In a Suit for Fixation of Boundary, Property of the Defendant Need Not be Scheduled

Jojy George Koduvath

The Kerala High Court in K.N. Sukumaran Nair v. K.E. Parameswara Pillai (Sathish Ninan & P. Krishna Kumar, JJ.), May 25, 2026, found the following in a ‘boundary fixation case’ –

1. Plaintiff Need Not Know Details of the Property of the Defendant

  • The plaintiff cannot be expected to know or be aware of the details of the property of the defendant including its extent and survey number.
  • It would be imprudent to hold that the plaintiff cannot file a suit for determination of the boundary of his property if he is unaware of the details of the property of the defendant.
  • In a suit for fixation of boundary the property of the defendant need not be separately scheduled in the plaint.
  • It would be sufficient to mention that the adjoining property of the disputed boundary is that of the defendant.

2. O. VII r. 3 CPC – Property Description Must Be Sufficient to Identify it

Order VII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:

  • “3. Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property.—Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the propertysufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers.”

3. Measurements be based on the title deeds of the both parties or possession

  • However, such measurements would be based on the title deeds of the respective parties or possession as the case may be.

4. When Commissioner Identified Properties, A Further Identification Not Necessary

  • The properties have been identified in the commissioner’s report and plan, a further identification by measurement is not necessary.

5. Decision Must Be By The Court 

  • Though the commissioner has included the disputed plot to be that of the plaintiff, the question as to whether it belongs to the plaintiff or to the defendant is to be decided by the court  based on the evidence on record including the recitals in the documents.

End Notes

Read: Mistake in Boundary or Survey Number will not Invalidate a Document; Insignificant Errors in Pleadings will not Disentitle a Decree

1. If the property is clearly identifiable, insignificant errors in its description in pleadings are not fatal. The court can act upon such correct identification without requiring a formal amendment to the pleadings or the decree.

  • Chandrakumar v. Narayana Bahuleyan, ILR 2011-2 Ker 897; 2011-2 KHC 884; 2011-3 KLT 185 (the plaintiffs may not be non-suited, for no explanation as to a larger extent).
  • Niyamat Ali Molla v. Sonargon Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. , AIR 2008 SC 225; 2007-13 SCC 421 (in the Schedule of the Property, certain blank spaces have been left for the insertion of the plot numbers maintained in the Village records).
  • Mohammed Munvar v. N.C. Nesan, 21 Mar 2024, 2024 Supreme(Mad) 613 (east and west boundaries interchanged).
  • Guda Sanjeeva Reddy v. Kodathala Sujatamma, 2006-4 ALT 636; 2006-4 CivCC 452; 2007-5 RCR(Civ) 271 (name of the Village was wrongly described in the plaint).

2. An insignificant error in the plaint, even repeated in the decree, can be corrected by the court, invoking section 152 CPC.

  • Rahulghani v. Uma Shenkar, A.I.R. 1944 Oudh 5, (clerical error: ‘west’ for ‘east’)
  • Satyanarayana v. Purnayya, 1931 Mad 260 (wrong survey number)
  • J. Sarojini Alias Nesamma v. Narayani Sarojini, 2008-1 ILR(Ker) 153; 2008-1 KHC 897; 2008-1 KLT 516 (mistake in survey number).
  • Deo Kumar Sah v. Mahesh Pd. Rai, 2004-3 BBCJ 175; 2004-3 PLJR 354 (mistake in plot number and area).
  • Mohinder Singh v. Teja Singh, AIR 1979 P & H 47, (incorrect plot number and area)
  • Pratibha Singh v. Shanti Devi Prasad, (2003)2 SCC 330 (mistake in survey number)
  • Easwari Amma Prsannakumari v. Radhakrishna Pillai, 2015 (5) KerHC 922 (a survey number was omitted, and the length of the way was incorrect).

3. A mere mistake occurred in the compromise petition Can Be Corrected In Decree

  • M. K. Soumini v. M. K. Sreedharen, 10 Jan 2017, 2017 Supreme(Ker) 173,

4. Mistakes in decree arose from the erroneous plaint Can also Be Corrected In Decree

  • J. Sarojini Alias Nesamma v. Narayani Sarojini, 2008-1 ILR(Ker) 153; 2008-1 KHC 897; 2008-1 KLT 516 (mistake in survey number),
  • Subramanian Iyer v. Joseph George, 1959 K.L.T. 165 (boundaries of the schedule wrongly described; decree corrected).

5. Even Incidental Errors Anterior To Decree (Original Document), Can Be Corrected In Decree

  • Abdhu v. Assainar (1993 [2] KLT 711)
  • Raman Nadar Velayudhan Nadar v. Janaki Karthi (2011 [2] KLT 149)

6. Court Orders – Technical Defects will not defeat Substantive Rights

  • Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480.
  • Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India, (1984) 3 SCC 46).
  • State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719.
  • Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar (1975) 1 SCC 774,
  • Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425,

7. Non-mentioning of survey number is not a ground to reject the application of Petrol Pump.

  • Rajesh Parmar v. Under Secretary, Petroleum Corporation, MANU/MP/0121/2019)
  • Indian Oil Corporation Limited v.  Gosala Raju, AIR 2022 AP (NOC) 260.

8. “Falsa Demonstratio Non Nocet”  (Adequate and sufficient description with convenient certainty of what was meant to pass): an erroneous addition to the description will not vitiate it.

  • Umrao Bapu v. Ramakrishna Bapu, AIR1938 Nag. 93,
  • Durga Prased Singh v. Rajendra Narain Bagchi (1910) 37 Cal. 293,
  • Savarimuthu Nadar Chellayan Nadar v. Kanakku Kali Pillai Padmanabha Pillai, 1957 KHC 184

9. General principle – boundary descriptions shall prevail

  • Subhaga v. Shoba, 2006-5 SCC 466
  • T. Venkata Vijaya Lakshmi v. Kodali Rayana Rao, 2023-4 ALT 272; 2023-3 CivCC 746
  • Vishnu Anant Dessai v. Govind Vithal Sawant, 2020-5 All MR 496 (Bom);
  • Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959

10.Boundary descriptions – Vague and Uncertain Description Rejected & Definite and Certain Preferred.

  • Chandrakumar v. Narayana Bahuleyan, ILR 2011-2 Ker 897; 2011-2 KHC 884; 2011-3 KLT 185
  • Sivaraman Nair v. Shamsuddin, 1990 (1) KerLT 187: 1990 KHC 295
  • Savithri Ammal v. Padmavathy, 1990 KHC 295,

11. No Stamp Duty for Rectification Deed

  • P. Sasikumar v. State Of Kerala, 2024-4 KLT 864,
  • Jihas P.A. v. District Registrar, 2012 (3) KHC 146)
  • Rajesh Kumar K.T. v. State of Kerala, 2024 (3) KHC 425

12. Error will not necessarily invalidate a document – Not Applied

  • Kamalamma v. Shibu, 2024-3 KerHC 547.
  • Savarimuthu Nadar Chellayan Nadar v. Kanakku Kali Pillai Padmanabha Pillai, 1957 KHC 184,

13. Execution of ‘Rectification Deed’

  • Rajesh Kumar KT  v. State of Kerala, 2024-3 KHC 425,
  • Vannathi Valatpil Mahmood v. State of Kerala, 2019 (2) KHC 736 (change in the description of the property)
  • Jihas v. District Registrar, 2012 (3) KLT 194 (mistake in mentioning flat number in the sale deed).

14. Wrong description in Will. Legal heirs can execute a rectification

  • Baburaj P.K v. State of Kerala, 2019 (2) KHC 628.

15. Clerical or Arithmetical Errors in the plaint and Final Decrees can be Rectified

  • Kalkonda Pandu Rangaiah v. Kalkonda Krishnaiah, AIR 1974 AP 201,

16, When instrument may be rectified

  • Section 26 of Sp. Relief Act

17. Suit for Rectification of Deed – When Needed?

  • Aliyar v. Raju V. Vayalat, 2016-1 KHC 763; 2016-2 KLT 656.

18. Intention of the Parties to prevail when conflict between area and boundaries

  • Krishnamoorthi Iyer v. Janaki Amma, 1957 KHC 202 : 1957 KLT 886,
  • Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959)
  • The Church of South India Trust Association v. Raja Ambrose, 1978- 2 MLJ 620.

19. No “suppression”, if the facts are (i) Not Material and  (ii) “Known” to the opposite side.

  • Avtar Singh v. Union of India, 2016-8 SCC 471, (in a case of information given to the employer by a candidate).

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Does a Cheque-Case under NI Act Lie Against a Partnership/ Trust/ Society?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • 1. A trust is a legal concept (an obligation); it is not an association of persons; and therefore, it cannot be made as a party to litigation (Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ), 2025 INSC 1210.
  • 2. A partnership firm need not be an accused in a Complaint under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act. Even if the firm is a juristic entity it is not distinct from the partners and therefore, the defect, if any, is not significant. If the ‘firm commits’ any breach, all the partners would become liable for the penalties (Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar (Nagarathna, Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.), 2025 INSC 831.
  • 3. A Society (both registered and unregistered) need not be an accused in a Complaint under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act. In Illachi Devi v. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India, AIR 2003 SC 3397, it is held that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, even after registration, does not become distinct from its members and does not become a separate legal person like a company  (Referred to in Vivek Narayan Sharma Vs. Union of India, 2023-3 SCC 1). Therefore, the principles as to partnership laid down in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar (Nagarathna, Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.), 2025 INSC 831, apply to societies also.

