1. Does ‘Pandarappattom’ mark Full-Ownership? If so, from which year?
Answer: Yes; from 1040 ME (1865 AD) .
In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court held that Pandarappattom properties in the erstwhile Cochin State come within ‘estate’* under Article 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution.
* Estatedenotes property ownership.
Five-Judge-Bench in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 KLT 216: AIR 1971 Ker 168, held that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the Kerala State satisfied even the orthodox definition of ‘ownership’ by Austinand was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution.
2. Can the Government ‘Lease-out’ Lands after 1061 (1886) Pattom Proclamation?
Answer: Yes; It is a Civil Right of every Owner of Properties.
3. Will the lease-character, of the Govt. leases after 1061, be lost (because of the 1040 and 1061 Proclamations) at the moment it is made, for it is “Pandaravaka-pattom”.
Answer: No; Proprietary rights as “Pandaravaka-pattom” are conferred only to Govt. leases prior to 1886.
(Note: Same is the situation in Cochin also. The crucial year is 1905)
Erstwhile Kingdom of Travancore, situated in southern part of Kerala was ruled by Marthandavarma, the powerful King, from 1729 to 1758. He was successful in bringing all people and properties of Travancore under his administration; and collected tax from all lands except those that were expressly exempted.
Major portion of the cultivable lands, other than the land owned by the Sircar, were under the Devaswoms or temples (Devaswom lands), and the Brahmin Janmies (Brahmaswom lands). Brahmins or their families were the administrators (called ‘Ooralers’) of the temples.
The Brahmins and prominent Nairs were the territorial lords. They were called Jenmies; and the lands belonged to them were known as Jenmom lands. The Sirkar (King) was the greatest Jenmi. Apart from original Jenmom lands, the rulers and the King obtained land by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation etc.
Travancore – Padmanabha Swamy Temple and ‘Pandara Vaka’ Lands
The King of Travancore, Marthandavarma, placed himself as the servant of the principal deity of the kingdom, Sree Padmanabha adorned the Padmanabha Swamy Temple at Thiruvanamthapuram. The entire assets of Travancore were regarded as the property that belonged to the Treasury or Offertory (Bhandaram in Malayalam; Pandaram in Tamil) of the principal deity – Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple.
Revenue Settlement of Travancore in 1910
The survey and settlement of Travancore State had been commenced in 1885 during the reign of Sri. Moolam Thirunal; and was finalised in 1910. In the Settlement Register the Sircar lands given to cultivators on various tenures were termed as Pandaravaka lands. The Settlement Register of 1910 is taken as the basic record of land related matters.
Travancore – ‘Jenmi’, ‘Jenmom
Padmanabharu Govindaru Namboodiripad v. State of Kerala (FB) AIR 1963 Ker 86, observed as under:
“Coming to the second category of lands, viz. , Jenmon lands, the jenmies have full proprietary rights in the soil. The origin of the title of the jenmies is shrouded in obscurity but the development of this branch of land tenure was on the assumption that Parasurama who con-quered the land of Kerala or, as mythology would put It, reclaimed it from the sea, gave it as gift to Malayala Brahmins or nambudiries. The rest of the people culti-vated the lands under the Jenmies. In course of time, the Jenmies endowed certain temples built by them with ‘lands and thus the Devaswom lands came into existence. These were similar in nature and incidents to Jenmom lands. These lands were enjoyed free of tax, the State imposing a light assessment only when the Jenmies alienated the land to others. We may extract the following passage from Sri T. Madhava Row’s Memorandum regarding the origin and nature of Jenmom rights :
“a Jenmi is often termed a landlord. But, it must be clearly understood and also always remembered that a Jenmi though certainly a landlord, is a peculiar Kind or landlord. Any person, who holds a pattah from a Collector In a British District and under it holds from the British Government subject to Government tax more or less, Is called a landlord in ordinary language. Even in Travancore, any coffee planter or indeed any ryot, who holds lands under a grant from the Sirkar, etc. , is or may be called a landlord. But, be it remembered, such landlords are not Jenmies. A Jenmi differs from such landlords in that he does not derive his title to lands from the Sirdar etc. His title to the Jenmom lands is inherent. He is, so far as his Jenmom lands are concerned, a little territorial sovereign in a limited sense. He is landlord of his Jenmom domain exactly in the sense in which this Sirkar is landlord of all the land it grants to planters and indeed to all ryots in general; in the sense in which the British government is landlord of all the Ryotwari lands of the East Coast Zillahs of the Madras Presidency. It is necessary, in view to avoid errors and misconceptions, to familiarize the mind to this definition of t Jenmi. The origin of Jenmom property may be briefly explained here with a view to make the rights of jenmis clear. Kerala Desom (in which Travancore is included) was origi-nally conquered by Parasurama, and this great warrior parcelled out the conquered lands among a limited number of brahmins. The Brahmins then became territorial lords, each independent of the rest. From that early age, the lands have descended with the tenure almost unimpared. The lands so belonging to each Brahmin are said to constitute his Jenmom, and the Brahmin himself is called a jenmi. These lands, so long as they continue in possession of the Jenmi, are free of all taxation. To this day this exemption continues in full force. Jenmom lands are precisely what are in Europe called allodial properties as contradistinguished from feudal. It must be clear from what has been stated that all the lands in travancore belong to a body of jenmis. There are no lands that do not belong to some Jenmi or other. Be it remembered that the Sirkar itself is one of these Jenmis, it having come to possess Jenmom lands by gift, purchase, eacheat, confiscation and other ways. It is only a great Jenmi, great fn the sense that its jenmom property is extensive. If any person wants land in Travancore, he must obtain it from, and hold it of, some one of the body of Jenmis, i. e. , from the Sirhar, which is the chief Jenmi, or from some other Jenmi “. (pp. 2 and 3 of Travancore land Revenue Manual, Vol. IV)
We may also refer to certain passages from an article contributed by a former maharaja of Travancore in 1882 :
“according to all legends and all available evidence, the Malabar Coast was populated by Aryan emigrants from the eastern side of the ghauts. It is equally a fact that the priestly class not only predominated among the emigrants, but actually monopolised the whole of the land of their adoption to themselves, the rest of the emigrant population being their drawers of water and hewers of wood, thejr serfs or at the most, their tenants-at-will. But to stereotype the configuration of society for all time to come, is as much an impossibility as to fix that of the clouds of the sky. Aggregations and segregations of power, influence and wealth, must ever and anon go on under the guidance of the universal law of struggle for existence and survival of the best. These priests are the wisest, and consequently the most powerful, who, without directly arrogating secular power to themselves, can bring into the meshes of their moral influence, those in whose hands that universal law places such power. The ecclesiastics of the Malabar Coast knew this as instinctively as the ecclesiastics of Rome. But they had the additional advantage of having something more solid than benedictions and indulgences to confer upon their political stewards, vi viz. , sovereignty of the land which exclusively belonged to them. They were equally wise and far-sighted in another step they took. They foresaw that the halo of sanctity which encircled themselves might not be proof against the gradual degeneracy of religious feelings which time must produce, and the consequent encroachment upon their supremacy in the land. And they constitutionalized that sanctity by demising large tracts of land and their revenues to certain temples built and consecrated by them. Men who would not hesitate to rob a priest may still hesitate to commit sacrilege on an object of general religious worship. Of these temples, the priests assumed the proprietary wardenship. Almost every temple of note had a synod of these priestly wardens. They invited the leading layman or chief to a membership of the synod and entrusted to him the stewardship of the whole temple domain, subject to their superior authority. Thus arose those rich temples. Thus arose the sovereignties of the Malabar Coast”. (pp. 6 and 7 of Travancore Land Revenue Manual, vol. IV-1916 ).
It cannot be disputed that these Jenmis and Devaswoms had full proprietary right in the soil and that the lands in which they have ‘jenmom rights’ are ‘estates’ within the definition of the word in Article 31-A.”
Note: Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86, was overruled by the larger Bench in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 KLT 216: AIR 1971 Ker 168, and it was held that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the State was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31-A(2)(a).
Malabar –‘Jenmi’, ‘Jenmom’ and ‘Ryotwari System’
Malabar is the northern part of Kerala. It formed part of the erstwhile Madras province in the British India. Two types of tenures were important in Madras Presidency: landlord-tenures and the ryotwari-tenures. The properties held by Janmis were regarded as their absolute proprietors. A large number of tenants cultivated the land. They paid rent to the Janmies.
Ryotwari System in Malabar – Lease by Government, under Pattas
Land owned by the Government was given to the cultivators under the ryotwari system, under a patta. Sir Thomas Munro, Madras Governor, introduced ryotwari system throughout the Madras Presidency in 1820. British Government collected taxes directly from the peasants. The rate of tax was 50% in dry-lands and 60% in irrigated land.
A ryotwari pattadar was not a proprietor of land in its full sense, but only a tenant. Still, such pattadar was virtually taken as a proprietor.
Ryotwari Settlement – Assessment for Revenue
The basic idea of ryotwari settlement (revenue-settlement is fixing tax or rent, after survey in most cases) was that every bit of land was assessed to a certain revenue and assigned a survey number for a period of years, which was usually thirty and each occupant of such land held it subject to his paying the land-revenue fixed on that land. But it was open to the occupant to relinquish his land or to take new land which had been relinquished by some other occupant or become otherwise available on payment of assessment.
Cochin – Land Situation
Cochin was brought under the centralised administration by the King, Rama Varma, popularly known as Sakthan Thampuran (1790 – 1805). The feudal custom prevailed in Cochin had been divided the land under several Naduvazhis or local chiefs. During the second half of 18th century, as in the case of Travancore, major portion of the lands in Cochin were brought under the Government administration, and these lands were also called Sircar or Pandaravaka lands.
Cochin-Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands
Settlement Proclamation of Cochin of 1030 ME (1905 AD) made a mountainous change in the land situation. Clause 13 of the Settlement Proclamation provided that the holders of Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands would acquire ‘full rights to the soil of the lands’ they held.
Pandarapattom was originally in the nature of lease without any proprietary or transferable right. By the royal proclamations, the holders of these lands were given with full proprietary rights and declared to be private, heritable and transferrable property. Puthuval lands came under this tenure.
b) Otti
It was originally in the nature of a mortgage. It stood as a real or constructive loan by the State. Interest was deducted from Pattom to be paid by the holder. He had also to pay Rajabhogam (tax).
c) Enams
Enams were service enams or personal enams. Service enams were inalienable. It continue as long as the holder was in service. Personal enams were given to support individuals or families. Such properties could have been transferred by the holders.
d) Viruthi
It stood analogous to service enams. But had permanency if the holder continued his service regularly. When he died the holding passed to legal heirs subject to certain payments.
e) Special tenures
It was in the nature of enam which received special treatment.
f) Karam-olivu
All Lands except janmam included under this head. The land was tax-free.
Land-Classification in Cochin – Pandaravaka and Puravaka
All lands were classed under Pandaravaka, or Puravaka. The lands owned by the State (or having the jenmom or proprietary right) were the Pandaravaka lands. The proprietary right over Puravaka land rested with private individuals or public institutions.
The chief land systems of tenancy were called Verumpattom. This was simple leasehold. By a series of legislative enactments, tenants gained occupancy rights in the lands held by them.
Land Reform Measures that Shaped Kerala
The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 made Kerala change tremendously. Modern Kerala is shaped by this Act. The legislation was not a sporadic one. The history shows – there were several ‘pre-independence’ Landmark Enactments that had paved the way to the KLR Act:
Landmark Enactments in Land Tenure Reforms
Travancore Royal Pattom Proclamation, 1040 (1865) pertained to Pandaravaka lands
Cochin Settlement Proclamation, 1080 (1905) pertained to Pandaravaka lands
TravancoreRoyal Pattom Proclamation of 1040 (1865 AD) – Magna Carta of peasants
During the second half of the 19th century several Royal Proclamations were promulgated with a view to confer rights in the land to the tenants who were the real cultivators. Majority of the people were engaged in agriculture; but the lands belonged to Jenmies (Sircar, Brahmins or Devaswoms).
The cultivators held the land under lease arrangement known as Pattom, Otti, Inam and Viruthi etc. One of the important Regulations came in the line of agrarian reforms was the Royal Proclamation of 1040 ME (1865 AD). It pertained to Pattom (lease) tenements created (by Sircar) on Sirkar lands known as Pandaravaka lands. It is exalted as the Magna Carta of peasants of Travancore it being led to conferring land to tillers, step by step.
Permanency to Cultivators
Till 1040 ME (1865 AD), the agriculturists, who held the Pandaravaka lands under Pattom arrangement, were liable to be treated as mere tenants-at-will; the land being resumable at any time, as they were in the nature of temporary leases just like tenements created by private jenmis.
The Pattom Proclamation of 1040 converted the pattom arrangement on pandaravaka lands into permanent leases and conferred on the holders thereof permanent rights of occupancy, heritable and alienable. Though the Proclamation of 1040 ME did not expressly confer full proprietary rights on tenants, it gave the tenants permanency in the Pandaravaka soil; and it recorded the fist gigantic step towards the land reforms in Travancore.
Royal Proclamation of 1040 ME (1865) declared:
“Whereas we earnestly desire that the possession of landed as well as other property in Our Territory should be as secure as possible, and whereas, we are of opinion that, with this view, Sirkar Pattom lands can be plated on a much better footing than at present so as to enhance their value; We are pleased to notify to Our Ryots –
1st. That the Sirkar hereby and for ever surrenders, for the benefit of the people all optional power over the following classes of lands, whether wet, garden or dry, and whether included in the Ayacut accounts or registered since VenPattom, Vettolivoo Pattom, Maraya Pattom Olavoo Pattom Mara Pattom, and all such Durkast Pattom, the tax of which is understood to be fixed till the next Survey and Assessment.
2ndly. That the Ryots holding these lands may regard them fully as private, heritable, saleable, and otherwise transferable, property.
3rdly. Accordingly, the sales, mortgages, etc., to these lands will henceforward be valid, may be effected on stamped cadjans, and will be duly registered. The lands may be sold for arrears of tax. In execution of decrees of Courts and such other legitimate purposes, and may also be accepted as security by the Sirkar as well as by private individuals.
4thly. That the holders of the lands in question may rest assured that they may enjoy them undisturbed so long as the appointed assessment is paid.
5thly. That the said holders are henceforth at full liberty to lay out labour and capital on their lands of the aforesaid description to any extent they please, being sure of continued and secure possession.
6thly. That the aforesaid description of lands will be resumable by the Sirkar like Jenmom and other private lands only for purely public purposes, as for instance, for making roads, canals, public buildings, etc., and when resumed for such purposes, compensation will be paid by the Sirkar not for improvements only as heretofore, but equal to the full market value of such lands.
7thly. That the foregoing concessions are not how-ever to be understood to affect it any way the rights of the Sirkar to regulate the land tax, to resume escheats, to confiscate the property of criminals, and generally such rights as have heretofore, been exercised upon ail property in general.
8thly. That it is to be understood that when Pattom land, being a portion of a holding, is transferred to a pauper with a view of defrauding the Sirkar of the tax due to it, the Sirkar will have the right of apportioning the tax so as to prevent loss of revenue; and
9thly — Repealed by Proclamation dated the 5th Karkatakom 1059.” (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.)
Cochin Settlement Proclamation of 1080 (1905)
The Sirkar or Pandaravaka tenure holders of the Kingdom of Cochin were conferred with fixity of tenure by the Settlement Proclamation of 1080 (1905). The Settlement Proclamation of 1905 covered all lands in the State, including lands held under concessional tenures or as tax-free. The Rules made under the Act contained the procedure for the issue of title deeds in respect of lands held under such grants. As stated above, Clause 13 of the Settlement Proclamation provided that the holders of Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands would acquire ‘full rights to the soil of the lands‘ they held. Settlement Proclamation of Cochin of 1080 Clause 13 provided as under:
“At present holders of Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands do not possess any property in the soil. As we are convinced that proprietorship in soil will induce a cultivator to improve his land and thereby add to agricultural prosperity of the country, we hereby declare that our Verumpattom holders of lands shall, after the new settlement has been introduced, acquire full rights to the soil of the lands they hold and that their rights shall remain undisturbed so long as they regularly pay the State revenue, provided that the rights to metals and minerals, possessed by the State in all lands under whatever tenures they are held, are reserved to the State”.
The Settlement Proclamation was expressly repealed by the Land Tax Act of 1955 of the united State of Travancore-Cochin; but this Act, as a whole, was struck down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 552. In Kesavan Vadhyan Namboodri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1968 Ker 279, it was pointed out that this Proclamation of 1080 stood repealed by implication by the Land Tax Act of 1961.
‘Jenmam’ and Pndarapattom Land Whether ‘Estate’ Within Article 31-A
‘Jenmam’ is ‘Estate’ within Article 31A
In K. K. Kochunni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080 and Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, 1962 Ker LT 913 : AIR 1963 Ker 86 it was held that jenmom rightwas the freehold right with ‘proprietary interest’.
Article 31A(2) of the Constitution of India reads thus:
“31A (2). In this article-
(a) the expression ‘estate ‘ shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant, and in the States of Madras and Kerala any janmam right;
(b) the expression ‘rights’, in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue.”
In K. K. Kochunni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080, the Supreme Court, while dealing with Article 31A of the Constitution, said:
“Under the definition, any Jenmom right in Kerala is an ‘estate’. A jenmom right is the freehold interest in a property situated in Kerala. Moor in his “Malabar Law and Custom” describes it as a hereditary proprietorship. A jenmom interest may, therefore be described as ‘proprietary interest of a landlord in lands‘.”
In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Supreme Court held as under:
“It seems to us that the basic concept of the word ‘estate’ is that the person holding the estate should be proprietor of the soil and should be in direct relationship with the State paying land revenue to it except where it is remitted in whole or in part”.
In Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, 1962 Ker LT 913 : AIR 1963 Ker 86, it was observed that ‘Thanathu, Thettom, Manavaka, Brahmaswom Vaka, Devaswom Vaka, Kudijenmom, Kanom, Kanom Kudijenmom and Venpattom’ created by Jenmis must be held to be covered by the word ‘Estate’ in Art. 31A of the Constitution. It held further as under:
“20. It cannot be disputed that these Jenmis and Devaswoms had full proprietary right in the soil and that the lands in which they have ‘Jenmom rights’ are ‘Estates’ within the definition of the word in Article 31-A.”
“21. … As regards ‘Inam lands’ it was conceded that the holders had full proprietary rights in the soil. These consist of Pandaravaka Adima, Anubhogam, Thiruvulam, Danom, Pandaravaka Kudijenmom, Erayeli, Viruthi and Karam Ozhivu. Inam lands other than Erayeli and Viruthi (Service Inams) were dealt with under S. 24 of the Revenue Settlement Proclamation of 1061 M.E. (1886 AD). Clause 7 of S. 24 provided:
“There shall be no further interference on the part of the Government with these free holds, except such as might be necessary for the punctual realization of the quit rent payable”.
Note: 1. It was held in Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 (analysing the 1040 ME, Travancore Proclamation) that the provisions of the Proclamation did not confer on the tenants absolute proprietary rights in the soil.
2. Overruling Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, it was held in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 KLT 216: AIR 1971 Ker 168, that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the State was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31-A(2)(a).
‘Pandarapattom’ (Cochin & Travancore) – Proprietary right
In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Supreme Court held** that Pandarappattom properties (in Cochin) come within ‘estate’ under Article 31A of the Constitution. The Apex Court considered the proclamation issued by his Highness Sir Rama Varma Raja of Cochin on March 10, 1905. Clause 13 that rendered ‘full rights to the soil of the lands they hold’.
**By majority, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta; and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, dissenting.
The Supreme Court (majority) held, with respect to Cochin Regulation as under:
“It would thus be seen that under clause 13 the person holding lands on the Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure is not a tenant. He is given the proprietary right in the soil itself, subject of course to the rights as to metals and minerals reserved in favour of the State, indeed, the whole scheme of the new Proclamation appears to be to change the character of the possession of the Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure-holder from that of a tenant into that of a proprietor-holder. It is true that he is made liable to pay half of the net produce and that may appear to be a little too high, but the measure of the levy will not convert what is intended to be a recovery of assessment Into a recovery of rent. The proprietor of the land held on Verumpattom tenure is nevertheless a proprietor of the land and he holds the land subject to his liability to pay the assessment to the State. It is not difficult to imagine that in a fairly large number of lands held by Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure-holders the holders in turn would let out the the lands to the cultivators and thus would come into existence a local equivalent of the class of intermediaries. Land revenue record is required to be prepared by the Proclamation and relevant entries showing the extent of the properties belonging to the respective holders and the details about their liability to pay the assessment are intended to be shown in the said record. In our opinion, it would not be reasonable to hold that the ‘lands held by the petitioner under the Pandaravaha Verumpattom tenure do not confer on him the proprietary right at all but make him a tenant of the State“.
But, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., while descending, observed as under:
“In this connection I might usefully refer to a proclamation of the ruler of Travancore of 1865 (1040 M. E.) regarding Sarkar-pattom lands, with the observation that subject to variations dependent on local usages, the system of land tenure and the concepts as regards the rights of property in land were substantially similar in Travancore and Cochin. Sarkar-pattom lands were what might be termed ‘Crown lands’ of which the ruler was deemed to be the Jenmi or the landlord. Previous to the proclamation the lands were legally capable of being resumed by the ruler, though this was seldom done and the cultivators were not legally entitled to transfer their rights and where this was done the Government had the right to ignore the transaction. The fact that the cultivator was conceived of as having no proprietary interest on the land also bore adversely on the State since the State was deprived of the means of realising any arrears of revenue by bringing the holding to sale. It was to remedy this situation that the proclamation was issued and the preamble and its terms carry the impress of the impact of the ryotwari system of Madras.”
After referring the 1040 Proclamation, Ayyangar, J. said as under:
“The language employed in the proclamation is of significance. It speaks of the relinquishment or withdrawal of the right of the State and not of the conferment of a right on the ryot so as to render the ryot a grantee from the State, just in line with the Hindu Law theory of the proprietorship of the soil vesting in the occupant-cultivator.”
In Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 (FB), in spite of the decision in Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694 (pertained to Cochin), it was held that Pandarapattom (or Pandaravaka pattom) lands in the Travancore area cannot have the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution. Analysing the 1040 ME Travancore Proclamation, it was held by the High Court as under:
“11. The provisions of the Proclamation do not, in our opinion, confer on the tenants absolute proprietary rights in the soil. There is no clause by which the Sirkar parted with all rights in favour of the tenants and in the absence of such a provision, the holders of such lands can only be treated as holding such lands on perpetual leases.”
Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301
The Supreme Court, in Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State Of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301 (Sikri (Cj), Shelat, A.N. Ray, I.D. Dua, , H.R. Khanna, JJ.) held that Kenan Devan Hills Concession (ongrantdeeds) fall within the expression “Janmam right” vested with Sircar. This land is dealt with under this heading, i.e. Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar.
Points came for consideration were the following:
1. Whether the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 was protected from challenge under Art. 31A of the Constitution. That is, whether these lands fall within expression ‘Janmam right’ or “estate” in art. 31A of the Constitution.
2. If the lands acquired were an “estate”, or with ‘Janmam right’ owned by the Company, the land reform enactment did not have stood valid. (Note: Kesavananda Bharathi Case came in 1973.)
According to the petitioner Company, ‘it has at all times been holding, cultivating, enjoying and dealing with the Concession Land as the absolute, owner thereof’.
The position taken by the State was –
that the petitioner Company was not an absolute owner, but only a lessee under the Government, especially since the 1899 Proclamation issued by H.H. the Maharaja.
that the petitioner’s predecessor-in-title was John Danial Munro, who obtained, the first Pooniat Concession from Punjar Valiya Raja, on July 11, 1877. This Concession recited that an, application was made for the grant of the above property to the Raja for coffee cultivation.
It was further stipulated in the Concession that
“you shall clear and remove the jungles, and reclaim the waste lands within the said boundaries, and cultivate them with coffee up to the year 1058 and from the year 1059, pay our rent collector a yearly rent at the rate of 3,000 British Rupees.”
H.H. the Maharaja (Travancore) executed a deed of ratification, dated November 28, 1878, by which the Government ratified the First Pooniat Concession dated July 11, 1877.
This deed of ratification laid down – the Government permitted the grantee to hold the land.
Clause 5 of the Deed of Ratification, is important. It provides, inter alia, that
“the grantee can appropriate to his own use within the limits of the grant all timber except … Teak, Cole Teak, Blackwood, Ebony, Karoonthaly, Sandalwood……….
The eleventh clause reads – “The land granted shall be held in perpetuity as heritableor transferable property, but every case of transfer … be immediately made known to the Sircar….”
The twelfth clause stipulates – “The discovery of useful mines and treasures within the limits of the grant shall be communicated to the Sircar, ….”
The sixteenth clause provides – “The grantee shall be bound to preserve the forest trees growing on the banks of the principal streams …. fifty yards …. Similarly … preserve the, trees about the crest of the hill to the extent of a quarter of a mile on each side.”
The Apex Court found the following:
The janmam rights (even if remained with the Poonjar Chief), H.H. the Maharaja became the janmi by the Royal proclamation of 1899.
The nature of ‘janmam right’ has been examined by this Court previously in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887 Subba Rao, J., observed that janmam right in Kerala is an “estate and it is the freehold interest.
The Sircar itself is one of these Janmis and it was the largest Janmi. It came to possess janmam lands by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation and other ways.
If any person wants land in Travancore, he must obtain it from, some one of the body of Janmis, i.e. from the Sircar, which is the Chief Janmi, or from some other Janmi.
The Apex Court held that it was difficult to resist the conclusion that the lands in dispute fall within the expression “Janmam right” vested with Sircar.
The Apex Court further found –
The Registered Lands included inter alia, (a) Pandaravaka lands and (b) Janmam lands. “Pandaravaka or Sircar lands are, lands of which the State is the landlord or the Jenmi and whatever rights which vest in the ryots are derived from the Sircar.”
Kenan Devan Hills Concession is dealt with under this heading, i.e. Pandaravaka Lands (lands belonging to the Sircar).
It thus appears that the State grants like
Kanan Devan Hills Concession and
Ten Square Miles Concession, and
Munro Lands,
were treated under the heading ‘Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar.
On these findings The Apex Court upheld the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 and dismissed the challenge of the Company.
Pandarapattom lands in Cochin & Travancore – Proprietary Right in the Soil
(In the matter of compensation when acquire land by Govt – under Art. 31A, Constitution)
Following decisions are important in this regard:
1. Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694
Proprietary Rights to Pandarapattom Lands in Cochin, in view of 1905 Proclamation.
N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. (descending) referred 1040 Travancore Proclamation, and said that there was only withdrawal of the right by the State and no conferment.
2. Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 (FB)
Pandarapattom Confered No Proprietary Rights in Travancore; only treated as holding on perpetual leases. (Overruled in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez)
3. Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (5 Judge Bench)
Proclamation of 1040 (1865 AD), all Sircar-pattom-lands were converted into full proprietary-lands
Rev. Fr. Victor case – Tenants ofPandarapattom Confered Proprietary Rights
Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86, was overruled by the larger Bench in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 KLT 216: AIR 1971 Ker 168, and it was held that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the State was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31-A(2)(a). (See: Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369).
It was found in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez case that by the Proclamation of 1040, all Sircar-pattom-lands were converted into full proprietary-lands, and rights on tenants of Pandarapattom lands had thenceforth been conferred with proprietary-rights.
In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 KLT 216: AIR 1971 Ker 168, it was observed as under:
Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.:
“11. …. We have already shown how, in the face of the Proclamation of 1040, it is impossible to regard the holders of these lands as tenants in the strict sense of that term having only the right to enjoy the land and no interest in the land as such. We have also drawn attention to the fact that what they pay to the Government is, under the very terms of the Proclamation, assessment or land tax, in other words, land revenue, and not rent properly so-called. As stated in 1962 Ker LT 913 = (AIR 1963 Ker 86 FB). with reference to contemporary documents, the avowed purpose of theProclamation of 1040 was to place pandarapattam lands on the same footing as ryotwari landsin the neighbouring province of Madras, and wo have no doubt that it succeeded in doing so. If the relations between the holder of a land and the Government are placed on the same footing as the relations between the holder of ryotwari land and the Government, it seems to us that it necessarily follows that the land is held under ryotwari settlement–it is the factual relationship and not the label that counts and no concept of legal rights is involved. ….
Per KK Mathew, J.
17……. To my mind the terms of the Proclamation leave no doubt that full proprietary interest has been conferred upon the holders of pandarapattom lands. ….Clause (2) is the pivotal clause; and it provides that the ryots holding such lands may regard them fully private, saleable and otherwise heritable and transferable property. Clause (4) guarantees the continued undisturbed enjoyment of the land so long as the appointed assessment is paid. Clause (6) makes it clear that the lands will be resumable by the State like other jenmom or private land only for public purpose and when resumed for such purposes compensation will be paid by the Sirkar not only for the improvements but also for the full market value of the property. Clause (7) provided that the rights conferred by the Proclamation would not in any way affect the right of the Sirkar to regulate land tax or to resume escheats or to confiscate the property of criminals. Clauses (6) and (7) are very significant. What are reserved to the Sirkar by Clauses (6) and (7) are not anv proprietary rights in the land. The rights which inhere in every sovereign in respect of every property within his jurisdiction like eminent domain, the right to impose or regulate tax, to resume escheats, to confiscate property of criminals, are alone reserved by those clauses. They not only do not derogate from the grant of full proprietary interest made by Clauses (1), (2) and (4), but would highlight that no proprietary rights have been reserved to the State. If the sovereign was careful to reserve to himself in respect of these lands only those rights which appertain to sovereignty and not any right which relates to dominium, that is a clear indication that no right relating to dominium was intended to be retained by the Sirkar. Even if the clauses were absent, the Sirkar would have those rights as they appertain to sovereignty and not to dominium. In other words, if by way of abundant caution the clauses reserved to the Sirkar only rights which appertain to sovereignty, there was absolutely no reason why the rights, if any, relating to dominium or ownership were not reserved, if the sovereign intended to retain any right in respect of the lands.….. I think, a holder of pandarapattom land satisfies even the orthodox definition of ownership by Austin. Austin defines the right of ownership as a–“right indefinite in point of user, unrestricted in point of disposition, and unlimited in point of duration, over a determinate thing.” (See ‘Jurisprudence’ by Austin, 3rd Edn., page 817.)
19. The basic concept of ‘estate’ is that the person holding the estate should be the proprietor of the soil and should be in direct relationship with the State by paying land revenue to it except where it is remitted in whole or in part. See AIR 1962 SC 694. As I have said the pattom Proclamation conferred full proprietary rights on tenants of pandarapattom lands, and they are also in direct relation with the State by paying land revenue. Since there is no definition of the word ‘estate’ in the existing local law relating to land tenure, pandarapattom land is the local equivalent of ‘estate,’ because its attributes conform to the basic concept of the term.”
Though Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 KLT 216: AIR 1971 Ker 168, was overruled in Velayudhan Vivekanandan v. Ayyappan Sadasivan, ILR 1975-1 Ker 166; 1975 KLT 1, it was without probing into the question – whether the Proclamation conferred, on the tenants, absolute proprietary rights or not. It was observed as under:
“4. The Full Bench decision in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 KLT 216: AIR 1971 Ker 168, also, I think with great respect, has not been correctly decided. The document that was considered therein was styled as ‘Ottikuzhikanam” …. The Full Bench observed that the words, in the operative portion of the document, would put it beyond any doubt that the property was given for enjoyment.”
Effect of Travancore Govt. Leases AFTERRoyal Pattom Proclamations of 1040and 1061
Now a question arises: What is the impact of 1040 and 1061 (1886) Proclamations over the ‘Government Land Leases’ (Pandaravakappattoms) made after 1061 (1886)? Do such leased lands qualify as “estate” under Article 31A of the Constitution?
The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out (by the Government) after 1061 (1886) do not acquire the rights of ‘permanency of tenure’ or attain the ‘proprietary interest’ conferred by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061. If such rights of permanency and ‘proprietary interest’ are axiomatically conferred as a matter of course, the result would be that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands (after the Proclamations), for, the lease character would be lost at the moment it is made.
In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (five Judge Bench), 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.), concluded that the land covered by the Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 were “estates” falling under Art. 31A of the Constitution. It was on the finding that the Proclamation “secured permanency of tenure”, and “proprietary interest” in the soil. It was observed as under:
“7. It is impossible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that,evenafter the Proclamation of 1040, the holders of these lands had no proprietary interest whatsoever in the soil and remained tenants in the strict sense of that term, with only the right of enjoyment, the only difference being that they secured permanency of tenure, the Government still remaining the full and absolute proprietor of the soil.”
Therefore, there is a clear difference between leases made before and after the Proclamations; and the rights conferred by the Proclamations do not apply to leases made after the Proclamations.
The nature of Pandaravaka lands is explained in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual (Revised Edition), Volume Ill, Part I, page 6 as under:
“The proclamation of 1040 converted them into permanent leases and conferred on the holders thereof permanent rights of occupancy, heritable and alienable.” (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.)
There is no scope for arguing that the future “Pandarappattoms” (future tenancy by Government) was ‘made void’ by the proclamation; or in other words, that the 1040 Proclamation “binds” the future Government tenancies also.
1040 Proclamation and ‘Grant‘ of Plantation Land by Travancore Government
In George A. Leslie v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 Ker 21 (K. K. Mathew, J.), it was argued that benefits of 1040 (1865) Travancore Pattom Proclamation were also entitled to by the Grantees of plantation land. After analysing the provisions of the grant deed it was held that Proclamation of 1040 (1865), which conferred full rights on tenants of pandarapattom land, did not apply to grant-lands.
George A. Leslie v. State of Kerala –AIR 1970 Ker 21
It was observed in this decision as under:
“Ext. P-l is a grant made under the Travancore Regulation II of 1040 and the Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills dated 24th April 1865. It conferred a heritable and transferable interest in the grantees of the land comprised in it. Clause 5 in Ext. P-l, which is identical with Section 5 in Form A of the Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills, is the relevant provision for deciding this question. It provides:
“Grantees can appropriate to their own use within the limits of the grant all timber except the following and such as may hereinafter be reserved, namely, Teak, Gole Teak, Blackwood, Ebony, Karcomthaly, Sandalwood; should they carry any timber without the limits of the grant, it will be subject to the payment of kuttikanom or customs duty or both, as the case may be, in the same way as timber ordinarily felled”.
10. We think that if title to the reserved trees passed to the grantees, a provision of this nature would have been quite unnecessary. There was no purpose in stating that the grantees will be free to appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant, if title to the trees passed to the grantees; the provision is a clear indication that the grantees were allowed to cut and appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant as a matter of concession.”
It was pointed out –
Travancore Pattom Proclamation of 1040 (1865), which conferred full rights on tenants of pandarapattom land. They have no application to the land or trees comprised in grants for cultivation of coffee or tea (under Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills dated 24th April 1865).
The above findings of Mathew, J. was approved the Apex Court in State of Kerala v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272, under the following words:
“We agree with the interpretation given to the clause by Mathew, J. and hold that the respondent- company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession Area or the trees and the timber therein.”
The effect of Grant deeds were also considered in the following two important cases by the Supreme Court-
Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301
State of Kerala v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272
Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd.v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301
As detailed above, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301 held that Kenan Devan Hills Concession (on grant deeds) fall within the expression “Janmam right” vested with Sircar. The State of Kerala made an Act – the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971, to “vest” the possession of the land remained in the possession of the Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd.
According to the petitioner Company, ‘it has at all times been holding, cultivating, enjoying and dealing with the Concession Land as the absolute, owner thereof’. According to the State, this land is dealt with under this heading – Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar, and that it was only “granted” to the company for ‘coffee cultivation’. The Apex Court upheld the contention of the Government.
State of Kerala v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272
With respect to the same property it was held in State of Kerala v. Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272, as under:
“The Trial Court in a detailed and well-reasoned judgment dismissed the suit of the company. The Trial Court on the interpretation of First Concession (Exhibit P- 1), Second Concession (Exhibit P-2), deed of ratification (Exhibit P-62) and the Government agreement with the Society dated August 2, 1866 (Exhibit P-64) came to the conclusion that the company did notacquireabsolute proprietary rightsover the Concession Area or the trees and timber in the said area. It was held that the Poonjar Chief had only conveyed heritable and transferable possessory rights over the Concession area to the grantee. It was also held that absolute rights over the trees and timber in the Concession Area did not pass to the grantee and it had only the right to use and remove timber subject to the restrictions imposed in the deeds of conveyance/ratification.”
It is observed:
“An identical clause in another grant entered into by the Travancore Government came for consideration before a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in George A Leslie v. State of Kerala, [1969] K. L.T. 378, K. K. Mathew, J. (as the learned Judge then was) interpreted the clause as under:
“ We think that if title to the reserved trees passed to the grantees, a provision of this nature would have been quite unnecessary. There was no purpose in stating that the grantees will be free to appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant, if title to the trees passed to the grantees; the provision is a clear indication that the grantees were allowed to cut and appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant as a matter of concession.”
“We agree with the interpretation given to the clause by Mathew, J. and hold that the respondent- company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession Area or the trees and the timber therein.”
It is observed further:
“It was further held by Mathew, J. (in George A. Leslie v. State of Kerala, 1969 KLT 378) that kuttikanam being the governments share of the value of the trees owned by the government it has the power to fix the value of the trees. We agree with the reasoning and conclusions reached by Mathew, J.”
The Apex Court upheld and approved “the judgment and findings” of the Trial Court.
Effect of Travancore Govt. Leases afterRoyal Pattom Proclamations of 1040and 1061
During the second half of the 19th century several Royal Proclamations were promulgated with a view to confer rights in the land to the tenants who were the real cultivators. Majority of the people were engaged in agriculture; but the lands belonged to Jenmies (Sircar, Brahmins or Devaswoms). The cultivators held the land under lease arrangement known as Pattom, Otti, Inam and Viruthi etc. One of the important Regulations came in the line of agrarian reforms was the Royal Proclamation of 1040 ME (1865 AD). It pertained to Pattom (lease) tenements created (by Sircar) on Sirkar lands known as Pandaravaka lands. It is exalted as the Magna Carta of peasants of Travancore it being led to conferring land to tillers, step by step.
Paragraph 9 of the Royal Proclamation of 1061 (1886) brought in further radical changes as regards Pandarapattam lands. It said as under:
““these lands were originally the absolute property of Government, and the tenants were mere tenants-at-will; but, by the Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, Government generously waived all right to these lands, and declared them to be the private, hereitable, saleable property of the holders.”.”
Section 22 of the Settlement Proclamation of 1061 (1886) made further changes in land tenure.
Those changes were:
(1) no debt shall be recognised as due to the holder;
(2) no interest shall be deducted from the Pattom on such debt;
(3) no reduction of debt or a corresponding enhancement of the Sirkar demand shall be made when such properties were transferred by sale.
The properties held on the tenures in question shall be recognised as so many favourably assessed lands or Inams and confirmed to the holders as such.
Clause 7 of Section 24 of the Proclamation provided as under:
“There shall be no further interference on the part of the Government with these free holds, except such as might be necessary for the punctual realization of the quit rent payable”. (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.)
Now a question arises: What is the impact of 1040 and 1061 (1886) Proclamations over the ‘Government Land Leases’ made after 1061 (1886)? Do such leased lands qualify as “estate” under Article 31A of the Constitution?
The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out (by the Government) after 1061 (1886) do not acquire the rights of ‘permanency of tenure’ or attain the ‘proprietary interest’ conferred by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061. If such rights are axiomatically conferred as a matter of course, the result would be that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands (after the Proclamations), for, the lease character would be lost at the moment it is made.
In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (five Judge Bench), 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.), concluded that the land covered by the royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 were “estates” falling under Art. 31A of the Constitution. It was on the finding that the Proclamation “secured permanency of tenure”, and “proprietary interest” in the soil. It was observed as under:
“7. It is impossible to acceptthe contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that,evenafter the Proclamation of 1040, the holders of these lands had no proprietary interest whatsoever in the soil and remained tenants in the strict sense of that term, with only the right of enjoyment, the only difference being that they secured permanency of tenure, the Government still remaining the full and absolute proprietor of the soil.”
Devaswom Proclamation, 1922 & 1948 and Formation of Dev. Board
The History of Governmental Administration of Devaswoms mark four phases. They are:
(i) Administration as the Land Revenue Department – started in 987 ME (1811-1812 AD) under the edicts of Col. Munro.
(ii) Administration as the Devaswom Department – from 1922 Devaswom Proclamation.
(iii) Direct Administration by Maharaja by the 1948 Proclamationassuming controlof Devaswoms and Devaswom Department.
(iv) Administration under Devaswom Board – from 1950 in accordance with the enactment, Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950.
Administration ‘AS’ the Governemnt Departments
By virtue of ‘organising’ the Devaswoms “as” the Land Revenue Department (from 987 ME) and “as” the Devaswom Department (by Proclamation, 1922), Devaswoms mentioned in the schedule thereof were treated as the ‘property of the State’.
The history as to the formulation of the Devaswom Proclamation, 1922, is given in M. Muraleedharan Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR1991 Ker 25. It was laid down:
The Hindu temples in the State of Travancore were mostly under private management called Ooralars or Karakars.
As those bodies were found mismanaging the institutions, Col. Munro decided in 987 ME (1811-1812 AD) that the State should assume control over them.
With a view to secure better management of the Devaswoms, the Government appointed a committee to report upon the assumptions of those Devaswoms, the feasibility of separating their administration from the Land Revenue Department and cost if a separate department be deemed desirable.
The Commitlee, recommended that the administration of the Devaswom should be separated from the Land Revenue Department and entrusted to a distinct agency.
The Government of Travancore after taking necessary legal opinion came to the conclusion that creation of a separate department exclusively to the administration of Devaswoms was necessary.
Considering that it is the solemn right and duty of the Government to maintain efficiently and in good condition the Hindu Religious Institutions the State the Travancore Government issued the Devaswom Proclamation on 12th April, 1922 corresponding to 30th Meenom, 1097.
Section 7 of the Proclamation is as under:
“7.(1) Our Government may for the better and more efficient management and more effective control of the Devaswoms mentioned in the schedule organised a Devaswom Department of the State consisting of such number of officers and other servants as they think fit.
2. The expenditure in connection with the said Department shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 3 and 4, be not out of the general revenue of the State.”
The Devaswom Department has become a part of the Government Department.
Administration ‘UNDER’ the Travancore Devaswom Board
The history shows that a “material change” was brought forth by the formulation of the Travancore Devaswom Board. It is laid down in M. Muraleedharan Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR 1991 Ker 25, as under:
The Maharaja did not want to leave the administration of the Devaswoms to the State Government in the new set up. Therefore on 10-8-1123 (23-3-1948), yet another proclamation was issued by which the Maharaja assumed controlof Devaswoms and Devaswom Department of the Government.
A material change also made in respect of funds from which expenditure. It was also provided that expenditure to be made not from general revenue but only from Devuswom fund.
Thereafter when Travancore-Cochin States were integrated it was provided by Section 8(c) of the Covenant that the administration of the Devaswoms, Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments and their properties and funds would vest with effect from 1-8-1949 in a Board known as Travancore Devaswom Board.
The Hindu Religious Institutions Ordinance 10 of 1124 was promulgated which came into force on 1-8-1949. Before expiry of the period of Ordinance, Act 15 of 1950, namely the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 was enacted.
Section 3 of the Act provided (as regards the formation of the Travancore Devaswom Board) as under:
“The administration of Incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and of Hindu Religious Endowments and all their properties and funds as well as the fund constituted under the Devaswom Proclamation, 1097 M. E. and the Surplus Fund Constituted under the Devaswom (Amendment) Proclamation, 1122 M. E. which were under the management of the Ruler of Travancore prior to the first day of July 1949, except the Sree Padrnanabhaswamy Temple, Sree Pandaravaga properties and all other properties and funds of the said temple, and the management of all institutions which were under the Devaswom Department shall vest in the Travancore Devaswom Board.”
The power of nomination given to the Ruler of Travancore was taken away and was given to the Council of Ministers by Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions (Amendment) Act 70 of 1974. Thereafter, of the three Hindu members of the Board, two will have to be nominated by the Hindus among the Council of Minister. The power given to Rajpramukh was subsequently vested in the Governor.
Part IV: Art. 31A of the Constitution of India and ‘Estates’
History – in Nutshell
Mythology ofParasurama: According to the prevailing mythology, Parasurama, the founder of Kerala, gave lands to Brahmins. The lands belonging to Brahmins constituted Jenmom(Janmom/Genmom) lands.
Jenmies: In the course time, the Brahmins and prominent Nairs came-out as the territorial lords. They were called Jenmies. The rest of the people cultivated the lands under these Jenmies.
Devaswom lands: The Jenmies endowed lands to temples, and thus emerged the Devaswom lands.
Devaswom and Brahmaswom lands: By 8th century, the entire cultivable lands came under (i) the Devaswoms or temples (Devaswom lands), and (ii) the Brahmin Janmies (Brahmaswom lands).
Sirkar a Jenmi: Original Janmam-holders were Brahmins (following Parasurama). By the act of Brahmins, Devaswoms also became Janmies.
In course of time, Sirkar itself became one of the Jenmis, it having come to possess Jenmom lands (Brahmaswom and Devaswom) by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation and other ways.
Period of Marthandavarma: In Travancore, during the period of Marthandavarma, the entire assets owned by the King were regarded as the property that belonged to the Treasury or Offertory (Bhandaram).
Travancore Proclamation of 1040 (1865):In Travancore, by virtue of Proclamation of 1040 (1865), all Sirkar (or Pandaravaga) pattom-lands were converted into full proprietary-lands.
Cochin Settlement Proclamation of 1080 (1905) : In Cochin, Settlement Proclamation of 1080 ME (1905 AD) conferred the holders of Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands ‘full rights to the soil of the lands’.
Settlement of Travancore: The survey and settlement of Travancore were finalised in 1910.
Ryotwari-tenures: In Malabar (formed part of the erstwhile Madras province), two types of tenures were important: landlord-tenures and the ryotwari-tenures (tenancy on Govt. land).
British Government, Permanent settlement: The permanent settlement (to fix revenue to be raised from land) was introduced by the British Government in the Malabar area in 1802.
Ryotwari Pattadar a Tenant: Under the ryotwari system, land was given on lease by the government to the ryot (tenant or cultivator) under a patta. A ryotwari pattadar was only a tenant.
Sakthan Thampuran, Cochin: Cochinwas brought under the centralised administration by the King, Rama Varma, popularly known as Sakthan Thampuran (1790 – 1805).
Pandaravaka lands: During the second half of 18th century major portion of the lands, in both Travancore and Cochin kingdoms, were brought under the respective Government administration and these lands were called Sircar or Pandaravaka lands.
KLR Act – socio-economic legislation: Except Kerala, no other state in India has implemented the socio-economic legislation like Kerala Land Reforms Act to safeguard the interest of the agricultural classes.
The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 made Kerala change tremendously.
Classification of Lands in Travancore
The lands were classified under 8 heads in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual (1915).
They were –
(i) Edavagas;
(ii) Registered lands;
(iii) Purambokes;
(iv) Tharisu or assessed waste;
(v) Thanathuchitta lands;
(vi) Reserved Forests;
(vii) Reserved lands or proposed reserves; &
(viii) Unreserved lands.
Travancore Land-Tenures
According to the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, (1915), the tenures fall under two main heads:
Sirkar or Pandaravaga (By virtue of Proclamation of 1040 (1865), all Sircar-pattom-lands were converted into full proprietary-lands);
Janmam (Janmam includes Devaswom & Brahmaswom.)
In settlement (1910), numerous tenancy-tenures had been recognized. For practical purposes, as per the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, the tenures were classified as under:
1. Sirkar or Pandaravaga
2. Sirkar Devaswom vaga
3. Kandukrishi
4. Sreepadam vaga
5. Sree pandaravaga
6. Janmam (Includes Devaswom, Brahmaswom)
Jenmom Lands
In Travancore State Manual (Vol. III, page 315) while dealing with freehold jenmom lands (in the province of Poonjar Chief) it is said as under:
“The peculiarity of these Jenmom properties is that their owners have absolute control over them and that they take from the ryots the pattern or rent as well as the Rajabhogam, which in the case of other lands would go to the State and that the Devaswom and Brahmaswom lands in these tracts pay their Rajabhogam or quit rent to these Chiefs instead of to the Sirkar.” (See: Godavarma Valia Raja v. Bhoothi Swamiyar, AIR 1953 TC 408; ILR 1954 TC 109)
Land-Classification in Cochin
Pandaravaka lands – The lands owned by the State, or State having the jenmom or proprietary right. (Settlement Proclamation of Cochin of 1080 ME (1905 AD) conferred the holders of Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands ‘full rights to the soil of the lands‘.)
Puravaka land (“outside land”)- The land over which the proprietary right (jenmam right) was vested with private individuals or public institutions (or land in which janmam right did not vest in the Sarkar, but, “outside”).
Tenancy in the aforesaid lands: Verumpattom – This was simple leasehold. It was the chief land system of tenancy. By a series of legislative enactments, tenants gained occupancy rights in the lands held by them.
Ryotwari System in Malabar
Ryotwari was a system of land revenue collection introduced by Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras, in 1820. The Government began to collect revenue or rent directly from the cultivators or tenants, bypassing the Zamindars or landlords. Subsequently, it was introduced in several other parts of British India.
Actually, it was an improved system of revenue collection successfully practiced by the Mughals, who reigned in northern India, just before the British.
Munro actually reduced the rent that tenants had previously paid to landlords; that is, from one-half to one-third of the produce; however, it was still considered exorbitant.
Ryots were Tenants; the sum payable was essentially ‘Rent’
While the payments made by the ryots were termed either ‘assessment’ or ‘rent’. But, the legislative enactments in this area demonstrate a distinct legal preference for the term ‘rent’ rather than the more administrative notion of ‘assessment’.
Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, XXX of 1947, reads as under:
“An Act to provide for the reduction of rents payable by ryots in estates governed by the ‘(Tamil Nsdu] Estates Land Act, 1908, approximately to the level of the assessments levied on lands in ryotwari areas in the neighbourhood and for the collection of such rents exclusively by the State Government.” (Referred to in: State of Madras v. Kannepalli Chinna Venkata Chalamaya Sastri, AIR 1962 SC 1687; 1963 1 SCR 155; Shree Raja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannatha Rao v. State of AP, AIR 1971 SC 71; 1969-3 SCC 71).
Madras District Boards Act (Madras Act XIV of 1920) Section 79 reads as under:
“79. The annual rentvalue shall, for the purposes of S. 78, be calculated in the following manner: (i) In the case of lands held direct from Government on ryotwari tenure or on lease or licence, the assessment, lease amount, royalty or other sum payable to Government for the lands, together with any water-rate which may be payable for their irrigation shall be taken to be the annual rent value…..” (Quoted in: H. R. S. Murthy v. Collector Of Chittoor: AIR 1965 SC 177; 1964-6 SCR 666)
It is also clear from 1040 ME (1865) Pattom Proclamation of Travancore (considered as a Magna Carta issued by the King to the cultivators). It begins as under:
“Whereas we earnestly desire that the possession of landed as well as other property in Our territory should be as secure as possible; and whereas We are of opinion that, with this view, SirkarPattom** lands can be placed on a much better footing than at present so as to enhance their value; We are pleased to notify to Our ryots: …”
** Note: ‘Sirkar‘ means Government; ‘Pattom‘ means rent.
In Travancore State Manual (Vol. III, page 315) it is stated as under:
“The peculiarity of these Jenmom properties is that their owners have absolute control over them and that they take from the ryots the pattern or rent as well as the Rajabhogam …. “
Malabar was a part of erstwhile Madras Presidency, ruled by British. The reign of British traces its history from the establishment of the East India Company.
East India Company was a joint-stock company that was founded in 1600. It was formed to trade in the Indian Ocean region, initially with the East Indies (South Asia and Southeast Asia), and later with East Asia. The company gained control of large parts of the Indian subcontinent and Hong Kong. It eventually came to rule large areas of the Indian subcontinent, exercising military power and assuming administrative functions. The company initiated the beginnings of the British Raj in the Indian subcontinent.
