘reposes’ the confidence; and the confidence is ‘reposed in’, and ‘accepted by’, the owner.  Who is the ‘owner’?

It is trustee.[11] The observations in some decisions[12] that the word ‘owner’ refers to the ‘author’ is absolutely incorrect.

The nexus between owner and trustee is clear from the definitions of ‘trust’ and ‘trustee’ – when ‘trust’ is defined, it is stated: the confidence is ‘accepted by the owner’; when ‘trustee’ is defined, it is stated: the confidence is ‘accepted by the trustee’.

According to the definition of trust, the ‘obligation’ stands ‘annexed to the ownership’ of the trust-property. Sec. 6 of the  Trusts Act makes it clear that ‘a trust is created when the author of the trust transfers the trust property to the trustee’.  Therefore, the ‘obligation’ upon the trustee casts a duty upon him to deal with or administer the trust-property as if he is its ‘owner’.

From Sec. 6 of the  Trusts Act, it is further clear that a trust cannot be said to have been constituted, unless the trustee is constituted as the ‘owner’ of the endowed property.[13]  For due administration,[14] such transfer[15] and vesting[16] of property in the trustee, as its (legal) owner,[17]is  inevitable. 

To find the answer, who is the ‘owner’ referred to in the definition of trust,we can also refer to the definition of ‘beneficial interest or interest’, in Sec. 3. The definition reads: 

  • “The ‘beneficial interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.”

The endowed property of a trust stands vested in trustee as its (sole) ‘owner’.[18] In RP Kapur  Vs. Kaushalya Educational Trust[19]  it is held by Delhi High Court that  ‘obligation’ in trust refers to a ‘tie of equity’ (viniculum-juris), whereby the trustee accepts the confidence reposed in him by the author to hold or apply the trust property for the purposes of the trust.

(v) ‘Obligation … Declared And Accepted By Him’

Going by the definition, the pronoun ‘him’ stands for ‘owner’. The definition reads:

  • “A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him …..”

As we have found in the notes just above, the confidence is ‘reposed and declared’ by the author;[20] and the confidence is ‘reposed in’, and ‘accepted by’, the trustee[21] (trustee is referred to in the definition as ‘owner’ – since trustee is the ‘legal owner’).

The expression, ‘obligation … declared and accepted by him’, is applied only when the declaration and the acceptance  are  made by the same person – it is Trustee. Rajasthan High Court observed in Heeralal  Vs. Firm Ratanlal Mahavir Prasad[22] as under:

  • “If only the trustee himself is the author, then only the trustee can make a declaration of trust.”

Therefore it is clear that this expression is attracted when the author declares ‘himself to be the trustee’.[23] (In such cases, the requirement of a formal ‘reposition of confidence upon the trustee’ does not arise.)

Section 6 of the Trusts Act expressly states that an author can be a founder-trustee. Clause (e) of Sec. 6 indicates that the formal ‘transfer of the trust-property to the trustee’ is not required where the author ‘indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts’ that he himself would be the trustee.

Our Apex Court held in Tulsidas Kilachand Vs. CIT Bombay City[24]  as under:

  • “No doubt, under Ss. 5 and 6 of the Indian Trusts Act if the declarer of the trust is himself the trustee also, there is no need that he must transfer the property to himself as trustee; but the law implies that such a transfer has been made by him, and no overt act except a declaration of trust is necessary. The capacity of the declarer of trust and his capacity as trustee are different, and after the declaration of trust, he holds the assets as a trustee. Under the Transfer of Property Act, there can be a transfer by a person to himself or to himself and another person or persons. In our opinion, there was, in this case, a transfer by Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand to himself as a trustee, though there was no formal transfer.”

(vi) ‘Confidence (Reposed in and) Accepted by the Owner’

We have seen, on analysis of the definition, that:

  • the confidence is ‘reposed in’ and ‘declared by’ by the author; and
  • the confidence is ‘accepted’ by the trustee.

From the definition, it is clear that the clause, ‘Confidence Reposed in and Accepted by the Owner’ manifest that (i) the ‘Obligation‘ on trustee is that enjoined by the author, and (ii) the Obligation must have been accepted by the trustee, on his own.

“Accepted by the Owner” denotes Unconditional Obligation undertaken by the Trustee

The words, “accepted by the owner (trustee)” is used in the definition with the deliberate object of denoting the unconditional obligation undertaken by the trustee, ‘on his own’; if not, the words “and accepted by” stand superfluous; inasmuch as a trust will not endure without a trustee.

The definition of Trust can be explained, in a nutshell, as under:

A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, andTrust is an obligation (upon trustee[25]). It is to deal with or administer[26] the trust-property as its (legal) owner.
arising out of a confidenceDuty of a Trustee is fiduciary[27] in nature.[28]  It is moral as well as legal.[29] (It must have been arisen from the confidence reposed in by the author.)
reposed inConfidence is reposed in Trustee (by the Author[30]).
and accepted by the owner, orTrustee,[31]the (legal) owner,[32] must have (unconditionally) accepted the confidence (reposed in by the author).
declared and accepted by himThe obligation is ‘declared and accepted‘ by the trustee.
(Only when the author himself is the trustee
,[33] the obligation can be ‘declared and accepted’ by one person.)
for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner.Author creates trust for the benefit of others. Trustee can be one among the beneficiaries.

Essential Requirements for a Valid Trust

Sec. 4 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 speaks as to creation of trust for ‘lawful purpose’. It reads as under:

  • 4. Lawful purpose. A trust may be created for any lawful purpose. The purpose of a trust is lawful unless it is
    • (a) forbidden by law, or
    • (b) is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law, or
    • (c) is fraudulent, or
    • (d) involves or implies injury to the person or property of another, or
    • (e) the Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy.
  • Every trust of which the purpose is unlawful is void. And where a trust is created for two purposes, of which one is lawful and the other unlawful, and the two purposes cannot be separated, the whole trust is void.
  • Explanation. In this section, the expression “law” includes, where the trust property is immovable and situate in a foreign country, the law of such country.

The essential elements for creation of a trust, enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act, reads as under:

  • 6. Creation of trust: Subject to the provisions of section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts
    • (a) an intention on his part to create thereby a trust,
    • (b) the purpose of the trust,
    • (c) the beneficiary, and
    • (d) the trust-property, and
    • (e) (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust-property to the trustee.  

Trust and Endowment

For a valid trust there should be certainty[34] as to:

  • Intention to create trust,[35]
  • Purpose,[36]
  • Beneficiary,[37]  and
  • Property.[38]

These are the ingredients of an endowment also. Appointment of a trustee[39] and transfer[40] of property to trustee for administration make Trust different from an Endowment.

The word ‘endow’[41] expresses the idea of giving, bequeathing or dedicating something for some purpose.[42] An ‘endowment’ is founded by dedication of property for the purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[43]  There may be dedication (granting) of property for subjecting it to an ‘easement’. But, in ‘law of trusts’, dedication involves the extinguishment of the rights of the original owner of the lands.[44] By ‘dedication’, the owner divests all his rights, title and interest in the property which becomes the property of the deity[45] or other endowment.

An ‘endowment’ can be public or private.[46] It is a corporeal reality to which social concepts are adhered to; whereas, a trust is primarily a legal concept attached to the administration of the endowed property.[47]

See Blog: Dedication of Property in Public Trusts

Property Vests in Trustee, by Transfer; But no Proprietary Interest

According to the definition of ‘Trust’, in the Indian Trusts Act, ‘a   trust is an obligation (a) annexed to the ownership of property, and (b) arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner/trustee. To establish a valid trust, the author must have completely parted with all his interest in the trust-property, and the property must have been transferred[48] to the trustee. But, the trustee acquires only ‘legal ownership’ over the trust-property, under the law in India. And, the beneficiaries have no proprietary-interest, or ‘beneficial interest’ pertaining to owners, as they have no ownership in the trust property.

In WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1957),[49] referring to the definition of trust, it is laid down by our Apex Court that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such.  It is held in this decision as under:

  • “22. Whatever be the position in English Law, the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (II of 1882) is clear and categoric on this point. Sec. 3 of that Act defines a Trust as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another or of another and the owner : the person who accepts the confidence is called the ‘trustee’ : the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the ‘beneficiary’ : ‘the beneficial Interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property; the subject-matter of the trust is called ‘trust property’ or ‘trust money’.”

Following WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,[50] it is observed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Special Secretary Land and Land Revenue[51] that Sec. 3 of the Trusts Act emphasises the fact that the beneficiary has a right to obtain his beneficial interest or interest against the trustee as owner of the trust property and that the trustee would become trust property’s owner for the purpose of effectively executing or administering the trust. 

It is observed by the Calcutta High Court in Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jew Vs. Commr. of IT[52] as under:

  • “Three parties are necessary to the constitution of a trust, namely, the settlor, the trustee and the beneficiary. A trust is not completely constituted until the trust property is vested in trustees for the benefit of the cestui que trust.”

In Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal (1957)[53] the Allahabad High Court had held as under:

  • “A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property (vide Sections 3 and 5 of the Trusts Act). It is an essential condition of trust that property must vest in the trustee. Unless, therefore, the trustee is constituted as the owner of the property entrusted to him, a trust cannot be said to have been constituted. Reference in this connection might be made to cases reported in Hussain Ali v. Baqir Ali, AIR 1946 Mad 116 (A); Shri Mahadeoji v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1941 Nag 181 (B) and Khemchand Ramdas v. Girdharidas Radhakishaindas, AIR 1947 Sind 187 (C); Ma Thein May v. U Po Kin, AIR 1925 Rang 289 (D) and Secretary of State for India v. Guru Proshad Dhur, ILR 20 Cal 51 (FB) (E). … The mere fact that a person is holding the property on behalf of another, will not constitute him a trustee, unless the ownership of the property is also vested in him.”

The definitions of ‘trust’, ‘trustee’ and ‘beneficiary’ lay down that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.

The obligation upon the trustee, to administer,[54] being ‘annexed to the ownership of property’, the property has to be administered by the trustee as if he is the ‘owner’ of the same;[55]  and, for such administration, the property must have been vested upon him as its (legal) owner.

Under Sec. 6 of the Trusts Act, a trust is created when the author of the trust transfers[56] the trust-property to the trustee.[57] Holding that the trustee is the legal owner of the trust property, it is observed in Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs.   Badrun Nisa Bibi (1940)[58] as under:

  • “In short, it is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and before there can be a trust the trustee must be the owner. The matter is made abundantly clear in Section 6, Trusts Act, 1882, which is in these terms:

‘Subject to the provisions of Section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts an intention on his part to create thereby a trust, the purpose of the trust, the beneficiary, and the trust property, and (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust property to the trustee.’

In short, there must be a transfer of the property to the trustee before a trust is created.”

Orissa High Court held in Narasingh Charan Mohapatra Vs. Radhakanta Mohapatra[59] as under:

  • “A trust in the accepted sense of the word is the creation of an obligation by the owner to the intent that he may hold the property for the benefit of some other person or object. As soon as the trust is declared according to the requirements of the law, the legal ownership passes to the trustee and he is bound to apply the income arising out of the property to the use and benefit of ‘cestuique trust’. As a general rule, it may be laid down that in order to make a voluntary declaration of trust binding upon the author of the trust he must have completely parted with all his interest in the property to the trustee or declared himself to be a trustee of the property for the benefit of the ‘cestuique trust’ –See: Agnew’s Trusts, p. 53.”

Sec. 10 and 75 of the Indian Trusts Act implies ‘vesting of property in trustees’.

Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 10. ….. Disclaimer of trust—Instead of accepting a trust, the intended trustee may, within a reasonable period, disclaim it, and such disclaimer shall prevent the trust property from vesting in him. A disclaimer by one of two or more co-trustees vests the trust property in the other or others and makes him or them sole trustee or trustees from the date of the creation of the trust.

Sec. 75 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 75. Vesting of trust property in new trustees.—Whenever any new trustee is appointed under section 73 or section 74, all the trust property for the time being vested in the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, or in the legal representative of any trustee, shall become vested in such new trustee, either solely or jointly with the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, as the case may require.

A Compny can be a Trustee of a Public Trust

It was held in See M.Gomathinarayagam Pillai v. Sri.Manthramurthi High School Committee, Tirunelveli, AIR 1963 Mad 387, as under:

  • “For the application of that section (Section 92 CPC)  it makes no difference whether the trustees is an individual or a company, nor is there any distinction between a company in whom the office of trustee vests and one which is specially formed for the purpose of executing the trust.” (Referred to in: S.N.D.P.  Yogum v. G.  Krishnamoorthy, ILR 2022-3 Ker 494; 2022-4 KHC 168; 2022-4 KLT 36)

Duel Ownership, as comprehended by Salmond is Not accepted in Indian Law

Trustee is full and Sole Owner, under Indian law.

Under English law, there is ‘duel ownership’ on trust property. First is the ‘legal ownership’ which is vested with trustee; and the second, the ‘equitable or beneficial ownership’ vested with the beneficiary. Salmond on Jurisprudence[60]  refers it as under:

  • “A trustee is the legal owner of the property, the actual owner thereof having lost title thereto by the creation of a trust. The equitable ownership in the trust property vests in the beneficiaries. The trust is thus an incident of dual ownership in which the creator of the trust no longer figures.”[61]

The Law of Trust in India does not follow the ‘doctrine of dual ownership’; because, it does not recognise legal and equitable estates. The trustee ‘holds’ and administers the trust property as its (sole[62]) ‘legal owner’[63] or the ‘full (legal) owner’. The Privy Council, in Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram (1931),[64] held as under:

  • “The Indian Law does not recognise legal and equitable estates. By that law, therefore, there can be but one owner; and where the property is vested in a trustee, the owner must, their Lordship think, be the trustee. This is the view embodied in the Indian Trusts Act: See Sec. 3, 55, 56, etc. … “[65]

If more than one trustee, the trustees altogether are (joint) owners of the trust property.[66]

Out Apex Court, referring, Mount Royal/Walsh Inc. v. Jensen Star, the Ship, (1990) 1 FC 199, of Federal Court of Appeal in Canada, observed in Ahmed Abdulla Ahmed Al Ghurair Vs. Star Health and Allied Insurance Co. Ltd.[67] as under:

  • “49. The term ‘Beneficial interest’ is defined under Section 3 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 which is reproduced hereunder:
  • ‘Beneficial interest’ or ‘interest of the beneficiary’ is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.’
  • 50. As it can be discerned from the definition of ‘Beneficial interest’ provided in Section 3 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882, there are two parties involved in an issue governing beneficial interest. One is a beneficiary named as ‘beneficial owner’ and the other is the owner named as ‘registered owner’ being the trustee of the property or the asset in question. Thus, one can deduce the underlining principle that the ownership is nonetheless legal over the trust property, which vests on him but he also acts as a trustee of the beneficiary. A beneficial owner may include a person who stands behind the registered owner when he acts like a trustee, legal representative or an agent.”

It is beyond doubt that the Canadian law that follows the English principles is not applicable in India, in these aspects.

‘Beneficiaries’ have Merely Beneficial Interest; ‘Legal Ownershipwith Trustees

In The Province of Bihar v. FR Hayes,  1946-14 ITR 326 (Patna), Fazl Ali, CJ (as he then was) while interpreting Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1938, referring the definition of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, held as under:

  • “The framers of the Act must be assumed to have known the accepted legal meaning of the expression and also known that the term ‘beneficiary’ in law is not generally used with reference to a full legal owner but with reference to a person who has ‘beneficial interest’ in some property which is usually in the possession and control of another person. The distinction between beneficial interest and legal ownership is one of the most notable features of a trust and in my judgment ‘beneficiaries’ referred to in Section 11 are those persons who have merely beneficial interest in a property while the legal ownership of the property vests in a person or persons who hold the property for their benefit.”

Read Blog: Indian Law Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership

Trustee Holds ‘On His Own Right’; Not ‘On Behalf Of’ the Beneficiaries

In WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh[68]  it is laid down by our Apex Court as under:

  • “23. These definitions emphasise that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary only has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property. The trustee is thus, the legal owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such. He, no doubt, holds the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries but he does not hold it on their behalf. The expressions ‘for the benefit of’ and ‘on behalf of’ are not synonymous with each other. They convey different meanings.”

Our Apex Court observed in Comm. Wealth Tax Vs. Kirpashanker Dayashankar[69] that the trustee holds the trust property ‘on his own right’ and not ‘on behalf of’ someone else though he holds it ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.

Indian Trusts Act, 1882 does not accept the doctrine of ‘duel ownership’.  ‘Legal ownership’ of the trust property is ‘vested’ with the trustee. Indian Trusts Act expounds that the trustee ‘holds’ the trust property as its (sole[70]) owner.  These obligations are casted upon trustees only to manage the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[71] It is beyond doubt that the trustee has no ‘proprietary interest’ inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’[72] in the property itself.  In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[73]The Act refers only to ‘beneficial interest’ entitled to by the beneficiaries; and, not ‘beneficial ownership’.

It is clear from the following statements in the definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882:

  • (i) “A ‘trust’ is an obligation … arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner… for the benefit of another….”
  • (ii) “(T)he ‘beneficial interest’…  is his (beneficiary’s) right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.”

The Common Law of Trust predicated by the courts in India,[74] in the matters of public trusts, has disfavoured the doctrine of ‘duel ownership’;[75] and followed the Trusts Act.

The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 repeatedly lays down – trustees are ‘holding’ trust property(Sec. 10, 29 and Chap. IX: Sec. 80 onwards).  It is subject to the obligation to use his ownership ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.

Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 10. Who may be trustee.—Every person capable of holding property may be a trustee; but, where the trust involves the exercise of discretion, he cannot execute it unless he is competent to contract.

Sec. 29 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 29. Liability of trustee where beneficiary’s interest is forfeited to Government.—When the beneficiary’s interest is forfeited or awarded by legal adjudication to the Government, the trustee is bound to hold the trust property to the extent of such interest for the benefit of such person in such manner as the State Government may direct in this behalf.