S. 141 of the NI Act Refers to “firm or other association of individuals”

Section 141 of the NI Act speaks as to ‘Offences by Companies‘. It says:

  • “If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly…”

Then it is explained in this Section as under:

  • “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
  • “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”

Part I : PARTNERSHIP FIRM

The Scope of the Explanation:  “firm or other association of individuals”

The scope of the Explanation—“company means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals”—came up for consideration in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831. That is, whether it is necessary –

•             (i) to join the firm as a party in Section 138 Complaint, and

•             (ii) to issue notice under Section 138 of the Act to the firm?

In Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831, the Apex Court answered the aforesaid questions in the negative.

Even if Partnership Firm is a Juristic Entity, it is Not Distinct from Partners

The Apex Court, in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831, held as under:

  • “6.9  On considering the aforesaid judgments, we observe that even if we have to come to the conclusion that the juristic entity i.e., the partnership firm is the primary accused in the instant case it would be necessary for us to also state that such a juristic entity, namely, a partnership firm is not distinct from the partners who comprise the partnership. ….
  • 6.10 Alternatively, notice to the partners/accused could have been construed as notice to the partnership firm also. We say so for the reason that unlike a company which is a separate juristic entity from its directors thereof, a partnership firm comprises of its partners who are the persons directly liable on behalf of the partnership firm and by themselves. ….. The complainant herein has not arraigned the firm but has arraigned the partners of the firm as accused and has also issued notice to them; therefore, we find that the defect, if any, is not significant or incurable in these circumstances. Permission is therefore to be granted to the complainant to arraign the partnership firm also as an accused in the complaint.….”

Liability of Partners

The Court (Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar) held as under:

  • “7.19 The liability of partners for the debts of the business is unlimited and they are jointly and severally liable for all business obligations of the partnership firm. Sections 25 and 26 of the Partnership Act are relevant in this regard, which are reproduced as under:
    • “25. Liability of a partner for acts of the firm.—Every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners and also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner.
    • 26. Liability of the firm for wrongful acts of a partner.—Where, by the wrongful act or omission of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of a firm, or with the authority of his partners, loss or injury is caused to any third party, or any penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner.” 
  • 7.23 Moreover, since the firm by itself cannot transact any business, if a partner of the firm commits any breach, all the partners would become liable for the consequent penalties, just as the firm would be liable. Further, if a penalty is imposed on a partnership firm for contravention of a statute, it amounts to levy of penalty on the partners also and there is no separate or independent penalty on the partners for the said contravention.”

Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831

The controversy in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831, revolved around the interpretation of Section 141 of the NI Act.

Section 141 of the NI Act envisages that:

  • (i) a company or firm may be deemed guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act; and
  • (ii) the company or firm, along with the persons in charge of and responsible for its conduct of business, may be subjected to punishment.

Without detracting from the legal propositions in Section 141, the Supreme Court proceeded (in the light of the Partnership Act, 1932) as under:

  • (a) the Partnership firm need not (necessarily) be an accused in a complaint filed under Section 138 (“The defect, if any, is not significant“); and
  • (b) when a complaint is filed ‘against a firm’, under Section 138, all the partners are required to be prosecuted.

Part II : TRUST

Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ), 2025 INSC 1210 (09-10-2025), is a landmark decision on trust. It held:

  • A Trust Is Not a Legal Person.
  • A Trust Operates through its Trustees.
  • Trustees Can Maintain and Defend a Suit.
  • Trust is an Obligation and not a Legal Entity.
  • No Legal Requirement For A Trust To Be Made A Party.
  • Just as a Managing Director is responsible for the affairs of a company, a Chairman or Managing Trustee is responsible for the affairs and administration of a Trust, within the powers and duties conferred by the Trust Deed and law.

Question Considered

Two principal questions arose for consideration in this case. They are:

  • (i) Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is maintainable against the Chairman or a Trustee of a Trust when the cheque in question has been issued on behalf of the Trust, without the Trust itself being made an accused; and
  • (ii) Whether the complainant under Section 138 must make specific averments regarding the accused-trustee’s role and responsibility in the conduct of the day-to-day affairs of the Trust, even though the person is admittedly a Trustee.

Trust is NOT a Legal Person

Decisions relied on (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) to show – Trust is not a ‘legal entity’ capable of being sued – are:

  • 1. Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712.
  • 2. K P Shibu v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 7585, 2019 (3) KHC 1.

Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank

In Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712, it is held

  • A Trust is not a person.
  • It could not be a consumer.
  • A Trust cannot be a complainant.
  • It would not fall under the definition of ‘person’ as per Section 2(m) of the Consumer Protection Act.

The Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra) pointed out – it is observed in the Pratibha Pratisthan case-

  • “4. A reading of the definition of the words “complaint”, “complainant” and “consumer” makes it clear that a trust cannot invoke the provisions of the Act in respect of any allegation on the basis of which a complaint could be made. To put this beyond any doubt, the word “person” has also been defined in the Act and Section 2(1)(m) thereof defines a “person” as follows:
    • “2. (1)(m) “person” includes—
    • (i) a firm whether registered or not;
    • (ii) a Hindu undivided family;
    • (iii) a cooperative society;
    •  (iv) every other association of persons whether registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or not;”
  • 5. On a plain and simple reading of all the above provisions of the Act it is clear that a trust is not a person and therefore not a consumer. Consequently, it cannot be a complainant and cannot file a consumer dispute under the provisions of the Act.”

After quoting Sections 3 (definition of Trust) and 13 (Trustee to protect title to trust-property) of the Trust Act, the Apex Court observed in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal as under:

  • “23. To our mind, the above-extracted Sections of the Trusts Act would also favour the view we are taking, as the obligation to ‘maintain and defend’ suits is placed on the shoulders of a Trustee and not the Trust itself. It is clear that only a Trustee has the obligation to file, maintain and defend any suit on behalf of the Trust. Meaning thereby, that a Trust does not have a separate legal existence of its own, making it incapable of suing or being sued.”

Trust is an Obligation and Not a Legal Entity

Trust, as defined under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, is an obligation and not a legal entity.

The Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal), while discussing this matter, referred (with approval) the following decisions placed by the Appellant:

  • KR Rajan v. Cherian K Cherian, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 4699 (Kerala High Court)
  • Duli Chand v. M/s MPTC Charitable Trust, 1983 SCC OnLine Del 270 (Delhi High Court)
  • V Chandrasekaran v. Venkatanaicker Trust, 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 33745 (Madras High Court)
  • Narayana Iyer v. Anandammal Adheena Trust, (2021) 3 CTC 776; (Madras High Court)
  • Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin v. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat Ahmedabad, AIR 1968 Guj 184 (Gujarat High Court)
  • Vijay Sports Club v State of Bengal, 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 2331 (Calcutta High Court).

A Trust Operates Through its Trustees

After referring the aforestated decisions, the Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) said as under:

  • “25. …. A Trust is also not like a corporation which has a legal existence of its own and therefore can appoint an agent. A Trust operates through its Trustees, who are legal entities. We may gainfully refer to the decision of the Kerala High Court in KR Rajan (supra), where the said Court has rightly held:
  • ‘7. The legal status of a trust, is thus well discernible. Trust not being a legal person, and the Code of Civil Procedure not providing any enabling provision for the Trust to sue or for being sued in its name, there is no merit in the contention that the Trust is to be arrayed as a co-nominee party. The arraying of the trust in its own name is otiose or redundant. It is the trustees who are to be impleaded to represent the trust. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner on the ground of non-joinder, also fails’.”

Trust Is An Obligation Imposed On The Ostensible Owner – Trustee

The Apex Court held further as under (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal):

  • “26. Ergo, it is clear that though a Trust may act or even be treated as an entity for certain legal purposes and not all legal purposes, a Trust is an obligation imposed on the ostensible owner of the property to use the same for a particular object – for the benefit of a named beneficiary or charity, and it is the Trustee(s) who are bound to maintain and defend all suits and to take such other steps with regard to the nature, land or the value of the Trust property, that may be reasonably required for the preservation of the Trust property, and the assertion of protection of title thereto, subject to the provisions of the instructions of Trust to take such other steps.”

No Legal Requirement For A Trust To Be Made A Party

The Apex Court held further as under (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal):

  • “27. There exists no ambiguity about there being no legal requirement for a Trust to be made a party in a proceeding before a Court of Law since it is only a/the Trustee(s) who are liable and answerable for acts done or alleged to have been done for and on behalf of the said Trust. From a perusal of Orion’s Deed of Trust, of which the Respondent is the Chairman/Authorized Signatory, it emerges clearly that the relevant clauses deal with the Trustee insofar as administering and holding the funds and properties of the Trust are concerned. Which is to say that the Trust (i.e., Orion) operates only through the Trustee(s) and that the objects thereof were for charitable purposes. The Deed of Trust also provides for permitting one or more Trustees to operate a bank account. It becomes all the more apparent that it is the Trustees alone, through whom the Trust funds/property(ies) are managed and dealt with. The Trust itself is without any independent legal status.”

Read Also:

Requirement of Averments – Role of Trustee-Accused in Affairs of Trust

The position of a Managing Director in a company carries responsibility for its affairs. A similar principle applies to Trusts — the Trustees (authorised signatory or Managing Trustee, where designated) are responsible for the administration and conduct of the Trust’s affairs, subject to the powers and duties defined by the Trust Deed and applicable law.

The Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) relied upon the decision SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89 [3-Judge Bench], wherein it was held that a position of a Managing Director would suggest responsibility of the person holding the said position, in the day-to-day affairs of the Company.

The following portion from SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) is quoted by the Apex Court.

  • “…. The answer to the question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. …
  • …. the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141.”

The Apex Court also sought support from KK Ahuja v. VK Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48, which held as under:

  • “27. The position under Section 141 of the Act can be summarised thus:
  • .(i) If the accused is the Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he is in charge of, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. It is sufficient if an averment is made that the accused was the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director at the relevant time. This is because the prefix “Managing” to the word “Director” makes it clear that they were in charge of and are responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company.”