By 1647, the company had 23 factories and settlements in India. Many of the major factories became some of the most populated and commercially influential cities in Bengal, including the walled forts of Fort William in Bengal, Fort St George in Madras, and Bombay Castle (Wikipedia).
Land Law in Madras Presidency, BR Chakravarthy
‘Land Law in Madras Presidency’, BR Chakravarthy, 1927, page 31 reads as under:
“When the East India Company assumed control over the administration of the province, the revenues of the land were being collected mainly in two ways. The first was that people going by the name of Zamindars and poligars, collected the revenue from the ryots and paid a certain percentage of the collection to the government, retaining the balance for themselves; as remuneration for their services; the second was that the Sirkar collected the land revenue directly. But even in the latter case, instead of employing a gradation of officers, for collecting the revenue from each individual ryots, as we have it now in the case of ryotwari lands, the government farmed out the revenues of single villages or groups of villages to individuals or to village communities leaving the task of internal collection to those intermediate agents called renters. This system offered a splendid opportunity to many a speculator to enrich themselves at the cost of the poor cultivators. Thus, there existed in general an intermediate agency in one form or other.
In the system of collecting revenue by middlemen, there were two important defects.
Firstly, there was no limit to the demand made by the government. They went on increasing their demand from year to year, without any regard whatever to the conditions .and prosperity of the cultivators.
Secondly, there was nothing to prevent the Zamindars or middlemen from rack-renting the tenants under their control; or whenever the government raised its demand, the middlemen in their turn began to squeeze the tenants to the utmost, and in their anxiety to see, that they incurred no loss from their own pockets, but had a decent fraction of the collections left for them after paying the government its due, they more often than not, made the position of the ryots simply intolerable.”
‘Janmam Right in Jenmi‘ in Malabar
Different from riotwary settlement in other parts of Madras Presidency
In ‘Land Law in Madras Presidency’, BR Chakravarthy, 1927, page 372, it is stated as under:
“The land Revenue settlement in Malabar differs from the ordinary riotwary settlement in the rest of the presidency in that in Malalabar the existence of lit landlord between the state and the actual cultivator is recognised in the theoretical distribution of the produce, on which- the rates of assessment are based. For instance, in the case of wet lands, from the commuted value of the annual grain out-tum a deduction of 15 per cent is first made for vicissitudes of season and unprofitable areas; then a further deduction is made for cultivation expenses, of the balance is set apart for the cultivator’s share; and 6/10 of the remainder is fixed as the assessment. The calculation with respect to dry lands is similar and is even more lenient.
The reason of this difference from the rest of the presidency can be understood only if we bear in mind the essential distinction, or at any rate what according government constitutes an essential distinction, in regard to private ownership of land between Malabar and the cast of the presidency. The right of ownership in land in Malabar is termed janmam and is said to comprise the tall and complete ownership in land; so that the owner of janmam right or jenmi as he is called, is absolutely entitled not merely to the soil, but to all things above and below it from the highest point of heaven to the lowest depths of the earth. At one time, there was considerable dispute on this question in regard to Malabar as it was with regard to the other parts of the presidency. But it was ultimately accepted by the Government itself that in Malabar, at least, the private ownership mast be taken to exist in the jemnis and that the government could not claim any such right.”
Lands held under Ryotwari tenure after Ryotwari Settlement (1934)
In Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301; 1972-2 SCC 218, it was pointed out that it was held by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Sukapuram Sabhayogam v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Kerala 101 that the lands, after 1934, were ‘held under Ryotwari tenure after the introduction of the Ryotwari Settlement in the Malabar area of Kerala State’.
Note: The expression ‘estate’ in Article 31A (relating to ‘acquisition’ of land etc.) included ‘ryotwari’ land also by virtue of the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution on June 20, 1964 with retrospective effect.
Lease by Government, under Pattas
Under the ryotwari system, land was given on lease by the government to the ryot (or cultivator) under a patta. A ryotwari pattadar was not a proprietor of land in its full sense, but only a tenant.
Our Apex Court, in Threesiamma Jacob v.Geologist, Dptt. of Mining & Geology, AIR 2013 SC 3251; 2013-3 KLT 275; 2013-9 SCC 725, it is held as under:
“26. Coming to the ryotwari tenures, this Court [In Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 723] held that they were governed by the standing orders issued from time to time by the Revenue Board. Under the ryotwari system land was given on lease by the government to the ryot under a patta. Noticing the salient features of the ryotwari system as explained in various authoritative works, this Court opined that “though a ryotwari pattadar is virtually like a proprietor and has many of the advantages of such a proprietor”, such pattadar was never considered a proprietor of land but only a tenant.” (Also quoted in Raphy John v. Land Revenue Commissioner, Thiruvananthapuram, 2022-3 KLT 679.)
‘Ryotwari‘ Land included in ‘Estate’ by Constitutional Amendment
In S. Thenappa Chettiarv. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1986 SC 1117, it was held, following Khajamian Wakf Estates v. State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 161, that the expression ‘estate’ in Article 31A included ‘ryotwari‘ land also by virtue of the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution on June 20, 1964 with retrospective effect.
‘Jenmam’ (freehold right) is ‘Estate’ within Article 31A
In K. K. Kochunni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080 and Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, 1962 Ker LT 913 : AIR 1963 Ker 86 it was held that janmom right was the freehold right with ‘proprietary interest’.
Note: ‘Freehold’ – “In common law jurisdictions such as England and Wales, Australia, Canada, and Ireland, a freehold is the common mode of ownership of real property, or land, and all immovable structures attached to such land. It is in contrast to a leasehold, in which the property reverts to the owner of the land after the lease period expires or otherwise lawfully terminates” (Wikipedia). It doesn’t mean that such lands are free from payment of tax or revenue to the Government.
Pandaravaka Verumpattom in Cochin & ‘Pandarapattom‘ in Travancore – ‘Estate’ under Article 31A
In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court held that in the erstwhile Cochin State, Pandaravaka Verumpattom were proprietors of the lands and hold the lands subject to the liability to pay the assessment to the State, and therefore Pandaravaka verumpattom could be regarded as local equivalent of an ‘estate’* under clause (2) of Article 31A of the Constitution.
Five-Judge-Bench in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1: AIR 1971 Ker 168, held that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the Kerala State satisfies even the orthodox definition of ownership by Austin, and was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution.
Part I
Ancient History of Land of Kerala
Ancient Kerala had a peculiar culture of its own. It experienced an isolated life, protected by the Western Ghats on east and Arabian Sea on west. This land of mountains and forest was divided by a good number of rivers. The term Kerala was first epigraphically recorded as Ketalaputo in a 3rd century BCE rock inscription by emperor Ashoka (Encyclopaedia Britannica & Wikipedia).
The topographical situations made small and scattered villages with their own leaders or ‘Naduvazhis’ (Local Chiefs). The people here collected Hill Produces and tried agriculture. The calm gulf of Arabian Sea with favorable wind brought several merchants from Persian countries which were highly rich at that time.
The Arian Invasion
The Arian invasion from North India, through the eastern passages in Western Ghats, started in the 3rd century. It made considerable change in the life and style of the people of medieval Kerala. By 8th century the Aryans made a complete change in the social scenario. Brahmins, the priestly class, predominated the emigrants. They slowly caught hold of superiority in all fields of life. They were superior in intelligence, and people with ‘knowledge and experience’ in all walks of life. Brahmins made temples and attracted people there.
Rise of Brahmin Janmies
Aryans subjugated the minds of the native people including the rulers and made them consider that Brahmins were the servants of the God and deity. They introduced paddy cultivation and led people do agriculture in a large scale. The fascinating techniques taught by the Aryans miraculously increased the agricultural productivity. They succeeded in getting lands endowed by the Rulers to the temples and Brahmins in the entire erstwhile Travancore, Cochin and Malabar areas. They also made people offer the agricultural produces, and part of their income, to the temple. Temples were centers of collection of wealth. It also became the centers of distribution of food, and other articles. They were centers of learning and art also.
Devaswom Lands and Brahmaswom Lands
The Kings and other ‘Naduvazhis’ relied on Brahmins to carry on their administration in a successful manner. Brahmins or their families became the administrators or ‘Ooralers’ of the temples. Almost the entire cultivable lands were under the Devaswoms or temples (Devaswom lands) , and the Brahmin Janmies (Brahmaswom lands). A myth was rooted, by passage of time, in the minds of people, that this land was one reclaimed by Parasurama from Arabian Sea and that he entrusted this land to Brahmins. It was also believed that Parasurama was a great warrior and that he conquered this land and appointed Brahmins as the territorial lords. Slowly, the Aryans, who monopolised the whole of the land, began to rule the territory, directly or indirectly.
Jenmom lands and Exalted position of Brahmins
The Brahmins and prominent Nairs were the territorial lords. The owners of these lands were called Jenmies; and the lands belonged to them were known as Jenmom lands. The Sirkar (King) was the greatest Jenmi. Apart from original Jenmom lands, the rulers and the King obtained land by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation etc.
The exalted position of Brahmins in the society increased day by day, during the medieval period. A major portion of the cultivable land remained under the ‘Janmam’ of Brahmins.
Malabar and Chera Kingdom
Malabar was used to denote entire costal land from Goa to Kanyakumari, in ancient times, until the British limited it to the portion of land confined to northern part of present Kerala. During ‘Middle Ages’, till 12st century, entire Malabar remained under Chera Kingdom (from 9th Century). After breaking up of this Kingdom, the chieftains of the respective region proclaimed their political independence. They included the Zamorins of Calicut and Kolathiri; rulers of Perumbadappu Swaroopam (Later, Kingdom of Cochin), Naduvazhis of Venad, Valluvanad etc.
The land-scenario heftily changed on the advent of Dutch (1663–1773) and English (1773- 1947). The permanent settlement (fix revenue to be raised from land) was introduced by the British Government in the Malabar area in 1802. It obligated the jenmis to pay revenue to the State. But did not in any way affect their proprietary rights in the lands. (Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 2240; Thressiamma Jacob v. Geologist, Dptt. of Mining, 2013 (9) SCC 725).
Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1887 & its Repeal in 1901
In the “Report of the Malabar Tenancy Committee, 1940, Volume I” (in which EMS Namboothiripad, MLA was a member) it is observed –
“14. The question of land tenures first attracted the serious attention of the Government because of the Moplah outbreaks which assumed grave proportions from 1836 onwards and continued to mar the tranquillity of Malabar down to recent times.”
The Report narrated the following executive/legislative steps, to improve the situation of the tenants (on Kanam basis) –
i. The Government, in 1881 appointed Mr. Logan as Special Commissioner to investigate the question of land tenures and the adequacy of compensation allowed for tenants’ improvements. “He recommended legislation for giving fixity of tenure to actual cultivators of holdings not exceeding 25 acres of wet or dry land, or of 5 acres of garden land. He further recommended the fixing of the rent at two-thirds of the net produce. The report was vigorously criticized by various persons and the whole question of Malabar tenures was referred by the Government to a Special Commission presided over by Sir T. Madhava Rao ……”
The Special Commission presided over by Sir T. Madhava Rao, in their report, dated 17th July 1884, recommended giving fixity of tenure to persons who held directly under the janmis for a stated period of years. “The views of the Commission were subjected to a very trenchant criticism by the then Chief Justice of Madras. He upheld the view that the janmi had always possessed an unqualified and absolute right to the soil and that the tenant could be evicted at his pleasure after the contractual period of the tenancy.”
ii. In view of the strong observations made by the Chief Justice, the Government appointed a very strong Committee. The Committee decided that it was necessary to give the tenant on eviction the full value of his improvements and accordingly a bill was drafted to that effect and submitted to the Government on 9th February 1886. The Government placed it on the Statute book as The Malabar Compensation for Tenants’ Improvements Act, I of 1887. The said committee recommended legislation to the effect that no tenant should be ejected except at the end of an agricultural year and after giving six months’ notice and that the Collector should be empowered to grant waste lands in the ownership of private persons on patta to agriculturists. They accordingly submitted a draft bill to the Government along with their report but the Government did not accept the bill. Experience of the working of the Act I of 1887 showed that it had not had the effect of checking the growing practice of eviction. The Government, therefore, undertook an examination of the causes of the partial failure of the Act and came to the conclusion that the failure was to some extent due to the inadequacy of the compensation awarded by the Courts and that further legislation was necessary to rectify the defects of the Act.
Iii. In 1901, Compensation for Tenants’ Improvements Bill drafted by Mr. Benson was passed into law as Act 1 of 1900 which had the effect of repealing Act I of 1887 and re-enacting it with considerable amendments. Within a few years of the passing of Act I of 1900complaints were made that it had not had the effect of imposing a check on the arbitrary exercise of the power of eviction and that ‘Melcharths’ had become usual for the purpose of evicting the tenants in possession.
iv. In 1905 the Government decided not to consider the matter further until the Estates Land Bill had been passed. In the Bill, as it was originally introduced in the Council, there was a provision enabling the Government to extend its operation by notification to the Malabar district, but the provision was removed before it was passed into law in 1908.
v. In 1911 the Government called for a report on the working of the Compensation for Tenants’ Improvements Act and this led to the re-opening of the larger question of a comprehensive tenancy Law for Malabar. The Collector of Malabar made a report in 1915. According to him, the main evils which required remedying were insecurity of tenure, rack-renting, exorbitant renewal fees, social tyranny and miscellaneous exactions. He came to the conclusion that it was a matter of economic necessity to give fixity of tenure to the tenant as the extension of cultivation would be greatly accelerated if the tenants who reclaimed lands were given more protection against eviction. He accordingly recommended that fixity of tenure should be given to all cultivating tenants, who had been in possession of land in a village for a period of 15 years. The proposals were severely criticized by his successor collector who reported that there was no political or economic reason for undertaking legislation. The Government agreed the same and dropped the question of tenancy legislation.
PN Prabhakaran Pillai, in ‘Historical Introduction to the Kerala Land Reforms Act and the Working of the Land Tribunals’, Cochin University Law Review 1, No. 1 (1974), pointed out that, in Malabar, a part of erstwhile Madras State, almost all lands including waste and forest lands were the private property of janmies. The janmies had been in the habit of evicting the tenants irrationally; and they had been giving land to new lessees, evicting former tenants, even when lease arrangements (with former tenants) were subsisting. The Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1887, and its amendments made thereto, did not improve the situation.
Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929
‘Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929 was passed to protect some tenants from such arbitrary evictions by conferring fixity of tenure to cultivating verumpattomdars’. By this Act, and the amendments made thereto in 1945,1951 and 1954, “protection was guaranteed” to all types of verumpattomdars and kanonmdars, according to Prabhakaran Pillai.
Travancore – Padmanabha Swamy Temple and ‘Bhandara Vaka’ Lands
The powerful King, Marthandavarma who ruled Travancore from 1729 to 1758, was successful in bringing all people and properties of Travancore (Southern Kingdom at present Kerala) under his administration; and collected tax from all lands except those that were expressly exempted.
The King of Travancore placed himself as the servant of the deity. The entire assets of Travancore were regarded as the property that belonged to the Treasury or Offertory (Bhandaram in Malayalam; Pandaram in Tamil) of the Principal deity – Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple at Thiruvanamthapuram.
Deed of Dedication
The Translation of the Original Deed of Dedication in Malayalam (quoted from “Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple” authored by Princess Aswathi Thirunal Gouri Lakshmi Bayi) reads as under:-
“We, Thrippappoor Keezhperur Veera Bala Marthanda Varma, Mootha Thiruvati (Senior member) of Thrippappoor and Sree Pandarakaryam Cheyvarkal, have this day, Wednesday the 5th day of the month of Thai, the seventh day of the bright lunar fortnight with Saturn residing in the eighth sign and Jupiter in the twelfth, Kollam 925, transfer by absolute gift and dedication, to endure as long as the Sun and Moon shall last, all the lands and functions appertaining thereto together with all rights and dignities, positions of honour and all other possessions that we have been hitherto enjoying as of right within the territories between the Thovala Fort in the East and the Kavana River in the West, in favour of Perumal Sree Padmanabha Perumal. In token whereof we have this day executed this deed of absolute gift and dedication.” (Quoted in: Marthanda Varma v. State of Kerala, 2021-1 SCC 225)
Report on The Census of Travancore, 1911
‘Report on The Census of Travancore, 1911’, Introduction reads as under:
“On the 17th of January, 1750, accompanied by the members of the Royal family, his minister and the principal officers, he proceeded in state to the shrine of Sri Padmanabha Svami at the Capital and publicly dedicated Travancore to the Deity by what is called the Thiruppadidanom ceremony (gift at the sacred foot-steps), undertaking to administer what then became Padmanabba’s State, as His agent and trustee, with the official title of “Sri Padmanabha Dasa” (Servant of Sri Padmanabha). This dedication, prompted by the then necessity, meant that all revenue was to be collected in the name of Sri Padmanabha Svami (Pandaravakai Muthal) and expended for the protection and development of the country’s national life.”
Census of India, 1951 (Travancore-Cochin)
In the official publication, ‘Census of India, 1951 (Travancore-Cochin), District Census Handbook, Trivandrum’, it is laid down as under:
After making the kingdom of Travancore the property of Sree Pandara Vagay, and converting all denominations of the State servants into Sree Pandarakariyum Chaywargal (men who perform the duty of the holy financial administration), the name of the talooks (districts) was changed and styled Mandapathomvathukal (the gate or presence of the pagoda,) and all business was now carried on under the new titles. The MahaRajah having next ordered Rama Iyen Dalawah to frame regular accounts and rules for fixing permanent taxes on lands and gardens, that official commenced a survey of them in 926 M.E. (1751 A.D.) , and conducted and completed this laborious work throughout Travancore in 929 M.E. (1754 A.D. ) The first Auyacattu account (assessment) in Travancore was clearly framed out after this survey, and the holders of lands and gardens were furnished with a Pathivu ( registry ).
Sri Marthanda Varma v. State of Kerala, 2021-1 SCC 225
In the appeal judgment, Sri Marthanda Varma v. State of Kerala, 2020-4 KLT 490: 2021-1 SCC 225, the Supreme Court extracted the history of the Padmanabha Swamy Temple set out by the Kerala High Court (in T. P. Sundara Rajan v. State of Kerala, ILR 2011-1 Ker 604; 2011-1 KHC 386; 2011-1 KLT 634). The High Court Judgment included the following:
“4. Before proceeding to consider the legal issues raised and the jurisdiction of the lower courts and that of this Court which are also issues raised before us based on Article 363 of the Constitution, we have to briefly state the history of the Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple. Even though the origin of the Temple is shrouded in antiquity and different versions are stated by different Authors, the modern history of this Great Temple starts with Anizham Thirunal Marthandavarma who established the modern Travancore State which was previously known as Venad. For over 200 years prior to the re-establishment of the Princely State and taking over of management of the Temple and the State by Marthandavarma, the Temple was under the control of “Ettarayogam” (group of eight and a half) consisting of seven pottis (Brahmins), one Nair chieftain and the King who had only half a vote, whereas all others had one vote each. While the committee of Potties controlled the Temple, the properties of the Temple were managed by Ettuveettil Pillamars, the 8 Nair chieftains belonging to eight big families spread over in different villages of the State. The King was a low key functionary in the Committee managing the Temple and he had only a very limited authority with half a vote……
The Ettuveettil Pillamars with the help of Brahmins in management of the Temple plotted against Marthandavarma becoming the King and they tried to instal the previous King’s son as the new King in deviation of the practice of the nephew of the King namely, Marthandavarma becoming the King. However, in the protracted battle that followed between the heir to the throne namely, Marthandavarma and his loyalists on the one side and the Ettuveettil Pillamars, the Brahmins, and the King’s son’s loyalists on the other side, Marthandavarma succeeded……
Marthandavarma took over full control of the State and the Padmanabha Swamy Temple and it is he who reconstructed the Temple which was in bad shape after a major fire that took place years back and installed a new idol.
In fact the King surrendered his Kingdom to the presiding Deity namely, Padmanabha Swamy and declared himself the Dasa or servant of the Lord and assumed the name “Padmanabhadasa“. Marthandavarma ruled Travancore from 1729 to 1758 and after him also the Temple continued to be under the direct management and control of the King.
The Supreme Court continued as under:
“5. The act of surrender or dedication of the entire kingdom to Sree Padmanabhaswamy as referred to by the High Court has been described in a book (Published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan) [Dr. A. G. Menon – ‘History of Sri Padmanabhasvami Temple Till 1758] titled “Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple” authored by Princess Aswathi Thirunal Gouri Lakshmi Bayi as under:-
“Thrippati Danam – 5th of Makaram 925-ME/1750 AD Fifth Makaram 925 ME/19th or 20th January 1750 AD (Wednesday asterism Revait) stood witness to the act of a sublime dedication, the ultimate offering possible for a crowned head, carried out in supreme devotion – the Thrippati Danam. [Many historical works (too many to be listed).] Like Arjuna before the Kurukshetra War and Emperor Ashoka after the Kalinga War, the futility of battles as a means to an end and the conscious feeling that the Travancore he created was built on a foundation of sacrifice of the liver and limbs of countless numbers who fell due to him and for him, deeply disturbed and distressed the Maharaja [Sree Uthradom Thirunal Marthanda Varma]. Along with the love which offered Marthanda Varma no satiation however much he might submit to his Lord, this trauma also activated him to surrender to God the Thiruvithamcoor (Travancore) stretching from Kanyakumari to Paravoor which he had won and made.
Before this dedication certain religious ceremonies like Poorna Kalasa Homam, invoking the Deity, and so on were performed, followed later by Mahabhishekam.
Maharaja Anizhom Thirunal Marthanda Varma arrived at the appointed time in the morning accompanied by all male and female members of his family, his trusted Dewan Ramayyan and other officials. In the presence of the Swamiyar, members of the yogam and Brahmins, the Maharaja is submitted to Sree Padmanabha Prajapati by Deed of Gift carrying his signature, his entire State of Travancore along with his total right on it thereof by placing the Crown, the royal umbrella, the twin white chauries (fans), the Manikandha; which were all symbols of royalty along with some Thulasi leaves on the Mandapam. Last but most significant, his famous sword, which had lashed its unleashed valour in countless battle fields, the unquestioned insignia of sovereign authority which the King valued the most, was also placed with utmost reverence by the Maharaja on the step of the Ottakkal Mandapam leading to the sanctum. Then the King received the sword back from the high priest and returned to the Palace after worship. His directive that any further conquest of territory brought under the rule of Travancore by his successors should also be surrendered to Sree Padmanabha Swamy was accepted and scrupulously adhered to with deep respect by the later generations.”
The English Translation of the Original Deed of Dedication which was drawn up in Malayalam is as under:-
“We, Thrippappoor Keezhperur Veera Bala Marthanda Varma, Mootha Thiruvati (Senior member) of Thrippappoor and Sree Pandarakaryam Cheyvarkal, have this day, Wednesday the 5th day of the month of Thai, the seventh day of the bright lunar fortnight with Saturn residing in the eighth sign and Jupiter in the twelfth, Kollam 925, transfer by absolute gift and dedication, to endure as long as the Sun and Moon shall last, all the lands and functions appertaining thereto together with all rights and dignities, positions of honour and all other possessions that we have been hitherto enjoying as of right within the territories between the Thovala Fort in the East and the Kavana River in the West, in favour of Perumal Sree Padmanabha Perumal. In token whereof we have this day executed this deed of absolute gift and dedication.”
VP Menon, who was the Constitutional Advisor to the Governor General
VP Menon, who was the Constitutional Advisor to the Governor General till 1947 and Secretary to the Ministry of States who ‘played a stellar role’ in the integration of the princely States into the Dominion of India, penned-down, ‘in part fulfilment of a promise made to the late Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’, the “Story of Integration of the Indian States”. While dealing with Travancore-Cochin, VP Menon wrote as under:
“These two States, together with Malabar, have evolved a distinctive custom and culture of their own. The area is divided from the rest of India by the Western Ghats; and if a visitor were to cross the Ghats and enter Malabar, he could not fail to be struck by the change in scenery as well as in the life and customs of the people.
The ruling family of Travancore traces its descent from the ancient Chera kings of South India. In later historic times, Travancore was split up into a number of petty principalities. The consolidation of these into a single State was the achievement of Rajah Marthanda Varma, who ruled in the first half of the eighteenth century. He brought the whole of Travancore under his sway, established order and settled the country. In January 1750, he formally and solemnly dedicated the State to Sri Padmanabha, the tutelary deity of his family; and he and his successors have ever since ruled as ‘Dasas’, or servants of that deity.” (Quoted in: Sri Marthanda Varma v. State of Kerala, 2020-4 KLT 490: 2021-1 SCC 225)
Jenmies, Dewasoms and Sircar were Owners of Property in Travancore
In early times, Janmon lands, so long as they continued in possession of the Jenmi (Dewasom and Bhramin), were free from all taxations. King or Sirkar itself was one of the Jenmis. Sri T. Madhava Row’s Memorandum with regard to the origin and nature of Jenmom rights (Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Vol. IV) reads as follows:
“Be it remembered that the Sirkar itself is one of these Jenmis, it having come to possess Jenmom lands by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation and other ways. It is only a great Jenmi, great in the sense that its Jenmom property is extensive. If any person wants land in Travancore, he must obtain it from, and hold it of, some one of the body of Jenmis, i.e., from the Sirkar, which is the chief Jenmi, or from some other Jenmi”. (Quoted in: Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1; Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301).
Settlement Register of Travancore
‘Kettezhuthu’ and Kandezhuthu’
First attempt to make a settlement in Travancore was in 1712. It was on ‘Kettezhuthu’ (what is heard) basis; i.e., on discussions with landholders. Pattas were issued after the settlement. In 1775 a complete survey was conducted on ‘Kandezhuthu’ (what is seen) basis. Pattas were issued to the holders on this basis also. Complete resurvey of garden lands was conducted in 1836. This time measurements were made with the scale if a 10-Feet-Rod. Pattas were issued this time also.
The last settlement of Travancore was during 1882 to 1909. The survey thereon was commenced in 1885 and finalised in 1910.
Revenue Settlement Register of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters
The Kerala High Court held in Mohandas v. Santhakumari Amma, 2018-3 KLT 606 as under:
“We notice that, a new survey and settlement was undertaken in the erstwhile Travancore State for the purpose of putting in place a sound Revenue administration. Accordingly, it appears that a complete survey and reassessment of the entire State ’embracing an accurate measurement, demarcation, mapping and valuation of properties of every description and a registration of titles, as the basis of a sound Revenue Administration’ was carried out. On the basis of such a statement a proclamation was issued by the Maharaja of Travancore on 14 th Kumbhom 1061 corresponding to 24th February 1886.”
If Settlement Register says Government Land, Petitioner to Establish Title
In Vallikunnil Janaki Amma v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode, 2014 (1) KHC 57, Kerala High Court, referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, observed as under:
“Even though Ext. A2 is only an extract of the Settlement Register/ Adangal extract which may not by itself prove or confer title to a party in whose name the property stood registered, it can be accepted as evidence of title when there is no contra evidence. Admittedly it is adjacent to Amruthamangalam temple. The temple compound and this suit property which is adjacent to the temple are shown to be of Amruthamangalam Devaswom as per revenue record. In these circumstances, the contention that this property did not and does not belong to the temple/Devaswom cannot be sustained at all.” (Referred to in: Kunhimangalam Devaswam v. State of Kerala (2022 KHC OnLine 7354), 6 April, 2022, Anil K.Narendran, J.)
In Sahana Industries v. State of Kerala (2021 KHC OnLine 7110), Kerala High Court (Devan Ramachandran, J.) held (October 11, 2021) as under:
“… If the Settlement Register shows this land to be Government land, then certainly, the petitioner is obliged to establish their title over the property through competent documents”.
Is Settlement Register A Public Record
In Poddar Plantations Limited, v. Thekkemariveettil Madhavi Amma, ILR 2014-1 Ker 813, it is observed that the settlement register may be a public record. It is held as to the same as under:
“70. There could be no dispute that the court has the power to take judicial notice of public records. Assuming that the settlement register referred to by the Tribunal is a public record, it is not as if the contents of the settlement register cannot be disputed. Parties should get opportunity to challenge correctness of the contents of the document. The 2nd defendant did not get that opportunity. Hence the Tribunal was not correct in relying on the settlement register as referred to in its order.”
In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Poonam Kesarwani , (2010) ACJ 1992, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court said that the State Register of Driving Licences is a public record; for, it can be inspected by any person.
Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala – 0n Settlement Register
In Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, WP(C) No. 25830/2010 (2025:KER:5422) 24.01. 2025 (Harisankar V. Menon, J.) it is pointed out as under:
“7. …. In the settlement registerat Ext. R1(a), there is no dispute that the entire properties under old Survey No. 2211 having an extent in excess of 107 Acres are shown as “puramboke“….
8…. As regards the petitioner in WP(C) No. 25830 of 2010 also, the title is traceable to some documents of the Attingal Sub Registry of the yeas 1959, 1957 and 1061. But, it is categorically found that even in these documents, there is no mention as to the receipt of pattayam with respect to the property in question.
11. …. As already noticed, the settlement register describes the property as “Puramboke”. … In view of the discussions made above, I am of the opinion that the contentions raised by the learned Senior Government Pleader with respect to the malpractices committed, cannot be brushed aside.
13….. However, I notice that WP(C) No.25830 of 2010 the entry with respect to the Settlement Register is to be considered at first, which admittedly is against the petitioner. The case of the State is that some foul play is carried out subsequently at the instance of those interested and therefore, the subsequent entries cannot be acted upon.
14. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader relied on Vallikunnil Janaki Amma and Ors. v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode and Anr. [2014 (1) KHC 57], which laid down the principle with respect to the acceptability/relevance of the Settlement Register. As already noticed, I have found that the Settlement Register describes the property under old Survey No. 2211 as “Puramboke”. To the same effect is the judgment of a learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 20520 of 2021 dated 11.10.2021. This Court further notices the judgment of the Apex Court in Suraj Bhan and Ors. v. Financial Commissioner and Ors. [(2007) 6 SCC 186] which held that mere entry in the revenue records does not confer title on a person. As already noticed, in view of the entries in the Settlement Register, the requirement of an appropriate assignment cannot be lost sight of.”
In Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair M.N., (2013) 3 KLT 132, (T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J ; A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J), it is observed as under:
“18. …. The land register as well as the settlement register will establish the plea of the Board that the property having an extent of 2.26 acres is Temple property. Thus, Section 27 of Act of 1950 is clearly attracted and the property is clearly Devaswom property.”
“51. As far as the property herein is concerned, the land register and the settlement register produced herein are relevant. The property having the entire extent of 2.26 acres is described as ”kavu” (holy grove) in the settlement register. In the land register also it is described as ”kshethram irippu sthalam” (property where the temple is situated). No other document or other evidence is there to prove the contrary. Therefore, these documents will definitely show that the item of property will fit in with the requirement of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.”
“75. … Apart from that, in the light of Section 27 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act and in the light of the settlement register and land register, the property is described as Temple puramboke and not Government puramboke. Further Government lands are covered by the exemption u/s 3(1)(x) of the Land Reforms Act and therefore he cannot claim any fixity of tenure. There is no claim by the Government here to the property.”
Settlement Register (Adangal) as Mentioned in Kerala VO Manual
Clause 280 in Chapter 25 of the Kerala Village Office Manual (included in Land Revenue Manual Volume VI) refers to ‘Settlement Register (Adangal)’.
Clause 280 says:
1. Settlement Register is a Permanent Register.
2. It is also called “Adangal” or “A Register”.
3. There will be 2 Annexures (or Supplements) to the Settlement Register.
4. The 1st Annexure (or Supplement) Registers kept in the Village Offices contain all matters as to the lands subsequently surveyed (that were not surveyed at the time of Settlement).
5. The 2nd Annexure (or Supplement) Registers kept in the Village Offices contain all changes subsequent to settlement (and also the changes to the land mentioned in the 1st Annexure Registers).
6. The serial number of the entries in the 2nd Annexure Registers shall be noted in the remark column of the Settlement Register.
In Travancore, after 1910, no “Settlement” or “Settlement Register” has been made 2018(2) KLT 369 (HML case, Para 111).
Note: ‘Adangal’is a term originally used in the erstwhile Madras State. It is a Revenue Record based on the survey conducted.
See Note below: “Chitta and Adangal in Madras”
In Cl. 281, Basic Tax Register (BTR) is specifically referred to. It is described as a “Permanent Register”.
Note: Clause 280 in Chapter 25 of the Kerala Village Office Manual referred to the Annexures (or Supplements) to the Settlement Register because it was prepared prior to the Re- Survey. In the Areas where the Re-Survey is conducted and BTR is made, the Annexures (or Supplements) has no prominence.
In view of the fact that the Basic Tax Register is mentioned in Cl. 281, it is clear that the “A- Register” referred to in clause 280 is not the BTR prepared after Re-Survey. Thereby, it appears, even in places where Re-Survey is effected, the 1910 Settlement “A-Register” is to be maintained (as a ‘permanent register’).
Although Re-Survey was conducted in almost the entire Kerala State, no change has been made to Cl. 280 of the Village Office Manual; thereby, clause 280 still refers to the 1910 Settlement A-Register as the ‘basic document’.
As a matter of fact, in Village Offices the Registers are maintained with the name “A-Register” containing the particulars in BTR; and “B-Registers”, to incorporate the subsequent changes made in the land (after preparation of the BTR) though they are not specifically directed in Kerala Village Office Manual. It is exactly corresponds to the “second additional register” stated in Cl. 281 of the Village Office Manual which is directed to be maintained in addition to the 1910 Settlement “A-Register”
Note: Settlement A to D Registers are (originally) referred to in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Vol. III (1915), in Cl. 712 and 713, respectively.
But Clause 280 in Chapter 25 of the Kerala Village Office Manual recognises the Settlement Register alone as ‘Permanent Register’.
As regards the authority of “Manuals” it is observed in State of Kerala v. Navaneeth Krishnan, ILR 2023-3 Ker 686; 2023-4 KLT 756, as under:
“The Apex Court in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. [2013 (4) KHC 552: 2014-2 SCC 1] in paragraph 79 considered the binding authority of the CBI Crime Manual. It was held that CBI Crime Manual is not a statute, it is only a set of administrative orders issued for internal guidance of the CBI officers and it cannot supersede the provisions of Cr. P.C. It was further held that in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the Cr. P.C itself, the provisions of the CBI Crime Manual cannot be relied upon. A Single Bench of this Court in Santhosh T. A. And Another v. State of Kerala [2017 (5) KHC 107] dealt with the binding authority of the Kerala Excise Manual under the Abkari Act. It was held that the Manual contains only executive instruction and has no force of a statutory provision.”
In Jacob v. State of Kerala, 1964 KLT 359, it had been held (Vaidyalingam, J.), as under:
“The instructions or directions contained in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual … have not been given by virtue of any rule making power vested in the. Government, either under the provisions of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act or under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act. …. If that is so, the directions contained in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual can only be considered to be in the nature of executive directions and they will have no force whatsoever, especially in view of the fact that S.6 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951 lays down that the sale of immovable property of the defaulter shall be “in the manner provided hereinafter”.
Cochin – Land Situation and Survey Settlement Cochin was brought under the centralised administration by the King, Rama Varma, popularly known as Sakthan Thampuran (1790 – 1805). The feudal custom prevailed in Cochin had been divided the land under Naduvazhis or local chiefs – Paliyam swaroopam, Cheranellore Karthavu the head of the Anchi Kaimals, Muriyanatt (Mukundapuram-Nadavarambu) Nambiar the head of Arunattil Prabhus, Kodassery Kartha, Mappranam Prabhu, Vellore Nair, Chengazhi Nambiar (Chengazhinad Naduvazhi), Edappali Nampiyathiri etc.
During the second half of 18th century, as in the case of Travancore, major portion of the lands in Cochin were brought under the Government administration and these lands were called Sircar or Pandaravaka lands.
Settlement Proclamation of Cochin of 1080 ME (1905 AD) made a mountainous change in the land situation. Clause 13 of the Settlement Proclamation provided that the holders of Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands would acquire ‘full rights to the soil of the lands‘ they held and that their rights would remain undisturbed so long as they regularly pay the State revenue. Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694; Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.
Following the settlement Proclamation of 1905, a survey-settlement was done in Cochin during 1905-1909.
(See Notes below under the head: ‘Land Classification in Cochin)
Part II
Classification of Lands in Kerala
Classification of Janmam Holders in Kerala
Janmam (Jenmam) holders of lands were considered as the persons originally entitled to hold and enjoy the land as its Absolute Proprietor.
The meaning of the words ‘Janmam was considered in Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1972) 2 SCC 133. It is observed to be exclusive right to possession of the soil and a hereditary proprietorship. It is described as ‘estate’ in the Constitution. (See also: The Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State of Kerala, (1972) 2 SCC 218; Bhavani Tea and Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1991-1 KLT 666).
Janmam right was confined to Brahmins, in ancient times. They were called Janmies (jenmies). Subsequently the rulers also began to hold and enjoy the land. The janmies leased or mortgaged lands to various cultivators, under various tenures. This lead to Classification of lands under various heads.
Three Classes of Janmom Lands: (i) Brahmaswom, (ii) Devaswom & (iii) Sircar
Brahmaswom: Brahminswere Original Jenmies, following Parasurama. Devaswom: Brahminsendowed lands to Temples, to form Devaswoms. Sircar Lands: Sirkar also became Jenmis by gift, escheat, confiscation, etc.
In Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86, it is observed as under:
“18. Coming to the second category of lands, viz., Jenmom lands, the Jenmies have full proprietary rights in the soil. The origin of the title of the jenmies is shrouded in obscurity but the development of this branch of land tenure was on the assumption that Parasurama who conquered the land of Kerala or, as mythology would put it, reclaimed it from the sea, gave it as gift to Malayala Brahmins or Nambudiries. The rest of the people cultivated the lands under the Jenmies. In course of time, the Jenmies endowed certain temples built by them with lands and thus the Devaswom lands came into existence. These were similar in nature and incidents to Jenmom lands. These lands were enjoyed free of tax, the State imposing a light assessment only when the Jenmies alienated the land to others.
We may extract the following passage from Sri T. Madhava Row’s Memorandum regarding the origin and nature of Jenmom rights:
“A Jenmi is often termed a landlord. But, it must be clearly understood and also always remembered that a jenmi, though certainly a land-lord, is a peculiar kind of landlord.”
Any person, who holds a pattah from a Collector in a British District and under it holds from the British Government subject to Government tax more or less, is called a landlord in ordinary language. Even in Travancore, any coffee planteror indeed any ryot, who holds lands under a grant from the Sirkar, etc., is or may be called a landlord. But, be it remembered, such landlords are not Jenmies.
A Jenmi differs from such landlords in that he does not derive his title to lands from the Sirkar etc. His title to the Jenmom lands is inherent. He is, so far as his Jenmom lands are concerned, a little territorial sovereign in a limited sense. He is landlord of his Jenmom domain exactly in the sense in which this Sirkar is landlord of all the land it grants to planters and indeed to all ryots in general; in the sense in which the British Government island-lord of all the Ryotwari lands of the East Coast Zillahs of the Madras Presidency.
It is necessary, in view to avoid errors and misconceptions, to familiarize the mind to this definition of a Jenmi.
The origin of Jenmom property may be briefly explained herewith a view to make the rights of jenmis clear. Kerala Desom (in which Travancore is included) was originally conquered by Parasurama, and this great warrier parcelled out the conquered lands among a limited number of Brahmins. The Brahmins then became territorial lords, each independent of the rest. From that early age, the lands have descended with the tenure almost unimpared. The lands so belonging to each Brahminare said to constitute his Jenmom, and the Brahmin himself is called a Jenmi. These lands, so long as they continue in possession of the Jenmi, are free of all taxation. To this day this exemption continues in full force.
Jenmom lands are precisely what are in Europe called allodial properties as contradistinguished from feudal.
It must be clear from what has been stated that all the lands in Travancore belong to a body of Jenmis. There are no lands that do not belong to some Jenmi or other.
Be it remembered that the Sirkar itself is one of these Jenmis, it having come to possess Jenmom lands by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation and other ways. It is only a great Jenmi, great in the sense that its Jenmom property is extensive.
If any person wants land in Travancore, he must obtain it from, and hold it of, some one of the body of Jenmis, i. e., from the Sirkar, which is the chief Jenmi, or from some other Jenmi”. (pp. 2 and 3 of Travancore Land Revenue Manual Vol. IV)”
Sircar was the largest Janmi
During the second half of 18th century the lands in Travancore and Cochin were brought under the Government administration and these lands were called Sircar or Pandaravaka lands. In certain places local chiefs (Nadu-vazhis) were ’emerged’.
On emergence of the Sircar and Ndu-vazhies, the they were considered as the janmi of those lands belonged to them (got under gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation and other ways – See: Travancore Land Revenue Manual – IV). Regarding Pandaravaka lands it is stated in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual as under:
“Pandaravaka or Sircar lands are lands of which theState is the landlord or the Jenmi and whatever rights which vest in the ryots are (that) derived from the Sircar.”
In Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218, it is found as under:
“13. It must be clear from what has been stated that all the lands in the Travancore belonged to a body of janmis. There are no lands that do not belong to some janmi or other.
14. Be it remembered that the Sircar itself is one of these janmis, it having come to possess janmam lands by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation and other ways. It is only a great janmi, great in the sense that its janmam property is extensive.”
In Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218, it is further observed as under:
15. If any person wants land in Travancore, he must obtain it from, and hold it of, some one of the body of Janmis, i.e. from the Sircar, which is the Chief Janmi, or from some other Janmi.” (Sir T. Madava Row’s Memo.) In Mr. Kunhiraman Nair’s Memo on Land -Tenures it is stated:
“At present the Sircar is the largest Janmi in the State. The janmam lands of all the petty Rajas subdued in the last few centuries and of several Madampies, have lapsed to the State, and other causes such as escheat & c, have tended, to increase the extent of the Janmam possession of the Sircar. About three- fourths of the whole land in the State belong on Janmam to the Sircar, the remaining one-fourth being distributed among the classes mentioned in para 32 It is interesting to note that in certain parts of Madras Janmam rights existed ‘and the ‘Government lands were called government janman lands.
(See Government Order No. 1902 Revenue dated November 1, 1926) Para 3 of that order deals with the janmam estates and reads as under:
“3. JANMABHOGAM.-Paragraph 11 of ‘the Board’s Proceedings-“Lands have neither to been described as-
Government Janmam, i.e. lands which are held directly from the Government and on which taram assessment and janmabhogam are paid to the Government and
private janmam, i.e. lands which are held directly from the Government and on which taram assessment but not janmabhogam is paid to the Government.”
Concept of “Janmam” on Lands, and Classification of Lands, in Travancore
‘Jenmom Lands’ and ‘Janmies’ in Travancore
The concept of ‘Janmam’ (‘inherent right’) is associated with the myth that Parasurama, reclaimed the lands in Kerala from the sea with the help of a hatchet, and gave lands to Brahmins. The lands belonging to Brahmins constituted ‘jenmom’ .
They did not derive their title to lands from any King or Sircar; and it was considered as an ‘inherent right’. It can be equated to ‘allodial properties in Europe’, contra- distinguished from feudal. (See: Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301)
Till the second half of 18th century, the entire lands were considered to be belonged to some janmi or other.
“Janmi” – Absolute Proprietor; Ryotwari Pattadar, Not Proprietor
Tamil Nadu Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Patta) Act, 1969 defines in Sec. 2(7) Janmi as under
“(7) “janmi” means a person entitled to the absolute proprietorship of land and includes a trustee in respect thereof.”
In The Nilambur Kovilagam, Nilamburv. The State of Tamil Nadu by the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Fort St. George, 1971-1 MLJ 255, it was observed as under:
In the Glossary to the Fifth Report ‘janmam’ is said to imply birth, birth right, hereditary or proprietary right in the soil. We find from the Madras District Gazetteers relating to Malabar that the origin of Janmam has been stated thus at page 305:
“Parasurama created Malayam, the Keralabhumi, and gave it as a gift to the Brahmins of the 64 gramams. The gift of flower and water given to the sixty-four gramams together for their enjoyment is called janmam.”
On the basis of this and other texts, the Gazetteer adds:
“the Brahmins support their claim that they and they alone have always enjoyed the full janmam or proprietary right in the land; and as Brahmins are expressly exempted by Manu from payment of taxes, the tradition is offered as a simple and satisfactory explanation of the absence of any general land revenue in Malabar at the time of the first Mysorean invasion.”
The early British administration appears to have generally accepted this tradition, though it seems that they were more concerned with giving an accurate account of the land tenures as they found them. In 1793 one Mr. Farmer, one of the first Commissioners for inspecting the countriesceded by Tippu Sultan, reported that the possessors of land were of two descriptions: (1) Jelm-kaars or free holders who held their lands either by purchase or by hereditary descent and (2) Kanoonkaars or mortgagees, to whom an actual delivery of the land appeared to be made, although the money taken upon it was not at all proportioned to the value of the land. In 1800 Dr. Buchanan referred to the Janmis before the conquest by Hyder as the actual lords of the whole soil. Major Walker, who prepared in 1801 an elaborate treatise on the several forms of conveyance and leases, stated that jenma-karan possessed the entire right to the soil and no earthly authority could justly deprive him of it, but his Tight was confined to the property’ and he possessed neither judicial nor political authority. Mr. Thackeray reporting on land tenure in 1807 has observed to the same effect and said that almost the whole of the land in Malabar, cultivated and uncultivated, was private property and held by janmam right, which conveyed full absolute property in the soil. According to one Mr. Warden, who was Collector of Malabar from 1804 to 1816, the jenm right of Malabar vested in the holder an absolute property in the soil.
In Secretary of State v. Ashtamurthi1, in which considerable evidence was examined, it was pointed out that jenmis or the proprietors of the soil in Malabar had long been in the habit of leasing out the greater portion of their estates to “kanomdars who were thus in the immediate occupancy of the greater part of the soil. Parker, J. one of the members of the Division Bench, observed:
”This was the State of things at the time of Hyder’s conquest and the British Government is stated to have continued the practice of the Mysore Government in settling the assessment with these ‘kanomdars. At the annexation of Malabar in 1799 the Government disclaimed any desire to act as the proprietor of the soil, and directed that rent should be collected from the immediate cultivators, Triambad Ranu v. Nana Bhavani2and Secretary of State v. Vira Rayan3, thus liimiting its claim to revenue. Further, in their despatch of 17th December, 1813, relating to the settlement of Malabar the Directors observed that in Malabar they had no property in the land to confer, with the exception of some forfeited estates. This may be regarded as an absolute disclaimer by the Government of the day of any proprietary right in the jenmi’s estates, and is hardly consistent with the right of letting in a tenant which is certainly an exercise of proprietary right.“
We will have occasion to refer to Secretary of State v. Ashtamurthi1, in greater detail, but at this stage we may note that it was clearly pointed out by both the learned Judges who decided the case, that janmam was an absolute proprietary right in the soil, subject only to liability to payment of revenue. Meenakshi v. Secretary of State4and Neelakhandan Nambudripad v. The Secretary of State5, also affirmed that janmis owned absolute rights in the soil of the land. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) observed in Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala6. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) in Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala1. He holds the property directly under the Government, not as a tenant, but as a proprietor, subject only to the liability to pay the tax or revenue. Incidentally it follows that janmam right carries the indicia of an estate as is understood in the law of land tenures in Madras. The expression ‘estate’ has been defined in the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, which is a law relating to land tenure. Madras Regulation XXVI of 1802, the Madras Proprietary Estates’ Village Service Act, 1894, The Malabar Land Registration Act, 1895, and the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act, 1897, contain definitions of an ‘estate’ which though not enactments relating to tenures, point to the basic elements of an estate, namely, the holder’s proprietorship in the land and direct relation to the Government by paying the land revenue to them and capacity to induct sub-tenures involving the relationship of landlord and tenant.
Can it be said that these basic elements of janmam lands, which we noticed about, have ceased to exist and the janmam lands have become ryotwari lands by reason of the introduction of the settlement and resettlement? What constitutes ryotwari tenure is well settled. In theory, a ryotwari pattadar is not the proprietor of the land and there is certainly no possibility of occupancy ryots under the ryotwari pattadar. Also the pattadar, if he so desires, may relinquish his holding in favour of the Government so as to be relieved of the liability to pay revenue. But what he relinquishes is not his ownership in the soil, but only his right as a tenant under the Government. The basic assumption on which a ryotwari tenure proceeds is that the Government or State is the owner of the land and that ryotwari pattadar is the tenant and, therefore, the Government is entitled to share the produce, the Government’s share being determined on a system of survey, field classification and net produce. It will suffice to refer to the authoritative statement as to the ryotwari system in K. Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala2. Wanchoo, J., who spoke for the Court, stated: was never considered a proprietor of the land under his patta, though he had many of the advantages of a proprietor.“
Official Publication, ‘Census of India, 1951
In the official publication, ‘Census of India, 1951 (Travancore-Cochin), District Census Handbook, Trivandrum’, it is laid down as under:
“6. LAND TENURES
Till a century ago, the State presented an interesting (though from the point of view of economicdevelopment, far too complex) system of land tenures derived from Land Tenures the peculiar conditions of its historical development. They have been considerably simplified by several pieces of land-tenure legislation.
The chief categories of tenure· in this district may be broadly classified:-
.I. (a) Pandaravaka. These (comprising three-fourths of the total area of the State and including the vast majority of holdings) are lands belonging to the Sirkar or government. All tenants are now practically owners of their land, subject to payment of tax.
(b) Kandukrishi lands. They are the home-farm lands of the Maharaja of Travancore.
(c) Sripandaravaka lands (extent, 28,000 acres). These are lands belonging to the temple of Sri Padmanabhaswami in Trivandrum and lie scattered in the various taluks of this district.
(d) Sripadam lands-(area about 15,000 acres). These, lying in the pakuthies of Edakkodu and Attingal in the Chirayinkil taluk, are the private property of the Maharaja of Travancore. In all government lands, the system of land-tenures is based on· the ryot-wari principle, i. e . direct settlement with individual ryots.
II. Jenmom lands. They are the absolute private property of the owners. Under the Jenmikudiyan Acts, ryots holding jenmom lands have been given fixity of tenure, the dues to the jenmi being collected and paid to them by government the collection being made along with the land-tax.
The chief systems of tenancy under which tenants hold lands owned by others are:
I. Verumpattom (venpattom). They are tenants who hold lands on lease for periods and on -conditions, stated in the contract; they are liable to be evicted under the conditions of the contract.
II-Varamdars (Pankuvaramdars). They are people who’ raise crops ron agricultural lands in partnership with the owners of the land; the conditions of partnership vary in different localities.
III-Kudikidappukar. They are persons who were previously allow.ed by the owners of the land to occupy a small portion of it, generally to put up a small house to live in and watch the land or work on it.
IV -Otti (Mortgages). Tenancy under this head take different forms in different regions. The question of giving fixity of tenure to cultivating tenants is under consideration. It may be stated that the ratio of cultivating tenants to non-cultivating owners of land in this district is 4: 1.
“Sree Pandarakaryam Cheyvarkal” Property – Lands exclusively held by Govt.
Large extent of properties are seen recorded as Sree Pandarakaryam Cheyvarkal (Cheivarkal) properties in the settlement register of 1910 (Travancore). It is pertinent to note that ‘Sree Pandara karyam Cheivarkal’ was the character/name assumed by the King at the time of ‘truppadi danam’. (See notes below under the heading – Travancore, Padmanabha Swamy Temple and ‘Bhandara Vaka’ Lands)
In P. R. Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 30 June, 2011, the High Court of Kerala pointed out the stand of the State of Kerala as regards the ‘Sree Pandarakaryam Cheyvarkal’ as under:
“23. It is the further contention of the Government that “As per the Settlement Register of 1908 maintained by the State of Travancore, the lands aforesaid are “Sree Pandarakaryam Cheyvarkal” measuring about 2203.4 Acres and forest measuring about 1195.98 Acres which are the lands exclusively held by the Government“.
