Can Legislature Overrule Court Decisions by an Enactment?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction.

Our Constitutional jurisprudence accredits supremacy to the Constitution of India. The rationale of this proposition is that one among the three constitutionally recognised domains of authority, viz. Legislature, Executive and Judiciary, cannot encroach upon realm of another.[1]  Thereby, the court is the final authority to declare and interpret law, and it is not open to the legislature to simply brush aside findings of a court of law.

Following are the important decisions on this field:

  • Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate: AIR 1971 SC 57;
  • In Re Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal: AIR 1992 SC 522;
  • State of Haryana v. Karnal Co-op. Farmers’ Society: AIR 1994 SC 1;
  • M. P. Ram Mohan Raja v. State of T. N AIR 2007  SC 1742;
  • S.T. Sadiq Vs. State of Kerala, (2015) 4 SCC 400;
  • Goa Foundation v. State of Goa: AIR 2016 SC 1653;
  • Binoy Viswam v. Union of India: AIR 2017  SC 2967;
  • Medical Council of India v. State of Kerala: AIR 2018 SC 5041;
  • Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India: AIR 2020 SC 122;
  • Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2014 SC 3519;
  • Madras Bar Association v. Union of India 2021 SCC Online SC 463;
  • Dr. Jaya Thakur Vs. Union of India (2023).

Also Read: Judicial & Legislative Activism in India: Principles and Instances

No Legislation Can Nullify a Judicial Pronouncement

No legislation can nullify a judicial pronouncement of a court of law, in the following instances:

First, ‘Individual decisions, inter-parties‘: That is, it is not open to the legislature to directly annul a judgment of a court [2] (other than altering the very basis of such earlier decision, as stated below). It is also trite law that the rights and liabilities accrued by a person or a group of persons under a judgment cannot be deprived of such rights and liabilities by a subsequent legislative act[3]. In other words, ‘under our Constitution no Legislature has the power to abrogate civil courts’ decrees or orders or judicial adjudications by merely declaring, under a law made by it, that such decrees or orders or adjudications are no longer valid or binding on the parties, for such power of declaration would be a judicial function which cannot be encroached upon by a Legislature’[4]. 

Second, Judgments that interpret the law: [5][Medical Council of India Vs. State of Kerala (2018), Janapada Sabha Chhindwara Vs. Central Provinces Syndicate (1970) ].

The  act of the legislature that amounts to exercising the judicial power, and the function of the legislature as an appellate court or tribunal, will be against the concept of separation of powers [6][In Re Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (1992); Medical Council of India Vs. State of Kerala (2018)].

Legislature Cannot take away what is granted in implementation by Court’s decision

In Virender Singh Hooda v. State of Haryana, (2004) 12 SCC 588, our Apex Court did not accept the contention that vested rights cannot be taken away by retrospective legislation. However, it was observed that taking away of such rights would be impermissible if there is violation of Articles 14, 16 or any other constitutional provision. The appointments already made in implementation of a decision of this Court were protected with the reason that “the law does not permit the legislature to take away what has been granted in implementation of the Court’s decision. Such a course is impermissible.” (See: Madras Bar Association v. Union of India 2021 SCC Online SC 463, L. Nageswara Rao, J.)

Read Blog: Doctrines on Ultra Vires and Removing the BASIS of the Judgment, in ED Director’s Tenure Extension Case (Dr. Jaya Thakur Vs. Union of India)

How Can Legislature Interfere with a Judgment

It is open for the legislature, in a limited sphere, to interfere with the judicial pronouncements.  The legal principles in this realm can be presented as under:

(i) If the decision of a Court is based on an enacted law which stood when the decision was arrived at,[7] it is open to the legislature to enact a fresh law, or amend the existing law, with retrospective effect, which may fundamentally[8] alter the very basis[9] of such earlier decision, and it can be sought to be applied in the appeal from such judgment.

(ii) Further, such changed or amended law should be one that can be applied ‘in general’, which would affect a class of persons and events at large; that is, it should not be for changing a particular court-decision inter-parties [10]. In State of Haryana v. The Karnal Co-op.Farmers’ Society Limited (1994),[11] it was held by the Supreme Court that ‘under our Constitution no Legislature has the power to abrogate civil courts’ decrees or orders or judicial adjudications by merely declaring, under a law made by it, that such decrees or orders or adjudications are no longer valid or binding on the parties, for such power of declaration would be a judicial function which cannot be encroached upon by a Legislature’.  It was found that where a civil court found, in a decree, that certain immovable properties fell outside “shamilat deh” regulated by an enactment, subsequent amendment made to the law by the legislature directing the Assistant Collector to decide the claim by ignoring the decree was unconstitutional as it encroached upon judicial power.

(iii)  It is open to the legislature to remove causes of ineffectiveness or invalidity[12] of a particular legislation in the existing law, or to remove the defect which the courts had found or pointed out.[13] It can also be done to validate[14] a particular law or for the implementation of the purpose sought to be achieved by the enactment.[15] Here also, the new law or amendment should not transgress the constitutional limitations.[16]

(iv) It is also open to the legislature to codify what was stated in a decision, as done in the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, after Shah Bano Case.[17] In Danial Latifi Vs. Union of India[18] the Supreme Court held that the Act ‘actually and in reality’ codified what was stated in Shah Bano Case. (It had been criticised that the Indian Parliament, by the 1986 Act, ‘reversed’ the judgment in Shah Bano Case or at least it was ‘diluted’.)