The Apex Court also relied on Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, (2022) 10 SCC 152, where it was observed:

  • “36. The High Court also rightly held that the Managing Director or Joint ManagingDirector would admittedly be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business by virtue of the office they hold as Managing Director or Joint Managing Director. These persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, and they get covered under Section 141 of the NI Act.”

Part III : SOCIETY

Registration does not Confer Juristic Personality

In Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State, AIR 1962 SC 458, it is held that the registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status.

In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India: AIR 2003 SC 3397, it is held that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act as a society even after registration does not become distinct from its members and does not become a separate legal person like a company. (Referred to in Vivek Narayan Sharma Vs. Union of India, 2023-3 SCC 1)

In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India, AIR2003 SC 3397, says as under: 

  • i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
  • ii) A Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  (Para 21)
  • iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)

Society is the Compendium of its Members

A society or a club, both registered and unregistered, is the compendium of its members. When it sues or is sued all its members should be made parties. Registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458. Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India: AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata, AIR 2010 SC 2943)

Property Belonging to a Society’, “Merely Describes” Property Vests in Gover. Body

Expressions in the Societies Registration Act, ‘property belonging to a society’ (Societies Registration Act: Sec. 5) and ‘property of the society’, (Societies Registration Act: Sec. 8 and 10) do not give the society a corporate status; and it “merely describes the property which vests in trustees or Governing Body”. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458)

‘Suit By or Against a Regd. So.’ is Virtually Suit By or Against Entire Members

Following the above propositions, it can be legitimately concluded that the common expression, ‘suit by or against a society’, legally and virtually denotes suit by or against its entire members.

How Sec. 6 is an Enabling Provision

The earlier view taken by various courts in India was that the registered societies were legal persons and they could sue or be sued in their own name; and that Sec. 6 was only an enabling (or added) provision to sue or be sued in the name of the president, secretary, etc.. (Shanti Sarup Vs. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha, Dayalbagh Agra: AIR 1969 All. 248; K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook, AIR 1970 Pat 163;  Khiri Ram Gupta and Another versus Nana Lal:  AIR 1964 Pat. 114, Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay : AIR 1946 Bom. 516; Nabadwip Bhajan Asram Vs. Commissioner of Nabadwip Municipality : AIR 1959 Cal 361; Sonar Bangala Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College: AIR 1960 Cal 409)

This view does not hold good in the light of Unani Tibia College case, AIR 1962 SC 458, Illachi Devi case,  AIR 2003 SC 3397, and Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.

Suing entire members of the society, either in person or invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC, is the normal rule. But, Sec. 6 enables ‘to sue or be sued’ every registered society in the name of its president, secretary, etc., as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society (or through such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion).

Suit shall be in the Personal Name of President, Chairman, etc.

From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ as President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees.

Sec. 6: Impliedly Bars Filing a Suit in the Name of Society

As already stated, our Apex Court has repeatedly  made it clear that Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act provides that a registered society must sue or be sued through the office bearer or a nominee, as provided in that section. Therefore, it can be concluded that Sec. 6 impliedly bars filing a suit in the name of the society, otherwise than through its President, Secretary or the nominated person. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.)

Principles in Prosecuting a Cheque Case as to Partnership Apply to Societies Also

In Illachi Devi v. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India, AIR 2003 SC 3397, it is held that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, even after registration, does not become distinct from its members and does not become a separate legal person like a company  (Referred to in Vivek Narayan Sharma Vs. Union of India, 2023-3 SCC 1). Therefore, the principles as to partnership, in prosecuting a cheque case under Sec. 138 NI Act, laid down in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar (Nagarathna, Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.), 2025 INSC 831, apply to societies also.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

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Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar: Partnership Firm Need Not be an Accused in S. 138 NI Act Complaint

Where a partner of a firm commits a breach, all the partners would be liable for the penalties arising therefrom.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Contents in a Nutshell

Supreme Court of India (Nagarathna, Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.) held in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831 –

  • A partnership firm need not be an accused in a Complaint under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • Notice under Section 138 of the Act need not be issued to the firm.
  • If the ‘firm commits’ any breach, all the partners would become liable for the penalties.

Genesis of the Controversy

Section 141 of the NI Act speaks as to ‘Offences by Companies‘. It says:

  • “If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly…”

Then it is explained in this Section as under:

  • (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
  • (b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”

The scope of the Explanation—“company means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals”—came up for consideration in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831.

That is, whether it is necessary –

  • (i) to join the firm as a party in Section 138 Complaint, and
  • (ii) to issue notice under Section 138 of the Act to the firm?

In Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831, the Apex Court answered the aforesaid questions in the negative.

Kerala High Court Decisions Stand Overruled

The following decisions took the view that a prosecution under Section 141 of the NI Act is not maintainable if the cheque is issued ‘by the firm’ (or society), without arraigning the firm (or society) as an accused in the complaint.

  • (i) S.  Balakrishna Prabhu v. V. Indira, 2023-7 KHC 587; 2024-1 KLT 84,
  • (ii) P.I.  Moideen Kutty v. Abdul Rasheed, 2023-5 KLT(SN) 15,
  • (iii) Binu v. State of Kerala, 2023-2 KLD 565,
  • (iv) Dominic Joseph v. State of Kerala, 2017-1 KHC 790; 2017-2 KLT(SN) 19,
  • (v) Shishan M. A.  v. M. K.  Murali, 2016-5 KHC 810; 2016-4 KLT 876,
  • (vi) Sheeja Mol v. State of Kerala, 2015 (4) KLT 748,
  • (vil) Babu v. State of Kerala, 2017-4 KLT(SN) 33,
  • (viil) Fakruddin V.P. v. State of Kerala, 2014 (4) KHC 815,
  • (ix) Vijaya Lekshmi v. Indian Bank, Tvm., 2016 (1) KLD 639.

In the light of Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831, the aforesaid decisions no longer hold the field and cannot be regarded as laying down good law.

Submissions of the Appellant in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar

  • A company is a separate legal entity from its shareholders. But a partnership is only a compendious name for its partners.   The shareholders in a company have limited liability, whereas in a partnership firm, the partners have unlimited liability.
  • The partnership firm cannot be arraigned as an accused or being issued notice under Section 138 of the Act.
  • A partnership firm cannot enter into any contract and that either those partner(s) authorized by all the partners or all the partners of the firm, must execute the contract.
  • Though Order XXX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 allow for suing of partners in the name of the firm, it is only a convenient method for referring to the persons who constitute the firm and that a decree in favour of or against a firm, in the name of the firm, has the same effect as a decree in favour of or against all the partners.

Submissions of the respondents (Sr. Advocate  S. Nagamuthu)

  • Explanation (a) of Section 141(1) of the Act states that a “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals.
  • The terms ‘association of persons’ or ‘body of individuals’ have a legal connotation. In this regard, a partnership firm is not an association of persons in the literal sense. 
  • The expression ‘person’ in Section 141 of the Act includes a partnership firm, as Section 141 of the Act deems a partnership firm to be a company.
  • That this deeming fiction is also seen when the “director” is defined.
  • Thus, a firm is deemed to be a company and if a firm commits an offence under Section 138 of the Act, and firm should also be added as an accused and found guilty.
  • The partners of a firm should be arraigned as accused along with the firm and such partners should be liable for punishment vicariously/constructively for the offence committed by the firm.
  • In the absence of the firm being issued the statutory notice or arraigned as an accused in the complaint, the same was not maintainable at all.

The senior counsel, Sri S. Nagamuthu referred the following  judgments:

1.  Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661.  

  • Note: It is held (in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar) that Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661, was not applicable in the facts of this case, since it concerned the vicarious liability of directors of a company where the company itself was neither prosecuted nor made liable (and did not consider the position of a partnership firm); and there is distinction between a company and a partnership firm.

2.  Dilip Hariramani v. Bank of Baroda, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 579.

  • Note: This decision is also distinguished in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar. The notice was not served to the appellant therein but it was served only on the authorized signatory of the firm. In the instant case, the notice was sent by the complainant to both the partners of the firm. 

Even if partnership firm is a juristic entity, it is Not Distinct from Partners

The Court (Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar) held as under:

  • “6.9  On considering the aforesaid judgments, we observe that even if we have to come to the conclusion that the juristic entity i.e., the partnership firm is the primary accused in the instant case it would be necessary for us to also state that such a juristic entity, namely, a partnership firm is not distinct from the partners who comprise the partnership. ….
  • 6.10 Alternatively, notice to the partners/accused could have been construed as notice to the partnership firm also. We say so for the reason that unlike a company which is a separate juristic entity from its directors thereof, a partnership firm comprises of its partners who are the persons directly liable on behalf of the partnership firm and by themselves. ….. The complainant herein has not arraigned the firm but has arraigned the partners of the firm as accused and has also issued notice to them; therefore, we find that the defect, if any, is not significant or incurable in these circumstances. Permission is therefore to be granted to the complainant to arraign the partnership firm also as an accused in the complaint.….”

Liability of Partners

The Court (Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar) held as under:

  • “7.19 The liability of partners for the debts of the business is unlimited and they are jointly and severally liable for all business obligations of the partnership firm. Sections 25 and 26 of the Partnership Act are relevant in this regard, which are reproduced as under:
    • “25. Liability of a partner for acts of the firm.—Every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners and also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner.
    • 26. Liability of the firm for wrongful acts of a partner.—Where, by the wrongful act or omission of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of a firm, or with the authority of his partners, loss or injury is caused to any third party, or any penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner.” 
  • 7.23 Moreover, since the firm by itself cannot transact any business, if a partner of the firm commits any breach, all the partners would become liable for the consequent penalties, just as the firm would be liable. Further, if a penalty is imposed on a partnership firm for contravention of a statute, it amounts to levy of penalty on the partners also and there is no separate or independent penalty on the partners for the said contravention.”