The concept of Classification of Lands
The concept of classification of lands emerged in 2nd half of the 19th century in Travancore and Cochin. The lands were classified under 8 heads in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Volume III (1915). They were –
(i) Edavagas;
(ii) Registered lands;
(iii) Purambokes;
(iv) Tharisu or assessed waste;
(v) Thanathuchitta lands;
(vi) Reserved Forests;
(vii) Reserved lands or proposed reserves; &
(viii) Unreserved lands.
Registered lands
Registered lands were that included in Sirkar Revenue accounts as lands held by or granted to individuals, families, institutions, etc.
The revenue from these lands fell under the head, ‘Ayacut’ or ‘Settled Revenue’.
Each of this field had been surveyed and settled.
The functions of the Land Revenue Department were to collect the revenue and see that no encroachment was made on adjoining Sirkar lands (puramboke, tharisu, forests).
Our Apex Court in Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218, held as under:
“In the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Vol. III, Revised Edition, 1936, Registered Lands are described as follows
“Registered lands are lands registered in the revenue accounts as held by or granted to individuals, families, corporations or institutions, and comprise all the different kinds of tenures bearing either the full assessment or wholly or partially free of assessment. These lands comprise not only the areas brought under cadastral survey but include also coffee, tea, rubber and other estates, cardamom gardens and other special grants outside the limits of cadastral survey.”
The Registered Lands include inter alia, (a) Pandaravaka lands and (b) Janmam lands. Regarding Pandaravaka lands it is stated :
“Pandaravaka or Sircar lands are, lands of which the State is the landlord or the Jenmi and whatever rights which vest in the ryots are derived from the Sircar.”
‘Jenmom’ was proprietary interestwith Liability to Pay Tax (Freehold)
The concepts on ‘janmam’ continued even after introduction of Tax system by Government. ‘Jenmom’ was taken the proprietary interest of a landlord in lands (Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080). Subba Rao, J., observed as under:
“Under the definition, any janmam right in Kerala is an “estate”.A janmam right is the freehold interest in a property situated in Kerala.
Moor in his “Malabar Law and Custom” describes it as a hereditary proprietorship. A janmam interest may, therefore, be described as “proprietary interest of a landlord in lands” and such a janmam right is described as “estate” in the Constitution. Substituting “janmam right” in place of “estate” in cl. 2 (b), the “rights” in Art. 31 A (1) (a) will include the rights of a proprietor and subordinate tenure-holders in respect of a janmam right.
It follows that the extinguishment or modification of a right refers to the rights of a proprietor or a subordinate tenure-holder in the janmam right. A proprietor called the janmi or his subordinate tenure-holder has certain defined rights in janmam right”. Land-tenures in Malabar are established by precedents or immemorial usage. Janmam right is a freehold interest in property and the landlord is called “janmi”. He can create many subordinate interests or tenures therein.” (Quoted in: Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301)
In the Jenmi and Kudiyan Regulation, V of 1071 (1896), Jenmom land is defined as-
“land (other than Pandaravaka, Sripandaravaka, Kandukrishi or Sircar Devaswom land, recognised as such in the Sircar accounts) which is either entirely exempt from Government tax or if assessed to public revenue, is subject to Rajabhogam only, and the occupancy right in; which is created for a money consideration (Kanom) and is also subject to the payment of Michavaram or customary dues and the payment of the renewal fees.”
The Travancore Jenmi and Kudiyan Act, V of 1071 (1896), defines ‘Jenmi’ as under:
” ‘Jenmi’ means a person in whom the proprietary right over Jenmom lands is vested and includes, in the case of Devaswoms owning Jenmom lands, the managing Trustee or Trustees of the Institution for the time being.”
In Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86, it was observed with respect to the ‘Janmi’ as under:
“What the definition stresses is the proprietary right in the land. We may in this connection extract a passage from the Memorandum of Mr. Kunhiraman Nair, one of the Judges of the High Court of Travancore, about 70 years ago:
“The term ‘Jenmom’ was originally used by the Brahmins exclusively to denote their allodial proprietorship and is still used in that sense in courts and cutcherries in Travancore, though in other parts of Malayalam and in popular parlance in Travancore, the term is now universally employed to denote the full proprietary right in the land of any class of people”.
Michavaramis Essentially Rent
Michavaram is explained in the speech of Kayalam Paramesvaran Pillai (Additional Head Sircar Vakil) while moving the Travancore Jenmi and Kudiyan Regulation (Amendment) Bill, on 28th May 1935 (‘Proceedings of the Travancore Sri Chitra State Council’), as under:
“Honourable members know what a kanapattom transaction is. It is a demise by a jenmi to a person called kudiyan in respect of a Jenmam land on receipt by the jenmi of an amount as loan, called Kanam. The kudiyan has to pay a rent or pattom to the jenmi. The jenmi has to pay interest in respect of the kanam money advanced. The net result is that the kudiyan pays to the jenmi the rent or pattom minus the interest and this residual rent is called michavaram. Besides this michavaram the kudiyan has also to pay certain customary dues and periodical fees.”
In Mangala Kunhimina Umma v. Puthlyaveettil Paru Amma, AIR 1971 SC 1575, it was observed as under:
The decision of the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Parameswaran s case, 1962 Ker LT 404 (Parameswaran Embranthiri v. Narasimha Nambudiri) was that recital in the deed that the defendant was to be in possession of the properties and was to pay the revenue out of the income and appropriate the balance towards interest on the amount of the advance amounted to a stipulation for payment of revenue asmichavaram or rent. In Sankunni s case, ILR (1944) Mad 254 (Sankunni Variar v. Neelakandhan Nambudripad) the direction to pay revenue out of the rent of the property which was due to the landlord was justifiably held to be a payment on behalf of the landlord because it was apart of the michavaram. That reasoning could not apply to Parameswaran s case, 1962 Ker LT 404 (supra), because in that case there was neither any fixation of rent nor any stipulation for payment of rent or michavaram to the landlord.
Concept of ‘Freehold lands’
The term ‘Freehold‘ is used in erstwhile Travancore to denote two ideas –
1. Exempted from payment of any kind of tax to Government.
2. Free to cultivate any crop (inasmuch as crop is specified in ordinary leases/grants).
Exempted from payment of any kind of tax to Government
Travancore State Manual Vol. III published by the Travancore Government in 1940, says as to the class of jenmom land which were entirely freehold and exempted from payment of any kind of tax to Government under any circumstances. These were the special properties given by the Ruler to certain individuals considering their valid services or to certain institutions including temples.
Free to cultivate any crop
In the proceedings of the Chief Secretary to the Travancore Government, dated 28.03. 1906, the request of the tenant to ‘convert the lease hold into free-hold’ in the light of the promise “to pay 3 annas instead of 2 1/2 annas, the rent payable at present per acre” is seen allowed. The tenants represented that they were ‘prepared to pay tax that may be payable on lands under coffee, tea or other products at the rates which may prevail at that times’.
It was added further:
“If any portion of land is brought under rubber cultivation he also agreed to pay tax at the rate Rs. 2 per acre per annum on such land. He also agreed to pay an upset price of Rs. One per acre on the 10 sq. miles of land granted to them as consideration for converting the leasehold into freehold tenure”.
The intention and objective of the term “freehold” in the Order of the Chief Secretary is clear from the following statement –
“The other terms of the grant shall be the same as those that apply to waste lands granted under the Coffee land Rules dated 7th July 1898″. (Quoted in: Majeed v. State of Kerala,(2006) 1 KerLT 19.)
Note: Under the aforesaid Rules, 1898 the grantees were allowed to cultivate only “coffee”.
The aforesaid view is fortified by the decision in Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, which states as under:
“55. It thus appears that the State grants like Kanan Devan Hills Concession and Ten Square Miles Concession, and Munro Lands, were treated under the heading ‘Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar.”
Concept of ‘Grants’
The lands granted/leased by Erstwhile (Travancore or Cochin) Sircar continued to be lands belonging to the Sircar, and the grantees did not acquire absolute proprietary rights. It is made clear in the following decisions.
Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301
The Concession from Punjar Valiya Rajaand the deed of Ratification of the Travancore Govt. laid down that the grantee was permitted only to hold the land; and it had no absolute ownership.
State of Kerala v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272
Finding of Trial Court (on Grant deeds) company did notacquire absolute proprietary rights – upheld.
Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86
A coffee planter who holds lands under a Grant is not a Jenmi.
Majeed v. State of Kerala,(2006) 1 KerLT 19
Petitionercontended – ‘Grant’ was free hold property. The court did not accept.
Thomas Philip v. Forest Range Officer, 2021-2 KerLT 578
Arguement that deed of ‘Grant’ ‘for coffee or tea cultivation’ was not a grant, but a title deedwas not accepted.
Important Enactments on ‘Grant’
1. The Government Grants Act, 1895
The Government Grants Act, 1895 (known as ‘Crown Grants Act, 1895’), had been enacted with a view to secure the Govt. lands from potential or protracted legal claims. It applies to erstwhile Malabar area of Kerala (part of former Madras State).
The Government Grants Act, 1895 reads as under:
1. Title and extent.-(1) This Act may be called the Government Grants Act, 1895. (2) It extends to the whole of India except the territories which, immediately before the 1st November, 1956 , were comprised in Part B States. 2. Transfer of Property Act, 1882, not to apply to Government grants.- Nothing in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882 ), contained shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grantor other transfer of land or of any interest therein heretofore made or hereafter to be made by or on behalf of the Government to, or in favour of, any person whomsoever; but every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed. 3. Government grants to take effect according to their tenor.- All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over contained in any such grant or transfer as aforesaid shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute or enactment of the Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding.
2. Government Lands Grants Act, 1940 (Cochin)
The Government Lands Grants Act, 1940 (enacted with the same words to effect restrictions as that of the Government Grants Act, 1895) made constraints in the ‘grant or other transfer of land or of any interest thereinheretofore made or hereafter to be made by or on behalf of the Government to, or in favour of, any person whomsoever’. By virtue of this Act also, Transfer of Property Act and Tenancy Acts did not to apply to lands given as grant by the Government.
3. Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980
Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980 was enacted with a view to modify the rights under grants and leases, for cultivation, made by the former States of Travancore and Cochin. The Act was made for the reason that such grants and leases brought about heavy loss to the Government and they resulted in huge un-earned profits to the grantees and lessees; and it was found necessary in the public interest that such undue profits to a few person were to be utilised for the common benefit of the general public.
In the following cases the effect of “grant” by the Erstwhile Governments was considered.
1. Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd.v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301
The Supreme Court, in Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301 (Sikri (Cj), Shelat, A.N. Ray, I.D. Dua, , H.R. Khanna, JJ.) held that Kenan Devan Hills Concession (ongrantdeeds) fall within the expression “Janmam right” vested with Sircar. The State of Kerala made an Act – the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971, to “vest” the possession of the land remained in the possession of the Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd.
According to the petitioner Company, ‘it has at all times been holding, cultivating, enjoying and dealing with the Concession Land as the absolute, owner thereof’.
According to the State, this land is dealt with under this heading – Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar. and that it was only “granted” to the company for ‘coffee cultivation’. The State asserted in this case –
that the petitioner Company was not an absolute owner, but only a lessee under the Government, especially since the 1899 Proclamation issued by H.H. the Maharaja declaring that Kannan Devan Hills was ‘an integral part’ of the ‘territory’.
that the petitioner’s predecessor-in-title was John Danial Munro, who obtained, the first Pooniat Concession from Punjar Valiya Raja, on July 11, 1877. This Concession recited that an, application was made for the grant of the above property to the Raja for coffee cultivation.
It was further stipulated in the Concession that
“you shall clear and remove the jungles, and reclaim the waste lands within the said boundaries, and cultivate them with coffee up to the year 1058 and from the year 1059, pay our rent collector a yearly rent at the rate of 3,000 British Rupees.”
H.H. the Maharaja executed a deed of ratification, dated November 28, 1878, by which the Government ratified the First Pooniat Concession dated July 11, 1877.
This deed of ratification laid down – the Government permitted the grantee to hold the land. (it is similar to the ‘Grant/Title’ deeds executed by the State in all other ‘Grants’ – under the ‘Grant Rules’).
Clause 5 of the Deed of Ratification, is important. It provides, inter alia, that
“The grantee can appropriate to his own use within the limits of the grant all timber except the following and such as may hereafter be reserved namely, Teak, Cole Teak, Blackwood, Ebony, Karoonthaly, Sandalwood; should he carry any timber without the limits of the grant it will be subject to the payment of Kooteekanom, or Customs Duty……….
The eleventh clause reads – “The land granted shall be held in perpetuity as heritable or transferable property, but every case of transfer of the grant by the grantee shall be immediately made known to the Sircar, who shall have the right of apportioning the tax, if a portion of the holding is transferred.”
The twelfth clause stipulates – “The discovery of useful mines and treasures within the limits of the grant shall be communicated to the Sircar, and the grantee shall in respect to such mines and treasures, abide by the decision of the Sircar.”
The sixteenth clause provides – “The grantee shall be bound to preserve the forest trees growing on the banks of the principal streams running through the tract to the extent of fifty yards in breadth on each side of the stream, the Underwood only being permitted to be cleared and coffee planted instead. Similarly he shall also be bound to preserve the, trees about the crest of the hill to the extent of a quarter of a mile on each side.”
A Royal Proclamation was made on September 24, 1899 provided that ‘Anjanad and Kannan Devan Hills is an integral portion of our territory and that the inhabitants of the said tract are ‘hereby informed and warned that they are not to pay any taxes, rents or dues, or make any other payment to the Poonjar Chief.
Points came for consideration in this decision were the following:
Whether the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 was protected from challenge under Art. 31A of the Constitution. That is, whether these lands fall within expression ‘Janmam right’ or “estate” in art. 31A of the Constitution.
If the lands acquired were an “estate”, or with ‘Janmam right’ owned by the Company, the land reform enactment did not have stood valid. (Note: Kesavananda Bharathi Case came in 1973.)
The Apex Court found the following:
The janmam rights (even if remained with the Poonjar Chief, H.H. the Maharaja became the janmi by the Royal proclamation of 1899.
The nature of ‘janmam right’ has been examined by this Court previously in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887 Subba Rao, J., observed that janmam right in Kerala is an “estate and it is the freehold interest.
The Sircar itself is one of these janmis and it was the largest Janmi. It came to possess janmam lands by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation and other ways
If any person wants land in Travancore, he must obtain it from, some one of the body of Janmis, i.e. from the Sircar, which is the Chief Janmi, or from some other Janmi.
The Apex Court observed as under:
“… On the material placed before us it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the lands in dispute fall within the expression “Janmam right”.
If, as stated in Travancore Land Revenue Manual Volume IV, there are no lands that do not belong to a Janmi and the Sircar becomes a janmi by gift, escheat confiscation or otherwise, the effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1899 must be that the Sircar became the Janmi.”
The Apex Court further found –
The Registered Lands included inter alia, (a) Pandaravaka lands and (b) Janmam lands.
Regarding Pandaravaka lands it is stated : “Pandaravaka or Sircar lands are, lands of which the State is the landlord or the Jenmi and whatever rights which vest in the ryots are derived from the Sircar.”
Kenan Devan Hills Concession is dealt with under this heading, i.e. Pandaravaka Lands.
“It thus appears that theState grants like Kanan Devan Hills Concession and Ten Square Miles Concession, and Munro Lands, were treated under the heading ‘Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar.”
On these findings The Apex Court upheld the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 and dismissed the challenge of the Company.
2. State of Kerala v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272
With respect to the same property it was held in State of Kerala v. Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272, as under:
“The Trial Court in a detailed and well-reasoned judgment dismissed the suit of the company. The Trial Court on the interpretation of First Concession (Exhibit P- 1), Second Concession (Exhibit P-2), deed of ratification (Exhibit P-62) and the Government agreement with the Society dated August 2, 1866 (Exhibit P-64) came to the conclusion that the company did notacquireabsolute proprietary rightsover the Concession Area or the trees and timber in the said area. It was held that the Poonjar Chief had only conveyed heritable and transferable possessory rights over the Concession area to the grantee. It was also held that absolute rights over the trees and timber in the Concession Area did not pass to the grantee and it had only the right to use and remove timber subject to the restrictions imposed in the deeds of conveyance/ratification.”
It is observed:
“An identical clause in another grant entered into by the Travancore Government came for consideration before a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in George A Leslie v. State of Kerala, 1969 K. L.T. 378, K. K. Mathew, J. (as the learned Judge then was) interpreted the clause as under:
“ We think that if title to the reserved trees passed to the grantees, a provision of this nature would have been quite unnecessary. There was no purpose in stating that the grantees will be free to appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant, if title to the trees passed to the grantees; the provision is a clear indication that the grantees were allowed to cut and appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant as a matter of concession.”
“We agree with the interpretation given to the clause by Mathew, J. and hold that the respondent- company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession Area or the trees and the timber therein.”
It is observed further:
“It was further held by Mathew, J. (in George A. Leslie v. State of Kerala, 1969 KLT 378) that kuttikanam being the governments share of the value of the trees owned by the government it has the power to fix the value of the trees. We agree with the reasoning and conclusions reached by Mathew, J.”
The Apex Court upheld and approved “the judgment and findings” of the Trial Court.
3. George A. Leslie v. State of Kerala –AIR 1970 Ker 21, (K. K. Mathew, J.)
Travancore Regulation II of 1040 (1865) and Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills dated 24th April 1865 considered.
It is observed:
“Ext. P-l is a grant made under the Travancore Regulation II of 1040 and the Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills dated 24th April 1865. It conferred a heritable and transferable interest in the grantees of the land comprised in it. Clause 5 in Ext. P-l, which is identical with Section 5 in Form A of the Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills, is the relevant provision for deciding this question. It provides:
“Grantees can appropriate to their own use within the limits of the grant all timber except the following and such as may hereinafter be reserved, namely, Teak, Gole Teak, Blackwood, Ebony, Karcomthaly, Sandalwood; should they carry any timber without the limits of the grant, it will be subject to the payment of kuttikanom or customs duty or both, as the case may be, in the same way as timber ordinarily felled”.
10. We think that if title to the reserved trees passed to the grantees, a provision of this nature would have been quite unnecessary. There was no purpose in stating that the grantees will be free to appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant, if title to the trees passed to the grantees; the provision is a clear indication that the grantees were allowed to cut and appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant as a matter of concession.”
It was pointed out –
Travancore Pattom Proclamation of 1040 (1865), which conferred full rights on tenants of pandarapattom land. They have no application to the land or trees comprised in grants for cultivation of coffee or tea (under Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills dated 24th April 1865).
4. Thomas Philip v. Forest Range Officer – 1923 ‘Grant’ of Travancore Government
Grant made by the Travancore Government, in 1923 was considered in Thomas Philip v. Forest Range Officer, 2021-2 KerLT 578. The Chief Secretary to the Government of Travancore ‘granted’ land ‘for coffee or tea cultivation’. The fifth condition read as under:
“The full right to Royal trees within the grant is reserved and continues to vest in the Government. The Grantee shall be bound to take care of the Royal trees particularised in column 5 of the schedule hereunder written until they are removed or otherwise disposed of by the Government. The Grantee shall also be bound to deliver to the Government all ivory found and other Royalties produced in the land, and all captured elephants, and will be paid the regulated price for the articles of produce, and the regulated reward for the elephant, at the discretion of the Government.”
It was contended that the ‘ownership’ of the land was purchased by the petitioner’s father in 1941. He planted trees. The petitioner made an application in 2006 to the Forest Range Officer seeking NOC for felling rosewood trees and teak wood trees. It was denied in view of the fifth condition of title deed to the effect that the full right over all the trees in the properties were fully vested with the Government. The petitioner argued that the 1923 deed is not a grant, but a title deed. The Government Pleader argued that the property held by the petitioner is a grant which would come under the purview of the Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980. In view of the said Act, 1980, the appropriation of teak, Blackwood, etc. were subject to payment of seigniorage at the rates specified. Section 4(1) of the Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980, reads as under:
“4. Grantees and lessees to pay current seigniorage rates- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, or in any grant, lease deed, contract or agreement, or in any judgment, decree or order of any court, with effect on and from the commencement of this Act, every grantee and every lessee shall be bound to pay to the Government the seigniorage rates in force for the time being for the timber cut and removed from any land held by him under the grant or lease.”
On the basis of Jose v. State of Kerala, 2020 (2) KLT 560 and Manoj A.N. v. State of Kerala 2013 (3) KLT 649, it was argued for the State that the trees came into existence subsequent to the assignment was also covered by the Act.
Relying on Gopi v. Tahsildar, 2002 (3) KLT 526, and Majeed v. State of Kerala, 2006 (1) KLT 19, it was contended that that the rights obtained in terms of 1923 grant was not absolute. (The Government Pleader also relied on two unreported judgments – in W.P.(C) No. 804/2006 and Crl. M.C. No. 7347/2017).
The petitioner argued that the restriction was only in respect of the trees made mention in 1923 title deed and the trees sought to be cut and removed by the petitioner are those planted by the father of the petitioner. The Court held as under:
“But, the fifth condition quoted above would show that the grantee is bound to deliver to the Government other royalties produced in the land also and Government is expected to pay regulated price for the articles of produce. The term ‘other royalties produced’ would indeed include subsequently planted royal trees also…..
In view of sub-section (1) of Section 4 and the non-obstante clause therein, the petitioner is liable to pay seigniorage for the trees proposed to be cut and removed by him. The fifth condition in Ext.P1 (1923) will stand modified to the extent provided under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1980.”
The High Court concluded analysing the Ext. P1 (1923) Title Deed, Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980, Kerala Preservation of Trees Act, 1986 and Kerala Promotion of Tree Growth on Non-Forest Areas Act, 2005 as under:
.(1) The fifth condition in Ext. P1 Title Deed will stand modified by the Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980, as per which every grantee and every lessee shall be bound to pay to the Government the seigniorage rates in force for the timber cut and removed from any land held under the grant or lease.
(2) For cutting, uprooting or burning any tree falling within the definition of tree as contained in Section 2(e) of the Kerala Preservation of Trees Act, 1986, it is necessary to obtain previous permission of the Authorised Officer.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, except in respect of trees:
.(i) reserved by the Government at the time of assignment of such land, or
(ii) trees standing on any land notified under Section 5 of the Kerala Preservation of Trees Act, 1986 every owner of non-forest land shall have the right to cut and transport any tree, other than sandalwood tree standing on his land.”
Note: In this case, the expression “title deed” does not denote a document conferring full ownership. This can be clarified by the use of the phrase “title thereto” in the definition of ‘Prescriptive Easement’ under the Easement Act.
In Surendrasingh v. Phirosahah, AIR 1953 Nag. 205, a Division Bench (Sinha C.J. and Hidayatullah, J.) held that the pleadings in a case dealing with easement have to be very precise. Following passage was quoted from Peacock – “Law Relating to Easements in British India” Third Edn., at page 608:
“As an easement is not one of the ordinary rights of ownership, it is necessary that either Party claiming or relying on an easement should plead the nature of his title thereto so as clearly to show the origin of the right, whether it arises by statutory prescription, or express or implied grant, or the old common law method of a lost grant“. (quoted in: Ibrahimkutty Koyakutty v. Abdul Rahumankunju Ibrahimkutty, AIR1993 Ker 91, 1992 (1) Ker LT 775, (1993) ILR(Ker) 1 KER 331 (K.S. Paripoornan, J.)
No doubt, the words ‘title thereto‘ refers tile of ‘easement’ claimed; and the word ‘title’ was not used in the general sense now used (that is, absolute ownership) in the Indian Easements Act, 1882.
5. Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala– Coffee Planter under a Grant is not a Jenmi
Following passage from Sri T. Madhava Row’s Memorandum (Travancore Land Revenue Manual) regarding the origin and nature of Jenmom rights is quoted in the Judgment (Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86). Sri T. Madhava Row stated as under:
“A Jenmi is often termed a landlord. But, it must be clearly understood and also always remembered that a Jenmi though certainly a landlord, is a peculiar Kind or landlord. Any person, who holds a pattah from a Collector in a British District and under it holds from the British Government subject to Government tax more or less, is called a landlord in ordinary language.
Even in Travancore, any coffee planter or indeed any ryot, who holds lands under a grant from the Sirkar, etc. , is or may be called a landlord. But, be it remembered, such landlords are not Jenmies.
A Jenmi differs from such landlords in that he does not derive his title to lands from the Sirdar etc. His title to the Jenmom lands is inherent. He is, so far as his Jenmom lands are concerned, a little territorial sovereign in a limited sense. He is landlord of his Jenmom domain exactly in the sense in which this Sirkar is landlord of all the land it grants to planters and indeed to all ryots in general; in the sense in which the British government is landlord of all the Ryotwari lands of the East Coast Zillahs of the Madras Presidency.
It is necessary, in view to avoid errors and misconceptions, to familiarize the mind to this definition of t Jenmi. The origin of Jenmom property may be briefly explained here with a view to make the rights of jenmis clear. Kerala Desom (in which Travancore is included) was originally conquered by Parasurama, and this great warrior parcelled out the conquered lands among a limited number of brahmins. The Brahmins then became territorial lords, each independent of the rest. From that early age, the lands have descended with the tenure almost unimpared. The lands so belonging to each Brahmin are said to constitute his Jenmom, and the Brahmin himself is called a jenmi. These lands, so long as they continue in possession of the Jenmi, are free of all taxation. To this day this exemption continues in full force.
Jenmom lands are precisely what are in Europe called allodial properties as contradistinguished from feudal. It must be clear from what has been stated that all the lands in Travancore belong to a body of jenmis. There are no lands that do not belong to some Jenmi or other. Be it remembered that the Sirkar itself is one of these Jenmis, it having come to possess Jenmom lands by gift, purchase, eacheat, confiscation and other ways. It is only a great Jenmi, great in the sense that its jenmom property is extensive. If any person wants land in Travancore, he must obtain it from, and hold it of, some one of the body of Jenmis, i. e. , from the Sirhar, which is the chief Jenmi, or from some other Jenmi”. (pp. 2 and 3 of Travancore land Revenue Manual, Vol. IV)
Note: Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 gives us “illuminative information as to the concept of ‘jenmom’” as pointed out in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, 2018 2 KerHC 719; 2018 2 KerLT 369 – though this decision was overruled by the larger Bench in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez Vs. Albert Fernandez, AIR 1971 Ker 168 :1971 KerLT 1).
6. Majeed v. State of KeralaGrant and the Right of Ownership
In Majeed v. State of Kerala,(2006) 1 KerLT 19, the State demanded seigniorage under Kerala Grants and Leases Modification of Rights Act, 1980. Petitioner was a person who purchased trees from Travancore Rubber and Tea Company Ltd. Disputes and questions arose in the light of of the Kerala Grants & Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980. Admittedly there was originally a grant. The scope of ‘grant’ was disputed. The contention of the petitioner was that it was the free hold property. The court did not accept the argument.
The rejected contention was stated by the Court as under:
“The petitioner contends that the respondents have no authority to demand seigniorage in respect of the timber of the trees planted by the company, as the property in question granted in favour of the company is not a leasehold property, but a free hold property, as is revealed by the order of grant Exts. R2(i).”
Edavagais
Edavagai Chiefs of Edapally, Kilimanoor, Poonjar and Vanjipuzhawere the Vassals of the Travancore-Maharaja (Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, 2018-2 KLT 369). In Harska Turst v. Stateof Kerala, ILR 1960 Ker 345, 1960 Ker LT 378, it is observed as under:
“ The Edavagais were petty kingdoms or principalities which remained independent or quasi independent until the consolidation of Travancore in the 18th century.
They were outside the State Ayacut and paid no land tax.
The Chiefs, however, in exercise of their ancient sovereign powers, collected Melvaram or Melvara Rajgbhogam from the jenmis inside the Edavagais (See: 1945 T. L. R. 581 and 728).”
The decision of the Settlement Officer for Poonjar Boundary Settlement with that of the Travancore Kingdom contained the following observation relating to the status of the Poonjar Chief. It reads as under:
“It is not necessary for the purpose of this enquiry to decide whether the Poonjar family ever had Sovereign rights. It is enough for my purpose to state that it is not possible that the Chief could have exercised any Sovereign rights since the invasion of Thekkumkoor by the Travancore Maharaja. The Chief has, since his Edavagai became included within Travancore territory, always been merely a jenmi and nothing more. Of course, I use that word in the sense of one who owns jenmam lands of the kind mentioned in paragraph 46, clause [2] of Mr. Rama Iyengar’s Memorandum, namely, lands which are entirely freehold and exempt from payment of any revenue to Government under any circumstances.” (See: Godavarma Valia Raja v. Bhoothi Swamiyar, AIR 1953 TC 408; ILR 1954 TC 109)
The lands in the following areas were recognized in Sirkar Accounts as Edavagas:-
1. Sreepadam.
It comprised in 7 pakuthies in Chirayinkil Taluk.
These villages were originally hereditary domain of Ranis Attangal. Subsequently the sovereignty was transferred to Travancore Maha Raja.
Rent was collected from this land and accounted as public revenue.
2. Kilimanur.
It comprised in 2 pakuthies in Chirayinkil Taluk.
This land was granted to Kilimanur Koil Thampurans.
The land revenue was assigned to the family of Koil Thampurans.
3. Edappally.
It comprised in Edappally North and Edappally South Pakuthies in Alangad Taluk; Thrukkunnappuzha in Karthikappally Taluk; Kallooppara in Thiruvalla Taluk; and Vazhakkulam in Kunnathunad Taluk.
The land revenue was assigned to the Chief of the Edappally Edavaga.
4. Vanjipuzha
The administration and collection of rent from the tenants in this Edavaga was left to be settled by the Chief in 3 Pakuthies in Peermedu Taluk.
5. Poonjar
A Pandya King, Manavikrama Kulasekhara Perumal, had to flee from Madurai, in the 12th century after a dispute over Madurai. He purchased, after selling his possessions, the Western hills of the Western Ghats (Poonjar) from Thekkumkur Rajas and established a Principality.
By 15th Century, Marthanda-varma of Travancore had annexed Thekkumkur and Vadakkumkur, to Travancore. During 1749-50 Poonjar Principality was annexed to Travancore. Thereafter, the Poonjar Chief became the vassal of Travancore.
Edavagai Rights Acquisition Act, 1955
‘The Edavagai Act intended acquisition and extinguishing of all Edavagai rights over the Edavagais of Edapally, Kilimanoor, Poonjar and Vanjipuzha’ as observed in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, 2018-2 KLT 369. The Edavagai rights were that vested in the –
Edapally Swaroopam,
Kilimanoor Kottaram,
Poonjar Koickal and
Vanjipuzha Madom.
History of Land Tax Collection from Edavagai Lands
Harska Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR 1960 Ker 345, 1960 Ker LT 378, clearly lays down the history. It is pointed out that the collection of Basic-Tax was first introduced by the Travancore Land Tax Proclamation, 1121. Sec. 6 of the Proclamation provided that the Proclamation would not be applicable to certain classes of lands. One of those classes was-
“Freeholds (Adhikara Ozhivus) belonging to the Edavagais of Edapally, Kilimanoor, Vanjipuzha and Poonjar”.
The reason for non-collection of Tax from Edavagais was also laid down in this decision as under:
“Edavagais were petty kingdoms or principalities which remained independent or quasi-independent until the consolidation of Travancore in the 18th century. They were outside the State Ayacut and paid no land tax. The Chiefs, however, in exercise of their ancient sovereign powers, collected Melvaram or Melvara Rajabhogam from the jenmis inside the Edavagais (See 1945 TLR 581 and 728).”
As pointed out in Harska Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR 1960 Ker 345, the next enactment was the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955 which came into force on 1-4-1956. Sec. 17 of the Land Tax Act, 1955, repealed the Travancore Land Tax Proclamation, 1121.
The Act provided no exemption from tax to lands situated within the Edavagais. The reason thereof was the already promulgated Edavagai Rights Acquisition Act, 1955. It is laid down in Harska Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR 1960 Ker 345, as under:
“8. The rights of the Poonjar Chief were acquired by the State under the Edavagai Rights Acquisition Act, 1955, which came into force on 1-1-1956. Edavagai rights is defined in Sec. 2(5) of that Act as follows:
Edavagai rights means all the rights and privileges vested in
the Edapally Swaroopam,
the Kilimanoor Kottaram,
the Poonjar Koickal and
the Vanjipuzha Matom
relating to heir respective Edavagais and includes in the case of the Poonjar Koickal the right to receive Melvaram in respect of lands situate within the Edavagai of Poonjar.
9. Sub-s.(1) of S.3 of the Act provided that on and from its commencement, the privileges of the Edapally Swaroopam and the Poonjar Koickal relating to Excise Revenues of the Edavagais of Edapally and Poonjar shall stand extinguished, and sub-s.(2):
“All the Edavagai rights of the Edapally Swaroopam and the Poonjar Koickal other than those mentioned in sub-section [1] and all the Edavagai rights of the Kilimanoor Kottaram and the Vanjipuzha Matom over their respective Edavagais, and all rights, title and interests vested in the Chiefs, in respect of waste lands or thanathu lands which have been assigned by them on Kuthagapattom or other like demises,
and all rights, title and interests vested in the Chiefs, in respect of waste lands or thanathu landswhich have not been so assigned by themare herebyacquired by Government, and all such rights, title and interests shall vest in Government free of all encumbrances.”
Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 4fixed the compensation payable by the Government to the Edavagais for the acquisition of the rights, title, and interests mentioned in sub-s.(2) of S.3 at the amounts as specified in the Schedule, being 8 1/3 times the annual income of the respective Edavagais less five per cent for collection charges. It is clear from these provisions that what was acquired was the Chiefs rights, and it is difficult to understand how the acquisition of those rights can possibly affect the right of the State to tax the lands concerned.
10. The right to basic tax is in no sense a manifestation of the Chiefs right to Melvaram. It is a right founded on the Constitution and not on the acquisition of the rights of the Edavagais.”
Edavagai Rights Acquisition Act, did Not change Character of Holdings
The object behind the act is very clear – it was only to ‘acquire’ the rights of the Edavagais; it was not to change the character of the land held by the tenants or purchasers.
Lease-holdings of the Edavagais continued as Lease holdings, but with liability to pay Tax.
In Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, 2018-2 KLT 369, it is pointed out-The Edavagai Rights Acquisition Act, 1955 did not change the character of the holdings and it only interfered with the right, title and interest of the respective Edavagais; they made made to vest with the Government. The effect was that the liability of the tenants to pay rent or other levies to the Edavagais stood altered as liability to tax imposed by the Government.
The 1955 Act is analysed in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, as under:
“There was also a saving clause in Section 11 which exempted from vesting, those lands held by the Chiefs as a Jenmy or as a pattadar under the Government and those held by the families, already settled and assessed, as also those lands in the direct possession of the Chiefs and any of the members of the respective families.”
Then it is observed by the High Court of Kerala as under:
“Hence land existing on a lease from either of the Edavagais or as freeholdon valid purchase made, continues in the possession and ownership of the land holder/lessee and the liability to payment of rent or other levies to the Edavagais would stand altered as liability to tax imposed by the Government. This does not change the character of the holdings and only interferes with the right, title and interest of the respective Edavagais; which stands vested with the Government.”
It was pointed out-
“The ‘Edavagai Rights’ is defined under sub-section (5), as the rights and privileges which vested in the families and ‘Chief’ was defined under sub-section (6) as the senior male member of the respective families, in whom the management of the family is vested.”
“The right, title and interest within the respective Edavagais, existing in favour of the families and the Chiefs, by the enactment, stood vested in the Government, free of all encumbrances.”
Note: Here the High Court of Kerala (in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, 2018-2 KLT 369) did not consider the effect of grant.
Did Edavagai Rights Acquisition Act, 1955 confer Title to ‘Registered Holders‘
No.
Sec. 8(1) of the Edavagai Rights Acquisition Act, 1955 reads as under:
“On and from the first day of April 1956, every registered holding in an Edavagai shall be deemed to be a holding registered under Government, and every registered land holder thereof shall be deemed to be a registered holder and pattadar under Government, and the holding shall be liable to basic tax imposed by Government, from time to time, in lieu of the rent assessed thereon at the settlement of the Edavagai.
If we take the words, in Sec. 8(1) – that, “in lieu of the rent assessed thereon at the settlement of the Edavagai” – as that used by the legislature purposefully, we have to say that no title is conferred inasmuch as the lease (associated with rent) is not given-a-go-bye. From Harska Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR 1960 Ker 345 (note the words – “But for Sec. 8(1) of the Edavagai Rights Acquisition Act, 1955, both the basic tax and the Melvaram would have been payable“), it appears that this is the view that is taken in this decision. It reads as under:
“17. It is settled law that if a right has been acquired by virtue of a statute, it is not necessarily taken away by the repeal of that statute (See: AIR 1950 Pat 505). What the argument fails to note is the fact that it is not the repeal of the Travancore Edavagai Act, 1109, which attracts the basic tax to these lands but the positive provisions embodied in the Land Tax Act, 1955. But for Sec. 8(1) of the Edavagai Rights Acquisition Act, 1955, both the basic tax and the Melvaram would have been payable. That sub-section restricts the claim to basic tax.”
18. We are unable to hold that the impugned imposition of the basic tax is in any way ultra vires of the powers of the State under the Constitution or violative of any legal right vested in the petitioners before us. It must follow that these petitions have to be dismissed and we do so with costs, advocates fee Rs. 100 in each of the two petitions.
It can also be seen that the purport of the act is not conferring tile to the ‘registered holdings’.
What is Patta or Pattayam?
Patta is a Certificate or Document issued by the Government
(i) to tenants/grantees/licencees of Govt. property, for cultivation, residence etc., and
(ii) to persons to whom ownership is conferred upon Govt. property.
Following decisions speak as to patta issued to Tenants –
Nature Lovers Movement Vs. State of Kerala, AIR 2009 SC 1573
Kamala Bakshi Vs. Khairati Lal, AIR 2000 SC 1808
Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2010 SC 795 (Ryotwari Patta).
M Chinnathambi Alias Muthiah Vs. Ponnathal, 2010-1 Mad WN 725;
Umapathi, K. Vs. Addl. Collector, Thanjavur, 2000-2 Mad LJ 725
In Revenue documents (‘record of rights’) of various States in India, the lessee is referred to as pattadhar.
Several enactments also refer patta as lease-document.
‘Patta’ (or ‘Pattayam’) in Kerala
Now-a-days ‘patta’ is generally used to show absolute Title in Kerala.
But, Patta, as a Revenue-Term, does not express absolute Tile, in Kerala.
Kerala Forest Act, 1961 refers to patta to denote grant or lease.
It was used in erstwhile Travancore, in early times to signify Government- lease of lands; and subsequently it was used also to show conferment of Janmam rights also.
Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960
From The Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960, Sec. 2(2) and 8 it is clear that “Patta” is issued by the Government on assignment of land including that on lease or grant of licence.
Section 2(2) of the Land Assignment Act, 1960 reads as under:
“2. Definitions.- (1) ….
(2). In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) assignment includes a transfer of land by way of lease and a grantof licence for the use of land.”
Section 8 of the Land Assignment Act, 1960 reads as under:
“8. Assignment to take effect with restrictions, conditions, etc., according to their tenor .- All the provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any Pattah or other document evidencing the assignment of Government land or of any interest therein shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, notwithstanding any law for the time being in force or any custom or contract to the contrary.”
Maximum limit to be assigned for cultivation
Rule 5 of the Kerala Government Land Assignment Rules, says as under:
“5. Maximum limit to be assigned for cultivation.- (1) The extent of land that shall be registered in favour of a single family for personal cultivation by members of the family shall not ordinarily exceed –
(a) in the case of unoccupied lands, not more than fifty cents of land, whether wet or dry, in the plains and not more than one acre of wet or dry lands in hilly tract;
(b) in the case of lands held on lease, whether current or time expired or by way of encroachment not considered objectionable, the lessee or the encroacher as the case may be will, be eligible for assignment of not more than 50 cents of land, whether wet or dry, in the plains, and one acre of land, whether wet or dry in hilly tracts. Land, if any, held in excess of this area shall be surrendered to Government and no compensation shall be payable for the lands so surrendered.
(2) When a family owns or holds any land over which it has proprietary right or has security of tenure, only the balance of extent of Government land necessary to make up the extent admissible under sub-rule (1) shall be granted to it on registry.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this rule:-
(i) xxxxxxxxxx
(ii) xxxxxxxxxx
(iii) for the purpose of calculating the extent of land that may be assigned to a family, the total extent of land possessed or held with proprietary right or fixity of tenure by the head of the family and also the members of the family both individually and collectively shall be taken into account. Assignment made in favour of a family under these rules shall, for the purpose of calculating the maximum extent that may be so assigned, include assignment made to members of the family both individually and collectively, the total extent so assigned not exceeding the maximum area that may be assigned to that family. The area under encroachment by a member of a family shall, for the purpose of these rules, be deemed as the area under encroachment by the family.” (Quoted in: C. A. Abdul Rahim v. District Collector, Ernakulam, 2013-3 KHC 790; 2013-4 KLT 514)
Assignment for house site and for beneficial enjoyment
Rule 6 of the Land Assignment Rules reads as under:
“6. Assignment for house site and for beneficial enjoyment.- (1) The extent of Government land that shall be registered in favour of a family as house site shall not exceed fifteen cents (6.072 ares). The assignee shall be liable to pay land value for house sites at the rate of Rs.200 per cent.
(2) The extent of Government land that may be granted on registry when the same is indispensably required for the beneficial enjoyment of adjoining registered holdings shall not exceed, in the case of one registered holding fifteen cents (6.072 ares)
Note.-(1) The authority competent to assign land for beneficial enjoyment shall be the Revenue Divisional Officer. He may pass order of assignment in such cases only after personally satisfying himself that the land is absolutely necessary for that purpose.
xxxxxxxxxxxx”
Duty is cast on the Panchayath to preserve the Pond
In Kuriyakose Thomas v. Ombudsman For Local Self Government Institutions, 2014-1 ILR(Ker) 366; 2013-4 KHC 455; 2013-4 KLJ 440; 2013 4 KLT(SN) 112, it is observed as under:
“However, if there is an existence a pond, then there is no requirement of assignment since it vests in the Panchayath under Section 218; in which case a duty is cast on the Panchayath to preserve the pond.”
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the judgment reported in A.I.R. Supreme Court Weekly 2001 Page 2865 (Hinch Lal Tiwari Vs. Kamala Devi).
4. I perused the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. In that decided case, assignment of lands to various individuals was questioned by an individual on the ground that lands classified as pond is of public utility and meant for public use and therefore no part of it could have been allotted in favour of any person. It was also argued that under the Statutory Act in force in Uttar Pradesh, lands classified as pond was not one among the classes of land that could be allotted. The Departmental Authorities cancelled the allotment and on being challenged by the allottees, the High Court gave the relief in favour of some of the allottees in respect of certain extent of land and rejected in respect of other extent. In the above stated facts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had held as follows:
“13. It is important to note that material resources of the community like forests, tanks, ponds, hillock, mountain, etc. are nature’s bounty. They maintain delicate ecological balance. They need to be protected for a proper and healthy environment which enable people to enjoy a quality life which is essence of the guaranteed right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Government, including revenue authorities, i.e., respondents 11 to 13, having noticed that a pond is falling in disuse, should have bestowed their attention to develop the same which would, on one hand, have prevented ecological disaster and on the other provided better environment for the benefit of public at large. Such vigil is the best protection against knavish attempts to seek allotment in non-abadi sites”.
The Supreme Court of India held as regards assignment of a pond as under::
“14. …. The State including respondents 11 to 13 shall restore the pond, develop and maintain the same as a recreational spot which will undoubtedly be in the best interest of the villagers. Further it will also help in maintaining ecological balance and protecting environment in regard to which this court has repeatedly expressed it’s concern. Such measures must begun at the grass-root level, if they were to become the nation’s pride.” (Quoted in: Thyagi Ponnurangam Dwellers Public Welfare Association v. The District Collector & Others, 04 Nov 2003: 2003 0 Supreme(Mad) 1738)
In Thyagi Ponnurangam Dwellers Public Welfare Association v. The District Collector & Others, 04 Nov 2003: 2003 0 Supreme(Mad) 1738 it is held as under:
“5. Therefore it is clear from the above judgment that a duty is cast upon the State to protect and preserve water courses, ponds, tanks and other lands so as to avoid ecological imbalance. The present case comes within one of the lands to be preserved by the State. As already noted, the State Government, has banned allotment of such lands to any individuals. Therefore finding that the petitioner has no legal right to compel the respondents to recognise their possession and issue pattas, the writ petition stands dismissed. The State Government is, therefore, directed to take expeditious steps to remove the encroachment in the lands concerned and restore it to the nature’s fold.”
In Kerala, in the Land Tax Act Rules, 1972 and the Tax Receipt, describes the ‘holder of property’ as ‘Pattadaran’. It is definite that he is not the title holder.
Transfer of Registry Rules (Kerala) makes it clear– Patta and Title Different Concepts. In Moideen v. Village Officer, 9 January, 2019(Alexander Thomas, J.) Kerala High Court pointed out with reference to Rule 16 of the Transfer of Registry Rules that the mutation or acceptance of basic land tax, by itself, will not confer or extinguish title and that in accordance with the decisions of the Civil Court pattas will be revised from time to time. It is observed further as under:
“Rule 16 of the Transfer Registry Rules envisages that summary enquiry and decision thereon envisaged under those rule is only an arrangement for fiscal purposes and does not affect the legal rights of any person in respect of the lands covered by the decisions in transfer of registry cases and the prescribed legal rights is always subject to adjudication by Civil Court and pattas will be revised from time to time in accordance with such judicial decisions.”
In Cochin also – “Patta” denoted Lease
‘Patta’ was used in Travancore & Cochin to denote Government-recognition of both lease lands and Janmam lands.
In Harska Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR 1960 Ker 345, it is pointed out as under –
‘According to the petitioners, the issue of the Patta under that Act in respect of these lands was something duly done and the repeal of the Act cannot in any way affect the right granted under that Patta, namely, the right to continue in possession of the lands till the end of 1144 on payment of Rs. 2,665 (about) per year as rent against the basic tax now demanded of over Rs. 12,000 per year’.
Purambokes
Purambokes were unassessed Govt. lands connected with public works or used or reserved for public purposes, such as public road, and margins within their defined boundaries, public lanes and pathways, heads and banks of Rivers, Irrigation and drainage channels, Lakes and Backwaters, Markets, Burial-grounds, and Landing Bhats.
Lands acquired for public purposes were also included under the head ‘Purambokle’ in Revenue Registers.
The functions of the Land Revenue Department were to prevent encroachment.
Where an unobjectionable encroachment, the head of the land was changed to ‘Tharisu’.
Objectionable encroachment was punished with fine and charged to prohibitory assessment till retracted.
Land Revenue Department granted leases of poramboke for putting up shops in Markets and given permission to occupy the land in Festivals.
Kuthakapattom – Travancore Land Revenue Manual
In Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Vol. III, Part I, Chap.6 discusses about Kuthakapattom. Para 67 defines Kuthakapattom as follows:
“Kuthakapattom means and includes–
Lease of Government land which cannot be permanently assigned away.
Lease of trees standing on Government land.
Lease of Poramboke land on fixed ground rent for putting up shops in bazaars and markets.
Lease of Government land for temporary occupation in connection with fairs, festivals, marriages, public entertainment, etc.”
Para 68 of Chap. 6 of the Manual discusses the conditions of a lease with or without limit of time which is as follows:
“68. Conditions of a lease with or without limit of time:
.(i) A lessee should not put up permanent structures, sink wells, erect walls, plant more trees, open roads or pathways on the lands leased or do, or aid the doing of any act which will injuriously affect the land or trees directly or indirectly or diminish their letting value, or which will obstruct the Government servants in the discharge of their duties or in any way prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the public. He should not in any way interfere with, or make any alteration in, the lie of the land.
(ii) The lease shall be revocable at any time, if the land or tree or both is required for any Government or public purposes.
(iii) When a lease relates to trees alone, (1) the lessee should not cultivate the land on which the trees stand, and (2) the lessee should manure the trees and keep them in such a condition as will not diminish their letting value or yielding capacity.
(iv) The lessee should take care of the property, if any, included in Schedule II appended to the grant, but shall have no right of enjoyment over the same. He should intimate the Tahsildar if any tree on the property withers or is blown down or if any damage is caused to them.
(v) If any of the conditions laid down above are not fulfilled or violated by a lessee, the leasehold could be resumed by the officer who sanctioned the lease, irrespective of the nature of the lease”. Para 71 of Chap.6 of the Manual states that on the termination of a lease, the lessee should surrender possession of the property leased. If he refuses or omits to do so, he should be considered as a tenant holding over liable to be proceeded against and evicted under the provisions of Regulation IV of 1901. Para 73 of Chap.VI of the Manual discusses about the preparation of grant in Form C.”
Kuthakappattam – Conditions
In Kozhencherry Grama Panchayat v. Mariamma Chacko, ILR 2001-2 Ker 251; 2001-1 KLT 880, after referring Travancore Land Revenue Manual it is stated as under:
“6. The Kuthagapattom Rules which were made in exercise of the powers of the Government Land Assignment Regulation, Regulation III of 1097, govern the Kuthakapattom prior to 1947. R. 17 states that immediately after a lease for a definite period is sanctioned by the Tahsildar, he shall issue a notice to the party concerned, intimating the nature of the order and calling upon him to produce an amount not less than one year’s rental as security for proper conduct of the lease within a period of 15 days from the date of notice. Form C is the form of Kuthagapattom Grant and it prescribes the conditions. Condition No. 19 states that, on the expiry of the lease, or in the event of the cancellation of the lease, or in the event of resumption of the property, the lessee shall, unless the he has taken a further lease, surrender the property in tact to the Proverthicar. If he does not so surrender, he will be considered a tenant holding over liable to be proceeded against and evicted under Regulation IV of 1091. He will not however be entitled to compensation for any trees planted or for any improvements that he might have made on the land or for any structures raised by him thereon and not removed.”
Kuthakappattam Rules, 1947 v. Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964
In K.B Augustine v. State of Kerala, 2016-2 KLJ 18; 2016 3 KLT(SN) 15, a question arose –
Whether a land leased under Kuthakappattam Rules, 1947 (under Government Land Assignment Regulation, No. III of 1097), is eligible for assignment under the Kerala Assignment Rules, 1964 (under Kerala Land Assignment Act, 1963)?
It was contended that such assignment of Kuthakappattam land is against the provisions of both the Kerala Land Assignment Rules and the Kuthakappattam Rules. The High Court pointed out as under:
“From a mere reading of clause (iii) of Rule 1A it is clear … what is exempted is only those assignment of Government lands under any special rules other than the Kuthakappattam Rules, 1947. …. Since it is the admitted case of the Government that the land is covered under the Kuthakappattam Rules, 1947, it is only to be held that a land covered by a Kuthakapattam lease will not come under the exclusion under Rule 1A of the Kerala Land Assignment Rules. The respondents have not been able to point out any provision in the Kuthakappattam Rules, 1947, whereunder such land cannot be the subject matter of assignment either under the Kerala Assignment Rules, 1964 …”
Tharisu or Assessed Waste
Tharisu was the waste lands ‘at the disposal of the Govt’ and available for ‘extension of cultivation’. It was distinguished from poramboke. Unauthorized occupation of tharisu was also punishable.
In K. P. C. Properties represented by its Managing Partner Jerald Jacob v. State of Kerala, 2014 3 KLT(SN) 31, it is observed as under:
“The said land was classified as ‘tharisu’ in Government records and was treated as assignable lands.”
Transposition ‘tharishu’ to ‘puthual-registry’:
Detailed procedure was prescribed for transposing ‘tharishu’ to ‘puthual-registry’ in the Revenue Manuel, Under the Puthuvel Rules (1097 ME : 1922).
Puthuval (Puduval) Assignment Under the Puthuvel Rules (1097 ME : 1922)
Puduval Rules were framed under Section 7 of the Government Land Assignment Regulation, III of 1097 (Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, 24 January, 2025, 2025:KER:5422).
(Also in page 94 of the Report of the Special Officer & Collector, M.G. Rajamanickam IAS, No. GLR – (LR) – 1/2016/BRT/Co. Dated: 04.06.2016).
Puduval lands can be disposed of only in accordance with the aforestated Rules. In other words, insofar as the property is described as Puduval land, the same is required to be assigned as provided under Rule 13 of the Puduval Rules.
