Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?

Jojy George Koduvath.

Abstract: Why ‘Particulars’ are Insisted in Pleadings

  • 1. To give Notice to the other side.  
  • 2. To narrow down the controversy.
  • 3. To give definiteness to the stance of parties in court.
  • 4. Pleadings must be pregnant enough to produce an issue.
  • 5. It is Court that draws inference as to ‘abstract’ propositions.
  • 6. Pleadings constitute the skeleton that give shape to the case.

Introduction

Order VI, rule 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 lay down the basics of pleading. They read as under:

  • Rule 1: Pleading: “Pleading” shall mean plaint or written statement.
  • Rule 2: Pleading to state material facts and not evidence:
  • (1) Every pleading shall contain, and contain only a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.
  • (2) Every pleading shall, when necessary, be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively, each allegation being, so far as is convenient, contained in a separate paragraph.
  • (3) Dates, sums and numbers shall be expressed in a pleading in figures as well as in words.

Order 6 rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code stipulates guidelines for precise pleadings. Order 6 Rule 4 CPC reads as under:

  • “Rule 4. Particulars to be given where necessary: In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.”

Order VIII Rule 3, 4 and 5 CPC reads as under:

  • Rule 3: Denial to be specific: It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages.
  • Rule 4: Evasive denial: Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. Thus, if it is alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received. And if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances.
  • Rule 5: Specific denial: (1) Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability :
  • Provided that the Court may in it discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.
  • (2) Where the defendant has not filed a pleading, it shall be lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint, except as against a person under a disability, but the Court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved.
  • (3) In exercising its discretion under the proviso to sub-rule (1) or under sub-rule (2), the Court shall have due regard to the fact whether the defendant could have, or has, engaged a pleader.
  • (4) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under this rule, a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with such judgment and such decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.

Concise Statement of Material Facts – Explained

Order VI rule 2 reads as under:

  • “2: Pleading to state material facts and not evidence:
  • (1) Every pleading shall contain, and contain only a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.”

AS Anand, J. in Mohd.  Sadiq v. Rafiq Hussain Khan, 1978 JKLR 580, explained what is concise statement of material facts, as under:

  • “Assuming, that the petitioner could not give all the necessary details, as noticed earlier, nothing could have stopped him from giving at least the total number of votes which were either illegally accepted or illegally rejected or from stating as to why he considered the rejection or acceptance of any particular ballot paper to be illegal. In the absence of such particulars, in the petition, the allegations made in the petition are general and vague. Merely stating “a number of void votes” were counted in favour of the returned candidate or that “a number of valid votes” polled for the petitioner were illegally rejected, does not satisfy the requirements of given a concise statement of material facts in the petition and no order of recount can be made on the basis of such vague pleas.”

Under Order 6 rule 4, CPC, vague or general allegations are insufficient in pleading with respect to the matters laid down in this rule(f.n. 1) and it requires ‘full‘ particulars of such matters in pleadings(f.n. 2).

Plaintiff must plead the correct property number, extent and also boundaries

In Naganna  v. Siddaramegowda (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 369, dt. 19.3.2025), it is held as under:

  • “One who comes before the court with a declaration that, he is the absolute owner of the schedule property, he must plead the correct property number, extent and also boundaries before the court with cogent and acceptable evidence. On critical assessment of the material placed on record, the Trial Court arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their ownership over the scheduled property by adducing acceptable oral and documentary evidence.”

Why ‘Particulars’ insisted in Pleadings

A pleadings shall contain only material facts; not law. For that, material ‘Particulars’ insisted. They are –

  • 1. To narrow down the controversy to precise issues:
    • Trojan & Co. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar : AIR 1953 SC 235; 
    • Ladli Prashad Jaiswal v. Karnal Distillery, Co., AIR 1963 SC 1279;
    • Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh ; Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal : AIR 2002 SC 665;
    • Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector: AIR 2005 SC 3165;
    • State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. : (2010) 4 SCC 518.
    • Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C.P.Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127;
    •  K. Anil Kumar v. Ajith, ILR 2012-4 Ker 632: 2012-4 KLT 545.
  • 2. Notice to other side and ‘protect the party charged with improper conduct from being taken by surprise’:
    • Ladli Prashad Jaiswal. v. Karnal Distillery, Co., AIR 1963 SC 1279;
    • Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242.  
    • Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad, AIR 2018 SC 3152; 2018-7 SCC 646.
  • 3. Definiteness to the stance in court. Strictness in pleading ‘material facts’ is adopted in the procedural law also with a view to prevent a party from taking a changed position (from what he had taken at the time of making the pleading) to suit the situation that may be emerged subsequently, and thereby prejudice the other party. And to prevent cases being expanded or grounds being shifted during trial.
    • Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal: AIR 2009 SC 1103.
  • 4. It is court that draws inference as to ‘abstract’ propositions. Plaint should contain plain facts; not law. Presentation of pleadings in mere ‘abstract’ propositions (like: injury, damages, illegality, trust, bias) is improper. Law requires pleading of “material facts” (rule 2 of Order VI) and “particulars” (rule 4 of Order VI). Facts that lead to such inferences must be pleaded in clear terms; and it is for the court to draw a reasonable inference as to such ‘abstract’ propositions or inferences from the facts pleaded and established.
  • Pleadings as to mere ‘mala fides‘, without details, it is held in Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha, 2011-5 SCC 142, as under:
  • “36. In M. Sankaranarayanan, IAS v. State of Karnataka & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 763, this Court observed that the Court may –
    • “draw a reasonable inference of mala fide from the facts pleaded and established. But such inference must be based on factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of insinuation, surmise or conjecture.”
  • 37. There has to be a very strong and convincing evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides specifically alleged in the petition, as the same cannot merely be presumed. The presumption is in favour of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material. (Vide: M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 65; Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 294; and Samant & Anr. v. Bombay Stock Exchange & Ors., (2001) 5 SCC 323).”
  • Pleadings as to mere ‘consent‘ of a candidate with respect to a corrupt practice, without details –
    • Balan v. Manoharan Master, 1988 (1) KLT 717.
  • 5. Pleadings must be pregnant enough to produce an issue on fact or law, and conduct an investigation (if opposite side varies), inasmuch as a bald and general allegation cannot be sufficient to lead to an issue–
    • K.S. Mariyappa v. K.R. Siddalinga Setty, AIR 1989 Kar 425).
    • General allegations insufficient to take notice by the court, however strong the allegation is- AIR 1977 SC 615.
  • 6. Pleadings are meant to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between the parties
    • Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad, AIR 2018 SC 3152; 2018-7 SCC 646.
  • 7. Pleadings constitute the skeleton that give shape to the case. For every motion, including drawing adverse inference for non-production of a document, lack of bonafides etc., the court has to apprise the pleadings–
    • Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148).
  • 8. No Relief Can Be Granted On A Case Not Founded In The Pleadings. It is the well-entrenched principle of law that no relief can be granted on a case not founded in the pleadings
    • National Textile Corporation Limited v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad, (2011) 12 SCC 695;
    • Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar v. Union of India, September 24, 2025 (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1145)

If no specific pleadings, no evidence can be looked into

In the absence of specific pleadings, no evidence can be looked into in relation thereto.