Conclusion

The controversy in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831, revolved around the interpretation of Section 141 of the NI Act.

Section 141 of the NI Act envisages that:

  • (i) a company or firm may be deemed guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act; and
  • (ii) the company or firm, along with the persons in charge of and responsible for its conduct of business, may be subjected to punishment.

Without detracting from the legal propositions in Section 141, the Supreme Court proceeded (in the light of the Partnership Act, 1932) as under:

  • (a) the Partnership firm need not (necessarily) be an accused in a complaint filed under Section 138 (“The defect, if any, is not significant“); and
  • (b) when a complaint is filed ‘against a firm’, under Section 138, all the partners are required to be prosecuted.

End Notes

Section 138 of the NI Act reads as under:

  • “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. — Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—

  • .(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months* from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
  • (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
  • (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
  • Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.
  • xxx

Section 141 of the NI Act reads as under:

  • 141. Offences by companies.— (1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
  • Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he  had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
  • Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this chapter.
  • (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
  • Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
  • (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
  • (b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

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Mansi Finance (Chennai) Ltd. v. M. Lalitha: Cheque Bounce (NI Act) Cases: No Deemed Liability to the Directors of a Company or Society; The Complaint Must Disclose Factual Basis

Also read: Suits and Criminal Complaints By and Against a Company

Jojy George Koduvath

In M/s Mansi Finance (Chennai) Ltd. v. M. Lalitha, 2026 INSC 547, the issue was whether the complaint disclosed sufficient factual foundation (of offence) against each of the accused so as to justify continuation of the prosecution.

Justice Prashant  Kumar Mishra and Justice N. V. Anjaria observed that the answer to that question “must necessarily depend upon the role attributable to each of them”.

The Court held as under:

  • “30. Mere designation as an office bearer of a company or society is not sufficient to attract Section 141 of the NI Act. Equally, a complaint containing only a bald reproduction of the statutory language without factual foundation cannot be sustained. However, it is clear that the complaint itself is required to be read as a whole and not in isolated fragments. …”
  • “35. The material placed on record prima facie indicates that respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 were themselves signatories to some of the antecedent financial documents forming part of the transaction. The MoU bears signature of respondent no. 1. The dishonoured cheque itself bears the signature of respondent No. 2. The promissory notes and allied payment documents disclose participation of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4. These are not matters of mere designation but constitute prima facie material linking them to the underlying transaction”.
  • “39. …The law governing Section 141 of the NI Act is clear that there is no deemed liability merely by virtue of holding an office or position in the company or society. The complaint must disclose the factual basis showing that the person sought to be prosecuted was in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the entity at the relevant time. As far as the present case is concerned, except for the general assertion regarding his status as an Executive Member, no specific averment or material connecting respondent No. 3 with the transaction in question has been brought on record. His designation alone, therefore, would not be sufficient to attract liability under Section 141 of the NI Act”.

Decisions referred:

1. S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89. A three-Judge Bench held that for invoking vicarious liability under Section 141 of the NI Act, it is necessary to aver in the complaint that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.

2. National Small Industries Corporation Limited vs. Harmeet Singh Paintal, (2010) 3 SCC 330. It was observed that vicarious liability cannot be inferred merely from holding an office or designation, and the complaint must disclose how and in what manner the accused was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.

3. HDFC Bank Limited vs. State of Maharashtra, (2025) 9 SCC 653 at Para 27. It was clarified that the complaint need not mechanically reproduce the exact phraseology of Section 141 of the NI Act if the substance of the allegations, read as a whole, discloses the factual basis for such liability. The emphasis, therefore, is not on form but on substance in the sense that the criminal liability under Section 141 of the NI Act is person-specific and cannot be imposed merely by association. The complaint must, therefore, disclose sufficient factual foundation qua each accused, and the role attributable to each must be independently discernible.

Impugned High Court Decision

The High Court had quashed the proceedings against all the respondents on the ground that the complaint did not disclose specific averments as to how and in what manner they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the affairs of the Society, and that the allegations are omnibus in nature. The High Court placed reliance upon the decisions of this Court in

  • S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan (2023) 10 SCC 685
  • Ashok Shewakramani v. State of Andhra Pradesh,  (2023) 8 SCC 473.  

The Apex Court, as stated above, set aside the Order of the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings against respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

‘Absolute‘ Transfer of Property in a Will, with Stipulation: ‘If property Remains’ on Death of Transferee, it will Go to Another – If Valid?

Yes.

Taken from: Interpretation of Inconsistent Clauses in a Will

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

The following important points require consideration in this regard:

  1. In Indian practice, though the words used in the deeds might be ‘absolute transfer’, on a true construction, on a reading of the entire document, it might only be a salable/transferable right during lifetime; and the left-over property might be given to another.
  2. The common law in India requires reading the whole document altogether, and give effect to the document on a harmonious interpretation, rather than giving effect to the legal terms used in a deed.
  3. Illustrations in Sections 24 and 27 make it clear that Indian law recognises ‘vested remainder’ and ‘contingent remainder‘ (as detailed in the notes above).
  4. It is also beyond doubt that such a transfer is not hit by Sec. 10 and 11 of the TP Act; inasmuch as Sec. 10 and 11 cumber only when ‘conditions’ impose ‘Absolute Restraint’ or ‘Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’.
  5. First illustration in Sec. 88 of the Indian Succession Act reads as under:
    • “The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.”

Various court decisions make it clear that one can validly transfer or bequeath a property to another, with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights, with the stipulation that after that (first) transferee’s lifetime, if whole or any part remains, it (contingent remainder) may go to another.

In K. S.  Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017  SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.), Palaniappa Chettiar and his wife by registered Will created a Trust. The Will indicated that after the death of one of the testators, the survivor had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same.  Certain alienations were made by Rangammal after death of Palaniappa Chettiar.  It is held as under:

  • “49. The intention in testamentary disposition has to be primarily found out from the actual words used in the Will. The court is not entitled to ignore clear words or add something of its own or dilute the meaning of any clear word used in the Will. The solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention. On the reading of the Will, the intendment of testator/testatrix is clear that survivor shall have absolute right of enjoyment of properties. There is no reason not to give effect to said intendment on the ground that the testator and testatrix have mutually intended to set apart the property for charity and holding that survivor shall have right of disposition be not in the interest of the trust.”

Other Erudite Decisions on the Topic

In Sanford v. Sanford(1901) 1 Ch. 939, the gift to the wife conferred a power of disposal limited explicitly to her lifetime. But, the gift-over to son was of a quite absolute estate. The gift did not include a power of disposition by will, but allowed power of disposition inter vivos. It was provided in the gift deed that if any property remained at her death it was to pass ‘from father to son, from generation to generation’.   Therefore, it was held that the widow was conferred with only a limited right; and the gift-over, which was ‘the will of the testator’ was to ‘settle its destination’. (This decision is referred to in Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, 1976-2 MLJ 381.)

In Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381, the Madras High Court rendered a well-read decision in this topic. The facts of this case, in a nutshell, are as under:

  • (i) The settlement deed considered in the case provided:
    • (a)  the wife of the settlor should enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights.
    • (b) the respondent should take the properties remained at the time of her death, with absolute rights.
  • (ii) the appellant contended that the clause providing for the respondent taking absolutely such of the properties as at the time of the death of the settler’s wife was repugnant to the earlier clause conferring an absolute estate on her, and has, therefore, to be ignored as void.
  • (iii) the respondent contended that if the settlement deed had to be read as a whole  and the effect would be:
    • there was no absolute transfer to the wife of the settler as stated in Sec. 11 of the TP Act.

It is seen that the High Court accepted the contentions of the respondent that the settlement deed was to be read as a whole and that the respondent had taken absolutely such of the properties covered by the settlement deed as remained undisposed of by the settlee, the wife of the settlor; as she had only a right to enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) powers of disposal during her lifetime. The clause as to acquiring property by respondent was not repugnant and void.

The High Court relied on the following cases. The facts of these were ‘very near’ to the facts of that case.

  • Thayalai Achi v. Kannammal, AIR 1935 Mad 704,
  • S.M. Hara Kumari v. Mohim Chandra Sarkar, (1908) 12 CWN 412,
  • Anantnasayana v. Kondappe AIR 1940 Mad 479,
  • Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247,
  • Ramasreenivasa Iyengar v. Padmasani Ammal, (1973) 1 MLJ 34.

In Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247, it was held, as regards a Will, as under:

  • “After giving an absolute estate to his wife over the two items of scheduled properties, he provided that these scheduled properties, after the wife’s lifetime should devolve – item 1 on the first daughter and item 2 on the second daughter – who would have absolute rights. When the testator took care to indicate that the properties without any distinction even after his wife’s lifetime should go to each of the daughters, it should be presumed that it was clearly in his mind that the wife’s estate was only to be a limited estate or life estate, and not an absolute one.” (Quoted in: Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381).