Change of Law and Res judicata

When the law has been changed, subsequent to a decision rendered by a Court, it is held in Alimunnissa Chowdharani v. Shyam Charan Roy, 1905-1 CLJ 176, that the earlier decision would not operate as res judicata.

In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, 1970-1 SCC 613, it is observed that when the law has undergone a change, there would be no question of res judicata or constructive res judicata. It is observed as under:

  • “5. But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure: it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative direction between the parties so as to determine the question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and relating to the right in dispute between the parties has been determined thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties: the “matter in issue” may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be reopened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are not res judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is the right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A previous decision of a competent Court on facts which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transaction which is the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transactions which is the soured of the right is res judicata. A previous decision on a matter in issue is a composite decision: the decision of law cannot be dissociated from the decision on facts on which the right is founded. A decision on an issue of law will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, if the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous proceeding, but not when the cause of action is different, nor when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is prohibited by law. …….
  • 7. Where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same, parties: Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee’s case. It is obvious that the matter in issue in a subsequent proceeding is not the same as in the previous proceeding, because the law interpreted is different.”

Legislation that Nullifies Judicial Verdict is an ‘Invitation to Lawlessness’

Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal Case[21] is the important decision in this field. Our Apex Court observed in this decision that the Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, passed by the Karnataka State, was unconstitutional. The Ordinance rebutted the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Inter-state Water Disputes Act, 1956; and it nullified the interim order passed by the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the Ordinance was against the basic tenets of the rule of law.

The Apex Court observed that the State of Karnataka, by issuing the Ordinance, had sought to take law in its own hand. It was laid down that such an Act was an invitation to lawlessness and anarchy. The Ordinance was a manifestation of a desire on the part of the State to be a judge in its own cause and to defy the decisions of the judicial authorities.  The Ordinance foreboded evil consequences to the federal structure under the Constitution and opened doors for each State to act in the way it desired. It disregarded not only the rights of the other states but the orders passed by instrumentalities constituted under an Act of Parliament as also the provisions of the Constitution itself. It was also affirmed that the Ordinance, if allowed to stand, would lead to the breakdown of the Constitutional mechanism and affect the unity and integrity of the nation.

The Apex Court further asserted in Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal Case, relying on Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabado v. New Shorock Spg. & Wvg. Co., (1970) and Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (1978), [22] that the legislature could change the basis on which a decision was given by the Court and thus change the law in general, which would affect a class of persons and events at large. It was unambiguously held that the legislature could not, however, set aside an individual decision inter-parties. Such an act on the part of the legislature would amount to exercising the judicial power.

Legislative  Overruling of Court Decision

Before the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act 26 of 2015), there was no specific legislative commandment in the NI Act, as to territorial jurisdiction of courts for filing a complaint. Therefore, it was taken as the court (or courts) within whose territorial jurisdiction the offence was committed.

  • The Supreme Court held  Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2014 SC 3519, that the jurisdiction for filing of complaints was ‘restricted to the location where the cheque was dishonoured, i.e., cheque was returned unpaid by the bank on which it was drawn’
    • [Broadly speaking, ‘cheque is returned unpaid’ by Drawer-Bank – the bank of the person who signs the cheque].
  • By the amendment of 2015, the dictum in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2014 SC 3519, was overturned – Section 142 has been re-numbered as Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) has been inserted (which specified the territorial jurisdiction of the court).
    • The dictum of the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod case has been “legislatively overruled”** by an amendment to the Negotiable Instruments Act, in 2015
      • **(as observed in  P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd: (2021) 6 SCC 325 – RF Nariman, J.)
  • After the 2015 amendment (after inserting Sub-section – 2) the territorial jurisdiction is limited to the Drawee-Bank.
    • [Generally speaking, Drawee-Bank is the Bank in which the payee presents the cheque for ‘collection’].

Dignity and Authority of the Court – protected for maintenance of ‘Rule of Law‘

The interesting question came for consideration before our Supreme Court in M.C. Metha Vs. Union of India[23] was whether the legislature can extend a time frame fixed by the Supreme Court. It was definitely pronounced in this case that the legislature lacked competence to extend the time granted ‘to seal premises in case of misuser’, by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its law making power. The Apex Court observed that such an extension by the State legislature would be virtually exercising judicial functions which do not vest in the legislature. The Court proceeded to hold that the dignity and authority of the Court has to be protected not for any individual but for maintenance of the rule of law. It was predicated that the State was bound to act in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court.

Transgression upon a Judgment is Misadventure and Glaring Arbitrariness

Our Apex Court heavily criticised, by strong words, the act of passing an Ordinance by the State of Kerala in ‘Medical Council of India Vs. State of Kerala[24]  to overturn a decision of the Apex Court. The Admission Supervisory Committee of the Professional Colleges found that certain Medical College students’ admissions were illegal. The decision was upheld by the High Court of Kerala and the Apex Court. Thereafter the State of Kerala promulgated an Ordinance for regularising the admission of 180 students. The Supreme Court held that the State had clearly transgressed upon the field of judicial review and obviously resorted to a misadventure. It was laid down that the judgment of the court was nullified by the glaring arbitrariness. It was clearly an act violative of judicial powers. It was further asserted that it was not a case of removal of a defect in existing law; and pointed out that various Constitution Bench decisions have settled the principles of law governing the field. The Supreme Court exclaimed that it passes comprehension how the State has promulgated the Ordinance in question.