  • Duggi Veera Venkata Gopala Satyanarayana Vs. Sakala Veera Raghavaiah (1987) 1 SCC 254;
  • Sri Venkataramana Devaru Vs. State of Mysore & Ors. AIR 1958 SC 255;
  • Bhagwati Prasad Vs. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735
  • Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat Vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe (1995) 5 SCC 347;
  • Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) By LRs v/s. Bishim Narain Inter College & Ors : (1987) 2 SCC 555.
  • Abubakar Abdul Inamdar Vs. Harun Abdul Inamdar AIR 1996 SC 112,
  • Gulabrao Balawantrao Shinde Vs. Chhabubai Balawantrao (2003) 1 SCC 212
  • Bondar Singh Vs. Nihal Singh (2003) 4 SCC 161
  • M Chandra Vs. M Thangamuthu, AIR 2011 SC 146. 

Plea ‘Arising out of what is alleged‘ or ‘otherwise Apparent’ Sufficient

In Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, (1977) 1 SCC 511, it is observed as under:

  • “25…If the plea or ground of defence ‘raises issues of fact not arising out of the plaint’, such plea or ground is likely to take the plaintiff by surprise, and is therefore required to be pleaded. If the plea or ground of defence raises an issue arising out of what is alleged or admitted in the plaint, or is otherwise apparent from the plaint, itself, no question of prejudice or surprise to the plaintiff arises. Nothing in the rule compels the defendant to plead such a ground, not debars him from setting it up at a later stage of the case, particularly when it does not depend on evidence but raises a pure question of law turning on a construction of the plaint.” (Quoted in: Mohammed Abdul Wahid v. Nilofer, 2024-2 SCC 144)

Evidence beyond pleadings

Following are the accepted propositions of law.

  • Proof in variance of pleadings cannot be accepted.
  • Statement of witness beyond pleadings will not be read in evidence.
  • Reference to pleadings first and then to evidence is the rule. (Sujan Singh v. Lalsahab, TK Thommen, J., 1993 JLJ 552)
  • Decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings (Trojan and Co. , AIR 1953 SC 235).
  • On the failure of a party to prove his case, the Court cannot make out a new case for him. Sheodhari Rai (AIR 1954 SC 758).
  • Endorsement of the Sub -Registrar on the sale deed that the vendor has admitted receipt of consideration ‘loses sanctity’ if the vendor has not denied that he made that statement to the Sub-Registrar and his case is that the arrangement was to pay within a stipulated period and if there was default the vendee would execute a sale-deed in vendor’s favour. (Sujan Singh v. Lalsahab, TK Thommen, J., 1993 JLJ 552)

No New Case At The Appellate Stage

In Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar v. Union of India, September 24, 2025 (SC – Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1145), it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “This Court cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage at the behest of either party and is strictly confined to adjudicate the issues arising from the suit as framed by the pleadings of the parties.
  • 19. This rule has been consistently affirmed across time and is rooted in the very purpose of pleadings-namely, to define the scope of the dispute and enable the court to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Pleadings, together with the issues framed thereon, serve to crystallise the points of conflict, ensure that each side is apprised of the case it has to meet, and afford both parties a fair opportunity to lead evidence and advance submissions (Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. CP Joshi, (2011) 11 SCC 786; Trojan and Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235.)”

Not necessary to Plead ‘Specific Words‘ or Expressions in the Statute

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242, 1987- 2 SCC 555, our Apex Court has held that when necessary pleadings were taken, though not in specific words, and parties were aware about the point in dispute and the parties had also led the evidence, merely because the, plea of irrevocability was not taken in so many words, it is not sufficient to reject the case of licensee. The Supreme Court held as follows :

  • “It in well settled that the pleadings need not reproduce the exact words or expressions as contained in the statute, nor the question of law is required to be pleaded. The substance of the respondent’s pleadings clearly informed that their case was that they had made constructions on the land acting upon the licence which substantially met the requirement of law.” (Quoted in: Paryag Mahto v. Ram Janam Mahto, 1991 BBCJ 118 (Pat)

In Nawal Kishore Vr. Kauleshwari Devi, 1986 PLJR. 431, referring Nandlal Sah v. Pawan Devi (1979 BBCJ 599), Ouseph Verghese v. Joseph Aleya (1969) 2 SCC 539) and Preme Raj v. The DLF Housing and Construction Pvt. Ltd. (AIR. 1968 SC 1355) it was held as under :

  • “The ratio of the decision relied upon by both the parties, to my mind, is that there ought to be an averment of the plaintiff’s willingness and readiness to perform his part of the contract. This may not be in the exact words used by the Legislature. The substance of it, however must be there as required under section 16 of the Specific Relief Act. The surrounding circumstances most also indicate that the readiness and willingness continued from the date of the contract till the hearing of the suit. It is true that the plaint cannot be construed in the pedantic manner to non suit the plaintiff.” (Quoted in: Paryag Mahto v. Ram Janam Mahto, 1991 BBCJ 118 (Pat)

Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J. observed in Sambhav Kapur v.British Indo German Industrial Organics Private Ltd. , 2017-236 DLT 123; 2017-69 PTC 617; 2017-4 RAJ 99, as under:

Pleading to contain “only” a statement in a concise form

  • “7. Burdening the plaint with passages of judgments and citing the said judgments is contrary to the tenet of pleadings and Orders VI and VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) which requires a pleading to contain “only” a statement in a concise form of material facts on which the party relies for his claim or defence laying down negatively that it shall not contain evidence or law. It was also so held in
  • The Mah. State Ele. Board vs. Madhusudan Dass, AIR 1966 Bom 160 (DB),
  • Guruswami Achari vs. Vengiduswami Achari, AIR 1963 Mad 71,
  • Lakshmi Narain vs. Union of India, AIR 1962 Pat. 64 (DB) and
  • Sampuran Singh vs. Aryan Singh, AIR 1961 P&H 414 (DB).”

Pleadings need not reproduce exact words in the statute

  • “Supreme Court also, in Ram Sarup Gupta vs. Bishun Narain Inter College, (1987) 2 SCC 555 held
    • “it is well settled that the pleadings need not reproduce the exact words or expressions as contained in the statute, nor the question of law is required to be pleaded.”
  • The Division Bench of this Court also in Abhay Sapru vs. Chitralekha Bukshi, 2008 (106) DRJ 589 held that though “pleadings must contain only the material facts and not the law, yet copious reference to the law has been made.” Such burdening of the plaint with what is not required to be contained therein has a cascading effect, with the defendant replying thereto, the plaintiff filing replication thereto, issue, though not really required to be framed being framed thereon and often, evidence also being led thereon and is one of the causes of delay in disposal of suits.”

Courts to strike out pleadings under Order 6 Rule 16

  • “Rule 16 Order 6 empowers the Courts to strike out pleadings which are unnecessary or vexatious or which may delay trial. Though power thereunder is found to have been used often in the past, with pleadings not conforming to the requirement of law being labelled as mofussil pleadings and being blamed on weakness, in language and law, of pleaders in mofussil courts but owing to docket explosion is now exercised rarely.”