Reconcile all clauses in the Will, Even if an apparent Absolute Estate Given

In Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, AIR 2006 SC 3282, 2006-8 SCC 75 (B.P. Singh & P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.), it is held as under:

  • “20. Thus the first attempt must be to reconcile all the clauses in the will and give effect to all of them. When we make that attempt in the context of what this Court had indicated in the decision quoted above, we find that the apparent absolute estate given to his wife by the testator is sought to be cut down by the stipulations that the property must go to his nephews after the death of the wife, that the wife cannot testamentarily dispose of the property in favour of any one else and the further interdict in the note that the wife during her life time would not be entitled to mortgage or sell the properties. Thus on reconciling the various clauses in the will and the destination for the properties that the testator had in mind, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the apparent absolute estate in favour of Isher Kaur has to be cut down to a life estate so as to accommodate the estate conferred on the nephews.
  • 21. Thus understood, it has necessarily to be held, as was held by the first appellate court, that Isher Kaur was not competent to gift away the properties in favour of the Gurdwara as she had done. Even if the gift were to be treated as valid, the donee thereunder cannot resist the claim for eviction by the legatees under the will, the nephews of Ralla Singh, on the cessation of the life estate of Isher Kaur. Admittedly, that life estate has ceased and once it is found that the plaintiff has acquired a title to the property as a legatee under the will, he would be entitled for and on behalf of himself and his brother to recover possession of the property from the Gurdwara in view of the death of Isher Kaur.”
  • Note: In Tej Bhan v. Ram Kishan,2024 INSC 945, the Apex Court referred this decision and various other decisions to a ‘larger bench for reconciling the principles laid down in various judgments of this Court and for restating the law on the interplay between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy: A Will is a Legally Recognised Mode of Property Disposition; an Unregistered Will is Valid; Deprivation of Natural Heirs Does Not Amount to Suspicious Circumstance; A Will is not Required to be Proved with Mathematical Accuracy.

Jojy George Koduvath

Key Findings

The following are the key findings of the Supreme Court of India, in Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy (Ujjal Bhuyan, Vijay Bishnoi, JJ.), 21 May 2026 (2026 INSC 521):

  • 1. A Will is a legally acknowledged mode of bequeathing a testator’s property during his lifetime to be acted upon on his/her death. It carries with it an element of sanctity (Quoted: Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan  2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198).
  • 2. Mere deprivation of natural heirs, by itself, may not amount to a suspicious circumstance because the whole idea behind the execution of a Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession (Relied on: Rabindra Nath Mukherjee v. Panchanan Banerjee (1995) 4 SCC 459).  
  • 3. A Will is not required to be proved with mathematical accuracy, but the test of satisfaction of the prudent mind has to be applied (Quoted: Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan  2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198).
  • 4. The Will is Unregistered has no significant bearing on its validity (Relied on: Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Kamta Devi And Others (1953) 1 SCC 295).  
  • 5. Any and every circumstance in the disposition of a Will is not a “suspicious” circumstance. A circumstance would be “suspicious” when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person (Referred: Indu Bala Bose v. Manindra Chandra Bose, (1982) 1 SCC 20).

Further Findings of the Apex Court

  • 1. One who alleges fraud, fabrication, undue influence, etc., has to prove the same.
  • 2. Mutation does not confer title. (Referred: Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137).
  • 3. Mere non-compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC (the points for determination were not fixed by the Appellate Court) may not vitiate the judgment (Relied on: G. Amalorpavam v. R. C. Diocese of Madurai, (2006) 3 SCC 224).
  • 4. An affidavit is not an “evidence” within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and the same can be used as “evidence” only if, for sufficient reasons, the Court passes an order under Order XIX of CPC (Relyed on: Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 465).

Facts in a Nutshell

Sheena Nairi, a Chartered Accountant, executed his last Will bequeathing the plaint schedule properties in favour of his sister. After the death of the testator, upon the application of Nairi’s wife (Nairthy), the Tehsildar effected the mutation. The sister of the testator instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration that the Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule properties under the Will, and an injunction.

The wife and children of the testator filed written statement and contended –

  • that the Will is false and fabricated;
  • that the testator has never executed any such Will;
  • that the signature affixed on the said Will does not belong to him
  • that after the death of the testator, the said Will was created by his brothers, in collusion with each other and
  • that the plaint schedule properties were never in possession of the Plaintiff.

The Trial Court allowed the suit and opened an enquiry under Order XX Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure for mesne profits. The trial court found –

  • The Plaintiff produced PW2, the attesting witnesses to the Will. However, the wife and children of the testator –
    • did not adduce evidence,
    • had not produced any witness,
    • had not appeared for cross-examination, and
    • had not specifically cross- examined the Plaintiff and PW2 to prove the Will as fraudulent.
  • The signature on the POA executed by the testator was accepted by the wife and children of the testator.  Thereby, the trial court concluded that the signatures were made by the same person when that accepted signature was compared with the signatures that appeared on every page of the Will, and it appeared to be the same, observing sufficient coordination in the writing, the placement of dots in the signature and the formation of the underline.

The appeals before the District Court and the High Court were dismissed.

Submissions of the Appellants (Defendants), in the SC

1. The Will produced is not legally acceptable on the following grounds:

  • No explanation for the delay of 7 years in filing suit,
  • No explanation for the delay of 6 years after the mutation and conversion of the land in favour of the Appellants,
  • No explanation for exclusion of wife and children,
  • No explanation for excluding other assets.
  • The plaintiff never objected to the mutation, and no copy of the Will was produced at that time.
  • The witness to the Will did not know the place of death of the executant of the Will or about its contents.

2. The First Appellate Court failed to comply with Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC – for the ‘points for determination’ were not fixed.

Main Submissions the Respondents (Plaintiffs), in the SC

1.  Once specific allegations of forgery or fraud were made in respect of the Will and the Plaintiff had duly proved the execution of the Will, the burden shifted on the Appellants to prove their plea of forgery.

2. The Appellants never asked for sending the Will for examination by a handwriting expert nor chose to examine any expert witness; and, thus, the specific plea of forgery was not even attempted to be proved.

3. Additionally, it is submitted that the testator, in the Will itself, specifically stated that “I am doing no injustice to my wife and children or other relatives… I have given enough and more to my wife and children who are residing at Bombay.”

Analysis of the Apex Court on the Validity and Execution of a Will

Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as under:

  • “Section 68- Proof of Execution of document required by law to be attested— If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence: xxx”

After quoting Section 68, the Apex Court (in Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy) referred the following passage in Meena Pradhan and Others v. Kamla Pradhan  2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198 –

  • “9. A Will is an instrument of testamentary disposition of property. It is a legally acknowledged mode of bequeathing a testator’s property during his lifetime to be acted upon on his/her death and carries with it an element of sanctity. It speaks from the death of the testator. Since the testator/testatrix, at the time of testing the document for its validity, would not be available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be executed, stringent requisites for the proof thereof have been statutorily enjoined to rule out the possibility of any manipulation.”

 With respect to the principles relating to the validity and execution of a Will, Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy noted that the Apex Court, in Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198, relied upon the following authorities:

  • H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma 1958 SCC OnLine SC 31, 
  • Bhagwan Kaur v. Kartar Kaur And Others(1994) 5 SCC 135, 
  • Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam(2003) 2 SCC 91, 
  • Yumnam Ongbi Tampha Ibema Devi v. Yumnam Joykumar Singh (2009) 4 SCC 780, and 
  • Shivakumar And Others v. Sharanabasappa And Others(2021) 11 SCC 277, .

In Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy it is further pointed out – in Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan,  2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198, the Court deduced the following principles from the afore-stated decisions:

  • “10.1. The court has to consider two aspects : firstly, that the will is executed by the testator, and secondly, that it was the last will executed by him;
  • 10.2. It is not required to be proved with mathematical accuracy, but the test of satisfaction of the prudent mind has to be applied.
  • 10.3. A will is required to fulfil all the formalities required under Section 63 of the Succession Act, that is to say:
  • .(a) The testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and the said signature or affixation shall show that it was intended to give effect to the writing as a will;
  • (b) It is mandatory to get it attested by two or more witnesses, though no particular form of attestation is necessary;
  • (c) Each of the attesting witnesses must have seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of such signatures;
  • (d) Each of the attesting witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator, however, the presence of all witnesses at the same time is not required;
  • 10.4. For the purpose of proving the execution of the will, at least one of the attesting witnesses, who is alive, subject to the process of court, and capable of giving evidence, shall be examined;
  • 10.5. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator’s signatures but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator; 10.6. If one attesting witness can prove the execution of the will, the examination of other attesting witnesses can be dispensed with;
  • 10.7. Where one attesting witness examined to prove the will fails to prove its due execution, then the other available attesting witness has to be called to supplement his evidence;
  • 10.8. Whenever there exists any suspicion as to the execution of the will, it is the responsibility of the propounder to remove all legitimate suspicions before it can be accepted as the testator’s last will. In such cases, the initial onus on the propounder becomes heavier. 10.9. The test of judicial conscience has been evolved for dealing with those cases where the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. It requires to consider factors such as awareness of the testator as to the content as well as the consequences, nature and effect of the dispositions in the will; sound, certain and disposing state of mind and memory of the testator at the time of execution; testator executed the will while acting on his own free will;
  • 10.10. One who alleges fraud, fabrication, undue influence et cetera has to prove the same. However, even in the absence of such allegations, if there are circumstances giving rise to doubt, then it becomes the duty of the propounder to dispel such suspicious circumstances by giving a cogent and convincing explanation.
  • 10.11. Suspicious circumstances must be “real, germane and valid” and not merely “the fantasy of the doubting mind [Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa, (2021) 11 SCC 277] ”. Whether a particular feature would qualify as “suspicious” would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Any circumstance raising suspicion legitimate in nature would qualify as a suspicious circumstance, for example, a shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit, etc.”

Findings on the Delay of 7 Years in Producing the Will

The Apex Court pointed out that the Plaintiff had given a representation before the Tehsildar soon after the death of the testator (in 1984) to mutate her name, and the said notice was received by the concerned authorities as evidenced by the postal certificate. Although there was no material which disclosed that the Plaintiff had produced a copy of the Will before the concerned authority, the said notice itself disclosed all relevant facts, including the execution of the Will in favour of the Plaintiff, without any delay.