It was sale/lease to augment the King’s treasury and also to distribute the lands for cultivation among subjects.
Puthuval lands were lands (i) not assessed and registered in the Sirkar accounts in the name of any individual and (ii) not governed by Regulation II of 1040 (1865). The lands, when remained unregistered, were the absolute property of Government. Title was conferred to individualsby the Grant or assignment by the Government (under Puduval Rules).
Under the Puthuvel Rules (1097 ME : 1922) it had to be done by ‘public auction’ or by ‘assignment otherwise than by auction’.
Rule 13 speaks about “Assignment of Unoccupied Lands“. It reads as under:
“13. (i) All unoccupied lands available for registry shall, subject to the provisions of Rules 24 to 28, 35 and 46 (i) and (ii) and unless otherwise directed by Government, be sold by publicauction together with the reserved trees standing thereon, at an upset price to be fixed in each case by the Officer conducting the auction. The upset price shall he equivalent to the estimated value of the reserved trees standing on the lands plus the estimated Tharavila according to the importance of the land, fixed under Rule 5 or 9 as the case may be, and the cost of demarcation and survey.”
Rule 16 reads as under:
“16. On the day fixed for the sale of the land, the land shall, as proclaimed, be put up to auction, block by block, if it consists of more than one block, and sold to the highest bidder above the upset price. Provided however that no single person should be allowed, directly or indirectly, to bid for more than 50 acresof the land advertised for sale. The sale shall be conducted subject to the following general conditions:-
(i) The highest bidder above the upset price shall be declared to be the purchaser of the land, and if any dispute arises between two or more bidders at the same price, the land shall be immediately put up to auction again at the last preceding undisputed bid and sold…….”
In the Puthuval Rules there was provision for sale of lands below 5 acres, above 5 acres and also ‘Concessional Registry of Lands’ for the assignment to the members of the depressed classes or to indigent families belonging to other communities, on application made to the Tahsildar of the Taluk.
Sub rule (iii) dealt with sale of area below 5 acres it reads as under:
“(iii) If the entire area of the block is 5 acres or less, the Tahsildar need not make a requisition to the Officer referred to above but shall get the land sub-divided, if necessary, and demarcated and surveyed by the Provertikar and a sketch, drawn to scale, prepared by him. This sketch should be cheeked on the ground by the Tahsildar or the Assistant Tahsildar.”
If the encroachment was one where ‘Registry is desired’, the Rules provided for an application be taken from the occupier and dealt with under Puthuval rules. If registry was ‘not desired’ or if puthuval registry was refused, steps could have been taken against the encroachment.
Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, 24 January, 2025, 0n Puduval lands
In this decision it is held as under:
“9. Furthermore, this Court notices that the Government has produced the prior documents as regards the petitioner in W.P(C) No.25830 of 2010 along with a memo dated 13.11.2024. A reference to the said document – partition deed No. 460 of 64 – shows that the property in Survey No.2211 is recorded as “Puduval” land. In this connection, reference requires to be made to the Puduval Rules framed under Section 7 of the Government Land Assignment Regulation, III of 1097. Puduval lands can be disposed of only in accordance with the afore Rules. In other words, insofar as the property is described as Puduval land, the same is required to be assigned as provided under Rule 13 of the Puduval Rules. The prior deeds in support of the case set up by the petitioners do not disclose the existence of any such assignment with respect to the properties in question.
10. As regards the claim of the petitioners in W.P(C) No. 30260 of 2010, this Court notices that the petitioners have attempted to trace the title of the properties in question to the decree of the Principal Sub Court, Attingal which was later purchased by one Neelakanda Pillai as per sale deed No. 2099 of 1940. The learned Government Pleader has produced the afore- sale deed along with a memo dated 29.10.2020. The said documents also show that the property in question is ‘Puduval’ land and therefore, the requirement of an assignment is essential. But as in the connected case, here also the petitioners have no case that the documents relied on by them show that the property was covered by an assignment to support their case.
11. On the whole, the dispute in these writ petitions has to be considered with reference to the description of the properties falling under old survey No. 2211 in the settlement register. As already noticed, the settlement register describes the property as “Puramboke”.
The petitioners, it is true, have contended that the survey numbers as per Exts.P1 to P4 are not seen described as “Tharisu” in the BTR at Ext.R1(b) and Form No.7 prepared by the Survey Authority at Ext.R1(d). But as already noticed, the prior documents produced by the Senior Government Pleader, along with the memo as noted earlier, strike at the root of the contentions raised by the petitioners. In view of the discussions made above, I am of the opinion that the contentions raised by the learned Senior Government Pleader with respect to the malpractices committed, cannot be brushed aside.”
Thanathuchitta lands
It was virtually the Govt. land or land at the disposal of the Government. It was occupied by Govt. institutions or sirkar temples (not included in poramboke) or for Govt. purposes. Irippukaram was fixed upon this land. The Sirkar was treated as Pattadar though no patta was actually issued. It was analogous to registered lands, but Sirkar itself was in position of pattadar. These lands were not opened for all sections of public. They cannot be transferred to poramboke or tharisu.
These lands fall under ‘Govt. lands’ other than poramboke in Land Conservancy Regulations. It was the duty of the Land Revenue Department to prevent encroachments.
Reserved Forests
It was the land under Forest Department. It comes under Forest Regulations of 1068 (1893).
Land Revenue Department co-operate with Forest Department in case of trespass.
Reserved lands or proposed reserves
These lands were proposed for reservation under the Forest Regulations.
Land Revenue Department co-operate with Forest Department in enforcing the provisions.
Unreserved lands
It was also under the control of Forest Department. Most of such lands were available for extension of cultivation.
Land Tenures.
Revenue Records – Maintained Promptly
The Land Revenue Department was one of the main departments of the Travancore Government. The ownership remained with the Jenmies and Sircar (Government). The agriculturists, who formed majority of population, had to pay various kinds of remunerations to the Janmies and the Sircar (Government), based on the nature of tenancy and the nature of the ‘Jenmam (Janmam) right’. The lease arrangements were known by various nomenclatures based on the conditions of tenancies. Several enactments were made for proper collection of Taxes, and management of the Govt. lands and the lands upon which the tenants toiled. The Revenue Records were prepared and maintained promptly.
Various Land-Tenuers
The tenures, according to the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Volume III (1915), fall under two main heads:
(1) Sirkar or Pandaravaga;
(2) Janmam.
760 Types of Tenures in Travancore
In ‘Historical Introduction to the Kerala Land Reforms Act and the Working of the Land Tribunals’, PN Prabhakaran Pillai, Cochin University Law Review 1, No. 1 (1974), says as under:
“The land tenures that existed in the former Travancore area were very complex and special tenures and sub-tenures were numerous It may be seen that there were 760 types of tenures including sub-tenures in Travancore area alone. At the last Revenue Settlement’, an endeavour was made to systematise and simplify the tenures as far as possible. After the settlement, the number of tenures were reduced to a considerable minimum. The numerous tenures which have been recognised at the settlement may be generally traced to one or other of main two heads, viz., Sirkar or Pandaravaka and Jenmom.”
In settlement (1910), numerous tenures had been recognized. For practical purposes, as per the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, the tenures were classified as under:
1. Sirkar or Pandaravaga
2. Sirkar Devaswom vaga
3. Kandukrishi
4. Sreepadam vaga
4. Sree pandaravaga
6. Janmam
1. Sirkar or Pandaravaga:
This tenure represents Sirkar as the landlord. The tenures fall under the following heads:
a) Pandarapattom,
Pandarapattom was originally in the nature of lease without any proprietary or transferable right. By the royal proclamations, the holders of these lands were given with full proprietary rights and declared to be private, heritable and transferrable property. Puthuval lands came under this tenure.
b) Otti
It was originally in the nature of a mortgage. It stood as a real or constructive loan by the State. Interest was deducted from Pattom to be paid by the holder. He had also to pay Rajabhogam (tax).
c) Enams
Enams were service enams or personal enams. Service enams were inalienable. It continue as long as the holder was in service. Personal enams were given to support individuals or families. Such properties could have been transferred by the holders.
d) Viruthi
It stood analogous to service enams. But had permanency if the holder continued his service regularly. When he died the holding passed to legal heirs subject to certain payments.
e) Special tenures
It was in the nature of enam which received special treatment.
f) Karamolivu
All Lands except janmam included under this head. The land was tax-free.
2. Sirkar Devaswom vaga
The lands under this head were originally janmam lands or private property of Devaswoms. They were held on venpattom tenure. Later on, Sirkar took over the Devaswoms and the lands were treated as Sirkar lands. Subsequently, Sirkar Devaswom lands were separated from Sirkar lands; and separate accounts were kept.
3. Kandukrishi
It was the home-farms or the private property of the sovereign. The tenants had no right in such properties.
In Neelakanta Pillai v. Madhavan Nair, 1965 KLT 537 the court surveyed the Manuals and the judicial decisions and found that the occupant of Kandukrishi lands had no rights of any kind in the lands cultivated by him (See S.28 of the Revenue Settlement Proclamation of 1061; the Travancore Land Revenue Manual Vol. 3, pages 15 and 16, Para.23 and 24). The court referred to Subramonian Kesavan Empran v. Krishnan Govindan Plappalli (22 TLJ. 968 at p. 976 (F.B.) which reads as under:
“This being the correct position in regard to tenancies-at-will generally, the position is stronger in respect of Kandukrishi lands, for as the Full Bench observed in 33 T.L.R. 242, such tenants are “according to the traditional policy of the Crown of not capriciously disturbing possession, left to enjoy Kandukrishi lands for generations” and their rights have except so far as regards the liability to eviction at the will of the Sirkar been always regarded as valuable property. It is therefore not possible to hold that the tenant of such lands has no right or interest at all in them as contended by the respondent’s learned Vakil …..It is therefore impossible to hold that he holds these lands as a mere tenant-at-will with no powers of disposal at all over them.”
4. Sreepadam vaga
Sreepadam lands were-
(i) thelands comprised in the free-hold villages of Idakkode, Illamba, Mudakkal, Alamkodu, Avanavancherry, Attingal and Kilattingal in the Chirayinkil Taluk, the revenue from which was wholly assigned in favour of the Sreepadam Palace; and
(ii) other lands not being pandaravaka lands situate in the State of Kerala and owned by the Sreepadam Palace (See: The Sreepadam Lands Enfranchisement Act, 1969).
5. Sree Pandaravaga
Sree Pandaravaka land was the land owned by the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple and registered in the revenue records as ‘Sree Pandaravaka’ (See: The Sree Pandaravaka Lands (Vesting And Enfranchisement) Act, 1971).
Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple had originally been administered by Madathil Pillamars. The lands that belonged to the Temple were in the possession of various persons under different tenures. All such persons were liable to pay tax as ‘Rajabhogam’. The grants or Inams were made by the Kingdom for the services rendered. Such Inams included tenures like Adima, Anubhogam, Thiruvulam, Thiruvadayalam etc. The Madathil Pillamars collected the Michavaram due to Devaswom on those lands to be utilized for the poojas and other rituals to be performed in the temple.
When the Revenue Settlement was prepared (in 1910), all the properties that were classified under the names of the different Madoms were brought under the class ‘Sree Pandaravaka’. The lands that were in the names of the family members, received as personal Inams were described as Kudumbaporuthy lands.
6. Janmam (Thanathu)
It was the properties owned by Janmies. Such lands were exempted from tax.
Regulation of 1071 (1896) attracted these properties. The tax under Rajabhogam had to be paid for this land. But Devaswom and Brahmaswom thanathu lands, though came under the head ‘Janmam’, and were exempted from tax, only so long as they remained unalienated. When alienated it was charged under Rajabhogam assessment. Devaswom and Brehmaswom properties could have been subjected to outright sale.
Travancore Proclamation of 1040 (1865)
In Travancore, by virtue of Proclamation of 1040 (1865), all Sirkar (or Pandaravaga) pattom-lands were converted into full proprietary-lands.
The Proclamation of 1040 reads thus:
“PROCLAMATION
By His Highness the Maha Rajah of Travancore, issued under date the 2nd June 1865, corresponding to the 21st Edavam 1040.
Whereas we earnestly desire that the possession of landed as well as other property in Our territory should be as secure as possible; and whereas We are of opinion that, with this view, Sirkar Pattom lands can be placed on a much better footing than at present so as to enhance their value; We are pleased to notify to Our ryots
Istly- that the Sirkar hereby and for ever surrenders, for the benefit of the people all optional power over the following classes of lands, whether wet, garden or dry, and whether included in the Ayacut accounts or registered since:
Ven Pattom, Vettolivoo Pattom, Maraya Pattom, Olavoo Pattom, Mara Pattom, and all such Durkast Pattom the tax of which is understood to be fixed till the next Survey and Assessment;
2ndly. that the ryots holding these lands may regard them fully as private, heri-table, saleable, and otherwise transferable, property;
3rdly. accordingly, the sales, mortgages, & e., of these lands will hence-forward be valid; may be effected on stamped cadjans and will be duly registered; the lands may be sold for arrears of tax, in execution of decrees of Courts and such other legitimate purposes, and may also be accepted as security by the Sirkar as well as by private individuals;
4thly. that the holders of the lands in question may rest assured that they may enjoy them undisturbed so long as the appointed assessment is paid;
5thly. that the said holders are hence-forth at full liberty to lay out labour and capital on their lands of the aforesaid description to any extent they please, being sure of continued and secure possession;
6thly. that the aforesaid description of lands will be resumable by the Sirkar like Jenmom and other private lands only for purely public purposes, as for instance, for making roads, canals, public buildings, & e., and when resumed for such purposes compensation will be paid by the Sirkar not for improvements only as here to fore, but equal, to the full market value of such lands;
7thly. that the foregoing concessions are not however to be understood to affect in any way the rights of the Sirkar to regulate the land tax, to resume escheats, to confiscate the property of criminals, and generally such rights as have heretofore been exercised upon all property in general;
8thly. that it is to be understood that when Pattom land being a portion of a holding, is transferred to a pauper, with the view of defrauding the Sirkar of the tax due to it, the Sirkar will have the right of apportioning the tax so as to prevent loss of revenue; and,
9thly. (Repealed by Proclamation dated the 5th Karkadakam 1059). (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 : Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez Vs Albert Fernandez, AIR 1971 Ker 168; 1971 Ker LT 1.)
Devaswom Proclamation, 1922 & 1948 and Formation of Dev. Board
The History of Governmental Administration of Devaswoms mark four phases. They are:
(i) Administration as the Land Revenue Department – started in 987 ME (1811-1812 AD) under the edicts of Col. Munro.
(ii) Administration as the Devaswom Department – from 1922 Devaswom Proclamation.
(iii) Direct Administration by Maharaja by the 1948 Proclamationassuming controlof Devaswoms and Devaswom Department.
(iv) Administration under Devaswom Board – from 1950 in accordance with the enactment, Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950.
Administration ‘AS’ the Governemnt Departments
By virtue of ‘organising’ the Devaswoms “as” the Land Revenue Department (from 987 ME) and “as” the Devaswom Department (by Proclamation, 1922), Devaswoms mentioned in the schedule thereof were treated as the ‘property of the State’.
The history as to the formulation of the Devaswom Proclamation, 1922, is given in M. Muraleedharan Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR1991 Ker 25. It was laid down:
The Hindu temples in the State of Travancore were mostly under private management called Ooralars or Karakars.
As those bodies were found mismanaging the institutions, Col. Munro decided in 987 ME (1811-1812 AD) that the State should assume control over them.
With a view to secure better management of the Devaswoms, the Government appointed a committee to report upon the assumptions of those Devaswoms, the feasibility of separating their administration from the Land Revenue Department and cost if a separate department be deemed desirable.
The Commitlee, recommended that the administration of the Devaswom should be separated from the Land Revenue Department and entrusted to a distinct agency.
The Government of Travancore after taking necessary legal opinion came to the conclusion that creation of a separate department exclusively to the administration of Devaswoms was necessary.
Considering that it is the solemn right and duty of the Government to maintain efficiently and in good condition the Hindu Religious Institutions the State the Travancore Government issued the Devaswom Proclamation on 12th April, 1922 corresponding to 30th Meenom, 1097.
Section 7 of the Proclamation is as under:
“7.(1) Our Government may for the better and more efficient management and more effective control of the Devaswoms mentioned in the schedule organised a Devaswom Department of the State consisting of such number of officers and other servants as they think fit.
2. The expenditure in connection with the said Department shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 3 and 4, be not out of the general revenue of the State.”
The Devaswom Department has become a part of the Government Department.
Administration ‘UNDER’ the Travancore Devaswom Board
The history shows that a “material change” was brought forth by the formulation of the Travancore Devaswom Board. It is laid down in M. Muraleedharan Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR 1991 Ker 25, as under:
The Maharaja did not want to leave the administration of the Devaswoms to the State Government in the new set up. Therefore on 10-8-1123 (23-3-1948), yet another proclamation was issued by which the Maharaja assumed controlof Devaswoms and Devaswom Department of the Government.
A material change also made in respect of funds from which expenditure. It was also provided that expenditure to be made not from general revenue but only from Devuswom fund.
Thereafter when Travancore-Cochin States were integrated it was provided by Section 8(c) of the Covenant that the administration of the Devaswoms, Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments and their properties and funds would vest with effect from 1-8-1949 in a Board known as Travancore Devaswom Board.
The Hindu Religious Institutions Ordinance 10 of 1124 was promulgated which came into force on 1-8-1949. Before expiry of the period of Ordinance, Act 15 of 1950, namely the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 was enacted.
Section 3 of the Act provided (as regards the formation of the Travancore Devaswom Board) as under:
“The administration of Incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and of Hindu Religious Endowments and all their properties and funds as well as the fund constituted under the Devaswom Proclamation, 1097 M. E. and the Surplus Fund Constituted under the Devaswom (Amendment) Proclamation, 1122 M. E. which were under the management of the Ruler of Travancore prior to the first day of July 1949, except the Sree Padrnanabhaswamy Temple, Sree Pandaravaga properties and all other properties and funds of the said temple, and the management of all institutions which were under the Devaswom Department shall vest in the Travancore Devaswom Board.”
The power of nomination given to the Ruler of Travancore was taken away and was given to the Council of Ministers by Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions (Amendment) Act 70 of 1974. Thereafter, of the three Hindu members of the Board, two will have to be nominated by the Hindus among the Council of Minister. The power given to Rajpramukh was subsequently vested in the Governor.
Land-Classification in Cochin
Pandaravaka, or Puravaka
All lands were classed under Pandaravaka or Puravaka.
Pandaravaka lands – The lands owned by the State (or State having the jenmom or proprietary right).
Puravaka land – The land over which the proprietary right (jenmam right) was vested with private individuals or public institutions (or land in which janmam right did not vest in the Sarkar.
Land-Tenuers in Cochin
Verumpattom
The chief land systems of tenancy under which tenants held lands owned by others were called Verumpattom. This was simple leasehold. By a series of legislative enactments, culminated in the Cochin Tenancy Act (1118 ME – 1943) – hailed as the ‘great charter’ for the tenants, tenants gained occupancy rights in the lands held by them.
Kanam
Verumpattom became a kanam when the landlord acknowledged liability to pay a lump sum to the tenant on the redemption of his lease.
Kanam-Kuzhikanam
Section 2(23) in Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, reads as under:
(23) “Kanam-Kuzhikanam” means a transfer by a landlord to another person of garden lands or of other lands or of both –
(i) with all or any of the trees, if any, standing there on at the time of the transfer; or
(ii) without such trees, for the purpose of planting trees or pepper vines or both thereon and for the enjoyment of the trees transferred, if any, the incidents of which transfer include-
(a) a right in the transferee to hold the said lands liable for the consideration paid by him or due to him which consideration is called ‘Kanartham’; and
(b) the liability of the transferor to pay to the transferee interest on the kanartham unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.”
Pankuvaramdars
Under this tenancy tenants raised crops on agricultural lands in partnership with the owners, the terms of partnership varyied from place to place.
Kudikidappukar
Under this arrangement landlords allowed tenants to occupy a portion of their land generally for putting up a house.
Otti (Mortgages)
Tenancy under this head took different forms in different regions.
Cochin Settlement Proclamation, 1080 (1905)
Cochin Settlement Proclamation, was made by his Highness Sir Rama Varma Raja of Cochin on March 10, 1905. It declared that the verumpattom holders of lands would, acquire full rights to the soil of the lands they hold. The Proclamation aimed to make better the status of the men toiled in the agricultural fields and to improve the economic insecurity of the tenants, and thereby increase the revenue of the King also.
Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, describes the 1905 declaration as under:
“This proclamation consists of twenty- eight clauses which deal broadly with all the aspects of land tenure prevailing in the State of Cochin. The preamble to the proclamation recites that the Raja had already ordered that a complete survey embracing demarcation and mapping and the preparation of an accurate record of titles in respect of all descriptions of properties within his entire State shall be carried out, and it adds that directions had been issued that a revenue settlement or revision of the State demand shall be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down by the proclamation. Clause 6 enumerates the tenures of lands prevailing in the State. Under this clause there are two major tenures –
(1) Pandaravaka and
(2) Puravaka.
The former are held on one or the other of six varieties of tenures; of these we are concerned with the verumpattom sub-tenure. This clause provides that the Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure shall be deemed as the normal tenure for settling the full State demand and that the other tenures shall be treated as favourable tenures and settled on the lines indicated in cls. 14 to 17. Clause 7 says that the present rate of assessment on Pandaravaka verumpattom nilas varies from one eighth para to twelve paras of paddy for every para of land; and it adds that such a vast disparity of rates is indicative of unequal incidence under the existing revenue system. That is why the clause proceeds to lay down that the State demand should bear a fixed proportion to the produce a land is capable of yielding and so it prescribes that under the Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure the holder should pay half of the net produce to the State. The clause then proceeds to provide for the method in which this half of the net produce should be determined. Clauses 11 and 12 deal with the assessment on tree.
Clause 13 is important. It says:
“at present holders of Pandaravaka verumpattom lands do not possess any property in the soil. As we are convinced that proprietorship in the soil will induce the cultivator to improve his land and thereby add to the prosperity of the land, we hereby declare that the verumpattom holders of lands shall,after the new settlement has been introduced, acquire full rights to the soil of the lands they hold and that their rights shall remain undisturbed so long as they regularly pay the State revenue provided that the rights to metals, minerals possessed by the State in all lands under whatever tenure they are held are reserved to the State”.
Under cl. 18 it is provided, inter alia, that in the case of Pandaravaka lands held on the verumpattom tenure the settlement shall be made with the present holder of the land and in regard to Puravaka land with the Janmam. Clause 22 prescribes the procedure and the time for the introduction of settlement. It requires that before the introduction of the new rates of assessment a rough patta shall be issued to each of the landholders showing the relevant detail of his holdings and the assessment to be paid by him hereafter. The object of preparing such a patta is to give an opportunity to the landholders to bring to the notice of the authorities their objections if any. The objections are then required to be heard before the final entries are made. Clause 26 declares that the new settlement shall be current for a term of thirty years. This has been done with a view to secure the utmost freedom of action to the landholders in improving their properties and turning them to the best advantage according to their means and inclination. Clause 27 deals with escheats; and cl. 28 makes general provisions as to the formation of a new land record including reassessment of land and the registration of titles “a work calculated to promote the well- being of a State”.
Malabar –‘Jenmi’, ‘Jenmom’ and ‘Ryotwari System’
Malabar is the northern part of Kerala. It formed part of the erstwhile Madras province in the British India. By the medieval period lands in South India were owned by Jenmis and the tenants cultivated the land giving rent or other remuneration to the landlords. ‘Jenmi’ held ‘jenmom lands’ as his absolute property.
Innumerable varieties of land tenures were prevalent in various parts of South India. Two types of tenures were important in Madras Presidency: landlord-tenures and the ryotwari-tenures. (‘The Land Systems of British India’ by Bedan Henry Powell first published in 1892; ‘Land Tenures in the Madras Presidency’ by S. Sundararaja Iyengar, published in 1916. See: Thressiamma Jacob v. Geologist, Dptt. of Mining, 2013 (9) SCC 725).
In Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 2240, the Constitution Bench of our Supreme Court held as under:
“Originally the janmis in Malabar were absolute proprietors of the land and did not pay land revenue. After Malabar was annexed by the British in the beginning of the 19th century, the janmis conceded the liability to pay land revenue” (Quoted in Thressiamma Jacob v. Geologist, Dptt. of Mining, 2013-9 SCC 725.)
Land owned by the Government was given to the cultivators under the ryotwari system, under a patta. Sir Thomas Munro, Madras Governor, introduced ryotwari system throughout the Madras Presidency in 1820. British Government collected taxes directly from the peasants. The rate of tax was 50% in dry-lands and 60% in irrigated land.
What was ‘Patta’ In Malabar?
In Malabar area ‘Patta’ was originally a word connected to land-lease. “Patta” issued when Lease by Government.
Ryotwari System in Malabar – Lease by Government, under Pattas
Sir Thomas Munro, Madras Governor, introduced ryotwari system throughout the Madras Presidency in 1820.
Under the ryotwari system, land was given on lease by the government to the ryot under a patta.
A ryotwari pattadar was not a proprietor of land in its full sense, but only a tenant.
British Government collected taxes directly from the peasants. The rate of tax was 50% in dry-lands and 60% in irrigated land.
In S. Thenappa Chettiarv. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1986 SC 1117, it was held, following Khajamian Wakf Estates v. State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 161, that the expression ‘estate’ in Article 31A included ‘ryotwari’ land also by virtue of the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution on June 20, 1964 with retrospective effect.
Ryotwari Settlement, 1920 – Assessment for Revenue
As stated above, Sir Thomas Munro, Madras Governor, introduced ryotwari system throughout the Madras Presidency in 1820. The basic idea of ryotwari settlement (revenue-settlement is fixing tax or rent, after survey in most cases) was that every bit of land was assessed to a certain revenue and assigned a survey number for a period of years, which was usually thirty and each occupant of such land held it subject to his paying the land-revenue fixed on that land. But it was open to the occupant to relinquish his land or to take new land which had been relinquished by some other occupant or become otherwise available on payment of assessment (Land Systems of British India by Baden-Powell. See: Thressiamma Jacob v. Geologist, Dptt. of Mining, 2013-9 SCC 725).
Land-Settlements in Malabar
Madras Land Registration Regulation, 1802
The Madras Land Registration Regulation, 1802 (Madras Regulation XXVI of 1802), is the first Settlement. It was promulgated with the object as shown in its preamble –
“Whereas it is expedient that public means should be established for the purpose of ascertaining the public revenue on landed estates paying revenue to the Government as well as for prescribing rules for the transfer,of all lands; wherefore the following rules have been passed for that purpose.”
Malabar Land Registration Act, 1895
The Malabar Land Registration Act, 1895 (Act 3 of 1896), is promulgated with the object as shown in its preamble –
“Whereas Regulation XXVI of 1802 provides that landed property paying revenue to Government shall be registered by the Collector; and whereas such landed property *[in certain areas in the Nilgiri district] has in many cases not been registered in the names of the proprietors thereof; and whereas it is desirable for the security of the public revenue to provide a summary means whereby the Collector may ascertain such proprietors …..”
*[The words “and Certain neighbouring areas in the State of Madras” were substituted for the words “and the Wynaad” by section 45 of the Malabar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1951 (Madras Act XXXIII of 1951) and the words “in certain areas in the Nilgiri district ” were substituted for the words ” in Malabar and certain neighbouring areas in the State of Madras” by the Madras Adaptation of Laws Order, 1957. The above Act came into force on the 15th March 1952.]
Prior to independence, the last survey settlement was made in Malabar during 1926-1934. It was done as per the Resettlement Manual of 1930.
Chitta and Adangal in Madras
Chitta: Chitta is a revenue document maintained in Taluk office. It contains extent of land, name of owner and the type of land (wet/dry, irrigated/rainfed, etc.).
Adangal: Adangal is also a revenue record that contains details about the land, such as the ownership, extent, classification of land, and details of cultivators. It is taken as a document for showing the ownership and possession of land. (See: D. Rajamanickam v. M. Pasupathiammal, 2019-2 Mad LJ 208; N. Chandrasekaran v. Arulmighu Thiruvatteeswarar Thirukkoil, 2020-1 LW 631; 2020-5 Mad LJ 227).
History of Settlement and Adangal Register in Malabar
In Sukapuram Sabhayogam v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 101, it was pointed out with referencetothe Madras District Gazetteer, Malabar as regards the history of settlement (1900 -1904) and re settlement (1931-1934) and as regards the preparation of Adangal Registers after the settlement as under:
“67. In the Madras District Gazetteer, Malabar, by Inis, 1951 Edition, at page 344, it is stated that the settlement was introduced into the eight plain Taluks of Malabar between 1900 and 1904and the Revenue system of the District has been brought into line with that of the rest of the Presidency, due allowance being made for special local conditions.
68. Dealing with the re-settlement, it is stated in the same Gazetteer, at page 848, that it took place between 1931 and 1934, and that the re-settlement was done because the term of 30 years for which the then existing rates of land assessment were sanctioned had expired between 1929-30 and 1932-33- A list of the taluks giving particulars as to when the last settlement expired and the new settlement came into operation, is also given at the same page.
69. At page 349 of the same book, among the special features of the re-settlement, it is mentioned that the terms “janmabhogam” or “private janmam” were replaced by new holdings and old holdings respectively. That is, in the Adangal Registers etc., maintained after the settlement was introduced for the first time in 1900 and 1904, the lands of all the jenmis appear to have been shown as private janmam but in the re-settlement the register shows them as old holdings.”
Note: The expression ‘estate’ in Article 31A (relating to ‘acquisition’ of land etc.) included ‘ryotwari’ land also by virtue of the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution on June 20, 1964 with retrospective effect.
Supreme Court: Ryotwari Tax Collection Begun in 1792
In Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. The State of T.N., AIR 1972 SC 2240 examined the status of land holders under ryotwari settlement. It was held as under:
“Ryotwari or kulwar system was first introduced into the British possessions by Col. Read in 1792. When the Baramahal and Saleem were ceded to the British by Tippu, Lord Cornwall is specially deputed Col. Read for their settlement. …. The ryot was not regarded as the proprietor of the soil but only as a cultivating tenant from whom was to be exacted by government all that the he could afford. ….. This distinguishing feature of this system is that the state is brought into direct contact with the occupant of land and collects its revenue through its own servants without the intervention of an intermediate agent such as the Zemindar. All the income derived from extended cultivation goes to the state.”
Private Janmam in Malabar Area – Ended By 1934
In Sukapuram Sabhayogam v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 101, it is also pointed out that notwithstanding the introduction of the Ryotwari settlement in Malabar area between 1900 and 1904, certain lands were shown as ‘private janmam’ as distinguished from ‘Government Janmam’. And, added as under:
“The practice of treating the properties of persons like the petitioner as private janmam has been completely given the go-by, at any rate, after the resettlement during 1931-1934.”
Note: The expression ‘estate’ in Article 31A (relating to ‘acquisition’ of land etc.) included ‘ryotwari’ land also by virtue of the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution on June 20, 1964 with retrospective effect.
Lands held under Ryotwari tenure after Ryotwari Settlement (1934)
In Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301; 1972-2 SCC 218, it was pointed out – “(We are not concerned here with) lands which were held by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Sukapuram Sabhayogam v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Kerala 101 to be held under Ryotwari tenure after the introduction of the Ryotwari Settlement in the Malabar area of Kerala State”.
Part III
Land Reform Measures that Shaped Kerala
In ‘Historical Introduction to the Kerala Land Reforms Act and the Working of the Land Tribunals’, PN Prabhakaran Pillai, Cochin University Law Review 1, No. 1 (1974), observes as under:
“Most of the Land Reforms Laws enacted by the States have not been effectively implemented. Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, as amended upto date is however an exception. The major amendment made in 1969 is considered to be a bold step in the land reforms legislation. No other state in India has introduced a socio-economic legislation of this type to safeguard the interest of the agricultural classes of the society.”
Kanam Tenancy Abolition Act, 1976 (applied only to Cochin area)
Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961
In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the legislatice History of Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill is given. It reads as under:
“The Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill which has ultimately become the Act was published in the Government Gazette of Kerala on December 18, 1957 and was introduced in the Kerala Legislative Assembly on December 21, 1957 by the Communist Government which was then in power.
The bill was discussed in the Assembly and was ultimately passed by it on June 10, 1959. It was then reserved by the Governor of the state for the assent of the President under Art. 200 of the Constitution, Meanwhile, on July 31, 1959 the President issued a proclamation under Art. 356 and the Assembly was dissolved. In February1960 mid-term general elections took place in Kerala and as a result a coalition Government came into power.
On July 27, 1960 the President for whose assent the bill was pending sent it back with his message requesting the Legislative Assembly to reconsider the bill in the light of the specific amendments suggested by him. On August 2, 1960 the Governor returned the bill remitted by the President with his message and the amendments suggested by him to the new Assembly for consideration. On September 26, 1960 the amendments suggested by the President were taken up for consideration by the Assembly and ultimately on October 15, 1960 the bill as amended in the light of the President s recommendations was passed by the Assembly. It then received the assent of the President on January 21, 1961, and after it thus became law.”
The Supreme Court struck down the 1961 Act as regards its application to the ryotwari lands of Hosdurg and Kasargod Taluks, as unconstitutional, on the ground that it was violative of the Art. 14 of the Constitution, in Kunjikoman V. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 723 .
The High Court of Kerala, declared its application, null and void, as regards the ryotwari lands of Malabar area and the lands held under Kandukrishi, Sreepadomvaka, Thiruppuvaram, Pandaravaka, Viruthi etc., in Govindaru Nampoothiripad v. State of Kerala, 1962 KLT 913, AIR 1963 Ker 86.
In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, challenge was made to the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 (as regards the Pandaravaka Lands of Cochin),on the basis of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. It was not not accepted.
The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963
The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 made Kerala change tremendously. Modern Kerala is shaped by this Act (though some, including a few who were benefitted, may hesitate).
Landmark Enactments in Land Tenure Reforms that Culminated in KLR Act, 1963
Royal Pattom Proclamation of 1040(1865 AD) – Fist Gigantic Step
During the second half of the 19th century several Royal Proclamations were promulgated with a view to confer rights in the land to the tenants who were the real cultivators. Majority of the people were engaged in agriculture; but the lands belonged to Jenmies (Sircar, Brahmins or Devaswoms). The cultivators held the land under lease arrangement known as Pattom, Otti, Inam and Viruthi etc. One of the important Regulations came in the line of agrarian reforms was the Royal Proclamation of 1040 ME (1865 AD). It pertained to Pattom (lease) tenements created (by Sircar) on Sirkar lands known as Pandaravaka lands. It is exalted as the Magna Carta of peasants of Travancore it being led to conferring land to tillers, step by step.
Proclamation of 1040 (1865)– No Proprietary Rights; But, Permanency to Cultivators
Till 1040 ME (1865 AD), the agriculturists, who held the Pandaravaka lands under Pattom arrangement, were liable to be treated as mere tenants-at-will; the land being resumable resumable (by the Government) at any time, as they were in the nature of temporary leases just like tenements created by private jenmis.
The Pattom Proclamation of 1040 (1865) converted the pattom arrangement on pandaravaka lands into permanent leasesand conferred on the holders thereof permanent rights of occupancy, heritable and alienable. Though the Proclamation of 1040 ME did not expressly confer full proprietary rights on tenants, it gave the tenants permanency in the Pandaravaka soil; and it recorded the fist gigantic step towards the land reforms in Travancore.
Royal Proclamation of 1061 (1886) Brings in Further Radical Changes
Paragraph 9 of the Revenue Settlement Proclamation of 1061 says, with reference to Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, as regards Pandarapattam lands, as under:
““these lands were originally the absolute property of Government, and the tenants were mere tenants-at-will; but, by the Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, Government generously waived all right to these lands, and declared them to be the private, hereitable, saleable property of the holders.”.”
Section 22 of the Revenue Settlement Proclamation of 1061 (1886) made radical changes in land tenure.
Those changes were:
(1) no debt shall be recognised as due to the holder;
(2) no interest shall be deducted from the Pattom on such debt;
(3) no reduction of debt or a corresponding enhancement of the Sirkar demand shall be made when such properties were transferred by sale.
The properties held on the tenures in question shall be recognised as so many favourably assessed lands or Inams and confirmed to the holders as such.
Clause 7 of Section 24 of the Proclamation provided as under:
“There shall be no further interference on the part of the Government with these free holds, except such as might be necessary for the punctual realization of the quit rent payable”. (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.)
See notes below: ‘Pandarappattoms’ before 1061 (1886) were Recorded as “Thettoms”
Jenmi & Kudiyan Act (1896) and Amendments – Made Kudiyan, Full Owner
‘Jenmam (Janmam) land’ is defined in the Jenmi and Kudiyan Regulation, V of 1071 (1896), as land (other than Pandaravaka, Sripandaravaka, Kandukrishi or Sircar Devaswom land, recognised as such in the Sircar accounts) which is either entirely exempt from Government tax or if assessed to public revenue, is subject to Rajabhogam only, and the occupancy right in which is created for a money consideration (Kanom) and is also subject to the payment of Michavaram or customary dues and the payment of the renewal fees.
This definition is intended for the purposes of the Regulation, which regulates the relations between Janmis and their Kanapattom tenants. A Janmi has not only Kanapattom tenants but has other tenants as well holding on Adima Anubhogam, Thiruvulam and similar other tenures and the Regulation is not concerned with the latter class of tenants in whose case the ordinary law of landlord and tenant is applicable. Revenue law, on the other hand, makes no distinction between a Kanapattom tenant and a non Kanapattom tenant if he holds under a Janmi recognised in the revenue accounts.
Before Travancore Jenmi and Kudiyan Act, V of 1071 (1896), lands were granted as Inams by the Sovereign to Devaswoms and Brahmin jenmies. (Sreekumaran Kesavan Namboori v. Gopalan Madhavan, 1956 KLT 256).
The Jenmi & Kudiyan Regulation of 1071 ME (1896) was passed to stop the injustices perpetrated on the Kudiyans (bond-servants). It was amended by the Amendment Regulation of 1108 ME. The report of the Committee which led to the Amendment Regulation of 1108 ME reads as under:
“6. The outstanding feature of the amendment is that it lays the ghost of the Jenmis’ ownership for ever. The Jenmi has been expropriated and reduced to the position of a mere rentier. Refined considerations in the interests of the reciprocal rights and obligations have all been swept away. The solution of the problem looks like the cutting of the Gordian knot and the process is rather rough and coarse by the side of the Regulation of 1071. The measure is eminently democratic. To some extent it is socialistic also. For, one of the aims of some schools of social reformers, is to make the labourer free by breaking down the relationship of master and servant and similar situations involving superiority and inferiority by means of legislative interference. Whatever it be, to all appearance the jenmi has received the knock-out-blow. Yet it may be asked whether he has not good reason to come back smiling. For what he is entitled to by way of michavaram, renewal fees and customary dues has been consolidated and spread out with the advantage that he is assured of the payment without any worry. The burden on the Kudiyan is clearly fixed and the door has been closed on the chance of his escape. It remains to be seen who is the better for the present amendment of the Regulation”. (Quoted in: Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369)
The changes introduced by the Amended Regulation reads as under:
“i. Jenmi is not the owner of the land hereafter, his right being confined to the receipt of Jenmikaram as fixed by the law;
ii. the Kudiyan is the full owner of the land subject only to the payment of the Jenmikaram to the Jenmi;
iii. Jenmikaram is to be regulated and controlled by the Settlement Pattamicham and not by the Kanappattam contract except till the next general Land Revenue Settlement and, that even, only subject to certain statutory limitations;
iv. no renewals are hereafter obligatory;
v. Jenmis’ dues may be fractioned out and paid annually and in money as prescribed by the Statute;
vi. the rate of interest on arrears of Jenmikaram has been reduced to nine per cent whether payable in kind or in money when collected by the Jenmy direct, or under the provisions of chapter III or otherwise through Court, and to six per cent when collected by the Government under the provisions of chapter IV;
vii. The period of limitation for recovery of arrears of Jenmikaram has been reduced from the former period of twelve years to a period of six years;
viii. Government have undertaken the collection of Jenmikaram and payment thereof over to the Jenmi;
ix. in the case of Government realising the Jenmikaram under the provisions of chapter IV only the land on which the Jenmikaram is a charge shall be sold for arrears of jenmikaram, though this restriction may not apply as regards the movables of the defaulter;
x. Section 45 enacts an equitable method of the distribution between Jenmi and Kudiyan of compensation money granted by the Sircar when the Government compulsorily acquire or purchase jenmom lands”.
Cochin Settlement Proclamation of 1080 (1905)
As shown above, the Sirkar or Pandaravaka tenure holders of the Kingdom of Cochin were conferred with fixity of tenure by the Settlement Proclamation of 1080 (1905).
The Settlement Proclamation of 1905 covered all lands in the State, including lands held under concessional tenures or as tax-free. The Rules made under the Act contained the procedure for the issue of title deeds in respect of lands held under such grants. As stated above, Clause 13 of the Settlement Proclamation provided that the holders of Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands would acquire ‘full rights to the soil of the lands‘ they held. Settlement Proclamation of Cochin of 1080 (1905) Clause 13 provided as under:
“At present holders of Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands do not possess any property in the soil. As we are convinced that proprietorship in soil will induce a cultivator to improve his land and thereby add to agricultural prosperity of the country, we hereby declare that our Verumpattom holders of lands shall, after the new settlement has been introduced, acquire full rights to the soil of the lands they hold and that their rights shall remain undisturbed so long as they regularly pay the State revenue, provided that the rights to metals and minerals, possessed by the State in all lands under whatever tenures they are held, are reserved to the State”.
The Settlement Proclamation of 1905 was expressly repealed by the Land Tax Act of 1955 of the united State of Travancore-Cochin; but this Act, as a whole, was struck down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 552. In Kesavan Vadhyan Namboodri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1968 Ker 279, it was pointed out that this Proclamation of 1080 (1905) stood repealed by implication by the Land Tax Act of 1961.
Section 4 of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, 1118, reads as under:
“Notwithstanding any law, custom or contract to the contrary, every verumpattomdar shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding and shall not be evicted therefrom except as provided in Section 8 of this act.”
Section 4 concerned with the fixity of tenure, that is, fixity of the period of holding, possession or enjoyment of the land. The effect of such a mere conferment of fixity of tenure was not to continue the lease beyond the period specified therein, but to give to the person who continues to remain in possession of the land after the lease has come to an end the status of a statutory tenant. (Ittiravi Namboodiri Vs. Krishnankutty Menon AIR 1964 Ker 298. Dr. K. A. Dhairyawan V. J. R. Thakur, AIR 1958 SC 789, referred to.)
Travancore Jenmi and Kudiyan (Amendment) Act, 1935
‘Proceedings of the Travancore Sri Chitra State Council’ recorded the speech of Kayalam Paramesvaran Pillai (Additional Head Sircar Vakil) while moving the Travancore Jenmi and Kudiyan Regulation (Amendment) Bill, on 28th May 1935, as under:
“Sir, I beg to move that the Travancore Jenmi Kudiyan Regulation (Amendment) Bill, as passed by the Sri Mulam Assembly, be taken into consideration. I am sure that honourable members have carefully gone through the Bill and that it is not necessary for me to explain the principles underlying the Bill at great length. It will be noticed that the main point for which this Bill is proposed is in regard to jenmikaram in respect of cherikal lands held on Kanapattom. Honourable members know what a kanapattom transaction is. It is a demise by a jenmi to a person called kudiyan in respect of a Jenmam land on receipt by the jenmi of an amount as loan, called Kanam. The kudiyan has to pay a rent or pattom to the jenmi. The jenmi has to pay interest in respect of the kanam money advanced. The net result is that the kudiyan pays to the jenmi the rent or pattom minus the interest and this residual rent is called michavaram. Besides this michavaram the kudiyan has also to pay certain customary dues and periodical fees. Under the Jenmi and Kudiyan Regulation as amended, all these dues have been consolidated and their yearly value has been taken and fixed as the amount payable every year in lieu of all dues to the jenmi. This is the jenmivaram and this law further lays down what shall be the rent payable and this is called the jenmikaram. The jenmikaram may be “said to be the statutory rent and the jenmivaram the contract rent, and it has been laid down that in the case of Jenmom lands generally jenmivaram shall be the jenmikaram. But in the case of cherikal lands a differential provision is made and it has been laid down that in respect of cherikal lands that jenmikaram shall be the settlement pattamicham minus the interest on the kanam amount. Perhaps I may have to explain what settlement pattamicham is. Honourable members know that settlement pattom is the pattern fixed by Government in respect of Sirkar lands in the settlement of tax. The Settlement Pattamicham means the settlement pattom fixed at the settlement minus the tax actually payable in respect of the land. In respect of cherikal lands what has been fixed is that the kudiyan shall pay to the jenmi the settlement pattamicham minus the interest on the kanam amount. It has been assumed that the settlement pattamicham is the utmost fair rent that may be paid by the kudiyan to the jenmi. But it has been noticed in actual fact that the interest on the kanam is more than the settlement pattamicham, with the result that in many cases the jenmikaram is nil or a minus quantity. This was not the intention of the Legislature. Therefore provision is now proposed, in this Bill, that in respect of cherikal lands either the jenmivaram or settlement pattamicham minus the interest on kanam amount shall be the jenmikaram whichever is greater. I am sure that this will be admitted to be a reasonable arrangement. This is the main principle of the Bill.”
‘Cherikkal’Lands
In Godavarma Valia Raja v. Bhoothi Swamiyar, AIR 1953 TC 408; ILR 1954 TC 109; 1953 KLT 267, reference was made to the report of the Settlement Division Peishkar on the Revenue Settlement of Travancore, Chapter VII which containd the following note relating to Cherikkal lands:
“The term ‘Cherikkal’ was ordinarily applied to dry lands known as such, in hilly tracts in certain taluks of the Quilon and Kottayam Divisions, in which paddy or other cultivation was carried on in recurring periods of years and on which under the pre-settlement revenue orders, tax was either levied or leviable by Government only during years of cultivation. The Cherikkal lands were thus under the old practice immune from the payment of assessment to the Sirkar during the years of non-cultivation, though the lands themselves once taken up by a ryot for cultivation need not be and were not in many cases, relinquished by him.
The cultivation of Cherikkals is of a peculiar character. The lands are cultivated generally for 3 and rarely for 4 successive years and then allowed to run into jungle. The first crop raised is invariably paddy and is popularly known as Uzhavu (….) The second crop which is known as Kalai (…) is either paddy or other cereals or sugarcane &c., and the third crop designated Kurumpuppu (….) consists of cereals other than paddy, sugarcane, ginger, yams, plantains, etc. Cultivation is then stopped for the time being. The period of fallow extended in early times to twelve years and in some cases even more. But with the extension of cultivation and the demand for land, the interval of fallow was gradually lessened so much so that in course of time only three years were allowed in some places.
The system of Cherikkal assessment was also peculiar. In their round of annual inspections, the village officials ascertained the Cherikkals under cultivation in each year and the crops with which they were cultivated. A second inspection was made at the time of harvest and crops gathered were then estimated for the purpose of levying the Sirkar tax. The tax which was known in the revenue accounts as ‘Melavaram’ or’Vilameladi’ according as it was imposed on Cherikkals cultivated with paddy or with other crops, was fixed at 2/10 of the produce. It was levied either in kind or in money at the current rates in the case of the paddy tax and in money at certain fixed Padivu rates in the case of other crops.”
Godavarma Valia Raja v. Bhoothi Swamiyar, AIR 1953 TC 408, proceeded as under:
“15. The Government order reviewing the Settlement Final Report extracted in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Vol. II, page 380, will also help to give an idea about the nature of melvaram realised by the State in respect of Cherikkal lands:
“The cherikkal lands were unregistered dry lands in hilly tracts in certain Taluks of the Quilon and Kottayam Divisions, in which paddy or other cultivation was being carried on in recurring periods of years and on which the tax was being either levied or was leviable by the Government during the years of actual cultivation. The assessment was known as malavaram or vilameladi, according as the cultivation raised was paddy or other crop. The assessment used to be fixed, after local inspection, at a certain proportion of the produce, and used to be levied either in kind or in money, at the current market rate in the case of the paddy tax, and in money at certain pathivu or fixed rate in the case of any other crop. In some places, besides the malavaram tax, an extra cess called paranellu and kutta was also levied on all Sirkar or Pandaravaka cherikkals. In the case of Pandaravaka cherikkals held on favourable terms, and also in the case of cherikkals claimed by Devaswoms and Jenmis, only one-half the malavaram or vilameladi tax was ordinarily levied. Later on, the basis of the assessment was altered from the produce of the land to the extent cultivated; and irrespective of the crop raised, the tax was fixed entirely in money.”
Tamil Nadu Inam-Estate Enactments
In Khajamian Wakf Estates v. State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 161, the Constitution Bench considered the constitutionality of various Land Reform enactments that conferred ownership rights in tenants, including
(i) Tamil Nadu Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, Act 26 of 1963;
(ii) Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwsri) Act, Act 30 of 1963; and
(iii) the Tamil Nadu Leaseholds (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, Act 27 of 1963
and held that these Acts were completely protected by Art. 31A of the Constitution. The negative arguments on Article 31 and 31A footed on estate, public purpose etc. were rejected.
‘Estate’ in Article 31A included ‘Ryotwari’ Land also
Khajamian Wakf Estates v. State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 161, was followed in S. Thenappa Chettiar Etc v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1986 SC 1117; and held that the expression ‘estate’ in Article 31A included ‘ryotwari’ land also by virtue of the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution on June 20, 1964 with retrospective effect.
Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 & Land History
215 sq. miles of Land Belonged to Chief of Poonjar was granted to J.D. Munro for the rent Rs. 3000 (actually nominal, for it is only 3/4 paise per acre) by The Chief of Poonjar (or H.H. the Maharaja – See: Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218, Para 11). It was treated as “grant of lease” for coffee cultivation (First Poonjat Concession) in 1877 without limit of time. The tract of land was known as Anchunad and Kannan Devan Hills.
Poonjar Raja was a Janmi
Our Apex Court in Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218, observed that the Poonjar Raja was a Janmi (landlord or proprietary interest holder) when the First Concession was granted and the whole lands have fallen within the expression ‘Janmam right‘.
On 2.8.1886, the agreement called the Second Pooniat Concession was entered into modifying the previous deed of ratification. By this time a company called the North Travancore Land Planting and Agricultural Society Ltd. had acquired the rights in the said land.
Surrender of rights to Travancore Sircar & Royal Proclamation of 1899
Poonjar Chief or Raja had subjugated himself to Travancore Sircar or Maharaja. Agreement dated 18.09.1899 was entered into between Rohini Thirunal Kerala Varma Raja (the then Chief of Poonjar Koyikkal) and the Travancore Government, under which the ownership of the land described in the First Poonjat Concession had been transferred to the Government of Travancore. (See: Kottayam District Koottu Krishi Karshakasangam v. Stateof Kerala, 2015). It was a surrender of certain rights of the Poonjar Chief in favour of Travancore Sircar. On 24.9.1899, a Royal Proclamation (of 1899) was made.
The Royal Proclamation made on 24.9.1899 read as under:
“Whereas we deem it expedient to clearly declare the position of this State in respect of the tract known as Anjanad and Kannan Devan Hills, we are pleased to declare as follows; (1) The tract known as Anjanad and Kannan Devan Hills is an integral portion of our territory and all rights over it belong to and vest in us.
(2) The inhabitants of the said tract and all others whom it may concern are hereby informed and warned that they are not to pay any taxes, rents or dues, or make any other payment to the Poonjar Chief or his representatives or to any person other than an officer of our Government authorised in this behalf, in respect of anything in, upon or connected with the said tract, with the exception, however, of a payment of rupee three thousand per annum from the successors in interests of the late Mr. J.D. Munro of London and Peermade now being paid to the said Chief in virtue of a Lease deed executed by the said Chief in favour of the said late Mr.J.D. Munro on the 11th July, 1877, and which we are pleased to permit the said Chief to continue to receive.
(3) The lands within the said tract will be dealt with by our Government in the same manner as lands in other parts of our territory with such modifications as the circumstances and conditions of the said tract may require and all taxes, rents and dues hitherto paid, and that may hereafter be imposed by our Government shall, with the exception of the sum of rupees three thousand aforesaid, be paid by the, occupants of lands within the said tract whose occupation has been or may be recognized or confirmed by our Government, and of such portions of the said tract as may from time to time hereafter, with the permission of our Government, be occupied, to the officers of our Government who may be authorised in this behalf.” (Quoted in: Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218; Kottayam District Koottu Krishi Karshakasangam v. Stateof Kerala, 2015)
The Apex Court, in Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218, considered the effect of this surrender, with reference of its previous judgment in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras, (1960 (3) SCR 887) and observed, on the materials placed before the Court, that it was difficult to resist the conclusion that the lands in dispute (with the Poonjar Chief) fall within the expression ‘Janmam right‘; and that the effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1899 was that the Sircar became the Janmi. In Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218 our Apex Court observed as under:
“It seems to us that on the material placed before us it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the lands in dispute fall within the expression “Janmam right”. If, as stated in Travancore Land Revenue Manual Volume IV, there are no lands that do not belong to a Janmi, and the Sircar becomes a janmi by gift, escheat, confiscation or otherwise, the effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1899 must be that the Sircar became the Janmi.“
Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971
For revenue purposes, janmam lands were lands that were entered in the revenue accounts under the heads of Devaswom-vaka, Brahmamaswom-vaka and Madampimar-vaka, i.e., to say a land to be classed as Janmom land should have been recognised as such in the revenue accounts. The mere circumstance that a land belongs to a janmi does not bring it under janmom tenure and conversely the mere fact that janmom land is absolutely transferred to a non janmi does not any the less detract from its original character.
The Apex Court in Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218, observed that, the State grants like Kannan Devan Hills Concession and Ten square Miles Concession and Munro Lands, were treated under the heading ‘Pandaravaka Lands‘, i.e., lands belonging to the Sircar. (See: Kottayam District Koottu Krishi Karshakasangam v. Stateof Kerala, 2015)
Government of Kerala, successor of the former Government of Travancore, was vested with the right, title and interest of the former Government.
The Kerala Government found that a large extent of agricultural lands in Kannan Devan Hills Village had not been converted into plantations and such lands are not required for the purpose of existing plantations. Accordingly, the Government decided to resume such lands for distribution for cultivation and purposes ancillary thereto. Consequent to this, Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 was enacted. (Kottayam District Koottu Krishi Karshakasangam v. Stateof Kerala, 2015)
Constitution Bench of our Apex Court, in Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218, upheld the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act.
As already explained, while perusing the nature of ‘janmam right’ it was held by our Apex Court in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras, 1960-3 S.C.R. 887, Subba Rao, J., as under:
“Under the definition, any janmam right in Kerala is an “estate”. A janmam right is thefreehold interest in a property situated in Kerala. Moor in his “Malabar Law and Custom” describes it as a hereditary proprietorship. A janmam interest may, therefore, be described as “proprietary interest of a landlord in lands“, and such a janmam right is described as “estate” in the Constitution.” (Quoted in Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218)
Kanam Tenancy Abolition Act, 1976
Under the Kanam Tenancy Act, 1955, the kanam tenants in the Cochin area were liable for the recurring and periodical payment of jenmikaram to their jenmies. Such jenmies were intermediaries between the State and the cultivators and they had the right to receive jenmikaram. The 1976 Act was enacted to abolish such intermediary right and with a view to confer on the kanam tenants full proprietary rights over their holdings.
Sec. 14 of the Act provided as under:
14. Payment of amount or annuity to be full discharge of the liability to pay jenmikaram.-The payment of the amount or annuity payable under section 4 to the jenmies or other persons entitled thereto in the manner prescribed by or under this Act shall be a full discharge of the liability for payment of jenmikaram and no further claims for jenmikaram or for payment of such amount or annuity, as the case may be, shall lie.
Should a Kanam Tenant Get‘Purchase Certificate From Land Tribunal?
The Kanam Tenancy Act, 1976 contains no express provision for the issuance of ‘Purchase Certificate’ (through the Land Tribunal) or a ‘Patta’. Though the Preamble of the Act suggests an intention to confer full proprietary rights on kanam tenants, the substantive provisions of the Act do not explicitly confer such absolute ownership over their holdings (as done in The Sreepadam Lands Enfranchisement Act, 1969 or The Sree Pandaravaka Lands (Vesting And Enfranchisement) Act, 1971) .**
**Note: The Sreepadam Lands Enfranchisement Act, 1969, declared ‘full proprietorship in the land’ and provided for ‘issue of Pattas or other documents’ as shown in Sec. 4 and 11. “4. Landholders to be registered holders under Government . — Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract or in any judgment, decree or order of court, with effect on and from the appointed day,— (a) every landholder shall, subject to the provisions of section 9, have full proprietorship in the land comprised in his holding, and such right shall be heritable and alienable; (b) except as provided in section 10, no landholder shall be liable to pay rent to the Sreepadam Palace.” “11. Issue of pattas, etc., to landholders. —(1) As soon as may be after the appointed day, the Government shall issue pattas or other documents evidencing the right of the landholder in the lands comprised in their holdings. (2) The pattas or other documents issued under sub-section (1) shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed.” Similar provisions are also in The Sree Pandaravaka Lands (Vesting And Enfranchisement) Act, 1971.
Sec. 2(c) and (f) of the Kanam Tenancy Act, 1976, are relevant. They read as under:
“(c) the expressions ‘cultivating tenant’, ‘the holder of a kudiyiruppu’ and ‘wakf’ shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (1 of 1964).
(f) ‘kanam tenant’ means a person who holds land on kanam tenure and includes- (i) the heir, assignee or legal representative of such person; or (ii) a cultivating tenant or holder of a kudiyiruppu in whom the right, title and interest of such person have vested under the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (1 of 1964)”.
In view of the above, it is legitimate to say – a kanam tenant can obtain title (Purchase Certificate) to his holding only through the Land Tribunal – invoking the provisions thereof in Sec. 72B or 72C of the KLR Act.
This view has received judicial endorsement from the High Court of Kerala in P. V. Jinan v. Special Tahsildar [ILR 2007 (3) Ker. 641; 2007 (3) KHC 835; 2007 (3) KLJ 193; 2007 Supp (3) KLT 56, when it held –
“The contention is that by the omission of the proviso to Section 2(22) of the Act, by The Kanam Tenany Abolition Act, 1976 (Act 16 of 1976), a kanam tenant could again apply to the Land Tribunal for purchase of ‘kanam right’. This contention is absolutely unsustainable. It is well settled that if the claim of tenancy is rejected by the Land Tribunal on the merits, the same person cannot apply again before the Land Tribunal claiming tenancy right.”
Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980
Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980 was enacted with a view to modify the rights under grants and leases, for cultivation, made by the former States of Travancore and Cochin. The Act was made for the reason that such grants and leases brought about heavy loss to the Government and they resulted in huge un-earned profits to the grantees and lessees; and it was found necessary in the public interest that such undue profits to a few person were to be utilised for the common benefit of the general public. The Act required the Grantees and lessees to pay current seigniorage rates (for the trees cut by the grantees and leases) and rent to the Government. The Collector was authorised to revise assessment and rent.
Read Blog (ClicK):Grant in Law (Plantation Lands ‘Granted’ by Erstwhile Governments in South India–Legal Effect)
Part IV
Constitution of India and Kerala Land Reforms Act
Article 31A(2) of the Constitution of India reads thus:
“In this article-
(a) the expression ‘estate ‘ shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant, and in the States of Madras and Kerala any janmam right;
(b) the expression ‘rights’, in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue.”
1. Jenmam (Janmam) – Proprietary Right in the Soil
In K. K. Kochunni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080, the Supreme Court, while dealing with Article 31A of the Constitution, said:
“Under the definition, any jenmom right in Kerala is an ‘estate’. A jenmom right is the freehold interest in a property situated in Kerala. Moor in his “Malabar Law and Custom” describes it as a hereditary proprietorship. A jenmom interest may, therefore be described as ‘proprietary interest of a landlord in lands‘.”
In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Supreme Court held as under:
“It seems to us that the basic concept of the word ‘estate’ is that the person holding the estate should be proprietor of the soil and should be in direct relationship with the State paying land revenue to it except where it is remitted in whole or in part”.
In Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, 1962 Ker LT 913 : AIR 1963 Ker 86, it was observed that
‘Thanathu,
Thettom,
Manavaka,
Brahmaswom Vaka,
Devaswom Vaka,
Kudijenmom,
Kanom,
Kanom Kudijenmom and
Venpattom’
“created by Jenmis” must be held to be covered by the word ‘Estate’ in Art. 31A of the Constitution. It held further as under:
“20. It cannot be disputed that these Jenmis and Devaswoms had full proprietary right in the soil and that the lands in which they have ‘Jenmom rights’ are ‘Estates’ within the definition of the word in Article 31-A.”
“21. … As regards ‘jnam lands’ it was conceded that the holders had full proprietary rights in the soil. These consist of
Pandaravaka Adima,
Anubhogam,
Thiruvulam,
Danom,
Pandaravaka Kudijenmom,
Erayeli,
Viruthi and
Karam Ozhivu.
Inam lands other than Erayeli and Viruthi (Service Inams) were dealt with under S. 24 of the Revenue Settlement Proclamation of 1061 M.E. (1886 AD). Clause 7 of S. 24 provided:
“There shall be no further interference on the part of the Government with these free holds, except such as might be necessary for the punctual realization of the quit rent payable”.
Note:
1. It was held in Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 (analysing the 1040 ME (1865), Travancore Proclamation) that the provisions of the Proclamation did not confer on the tenants absolute proprietary rights in the soil.
2. Overruling Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, it was held in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1; AIR 1971 Ker 168, that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the State was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31-A(2)(a).
Inams and Viruthi in Travancore
In Neelakantan v. District Collector, Quilon, 1976 KerLT 489 (while dealing with Viruthi holding), it is held as under:
“Sec.3 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act exempts lands belonging to or vested in the Government from the operation of the tenancy provisions of the Act.
‘Land belonging to or vested in the Government’ shall have, by virtue of Explanation I to S.3(1) of Act I of 1964, the same meaning as Government land under sub-section (1) of Sec.2 of the Kerala Government land Assignment Act, 1960.
Sub-section (1) of S. 2 of the land Assignment Act defines Government land to include all lands wherever situated except in so far as the same are
the properties of jenmiesor holders of inams, or
holders of land subject to the payment of land revenue to the Government or of any registered holder of the land in proprietary right.
The argument of the petitioners is that this is ‘the property of the holder of the inam’ and not a Govt. land. That is not so.
So far as the Travancore area is concerned the properties of holders of Inams are only those lands comprised in personal inams, i.e., inams granted for support of individual families which are settled as per S.24, Para.2 to 7 of the Revenue Settlement Proclamation, 1061 M. E. Lands attached to specific services are not the property of the inam holders. S.8 of Viruthi Proclamation, 1061, and R.3(1) of the Viruthi Rules clearly provide that the holder of a land attached to specific services has no right over his Viruthi holding except its enjoyment during the regular performance of the service imposed on him. That means, the holding is not the property of the holder of the inam. Therefore the argument that this is not a Government land and therefore the exception claimed under Sec.3 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act will not apply is not sustainable. Leases granted by the Viruthikaran are invalid under R. 3 of the Viruthi rules. The tenancy claimed by the petitioners is in respect of Government lands and as against the Government they have no right to claim any fixity of tenure by virtue of S.3 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.”
Meaning of the Word ‘Thettom’
Generally meant – acquisition by Mortgage.
When ‘Thettom’ refers to a property dealing with a Jenmam (Janmam) holder, it can be any ‘subordinate tenure falling short of the full proprietary title‘.
When it refers to a property dealing with a Non-Jenmom holder, it may mean a sale’
As regards ‘Thettom’, Raman Menon, C.J., said, in Augusti v. The Dewan of Travancore, 8 Travancore LJ 438, as under:
“In S.A. 17 of 1074, this Court remarked:-‘In the Sirkar registry of 1011, the plaint property is entered as ‘Thettom’ in the name of defendants’ Tarwad.
That expression, according to its ordinary meaning, implies at least a mortgage lien, if not more, as held by this Court in A.S.166 of 1070 and A.S. 285 of 1071. It always implies something more than a simple lease’.
In S.A. 61 of 1075, the terms was taken to be generic and to include ‘all subordinate tenures falling short of the full proprietorytitle‘.
In S.A. 302 of 1075, it was observed that the word ‘Thettom’, as applied to Nambudiri Jenmies, had been held by this court to mean ordinarily a Kanom.
In S.A. 48 of 1076, Vencoba Chariar, C.J. and Mr. Justice Kunhiraman Nair construed the words thus:- ‘The chief ground of the plaintiff’s second appeal is that in arriving at this finding the lower courts have not given sufficient weight to the fact appearing from the Ext. B – an old Revenue account – in which the land in dispute is entered as ‘Thettam’ from plaintiff’s Illom; but the word ‘Thettom’ is a somewhat ambiguous one and though, as remarked in the case in 15 TLR 161 and in other cases, it is generally used in the Revenue accounts to signify the Kanom tenure under Jenmies, it is also sometimes used to denote other subordinate tenures‘.
In S.A. 343 of 1078, we find the following remarks:-‘Thettom ordinarily means a’Kanom’, and in any case, a derivative title when used in connection with Brahmaswam or Devaswom properties, as in the present case’.
Lastly, in A.S. Nos. 59 and 101 of 1083, Sadasiva Iyer, C.J., and Sankara Menon, J., observed thus:-‘Mr. Kochukrishna Marar quotes 15 TLR 161 and says the word ‘Thettom’ means a Kanom or mortgage.
No doubt, in the case of Jenmies, it has been so held; but we doubt whether in the case of non jenmies, any meaning other than the ordinary meaning of the word can be given to the word ‘Thettom’. The plaintiffs are Nairs and the tenure claimed is not Jenmom. The ordinary meaning of the word is acquisition. We are inclined to hold that a word ‘Thettom’, in cases of this sort, means only sale’.”
In Damodaran v. Sankaranarayanan Namboothiripad, ILR 1963-2 Ker. 707; 1964 KLT 25, the High Court referred to thanathu thettom land (nilam); and observed – it conveys the idea of ‘acquisition’.
Sale of Janmam Properties were Recorded as “Thettoms” in Settlement Register
In 1910 Travancore Settlement Register (and in the sale deeds), lands sold by Janmam holders were recorded as “Thettoms” (Devaswom Thettom/Namboori Thettom etc.).
Note: In the 1910 Settlement Register Janmam properties (with Brahmins and Devaswoms) were recorded as “Thanathu”.
As noted above, when lands were classified under various heads, in Govindaru Namboodiripad v. State of Kerala, 1962 Ker LT 913 : AIR 1963 Ker 86, ‘Janmam’ lands were denoted as ‘Tanathu’.
Theoretically, status in ‘Janmom’ cannot be transferred (it being an inherent right attached to land); though ‘rights in Janmam’ can be transferred.
Pandarapattom lands in Cochin & Travancore – Proprietary Right in the Soil
(In the matter of compensation when acquire land by Govt – under Art. 31A, Constitution)
Following decisions are important in this regard:
1. Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694
Proprietary Rights to Pandarapattom Lands in Cochin, in view of 1905 Proclamation.
N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. (descending) referred 1040 Travancore Proclamation, and said that there was only withdrawal of the right by the State and no conferment.
2. Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 (FB)
Pandarapattom Confered No Proprietary Rights in Travancore; only treated as holding on perpetual leases. (Overruled in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez)
3. Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (5 Judge Bench)
Proclamation of 1040 (1865 AD), all Sircar-pattom-lands were converted into full proprietary-lands
Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala (SC)
Confers Proprietary Rights to Pandarapattom Lands in Cochin
In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Supreme Court held (by majority, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta; and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, dissenting) that Pandarappattom properties come within ‘estate’ under Article 31A of the Constitution. The Apex Court considered the proclamation issued by his Highness Sir Rama Varma Raja of Cochin on March 10, 1905. Clause 13 that rendered ‘full rights to the soil of the lands they hold’.
The Supreme Court (majority) held, with respect to Cochin Regulation, 1905 as under:
“It would thus be seen that under clause 13 the person holding lands on the Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure is not a tenant. He is given the proprietary right in the soil itself, subject of course to the rights as to metals and minerals reserved in favour of the State, indeed, the whole scheme of the new Proclamation appears to be to change the character of the possession of the Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure-holder from that of a tenant into that of a proprietor-holder. It is true that he is made liable to pay half of the net produce and that may appear to be a little too high, but the measure of the levy will not convert what is intended to be a recovery of assessment Into a recovery of rent. The proprietor of the land held on Verumpattom tenure is nevertheless a proprietor of the land and he holds the land subject to his liability to pay the assessment to the State. It is not difficult to imagine that in a fairly large number of lands held by Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure-holders the holders in turn would let out the the lands to the cultivators and thus would come into existence a local equivalent of the class of intermediaries. Land revenue record is required to be prepared by the Proclamation and relevant entries showing the extent of the properties belonging to the respective holders and the details about their liability to pay the assessment are intended to be shown in the said record. In our opinion, it would not be reasonable to hold that the ‘lands held by the petitioner under the Pandaravaha Verumpattom tenure do not confer on him the proprietary right at all but make him a tenant of the State“.
Minority: Only Withdrawal of Right by State and No Conferment
But, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., while descending, observed as under:
“In this connection I might usefully refer to a proclamation of the ruler of Travancore of 1865 (1040 M. E.) regarding Sarkar-pattom lands, with the observation that subject to variations dependent on local usages, the system of land tenure and the concepts as regards the rights of property in land were substantially similar in Travancore and Cochin. Sarkar-pattom lands were what might be termed ‘Crown lands’ of which the ruler was deemed to be the Jenmi or the landlord. Previous to the proclamation the lands were legally capable of being resumed by the ruler, though this was seldom done and the cultivators were not legally entitled to transfer their rights and where this was done the Government had the right to ignore the transaction. The fact that the cultivator was conceived of as having no proprietary interest on the land also bore adversely on the State since the State was deprived of the means of realising any arrears of revenue by bringing the holding to sale. It was to remedy this situation that the proclamation was issued and the preamble and its terms carry the impress of the impact of the ryotwari system of Madras.”
Referring the 1040 Travancore Proclamation, Ayyangar, J. said that there was only withdrawal of the right by the State and no conferment. It was observed as under:
“The language employed in the proclamation is of significance. It speaks of the relinquishment or withdrawal of the right of the State and not of the conferment of a right on the ryot so as to render the ryot a grantee from the State, just in line with the Hindu Law theory of the proprietorship of the soil vesting in the occupant-cultivator.”
Govindaru Nambooripad v. State (FB)
Pandarapattom Confers No Proprietary Rights in Travancore
In Govindaru Namboodiripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 (FB), in spite of the decision in Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694 (pertained to Cochin), it was held that Pandarapattom (Pandaravaka pattom, Pandaravakappattom, or Pandarappattom) lands in the Travancore area cannot have the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution. Analysing the 1040 ME Travancore Proclamation, it was held by the High Court as under:
“11. The provisions of the Proclamation do not, in our opinion, confer on the tenants absolute proprietary rights in the soil. There is no clause by which the Sirkar parted with all rights in favour of the tenants and in the absence of such a provision, the holders of such lands can only be treated as holding such lands on perpetual leases.”
Note: Overruling Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, it was held in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1; AIR 1971 Ker 168, that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the State was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31-A(2)(a).
Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez Case (Five Judge Bench)
Pandarapattom Confers Proprietary Rights in Travancore also
The larger Bench in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168, overruled Govindaru Namboodiripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86, and it was held that Pandara-pattom land in the Travancore area of the State was (also) ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31-A(2)(a).
It was found in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez case that by the Proclamation of 1040 (1865 AD), all Sircar-pattom-lands were converted into full proprietary-lands, and rights on tenants of Pandarapattom lands had thenceforth been conferred with proprietary-rights.
In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168, it was observed as under:
Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.:
“11. …. We have already shown how, in the face of the Proclamation of 1040, it is impossible to regard the holders of these lands as tenants in the strict sense of that term having only the right to enjoy the land and no interest in the land as such. We have also drawn attention to the fact that what they pay to the Government is, under the very terms of the Proclamation, assessment or land tax, in other words, land revenue, and not rent properly so-called. As stated in 1962 Ker LT 913 = (AIR 1963 Ker 86 FB). with reference to contemporary documents, the avowed purpose of the Proclamation of 1040 was to place pandarapattam lands on the same footing as ryotwari lands in the neighbouring province of Madras, and wo have no doubt that it succeeded in doing so. If the relations between the holder of a land and the Government are placed on the same footing as the relations between the holder of ryotwari land and the Government, it seems to us that it necessarily follows that the land is held under ryotwari settlement–it is the factual relationship and not the label that counts and no concept of legal rights is involved. ….
Per KK Mathew, J.
17……. To my mind the terms of the Proclamation leave no doubt that full proprietary interest has been conferred upon the holders of pandarapattom lands. ….Clause (2) is the pivotal clause; and it provides that the ryots holding such lands may regard them fully private, saleable and otherwise heritable and transferable property. Clause (4) guarantees the continued undisturbed enjoyment of the land so long as the appointed assessment is paid. Clause (6) makes it clear that the lands will be resumable by the State like other jenmom or private land only for public purpose and when resumed for such purposes compensation will be paid by the Sirkar not only for the improvements but also for the full market value of the property. Clause (7) provided that the rights conferred by the Proclamation would not in any way affect the right of the Sirkar to regulate land tax or to resume escheats or to confiscate the property of criminals. Clauses (6) and (7) are very significant. What are reserved to the Sirkar by Clauses (6) and (7) are not anv proprietary rights in the land. The rights which inhere in every sovereign in respect of every property within his jurisdiction like eminent domain, the right to impose or regulate tax, to resume escheats, to confiscate property of criminals, are alone reserved by those clauses. They not only do not derogate from the grant of full proprietary interest made by Clauses (1), (2) and (4), but would highlight that no proprietary rights have been reserved to the State. If the sovereign was careful to reserve to himself in respect of these lands only those rights which appertain to sovereignty and not any right which relates to dominium, that is a clear indication that no right relating to dominium was intended to be retained by the Sirkar. Even if the clauses were absent, the Sirkar would have those rights as they appertain to sovereignty and not to dominium. In other words, if by way of abundant caution the clauses reserved to the Sirkar only rights which appertain to sovereignty, there was absolutely no reason why the rights, if any, relating to dominium or ownership were not reserved, if the sovereign intended to retain any right in respect of the lands.….. I think, a holder of pandarapattom land satisfies even the orthodox definition of ownership by Austin. Austin defines the right of ownership as a–“right indefinite in point of user, unrestricted in point of disposition, and unlimited in point of duration, over a determinate thing.” (See ‘Jurisprudence’ by Austin, 3rd Edn., page 817.)
19. The basic concept of ‘estate’ is that the person holding the estate should be the proprietor of the soil and should be in direct relationship with the State by paying land revenue to it except where it is remitted in whole or in part. See AIR 1962 SC 694. As I have said the pattom Proclamation conferred full proprietary rights on tenants of pandarapattom lands, and they are also in direct relation with the State by paying land revenue. Since there is no definition of the word ‘estate’ in the existing local law relating to land tenure, pandarapattom land is the local equivalent of ‘estate,’ because its attributes conform to the basic concept of the term.”
Note: Another decision (with the same parties), Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 KLT 216, AIR 1973 Ker 55, was overruled in Velayudhan Vivekanandan v. Ayyappan Sadasivan, ILR 1975-1 Ker 166; 1975 KerLT 1.
Effect of Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040and 1061
Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 bound only Travancore Govt. Leases or ‘Pandarappattoms’.
In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (five Judge Bench), 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.), concluded that the land covered by the Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 were “estates” falling under Art. 31A of the Constitution.
It was on the definite finding that –
the Proclamation “secured permanency of tenure” (to the tenants),
conferred (on the tenants) “proprietary interest” in the soil; and
the Government did not remain as the full and absolute proprietor
The Court said as under:
“7. It is impossible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that, evenafter the Proclamation of 1040, the holders of these lands had no proprietary interest whatsoever in the soil and remained tenants in the strict sense of that term, with only the right of enjoyment, the only difference being that they secured permanency of tenure, the Government still remaining the full and absolute proprietor of the soil.”
Effect of the Proclamations over ‘Government Land Leases’after 1061 (1886)?
Now a question arises:
What is the impact of 1040 and 1061 (1886) Proclamations over the ‘Government Land Leases’ (Pandaravakappattoms) madeafter 1061 (1886)?
Do such leased lands qualify as “estate” under Article 31A of the Constitution?
The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out (by the Government) after 1061 (1886) do not acquire the rights of ‘permanency of tenure’ or attain the ‘proprietary interest’ conferred by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061.
If such rights of permanency and ‘proprietary interest’ are axiomatically conferred as a matter of course (to the lese lands after 1061), the result would be that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands (after the Proclamations), for, the lease character would be lost at the moment it is made.
In George A Leslie v. State of Kerala, 1969 KLT 378, it was observed as under:
” 9. Ext. P 1 is a grant made under the Travancore Regulation II of 1040 and the Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills dated 24th April 1865. …
12. Reference was made by counsel for the petitioners to the Travancore Pattom Proclamation of 1040, which conferred full rights in the land on tenants of pandarapattom land, and the subsequent proclamations and notifications by which they acquired the full title to the trees in the land. They have no application to the land or trees comprised in Ext. P 1 grant.”
Therefore, there is a clear difference between leases made before and after the Proclamations; and the rights conferred by the Proclamations do not apply to leases made after them.
1865 Travancore Proclamation and 1905 Cochin Proclamation
In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Supreme Court (Rajagopala Ayyankar, J. Minority) pointed out the requirement and purport of these Proclamations. It reads as under:
“The evils which the system gave rise to, the economic insecurity of the tenant and the consequent lack of incentive on his part to put his best exertion on the land and the resultant loss to the state in the shape of revenue as well as the rise of a contented peasantry were exactly parallel to the situation which faced the ruler of Travancore leading to the proclamation of 1865. It was in these circumstances that the ruler of Cochin issued a proclamation on March 10, 1905, which defined with precision the rights of the State and of the cultivator in regard to these lands …”
Ayyankar, J. (Minority) observed that there was “conferment of proprietary rights by the Cochin Proclamation of 1905″ and “relinquishment by the State under the Travancore Proclamation of 1865″.
Finally, the Majority held that by virtue of the Cochin Proclamation of 1905 the holders of the Pandaravaka-verumpattom lands in Cochin were holding the property as “estate” within the meaning of Article 31A of the Constitution, and that the challenge thereon (to the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961) was not sustainable.
Kesavananda Bharati Case
29th Amendment of the Constitution of India put Kerala Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1969 and Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971, in IXth schedule. It was argued in Kesavananda Bharati case, known is as ‘Fundamental Rights Case’ [His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala: AIR 1973 SC 1461] that the amendments, that took away or abridged ‘fundamental rights’, were invalid.
Kesavananda Bharati case is one of the most important cases taken up by the Supreme Court of India. Largest ever bench of the Supreme Court (13 judges) considered it. Kesavananda credits the longest ever hearing in the history of the Supreme Court; it took 66 days, spread over to 5 months.
Points considered
The 13 judge bench was constituted to consider whether Golak Nath [IC Golak Nath v. State of Punjab: AIR 1967 SC 1643] was correctly decided. It had been held in Golak Nath, by an 11 judge bench, that the Parliament could not amend fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution.
Rival contentions:
Nani A Palkhivala led arguments for the petitioners. He emphasized:
Article 368 (Provision for amendment of the Constitution) does not override Article 13(2). The power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is derived from Articles 245, 246 and 248 of the Constitution and not from Article 368 which only deals with procedure.
The word ‘amendment’ has ‘limited’ meaning (something can be modified but without change of core) and there are ‘inherentand implied limitations’ to abrogate or repeal the Constitution (though not express; inherent in Constitution itself) for altering the essential features or basic structure of Constitution. It was explained by Palkhivala as under: “The principle of inherent and implied limitations means: deducing that is left unsaid from what is said, and perceiving what is implicit in the express provision and scheme of the instrument”.
Palkhivala argued against unlimited amending power elucidating the essential features of our constitution, which included sovereignty, the republican form of government, the federal structure and the fundamental rights (as a whole). They were unchangeable. Founding fathers of the Constitution considered fundamental rights as ‘fundamental’.
The Constitution is supreme. The Parliament is a creature of Constitution. Therefore, the Parliament cannot increase the power conferred to it or destroy essential/basic feature or basic structure of the Constitution. That is, there is implied limitation for the Parliament.
The Preamble of the Constitution limits ‘unlimited power’ of the Parliament.
If Parliament has unlimited power, it can make judiciary and executive completely subordinate or take over their powers.
Ultimate power is vested with ‘We, the people’.
The Constitution gives the Indian citizen freedoms which are to subsist for ever. If Article 31C is valid, Parliament and State Legislatures, and not the Constitution, will determine how much freedom is good for the citizens.
H.M. Seervai (for State of Kerala) and Niren De (Attorney General) stood for unlimited amending power. They stressed the following:
Unless there are no express words, or compelling implication from the existing provisions, for limiting extent of amendment, then there will be no implied limitation.
Government is duty bound to give effect to Directive principles (Part IV of the Constitution) and to enact ‘Laws’ to achieve those objectives.
The acceptance of concepts like ‘implied limitation’, which have no definite contours, would introduce uncertainty and vagueness.
No test can be applied to essential or non-essential feature.
The constituent assembly made no distinction between essential and non-essential features.
None in the constituent assembly said – fundamental rights could not be amended.
The expression ‘an amendment of this Constitution’ in Article 368 meant amendment of each and every provisions of Constitution. Article 368 not only prescribes the procedure but also gives the power of amendment
If Constitution-makers intended that the fundamental rights should override Article 368, it is reasonable to assume that they would have made an express provision to that effect. The Preamble cannot control the unambiguous language of the articles of the Constitution. The Constitution of India is one of the lengthiest Constitutions, if not the lengthiest of the world.
The expression ‘fundamental’ does not lift the fundamental rights above Constitution itself.
There is distinction between Constituent power and legislative power. Article 13(2) pertains to legislative power alone.
The Constitution did not envisage a constituent assembly, in future, to abridge or change fundamental rights.
Palkhivala contended that wide power to amend the Constitution would result ‘in liquidation of Constitution’. Attorney General (Niren De) retorted that ‘unambiguous meaning of amendment’ should not be destroyed ‘to nurse the theory of implied limitation’.
Final outcome of Kesavananda Bharati
It is a never ending controversy.
13 Judges delivered 11 judgments. (There were two ‘common judgments’.) In the paper titled “View by the Majority” signed by Chief Justice (S.M.Sikri) and other 8 Judges (9 only) contained six points. It stated:
(1) Golak Nath case is overruled.
(2) Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or frame work of the Constitution.
(3) The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid. (It was passed to get over Golek Nath.)
(4) Section 2(a) and 2(b) of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid. (It pertained to ‘right to property’. Art. 31 & 19(1)(f) and Added Art. 31C.)
(5) The first part of Section 3 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid. (New Article 31C provided: [first part] the laws which give effect to Directive Principles will not be void on the allegation that it is inconsistent with certain fundamental rights.) The second part, namely, “and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy” is invalid.
(6) The Constitution (29th Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid. (It put Kerala Acts in the 9th Schedule.)
The Constitution bench will determine the validity of the Constitution (Twenty-sixth amendment) Act, 1971 in accordance with law. (It related to abolition of privy purses and privileges of princes.)
(1) Judgment at a glance
Unanimous decision
Article 368 is independent from, and not controlled by, Article 13(2).
Golak Nath is overruled.
24th Constitutional Amendment Act is valid.
6 Judges accepted argument of Palkhiwala
Following Judges accepted the argument of Palkhiwala and held: (entire) fundamental rights (as such) were essential features of the Constitution and therefore there was implied limitation to abrogate or repeal them (though they could be abridged).
S.M. Sikri, CJ
J.M. Shelat
A.M. Grover
K.S. Hegde
A.K. Mukherjea
P. Jaganmohan Reddi
6 Judges accepted argument of Government
Following Judges accepted argument of Government in this regard. That is, there was unlimited power of amendment – even fundamental rights also could be repealed.
A.N. Ray
D.G. Palekar
K.K. Mathew
M.H. Beg
S.N. Dwivedi
Y.V. Chandrachud
Khanna, J. took ‘Midway’ [as qualified by Palkhivala in (1974) 4 SCC Journal 57]
Khanna, J. rejected argument on ‘essential features’ and ‘implied limitation’ & proceeded on ‘basic structure doctrine’ alone. He held: power of amendment extends to all Articles including fundamental rights; and only restriction is that the basic structure of the Constitution should not be changed.
No essential features; No implied limitation
All Sikri (CJ) – led 6 Judges held: Fundamental rights could not be abrogated, (though they could be abridged, by amendment).
CJ, Sikri led judges (except Jaganmohan, J) accepted argument of Adv. Palkhivala that the fundamental rights areessential features of the Constitution and that there was implied limitation to change or amend the fundamental rights.
J. Ray led 6 judges were of the definite opinion that there was no limitation at all to amend the Constitution and therefore fundamental rights also could be ‘amended’ – it could be abrogated or repealed.
Khanna J discarded both ‘essential features’ theory and ‘implied limitation’ theory; and held: fundamental rights also could be ‘added, altered or repealed’.
Therefore, majority (J. Ray led judges + Khanna, J.) decision emerged was that: There was “no implied limitation” to amend the Constitution; that is, even the fundamental rights could be ‘repealed’
Khanna J. ‘Tipped the scales’
Kesavananda Bharati is fundamental right’s case. The crux was whether fundamental rights could be ‘amended’. CJ. Sikri-led six judges stood for limited power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution. They held – fundamental rights could not be abrogated or repealed. Broadly speaking, J. Khanna joined with them for he held: Parliament has no unlimited power to amend the Constitution.
J. Khanna also joined six J. Ray-led judges when he held – fundamental rights also could be repealed. Therefore the majority decision turned out was that fundamental rights are also subject to ‘amendment power’ of the Parliament.
Finally the ‘mid-way’ stance of J. Khanna ‘tipped the scales’ in favour of CJ. Sikri-led-judges which paved way to emerge basic structure doctrine as the ‘essential feature’ of Kesavananda.
Final outcome – ‘Basic Structure Doctrine’: But, No Common Ratio?
Khanna, J. asserted: Art. 368 cannot be “so construed as to embody the death-wish of the Constitution or provide sanction for what may perhaps be called lawful hara-kiri”.
It is clear that Khanna, J. propounded ‘basic structure’ doctrine not in the way that was upheld by Sikri (CJ.) led judges. It was not in the way exactly argued by Palkhivala also. For discarding the ‘implied limitation’ theory and ‘essential features’ theory (these theories were accepted by Sikri-led judges), Khanna, J. accepted the arguments of Seervai and Attorney General in this regard. But, finally, by the ‘View by the Majority’ signed by nine judges, the view (minority?) of Khanna, J. (ie. basic structure doctrine) was emerged as the ‘ratio’ of the case.
Seervai in his treatise ‘Constitutional Law of India’ stated as under, on page 1626: “If the ‘fundamental rights case’ is stood by itself, it was possible to argue that the judgment of 7 Judges [Sikri (CJ) led judges + Khanna, J.] as to the basic structure disclosed no common ratio”.
Even CJ. Sikri-led-judges ‘diluted’ fundamental rights
CJ. Sikri led (6) judges (six only) held definitely that fundamental rights were not liable to be abrogated by amendment; and it is very important to note that even these 6 judges held that the fundamental rights were subject to reasonable abridgement, in the public interest; and the power of ‘amendment’ reached every part and every article of the Constitution, provided the basic foundation or structure remained the same. All these judges (also) varied from Golak Nath which unconditionally held – fundamental rights cannot be varied/ amended.
Did Khanna J. hold every ‘fundamental right’ was part of basic structure?
Justice Khanna held the following in his Judgment: “Subject to the retention of the basic structure or frame work of the Constitution, I have no doubt (i) that the power of amendment is plenary and (ii) would include within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles including those relating to fundamental rights as well as which may be said to relate to essential features”.
Divergent views as to Judgment of Khanna, J.:
Khanna, J. did not hold– fundamental rights were part of basic structure. Seervai stated as under in ‘Constitutional Law of India’ (Page 1625) – “His (Khanna, J.) Judgment was capable of being read to mean that according to him fundamental rights (as such) were not a part of the basic structure of our Constitution and it was so read by Chandrachud, J. in the Election case (Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narayan)”. (The idea conveyed is that, by ‘basic structure’ it brought-in broad aspects like ‘democracy, sovereignty, federalism’ etc. and it is not confined to any specific Part or Article.)
Khanna J. held– fundamental rights might bepart of basic structure. Bhagawati, J., in Minerva Mills case [AIR 1980 SC 1789], pointed out that Khanna, J. did not hold that fundamental rights (as such) were not a part of the basic structure. Bhagawati, J. observed: “The very fact that Khanna, J. proceeded to consider this question (whether right to property, appertained to basic structure) shows beyond doubt that he did not hold that fundamental rights (as such) were not part of the basic structure; but so far as other fundamental rights were concerned, he left the question open”.
Khanna J. held – fundamental rights were part of basic structure. Khanna, J. himself, also, had ‘explained’ in Election Case (Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narayanan, AIR 1975 SC 2299) as under:
“It is difficult to read anything in my judgment to justify the conclusion that fundamental rights (as such) were not part of the basic structure”.
What was the dictum on ‘right to property’?
The following two majority findings in Kesavananda are important:
The right of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is limited. There are certain essential features or basic structure which cannot be discarded. (Sikri (CJ) led judges + Khanna J)
Fundamental rights are also open to ‘amendment’. (J. Ray led judges + Khanna J)
In the light of the aforesaid two majority findings the following decision of Khanna, J. (single Judge) emerges as a declaration/ dictum (having force of law under Art. 141 of the Constitution) of Kesavananda on the right to property: “Right to property in Art. 19(1)(f) does not form part of the basic structure”(so that it cannot be amended).
For the finding of Khanna, J. that right to property did not form part of the basic structure (though a fundamental right) the Constitutional validity of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 stood upheld.
Conclusion
The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 was not a sporadic one. There were several pre-independence enactments that paved the way to the Act. The Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill, 1957 of the ‘Communist Government’ was a post-independent land-mark mile-stone in that line. The courts in India, especially the Supreme Court of India, supported the wisdom of the Parliament in Land Reform measures observing that they were in concordance with the Constitution of India.
Order XXII rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down the ‘Procedure in case of death of one of several plaintiffs or of sole plaintiff’; rule 4 speaks as to the ‘Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant’ to implead thelegal representatives of the deceased defendant. Order XXII rule 5 of the CPC directs the courts to determine the‘Question as to Legal Representative’.
Order XXII Rule 3 of the CPC reads as under:
3. Procedure in case of death of one of several plaintiffs or of sole plaintiff.(1) Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to the sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.
(2) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application of the defendant, the Court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff.
Order XXII Rule 4 of the CPC reads as under:
4. Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant.- (1) Where one of the two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.
(2) Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant.
(3) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant.
(4)The court whenever it thinks fit, may exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the legal representatives of any such defendant who has failed to file a written statement or who, having filed it, has failed to appear and contest the suit at the hearing; and judgment may, in such case, be pronounced against the said defendant notwithstanding the death of such defendant and shall have the same force and effect as if it has been pronounced before death took place.
(5) Where,—
(a) the plaintiff was ignorant of the death of a defendant, and could not, for that reason, make an application for the substitution of the legal representative of the defendant under this rule within the period specified in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), and the suit has, in consequence, abated, and
(b) the plaintiff applies after the expiry of the period specified there for in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), for setting aside the abatement and also for the admission of that application under section 5 of that Act on the ground that he had, by reason of such ignorance, sufficient cause for not making the application within the period specified in the said Act,
the court shall, in considering the application under the said section 5, have due regard to the fact of such ignorance, if proved.
Order XXII Rule 5 of the CPC reads as under:
5. Determination of Question as to Legal Representative. Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased defendant, such question shall be determined by the Court:
Provided that where such question arises before an Appellate Court, that Court may, before determining the question, direct any subordinate Court to try the question and to return the records together with evidence, if any, recorded at such trial, its findings and reasons therefor, and the Appellate Court may take the same into consideration in determining the question.
Injunction Suit and ‘Right to Sue Survives’
Observing that there is a distinction between the death of the plaintiff and the death of the defendant, it is held that Venkubai v. Assistant Commissioner, Sedam, Gulbarga District, 1999-1 CivCC 119; 1998-5 KarLJ 171, that the decree of injunction would become infructuous on the death of the (sole) defendant or the party against whom injunction is granted.
In Venkubai v. Assistant Commissioner, Sedam, Gulbarga it was further observed that if the person who got an injunction were to die, certainly his L. Rs would be entitled to the benefit of the decree. (Krishna Behari Goel v. Raj Mangal Persad, AIR 1954 All 182 referred to.)
Direction in Proviso to Order XXII Rule 5 of the CPC is not Mandatory
It is clear from the wordings (Court MAY) of the ‘Proviso’ that “direct any subordinate Court to try the question” (where such question arises before an Appellate Court) is not mandatory.
Proceedings, Summary in Nature
The jurisdiction to determine who is a legal heir is summary in nature. Varadarajan v. Kanakavalli, AIR 2020 SC 740. Such determination will not confer any right to the legal representatives, as regards any other claim, as to the estate of the deceased.
No Conclusive Decision on Legal heirs or Legal Representatives
In Jaladi Suguna v. Satya Sai Central Trust, (2008) 8 SCC 521, our Apex Court held as under:
“15. Filing an application to bring the legal representatives on record, does not amount to bringing the legal representatives on record. When an LR application is filed, the court should consider it and decide whether the persons named therein as the legal representatives, should be brought on record to represent the estate of the deceased. Until such decision by the court, the persons claiming to be the legal representatives have no right to represent the estate of the deceased, nor prosecute or defend the case. If there is a dispute as to who is the legal representative, a decision should be rendered on such dispute. Only when the question of legal representative is determined by the court and such legal representative is brought on record, can it be said that the estate of the deceased is represented. The determination as to who is the legal representative under Order 22 Rule 5 will of course be for the limited purpose of representation of the estate of the deceased, for adjudication of that case. Such determination for such limited purpose will not confer on the person held to be the legal representative, any right to the property which is the subject-matter of the suit, vis-à-vis other rival claimants to the estate of the deceased.” (Quoted in: Mahanth Satyanand @ Ramjee Singh v. Shyam Lal Chauhan, 2018-18 SCC 485; Varadarajan v. Kanakavalli , AIR 2020 SC 740)
ProceedingsCourt Cannot be Postponed
The court has to decide on merits who are the legal representatives of the deceased for the limited purpose of representation of the estate of the deceased of that case. The court cannot postpone the determination.
The Apex Court (Jaladi Suguna v. Satya Sai Central Trust) continued as under:
“The provisions of Rule 4 and 5 of Order XXII are mandatory. When a respondent in an appeal dies, the court cannot simply say that it will hear all rival claimants to the estate of the deceased respondent and proceed to dispose of the appeal. Nor can it implead all persons claiming to be legal representatives, as parties to the appeal without deciding who will represent the estate of the deceased and proceed to hear the appeal on merits. The court cannot also postpone the decision as to who is the legal representative of the deceased respondent, for being decided along with the appeal on merits. The Code clearly provides that where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a deceased respondent, such question shall be determined by the court.
… … Though Rule 5 does not specifically provide that determination of legal representative should precede the hearing of the appeal on merits, Rule 4 read with Rule 11 makes it clear that the appeal can be heard only after the legal representatives are brought on record”. (Quoted in: Mahanth Satyanand @ Ramjee Singh v. Shyam Lal Chauhan, 2018-18 SCC 485)
In Daya Ram v. Shyam Sundari, AIR 1965 SC 1049, it was held that the legal representatives are impleaded for the purpose of a suit alone and that the impleaded legal representatives sufficiently represent the estate of the deceased and the decision obtained with them on record would bind not merely those impleaded but the entire estate, including those not brought on record (Referred to in Varadarajan v. Kanakavalli , AIR 2020 SC 740).
In Suresh Kumar Bansal v. Krishna Bansal (2010) 2 SCC 162 the Supreme Court held as under:
“20. It is now well settled that determination of the question as to who is the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff or defendant under Order 22 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is only for the purpose of bringing legal representatives on record for the conducting of those legal proceedings only and does not operate as res judicata and the inter se dispute between the rival legal representatives has to be independently tried and decided in probate proceedings. If this is allowed to be carried on for a decision of an eviction suit or other allied suits, the suits would be delayed, by which only the tenants will be benefited.”
No Res Judicata
The summary decision as to who are the legal representatives of the deceased will not be res judicata and the disputes thereon can be independently tried in other proceedings including probate proceedings (Suresh Kumar Bansal v. Krishna Bansal, (2010) 2 SCC 162).
Punjab & Haryana High Court in Mohinder Kaur v. Piara Singh, AIR 1981 P&H 130, held that a decision under Order XXII Rule 5 would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit. It was held as under:
“5. So far as the first argument of Mr. Bindra, noticed above is concerned, we find that in addition to the judgments of the Lahore High Court and of this Court, referred to in the earlier part of this judgment, he is supported by a string of judgments of other High Courts as well wherein it has repeatedly been held on varied reasons, that, a decision under Order 22, Rule 5, Civil Procedure Code, would not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties or persons claiming through them wherein the question of succession or heirship to the deceased party in the earlier proceedings is directly raised. Some of these reasons are as follows:—
(i) Such a decision is not on an issue arising in the suit itself, but is really a matter collateral to the suit and has to be decided before the suit itself can be proceeded with. The decision does not lead to the determination of any issue in the suit.
(ii) The legal representative is appointed for orderly conduct of the suit only. Such a decision could not take away, for all times to come, the rights of a rightful heir of the deceased in all matters.
(iii) The decision is the result of a summary enquiry against which no appeal has been provided for.
(iv) The concepts of legal representative and heirship of a deceased party are entirely different.
In order to constitute one as a legal representative, it is unnecessary that he should have a beneficial interest in the estate. The executors and administrators are legal representatives though they may have no beneficial interest. Trespasser into the property of the deceased claiming title in himself independently of the deceased will not be a legal representative. On the other hand the heirs on whom beneficial interest devolved under the law whether statute or other, governing the parties will be legal representatives.” (Quoted in Varadarajan v. Kanakavalli, AIR 2020 SC 740. See also: Dashrath Rao Kate v. Brij Mohan Srivastava (2010) 1 SCC 277).
Legal Representatives Need Not be the Legal Heirs.
A legatee under a will can be a legal representative.
Jaladi Suguna v. Satya Sai Central Trust, (2008) 8 SCC 521.
‘Legal representative’ according to its definition in section 2(11) of CPC is a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles (administers or executors) with the estate of the deceased and where a party acts in a representative character, the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so acting.
If Many Heirs, those in Possession Entitled to Represent
If there are many heirs, those in possession bona fide, without there being any fraud or collusion, are also entitled to represent the estate of the deceased. See. Custodian of Branches of Banco, v. Nalini Bai Naique, AIR 1989 SC 1589.
Representation of/by Some Heirs, Binds also who are not brought on record
In Daya Ram v. Shyam Sundari, AIR 1965 SC 1049, the Supreme Court held that if after bona fide inquiry, some, but not all the heirs, of a deceased defendant, are brought on record the heirs so brought on record represent the entire estate of the deceased and the decision of the Court in the absence of fraud or collusion binds even those who are not brought on record as well as those who are impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased defendant.
In NK Mohammad Sulaiman v. NC Mohammad Ismail, AIR 1966 SC 792, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the auction purchaser obtained title only to the extent of the interest of the heirs who were impleaded eo nominee; and held that
(i) those who were impleaded, may ‘sufficiently represent’ the entire estate and all heirs,
(ii) the rule enunciated was of the domain of procedural law and applied to all communities irrespective of the religious persuasion or personal law and
(iii) where after due enquiry certain persons were impleaded after diligent and bona fide enquiry in the genuine belief that they were the only persons interested in the estate, the whole estate of the deceased would be duly represented by the persons who were brought on the record or impleaded, and the decree would be binding upon the entire estate.
Execution of a Decree – No abatement
Order 22 Rule 12 reads as under:
“Application of order to proceedings. Nothing in Rules 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order.”
V. Uthirapathi v. Ashrab, (1998) 3 SCC 148, it is held that abatement does not apply to execution proceedings. It is held as under:
“12. In other words, the normal principle arising in a suit — before the decree is passed — that the legal representatives are to be brought on record within a particular period and if not, the suit could abate, — is not applicable to cases of death of the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor in execution proceedings.
13. In Venkatachalam Chetti v. Ramaswami Servai [ILR (1932) 55 Mad 352 : AIR 1932 Mad 73 (FB)] a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held that this rule enacts that the penalty of abatement shall not attach to execution proceedings.
Mulla’s Commentary on CPC [(Vol. 3) p. 2085 (15th Edn., 1997)] refers to a large number of judgments of the High Courts and says:
“Rule 12 engrafts an exemption which provides that where a party to an execution proceedings dies during its pendency, provisions as to abatement do not apply. The Rule is, therefore, for the benefit of the decree-holder, for his heirs need not take steps for substitution under Rule 2 but may apply immediately or at any time while the proceeding is pending, to carry on the proceeding or they may file a fresh execution application.”
14. In our opinion, the above statement of law in Mulla’s Commentary on CPC, correctly represents the legal position relating to the procedure to be adopted by the parties in execution proceedings and as to the powers of the civil court.” (Quoted in: Varadarajan v. Kanakavalli, AIR 2020 SC 740).
A representative suit does not abate on the death of the plaintiff
In G.Christhudas v. Anbiah, 2003-3 SCC 502, the Apex Court held that a representative suit does not abate on the death of the plaintiff. It is for two reasons:
Firstly the plaintiff does not represent only himself but represents all other persons on whose behalf he is prosecuting the suit, thus all those persons are also parties to the suit albeit constructively, the conduct of the suit being in the hands one person to whom permission has been granted by the court and in case of his death, any other person can continue the suit.
And secondly, the persons represented by the plaintiff cannot said to be legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff within meaning of Section 2 (11) of Code of Civil Procedure and hence the provisions of order 22 would not apply to such case. (See: Sadati Al Hussaini Al Jalali Trust v. Qasim Ganaie (J&K High Court, 03.05.2024)
It is pointed out in Sadati Al Hussaini Al Jalali Trust v. Qasim Ganaie (J&K High Court, 03.05.2024) that the same view had also been taken by the Apex Court the following two earlier cases also.
Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh,1975 (1) SCC 298;
Karuppaswamy v. C. Ramamurthy, 1993(4) SCC 41,
On death of a Trustee new Trustee cannot be a Legal Representative
The Apex Court had held that on the death of a trustee new trustee (elected or appointed) cannot be said to be a legal representative of the deceased trustee but is a person on whom the interest of the Trust property devolves, making the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10; as it applies to him.
But, in G.F.F. Foulkes v. A.S. Suppan Chettiar, AIR 1951 Mad 296, it was held as under:
“When a suit is brought by several persons in a representative capacity, and if one of them dies, the suit does not abate because, the right to represent others of a class is not right which ipso facto survives to the legal representatives of the deceased party. The source of that right is the order of the Court permitting the party to represent others. In such a contingency, namely, the death of one of the parties to whom originally permission was granted to institute a suit in a representative capacity, it is for the Court to decide whether the suit can be allowed to be continued by the surviving person or persons or whether other persons should be joined. The proper procedure , in a case like this, is for the remaining person or persons to apply to the Court for directions and it is for the Court to decidewhether it will permit the remaining person or persons to whom the original sanction was given to continue to prosecute or defend the suit or appeal or it will give directions to bring on record additional person or persons.”
In a subsequent suit, Ram Kumar v. Jiwanlal, AIR 1960 Mad 288, the Madras High Court took a liberal view. It was held in this decision that a representative suit does not abate on the death of the representative as he or she can be substituted by another member of the plaintiff on defendant. (See also: Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram, AIR 1921 PC 123, State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Parwati Devi, AIR 1966 Raj 210).
Rules 1 of Order 30 CPC provides only an enabling method to sue, or be sued, partners of a firm (both Registered and Unregistered), at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, in the name of the firm. Suit by or against a firm is suit by or against its partners.
Order 30 Rule 1 do not apply when suit is instituted not in the name of the firm (instead, suit by all partners).
When all partners are in the party array (in a suit), impleading of the firm is surplusage,
The purpose of using the name of the firm, in a suit, is merely to encompass all the partners (even if none of them is not named as parties to the suit).
Rule 3 of Order 30 provides that summons to firm shall be served either-
(a) upon any one or more of the partners, or
(b) upon any person having the control or management of the partnership business, at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried:
Though no partner need comes as a plaintiff (under Rules 1 of Order 30 CPC), if so demanded by the defendant, the names and details of such partners should be revealed, forthwith, by the plaintiffs (Rule 2 of Order 30).
Judgment/Decree in the name of the firm (without joining any partner), has the same effect as a Judgment/ decree in favour of or against all its partners.
The partners are not necessary parties in trial-stage, to proceed in execution against all partners. The question as to who are the persons who constitute the firm can be decided in execution proceedings (Order 21, Rule 50 CPC).
Section 69(2) Partnership Act
Section 69(1) Partnership Act directs that the registration of the firm is mandatory, and a condition precedent, to institute a suit by one partner against the firm or another partner.
Section 69(2) directs that registration of the firm is necessary for suit by or on behalf of a firm (that is, by the firm or its partners) (i) against a third party (ii) to enforce a contract with the firm.
Note: Sec. 69 (2) is not attracted when a suit is filed against a third party for reliefs other than enforcement of contract – like enforcement of a statutory right (trade mark) or a common law right or a right under TP Act (eviction of tenant).
Section 69(3) directs that registration of firm is necessary for claiming ‘set off’.
Though the stipulation in Section 69 (which requires registration for filing certain suits) may appear harsh, the historical basis of this provision (enacted in 1932) justifies its legitimacy (making Registration compulsory, for filing certain suits). English law, stood at that time, required compulsory registration of partnership, and contravention thereof was made punishable.
After independence also, the provisions as to registration of firms were not changed (so as to make Registration compulsory). Obviously, it is also because of the proclamations in Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India (in Fundamental Rights Chapter)
Section 69 requires that (i) all the partnersat the time of the institution of the suit must be parties to the suit and (ii) their names also be in the Register of Firms, to proceed to obtain the reliefs stated in Sec. 69 (though Or. 30 r. I enables – two or more partners to sue).
Order 30 and Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act are independent provisions, that operate separately. They deal with different aspects.
Both these provisions must be complied with, when a suit is instituted (i) to enforce a contract, (ii) by or on behalf of a firm and (iii) against a third party.
A partnership (that arises by an agreement to share profits or loss) cannot be put an end by a partner without consent of others; whereas in a co-ownership venture, a co-owner can transfer his interest. Because co-ownership activities are not governed by Partnership Act, Sec. 69 Bar is not applicable to the same.
Practical Note – Under Order 30 Rule 1, to sue a firm, either the firm be made as a party, in addition to one or more of the partners; or
the firm alone be made as the party, naming the (one or more) partners or any person having the control (or management of the partnership business, at its principal place of business) upon whom the summons be served by the conjuncture “by”, “through” or “represented by”; because, Order 30 rule 1 says – partners “may sue or be sued with (or, in) the name of the firm”.
Order 30, Rule I, CPC lays down –
persons sue or be sued “with (or in) the name of the firm” should be
partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.
Order 30 Rule 1 – Reads: Suing of partners in name of firm
(1) Any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in India may sue or be sued with the name of the firm (if any) of which such persons were partners at the time of accruing of the cause of action, and any party to a suit may in such case apply to the Court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were, at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, partners in such firm, to be furnished and verified in such manner as the Court may direct.
(2) Where persons sue or are sued were partners in the name of their firm under Sub-rule (1), it shall, in the case of any pleading or other document required by or under this Code to be signed, verified or certified by the plaintiff or the defendant, suffice if such pleading or other document is signed, verified or certified by any one of such persons.
Order 30 Rule 2 – Reads: Disclosure of partners’ names
(1) Where a suit is instituted by partners in the name of their firm, the plaintiffs or their pleader shall, on demanding writing by or on behalf of any defendant, forthwith declare in writing the names and places of residence of all the persons constituting the firm on whose behalf the suit is instituted.
(2) Where the plaintiffs or their pleader fail to comply with any demand made under sub-rule (1) all proceedings in the suit may, upon an application for that purpose, be stayed upon such terms as the Court may direct.
(3) Where the names of the partners are declared in the manner referred to in sub-rule (1) the suit shall proceed in the same manner, and the same consequences in all respects shall follow, as if they had been named as plaintiffs in the plaint:
Provided that all proceedings shall nevertheless continue in the name of the firm, but the name of the partners disclosed in the manner specified in sub-rule (1) shall be entered in the decree.
Section 69 reads as under:
69. Effect of Non-registration
1. No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.
2. No suit to enforce a rightarising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.
3. The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect,—
(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or
(b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920) to realise the property of an insolvent partner.
4. This section shall not apply,—
(a) to firms or to partners in firms which have no place of business in[the territories to which this Act extends], or whose places of business in [the said territories], are situated in areas to which, by notification under [section 56], this Chapter does not apply, or
(b) to any suit or claim of set-off not exceeding one hundred rupees in value which, in the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), or, outside the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in the Second Schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (9 of 1887), or to any proceeding in execution or other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim.
Sec. 69(2) and Order 30 Rule 1 deal with different aspects and operate separately
Rules I of Order 30 deals with the mode or form in which the suit to be instituted. It requires that the persons suing ‘in the name of the firm‘ should be partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.
Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act should be satisfied in order that a suit can be instituted. That is, to institute a suit (i) to enforcea contract (ii) by or on behalf of a firm (iii) against a third party, (a) the registration of a firm is a condition precedent, and (b) the name of the partners suing must have been shown in the Register of Firms.
In short, these two independent provisions must be complied, when a suit is instituted (i) to enforce a right from a contract (ii) (in a contract) with the firm and (iii) against any third party.
Section 69 requires that (i) all the partners at the time of the institution of the suit must be parties to the suit and (ii) their names also be in the Register of Firms- to proceed with the matters stated in Sec. 69 (though Or. 30 r. I enables – two or more partners to sue). (See: Firm of V. Ramchandraiah Gupta v. Ravula Venkat Reddy, 1970 (1) Andhra WR 243 Hansraj Manot’s (1962) 66 Cal WN 262; Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791.
Note:
If the partners at the time of accruing of the cause of action (to enforce a contract) and the partners at the time of instituting the suit are different, to institute a suit by or on behalf of a firm , against a third party following persons must be in the party array –
(i) all partners at the time of cause of action and
(ii) all partners at the time of filing the suit.
Note – Rule 1(1) of Order 30 CPC says – “with the name of the firm” and Rule 1(2) says – “in the name of their firm“.
The firm can be made as a party, in addition to the partners; or the firm alone be made as the party, naming the partners thereafter followed by the words – “represented by”.
Plaint must be signed by the Partners in the Register of Firms on the DATE OF THE SUIT
In M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769, the Supreme Court has held that the plaint verified and signed by the partners as on the date of the suit who were not shown as partners in the register of firms, is not maintainable in view of S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. In para 6 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
“6. In the present case the suit filed by the appellants is clearly hit by the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 69 of the said Partnership Act, as on the date when the suit was filed, two of the partners shown as partners as per the relevant entries in the Register of Firms were not, in fact, partners, one new partner had come in and two minors had been admitted to the benefit of the partnership firm regarding which no notice was given to me Registrar of Firms. Thus, the persons suing, namely, the current partners as on the date of the suit were not shown as partners in the Register of Firms. In the result is that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 69 of the said Partnership Act and the view taken by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court in this connection is correct”.
S. 69(2) directs ‘all partners’must sue
Prior to M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769 (supra), there was difference of opinion as to ‘persons suing’ in Section 69(2) –
(i) it is the partners on the date of the institution of the suit. (Shanker Housing Corporation v. Mohan Devi, AIR 1978 Del 255. Also see decisions referred to therein – given below)
(ii) it is the partners (also) at time of the accruing of the cause of action (Bharat Sarvodaya Mills Co. Ltd. v. Mohatta Brothers, AIR 1969 Guj 178; Gandhi Company v. Krishna Glass Pvt. Ltd. (1983) 85 BomLR 179; Gurushiddayya Kalkayye Delimath v. Shah Hirachand Venechand and Co., AIR 1972 Mys 209; Sohanlal Basant Kumar v. Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791)
The line of decisions in this way are not good law in the light of M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769.
In Shanker Hoursing Corporation v. Mohan Devi, AIR 1978 Del 255 (D.B), it is held that the expression ‘persons suing’ in Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act means “all the partners of the firm who are its partners at the time of the institution of the suit“. But, under Rule I of Order 30 CPC provides that two or more partners can sue.
The contention raised in the case (the court rejected it) was the following-
“Rule I of Order 30 requires that the persons suing in the name of the firm should be partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, and, therefore, the same meaning should be given to the words “persons suing” in Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, 1932, and the “persons suing” in requirement (b) therein means the person who were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action and not on the date of the institution of the suit and it is sufficient for the purposes of requirement (b) if they have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.”
The Delhi High Court pointed out that Section 69(2), makes the registration of a firm a condition precedent to the institution of a suit by or on behalf of a firm against a third party. It deals with the question as to when a firm can sue, or be sued by, a third party in respect of a right arising from a contract, and provides certain requirements as conditions precedent for the institution of the suit, viz.. (a) that the firm is a registered firm, and (b) the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm. On the other hand, Rules I and 2 of Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide the mode or form and the procedure for suits by or against a firm. In other words, the requirements in Section 69(2) should be satisfied first in order that a suit can be instituted, and then the provisions of Rules I and 2 of Order 30 are attracted as regards the mode or form in which the suit may be instituted as well as the procedure applicable to the said suit. In providing the mode Rule I prescribes a certain requirement, viz., that the persons mentioned therein must have been partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.
Then the court observed as under:
(16) Thus, the provisions in Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act and those in Rule 1 of Order 30 deal with different aspects and operate separately. The former deals with the question as to when a firm can sue or be sued by a third party in respect of a right arising from a contract and prescribes certain requirements for the same, while the latter deals with the mode or form and the procedure for suits by or against firms, and prescribes a certain requirement for the same. It would not, therefore, be correct to interpret the. words “persons suing” in Section 69(2) and the point of time at which the requirements in Section 69(2) are to be fulfilled, by referring to the provision in Rule 1 of Order 30. In our opinion, the scope and effect of the two sets of provisions may be stated thus :
(17) Under Section 69(2), a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract can be instituted by or on behalf of a firm against any third party only if (a) the firm is registered and (b) the persons suing, i.e., all the partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit, are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm, while under Rule I of Order 30 two or more persons who claim as partners may sue, or who are liable as partners may be sued, in the name of the firm (if any), provided such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action. If the facts in a given case are such as to attract the applicability of the provisions in both Section 69(2) and Rule I of Order 30, the requirements in both the provisions should be fulfilled. In such a case, if a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract is to be instituted by or on behalf of a firm against any third party, the firm has to be a registered firm, and the partners ‘ of the firm as on the date of the institution of the suit must have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm, and further they must have been partners of the firm at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.
(18) As regards the scope and effect of Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, at view similar to the one expressed by us above baa been taken in the following decisions, vide-
(1)Firm Manghoomal Jethamal v. Finn Aratmal Satramdas Air 1922 Sind 13 ;
(2)Pratapchand Ramchand &Co. v. Jehangiriji Air 1940 Bom 257;
(3)Sri Meenakshi Mills v. C. Swaminatha Mudaliar and Bros. AIR 1944 Mad 443;
(4)Bank of Koothathikulam v. Itten Thomas. Air 1955 Travancore-Cochin, 155.
(5)Dr. V. S. Bahl v. M/s. S. L. Kapur ami Co., AIR 1978 Delhi 255;
(8)Firm Buta Mal Dev Raj v.-Chanan Mal and others. A.I.R. 1964 Punjab 270;
(9)Firm Alwar Iron Syndicate v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Raj 86,
(10)M/s. Badrimal Ramcharan & Co. v. M/s. Gana Kaul & Sons Air 1971 J&K 109;
(11)M/s. Chandrabhan Bansilal Ramratan Dass v. Municipal Council, Bikaner, AIR 1975 Raj 35 and
(12)Ram Kumar Shew Chandrai v. Dominion of India. AIR 1977 Cal 37.”
In Firm Buta Mai Dev Raj v. Chanan Mai, AIR 1964 Punj 270, it was pointed out that in order to institute a suit, a partnership firm must not only be a registered firm but also all the persons who are partners in the firm at the time of the institution of the suit must be, or have been, shown as such in the Register. The expression “the persons suing” in Section 69(2) must mean the partners in the firm. The use of the plural “persons” is obviously deliberate, since -while a singular may also mean the plural, the plural can never mean, singular. When a suit is instituted in the name of a firm the suit is on behalf of all the partners, and not only such of them as are shown, in the Register as such, and all the partners must be “the persons suing” contemplated in Section 69(2).
In Firm Alwar Iron Syndicate v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Raj 86, it is observed as under:
“6. It appears to me, however, that there is really no room for any controversy in regard to the correct meaning and purpose of Sub-section (2) of Section 69. It is well settled that a firm as such is not an entity in aw and is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 4 of the Partnership Act. Its name is therefore a mere abbreviated name of all its partners: Dulichand Laxminarayan v. Commr. of Income-tax, Nagpur, AIR 1956 SC 354. It is for this reason that special provisions have been made in Order 30, P. C. regarding suits by or against firms and persons carrying on business in names other than their own. So it is beyond doubt that even if a suit is brought in the name of a firm, it is really a suit by all its partners under the firm name. In other words, the persons suing are all the partners of the firmat the relevant date and none of them can, or obvious reasons, be left out for purposes of the suit. So it is incorrect to say that subsection (2) of Section 69 merely requires that only the person or persons actually signing the plaint on behalf of the firm should be shown in the Register of Firms as its partners. The word “persons” in the subsection has been used in the plural by design and serves an important purpose for it brings, out the real nature of a partnership firm which cannot consist of a single person. This is the view taken in –
Kapur Chand Bhagaji, Firm v. Laxrnan Trimbak, AIR 1952 Nag 57 and
Dr. V. S. Bahal v. S. L. Kapur and Co., AIR 1956 Punj 24.
The decision in Dr. V. S. Bahal’s case, AIR 1956 Punj 24 does not appear to have been noticed in AIR 1959 Punj 530 on which reliance has been placed by Mr. J. P. Jain, but it has been followed in AIR 1964 Punj 270.
It has also been followed in Hansraj Manot v. Gorak Natb Champalal Pandey, (1962) 66 Cal WN 262 and, if I may say so with respect, these judgments lay down the correct law on the point.”
Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit in violation of Section 69(1)
In Abani Kanta Pal v.Unknown, AIR 1986 Cal. 143, it is stated as under:
“9.In our opinion, it may be that S. 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act puts an embargo on the plaintiff and does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. A defendant in a suit for eviction may waive service of a notice under Section 13 (6). Section 69 (1) of the Partnership Act, however, stands on a different footing. The embargo that has been put on the plaintiff under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 is not for the purpose of protecting the interest of any party, but it is based on public policy. The requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 cannot be waived by the defendant, and the Court is debarred from entertaining a suit ignoring the fulfilment of such requirements. So, if a firm is not registered, excepting a suit as contemplated by Section 69 (3), the Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit in violation of Section 69(1). In other words, the plaint that has been filed by the plaintiff will be considered a void plaint, if it contravenes the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. This view finds support from a decision of the Supreme Court in Loonkaran Sethia Vs. Ivan E. John, AIR 1977 S.C.336. In that case, sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 were involved. The Supreme Court made the following observations;
“A bare glance at the section is enough to show that it is mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by a plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired by him under a contract which he entered into as a partner of an unregistered firm, whether existing or dissolved void. In other words, a partner of an erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of Section 69 of the Partnership Act.”
Defect (not signing by Partner) Cannot be Cured by Amendment of Plaint
The plaintiff in Popular Automobiles v. Chami, was a partnership firm and the plaint is verified, signed and filed by the Manager claiming that he had been authorised by one of the partners. The Kerala High Court (1 February, 2001) relying on M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769, held that the suit was filed in violation of the mandatory provisions of S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act; and therefore, the petition to amend the plaint was not sustainable.
Bar under Sec. 69 Partnership Actis absolute
Section 69(1) Partnership Act directs that the registration of a firm is mandatory, and a condition precedent, to institute a suit by one partner against the firm or another partner.
Section 69(2) directs that registration is necessary for suit by or on behalf of a firm (that is, by the firm or its partners) (i) against a third party (ii) to enforce a contract with the firm.
Section 69(3) directs that registration is necessary for claiming ‘set off’.
Unregistered Partnership Firm Cannot Bring A Suit for Enforcement of Contract
In Loon Koran v. Ivan E. John, AIR1977 SC 336, it is observed as under:
“A bare glance at the section is enough to show that it mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by a plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired by him under a contract which he entered into as a partner of an unregistered firm whether existing or dissolved, void. In other words, a partner of a erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of section 69 of the Partnership Act.” (quoted in: V.A. Abdul Wahab Sahib v. Abdul Subhan Sahib, (1998) 2 MLJ 720).
A co-ownership venture is not a Partnership; It is not Affected by Sec. 69 Bar
A partnership (that arises by an agreement to share profits or loss) cannot be put an end by a partner without consent of others; whereas in a co-ownership venture, a co-owner can transfer his interest. Because co-ownership activities are not governed by Partnership Act, Sec. 69 Bar is not applicable to the same.
Bar under Section 69 to ‘Other Proceedings’ also – to Get Rent Reduced
A suit by a tenant to get the rent reduced is thus a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract of tenancy. The suit therefore falls under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. See: Gappulal Gordhandas v. Chunilal Shyam Lal, AIR 1961 Raj 286.
No Bar to Arbitration
It is held by our Apex Court in Kamal Pushp Enterprises v. DR Construction Company, AIR 2000 SC 2676, that Section 69 of the Partnership Act has no application to proceedings before an Arbitrator; and therefore, an Arbitration and Award would not be vitiated. (But see: Jagdish Chander Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1882)
Bar to Claim Restoration of Benefits under S. 65 Contract Act
According to Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, when an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. Because of the bar under the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act, it is found in Bijendra Prasad v. Smt. Duleshwari Devi, AIR 1998 Pat 122, that the partners of the unregistered partnership cannot claim benefits under Sec. 65 of the Contract Act.
Partnership Cannot Amend to Become a Proprietorship
S. Krishnan v. Aruna and Associates, (1979) 2 MLJ 1, it is held that a suit filed as a partnership cannot amend to become a proprietorship. It is observed as under:
“When once he takes up a stand that it is a partnership firm, he should stand by it. Once he takes up the position that it is a dissolved firm, equally he should be prepared to substantiate it. But he cannot have a third way out of it by bringing in a person who was a quondam partner of the unregistered firm as if he has become the proprietor thereto on dissolution. This metamorphosis is not available in law.”
The Supreme Court Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar, in (2000) 3 SCC 250, observed as under:
“The points that arise for consideration are:
(I)Whether Section 69 (2) bars a suit by a firm not registered on the date of suit where permanent injunction and damages are claimed in respect of a trademark as a statutory right or by invoking common law principles applicable to a passing-off action?
(II) Whether the words” arising from a contract” in Section 69 (2) refer only to a situation where an unregistered firm is enforcing a right arising from a contract entered into by the firm with the defendant during the course or its business or whether the bar under Section 69 (2) can be extended to any any contract referred to in the plaint unconnected with the defendants, as the source of title to the suit property?
On question No. 1 the Supreme Court held as under:
“(9) The question whether Section 69(2) is a bar to a suit filed by an unregistered firm even if a statutory right is being enforced or even if only a common law right is being enforced came up directly for consideration in this Court in Raptakas Brett Co. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Property. In that case, Majumdar J.. speaking for the Bench clearly expressed the view that Section 69 (2) can not bar the enforcement by a way of a suit by an unregistered firm in respect of a statutory right or a common law right. On the facts of that case, it was held that the right to evict a tenant upon expiry of the lease was not a right ” arising from a contract” but was a common law right or a statutory right under the Transfer of Property Act. The fact that the plaint in that case referred to a lease and to its expiry, made no difference. Hence, the said suit was held not barred. It appears to us that in tht case the reference to the lease in the plaint was obviously treated as a historical fact. That case is therefore directly in point. Following the said judgment, it must be held in the presence case too that a suit is not barred by Section 69 (2) if a statutory right or a common law right is being enforced.
It is held while answering question No. 2:
“The above provision clearly signifies that the right that is sought to be enforced by the unregistered firm and which is barred must be a right arising out of a contract with a third party – defendant in respect of the firm’s business transactions….. The real crux of the question is that the legislature when it used the word “arising out of a contract” in Section 69(2), it is referring to a contract entered into in course of business transaction by the unregistered plaintiff firm with its customers – defendants and the idea is to protect those in commerce who deal with such a partnership firm in business. Such third parties who deal with the partners ought to be enabled to know what the names of the firm are before they deal with them in business.”
In this case our apex court pointed out as under:
if the firm is not registered on date of suit and the suit is to enforce a right arising out of a contract with the third party- defendant in the course of its business, then it will be open to the plaintiff to seek withdrawal of the plaint with leave and file a fresh suit after registration of the firm subject of course to the law of limitation and subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act. This is so even if the suit is dismissed for a formal defect. Section 14 of the Limitation Act will be available inasmuch as the suit has failed because the defect of non-registration falls within the words “other cause of like nature” in section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. See Surajmal Dagduramji Shop v. M/s. Srikishan Ram Kishan, AIR (1973) Bom. 313.”
In Ramachandraiah Gupta v. Ravula Venkat Reddy, 1971 Andhra WR. 243 (Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy) held as under:
“Now, a firm is not a legal entity at all, but is a mere abbreviated name for the several partners of which it consists. Ordinarily, therefore, a suit may not be brought by a firm in its own name but a suit may be brought by all the partners acting together or by some of the partners only but impleading the other partners also as parties to the suit. However Order 30, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code prescribes a special procedure by which a suit may be brought in the name of the firm. It provides that any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business may sue or be sued in the name of the firm of which such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action and that in such a case it shall suffice if one of such persons signs, verifies or certifies any pleadings or document required by the Code to be signed, verified and certified by the plaintiff or the defendant. The effect of a suit instituted in the name of the firm in the manner, prescribed by Order 30, Rule 1 is as if the suit is filed by all the partners collectively. Whether the suit is filed by all the partners collectively or by some only of the partners impleading the rest as parties to the suit or whether it is filed in the name of the firm prescribed by Section 69(2) must be fulfilled. They are (1) that the firm must be registered and (2) that the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the Firm….”
S. 69(2) – No Bar for Enforcement of a Statutory Right or a Common Law Right
Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932 is not a bar to a suit filed by an unregistered firm, if the same is for enforcement of a statutory right (like, trade mark) or a common law right or a right under TP Act (like, eviction of tenant – Govindaraja Naicker v. Sapthagiri Complex, ILR 1994 Kar 1832).).
To attract the bar of Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932, the contract in question (i) must be the one entered into by firm with the third-party defendant and (ii) must also be the one entered into by the plaintiff firm in the course of its business dealings.
Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property: (1998) 7 SCC 184, Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar: (2000) 3 SCC 250. Referred to in: Shiv Developers v. Aksharay Developers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 114.
Contract must be one in the Course of the Business Dealings
In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184, it is held as under:
“23 The further and additional but equally important aspect which has to be made clear is that the contract by the unregistered firm referred to in Section 69(2) must not only be one entered into by the firm with the third-party defendant but must also be one entered into by the plaintiff firm in the course of the business dealings of the plaintiff firm with such third-party defendant.
24… The real crux of the question is that the legislature, when it used the words “arising out of a contract” in Section 69(2), it is referring to a contract entered into in course of business transactions by the unregistered plaintiff firm with its defendant customers and the idea is to protect those in commerce who deal with such a partnership firm in business. Such third parties who deal with the partners ought to be enabled to know what the names of the partners of the firm are before they deal with them in business.”
25 Further, Section 69(2) is not attracted to any and every contract referred to in the plaint as the source of title to an asset owned by the firm. If the plaint referred to such a contract it could only be as a historical fact. For example, if the plaint filed by the unregistered firm refers to the source of the firm’s title to a motor car and states that the plaintiff has purchased and received a motor car from a foreign buyer under a contract and that the defendant has unauthorisedly removed it from the plaintiff firm’s possession — it is clear that the relief for possession against the defendant in the suit does not arise from any contract which the defendant entered into in the course of the plaintiff firm’s business with the defendant but is based on the alleged unauthorised removal of the vehicle from the plaintiff firm’s custody by the defendant. In such a situation, the fact that the unregistered firm has purchased the vehicle from somebody else under a contract has absolutely no bearing on the right of the firm to sue the defendant for possession of the vehicle. Such a suit would be maintainable and Section 69(2) would not be a bar, even if the firm is unregistered on the date of suit. The position in the present case is not different. (Quoted in: Shiv Developers v. Aksharay Developers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 114)
In Shiv Developers v. Aksharay Developers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 114, it is held as under:
“The relevant principles, when applied to the facts of the present case, leave nothing to doubt that the transaction in question was not the one entered into by the plaintiff firm during the course of its business (i.e., of building construction); and it had been an independent transaction of sale, of the firm’s share in the suit property, to the contesting defendants. The bar of Section 69(2) is not attracted in relation to the said sale transaction. Moreover, the subject suit cannot be said to be the one for enforcement of right arising from a contract; rather the subject suit is clearly the one where the plaintiff seeks common law remedies with the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation as also of the statutory rights of injunction and declaration in terms of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as also the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (while alleging want of the sale consideration). Therefore, the bar of Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932 does not apply to the present case.”
Suit by Sole (remaining) Partner Maintainable
In Gujarat Water Supply and Severage v. Sundardas Hukumatram Shivanani, AIR 1991 Guj 170, a contract was entered into by a partnership firm with the Government. One among the three partners of the firm was the plaintiff. Before filing the suit, other two partners had been retired. The plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of rights and liabilities of the dissolved firm. The High Court held that the suit was maintainable though the partnership firm was not registered.
A suit by one partner against another for damages on the grounds of the misconduct of his partner was held to be maintainable in Navinchandra Jethabhai v. Moolchand Sadaram Gindodiya, AIR 1966 Bom 111.
Registration of the Firm Must be proved by Certified Copy of Register
Nagpur High Court in Kapurchand Begaji Firm v. Laxman Triabuk, AIR 1952 Nag 57, held that the Register of Firms being a public document the requirements of Section 69(2) were to be complied with by producing a certified copy of an entry from that register; and that the oral evidence of the plaintiff-partner is not admissible as secondary evidence. The same view was taken in Chhotelal Darbarilal v. Mohammed Hussain AIR 1955 VP 44, M/s Badrimal Ramcharan and Co. v. M/s. Gama Kaul and Sons, AIR 1971 J&K 103; Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791.
Firm Need not be a Party
In M.S. Pearl Sound Engineer v. M/s. Poonam Chand, it was held that when the suit is instituted by all the partners, it was not necessary to implead the firm, and impleading the firm was merely a surplusage. (Referred to in: Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791).
Death of a Partner in the Registered Firm
In M/s Durga Das Janak Ram v. Preete Shah Sant Ram, AIR 1959 P H 530, Punjab High Court, following the decision of the Bombay High Court in Pratapchand Ramchand & Co. v. Jahangirji Bomanji, AIR 1940 Bom 237 held that the firm continued to be registered in spite of the death of one of the partners (and non-reporting of this fact to the Registrar) and the remaining partners were was entitled to institute a suit. But, in Krishna Chandra Agarwalla v. Shanti Prasad Jain, AIR 1981 Cal 199, it was held that if firm could not be maintained without the son of the deceased partner and his name did not appear in the Register of Firms, the suit filed by the firm could not be proceeded with. (See also: Maddi Sudarsanam v. Borogu Viswanadham Brothers, AIR 1955 AP 12; Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791).
Cause of action on dishonour of cheques & contract under Sec. 69
In Afsal Baker vs. Maya Printers, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 29914, it is held that the suit on the cause of action on dishonour of cheques can be brought independent of Sec. 69 of the Partnership Act, as it is not on a ‘contract’ stated in Sec. 69.
Decree Obtained Against a Partner Cannot be Executed Against Legal Heirs
In SP Misra v. Mohd. Laiquddin Khan, (2019) 10 SCC 329, it is held that a partnership firm stands dissolved, on the death of a partner, by operation of law under Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932; and therefore, the decree obtained against a partner cannot be executed against his legal heirs.
When all Partners are Necessary Parties
Partition of partnership property
Suit for settling the accounts of the dissolved firm
When firm constituted to take up a venture – after the completion of such venture.
Subsequent Registration Will Not Cure the Defect
In Delhi Development Authority v. Kochhar Construction Work, (1998) 8 SCC 559, following Shreeram Finance Corporation, it was held that proceedings under the Arbitration Act were ab initio defective for the firm was not registered; and that the subsequent registration of the firm could not cure that defect. (Followed in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd vs Jain Construction Co. (2004) 8 SCC 559) See also: Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar, 2000(3) SCC 250.
In Dwijendra Nath Singh v. Govinda Chandra, AIR 1953 Cal 497 (Dasgupta, G Ray, JJ.) the suit was brought by two persons who are described as the owners of the firm Samanta Naskar and Co. When the suit was instituted this firm had not been registered. It however was registered before the suit came to be heard. It was held following Firm Laduram Sagarmal v. Jamuna Prasad, AIR 1939 Pat 239 and Varadarajulu v. Rajmanika, AIR 1937 Mad 767, that a suit which was not maintainable by reason of non-compliance with S. 69 of the Partnership Act cannot become maintainable at a later stage by reason of registration and the subsequent registration cannot cure the initial defect.
Apex Court Impleaded Partners, Suo Moto, as Proper Parties, in eviction Case
In Richard Lee v. Girish Soni, (2017) 3 SCC 194, our Apex Court it was ruled that there was no doubt that all the partners are not necessary parties ‘form the point of view of the eviction petitioners’ and that both the firm and all its partners should be on the array of parties as proper party for properly adjudicating the issue before the Rent Controller in view of the contentions taken by the parties. The Apex Court impleaded the partners suo moto observing that the Court has a duty to see whether the presence of the proper parties would facilitate the complete determination of the matter in dispute.
Clauses impose obligations to legal heirs are opposed to public policy
In SP Misra v. Mohd. Laiquddin Khan, (2019) 10 SCC 329, it is held as under:
“When such legal representative are not parties to the contract, such contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations arising under it on any third party, except parties to it. No one but the parties to the contract can be entitled under it or born by it. Such principle is known as ‘Privity of Contract’. When the partnership stands dissolved by operation of law under Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the question of execution in pursuance of the decree does not arise. There cannot be any contract unilaterally without acceptance and agreement by the legal heirs of the deceased partner. If there are any clauses in the agreement, entered into between the original partners, against the third parties, such clauses will not bind them, such of the clauses in the partnership deed, which run contrary to provisions of Indian Partnership Act, 1932, are void and unenforceable. Such clauses are also opposed to public policy.”
Execution Against a Partner who was not a Party in Trial
In J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Firm Birdhichand Sumermal (Mukerji, Beg, Agarwala, JJ) AIR 1958 All 176, while interpreting Order 21, Rule 50 CPC, Beg, J. (concurred by Mukerji, J.) referring earlier judgments, it was held that all the partners were not necessary parties in trial, to proceed in execution. Beg, J. summed up his Judgment observing the following:
The decree can be satisfied not only from the property of the partnership, but also from the personal property of each of the partners.
The question as to who are the persons who constitute the firm can be decided in execution proceedings.
Order 21, Rule 50 is designed to define the scope and to lay down the mode and method of such an enquiry.
Effect of Contrary View: If a partner (not impleaded or served) succeeds when re-agitate in execution proceedings, he would be fully bound by the decree which has already been passed in the suit against the firm, yet according to the order of the same Court at the execution stage in the same suit, he would not be so bound.
A contrary view might result in a conflict between the findings at the trial and at the execution stage in the same case.
Further, in such a case he would have to be held to be immune from personal liability as a partner even though his property as a partner would be liable for the satisfaction of the decree under Order 21, Rule 50(1) (a).
Again, if a partner not impleaded or served in the suit is allowed to re-agitate the whole matter on merits, then it would be open to him to raise again the same pleas which were raised by other partners who were served in the suit.
If the decision in the suit is not to be treated as res judicata against all partners, then it would be open to the same Court at the execution stage to take a different view of the same plea.
The result would be that on the same point there would be two conflicting findings at two stages of the same case.
Moreover, as a result of his objection at the execution stage, the claim might be found to be good against the firm only partially, even though the decree in the suit might postulate the liability in respect of the entire claim.
The contrary view might result not only in a conflict between the decree in the suit and the order in execution proceedings in the same suit, but also in a conflict between various orders at the execution stage itself.
Thus, where the number of partners who had not been served in the proceedings and against whom applications under Sub-rule (2) might be given is a very large and they are allowed to re-agitate the whole matter, the result would be that each time a fresh application against each of such persons is made, fresh objections might be taken.
If this procedure is allowed, then there would neither be any consistency in findings nor would there be any finality of decisions in the same matter. The situation thus created would be a highly embarrassing and confusing one.
If collusion, the matter has to be re-agitated either by a separate suit to have the decree set aside or by reviving the proceedings in the same suit itself.
The Legislature has, also, provided some safeguard by making the leave of the Court necessary for proceedings under Sub-rule 2.
Where facts are such as to raise the suspicion of collusion between the parties, the Court may refuse such permission. The enquiry contemplated against a person proceeded against under Sub-rule (2) was of a restricted character.
Order 21 Rule 50 CPC Reads As Under:
“50. Execution Of Decree Against Firm.
(1) Where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted-
(a) against any property of the partnership;
(b) against any person who has appeared in his own name under rule 6 or rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be, a partner;
(c) against any person who has been individually served as a partner with a summons and has failed to appear:
Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the provisions of section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932).
(2) Where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in sub-rule (1), clauses (b) and (c), as being a partner in the firm he may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such court may grant such leave, or, where such liability is disputed, may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined.
(3) Where the liability of any person has been tried and determined under sub-rule (2) the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree.
(4) Save as against any property of the partnership, a decree against a firm shall not lease, render liable or otherwise affect any partner therein unless he has been served with a summons to appear and answer.
(5) Nothing in this rule shall apply to a decree passed against a Hindu Undivided Family by virtue of the provision of rule 10 of Order XXX.”
End Notes
In Sohanlal Basant Kumar v. Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791, after referring various previous decisions the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court (D P Gupta, K Lodha, JJ.) came to the following conclusions:
A firm is not a legal entity at all but is the collective term or an abbreviated name for all the persons who are partners thereof.
All such persons who have entered into a partnership with one another are individually called partners and collectively they are called a firm and the name under which their business is carried on is called the firm name.
Ordinarily, a suit may not be brought by a firm in its own name but a suit may be filed by all the partners acting together or by some of the partners only, but impleading the remaining partners also as parties to the suit.
However, Order 30 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes a special procedure by which a suit may be brought in the name of the firm.
Order 30 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables two or more persons, claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in partnership, to sue or be sued in the name of the firm, of which such persons are partners at the time of the accrual of the cause of action.
Any party to a suit, in such a case, may apply to the court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were at the time of the accrual of the cause of action partners in such firm.
Where persons sue or are sued as partners in the name of the firm, it shall suffice if any of the partners may sign, verify or certify any pleadings or other documents required under the Code of Civil Procedure to be signed, verified or certified by the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be.
If a demand is made as mentioned above, in the case of a suit instituted by the partners in the name of the firm, the plaintiffs shall forthwith declare in writing the names and places of residence of all partners constituting the firm on whose behalf the suit is instituted.
Thus, there can be no doubt that a suit brought in the name of the firm is actually one by all the persons who were partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit.
Thus although the firm is not a legal entity, yet the provisions of Order 30 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. enable several persons doing business as partners to sue or be sued in the name of the firm.
The effect of a suit instituted in the name of the firm in the manner prescribed by Order 30 Rule 1 C.P.C. is as if the suit is filed by all the persons collectively.
Whether the suit is filed by all the partners collectively or by some only of the partners impleading the rest as parties to the suit or whether it is filed in the name of the firm by one or more partners in the manner indicated by Order 30 rule I C.P.C. the conditions prescribed by Section 69(2) must be fulfilled.
They are:
(1) that the firm must be registered; and
(2) that the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the Firm.
The second condition requires that the names of the persons suing are presently shown or have been previously shown in the Register of Firm as partners in the firm. That appears to fallow pliantly from the provisions of Section 69(2).
The use of the conjunction ‘and’ shows that both the aforesaid conditions must exist together on the date of the institution of the suit.
As a matter of fact, these two requirements constitute the conditions precedent to the institution of the suit.
It may be pointed out that merely filing a statement under Section 58(1) of the Act in the office of the Registrar of Firms in the prescribed form, giving the particulars of the partnership firm and its partners together with the prescribed fee would not be enough for the fulfillment of the aforesaid conditions.
A certificate of registration in the prescribed form should be made available to the partners of the firm and an entry of the statement filed under Section 58(1) should be recorded by the Registrar in the Register of Firms before the institution of the suit.
Thus, even if the certificate of registration is made available, yet the second requirement of Sub-section (2) of Section 69 cannot be fulfilled merely by sending or delivering to the Registrar of Firms the statement required by Section 58, but it must also be shown that an entry of the statement so furnished was made by the Registrar in the Register of Firms before the date of the institution of the suit.
Similar is the position of a statement sent to the Registrar under Section 65 of the Act intimating the alterations or changes occurring in the constitution of the firm on account of addition, death or retirement of some of the partners.
Use of the expression ‘person suing” in Section 69(2) of the Act is significant.
Ordinarily a singular used in an enactment includes a plural, but the use of the word ‘persons’ in the aforesaid provision indicates that the legislature intended to refer to all those persons who are the partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit.
The reason is simple, as all these persons who desire to obtain a decree in their favour in a suit must become plaintiffs in the suit and all those persons against whom a decree is to be passed must similarly be made defendants in the suit.
When the suit is filed by or on behalf of the partnership firm, either all the partners of the firm should individually be named as plaintiffs in the suit or some of them maybe named as plaintiffs, while the remaining partners may be named as proforma defendants in the plaint.
Another alternative mode has been provided by Order 30 Rule 1 C.P.C. in such cases and the suit may be filed in the name of the firm, which name collectively represents all the partners of the firm at the time of institution of the suit.
Such a suit filed in the name of the firm shall be deemed to be a suit on behalf of all the partners of the firm.
The other limb of the requirement contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 69 is that all such persons who are partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit must be or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners of the plaintiff firm.
The expression “is or have been” refers to such persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm at the time of accrual of the cause of action and continues to remain so entered in the Register of Firms at the time of the institution of the suit. (It stands contrary to M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769.)
Thus either the persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm at the time of the accrual of cause of action and continued to remain so entered therein until the institution of the suit or persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms as partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit could maintain a suit in the name of the firm or on behalf of the firm.
It has also been held in some of the cases that all the persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms on the date of the institution of the suit could file a suit notwithstanding the fact that the names of some other persons also find place in the Register of Firms as partners of the firm, who have either died or have since retired and thus ceased to be partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit.
The crux of the matter is that the names of all those persons, who continued to hold together as partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit must be shown to be entered in the Register of Firms on the date of the institution of the suit.
If the relevant entry in the Register of Firms containing some other names of persons who have either died or have retired from the partnership, the same would not affect the maintainability of the suit, in as much as the suit in the name of the firm could be filed only by or on behalf of the surviving partners of the firm.
But if the name of one or more of the existing partners of the firm at the time of institution of the suit does not find place in the Register of Firms on that date, then the suit by or on behalf of the partnership firm is not maintainable.
It is also clear that no oral evidence can be taken for the purpose of deciding as to who were the partners of the plaintiff firm at the time of the institution of the suit and the names of the persons suing must be shown in the Register of Firm as partners of the plaintiff firm at the time of the institution of the suit, as the suit in the name of the firm is virtually a suit by all the partners of the firm and in order to prove the fact as to who were the partners of the plaintiff firm at the time of the institution of the suit, the only evidence admissible is a certified copy of the relevant entry in the Register of Firms.
Thus the only possible interpretation to be placed on the expression ‘are or have been shown in the Register of Firms’ could be the persons suing must either be presently shown in the Register of Firms as partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit or they must have been earlier shown in the said Register of Firms as partners of the firm, no other interpretation is possible so as to give a rational meaning to the provision.
‘Partnership’ is the relation between partners under an agreement to share profits in a business.
A ‘Firm’ is the collection of partners (of the Partnership).
A firm is not a juristic person.
In law, it is a compendious name for all the partners.
A partnership deed is not necessary to form a partnership.
Registration of partnership (before the Registrar of Firms) is also not necessary.
The liability of each partner is joint and several.
Order 30 CPC
Rule 1 of Order 30 CPC provides only an enabling method to sue, or be sued, partners of a firm (both Registered and Unregistered), at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, in the name of the firm. Suit by or against a firm is suit by or against its partners.
Order 30 Rule 1 do not apply when suit is instituted not in the name of the firm (instead, suit by all partners).
One partner alone can sue, or be sued, in the firm name. Still, the decree binds all partners.
When all partners are in the party array (in a suit), impleading of the firm is surplusage,
The purpose of using the name of the firm, in a suit, is merely to encompass all the partners (even if none of them is not named as parties to the suit).
Though no partner need comes as a plaintiff (under Rules 1 of Order 30 CPC), if so demanded by the defendant, the names and details of such partners should be revealed, forthwith, by the plaintiffs (Rule 2 of Order 30).
Rule 3 of Order 30 provides that summons to firm shall be served either-
(a) upon any one or more of the partners, or
(b) upon any person having the control or management of the partnership business, at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried:
Judgment/Decree in the name of the firm (without joining any partner), has the same effect as a Judgment/ decree in favour of or against all its partners.
The partners are not necessary parties in trial-stage, to proceed in execution against all partners. The question as to who are the persons who constitute the firm can be decided in execution proceedings (Order 21, Rule 50 CPC).
Section 69 Partnership Act
Section 69(1) Partnership Act directs that the registration of the firm is mandatory, and a condition precedent, to institute a suit by one partner against the firm or another partner.
Section 69(2) directs that registration of the firm is necessary for suit by or on behalf of a firm (i) against a third party (ii) to enforce a contract with the firm.
Note: Sec. 69 (2) is not attracted when a suit is filed against a third party for reliefs other than enforcement of contract – like enforcement of a statutory right (trade mark) or a common law right or a right under TP Act (eviction of tenant) or cause of action on dishonour of cheques.
Section 69(3) directs that registration of firm is necessary for claiming ‘set off’.
Though the stipulation in Section 69 (which requires registration for filing certain suits) may appear harsh, the historical basis of this provision (enacted in 1932) justifies its legitimacy. English law, stood at that time, required compulsory registration of partnership, and contravention thereof was made punishable.
After independence also, the provisions as to registration of firms were not changed. Obviously, it is also because of the proclamations in Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India (in Fundamental Rights Chapter).
Section 69 requires that (i) all the partnersat the time of the institution of the suit must be parties to the suit and (ii) their names also be in the Register of Firms, to proceed to obtain the reliefs stated in Sec. 69 (though Or. 30 r. I enables – two or more partners to sue).
Order 30 and Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act are independent provisions, that operate separately. They deal with different aspects.
Both these provisions must be complied with, when a suit is instituted (i) to enforce a contract, (ii) by or on behalf of a firm and (iii) against a third party.
A partnership (that arises by an agreement to share profits or loss) cannot be put an end by a partner without consent of others; whereas in a co-ownership venture, a co-owner can transfer his interest. Because co-ownership activities are not governed by Partnership Act, Sec. 69 Bar is not applicable to the same.
Practical Note
Under Order 30 Rule 1, to sue a firm, either the firm be made as a party, in addition to one or more of the partners; or
the firm alone be made as the party, naming the (one or more) partners or any person having the control (or management of the partnership business, at its principal place of business) upon whom the summons be served by the conjuncture “by”, “through” or “represented by”; because, Order 30 rule 1 says – partners “may sue or be sued with (or, in) the name of the firm”.
Part I
Partnership Definition
Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, defines partnership as under:
“4. Definition of ‘partnership’, ‘partner’, ‘firm’ and ‘firm name’—
‘Partnership’ is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all.
Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually ‘partners’ and collectively a ‘firm’, and the name under which their business is carried on is called the ‘firm name’.
‘Partnership’ and ‘Firm’ in Law
‘Partnership’ is the relation of persons under an agreement to share profits in a business.
A ‘Firm’ is the collection of partners (of the Partnership).
Elements of Partnership
From the above definition, it comes out that the following are the essential elements of a Partnership:
(1) Contract,
(2) two or more persons,
(3) business,
(4) object of sharing profits and
(5) business by all or any of them acting for all.
Co-ownership and Partnership: Distinction
Characteristics of a partnership, qua the Co-ownership, are the following:
Partnership arises by an agreement to share profits or loss.
It cannot be put an end by a partner without consent of others.
A partner cannot transfer his interest in partnership, of his own.
The basic distinction between co-ownership and partnership is laid down in Dr. Ramji Singh Properties v. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, 2013 SCC OnLine All 13873, as under:
The co-ownership is not necessarily the result of an agreement while the partnership is the result of an agreement.
The concept of involvement of community of profits or loss is not attached with the concept of co-ownership.
A co-owner can, without consent of others, transfer or discard his interest, but the result of the agreement for forming a firm does not allow a partner to transfer or discard his interest, unilaterally.
No Written or Registered Document is Needed to Contribute Land to Firm
In Dr. Ramji Singh Properties v. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, 2013 SCC OnLine All 13873, the decision, Firm Ram Sahay Mall Rameshwar Dayal v. Bishwanath Prasad, AIR 1963 Pat. 221, was referred which said as under:
“The legal position, therefore, appears to be that no written or registered document is necessary for an individual to contribute any land or immovable property as a contribution against his share of the capital of a new partnership business. The same view was taken by a bench of the Calcutta High Court in Prem Raj Brahmin v. Bhani Ram Brahmin, ILR (1946) 1 Cal 191. It was held that a written document, and, consequently registration, is not necessary to bring in the separate properties of the partners into the partnership stock, and by virtue of Sections 14 and 46 of the Indian Partnership Act and certain provisions of the Indian Contract Act, they become the properties of the firm as soon as the partners intend to so bring them in and Treat them as such. It was further laid down by their Lordships that this sort of contribution or transfer is hot prohibited by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or the Indian Registration Act, 1908.”
Maximum Number of Partners in a Partnership is 50
Indian Partnership Act, 1932 does not limit the number of partners in a firm.
Sec. 464 of the Companies Act, 2013 provided that the maximum number of partners should not exceed one hundred; and it was left to the Government to fix the maximum (by rules). Rule 10 of the Companies (Miscellaneous) Rules, 2014, fixed the the maximum number partners as 50.
Under the erstwhile Companies Act, 1956, maximum partners allowed in a partnership firm was 10 persons in a banking business; and 20 persons in other business.
Sec. 464 of the Companies Act, 2013 reads as under:
Prohibition of association or partnership of persons exceeding certain number:
(1) No association or partnership consisting of more than such number of persons as may be prescribed shall be formed for the purpose of carrying on any business that has for its object the acquisition of gain by the association or partnership or by the individual members thereof, unless it is registered as a company under this Act or is formed under any other law for the time being in force:
Provided that the number of persons which may be prescribed under this sub-section shall not exceed one hundred.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to—
(a) a Hindu undivided family carrying on any business; or
(b) an association or partnership, if it is formed by professionals who are governed by special Acts.
(3) Every member of an association or partnership carrying on business in contravention of sub-section (1) shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees and shall also be personally liable for all liabilities incurred in such business.
Kinds of Partnership (on duration)
i. At will (when no fixed period is prescribed for the expiration)
ii. Partnership for a fixed period
Kinds of Partners
Active/managing partners
Sleeping/Dormant partners
Nominal partner (partner only by his name who has no real interest in the firm)
Partner in profit only: (He is not liable for any)
Minor partner (He will share the profit but his liability will be limited)
Partner by estoppel (If one represented himself to be the partner, he may be estopped from denying the status)
Status of Partners in a Firm–Agent
Section 18 onwards declares Status of Partners in a Firm. They read as under:
Section 18: Partner to be Agent of the Firm.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, a partner is the agent of the firm for the purposes of the business of the firm.
Property purchased in the name of one Partner
Property purchased in the name of one Partner can be parnership property if the accounts reveal it. Merely because a property of a partner is used for partnership business, it will not become partnership property.
Power of Attorney executed by a Partner authorizing an Individual Bind the Firm.
Under S. 18 of the Act a partner is an agent of the firm. Power of Attorney signed by one partner will bind the firm. In Purushottam Umedbhai v. Manilal and Sons, AIR 1961 SC 325 our Apex Court held as follows:
“One of the partners Manubhai Maganbhai Amin was the Manager of the firm Manilal & Sons. He had executed a Power of Attorney in favour of four persons including one Dunderdale. By this Power he authorized any one of these persons to sue for recovery of moneys due to the firm from the firm Purushottam Umedbhai & Co., the appellant. It also empowered these persons to appear and to represent the firm in any court, in any jurisdiction – civil, criminal, insolvency, original, appellate or otherwise-and before any official in any suit or proceeding or matter and to make, sign, verify, present and file any plaint. Dunderdale had signed and verified the plaint in the present case. We have no doubt, on a perusal of the Power of Attorney, that it authorized Dunderdale to file the plaint on behalf of the firm Manilal & Sons and also to verify it. It was suggested that this was a Power of Attorney by Manubhai Maganbhai Amin for himself and not for the firm of Manilal & Sons. As we understand the Power of Attorney that is not so. No doubt the Power of Attorney is not signed by all the partners of Manilal & Sons but only by Manubhai Maganbhai Amin. In our opinion, it was not necessary that the Power should have been signed by all the partners of the firm because Manubhai Maganbhai Amin was the manager of the firm. Under S. 18 of the Act a partner is an agent of the firm for the purposes of the business of the firm. Manubhai Maganbhai Amin was therefore the agent of the firm as well as its manager. It is to be noticed that under s. 19(2) of the Act instances are stated where, in the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary, the implied authority of a partner does not empower him to do matters mentioned in cls. (a) to (h). It is significant that in these clauses there is no prohibition to a partner executing a Power of Attorney in favour of an individual authorizing him to institute a suit on behalf of the firm. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that at the time the plaint was filed it was defective because the Power of Attorney in favour of Dunderdale was not a Power of Attorney on behalf of the firm and its partners. As the High Court has pointed out, there is on the record now Powers of Attorney on behalf of all the partners of the firm.”
Section 19 Implied Authority of Partner as Agent of the Firm.
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 22, the act of a partner which is done to carry on, in the usual way, business of the kind carried on by the firm, binds the firm.
The authority of a partner to bind the firm conferred by this section is called his “implied authority”.
(2) In the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary, the implied authority of a partner does not empower him to –
(a) submit a dispute relating to the business of the firm to arbitration,
(b) open a banking account on behalf of the firm in his own name,
(c) compromise or relinquish any claim or portion of a claim by the firm,
(d) withdraw a suit or proceeding filed on behalf of the firm,
(e) admit any liability in a suit or proceeding against the firm,
(f) acquire immovable property on behalf of the firm,
(g) transfer immovable property belonging to the firm, or
(h) enter into partnership on behalf of the firm.
Section 20 Extension and Restriction of Partner’s Implied Authority.
The partners in a firm may, by contract between the partners, extend or restrict the implied authority of any partner.
Notwithstanding any such restriction, any act done by a partner on behalf of the firm which falls within his implied authority binds the firm, unless the person with whom he is dealing knows of the restriction or does not know or believe that partner to be a partner.
Section 21 Partner’s Authority in an Emergency.
A partner has authority, in an emergency, to do all such acts for the purpose of protecting the firm from loss as would be done by a person of ordinary prudence, in his own case, acting under similar circumstances, and such acts bind the firm.
Section 22 Mode of Doing Act to Bind Firm.
In order to bind a firm, an act or instrument done or executed by a partner or other person on behalf of the firm shall be done or executed in the firm-name, or in any other manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm.
Section 23 Effect of Admission by a Partner.
An admission or representation made by a partner concerning the affairs of the firm is evidence against the firm, it is made in the ordinary course of business.
Section 24 Effect of Notice to Acting Partner.
Notice to a partner who habitually acts in the business of the firm of any matter relating to the affairs of the firm operates as notice to the firm, except in the case of a fraud on the firm committed by or with the consent of that partner.
Section 25 Liability of a Partner for Acts of the Firm.
Every partner is liable jointly with all the other partners and also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner
Section26: Liability of the Firm for Wrongful Acts of a Partner.
Where, by the wrongful act or omission of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of a firm or with the authority of his partners, loss or injury is caused to any third party, or any penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner.
Part II
Suit Against Firm or Partners
The liability of each partner is unlimited, under Sec. 25. There being joint and several liability, suit can be filed invoking Order 1 Rule 6, C.P.C.
Order 1 Rule 6 reads as under:
“The plaintiff may at his option, join as parties to the same suit all or any of the persons severally, or jointly and severally, liable on anyone contract, including the parties to bills of exchange, hundis and promissory notes”.
Section 42 of the Indian Contract Act states as under:
“When two or more persons have made a joint promise, then, unless a contrary intention appears by the contract, all such persons, during their joint lives, and, after the death of any of them, his representative jointly with the survivor or survivors, and, after the death of the last survivor the representatives of all jointly, must fulfil the promise.”
Order 30 Rule 1: Suing of partners in name of firm
(1) Any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in India may sue or be sued with the name of the firm (if any) of which such persons were partners at the time of accruing of the cause of action, and any party to a suit may in such case apply to the Court for a statement of the names and addresses of the personswho were, at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, partners in such firm, to be furnished and verified in such manner as the Court may direct.
(2) Where persons sue or are sued were partners in the name of their firm under Sub-rule (1), it shall, in the case of any pleading or other document required by or under this Code to be signed, verified or certified by the plaintiff or the defendant, suffice if such pleading or other document is signed, verified or certified by any one of such persons.
Rule 1 of Order 30 allows the partners to sue or be sued in the name of the firm which they were a part of the firm when the cause of action arose (Bharat Sarvoday Mills Co. Limited v. Mohatta Brothers, AIR 1969 Guj 178).
Characteristics of a firm
A firm is not a juristic person.
It is a compendious name for all the partners.
The purpose of using the name of the firm is merely to encompass all the partners (even if all of them are not named).
Rules 1 of Order 30 CPC provides only an enabling method to sue, or be sued, partners of a firm (both Registered and Unregistered), at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, in the name of the firm.
Order 30 Rule 1 do not apply when suit is instituted not in the name of the firm (instead, suit by all partners).
When all partners are in the party array (in a suit), impleading of the firm is surplusage,
The purpose of using the name of the firm, in a suit, is merely to encompass all the partners (even if none of them is not named as parties to the suit).
Though no partner need comes as a plaintiff (under Rules 1 of Order 30 CPC), if so demanded by the defendant, the names and details of such partners should be revealed, forthwith, by the plaintiffs (Rule 2 of Order 30).
Judgment/Decree in the name of the firm (without joining any partner), has the same effect as a Judgment/ decree in favour of or against all its partners.
The partners are not necessary parties in trial-stage, to proceed in execution against all partners. The question as to who are the persons who constitute the firm can be decided in execution proceedings (Order 21, Rule 50 CPC).
Therefore, it is clear:
A firm can sue or be sued in its name of the firm.
Pleadings can be signed by any one of the partners.
One partner alone can sue, or be sued, in the firm name (AIR 1931 Sind 121). Still, the decree binds all partners.
Even if all the partners are made parties to the suit, it can be taken that they represent the firm.
The Delhi High Court held in Shanker Hoursing Corporation v. Mohan Devi, AIR 1978 Del 255 (D.B), as under:
“(15) Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure was added newly in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Normally, when a person wishes to obtain a decree against several persons, or when several persons wish to obtain a decree against a person, al1 the said persons must be made parties to the suit. Similarly, when a person makes a promise to more than one person, the right to enforce the promise rests with them all under the provisions of Section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, so that all of them are necessary parties to a suit to enforce the promise. It was, therefore, held in some decisions under the old Code of 1882 which did not contain any provisions corresponding to the present Order 30, that in suits by or against firms, all the partners of the firm were necessary parties. It was to enable two or more partners alone to sue or be sued, as a kind of exception to the provisions of Section 45 of the Contract Act, that the present provisions in Order 30 were introduced in the Code of 1908. It is, however, provided in Rule I of Order 30 that any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners may sue or be sued in the name of the firm (if any) of which such persons were partners aft the time of the accruing of the cause of action. As stated by us earlier, a firm is not under the law a juristic person, but is a compendious name for all the persons who are members of the firm (partners). The effect of using the name of the firm, as provided in Rule I, is merely to bring all the partners before the Court and the procedure indicated in Rules 1 and 2 of Order 30 is only a convenient method for showing the persons who constituted the firm at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, and a decree in favour of or against a firm, in the name of the firm, has the same effect as a decree in favour of or against all the partners. The various rules of Order 30 make this clear. Rule 1 of Order 30, in providing the mode or form of the suit, prescribes a requirement that the two or more persons who, claiming or being liable as partners, sue or be sued in the name of the film must be persons who were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.
Order 30 Rule 2. Disclosure of partners’ names
(1) Where a suit is instituted by partners in the name of their firm, the plaintiffs or their pleader shall, on demanding writing by or on behalf of any defendant, forthwith declare in writing the names and places of residence of all the persons constituting the firm on whose behalf the suit is instituted.
(2) Where the plaintiffs or their pleader fail to comply with any demand made under sub-rule (1) all proceedings in the suit may, upon an application for that purpose, be stayed upon such terms as the Court may direct.
(3) Where the names of the partners are declared in the manner referred to in sub-rule (1) the suit shall proceed in the same manner, and the same consequences in all respects shall follow, as if they had been named as plaintiffs in the plaint:
Provided that all proceedings shall nevertheless continue in the name of the firm, but the name of the partners disclosed in the manner specified in sub-rule (1) shall be entered in the decree.
Names of the Partners disclosed shall be entered in the Decree
Though the suit can be proceeded without joining all partners, proviso makes it clear that ‘the name of the partners disclosed in the manner specified in sub-rule (1) shall be entered in the decree’.
Order 30 Rule 3. Service
Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, the summons shall be served either-
(a) upon any one or more of the partners, or
(b) at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within India upon any person having, at the time of service, the control or management of the partnership business, there, as the Court may direct; and such service shall be deemed good service upon the firm so sued, whether all or any of the partners are within or without India:
Provided that, in the case of a partnership which has been dissolved to the knowledge of the plaintiff before the institution of the suit, the summons shall be served upon every person within India whom it is sought to make liable.
Order 30 Rule 4. Rights of suit on death of partner
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872) where two or more persons may sue or be sued in the name of a firm under the foregoing provisions and any of such persons dies, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the suit.
(2) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall limit or otherwise effect any right which the legal representative of the deceased may have-
(a) to apply to be made a party to the suit, or
(b) to enforce any claim against the survivor or survivors.
Order 30 Rule 5. Notice in what capacity served
Where a summons is issued to a firm and is served in the manner provided by rule 3, every person upon whom it is served shall be informed by notice in writing given at the time of such service, whether he is served as a partner or as a person having the control or management of the partnership business, or in both characters, and, in default of such notice, the person served shall be deemed to be served as a partner.
Order 30 Rule 6. Appearance of partners.
Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, they shall appear individually in their own names, but all subsequent proceedings shall, nevertheless, continue in the name of the firm.
Order 30 Rule 7. No appearance except by partners.
Where a summons is served in the manner provided by rule 3 upon a person having the control or management of the partnership business, no appearance by him shall be necessary unless he is a partner of the firm sued.
Order 30 Rule 8. Appearance under protest
(1) Any person served with summons as a partner under rule 3 may enter an appearance under protest, denying that he was a partner at any material time.
(2) On such appearance being made, either the plaintiff or the person entering the appearance may, at any time before the date fixed for hearing and final disposal of the suit, apply to the Court for determinig whether that person was a partner of the firm and liable as such.
(3) If, on such application, the Court holds that he was a partner at the material time, that shall not preclude the person from filing a defence denying the liability of the firm in respect of the claim against the defendant.
(4) If the Court, however, holds that such person was not a partner of the firm and was not liable as such that shall not preclude the plaintiff from otherwise serving a summons on the firm and proceeding with the suit; but in that event, the plaintiff shall be precluded from alleging the laibility of that person as a partner of the firm in execution of any decree that may be passed against the firm.]
Order 30 Rule 9. Suits between co-partners
This Order shall apply to suits between a firm and one or more of the partners therein and to suits between firms having one or more partners, in common; but not execution shall be issued in such suits except by leave of the Court, and, on an application for leave to issue such execution, all such accounts and inquiries may be directed to be taken and made and directions given as may be just.
Order 30 Rule 10. Suit against person carrying on business in name other than his own
Any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name, or a Hindu undivided family carrying on business under any name, may be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm name, and, in so far as the nature of such case permits, all rules under this Order shall apply accordingly.
Suit Against Deceased Partner – Not be necessary to join the legal representatives
On the death of a partner, the partnership business will not come to an end (unless otherwise provided in the partnership-deed); the partnership business may continue.
Rule 4 (1) of Order 30, C.P.C. stipulates that it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the Suit on death of a partner, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit. Rule 4 (1) reads as under:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872) where two or more persons may sue or be sued in the name of a firm under the foregoing provisions and any one of such persons dies, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the Suit”.
The Supreme Court in Upper India Cable Co. v. Sri Krishna, AIR 1984 SC 1986, it is held as under:
“Now the question is where the suit is instituted against the firm and partners are impleaded as proper parties, in the event of death of a partner so sued, would the suit or appeal, as the case may be, abate if heirs and legal representatives of the deceased partner are not substituted within the prescribed period of limitation. There is a twofold answer to this question. Order 30 Rule 4 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, where two or more persons are sued in the name of the firm under the enabling provisions of Order 30, and any such person dies whether before the institution of the suit or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representatives of the deceased as a party to the suit. Secondly death of a proper party would have no impact on the suit more so where on death of a partner the partnership may stand dissolved or heirs do not desire to join the firm. Both these aspects were overlooked by the High Court”.
“On the death of two of the proper or formal parties impleaded in their capacity as partners by the plaintiff along with the firm, in the absence of substitution of heirs and legal representatives the appeal abates”? I may even go a step further in stating that even on the death of two necessary parties who are partners of a firm and the suit was filed against the firm, the impleading of legal representatives of the deceased as a party to the suit shall not be necessary as it is stated in Rule 4 of Order 30, C.P.C. The language in Rule 4 is unambiguous which states, “Whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the suit.”
Decree Obtained Against a Partner Cannot be Executed Against Legal Heirs
In SP Misra v. Mohd. Laiquddin Khan, (2019) 10 SCC 329, it is held that a partnership firm stands dissolved, on the death of a partner, by operation of law under Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932; and therefore, the decree obtained against a partner cannot be executed against his legal heirs.
When all Partners are Necessary Parties
Partition of partnership property
Suit for settling the accounts of the dissolved firm
When firm constituted to take up a venture – after the completion of such venture.
Apex Court Impleaded Partners, Suo Moto, as Proper Parties, in eviction Case
In Richard Lee v. Girish Soni, (2017) 3 SCC 194, our Apex Court it was ruled that there was no doubt that all the partners are not necessary parties ‘form the point of view of the eviction petitioners’ and that both the firm and all its partners should be on the array of parties as proper party for properly adjudicating the issue before the Rent Controller in view of the contentions taken by the parties. The Apex Court impleaded the partners suo moto observing that the Court has a duty to see whether the presence of the proper parties would facilitate the complete determination of the matter in dispute.
Clauses impose obligations to legal heirs are opposed to public policy
In SP Misra v. Mohd. Laiquddin Khan, (2019) 10 SCC 329, it is held as under:
“When such legal representative are not parties to the contract, such contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations arising under it on any third party, except parties to it. No one but the parties to the contract can be entitled under it or born by it. Such principle is known as ‘Privity of Contract’. When the partnership stands dissolved by operation of law under Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the question of execution in pursuance of the decree does not arise. There cannot be any contract unilaterally without acceptance and agreement by the legal heirs of the deceased partner. If there are any clauses in the agreement, entered into between the original partners, against the third parties, such clauses will not bind them, such of the clauses in the partnership deed, which run contrary to provisions of Indian Partnership Act, 1932, are void and unenforceable. Such clauses are also opposed to public policy.”
Bar under Sec. 69 Partnership Actis absolute
A partnership deed is not necessary to form a partnership. The deed, if any, also need not be registered. (However, it must be made on Proper Stamp). But:
Section 69(1) Partnership Act directs that the registration of a firm is mandatory, and a condition precedent, to institute a suit by one partner against the firm or another partner.
Section 69(2) directs that registration is necessary for suit by or on behalf of a firm (that is, by the firm or its partners) (i) against a third party (ii) to enforce a contract with the firm.
Note: Sec. 69 is not attracted when a suit is filed against a third party or reliefs other than enforcement of contract – like, enforcement of a statutory right (trade mark) or a common law right or a right under TP Act (eviction of tenant).
Section 69(3) directs that registration is necessary for claiming ‘set off’.
Sec. 69(2) and Order 30 Rule 1 deal with different aspects and operate separately
Rules I of Order 30 deals with the mode or form in which the suit to be instituted. It requires that the ‘persons suing in the name of the firm‘ should be partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.
Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act should be satisfied in order that a suit can be instituted. That is, to institute a suit (i) to enforcea contract (ii) by or on behalf of a firm (iii) against a third party, (a) the registration of a firm is a condition precedent, and (b) the name of the partners suing must have been shown in the Register of Firms.
In short, these two independent provisions must be complied, when a suit is instituted (i) to enforce a right from a contract (ii) (in a contract) with the firm and (iii) against any third party.
Section 69 requires that (i) all the partners at the time of the institution of the suit must be parties to the suit and (ii) their names also be in the Register of Firms- to proceed with the matters stated in Sec. 69 (though Or. 30 r. I enables – two or more partners to sue). (See: Firm of V. Ramchandraiah Gupta v. Ravula Venkat Reddy, 1970 (1) Andhra WR 243 Hansraj Manot’s (1962) 66 Cal WN 262; Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791.
Note:
If the partners at the time of accruing of the cause of action (to enforce a contract) and the partners at the time of instituting the suit are different, to institute a suit in the name of the firm, against a third party following persons must be in the party array –
(i) all partners at the time of cause of action and
(ii) all partners at the time of filing the suit.
Note – Rule 1(1) of Order 30 CPC says – “with the name of the firm” and Rule 1(2) says – “in the name of their firm“.
The firm can be made as a party, in a suit, in addition to the partners; or the firm alone be made as the party, naming the partners thereafter followed by the words – “represented by”.
Plaint must be signed by Partners in the Register of Firms on the DATE OF THE SUIT
In M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769, the Supreme Court has held that the plaint verified and signed by the partners as on the date of the suit who were not shown as partners in the register of firms, is not maintainable in view of S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. In para 6 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
“6. In the present case the suit filed by the appellants is clearly hit by the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 69 of the said Partnership Act, as on the date when the suit was filed, two of the partners shown as partners as per the relevant entries in the Register of Firms were not, in fact, partners, one new partner had come in and two minors had been admitted to the benefit of the partnership firm regarding which no notice was given to me Registrar of Firms. Thus, the persons suing, namely, the current partnersas on the date of the suitwere not shown as partners in the Register of Firms. In the result is that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 69 of the said Partnership Act and the view taken by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court in this connection is correct”.
S. 69(2) directs ‘all partners’must sue
Prior to M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769 (supra), there was difference of opinion as to ‘persons suing’ in Section 69(2) –
(i) it is the partners on the date of the institution of the suit. (Shanker Housing Corporation v. Mohan Devi, AIR 1978 Del 255. Also see decisions referred to therein – given below)
(ii) it is the partners (also) at time of the accruing of the cause of action (Bharat Sarvodaya Mills Co. Ltd. v. Mohatta Brothers, AIR 1969 Guj 178; Gandhi Company v. Krishna Glass Pvt. Ltd. (1983) 85 BomLR 179; Gurushiddayya Kalkayye Delimath v. Shah Hirachand Venechand and Co., AIR 1972 Mys 209; Sohanlal Basant Kumar v. Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791)
The line of decisions in this way are not good law in the light of M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769.
In Shanker Housing Corporation v. Mohan Devi, AIR 1978 Del 255 (D.B), it is held that the expression ‘persons suing’ in Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act means “all the partners of the firm who are its partners at the time of the institution of the suit“. But, Rule I of Order 30 CPC provides that two or more partners can sue.
The contention raised in the case (the court rejected it) was the following-
“Rule I of Order 30 requires that the ‘persons suing in the name of the firm’ should be partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, and, therefore, the same meaning should be given to the words “persons suing” in Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, 1932, and the “persons suing” in requirement (b) therein means the person who were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action and not on the date of the institution of the suit and it is sufficient for the purposes of requirement (b) if they have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.”
The Delhi High Court pointed out that Section 69(2), makes the registration of a firm a condition precedent to the institution of a suit by or on behalf of a firm against a third party. It deals with the question as to when a firm can sue, or be sued by, a third party in respect of a right arising from a contract, and provides certain requirements as conditions precedent for the institution of the suit, viz.. (a) that the firm is a registered firm, and (b) the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm. On the other hand, Rules I and 2 of Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide the mode or form and the procedure for suits by or against a firm. In other words, the requirements in Section 69(2) should be satisfied first in order that a suit can be instituted, and then the provisions of Rules I and 2 of Order 30 are attracted as regards the mode or form in which the suit may be instituted as well as the procedure applicable to the said suit. In providing the mode Rule I prescribes a certain requirement, viz., that the persons mentioned therein must have been partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.
Then the court observed as under:
(16) Thus, the provisions in Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act and those in Rule 1 of Order 30 deal with different aspects and operate separately. The former deals with the question as to when a firm can sue or be sued by a third party in respect of a right arising from a contract and prescribes certain requirements for the same, while the latter deals with the mode or form and the procedure for suits by or against firms, and prescribes a certain requirement for the same. It would not, therefore, be correct to interpret the. words “persons suing” in Section 69(2) and the point of time at which the requirements in Section 69(2) are to be fulfilled, by referring to the provision in Rule 1 of Order 30. In our opinion, the scope and effect of the two sets of provisions may be stated thus :
(17) Under Section 69(2), a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract can be instituted by or on behalf of a firm against any third party only if (a) the firm is registered and (b) the persons suing, i.e., the persons suing, i.e., all the partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit, are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm, while under Rule I of Order 30 two or more persons who claim as partners may sue, or who are liable as partners may be sued, in the name of the firm (if any), provided such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action. It the facts in a given case are such as to attract the applicability of the provisions in both Section 69(2) and Rule I of Order 30, the requirements in both the provisions should be fulfilled. In such a case, if a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract is to be instituted by or on behalf of a firm against any third party, the firm has to be a registered firm, and the partners ‘ of the firm as on the date of the institution of the suit must have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm, and further they must have been partners of the firm at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.
(18) As regards the scope and effect of Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, at view similar to the one expressed by us above baa been taken in the following decisions, vide-
(1)Firm Manghoomal Jethamal v. Finn Aratmal Satramdas Air 1922 Sind 13 ;
(2)Pratapchand Ramchand &Co. v. Jehangiriji Air 1940 Bom 257;
(3)Sri Meenakshi Mills v. C. Swaminatha Mudaliar and Bros. AIR 1944 Mad 443;
(4)Bank of Koothathikulam v. Itten Thomas. Air 1955 Travancore-Cochin, 155.
(5)Dr. V. S. Bahl v. M/s. S. L. Kapur ami Co., AIR 1978 Delhi 255;
(8)Firm Buta Mal Dev Raj v.-Chanan Mal and others. A.I.R. 1964 Punjab 270;
(9)Firm Alwar Iron Syndicate v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Raj 86,
(10)M/s. Badrimal Ramcharan & Co. v. M/s. Gana Kaul & Sons Air 1971 J&K 109;
(11)M/s. Chandrabhan Bansilal Ramratan Dass v. Municipal Council, Bikaner, AIR 1975 Raj 35 and
(12)Ram Kumar Shew Chandrai v. Dominion of India. AIR 1977 Cal 37.”
In Firm Buta Mai Dev Raj v. Chanan Mai, AIR 1964 Punj 270 it was pointed out that in order to institute a suit, a partnership firm must not only be a registered firm but also all the persons who are partners in the firm at the time of the institution of the suit must be, or have been, shown as such in the Register. The expression “the persons suing” in Section 69(2) must mean the partners in the firm. The use of the plural “persons” is obviously deliberate, since -while a singular may also mean the plural, the plural can never mean, singular. When a suit is instituted in the name of a firm the suit is on behalf of all the partners, and not only such of them as are shown, in the Register as such, and all the partners must be “the persons suing” contemplated in Section 69(2).
In Firm Alwar Iron Syndicate v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Raj 86, it is observed as under:
“6. It appears to me, however, that there is really no room for any controversy in regard to the correct meaning and purpose of Sub-section (2) of Section 69. It is well settled that a firm as such is not an entity in aw and is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 4 of the Partnership Act. Its name is therefore a mere abbreviated name of all its partners: Dulichand Laxminarayan v. Commr. of Income-tax, Nagpur, AIR 1956 SC 354. It is for this reason that special provisions have been made in Order 30, P. C. regarding suits by or against firms and persons carrying on business in names other than their own. So it is beyond doubt that even if a suit is brought in the name of a firm, it is really a suit by all its partners under the firm name. In other words, the persons suing are all the partners of the firmat the relevant date and none of them can, or obvious reasons, be left out for purposes of the suit. So it is incorrect to say that subsection (2) of Section 69 merely requires that only the person or persons actually signing the plaint on behalf of the firm should be shown in the Register of Firms as its partners. The word “persons” in the subsection has been used in the plural by design and serves an important purpose for it brings, out the real nature of a partnership firm which cannot consist of a single person. This is the view taken in –
Kapur Chand Bhagaji, Firm v. Laxrnan Trimbak, AIR 1952 Nag 57 and
Dr. VS Bahal v. SL Kapur, AIR 1956 Punj 24.
The decision in Dr. VS Bahal’s case, AIR 1956 Punj 24 does not appear to have been noticed in AIR 1959 Punj 530 on which reliance has been placed by Mr. JP Jain, but it has been followed in AIR 1964 Punj 270.
It has also been followed in Hansraj Manot v. Gorak Natb Champalal Pandey, (1962) 66 Cal WN 262 and, if I may say so with respect, these judgments lay down the correct law on the point.”
Defect (not signing by Partner) Cannot be Cured by Amendment of Plaint
The plaintiff in Popular Automobiles v. Chami, was a partnership firm and the plaint is verified, signed and filed by the Manager claiming that he had been authorised by one of the partners. The Kerala High Court (1 February, 2001) relying on M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769, held that the suit was filed in violation of the mandatory provisions of S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act; and therefore, the petition to amend the plaint was not sustainable.
If the parties were not properly described, it will be allowed to be corrected
In M/S CS Company v. The Kerala State Electricity Board (2022) it is held by the Kerala High Court that it was open to the court to allow to amend the pleadings if the parties were not properly described or if there was a defective description of the parties. Such defect cannot be said to be fundamental or in the nature which cannot be permitted to be corrected. Therefore, it was held that if at all there was a defect in the cause title, an amendment could have been permitted by the court below. Such defect if any cannot be made a ground to hold the suit to be not maintainable.
Registration of the Firm Must be proved by Certified Copy of Register
Nagpur High Court in Kapurchand Begaji Firm v. Laxman Triabuk, AIR 1952 Nag 57, held that the Register of Firms being a public document the requirements of Section 69(2) were to be complied with by producing a certified copy of an entry from that register; and that the oral evidence of the plaintiff-partner is not admissible as secondary evidence. The same view was taken in Chhotelal Darbarilal v. Mohammed Hussain AIR 1955 VP 44, M/s Badrimal Ramcharan and Co. v. M/s. Gama Kaul and Sons, AIR 1971 J&K 103; Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791.
Firm Need not be a Party
In M.S. Pearl Sound Engineer v. M/s. Poonam Chand, it was held that when the suit is instituted by all the partners, it was not necessary to implead the firm, and impleading the firm was merely a surplusage. (Referred to in: Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791).
Death of a Partner in the Registered Firm
In M/s Durga Das Janak Ram v. Preete Shah Sant Ram, AIR 1959 P H 530, Punjab High Court, following the decision of the Bombay High Court in Pratapchand Ramchand & Co. v. Jahangirji Bomanji, AIR 1940 Bom 237 held that the firm continued to be registered in spite of the death of one of the partners (and non-reporting of this fact to the Registrar) and the remaining partners were was entitled to institute a suit. But, in Krishna Chandra Agarwalla v. Shanti Prasad Jain, AIR 1981 Cal 199, it was held that if firm could not be maintained without the son of the deceased partner and his name did not appear in the Register of Firms, the suit filed by the firm could not be proceeded with. (See also: Maddi Sudarsanam v. Borogu Viswanadham Brothers, AIR 1955 AP 12; Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791).
Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit in violation of Section 69(1)
In Abani Kanta Pal v.Unknown, AIR 1986 Cal. 143, it is stated as under:
“9. In our opinion, it may be that S. 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act puts an embargo on the plaintiff and does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. A defendant in a suit for eviction may waive service of a notice under Section 13 (6). Section 69 (1) of the Partnership Act, however, stands on a different footing. The embargo that has been put on the plaintiff under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 is not for the purpose of protecting the interest of any party, but it is based on public policy. The requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 cannot be waived by the defendant, and the Court is debarred from entertaining a suit ignoring the fulfilment of such requirements. So, if a firm is not registered, excepting a suit as contemplated by Section 69 (3), the Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit in violation of Section 69(1). In other words, the plaint that has been filed by the plaintiff will be considered a void plaint, if it contravenes the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. This view finds support from a decision of the Supreme Court in Loonkaran Sethia Vs. Ivan E. John, AIR 1977 SC 336. In that case, sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 were involved. The Supreme Court made the following observations;
“A bare glance at the section is enough to show that it is mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by a plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired by him under a contract which he entered into as a partner of an unregistered firm, whether existing or dissolved void. In other words, a partner of an erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of Section 69 of the Partnership Act.”
“Share between the parties” is a prayer for “Dissolution”
In Mukund Balkrishna Kulkarni v. Kulkarni Powder Metallurgical Industries, (2004) 13 SCC 750, the Supreme Court considered the applicability of Section 69(1). The suit was for declaration that the respondent no. 1 was a partnership business in which both the appellant and the respondent no. 2 had equal shares along with the prayer for dissolution of the firm and rendition of accounts.
Section 69(1) Partnership Act directs that the registration of a firm is mandatory, and a condition precedent, to institute a suit by one partner against the firm or another partner.
It was pointed out that the two embargoes which must co-exist for the plaintiff to be non-suited under Section 69(1) would be that:
.i. The suit should be filed by a person “suing as a partner in a firm” and;
ii. The suit must be to enforce a right arising from a contract.
The High Court held that the prayer of the appellant, namely,
for a declaration of the existence of the partnership and
the share between the parties
was a suit to enforce a right under a contract against the firm.
Allowing the appeal the Apex Court held as under:
“A prayer for such declaration could not be said to be made by person suing as a partner. It was a prayer to be a partner and is therefore not debarred under the provisions of Section 69(1). Furthermore, what was in fact being prayed for by the appellant was a declaration of the existence of a contract between the parties. That could not be said to be a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract. The second prayer of the appellant was not to continue as a partner of the firm but to dissolve the firm. To that extent the appellant was suing “as a partner”.
This he was entitled to do under Section 69(3)(a) which insofar as it is relevant, reads as follows:
“69. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) … shall not affect—
(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm;”
This decision is referred to in: Sunkari Tirumala Rao vs Penki Aruna Kumari (2025 INSC 92).
Sunkari Tirumala Rao v. Penki Aruna Kumari on 17 January, 2025
Our Apex Court, in Sunkari Tirumala Rao vs Penki Aruna Kumari (2025 INSC 92, 17 January, 2025), the plaintiffs filed the suit for recovery of money in their capacity as partners of an unregistered partnership firm, against the defendant in her capacity as a partner of the same unregistered partnership firm. The Apex Court (referring Seth Loonkaran Sethiya v. Mr. Ivan E. John, (1977) 1 SCC 379 and Mukund Balkrishna Kulkarni v. Kulkarni Powder Metallurgical Industries, (2004) 13 SCC 750) found –
(i) a partner of an unregistered Partnership cannot sue against the firm or its partners for recovery of money and
(ii) instead, the petitioner should have preferred a suit for dissolution of the partnership firm and rendition of accounts.
It is held as under:
“8. It is evident from a reading of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 that it assumes a mandatory character. Section 69(1) prohibits a suit amongst the partners of an unregistered partnership firm, for the enforcement of a right either arising from a contract or conferred by the Act, unless the suit amongst the partners is in the nature of dissolution of the partnership firm and/or rendition of accounts. Section 69(2) prohibits the institution of a suit by an unregistered firm against third persons for the enforcement of a right arising from a contract. As a consequence, a suit filed by an unregistered partnership firm and all proceedings arising thereunder, which fall within the ambit of Section 69 would be without jurisdiction.
15. It is a clear as a noon day that the present suit had not been instituted by or on behalf of the firm against any third persons so as to fall under the ambit of Section 69(2). The petitioners have also not filed the instant suit for enforcing any statutory right conferred under any other law or a common law right so as to exempt the application of Section 69. Hence, the rigours of Section 69(1) would apply on such a suit and the partnership firm being unregistered would prevent the petitioners from filing a bare suit for recovery of money from the respondent.
16. It would have instead been appropriate for the petitioner to have preferred a suit for dissolution of the partnership firm and rendition of accounts, especially considering that the factum of non-registration of the partnership firm would not have acted as bar in a suit for dissolution in light of the exception carved out under Section 69(3). The defence that the partnership business had not yet commenced and thus, such a suit for dissolution could not have been preferred, would not be of any avail to the petitioners, particularly for overcoming the jurisdictional bar under Section 69(1). The High Court is right in taking the view that a suit of such nature could not be said to be maintainable in the absence of the registration of the partnership firm.”
Part III
Unregistered Partnership Firm Cannot Bring A Suit for Enforcement of Contract
A suit hit by Sec. 69 Partnership will be struck off at the threshold – Mr. S.Thiagarajan v. M/S.Supreme Pipe Syndicate, 2018-1 Civil CC 775.
In Loon Koran v. Ivan E. John, AIR 1977 SC 336, it is observed as under:
“A bare glance at the section is enough to show that it mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by a plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired by him under a contract which he entered into as a partner of an unregistered firm whether existing or dissolved, void. In other words, a partner of a erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of section 69 of the Partnership Act.” (quoted in: V.A. Abdul Wahab Sahib v. Abdul Subhan Sahib, (1998) 2 MLJ 720).
A co-ownership venture is not a Partnership; It is not Affected by Sec. 69 Bar
A partnership (that arises by an agreement to share profits or loss) cannot be put an end by a partner without consent of others; whereas in a co-ownership venture, a co-owner can transfer his interest. Because co-ownership activities are not governed by Partnership Act, Sec. 69 Bar is not applicable to the same.
Bar under Section 69 to ‘Other Proceedings’ also – to Get Rent Reduced
A suit by a tenant to get the rent reduced is thus a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract of tenancy. The suit therefore falls under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. See: Gappulal Gordhandas v. Chunilal Shyam Lal, AIR 1961 Raj 286.
Bar to Claim Restoration of Benefits under S. 65 Contract Act
According to Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, when an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. Because of the bar under the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act, it is found in Bijendra Prasad v. Smt. Duleshwari Devi, AIR 1998 Pat 122, that the partners of the unregistered partnership cannot claim benefits under Sec. 65 of the Contract Act.
Partnership Cannot Amend to Become a Proprietorship
S. Krishnan v. Aruna and Associates, (1979) 2 MLJ 1, it is held that a suit filed as a partnership cannot amend to become a proprietorship. It is observed as under:
“When once he takes up a stand that it is a partnership firm, he should stand by it. Once he takes up the position that it is a dissolved firm, equally he should be prepared to substantiate it. But he cannot have a third way out of it by bringing in a person who was a quondam partner of the unregistered firm as if he has become the proprietor thereto on dissolution. This metamorphosis is not available in law.”
The Supreme Court Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar, in (2000) 3 SCC 250, observed as under:
“The points that arise for consideration are:
(I)Whether Section 69 (2) bars a suit by a firm not registered on the date of suit where permanent injunction and damages are claimed in respect of a trademarkas a statutory right or by invoking common law principles applicable to a passing-off action?
(II) Whether the words “arising from a contract” in Section 69 (2) refer only to a situation where an unregistered firm is enforcing a right arising from a contract entered into by the firm with the defendant during the course or its business or whether the bar under Section 69 (2) can be extended to any any contract referred to in the plaint unconnected with the defendants, as the source of title to the suit property?
On question No. 1 the Supreme Court held as under:
“(9) The question whether Section 69(2) is a bar to a suit filed by an unregistered firm even if a statutory right is being enforced or even if only a common law right is being enforced came up directly for consideration in this Court in Raptakas Brett Co. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184. In that case, Majumdar J.. speaking for the Bench clearly expressed the view that Section 69 (2) can not bar the enforcement by a way of a suit by an unregistered firm in respect of a statutory right or a common law right. On the facts of that case, it was held that the right to evict a tenant upon expiry of the lease was not a right ” arising from a contract” but was a common law right or a statutory right under the Transfer of Property Act. The fact that the plaint in that case referred to a lease and to its expiry, made no difference. Hence, the said suit was held not barred. It appears to us that in that case the reference to the lease in the plaint was obviously treated as a historical fact. That case is therefore directly in point. Following the said judgment, it must be held in the presence case too that a suit is not barred by Section 69 (2) if a statutory right or a common law right is being enforced.
It is held while answering question No. 2:
“The above provision clearly signifies that the right that is sought to be enforced by the unregistered firm and which is barred must be a right arising out of a contract with a third party – defendant in respect of the firm’s business transactions….. The real crux of the question is that the legislature when it used the word “arising out of a contract” in Section 69(2), it is referring to a contract entered into in course of business transaction by the unregistered plaintiff firm with its customers – defendants and the idea is to protect those in commerce who deal with such a partnership firm in business. Such third parties who deal with the partners ought to be enabled to know what the names of the firm are before they deal with them in business.”
In this case our Apex Court pointed out as under:
if the firm is not registered on date of suit and the suit is to enforce a right arising out of a contract with the third party- defendant in the course of its business, then it will be open to the plaintiff to seek withdrawal of the plaint with leave and file a fresh suit after registration of the firm subject of course to the law of limitation and subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act. This is so even if the suit is dismissed for a formal defect. Section 14 of the Limitation Act will be available inasmuch as the suit has failed because the defect of non-registra-tion falls within the words “other cause of like nature” in section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. See Surajmal Dagduramji Shop v. M/s. Srikishan Ram Kishan, AIR (1973) Bom. 313.”
In Ramachandraiah Gupta v. Ravula Venkat Reddy, 1971 Andhra WR. 243 (Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy) held as under:
“Now, a firm is not a legal entity at all, but is a mere abbreviated name for the several partners of which it consists. Ordinarily, therefore, a suit may not be brought by a firm in its own name but a suit may be brought by all the partners acting together or by some of the partners only but impleading the other partners also as parties to the suit. However Order 30, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code prescribes a special procedure by which a suit may be brought in the name of the firm. It provides that any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business may sue or be sued in the name of the firm of which such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action and that in such a case it shall suffice if one of such persons signs, verifies or certifies any pleadings or document required by the Code to be signed, verified and certified by the plaintiff or the defendant. The effect of a suit instituted in the name of the firm in the manner, prescribed by Order 30, Rule 1 is as if the suit is filed by all the partners collectively. Whether the suit is filed by all the partners collectively or by some only of the partners impleading the rest as parties to the suit or whether it is filed in the name of the firm prescribed by Section 69(2) must be fulfilled. They are (1) that the firm must be registered and (2) that the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the Firm….”
S. 69(2) No Bar for Enforcement of a Statutory Right or a Common Law Right
Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932 is not a bar to a suit filed by an unregistered firm, if the same is for enforcement of a statutory right (like, trade mark) or a common law right or a right under TP Act (like, eviction of tenant – Govindaraja Naicker v. Sapthagiri Complex, ILR 1994 Kar 1832).
To attract the bar of Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932, the contract in question (i) must be the one entered into by firm with the third-party defendant and (ii) must also be the one entered into by the plaintiff firm in the course of its business dealings.
Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property: (1998) 7 SCC 184, Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar: (2000) 3 SCC 250. Referred to in: Shiv Developers v. Aksharay Developers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 114.
S. 69(3) – No Bar for Suit for Dissolution
Sec. 69(3)(a) reads as under:
(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect,—
(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm,
S. 69(2) Bar –Contract must be one in the Course of the Business Dealings
In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184, it is held as under:
“23 The further and additional but equally important aspect which has to be made clear is that the contract by the unregistered firm referred to in Section 69(2) must not only be one entered into by the firm with the third-party defendant but must also be one entered into by the plaintiff firm in the course of the business dealings of the plaintiff firm with such third-party defendant.
24… The real crux of the question is that the legislature, when it used the words “arising out of a contract” in Section 69(2), it is referring to a contract entered into in course of business transactions by the unregistered plaintiff firm with its defendant customers and the idea is to protect those in commerce who deal with such a partnership firm in business. Such third parties who deal with the partners ought to be enabled to know what the names of the partners of the firm are before they deal with them in business.”
25 Further, Section 69(2) is not attracted to any and every contract referred to in the plaint as the source of title to an asset owned by the firm. If the plaint referred to such a contract it could only be as a historical fact. For example, if the plaint filed by the unregistered firm refers to the source of the firm’s title to a motor car and states that the plaintiff has purchased and received a motor car from a foreign buyer under a contract and that the defendant has unauthorisedly removed it from the plaintiff firm’s possession — it is clear that the relief for possession against the defendant in the suit does not arise from any contract which the defendant entered into in the course of the plaintiff firm’s business with the defendant but is based on the alleged unauthorised removal of the vehicle from the plaintiff firm’s custody by the defendant. In such a situation, the fact that the unregistered firm has purchased the vehicle from somebody else under a contract has absolutely no bearing on the right of the firm to sue the defendant for possession of the vehicle. Such a suit would be maintainable and Section 69(2) would not be a bar, even if the firm is unregistered on the date of suit. The position in the present case is not different. (Quoted in: Shiv Developers v. Aksharay Developers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 114)
In Shiv Developers v. Aksharay Developers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 114, it is held as under:
“The relevant principles, when applied to the facts of the present case, leave nothing to doubt that the transaction in question was not the one entered into by the plaintiff firm during the course of its business (i.e., of building construction); and it had been an independent transaction of sale, of the firm’s share in the suit property, to the contesting defendants. The bar of Section 69(2) is not attracted in relation to the said sale transaction. Moreover, the subject suit cannot be said to be the one for enforcement of right arising from a contract; rather the subject suit is clearly the one where the plaintiff seeks common law remedies with the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation as also of the statutory rights of injunction and declaration in terms of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as also the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (while alleging want of the sale consideration). Therefore, the bar of Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932 does not apply to the present case.”
Cause of action on dishonour of cheques & contract under Sec. 69
In Afsal Baker vs. Maya Printers, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 29914, it is held that the suit on the cause of action on dishonour of cheques can be brought independent of Sec. 69 of the Partnership Act, as it is not on a ‘contract’ stated in Sec. 69.
Suit by Sole (remaining) Partner Maintainable
In Gujarat Water Supply and Severage v. Sundardas Hukumatram Shivanani, AIR 1991 Guj 170, a contract was entered into by a partnership firm with the Government. One among the three partners of the firm was the plaintiff. Before filing the suit, other two partners had been retired. The plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of rights and liabilities of the dissolved firm. The High Court held that the suit was maintainable though the partnership firm was not registered.
A suit by one partner against another for damages on the grounds of the misconduct of his partner was held to be maintainable in Navinchandra Jethabhai v. Moolchand Sadaram Gindodiya, AIR 1966 Bom 111.
No Bar to Arbitration
It is held by our Apex Court in Kamal Pushp Enterprises v. DR Construction Company, AIR 2000 SC 2676, that Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act has no application to proceedings before an Arbitrator; and therefore, an Arbitration and Award would not be vitiated. (But see: Jagdish Chander Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1882)
Subsequent Registration Will Not Cure the Defect
In Delhi Development Authority v. Kochhar Construction Work, (1998) 8 SCC 559, following Shreeram Finance Corporation, it was held that proceedings under the Arbitration Act were ab initio defective for the firm was not registered; and that the subsequent registration of the firm could not cure that defect. (Followed in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd vs Jain Construction Co. (2004) 8 SCC 559) See also: Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar, 2000(3) SCC 250.
In Dwijendra Nath Singh v. Govinda Chandra, AIR 1953 Cal 497 (Dasgupta, G Ray, JJ.) the suit was brought by two persons who are described as the owners of the firm Samanta Naskar and Co. When the suit was instituted this firm had not been registered. It however was registered before the suit came to be heard. It was held following Firm Laduram Sagarmal v. Jamuna Prasad, AIR 1939 Pat 239 and Varadarajulu v. Rajmanika, AIR 1937 Mad 767, that a suit which was not maintainable by reason of non-compliance with S. 69 of the Partnership Act cannot become maintainable at a later stage by reason of registration and the subsequent registration cannot cure the initial defect.
Part IV
Benefits of Registration Partnership
The Partners of a registered partnership alone can –
1. file suits against third parties to enforce rights arising from a contract
2. claim set-off on such contracts.
(Note: A third party is free to file suits against a Firm irrespective of its registration status.)
3. sue Co-partners (or firm) for enforcing the clauses of Partnership Deed.
(Note: The Partners of an unregistered Partnership cannot enforce the clauses of Partnership Deed.)
When can a Partner of an Unregistered Firm File Suits against a Firm
The Partners of an unregistered firm can file suits against a firm (i) for accounts of a dissolved firm, (ii) for the dissolution of a firm or (iii) for realising the property of a dissolved firm.
Effect of Non-Registration of a Firm
Section 69 deals with it. It reads as under:
69. Effect of Non-registration
1. No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.
2. No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.
3. The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect,—
(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or
(b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920) to realise the property of an insolvent partner.
4. This section shall not apply,—
(a) to firms or to partners in firms which have no place of business in[the territories to which this Act extends], or whose places of business in [the said territories], are situated in areas to which, by notification under [section 56], this Chapter does not apply, or
(b) to any suit or claim of set-off not exceeding one hundred rupees in value which, in the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), or, outside the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in the Second Schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (9 of 1887), or to any proceeding in execution or other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim.
Execution Against a Partner who was not a Party in Trial
In J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Firm Birdhichand Sumermal (Mukerji, Beg, Agarwala, JJ), AIR 1958 All 176, while interpreting Order 21, Rule 50 CPC, Beg, J. (concurred by Mukerji, J.) referring earlier judgments, it was held that all the partners were not necessary parties in trial, to proceed in execution. Beg, J. summed up his Judgment observing the following:
The decree can be satisfied not only from the property of the partnership, but also from the personal property of each of the partners.
The question as to who are the persons who constitute the firm can be decided in execution proceedings.
Order 21, Rule 50 is designed to define the scope and to lay down the mode and method of such an enquiry.
Effect of Contrary View: If a partner (not impleaded or served) succeeds when re-agitate in execution proceedings, he would be fully bound by the decree which has already been passed in the suit against the firm, yet according to the order of the same Court at the execution stage in the same suit, he would not be so bound.
A contrary view might result in a conflict between the findings at the trial and at the execution stage in the same case.
Further, in such a case he would have to be held to be immune from personal liability as a partner even though his property as a partner would be liable for the satisfaction of the decree under Order 21, Rule 50(1) (a).
Again, if a partner not impleaded or served in the suit is allowed to re-agitate the whole matter on merits, then it would be open to him to raise again the same pleas which were raised by other partners who were served in the suit.
If the decision in the suit is not to be treated as res judicata against all partners, then it would be open to the same Court at the execution stage to take a different view of the same plea.
The result would be that on the same point there would be two conflicting findings at two stages of the same case.
Moreover, as a result of his objection at the execution stage, the claim might be found to be good against the firm only partially, even though the decree in the suit might postulate the liability in respect of the entire claim.
The contrary view might result not only in a conflict between the decree in the suit and the order in execution proceedings in the same suit, but also in a conflict between various orders at the execution stage itself.
Thus, where the number of partners who had not been served in the proceedings and against whom applications under Sub-rule (2) might be given is a very large and they are allowed to re-agitate the whole matter, the result would be that each time a fresh application against each of such persons is made, fresh objections might be taken.
If this procedure is allowed, then there would neither be any consistency in findings nor would there be any finality of decisions in the same matter. The situation thus created would be a highly embarrassing and confusing one.
If collusion, the matter has to be re-agitated either by a separate suit to have the decree set aside or by reviving the proceedings in the same suit itself.
The Legislature has, also, provided some safeguard by making the leave of the Court necessary for proceedings under Sub-rule 2.
Where facts are such as to raise the suspicion of collusion between the parties, the Court may refuse such permission. The enquiry contemplated against a person proceeded against under Sub-rule (2) was of a restricted character.
Order 21 Rule 50 CPC Reads As Under:
“50. Execution Of Decree Against Firm.
(1) Where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted-
(a) against any property of the partnership;
(b) against any person who has appeared in his own name under rule 6 or rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be, a partner;
(c) against any person who has been individually served as a partner with a summons and has failed to appear:
Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the provisions of section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932).
(2) Where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in sub-rule (1), clauses (b) and (c), as being a partner in the firm he may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such court may grant such leave, or, where such liability is disputed, may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined.
(3) Where the liability of any person has been tried and determined under sub-rule (2) the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree.
(4) Save as against any property of the partnership, a decree against a firm shall not lease, render liable or otherwise affect any partner therein unless he has been served with a summons to appear and answer.
(5) Nothing in this rule shall apply to a decree passed against a Hindu Undivided Family by virtue of the provision of rule 10 of Order XXX.”
Indian Law and English Law on Registration of Partnership Firm
English law required compulsory registration of partnership; contravention was punishable. In India it is optional. The Supreme Court, in Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar, (2000) 3 SCC 250, referred the Report of the Special Committee (1930-31, consisted of Sir Brojendra Lal Mitter, Sir Dinshah F. Mulla, Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Iyer and Mr. Arthur Eggar.) which examined the draft Bill and made recommendations to the legislature. Para 17 of the Report reads as under:
“17. The outlines of the scheme are briefly as follows. The English precedent, in so far as it makes registration compulsory and imposes a penalty for non-registration has not been followed, as it is considered that this step would be too drastic for a beginning in India, and would introduce all the difficulties connected with small or ephemeral undertakings. Instead, it is proposed that registration should lie entirely within the discretion of the firm or partner concerned; but, following the English precedent, any firm which is not registered will be unable to enforce its claim against third parties in the civil Court; and by partner who is not registered will be unable to enforce his claims either against third parties or against fellow partners”.
The Apex Court further pointed out that changes were made to the English law. The Court said:
“Business Names Act, 1985 has replaced the above Act of 1916 and Section 4 of the new Act refers to the ‘Civil Remedies for breach of Section 4’. It provides for dismissal of the action ‘to enforce a right arising out of a contract made in the course of a business’ if the firm is not registered.”
Conclusion
Considering the Indian situations, while enacting the Partnership Act for India, in 1932, registration of firms was not made compulsory. After independence also, the provisions as to registration of firms were not changed. Obviously, it is also because of the proclamations in Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India (in Fundamental Rights Chapter) which read as under:
(1) All citizens shall have the right
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e)to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f) (omitted)
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
‘Right to property’ was a Fundamental Right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. By the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, this right was omitted; and the right to property was belittled to a ‘Constitutional Right’ under Article 300A. It reads as under:
“No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”
End Notes
Dissolution of Partnership
Withdrawal of some Partners, and not by all, will not dissolve the firm. When any of the partner dies, retires or incapacitated and the remaining partners continue the business there will not be dissolution of the firm. Section 39 of the Partnership Act, 1932, as to the ‘dissolution of the firm’ says as under:
“39. Dissolution of A Firm:
The dissolution of a partnership between all the partners of a firm is called the ‘dissolution of the firm’.”
Dissolution of a Partnership firm – Two Ways
Dissolution otherwise than the intervention of the Court.
Dissolution by Court.
Provisions of the Partnership Act
Sections 40 to 43 of the Partnership Act are the relevant provisions as to dissolution ‘otherwise than through the intervention of the Court’. They read as under:
Section 40: Dissolution By Agreement:
A firm may be dissolved with the consenas to dissolution otherwise than through the t of all the partners or in accordance with a contract between the partners.
Section 41: Compulsory Dissolution:
A firm is dissolved (a) by the adjudication of all the partners or of all the partners but one as insolvent, or (b) by the happening of any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the firm to be carried on or for the partners to carry it on in partnership :
Provided that, where more than one separate adventure or undertaking is carried on by the firm, the illegality of one or more shall not of itself cause the dissolution of the firm in respect of its lawful adventures and undertakings
Section 42: Dissolution on the Happening of Certain Contingencies:
Subject to contract between the partners a firm is Dissolution On The Happening Of Certain Contingencies dissolved (a) if constituted for a fixed term, by the expiry of that term; (b) if constituted to carry out one or more adventures or undertakings, by the completion thereof; (c) by the death of a partner; and (d) by the adjudication of a partner as an insolvent.
Section 43: Dissolution By Notice of Partnership At Will:
(1) Where the partnership is at will, the firm may be dissolved by any partner giving notice in writing to all the other partners of his intention to dissolve the firm.
(2) The firm is dissolved as from the date mentioned in the notice as the date of dissolution or, if no date is so mentioned, as from the date of the communication of the notice.
Dissolution by the Intervention of Court
Section 44: Dissolution By The Court:
At the suit of a partner, the Court may dissolve a firm on any of the following grounds, namely:
(a) that a partner has become of unsound mind, in which case the suit may be brought as well by the next friend of the partner who has become of unsound mind as by any other partner;
(b) that a partner, other than the partner suing, has become in any way permanently incapable of performing his duties as partner;
(c) that a partner, other than the partner suing, is guilty of conduct which is likely to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business regard being had to the nature of the business;
(d) that a partner, other than the partner suing, wilfully or persistently commits breach of agreements relating to the management of the affairs of the firm of the conduct of its business; or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the business that it is not reasonably practicable for the other partners to carry on the business in partnership with him;
(e) that a partner, other than the partner suing, has in any way transferred the whole of his interest in the firm to a third party, or has allowed his share to be charged under the provisions of rule 49 of Order XXI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or has allowed it to be sold in the recovery of arrears of land revenue or of any dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue due by the partner;
(f) that the business of the firm cannot be carried on save at a loss; or
(g) on any other ground which renders it just and equitable that the firm should be dissolved.
In Sohanlal Basant Kumar v. Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791, after referring various previous decisions the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court (D P Gupta, K Lodha, JJ.) came to the following conclusions:
A firm is not a legal entity at all but is the collective term or an abbreviated name for all the persons who are partners thereof.
All such persons who have entered into a partnership with one another are individually called partners and collectively they are called a firm and the name under which their business is carried on is called the firm name.
Ordinarily, a suit may not be brought by a firm in its own name but a suit may be filed by all the partners acting together or by some of the partners only, but impleading the remaining partners also as parties to the suit.
However, Order 30 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes a special procedure by which a suit may be brought in the name of the firm.
Order 30 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables two or more persons, claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in partnership, to sue or be sued in the name of the firm, of which such persons are partners at the time of the accrual of the cause of action.
Any party to a suit, in such a case, may apply to the court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were at the time of the accrual of the cause of action partners in such firm.
Where persons sue or are sued as partners in the name of the firm, it shall suffice if any of the partners may sign, verify or certify any pleadings or other documents required under the Code of Civil Procedure to be signed, verified or certified by the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be.
If a demand is made as mentioned above, in the case of a suit instituted by the partners in the name of the firm, the plaintiffs shall forthwith declare in writing the names and places of residence of all partners constituting the firm on whose behalf the suit is instituted.
Thus, there can be no doubt that a suit brought in the name of the firm is actually one by all the persons who were partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit.
Thus although the firm is not a legal entity, yet the provisions of Order 30 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. enable several persons doing business as partners to sue or be sued in the name of the firm.
The effect of a suit instituted in the name of the firm in the manner prescribed by Order 30 Rule 1 C.P.C. is as if the suit is filed by all the persons collectively.
Whether the suit is filed by all the partners collectively or by some only of the partners impleading the rest as parties to the suit or whether it is filed in the name of the firm by one or more partners in the manner indicated by Order 30 rule I C.P.C. the conditions prescribed by Section 69(2) must be fulfilled.
They are:
(1) that the firm must be registered; and
(2) that the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the Firm.
The second condition requires that the names of the persons suing are presently shown or have been previously shown in the Register of Firm as partners in the firm. That appears to fallow pliantly from the provisions of Section 69(2).
The use of the conjunction ‘and’ shows that both the aforesaid conditions must exist together on the date of the institution of the suit.
As a matter of fact, these two requirements constitute the conditions precedent to the institution of the suit.
It may be pointed out that merely filing a statement under Section 58(1) of the Act in the office of the Registrar of Firms in the prescribed form, giving the particulars of the partnership firm and its partners together with the prescribed fee would not be enough for the fulfillment of the aforesaid conditions.
A certificate of registration in the prescribed form should be made available to the partners of the firm and an entry of the statement filed under Section 58(1) should be recorded by the Registrar in the Register of Firms before the institution of the suit.
Thus, even if the certificate of registration is made available, yet the second requirement of Sub-section (2) of Section 69 cannot be fulfilled merely by sending or delivering to the Registrar of Firms the statement required by Section 58, but it must also be shown that an entry of the statement so furnished was made by the Registrar in the Register of Firms before the date of the institution of the suit.
Similar is the position of a statement sent to the Registrar under Section 65 of the Act intimating the alterations or changes occurring in the constitution of the firm on account of addition, death or retirement of some of the partners.
Use of the expression ‘person suing” in Section 69(2) of the Act is significant.
Ordinarily a singular used in an enactment includes a plural, but the use of the word ‘persons’ in the aforesaid provision indicates that the legislature intended to refer to all those persons who are the partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit.
The reason is simple, as all these persons who desire to obtain a decree in their favour in a suit must become plaintiffs in the suit and all those persons against whom a decree is to be passed must similarly be made defendants in the suit.
When the suit is filed by or on behalf of the partnership firm, either all the partners of the firm should individually be named as plaintiffs in the suit or some of them maybe named as plaintiffs, while the remaining partners may be named as proforma defendants in the plaint.
Another alternative mode has been provided by Order 30 Rule 1 C.P.C. in such cases and the suit may be filed in the name of the firm, which name collectively represents all the partners of the firm at the time of institution of the suit.
Such a suit filed in the name of the firm shall be deemed to be a suit on behalf of all the partners of the firm.
The other limb of the requirement contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 69 is that all such persons who are partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit must be or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners of the plaintiff firm.
The expression “is or have been” refers to such persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm at the time of accrual of the cause of action and continues to remain so entered in the Register of Firms at the time of the institution of the suit. (It stands contrary to M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769.)
Thus either the persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm at the time of the accrual of cause of action and continued to remain so entered therein until the institution of the suit or persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms as partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit could maintain a suit in the name of the firm or on behalf of the firm.
It has also been held in some of the cases that all the persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms on the date of the institution of the suit could file a suit notwithstanding the fact that the names of some other persons also find place in the Register of Firms as partners of the firm, who have either died or have since retired and thus ceased to be partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit.
The crux of the matter is that the names of all those persons, who continued to hold together as partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit must be shown to be entered in the Register of Firms on the date of the institution of the suit.
If the relevant entry in the Register of Firms containing some other names of persons who have either died or have retired from the partnership, the same would not affect the maintainability of the suit, in as much as the suit in the name of the firm could be filed only by or on behalf of the surviving partners of the firm.
But if the name of one or more of the existing partners of the firm at the time of institution of the suit does not find place in the Register of Firms on that date, then the suit by or on behalf of the partnership firm is not maintainable.
It is also clear that no oral evidence can be taken for the purpose of deciding as to who were the partners of the plaintiff firm at the time of the institution of the suit and the names of the persons suing must be shown in the Register of Firm as partners of the plaintiff firm at the time of the institution of the suit, as the suit in the name of the firm is virtually a suit by all the partners of the firm and in order to prove the fact as to who were the partners of the plaintiff firm at the time of the institution of the suit, the only evidence admissible is a certified copy of the relevant entry in the Register of Firms.
Thus the only possible interpretation to be placed on the expression ‘are or have been shown in the Register of Firms’ could be the persons suing must either be presently shown in the Register of Firms as partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit or they must have been earlier shown in the said Register of Firms as partners of the firm, no other interpretation is possible so as to give a rational meaning to the provision.
What is the time-limit for the registration of documents executed within India? Answer – Four Months.
Is there provision for extension paying fine, after the 4 months? Answer – Yes. (within further 4 months)
Can a document already executed and registered by some (alone) can again be re-registered after signing by others who were left out? Answer – Yes. (within four months from the date of each execution)
Can a document be re-presented for improper earlier presentation? Answer – Yes.
Time Limit for Registration of Documents (executed within India)– Four Months
Time limit for registration of documents before a Sub-Registrar is four months under section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908. Time is calculated from the date of execution (signature) of the deed.
23. Time for presenting documents. Subject to the provisions contained in sections 24, 25 and 26, no document other than a will shall be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution:
Provided that a copy a of a decree or order may be presented within four months from the day on which the decree or order was made, or, where it is appealable, within four months from the day on which it becomes final.
Re-registration of certain documents not duly Presented
If a person not duly empowered to present a document registers a document the defect can be cured by re-registration of the document within four months of becoming aware of the defect, under Sec. 23A.
23A. Re-registration of certain documents. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, if in any case a document requiring registration has been accepted for registration by a Registrar or Sub-Registrar from a person not duly empowered to present the same, and has been registered, any person claiming under such document may, within four months form his first becoming aware that the registration of such document is invalid, present such document or cause the same to be presented, in accordance with the provisions of Part VI for re-registration in the office of the Registrar of the district in which the document was originally registered; and upon the Registrar being satisfied that the document was so accepted for registration from a person not duly empowered to present the same, he shall proceed to the re-registration of the document as if it has not been previously registered, and as if such presentation for re-registration was a presentation for registration made within the time allowed therefore under Part IV, and all the provisions of this Act, as to registration of documents, shall apply to such re-registration; and such document, if duly re-registered in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall be deemed to have been duly registered for all purposes from the date of its original registration.
Documents executed by several persons at different times.
A document already executed and registered by some (alone) can again be re-registered after signing by others who were left out. But, it must be within four months from the date of each execution, according to Sec. 24..
24. Documents executed by several persons at different times. Where there are several persons executing a document at different times, such document may be presented for registration and re-registration within four months from the date of each execution.
Document Executed out of India– can be registered
A document executed outside India can be registered in India. Sec. 23 of the Registration Act allows it.
Note – Power of attorney, executed outside India, is
not a compulsorily registrable document, or
a document to be authenticated by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar.
Registration of Documents Executed out of India – Four Months from Receipt in India
The period of four months for registration (stated above) will be counted from the date of receipt of that document in India, as per Sec. 26 of the Registration Act. Sec. 26 of the Registration Act is the relevant provision. It reads as under:
“26. Documents executed out of India. When a document purporting to have been executed by all or any of the parties out of India is not presented for registration till after the expiration of the time hereinbefore prescribed in that behalf, the registering officer, if satisfied— (a) that the instrument was so executed, and (b) that it has been presented for registration within four months after its arrival in India, may, on payment of the proper registration-fee accept such document for registration.”
UnavoidableDelay – Registration with Fine – within Eight Months
After four months, document can be presented within another four months to the District Registrar. The District Registrar may impose a penalty up to a maximum of ten times the registration fees and grant permission to Sub-Registrar to register the document (as per Sec. 25 – quoted below).
25. Provision where delay in presentation is unavoidable. (1) If, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, any document executed, or copy of a decree or order made, in India is not presented for registration till after the expiration of the time hereinbefore prescribed in that behalf, the Registrar, in cases where the delay in presentation does not exceed four months, may direct that, on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper registration-fee, such document shall be accepted for registration.
(2) Any application for such direction may be lodged with a Sub-Registrar, who shall forthwith forward it to the Registrar to whom he is subordinate.
Registering authority cannot cancel registration
Our Apex Court has held in Satya Pal Anand vs. State of M.P, 2016 (10) SCC 767, as under:
“21. The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged, once the document is registered (see Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan (supra). Section 17 of the Act of 1908 deals with documents which require compulsory registration. Extinguishment Deed is one such document referred to in Section 17(1)(b). Section 18 of the same Act deals with documents, registration whereof is optional. Section 20 of the Act deals with documents containing interlineations, blanks, erasures or alterations. Section 21 provides for description of property and maps or plans and Section 22 deals with the description of houses and land by reference to Government maps and surveys. There is no express provision in the Act of 1908 which empowers the Registrar to recall such registration. The fact whether the document was properly presented for registration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its registration. The power to cancel the registration is a substantive matter. In absence of any express provision in that behalf, it is not open to assume that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) would be competent to cancel the registration of the documents in question. Similarly, the power of the Inspector General is limited to do superintendence of registration offices and make rules in that behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel the registration of any document which has already been registered.”
Time Limit for Registration of Documents (executed within India)– Four Months
Time limit for registration of documents before a Sub-Registrar is four months under section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908. Time is calculated from the date of execution (signature) of the deed.
23. Time for presenting documents. Subject to the provisions contained in sections 24, 25 and 26, no document other than a will shall be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution:
Provided that a copy a of a decree or order may be presented within four months from the day on which the decree or order was made, or, where it is appealable, within four months from the day on which it becomes final.
Re-registration of certain documents not duly Presented
If a person not duly empowered to present a document registers a document the defect can be cured by re-registration of the document within four months of becoming aware of the defect, under Sec. 23A.
23A. Re-registration of certain documents. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, if in any case a document requiring registration has been accepted for registration by a Registrar or Sub-Registrar from a person not duly empowered to present the same, and has been registered, any person claiming under such document may, within four months form his first becoming aware that the registration of such document is invalid, present such document or cause the same to be presented, in accordance with the provisions of Part VI for re-registration in the office of the Registrar of the district in which the document was originally registered; and upon the Registrar being satisfied that the document was so accepted for registration from a person not duly empowered to present the same, he shall proceed to the re-registration of the document as if it has not been previously registered, and as if such presentation for re-registration was a presentation for registration made within the time allowed therefore under Part IV, and all the provisions of this Act, as to registration of documents, shall apply to such re-registration; and such document, if duly re-registered in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall be deemed to have been duly registered for all purposes from the date of its original registration.
Documents executed by several persons at different times.
A document already executed and registered by some (alone) can again be re-registered after signing by others who were left out. But, it must be within four months from the date of each execution, according to Sec. 24..
24. Documents executed by several persons at different times. Where there are several persons executing a document at different times, such document may be presented for registration and re-registration within four months from the date of each execution.
Registration of Documents executed out of India – Four Months from Receipt in India
The period of four months for registration (stated above) will be counted from the date of receipt of that document in India, as per Sec. 26 of the Registration Act. Sec. 26 of the Registration Act is the relevant provision. It reads as under:
“26. Documents executed out of India.When a document purporting to have been executed by all or any of the parties out of India is not presented for registration till after the expiration of the time hereinbefore prescribed in that behalf, the registering officer, if satisfied— (a) that the instrument was so executed, and (b) that it has been presented for registration within four monthsafter its arrival in India, may, on payment of the proper registration-fee accept such document for registration.”
UnavoidableDelay – Registration with Fine – within Eight Months
After four months, document can be presented within another four months to the District Registrar. The District Registrar may impose a penalty up to a maximum of ten times the registration fees and grant permission to Sub-Registrar to register the document (as per Sec. 25 – quoted below).
25. Provision where delay in presentation is unavoidable. (1) If, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, any document executed, or copy of a decree or order made, in India is not presented for registration till after the expiration of the time hereinbefore prescribed in that behalf, the Registrar, in cases where the delay in presentation does not exceed four months, may direct that, on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper registration-fee, such document shall be accepted for registration.
(2) Any application for such direction may be lodged with a Sub-Registrar, who shall forthwith forward it to the Registrar to whom he is subordinate.
Registering authority cannot cancel registration
Our Apex Court has held in Satya Pal Anand vs. State of M.P, 2016 (10) SCC 767, as under:
“21. The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged, once the document is registered (see Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan (supra). Section 17 of the Act of 1908 deals with documents which require compulsory registration. Extinguishment Deed is one such document referred to in Section 17(1)(b). Section 18 of the same Act deals with documents, registration whereof is optional. Section 20 of the Act deals with documents containing interlineations, blanks, erasures or alterations. Section 21 provides for description of property and maps or plans and Section 22 deals with the description of houses and land by reference to Government maps and surveys. There is no express provision in the Act of 1908 which empowers the Registrar to recall such registration. The fact whether the document was properly presented for registration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its registration. The power to cancel the registration is a substantive matter. In absence of any express provision in that behalf, it is not open to assume that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) would be competent to cancel the registration of the documents in question. Similarly, the power of the Inspector General is limited to do superintendence of registration offices and make rules in that behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel the registration of any document which has already been registered.”
After 2015 Amendment, it is (only) the place where the Payee-Bank (Bank in which the Payee Presents the Cheque for ‘Collection’) is situated.
Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.
1. Key Takeaways
1. Before the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act 26 of 2015), there was no specific legislative commandment in the NI Act, as to territorial jurisdiction of courts for filing a complaint. Therefore, it was taken as the court (or courts) within whose territorial jurisdiction the offence was committed.
2. The Supreme Court held Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2014 SC 3519, that the jurisdiction for filing of complaints was ‘restricted to the location where the cheque was dishonoured, i.e., cheque was returned unpaid by the bank on which it was drawn (or, drawee bank – the Bank that is directed, by the drawer, to pay).
3. By the amendment of 2015, the dictum in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2014 SC 3519, was overturned – Section 142 has been re-numbered as Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) has been inserted (which specified the territorial jurisdiction of the court).
The dictum of the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod case has been “legislatively overruled”**by an amendment to the Negotiable Instruments Act, in 2015
**(as observed in P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd: (2021) 6 SCC 325 – RF Nariman, J.)
4. After the 2015 amendment (after inserting Sub-section – 2) the territorial jurisdiction is limited to the Payee-Bank
The amendment stands as under:
“(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction –
(a) if the cheque is delivered for collectionthrough an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated; or
(b) if the cheque is presented for paymentby the payee or holder in due course otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated.
5. Section 142(2)(b) Simplified
The words ‘otherwise through an account‘ requires explanation.
It can be simplified as under:
if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due coursedirectly#–otherwise through an account–in thebank of the drawer, (the proper court is that within whose local jurisdiction)the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated.
#E.g. (i) a bearer cheque (contra-distinct to account-payee cheque), presented directlyin the drawee Bank, “over the counter” (Brijendra Enterprise v. State of Gujarat, 2016(3) Guj LH 143; MahendraKumar Kedarnath Modi v. State of Gujarat, 2018 (1) Guj LH 288; 2018 (2) Crimes 441).
E.g. (ii)Using Kiosk Banking facility – Reserve Bank of India introduced the system of Kiosk Banking under which specified persons can avail the banking facilities like cheque transfers, money transfers, balance inquiries, cash deposits, remittances etc., similar to that of ATM/CDM facility (See: Mahendra Kumar Agarwal v. The State of West Bengal, 2021 Cr LJ 3889; 2022-3 BC 135).
6. The decision in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2014 SC 3519#, was “legislatively overruled” by the amendment of 2015.#* It is done within the ‘shortest‘ (?) time for ensuring “a fair trial“.
#(rendered “keeping in perspective the hardship that … will continue to bear on alleged accused/respondents who may have to travel long distances in conducting their defence”)
#*(with the object of addressing “the difficulties faced by the payee or the lender of the money in filing the case under Section 138 of the said Act”, and “it is expected that the proposed amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 would help in ensuring thata fair trial of cases under Section 138 of the said Act is conducted ….”)
2. Section 142 of the N I Act, after 2015 Amendment, reads as under:.
“142. Cognizance of offences.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—
no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138:
Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138.
“(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction,—
(a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated; or
(b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due course, otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated.
Explanation— For the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account.”
3. Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2014 SC 3519
The Supreme Court, in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2014 SC 3519, (T.S. Thakur, Vikramajit Sen, C. Nagappan, JJ.) held that the jurisdiction of the court in matters where the cheque is returned unpaid was ‘restricted to the location where the cheque was dishonoured, i.e., cheque was returned unpaid by the bank on which it was drawn’. It observed further as under:-
“20. We are quite alive to the magnitude of the impact that the present decision shall have to possibly lakhs of cases pending in various Courts spanning across the country. One approach could be to declare that this judgment will have only prospective pertinence, i.e. applicability to complaints that may be filed after this pronouncement. However, keeping in perspective the hardship that this will continue to bear on alleged accused/respondents who may have to travel long distances in conducting their defence, and also mindful of the legal implications of proceedings being permitted to continue in a Court devoid of jurisdiction, this recourse in entirety does not commend itself to us. Consequent on considerable consideration we think it expedient to direct that only those cases where, post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will proceeding continue at that place. To clarify, regardless of whether evidence has been led before the Magistrate at the pre- summoning stage, either by affidavit or by oral statement, the complaint will be maintainable only at the place where the cheque stands dishonoured. To obviate and eradicate any legal complications, the category of complaint cases where proceedings have gone to the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond shall be deemed to have been transferred by us from the Court ordinarily possessing territorial jurisdiction, as now clarified, to the Court where it is those where the accused/respondent has not been properly served) shall be returned to the complainant for filing in the proper Court, in consonance with our exposition of the law. If such complaints are filed/refiled within thirty days of their return, they shall be deemed to have been filed within the time prescribed by law, unless the initial or prior filing was itself time barred.”
4. Legislative Overruling
In P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd: (2021) 6 SCC 325 (Rohinton Fali Nariman, B.R. Gavai, JJ.) it is held as under:
“49. In Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129, a three-Judge Bench of this Court answered the question as to whether the territorial jurisdiction for filing of cheque dishonour complaints is restricted to the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offence is committed, which is the location where the cheque is dishonoured, i.e., returned unpaid by the bank on which it is drawn. This judgment has been legislatively overruled by Section 142(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act set out hereinabove.”
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End Note:
The Prefatory Note of the Bill which lead to Act 26 of 2015 reads as under:
“Statement of Objects and Reasons – The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was enacted to define and amend the law relating to Promissory Notes, Bills of Exchange and Cheques. The Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 inserted in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter called the said Act), a new Chapter XVII, comprising Sections 138 to 142 with effect from 1st April, 1989. Section 138 of the said Act provides for penalties in case of dishonour of cheques due to insufficiency of funds in the account of the drawer of the cheque.
2. As Sections 138 to 142 of the said Act were found deficient in dealing with dishonour of cheques, the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002, inter alia, amended Sections 138, 141 and 142 and inserted new Sections 143 to 147 in the said Act aimed at speedy disposal of cases relating to dishonour of cheque through their summary trial as well as making them compoundable. Punishment provided under Section 138 too was enhanced from one year to two years. These legislative reforms are aimed at encouraging the usage of cheque and enhancing the credibility of the instrument so that the normal business transactions and settlement of liabilities could be ensured.
3. The Supreme Court, in its judgment dated 1st August, 2014, in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129, held that the territorial jurisdiction for dishonour of cheques is restricted to the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed, which in the present context is where the cheque is dishonoured by the bank on which it is drawn. The Supreme Court has directed that only those cases where, post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will proceeding continue at that place. All other complaints (including those where the accused/respondent has not been properly served) shall be returned to the complainant for filing in the proper court, in consonance with exposition of the law, as determined by the Supreme Court.
4.Pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme Court, representations have been made to the Government by various stakeholders, including industry associations and financial institutions, expressing concerns about the wide impact this judgment would have on the business interests as it will offer undue protection to defaulters at the expense of the aggrieved complainant; will give a complete go-by to the practice/concept of ‘Payable at Par cheques’ and would ignore the current realities of cheque clearing with the introduction of CTS (Cheque Truncation System) where cheque clearance happens only through scanned image in electronic form and cheques are not physically required to be presented to the issuing branch (drawee bank branch) but are settled between the service branches of the drawee and payee banks; will give rise to multiplicity of cases covering several cheques drawn on bank(s) at different places; and adhering to it is impracticable for a single window agency with customers spread all over India.
5.To address the difficulties faced by the payee or the lender of the money in filing the case under Section 138 of the said Act, because of which, large number of cases are stuck, the jurisdiction for offence under Section 138 has been clearly defined. The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2015 provides for the following, namely-
(i) filing of cases only by a court within whose local jurisdiction the bank branch of the payee, where the payee presents the cheque for payment, is situated;
(ii) stipulating that where a complaint has been filed against the drawer of a cheque in the court having jurisdiction under the new scheme of jurisdiction, all subsequent complaints arising out of Section 138 of the said Act against the same drawer shall be filed before the same court, irrespective of whether those cheques were presented for payment within the territorial jurisdiction of that court;
(iii) stipulating that if more than one prosecution is filed against the same drawer of cheques before different courts, upon the said fact having been brought to the notice of the court, the court shall transfer the case to the court having jurisdiction as per the new scheme of jurisdiction; and
(iv) amending Explanation I under Section 6 of the said Act relating to the meaning of expression “a cheque in the electronic form”, as the said meaning is found to be deficient because it presumes drawing of a physical cheque, which is not the objective in preparing “a cheque in the electronic form” and inserting a new Explanation III in the said section giving reference of the expressions contained in the Information Technology Act, 2000.
6.It is expected that the proposed amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 would help in ensuring that a fair trial of cases under Section 138 of the said Act is conducted keeping in view the interests of the complainant by clarifying the territorial jurisdiction for trying the cases for dishonour of cheques.
Restrictions on Transfer of Property & ‘Rule Against Perpetuity’
Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.
Prologue
‘Perpetuity’ or constancy is not the rule, in all spheres of life.
In law of transfer of property, the rule is ‘rule against perpetuity or permanency’.
The Acts on Transfer of Property and Succession expressly disfavor ‘perpetuity’; and, stand against stagnancy in transference.
Our Apex Court has said in R. Kempraj v. Barton Son & Co, AIR 1970 SC 1872 as under:
“It is well known that the rule against perpetuity is rounded on the principle that the liberty of alienation “shall not be exercised to its own destruction and that all contrivances shall be void which tend to create a perpetuity or place property for ever out of the reach of the exercise of the power of alienation”.
Part – I
Section 10 and 11, TP Act
Sec. 10.Condition absolutely restraining alienation – Analysed
Sec. 10 of the TP Act (Condition absolutely restraining alienation) directs that if there is a condition in a transfer of property ‘absolutely restraining the transferee from disposing of his interest’, that condition is void.
Instances of “Absolute Restraint” and “Reasonable Restraint”
Sale or gift (transfer) with direction – transferee should not sell (absolute restraint). The direction is void.
Sale or gift (transfer) with direction – transferee should sell to a particular person alone (in-effect absolute restraint). The direction is void.
Sale or gift (transfer) with direction – transferee should not sell outside family (in-effect absolute restraint). The direction is void.
Sale or gift (transfer) with direction – transferee should not sell for 3 years (reasonable restraint). The direction is valid.
Direction to members of Zoroastrian Housing Society – not to sell property other than Zoroastrians (reasonable restraint). The direction is valid.
In Gayasi Ram v. Shahabuddin, AIR 1935 All 493, the sale deed contained a clause that the vendee shall not transfer the house by mortgage, gift or sell to any one except the vendor or his heirs and if in contravention of the clause, the property is sold the vendor or his heir would have a right to get back the house by paying Rs. 175/- and if the property was to be sold in court auction sale, the sale would be invalid. The sale consideration for the house was Rs. 150/-. It was held (relying on Dal Singh v. Khub Chand, AIR 1921 All 97, Asghari Begam v. Maula Bakhsh, AIR 1929 All 381, and Gomti Singh v. Anari Kuar, AIR 1929 All 492) that this impugned clause in a sale between strangers was an absolute restraint on alienation; and therefore the same was void, in view of Section 10 of Transfer of Property Act; and that in such cases question of pre-emption did not arise. (See also: Manohar Shivram Swami v. Mahadeo Guruling Swami, AIR 1988 Bom 116)
In Trichinopoly Varthaga Sangam Ltd. v. T. N. Shanmughasundaram, AIR 1939 Mad. 769, the Clause in the Partition deed – the property should not be sold to any stranger; and lease only to brothers or their heirs for a sum not exceeding Rs. 1000/-. The court found that there was “no obligation” for a member to buy “even at Rs. 1000/-“. Hence it was held – Restriction is ‘absolute’, and hence, void. (See also: Rosher v. Rosher, (1884) 26 Ch D 801).
Similarly, it was held in Manohar Shivram Swami v. Mahadeo Guruling Swami, AIR 2008 Bom 116, that the condition in the Sale Deed prohibiting sale ‘outside family’ was void – as it was absolute restraint.
Reasonable Restraint is Allowed in Law
The words ‘absolute restraint‘ in Sec. 10 of the TP Act makes it clear that ‘reasonable restraint’ is allowed in law. Hence, it is clear that the cases in this subject has to be dealt with on the facts of each case.
Therefore, it is not possible to place a hard and fast rule on the validity of the restrictions of enjoyment for a particular period, enjoyment in a particular manner, restrictions on transfer etc. In Renand v. Tourangeaon, (1867) LR 2 PC 4, it was held that a condition prohibiting transfer the property for twenty years was held to be an absolute restraint and hence void. But it was opined that if it were for a period of 3 years, it would have been a partial restraint and valid. This decision is referred to in Athmaram Rao v. Shanthan Phawar (2018 Madras High Court).
Our Apex Court held in Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Urban ), AIR 2005 SC 2306, that in the matter of a Housing Society, the restriction imposed in the light of the byelaws of the Society that the property should not be sod to others, other than Zoroastrians, was a valid condition.
Sec. 11. Restriction repugnant to Absolute interest created – Analysed
Sec. 11 of the TP Act (Restriction repugnant to Absolute interest created) cautions that the terms, in an absolute transfer, that direct enjoyment of interest in a particular manner, is invalid.
But the direction for securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property is valid.
Instances of ‘Absolute Sale & Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’in S. 11, TP Act
Absolute sale or gift with direction – transferee should reside there. The direction is invalid.
Absolute sale or gift with direction – transferee should not cut trees. The direction is invalid.
Instances of ‘No Absolute Transfer‘in S. 11, TP Act
On a ‘Harmonious Construction’ of the deed, sale or gift subject to a condition – transferee should reside there, or look after transferor (that is, no absolute transfer). The direction is valid.
In a transfer, life interest alone is created (that is, no absolute transfer) and a direction – assignee should not cut trees. The direction is valid.
In Bhavani Amma Kanakadevi v. CSI, Dakshina Kerala Maha Idavaka, AIR 2008 Kerala 38, the question came for consideration was whether a provision in a sale deed that in the event of failure to construct a private college in the property sold thereunder, the property shall be re-conveyedby the vendee to the vendor for the same sale consideration is barred under the provisions of Sections 10 or 11 of Transfer of Property Act. Observing that (though) Ext.A2 did not contain a specific clause prohibiting respondent from alienating the property to third parties, the implied clause – that in the event of failure to construct a college, the property shall be reconveyed to the assignor at the same price – shut out any other option. The High Court held that it was an absolute restrainton the right of respondent to deal with the property including alienation, which was void as provided under Section 10.
The court referred to the following decisions:
Jatru Pahan v. Mahatma Ambikajit Prasad ( AIR 1957 Patna 570),
Rule against perpetuity, in Indian law, is applicable when property is transferred to an ‘unborn’ person. Sec. 14 of the Transfer of property Act directs that such (unborn) person must have born within the life-time of ‘one or more persons’ named in the transfer deed (who must be one living at the date of such transfer).
Under the English jurisprudence, it is pertaining to and for ‘controlling the duration of private trusts‘. The Rule Against Perpetuities Applied to Trusts, 9 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 286 (1924) speaks as under:
“Under the rule against perpetuities, private trusts may be created for the life of the last survivor of any number of designated persons, in being at the commencement of the trust, and for period of 21 years thereafter.”
Indian law specifies, and limits, the doctrine to the transfer of property to ‘unborn’ persons. Sections 13 and 14 of the TP Act are the relevant provisions.
Sec. 13. Transfer for benefit of Unborn Person
(Similar provision in Section 113 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925)
Sections 13 and 14 of the TP Act are worded in a tiresome manner. It is too difficult to understand the purport of the Section, in its correct perspective, without a thorough exploration. Both these sections says about transfer of property to unborn persons.
Sec. 13 of the TP Act reads as under:
13. Transfer for benefit of unborn person. Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence at the date of the transfer, subject to a prior interestcreated by the same transfer, the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property.
As articulated in Sec. 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, ‘Transfer of Property’ must be by a living person, to another living person. Sec. 13 is an enabling provision to transfer property to an unborn person. It directs that following conditions must be satisfied for a valid transfer to an unborn person:
(i) Prior interest must have been created in ‘someone’:
The interest in the property (referred to in this Section as prior interest), for the period between the transfer and the birth of the unborn person, must have been created (in someone), by the same transfer.
[The aforesaid proposition can be deduced from the clause in Sec. 13 – “subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer”];
(ii) Whole of the remaining interest of the transferormust be created in the unborn person – purport and principle:
The ‘prior interest-holder’ must have been directed (by the transferor) to create/transfer the whole remaining interest (directly) to such unborn person.
The transfer under Sec. 13 cannot be limited to ‘life interest’ alone (as in English law) of the ‘unborn’ (Life-interest is the interest that remains only in his/her life time – thereafter it will go to a named person or another ‘unborn’).
The transfer under Sec. 13 must be definite in nature; it cannot be unlimited or ‘perpetual’.
That is, if a life-interest stands created, or continues, on an intermediary, (after the birth of the said ‘unborn’) it will not ‘take effect‘.
[These can be deduced from the clause in Sec. 13 – “the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property”; and from the illustration in Sec. 13.]
Note: 1. ‘Whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property‘ may by be the the whole fractional interest of the transferor (originally he had).
2. Though it may appear worded otherwise, it can also be the fractional interest (of the whole interest) that is intended to be transferred to the ‘unborn’.
The Illustration in Sec. 13 of the TP Act reads as under:
Illustration: A transfers property of which he is the owner to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for their lives, and, after the death of the survivor, for the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death for A’s second son. The interest so created for the benefit of the eldest son does not take effect, because it does not extend to the whole of A’s remaining interest in the property.
“For the benefit of” – Implies ‘TRUST’
Sec. 13 begins with the words – “Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence”. The words ‘for the benefit of‘ definitely brings-in the concept of ‘trust’.
Note: Trust is ‘an obligation’ upon the trustee to administer the trust property, as if he is its owner and as required by the author, for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
Transfer to Unborn can only be made by a Machinery of Trust
Mulla, on The Transfer of Property Act, in commentary to Sec, 122, Gifts, it is stated:
“A gift may be made by the equitable machinery of a trust; and the interposition of the trustees enables a gift to be made to a person not yet in existence and, therefore, incapable of being the donee of a direct gift.” (See: Controller of Estate Duty, Bombay v. Bhagwandas Velji Joshi, 1983-139 ITR 316 (Bom); 1981-6 TAXMAN 202; Saraswathi v. Devaki Amma, ILR 1986-1 Ker 550; 1985 KLT 217.)
In Mathen Mathew v. Kunjika Bharathi: AIR 1968 Ker 12, it is held as under:
“18. The gift can be to the named donees as representing the group of persons composed of the wife and children including children to be born. Such a gift can be made only through the machinery of a trust, the named donees holding as trustees for themselves and the other beneficiaries.”
In The Commissioner of Income Tax v. Brig. Kapil Mohan, [2001] 252 ITR 830: 118 Taxman 430 (Delhi ) observed as under:
“5. A transfer cannot be made directly to an unborn person, for the definition of transfer in Section 5 is limited to living persons. Such transfer can only be made by the machinery of trusts. Possibly, to express this distinction, the expression “for the benefit of” has been used, since trustees being the transferees hold the property for the benefit of the unborn person.”
The Madras High Court in T Subramania Nadar v. T Varadharajan, AIR 2003 Mad 364, pointed out as under:
“12. Under Section 13 of Transfer of Property Act transfer cannot be made directly to an unborn person as the definition of transfer in Section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is limited to living persons. The transfer in favour of an unborn person can be made by a machinery. It is intended to express this distinction by the words “for the benefit of“, the trustees being the transferees who hold the property for the benefit of the unborn persons. The estate must vest in some person between the date of the transfer and the coming into existence of the unborn person. The interest of the unborn person must therefore be in every case preceded by a prior interest. Section 13 says that the interest of the unborn person must be the whole remainder.”
“TRANSFER OF PROPERTY” and ‘CREATION OF INTEREST’ in Sec. 13
It is clear that the words, ‘transfer of property‘ and ‘an interest created therein’ are used in Sec. 13 to denote two different notions. Transfer of property to the ‘unborn’ should take place on his/her birth. Creation of interest can be done only on attaining his/her majority.
Can a limited ‘beneficial enjoyment’ be allowed to ‘prior-interest-holder’
It appears that there is no impediment in giving a limited ‘beneficial enjoyment’ (like appropriating income derived; right to reside in the building) to the ‘prior-interest-holder’- up to the birth of the ‘unborn’ person. If it is not so specifically provided, the prior-interest-holder will be a mere ‘trustee’ for the unborn person (the beneficiary). These propositions are made from the following:
Sec. 13 only directs -‘the whole of the remaining interest‘ must have been directed to be vested in the (unborn) person (when he/she born). The word ‘remaining’ persuades only one reasoning.
The prohibition in Sec. 13 is that ‘life interest’ (interest that remains only in his/her life time) alone can be conferred upon the ‘unborn’; that is, creation of life-interest alone is bad in law.
Sec. 13 speaks about ‘Transfer of Property’ to the ‘unborn’ on his/her birth, and, therefore, it can also be a ‘conditional transfer’.
Generally speaking, the question of ‘trust’ comes only on birth of the ‘unborn’. Though property can be given to ‘unborn’, it is only because of specific enacted provisions (Section 9 of the Indian Trusts Act; Section 14 of the TP Act). Since those provisions do not expressly prohibit, the aforesaid ‘conditional transfer’ can be made validly (provided it does not be bad under Sec. 11 of the TP Act – as shown above.
The owner of a property is free to deal with his property in any manner he wishes, unless expressly or impliedly restricted by law. ‘Conditional transfer’ is permitted by the TP Act itself.
If a ‘conditional transfer is made, it can only be upto the birth of the ‘unborn’. [It is clear from the words in Sec. 13 – “the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property”; and from the illustration in Sec. 13.]
In either case, the ‘the whole of the remaining interest‘ must have been directed to be vested in the (unborn) person (when he/she born).
Even if no trustee is appointed, and it does not come out from the deed of transfer as to who should be the trustee, the court will appoint a trustee, on the principle – ‘no trust will fail for want of trustees’.
Sec. 13 does not specifically refer to Prior Interest “HOLDERS”. Why?
The (main) object of this section is to provide – ‘whole remainder interest … in the unborn person‘.
The creation of interest, in a prior interest HOLDER, for the period between the transfer and the birth of such unborn person, is an inevitable coincident.
As stated earlier, a limited ‘beneficial enjoyment’ could be given, to the prior interest HOLDER, up to the birth of the ‘unborn’ .
For the above, only an indication as to creation of prior interest was apposite.
Sec. 14. Rule against Perpetuity – Analysed.
(Similar provision in Section 114 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925)
Sec. 14 of the TP Act reads as under:
14. Rule against perpetuity. No transfer of property can operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the life-time of one or more persons living at the date of such transfer, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the interest created is to belong.
Sec. 14 of the TP Act lays down the following:
Property can be transferred to an unborn person.
Sec. 14 basically declares the maximum period (perpetuity period) for creating an interest in an unborn person as regards an immovable property.
For transferring property to an unborn person, such (unborn) person must have born within the life-time of ‘one or more persons’ named in the transfer deed (who must be one living at the date of such transfer).
The interest in the property can be created in favour of such (unborn) person only on attaining majority by such (unborn) person (i.e., 18 years).
Therefore, the maximum period (perpetuity period) for creating the interest in the property in favour of such (unborn) person will be the remaining (after transfer) ‘life-time‘ of such ‘one or more persons‘ (who were living at the date of such transfer) plus (+) the ‘minority’ of such (unborn) person (i.e., 18 years).
It is clear – such (unborn) person must have born at least on the day of death of such ‘one or more persons‘.
Sec. 14 allows the transferor to name any ‘one or more persons‘ whose ‘life-time’ is to be taken into consideration for Sec. 14.
Who are such ‘one or more persons‘ has to be inferred from the transfer deed.
As stated in Sec. 13, the interest in the property, for the period between the transfer and the birth of such unborn person (referred to as prior interest), must have been created in ‘some’ (prior interest) holder.
Note: The prior interest holder in Sec. 13 need not necessarily be the ‘one or more persons‘ stated in Sec. 14.
G. Ramakrishniah v. Dasaratharama Reddiar, AIR 1970 Mad 484 ( Natesan, J.), vividly explains these matters, as under:
“The perpetuity period under Section 14 of the Act consists of the lifetime of one or more persons living at the time the transfer takes effect, and the further period of the minority of a person in existence at the close of the person living at the time of the transfer. ….. Section 14 of the Act however does not place any restriction as to who can be the living person whose existence can postpone the vesting. It allows the settlor to use any life for the purpose…… It may be any person or any number of persons, but the person or persons must be living at the date of such transfer. True, one must infer from the document itself the person or persons whose life has to be considered.”
Status of the ‘one or more persons‘ whose ‘life-time’ is to be taken into consideration
As stated earlier, the prior interest holder in Sec. 13 need not necessarily be the ‘one or more persons‘ stated in Sec. 14.
They are not ‘trustees’ inasmuch as no property is entrusted for their administration, and no obligation is casted upon them.
Therefore, they are persons merely chosen by the transferor of property (to an unborn), for the purpose of Sec. 14.
Where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee or any person claiming under him from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property, the condition or limitation is void, except in the case of a lease where the condition is for the benefit of the lessor or those claiming under him: provided that property may be transferred to or for the benefit of a women (not being a Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist), so that she shall not have power during her marriage to transfer or charge the same or her beneficial interest therein.
Sec. 11. Restriction repugnant to interest created.
Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.
Where any such direction has been made in respect of one piece of immoveable property for the purpose of securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property, nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any right which the transferor may have to enforce such direction or any remedy which he may have in respect of a breach thereof.
Sec. 12. Condition making interest determinable on insolvency or attempted alienation.
Where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation making any interest therein, reserved or given to or for the benefit of any person, to cease on his becoming insolvent or endeavouring to transfer or dispose of the same, such condition or limitation is void. Nothing in this section applies to a condition in a lease for the benefit of the lessor or those claiming under him.
Sec. 13. Transfer for benefit of unborn person.
Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence at the date of the transfer, subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer, the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property.
Illustration: A transfers property of which he is the owner to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for their lives, and, after the death of the survivor, for the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death for A’s second son. The interest so created for the benefit of the eldest son does not take effect, because it does not extend to the whole of A’s remaining interest in the property.
Sec. 14. Rule against perpetuity.
Rule against perpetuity.No transfer of property can operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the life-time of one or more persons living at the date of such transfer, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the interest created is to belong.
Sec. 15. Transfer to class some of whom come under sections 13 and 14.
If, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a class of persons with regard to some of whom such interest fails by reason of any of the rules contained in sections 13 and 14, such interest fails 1[in regard to those persons only and not in regard to the whole class].
Sec. 16. Transfer to take effect on failure of prior interest.
Where, by reason of any of the rules contained in sections 13 and 14, an interest created for the benefit of a person or of a class of persons fails in regard to such person or the whole of such class, any interest created in the same transaction and intended to take effect after or upon failure of such prior interest also fails.
Succession Certificate (relating to the deceased plaintiff) is required to get a decree for payment of ‘debt’, so also to execute such a decree.
The surviving decree holder could execute decree without a Succession Certificate (relating to the co-plaintiff).
It is not needed for partition, easement, rent – cases.
Succession Certificate will Not to establish Title.
It is not a condition precedent for impleadment.
It is not needed if EP had been filed by the DH himself.
‘Legal heirship certificate’ is issued by revenue officers.
It is not referred to in Indian Succession Act
It can be used for certain limited and specified purposes only.
Various States promulgated Rules or GOs for issuing the same.
Introduction
The law requires production of Succession Certificate by the legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff, to get a decree for payment of ‘debt’ (to be paid) by a defendant, so also to execute such a decree.
Succession Certificate – Relevant Provision of Law
Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is the relevant provision of law.
This provision applies to both continuation of trial for, and execution of, a decree:
1. for ‘payment of debt’ (to be paid) by the defendant; and
2. in an execution proceeding initiated by the legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff/decree-holder.
This provision will not apply to:
1. Any decree other than that for ‘payment of debt’ – such as: for partition, easement, rent.
2. Appeal.
3. Execution of an appellate decree, even if the death of the plaintiff was after the decree by the trial court.
4. Decree holder dies after deposit of the entire decree debt by the judgment debtors.
5. Execution petition had been filed by the decree-holder himself.
6. Surviving decree holder could execute decree on his own behalf and on behalf of the legal representative of the deceased.
7. Adjudication of the title of the deceased.
Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act reads as under:
214. Proof of representative title a condition precedent to recovery through the Courts of debts from debtors of deceased persons:
(1) No Court shall—
(a) pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof, or
(b) proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled, to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt, except on the production, by the person so claiming of—
(i) a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant to him of administration to the estate of the deceased, or
(ii) a certificate granted under S.31 or S.32 of the Administrator General’s Act, 1913 (3 of 1913) and having the debt mentioned therein, or
(iii) a succession certificate granted under Part X and having the debt specified therein, or
(iv) a certificate granted under the Succession Certificate Act, 1889 (7 of 1889) or
(v) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No.VIII of 1827, and, if granted after the first day of May, 1889, having the debt specified therein.
(2) The word “debt” in sub-section (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes.”
Decisive Judgments – Succession Certificate is Not Needed
Following cases it is held that the Succession certificate contemplated in Sec. 214 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is needed only in respect of ‘debts’ or ‘securities’, and not required in a suit for partition, compensation, maintenance etc:
Vishalakshi v. Bank of India, 2006 (2) KLT 488 – in respect of immovable property
Khader Bee v. Mohammad Vazir, 2001 (2) ALT 513 – for execution of the decree in the suit for partition.
Rukhsana v. Nazrunnisa , 2000 (9) SCC 240 – compensation on account of the death of the deceased.
Rama Seshagiri Rao vs. N. Kamalakumari – AIR 1982 AP 107 – for executing the decree for maintenance and for execution of a decree for costs.
Resilikutty Chacko v. State of Kerala, AIR 1999 Ker. 56 – claimant in compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. (Contra view in Sangappa Mallappa Kuri v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bagalkot, AIR 2003 Kar. 142; Mallappa v. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer, ILR 1999 Kant 4411)
Sabnam v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2014 ACJ 2501 (Rajasthan High Court) – compensation in motor accident cases.
Object of a Succn. Certificate – Facilitate collection of debts; Not to establish Title
The Supreme Court explained the object in Shri Banarsi Dass v. Mrs. Teeku Dutta, 2005(4) SCC 449, as under:
“The main object of a Succession Certificate is to facilitate collection of debts on succession and afford protection to parties paying debts to representatives of deceased persons. All that the Succession Certificate purports to do is to facilitate the collection of debts, to regulate the administration of succession and to protect persons who deal with the alleged representatives of the deceased persons.
Such a certificate does not give any general power of administration on the estate of the deceased. The grant of a certificate does not establish title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased.
A Succession Certificate is intended as noted above to protect the debtors, which means that where a debtor of a deceased person either voluntarily pays his debt to a person holding a Certificate under the Act, or is compelled by the decree of a Court to pay it to the person, he is lawfully discharged.
The grant of a certificate does not establish a title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased, but only furnishes him with authority to collect his debts and allows the debtors to make payments to him without incurring any risk. In order to succeed in the succession application the applicant has to adduce cogent and credible evidence in support of the application. The respondents, if they so chooses, can also adduce evidence to oppose grant of succession certificate.”
Surviving Decree Holder Can Execute Decree on His Own Behalf
In M.C. Sreedharan v. Pattieri Kumaran, AIR 1981 Ker 51, it is held that in a case involving ‘debt’ as contemplated under Section 214(1)(b) of the Succession Act, when one of the decree holders had been died, the surviving decree holder could execute decree on his own behalf and on behalf of the legal representative of the deceased decree holder and in such case, succession certificate as per Section 214(1)(b) of the Succession Act was not necessary.
Succession Certificate is not condition precedent
Elsy v. State of Kerala, 2008 (1) KHC 615 : 2008 (1) KLT 904 it is held that the restriction in Sec. 214 of the Indian Succession Act being “not to proceed with the application”, it is not a condition precedent to file a Succession Certificate along with the application for impleadment.
It was also held in this case that after deposit of the entire decree debt by the judgment debtors, if the decree holder dies, the legal-heirs of the decree holder need not produce succession certificate.
Succession certificate needed in succession; not in survivorship in a Joint Hindu Family
It is held in Sreeram Rangaiah v. Gajula Krisnaiah, 2006 (1) ALT 186, that the Succession certificate would be necessary only in case of succession but not in a case of survivorship (birth-right) in a Joint Hindu (also:K. Laxminarayan v V. Gopalaswami, AIR 1963 AP 438; L.I.C. Of India v. T. Tirupathayya, AIR 1963 AP 353; Radhamma v. H.N. Muddukrishna, AIR 2019 SC 643; Devireddy Suryanarayana Reddy v. Kusum Kasturamma, 2015 (5) ALT 802; B. Chandrakala v. A. Anuradha, 2015 (5) ALT 383.
Where Execution petition is already filed by the decree-holder
In Akula Mabukhan vs Rajamma, AIR 1963 AP 69 the execution petition had been filed by the decree-holder himself. It was held that for continuing the execution petition the legal representative need not obtain a succession certificate. (Also in:Akula Rangappa v. Narayana Swamy, AIR 1988 AP 314;Ramanatha Reddy v. K.V. Kuppuswami Mudaliar, AIR 1971 Mad 419)
Cannot be Waived by the parties
In Abdul v. Shamseali, AIR 1942 Bom 285 , the Bombay High Court held that the necessity for obtaining a succession certificate cannot be waived by the parties.
No limitation
In Vishalakshi v. Bank of India, AIR 2006 Ker 255, it is held as under:
“As in the case of probate or letters of administration [vide Francis v. Antony -1991 (1) KLT 62] there is no limitation for approaching the court for the grant of a Succession Certificate. (See Janaki v. Kesavalu – ILR 8 Madras 207)”
An Overview
It is high time to change the law in this subject. It might have been justifiable in the past – for the protection from bogus claims. But, now-a-days the directions in Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is redundant and superfluous. It is clear from the fact that such a certificate is not needed when an appeal is filed; or, when a legal hair or legal representative is impleaded in trial.
Legal Heirship Certificate
Indian Succession Act, 1925 does not speak about ‘legal heirship certificate’. It is issued by revenue officers such as Tahsildars, Revenue Divisional Officers. A legal heirship certificate can be used for certain limited purposes only, such as:
Property Transfer
Transfer of the electricity connection
House tax transfer
Telephone connection transfer
To change bank account to a family member
Insurance claims
Retirement benefit claims
Pension claims
Provident fund claims
Gratuity claim.
Such certificates are not conclusive when disputes arise as to lawful legal heirs of a deceased person or as to the validity of the title of the deceased. When such disputes arise, the revenue authorities have to direct the claimants to approach proper civil court.
Rules, Guidelines and Government Orders
Various States in India have promulgated particular Rules and/or Government Orders with respect to issuance of Legal Heir (Heirship) Certificates – e.g. Kerala Information Technology (Electronic Delivery of Services) Rules, 2010; Kerala Village Manual and G.O. (MS) No. 359/67/RD dated 10.08.1967 ; TN Revenue Department G.O. (Ms) No. 2906, dated 4.11.1981 read with Government Letter No. 1534, dated 28.11.1991; The Revenue Manual issued by the CRA on 14.9.2001 Circular Instructions No. 11/2017, RA 5(3)/180/2017, dated 9.8.2017; Odisha Miscellaneous Certificate Rules, 1984.
See: Premalatha Subhash v. State of Kerala, 2021 5 Ker HC 736: 2021 4 Ker LJ 612;
Vishalakshi v. Bank of India, AIR 2006 Ker 255;
Mymoonath v. District Officer, State Life Insurance District Office, Thrissur, AIR 2021 Ker 83;
M. V. Suprabha v. Tahsildhar, Taluk Office, Velachery Taluk, Tharamani, 23 Sep 2021 (Madras);
V. Devan v. Tahsildar, Office of the Tahsildar, Chennai, 22 Dec 2020;
J. Babu v. Tahsildar, Tharangampadi Taluk, Nagapattinam, 2021-3 CTC 79.
End Notes
Section 370 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925
370. Restriction on grant of certificates under this Part.—
(1) A succession certificate (hereinafter in this Part referred to as a certificate) shall not be granted under this Part with respect to any debt or security to which a right is required by section 212 or section 213 to be established by letters of administration or probate: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to prevent the grant of a certificate to any person claiming to be entitled to the effects of a deceased Indian Christian, or to any part thereof, with respect to any debt or security, by reason that a right thereto can be established by letters of administration under this Act.
(2) For the purposes of this Part, “security” means—
(a) any promissory note, debenture, stock or other security of the Central Government or of a State Government;
(b) any bond, debenture, or annuity charged by Act of Parliament 1[of the United Kingdom] on the revenues of India;
(c) any stock or debenture of, or share in, a company or other incorporated institution;
(d) any debenture or other security for money issued by, or on behalf of, a local authority;
(e) any other security which the 2[State Government] may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a security for the purposes of this Part.
Section 372 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925
372. Application for certificate. —
(1) Application for such a certificate shall be made to the District Judge by a petition signed and verified by or on behalf of the applicant in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the signing and verification of a plaint by or on behalf of a plaintiff, and setting forth the following particulars, namely:—
(a) the time of the death of the deceased;
(b) the ordinary residence of the deceased at the time of his death and, if such residence was not within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Judge to whom the application is made, then the property of the deceased within those limits;
(c) the family or other near relatives of the deceased and their respective residences;(d) the right in which the petitioner claims;
(e) the absence of any impediment under section 370 or under any other provision of this Act or any other enactment, to the grant of the certificate or to the validity thereof if it were granted; and
(f) the debts and securities in respect of which the certificate is applied for.
(2) If the petition contains any averment which the person verifying it knows or believes to be false, or does not believe to be true, that person shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 198 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).
(3) Application for such a certificate may be made in respect of any debt or debts due to the deceased creditor or in respect of portions thereof.
Note: S.388 of the Act confers power on the State government to invest any inferior court with the power to exercise the functions of a District Judge (See: Vishalakshi v. Bank of India, AIR 2006 Ker 255).