A time has come for maintaining the discipline of legal proceedings

  • “The Division Bench of this Court in Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. vs. Natco Pharma Ltd. (2014) 210 DLT 591 also lamented on the malady afflicting courts in cities including on the original side of the High Court. However refrain of the courts in exercising powers to strike off such pleadings is resulting in the principles of drafting of pleadings being thrown to the wind and passages of judgments being quoted in the plaint. A time has perhaps come for the Courts, which are responsible for maintaining the discipline of the legal proceedings before them, to refuse to entertain such pleadings to send a message to the pleaders. The plaint, being not in accordance with law and as provided in CPC, is liable to be rejected on this ground alone.”

No party should be Permitted to Travel Beyond its Pleading

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242, it was held as under:

  • “6………It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet…. In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question.”
  • Also See: Syyad Mohammad versus Fateh Bahadur, (1894-95) 22 IA 4 PC; Sidiq Lal Shah v. Saran, 2003(8)SCC 740.

In J.K. Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Kanpur v. The Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union, Kanpur : AIR 1956 SC 231, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “It is not open to the Tribunals to fly off at a tangent and, disregarding the pleadings, to reach any conclusions that they think are just and proper.”

Pleadings should be Precise in Easement: Why?

Kerala High Court, in Ibrahimkutty Koyakutty v. Abdul Rahumankunju Ibrahimkutty, AIR1993 Ker 91, 1992 (1) Ker LT 775, (1993) ILR(Ker) 1 KER 331 (K.S. Paripoornan, J.), it is held as under:

  • “Since the right of easement is a precarious and special right claimed over the land of another, it is highly essential that the pleadings should be precise.”

The court quoted Gale on Easements (15th Edn.) (Pages 415) which reads as under:

  • “Under the present system of pleading, it is conceived that, whether the section be brought against the servient owner or a stranger, a party cannot safely allege his right to an easement generally, but should state specifically the manner in which he claims title to the easement, whether by grant (actual or lost), prescription at common law, or under the Prescription Act, and in many cases it is advisable to plead, alternatively, a title by all three methods.”

It was also pointed out that in Surendrasingh v. Phirosahah, AIR 1953 Nagpur 205, a Division Bench of their Lordships Sinha C.J. and Hidayatullah, J. stated, at page 206 (para 9), that the pleadings in a case dealing with easement have to be very precise. Their Lordships quoted the following passage from Peacock – “Law Relating to Easements in British India” Third Edn., at page 608:

  • “As an easement is not one of the ordinary rights of ownership, it is necessary that either Party claiming or relying on an easement should plead the nature of his title thereto so as clearly to show the origin of the right, whether it arises by statutory prescription, or express or implied grant, or the old common law method of a lost grant“.

Mulla – Code of Civil Procedure (14th Edn.) Volume II, at page 986, states the law thus :

  • “Easement — A party claiming or relying on an easement should plead the nature of the title thereto, so as to clearly show the origin of the right, whether it arises by statutory prescription or express or implied grant, or the old common law method of a lost grant.”

Finally K.S. Paripoornan, J. remanded the case holding as under:

  • “Though it is belated, I do not think that the plaintiffs should be put out of court due to a technical error or mistake that has crept in the proceedings. If the plaint is amended, the appellants/defendants should be given an opportunity to file additional written statements.”

Sec. 60 (b) Easement Act: Specific Contention Needed

Pleading and evidence are insisted in cases which claimed ‘irrevocable licence’ under Sec. 60 (b) Easement Act. See:

  • R. Mohan v. Sarat Chandran Nair, 2016-4 KHC 318; 2016-4 KLT 15.
  • Ramesh Raghunath v. Pandurangrao Ambadasrao Ratnalikar, 2006-4 BomCR 910 (Plea and evidence necessary, though right not claimed in “specific words”)
  • Zila Panchayat Etah v. Om Prakash Shah, 01 Sep 2017 2017 0 Supreme(SC) 1418

In Zila Panchayat Etah v. Om Prakash Shah, 01 Sep 2017; 2017 0 Supreme(SC) 1418, it is held as under:

  • “13. Thus, in our view, even as per the pleadings of the plaintiff, the suit could not have been decreed. Apart from that, we find that the findings recorded by the trial court as to the ownership of plaintiffs are wholly perverse and impermissible. The documentary evidence could not have been discarded in the method and manner in which it has been done. There was absolutely nothing to rebut the Nazul Khasra or the records maintained by the municipality and Zila Parishad. The appellant had pleaded Survey numbers in its written statement very clearly and had adduced evidence in this regard. There was absolutely nothing to discard the documentary evidence adduced by the appellant and rely upon oral ipse dixit evidence of the plaintiff-respondent. There is statutory presumption of correctness of revenue entries which has not been rebutted in the instant case. The plaintiff-respondent was claiming his ownership on the property in question, but no documentary evidence had been adduced on his behalf indicating that they were the owners of the property in question. Absence of entry in relevant documents of ownership also negates case of plaintiffs. Thus the property in question was clearly under the ownership of the Government. Even assuming that it belonged to the ancestors of the plaintiff, once the land had been given to run a school, which had been constructed on the land by District Board, obviously licence could not have been revoked. It was admitted by the plaintiff, Om Prakash Shah, that the property in question is plot No.212. The record indicates that it is owned by respondent-plaintiff.
  • 14. Thus we find no legal basis to sustain the judgment and decree passed by the courts below, the same are wholly unsustainable. An attempt has been made by the plaintiff to illegally usurp the valuable property of the school. Suits were frivolously filed without any right, title or interest.”

In Shankar v. Gangabai, AIR 1976 SC 2506, the Supreme Court observed as under:

  • “Paced with this difficulty, learned counsel for the appellant was driven to raise points on which there is no pleading, no issue and naturally no satisfactory evidence. The first of such contentions raised by Mr. Bal is that the appellant must be deemed to be a licensee of the respondent and since he has executed work of a permanent character on the land involving heavy expenses, the licence would be irrevocable under S.60 (b) of the Easements Act, 1882 only one more thing need be stated: even assuming that the appellant has executed work of a permanent character on the land it cannot be said that he has done so acting upon the licence“, as required by S.60 (b) of the Basements Act. If be really improved the land by executing a work of a permanent character, be did so in the belief that being a tenant he will become a statutory purchaser of the land, or that the oral agreement of sale will one fine day be implemented The execution of work would therefore be in his capacity as a tenant or a prospective purchaser and not in his capacity as a licensee”. (Quoted in: Kesavan Nair Vs Narayanan Nair, 27 Oct 1988 1988 2 KLT 1006)

In R. Mohan v. Sarat Chandran Nair, 2016-4 KHC 318; 2016-4 KLT 15, it is held as under:

  •  “It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the engineering workshop is conducted in a makeshift shed. I have carefully gone through the averments in Ext.B2. It does not spell out any authorisation to the respondent to make a permanent structure. In the absence of such a stipulation in Ext.B2 and in the absence of evidence before the courts below that he had incurred expenses for construction of a shed for running a workshop, the courts below are not justified in holding that the respondent is entitled to get the benefit of Section 60(b) of the Act. Therefore, the contention of appellant that the lower courts erred is sustainable. Hence the substantial question of law is to be answered in favour of the appellant.”

In Gujarat Ginningand Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Ahmedabad v. Moti Lal Hirabhai Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Ahmedabad, AIR 1936 PC 77,  protection of S. 60(b) of the Act was invoked by a party who had made constructions on his own land and not on the land of the licenser and in that factual backdrop the Privy Council held that the expression “acting upon the license” must mean “acting upon a right granted to do upon the land of the grantor something which would be unlawful in the absence of such right.” A man does not “acting upon a license” execute works and incur expense upon his own property as that he can do without any ones license. (Referred to in: Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987  SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555)

Issues, and not Pleadings as such, guide in adducing evidence

The court decides the matters on the issues framed. Sitaram v. Radhabai, AIR 1968 SC 534,  Gappu Lal v. Thakur Sripada, (1969)1 SCC 92 , Vishwanath Agarwal v. Sibitribera, 2009(15) SCC 593.

The object of framing of issues is to ascertain the points in dispute and pinpoint the matters for determination by the court. It is also not to surprise the parties at the trial. It is the issues, and not pleadings as such, guide in adducing evidence by the parties.

No Adjudication, If No Issue

In Kalyan Singh Chouhan v.  CP  Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127, the Apex Court held that no courts decide a suit on a matter/point on which no issue has been framed. It is to ascertain/shorten the area of dispute and pinpoint the points required to be determined by the court, so that no party at the trial is taken by surprise. The court referred following decisions:

  • Sayad Muhammad. v. Fatteh Muhammad20 (1894-95) 22 Ind. App. 4 (PC)
  • Raja Bommadevara Venkata v. Raja Bommadevara Bhashya, (1902) 29 Ind. App. 76 (PC);
  • Siddik Mohd. Shah v. Saran, AIR 1930 PC 57;
  • Sita Ram v. Radha Bai, AIR 1968 SC 535;
  • Gappulal v. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji, AIR 1969 SC 1291; and
  • Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693.

With reference to the following decisions, in Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. CP Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127,   it was also pointed out that there may be exceptional cases wherein the parties proceeded to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the evidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation thereof by the other side; and in such an eventuality, it would not be permissible for a party to submit that the proceedings stood vitiated. The decisions were the following:

  • Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593;
  • Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, AIR 1963 SC 884;
  • Kunju Kesavan v. M.M. Philip, AIR 1964 SC 164;
  •  Kali Prasad Agarwalla v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1530;
  • Sayed Akhtar v. Abdul Ahad, (2003) (7) SCC 52; and
  • Bhuwan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co., AIR 2009 SC 2177.

“All other cases in which particulars may be necessary“

Order 6 rule 4 of the CPC enumerates the following:

  • misrepresentation,
  • fraud,
  • breach of trust,
  • willful default,
  • undue influence and
  • “all other cases in which particulars may be necessary”.

Following are the matters that commonly come for consideration of court under the head, “other cases in which particulars may be necessary”:

  • Injury,
  • Damages,
  • Illegality,
  • Collusion,
  • Victimisation,
  • Mala-fides,
  • Bias,
  • Unconstitutionality,
  • trust,
  • consent,
  • Irregularity.

In short, in pleadings, wherever it is required to make clear ‘abstract’ propositions, it must have been done; otherwise it will be termed ‘vague pleading’.

Illegality

While dealing with a matter pertaining to recount of votes, referring Apex Court decisions(f.n.3), it was held in Indira Devi v. State of Bihar, 2019-1 Pat LJR 670, that the vague pleadings that illegality was committed while counting the ballot papers and that there were improper acceptance of invalid votes and improper rejection of valid votes, were not sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.

Kerala High Court, in St.  Marys Orthodox Church v. Thankamani Rajan, 2016-1 Ker LT(SN) 38, while considering the issue as to grant the licence/permission to construct a cemetery it was observed, referring various Supreme court decisions(f.n.4), as under:

  • “36. Therefore, while challenging the decision making process of a public authority, as in the instant case, as to its legality, propriety or reasonableness, it is not sufficient that the averments should be in generalised terms as if the entire decision making process is vitiated by illegality or impropriety, etc. or that none of the legal formalities or official formalities has been complied with by the decision maker, etc. But the factual foundation for such challenge should be cogently and precisely pleaded in the plaint so as to disclose a specific and concrete case as to how the decision has been vitiated by any illegality or impropriety or unreasonableness, etc. Mere pleading in generalised terms that none of the legal procedural formalities have been complied with or that the provisions of statutory formalities have been blatantly violated, etc. will not do and that the pleadings should be precise and cogent as stated above. The essence of fair play in a civil trial demands this aspect. It is only then that the opposite side can be called upon to prepare the defence properly so that they can have reasonable opportunity to frame a defence and plead the averments in their written statement of objections to the plaint accordingly in such civil proceedings. So also, the defendants could then get a reasonable opportunity to know as to the type of evidence that they are called upon to let in, in order to meet the specific allegations and averment in the plaint. In the instant case, there are no specific and concrete pleadings in the plaint that the Municipality has not referred the matter to the District Collector for his approval before the Municipality had taken the impugned decision. So also, there is no pleading or averment in the plaint, in precise and concrete terms, as to the D.M.O. had not conducted any inspection or committed any procedural lapses before making the recommendation to the Municipality. Therefore, it is totally impermissible in law for the plaintiffs to let in any evidence on that aspect of the matter. Even if any evidence has been let in on those aspects of the matter, it is the duty of the court not to take into consideration any such evidence in view of the conclusive legal position settled as stated above. Therefore, on this ground alone, the trial court and the lower appellate court have committed a grave error in holding that the official defendants (statutory authorities concerned) have violated the statutory provisions and that they have not complied with the legal formalities, etc. on the basis of the evidence so let in the instant trial. Therefore, the said finding of both the courts below is tainted by grave error and illegality and is liable to be reversed by this Court.”

Coercion

When collusion is taken as a ground in a case, full particulars thereof are to be pleaded. In Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya v. Rajkishore Tripathi, AIR 1977 SC 615, invoking Order VI, Rule 4, CPC and referring Bishundeo v. Seogeni Rai, AIR 1951 SC 280, it was held as under:

  • “General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any court ought to take notice, however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion.”

Fraud and Collusion

While considering Order VI Rule 4 of CPC in K.S. Mariyappa v. K.R. Siddalinga Setty, AIR 1989 Kar 425, it was observed that in the absence of necessary particulars pleaded by the plaintiffs regarding fraud and collusion, it was not possible to hold that the plaint contains necessary averments as to fraud and collusion. The Court held further as under:

  • “Such a bald and general allegation without material particulars in the light of rule 4 of Order 6 of the Code of Civil procedure cannot be held to be sufficient to lead to an issue. Mere general allegation that an act or the deed is vitiated by fraud and collusion is no plea of fraud and collusion. Material particulars such as when and how and who and in what manner and for what purpose the fraud was practised and who colluded with whom and in what manner and with what object or purpose etc., must be averred.” 

Fraud must be pleaded and proved. Without substantiating materials fraud cannot be merely assumed. See: Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy, (2003) 7 SCC 667; Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695.

Charge of Victimisation

Charge of victimisation must not be vague or indefinite. It is an amalgam of facts as well as inferences and attitudes. It is to be established by safe and sure evidence. Mere allegations, vague suggestions and insinuations are not enough (Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel, AIR 1976 SC 98. Referred to in Raja Ram v. Jai Prakash Singh, AIR 2019 SC 4374; 2019 8 SCC 701).

Mala-fides and Bias

In State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, JT 1992 (2) SC 147 : 1992 (Suppl. 1) SCC 222 it is held that mere assertion or a vague or bald statement as to mala fides, is not sufficient and that it is well settled that the burden of proving mala fide is on the person making the allegations and the burden is ‘very heavy’ [See also: E.P. Royappa v. State of TN, 1974 (4) SCC 3]. It is also pointed out that there is every presumption in favour of the administration that the power has been exercised bona fide and in good faith; and that the allegations of mala fide are often more easily made than made out and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high degree of credibility. Further, the Apex Court referred to  Krishna Iyer, J. in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra [1976 (1) SCC 800] where it was stated:

  • ‘It (mala fide) is the last refuge of a losing litigant.’ 

In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [JT 1986 (2) SC 701 : 1986 (4) SCC 566], the Supreme Court emphasised the need for furnishing full particulars of allegations suggesting mala fides as under:

  • “In the first place it is difficult to appreciate how any such observation could be made by the learned Judge without any foundation for the same being laid in the pleadings. It is true that in the writ petitions the petitioners used words such as ‘mala fide’, ‘corruption’ and ‘corrupt practice’ but the use of such words is not enough. What is necessary is to give full particulars of such allegations and to set out the material facts specifying the particular person against whom such allegations are made so that he may have an opportunity of controverting such allegations.”

Malafides – Vague general allegations are not sufficient. (2018(2) KLT 236).

Insufficient Pleadings – No Investigation

In Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, AIR 1951 SC 280: 1951 SCR 548, it was observed as under:

  • “… In cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any court ought to take notice however strong the language in which they are couched may be and the same applies to undue influence and coercion.” : Quoted in Raja Ram v. Jai Prakash Singh, AIR 2019 SC 4374; 2019-8 SCC 701).

In Smt. Swaran Lata v. Union of India [(1979) 3 SCC 165], the Apex Court held that in the absence of particulars, the Court would be justified in refusing to conduct an investigation into the allegations of malafides. The court said:

  • “In our view, the allegations in the writ petition are not sufficient to constitute an averment of mala fides or bias on the part of either the Chandigarh Administration or, in particular, against Dr. 0. S. Sehgal sufficient to vitiate the appointment of respondent 6. No mala fides as such are imputed against the Union Public Service Commission. The court would be justified in refusing to carry on investigation into allegations of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition. The burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges. …. The appellant further averred that she had, in her representation dated 1/05/1975, alleged that after the interview she had overheard Dr. 0. S. Sehgal talking to the third lady member, saying as to ‘how they could take this lady’, meaning the appellant, ‘as the Principal’ and, therefore, she felt that she was a victim of the machination of Dr. Sehgal. There is nothing on record to substantiate such general and vague allegations of the appellant as to mala fides or bias on the part of Dr. Sehgal.”

Referring above decisions, in Mutha Associates v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 304: 2013-2 Ker LT 1103, the Apex Court observed as under:

  • “39. The law regarding pleading and proof of ‘malice in fact’ or mala-fides as it is in common parlance described is indeed settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. The decisions broadly recognise the requirement of allegations suggesting “malice in fact” to be specific and supported by necessary particulars. Vague and general averments to the effect that the action under review was taken mala-fide would not therefore suffice. Equally well settled is the principle that the burden to establish that the action under challenge was indeed mala-fide rests heavily upon the person making the charge; which is taken as quasi criminal in nature and can lead to adverse consequence for the person who is proved to have acted mala-fide. There is in fact a presumption that the public authority acted bona-fide and in good faith. That presumption can no doubt be rebutted by the person making the charge but only on cogent and satisfactory proof whether direct or circumstantial or on admitted facts that may support an inference that the action lacked bona-fides and was for that reason vitiated. The third principle equally sanctified by judicial pronouncements is that the person against whom the charge is made must be impleaded as a party to the proceedings and given an opportunity to refute the charge against him.”
  • “45. The charge of malafides levelled against the appellant, Mr. Rane, the then Minister was not supported by any particulars. The writ petition filed by APMC did not provide specific particulars or details of how the decision taken by minister was influenced by Mutha Associates or by any other person for that matter. The averments made in the writ petition in that regard appeared to be general and inferential in nature. Such allegations were, in our opinion, insufficient to hold the charge of ‘malice in fact’ levelled against the minister proved.”

In Ratnagiri Gas & Power Pvt.  Ltd.  v. RDS Projects Ltd., AIR 2013  SC  200; 2013-1 SCC 524 the Apex Court, pointing out the requirement of assertions in the writ petition and the presence of the officers concerned, held as under:

  •  “The law casts a heavy burden on the person alleging mala fides to prove the same on the basis of facts that are either admitted or satisfactorily established and/or logical inferences deducible from the same. This is particularly so when the petitioner alleges malice in fact in which event it is obligatory for the person making any such allegation to furnish particulars that would prove mala fides on the part of the decision maker. Vague and general allegations unsupported by the requisite particulars do not provide a sound basis for the court to conduct an inquiry into their veracity.”

In Kamalakanta Mohapatra Vs. Pratap Chandra Mohapatra, AIR 2010 Ori 13, it is held as under:

  • The words “undue influence”, “fraud” and “misrepresentation” are cognate vices and may in part overlap in some cases, they are in law distinct categories and in view of Order 6, Rule 4 read with Order 6, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure required to be separately pleaded, with specificity, particularity and precision. In other words general allegations made in the plaint does not tantamount to particulars required to be pleaded under the said provision of the Code. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Ladli Parshad Jaiswal v. The Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. Karnal, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1279 observed that under Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in all cases where a party takes a plea of undue influence, particulars thereof should be unambiguously stated in the pleadings so as to enable the adversary to controvert the same. A vague and general plea to that effect would not serve the purpose and the pleading must be always very specific and precise in nature. This rule has been evolved with a view to narrow down the controversy and protect the party charged with improper conduct from being taken by surprise.
  • In the case of Afsar Shaikh v. Soleman Bibi, reported in AIR 1976 SC 163, the Supreme Court has reiterated the same principle and had clearly held that in a case where there are allegations with regard to fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation the said allegation/facts must be specifically indicated in the pleadings. Keeping in mind the provision of Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if the averments made in the plaint are examined it reveals that the basic requirement of Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not kept in mind while making the allegations and the same appear to be more on the basis of surmises and conjectures rather than cogent facts.
  • So far as the nature of proof of undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation are concerned in he case of Balabhadra Nisanka v. Suka Dibya, reported in 38 (1972) CLT 325, it was held by this Court that ‘fraud’ in a civil proceeding must be established beyond reasonable doubt as in a criminal proceeding. So far as the evidence to establish fraud is concerned, it is held by this Court in the case of Bira Jena v. Tauli Dei, respondent in 38 (1972) CLT 39 : (AIR 1972 Ori 143) that unless the particulars of fraud are pleaded in the plaint, no evidence should be allowed to be led in the suit and if any such evidence has unwittingly been introduced without any pleading, it must be ruled out of consideration. In other words, the standard of proof to establish fraud should be beyond all reasonable doubt. After discussing the evidence threadbare the appellate Court had clearly come to a conclusion that the same does not satisfy the basic requirement of mandatory requirement of law. Even otherwise in the absence of pleadings, the evidence adduced had to be ignored.”

In Balan v. Manoharan Master, 1988 (1) KLT 717, where a candidate said to have ‘consented’ a ‘corrupt practice’, it is held that without the objectionable part of the speech of the candidate being made available in pleading, proof in that respect was not possible.

Damages: Issue will be framed, without denial

As shown above, Order VIII Rule 3 gives an exemption to strict ‘denial’ with regard to the claim of ‘damages’. Why? J. B. Ross v. C. R. Screven, AIR 1917 Cal 269 explained as under:

  • “(O. 8, R 3, CPC) puts the burden on the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant denies in such a case an issue is necessary.” (Quoted in – Indore Malwa United Mills Ltd.  Vs Ramkaran Ghisslal, AIR 1963 MP197. Also see: W.  Jaya-raghavan v. The Leo Films, 1948 61 LW 173; 1948 1 MLJ 209)

In Fateh Chand Vs. Balkishan, AIR 1963 SC 1405, it was observed that the ‘Legislature has sought to cut across the web of rules and presumptions under the English common law’ with regard to the compensation to be awarded in case of breach of contract. Section 74 speaks as to ‘reasonable’ compensation. It is pointed out that this proposition as to ‘reasonable’ compensation, and thereby the intervention of court to fix the reasonable amount, laid down in Section 74, is a deliberate deviation from the English Common Law which allows forfeiture of genuine pre-estimated damages, by the affected party.

Damages (in general) are of three kinds

  • First, nominal
  • Second, general damages
  • Third, special damages.

Read Blog: Law on Damages in Defamation Cases

General Damages can be Awarded if failed to prove Special Damages

Court may, in proper cases, award ‘general damages’ even if the plaintiff failed to prove Special Damages; because, general damages need not be pleaded specifically, inasmuch as law will presume, without direct proof, the natural or probable consequence of an illegal or improper act. (Minor Veeran Vs. T. V. Krishna-moorthy, AIR 1966 Ker 172. Quoted with approval a passage from Law of Pleadings by Mogha.)

It was held by the Supreme Court of India in Maula Bux Vs. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 1955, that ‘forfeiture of earnest money under a contract for sale of property, if the amount is reasonable, does not fall within Section 74’. That is, when the forfeiture clause in a contract refers to a nominal (thereby reasonable) sum alone, as earnest money, it does not provide for an ‘amount to be paid in case of such breach’, or amount to imposing a penalty.  In such cases of forfeiture of reasonable (nominal) earnest money, it is immaterial ‘whether or not actual damage or loss is proved’.

Proper parties must be before the court

In All India State Bank Officers’ Federation v. Union of India: (1997) 9 SCC 151 it is observed as under:

  • “22. There is yet another reason why this contention of the Petitioners must fail. It is now settled law that the person against whom mala fides are alleged must be made a party to the proceeding. … Neither the Chairman nor the Directors, who were present in the said meeting, have been impleaded as Respondents. This being so the Petitioners cannot be allowed to raise the allegations of mala fides, which allegations, in fact, are without merit.”

Adverse inference for non-production (by the Other Party), only on considering pleadings

Generally, it is the duty of the party to lead the best evidence in his possession even though onus of proof do not lie on him, and he is not called upon to produce the said evidence; and the Court will draw adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act if such evidence is withheld. But this rule cannot be applied blindly. Mere non-production of documents would not result in adverse inference, invariably. It is held in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148 (f.n.5), as under:

  • “16. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that, issue of drawing adverse inference is required to be decided by the court taking into consideration the pleadings of the parties and by deciding whether any document/evidence, withheld, has any relevance at all or omission of its production would directly establish the case of the other side. The court cannot lose sight of the fact that burden of proof is on the party which makes a factual averment. The court has to consider further as to whether the other side could file interrogatories or apply for inspection and production of the documents etc. as is required under Order XI CPC. Conduct and diligence of the other party is also of paramount importance.”

Parties to plead facts, not law; Court can take ‘Inferences’

Plaint should contain plain facts; not law. In M. Sankaranarayanan, IAS v. State of Karnataka. AIR 1993 SC 763, the Apex Court observed that the Court may ‘draw a reasonable inference of mala fide from the facts pleaded and established’ (It is quoted in Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha, (2011) 5 SCC 142).

In E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., 1974 (4) SCC 3, the Apex Court held as under:

  • “The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration.”

Kerala High Court, in Balan v. Manoharan Master, 1988 (1) KLT 717, it is observed (in a case where the candidate in an election said to have ‘consented‘ a ‘corrupt practice’) as under:

  • “On a material fact the petitioner cannot request the court to make an inference without supporting pleading. When pleading is absent proof is also not possible. Without the objectionable portions of the speeches being made available proof in that respect is also not possible.”

No Hyper-technical View

No hyper-technical view can be taken in analysing pleadings. See:

  • M. Chinnasamy v. K. C. Palanisamy, AIR 2004 SC 541; 2004-6 SCC 341
  • Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy, AIR 2012 SC 2638.

In Leela Amma v Aravindaksha Menon, the Kerala High Court, 2012 2 KHC 169, held as under:

  • “The Court below was taking a hyper-technical view regarding the pleadings of the appellants. The object and purpose of pleadings is to enable the adverse party to know the case it has to meet. For a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that the other party may not be taken by surprise. At the same time pleadings should receive a liberal construction and no pedantic approach should be adopted so as to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. The Court must find out whether in substance, the parties knew their respective case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of the deficiency in the pleadings, the parties knew the case which arose for resolution and they proceeded to trial on those issues and adduced evidence in support of their respective versions, it would not be open to a party to question the absence of pleadings (Vide –
  • Kedar Lal v. Hari Lal, 1952 KHC 297 : AIR 1952 SC 47 : 1952 SCR 179 : 1952 (1) MLJ 431;
  • Bhagawati Prasad v. Shri. Chandramauli, 1966 KHC 493 : AIR 1966 SC 735 : 1966 (2) SCR 286 : 1966 ALJ 799 : 1967 BLJR 158 : ILR 1966 (1) All 796;
  • Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, 1987 KHC 965 : AIR 1987 SC 1242 : 1987 (2) SCC 555.;
  • Smt. Rajbir Kaur v. M/s.. S. Chokosiri and Co., 1989 KHC 1032 : AIR 1988 SC 1845 : 1989 (1) SCC 19. and
  • Para 15 of Prasanth v. Kalyani, 2007 (2) KHC 451 : 2007 (2) KLT 992 : ILR 2007 (2) Ker. 164 : 2007 (1) KLJ 910.”

Parties need not plead – Court can take ‘Presumptions’

In PRS Hospital Killipalam, Thiruvananthapuram v.  P.  Anil Kumar, 2021-1 Ker 287, it is held as under:

  • “Order 6 rule 13 of the CPC, which entitles that the parties need not plead any matter of fact which the law presumes in his favour, or as to which the burden of proof lies upon the other side.”

Order VI Rule 4 of CPC requires pleading with specificity, particularity and precision

In Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash: AIR 2005 Kar 426; 2006 (3) Kar. L.J. 177, it is observed (relying on Kanchawwa v. Amagonda, AIR 2003 Kar. 434) that Order VI Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure is of a distinct category in law, requiring pleading with specificity, particularity and precision. It is pointed out that general allegations – using the words “fraud” and “misrepresentation” etc. – will not be sufficient; it should be shown – how fraud was played and misrepresentation occasioned. (Referred to in: K. V. Shivakumar v. National Institute of Mental Health And Neuro Sciences, 2016-4 AIR Kar R 754; ILR 2016 Kar 3114)

Undue Influence: Simple Pleading by Plaintiff may cast Burden on Defendant

In Chandrika Babu v. Sudhakaran, 2013 4 KLT(SN) 103 it is pointed out that the Apex Court’s judgment in Joseph John Peter Sandy’s case, AIR 2013  SC 2028; (2013) 3 SCC 801, would show that the required materials should be placed before the court in support of the plea to draw an inference of undue influence.

Even if a person is in a fiduciary relationship with another and his conduct in looking after the other in old age may have influenced the thinking of the other, that per se cannot lead to the only irresistible conclusion that the person was therefore in a position to dominate the will of the deceased. The onus would shift  only after the plaintiff would have established a prima-facie case under Section 16 of the Contract Act read with Section 111 of the Evidence Act (Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh,  AIR 2006  SC 1971; (2006) 5 SCC 558: referred to in Raja Ram v. Jai Prakash Singh, AIR 2019 SC 4374; 2019-8 SCC 701).

In Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib, AIR 1967 SC 878; 1967 (1) SCR 331, it was observed that there was no presumption of imposition merely because a donor was old and weak. Mere close relation also was insufficient to presume undue influence.  Influence and undue influence were distinguished in this decision as under:

  • “It must also be noted that merely because the parties were nearly related to each other no presumption of undue influence can arise. As was pointed out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Poosathurai v. Kappanna Chettiar,  (1919) 47 IA 1, AIR 1920 PC 65.
  • “It is a mistake (of which there are a good many traces in these proceedings) to treat undue influence as having been established by a proof of the relations of the parties having been such that the one naturally relied upon the other for advice and the other was in a position to dominate the will of the first in giving it. Up to that point “influence” alone has been made out. Such influence may be used wisely, judiciously and helpfully. But whether by the law of India or the law of England, more than mere influence must be proved so as to render influence, in the language of the law, undue.”
  • “Before, however, a court is called upon to examine whether undue influence was exercised or not, it must scrutinise the pleadings to find out that such a case has been made out and that full particulars of undue influence have been given as in the case of fraud. See Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This aspect of the pleading was also given great stress in the case of Ladli Prasad Jaiswal v. Karnal Distillery, Co., AIR 1963 SC 1279; (1964) 1 SCR 270 above referred to. In that case it was observed (at p. 295):
  • “A vague or general plea can never serve this purpose; the party pleading must therefore be required to plead the precise nature of the influence exercised, the manner of use of the influence and the unfair advantage obtained by the other.”

(Quoted in Raja Ram v. Jai Prakash Singh, AIR 2019 SC 4374; 2019-8 SCC 701)

In Krishna Mohan Kul @ Nani Charal Kul v. Pratima Maity, AIR 2003 SC 4351;  2004 KHC 903 (SC), the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “When fraud, mis-representation or undue influence is alleged by a party in a suit, normally, the burden is on him to prove such fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation. But, when a person is in a fiduciary relationship with another and the letter is in a position of active confidence the burden of proving the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence is upon the person in the dominating position, he has to prove that there was fair play in the transaction and that the apparent is the real, in other words, that the transaction is genuine and bona fide. In such a case the burden of the proving the good faith of the transaction is thrown upon the dominant, party, that is to say, the party who is in a position of active confidence. A person standing in a fiduciary relation to another has a duty to protect the interest given to his care and the Court watches with jealousy all transactions between such persons so that the protector may not use his influence or the confidence to his advantage. When the party complaining shows such relation, the law presumes everything against the transaction and the onus is cast upon the person holding the position of confidence or trust to show that the transaction is perfectly fair and reasonable, that no advantage has been taken of his position.
  • This principle has been engrained in Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 …. …..”When the relation between the donor and donee at or shortly before the execution of the gift has been such as to raise a presumption that the donee had influence over the donor, the Court sets aside the gift unless the donee can prove that the gift was the result of a free exercise of the donors will….
  • 15. The corollary to that principle is contained in Clause (3) of Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (in short Contract Act).

In a subsequent decision in Raja Ram v. Jai Prakash Singh,  AIR 2019 SC 4374; 2019-8 SCC 701 the Apex Court distinguished Krishna Mohan (supra) on fact that the executant in that case was indisputably over 100 years of age, witnesses to the document were ‘not in existence’ and the witnesses proved that he was paralytic and virtually bedridden; and none of the witnesses could substantiate that the executant had put his thumb impression.

Pleading in Invalidation of a Statute

In Assam State Electricity Board v. Bharat Hydro Power Corporation Ltd., 1999-1 Gau LJ  142, 1999-1 Gau LR 249, the importance of pleading in invalidation of a statute was considered. It was held that he pleading must be specific and not vague. It is pointed out that if the pleadings were vague, the Court should not consider the alleged allegation regarding violation of the constitutional or other provisions. The following decisions were referred to:

  • 1. Amrit Banaspati Company Limited Vs. UOI, (1995) 3 SCC 335;
  • 2. The III Income Tax Officer, Mangalore  Vs M. Damodar Bhat, AIR 1969 SC 408,
  • 3. The Municipal Board Maunath Bhanjan v.  Swadeshi Cotton Mills,  U.J (SC) 1977 P. 180
  • 4. S.R. Tewari v.  The District Board, Agra, AIR 1964 SC 1680.
  • 5. The Hamdard Dcnvakhana (Wakf) Delhi v. The Union of India, AIR 1965 SC 1167
  • 6. M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills . v.  The State of UP, AIR 1979 SC 621  
  • 7. Narendra Bahadur Singh v.  State of U.P., AIR 1977 SC 660  
  • 8. Bharat Singh  V.  State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 2181  
  • 9. M.K. Balakrishna Menon v.  The Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, AIR 1971 SC 2392
  • 10. Ratanlal Nath and Ors. V.  State of Tripura, 1997 (III) GIT (SC) 8

Substantial justice should be preferred as against technicalities

Our Apex Court, in Sathyanath v. Sarojamani,  (2022) 7 SCC 644, quoted Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar, (2020) 10 SCC 706, where it is held – ‘if the procedural violation does not seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party, Courts must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violations. It is not to be forgotten that litigation is nothing but a journey towards truth which is the foundation of justice and the Court is required to take appropriate steps to thrash out the underlying truth in every dispute’. It was held in Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar, (2020) 10 SCC 706, as under:

  • “9. It is often said that procedure is the handmaid of justice. Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of the court while doing substantial justice. If the procedural violation does not seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party, courts must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violation. We should not forget the fact that litigation is nothing but a journey towards truth which is the foundation of justice and the court is required to take appropriate steps to thrash out the underlying truth in every dispute. Therefore, the court should take a lenient view when an application is made for production of the documents under sub-rule (3).”

In Management, ICICI Bank Limited v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, 2020-2 LLJ 453, it was observed by the Madras High Court  that the substantial justice should be preferred as against technicalities in law. It was pointed out that the Court, while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution it was not only acting as a Court of law but also as Court of justice. It is further held that when the Court finds that substantial justice is not done to a party in a particular case, it can extend its arms and do slight tinkering of law, of course, without damaging its scope and object, for the purpose of moulding the relief and to meet the ends of justice. The Madras High Court relied on the Apex Court decision in a civil suit relating to adoption in Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva, 2013 (4) SCC 97, where it was observed as follows:

  • “When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred and the courts may in the larger interests of administration of justice may excuse or overlook a mere irregularity or a trivial breach of law for doing real and substantial justice to the parties and pass orders which will serve the interest of justice best.”

(This decision is referred to in MRF Limited v. Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2018-2 CTC 353 and Arun Mondal v. Director, Directorate of Health Services, AIR 2016 Cal 141.)

Admission in pleading cannot be Dissected

In Sainaba Umma v. Moideenkutty, ILR 1988-1 (Ker) 206; 1987-2 KLT 59 it is observed as under:

  • “The Privy Council in the decision in Motabhoy Mulla Essabhoy v. Mulji Haridas (42nd. App.103) observed:
    • “It is permissible for a tribunal to accept part and reject the rest of any witness’s testimony. But admission in pleading cannot be so dissected, and if it is made subject to a condition it must either be accepted subject to the condition or not accepted at all.”
  • The same view is expressed in the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Fateh Chand Murlidhar v. Juggilal Kamlapai (AIR 1955 Cal. 465). Following these decisions a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in J. Mc. Gaffin v. LIC of India (AIR 1978 Cal. 125) stated at page 127:
    • “These decisions, in our opinion, indicate that when a statement on admission is made in pleading together with further statement centering round, depending and standing on and conditional upon that admission, all the statements are to be taken and considered together in respect of such pleading.”
  • The Supreme Court in Hanumant v. State of M. P (AIR. 1952 SC. 343) stated at page 350:
    • “An admission must be used either as a whole or not at all.”

Can one Change his Pleading as to Licencee (From Tenancy) in a Subsequent Suit

In Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735; 1966-2 SCR 286, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “14. In support of its conclusion that in a case like the present a decree for ejectment can be passed in favour of the plaintiff, though the specific case of tenancy set up by him is not proved, the High Court has relied upon two of its earlier Full Bench decisions. In Abdul Ghani v. Mt. Babni, (1903) ILR 25 All 256 (FB), the Allahabad High Court took the view that in a case where the plaintiff asks for the ejectment of the defendant on the ground that the defendant is a tenant of the premises, a decree for ejectment can be passed even though tenancy is not proved, provided it is established that the possession of the defendant is that of a licensee. It is true that in that case, before giving effect to the finding that the defendant was a licensee, the High Court remanded the case, because it appeared to the High Court that that part of the case had not been clearly decided. But once the finding was returned that the defendant was in possession as a licensee, the High Court did not feel any difficulty in confirming the decree for ejectment, even though the plaintiff had originally claimed ejectment on the ground of tenancy and not specifically on the ground of licence. To the same effect is the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Balmakund v. Dalu. (1903) ILR 25 All 498 (FB).”

See Blog: PLEADINGS IN ELECTION MATTERS

Foot Notes:

  1. Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, AIR 1951 SC 280; Ladli Prashad Jaiswal v. Karnal Distillery, Co., AIR 1963 SC 1279; Subhash Chandra Das v. Ganga Parsad Das, AIR 1967 SC 878; Varanasaya Sanskrit Vishwavidalaya v. Dr. Raj Kishore Tripathi, AIR 1977 SC 615; Jai Parkash Power Ventures v. State of HP, ILR 2017-6 HP 210.
  2. Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, AIR 1951 SC 280;  Raja Ram v. Jai Prakash Singh, AIR 2019 SC 4374; Ladli Prasad Jaiswal v. Karnal Distillery, Co., AIR 1963 SC 1279.
  3. Ram Sewak Yadav v. Hussain Kamil Kidwai, AIR 1964 SC 1249, Dr. Jagjit Singh v. Giani Kartar Singh, AIR 1966 SC 773, Beliram Bhalaik v. Jai Beharilal Khachi, (1975) 4 SCC 417, Suresh Prasad Yadav v. Jai Prakash Mishra, (1975) 4 SCC 822, Bhabhi v. Sheo Govind, (1976) 1 SCC 687, S. Raghbir Singh Gill v. S. Gurcharan Singh Tohra, (1980) Supp1 SCC 53,  P.K.K. Shamsudeen v. K.A.M. Mappillai Mohindeen, (1989) 1 SCC 526, Vadivelu v. Sundaram, (2000) 8 SCC 355, VS Achuthanandan v. P J  Francis (2001) 3 SCC 81, andM. Chinnasamy v. K. C. Palanisamy, (2003) 10 SCALE 103.
  4. M/s. Trojan & Co. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235;  Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, AIR 2002 SC 665; Ishwar Dutt v. L.A Collector, AIR 2005 SC 3165; State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co., AIR 2010 SC 1299; Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C.P. Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127; Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, AIR 2009 SC 1103; Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, 2012 (3) KLT SN 73 SC; (2012) 8 SCC 148.
  5. In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148, the Apex Court considered the following decisions: Mt. Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh, AIR 1915 PC 96; Mahant Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das v. Surjanarayan Das, AIR 1967 SC 256; Smt. Indira Kaur v. Shri Sheo Lal Kapoor, AIR 1988 SC 1074; Kamma Otukunta Ram Naidu v. Chereddy Pedda Subba Reddy, AIR 2003 SC 3342, Mohinder Kaur v. Kusam Anand, (2000) 4 SCC 214; Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing, AIR 2001 SC 2328; Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas, AIR 2004 SC 4681; A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, AIR 2005 SC 534; R.M. Yellatti v. Assistant Executive Engineer AIR 2006 SC 355; Pratap Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 2006 SC 514; Ramrati Kuer v. Dwarika Prasad Singh, AIR 1967 SC 1134, Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad, AIR 2012 SC 1339.

End Notes:

HC Interference in Second Appeal if Vitiated by Perversity, Misreading of Evidence etc.

In Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar v. Union of India, September 24, 2025 (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1145), our Apex Court examined the jurisdiction of the High Court in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The Apex Court held as under:

  • “40. At the very outset of our analysis on this issue, it becomes necessary to peruse Section 100 of the CPC, which provides that an appeal would lie before the High Court, from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if it is satisfied that the case involves a ‘substantial question of law’. The provision further elucidates that “nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.”
  • 41. The legislative intent underlying Section 100 of the CPC is therefore unambiguous. It demarcates the jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal to instances where a substantial question of law is involved, thereby precluding interference with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below. This Court has, through a consistent line of authority, clarified that such a restriction is not absolute. The High Court may justifiably exercise its jurisdiction in a second appeal where the findings of the subordinate courts are vitiated by perversity, misreading of evidence, or a manifest disregard of settled legal principles ( Neelakantan v. Mallika Begum, (2002) 2 SCC 440).”
  • The Supreme Court also referred to: Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, and Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap v. Pramilabai Chandulal Parandekar, (2020) 15 SCC 731.

When the High Court will interfere with the concurrent findings

In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, the Supreme Court has delineated the contours of interference with concurrent findings of fact in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC as under:

  • “19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so.
  • In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, the one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were
    • erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or
    • its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or
    • was based upon inadmissible evidence or
    • arrived at by ignoring material evidence.
  • 24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus:
  • .(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.
  • (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.
  • (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence“, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” (Quoted in: Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar v. Union of India, September 24, 2025; Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1145)

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