Findings on Mutation – It Does Not Confer Title

As regards the contention of the Appellants that they had obtained mutation entries in the year 1984, it is held that it is well settled that such mutation entries do not confer title and are effected merely for fiscal purposes, namely, to enable the State to realise tax from the person whose name is recorded in the revenue records. The Court referred the following decision –

  • Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137.

Findings on the Contention – Will is Unregistered

The Apex Court held – this contention of the appellants/defendants has no significant bearing on its validity, as the Apex Court in Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Kamta Devi, (1953) 1 SCC 295, has clearly held as under:

  • “6. …There is nothing in law which requires the registration of a will and wills are in a majority of cases not registered at all. To draw any inference against the genuineness of the will on the ground of its non-registration appears to us to be wholly unwarranted.” 

Scope of ‘Deprivation of Natural Heirs‘ to Vitiate a Will

In this case, the Appellants contended – the Appellants, being the natural heirs of the testator, have been outrightly excluded without any reason, and that such exclusion constitutes a suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the Will is legally untenable. The Apex Court pointed out as under:

  • It is well-established that mere deprivation of natural heirs, by itself, may not amount to a suspicious circumstance because the whole idea behind the execution of a Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession, as categorically held in Rabindra Nath Mukherjee v. Panchanan Banerjee (1995) 4 SCC 459. 
  • However, in the case of Ram Piari v. Bhagwant (1990) 3 SCC 364, it was held that prudence requires reason for denying the benefit of inheritance to natural heirs and an absence of it, though not invalidating the Will in all cases, shrouds the disposition with suspicious as it does not give inking to the mind of the testator to enable the Court to judge that disposition was a voluntary act. 

What are the Suspicious Circumstances that Vitiate a Will

While considering this issue, i.e., what are the suspicious circumstances which may vitiate the disposition of a Will, the Apex Court referred to Indu Bala Bose v. Manindra Chandra Bose, (1982) 1 SCC 20, which pointed out as under:

  • “8. Needless to say, that any and every circumstance is not a “suspicious” circumstance. A circumstance would be “suspicious” when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person.”

Conclusion in Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy – ‘The Will was Duly Executed’

The Apex Court came to the conclusion that ‘the Will was duly executed by the testator voluntarily out of his free will in a sound state of mind and the same stands proved through the testimony of one of the attesting witnesses’.  It held further as under:

  • “It is trite to state that when the validity of a Will is to be determined, the overall terms of a Will, the intention of the testator and the surrounding circumstances have also to be seen. Mere exclusion of the natural heirs from the property of the testator, by itself, cannot be construed as a suspicious circumstance so as to invalidate a Will outrightly. A testator is legally entitled to dispose of his property according to his own wishes, and unless the exclusion is accompanied by suspicious circumstances affecting the genuineness or due execution of a Will, such exclusion alone does not render a Will invalid. Thus, we are of the considered view that the exclusion of the natural heirs cannot be sufficient to vitiate the Will in question, particularly when the Will clearly specifies that the testator has not done any injustice to his wife, children, or other relatives, and that he has given enough to his wife and children who are residing at Bombay.”

Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC should not be Interpreted Technically

 In this case (Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy), the Appellants contended that the First Appellate Court, while deciding the first appeal, had not complied with Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC.

Rule 31 reads as under:

  • “31. Contents, date and signature of judgment– The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state-
  • .(a) the points for determination;
  • (b) the decision thereon;
  • (c) the reasons for the decision; and
  • (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled, and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.”

The Apex Court held that mere non-compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it, and the rule should not be interpreted technically to compromise substantial justice. The Court relied on G. Amalorpavam v. R. C. Diocese of Madurai, (2006) 3 SCC 224, which held as under:

  • “9. The question whether, in a particular case, there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient.
  • Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion, and its findings are supported by reasons, even though the point has not been framed by the appellate court, there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC.”

Evidentiary Value of Affidavits Renders the Will Invalid is Unsustainable.

Finally, the evidentiary value of affidavits of both the attesting witnesses to the Will was considered by the Apex Court. Appellants contended –

  • In the affidavits, both the attesting witnesses to the Will denied that they had signed the same. 

The Apex Court relying on Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 465, it is held as under:

  • “In this regard, this Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra, has categorically held that an affidavit is not an “evidence” that it has been categorically held that an affidavit is not an “evidence” within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the same can be used as “evidence” only if, for sufficient reasons, the Court passes an order under Order XIX of CPC and thus, the filing of an affidavit cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal, on the basis of which it can come to a conclusion as regards a particular fact situation. However, in a case where the deponent is available for cross-examination, and opportunity is given to the other side to cross-examine him, the same can be relied upon. In the present case, it is also important to note that those affidavits were filed even prior to the filing of the written statement, and the same has been rightly dealt by all the Courts, which questioned as to how the witnesses came to know about the enquiry regarding the validity of the Will despite no notice having been issued by the Court calling upon them to submit such affidavits. Thus, in view of the same, the affidavits filed by the attesting witnesses to the Will cannot be relied upon. 

End Notes

Order 20, Rule 12 CPC reads as under:

“12. Decree for possession and mesne profits.

  • .(1) Where a suit is for the recovery of possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits, the Court may pass a decree-
  • .(a) for the possession of the property;
  • (b) for the rents which have accrued on the property during the period prior to the institution of the suit or directing an inquiry as to such rent;
  • (ba) for the mesne profits or directing an inquiry as to mesne profits;
  • (c) directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until-
  • .(i) the delivery of possession to the decree-holder,
  • (ii) the relinquishment of possession by the judgment-debtor with notice to the decree-holder through the Court, or
  • (iii) the expiration of three years from the date of the decree, whichever event first occurs.
  • (2) Where an inquiry is directed under clause (b) or clause (c), a final decree in respect of the rent or mesne profits shall be passed in accordance with the result of such inquiry.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao v. The Government of AP: Title is Not Proved by Revenue Entries; Title Claims are Investigated by Civil Courts, Not by High Courts

The mere acceptance of municipal or agricultural taxes, or the granting of a bank loan based on these records, does not stop the State from challenging the ownership of the land.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

In Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh (Pankaj Mithal, S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ.), 2026 INSC 450, the Supreme Court of India, held to the following effect:

  • The law is well settled that the claim to title is not proved through Revenue entries.
  • In a Writ of Certiorari, the High Court cannot declare the title of the lands.
  • The High Courts (under Article 226 of the Constitution of India) are not the appropriate forum for resolving serious disputes concerning questions of fact and title to property. It is so held in Sohan Lal v. Union of India,   (1957) 1 SCC 439.
  • The title claims to the property are investigated by the civil courts in a regularly constituted suit, rather than the courts exercising the prerogative to issue writs.
  • Unauthorised entries or mutations may befall in the Revenue Records (Pahanies).

Facts of the Case in a Nutshell

  • The Appellants, on 09.11.1990, moved the Joint Collector for the exclusion of Subject Matter from the proposed declaration as Forest Land/Reserve Forest.
  • The Joint Collector, rejected the claim because the Appellants failed to prove the primary document through which title to the property is claimed by them.
  • The learned Single Judge, notwithstanding the above deficiencies in the quality of documentary evidence, expanded the scope of judicial review, and for all purposes declared the claim of the Appellants as maintainable for the title to the Subject Matter.

Findings

The Apex Court held in para 16 and 17 as under:

  • “16.1 Entries in Revenue Records or Jamabandi serve only a “fiscal purpose”.
  • Their primary function is to enable the person whose name is mutated in the records to pay the land revenue in question.
    • Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186; 
    • Jitendra Singh v. State of MP, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802; 
    • Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; 
    • Sawarni v. Inder Kaur, (1996) 6 SCC 223.
  • 16.2 A Revenue Record is not a document of title and does not confer any ownership or title upon the person whose name appears in it.
    • Suraj Bhan. (supra); 
    • Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, (2007) 13 SCC 565; 
    • State of A.P. v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Co., (2013) 9 SCC 319; 
    • Jitendra Singh (supra).
  • Further, mutation does not create or extinguish title and has absolutely no presumptive value regarding title.
    • Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs., (1997) 7 SCC 137; 
    • Sawarni (supra);
    • Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar. (supra)
  • 16.3 The mere acceptance of municipal or agricultural taxes, or the granting of a bank loan based on these records, does not stop the State from challenging the ownership of the land.
    • Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Co. (supra)
  • 16.4 While they do not prove title, Revenue Records can raise a presumption regarding possession.
    • Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar (supra); 
    • Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Co. (supra)
  • Maintenance and custody of Revenue Records is the exclusive domain of the Patwari, and it is not uncommon that Revenue Records are often tinkered with by him to suit the exigencies.
    • Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand, (1993) 4 SCC 349. 
  • 16.5 Stray or solitary entries recorded for a single year do not raise a presumption of rights and cannot be relied upon against a long, consistent course of revenue entries in favour of another party.
    • Bhimeshwara Swami Varu Temple v. Pedapudi Krishna Murthi, (1973) 2 SCC 261;
    • Salem Municipality. (supra)
  • 16.6 The creation of fabricated records in collusion acts as a camouflage to defeat the legal rights of the actual tiller, and the Government is not bound by them.
    • Baleshwar Tewari v. Sheo Jatan Tiwary, (1997) 5 SCC 112 ; 
    • State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram, (1997) 9 SCC 544.
  • “17. For the limited purpose of appreciating the case of Appellants, we notice that the two Revenue Records are (i) Faisal Patti for 1342F, and (ii) Vasool Baqi for 1352F. The Pahanie copy of the village for the Faslis 1346-1356, shown in Column No. 3, records Survey No. 81 of Kalvalanagaram as Jungle. At best, the Pahanies, as is evident to a mere perusal, are unauthorised entries or mutations. The law is well settled that, through Revenue entries, the claim to title is not proved. Further, in a Writ of Certiorari, the learned Single Judge declared the title of the Appellants. On perusal of these documents, and appreciating the intrinsic quality deficiency and the contradictory mutation, it is noted that Subject Matter is recorded as “Jungle” (meaning Forest), and the names of private individuals were recorded in one of the columns. These entries are not supported by a patta or an Order lawfully made, authorising mutation as per the extant procedure.