It is Not Open to the Legislature to say that a Judgment shall be Ineffective

The legislative function consists in ‘making’ law and not in ‘declaring’ what the law shall be. If the purpose of a legislation is to annul a final judgment, such act of legislature must necessarily be declared unconstitutional. The Apex Court held in Janapada Sabha Chhindwara Vs. Central Provinces Syndicate[25] as under:

  • “On the words used in the Act, it is plain that the Legislature attempted to overrule or set aside the decision of this Court. That, in our judgment, is not open to the Legislature to do under our constitutional scheme. It is open to the Legislature within certain limits to amend the provisions of an Act retrospectively and to declare what the law shall be deemed to have been, but it is not open to the Legislature to say that, a judgment of a Court properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its powers in a matter brought before it shall be deemed to be ineffective and the interpretation of the law shall be otherwise than as declared by the Court.”

It Is Not Open to Legislature to say – what the law shall be deemed to have been

L. Nageswara Rao, J, held in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2021 SCC Online SC, as under:

  • “41. It is open to the legislature within certain limits to amend the provisions of an Act retrospectively and to declare what the law shall be deemed to have been, but it is not open to the legislature to say that a judgment of a Court properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its powers in a matter brought before it shall be deemed to be ineffective and the interpretation of the law shall be otherwise than as declared by the Court. (Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. & Anr. (1970) 1 SCC 44 I.N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 4 SCC 750; Indian Aluminium Co. & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (1996) 7 SCC 637; Bakhtawar Trust & Ors. v. M. D. Narayan & Ors. (2003) 5 SCC 298) The test of judging the validity of the amending and validating enactment is, whether the legislature enacting the validating statute has competence over the subject-matter; whether by validation, the said legislature has removed the defect which the Court had found in the previous laws; and whether the validating law is consistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution .
  • In State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala, (2014) 12 SCC 696, this Court held that any law enacted by the legislature may be invalidated if it is an attempt to interfere with judicial process by being in breach of the doctrine of separation of powers.”

Law Declared By Apex Court Is the Law of the Land

Law includes not only legislative enactments but also judicial precedents. The law declared by the Apex Court is law of land, under Article 141 of the Constitution.[26]

The law declared by the Supreme Court is is binding on the Government also (Naeem Ahmad Vs. State of Uttarakhand: AIR 2019 Uchal 163; State of Maharashtra Vs. Murarao Malojirao Ghorpade, 2010-1 AIR Bom R 265; Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Karnataka State Transport Authority, AIR 2005 Kar 205).

It is equally important that the authority of law under Article 141 ends when the statutory vacuum is put to an end. It cannot also be construed as a provision conferring powers to ignore express statutory provisions. The powers under Article 141 are introduced for filling up the void created by an insufficient law so as to meet the ends of justice.[27]

Government is obliged to give effect to the directions of Apex Court under Art. 144

Article 144 of the Constitution mandates, civil and judicial authorities in India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court meaning thereby executive and judicial authorities shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. (Madras Bar Association Vs. Union of India, 2021-8 SCALE 174: 2021 SCC Online SC 463; M C Mehta Vs. Union of India, 2006-3 SCC 399 ). It is observed in Bharat Earth Movers vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, 2000-6 SCC 645, that the Article 144 of the Constitution obliges all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India to act in aid of Supreme Court and that failure to comply with the directions of this court by the Tribunal has to be deplored. 

In Suyog v. State of Maharashtra, 2008-1 AIR Bom R 417, it is observed as under:

  • “No doubt, Article 144 of the Constitution requires the authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court and, therefore, the State Government is expected to take all necessary steps to give effect to the directions issued by the Honble Apex Court. It is also well settled that the State Government in exercise of executive powers under Article 162 can issue executive instructions where the State has powers to make laws when there exists a vaccum or the laws are not framed. The State Government is entitled to fill the gaps to give effect to and to make the laws operational.“

Court cannot Encroach upon the field assigned for the Legislature

In any event, Article 141 cannot be applied to encroach upon the field reserved for the legislature, as observed in Union of India Vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2019 SC 4917). In this decision, exhorting the rationale of judicial restraint and relying on the doctrine of separation of powers, it is pointed out that the courts must not encroach into the legislative domain. The court relied on the following decisions:  

  • Bachan Singh v. the State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684;
  • Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 364;
  • Rama Muthuramalingam v. Dy. Supdt. of Police, AIR 2005 Mad 1;
  • S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279;
  • Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals v. Workmen, (2007) 1 SCC 408;
  • Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass, (2008) 1 SCC 683;
  • Kuchchh Jal Sankat Nivaran Samili v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 12 SCC 226

Judicial Review is a powerful weapon

The Apex Court held in Dr. Jaya Thakur Vs. Union of India (2023) as under –

  • “It could thus be seen that the role of the judiciary is to ensure that the aforesaid two organs of the State i.e. the Legislature and the Executive function within the constitutional limits. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive. The role of this Court is limited to examine as to whether the Legislature or the Executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the Constitution. However, while doing so, the court must remain within its self-imposed limits.”

The scope of the judicial review in examining the legislative functions of the Legislature with regard to validity of the Amendments were considered in the following decisions-

  • Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 364
  • Frankfurter, J. of the U.S. Supreme Court dissenting in the controversial expatriation case of Trop v. Dulles [356 US 86]
  • Binoy Viswam v. Union of India and others2222 (2017) 7 SCC 59

The Apex Court (Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India) elaborately quoted  Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, (2017) 7 SCC 59, to pointed out  the following –

a. Judicial Review – Grounds available (on the validity of a piece of legislation): The grounds of judicial review that are available to adjudge the validity of a piece of legislationare two and “there is no third ground.”  (State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co., 1996-3 SCC 709, State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli, 2012- 6 SCC; State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli, 2012-6 SCC 312). The grounds are:

  • First, Legislation, not within the competence of the legislature, and
  • Second, Legislation, in contravention of any of the fundamental rights stipulated in Part III of the Constitution or any other right/provision of the Constitution.

b. Arbitrariness and Unreasonableness By Itself Do Not Constitute A Ground For striking down a statute (though they are Grounds for Administrative Action): Pointing out that there are only two grounds, (1) lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights, and no third ground to invalidate any piece of legislation, it was observed in State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co. 1996-3 SCC 709, as under:

  • “No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary [An expression used widely and rather indiscriminately – an expression of inherently imprecise import. The extensive use of this expression in India reminds one of what Frankfurter, J. said in Hattie Mae Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 87 L Ed 610 : 318 US 54 (1943): “The phrase begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas”, said the learned Judge.] or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and the legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them.
  • The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. In this connection, it should be remembered that even in the case of administrative action, the scope of judicial review is limited to three grounds viz.
    • unreasonableness, which can more appropriately be called irrationality,
    • illegality, and
    • procedural impropriety
  • (see: Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1984-3 All ER 935 (HL) which decision has been accepted by this Court as well).
  • The applicability of doctrine of proportionality even in administrative law sphere is yet a debatable issue.
  • (See the opinions of Lords Lowry and Ackner in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex p Brind, (1991) 1 All ER 720 (HL).
  • It would be rather odd if an enactment were to be struck down by applying the said principle when its applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled.” (Quoted in State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli, 2012-6 SCC 312)
  • A legislation cannot be challenged simply on the ground of unreasonableness because that by itself does not constitute a ground. The validity of a constitutional amendment and the validity of plenary legislation have to be decided purely as questions of constitutional law. This Court in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India [State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592] said : (SCC p. 660, para 149)”
  • Also referred: State of WB v. EITA India Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 239, Rajbala v. State of Haryana, (2016) 2 SCC 445 : AS Krishna v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297.
  • A fortiori, a law cannot be invalidated on the ground that the legislature did not apply its mind or it was prompted by some improper motive.
  • In K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1, it was observed as under:
  • “205. Plea of
    • unreasonableness,
    • arbitrariness,
    • proportionality, etc.
  • always raises an element of subjectivity on which a court cannot strike down a statute or a statutory provision, especially when the right to property is no more a fundamental right. Otherwise the court will be substituting its wisdom to that of the legislature, which is impermissible in our constitutional democracy.”

c. Judicial Review – First Ground – Ultra Vires The Constitution: In Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1, following pertinent observations were made –

  • “219. A legislation passed by Parliament can be challenged only on constitutionally recognised grounds. Ordinarily, grounds of attack of a legislation is whether the legislature has legislative competence or whether the legislation is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. If any of the provisions of the legislation violates fundamental rights or any other provisions of the Constitution, it could certainly be a valid ground to set aside the legislation by invoking the power of judicial review.

d. 2nd Ground – Violation of Fund. Rigt. – Presumption In Favour of Constitutionality

  • In Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731, it was observed as under:
  • ’15. The courts, it is accepted, must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. It must be borne in mind that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest …” (reiterated in Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942.)
  • In Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731, it was observed that there was always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him, who attacks it. It stated as under:
  • ’15. … and finally that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation.” (reiterated in Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942.)
  • In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554, reiterated the principle that presumption was always in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and observed as under:
  • ‘8. Therefore, when the constitutionality of an enactment is challenged on the ground of violation of any of the articles in Part III of the Constitution, the ascertainment of its true nature and character becomes necessary i.e. its subject-matter, the area in which it is intended to operate, its purport and intent have to be determined. In order to do so it is legitimate to take into consideration all the factors such as history of the legislation, the purpose thereof, the surrounding circumstances and conditions, the mischief which it intended to suppress, the remedy for the disease which the legislature resolved to cure and the true reason for the remedy.’ (referred Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942, Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661, Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, 1950 SCC 833 : AIR 1951 SC 41, and State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara,  1951 SCC 860 : AIR 1951 SC 318.)

e. In Taxation, The Legislature Enjoys A Greater Latitude: In the field of taxation, the legislature enjoys a greater latitude for classification, as noted by in a long line of cases. Some of these decisions are –