‘Obligation’ in Trustee: Moral & Legal Duty

A trust being an ‘obligation’ (i) for administration and (ii) arising out of a ‘confidence’ reposed in the trustee, the trustee has to discharge the ‘obligation’  and ‘confidence’ faithfully.[76]It must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries. He has to fulfill the object and the purpose of the trust and obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation.[77]It is his moral as well as legal duty.[78]

As pointed out by our Apex Court, in WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,[79]  the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 declares vesting legal ownership with trustees. The vesting of ownership of trust property with the trustee is under an obligation to manage it for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[80]  Though, in a trust, the trust property must have been transferred to the trustees, and the trust property vests in the trustee as owner thereof, it does not absolutely belong to any individual. The property is vested in trustees subject to the obligations upon which the trustees accepted the trust.[81] The trustee deals with the property in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust.[82]  In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[83]The legal ownership which vests in the trustee is for the purposes of the trust and to administer[84] the same.

It is observed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Special Secretary Land and Land Revenue[85] that the trustee would become the owner of the trust property for the purpose of effectively executing or administering the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries and for due administration thereof, and not for any other purpose. Merely because the property is vested in the trustee as the legal owner, he has no ‘proprietor interest’, inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’ in the property itself.  The trustee is not the full owner of the property in the real sense of the term.

Trustee has to perform these duties gratuitously.[86] No remuneration can be claimed from the trust property or income unless the terms of the trust do not specifically allow it.  But, the trustee is entitled to get reimbursement out of the trust property for all expenses properly incurred in relation to the execution of the trust and for preservation of the trust property.[87]

See Blog: Trustees and Administration of Public Trusts

Distinguishing Particularities of Trust from Other Legal-Relations

Trust imposes obligation upon trustees.[88]The whole edifice of trust rests upon the acceptance of ‘confidence’ by the trustee, reposed in by the author.[89] It is for administration[90] as desired by the author.  As soon as the trust is validly declared by the author and duly accepted by the trustee, the legal ownership passes to the trustee[91]and the property vests[92] in him. The trustee holds the endowed property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[93] The distinguishing particularities of trust from other legal-relations lie in ‘obligation’, ‘confidence’ and ‘entrustment of ownership in trustee’. 

Entrustment with Banker

The trustee administers the property as its (legal) owner (Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan:  AIR 1919 Mad 555; In Re Sabnis, Goregaonkar Senjit  Vs.  Shivramdas:  AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan:   AIR   1938 Cal818; Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Life Insurance Corp.  of India Vs.   Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1) with exclusive rights. (Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma: 2010-85 AIC 762; 2009-6 ALT 197, 2009-6 ALD 269).  In N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh (13.12.2021) the Supreme Court held as under:

“The money that a customer deposits in a bank is not held by the latter on trust for him. It becomes a part of the banker’s funds who is under a contractual obligation to pay the sum deposited by a customer to him on demand with the agreed rate of interest. Such a relationship between the customer and the Bank is one of a creditor and a debtor. The Bank is liable to pay money back to the customers when called upon, but until it’s called upon to pay it, the Bank is entitled to utilize the money in any manner for earning profit.”

‘Once a (Public) Trust Always a Trust’

A public trust is perpetual. Rule against perpetuities does not apply to it. It can never be put to an end though its nature may be changed.[94] Once a public endowment is made, even the former owners or founders cannot revoke it.[95]Subsequent conduct of the founder or his descendants contrary to such dedication would amount to a breach of trust.[96]  Tudor on Charities,[97]  while dealing with creation of charitable trusts, explains it as under:

  •  “When a charity has been founded and trusts have been declared, the founder has no power to revoke, vary or add to the trusts. This is so irrespective of whether the trusts have been declared by an individual, or by a body of subscribers, or by the trustees. “[98]

In Halsbury’s Laws of England,[99]it is stated as under:

  • “Charitable trusts have sometimes been declared subject to express powers of revocation, but there has apparently been no decision on the validity of such a power except as regards the rule against perpetuities.”[100]

Underhill in ‘Law relating to Trusts and Trustees’ has explained it,with respect to associations, thus:

  • “However, the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the Association for the time being. The members for the time being cannot under the Association rules Appropriate Trust property for themselves for there would then be no property held on trust as intended by the testator for those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the Association for the time being.”[101]

Revocable Trust

When the author/settlor creates or establishes the trust reserving his power to terminate the trust, or change the beneficiaries and trustees, or the terms of the trust, as he likes, such trust at the will and pleasure of the author is called revocable trust (See: Jyotendrasinhji v. SI Tripathi, AIR 1993 SC 1991).

Such trusts are possible only in private trusts. In case of revocable trusts, there will not be complete dedication of trust property.

  • 77. Trust how extinguished.—A trust is extinguished
  • (a) ….(b) …..(c) ….. or
  • (d) when the trust, being revocable, is expressly revoked.

Read Blog: Extinction, Discharge, Revocation, etc. of Public Trusts

A Trust or An Endowment Shall Not Fail for Want of Trustees.

It is a principle of equity that no trust shall fail for want of trustees.[102]  It applies  in three occasions: First, though a trust was clearly intended, the settler did not or could not appoint trustees owing to a mere omission or the trustee who was named either refused or was unable to act.[103]  Secondly, when a vacancy of trustee occurs.  Thirdly, in dedication to a juristic person like temple, or to a well identified institution or purpose though it is not regarded as juristic person.

Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act shows that, generally, a trust is created by transfer of trust-property to a trustee; and that a trust can also be created otherwise than ‘by any words or acts’ as to appointment of trustee when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts that he himself would be the trustee.

Dedication of property is like a rocket fired.  As long as it is in private realm it retains the character of a private property.[104] Once dedication is complete, it cannot be revoked.[105] It is a trite law that ‘once a trust always a trust’.[106]  In Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Som Nath Dass[107] the Supreme Court has described ‘Endowment’ as under:

  • “Endowment is when donor parts with his property for it being used for a public purpose and its entrustment is to a person or group of person in trust for carrying out the objective of such entrustment. Once endowment is made, it is final and it is irrevocable. It is the onerous duty of the persons entrusted with such endowment, to carry out the objectives of this entrustment. They may appoint a manager in the absence of any indication in the trust or get it appointed through Court.”

Sec. 92, CPC, applicable to public trusts, expressly authorizes court to appoint a new trustee.[108] Section 59 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, applicable to public trusts, deals[109] with the principle ‘A Trust shall not fail for want of a trustee’.  It reads:

  • 59. Right to sue for execution of trust.—Where no trustees are appointed or all the trustees die, disclaim or are discharged, or where for any other reason the execution of a trust by the trustee is or becomes impracticable, the beneficiary may institute a suit for the execution of the trust, and the trust shall, so far as may be possible, be executed by the Court until the appointment of a trustee or new trustee.

Public Trusts &  Indian Trusts Act

The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 is enacted primarily to govern private trusts; and ‘public or private charitable or religious endowments’ are expressly excluded from its ambit. 

In Sec. 1, under the head, ‘Savings’, it is stated:

  • But nothing herein contained affects the rules of Mohammedan law as to waqf, or the mutual relations of the members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law, or applies to public or private religious or charitable endowments, or to trusts to distribute prizes taken in war among the captors; and nothing in the Second Chapter of this Act applies to trusts created before the said day.

Though the Indian Trusts Act does not apply, in terms, to the public trusts, the common legal principles,[110] which cover matters of both public and private trusts, especially the Sections that speak as to the Duties and Liabilities of Trustees (Chapter III), Disabilities of Trustees (Chapter V), and Chapter IX pertaining to implied trusts, apply to public trusts also.[111]They ‘cannot become untouchable’[112] merely because they find a place in the Trusts Act.

Our courts apply the general law of trusts, and the universal rules of equity and good conscience upheld by the English judges in this subject, in appropriate cases.

Registration of Public Trusts

Various State Public Trusts Acts require registration of all public trusts with the authorities appointed under the said Acts. In New Noble Educational Society v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax-1, 2023-6 SCC 649, it is held with reference to Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, as under:

  • “67. In the event of failure to comply with Section 43(1), or failure to intimate changes in the trust, or for supplying false information, the trustee or other person in charge, can be penalized by Section 43 (11). Section 44 empowers the Commissioner to direct charitable organizations and trusts to comply and register under the Act.
  • 68.The assessees had argued that since they were registered under the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 or were trusts duly registered, they could not be compelled to comply with state laws as a condition for consideration of their application as charitable institutions, under Section 10 (23C).
  • 69. This court is of the opinion that the findings in the impugned judgment on this aspect are sound. The requirement of registration of every charitable institution is not optional. Aside from the fact that the consequences of non-registration are penal, which indicates the mandatory nature of the provisions of the A.P. Charities Act, such local laws provide the regulatory framework by which annual accounts, manner of choosing the governing body (in terms of the founding instrument: trust, society, etc.), acquisition and disposal of properties, etc. are constantly monitored. Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution reads as follows:
    • “32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, and universities; unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations; cooperative societies.”
  • By Entry 28, List III of the Seventh Schedule, the states have undoubted power to enact on the subject of charities:
    • “28. Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions.”

Private Religious Trusts

So far as private religious trusts are concerned, there are no specific statutory enactments to regulate their affairs. Such trusts are governed by the foundational principles upon which they are established, as evidenced by documents, if any; customs and usages;general law of contract and transfer of property, etc; apart from the Common Law of the Land applicable to such trusts.

See Blog (click): Public & Private Trusts in India.

In Hindu Endowments, Managers are Trustees in a General Sense

Three parties are necessary to constitute a trust; namely, the settlor, the trustee and the beneficiary, as laid down in Sree SreeIswar Gopal Jew Vs. CIT[113]. Trustee holds the property for the benefit of the beneficiaries or cesti que trust. In Hindu religious endowments, the trustees hold the endowed properties for the institution. It is laid down in Ram Parkash Dass Vs. Anant Das (1916)[114] as under:

  • “He (Mahanth) sits upon the gadi, he initiates candidates into the mysteries of the cult; he superintends the worship of the idol and the accustomed spiritual rites; he manages the property of the institution; he administers its affairs; and the whole assets are vested in him as the owner thereof in trust for the institution itself.”

This decision was noticed by the Board in Vidya Varuthi Vs. Baluswami[115] (1922) and it was observed:

  • “They thus concur with the first court that there was no “specific trust” which was the foundation of the plaintiff’s case. But after examining some of the judgments of their own court, they apparently felt constrained to hold that the decision of his Board in Ram Parkash Das Vs. Anand Das had crystallised the law on the subject, and definitely declared the Mahant to be a trustee. It is to be observed that in that case the decision related to the office of Mahant, but in the course of their judgment their Lordships conceived it desirable to indicate inter alia what, upon the evidence of the usages and customs applicable to the institution with which they were dealing, and similar institutions, were the duties and obligations attached to the office of superior: and they used the term trustee in a general sense, as in previous decisions of the Board, by way of a compendious expression to convey a general conception of those obligations. They did not attempt to define the term or to hold that the word in its specific sense is applicable to the laws and

In Pratap Singhji   Vs. Charity Commissioner[116] our Apex Court held as under:

  • “ ‘Endowment’ is dedication of property for purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment. It is to be remembered that a trust in the sense in which the expression is used in English law is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple. Hindu piety found expression in gifts to idols and images consecrated and installed in temples, to religious institutions of every kind and for all purposes considered meritorious in the Hindu social and religious system. Under the Hindu law the image of a deity of the Hindu pantheon is, as has been aptly called, a ‘juristic entity’, vested with the capacity of receiving gifts and holding property. The Hindu law recognises dedications for the establishment of the image of a deity and for maintenance and worship thereof. The property so dedicated to a pious purpose is placed extra-commercium and is entitled to special protection at the hands of the Sovereign whose duty it is to intervene to prevent fraud and waste in dealing with religious endowments. Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. It would be a legitimate inference to draw that the founder of the temple had dedicated it to the public if it is found that he had held out the temple to be a public one: Pujari Lakshmana Goundan Vs. Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44.”

The same is the position with respect to Wakf property held by Sajadahnashin who controls and manages the same.[117]

Roman Law and Hindu Law

In Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakhmiram,[118] it was held that ‘the Hindu Law like the Roman law and those derived from it recognizes not only corporate bodies with rights or property-vested in the corporation’ apart from its individual members, but also juridical persons and subjects called foundations.’ The religious institutions like mutts and other establishments obviously answer to the description of foundations in Roman law. The idea is the same, namely, when property is dedicated for a particular purpose, the property itself upon which the purpose is impressed, is raised to the category of a juristic person so that the property which is dedicated would vest in the person so created.

Trustee Represents Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries do not have right of ownership over the trust property.  But, Order XXXI, Rule 1 CPC lays down that the Trustee shall represent the persons interested in the trust in suits concerning property vested in the Trustee. Apart from providing an enabling stipulation, it indicates the significance of obligation casted on the trustees. And, it also asserts the paramount importance of the beneficiaries in a trust. 

Vesting of Ownership of Trust Property

While establishing a trust the author completely parts with all his interest in the trust-property, and the property has to be transferred[119] to the trustee. But, the trustee acquires only ‘legal ownership’ over the trust-property, under the law in India. And, the beneficiaries have mere ‘beneficial interest’, as they have no proprietary-interest or ownership. Then, an interesting question arises: In whom the actual ownership vests?

The following propositions can be presented as to the vesting of ownership of the trust-property.

  1. In most cases of public trusts, the ‘ultimate vesting’ may not be a matter of practical importance; because, the endowment will be permanent and indivisible; and court takes cognizance, when practical difficulties are faced while carrying out the object of the trust, by applying cy pres doctrine, or by invoking its inherent jurisdiction.
  2. The terms of dedication (as revealed from the deed of dedication, if any, or on other substantial evidence) determine the person or body of persons in whom/which such property ultimately vest in.
  3. If the ownership of the property of a trust vests in a legal person, such vesting is permanent (thereby it cannot be put to an end), and such vesting is subject to the object and purpose envisaged by the founder.
  4. If the subject matter of the trust is dedicated to public at large or a section of public, the title of such subject matter stands separated from the owner and vests in public or the section of public who are the beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation.
  5. If the property is that of an unregistered association and the members thereof are ascertainable (as in the case of an unregistered society) the actual ownership of the property will be presumed to be vested with those members (from time-to-time), only as joint owners (contra-distinct to ownership under tenants-in-common).
  6. If the property is one stands dedicated to a Political Party, unregistered Association or a Church, and the beneficiaries thereof are unascertainable, the property vests with the entire members (of such Party, Association or Church), from time to time, subject to its objectives Such vesting is permanent, whereby it cannot be put to an end even by a majority decision of the members of a particular time.
  7. In case such unregistered association or church becomes defunctive and it is impossible to carry on the affairs of the trust as intended by the founders, the court will apply the trust-property to a charitable purpose, ‘as nearly as possible’[120]to the objects of the original Trust, invoking ‘cy pres’ doctrine.  
  8. If the subject matter of a trust is one partially dedicated to public at large or a section of public (as in the case of a waiting shed or a public well) by a known person and administered and maintained by himself or through another person, the property will remain vested with the owner, when the purpose of dedication is extinguished.

Two (Kinds of) “Trusts” over the Parish or Branch Property

One Property, Several Trusts Possible

Trust is a general term used in wider sense in law. Therefore –

  1. If a property is acquired by a branch of a larger body, or a parish of a Church, the entire members of the larger body, from time to time, will be presumed to be the owners, subject to (i) the byelaws of the (entire) association or trust and (ii) the purposes or objectives ‘aimed to achieve’ by that particular property. 
  2. If the bylaws (expressly or by necessary implication) provides for special beneficial enjoyment by the members of the branch or parish, over the branch/parish properties, definitely there will be two (kinds of) “trusts” over the same property – one, trust for the beneficial enjoyment of whole body; and the other, for the members of the branch/parish.

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

Read Blog: Vesting of Property in Trusts

Trust is a Legal Concept ; Not a Juristic Person

‘A Trust’ is ‘an obligation’ according to the definition in the Trusts Act. In common law also it does not convey the idea that it is a tangible or a corporeal property. Grammatically speaking, as pointed out earlier, it is an ‘abstract[121]-countable[122] noun’. Therefore, it can neither be a juristic person[123] nor an association of persons.[124]

‘Trust’ is essentially a legal concept attached to the endowed property. It arises by the appointment of a trustee. For creation of a trust, the trust-property must have been transferred to the trustee.[125]The Delhi High Court held in Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Sham Lal[126] as under:

  • “A trust is primarily a legal concept, a mode of transfer of property and of holding property. On the other hand, an institution is primarily a social concept. It is not a legal concept at all. For, there is established legal method by which an institution may come into being. It may be established by way of an organisation which may assume any or no legal form. It may be a trust or a company or a statutory corporation or a mere unincorporated association or a society registered or otherwise. It is its work and place in the society that is the hall-mark of an institution. As observed by Lord Macnaghten in Mayor, etc. of Manchester V. Mcadam,3 Tax Cases 491 at 497, ‘it is the body (so to speak) called into existence to translate the purpose as conceived in the mind of the founders into a living and active principle.’ In the present case, the founders of the trust may have transferred their property to a charitable purpose and thus created a public trust. But the body to translate the trust into a living and active principle has not yet come into existence. It is that body which will be entitled to be called an institution. It is not a mere legal arrangement like a trust but an active working body with a social impact which can be called an institution.”

Read Blog: Trust is ‘An Obligation’; Not a Legal Entity

‘Trust’ is Used as Synonym to Endowment/Association

Inasmuch as the ‘trust’ has no existence without its trust property, and it is an ‘obligation’ ‘annexed to’ the trust property, the endowment or institution, upon which the obligation of ‘trust’ is pervaded, is personified as a ‘trust’. Certain public institutions established or dedicated with philanthropic view are also generally described as ‘trusts’.

In the inclusive definition of ‘trust’ in the Public Trusts Acts enacted by various States and in several Tax-Laws, Trust ‘means and includes’ a temple, a math, wakf, a dharmada or any other religious or charitable endowment, and even a society.  It is interesting to note that the word ‘trust’ is used as an ‘entity’ even in Illustration (b) of Sec. 15 of the Trusts Act –it is the only one place in this Act where the term ‘trust’ is used in this manner.

The Illustration (b) of Sec. 15 reads: 

  • “(b) A, trustee of lease-hold property, directs the tenant to pay the rents on account of the trust to a banker, B, ….”

See Blog: Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies

Life is Bestowed  upon Endowment When Trustee is Appointed

An ‘endowment’ is arisen by the dedication of a specified property for purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[127]

The differentiating particularity of a trust from an endowment is, the ‘transfer[128] of the trust-property to the trustee’.[129]The other ingredients for creation of trust as stated in the clauses (a) to (d) of Section 6 of the Act (Intention to create trust,  Purpose,  Beneficiary,  and Property) are the requisites for endowments also.

The author endows the property with a definite purpose, beneficial to the beneficiaries. Trust arises when a trustee is appointed for administration of the endowment.[130]  For the formation of a trust, the trust-property must have been vested in trustees.[131]The administration by the trustee must be to accomplish the purpose intended by the founder. The ‘obligation’ upon trustee arises only when the trustee accepts the confidence reposed-in by the author. The duty accepted by the trustee is ‘fiduciary’ in character. The administration by the trustee must be carried on with prudence,[132] and as a reasonable man.[133]

The Trustee of a Charitable Trust is enjoined with the duty to preserve and protect the property of the Trust as if the Manager of an infant, but such power of the Trustees cannot be read as that of a pleasure doctrine or a sweet will of the Trustees to dispose of the property. The degree of obligation is coupled with their fiduciary capacity to preserve and protect the property for the larger interest of the Trust and to be made available to the beneficiaries of the Trust to the maximum possible extent.[134]

Therefore, a legal identity is renowned, or life is bestowed, upon the endowment when a trustee is appointed. An endowment, sans trustee, remains static.

Trust Property must be one “Transferable to the Beneficiary”: Import

It must not be merely beneficial interest.

Section 8 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads:

  • 8. Subject of Trust. The subject-matter of a trust must be property transferable to the beneficiary. It must not be merely beneficial interest under a subsisting trust.

Subject matter[135] of an endowment and a trust will, normally, be a corporeal property. Sections 5 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 speaks as to ‘trust of’ movable and immovable properties. Under Section 8 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, the subject-matter of a (private) trust must be property transferable(note:- not, ‘be transferred’, ultimately)to the beneficiary, and it must not be merely beneficial interest under a subsisting trust. It conveys us two ideas:

  • (i) those who created the trust must be owners of the trust property and must be capable of transferring their interest in the trust properties[136] and
  • (ii) a Trust cannot be created only for a beneficial interest, (Note: Not the ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner; it is the interest pertaining to beneficiaries.) or there is no trust upon a trust.  In Pestonji Jalbhoy Chichgar Vs. Jalbhoy Jehangir Chichgar[137] it is observed by the Privy Council: “What the S. 8 forbids is a trust upon a trust– a trust of a mere right of the beneficiary to proceed against the trustee, and if the Will of Gulbai amounts to a declaration of a trust of her beneficial interest, that is, of her right to go against the trustees of Kaka’s will, then the trust offends against S.8.”

(Note: Section 8 does not postulate that the property should be transferred to the beneficiaries, ultimately.)

Salmond’s Jurisprudence (while describing “property”) refers to corporeal property  as, ‘the right of ownership in a material object, or that object itself’.[138]A founder can also be a beneficiary of a trust after its dedication. (But, he cannot claim any special right on that score, unless he reserved the same positively.)

Progressive Jurists Accept Trust in a ‘General Sense’

Indian law of trusts follows the progressive view of jurists like Halsbury.  They preferred investing principles of trust, in a ‘wider’ or ‘general’ form.  They see principles of trust in all matters of fiduciary relationships under which one holds property on behalf of, or for the benefit of, others.  Halsbury’s Laws of England defines ‘trust’ as a confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power, to the intent, that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object. Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 substantially follow this definition.

Our Common Law imports still wider meaning to ‘trust’ in the matters of religious trusts.

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

It is trite law that dedicated property of a temple will be vested with the idol as the legal owner thereof, though such vesting is qualified to be in an ‘ideal or secondary sense’;[139] and the possession and management thereof will be with some human being identified as Shebait or Manager, though in the strict legal sense, they cannot be accepted as trustees.

In Wali Mohammed v. Rahmat Bee, (1999- 3 SCC 145), to the question whether the Mutawalli of a Wakf would be a trustee, our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “35. It will be seen that the main part of Sec. 10 (Limitation Act) states that no period of limitation applies for recovery of property from a trustee in whom the property is vested for a specific purpose, unless such a person is an assignee for valuable consideration. The Explanation further states that it shall be deemed that a person managing the property of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is to be deemed to be a trustee in whom such property has vested for a specific purpose. We shall explain these provisions in some detail.
  • 36. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] the Privy Council held that property comprised in a Hindu or Mohammedan religious or charitable endowment was not property vested in trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of the said words in the main section. The reason was that according to the customary law, where property was dedicated to a Hindu idol or mutt or to a Mohammedan wakf, the property vested in the idol or the institution or God, as the case may be, directly and that the shebait, mahant, mutawalli or other person who was in charge of the institution was simply a manager on behalf of the institution. As Sec. 10 did not apply unless these persons were trustees this judgment made recovery of properties of the above trusts from donees, from these managers, rather difficult.
  • 37. The legislature therefore intervened and amended Sec. 10 for the purpose of getting over the effect of the above judgment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill of 1929 makes this clear. It says: “The (Civil Justice) Committee’s recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] and Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das Aurora [(1922) 50 IA 84] which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutawalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Mohammedan religious endowment is vested, are not trustees within the meaning of the words as used in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in them. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person, not being an assignee for valuable consideration, endowments of this nature are not protected. The Committee’s recommendation is that Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Mohammedan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee.” (Quoted in: Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482).

In Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482, the Apex Court held that the Mutawalli is not a trustee in its true sense. The Supreme Court formulated a crucial question and answered it as under:

  • “127. Thus, the Mutawalli is treated as a trustee. But would the amendment made to Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make a Mutawalli a trustee generally?

Our answer is an emphatic No. This is for the reason that the change in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act was effected to overcome the judgment of the Privy Council, when it held that a Mutawalli would not be a trustee and when in view of the requirement in Sec. 10 that the suit must be one against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose and as a Mutawalli would not be a trustee in law per se, the legislature brought in the explanation. But what is striking are two features. Firstly, the change is brought by way of an Explanation. More importantly, the explanation begins with words “For the purpose of this section  and proceeds to declare that “any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be properly vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”

Both Express and Constructive Trusts Differ from Contract

Trust differs from contract. Trust is a concept derived by law to give effect to a pious or philanthropic wish of a generous man, and to ensure the benefits thereof to the beneficiaries intended by its founder. But, contract is the result of positive acts of two persons. There is no intermediary in contract, as trustees in a trust. A contract without consideration is void. In ‘trust’, trustee undertakes an obligation; and there is no question of consideration.

In express trust there must be a deliberate intention on the part of the author to create a trust.[140] Constructive trust emerges without regard to the intention of the parties to create a trust.  It is an equitable remedy exercises by court of law. In both cases, there no direct involvement of beneficiaries. In a contract, the claims of one party against the other are personal in nature;[141] whereas, trust is governed by obligation and fiduciary relation. Fiduciary relationship for trustees and beneficial interest for beneficiaries in the trust property are the characteristics of trust; they are absent in contract.[142] Trustee deals with the property in a discretionary manner applying his prudence.[143]The beneficiaries of a trust have the right to get the trust enforced. Beneficiary of a contract has merely a personal claim against the promisor.

Breach of trust by itself is punishable under law; whereas breach of a contract, without fraud or cheating, raises civil liability alone. Every breach of contract is not breach of trust or cheating. A breach of contract is different from the offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust under IPC. In the absence of illegal motives or intention at the very inception, no offence of cheating would be made out in a contract.[144]

The service of a person agreeing to collect rent for another[145] with the undertaking to render accounts thereof does not create a trust even  constructively or impliedly.[146]  A mortgagee in possession is also not a trustee in the strict sense, and a constructive or implied trust  is legally recognised, as in cases governed by S. 90 and 95 of the Trusts Act, for he holds a fiduciary character in certain respects.[147]

Court is the Ultimate Protector of Charities[148]

Courts have jurisdiction and duty[149] to administer and enforce public trusts.[150]  As in the case of English Law, Indian Law also accepts court as the ultimate protector of all charities.[151] It is the guardian of the public charitable trusts or institutions[152] and its property.[153] In legal theory the Court is the guardian of charity, as it is of an infant.[154]In P. Elumalai Vs. Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board[155] the Madras High Court while passing an order exercising the ‘Parens Patriae’ jurisdiction over the trust held that, as ‘Parens Patriae’, the Courts were empowered to protect the sanctity of public trust in case of breach of trust on account of irregularities committed in trust. In this decision it was held that the Court could not remain a mute spectator when illegality had been committed against a public Trust in front of its own eyes.[156]

Public Trust Doctrine

Who is the owner of the sea, sky, air, rivers, sea shore etc.? Roman Law thought about it first. They found the answer and declared: either owned by no one (res nullius) or by everyone in common (res communious).  The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life.

The Public Trust Doctrine rests on the principle that the resources made available by the nature are of immense importance to the people as a whole and that it will stand wholly unjustified if made them an object of private ownership.

This doctrine envisages that the natural resources such as lakes, ponds (water bodies)etc. are held by the State as a ‘trustee’ of the public. The State is the trustee of all natural resources. The public trust doctrine[157]enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes.[158]It requires the State to protect, conserve and augment the gift of nature including the traditional water retaining structures.

The Government cannot ignore the fiduciary duty of care and responsibility casted upon it. If a water body has been fallen into disuse or forest is burnt up, that by itself, would not be a good ground for the Government to regularise the encroachments therein; as it amounts to breach of the public trust.

Any act or attempt made by the Government, or even the legislature, that derogate the object for which such land air or water exists, has to be held illegal by the higher authority, if any, which is equipped to scrutinise the illegality of such acts.

MC Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath

The Doctrine of Public Trust, by that name, is introduced to our legal system by our Apex Court in MC Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath.[159]  It was a public interest litigation. It arose from a news item appeared in the Indian Express.  It was stated that a private company, Span Motels, had built a motel at the bank of River Beas in Kullu Valley, by encroaching forest land. The major shares of the company were with the relatives of one Kamal Nath. The encroachment was later regularized by the government; and the land was leased out to the company, when Kamal Nath was the Minister for Environment and Forests.

The Motel used earth-movers and bulldozers to turn the course of river Beas. It was found to be illegal and constituted ‘callous interference with the natural flow of river Beas’; and that it resulted in the degradation of the environment. In this case the Supreme Court found that the Motel was liable to pay compensation by way of cost for the restitution of the environment and ecology of the area  and  issued various directions to restore the original position.

The  Apex  Court observed that the public had a right to expect certain lands and natural areas to retain their natural characteristics.  It  was  declared in the judgment that the public trust doctrine, ‘as discussed by in this judgment is a part of the law of the land’.

In this   trailblazing landmark decision, the Apex Court quoted Joseph L. Sax, Professor of Law, University of Michigan – proponent of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine -from his  erudite article ‘Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention’, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, Part 1 p. 473, which gave the historical background of the Public Trust Doctrine,[160] as under :

  • “The source of modern public trust law is found in a concept that received much attention in Roman and English law – the nature of property rights in rivers, the sea, and the seashore. That history has been given considerable attention in the legal literature, need not be repeated in detail here. But two points should be emphasized. First, certain interests, such as navigation and fishing, were sought to be preserved for the benefit of the public; accordingly, property used for those purposes was distinguished from general public property which the sovereign could routinely grant to private owners. Second, while it was understood that in certain common properties – such as the seashore, highways, and running water – ‘perpetual use was dedicated to the public’, it has never been clear whether the public had an enforceable right to prevent infringement of those interests. Although the State apparently did protect public uses, no evidence is available that public rights could be legally asserted against a recalcitrant government.”
  • “Three types of restriction on governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the public trust; first the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purposes but it must be held available for use by the general public; second, the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third the property must be maintained for particular types of uses:”

The Supreme Court held further as under:

  • “Our legal system – based on English common law – includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership.”[161]

In Tehseen Poonawalla  Vs. Union of India[162] it is pointed out that the principles such as the ‘polluter pays’ and the public trust doctrine have evolved during the adjudication of public interest petitions. (Also See: In Re: T. N.  Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, AIR 2024  SC 1955.)

Expansion of the Concept

In Fomento Resorts & Hotels Vs. Minguel Martins[163] our Apex Court held that the heart of the public trust doctrine is that it imposes limits and obligations upon government agencies and their administrators on behalf of all the people; especially future generations. It is pointed out in Noida Entrepreneurs Association Vs. Noida[164]that the doctrine has been developed from Article 21 of the Constitution. (Referred to in Bikramchatterji Vs. Union Of India: 2019 5 Supreme 3; 2019 0 Supreme(SC) 768).

It is held by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Kerala (2014  AIR SC 2407, Referred to in  In Re: The Punjab Termination of Agreement Act, 2004: AIR 2016  SC 5145) that the judicial function is also a very important sovereign function of the State and the foundation of the rule of law, and that the legislature cannot indirectly control the action of the courts and directly or indirectly set aside the authoritative and binding finding of fact by the court, by invoking ‘public trust doctrine’ or ‘precautionary principle’.

Our Apex Court held in Tata Housing Development Company  Vs.  Aalok Jagga (2020) 15 SCC 784; 2019 0 Supreme(SC) 1228) that the housing project,  setting up of high-rise buildings up to 92 meters, fell within the catchment area of Sukhna Lake and 123 meters away from the boundary of Sukhna Wildlife Sanctuary, could not be allowed to come up. 95 MLAs were to be the recipients of the flats in the buildings. The State of Punjab was required to act on the basis of Doctrine of Public Trust.

In Bikram Chatterji Vs. Union of India (2019 (8) SCC 527; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 901.) our Apex Court pointed out that the Public Trust Doctrine imposes on the State and its functionaries a mandate to take affirmative action for effective management, and the citizens are empowered to question its ineffectiveness. When the land of the farmers had been acquired for the purpose of housing and infrastructure needs by the State Government and handed over to the concerned authorities for construction, they were bound to ensure that builders acted in accordance with the objective behind the acquisition of land and the conditions on which allotment had been made. The concerned officials were not only enjoined to ensure protection of the rights of the home buyers, but also the interests of the authorities and bankers. The public authorities are duty-bound to observe that the leased property is not frittered away along with the money of the home buyers.

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[1]     Quoted in: Shanmughan  Vs. Vishnu Bharatheeyan:  AIR  2004 Ker 143.

[2]     Quoted in: Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar. 72

[3]     Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th  Edition, page 256.

[4]     Quoted in: Assn. of University Teachers Vs. AICTE: AIR 1999 Mad 164.

[5]     Contra-distinct to ‘concrete noun’ like God, earth, man, president etc.

[6]     Contra-distinct to ‘uncountable noun’ like poverty, wealth, kindness, innocence etc.

[7]    Grammatically, ‘a trust is attached to a property’, as ‘a business is done by a man’.

[8]     State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106. 

[9] Sec. 11  reads: “11. Trustee to execute trust.—The trustee is bound to fulfil the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation ….”

[10]   Allahabad    Bank  Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.

[11]   Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553; Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co Vs. CIT: 1966-61 ITR 572 (Bom); Christopher Karkada VS Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569;       Rajah SagiJanaki Vs. Appururu Bhukta: 1976-2 AndWR 117, 1976-1 APLJ 312;       Special Secy Govt of WB Vs. State Bank of India: AIR  1989 Cal 40; CIT Vs. K Shyamaraju: 1991-1 KantLJ 233; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[12]   C. Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma Association: 2010-85 AIC 762, 2009-6 ALD 269, B Vasudeva Rao Vs. K Laxminarayana : AIR 1985 Kar 129,

[13]   Khairul Bashar Vs. ThannuLal: AIR1957 All 553; Christopher Karkada  Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725;.

[14]   State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30.

[15]   Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revn. Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass Ahluwalia: AIR 1972 Del 128; Pankumari Kochar Smt Vs. Controller Of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.

[16]   Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460

[17]   Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan:  AIR 1919 Mad 555; Chhatra  Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram:  AIR 1931 PC 196; In Re Sabnis, Goregaonkar Senjit  Vs.  Shivramdas:  AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan:   AIR   1938 Cal818; Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of UP: AIR1957 SC 887, Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569; Comm. Wealth Tax Vs. Kirpashanker Dayashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463; Controller of Estate Duty Lucknow Vs. Aloke Mitra: AIR 1981SC 102; Life Insurance Corp.  of India Vs.   Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1. Special Secy. Govtof W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; Christopher Karkada  Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; PrabhakarGonesPrabhu  Vs. Saradchandra Suria Prabhu: 2019-11SCALE 381.

[18]   Chhatra Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of UP: AIR1957 SC 887; Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569.

[19]   1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801

[20]   Definition of Author: “The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’.”

[21]   Definition of Trustee: “The person who accepts the confidence is called the ‘trustee’.

[22]   Heeralal  Vs. Firm Ratanlal Mahavir Prasad:1964 Raj LW  33

[23]   As stated in Sec. 6.

[24]   AIR 1961SC  1023

[25]   Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act casts duty on the trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling ‘the purpose of the trust’, and obeying ‘the directions of the author of the trust’.

[26]   Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; State Bank of India Vs. Spl. Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529; Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173.

[27]   R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Edl Trust: 1982-21 DLT 46: ILR  1982-1Del 801, Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid: AIR1944  Cal 163.

[28]   Paru Vs. Chiruthai: 1985 KerLJ 480, 1985  KerLT 563: Referred: UN Mitra’s Law of Limitation and Prescription, 9th Edn., Vol. II, at page 1574, Para 66; Bhavna Nalinkant  Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529, CBSE Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay: AIR 2011 SCW  4888:  2011-8 SCC 497; Reserve Bank of India Vs. Jayantilal N.  Mistry: AIR 2016 SC 1.

[29]   Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557

[30]   Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Canara Bank Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1982 Ker 1: ILR 1981-2 Ker 649; R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[31]   Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.

[32]   Trustee is the owner.

      Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram   Shah:  AIR 1931 PC 196;       WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887; Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553; Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW (Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Benafasilal Rajgorhia Vs. Central Bank of India: 1971-76 CalWN 807; BomiMunchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993 BCR 301; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[33]   Heeralal  Vs. Firm Ratanlal Mahavir Prasad: 1964 Raj LW  33

[34]   Life Insurance Corp.  of India VS Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1; Patel Chhotabhai Vs. Gian Chandra Basak: AIR 1935 PC 97; Chambers Vs. Chambers: AIR 1944 PC 78.

[35]   Chambers Vs. Chambers, AIR 1944 PC 78, Benafasilal Rajgorhia Vs. Central Bank of India: 1971-76 CalWN 807; Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Badri: 1966 2 DLT 294. Khub Narain Missir Vs. Ramchandra Narain Dass: AIR 1951  Pat 340; Patel Chhotabhai Vs.Jnan Chandra Bank: AIR 1935 PC 97.

[36]   Laxman Balwant Bhopatkar Vs. Charity Commr, Bombay: AIR 1962  SC 1589, Banwarilal  Vs. Edwin Bhagirathi:  AIR 1981 MP 116.

[37]   Allahabad Bank Ltd.  Vs. CIT: 1952 21 ITR 169

[38]   Cambay Municipality Vs. Ratilal Ambalal Reshamwala: 1995 Supp2 SCC 591. Mahabir Prasad Mishra Vs. Shyama Dev : 2013 9 ADJ 46; 2013 101 AllLR 402; Hardinge Memorial Fund Trust Vs. St. of Bihar: 2008 1 BLJR 28; 2007 3 PLJR 553, LIC of India Vs. Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1.

[39]Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[40]Sec. 6 Clause (e) of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[41]   Vidarbha and Marathwada, Nagpur Vs. Mangala: 1982 MhLJ 686; Maria Antonica Rodrigues Vs. DR Baliga: AIR 1967 Bom 465.

[42]   Idol of Sri Renganathaswamy Vs. PK Thoppulan: (2020) 5 Mad LJ 331(SC); MJ  Thulasiraman Vs. Comr, HR & CE: AIR 2019 SC 4050.

[43]   Pratap Singhji Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064

[44]Gulam Mohideen Khan Vs. Abdul Majid Khan: AIR  1957 AP 941.

[45] SM Manorama Dasi Vs. Dhirendra Nath Busu: AIR  1931 Cal 329,

[46]   Deoki Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar:  AIR 1957 SC 133, Quoted in: M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1, Pratap Singhji  Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064

[47]Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Sham Lal: ILR 1973-1 Del  144,

[48]   Sec. 6(e) of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[49]   AIR1957 SC 887; Referred to in: Commr W. Tax Vs. Kirpashanker  : AIR 1971 SC 2463; Shyam Sunder Kejriwal Vs. Usha: 2011-97 AIC 910: 2010-4 CalHN 782; Shyam Sunder Kayal Vs. Mist Valley: 2008-1 CalHN 900: 2007-3 CalLT 560. The Nizams Jewellery Trust Vs. Asst Commr: 1997-1 ALD 4: 1996-4 ALT 852, CIT Vs. A N Chowdhury: AIR  1970 Cal 124, See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[50]   AIR1957 SC 887.

[51]   1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30;  Followed in: Shyam Sunder Kayal Vs. Mist Valley Binimoy: CalHN 2008 1 900,CalLT 2007 3 560.

[52]   AIR 1951  Cal 309

[53]   Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553.

[54]   Arjan Singh Vs Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; P.  Elumalai v Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board, 2017-8 MLJ 529; Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173; State Bank of India v. Special Secretary Land, [1995] Suppl 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529; Mathura Bai Vs. Regional Provident Fund: 1992 WLN 206(Raj); Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106

[55]   Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[56]   Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass Ahluwalia: AIR  1972 Del  128; Pankumari KocharSmt Vs. Controller Of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.

[57]   Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan:  AIR 1919 Mad 555, Goregaonkar Senjit  Vs.  Shivramdas:  AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan:   AIR   1938 Cal818; Rajah Sagi Janaki Vs.Appururu Bhukta: 1976-2 And WR 117, 1976-1 APLJ 312; Life Insurance Corp.  of India VS Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1.

[58]   AIR 1940 Pat 90

[59]   AIR 1951 Ori  132

[60]   Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th  Edition, page 256

[61]   See: Baba Badri Dass  Vs. Dharma: ILR 1982(1) P&H 491;       Govordhanhari Devasthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: 1982 Mh.L.J 390.

[62]   Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Himansu Kumar Roy Chowdhury Vs. Moulvi Hasem: AIR1938 Cal 818, Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid Ostagar: AIR1944 Cal163, Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329.

[63]   Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569, Birendra Kumar Datta Vs. Commr IT: AIR 1960 Cal 323: 1961-42 ITR 661, Shantiniketan Co Op Hsg. Society Vs. Dist.  Regr Co Op So: AIR 2002  Guj 428; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329; Mohammed Basheer Vs. Ahmed Kutty: 2011 (3) Ker LJ 767.

[64]   AIR 1931 PC 196. Referred to in: A S Krishna Murthy Vs. C N Revanna: AIR 2009KarRep 2692 , Raja Baldeodas Birla Santatikosh Vs. C I T: 1991-190ITR 578; Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid Ostagar: AIR1944 Cal 163, Himansu Kumar Roy Chowdhury Vs. MoulviHasem Ali Khan: AIR 1938 Cal 818.

[65]   Quoted in Special Secy. Govt of W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar. 72; Raja Sir Muthiah Chettiar Vs. CIT: 1984-38 CTR 76: 1984-148 ITR532: Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Ganga Properties Ltd: 1970-77 ITR 637; Sardarilal Vs. Shrimati Shakuntla Devi: AIR 1961 P&H 378.

[66]   Rakesh Arora Vs. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories: 2019-261 DLT 307; Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 145.

[67] AIR 2019 SC 413

[68]   AIR1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[69]   AIR 1971 SC 2463.

[70]   Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329 , Uma Roy VS Mehamala Dey: 1988 2 Cal HN 128.

[71]   Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin Vs. Trustees Maniar: AIR 1968 Guj 184

[72]   Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Special SecyGovtof W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40.

[73]   Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Kumar Jain Vs. ParasnathDigambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199

[74]   Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram Shah:  AIR 1931 PC 196;       WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887 ,       Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Kripashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463,       Bai Dosabai Vs. Mathuradas: AIR 1980 SC 1334;        Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2BCR301;       Hem Chandra Vs. Suradham Debya: AIR 1940 PC 134;      Ramabai Govind Vs. RaghunathVasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.        Deoki Nandan  Vs.  Murlidhar:  AIR 1957 SC 133;      Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73.

[75]   Smith Vs. Anderson, (1880) 15 Ch. D. 247;Quoted in: Bengal Luxmi Cotton Mills  Vs. State: 1964-69 CalWN 137; 1965-35 CC 187

[76]   Allahabad    Bank  Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476.

[77]Sec. 11.

[78]   Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557

[79]   AIR1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[80]   Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin  Vs. Trustees Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184. See also: RamabaiGovind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj).

[81]   Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj)

[82]   Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106

[83]   Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Vs. Parasnath Digambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199

[84]   Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529.

[85]   1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30.

[86]   Scott on Trusts Vol. II Sec. 170. The leading case on the subject is Kench  Vs. Gandford (1726) (White and Tudor Leading Cases in Equity page 693) , Referred to in: Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

[87]   Kishore Joo Vs. Guman BehariJoo Deo: AIR  1978 All 1; Bapalal Godadbhai Kothari Vs. Charity Commissioner Gujarat: 1966  GLR 825

[88]   Allahabad    Bank  Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476.

[89]   S Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma Association: 2009-6 ALD 269; 2009-6 ALT 197

[90]   State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30.

[91] Narasingh Charan Mohapatra Vs. Radhakanta Mohapatra: AIR1951 Ori  132

[92]   Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460

[93]WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh:AIR 1957 SC887 .

[94]   In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228

[95]   Ramkishorelal vs. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890;  Agasthyar Trust Vs. CIT ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;(1998) 5 SCC 588). Krishnaswamy Pillai Vs. Kothandarama Naicken: AIR 1915 Mad 380; Dasami Sahu Vs. Param Shameshwar, AIR 1929 All 315

[96]   Agasthyar Trust Madras Vs. CIT ; 1998 AIR (SCW) 3945 ; (1998) 5 SCC 588).     

[97]   (6th edn. ). at p. 131

[98]   Quoted in: Agasthyar Trust Vs. CIT ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;(1998) 5 SCC 588). Sri Gasthyar Trust vs. CIT: [1999] 236 ITR 23:103 Taxman 363

[99]   4th Edn., Vol. 5, para. 624

[100]  See also: Radhika Mohan Nandy Vs. Amrita LalNandy, AIR 1947 Cal 301

[101]  Quoted in: Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar: AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[102]  Silvy George Vs. Anna Joseph: 2014-2 KerLJ 462;       Commr. of Wealth Tax Vs. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali:1983-139 ITR 517;      Vadivelu Mudaliar Vs. CN  Kuppuswami Mudaliar: ILR1971-3 Mad142;      Mahadulal Vs. Chironji Lal: AIR 1963 MP 51;      Chidambaranatha Thambiran Vs. Psnallasiva Mudaliar: AIR 1918 Mad 464.

[103]  Shanti Devi Vs. State : AIR1982Del453

[104]  See: MAppala Ramanujacharyulu Vs. M Venkatanarasimha: 1974 AP 316; Siva Kanta Barua Vs. RajaniramNath:AIR 1950 Ass. 154: ILR 51 All. 626.

[105]   Radhika Mohan Nandy v. Amrita LalNandy: AIR1947 Cal  301, Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17;       M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; T C Chacko Vs. Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107. Virbala K. Kewalram Vs. Ramchand Lalchand: AIR 1997 Bom 46

[106]   See: Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17; M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; TC ChackoVs. Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107. KS Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333

[107]AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[108]  Deelipkumar And Co.  Vs. Mulla Gulamali: 1998-1 Mad LJ 773; Ramdas Bhagat vs. Krishna Prasad: AIR 1940Pat425.

[109]  Thangachi Nachial Vs. Ahmed Hussain Malumiar: AIR 1957 Mad 194;      AS Krishna Murthy Vs. CN Revanna: AIR 2009 Kar 2692

[110]  Thayarammal Vs. Kanakammal: AIR 2005 SC 1588; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309.

[111]  Bai Dosabai  Vs. Mathurdas Govinddas: AIR 1980 SC 1334.

[112]  State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Bansi Dhar:  AIR 1974 SC 1084.

[113]  AIR 1951  Cal 309

[114]  AIR 1916 PC 256

[115]  AIR 1922 PC 123

[116]  AIR 1987 SC 2064

[117]  Mir Ghulam Hassan Shah Geelani Vs. Mir Maqbool: AIR 1975 J&K 57

[118]  ILR 12 Bombay 247.

[119]  Sec. 6(e) of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[120]  In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228

[121]  Contradistinct to ‘concrete noun’.

[122]  Contradistinct to ‘uncountable noun’ like poverty, wealth, kindness, innocence etc.

[123]  Govt. of the Province of Bombay Vs. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia:  AIR 1949 PC 143; Thiagesar Dharma Vs.  CIT: AIR 1964 Mad 483: [1963] 50 ITR 798  (Mad);  Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas 1967 Raj LW 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144; Thanthi Trust Vs. W. Tax Officer: (1989) 45 TAXMAN 121: (1989) 178  ITR 28; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Kishorelal AseraVs. Haji Essa Abba: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367; Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. Commner. of IT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-336  ITR 611; Sambandam Died Vs. NatarajaChettiar: 2012-1 Mad LW 530.

[124]  Canara Bank Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1982 Ker 1: ILR 1981-2 Ker 649.

[125]  Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass: AIR  1972 Del  128; Pankumari Kochar Smt Vs. Controller of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.

[126]ILR 1973-1 Del  144,

[127]  Pratap Singh ji Vs. Charity Commissioner: 1987 AIR SC 2064.

[128]  CIT Vs. P. Bhandari 1984 -47 ITR 500 (Mad); L Gouthamchand  Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1989-176 442(Mad).

[129]  Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, reads as under:  “6. Creation of trust: Subject to the provisions of section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts: … … … (e) (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust-property to the trustee.”

[130]  Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553.

[131]  Padmavathi Vs. Raghu Tippanna Ruge: 1968(1) MysLJ 583; Relied on: Shivramdas Vs. Nerukar: 39 Bom LR 633; Sree SreeIswar Gopal Jew Vs. Commr of IT: AIR 1951  Cal 309; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Mgr. St. Bnk Mysore: AIR1988 Kar 1

[132]  Shanti Vijay and Company Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR 1980  SC 17; P Parthasarathy   Vs. Kee Pee Yes: 2016-1 MLJ 267; Neelam  Tirupatirayudu  Vs. Vinjamuri: 1912-17 Ind Cas 597; 1912-23 MLJ 599.

[133]  Shanti Vijay And Company VS Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR1980  SC 17.

[134]Ramdev Developers Vs. Jt. Chrity Commissioner: 2009-1Guj LR 337,

[135]  See Sec. 8 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[136]  A D Vehvalwala Vs. M C H Rustomji: 1970 Cal LJ 312;1970-1 Cal LT 292.

[137]AIR 1934 Bom 64

[138]Quoted in: Maharashtra St. Co Op Bank Vs. Asst. Provt. Fund Commr: AIR  2010 SC 868; Santhoshkumar Vs. Shaji: AIR  2013 Ker 184; Ans Gopal heo Narain Vs. PK Banerji: AIR  1949 All 433.

[139]  Bhupathi Nath Vs. Ramlal Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128

[140]  Cambay Municipality Vs. Ratilal Ambalal: 1995 Supp2 SCC 591.

[141]  LT Overseas, North America Vs. Sachdeva : 2018 252 DLT 270

[142]  The Travancore Bank Ltd.  Vs. Abraham: AIR 1955  TC 131; Rama Rao Vs. V Chandra Gopal: 1969-82 LW 738: 1969-2 MLJ 460

[143]  Shanti Vijay and Company Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR 1980  SC 17; P Parthasarathy Vs. Kee Pee Yes: 2016 1 MLJ 267; Neelam Tirupatirayudu Vs. Vinjamuri: 1912-17 Ind Cas 597; 1912-23 MLJ 599.

[144]  Uma Shanker Gopalika Vs. State of Bihar (2006)2 SCC (Crl.) 49, Referred to in: Ranbaxy Vs. State of Telangana: 2016 2 ALT(Cri) 165.

[145]  Mussamat Basso Kuar Vs. Lala Dhum Singh: 1887-15 Law Rep. Ind.App. 211

[146]  BL Rai Vs. Bhaiyalal: AIR 1920 PC 8; Mahabir Prasad Mishra Vs. Shyama Devi: 2013-9 ADJ 46; 2013-101 AllLR 402

[147]  Jagannath Vs. Sripathi Babu: AIR 1945 Mad. 297.      Relied on in Narayani Amma Vs. Eyo Poulose: AIR 1982 Ker 198.

[148]  See Chapter: State & Court – Protectors of All Charities

[149]  AG Vs. Pearson: (1817) 3 Mer 353; Ram Dularey Vs. Ram Lal: AIR 1946 PC 34. Quoted in KS  Varghese Vs. St. Peters and St. Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333. Rajendra Gupta VS Corporation of Chennai, rep. by its Commissioner: 011 4 LW 633, Rajagopal v. Balachandran: 2002 (2) CTC 527, See also: Narasimhiah Vs. Y H Venkataramanappa: AIR 1976 Kar 43.

[150]  C.K. Rajan Vs. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee: .AIR 1994 Ker 179. [Appeal Judgment: Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee Vs. C.K. Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546]; Fakhuruddin Vs. Mohammad Rafiq: AIR  1916 All 115 (PC);  Sridhar Vs. ShriJagan Nath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner Of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089. Ch Hoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265;  I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. MullaAlibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309. See also: Mulla’s Hindu Law (11th Ed. Page 489) and Dr. B.K. Mukherjea: Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Fifth Ed, Page 407 and 412).

[151]  C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296: Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia:  AIR 1952 Kar 14; Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915; Subramonia Pillai Chellam Pillai Vs. Subramonia Pillai Chathan Pillai: AIR 1953 TC 198;  M.G. Narayanaswami Naidu Vs. M. Balasundaram Naidu: AIR 1953 Mad 750.

[152]  ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh Laws(Dlh)-2009-4-105 ILR (Dlh)- 2009-19-265], See also Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate  AIR 2007 SC 1337. 

[153]Sujan Mohinder Charitable Trust  Vs. Mohinder Kaur: 2019 0 Supreme(Del) 281, AM Shamsudeen Vs AM Mohamed Salihu: 2004 2 LW 487; 2003 2 MLJ 526.

[154]In-Re, Man Singh AIR 1974 Del. 228

[155]2017-8 MadLJ 529

[156] Referred to in: Thatha Sampath Kumar Vs. Vupputur Alwar: 2019-3MadLW 705

[157]  Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Union of India: (1996) 5 SCC 281; T.K. Shanmugam Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu: AIR 2016 Mad 25.

[158]  Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. Vs. Minguel Martins (2009) 3 SCC 571. Quoted in  Association for Environment Protection Vs. State of Kerala: AIR  2013 SC 2500; Navi Mumbai Environt. Preservation Society Vs. Ministry of Environment: 2019-1 BCR 39.

[159]  1997-1 SCC 388; Referred to in T. N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India , AIR 1997 SC 1228; In re T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2022) 4 SCC 289.

[160] Rajeev Suri Vs. Delhi Development Authority: 2021 SCC Online 7

[161]Jayant Etc Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh: AIR 2021 SC 496.

[162]  AIR 2018 SC 5538

[163]  (2009) 3 SCC 571

[164]  (2011) 6 SCC 508.



Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India