This Court, in Sohan Lal v. Union of India and another, (1957) 1 SCC 439, noted that proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not the appropriate forum for resolving serious disputes concerning questions of fact and title to property. Investigating these claims is the proper function of a civil court in a regularly constituted suit, rather than of a court exercising the prerogative to issue writs.”

Read also: ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Gratuitous Possession – Owner can Reclaim Even Without Knowledge of the Other

Jojy George Koduvath

Gratuitous Possession – Owner can Reclaim Even Without Knowledge of the Other: In Anima Mallick v. Ajoy Kumar Roy (B.N. Kirpal and S.S.M. Quadri, JJ.), 2000-4 SCC 119, our Apex Court held that where the sister gave possession as gratuitous to her brother, the sister could reclaim such possession even without knowledge of the brother; and that ‘no one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. It is held in this decision as under:

  • “(1) Special leave granted.
  • (2) These proceedings arise from a suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, which was filed by the respondent as per the judgment of the High Court. The respondent in his suit stated that he was using the garage owned by the appellant, his sister. The contention was that he had been dispossessed from the garage by his sister.
  • (3) The trial court ordered possession to be restored but on an application filed under Section 115-A of the Civil Procedure Code, the District Judge allowed the said application filed by the applicant (appellant herein). The order of the trial court was set aside. This order was sought to be challenged by a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the Calcutta High Court and the decision of the trial court had been restored.
  • (4) Without going into the question of law we are of the opinion that under Article 227 the High Court ought not to have exercised its discretion and interfered with the judgment of the District Judge. It is evident that the respondent was using the garage of the appellant on permission having been granted by the sister to the brother. According to the judgment of the High Court the respondent was claiming no legal interest in the said garage as he was not claiming its ownership because he was not claiming to be a tenant or even a licensee. His possession was purely gratuitous, and even if, without the knowledge of the respondent, the appellant has reclaimed the possession, it was not a fit case for the High Court to have interfered under Article 227 of the Constitution.
  • (5) We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the decision of the District Judge.”
  • (Relied on in Maria Margadia Sequeria v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria 2012 (5) SCC 370, Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129; AIR 2020 SC 1496.)

In Maria Margadia Sequeria v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria 2012 (5) SCC 370, it is observed as under:

  • “26. This Court in Anima Mallick v. Ajoy Kumar Roy and Another (2000) 4 SCC 119 held that where the sister gave possession as gratuitous to the brother, this Court restored possession to the sister as it was purely gratuitous basis and the sister could have reclaimed possession even without knowledge of the brother.”

No injunction can be granted against the true owner

It is further pointed out in Maria Margadia Sequeria v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria 2012 (5) SCC 370, as under:

  • “27. According to the appellant, this Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Others (2004) 3 SCC 137 has observed that no injunction can be granted against the true owner, and Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act cannot be invoked to protect the wrongdoer who suppressed the material facts from the Courts.”
  • “96. The respondent’s suit for injunction against the true owner – the appellant was not maintainable, particularly when it was established beyond doubt that the respondent was only a caretaker and he ought to have given possession of the premises to the true owner of the suit property on demand. Admittedly, the respondent does not claim any title over the suit property and he had not filed any proceedings disputing the title of the appellant.”

Read also:

Read Book No. 5
•  Adverse Possession: A Concise Overview
•  What is Adverse Possession in Indian Law?
•   Adverse Possession: Dispossession and Knowledge
•   Adverse Possession: Admission of Title of Other Party
•   Ouster and Dispossession in Adverse Possession
•   Does ‘Abandonment’ a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
   Illegal or Fraudulent Regn. of Deed: No Adverse Possession
•   Does 12 Years’ Unobstructed Possession Precede the Suit?
•   Prescriptive Rights – Is it Inchoate until Upheld by Court
•   Sec. 27, Limitation Act: Right to Declaration and Recovery
•  Declaration & Recovery: Art. 65, not Art. 58 Governs
•  ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
•   Possession: a Substantive Right Protected in Indian Law
•   Recovery Based on Title and on Earlier Possession
•   ‘Possession is Good Against All But the True Owner’
•   Gratuitous Possession – Owner can Reclaim at Any Time
•   When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’
•   Can a Tenant Claim Adverse Possession
•   Adverse Possession Against Government
•   Is Registration of a Deed, Notice to Govt. and Public?
•   Government of Kerala v. Joseph
•   Adverse Possession: UK and US Law and Classic Decisions
•   22nd Law Commission  Report
•  How to Plead Adverse Possession? 

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Suit on Possessory Remedy, Other side Admits Possession; Should the Will be Proved?

Jojy George Koduvath

Suit on Possessory Remedy, Other side Admits Possession; Should the Will be Proved? No. Because proving the Will will be a surplusage.

Read also:

Possession is a Substantive Right: Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law. It is heritable and transferable, as explained in the following decisions –

  • Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165,
  • Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179;
  • Phirayalal Kapur v. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186;
  • Nallammal v. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864). 

Possession Follows Title and Adverse Possession: It is held in MS Jagadambal v. Southern Indian Education Trust, 1988 (Supp) SCC 144, that the possession continues with the title holder unless and until the defendant acquires title by adverse possession (possession follows title). In LN Aswathama v. P Prakash, 2009-13 SCC 229, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “In law, possession follows title. The plaintiffs having established title to the suit property, will be entitled to decree for possession, unless their right to the suit property was extinguished, by reason of defendant being in adverse possession for a period of twelve years prior to the suit.”

Sec. 17 (Admission) and Sec. 58 (Facts admitted need not be proved) are attracted. Division Bench decision in Boomathi v. Murugesan, 2023-2 Mad LJ 684 considered – when a Will is ‘categorically’ and ‘clearly’ admitted by the other side, should it be proved by calling a witness of the Will under Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The Madras High Court came to the conclusion that Section 68 will not be attracted where the Will is “admitted” by the other side.

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Gratuitous Possession – Owner can Reclaim Even Without Knowledge of the Other: In Anima Mallick v. Ajoy Kumar Roy, (2000) 4 SCC 119, our Apex Court held that where the sister gave possession as gratuitous to her brother, the sister could reclaim such possession even without knowledge of the brother; and that ‘no one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. (Relied on in Maria Margadia Sequeria v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria 2012 (5) SCC 370, Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129; AIR 2020 SC 1496.)

Documents required by law to be attested by attesting witnesses.

The following documents are required by law to be attested by attesting witnesses.

  1. Will: Sec. 63 of the Succession Act.
  2. Mortgage deed: Sec. 59 of the T P Act.
  3. Gift deed: Sec. 123 of the T P Act.
  4. Bond: Sec.  2(5) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 mandates examination of one attesting witness at least to prove the aforesaid four documents required by law to be attested. The proviso to Sec. 68 lays down the following: if the aforesaid documents, EXCEPT WILL, are (i) registered in accordance with the provisions of Indian Registration Act, 1908 and (ii) not specifically denied by the person who executed it, execution of those documents need not necessarily be proved by calling ‘an attesting witness’. That is, for the purpose of proving the Will (alone), the examination of ‘an attesting witness’ is necessary. It is difficult to support the logic and grounds for picking out Will (in Sec. 68 Evidence Act), from other (three) documents that are required by law to be attested by attesting witnesses.

But, note – the Will stands picked out (in Sec. 68 Evidence Act) from other (three) documents that are required by law to be attested by attesting witnesses.

Do General Provisions of S. 58 give way to Special Provisions of S. 68

Three views are possible:

  • First: Requirement of calling at lest one witness to prove those documents that requires attestation, in spite of express admission from the opposite party as to the execution of the document in the written statement.
  • Second: If the Will is (even impliedly) admitted, Sec. 68 need not be invoked.
  • Third: If only the Will is expressly or categorically admitted, then only there will be alleviation of burden laid down in Sec. 68.

In the light of the Apex Court decision in Ramesh Verma v. Rajesh Saxena, 2017-1 SCC 257, (that the position – as to proof of documents requires attestation – remains the same even in a case where the opposite party does not specifically deny the execution of the document in the written statement) it appears that the second view stated above (taken in Thayyullathil Kunhikannan v. Thayyullathil Kalliani, AIR 1990 Ker 226) is not sustainable.

But, the proposition of law in the third view above, applied in Boomathi v. Murugesan (supra), and other decisions (that the position – as to proof of documents requires attestation – will be different if the Will is “categorically admitted), sounds good.

Dominant Owner  Cannot Dispute The Title Of The Servient Owner

It is a trite law in ‘Law on Easement’ that the dominant owner cannot dispute the title of the servient owner (Reghuprasad v. M.  Raghunathan, AIR 2020 Ker 16). 

In Omana v. Reji Kurian, AIR 2022 Ker 91, it is held (K. Babu, J.) as under:

  • “19. Yet another aspect that requires consideration is that the pleadings of the defendants in the written statement go in the line, denying the title of the plaintiff over the ‘B’ schedule way. One of the fundamental ingredients in a claim of easement is the admission of the title of the servient owner by the dominant owner. On this ground alone, the claim of the defendants over plaint ‘B’ schedule property by way of easement by prescription must fail.”