  • Steelworth Ltd. v. State of Assam, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 589,
  • Gopal Narain v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 370 ,
  • Ganga Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1980) 1 SCC 223 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 90,
  • R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675.

f. Judiciary – Protector of Constitution & Democracy as ultimate arbiter on Constitution: The Apex Court (in Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India) quoted up to the following passage in Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, (2017) 7 SCC 59 –

  • “88. Undoubtedly, we are in the era of liberalised democracy. In a democratic society governed by the Constitution, there is a strong trend towards the constitutionalisation of democratic politics, where the actions of democratically elected Government are judged in the light of the Constitution. In this context, judiciary assumes the role of protector of the Constitution and democracy, being the ultimate arbiter in all matters involving the interpretation of the Constitution.
  • 89. Having said so, when it comes to exercising the power of judicial review of a legislation, the scope of such a power has to be kept in mind and the power is to be exercised within the limited sphere assigned to the judiciary to undertake the judicial review. This has already been mentioned above. Therefore, unless the petitioner demonstrates that Parliament, in enacting the impugned provision, has exceeded its power prescribed in the Constitution or this provision violates any of the provision, the argument predicated on “limited governance” will not succeed. One of the aforesaid ingredients needs to be established by the petitioners in order to succeed.”

Is Nullification of a Mandamus (by A Changed Law) Permissible? Ans. No.

It is found in Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India (2023) by the Apex Court that that the direction in an earlier case (Common Cause case, 2021) was “a specific mandamus that no further extension shall be granted to the second respondent (Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Director, Enforcement Directorate)”. Undisputedly, the Union of India as well as the respondent No. 2- Sanjay Kumar Mishra were parties to the said proceedings.

Therefore it is held in Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India  (2023) that the orders giving extensions to the tenure of the respondent No. 2- Sanjay Kumar Mishra, for a period of one year each are illegal.

It is held that nullification of a mandamus by a subsequent legislative exercise would be impermissible.

The Apex Court relied on, mainly, the following earlier decisions –

  • Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCC 50,
  • In Re., Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96,
  • S.R. Bhagwat v. State of Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC 16
  • Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2022) 12 SCC 455,
  • Medical Council of India v. State of Kerala and others, (2019) 13 SCC 185.

(a) Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCC 50: The employees of the LIC were denied the benefits which they were entitled to. They filed writ petitions  before the High Court of Calcutta for a writ of mandamus and prohibition directing the LIC to act in accordance with the terms of a Settlement. It was allowed by the Calcutta High Court The LIC preferred Appeal. During the pendency of the appeal the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 was enacted. The effect of the enactment was to annul the benefits which the employees of the LIC were entitled to in view of the mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court. The Seven Judge Bench in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCC 50, considered the constitutional validity of the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976.

Bhagwati, J (speaking for himself, Krishna Iyer and Desai, JJ.) observed thus:

  • “9. We are, therefore, of the view that, in any event, irrespective of whether the impugned Act is constitutionally valid or not, the Life Insurance Corporation is bound to obey the writ of mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court and to pay annual cash bonus for the year April 1, 1975 to March 31, 1976 to Class III and Class IV employees.”

Beg. CJ, in his concurring judgment observed thus:

  • “32. I may, however, observe that even though the real object of the Act may be to set aside the result of the mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court, yet, the section does not mention this object at all. Probably this was so because the jurisdiction of a High Court and the effectiveness of its orders derived their force from Article 226 of the Constitution itself. These could not be touched by an ordinary act of Parliament.”

Doctrine of Change of basis of earlier Judgment

Beg. CJ, continued as under:

  • “Even if Section 3 of the Act seeks to take away the BASIS of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, without mentioning it, by enacting what may appear to be a law, yet, I think that, where the rights of the citizen against the State are concerned, we should adopt an interpretation which upholds those rights. Therefore, according to the interpretation I prefer to adopt the rights which had passed into those embodied in a judgment and became the BASIS of a mandamus from the High Court could not be taken away in this indirect fashion.”

(b) In Re., Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96

The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, In Re., Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96, observed as under:

  • “76. The principle which emerges from these authorities is that the legislature can change the BASIS on which a decision is given by the Court and thus change the law in general, which will affect a class of persons and events at large. It cannot, however, set aside an individual decision inter partes and affect their rights and liabilities alone. Such an act on the part of the legislature amounts to exercising the judicial power of the State and to functioning as an appellate court or tribunal.”

(c) S.R. Bhagwat v. State of Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC 16: In this case it was observed as under:

  • “12. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that a binding judicial pronouncement between the parties cannot be made ineffective with the aid of any legislative power by enacting a provision which in substance overrules such judgment and is not in the realm of a legislative enactment which displaces the BASIS or foundation of the judgment and uniformly applies to a class of persons concerned with the entire subject sought to be covered by such an enactment having retrospective effect. We may only refer to two of these judgments.
  • … This is a case where on interpretation of existing law, the High Court had given certain benefits to the petitioners. That order of mandamus was sought to be nullified by the enactment of the impugned provisions in a new statute. This in our view would be clearly impermissible legislative exercise.”

(d) Medical Council of India v. State of Kerala and others2525 (2019) 13 SCC 185: A similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in Medical Council of India v. State of Kerala and others2525 (2019) 13 SCC 185 .

(e) Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2022) 12 SCC 455: In Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, the Apex Court “on the issue of permissibility of legislative override”, observed as under:

  • “50. The permissibility of legislative override in this country should be in accordance with the principles laid down by this Court in the aforementioned as well as other judgments, which have been culled out as under:
  • 50.1. The effect of the judgments of the Court can be nullified by a legislative act removing the BASIS of the judgment. Such law can be retrospective. Retrospective amendment should be reasonable and not arbitrary and must not be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. [Lohia Machines Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 2 SCC 197 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 245]
  • 50.2. The test for determining the validity of a validating legislation is that the judgment pointing out the defect would not have been passed, if the altered position as sought to be brought in by the validating statute existed before the Court at the time of rendering its judgment. In other words, the defect pointed out should have been cured such that the BASIS of the judgment pointing out the defect is removed.
  • 50.3. Nullification of mandamus by an enactment would be impermissible legislative exercise (see : S.R. Bhagwat [S.R. Bhagwat v. State of Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC 16 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1334] ). Even interim directions cannot be reversed by a legislative veto (see : Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal [Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, In re, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 (2)] and Medical Council of India v. State of Kerala [Medical Council of India v. State of Kerala, (2019) 13 SCC 185] ).
  • 50.4. Transgression of constitutional limitations and intrusion into the judicial power by the legislature is violative of the principle of separation of powers, the rule of law and of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”

When Legislative Enactment can be Struck Down by Courts

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rakesh Kohli (2012) 6 SCC 312 42, this Court held that sans flagrant violation of the constitutional provisions, the law made by Parliament or a State legislature is not declared bad and legislative enactment can be struck down only on two grounds:

  • that the appropriate legislature does not have the competence to make the law, and
  • that it takes away or abridges any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provisions.

It is pointed out in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India 2021 SCC Online SC 463, (L. Nageswara Rao, J.) the Supreme Court has also recognised

  • “manifest arbitrariness”

as a ground under Article 14 on the basis of which a legislative enactment can be judicially reviewed.

Permissibility of Legislative Override

L. Nageswara Rao, J, held in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2021 SCC Online SC 463, observed as to the ‘permissibility of legislative override’ as under:

  • “44. The permissibility of legislative override in this country should be in accordance with the principles laid down by this Court in the aforementioned as well as other judgments, which have been culled out as under:
  • a) The effect of the judgments of the Court can be nullified by a legislative act removing the basis of the judgment. Such law can be retrospective. Retrospective amendment should be reasonable and not arbitrary and must not be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. (Lohia Machines Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (1985) 2 SCC 197)
  • b) The test for determining the validity of a validating legislation is that the judgment pointing out the defect would not have been passed, if the altered position as sought to be brought in by the validating statute existed before the Court at the time of rendering its judgment. In other words, the defect pointed out should have been cured such that the basis of the judgement pointing out the defect is removed.”

The Doctrine of Separation of Powers – In Mullaperiyar dam Issue

State of Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Kerala (2014) [28] , the prominent Supreme Court decision on dam related issues, is pronounced in the matter of validity of an enactment [The Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006] made by the State of Kerala concerning the Mullaperiyar dam. The crux if the issue that was arisen in this case was whether the rights claimed in this case had been crystallised in the earlier Judgment on the same subject, Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union of India, (2006) 3 SCC 643. The 2014 Judgment went against the stance of Kerala, mainly, on the following premises:

  1. A categorical finding has been recorded by the Court in the earlier judgment that the Mullaperiyar dam is safe and that judgment has become final and binding. A final judgment remains in force until it is altered by the court.
  2. The Kerala enactment is is bad because it infringes the doctrine of separation of powers and rule of law,
  3. Legislature cannot indirectly control the Courts.
  4. Legislature cannot reopen or alter a judicial decision rendered on a finding of fact.
  5. The impugned 2006 (Amendment) Act is a classic case of nullification of a judgment.
  6. If the judgment of this Court and the 2006 (Amendment) Act are placed side by side, both cannot stand together.
  7. When the dispute between two States has already been adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court, any unilateral law enacted by one of the parties results in overturning the final judgment.
  8. By such law, the legislature has clearly usurped the judicial power.
  9. If substantial changes in the circumstances occur and such circumstances are shown to the Court necessitating departure from the earlier finding on the issue of safety, the Court can be approached and in that event the Court itself may exercise its discretion to reopen the safety aspect having regard to the drastic change in circumstances or in emergent situation as to the safety of dam.
  10. A judicial decision, having achieved finality, becomes the last word and can be reopened in the changed circumstances by that Court alone and no one else.

In para 143, 145, 146, 150, 151, 153 and 154 of the judgment the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “143. …. The Constitutional principle that the legislature can render judicial decision ineffective by enacting validating law within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing its character retrospectively has no application where a judicial decision has been rendered by recording a finding of fact. Under the pretence of power, the legislature, cannot neutralise the effect of the judgment given after ascertainment of fact by means of evidence/materials placed by the parties to the dispute. A decision which disposes of the matter by giving findings upon the facts is not open to change by legislature. A final judgment, once rendered, operates and remains in force until altered by the court in appropriate proceedings.
  • 145. …. In our opinion, by 2006 (Amendment) Act, the Kerala legislature has overturned a final judgment in the interest of its own executive Government. The impugned law amounts to reversal of the judgment of this Court which determines directly the question of safety of Mullaperiyar dam for raising water level to 142 ft. and whereunder Tamil Nadu’s legal right has been determined.
  • 146. … Once a judicial decision on ascertainment of a particular fact achieves finality, we are afraid the legislature cannot reopen such final judgment directly or indirectly. In such cases, the courts, if brought before them, may reopen such cases in exercise of their own discretion.
  • 150. … What has been found as a fact by judicial determination cannot be declared otherwise by applying legal fiction. We are, however, persuaded to accept the submission of Mr. Vinod Bobde, learned senior counsel for Tamil Nadu that the fact that the Mullaperiyar dam is safe was found by this Court and that finding of fact can never be deemed to be imaginary by a legal fiction which then proceeds to deem the opposite to be real, viz., that the dam is endangered. This is not a matter of legislative policy as it is being made out to be, rather in our opinion, it is incursion in the judicial process and functions of judicial organ.
  • 151. The question whether or not the legislature has usurped the judicial power or enacted a law in breach of separation of powers principle would depend on facts of each case after considering the real effect of law on a judgment or a judicial proceeding. One of the tests for determining whether a judgment is nullified is to see whether the law and the judgment are inconsistent and irreconcilable so that both cannot stand together. In what we have already discussed above, it is abundantly clear that on the one hand there is a finding of fact determined by this Court on hearing the parties on the basis of the evidence/materials placed on record in the judgment of this Court in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum and on the other in 2006 (Amendment) Act, the Kerala legislature has declared the dam being an endangered one and fixed the water level in the dam at 136 ft. …. The impugned law is a classic case of nullification of a judgment simpliciter, as in the judgment of this Court the question of the safety of the Dam was determined on the basis of materials placed before it and not on the interpretation of any existing law and there was no occasion for the legislature to amend the law by altering the basis on which the judgment was founded. When the impugned law is not a validation law, there is no question of the legislature removing the defect, as the Court has not found any vice in the existing law and declared such law to be bad.”
  • 153. … The question here is not that the 2006 (Amendment) Act is unconstitutional on the ground of res judicata but the question is, when a categorical finding has been recorded by this Court in the earlier judgment that the dam is safe for raising the water level to 142 ft. and permitted the water lever of the dam being raised to 142 ft. and that judgment has become final and binding between the parties, has the Kerala legislature infringed the separation of powers doctrine in enacting such law? In what has already been discussed above, the answer to the question has to be in the affirmative and we hold so.
  • 154. Where a dispute between two States has already been adjudicated upon by this Court, which it is empowered to deal with, any unilateral law enacted by one of the parties that results in overturning the final judgment is bad not because it is affected by the principles of res judicata but because it infringes the doctrine of separation of powers and rule of law, as by such law, the legislature has clearly usurped the judicial power.”

Judiciary & Legislature, Exercise in Different Areas of Jurisdiction

The judiciary and the legislature exercise jurisdiction in different compasses. This balancing act, delicate as it is, is guided by well-defined expositions of the Apex Court [Goa Foundation Vs. State of Goa: AIR 2016  SC 1653].

Commissioner HR & E Vs. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt [AIR 1954 SC 282] is the trailblazing decision handed down by the Supreme Court of India laying down the parameters to determine the fate and effect of an unconstitutional enactment. This decision, explaining ‘spiritual community represented by the math‘, is followed in all subsequent decisions in this field. The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, passed by the Madras Legislature, practically made to vest administration of religious and charitable institutions in a department of the Government, head of which was the Commissioner. The Act gave vast powers to the Commissioner.  Swaminar of Shirur Mutt questioned the Act in the Madras High Court. The Madras High Court accepted the case of Swaminar. The High Court found that several provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. The Commissioner,   Hindu Religious Endowments filed appeal before the Supreme Court. Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Madras High Court.

Justice BK Mukherjea, writing for the Seven-Judge Bench, held that the spiritual community represented by the math falls under Art. 26(b) which contemplates ‘religious denomination or a section thereof’; and the right to manage the affairs of religion is a fundamental right under Art. 26. Such rights cannot be taken away by the legislature.

Did Apex Court Incorrectly held – Constitution (24th Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid?

In His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1973 SC 1461, there was unanimous decision on the following:

  • Article 368 is independent from, and not controlled by, Article 13(2).
  • Golak Nath is overruled.
  • The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid.

The 24th Constitutional Amendment Act had been passed to get over IC Golak Nath Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1967 SC 1643. (In Golak Nath, it was held by an 11 judge bench that the Parliament could not amend fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution and that the amendments that took away or abridged fundamental rights were invalid.) The Golak Nath decision was on the basis of Article 13 – which laid down that the ‘Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights’ are void. But, the Twenty-fourth Amendment Act, mainly, legislated: “(4) Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article”. 

(i) The law declared by the Apex Court being the law of land, under Article 141 of the Constitution (See also: Bharvagi Constructions Vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy: AIR 2017 SC 4428) and (ii) it being not open to the legislature to simply brush aside findings of a court of law by an Amendment Act, under the Constitutional principles; instead of upholding Twenty-fourth Amendment Act (after overruling Golak Nath) the Supreme Court should have either annulled the Amendment, or observed that this amendment was redundant in view of the overruling. It is legitimate to say that the course open to the Government was to approach the Supreme Court, again (Note: AN Ray, CJ constituted a 13 judge bench to reconsider Kesavananda on the presumed premises that the Governments sought for a ‘reconsideration’).

Did Indian Parliament Reversed Shah Bano Cases?

As pointed out earlier, in Danial Latifi Vs. Union of India the Supreme Court held that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, ‘actually and in reality’ codified what was stated in Shah Bano Case. But, it had been criticised that the Indian Parliament, by the 1986 Act, ‘reversed’ the judgment in Shah Bano Case or at least it was ‘diluted’.

Conclusion

The judiciary and the legislature exercise jurisdiction in different domains. But, as observed by Chief Justice Chandrachud in AK Roy Vs. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 710) ‘our constitution does not follow the American pattern of strict separation of powers’. That is why the legislatures in India could ‘enact a fresh law with retrospective effect to alter the foundation and meaning of the legislation and to remove the base on which the judgment is founded’ as held in Cheviti Venkanna Yadav Vs. State of Telangana (AIR 2016  SC  4982).

Nevertheless, the legislature cannot make a law to overpower the findings of a court which were made in an ‘Individual’ decision, inter-partes.

[1]     Union of India Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2019 SC 4917

[2]   Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate: AIR 1971 SC 57;  S.T. Sadiq Vs. State of Kerala and Ors. (2015) 4 SCC 400; Medical Council of India Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 2018 SC 5041.

[3]   In Re Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal: 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96: AIR 1992 SC 522; M. P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State of T. N AIR 2007  SC 1742; Medical Council of India Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 2018 SC 5041; Goa Foundation v. State of Goa: AIR 2016 SC 1653; Binoy Viswam Vs. Union of India: AIR 2017  SC 2967; Hindustan Construction Company Vs. Union of India: AIR 2020 SC 122.       

[4]  State of Haryana v. The Karnal Co-op.Farmers’ Society Limited: AIR 1994 SC 1 (Relied on: Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality: [1970] 1 SCR 388). Referred to in: M. P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State of T. N: AIR 2007 SC 1742.

[5]     Medical Council of India Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 2018 SC 5041; Janapada Sabha Chhindwara Vs. Central Provinces Syndicate: AIR 1971 SC 57; 1970 (1) SCC 509.

[6]     In Re Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal: 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96; AIR 1992 SC 522

[7]     S.T. Sadiq Vs. State of Kerala   (2015) 4 SCC 400

[8]   Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate: AIR 1971 SC 57;  Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Vs. Broach Borough Municipality: (1969) 2 SCC 283

[9]  Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality: [1970] 1 SCR 388; State of Haryana v. The Karnal Co-op.Farmers’ Society Limited: AIR 1994 SC 1; S.T. Sadiq Vs. State of Kerala   (2015) 4 SCC 400; Goa Foundation Vs. State of Goa: 2016 0 AIR(SC) 1653. Binoy Viswam Vs. Union of India: 2017 0 AIR(SC) 2967; Hindustan Construction Company Limited Vs. Union of India: AIR 2020 SC 122.      

[10]   In Re Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal: 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96; AIR 1992 SC 522; Referred to in:  M. P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State of T. N: AIR 2007 SC 1742; Medical Council of India Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 2018 SC 5041.

[11]  State of Haryana v. The Karnal Co-op.Farmers’ Society Limited: AIR 1994 SC 1 (Relied on: Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality: [1970] 1 SCR 388). Referred to in: M. P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State of T. N: AIR 2007 SC 1742.

[12]   Cheviti Venkanna Yadav State of Telangana: (2017) 1 SCC 283

[13]   State of T.N. Vs. Arooran Sugars Ltd. (1997) 1 SCC 326.

[14]   Tara Prasad Singh Vs. Union of India (1980) 4 SCC 179

[15]   Medical Council of India Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 2018  SC 5041. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Vs. Broach Borough Municipality: (1969) 2 SCC 283

[16]   State of H.P. v. Narain Singh (2009) 13 SCC 165; Medical Council of India Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 2018  SC 5041.

[17]   Mohd. Ahmed Khan Vs. Shah Bano Begum: AIR 1985 SC 945

[18]   AIR 2001 3958

[19]   Goa Foundation Vs. State of Goa: AIR 2016  SC 1653

[20]   AIR 1954 SC 282

[21]   In Re Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal: AIR 1992 SC 522

[22]   Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabado v. New Shorock Spg. & Wvg. Co., AIR 1970 SC 1292; Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 803.

[23]   (2006) 7 SCC 456

[24]   AIR 2018 SC 5041

[25]  Janapada Sabha Chhindwara Vs. Central Provinces Syndicate, AIR 1971 SC 57; 1970 (1) SCC 509.

[26] Bharvagi Constructions Vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy: AIR 2017 SC 4428

[27]   University of Kerala Vs. Council, Principals, Colleges, Kerala: AIR 2009 SC 2223

[28]   (2014) 12 SCC 696; Quoted in: State of Karnataka Vs. Karnataka Pawn Brokers Assn.: AIR 2018 SC 441

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