Recovery onGENERAL TITLE” and “SUPERIOR TITLE

The legal proposition on “General Title” is seen adhered to in Mt.  Sewti v.Rattan, AIR 1951  HP 54. It is observed as under:

  • “It has therefore been held that where a suit for recovery of possession of property based on a lease fails, a subsequent suit to recover the same property on the strength of general title is not barred by res judicata: Zamorin v. Narayanan, 22 Mad. 323 and Kuttt Ali v. Cindan, 23 Mad. 629.”

The legal proposition on “Superior Title” is seen adhered to in Shankarlal v. Gangabisan, AIR 1972  Bom 326, and it is observed as under:

  • “The plaintiff could have sued upon this document and the claim in that case would have been under the contract. But the plaintiff in the subsequent suit did not sue upon the contract but he sued upon his general title as the owner of the property. He alleged that the defendants were trespassers and that the plaintiff was entitled to get possession and further damages on the basis of his title as stated in the passage we have quoted above. Therefore, the plaintiff was claiming in the second suit on the basis not of a title arising under the contract but dehors the contract. In other words, the plaintiff was seeking to enforce in the subsequent suit his general title as owner and not his title to get back the property under the contract of lease. It is clear therefore that this title was superior to the contract between the parties and it was by virtue of this superior title that the plaintiff claimed in the second suit. The respective causes of action in the earlier suit and in the subsequent suit were therefore entirely distinct and separate.”

Landlord can win the TITLE SUIT if he Proves his GENERAL TITLE

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, the plaintiff-landlord sued defendant for eviction. The Defendant claimed title over the property. It is held–

  • “The landlord in a given case#* although may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the event he proves his GENERAL TITLE, may obtain a decree on the basis thereof.”
    • #*Tenant challenges title of landlord; and no special law (e.g., BRC Act) bars to give such a relief in ‘civil suit’.
  • This decision is referred to in TribhuvanShankar v. Amrutlal (S.B. Sinha and Deepak Misra, JJ.), 2014-2 SCC 788.

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, the question was formulated by the Court as under:

  • “Whether a Civil Court can pass a decree on the ground that the defendant is a trespasser in a simple suit for eviction is the question involved in this appeal.”

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Dharmendra Kalra v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia: Striking off defence under Order XV Rule 5 CPC (U.P. Amendment): Consequence is Drastic; Mere Denial of the Landlord–Tenant Relationship Not Absolve Tenant from the Statutory Obligation to Deposit Rent

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Order XV Rule 5 CPC (U.P. Amendment)

The Rule 5 (U.P. Amendment) reads as under:

5. Striking off defence on failure to deposit admitted rent, etc.

  • .(1) The defendant shall:
  • .(a) At or before the first hearing, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due, together with interest at 9% per annum; and
  • (b) Throughout the continuation of the suit, regularly deposit the monthly amount due within the prescribed time.
  • If the defendant fails to make such deposit, the Court may, subject to sub-rule (2), strike off his defence.
  • (2) Before striking off the defence, the Court may consider any representation made by the defendant showing sufficient cause for the default.

Order XV Rule 5 (U.P. Amendment) Anabysed

Order XV Rule 5 (U.P. Amendment) applies in a suit for:

  • .1. Eviction of lessee and
  • 2. Recovery of rent.

Dharmendra Kalra v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia

Supreme Court of India in Dharmendra Kalra v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia, Prasanna B Varale, Aravind Kumar, JJ., 2026 INSC 492, while considering Order XV Rule 5 CPC (U.P. Amendment), held to the following effect:

Under Order XV Rule 5 CPC (U.P. Amendment), if any default in payment of rent, the trial court can determine, at the ‘first date of hearing’ of the suit –

  • 1. whether the default is wilful or bonafide
  • 2. whether there has been due compliance or substantial compliance with the requirements of Order XV Rule 5 CPC;

The Court further pointed out – (i) Striking off is not entirely automatic; the tenant may explain the default and seek the Court’s indulgence. (ii) If such an order is passed, there should be a reasoned order, after affording adequate opportunity to both parties.

Earlier Decisions Referred by the Apex Court

1. Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal, (1981) 3 SCC 486 where in it is observed:

  • 6. It seems to us on a comprehensive understanding of Rule 5 of Order 15 that the true construction of the Rule should be thus. Sub-rule (1) obliges the defendant to deposit, at or before the first hearing of the suit, the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and further, whether or not he admits any amount to be due, to deposit regularly throughout the continuation of the suit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual. In the event of any default in making any deposit, “the court may subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence”. We shall presently come to what this means. Sub-rule (2) obliges the court, before making an order for striking off the defence to consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf. In other words, the defendant has been vested with a statutory right to make a representation to the court against his defence being struck off. If a representation is made the court must consider it on its merits, and then decide whether the defence should or should not be struck off. This is a right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of the default alleged or if the default has occurred there is good reason for it. Now, it is not impossible that the record may contain such material already. In that event, can it be said that sub-rule (1) obliges the court to strike off the defence? We must remember that an order under sub-rule (1) striking off the defence is in the nature of a penalty. A serious responsibility rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. It will always be a matter for the judgment of the court to decide whether on the material before it, notwithstanding the absence of a representation under sub-rule (2), the defence should or should not be struck off. The word “may” in sub-rule (1) merely vested power in the court to strike off the defence. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default. To that extent, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court in Puran Chand [ Civil Revision No. 356 of 1978, decided on October 30, 1980] . We are of opinion that the High Court has placed an unduly narrow construction on the provisions of clause (1) of Rule 5 of Order 15.

2.  Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash (1980) 3 SCC 610, wherein it is held:

  • “2. Rent Control laws are basically designed to protect tenants because scarcity of accommodation is a nightmare for those who own none and, if evicted, will be helpless. Even so, the legislature has provided some grounds for eviction, and the Delhi law contains an extreme provision for striking out altogether the defence of the tenant which means that even if he has excellent pleas to negative the landlords’s claim the court will not hear him. Obviously, this is a harsh extreme and having regard to the benign scheme of the legislation this drastic power is meant for use in grossly recalcitrant situations where a tenant is guilty of disregard in paying rent. That is why a discretion is vested, not a mandate imposed. Section 15(7) reads thus:
  • “If a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required by this section, the Controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the application.”
  • 3. We must adopt a socially informed perspective while construing the provisions and then it will be plain that the Controller is armed with a facultative power. He may, or may not strike out the tenant’s defence. A judicial discretion has built-in-self-restraint, has the scheme of the statute in mind, cannot ignore the conspectus of circumstances which are present in the case and has the brooding thought playing on the power that, in a court, striking out a party’s defence is an exceptional step, not a routine visitation of a punitive extreme following upon a mere failure to pay rent. First of all, there must be a failure to pay rent which, in the context, indicates wilful failure, deliberate default or volitional non-performance. Secondly, the section provides no automatic weapon but prescribes a wise discretion, inscribes no mechanical consequence but invests a power to overcome intransigence. Thus, if a tenant fails or refuses to pay or deposit rent and the court discerns a mood of defiance or gross neglect, the tenant may forfeit his right to be heard in defence. The last resort cannot be converted into the first resort; a punitive direction of court cannot be used as a booby trap to get the tenant out. Once this teleological interpretation dawns, the mist of misconception about matter-of-course invocation of the power to strike out will vanish. Farewell to the realities of a given case is playing truant with the duty underlying the power.” (emphasis supplied)

3. Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor, (1993) 4 SCC 406, wherein it is observed:

  • “12. A few provisions of the said Act and of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, need to be examined. Section 38 of the said Act states that the provisions thereof would have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Code. Order V, Rule 1 of the Code states that when a suit has been duly instituted summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim on a day to be therein specified, provided that no summons need be issued when the defendant has appeared at the presentation of the plaint and admitted the plaintiff’s claim. Where the summons is issued the court may direct the defendant to file a written statement on the date of his appearance and cause an entry to that effect to be made in the summons. Order V, Rule 5 provides that in every suit heard by a Court of Small Causes (which the trial court was) the summons shall be for the final disposal of the suit. Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code uses the expression first hearing and it says that the defendant shall on or before the first hearing or within such time as the court may permit present a written statement of his defence. The court is called upon to frame issues under the provisions of Order XIV, Rule 3 on the basis of the pleadings and documents of either party to the suit.
  • 13. The date of first hearing of a suit under the Code is ordinarily understood to be the date on which the court proposes to apply its mind to the contentions in the pleadings of the parties to the suit and in the documents filed by them for the purpose of framing the issues to be decided in the suit. Does the definition of the expression “first hearing” for the purposes of Section 20(4) mean something different? The step or proceeding mentioned in the summons referred to in the definition should, we think, be construed to be a step or proceeding to be taken by the court for it is, after all, a “hearing” that is the subject-matter of the definition, unless there be something compelling in the said Act to indicate otherwise; and we do not find in the said Act any such compelling provision.
  • Further, it is not possible to construe the expression “first date for any step or proceeding” to mean the step of filing the written statement, though the date for that purpose may be mentioned in the summons, for the reason that, as set out earlier, it is permissible under the Code for the defendant to file a written statement even thereafter but prior to the first hearing when the court takes up the case, since there is nothing in the said Act which conflicts with the provisions of the Code in this behalf. We are of the view, therefore, that the date of first hearing as defined in the said Act is the date on which the court proposes to apply its mind to determine the points in controversy between the parties to the suit and to frame issues, if necessary.

4.  Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India4 4 (2005) 6 SCC 344, wherein it is held:

  • 20. The use of the word “shall” in Order 8 Rule 1 by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. We have to ascertain the object which is required to be served by this provision and its design and context in which it is enacted. The use of the word “shall” is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice.