Public Trusts and (State) Endowments/Trusts Acts

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Synopsis.

  1. Introduction
  2. Important  Enactments During British regime 
  3. Important Enactments After Independence:
  4. Public Trusts and The Indian Trusts Act, 1882
  5. Registration of Public Trusts under Public Trusts Act
  6. Effect of Non-Registration upon Vesting of Property

Introduction.

(i) ‘Trust and trustees’ and (ii) ‘charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments, and religious institutions’ are included as subjects in ‘Concurrent List’ of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India, whereby both the Centre and the States are competent to legislate and regulate trusts or charities and charitable institutions. Charitable institutions allowed to be founded by our law include trusts, societies, Wakfs etc. The Constitution of India guarantees its citizens the right to form associations or unions, under Article 19(1)(c).

Public Trusts and The Indian Trusts Act, 1882

The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 is enacted primarily to govern private trusts; and ‘public or private charitable or religious endowments’ are expressly excluded from its ambit. 

Sec. 1, under the head ‘Savings’, reads:

  • “But nothing herein contained affects the rules of Mohammedan law as to waqf, or the mutual relations of the members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law, or applies to public or private religious or charitable endowments, or to trusts to distribute prizes taken in war among the captors; and nothing in the Second Chapter of this Act applies to trusts created before the said day.”

But there are common legal principles which cover matters of both public and private trusts; and merely because they find a place in the Trusts Act, 1882, they cannot become ‘untouchable’ where affairs of public trusts are involved as held by VR Krishna Iyer J. in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Bansi  Dhar.[1] 

Our courts apply the general law of trusts and the universal rules of equity and good conscience upheld by the English judges in this matter. In other words, the principles of the English law of Trusts which have been incorporated in the Indian Trusts Act will apply to public trusts also.[2]

Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950

Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (BPTA) is the first Public Trusts Act enacted by a State, invoking the principle of ‘parens-patriae’.  It required registration of all public trusts with the authorities appointed under the Act. All other State Public Trust Acts Orissa, Tamil Nadu Public Trusts Acts followed this Act in their legislation. State Acts include the following:

  • Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950
  • Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951
  • Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959

Other important State-Acts are the following:

  • Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950
  • Uttar Pradesh Charitable Endowments (Extension of Powers) Act, 1950
  • Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951
  • Madras Hindu Religious And Charitable Endowments Act, 1951
  • Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951
  • Charitable Endowments (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1952
  • Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959
  • AP Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987
  • Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1997

Constitutional Validity of BPTA (Qua Articles 25 and 26)

The Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 was enacted, as seen from its preamble, ‘to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the State of Bombay’. The constitutional validity (qua Articles 25 and 26) of some provisions of Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 was considered by our Apex Court in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi Vs. The State of Bombay.[3] Challenges against certain provisions were upheld, and some were overruled.

Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees to all persons the freedom of conscience (and free profession), practice and propagation of religion. Article 26 guarantees to all religious denominations, the freedom to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. However, Article 26(d) requires religious denomination or its representatives to administer its property ‘in accordance with law’. Therefore, the right of administration guaranteed to the religious denominations is subject to such restrictions and regulations enacted by the legislatures.

Article 26 of our Constitution reads as under:

  • 26. Freedom to manage religious affairs – Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right
  •        (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
  •        (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
  •        (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
  •        (d) to administer such property in accordance with law.

It is clear from clause (d), read with clauses (a) and (b), of Article 26 that the legislature is empowered to enact laws relating to secular matters related to the field of administration of property, acquired and owned by a religious denomination. Certain secular activities associated with religion may not be amenable to State regulations. But those secular activities which do not relate to an essential part of religion or religious activity will always be amenable to State regulations. What constitutes the ‘essential part’ of religion has to be ascertained from the doctrines of that religion according to its tenets, historical background and change in evolved process etc.[4]

Just before passing the judgment in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi Vs. The State of Bombay (18 March, 1954), by J. Mukherjea, for the Constitution Bench, it has been held in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra  Thirtha  Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (16 March, 1954),[5] the leading decision in this subject, rendered by J. Mukherjea himself, for a 7 Judge Bench, that only a law which took away the right of administration altogether from the religious denomination and vested it in any other secular authority[6] would alone be taken to be violative of the right under Article 26(d).

In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi Vs. The State of Bombay, Section 44 of the BPT Act was held to be unconstitutional. It is observed in this decision as under: 

  • “The language of the two Clauses (b) and (d) of Article 26 would at once bring out the difference between the two. In regard to affairs in matters of religion, the right of management given to a religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right which no legislation can take away. On the other hand, as regards administration of property which a religious denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to administer such properly but only in accordance with law.”

The challenge against the constitutional validity of Section 58 of the Act which made it obligatory on every public trust to pay to the Administration Fund a contribution was upheld. Section 35 of the Act was also upheld in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi Vs. The State of Bombay observing as under: 

  • “It is a well-established principle of law that trustees in charge of trust properties should not keep cash money in their hands which are not necessary for immediate expenses; and a list of approved securities upon which trust money could be invested is invariably laid down in every legislation on the subject of trust.”[7] 

In Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin[8]  while Gujarat High Court examining whether the partial deprivation by devising system of regulation and control of public funds violate Article 26 (d), it was held that Article 26 (d) would be violated only if a denomination was deprived of the administration of the property altogether. And that the impugned section neither violated Article 25 (1) nor clauses (b) and (c) of Article 26. The impugned section was protected by clause (d) of Article 26 and that the matters which the impugned section provided for were purely secular matters and that they related to the field of administration of property, acquired and owned by a religious denomination.

Registration of Trusts under Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950

Section 4 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 provides that within three months from the date of coming into force of the section, the working trustees of every public trust shall apply to the Registrar having jurisdiction for the registration of the public trust. Subsection (5) of Section 4 provides an appeal against the decision made by the Registrar regarding registration of a public trust and it also lays down that the order of the Appellate Authority shall be final.

Section 5 enjoins the Registrar to make inquiry in the prescribed manner for the purposes of ascertaining whether the trust is a public trust; whether any property is the property of the trust; the names and addresses of the trustees and mangers and the mode of succession to the office of the trustee of such trust; the amount of gross average annual income and expenditure etc. Section 6 lays down that on completion of the inquiry provided for under Section 5, the Registrar shall record his findings with reasons therefor as to the matters mentioned in the said section.

Section 8 lays down that any working trustee or person having interest in a public trust or any property found to be trust property, feeling aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar under Section 6 may, within six months from the date of the publication of the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 7, institute a suit in a civil court[9] to have such finding set aside or modified.[10]

Section 18(2) allows registration under the said Act if the trustee has an office of administration of the Trust within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the operation of Act, even though the trust property or substantial trust property is not located within the local limits of jurisdiction of the he Bombay Public Trusts Act.

Section 22(C) requires informing the Charity Commissioner the immovable property vesting in the public trust within a period of three months.

Alienation and Sanction of Charity Commissioner under Public Trusts Acts

(State) Public Trusts Acts impose restrictions for sale, mortgage, exchange, lease etc. of immovable properties of public trust.

Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act reads as under:

  • “Alienation of immovable property of public trust:
  • (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of trust –
  • (a) no sale, exchange or gift of any immovable property, and
  • (b) no lease for a period exceeding ten years in the case of agricultural land or for a period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or a building, belonging to a public trust, shall be valid without the previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner. Sanction may be accorded subject to such conditions as the Charity Commissioner may think fit to impose, regard being had to the interest, benefit or protection of the trust;
  • (c) if the Charity Commissioner is satisfied that in the interest of any public trust any immovable property thereof should be disposed of, he may, on application, authorise any trustee to dispose of such property subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose, regard being had to the interest or benefit or protection of the trust.
  • (2) The Charity Commissioner may revoke the sanction given under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) on the ground that such sanction was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation made to him or by concealing from the Charity Commissioner, facts material for the purpose of giving sanction; and direct the trustee to take such steps within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the date of revocation (or such further period not exceeding in the aggregate one year as the Charity Commissioner may from time to time determine) as may be specified in the direction for the recovery of the property.
  • (3) No sanction shall be revoked under this section unless the person in whose favour such sanction has been made has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the sanction should not be revoked.
  • (4) If, in the opinion of the Charity Commissioner, the trustee has failed to take effective steps within the period specified in sub-section (2), or it is not possible to recover the property with reasonable effort or expense, the Charity Commissioner may assess any advantage received by the trustee and direct him to pay compensation to the trust equivalent to the advantage so assessed.

Similar provisions are found in other Public Trusts Acts also.[11] Our courts dealt with these provisions several times.[12]  

In Cyrus Rustom Patel Vs. Charity Commissioner, Maharashtra (2017)[13]  our Apex Court pointed out that ‘the power to grant sanction has to be exercised by the Charity Commissioner, taking into consideration three classic requirements of the Trust: ie. ‘the interest, benefit and protection’.  

Non-Registration: No Effect upon Vesting of Property

Non-registration of a public trust under the State Public Trusts Act will not have any effect upon vesting of property in a Trust. If a property is vested in a public trust by means of a duly registered Settlement Deed in terms of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act by the Settler of the Trust, then such a transfer would not be void on the ground that the details of the trust properties were not given to the Charity Commissioner under the Public Trusts Act.[14]

Quoting various provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 including Section 29 (which provides that ‘no suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust which is required to be registered under the Act but has not been so registered shall be heard or decided in any Court’) it is held by the Rajasthan High Court that none of the provisions of the Act spells about any such compulsory registration of all the trusts.[15]

Formation and Registration of Public Trusts Independent

Formation of trusts and registration of the same under the Public Trusts Acts are two independent actions. A public trust arises by dedication of property and appointment of trustees. Declaration by a registered deed, or transfer rights to trustee, is the usual mode of dedication of immovable property. A document not is essential for the dedication of property to charity. 

In Menakuru  Dasaratharami  Reddi Vs. D Subba  Rao[16] it is held:

  • “The principles of Hindu Law applicable to the consideration of questions of dedication of property to charity are well settled. Dedication to charity need not necessarily be by instrument or grant. It can be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties and use of the property which shows the extinction of the private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity.”

In Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of HP[17], while dealing with a Dharmasala, it is held:

  • “Dedication of property either may be complete or partial. When such dedication is complete, a public trust is created in contradistinction to a partial dedication which would only create a charity…… A dedication for public purposes and for the benefit of the general public would involve complete cessation of ownership on the part of the founder and vesting of the property for the religious object…. A dedication, it may bear repetition to state, would mean complete relinquishment of his right of ownership and proprietary.”

In State of Madras Vs. SSM Paripelena  Sangam[18] it was held that in order to constitute a valid endowment it is necessary that the donor should divest himself of the property.[19] In Ramalinga  Chetti Vs. Sivachidambara  Chetty[20] it was held that the dedication of property to an idol of a temple is not required by law to be in writing and may be made orally.[21]  In Kapoor Chand Vs. Ganesh Dutt[22] it is held that dedication of private property for religious and charitable purpose may be proved by oral evidence or may be inferred from the conduct of the parties.[23]  It can also be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties, and extinction of the private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity.[24] 

In those States where Public Trusts Acts are enacted, the affairs of Trusts therein are to be carried on in accordance with those Acts. These Acts cast duty on the trustees of the public trusts to register the Trusts before the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner. Non registration does not entail the dedication void.

Non-Registration: Effect upon Suits

Section 31 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 reads as under:

  • “(1) No suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust which has not been registered under this Act shall be heard or decided in any Court.
  •  (2) The provisions of Sub -section (1) shall apply to a claim of set off or other proceeding to enforce a right on behalf of such public trust.”

In Idol Shri ‘Shriji’ Vs. Chaturbhai,[25] the Madhya Pradesh High Court considered the scope of the Section in the Trusts Act that bars civil suit and it was observed: 

  • “A suit on behalf of an idol for declaration that the suit properties belonged to the idol and as such were not liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree obtained against the shebait of the idol was a suit ‘to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust within Section 32 of MP Public Trusts Act. 1951, and as the trust was not registered as per provisions of the said Act the suit could not be heard or decided by any court.”

But, the Bombay High Court had, in Gandhi Sewa Shikshan Samiti Vs. Gulam Hussain Welji,[26] taken the view that the bar against an unregistered trust of asking for a decree in enforcement of a right on behalf of the public trust, would have to be read in the context of other Sections of the Act which pertain to filing of suits, such as Sec. 50, 51, 52 and 52A, and the bar was limited in its application to the kinds of suits contemplated in those sections.

In Parshvanath Jain Temple Vs. LRs. of Prem Dass[27] it was held that irregularity, if any, on account of non-registration of the Trust at the time of institution of the suit could be cured with the subsequent registration of the Trust. It was pointed out that the bar under Section 29 of the Rajasthan Act was only against the hearing and final decision of the suit, and not against the institution of the suit itself.

Registered  Societies also to be Registered under BPT Act

All Societies registered under the So. Regn. Act of 1860, which appertain public trusts, are also required to be registered under the Public Trusts Acts. Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, defines ‘public trust’ to mean an express or constructive trust for either a public religious or charitable purpose or both and includes a temple, a math, a wakf, a dharmada or any other religious or charitable endowment and a society formed either for a religious or charitable purpose or for both and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.

Registration with IT Authorities

Various Tax laws direct registration with IT authorities also, for exemption from Tax. Section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides that the income from property held for charitable or religious purposes, shall not be included in the total income of the assessee. Section 12 gives the benefit of exemption to the income of trusts and institutions. Section 12 also provides for conditions for registration of trusts, societies etc.


[1]      AIR 1974 SC 1084

[2]      The Nizams Pilgrimage Money Trust Vs. Commissioner of IT:  AIR 2000 SC 1802;

Kishore Joo Vs. Guman  Behari  JooDeo: AIR  1978 All 1.

Bonnerji  Vs. Sitanath: 49 IA 46:

referred to in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain: ILR 1982- 1 Del 11;

Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla  Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309;

See also: Shivramdas Vs. B V Nerukar: AIR 1937 Bom 374;

Rambabu  Vs. Committee of Rameshwar: (1899) 1 Bom LR 667;

Nathiri  Menon Vs. Gopalan Nair: AIR 1916 Mad 692.

[3]      AIR 1954 SC 388.  

[4] Durgah Committee, Ajmer Vs. Syed Hussain Ali: AIR 1961 SC 1402;

Sardar Sarup Singh Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1959 SC 860;

Indian Young Lawyers Assn. Vs. State of Kerala: 2018 13 Scale 75; 2018 8 SCJ 609.

[5]      AIR 1954 SC 282.

[6] The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments Vs. Sri Lakshmindra  Thirtha  Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt: AIR 1954 SC 282;

Indian Young Lawyers Assn. Vs. State of Kerala: 2018 13 Scale 75; 2018 8 SCJ 609;

KS VargheseVs. St. Peters and St. Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333;

VM Malaviya Vs. GY Dewaji: 2018-1 GLR 435

[7]      This decision is referred to in  Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti: 2013 AIR (SCW) 5782: AIR 2013 SC (CIV) 2849; 2013 (15) SCC 394;

T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad Vs. Union of India: AIR 2005 SC 4256;

State of Rajasthan Vs. Sajjanlal Panjawat: AIR 1975 SC 706.

[8] Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin :1992 (1) GLH 331;

VM Malaviya Vs. GY Dewaji: 2018-1 GLR 435

[9]      Seth Chand Ratan Vs. Pandit Durga Prasad: AIR 2003 SC 2736;

Prahlad Kushwaha Vs. Rani Devmati: 2012-3 MPLJ 673;

Swami Indredevanand Vs. State of MP: 1976 MPLJ 722.

[10]    Kada Manikpuri Jijhotia Brahman Trust Vs. Regtar, Public Trusts :LAWS(MPH) 2017 8 178

[11] See: Orissa, Tamil Nadu Public Trusts Acts.

[12] K.  Arjun Das Vs. Commissioner of Endowments, Orissa: 2019 0 Supreme(SC) 1024;

Natesan Agencies VS State: 2019 0 Supreme(SC) 891;

Joint Commissioner, HR and CE Vs. Jayaraman: 2006-1 SCC 257

Idol of Sri Ranganathaswamy VS Gopaldas Dwarakadoss: 2019-3 LW 642; 2019-5 MLJ 769

Executive Officer, Arulmigu Yoganarasimmar Vs. S. Kuppan: 2012-5 LW 171

T Subbaraman Vs. Sri Vedantha Desikar Devasthanam: 2007-5 MLJ 87

Mahanta Srikrushna Chandra Das Vs. Rajkishore Mohanty: AIR 1982  Ori 123.

[13] 2018-14 SCC 761

[14]    Priti Pratap Singh Vs. Rani Prem Kumari: 2018-8 LAWS (DLH) 492

[15] Ramesh Chandra Vs. Milap Chand: 2015-3 CDR 1072: 2015-4 WLC 143,

[16]    AIR 1957 SC 797

[17]    AIR 2003 SC 1685

[18]    AIR 1962 Mad 48

[19]    See also: Idol Murli  Manoharji  Vs. Gopilal  Garg: AIR 1971 Raj 177

[20]    (1918) ILR 42 M 440: 36 MLJ 575

[21]    See also: R Venugopala  Reddiar Vs. Krishnaswamy: AIR 1971 Mad  262

[22]    AIR 1993 SC 1145

[23]    Referred to in Bala Shankar Maha  Shanker  Vs. Charity Comner: AIR 1995 SC 167

[24]    Shri Ram Kishan Mission Vs. Dogar Singh: AIR 1984 All 72.

[25]    AIR 1965 MP 4

[26]    1962-64 Bom LR 206;

Both these decisions referred in: Jagannath Vs. Satya Narainlaws: AIR 1973 Raj 13.

[27]   2009-3-RCR(CIVIL) 133



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Hindu Temples & Law of Trusts

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Synopsis.

  1. Introduction
  2. Temple and Idol
  3. Idolas representing spititual purpose is Juristic Person
  4. Mutts a Juristic Person
  5. Whether Shebaitship and Mahantship a Property?
  6. School: Juristic Personality
  7. Vesting of Tank
  8. Vesting of Temple Property in Idol
  9. Ideal, Secondary, General or Figurative Sense’
  10. Worshippers are Beneficiaries: in a Spiritual Sense
  11. Deity, Legal Person ‘Representing Purpose of Dedicator’
  12. Dedication for Spiritual Benefit
  13. Deity and Idol
  14. Shebait – Heritable Property
  15. Can an Idol Sue as an Indigent Person
  16. Shebait – Legal Status
  17. Vesting Dedicated Property – Roman Law &Hindu Law
  18. Valid Dedication
  19. Family Deity is also a Juristic Person
  20. Ownership Vests in Idol – Legal Principles
    • Res nullius
    • Re – Property Vests in Temple.
    • Re – Property Vests in Idol in a ‘figurative sense’
    • Property Vests in Idol Representing ‘Aim of Donor’.
  21. Debutter/Devaswam Property
  22. Devaswom – Legal Character

Introduction

Religious and Charitable Trusts exist in some shape or other, in almost all the civilized societies. Instincts of devoutness and compassion, inherent in human nature, made him found religious and charitable trusts.

Roman law

  • In Roman law, properties dedicated to Gods formed a species of Res Publicae. The only juristic person recognized in early Roman Law was the State.
  • The idea of a corporate body as a new subject to rights and duties distinct from all its members was fully recognized in Rome during the Imperial period.

English Law

  • In English Law there is something technical in the conception of trust which had its origin in dual system of law and dual system of ownership.
  • The notions of trust in its technical sense were devised by the Chancery Courts in England. These principles were imported to a large extent form the Roman Civil Law.[1]

Hindu Law

  • Hindu Law also has its own unique history of development as to the concepts of legal identity of its religious and charitable endowments, and rules fastened thereto. It marks differences from the English principles.
  • The norms and doctrines that exist in the Hindu religion of modern times were not devised in the religion of the Vedas.
  • The law which is administered today in India with respect to the endowed Hindu temples and religious institutions is, to a large extent, the creation of Judges.

Ever since the establishment of British Courts in India, an array of eminent Judges, both English and Indian, brought their legal learning and strong common sense to bear upon this branch of law.  They evolved a sufficiently well-developed body of rules and principles. They based on the few cryptic writings of ancient Hindu sages. This development was, in a sense, necessitated by the demands of the time and the prevalent social and moral ideas. The notions and principles of English Law had also influenced it to a great extent.[2]

Temples were Common Hindu Endowments

It was observed by the Madras High Court, in Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami Vs. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami (1904),[3] that temples were numerous in India and they had the largest endowments, especially in the shape of lands, revenue and jewellery.

Hindu Law on Dedication

A religious trust by way of debutter comes into existence only on dedication of property for worship or service of Idol. For a valid dedication there should be proof of renunciation of the ownership of (dedicated) property, by the owner.[4] In case of a dispute as to dedication, the court decides the same on the basis of its particular facts and circumstances.[5] The ceremonies of Sankalpa and Samarpana are relevant to show the intention of the owner. If there is clear evidence of divesting of ownership with the intention of devoting it to religious or charitable purpose, dedication can be inferred even without specific evidence of ceremonies.[6]

In Deoki  Nandan Vs. Murlidhar[7] it is observed:

  • “It is a settled law that an endowment can validly be created in favour of an idol or temple without the performance of any particular ceremonies, provided the settlor has clearly and unambiguously expressed his intention in that behalf. Where it is proved that ceremonies were performed, that would be valuable evidence of endowment, but, absence of such proof would not be conclusive against it.” 

In Menakuru Dasaratharami Reddi Vs. D Subba Rao[8] it is held:

  • “The principles of Hindu Law applicable to the consideration of questions of dedication of property to charity are well settled. Dedication to charity need not necessarily be by instrument or grant. It can be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties and use of the property which shows the extinction of the private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity.”

In Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of H P[9] while dealing with a Dharmasala, it is held:

  • “Dedication of property either may be complete or partial. When such dedication is complete, a public trust is created in contradistinction to a partial dedication which would only create a charity…… A dedication for public purposes and for the benefit of the general public would involve complete cessation of ownership on the part of the founder and vesting of the property for the religious object…. A dedication, it may bear repetition to state, would mean complete relinquishment of his right of ownership and proprietary.”

It is pointed out by Dr. BK Mukherjea, J., on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, Tagore Law Lectures, that ‘it is undoubtedly possible for a founder to dedicate property in the form of a gift; he can also, if he likes, create a trust through the medium of trustees’;[10]and that under Hindu law, if an endowment is made for a religious or charitable institution, without the instrumentality of a trust, and the object of the endowment is one which is recognised as pious, being either religious or charitable under the accepted notions of Hindu law, the institution will be treated as a juristic person capable of holding property.[11]

Mulla, Hindu Law: reads as under:

  • “A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution, may, according to his law, express his purpose and endow it. A trust is not required for that purpose. … “[12]

Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts[13] observes that a dedication by a Hindu for religious or charitable purposes is neither a ‘gift’ nor a ‘trust’ in the strict legal sense.

Peculiarities of ‘Hindu Dedications’

In Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs. Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi[14] AP High Court listed following peculiarities of ‘Hindu dedications’:

  •        “(1) A dedication to the religious or a charitable trust under Hindu law is not a gift or a transfer of property.
  •        (2) A dedication does not require writing or registration. No formal words or ceremonies are necessary to effect a dedication.
  •        (3) A dedication does not require acceptance on behalf of the idol or charity.
  •        (4) A dedication will not fail even though there is uncertainty in the name of the idol or uncertainty in the quantum of income that has to be applied to the trust.
  •        (5) A dedication will not fail even if a gift is made to an idol which is not in existence at the time of the testator’s death (Mohan Singh v. Hat Singh, 32 All 337), nor a dedication to a temple which is yet to be built to a deity.
  •        (6) A dedication will not fall even if there is destruction or a mutilation of the image of the deity (Raghavachari v. Narayan, AIR 1974 Mad 166). A dedication is not affected by the Rule against Perpetuities and Accumulations.
  •        (7) A dedication is irrevocable even at the instance of the donor (Deoki Nandan Vs. Mulidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133).
  •        (8) The dedication of property is not a sacrament but a secular act. The only difference between a dedication and secular gift is that in former no acceptance is necessary; mere renunciation of ownership by the donor with a particular object being sufficient to create an endowment (Ram Swaroop v. Thakur Ram Chandra, AIR 1953 Nag 35).
  •        (9) Declaration in unequivocal term is sufficient. Where a tablet was fixed declaring that house was set apart for using as staying place for marriage parties of Khattries, it was held as sufficient to constitute the dedication (Jay Dayal v. Diwan, ILR 1938 Lah 704).
  •        (10) The rule against perpetuities embodied Section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable to properties dedicated for public religious and charitable purposes.”

Dedication to the Almighty

A Full Bench of Madras High Court, in Narasimha Vs. Venkatalingam,[15] held that a gift to Almighty is not a gift to a living person; and therefore, it is neither a gift nor a conveyance under the Transfer of Property Act.[16]Dedication of property to a deity is actually renunciation of its ownership by a private individual, in favour of the Almighty.

Purpose of Gift to a Religious Endowment

In Hindu Religious Endowments Board Vs. Veeraraghavacharlu (1937)[17] it had been observed:

  • “As explained in the case, that purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner. This is the sense in which a temple and its endowments are regarded as a public trust.”[18]

Our Apex Court, in Deoki  Nandan  Vs  Murlidhar,[19] it was held as under:

  • “The true purpose of a gift of properties to the Idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship.”[20]

Trust: Hindu Law & English Law

Main characteristics of charitable trusts under Hindu Law that bear stark difference from the English Law are the following:

  • (i)   Under Hindu Law, charitable trusts of private nature are also accepted as valid. Dr. Mukherjea in his Tagore Law Lectures ‘On the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’ depicted this feature as under:
    • “In English Law charitable trusts are synonymous with public trusts and what is called religious trust is only a form of charitable trust. … One fundamental distinction between English and Indian Law lies in the fact that there can be religious trust of a private character under Hindu Law which is not possible in English Law.”[21]
  • (ii) Under Hindu Law, especially in the case of temples and Mutts, property can vest in the deity or in the institution, considered as juristic persons;[22]whereas, in English Law, a trustee is the legal owner of the trust property. Dr. Mukherjea, ‘On Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’ spoke:
    • “The idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests.”
  • Our Apex Court in Sarangadeva  Periya  Matam  Vs. Ramaswami  Goundar[23] held that the Mutt was the owner of the endowed property; and that, like an idol, the Mutt is a juristic person  having the power of acquiring, owning and possessing property and having the capacity of suing and being sued.
  • (iii) Under Hindu Law, Shebaites are only persons in charge of administration of the temple and its property; and they are not recognized, in the strict legal sense, as trustees, for the main reason that the property does not vest in them.  They are only Managers. Deeming provision was inserted in Sec. 10 of the (old) Limitation Act to bring-in such managers also under this section.[24]
  • (iv) Under Hindu Law, beneficiaries have only beneficial interest; and, not beneficial ownership. Under English law, legal ownership is vested in Trustees and beneficial ownership, in Beneficiaries.
  • (v) Under Hindu Law, the administrators of religious trusts in India have no title to the trust properties; and the properties are vested in them for administration and management alone.[25]
  • (vi) Under Hindu Law, the beneficiaries have an interest in trust property, as distinct from a right against the trustee, as recognized by the Privy Council in ME Moolla Sons Ltd Vs. Official Assignee, Rangoon.[26]

In Vidya  Varuthi  Thirtha  Swamigal Vs.  Baluswami  Ayyar (1922)[27] the Privy Council held as under:

  • “It is to be remembered that a ‘trust’ in the sense in which the expression is used in English Law is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple. When the gift is directly to an idol or a temple, the seisin to complete the gift is necessarily effected by human agency. Called by whatever name, the agent is only the manager and custodian of the idol or the institution. In no case is the property conveyed to or vested in him; nor is he a ‘trustee’ in the English sense of the term although in view of the obligations and duties resting on him, is answerable as a trustee in the general sense for maladministration. ” 

In Mt. Allah Rakhi Vs.  Shah Mohammed Abdur Rahim[28] it was held by the Privy Council as under:

  • “Mutawalli or Sajjadanashin is merely a manager of the wakf property, the ownership of which vests in God Almighty. Mutawalli or Sajjadanashin is not a trustee as understood in the English system.”

In Hem Chandra Vs. Suradham  Debya[29] it was held by the Privy Council that the beneficial interest, though not technically an equitable estate in India, could be mortgaged by the beneficiary.

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

It is trite law that dedicated property of a temple will be vested with the idol as the legal owner thereof, though such vesting is qualified to be in an ‘ideal or secondary sense’ (Bhupathi Nath v. Ramlal Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128) and the possession and management thereof will be with some human being identified as Shebait or Manager, though in the strict legal sense, they cannot be accepted as trustees.

In Wali Mohammed v. Rahmat Bee, (1999- 3 SCC 145), to the question whether the Mutawalli of a Wakf would be a trustee, our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “35. It will be seen that the main part of Sec. 10 (Limitation Act) states that no period of limitation applies for recovery of property from a trustee in whom the property is vested for a specific purpose, unless such a person is an assignee for valuable consideration. The Explanation further states that it shall be deemed that a person managing the property of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is to be deemed to be a trustee in whom such property has vested for a specific purpose. We shall explain these provisions in some detail.
  • 36. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] the Privy Council held that property comprised in a Hindu or Mohammedan religious or charitable endowment was not property vested in trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of the said words in the main section. The reason was that according to the customary law, where property was dedicated to a Hindu idol or mutt or to a Mohammedan wakf, the property vested in the idol or the institution or God, as the case may be, directly and that the shebait, mahant, mutawalli or other person who was in charge of the institution was simply a manager on behalf of the institution. As Sec. 10 did not apply unless these persons were trustees this judgment made recovery of properties of the above trusts from donees, from these managers, rather difficult.
  • 37. The legislature therefore intervened and amended Sec. 10 for the purpose of getting over the effect of the above judgment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill of 1929 makes this clear. It says: “The (Civil Justice) Committee’s recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] and Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das Aurora [(1922) 50 IA 84] which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutawalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Mohammedan religious endowment is vested, are not trustees within the meaning of the words as used in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in them. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person, not being an assignee for valuable consideration, endowments of this nature are not protected. The Committee’s recommendation is that Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Mohammedan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee.” (Quoted in: Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482).

In Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482, the Apex Court held that the Mutawalli is not a trustee in its true sense. The Supreme Court formulated a crucial question and answered it as under:

  • “127. Thus, the Mutawalli is treated as a trustee. But would the amendment made to Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make a Mutawalli a trustee generally?
  • Our answer is an emphatic No. This is for the reason that the change in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act was effected to overcome the judgment of the Privy Council, when it held that a Mutawalli would not be a trustee and when in view of the requirement in Sec. 10 that the suit must be one against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose and as a Mutawalli would not be a trustee in law per se, the legislature brought in the explanation. But what is striking are two features. Firstly, the change is brought by way of an Explanation. More importantly, the explanation begins with words “For the purpose of this section  and proceeds to declare that “any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be properly vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”
  • Therefore, apart from it being an Explanation, it also on its very terms, limits the deeming fiction to the purpose sought to be attained in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act.”

Trust Not Required for Endowing Hindu Religious Institutions

A Hindu can establish a religious or charitable institution even without creating a trust; i.e., one can endow an institution without appointing trustees. Such a dedication will not be recognised under English Law.

Mulla, Hindu Law[30] reads:

  • “A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may, according to his law, express his purpose and endow it. A trust is not required for that purpose. All that is necessary is that the religious or charitable purposes should be clearly specified, and that the property intended for the endowment should be set apart for or dedicated to those purposes….”

Dr. B.K. Mukherjea ‘‘On the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’’, Tagore Law Lectures, page 158, explains as to debutter property as under:

  • “The mere fact that an idol has been established does not by itself create a debutter. A religious trust by way of debutter can come into existence only when property is dedicated for worship or service of the idol. When there is no endowment in favour of an established idol, no trust in the Legal Sense of the term can possibly come into being; it is only the moral duty of the person who founds the deity or his heirs to carry on the worship in such a way as they think proper.”

Debutter/Devaswam Property

Though the dedicated asset of a temple is described as ‘Property of the Gods’ or ‘Devaswom’, according to the texts, the Gods have no beneficial enjoyment of the property and they can be described as their owners only in a figurative[31] sense.

Our Apex Court, in Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar,[32]observed as under: 

  • “In the conception of Debutter, two essential ideas are required to be performed: In the first place, the property which is dedicated to the Deity vests in an ideal sense in the Deity itself as a Juristic Person and in the second place, the personality of the Idol being linked up with natural personality of the Shebait, being the manager or being the Dharamkarta and who is entrusted with the custody of the Idol and who is responsible otherwise for preservation of the property of the Idol.”

Medhathiti commented on the expression ‘Devaswam’ in Manu, Chapter XI, Verse 26 as under:[33]

  • “Property of the Gods, Devaswam, means whatever is abandoned for Gods, for purposes of sacrifice and the like, because ownership in the primary sense, as showing the relationship between the owner and the property owned, is impossible of application to Gods.”[34]

Hindu Temples and Principles of Trust

Two conditions are to be satisfied for considering a religious institution as a Hindu Temple: One, it should be a place of public religious worship; and the other is that it should have been dedicated for the benefit of, or is used as of right by the Hindu Community, or any section thereof, as a place of religious worship. Placing these principles, our Apex Court held, in PF Sadavarthy Vs.  Commissioner, HR and CE,[35] as under:

  • “To constitute a temple it is enough if it is a place of public religious worship and if the people believe in its religious efficacy irrespective of the fact whether there is an Idol or a structure or other paraphernalia. It is enough if the devotees or the pilgrims feel that there is some super human power which they should worship and invoke its blessings.”[36]

In Hindu Religious Endowments Board Vs. Veeraraghavacharlu[37] it was observed by the Madras High Court as under:

  • “As explained in the case, that purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner. This is the sense in which a temple and its endowments are regarded as a public trust.”[38]

Worshippers are the Beneficiaries of Temples

Temples are established for the spiritual benefit of the Hindu community in general, or for a particular sect or section thereof. The beneficiary thereof is not God or deity; but, it is the worshippers as a whole.  Worshippers of an Idol are its ultimate beneficiaries, in a ‘spiritual sense’ only.[39]

The Supreme Court in the celebrated decision Deoki  NandanVs. Murlidhar,[40] after considering various decisions and Sanskrit texts, upheld the view that a Deity is an owner in ideal sense[41] and the real beneficiaries are the worshippers.[42]

Idol is a is a ‘Juristic Person’

In Prosunno Kumar Debia Vs. Golapchand (1874-75)[43] the Judicial Committee observed that it was only in an ideal sense that property could be said to belong to an idol. It had been expressly laid down in Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakhmiram (1887)[44] that the consecrated idol in a Hindu temple was a juridical person. In Vidyapurna  Tirtha Swami Vs.  Vidyanidhi  Tirtha Swami (1904)[45] it was observed as under:

  • “It is not strange, therefore, that in a country like this, where the sacredbooks of the people abound in personified descriptions of the Deity, His powers and attributes, the belief of donors should be similar and even stronger, as will be seen from Doorga Prasad v. Shiva Prasad, 7 CLR 278, where Mac Donnel and Tottenham JJ. observed: ‘According to Hindu notions when an idol has once been so to speak consecrated by the appropriate ceremony being performed and mantra pronounced, the deity of which the idol is the visible symbol resides in it.’
  • It is to give due effect to such a sentiment, widespread and deep rooted as it has always been, with reference to something not capable of holding property as a natural person, that the laws of most countries have sanctioned the creation of a fictitious person in the matter, as is implied in the felicitous observation made in the work already cited: ‘Perhaps the oldest of all juristic persons is the God, hero or the saint.’ (Pollock and Maitlands: History of English Law, p. 481).”

Pollock and Maitlands: ‘History of the English Law’ had been quoted in this decision (Vidyapurna  Tirtha Swami).  It reads:

  •  “His worshippers who gave him lands and goods regarded him, if in one sense as a supernatural person, yet in another and a very real sense, as a natural person; he was no creature of human thought, he lived and could hold property”.

Following are the important decisions of the Supreme Court that explained the principles as to ‘juristic personality’ of Idols.

  • Bishwanath Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji (1967)[46]
  • Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (1969)[47]
  • Official Trustee of WB Vs. CIT, WB, Calcutta (1974)[48]
  • Profulla  Chorone  Requitte Vs. Satya  Choron  Requitte (1979)[49]
  • Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar (1999)[50]
  • Parbandhak Committee Vs. Som Nath Dass (2000)[51]
  • Sri Ganapathi Dev Temple Vs. Balakrishna Bhat Shir. Gurdwara (2019)
  • M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case) (2019).[52]

Property Vests in Deity or Institution; Not in Trustees

As shown above, one of the main differences with respect to charitable trusts, between English Law and Hindu Law (temples, Mutts, schools, tank etc.) is that under Hindu Law, property vests in the Idol or Deity[53] or in the institution; whereas under English Law trust-property vests in trustees.

Our Apex Court in Sarangadeva  Periya  Matam  Vs.  Ramaswami  Goundar[54] held that the Mutt was the owner of the endowed property; and that, like an Idol, the Mutt is a juristic person  having the power of acquiring, owning and possessing property and having the capacity of suing and being sued.

Vesting Property with Idol, in an Ideal Sense; Management remains with Shebait

The possession and management of the dedicated property of a temple, which is vested with the idol, has to be in actual possession of some human-being. It is Shebait (शेबैत ). The responsibilities undertaken by Shebaits, in different parts of India, are similar. But, those persons are identified by different names.

  • Shebait (Shebaite) is the name used in Bengal & North India.
  • It is Dharmakarthas in Tamil and Telungu area.
  • And, Uralens/Ooralans in Kerala.

The Shebait being entitled to deal with all the temporal affairs of the idol and to manage its property,[55] the vesting of property with the Idol, as legal owner thereof, is qualified to be:

  • (a) in an ideal sense (Jogadinadra  Nath  Vs.  Hemanta  Kumari Debi),[56]
  • (b) secondary/general character (Bhupathi  Nath Vs. Ramlal Maitra)[57] or
  • (c) in a figurative sense (Yogendranath  Vs. IT Commr)[58].

Because of the fiduciary position, their liability equates that of trustees. With regard to status of Shebaits, Indian Law differ from that of trustees in English Law, on details.

Under true English concept of trust, a trustee is the legal owner of the trust property; and the beneficial ownership thereof vests in the beneficiary or the cestuique trust.  Though Shebaits have certain limited proprietary rights, as shown below, they are only managers or persons in charge of administration of the temple and its property; and, the property do not vest in them as the legal-owners as in English Law.

Dr. BK Mukherjea on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts,[59] reads as under:

  • “(1) According to these sages the deity or idol is the owner of the dedicated property but in a secondary sense. The ownership in its primary sense connotes the capacity to enjoy and deal with the property at one’s pleasure. A deity cannot hold or enjoy property like a man; hence the deity is not the owner in its primary sense; (2) ownership is, however, attributed to the deity in a secondary or ideal sense; this is a fiction but not a mere figure of speech, it is a legal fact; otherwise the deity could not be described as owner even in the secondary sense; (3) the fictitious ownership which is imputed to the deity is determined by the expressed intentions of the founder; the debutter property cannot be applied or used for any purpose other than that indicated by the founder. The deity as owner, therefore, represents nothing else but the intentions of the founder….. Neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law. So far as the deity stands as the representative and symbol of the particular purpose which is indicated by the donor, it can figure as a legal person and the correct view is that in that capacity alone the dedicated property vests in it.”[60]

The Supreme Court, in Deoki  Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar (1957),[61] after considering various decisions and Sanskrit texts, observed as under:

  • “Thus, according to the texts, the Gods have no beneficial enjoyment of the properties, and they can be described as their owners only in a figurative sense (Gaunartha),[62] and the true purpose of a gift of properties to the Idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship.”[63]

It is expressed in another way by the Apex Court in Yogendranath  Vs. IT Commissioner[64] as under:

  • “The juristic person in the idol is not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that the image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated. … It is also not correct that the Supreme Being of which the idol is a symbol or image is the recipient and owner of dedicated property. … Thus according to texts, the Gods have no beneficial enjoyment of properties, and they can be described as their owners in a figurative sense (though the assets are called ‘properties of the Gods’ or ‘Devaswam’)”.

Our Apex Court followed the proposition that the property vests in idol in an ideal sense only, in the following decisions.

  • Bishwanath Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji (1967)[65]
  • Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (1969)[66]
  • Profulla  Chorone  Requitte Vs. Satya  Choron  Requitte (1979)[67]
  • Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar (1999)[68]
  • M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case) (2019).[69]

Juristic personality of Idol Explained

It is held by the Supreme Court in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case) [70] as under:

  • “322. Courts recognise a Hindu idol as the material embodiment of a testator’s pious purpose. Juristic personality can also be conferred on a Swayambhu deity which is a self-manifestation in nature. An idol is a juristic person in which title to the endowed property vests. The idol does not enjoy possession of the property in the same manner as do natural persons. The property vests in the idol only in an ideal sense. The idol must act through some human agency which will manage its properties, arrange for the performance of ceremonies associated with worship and take steps to protect the endowment, inter alia by bringing proceedings on behalf of the idol. The shebait is the human person who discharges this role.”

Status of Shebaits and Mahanths – Concept and History of Origin, Unique

Mahant is the head and superior of the spiritual fraternity attached to a Mutt. The concept of Shebaiti and Mahanthship is deep-rooted in past Indian history, and has its own unique history of origin and development. When compared to ‘trustees’ in Law of Trusts, the status and position of Shebaits and Mahanths may appear anomalous.

  • Because,
    1. Viewing through the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, they are not trustees.
    2. Despite the fact that property will not vest in them and they are mere managers or administrators, in one view of the matters, they have certain proprietary rights.
    3. In the conception of Shebaiti and Mahanthship, both the elements of office and property are mixed up; and duties and personal interest are blended together.
    4. The legal character of a Shebait cannot be defined with precision and exactitude in the English standards, though the concept of Shebaiti and Mahanthshipit is precise, and bounded by definite contours.

In Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Chorone Requitte (1979) it was observed by our Apex Court that the legal character of a Shebait cannot be defined with precision and exactitude.

See Blog: Shebaits & Mahants and Law of Trustees

Management Entrusted to Shebaites,  Ex Necessitas

In Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Chorone Requitte (1979)[71] it was observed by our Apex Court that the property dedicated to an idolvests in it in an ideal sense only;the possession and management has to be (ex necessitas) entrusted to some human agent. The legal character of a shebait cannot be defined with precision and exactitude. Broadly described, he is the human ministrant and custodian of the idol, its earthly spokesman, its authorised representative entitled to deal with all its temporal affairs and to manage its property.

Property Vests in Idol ‘as representing the aim or purpose of donor

Ownership property dedicated to temple/Idol vests in Idol/Deity itself. Legally accepted theory as to vesting is that such vesting is ‘as representing the aim or purpose of donor’ or the purpose of the trust.

Legal Personality: ‘Entity of the Idol’ Linked with‘Pious Purpose’: Dedicated property of a temple is generally said to be vested with Idol, as legal owner thereof; and not with any human being. But, neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law.[72] It is held to be an exploded theory that the idol or image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated.[73]

In this situation, to give a logical proposition as to the ‘juristic personality’ of idol, the ‘entity of the idol’ has to be linked or merged with the ‘pious purpose’ of the donor; especially since such ‘purpose’ itself is recognised in law as a legal person, as pointed out as early as in Manohar Ganesh Tambekar Vs. Lakhmiram (1888).[74]

Other Potential Theories as to Property Dedicated to Temples

Other potential theories discussed in legal parlance are the following:

  • 1. Dedicated property becomes Res nullius – belongs to nobody.
  • 2. Ownership vests in Temple.
  • 3. Ownership vests in Idol/Deity as representing God/Creator.
  • 4. Ownership vests in the Hindu Community at large or the section thereof.

1.Res nullius

This proposition is liable to be discarded for its inherent illegitimacy. It is noteworthy that Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. did not support the doctrine of ‘res nullius’; Dr. Mukherjea opined that ownership ‘must vest in somebody.’[75]

2. Re – Property Vests in Temple.

The Deity/Idol being invariably present in a Temple and it forms central part (or ‘nucleus[76]) of the foundation and it stands as the material symbol and embodiment of the pious purpose which the dedicator had in view[77], the law prefers recognition of the Deity as the legal person;[78] and disfavours recognition of Temple (or Endowment/Devaswam) as a legal person.[79]

3. Re – Property Vests in Idol in a ‘figurative sense’and  as Representing God/ Supreme-Being/ Creator.

Idol is regarded as the image or embodiment of Deity, which ultimately represents the Supreme Being. Idol or Image may be broken or lost; it can be replaced or substituted.  But Deity remains as same. In spiritual and legal concepts the ‘Deity’ is a representative. (‘Idol’ and ‘deity’ are seen used as synonyms when legal principles are formulated.)

Actually, when a devotee worships at the temple, he offers his prayers, or glorifies the Eternal Spirit attributed, to the Idol (and not the visible material of Idol, as it is).  This is the reason for regarding the Idol as Deity (one of the Gods). This principle could not be discarded while a theory as to true vesting of property is evolved.

It was observed by Privy Council in Bhupathi  Nath Vs. Ramlal  Maitra[80] that the concept that the Deity could be a ‘person’ was not accepted under Hindu- philosophy for the following:

  •  “It is a contradiction in terms to talk of the Creator accepting anything, in the legal sense of the word, from a creature, and that it is inconceivable that laws which were made for, if not by, men should be applicable to a Deity.”

4. Ownership vests in the Hindu Community at large

The ownership of the property vests, ideally speaking, in the idol or the deity; and in a practical sense in the Hindu community at large or the section, as the case may be, for whose worship the institution has been founded.[81]

Dr. BK Mukherjea on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts

It is explained by Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. that the Idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law.  Dr. Mukherjea, J  explained:

  • “Neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law. So far as the deity stands as the representative and symbol of the particular purpose which is indicated by the donor, it can figure as a legal person and the correct view is that in that capacity alone the dedicated property vests in it.”

Dr. BK Mukherjea evaluated the decisions of the Privy Council as well as the Courts of India and points out as under:

  • “With regard to Debutter, the position seems to be somewhat different. What is personified here is not the entire property which is dedicated to the deity but the deity itself which is the central part of the foundation and stands as the material symbol and embodiment of the pious purpose which the dedicator has in view.
  • “The dedication to deity”, said Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Bhupati v. Ramlal Maitra, (1910) 10 Cal LJ 355 at p. 369 “is nothing but a compendious expression of the pious purpose for which the dedication is designed”.
  • It is not only a compendious expression but a material embodiment of the pious purposeand though there is difficulty in holding that property can reside in the aim or purpose itself, it would be quite consistent with sound principles of Jurisprudence to say that a material object which represents or symbolises a particular purpose can be given the status of a legal person, and regarded as owner of the property which is dedicated to it”[82]

Dr. BK Mukherjea J., reads further as under:[83]

  • “Principle as to personality of institutions.- Apart from natural persons and corporations, which are recognised by English Law, the position under Hindu Law is that if an endowment is made for a religious or charitable institution, without the instrumentality of a trust, and the object of the endowment is one which is recognised as pious, being either religious or charitable under the accepted notions of Hindu Law, the institution will be treated as a juristic person capable of holding property….
  • The position as to Idols is of a special nature. In the Hindu Debutter, it seems, the position is slightly different, and not the whole endowment, but the Idol which as an embodiment of a pious or benevolent idea, constitutes the centre of the foundation and is looked upon as the juristic being in which the Debutter property vests. After all, juristic personality is a mere creation of law and has its origins in a desire for doing justice by providing, as it were, centres for jural relations. As Salmond says: ‘It may be of as many kinds as the law considers proper,’ and the choice of the corpus into which the law shall breathe the breath of fictious personality is a matter of form than of substance.”[84]

Expansion of Concept as to Vesting Property in ‘Pious Purpose’

Prosunno Kumari Debya Vs. Golab Chand Baboo: 1875

Onward march of jurisprudential ideas as to vesting of property dedicated to an Idol, begins from the decision of the Privy Council in 1875, in Prosunno Kumari Debya Vs. Golab Chand Baboo.[85]It was held in this decision that the property vest in the deity only in an ‘ideal sense’.  The ever growing ideas in this subject are bloated out from this pile.

  • “It is only in an ideal sense that property can be said to belong to an Idol; and the possession and management of it must in the nature of things be entrusted to some person as shebait, or manager. It would seem to follow that the person so entrusted must of necessity be empowered to do whatever may be required for the service of the  Idol, and for the benefit and preservation of its property, at least to as great a degree as the manager of an infant heir. If this were not so, the estate of the Idol might be destroyed or wasted, and its worship discontinued, for want of the necessary funds to preserve and maintain them.”

Manohar  Ganesh  Tambekar  Vs.  Lakhmiram: 1888

Bombay High Court, in 1887, in Manohar Ganesh Tambekar Vs.Lakhmiram,[86] set out the underlying principles for conferring legal personality on an Idol and the doctrine as to the pious purpose of the testator as the legal entity capable of holding property. Justice West observed as under:

  • “The Hindu Law, like the Roman law and those derived from it recognizes not only corporate bodies with rights of property vested in the corporation apart from its individual members, but also juridical persons or subjects called foundations. The religious institutions like Mutts and other establishments obviously answer to the description of foundations in Roman Law. The idea is the same, namely, when property is dedicated for a particular purpose, the property itself upon which the purpose is impressed, is raised to the category of a juristic person so that the property which is dedicated would vest in the person so created.”[87]

Vidyapurna  Tirtha Swami Vs. Vidyanidhi  Tirtha   Swami: 1904

Madras High Court in Vidyapurna  Tirtha Swami Vs. Vidyanidhi  Tirtha Swami[88] observed in the year 1904 as under:

  • “For all practical purposes however it is immaterial whether the presiding Idol or the community of worshippers is regarded as the corporation or juristic person in which the properties are vested, though from a juristic point of view there may be a difference of opinion as to which theory is more scientific. In the words of a recent writer on Jurisprudence (Salmond‘s ‘Jurisprudence’ (1902), 346) ‘the choice of the corpus into which the law shall breathe the breath of a fictious personality is a matter of form rather than of substance, of lucid and compendious expression, rather than of legal principle’ …”[89]

Bhupathi  Nath  Vs. Ramlal  Maitra:  1909-1910

Privy Council in Bhupathi  Nath  Vs. Ramlal  Maitra[90] held that, in law, neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person; but, the Deity ‘as representing Supreme Being’ or ‘as representing the pious purpose of the dedicator’ could be accepted as a legal person. It was pointed out that the concept that the Deity could be a ‘person’ was not accepted under Hindu-philosophy, observing as under:

  •  “It is a contradiction in terms to talk of the Creator accepting anything, in the legal sense of the word, from a creature, and that it is inconceivable that laws which were made for, if not by, men should be applicable to a Deity”

Deoki  Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar: 1957

The Supreme Court in the celebrated decision Deoki  NandanVs. Murlidhar,[91] after considering various decisions and Sanskrit texts upheld the view that a Deity is an owner in ideal sense and the real beneficiaries are the worshippers.[92] It was observed that the true purpose of a gift of properties to the Idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship. In Deoki  Nandan  Vs  Murlidharit was held as under:

“The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof.”

Yogendra  Nath  Vs. IT Commissioner: 1969

The Supreme Court held in Yogendra  Nath Vs. IT Commissioner,[93]  that the Idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor was the juristic person recognized by law; and ‘that in this juristic person the dedicated property vests’.[94] It was further observed in this decision that ‘neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law. Then held:

  • “But, so far as the deity stands as the representative and symbol of the particular purpose which is indicated by the donor, it can figure as a legal person.”

The Supreme Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, AIR 1969 SC 1089, observed as under:

  • “6. …It should however be remembered that the juristic person in the idol is not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that the image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated and vivified by the Pran Pratishta ceremony. It is not also correct that the Supreme Being of which the idol is a symbol or image is the recipient and owner of the dedicated property.
  • …The correct legal position is that the idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests. As observed by Mr. Justice B.K. Mukherjea:
    • “With regard to the debutter… It is not only a compendious expression but a material embodiment of the pious purpose and though there is difficulty in holding that property can reside in the aim or purpose itself, it would be quite consistent with sound principles of Jurisprudence to say that a material object which represents or symbolises a particular purpose can be given the status of a legal person, and regarded as owner of the property which is dedicated to it. … The legal position is comparable in many respects to the development in Roman Law.”
  • (It is quoted in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case), 2019)

The Supreme Court, after referring to various texts, explained that that the juristic person in the Idol was not the material image, and it was an exploded theory that the image itself developed into a legal person as soon as it was consecrated. According to the texts, Gods had no beneficial enjoyment of the properties, and they could be described as their owners only in a figurative sense[95] (Gannartha), though the assets were called ‘property of the Gods’ or ‘Devaswam’. It was pointed out that the true purpose of a gift of properties to the Idol was not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desired to worship.

Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar: 1999

Our Apex Court, in Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar,[96] while considering the legal status of two separate deities, Ram Jankijee and Thakur Raja, it was held that they were separate Juristic Persons. So, in the same precincts, as a matter of law, it is possible to exist two separate juristic persons. The Apex Court also observed as under: 

  • “God is omnipotent and omniscient and its presence is felt not by reason of a particular form or image but by reason of the presence of the omnipotent: It is formless, it is shapeless and it is for the benefit of the worshippers that there is manifestation in images of the Supreme Being.”

It is observed further:

  •  “A simple piece of wood or stone may become the image or idol and divinity is attributed to the same. As noticed above, it is formless, shapeless but it is the human concept of a particular divine existence which gives it the shape, the size and the colour.”

Read Blogs:Common Law of TRUSTS in India


[1] CR Shivananda Vs. HC Gurusiddappa: 2011 0 ILR(Kar) 4624

[2] CR Shivananda Vs. HC Gurusiddappa: 2011 0 ILR(Kar) 4624

[3]      27 ILR Mad 435

[4]      AIR 1953 Nag. 351;  AIR 1959 All. 473. 

[5]      (1972 All 273). See 1963 SC 1638.

[6]      ILR 16 Lah.85.

[7]      AIR 1957 SC 133

[8]      AIR 1957 SC 797.

[9]      AIR 2003 SC 1685.

[10]    Quoted in: Iswar Madan Mohun Vs. Priyamoni Dasi: 1971 Cal LJ  314, 1971-1 Cal LT 254; Rivers Steam Navigation Co Ltd Vs. State: 1966-71 Cal WN 854.

[11] page 36. Quoted in M. Siddiq (D) Thr.Lrs.  VS Mahant Suresh Das: 2020-1 SCC 1.

[12]    Quoted in : Shri Ram Kishan Mission Vs. Dogar Singh: AIR 1984 All 72; Also referred: Lalta Prasad Vs. Brahmanand: AIR 1953 All 449 (DB).

[13]    pages 102 & 103.

[14] 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 AllLR 591

[15] ILR 50 Mad 687

[16] Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 AllLR 591.

[17]    AIR 1937 Mad 750; Referred to Bhupati  Vs.  Ramlal Maitra (1910): ILR 37 Cal 128,

[18]    Quoted in: Shriomani  Gurudwara  Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs.  Shri  Som  Nath  Dass:  AIR 2000 SC 1421. See also: Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Religious Endowments: AIR1981 SC 798.

[19]    Deoki  Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar: AIR 1957 SC 133.

[20]    See also: Yogendra  Nath Vs. IT Commr: AIR1969 SC 1089

[21]    Quoted in Mahant Ram Saroop  Dasji Vs. S P Sahi  Spl Officer: AIR  1959 SC  951.

[22]    See Chapter: VESTING OF PROPERTY IN HINDU ENDOWMENTS.

[23]    AIR 1966 SC 1603

[24]    See: Sri Silambani Vs. Chidambaram Chettiar: AIR 1943 Mad 691.

[25]    Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs. CIT:AIR 1964 Mad 483

[26]    38 Bom LR 1011 (PC)

[27]    AIR 1922 PC 123

[28]    AIR 1934 PC 77

[29]    AIR 1940 PC 134

[30]    Page 600, 21stEdn

[31]    Deoki  Nandan Vs. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133;

Yogendra  Nath  Naskar  Vs. Commr. of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089.

[32]    AIR 1999 SC 2131.

[33]    See Page 38 of ‘Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’

[34]    Quoted in: Yogendra  Nath  Naskar  Vs. Commr. of IT Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089. 

[35]    AIR 1963 SC 510

[36]    It  is quoted in Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1999 SC 2131

[37]    AIR 1937 Mad 750: Referred to ILR 37 Cal 128

[38]    Quoted in: Shriomani  Gurudwara  Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs.  Shri  Som  Nath  Dass: AIR 2000 SC 1421.

See also: Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Religious Endnts. Orissa: AIR1981 SC 798.

[39]    Vidyapurna  Tirtha Swami Vs.  Vidyanidhi  Tirtha Swami (1904): 27 ILR Mad 435

Bishwanth  Vs. Sri Thakur Radha  Ballabhji: AIR 1967 SC 1044;

        Deoki  Nandan Vs. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133.

[40]    AIR 1957 SC 133

[41]    Deoki  Nandan Vs. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133

Bishwanth  Vs. Sri Thakur Radha  Ballabhji: AIR 1967 SC 1044;

Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commr. of Income Tax:AIR1969 SC 1089;

Profulla  Chorone  Requitte Vs. Satya  Choron  Requitte: AIR 1979 SC 1682

Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1999 SC 2131

M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1.

[42]    Idol Baldauji  of  Dabri  Pittha  Vs.  Medh Rajput Association: AIR 1959 MP 330

Hindu Religious Endnt. Board Vs. Parasram  Veeraghava  Chrlu, AIR 1937 Mad 750

[43]    (1874-75) L.R.,2 Ind App 145 (PC).

[44]    ILR 12 B. 274

[45]    27 ILR Mad 435

[46]    1967 AIR SC 1044

[47]    AIR1969 SC 1089

[48]    AIR 1974 SC1355

[49]    AIR 1979 SC 1682;

See also:  Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228

[50]    AIR 1999 SC 2131 

[51]    AIR 2000 SC 1421

[52]    2020-1 SCC 1.

[53]    Smt. Mahani  Dasi Vs. Pareshnath Thakur: AIR  1954Ori 198;

Sankaranarayanan  Iyer Vs. Sri Poovananathaswami Temple: AIR1949 Mad 721.

[54]    AIR 1966 SC 1603

[55]   Profulla  Chorone  Requitte Vs. Satya  Choron  Requitte: AIR 1979 SC 1682

[56]    Jogadinadra  Nath  Vs.  Hemanta  Kumari Debi (1904) 31 Ind App 203

Silambani  Chidambara  Vinayar   Vs. Chidambaram Chettiar: AIR 1943 Mad 691;

Balram  Chunnilal  Vs. Durgalal  Shivnarain: AIR1968 MP 81.

Also: Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228

[57]    Bhupathi  Nath  Vs.  Ramlal  Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128.

[58]    Yogendranath  Vs. IT Commr: AIR 1969 SC 1089.

[59]    Page 46

[60]    See also: Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228

[61]    AIR 1957 SC 133

[62]    Commr. of Income Tax, Calcutta Vs. Iogendra  Nath: AIR 1965 Cal. 570 :

Decision reversed in: Yogendra  Nath  Naskar  Vs. Commr. of IT: AIR 1969 SC 1089.

[63]    See also: Hindi Religious Endowment in Board of Commrs. for the Hindu Religious Endowments Madras Vs. Parasram  Veeraghavachrlu, AIR 1937 Mad 750

[64]    AIR 1969 SC 1089

[65]    1967 AIR SC 1044

[66]    AIR1969 SC 1089

[67]    AIR 1979 SC 1682;

See also:  Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228

[68]    AIR 1999 SC 2131 

[69]    2020-1 SCC 1.

[70]See also: M. Siddiq Vs. Mohanth: 2020-1 SCC 1.

[71]    AIR 1979 SC 1682;

See also:  Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228

[72]    M.  Siddiq VS Mahant Suresh Das: 2020-1 SCC 1.

[73]    Yogendranath  Vs. IT Commr: AIR 1969 SC 1089

[74]    ILR 12 Bombay 247

[75]    See: Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, page 35

[76]    Shriomani  Gurudwara  Prabandhak  Vs.   Shri  Som  Nath  Dass: AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[77]    Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts by Dr. BK Mukherjea, J.;

Yogendra  Nath  Naskar  Vs. Commr. of Income Tax: AIR 1969 SC 1089.

[78]    TaritBhusan Vs. Sri Iswar Sridhar Salagram  Shila Thakur: AIR 1942 Cal 99;

Menakuru  Dasaratharami  Reddi Vs. D Subba  Rao, AIR 1957 SC 797;

DeokiNandan Vs. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133;

Bishwanath Vs. Thakur RadhaBallabhji: AIR 1967 SC 1044;

Sarangadeva  Periya  Matam Vs. Ramaswami  Goundar Dead: AIR 1966 SC1603;

Yogendra  Nath  Naskar Vs. Commr. of Income Tax, Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089;

Shrikalankade Visansthan Vs. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal Nagpur: AIR1970 SC 439;

Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Reli. Endts, 1981 SC 798;

Bala Shankar Maha  Shanker  Bhattjee Vs. Charity Commr: AIR 1995 SC167;

Shriomani  Gurudwara  Prabandhak Comtee Vs.   Shri  Som  Nath  Dass: AIR 2000 SC 1421;

Union Bank of India Vs. Khader International Construction: AIR  2001 SC 2277

[79]    See also: AIR 1967 J&K 52;

Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakshmiram, (1887) ILR 12 Bom 247.

[80]    ILR 37 Cal. 128: at page 141;

See also: Yogendranath  Vs. IT Commr: AIR 1969 SC 1089

[81]    Silambani  Chidambara  Vinayar  Vs. Chidambaram Chettiar AIR 1943 Mad 691;

Balram  Chunnilal  Vs. Durgalal  Shivnarain AIR1968 MP 81.

[82]    Quoted in: Yogendranath  Vs. IT Commr: AIR 1969 SC 1089

[83]    Page 36

[84]    Quoted in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): .2020-1 SCC 1.

[85]    (1875)  LR 2 Ind. App. 145

[86]    ILR (1888) 12 Bom 247

[87]    M.  Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das(Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1.

Thayarammal Vs. Kanakammal: AIR 2005 SC 1588

[88]    ILR (1904) 27 Mad 435

[89]    Quoted in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1.

[90]    (1909-1910) ILR 37 Cal. 128.

[91]    AIR 1957 SC 133

[92]    See also: Hindu Religious Endowment in Board of Commrs. for the Hindu Religious Endowments Madras Vs. Parasram  Veeraghava  Chrlu, AIR 1937 Mad 750

[93]    AIR1969 SC 1089

[94]    Followed in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1.

[95]    Also see: Commr. of Income Tax, Calcutta Vs. Jogendra  Nath, AIR 1965 Cal. 570: Reversed in: Yogendra  Nath  Naskar  Vs. Commr. of IT: AIR 1969 SC 1089.

[96]    AIR 1999 SC 2131.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Can a Trust be Dissolved? Extinction, Discharge, Revocation, Variation etc. of Public Trusts

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Synopsis.

  1.  ‘Once a Trust Always a Trust’; No Dissolution; No Termination
  2. Once a Dedication, No Revocation; No Extinction; No Termination
  3. Temple/Deities Cannot Be Transferred
  4. Transfer of an Institution
  5. Can a Private (Secular) Trust be Put to an End?
  6. Chapter VIII – The Extinction of Trusts  
  7. Can Entire Family Members Put an End to Family Temple?
  8. Cy Pres Doctrine – State & Court: Protectors of All Charities
  9. Sec. 77 and 78 do not Apply to Public Trusts
  10. Variation of Trust

Introduction

The provisions of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 as to ‘Discharge of Trustee’ (Sec. 71), ‘Trust how Extinguished’ (Sec. 77) and ‘Revocation of Trust’ (Sec. 78) do not apply to public or private religious or charitable endowments. Inasmuch as the beneficiaries as a whole alone have to consent to give effect to the acts given in the above list, it is clear that it is feasible only in private trusts; and not in public trusts.

In Private Trusts Beneficiaries Can Give Consent on Certain Variations

Indian Trusts Act, 1882 permits the beneficiaries, as a whole, who are competent to contract, to do, act or perform the following matters, as stated in those sections.

  • Sec.11. Modify the purpose of the trust and the directions for management.
  •          23.  Acquiesce a breach of trust of trustee.
  •          46.  Allow the trustee to renounce.
  •          47.  Allow the trustee to delegate his office or any of his duties.
  •          56.  Require trustee to transfer trust property to them, or to another.
  •          58.  Transfer the interest of beneficiary.
  •          62.  Ratify the sale to the trustee.
  •          71.  Discharge the trustee.
  •          77.  Allow to extinguish trust.
  • 78.  Revoke the trust.

Two important matters are worth noticeable in this regard. First, ‘once a public endowment/trust is made, it is final and irrevocable’ is a fundamental principle of public trusts.[1] Second, by virtue of Sec. 1 of the Trusts Act, the applicability of the Trusts Act is expressly excluded from public or private religious or charitable endowments.

S. 1, Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 1. “This Act may be called the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, and it shall come into force on the first day of March, 1882. It extends to the whole of India… But nothing herein contained affects the rules of Muhammadan law as to Wakf, or the mutual relations of the members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law, or applies to public or private religious or charitable endowments, or to trusts to distribute prizes taken in war among the captors ; and nothing in the second chapter of this Act applies to trusts created before the said day.”

Can a Private (Secular) Trust be Put to an End or Dissolved?

It is settled that in the case of (secular) private trusts, English principles are followed in India which lay down that if the beneficiaries are sui juris (of one mind), the trust can be put to an end or use the trust fund for any purpose.[2]

In Doorganath Roy Vs. Ram Chander Sen[3]the Privy Council observed that in the case of a family idol, ‘the consensus of the whole family might give the (Debutter) estate another direction’ and turn it into a secular estate; though in case of  the dedication is to a public temple, the family of the founder could not put an end to it. But, in Pramatha Nath Mullick Vs.Pradymna Kumaar Mullick[4], the Juducial Committee clarified that the property cannot be taken away from the idol and diverted to other purposes without the consent of the idol through its earthly agents who, as guardians of the deity, cannot in law consent to anything which may amount to an extinction of the deity itself.[5]

Fundamental Principles Cannot be Changed

A charitable foundation is the creature of the founder. And on this view, the founder provides for the mode of government and administration of trust.[6] The fundamental principles upon which a trust is founded cannot be varied. It applies heavily to public trusts. The courts cannot sanction any drastic amendment to the document of trust which would destroy the basic purpose for which the trust was created.

In Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun[7] House of Lords  (by a majority of 5-2) found that the minority was entitled to the assets of the Free Church. It was observed that when men subscribe money for a particular object, and leave it behind them for the promotion of that object, their successors have no right to change the object endowed.  In this case, the majority adopted new standards of doctrine, and abandoned its commitment to ‘the establishment principle’, which was held to be fundamental to the Free Church. In this circumstances, it was found that the majority had violated the conditions on which the property of the Free Church was held. This principle is also found in Milligan Vs. Mitchel[8] and Attorney General Vs. Anderson[9] and Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun. All these decisions were considered by the Madras High Court in Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao (1931).[10]

In Pragji Savji Vaja  Vs. Chhotalal Narsidas Parmar[11] it was held that no deviation from the object of the trust could be allowed; and the properties could not be allowed to be sold to the members of their community for whose benefit the trust is created and the properties were acquired.

Public Trust: ‘Once a Trust Always a Trust’; No Dissolution; No Termination

A public trust is perpetual. It cannot be terminated or dissolved. Rule against perpetuities does not apply to it. It can never be put to an end though its nature may be changed.[12] Once a public endowment is made (by dedication of properties) even the former owners or founders cannot revoke it.[13] Subsequent conduct of the founder or his descendants contrary to such dedication would amount to a breach of trust.[14] Tudor on Charities[15] explained this principle as under:

  • “When a charity has been founded and trusts have been declared, the founder has no power to revoke, vary or add to the trusts. This is so irrespective of whether the trusts have been declared by an individual, or by a body of subscribers, or by the trustees. “[16]

In Halsbury’s Laws of England,[17] while dealing with creation of charitable trusts, it has been observed as under:

  • “Charitable trusts have sometimes been declared subject to express powers of revocation, but there has apparently been no decision on the validity of such a power except as regards the rule against perpetuities.”[18]

Dedication of property for public trust is like a bullet fired.  As long as it is in private realm it retains the character of a private property.[19] Once dedication is complete, it cannot be revoked.[20] Once a public endowment/trust is made, it is final and irrevocable. ‘Once a trust always a trust’[21] is a trite principle of law.[22]

Underhill in ‘Law relating to Trusts and Trustees’ has explained it,with respect to associations, thus:

  • “However, the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the Association for the time being. The members for the time being cannot under the Association rules Appropriate Trust property for themselves for there would then be no property held on trust as intended by the testator for those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the Association for the time being.”[23]

If the property is one stand dedicated to a Political Party, Association or a Church, and the beneficiaries thereof are unascertainable, the property vests with the entire members (of such Party, Association or Church), from time to time, subject to its objectives, as revealed from the document of foundation or byelaws, if any. Such vesting is permanent, whereby it cannot be put to an end even by a majority decision of the members of a particular time. In case such association or church becomes defunctive and it is impossible to carry forward the affairs of the trust as intended by the founders, and the matter is placed before a court, the court will apply the trust-property to a charitable purpose, ‘as nearly as possible’,[24] resembling the original Trust, invoking ‘cy pres’ doctrine.  

Subsequent Deeds: Scrap of Paper

In Agasthyar Trust Vs. Commr. IT, Madras[25]the Supreme Court approved the observation of the Madras High Court, dealing with the question whether the founder of a trust had power to revoke the same,in Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO,[26] as under:

  • “It is well established that the subsequent acts and conduct of the founder of the trust cannot affect the trust if there has been already a complete dedication, (vide Krishnaswamy Pillai v. Kothandarama Naicken [1914] 27 MLJ 582: Sunder Singh Mallah Singh Sanathan Dharam High School Trust v. Managing Committee, Sunder Singh Mallah Singh Rajput High School [1938] 1 MLJ 359: AIR 1938 PC 73, and Gokuldoss Jamnadoss and Co. v. Lakshminarasimhalu Chetti [1940] 2 MLJ 409: AIR 1940 Mad. 920), If a valid and complete dedication had taken place, there would be no power left in the founder to revoke and no assertion on his part or the subsequent conduct of himself or his descendants contrary to such dedication would have the effect of nullifying it. If the trust had been really and validly created, any deviation by the founder of the trust or the trustees from the declared purposes would amount only to a breach of trust and would not detract from the declaration of trust. Therefore, the subsequent-conduct of the founder in dealing with the funds of the trust long after the creation of the trust may not put an end to the trust itself.”[27]

Our Apex Court, approving the principle stated in the aforesaid passage, it is held that the trustee had no authority or jurisdiction to execute a fresh trust deed or document; and it was of no consequence, and was no more than a scrap of paper. The Trust as originally established by the deed remained unchanged or unaffected by the latter document.

Effect of Offering Trust Property as Bank Security to Raise Funds

Referring to Supreme Court decision in Agasthyar Trust Vs. Commr. IT, Madras[28] and Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO,[29]it was observed in CIT Vs. AS Kupparaju Brothers Charitable Foundation Trust [30] that it was clear that once the authors of the trust transferred the title of the property to the trustees and created a trust, they had no right to meddle with the property even if they had created partition deed, rectification deed and offered the property as security to the bank to raise funds. As pointed out by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment, they were of no consequence. All those transactions were void ab initio and in no way-affected the right of the trust and were no more than a scrap of paper.

Trustees Cannot Alter the Trust.

Trustees cannot alter the purposes of the trust.[31]In RP Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Educational Trust[32]it is held by Delhi High Court (Avadh Behari Rohatgi) as under:

  • “The trustees can bring the trust to an end where there is power of dissolution, as in this case. But they cannot alter the purposes of the trust. They are not authorised by the trust instrument to remodel the trust. The trustees have no power to alter, amend or vary the trust purposes, whether on the ground of “expansion” or “addition” or “enlargement” of the objects of the trust. I decline to accept any suggestion that the trustees can alter a man’s intention because they think it beneficial to divert the trust property to charity. It seems to me: that is quite impossible. The reason is that a trust is an obligation, that is to say a tie of equity (viniculum juris), whereby the trustee accepts the confidence reposed in him by the author of the trust to hold or apply the trust property for the purposes of the trust.”

Extinguishment of Trust

Sec. 77 of the Indian Trusts Act reads:

  • 77. Trust how extinguished.—A trust is extinguished—
  •      (a) when its purpose is completely fulfilled; or
  •      (b) when its purpose becomes unlawful; or
  •      (c) when the fulfillment of its purpose becomes impossible by destruction of the trust property or otherwise; or
  •      (d) when the trust, being revocable, is expressly revoked.

Under Section 77, Trusts Act, a trust is extinguished in the four enumerated instances. Very rarely these provisions apply to public trusts. For example, complete destruction of the trust property, or conversion of the status of entire beneficiaries so that they all are not entitled to be the beneficiaries of the trust.

Under section 71, a trustee is discharged from his office by the extinction of the trust. But this discharge does not mean that the trustee is ceased to be a trustee, or relieved from his duty of rendering accounts and delivering the trust property to the beneficiaries.[33]

No trustee can get a discharge unless he renders accounts of his management even when there is no allegation of misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance and also gross negligence. Courts have discretion in regard to the fixing the period of accounting in a suit for accounting against a trustee of a charity. [34]

Property Entrusted by Wife to Husband – Trust and Limitation

In Sheela Vs. Suresh, ILR 2020-4 Ker 486, it is held by the Kerala High Court as under:

  • It is settled law and as laid down in the judgments aforesaid, when the wife entrusts with the husband any property belonging to her, a trust is created and the husband is bound to return the same to his wife. If the same is not returned, the wife has a right to demand the same by filing a suit or as in the present case, file an application before the Family Court or take other necessary steps under the relevant statutes in force. When S. 10 of the Limitation Act indicates that there is no limitation for initiating any such action, in the absence of any other statute providing for a limitation, the trustee cannot take a contention that he shall not return the trust property on account of any period of limitation.

Effect of an agreement settling obligations, Trust gets fulfilled in terms of S.77(a)

In Sheela Vs. Suresh, ILR 2020-4 Ker 486, after laying down the aforesaid settled position the Court considered whether the wife can claim property entrusted to husband (other than dowry for which there is a statutory trust as per S.6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961) where there is an agreement between the parties settling the obligations arising from the trust. The court held as under:

  • “The question involved in the above reference is that, when there is a change in circumstances between the spouses, especially when there is a dissolution of marriage and substantial time had elapsed, whether the trust created between them would be extinguished.”
  • “The question posed is, when the relationship between the parties gets deranged and results in divorce, whether the trust gets extinguished and the divorced wife would be entitled to invoke S. 10 of the Limitation Act and file a suit at her will and pleasure at any point in time. In such an event, the questions to be considered are (i) whether a trust had been created at any point of time, (ii) if a trust has been created and the husband remains in the position of a trustee, whether it gets extinguished on the dissolution of marriage or under any other circumstances.

After quoting Sec. 77 the High Court observed as under:

  • “Therefore, unless any of the eventualities as mentioned U/s. 77 takes place, which of course is a question of fact to be decided on a case to case basis and once a trust is created, it continues to operate, even though there is a dissolution of marriage.
  • However, in an instance where there is an agreement between the parties settling the obligations arising from the trust, it gets fulfilled in terms of S.77(a).”

Revocable Trust

When the author/settler creates or establishes the trust reserving his power to terminate the trust, or change the beneficiaries and trustees, or the terms of the trust, as he likes, such trust at the will and pleasure of the author is called revocable trust (See: Jyotendrasinhji v. SI Tripathi, AIR 1993 SC 1991).

A trust will never be allowed to fail for want of a trustee

On the rule of equity it is held that a trust will never be allowed to fail for want of a trustee.[35] The trusts will fasten upon the conscience of whoever holds the property. Even when court directs the trustee to hand over trust property to donor it does not extinguish the trust; it makes the donor himself a trustee.

It is also well settled principle that the death of a trustee or trustees would not extinguish the trust. The office of the trustee/trustees as well as the trust estate survives to the surviving trustee or trustees. They can carry out the trust and exercise all such powers as were given to the original trustees. Upon the death of the last surviving trustee, the trust property devolves on his legal representative. (Sections 75 and 76 of the Indian Trust Act).[36]

No Discharge If Not Accounted

Indian Trusts Act, 1882, Sec. 71 reads as under:

  • 71. Discharge of trustee.—A trustee may be discharged from his office only as follows:—
  • (a) by the extinction of the trust;
  • (b) by the completion of his duties under the trust;
  • (c) by such means as may be prescribed by the instrument of trust;
  • (d) by appointment under this Act of a new trustee in his place;
  • (e) by consent of himself and the beneficiary, or, where there are more beneficiaries than one, all the beneficiaries being competent to contract; or
  • (f) by the Court to which a petition for his discharge is presented under this Act.

Indian Trusts Act, 1882, Sec. 19 and 23 reads as under:

  • 19. Accounts and information.—A trustee is bound (a) to keep clear and accurate accounts of the trust property, and (b) at all reasonable times, at the request of the beneficiary to furnish him with full and accurate information as to the amount and state of the trust property.
  • 23. Liability for breach of trust.—Where the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is liable to make good the loss which the trust property or the beneficiary has thereby sustained.

The principles laid down in the above provisions of the Trusts Act apply the public trusts also. They contain the general principles of law.

In Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple Vs. Induru Pattabhirami Reddi[37] new trustees alleged misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance and also gross negligence against former trustees. On the questions whether the present trustees can demand rendition of account from the ex-trustees in respect of their management without alleging against them any acts of negligence or willful default and, if so, whether there was a bar to the maintainability of a suit for the relief of rendition of accounts in a civil court, it was observed by the Apex Court that  it was ‘common place that no trustee can get a discharge unless he renders accounts of his management’ and that this liability was irrespective of any question of negligence or wilful default. They are, therefore, held liable to render accounts of their management to the present trustees.[38]

Variation of Trust

The Trust or the author of the trust has no authority or jurisdiction to execute a fresh trust deed, after revoking the earlier trust deed.[39]The sole beneficiary, or all the beneficiaries together, can give a different direction to the trust by their common consent in the absence of incompetence on the part of any one or more of the beneficiaries. This rule has been summarized in Underhill’s Law of Trusts and Trustees:[40]

If there is only one beneficiary, or if there are several (whether entitled concurrently or successively) and they are all of one mind and he or they are not under any disability, the specific performance of the trust may be arrested and the trust modified or extinguished by him or them without reference to the wishes of the settler or trustees.[41]

Shifting of a Church

            The property of an Episcopal Church is vested with the ecclesiastical authorities, or in the endowment or trust itself, and that of a congregational church is vested with the congregation.[42]It is difficult to pin-point a tangible-nucleus or a core-element for a church (building). In this respect a church resembles Mosque. Christians also worship the invisible God Almighty. For Christians, as in the case of Muslims, worship is important, rather than the place where they worship. 

For all the above, it can be concluded that the decision lawfully taken by the authoritative body of the church to effect a shifting of the church from one place to another may not be rendered illegal. Doctrines of faith or any legal proposition (including ‘once a trust always trust’ and ‘once a dedication always a dedication’) cannot be validly raised.

Can Entire Family Members Put an End to Family Temple?

See Chapter: Public and private Temples

Cy Pres Doctrine

‘Cy pres’ Doctrine

When it is found by the court that the particular mode of charity, indicated by the donor, cannot be carried on for impossibility or impracticability, the court will execute and accomplish the donor’s intention applying ‘cy pres’ doctrine.  It is applied where from lapse of time or change of circumstances it is no longer possible to apply the property left by the founder or donor in the precise way in which it was directed to be applied (BalkrishnaVishvanath Vs. Vinayak Narayan: AIR 1932 Bom 191; AP Shah Vs. BM Institute of Mental Health: 1986  GLH 262).  It is based on the principle that the court is the protector of all charities (C ChikkaVenkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia: AIR 1952 Kar14) and that the court will not allow to fail a validly created trust or objects of foundation. 

Invoking ‘cy pres’ doctrine the court will apply the property of the Trust to a charitable purpose ‘as nearly as possible’ (In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228) resembling the original Trust. Besides physical impossibility, becoming the trust valueless, owing to attendant circumstances, also invites application of cy pres doctrine (Hormusji Franji Warden, ILR 32  B. 214).

The trustees are bound to carry out the directions of the author under Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act and the only way in which the directions of the testament may be varied is by applying ‘cy  pres’ doctrine.

Transfer of Institution Itself

See Chapter: Alienation of public Trust Property

Transfer of Trusteeship to Another Body

Trust is a confidential relationship which involves a special duty of loyalty to the purpose or object of the trust.  There is no principle of law or precedent which permits transfer of trust in favour of another body of persons.[43]

In Abdul Kayum Vs. Alibhai[44] the Apex Court expounded the following legal incidents of trusteeship:

  • (i) Trustees cannot transfer their duties, functions & powers to some other body of men and create them trustees in their own place unless this is clearly permitted by the trust deed, or agreed to by the entire body of beneficiaries;
  • (ii) A trustee is not bound to accept the trust; but having once entered upon the trust he cannot renounce the duties and liabilities except with the permission of the Court or with the consent of the beneficiaries or by the authority of the trust deed itself.
  • (iii) A trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his functions except in some specified cases.

Abuse of Trust – Dedication Will Remain Valid

The endowment and its dedication will remain valid even if there is misappropriation or abuse of trust by the trustees subsequent to a valid dedication.[45]

Trust Property Doesn’t Revert Even If Trustee Refuses

It is an established principle of equity jurisprudence that a trust never fails even if there is no trustee. The property does not revert to the settlor or his heirs.[46]


[1]      Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17; M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; TC Chacko Vs. Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107.

[2]      Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Chorone Requitte: AIR 1979 SC 1682.

[3](1876) 4 Ind App 52 (PC)

[4](1925) 52 Ind App 245

[5] Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Chorone Requitte: AIR 1979  SC 1682.

[6]      St. John’s College Vs. Todington: (1757) 1 Burr. 158; Green Vs. Rutherford: (1750) 1 Ves. Sen. 462; Ananda Chandra Chuckerbutly  Vs.  Braja Lal Singh (1922) I.L.R. 50 C. 292; Settikara Venkatarama  Vs. OP Damodaram  : AIR 1926 Mad 1150: (1926) 51 MLJ 457.   

[7]      (1904) AC 515: 

[8]      40 ER 852

[9]      (1888) 57 LJ Ch 543

[10]    AIR 1931 Mad. 12

[11]    AIR 2014-3 Bom R 211: 2013-6 BCR 72.

[12]    In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228

[13]    Ramkishorelal vs. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890; Agasthyar Trust Vs. Commr IT Madras ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;(1998) 5 SCC 588). Krishnaswamy Pillai Vs. Kothandarama Naicken: AIR 1915 Mad 380; Dasami Sahu Vs. Param Shameshwar, AIR 1929 All 315.

[14]    Agasthyar Trust Madras Vs. CIT: 1998- 5 SCC 588.         

[15]   6th Edn.  At p. 131

[16] Quoted in: Agasthyar Trust Vs. Commr IT Madras: 1998-5 SCC 588, Sri Gasthyar Trust vs. CIT: [1999] 236 ITR 23:103 Taxman 363

[17]    4th Edn., Vol. 5, para. 624

[18]    See also: Radhika Mohan Nandy Vs. Amrita Lal Nandy, AIR 1947 Cal 301

[19]    See ILR 51 All. 626; AIR 1974 AP 316; AIR 1950 Ass. 154.

[20]    Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17; M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; T C Chacko Vs. Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107.

[21]    KS Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[22]    Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17; M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; T C Chacko Vs. Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107.

[23] Quoted in: Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001- Para 69.

[24]    In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228

[25] 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;(1998) 5 SCC 588)

[26] Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO: 91 ITR 261

[27] Quoted also in: CIT Vs. AS Kupparaju Brothers Chari. Fondn. Trust: DTR 2012 69 315

[28] 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;(1998) 5 SCC 588)

[29]Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO: 91 ITR 261

[30]DTR 2012 69 315

[31]Agasthyar Trust Madras Vs. Commr IT ; 1998 AIR (SCW) 3945 ; (1998) 5 SCC 588). Commissioner of IT Vs. Ramaswamy Iyer: 1977 CTR  21; 1977-110 ITR 364; Naresh Sengupta Foundation Vs. Commir IT: 1994 207 ITR 340 (Cal); Christopher Karkada Vs. Church Of South India Madras: KCCR 2012 1 503

[32]    1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801

[33] S Darshan Lal Vs RES Dalliwall: AIR 1952  All 825

[34]    Attorney General Vs. Exetor Mayor: (1822) 37 ER 918; Anyasayya Vs. Muthamma: AIR 1919 Mad 943; Hariharabrahman Vs. Janakiramiah: AIR 1955 Andhra 18

[35] Sharf-uz-Zaman v. Sir Henry Stanyon, 1923 AIR Oudh 80; Seth Soorajmull Jalan Trust Vs. Tolaram Jalan, 2015 AIR (CC) 3225, 2015-4 Cal LT  1

[36] Seth Soorajmull Jalan Trust Vs. Tolaram Jalan, 2015 AIR (CC) 3225, 2015-4 Cal LT  1

[37]AIR 1967 SC 781

[38] Referred to in: M. M. Jaffar Kermani VS M. M. Hassan Kirmani: AIR 1978  Mad 121; Bhimasena Mahapatra VS Ramesh Chandra Mohapatra: AIR 1978  Ori 159, TG  Viswanathan Chettiar Vs. TA  Shanmugha Chettiar:  AIR 1992  Mad 148.

[39]Christopher Karkada, Bangalore Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725: 2012-1 KCCR 503

[40]    10th Ed., p. 421

[41]    Quoted in: A D Vehvalwala Vs. M C H Rustomji: 1970 Cal LJ 312;1970-1 Cal LT 292

[42]    Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[43]    Abdul Kayua Vs. Alibhai AIR 1963 SC 309: Referred to in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain: ILR  1982-1 Del-11.

[44]AIR 1963 SC 309

[45]    ILR 1936 Cal. 420.Kuldip Chand Vs. A G Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685; AIR 1954 M. 1110.

[46]    Yelandau Arasikere Deshikendra Sammthana Vs. Gangadharaiah: 2007-5 AIR Kar R 565: 2008-4 Kat LJ 323. See also: Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11. See Chapter: RIGHTS AND DUITIES OF TRUSTEES.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Trust is ‘An Obligation’; Not a Legal Entity

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Synopsis.

  1. Introduction
  2. Legal Persons, Arbitrary Creations of the Law
  3. Hindu Conception on Legal Personality of Idol
  4. Law Attributes, Legal Personality
  5. Legally, ‘Trust’ is Not an Institution or Association
  6. ‘Trust’ Used to Identify Endowment/Association
  7. Hindu Idol and Math are Juristic Persons
  8. ‘Trust’: Not a Legal Person
  9. Certain Institutions are Identified as ‘Trusts’
  10. Juristic Personality of Trusts Under NI Act
  11. Trust Cannot be Sued in Its Own Name
  12. How Can a Trust Execute Deeds and Enter Contract?
  13. Trust Cannot be Sued in Its Own Name
  14. Trustee represents beneficiaries   
  15. Juristic personality of Gurudwara
  16. Juristic personality of Wakfs & Mosques
  17. Juristic Personality of Churches

Introduction: What is Trust, in Law?

Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 defines trust as under:

  • Trust: A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner:

From the definition it is clear that ‘Trust’, in law, holds the following conceptions:

  • Trust is ‘an obligation’ upon the trustee.
  • It is to administer the endowed property.
  • The administration must be done by the trustee as if he is the owner  of the trust property.
  • It must be done by him accepting the intents desired by the author.
  • And, the same must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.

It is clear that the word ‘trust’ is used in law as an ‘abstract countable noun’, similar to ‘a concept’, ‘an idea’ or ‘a duty’.

Charitable and Religious Institutions – Legal Concept

Wealthy and mighty men of all social systems considered it their duty to help the weak and poor. Charitable and religious institutions are founded on this principle. With a view to legally recognise these institutions numerous legal theories have been propounded. One among them is attributing legal personality to those institutions and considering them as legal units.[1] The attributed legal personality, by itself, enabled to ascribe interests, rights and duties to those institutions. It made the courts possible to effectively adjudicate upon the assertions and obligations pertained to them. The conferment of legal personality also facilitated to accomplish the objects and purposes envisioned by the founders, in a pragmatic manner.[2]

All religions and its institutions have the aim of civilising man. They enforce man lead a disciplined life. Thus the religions and its institutions promote public welfare.[3] Though various public institutions are generally referred to as entities having its own identity, our law does not favour all. Our Law on this subject does not lay down a precise and explicit edict. It requires authoritative and cogent judicial dicta, exploring and reconciling divergent views as to the legal personality of various institutions (such as schools, hospitals, universities, libraries, ships[4] etc.).

Endowment and Trust

‘Trust’ is essentially a legal concept; whereas, ‘endowment’ is a corporeal reality to which social concepts are adhered to. Endowment is founded by dedication of property for the purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[5]

An ‘endowment’ may be public or private.[6] From the usage of the word ‘endow’ and the connected word ‘endowment’  it is clear that they relate to the idea of giving, bequeathing or dedicating property or other possession, for some specified purpose.[7] According to Chamber’s Twentieth Century Dictionary, the word ‘endowment’ means: ‘that which is settled on any person or institution’.[8] Webster’s International Dictionary gives the following meaning to the word ‘endowment’:

  • “(1) The act of bestowing a dower, fund, or permanent provision for support. (2) That which is bestowed or settled on a person or an institution; property, fund, or revenue permanently appropriated to any object; as the endowment of a church, a hospital or a college. (3) That which is given or bestowed upon the person or mind; gift of nature, accomplishment; natural capacity; talents; usually in the plural.”[9]

‘A Trust’ is “An Obligation” and Not a Legal Entity

‘A trust’, according to the definition, being ‘an obligation’, it is clear that ‘a trust’ does not convey the idea that the ‘trust’ is a legal person, an association of persons, or a tangible or corporeal property.

The following are the important decisions on this point.

  • Sankar Padam Thapa v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal, 2025 INSC 1210 (09-10-2025).
  • Govt. of the Province of Bombay Vs. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia:  AIR 1949 PC 143;
  • Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam  Vs.  CIT: AIR 1964 Mad 483: 1963- 50 ITR 798  (Mad); 
  • Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas 1967 Raj LW 273; [10] .
  • Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Trilok  Chand Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144;
  • Thanthi Trust Vs. Wealth Tax Officer: 1989- 45 TAXMAN 121: 1989-178  ITR 28;
  • Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Memorial Trust Vs. State: ILR 1997  Kar 2460;
  • KishorelalAseraVs. Haji Essa Abba: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367;
  • Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-336  ITR 611;
  • Sambandam Vs. Nataraja Chettiar: 2012-1 Mad LW 530.

As explained above:

  • A trust’ is ‘an obligation’ or a fiduciary duty upon the trustee to administer the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
  • ‘Trust’ being an obligation or fiduciary duty upon the trustee to administer the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries, it is essentially a legal concept.
  • The expression ‘a trust’ in the definition, being followed by the words ‘is an obligation’, it is clear that ‘a trust’ does not convey the idea that it is a tangible matter or a corporeal property.
  • Trust differs from an ‘Endowment’ for,the latter is basically a tangible corporeal reality to which social concepts are adhered to.
  • The trust-property (or the dedicated-property) vests in the ‘legal ownership’ of the trustee.  
  • The term ‘endowment’ stands analogous to ‘trust property’, and not to ‘trust’ as such.

From the above, it is clear that, legally, the ‘trust’:

  • (i)   cannot be a juristic person;
  • (ii) cannot be an association of persons; and
  • (iii) cannot be a tangible endowment or a corporeal property.

In Surya Kant Chunilal Vs. Mahesh Chand, AIR 1972 Del. 72 it is held as under:

  • “Further defendant No. 2 (Trust) is not a registered body or a juristic person. The properties of the Trust vest in the trustees.”

In Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin Vs. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat Ahmadabad[11] it is observed by the Gujarat High Court as under:

  • “The ‘trust property’ is nothing but the subject matter of the trust; that is, a property which is impressed with the obligation giving rise to a trust. When we speak of a trust, we speak merely of the requisite obligation which is annexed to the ownership of a property. This obligation is not a legal entity in any sense; as for example, the trust cannot own any property the property is owned by the trustee who is an entity by himself different from the trust, a trust cannot sue and a trust cannot be sued; it is only a trustee who can sue and who can be sued. It is only a trustee who can hold properties. A ‘trust’ cannot be a landlord since the trust properties vest in the legal ownership of the trustees. It is the trustee alone who can be a landlord. Since the trust is not a legal entity, no question of hardship suffered by the trust or accommodation required by the trust can arise for consideration.”[12

Order 31 rule 1 CPC

Order 31 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure spells out – a trust is not a legal person. It enables to file a suit by (or be sued) a trustee concerning ‘property vested in trustees’.

  • In Government of the Province of Bombay Vs. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia[13] the Privy Council held as under:
  • “The trust is not the plaintiff, and there is no power under the Code for trustees to sue in the name of their trust, as members of a firm may sue in the name of the firm. The plaintiffs were, and were bound to be, the three trustees, and, as no notice was given specifying their names and addresses, the condition precedent to the filing of the suit was not fulfilled”.

The view taken by the Privy Council was accepted by our Apex Court in Ghanshyam Dass Vs. Dominion of India.[14]Penner JE, the Professor of Law at King’s College, London, in his book, The Law of Trusts, has commented as under:

  • “The trust itself has no legal personality like a company, on behalf of which agents of the company make contracts which bind the company as a legal person itself. Having no legal personality, one cannot sue the trust itself for breach of contract; one sues the trustee for his own breach of contract, even though the breach was of contractual obligation he undertook to benefit the trust.”

Relying the Privy Council and Penner J Ethe Kerala High Court held in KR Rajan Vs. Cherian K. Cherian[15]   as under:

  • Trust not being a legal person, and the Code of Civil Procedure not providing any enabling provision for the Trust to sue or for being sued in its name, there is no merit in the contention that the Trust is to be arrayed as an eo-nominee party. The arraying of the trust in its own name is otiose or redundant. It is the trustees who are to be impleaded to represent the trust.”

In M. V. Muthuramalingam Vs. D. Narayanaswamy, 1995-83 CC 77 it is held by the Madras High Court as under:

  • “Unlike a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, the trust is not a juristic person having a separate legal entity. It can act only through its trustees. So, when the petitioner came to issue the impugned cheques and that has resulted in his committing an offence under section 138 Of the Negotiable Instruments Act, he is liable to be proceeded against.”

The Madras High Court has held in Kishorelal Asera Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endowments[16]and in Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs.  CIT[17]that a trust not being a legal person is not entitled to sue in its own name.[18]

The Gujarat High Court has also held in Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin Vs. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat Ahmedabad[19]  that ‘the trust is not a legal entity.[20]

Following decisions do not present correct law (It is clear from the above)

(i) Pratheesh V v. State of Kerala, 2017-2 Ker HC 977. It is observed as under:

  • “It is the settled position of law that a registered trust is a legal entity and juristic person entitled to hold property by itself.”

(ii) Lal Chandra Jain v. Suparasdas Jain, 2016-11 All DJ 615. It is observed –

  • “It is also not in dispute that a registered Trust is a legal person/juristic person and can be sued or can sue in its own name, through the person responsible to manage it.”

(See Notes under the Head: Is Trust  a ‘Living Person’ under S. 5 of the TP Act) 

Legal Persons, Arbitrary Creations of the Law

Salmond on Jurisprudence[21] reads:

  • “A legal person is any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of personality beyond the class of human beings is one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination.”

Salmond reads further:

  • “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases. Those which are actually recognised by our own system, however, are of comparatively few types. Corporations are undoubtedly legal persons, and the better view is that registered trade unions and friendly societies are also legal persons though not verbally regarded as corporations. If, however, we take account of other systems than our own, we find that the conception of legal personality is not so limited in its application, and that there are several distinct varieties, of which three may be selected for special mention.
  • 1. The first class of legal persons consists of corporations, as already defined, namely, those which are constituted by the personification of groups or series of individuals. The individuals who thus form the corpus of the legal person are termed its members.
  • 2. The second class is that in which the corpus, or object selected for personification, is not a group or series of persons, but an institution. The law may, if it pleases, regard a church or a hospital, or a university, or a library, as a person. That is to say, it may attribute personality, not to any group of persons connected with the institution, but to the institution itself.
  • 3. The third kind of legal person is that in which the corpus is some fund or estate devoted to special uses a charitable fund, for example or a trust estate.”[22]

In Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakshmiram (1888),[23]the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court set out the rationale for and the process by which legal personality is conferred on a Hindu idol. Justice West observed:

  • “The Hindu law, like the Roman law and those derived from it, recognizes, not only corporate bodies with rights of property vested in the corporation apart from its individual members, but also juridical persons or subjects called foundations. A Hindu, who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution, may, according to his law, express his purpose and endow it, and the ruler will give effect to the bounty … A trust is not required for this purpose: the necessity of a trust in such a case is indeed a peculiarity and a modern peculiarity of the English law. In early times a gift placed, as it was expressed, “on the altar of God sufficed to convey to the church the lands thus dedicated.”[24]

Law Attributes Legal Personality

Roscoe Pound,[25] on “Jurisprudence”, reads as under:

  • “In civilised lands even in the modern world it has happened that all human beings were not legal persons. In Roman law down to the constitution of Antonius Pius the slave was not a person. He enjoyed neither rights of family nor rights of patrimony. He was a thing, and as such like animals, could be the object of rights of property. … In French colonies, before slavery was there abolished, slaves were put in the class of legal persons by the statute of April 23, 1833 and obtained a ‘somewhat extended juridical capacity’ by a statute of 1845. In the United States down to the Civil War, the free Negroes in many of the States were free human beings with no legal rights.”[26]

The Supreme Court in Som Prakash Rekhi Vs.  Union of India[27]held that ‘a legal person is any entity other than human being to which law attributes personality’. It held further as under: 

  • “Let us be clear that the jurisprudence bearing on corporations is not myth but reality. What we mean is that corporate personality is a reality and not an illusion or fictitious construction of the law. It is a legal person. Indeed, a legal person is any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of personality is one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination. Corporations are one species of legal persons invented by the law and invested with a variety of attributes so as to achieve certain purposes sanctioned by the law.”[28]

In SGPC Vs. Som Nath Dass[29] the Supreme Court held:

  • “The very words ‘Juristic Person’ connote recognition of an entity to be in law a person which otherwise it is not. In other words, it is not an individual natural person but an artificially created person which is to be recognized in law as such.”

It held further that Guru Granth Sahib revered in Gurudwara had all the qualities to be recognized as juristic person. Holding otherwise would mean giving too restrictive a meaning to a ‘juristic person’ and that would erase the very jurisprudence which gave birth to it.It is observed (obiter) in this case that ‘it is really the religious faith that leads to the installation of an idol in a temple. Once installed, it is recognised as a Juristic Person. The idol may be revered in homes but its Juristic Personality is only when it is installed in a public temple’. Nevertheless, Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. in his treatise ‘On Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts’ the principles as to legal personality, rights emanating therefrom, etc. with respect to a family temple, are presented in the same manner[30] as that of a public temple.[31]

Public Trust and Endowment: Different Concepts

Jurisprudentially, trust and endowment are not synonyms.[32]‘Trust’ being an obligation upon the trustee to administer the trust propertyfor the benefit of the beneficiaries, it is essentially an idea or a legal concept. ‘Endowment’ is basically a corporeal reality to which social concepts are adhered to.

 Life is bestowed upon endowment when trustee is appointed. A public ‘endowment’ is created by dedication of property for the purpose of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[33] A legal recognition and status is acquired by the endowment by the appointment of a trustee. An endowment, sans trustee, remains static.

But, Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. in his erudite treatise ‘On Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts’points out that under Hindu law, if an endowment is made for a religious or charitable institution, without the instrumentality of a trust, and the object of the endowment is one which is recognised as pious, being either religious or charitable under the accepted notions of Hindu law, the institution will be treated as a juristic person capable of holding property.[34]

Legally, the term ‘endowment’ stands analogous to ‘trust property’; and not to trust. Sections 5 of the Indian Trusts Acts peaks as to ‘trust of’ movable and immovable (corporeal) properties. Salmond’s Jurisprudence, while describing property, refers to corporeal property as ‘the right of ownership in a material object or that object itself’.[35]The imperative characteristics of ‘trust’ that differ from an ‘endowment’ are the following:

  • (a)  trustee, for administration,
  • (b)  entrustment/transfer of trust property to the trustee,  and
  • (c)  vesting of ‘legal ownership’ in trustee.              

As the managers of religious ‘endowments’ are not ‘trustees’ in its full sense, deeming provision was inserted in Sec. 10 of the (old) Limitation Act to bring-in such managers also under this section.[36]

‘Trust’ is Used as Synonym to Endowment/Association

However, inasmuch as the ‘trust’ has no existence without its trust property, and it is an ‘obligation’ ‘annexed to’ the trust property, the endowment/institution, upon which the obligation of ‘trust’ is pervaded, is personified as a ‘trust’. Certain public institutions established or dedicated with philanthropic view are also generally described as ‘trusts’.

Similarly, when a ‘trust’ is created/managed under the auspices of an association, the term ‘trust’ is generally used to denote the ‘association of persons’, in view of the underlying significant nexus between the members of the association and the ‘trust’.

The term ‘trust’ is also used as a compendious expression taking-in the trustees, the beneficiaries and the subject-matter of the trust.It is observed in Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs.  CIT[37] as under:

  • “The word ‘trust’ is a convenient and a compendious description of the trustees, the beneficiaries and the subject-matter of the trust. ….”[38]

It is interesting to note that the word ‘trust’ is used an ‘entity’ even in Illustration (b) of Sec. 15 of the Trusts Act – and it is the only one place in this Act where the term ‘trust’ is used in this manner. The Illustration (b) of Sec. 15 reads: 

  • “(b) A, trustee of lease-hold property, directs the tenant to pay the rents on account of the trust to a banker, B, ….”

In Public Trusts Acts enacted by various States and in several Tax-Laws, wider import is given to ‘trust’.  Various Town Improvement Acts refer to vesting of land ‘in the trust’. [39] In the inclusive definition of Public Trusts Acts, ‘trust’ embraces a temple, a math, wakf, a dharmada or any other religious or charitable endowment and even a society. For example, Section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act reads:

  • ” ‘Public trust’ means an express or constructive trust for either a public religious or charitable purpose or both and includes a temple, a math, wakf, a dharmada or any other religious or charitable endowment and a society formed either for a religious or charitable purpose or for both and registered under the Societies Registration Act. 1860.”

The trust cannot sue or be sued in its own name. Trustee being the legal owner of the trust property he has to sue or be sued for and on behalf of the Trust.[40]There is no provision under the CPC for the trustees to sue in the name of their trust, as allowed in the case of firms.[41]Order XXXI, Rule 1 CPC deals with the representation of beneficiaries in suits concerning property vested in the trustee.  It lays down that the trustee shall represent the persons so interested.[42]

It is observed by Madras High Court in Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs.  CIT:[43]

  • “Sometimes, the expression ‘trust’ is used to denote the trustees. For example, when the trustees carry on a business, we generally say that the trust is doing so”.

The Supreme Court quoted with approval, in Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs. Krishna Warriar[44] the following passage of Madras High Court in Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs.  CIT:[45]

  • “When the trustee acts, it is only the trust that acts, as the trustee fully represents the trust. A business carried on, on behalf of a trust rather indicates a business which is not held in trust, than a business of the trust run by the trustees.” 

Juristic Personality of Public Charitable Trusts Under NI Act 

To the question whether a Public Charitable Trust has been recognised as a juristic person for the purpose of Negotiable Instrument Act , it is held in Abraham Memorial Vs C. Suresh Babu[46] that a Public Charitable Trust being capable of contracting, and capable of making and issuing a cheque or Bill (Sec. 26), it is a juristic person for the purpose of the said Act; and that a Trust, either private or public/charitable or otherwise, is a juristic person liable for punishment for the offence punishable under Sec. 138 of the N I Act.

Public Trust Depends on Charity and Donations

Referring Sec. 14 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, it is observed in Khasgi (Devi Ahilyabai Holkar Charities) Trust, Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar,  2022-11 SCALE 1,  2022-17 SCR 173, as under:

  • “A Public Trust invariably depends on charity done by individuals by donating immovable property or by making cash donations.”

Eventhough the above observation is made invoking Sec. 14 of the BPT Act, it is clear that it is a common law principle applicable to all Public Trusts.

Legal Obligations of Trustees to Administer and Give Effect to Objects of Trust

It is held further in Khasgi (Devi Ahilyabai Holkar Charities) Trust, Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar,  2022-11 SCALE 1,  as under:

  • “Though in law, the assets and properties of a Public Trust vest in its Trustees, they hold the Trust property in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the Trust. They hold the property for giving effect to the objects of the Public Trust. A Trust property cannot be alienated unless it is for the benefit of the Trust and/or its beneficiaries. The Trustees are not expected to deal with the Trust property, as if it is their private property. It is the legal obligation of the Trustees to administer the Trust and to give effect to the objects of the Trust. …. There are statutory constraints on the power of the Trustees to alienate the property of a Public Charitable Trust. …. The Trustees are the custodians of Trust properties. The Trustees have a duty to safeguard the interests of the beneficiaries of the Public Trust. That is how, a provision in Public Trust Law, like Sec.  14 of the Public Trusts Act, is of importance. This provision seeks to protect the Trust property in the hands of the Trustees from unwarranted alienations.”

Is Trust  a ‘Living Person’ under S. 5 of the TP Act 

Can transfer of property be made to or by Trusts/Associations?

Sec. 5 of the TP Act reads as under:

  • 5. “Transfer of property” defined:  In the following sections “transfer of property” means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such act.
  • In this section “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals.

Existing Laws as to Transfer of Property will Remain in Force

Two points are emphasised in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 5 –

  • First, all unregistered associations, whether incorporated or not, are ‘living persons’, so that transfer of property can be made.
  • Second, the qualifying second limb – ‘nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals‘ – made it clear:
    • if any law regulates transfer of property to (or by) companies, associations or bodies of individuals, it will remain in force.

Bodies of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act

It may also be pointed out that, “bodies of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act is wide in meaning; and it stands independent. It is broad enough to take-in Beneficiaries/ Trustees of a Trust.

Accordingly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

  • Note: Order 31 rule 1 CPC spells out – a trust is not a legal person. It enables to file a suit by (or be sued) a trustee concerning ‘property vested in trustees’.

Can ‘Law for the Time Being in Force’ Include ‘Common Law’

‘Law for the time being in force’ in Sec. 5 TP Act includes “common law”.

It is a reality – the common law of our country accepts as valid the ‘transfer of property’ made to or effected by well-known institutions, organisations, and associations attached to reputed trusts, institutions etc., though they are not juristic-persons in its strict senseOur courts sumptuously refer to such deeds as documents executed by or in favour of such entities, when they are referred to as exhibits. For example:

  • Settlement deed by Ashramam–Swayam  Prakash  Ashramam Vs. G Anandavally  Amma : AIR  2010 SC 622;
  • Settlement to trust – S N Mathur  Vs. Board of Revenue: 2009-13  SCC 301;
  • Sale deed by unregistered society – Suresh s/o. Bhagwanrao  Puri Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2016-3 AIR Bom R (Cri.) 603;
  • Gift to unregistered Association – Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna Satram: 1984-2 ALT 157;
  • Sale deed to an association – K. Kala Vs. Dist Registrar, Madurai: 2016 3 MLJ 50, 
  • Sale deed to an association – State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 P&H 218.
  • Sale deed to an association – Asst. Commr. Vs. Shivalingawwa: ILR 2003 Kar 2855;
  • Lease deed by trust to school – TNP Mothoo  Natarajan Vs. PV Ravi: 2015-2 MLJ (Cri.) 656;
  • Lease deed by a firm -2014-3 ALT 46;
  • Settlement deed to private trust –Kolli  Venkata Raja Vs. Govt. of AP: 2014-1 ALT 155;
  • Lease deed to a public trust –Nadigar  Sangham Charitable Trust, rep. by its managing Trustee, R. Sarathkumar Vs. S. Murugan:2013-1 MLJ 433;
  • Sale deed to Board of Trustees – Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chemists and Druggists Association Building Trust: 1995-215 ITR(Mad) 741;
  • Mortgage deed by a College – Sonar Bangla Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College:  AIR 1960 Cal 450.

Similarly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

It was held by our Apex Court in Kamaraju  Venkata Krishna Rao Vs. Sub Collector,  Ongole, AIR 1969 SC 563, that, under Hindu Law, a tank can be an object of charity and when a dedication was made in favour of a tank, the same was considered as a charitable institution. Without deciding whether that institution can also be considered as a juristic person, it was held that the same had to be registered in its name (ie., in the name of the tank) in the Inam register though it had continue to be managed by its Manager.

It is also noteworthy that Salmond on Jurisprudence reads: “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases.”

Read Blogs:

Is Trust A Juristic Person to File a Complaint Under the N.I. Act

Read Blog: Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal: Landmark Decision on Trust – A Trust Cannot Be Made as a Party to a Litigation


[1]     Shiromani Gurdwara Vs. Som Nath Dass: AIR 2000 SC 1421, M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case):2020-1 SCC 1.

[2]     M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1

[3]     ‘Hindu and Mohamedan Endowments’ by P. R. GanapathiIyer, (Quoted in: Papanna Vs. State of Karnataka: AIR1983 Kar 94.

[4]     MV Elisabeth Vs. Harwan Investment and Trading: 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433. M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case):2020-1 SCC 1.

[5]PratapSinghji v. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064

[6]DeokiNandan  Vs. Murlidhar:  AIR 1957 SC 133, Quoted in: M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1, Pratap Singhji  Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064

[7]Idol of Sri Renganatha-swamy Vs. PK Thoppulan Chettiar: 2020 0 Supreme(SC) 177; MJ  Thulasiraman Vs. Comr, HR & CE: AIR 2019 SC 4050.

[8]Vidarbha and Marathwada, Nagpur Vs. Mangala: 1982 0 MhLJ 686

[9]Maria Antonica Rodrigues Vs. DR Baliga: AIR 1967 Bom 465.

[10]   Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas 1967 Raj LW 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89.

[11]   AIR 1968 Guj 184.

[12]   See also: RamabaiGovindVs. RaghunathVasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[13]   AIR 1949 PC  143

[14]   AIR 1984 SC 1004

[15]   2019-5 KHC 661; 2019-4 Ker LJ 981; 2019-4 Ker LT 1056

[16]   2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367

[17]   AIR 1964 Mad 483; 1963- 50 ITR 798

[18]   Referred to in: Thanthi Trust Vs. Wealth Tax Officer: 1989-78 CTR 54: 1989- 45 TAXMAN 121: 1989-178  ITR 28.

[19]   AIR 1968 Guj 184.

[20]   See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[21]   12th Edn., Page 305.

[22]   Quoted in: Shriomani Gurudwara Vs. Shri Som Nath: AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[23]   (1888) ILR 12 Bom 247

[24]   Quotted in M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case):2020-1 SCC 1

[25]   Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence, Part IV, 1959 Edition.

[26]   Quoted in: Shiromani Gurdwara  Vs. ShriSom Nath: AIR 2000 SC 1421; M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case):2020-1 SCC 1.

[27]   AIR 1981 SC 212

[28]   Quoted in: Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Vs. Shri Som Nath  :AIR 2000 SC 1421. See also: Samatha Hyderabad Abrasives Minerals Vs. State of AP: AIR 1997 SC 3297.

[29]   AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[30]   KM Senthivel Pillai Vs. Kulandaivel Pillai: 1970-2 MADLJ 555; P. Jayader Vs. Thiruneelakanta Nadar: ILR 1966-2 Mad 92; Commissioner of Endowments Vs. Sri Radhakanta Deb: 1969-35 Cut LT 992.

[31]   See Chapter: DEDICATION IN PRIVATE TRUSTS AND FAMILY TEMPLE.

[32]   Shanmughan  Vs. Vishnu Bharatheeyan:  AIR  2004 Ker 143.

[33]   Pratap Singhji Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064. M R GodaRao Sahib Vs. State of Madras: AIR 1966 SC 653. See also: Ram Charan Das Vs. Mst. Girjanandani Devi: AIR 1959 All 473; S. Shanmugam Pillai Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai: AIR 1972 SC 2069; Controller of Estate Duty WB Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312.

[34]page 36. Quoted in M.Siddiq Vs.Mahant Suresh Das: 2020-1 SCC 1,

[35]   Quoted in: Maharashtra State Co Op. Bank Ltd. Vs. Asst. PF Commir: AIR 2010 SC 868; Santhoshkumar Vs. Shaji: AIR  2013 Ker 184; Ans Gopal Sheo Narain Vs. PK Banerji: AIR  1949 All 433.

[36]   See: Sri Silambani Vs. Chidambaram Chettiar: AIR 1943 Mad 691.

[37]   AIR 1964 Mad 483; ([1963] 50 ITR 798)

[38]   Quoted in: Thanthi Trust Vs. Wealth Tax Officer: (1989)78 CTR 54: (1989) 45 TAXMAN 121: (1989) 178  ITR 28. See also: Kishorelal Asera  Vs. Haji Essa Sait : 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC 367.

[39]   Eg.  Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922; Nagpur Improvement Act, 1936; Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911; Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act; United Province Town Improvement Act, 1919 etc.

[40]   Kishorelal Asera Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endnts: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC 367

[41]   K. Dhondoji Rao Vs Dominion of India: AIR 1957  Kar 94.

[42]   Kishorelal Asera Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endts.:  2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367

[43]   AIR 1964 Mad 483

[44]   AIR 1965 SC 59

[45]   AIR 1964 Mad 483

[46]   2013- 2  Bank   Case  133: 2012-5 CTC 203: CC 2012-175 361. Relied on in Hakkimuddin Taherbhai Shakor Vs. State of Gujarat: 2017 CrLJ 3143.





Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

State & Court – Protectors of All Charities

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Synopsis

  1. Introduction
  2. Crown – Constitutional Protector of all Charities
  3. Court is the Ultimate Protector of all Charities:
  4. It is the Duty of Courts to Protect Trusts
  5. Plaintiffs were Allowed to Protect Property
  6. Duty of Courts to Protect Trusts – Applies to Churches
  7. Jurisdiction of Courts, Analogous to Infant
  8. Fundamental Principles cannot be Varied
  9. Court will apply Cy Pres Doctrine
  10. Conditions for Cy Pres Doctrine
  11. Taking Over Management of Trusts by the State
  12. Service of a Priest & Admin. of Institution, Secular Acts
  13. Legislature can Enact Law and Courts have Jurisdiction
  14. Constitutional Rights and Interference by Court
  15. Rights under Art. 25 and 26 are not absolute
  16. Rights under Art. 30
  17. Relevance of Common Law in Affairs of Churches
  18. Church Tribunal – Authority
  19. Sec. 38 of the Specific Relief Act
  20. Courts Act as Guardian of Charitable Organizations
  21. Court Interference in Religious Decisions:
  22. Church of North India Case
  23. Court Enforces Discipline of Church:
  24. Church is a voluntary body
  25. Court Interference in Faith Matters:
  26. Court Interference in Religious and Communal Affairs:
  27. Private Trust: Settlement of Scheme
  28. Beneficiaries can Invoke Jurisdiction of Courts
  29. A Trust Shall Not Fail For Want of a Trustee

Introduction

Because the affairs of charitable trusts are matters of public concern, under English Law, the Crown, as parens patriae, is the protector of charitable trusts. Indian Law also follows this principle.[1]In our Constitution, the ‘Concurrent List’ of the Schedule VII, contains ‘trust and trustees’ and ‘charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions’, whereby both the Centre and the States are competent to legislate and regulate trusts or charities and charitable institutions. Under Article 26(d) of the Constitution the legislature can validly regulate the administration of the property of a religious denomination.[2]

Dr. BK Mukherjea on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts[3] reads in this regard as under:

  • “In English law, the Crown as parens patriae is the constitutional protector of all property subject to charitable trusts, such trusts being essentially matters of public concern. The Attorney General represents the proper person to take proceedings on this behalf and to protect charities. Whenever an action is necessary to enforce the execution of a charitable purpose, to remedy any abuse or misapplication of charitable funds, or to administer a charity, the Attorney General is the proper plaintiff, whether he is acting alone ex officio as the officer of the Crown and, as such, the protection of charities, or ex relations, that is to say, at the request of a private individual called a ‘relator’ who thinks that the charity is being or has been abused. The Attorney General does not come before the court as a plaintiff asserting a private right but as an officer of the Crown informing the Judge, another officer of the Crown, of some breach of trust or neglect of duty on the defendant’s part in the management and administration of charities which requires to be remedied. That is why such actions were called ‘information’ – a name which was dropped only after the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873.”[4]

In Raju Muttu Rama Linga Vs. Perianayagum (1874),[5] it was observed by Privy Council that there could be little doubt that the superintending authority, over temples and religious endowments, was exercised by the old rulers.[6]

Crown – Constitutional Protector of all Charities

Tudor on Charities[7] reads as under:

  • “The Court and the Crown: The Crown as ‘parens-patriae’. The character of ‘parens-patriae’ which formerly imposed upon the Crown the duty of watching over the interests of wards makes it the protector of charity in general. Therefore, as Lord Eldon said, ‘where money is given to charity generally and indefinitely, without trustees or objects selected, the King as parens-patriae is the constitutional trustee’. While the jurisdiction of the court of Chancery over charitable foundations and gifts was in general conterminous with that over trusts of every kind, in one respect it had a jurisdiction peculiar to charitable trusts, in that wherever there was an intention to create a trust in favour of charity, the Court would give effect to the intention, in the first place by validating a defective gift and subsequently by reforming the trusts, if necessary, so that the donor’s paramount intention might be perpetually observed. This was an inherent jurisdiction, not conferred by statute, and now vested in the High Court of Justice and assigned to the Chancery Division”.

Early Enactments Governing Public Trusts – During British Regime[8]

  • Bengal Regulation XIX of 1810
  • Madras Regulation VII of 1817
  • Bombay Regulation XVII of 1827 
  • Religious Endowments Act, which repealed the Bengal and Madras Regulations
  • The Societies Registration Act, 1860
  • Religious Endowments Act, 1863
  • Civil Procedure Code of 1877: under S. 539 a suit could be instituted in case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public religious or charitable purposes. (This section was later amended, and incorporated provision similar to S. 92 of the present Civil Procedure Code, Act V of 1908.)
  • Religious Societies Act, 1880
  • Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (applicable for private trusts)
  • Charitable Endowments Act, 1890
  • Civil Procedure Code, 1908 
  • Registration Act, 1908
  • Official Trustees Act, 1913
  • Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920
  • Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925
  • Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939
  • Mussalman Wakf Act, 1923
  • Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913
  • Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1930
  • United Provinces Charitable Endowments Rules, 1943

Important Enactments Governing Public Trusts, After Independence

  • Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988
  • Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010
  • Companies Act, 2003
  • Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951
  • Wakfs
  • Wakf Act, 1995

State Acts

  • Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (BPTA) is the first Public Trusts Act enacted by a State, invoking the principle of ‘parens-patriae’.  It required registration of all public trusts with the authorities appointed under the Act. All other State Public Trusts Acts followed this Act in their legislation.
  • Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950
  • Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951
  • Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950
  • Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951
  • Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959
  • Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959
  • Madras Hindu Religious And Charitable Endowments Act, 1951
  • Uttar Pradesh Charitable Endowments (Extension of Powers) Act, 1950
  • Charitable Endowments (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1952
  • AP Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987
  • Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endownts Act, 1997
  • State Laws Governing Societies
  • Travancore Cochin Literary Scientific and Charitable So.Regn. Act, 1955
  • Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958
  • Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960
  • West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961
  • Madhya Pradesh Registration Adhiniyam, 1961
  • Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975
  • Manipur Societies Registration Act, 1989
  • Jammu – Kashmir Societies Registration Act, 1998
  • Societies Registration (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 2000

Court is the Protector of All Charities

It is trite law – in the matters as to custody of a minor, management of its affairs etc., paramount importance or concern is the welfare of the minor. The same principle is applied by our courts in the matters of public trusts also. The court is accepted as the guardian of the public charitable trusts or institutions.[9]

Courts have jurisdiction to enforce trusts.[10] As in the case of English Law, Indian Law also accepts court as the ultimate protector of all charities.[11] Sec. 92 CPC expressly authorizes designated courts to give directions for administration of public trusts. It is also the duty of Courts to protect and safeguard the property of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation[12] and from diversion from the objects to which it was dedicated.[13] The Court has necessarily a duty to protect the interest of the Public Trust and the courts should not adopt hyper technical approach, while dealing with the application for granting leave under Section 92 of CP.C.[14] Courts are bound to zealously guard the interest of the Trust, since the question of public interest is also involved.[15]

Where the Shebait of a temple has done something which is obviously adverse to the interest of the institution, it may be that the court would allow a disinterested third party to file a suit, but such a suit must be filed in the interest of the foundation or the deity.[16] The Supreme Court, in Chenchu Ram Reddy Vs. Government of AP,[17] observed that what is true of ‘public property’ is equally true of property belonging to religious or charitable institutions or endowments and that property of such institutions or endowments must be jealously protected by the courts. It is remarked further as under:

  • “It must be protected, for, a large segment of the community has beneficial interest in it (that is the raison d’etre of the Act itself). The authorities exercising the powers under the Act must not only be most alert and vigilant in such matters but also show awareness of the ways of the present day world as also the ugly realities of the world of today. They cannot afford to take things at their face value or make a less than the close stand best attention approach to guard against all pitfalls.”

In Subramannaiya Vs. Abbinava (1940)[18]  it was observed by the Madras High Court as under:

  • “When the trust property is without a legal guardian, owing to any defects in the machinery for the appointment of a trustee or owning to unwillingness of the legal trustee to act, it would be a monstrous thing if any honest person recognised as being in charge of the institution and actually controlling its affairs in the interest of the trust should not be entitled, in the absence of any one with a better title, to take these actions which are necessary to safeguard the interests of the trust”.[19]

In In-Re, Man Singh[20] it is pointed out by the Delhi High Court that in legal theory the Court is the guardian of charity, as it is of an infant. Sec. 92 CPC, which pertains to public trusts, is enacted adopting the English principles. The deity occupies, in law, with respect to the administration of property, the position of an infant.

Pollock and Maind’s ‘History of English Law’[21], it is laid down:

  • “A church is always under age and is to be treated as an infant and it is not according to law that infants should be disinherited by the negligence of their guardians or be barred of an action in case they would complain of things wrongfully done by their guardians while they are under age.”[22]

Inherent Jurisdiction of Court in the Affairs of Public Trusts

Snell’s Principles of Equity[23] reads as under:

  • “Apart from statute, the court has an inherent jurisdiction to remove a trustee and to appoint a new one in his place. As the interests of the trust are of paramount importance to the court, this jurisdiction will be exercised whenever the welfare of the beneficiaries requires it, even if the trustees have been guilty of no misconduct”.

Apart from the jurisdiction of courts to administer and enforce public trusts,[24]and set right mismanagement, fraud or maladministration whenever the assistance of the Court is sought for,[25]the courts have the power of judicial review and even a duty[26] in the matters of public trusts. Court is the guardian of the public charitable trusts/institutions.[27] Interest of public and public trusts is its paramount consideration.[28]Sec. 92 CPC expressly authorizes designated courts to give directions for administration of trusts. It is held by Privy Council in Ram Dularey Vs. Ram Lal[29]that ‘court has a duty, once it finds that it is a trust for public purposes, to consider what is best in the interest of the public’.[30]

In CK Rajan Vs. State of Kerala[31] it is held by the Kerala High Court that apart from the right of suit under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts have got ‘inherent jurisdiction’ to protect the interest of a religious or a charitable trust or deity. It was found to be a ‘reserve power’ with the courts.  The courts can invoke this discretionary power, when it is warranted, though not conferred by any statute, since this class of persons cannot, on their own, take proceedings to protect or safeguard their interests and set right the abuses or mismanagement or maladministration. Justice BK Mukherjea on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts[32]points out the following, as to the jurisdiction and the remedies granted independent of the statute, as under:

  • “The fact that a temple committee has been appointed does not oust the general jurisdiction of the Court to make any order that it considers necessary for due administration of the trust. The true principle undoubtedly is that the courts would not ordinarily interfere with the statutory powers conferred upon the members of the temple committee so as to deprive them of their legitimate functions. But the general right of a subject to ask for the Court’s assistance to set right abuses or to have other remedies independent of the statute is not thereby taken away. In England, it is settled law that the Court’s jurisdiction to make suitable orders in the case of a charitable trust is not in any way affected by reason of the existence of visitatorial powers.”

Affairs of a trust are essentially matters of public concern.

In Attorney General Vs. St. Cross Hospital (1853)[33] Sir Samuel Romilly observed as under:

  • ‘The only remaining point then on this part of the case is whether the jurisdiction of this Court is taken away by reason of the visitorship of the Bishop of Winchester. If this were the law it would be very unfortunate, for it does not require the history of this case to teach us that the visitorship vested in any one, whether a corporation sole or aggregate or the heir of the founder is a mere nominal office, the duties and functions of which are rarely if ever spontaneously performed. But the law is not so. Where there is a clear and distinct trust, this Court administers and enforces it as much whether there is a visitor as where there is none. This is clear both on principle and on authority’.”

In Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakhmiram (1888)[34] West and Birdwood, JJ. observed:

  • “Civil Courts have jurisdiction to enforce trusts for charitable and religious purposes, having connection with Hindu and Mohammadan foundations and to prevent fraud and waste in dealing with religious endowments, though incidentally it has to take cognisance of religious or caste questions. The religion of the Hindu population being jurally allowed, the duties and services connected with it must be deemed objects of public concern and at least as to their physical and secular elements enforceable like other obligations.”[35]

The Madras High Court had held in Sitarama Chetty Vs. Subramania Ayyar (1917)[36] that the High Courts and the mofussil Courts were Courts of both law and equity and that they can exercise jurisdiction over religious and charitable institutions in the same way as the Courts Chancery did in England.[37] It is also the duty of Courts to protect and safeguard the property of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation.Where the Shebait of a temple has done something which is obviously adverse to the interest of the institution it may be that the court would allow a disinterested third party to file a suit, but such a suit must be filed in the interest of the foundation or the deity, as the case may be.[38]

Plaintiffs were Allowed to Protect Property

It is taken note of in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez[39] that as per the Canon Law the church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar. But, it is observed that the parish being by law a public juridic person, the plaintiffs, as the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church, were competent to initiate civil proceedings with the ultimate aim of protecting the property belonging to the church; and that the plaintiffs were entitled to represent the juridic person before the Civil Court.

Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920

The object of the act is shown to be ‘to provide more effectual control over the administration of Charitable and Religious Trusts’; and it is made to provide facilities for the obtaining of information regarding trusts created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, and to enable the trustees of such trusts to obtain the directions of a Court on certain matters, and to make special provision for the payment of the expenditure incurred in certain suits against the trustees of such trusts’.

Following are the important provisions of the Act.

  • “Sec. 2. Interpretation. — In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, ‘the Court’ means the Court of the District Judge or any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government and includes the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
  • Sec. 7. Powers of trustee to apply for directions.—
  • .(1) Save as hereinafter provided in this Act, any trustee of an express or constructive trust created or existing for public purpose of a charitable or religious nature may apply by petition to the Court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any substantial part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate, for the opinion, advice or direction of the Court on any question affecting the management or administration of the trust property, and the Court shall give its opinion, advice or direction, as the case may be, thereon:
  • Provided that the Court shall not be bound to give such opinion, advice or direction on any question which it considers to be a question not proper for summary disposal.
  • (2) The Court on a petition under sub-section (1), may either give its opinion, advice or direction hereon forthwith, or fix a date for the hearing of the petition, and may direct a copy thereof, together with notice of the date so fixed, to be served on such of the person interested in the trust, or to be published for information in such manner, as it thinks fit.
  • (3) On any date fixed under sub-section (2) or on any subsequent date to which the hearing may be adjourned, the Court, before giving any opinion, advice or direction, shall afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to all persons appearing in connection with the petition.
  • (4) A trustee stating in good faith the facts of any matter relating to the trust in a petition under sub-section (1), and acting upon the opinion, advice or direction of the Court given thereon, shall be deemed, as far as his own responsibility is concerned, to have discharged his duty as such trustee in the matter in respect of which the petition was made.
  • Sec. 9. Savings.— No petition under the foregoing provisions of this Act in relation to any trust shall be entertained in any of the following circumstances, namely:—
  • .(a) if a suit instituted in accordance with the provisions of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (5 of 1908), is pending in respect of the trust in question;
  • (b) if the trust property is vested in the Treasurer of Charitable Endowments, the Administrator General, the Official Trustee, or any Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860); or
  • (c) if a scheme for the administration of the trust property has been settled or approved by any Court of competent jurisdiction, or by any other authority acting under the provisions of any enactment.
  • Sec. 12. Barring of appeals.— No appeal shall lie from any order passed or against any opinion, advice or direction given under this Act.”

The purport of the Act can be analysed as under:

  • Court gives opinion, advice or direction to trustees alone.
  • The advice or direction is given only on any question affecting the management or administration of the trust property.
  • It is on the principle – Court is Guardian or Protector of All Public Trusts.
  • It envisages a ‘summary disposal’.
  • Court exercises a discretionary jurisdiction in this matter.
  • Court is not bound to give opinion if the question not susceptible to a summary disposal.
  • The opinion is not given in matters which are seriously disputed or contested.
  • There will not be adjudication on questions of fact or law.
  • Operation of this section is subject to Sections 9 and 12 (given above).

Court is Protector of All Public Trusts – Cannot Refuse Opinion

Referring Sec. 7 of the  Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920, it is observed in Sennimalai Swamy Madam Trust, Palani v. NIL, 1999-3 CTC 390, as under:

  • “10. In view of these decisions, it has to be held that petitioner is competent to file an application before lower court seeking opinion. Unless Court finds that the opinion cannot be given since there are complicated facts or question of law is to be decided, it may not be proper on its part to refuse to give opinion.  After all, Court is guardian or Protector of all public trusts and it cannot refuse to give its opinion, when the same is sought for by a Trustee.” (Avoch Thevar v. Chummar, AIR 1957 Ker 171, In Re Birla Jankalyan Trust, AIR 1971 Cal. 290, In Re Dhanalat, AIR 1975 Cal. 67, referred to)

Courts desist if Complicated Facts or Question of Law

In Avoch Thevar v. Chummar, AIR 1957 Ker 171, it is observed that serious questions of res judicata, estoppel, good faith etc. could not be adjudicated under Sec. 7 of the  Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920. It is said as under:

  • “6. …. “The Court under the section exercises what might be called its consultative jurisdiction, giving guidance to the trustee. The court is not, however, to grant sanction merely because it is applied for. The limitation is that the court will refuse to consider the matter if in its opinion the question is one not capable of summary disposal e.g. if it is one of the detail or difficulty. In any event the court will consider judicially the matters placed before it before disposing of the matter.”

This Kerala decision is followed in Hasan Bin Mubarak v. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad AIR 1999 AP 11, observing as under:

  • “Section 34 of the Act contemplates only a summary disposal on non-controversial issues. The mental condition of a person being an important personal problem, the Court cannot dispose of the same in a summary manner. What the Court below has done was to examine 3rd respondent, who is alleged to be an insane person and give the opinion on the basis of her statement. Though Ex.R-1, certificate, alleged to have been given by a psychiatrist, was marked, the Court made no effort to examine the said doctor. Obviously, this could not have been done because the matter has to be disposed of in a summary manner. Thus, it is evident that the advice that was sought for by the trustee required a determination on contentious facts and the jurisdiction of the Court under section 34 being only in the nature of giving guidelines or directions without entering into the merits, the application ought not to have been entertained by the Court. The trustee might have got a valid and satisfactory opinion had he approached a qualified medical man or the Court in a properly instituted suit.
  • 23. In Avoch Thevar case (supra) following the decision in Armugan Chetty vs. Raja Jagaveera ILR 28 Madras 444, it was clearly held that while providing the trustees a right to apply to the Court for opinion to the Management and the Members, Section 34 embodied at the same time, a limitation governing the questions to be asked viz. that there should not be hypothetical and any questions of details or difficulty or importance, not proper in the opinion of the Court for summary disposal……” (quoted in Ashok Kumar Kapur VS Ashok Khanna, AIR 2007 SC  6; 2007-5 SCC 189).

Avoch Thevar v. Chummar, AIR 1957 Ker 171, is followed in P. D. Jaiswal v. Dwarikadhish Temple Trust, 2006 2 ADJ 680; 2006 3 AllLR 21; 2006 3 AWC 2823 saying as under:

  • “39. The last strand of Mr. Ravi Kant’s arguments was a Kerala Division Bench decision given in the case of Avoch Thevar v. Chummar, A.I.R. 1957 Ker 171, which was delivered for the Court by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Varadaraja lyengar. With the greatest of respect, it is a beautiful learned judgment which should be read by any reader of this judgment and we do not set out the materials collected therein simply because we cannot do it better or in a briefer way. We respectfully referred the reader to paragraph-6, 7, 8 and 9 of the said judgment.
  • 40. Following the said judgment and the authorities quoted there, which are fully persuasive in our respectful opinion, we must opine that a decision under Section 7 of the 1920 Act is not to be given at all by the District Court in matters which are seriously disputed or contested, or which required difficult decisions on questions of fact or law,”

‘Breach of an Obligation’in Sec. 38 of the Specific Relief Act

Under Sec. 38 of the Specific Relief Act the court is expressly authorized to grant injunctions to prevent breach of an obligation existing in favour of the plaintiff or where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff. Sec. 38 of the Sec. 38 of the Specific Relief Act reads:

  • “38. Perpetual injunction when granted.—(1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to by this chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication.
  • (2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the Court shall be guided by the Rules and provisions contained in Chapter II.
  • (3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of property, the Court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely;
  •         (a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff;
  •         (b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be caused, by the invasion;
  •         (c) where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief;
  •         (d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.

The word obligation is defined in Sec. 2 of the Specific Relief Act with a widermeaning.It is so wide that it encompass obligations ‘whether expressly or by implication’.Italsoreads: ” ‘obligation’ includes every duty enforceable by law to include ‘every duty enforceable by law”. The word ‘trust’ is also used in a wider sense[40] in this Act as under:   ” ‘trust’ has the same meaning as in Section 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882), and includes an obligation in the nature of a trust within the meaning of Chapter IX of that Act.” It is also noteworthy that ‘trust’ is not alien to the affairs of a society inasmuch as the administrators of  societies can be ‘trustees’ as seen from Sec. 5 and 16 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, which reads as under.

  • 5. Property of society how vested: The property, movable and immovable belonging to a society registered under this Act, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body of such society, and in all proceedings civil and criminal, may be described as the property of the governing body of such society for their proper title.
  • 16. Governing body defined: The governing body of the society shall be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees, or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted.

Courts Act as Guardian of Societies & Can Oversee its Functions

In I. Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate[41]  it is laid down by our Apex Court as under:

  • “Keeping in view the interest of the general public, we see no reason as to why in a case of mismanagement of such charitable organizations, although run by minorities, the Court cannot oversee its functions. The Courts, indisputably, act as guardian of such societies. [See Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee Vs. CK Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546.] Even otherwise, rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution are not absolute and unfettered. The right to manage, it goes without saying, does not carry with it a right to mismanage.”

Court Enforces Discipline of Church:

Church is a voluntary body. The Supreme Court held in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma[42] as under:

  • “A church is formed by the voluntary association of individuals. And the churches in the commonwealth are voluntary body organised on a consensual basis – their rights apart from statutes will be protected by the courts and their discipline enforced exactly as in the case of any other voluntary body whose existence is legally recognised. Therefore, all religious bodies are regarded by courts of law in the same position in respect of the protection of their rights and the sanction given to their respective organisations.”

Superintendence of the Temple: Not a Property

In Bira Kishore Deb Vs. State of Orissa (1964).[43] A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had held that Section 6 of Sri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954 extinguished the hereditary right of the Raja and entrusted secular management of the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri to the Committee. The Chairman remained. It was found that the superintendence of the Temple was not a property. It carried no beneficial interest or enjoyment of the property with it. The right was not acquired by the State. The whole of the right to manage the Temple was extinguished and in its place another body for the purpose of administration of the properties of the Temple was created. Such process cannot be said to constitute the acquisition or extinguishment of office or the vesting of the right in such persons holding that office.

Cy Pres Doctrine

‘Cy   pres’ doctrine conveys the concept of ‘following as nearly as possible the intention of the donor’.[44]It is applied by courts when general intention of charity viewed by the founder cannot be carried into effect, for impossibility or impracticability.It is based on the principle that the court is the protector of all charities.[45]  It is an established principle of equity jurisprudence that a trust never fails even if there is no trustee.[46]

Invoking this doctrine the court will apply the Trust to some other charitable purpose ‘as nearly as possible’[47]Where a clear charitable intention is expressed by the founder of a trust and also the mode, if the mode becomes in-executable, the law will substitute another mode, cy-pres, ie., as near as possible to the mode specified by the donor; so that the charitable intention will not be permitted to fail.[48] It is held in Ironmonger’s Co. Vs. AG[49] and Re Cunningham[50] that this doctrine is applied not only to the affairs of trusts subsequent to their formation, but also to the trusts execution of which is rendered, initially itself, impossible or impracticable.  

This doctrine is applied by the Courts in England to administer a charitable trust of which the particular mode of application has not been defined. Where a clear charitable intention is expressed, it will not be permitted to fail because the mode, if specified, cannot be executed, but the law will substitute another mode.[51]

Besides physical impossibility, becoming the trust valueless, owing to attendant circumstances, also invites application of cy pres doctrine[52]. When a fund is conditionally given to charity, and the condition is not fulfilled, application of cy pres doctrine is not attracted for there is no complete dedication.[53]Cy pres doctrine is not applied in a case where intention of the founder is opposed to public policy[54].

Halsbury’s Laws of England reads:

  • “The cy-pres doctrine. Where a clear charitable intention is expressed, it will not be permitted to fail because the mode, if specified, cannot be executed, but the law will substitute another mode cy-pres, that is, as near as possible to the mode specified by the donor.
  • An application cy-pres results from the exercise of the court’s ordinary jurisdiction to administer a charitable trust of which the particular mode of application has not been defined by the donor. Where he has in fact prescribed a particular mode of application and that mode is incapable of being performed, but he had a charitable intention which transcended the particular mode of application prescribed, the court, in the exercise of this jurisdiction, can carry out the charitable intention as though the particular direction had not been expressed at all.
  • However, where the particular mode of application prescribed by the donor was the essence of his intention, which may be shown by a condition or by particularity of language, and that mode is incapable of being performed, there is nothing left upon which the court can found its jurisdiction, so that in such circumstances the court has no power to direct any other charitable application in place of that which has failed.
  • Where the particular mode of application does not exhaust a gift, these principles apply to the surplus.
  • There can be no question under English law of a cy pres application of property subject to trusts which are not charitable in law.”[55]

When it is found by the court that the particular mode of charity, indicated by the donor, cannot be carried out for impossibility or impracticability, the court will execute and accomplish the donor’s intention applying ‘cy pres’ doctrine.  The court will not allow to fail a validly created trust, or its objects of foundation. In Ratilal Vs. State of Bombay[56] it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “When the particular purpose for which a charitable trust is created fails or by reason of certain circumstances the trust cannot be carried into effect either in whole or in part, or where there is a surplus left after exhausting the purposes specified by the settler the Court would not when there is a general charitable intention expressed by the settler, allow the trust to fail but would execute it ‘Cy Pres’, that is to say, in some way as nearly as possible to that which the author of the trust intended. In such cases, it cannot be disputed that the Court can frame a scheme and give suitable directions regarding the objects upon which the trust money can be spent.”

The beneficiaries can enforce the trust. Once a trust is created the property does not revert to the settlor or his heirs.[57]But, in Vadivelu Mudaliar Vs.Kuppuswamy Mudaliar[58]  it has been held that when all the trustees fail to administer the trust or repudiate trust property dedicated to the trust would re-vest in the donor or his legal representatives; and it is only when the legal representatives are not available or do not take charge of the trust for some reason or the other, it will be that the Court to interfere for the purpose of appointing of trustee or trustees for the administration of trust.

The essential conditions to attract the application of the Cy Presdoctrine are:

  • (i) the donor (rather the testator) must clearly evidence a general intention of charity when the particular charitable disposition cannot be carried into effect, the Court, in order that the general charitable intention may not be disappointed, makes a Cy Presapplication of the fund and applies it to a purpose which coincides as nearly as possible with the object that has failed;
  • (ii) there must be a failure of the particular object of charity as specified by the testator, or there must be a surplus left after satisfying the particular purpose;
  • (iii) the court should choose such objects as are akin to the object that had failed;
  • (iv) the gift or trust must be by Will and not by a deed inter vivos (by case law).[59]

Relevance of Common Law in Affairs of Churches

The Supreme Court held in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma[60] as under:

  • “The jurisdiction of courts depends either on statute or on common law. The jurisdiction is always local and in absence of any statutory provision the cognizance of such dispute has to be taken either by a hierarchy of ecclesiastical courts established in the country where the religious institutions are situated or by a statutory law framed by Parliament. Admittedly no law in respect of Christian churches has been framed, therefore, there is no statutory law. Consequently any dispute in respect of religious office in respect of Christians is also cognizable by the civil court. The submission that the Christians stand on a different footing than Hindus and Buddhists, need not be discussed or elaborated. Suffice it to say that religion of Christians, Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains or Parsees may be different but they are all citizens of one country which provides one and only one forum that is the civil court for adjudication of their rights, civil or of civil nature.”

Church Tribunal – Authority

It is further held in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma[61] as under:

  • “In Long Vs.  Bishop of Cape Town where the Bishop held an ecclesiastical court for proceeding against the appellant who was authorised to perform ecclesiastical duties in a parish was held as coram non judice as he had no authority to hold an ecclesiastical court. The court held that where no church was established by law it was in the same situation as any religious body, therefore, if any tribunal was constituted by such body which was not court then its decision would be binding only if it was exercised within the scope of the authority.
  • In Dame Henriette Brown Vs. Les Cure Et Marguilliers De L’oeuvre Et Fabrique De Notre Dame De Motrea[62], the Privy council while following the decision in Long[63] held that where a church was merely a private and voluntary religious Society resting only upon a consensual basis courts of justice were still bound when due complaint was made that a member of the Society was injured in any manner of a mixed spiritual and temporal character to inquire into the laws and rules of the tribunal or authority which inflicted the alleged injury and ascertain whether the act complained of was law and discipline of the church and whether the sentence was justifiably pronounced by a competent authority. The decision in Longhas been followed in this country in AnadravBhikajiphadke Vs. Shankar DajiCharya[64] where certain persons brought a suit that their right of worship in the sanctuary of a temple was being infringed, it was held that the right of exclusive worship of an idol at particular place set up by a caste was civil right.”

Court Interference in Faith and ReligiousMatters: Cognisable by Civil Court

It was contented in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma[65] that various decisions[66] indicate that Explanation 1 to Section 9 embraced questions relating to the religious faith, doctrine and belief and saved only those suits where the right to property or to an office was contested. Sahai, J. observed that any dispute in respect of religious office is cognisable by the civil court. Sahai J. observed as under:

  • “The jurisdiction of courts depends either on statute or on common law. The jurisdiction is always local and in absence of any statutory provision the cognizance of such dispute has to be taken either by a hierarchy of ecclesiastical courts established in the country where the religious institutions are situated or by a statutory law framed by the Parliament. Admittedly no law in respect of Christian Churches has been framed, therefore, there is no statutory law. Consequently any dispute in respect of religious office in respect of Christians is also cognisable by the civil court.”

Private Trust: Settlement of Scheme

Section 92 CPC will not apply to private trusts; and, suits relating to religious[67] private trusts are outside the purview of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. It does not necessarily mean that the civil court has no jurisdiction to settle a scheme for the management of a private trust. It is a civil right under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code and governed entirely by the general law of the land which prescribes the remedies for enforcement of civil rights.[68] In Thenappa Chettiar Vs.Karuppan Chettiar[69], the Supreme Court held that even in the case of a private trust, a suit can be brought by any person interested in the proper administration of the endowment including that for settlement of a scheme.

Beneficiaries can Invoke Jurisdiction of Courts to Enforce Trust

A Trust Shall Not Fail For Want of a Trustee

It is an established principle of equity jurisprudence that a trust never fails even if there is no trustee.[70] The beneficiaries can enforce the trust. Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. ‘on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’ reads as under:

  • “The trust itself does not fail. …. The property does not revert to the representatives or the heirs of the settlor testator who has already divested himself of the title and interest in the property by creating a valid and complete trust. ….. That is, the beneficiaries can enforce it, or the object of the trust can be enforced where beneficiaries are not capable of suing”[71]

Under Sec. 59 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, where no trustees are appointed or all the trustees die, disclaim or are discharged, or where for any other reason the execution of a Trust by the trustee is or becomes impracticable, the beneficiary may institute a suit for the execution of the Trust and the Trust shall, so far as may be possible, be executed by the Court until the appointment of a trustee or new trustee.[72]  It is clear that this principle is adopted by Mukherjea, J. in the case of public trust also.

In Thangachi Nachial Vs.  Ahmed Hussain Malumiar[73] it has been observed by the Madras High Court that the beneficiary’s right to sue embodied in Section 59 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 was based on the principle that ‘a Trust shall not fail for want of a trustee’. It has been held in this case that the beneficiary of the trust in respect of a Muhammadan Wakf, may (without having recourse to Order 1 Rule 8 of CPC and without suing in a representative capacity on behalf of the other beneficiaries) sue for declaration that the property were the subject of the trust and for recovery of possession of property wrongfully alienated by the trustee.

Fundamental Principles Cannot be Varied

The fundamental principles upon which a trust is founded cannot be varied. Therefore, the courts cannot sanction any drastic amendment to the document of trust which would destroy the basic purpose for which the trust was created.[74]This principle in Milligan Vs. Mitchel,[75]Atttorney General Vs. Anderson[76] and Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun[77]was referred to in PrasannaVenkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao.[78]


[1]      C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296: Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia:  AIR 1952 Kar 14; Thenappa Chattier Vs. Kuruppan Chhietier AIR 1968 SC 915; SubramoniaPillai Chellam Pillai Vs. Subramonia Pillai Chathan Pillai: AIR 1953 TC 198;  M.G. Narayanaswami Naidu Vs. M. Balasundaram Naidu: AIR 1953 Mad 750.

[2] Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt: AIR 1954 SC 282.

[3] Fifth Edition, page 404.

[4] Also see: Joint Commissioner Hindu Religious And Charitable Endowments Vs. Jayaraman: AIR 2006 SC 104

[5]      (1874) 1 Ind App 209 at 233;  See also Dr. B.K. Mukherjea: Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Fifth Edition, pages 404).

[6]      See also Dr. BK Mukherjea: Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Fifth Edition, page 404). M Siddiq Vs.Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1.

[7]      VII Edition, page 294

[8]      See history: Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji Vs. SP Sahi: AIR 1959 SC 951;  Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jogendra Nath Naskar: AIR 1965 Cal  570; Kidangazhi Manakkal Narayanan Nambudiripad Vs. State of Madras: AIR 1954 Mad 385; C.K. Rajan Vs. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee : AIR 1994 Ker 179.

[9]      ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh: ILR  2009-19Dlh 265 ; See also:Thenappa Chattier Vs. Kuruppan Chhietier: AIR 1968 SC 915; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337. 

[10]   C.K. Rajan Vs. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee: .AIR 1994 Ker 179. [Appeal Judgment: Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee Vs. C.K. Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546].  C  Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Thenappa Chattier Vs. Kuruppan Chhietier AIR 1968 SC 915 ,     ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265,      I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337,       Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309.

[11]   Haleema Vs. High Court Of Kerala: ILR 2011-1Ker 50: 2011-1 KerLT 134, Awadesh Kumar Vs. Rajendra Prasad Sharma: BLJ 1996-2 423: 1997-1BLJR 126 , C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa: 1970-1 MysLJ 296, Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman Eislamia: AIR1952 Kar 14: ILR 1952Kar  2, Hamumiya Bachumita Vs. Mehdihusen Gulamhusen: 1978 GLR  661, Lallubhai Girdharlal Parikh Vs. Acharya Vrijbhushanlalji: AIR 1967 Guj 280, The Breach Candy Bath Trust. Vs. Dipesh Mehta : 2015-6 AIR-BOMR 709, [12]   AA Gopalakrishnan Vs. Cochin Devaswom Board: AIR 2007 SC  3162. Referred to in: Mandal Revenue Officer Vs. Goundla Venkaiah: AIR 2010 SC 744.

[13]   Subramannaiya Vs. Abbinava: AIR  1940 Mad. 617; Quoted in: M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1;  Sankaranarayanan Vs. Shri Poovananatha: AIR  1949 Mad.721; Parshvanath Jain Temple Vs. LRs of Prem Dass: 2009-3 RCR(Civil) 133

[14]   Nadigar Sangham Trust Vs. S. Murugan Poochi: 2013-1 MLJ 433: 2012-6 CTC 721; Imayam Trust Vs. Balakumar: CTC 2015 3 654: : 2015-2 MadLW 235.

[15]   Rajagopal v. Balachandran: 2002 2 CTC 527; Imayam Trust Vs. Balakumar: CTC 2015 3 654: : 2015-2 MadLW 235.

[16]   Doongarsee Shyamji Vs. Tribhuvan Das: AIR 1947 All 375. Referred to in  Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73.

[17]   (1986) 3 SCC 391.

[18] AIR  1940 Mad. 617

[19] Quoted in Sankaranarayanan Vs. Shri Poovananatha: AIR  1949 Mad.721 and  Parshvanath Jain Temple Vs. LRs of Prem Dass: 2009-3-RCR(CIVIL) 133

[20] AIR 1974 Del. 228; See also: Avoch Thevar Vs. Chummar: AIR 1957 Ker. 171; In Re Birla Jankalyan Trust: AIR 1971 Cal. 290; In Re Dhanalat, AIR 1975 Cal. 67.

[21]    Volume I (Page 463).

[22]    Quoted in YogendraNathNaskar Vs. Commr of IT Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089.

[23]    28th Edition, pages 210 and 211

[24]    CK RajanVs. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee: AIR 1994 Ker 179. [Appeal Judgment: Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee Vs. CK Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: AA Gopalakrishnan Vs. Cochin Devaswom Board: AIR 2007 SC 3162. Mandal Revenue Officer Vs. Goundla Venkaiah: AIR 2010 SC 744. Subramannaiya Vs. Abbinava: AIR  1940 Mad. 617. Quoted in: Sankaranarayanan Vs. Shri Poovananatha: AIR  1949 Mad.721, Parshvanath Jain Temple Vs. L.Rs of Prem Dass: 2009-3-RCR(CIVIL) 13),  Fakhuruddin Vs. Mohammad Rafiq: AIR  1916 All 115 (PC);  C  Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Thenappa Chattier Vs. Kuruppan Chhietier AIR 1968 SC 915; Sridhar Vs. Shri Jagan Nath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commr IT Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089. ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265;  I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309.

[25]    Thenappa Chattier Vs. Kuruppan Chhietier AIR 1968 SC 915,

[26]    AG Vs. Pearson: (1817) 3 Mer 353; Referred to in Varghese Vs. St. Peters and St. Pauls: (2017) 15 SCC 333; Fakir Mohamed Abdul Razak Vs. Charity Commissioner Bombay: AIR 1976 Bom 304; Narasimhiah Vs. YH Venkataramanappa: AIR  1976Kar 43; Sobhanadreswara Rice Mill Vs. Brahmachari Bavaji Mutt: AIR  1973 AP 292. Subramania Gurukkal Vs. Abhinava Poornapriya Asrinivasa Rao Sahib: AIR 1940 Mad 617; Mohideen Khan Vs. Ganikhan: AIR  1956 AP 19. See with respect to Educational Institution: KK Saksena  Vs. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage: 2015-4 SCC 670.

[27]    ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh: ILR 2009-19Dlh 265, See also Thenappa Chattier Vs. Kuruppan Chhietier: AIR 1968 SC 915; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337.  In In-Re, Man Singh: AIR 1974 Del. 228.

[28]    RambakeshwarDevasthan Trust Vs. President PurohitSangh: AIR  2012 SC 139.

[29]    AIR1946 PC 34.

[30]    Referred to in: Varghese Vs. St. Peters and St. Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333; Narasimhiah Vs. YH Venkataramanappa: AIR 1976 Kar 43.

[31]    AIR  1994 Ker 179.

[32]    Fifth Edition, pages 411 and 412

[33] (1853) 51 ER 1103

[34]    (1888) ILR 12 Bom 247

[35]    Quoted in CK Rajan Vs. State of Kerala: AIR  1994 Ker 179

[36]    AIR 1917 Mad 551; ILR 39 Mad 700: citing Attorney General Vs. Brodie, (1846) 4 Moo Ind App 190 Maharanee Shibessoree Vs. Mothooranath, (1869-70) 13 Moo Ind App 270.

[37]    Referred to in CK Rajan Vs. State of Kerala: AIR  1994 Ker 179,

[38]    Doongarsee Shyamji Vs. Tribhuvan Das: AIR 1947 All 375. Referred to in Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73.

[39]    2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[40]    Rotopacking Materials Industry Vs. Ravider Kumar Chopra: 2003(6) BCR 6; Smt. Parul Bala Roy Vs. Srinibash Chowmal: AIR 1952 Cal 364; Referred to in: Arun Kumar Mitra Vs. Gorachand Saheb Sekh Abdul: AIR 2005 Cal 178.

[41]    AIR 2007 SC 1337

[42]    AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[43]AIR  1964 SC 1501

[44]    AbidHatim Merchant Vs. Janab Salebhai Saheb Shaifuddin AIR 2000  SC 899: Commissioner of Income Tax Kanpur Vs. Kamla Town Trust: AIR 1996 SC  620;  NS Rajabathar Mudaliar Vs. M.S. Vadivelu Mudaliar, AIR 1970 SC 1839;

[45]    C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia: AIR 1952 Kar14 .

[46] Yelandau Arasikere Deshikendra Sammthana  Vs. Gangadharaiah: 2007-5 AIR Kar R 565: 2008-4 Kat LJ 323.

[47]    Abid Hatim Merchant Vs. Janab Salebhai Saheb Shaifuddin:  AIR 2000  SC 899: Commissioner of Income Tax Kanpur Vs. Kamla Town Trust: AIR 1996 SC  620;  NS Rajabathar Mudaliar Vs. Vadivelu Mudaliar, AIR 1970 SC 1839; In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228

[48] Union of India Vs. Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust: AIR 2018 SC 5426

[49]    (1844) 10 Cl& F 908.

[50]    (1914) 1 Ch 427.

[51]    Union of India Vs. Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust: (2018) 8 SCC 321.

[52]    Hormusji Franji Warden, ILR 32  B. 214.

[53] Chamberlane Vs. Brochett: LR 8 Ch. 206; Santana Roy Vs. AG ILR 45 Cal. 1.

[54]    Tudor on Charities,  5thEdn, P. 153.

[55]    Quoted in Union of India Vs. Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust: (2018) 8 SCC 321.

[56] AIR 1954 SC 388

[57] Yelandau Arasikere  Vs. Gangadharaiah: 2007-5 AIR Kar R 565: 2008-4 Kat LJ 323. Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11; Laxmi Ammal Vs. Sun Life Assurance Co., Canada AIR 1934 Mad 264; Kumaraswamy Goundan Vs. Planisamy Goundan: AIR 1938 Mad 668.

[58]    1972 (1) Mad LJ 265.

[59]    Gedela Satchidananda Murthy Vs. Dy.  Commnr Endnts. Deptt A P: AIR 2007 SC 1917

[60]    AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[61]    AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[62]    1874-75 (6) PC 157

[63]    Long  Vs. Bishop of Capetown,  1863 (1) Moore PCC NS 411

[64]    ILR 7 Bombay 323

[65]    AIR 1995 SC 2001

[66]    Sardar Syedna Tahar Saifuddin Saheb Vs. The State of Bombay, 1962 Supp. 2 SCR 496; Uqamsingh & Mishramal Vs. Kesrimal: 1971(2) SCR 836; Thiruvenkata Ramanuja Vs. Prathivathi Bhayankaram:  AIR 1947 PC 53; M. Appadorai Ayyangar Vs. P.B. Annanqarachariar: AIR 1939 Mad. 102; Kattalai Michael Pillai  Vs. J.M. Barthe: AIR 1917 Mad. 431; E.C. Kent Vs. EEL Kent: AIR 1926 Madras 59;  Sri Sinna Ramanuja Jeer Vs. Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer:1962 (2) SCR 509.

[67]    See Sec. 1.

[68]    Cheriyathu Vs. Parameswaran Namboodiripad: 1953 Ker LT 125, Also 1953 Ker LT 117; AIR1922 P. C. 253 A I R 1925 P C 139.

[69] AIR 1968 SC 915.

[70]    Yelandau Arasikere Deshikendra Sammthana Vs.Gangadharaiah: 2007-5 AIR Kar R 565: 2008-4 Kat LJ 323.

[71] Quoted in: Yelandau Arasikere Deshikendra Sammthana Vs. Gangadharaiah: 2007-5 AIR Kar R 565: 2008-4 Kat LJ 323. See also: Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

[72]    Laxmi Ammal Vs. Sun Life Assurance Co., Canada AIR 1934 Mad 264; Kumaraswamy Goundan Vs. Planisamy Goundan: AIR 1938 Mad 668.

[73]    AIR 1957 Mad 194, Relying on Maulvi Muhammad Fahimul Haq  Vs. Jagat Ballay Ghosh AIR 1923 Pat 475.

[74] Pragji Savji Vaja  Vs. Chhotalal Narsidas Parmar: AIR 2014-3 Bom R 211: 2013-6 BCR 72.

[75]    40 ER 852.

[76]    (1888) 57 LJ Ch 543

[77]    (1904) AC 515:

[78]    AIR 1931 Mad. 12



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Suits By or Against Trusts and Trustees

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Contents in a Nutshell.

  • A trust is not a legal person.[1]
  • It cannot sue or be sued in its own name.[2]
  • Court is the ultimate protector of all charities.
  • There is no provision in the CPC to sue or be sued in the name of the trust.
  • Order XXXI, Rule 1 CPC deals with the representation of beneficiaries in suits concerning property vested in the Trustee.
    • That is, the Trustee shall represent the persons interested in the trust and that the affairs of a trust have to be brought before a court of law in the name of its trustees.
  • But, idol in a temple and Mutt being accepted as juridical persons, suits are maintainable in the name of the idol and Mutt. Such entity must also be represented by a proper person.
  • Reliefs enumerated in Section 92 CPC can be sought for by two or more persons having interest in the public trust, after obtaining the leave of the Court.
    • Section 92 CPC is applicable to public trusts; and not to private trusts. 
    • Reliefs set forth in Section 92 CPC can be granted to private trusts, applying the general law of the land, as civil rights.[3] 

Jurisdiction of Courts

RM Sahai, J. observed in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma[4] as under:

  • “The jurisdiction of courts depends either on statute or on common law.”

Sahai J. continued:

  • “The jurisdiction is always local and in absence of any statutory provision the cognizance of such dispute has to be taken either by a hierarchy of ecclesiastical courts established in the country where the religious institutions are situated or by a statutory law framed by the Parliament. Admittedly no law in respect of Christian Churches has been framed, therefore, there is no statutory law. Consequently any dispute in respect of religious office in respect of Christians is also cognisable by the civil court.”

Court is the Ultimate Protector of Charities[5]

Courts have jurisdiction and duty[6] to administer and enforce public trusts.[7]  As in the case of English Law, Indian Law also accepts court as the ultimate protector of all charities.[8] It is the guardian of the public charitable trusts/institutions[9] and its property.[10]   

In legal theory the Court is the guardian of charity, as it is of an infant.[11]  In P.  Elumalai Vs. Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board[12] the Madras High Court while passing an order exercising the ‘Parens Patriae’ jurisdiction over the trust held that as ‘Parens Patriae’, the Courts were empowered to protect the sanctity of public trust in case of breach of trust on account of irregularities committed in trust. In this decision it was held that the Court could not remain a mute spectator when illegality had been committed against a public Trust in front of its own eyes.[13]

In Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014, T.R. Ramachandran Nair, P.V. Asha, JJ.) held as under:

  • “60. As far as the property of the Temple is concerned, this Court will be right in exercising the parens patriae jurisdiction. The Division Bench in paragraphs 61 and 63 of the judgment in Mohanan Nair’s case (2013 (3) KLT 132) has considered two aspects, viz. the power of this Court to interfere even if there is inaction on the part of the Board and the importance of protecting the interest of Deity. Herein, what we find from Ext. P7 order is that a complaint was made by the Temple Advisory Committee which was considered by the learned Ombudsman appointed by this Court for Travancore and Cochin Devaswom Boards. The learned Ombudsman had also directed the third respondent to take urgent action for recovery of Devaswom property. In paragraph 62 of the judgment in Mohanan Nair’s case (2013 (3) KLT 132) this Court relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board (2007 (4) KLT 965) wherein the duty of the courts to protect and safeguard the interest of the Deity has been highlighted.”

It is held in Mohanan Nair’s case, 2013 (3) KLT 132, as under:

  • “62. The Apex Court, in a recent decision reported in Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board (ILR 2007 (4) Ker. 181), has emphasised that it is the duty of the Courts to protect and safeguard the interest and properties of the religious and charitable institutions. The Bench presided over by Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan (as he then was), in para 10 has held as follows:
  • “10. The properties of deities, temples and Devaswom Boards, require to be protected and safeguarded by their Trustees/Archaks/Sebaits/employees. Instances are many where persons entrusted with the duty of managing and safeguarding the properties of temples, deities and Devaswom Boards have usurped and misappropriated such properties by setting up false claims of ownership or tenancy, or adverse possession. This is possible only with the passive or active collusion of the concerned authorities. Such acts of ‘fences eating the crops’ should be dealt with sternly. The Government, members or trustees of Boards/Trusts, and devotees should be vigilant to prevent any such usurpation or encroachment. It is also the duty of courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation.”
  • That was also a similar case wherein the alleged encroachment of Temple property was raised in a complaint filed by a devotee.” (quoted in: Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014)

In Mohanan Nair’s case, 2013 (3) KLT 132, it is further held as under:

  • “61. We will now come to the decisions relied upon by both sides. A Full Bench decision of this Court in Achuthan Pillai and others v. State of Kerala and others (1970 KLT 838 – FB) was relied upon by the learned counsel for the Temple Advisory Committee to show that in respect of matters concerning Hindu Religious Institutions and Temples, a contention regarding limitation/delay, etc. alone cannot deny the jurisdiction and hence this Court will be properly justified in considering the matter in detail. That was a case where the Full Bench considered the validity of an order passed by the Government under Section 99 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras). By the said order the Government cancelled the sanction given for transfer of immovable property of a Devaswom. The initial order was passed by the Commissioner for sanction to lease 600 acres of forest land belonging to Emoor Bhagavathy Devaswom. The said order was passed in the year 1960 and the Government cancelled the same by Ext. P5 order dated 23.2.1967. The Full Bench, speaking through K.K. Mathew, J. (as he then was), traced the principles regarding the rights of an authority to protect the institution like Devaswom in order to prevent fraud. The relevant parts of the discussion contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 are extracted below:
  • “5………… The power to cancel a sanction and thereby to make null and void an improvident transfer or alienation of immovable property of a Devaswom, though exercised under the guise of revision, is visitorial in character. It is a matter of common knowledge that even from very early times religious and charitable institutions in India came under the special protection of the ruling authority. The rulers of the country always asserted their right to visit these institutions in order to prevent fraud and redress the abuses in their management. In the celebrated Rameswar Pagoda case, LR. 1 I. A. 299 it was pointed out by the Judicial Committee that the former rulers of this country always asserted the right to visit endowments of this kind to prevent and redress the abuses in their management…………….”

In Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014, T.R. Ramachandran Nair, P.V. Asha, JJ.) held further as under:

  • 60. As far as the property of the Temple is concerned, this Court will be right in exercising the parens patriae jurisdiction. The Division Bench in paragraphs 61 and 63 of the judgment in Mohanan Nair’s case (2013 (3) KLT 132) has considered two aspects, viz. the power of this Court to interfere even if there is inaction on the part of the Board and the importance of protecting the interest of Deity. Herein, what we find from Ext. P7 order is that a complaint was made by the Temple Advisory Committee which was considered by the learned Ombudsman appointed by this Court for Travancore and Cochin Devaswom Boards. The learned Ombudsman had also directed the third respondent to take urgent action for recovery of Devaswom property. In paragraph 62 of the judgment in Mohanan Nair’s case (2013 (3) KLT 132) this Court relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court

In Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board (2007 (4) KLT 965) the duty of the courts to protect and safeguard the interest of the Deity has been highlighted as under:

  • “6. The authorities, therefore, support the conclusion that supervision and control of Hindu Religious and Charitable Institutions is a function of government and that government at all times asserted and exercised the power. Although India is today a secular State, “that would not preclude the secular administration of religious institutions”.
  • (See the observations of B.K. Mukherjee, J. in Commr. HRE v. Swamdur – AIR 1954 SC 282).
  • The fact that government did not exercise the power immediately when it became aware of the circumstances vitiating Ext. P1 order cannot prejudice the interest of the devaswom. If the contention of the petitioner were to prevail, it would mean that because the government was not very vigilant in exercising the power the interest of the devaswom should suffer. S.10 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides no period of limitation for a suit against a person in whom the trust property has become vested for any specific purpose or against his legal representatives or assigns for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property. The reason behind the section is that an express trust ought not suffer by the misfeasance or non-feasance of a trustee…………. “
  • Their Lordships were of the view that “an express trust ought not suffer by the misfeasance or non-feasance of a trustee.” (quoted in: Mohanan Nair’s case, 2013 (3) KLT 132, and Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014, T.R. Ramachandran Nair, P.V. Asha, JJ.)

The Full Bench, in Mohanan Nair’s case, 2013 (3) KLT 132, held that the misfeasance or non-feasance of a trustee and the time lag in the matter and inaction on the part of the Board will not deter the court from passing appropriate orders.

In Achuthan Pillai’s case (1970 KLT 838 – FB) it is held as under:

  • “63. The relevant principles under the Hindu law will show that the Deity is always treated similar to that of a minor and there are some points of similarity between a minor and a Hindu idol. This Court therefore is the guardian of the Deity and apart from the jurisdiction under Section 103 of the Land Reforms Act, viz. the powers of revision, this Court is having inherent jurisdiction and the doctrine of parens patriae will also apply in exercising the jurisdiction. Therefore, when a complaint has been raised by the Advisory Committee which was formed by the devotees of the Temple about the loss of properties of the Temple itself, the truth of the same can be gone into by this Court in these proceedings.” (quoted in: Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014, T.R. Ramachandran Nair, P.V. Asha, JJ.)

In Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014), it is further held that the absence of a revision petition under Section 103 of the Act (Kerala Land Reforms Act) against the Order of Land Tribunal will not prevent the High Court, from acting, especially in the light of the inherent jurisdiction available to the High Court and the applicability of the doctrine of parens patriae in the light of the principles rendered by the Full Bench in Achuthan Pillai’s case (1970 KLT 838 – FB) as well as that of the Apex Court in Gopalakrishnan’s case (2007 (4) KLT 965),

See Blog: What is Trust in Indian Law?

Trust Cannot Sue in Its Own Name; Trustee Has to Sue

A trust, not being a legal person, is not entitled to sue in its own name. And, trustee being the legal owner of the trust property he has to sue or be sued for and on behalf of the trust[14] (actually refers to beneficiaries). The Code of Civil Procedure does not provide any enabling provision for the trust to sue or for being sued in its name, as allowed in the case of firms (Order XXX, CPC).[15] Trust need not be arrayed as an eo-nominee party. The arraying of the trust in its own name is otiose or redundant. It is the trustee who is to be impleaded to represent the trust.[16]  

Section 29 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act reads as follows:

  • Bar against suits by unregistered trust– (1) No suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust which is required to be registered under this Act but has not been so registered shall be heard or decided in any court.
  • (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to claim of set off or other proceeding to enforce a right on behalf of such public trust.”

It appears that the words “on behalf of” has some significance. These words support the argument that a Trust cannot file a suit in its name and that it can be filed through trustees alone. But, in Ambalal Dhakad v. Assistant Commissioner, 9 December, 2024 (Raj) took the stand – “the Public Trust is a necessary and proper party for the adjudication of the appeal”.

Representation of Beneficiaries, Under O XXXI  R 1 CPC

Order XXXI, Rule 1 CPC deals with the representation of beneficiaries in suits concerning property vested in Trustees.  It lays down that the beneficiaries shall be represented by trustee.[17]

Suits Must Be By All Trustees

Rule 2 of Order XXXI CPC says that where there are several Trustees, ‘they shall all be made parties to a suit against one or more of them’.[18]  Therefore, when a suit is filed against the ‘trust’, all the trustees must be joined as defendants.

It is important to consider the effect of the provisions of the Indian Trusts Act in this regard.

Section 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, reads:

  • 47. Trustee cannot delegate.  A trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his duties either to a co-trustee or to a stranger, unless (a) the instrument of trust so provides, or (b) the declaration is in the regular course of business, or (c) the delegation is necessary, or (d) the beneficiary, being competent to contract, consents to the delegation.”

Section 48 states:

  • 48. Co-trustees cannot act singly.  When there are more trustees than one, all must join in the execution of the trust, except where the instrument of trust otherwise provides.”

Our courts found it legitimate to bring the principles in these provisions to the matters of Public Trusts also. It is held that those principles will not become untouchable for it is incorporated in the Trusts Act.[19]  And, it must be remembered that that the Trusts Act of 1882 embody nothing more or less than the principles which have been applied to all trusts in all countries. [20]

Same will be the position even if the suit is filed by the Managing Trustee. [21] The argument that he was unanimously chosen by the co-trustees will not satisfy the requirement. If any one or more of them are unwilling or, for some reason or the other, if it is not possible to join them as plaintiffs, they must be impleaded as defendants.[22]  But, if the instrument of trust so provides, all co-trustees need not join in filing a suit  to recover possession of the property from the tenant after  determination of the lease. [23]  It may also be possible if the delegation is in the regular course of business or the delegation is necessary; or the beneficiary being competent to contract, consents to the delegation.[24]

Suit by One of its Trustees: Effect

The trustees altogether constitute one body in the eye of law and all must act together. A suit against a trust is not maintainable without impleading all its trustees. However, suits can be filed by any one (or more) of the trustees, when so authorised in that behalf by the rest.[25] But such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.[26]  It is doubtful whether it can be by a resolution, otherwise than executing powers of attorney. Similarly, all co-trustees together should determine the tenancy by issuing notice;[27] and all together should file the suit for eviction.[28]  In J.P. Srivastava and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. (2005)[29] it is held by the Supreme Court as follows:

  • “Therefore, although as a rule, trustees must execute the duties of their office jointly, this general principle is subject to the following exceptions when one trustee may act for all
  • (1) where the trust deed allows the trusts to be executed by one or more or by a majority of trustees;
  • (2) where there is express sanction or approval of the act by co-trustees;
  • (3) where the delegation of power is necessary;
  • (4) where the beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation;
  • (5) where the delegation to a co-trustee is in the regular course of the business,
  • (6) where the co-trustee merely gives effect to a decision taken by the trustees jointly. “

Our Apex Court, in Kanakarathanammal Vs. Loganatha  Mudaliar (1965),[30]  has observed that where all the trustees were not joined as parties the omission was fatal and that in appropriate cases it was not impermissible for the Court, to permit the impleading of the other Trustees in exercise of its powers under Order I Rule 10 (2) of the CPC, 1908. The Apex Court cautioned that this should be done at the stage of trial and that too, without prejudice to the plea of the parties as to limitation.

But it is held otherwise by Bombay High Court in Namdeo Vs. Shahi Gupta Masjid Chandrapur,[31]  pointing out that the trust represented by one of the co-trustees itself was the ‘landlord’ and that the ‘landlord’ was entitled to file a petition for eviction under the Rent Control Act and also referring the definition of ‘landlord’ mentioned in the Act.

Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts speaks in this regard as under:

  • “When there are more Shebaits than one, they constitute one body in the eyes of law, and all of them must act together. The management may be for practical purposes in the hands of one of the Shebaits who is called the managing Shebait or the Shebaits themselves may exercise their right of management by turns; but in neither case it is competent for one of the Shebaits to do anything in relation to the Debutter estate without the concurrence either express or implied of his co-Shebaits. This is of course, subject to any express direction given by the grantor.”[32]

If the Trust Deed Permits One Trustee can Execute the Duties

In J.P. Srivastava and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd., AIR 2005 SC 83; (2005) 1 SCC 172, our Apex Court held – if the trust deed so permits, one trustee can execute the duties for other trustees also. It is referred to in the following decisions:

  • Charu Kishor Mehta v. Joint Charity Commissioner, 2015-8 SCC 207
  • Tapendro Mullick v. Kumar Mrigendro Mallick, 20193 CHN 640 (Cal)
  • Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Digvijaysingh Gangasingh, 2017-6 AllMR 346; 2018-1 MhLJ 259
  • Namdeo v. Shahi Gupta Masjid Chandrapur, 2014-3 AllMR 592; 2014-4 MhLJ 209
  • Shyamabai v. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha, 2014-1 AllMR 810; 2014-2 BomCR 436; 2014-2 MhLJ 547
  • Indian Youth Centres Trust v. Shishir Bajaj, 2012-193 DLT 584
  • Shyamabai v. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha, AIR 2010 Bom  88
  • Canbank Mutual Fund v. Nuclear Power Corporation, 2007-145 DLT 1; 2007-98 DRJ 464; ILR 2007-16 Dlh 1303.

Shebait  to Institute Suits; Not Idol

Though Idol or deity is regarded in law as a juristic person, the suit by or against a deity has to be represented necessarily by a natural person.[33]  Shebaits[34] are the proper persons to represent a deity. It had been held by the Calcutta High Court in AG of Bengal Vs.  Balkissen[35] that after the appointment of Shebait the right to sue for possession of the property, with which the idol is endowed, belongs to the Shebait and not to the idol.[36]

The Privy Council, in Jagadinadra  Nath Vs.  Hemanta  Kumari Debi (1904),[37] declared the legal position as under: 

  • “… The possession and management of the dedicated property belong to the Shebait. And this carries with it the right to bring whatever suits are necessary for the protection of the property. Every such right of suit is vested in the Shebait and not in the ‘idol’…”[38]

Our Apex Court, in Vemareddi  Ramaraghava  Reddi Vs. Kondaru  Seshu  Reddi,[39] Bishwanath Vs. Sri Thakur Radha Ballabhji[40] and M Siddhiq, it was held that the possession and management of the property with the right to sue in respect thereof are, in the normal course, vested in the Shebait. But where, however, the Shebait is negligent or where the Shebait himself is the guilty party against whom the deity needs relief it is open to the worshippers or other persons interested in the religious endowment to file suits for the protection of the trust properties.

Inherent Right of Idol to Sue for Recovery of Property

In Siddiq (D) Thr.  Lrs.  Vs. Mahant Suresh Das[41]  our Apex Court pointed out that the idol is not deprived of its inherent and independent right to sue in its own name in certain situations. It reads as under:

  • Ordinarily, the right to sue on behalf of the idol vests in the Shebait. This does not however mean that the idol is deprived of its inherent and independent right to sue in its own name in certain situations. The property vests in the idol. A right to sue for the recovery of property is an inherent component of the rights that flow from the ownership of property. The Shebait is merely the human actor through which the right to sue is exercised. As the immediate protector of the idols and the exclusive manager of its properties, a suit on behalf of the idol must be brought by the Shebait alone. Where there exists a lawfully appointed Shebait who is able and willing to take all actions necessary to protect the deity’s interests and to ensure its continued protection and providence, the right of the deity to sue cannot be separated from the right of the Shebait to sue on behalf of the deity. In such situations, the idol’s right to sue stands merged with the right of the Shebait to sue on behalf of the idol.”

The Supreme Court quoted Justice BK Mukherjea in “The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts”. It says as under:

  • “This decision [in Jagadindra Nath], therefore, establishes three things:
  • (1) That the right of a suit in respect of the deity’s property is in the Shebait;
  • (2) this right is a personal right of the Shebait which entitles him to claim the privilege afforded by the Limitation Act; and
  • (3) the Shebait can sue in his own name and the deity need not figure as a plaintiff in the suit, though the pleadings must show that the Shebait is suing as such.”

Can an Idol Sue as an Indigent Person

Order XXXIII, CPC does not suggest that the word ‘person’ in is exhaustive; and it does not exclude categories of Juristic Persons. Therefore a company or corporation can invoke provisions of Order XXXIII CPC.[42] The same principle applies to suits filed by Idol through its human representative.[43]

Should Idol be a Necessary Party to Suits?

When Trust Admitted, Deity Not a Necessary Party

Trust property being vested in the Shebaits, ordinarily, the right to sue on behalf of the idol vests in the Shebait.[44] Therefore, the Idol is not a necessary party in such suits. Similarly, when the trust is admitted by both sides, in a suit for removal of a trustee on the ground of breach of trust, the Deity is not a necessary party.[45] In Monindra Mohan Vs. Shamnagar Jute Factory[46]  the Calcutta High Court held that the deity was not a necessary party in a suit filed on behalf of the Hindu public for declaration that the land in question was a Debasthan of the idol and that it was a public place of warship.

If it comes necessary to sue against a Shebait, the Idol should, usually, be made a party to the suit.[47] The Patna High Court, in Sri Ram Vs. Chandeswar Prasad,[48] took the view that when the Shebait denied the right of the idol to the dedicated properties, it was desirable that the idol should file a suit through a ‘disinterested’ next friend appointed by the court. As to the right to maintain the suit in respect of endowed property it was held by Calcutta High Court in Tarit  Bhushan  Rai Vs.  Sri Iswar Sridhar Saligram  Shila[49] as under:

  • “(1) the idol itself, as a juristic person, has the right of suit;
  • (2) the Shebait, the human agency through whom the idol must act, has a distinct right, distinct from and in normal cases in supersession of the idol’s right of suit; it is this right of suit which has been said to be vested in the Shebait and not in the idol;
  • (3) the prospective Shebait, as persons interested in the endowment, have a right of suit.”[50]

In  M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case)[51]  our Apex Court explained the position and held as under:

  • “A suit by a Shebait on behalf of an idol binds the idol. For this reason, the question of who can sue on behalf of an idol is a question of substantive law. Vesting any stranger with the right to institute proceedings on behalf of the idol and bind it would leave the idol and its properties at the mercy of numerous individuals claiming to be ‘next friend’. Therefore, the interests of the idol are protected by restricting and scrutinising actions brought on behalf of the idol. For this reason, ordinarily, only a lawful Shebait can sue on behalf of the idol. When a lawful Shebait sues on behalf of the deity, the question whether the deity is a party to the proceedings is merely a matter of procedure. As long as the suit is filed in the capacity of a Shebait, it is implicit that such a suit is on behalf of and for the benefit of the idol.”

In The Banaras Bank Ltd. Vs. Bhagwan Das,[52] Allahabad High Court, pointing out that the necessary party was not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, it was observed that there were two tests by which the question as to necessary party could be determined. Firstly, there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceedings in question and secondly it should not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such a party. In  Upendra  Nath  Vs. Nilmony[53] it was held that in a suit for framing a scheme[54] as between co- Shebaits a deity was not a necessary party unless its interests were likely to be affected by the scheme proposed.[55]   

In Doongarsee  Shyamji  Vs.  Tribhuvan Das[56] it was pointed out that where the Shebait of a temple had done something which was obviously adverse to the interest of the institution, court would allow a disinterested third party to file a suit, but such a suit should have been filed in the interest of the foundation or the deity.

But, when the right or title over the property is in dispute or when the Shebaits raise claim adverse to Idol,[57] the Deity should be a necessary party. Likewise, the Deity should be a necessary party in a suit for declaration that the Deity and the property are not a public trust, but are private property.[58]

The decree for recovery of possession can be passed in a suit, if only the plaintiff has a present right to be in possession of the properties. If the deity was represented by a duly appointed next friend or the Shebait/trustee was made a party to the suit, if the alienation was found to be bad, the court could direct delivery of possession of the trust property to the trustee after declaring the alienation invalid. [59]   But, in a case where neither the deity nor the trustee is a party, the court cannot pass a decree permitting the worshipper to recover possession; for, if such a decree is passed, only the plaintiff therein could execute the same; in such an event, the property may not inure to the benefit of the temple; and if the property does not go to the hands of the trustee, the trustee may have to file a suit again for the same. This appears to be the logic and reason, as pointed out by the Kerala High Court in Chandrasekhara Menon Vs. Divakaran Namboodiri,[60] behind the principle that a decree for recovery of possession cannot be granted in a suit filed by a worshipper without the deity or the trustee is in the array of parties.

Right to file Suits – Other Than Shebaits

On the basis of Section 63 of the Indian Trusts Act (applicable to private trusts) it is observed by the Bombay High Court in Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.,[61] as to the authority of the beneficiaries to file a suit, as under:

  • “A gradual loosening of the old rigidity is visible in later decisions: Janakirama Iyer Vs. Nilkanth Iyer, AIR 1962 SC 633, lays it down that Section 63 of the Indian Trusts Act is not exhaustive of remedies available to a beneficiary, where the trustee has improperly alienated trust property. … What Janakirama (supra) specifies is that the beneficiary can sue third parties for more effective reliefs than those contemplated by Section 63.”

Sec. 63 of the Indian Trusts Act reads as follows:

  • 63. Following trust property into the hands of third persons.—Where trust property comes into the hands of a third person inconsistently with the trust, the beneficiary may require him to admit formally, or may institute a suit for a declaration, that the property is comprised in the trust.
  • Into that into which it has been converted.—Where the trustee has disposed of trust property and the money or other property which he has received therefor can be traced in his hands, or the hands of his legal representative or legatee, the beneficiary has, in respect thereof, rights as nearly as may be the same as his rights in respect of the original trust property.
  • Illustrations
  • (a) A, a trustee for B of Rs. 10,000, wrongfully invests the Rs. 10,000 in the purchase of certain land, B is entitled to the land.
  • (b) A, a trustee, wrongfully purchases land in his own name, partly with his own money, partly with money subject to a trust for B. B is entitled to a charge on the land for the amount of the trust money so misemployed.

In Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. after referring various decisions the position in this point is summarised by the Bombay High Court as under:

  •  “(a) A beneficiary can in certain circumstances sue a third party for an injury or threatened injury to trust property.
  •  (b) In certain suits depending on circumstances the beneficiaries need not establish collusion between trustee and third party.
  •  (c) The beneficiary definitely has the capacity to sue a third party when the trustee is unwilling, refuses or has precluded himself from suing.
  • (d) Where the trustees collude, whether overtly or covertly, with the third party a beneficiary can obviously sue.
  •  (e) The beneficiary suing need not ask for displacement of the trustee and his replacement by a new trustee in a suit to recover alienated or adversely affected property in the hands of a third party.
  • (f) A reversioner or the remainder man can sue even if he be a beneficiary at the date of suing.
  • (g) Section 40 of the T.P. Act aids plaintiff as a reversioner to enforce his rights against defendant 1 under section 40 of the T.P. Act.”

Our courts unhesitatingly apply the general principles come out from the Trust Act in the matters of public trusts also.

An idol of a Hindu temple is a juridical person. A Shebait or a trustee tmanages its affairs. Ordinarily no person other than the Shebait or trustee can represent the idol in legal proceedings. Under Indian law, a trustee is regarded as the sole (legal) owner of the trust property;[62] for, the ‘beneficial ownership’ with beneficiaries is not recognised by Indian law.[63]  But any person who is interested in the matters of a trust can bring a suit for preservation and maintenance of the dedicated property.[64] It can be:

  • a prospective Shebait,[65]
  • de-facto  Shebait,
  • de facto manager,[66]
  • worshipper,[67]
  • beneficiary
  • who has made large donations [68] or
  • a contribution.[69]

In Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy Vs. Konduru Seshu Reddy[70]  our Apex Court  held as under:

  • “As a matter of law the only person who can represent the deity or who can bring a suit on behalf of the deity is the Shebait, and although a deity is a judicial person capable of holding property, it is only in an ideal sense that the property is so held. The possession and management of the property with the right to sue in respect thereof are, in the normal course, vested in the Shebait.[71] But where, however, the Shebait is negligent or where the Shebait himself is the guilty party against whom the deity needs relief it is open to the worshippers or other persons interested in the religious endowment to file suits for the protection of the trust properties. It is open, in such a case, to the deity to file a suit through some person as next friend for recovery of possession of the property improperly alienated or for other relief. Such a next friend may be a person who is a worshipper of the deity or is a prospective Shebait legally interested in the endowment. In a case where the Shebait has denied the right of the deity to the dedicated properties, it is obviously desirable that the deity should file the suit through a disinterested next friend, nominated by the court…”[72]

Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts reads:

  • “The trust itself does not fail. …. The property does not revert to the representatives or the heirs of the settlor testator who has already divested himself of the title and interest in the property by creating a valid and complete trust. ….. That is, the beneficiaries can enforce it, or the object of the trust can be enforced where beneficiaries are not capable of suing”[73]

Right of Defacto Shebait to File Suits

A de facto Shebait is entrusted with the power and the duty to carry out the purpose of the debutter in respect of the idol and its properties.  Justice Viswanatha Sastri of the Madras High Court considered who is a de facto trustee, in Sankar-narayanan Iyer Vs. Sri Poovananatha-swami Temple. He had held as under:

  • “A fugitive or isolated act of a person with regard to the property of a religious endowment would not make him a de facto trustee. One swallow does not make a summer. There must be a continuous course of conduct, the length of the same depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. The possession of the office or the institution which is the object of the trust and the exercise of the rights pertaining to the office, would be important indicia of a de facto trusteeship.”

The rights of a de facto trustee to institute suits on behalf of the deity can be traced to the Privy Council decisions in Mahant Ram Charan Das Vs. Naurangi Lal (1933)[74] and Mahadeo Prasad Singh Vs. Karia Bharti (1933)[75]. Relying on the first decision it was held in the latter decision that a person in actual possession of the math is entitled to maintain a suit to recover property appertaining to it, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of the math. [76]  

The Supreme Court in Vikrama Das Mahant Vs. Daulat Ram Asthana (1956)[77] held that a person who has been in de facto possession and management of the Asthan and its properties from 1934 onwards, claiming to be its trustee under the decree of a Court, valid or invalid, had sufficient interest to maintain proceedings for the warding off of a cloud cast by the defendant’s action against the interests of the Asthan. The Court relied on, Mahadeo Prasad Singh vs. Karia Bharti[78] and Ram Charan Das vs. Naurangi Lal.[79]

Recognition of De facto Shebait – Principle:  Paramount Interest of the Debutter

It is held in  M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case)[80] that these principles relating to a defacto Mahanth can be applied to a de facto Shebait of an idol and its properties also; and that the paramount interest in the protection of the debutter property underlines the recognition of a de facto Shebait. The Supreme Court relied the following passage from the judgment of Madras High Court in Subramania Gurukkal Vs. Abhinava Poornapriya A Srinivasa Rao Sahib (1940)[81]

  • “It is the duty of the Court to protect trust property from misappropriation and diversion from the objects to which it was dedicated. When trust property is without a legal guardian owing to defects in the machinery for the appointment of a trustee or owing to the unwillingness of the legal trustee to act, it would be a monstrous thing if any honest person recognised as being in charge of the institution and actively controlling its affairs in the interests of the trust should not be entitled, in the absence of any one with a better title to take those actions which are necessary to safeguard the objects of the trust.”

Shebaits Neglect Duties: Suit for Proper Administration of Trust

If the trustee or Shebait is guilty of mismanagement, waste, wrongful alienation of debutter property or other neglect of duties, a suit can be instituted for remedying these abuses of trust. A suit can also be filed for settlement of a scheme for the purpose of effectively carrying out the objects of the trust. [82]

In Aurobindo Ashram Trust Vs. S Ramanathan[83] it is held by Madras High Court that there was no breach of trust on the part of trustees of Sri Aurobindo Ashram if one of the inmates published a book containing derogatory remarks about Sri Aurobindo, and no action had been taken by the trustees, since the Ashram has nothing to do with it. But, the court observed that plaintiffs have made out a case to bring the suit within the ambit of Sec. 92 CPC.  The Court held as under:

  • “Nevertheless, having regard to the prayer in the suit viz., steps to be taken to ensure withdrawal of the book, the plaintiffs seek a direction of the court for the administration of the trust. Therefore, having regard to the intention of the plaintiffs in directing a ban on the book which contained derogatory remarks against Sri Aurobindo and having regard to the fact that no action has been taken by the trustees to secure the ban or take any action against the author of the book, in my opinion, the plaintiffs have made out a case to bring the suit within the ambit of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore, the court below has rightly rejected the application to revoke the leave.”

Right of a Worshipper to file Suit for Recovery: Principles

Right to worship is a civil right.[84] A worshipper of an idol being its beneficiary in a spiritual sense, he is entitled to represent the idol when the Shebait or trustee acts adverse to its interest or fails to take action to safeguard its interest. When the person who is duty-bound to and empowered to protect the idol leaves the idol in a lurch, a person interested in the worship of the idol can certainly be clothed with the authority to protect the interests of the idol. The principle being that, such suits are in effect, suits on behalf of the trust and the worshippers must be deemed to be invoking the right of the trustee. Therefore, the worshippers are entitled to institute a suit even for a mere declaration that the alienation of the temple properties by the de jure Shebait is invalid and not binding upon the temple.[85]

When the Shebait acted adversely to the interest of the idol and fails to take action to safeguard its interest, it is held by our Apex Court in Bishwanath  Vs. Thakur Radha  Ballabhji[86] that there was no justification for denying the right to a worshipper to file suit to seek appropriate reliefs. It is also observed that an idol is in the position of a minor and when the person representing it leaves it in a lurch, a person interested in the worship of the idol could certainly be clothed with an ad hoc power of representation to protect its interest.[87] The Supreme Court observed that it had been held in a number of decisions[88] that worshippers may file a suit praying for possession of a property on behalf of an endowment. 

In Ramchand  Vs. Janki  Ballabhji  Maharaj[89] the Supreme Court held that a person, who has made large donations for the maintenance of the temple, has clearly a substantial interest to maintain a suit for possession of the temple and its property against the Pujari or Manager, on behalf of the deity to protect the property from mismanagement or misappropriation.

Own Right of Worshipper to file Suit for Protection and Recovery

It is now a settled law that a worshipper has his own right to institute a suit to protect his right to worship and for that purpose to protect the debuttar property and that he can do so in his personal capacity as worshipper and not as a next friend of the deity.[90]

In  M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case)[91] it was pointed out that Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy Vs. Konduru Seshu Reddy[92]  was arisen from a suit not instituted on behalf of the deity. But, it was instituted in a personal capacity by the worshipper seeking a declaration that the property in question was debutter property. In this context, in Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy Vs. Konduru Seshu Reddy, it had been held:

  • “If a Shebait has improperly alienated trust property a suit can be brought by any person interested for a declaration that such alienation is not binding upon the deity but no decree for recovery of possession can be made in such a suit unless the plaintiff in the suit has the present right to the possession. Worshippers of a temple are in the position of cestuui que trust or beneficiaries in a spiritual sense. … Since worshippers do not exercise the deity’s power of suing to protect its own interests, they are not entitled to recover possession of the property improperly alienated by the Shebait, but they can be granted a declaratory decree that the alienation is not binding on the deity…”[93]

The right of worshippers to file suits, for reliefs outside S. 92 CPC, is well accepted.[94] It has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Deoki  Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar[95]  that the worshippers have ‘beneficial interest’.[96]  Where the Shebait functions normally, the deity’s right to sue lies dormant; but as soon as the Shebait is unable to act, or his own act is questioned, certainly a person who has a beneficial interest should be allowed to take steps to prevent the idol’s interest being jeopardised.[97] Where a Shebait or even a de facto Shebait is absent, a person who has beneficial interest will be permitted to come forward.[98]

It is clear, in peculiar circumstances, the Idol can sue or be sued through persons, other than Shebaits. It may be a beneficiary, that is, a worshipper (in case of a public temple) or a member of the family (in case of a private temple). Apart from representing the deity they have the authority to institute a suit in their own name for seeking certain reliefs. It includes suits for protection and recovery of property belonging to the deity. It is observed by Delhi High Court in Vaidyaratnam PS Variers Arya Vaidyasla Vs. KC Vijaikumar[99]  that there is no reason why a suit by one co-trustee should not be maintainable against a trespasser.

The beneficiary of the trust in respect of a Muhammadan Wakf, interested in the maintenance of a mosque or other charitable institution, may, without having recourse to Order 1 Rule 8 of CPC and without suing in a representative capacity, on behalf of the other beneficiaries, sue for recovery of possession of property, wrongfully alienated by the trustee, and for the incidental declaration that theproperties are the subject of the trust and that they cannot be alienated.[100]

Right of Parishioners to Sue against Third Parties

Though the property of a Catholic Church vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar, in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez[101]  it is observed by the Kerala High Court that the parish being by law a public juridic person, the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church were competent to represent the juridic person; and that they were competent to initiate proceedings before a Civil Court with the ultimate aim of protecting the property belonging to the church. 

Private Trust: Scheme and Removal of Trustee – Civil Court has Jurisdiction

Section 92 CPC will not apply to private trusts, and suits relating to religious[102] private trusts are not governed under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. It does not necessarily mean that the civil court has no jurisdiction to settle a scheme for the management of a private trust. It is a civil right[103] under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code and governed entirely by the general law of the land which prescribes the remedies for enforcement of civil rights.

In Thenappa  Chettiar  Vs.  Karuppan  Chettiar[104] the Supreme Court held that even in the case of a private trust, a suit could be filed for settlement of a scheme for the purpose of effectively carrying out the object of the trust. If there is a breach of trust or mismanagement on the part of the trustee of a private trust, a suit can be brought in a Civil Court by any person interested for the removal of the trustee and for the proper administration of the endowment.

Compromise of a Suit Relating to Public Trust

Compromise of a suit relating to public trust was prima facie against public policy, yet the court had jurisdiction to sanction it if it was not detrimental to the interest of the trust and was lawful.[105]

Suits in Matters of Private Religious Trusts

Under general law, founder or heirs to institute suits

A family idol can sue or be sued through Shebaits; or a beneficiary, that is, a member of the family. BK Mukherjea (Tagore Law Lectures) on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts it is observed:

  • “The suits relating to such private trust are not regulated by any statute as in the case of public trusts; they are governed entirely by the general law of the land which prescribes the remedies for enforcement of civil rights. In a private or family debutter, the beneficiaries are a limited and defined class of persons, viz. , the members of the family. If the trustee or Shebait is guilty of mismanagement, waste, wrongful alienation of debutter property or other neglect of duties, a suit can be instituted for remedying these abuses of trust. The suit could be for the removal of the trustee with a prayer for accounts as ancillary to the removal. It would lie for a declaration that any alienation of the debutter property is not binding on the deity or for recovery of possession of the property thus wrongfully alienated. A suit can also be filed for settlement of a scheme for the purpose of effective carrying out of the trust.”

The learned author has extracted the observations of Asutosh  Mukherji, J. in Manohar  Mukherji V. Raja Peary Mohan Mukherji.[106] He had also quoted the observations in Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar  Radha   Ballav.[107]

In Mahant Ram Saroop  Dasji  Vs. S P Sahi Special Officer[108] it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “In a private or family debutter the beneficiaries are a limited and defined class of persons, as for example, the members of a family. If the trustee or Shebait is guilty of mismanagement, waste, wrongful alienation of debutter property or other neglect of duties, a suit can certainly be instituted for remedying these abuses of trust. Under the general law of the land the founder of the endowment, or any of his heirs is competent to institute a suit for proper administration of the debutter, for removal of the old trustee and for appointment of a new one.”

Suits Against Public Charitable Trusts Under NI Act 

To the question whether a Public Charitable Trust (organisation) has been recognised as a juristic person for the purpose of Negotiable Instrument Act, it is held in Abraham Memorial Vs C. Suresh Babu[109] that a Public Charitable Trust being capable of contracting, and making and issuing a cheque or Bill (Sec. 26), it is a juristic person for the purpose of the said Act; and that a Trust, either private or public/charitable or otherwise, is a juristic person liable for punishment for the offence punishable under Sec. 138 of the N I Act.

Suit by the Deity: Outside S. 92 CPC

The suit by the deity for declaration and possession challenging the alienation is for the enforcement of a private right. Such a suit falls outside the purview of S. 92 CPC and is not barred.[110]

A representative suit does not abate on the death of the plaintiff

In G. Christhudas v. Anbiah, 2003-3 SCC 502, the Apex Court held that a representative suit does not abate on the death of the plaintiff. It is for two reasons:

  • Firstly the plaintiff does not represent only himself but represents all other persons on whose behalf he is prosecuting the suit, thus all those persons are also parties to the suit albeit constructively, the conduct of the suit being in the hands one person to whom permission has been granted by the court and in case of his death, any other person can continue the suit.
  • And secondly, the persons represented by the plaintiff cannot said to be legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff within meaning of Section 2 (11) of Code of Civil Procedure and hence the provisions of order 22 would not apply to such case. (See: Sadati Al Hussaini Al Jalali Trust v. Qasim Ganaie (J&K High Court, 03.05.2024)

On death of a Trustee, Trust Would Not Fail; Vests in Remaining Trustees

In Kapoorchand Rajendra Kumar Jain v. Parasnath Digambar Jain Bada Mandir, 2000-1 MPJR 199, it is held as under:

  • “A trustee exercises the rights of the beneficiary in such a dispute. He represents and personates the beneficiary, while dealing with the world at large. Thus, he acquires a legal personality. If there be more than one trustee, then all of them conjointly form a corporate or legal personality. This principle has been recognized under Order 31 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court has ample power to order that a suit on behalf of the beneficiary shall be represented by one or more trustees. Where there be order of the Court or if the requirement of the law, all trustees have to be joined as parties to the suit. The trust would not fail because one of the trustees had died after filing of the suit. The body of trustees is not dissolved. The trust vested in the remaining trustees shall continue. The rights and the duties of the trustees are not abrogated by the death of one of trustees. So in this case, the remaining trustees after the death of two trustees could continue the suit. The right to sue for and on behalf of the beneficiary continued. There was no abatement. This principle was recognized by the Privy Council in the case of Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram and others, reported in AIR 1921 P.C. 123, wherein their Lordships stated that a suit, filed under Section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1882, could continue even after the death of person whom the Court granted permission to sue. It could be continued by a member of the public. This case was referred to with approval of the decision in the case of Charan Singh and Anr. v. Darshan Singh and others, reported in AIR 1975 SC 371 (at para 5 page 373). In somewhat similar circumstances, the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir and others, reported in AIR 1980 SC 707, held that the death of Mahant during the pendency of a suit for ejectment brought by him against a trespasser would no cause the suit, to abate. It is true that the obligations of a Mahant are not that of a trustee but his office is akin to the office of a trustee. Therefore, the principle laid down in that case would apply.”

O 22 Not Apply to Repre. Suits where devolution (Not Substitution) takes place

In Jagadamba Bai & Beharilal Khandelwal v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala, 1978 Cal HN 1050, it is observed as under:

  • 8. In a case reported in AIR 1975 SC page 371 between Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh, Supreme Court has held that where the suit is filed in a representative capacity death of one of the plaintiffs during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal does not abate. In AIR 1921 PC at page 123 in the case of Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Dadu Rao, a distinction was drawn between a suit which was prosecuted by an individual for his own interests and persons suing as representatives of the general public.
  • 9. Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Code provides the rules for recording the death and/or substitution of the parties. Order 22 Rule 1 provides-
    • “The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause a suit to abate if the rights of suit survive”.
  • Order 21 Rule 2 provides that
    • where there are more plaintiffs or defendants than one, and anyone of them dies and where the rights of a suit survive against the surviving defendants alone, the court shall cause an entry to that effect to be, made on the record and the suit shall proceed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs or against the surviving defendant or defendants.
  • Order 22 Rule 10 provides
    • in other cases of assignments, creation or devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may by leave of the court be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved.
  • 10. Order 22 does not apply to representative suits. Suits brought in a representative character can be continued under Order 22 Rule 20(10) by the successor in office. Where a trustee dies or retires or is removed and another is elected it is a case of devolution. In this respect the relevant cases are reported in AIR 1928 Cal. page 651 and also in AIR 1926 page 540. The right to apply in such a case is pending law and accrues from day to day and is therefore not barred by the law of limitation. In this respect, reference can be made to cases reported in 57 CWN page 710 and also AIR 1952 Pat. 323 and 30 Cal. page 609. In case reported in 36 CWN at page 816 (Sri Sri Keshab Rai Jeu Thakur & Raja Jyoti Prasad Sinsh Deo) a Division Bench judgment of this High Court presided over by Mitter J. and Bartley J. it was held that Order 22 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to a case of substitution of a person who had sued or held been sued against in a representative capacity. In the case reported in 27 CWN at page 710 which was referred in my order, Chatterjee J. and Pearson J. held that where the heirs are substituted on the ground of devolution of interest such interest would be governed by Order 22 Rule 10. It further held that three months limitation does not apply to a case of devolution pending the suit. It further held that application under Order 22 Rule 10 can be made in the Appellate Court even over the devolution of interest when the case was pending before the Trial Court.”

On death of a Trustee, new Trustee cannot be a Legal Representative

It is pointed out in Sadati Al Hussaini Al Jalali Trust v. Qasim Ganaie (J&K High Court, 03.05.2024) the Apex Court had held, in two cases, that on the death of a trustee new trustee (elected or appointed) cannot be said to be a legal representative of the deceased trustee but is a person on whom the interest of the Trust property devolves, under the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10; as it applies to him. The cases referred to by the J&K High Court are the following –

  • Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh,1975 (1) SCC 298;
  • Karuppaswamy v. C. Ramamurthy, 1993(4) SCC 41.

But, in G.F.F. Foulkes v. A.S. Suppan Chettiar, AIR 1951 Mad 296, it was held as under:

  • “When a suit is brought by several persons in a representative capacity, and if one of them dies, the suit does not abate because, the right to represent others of a class is not right which ipso facto survives to the legal representatives of the deceased party. The source of that right is the order of the Court permitting the party to represent others. In such a contingency, namely, the death of one of the parties to whom originally permission was granted to institute a suit in a representative capacity, it is for the Court to decide whether the suit can be allowed to be continued by the surviving person or persons or whether other persons should be joined. The proper procedure , in a case like this, is for the remaining person or persons to apply to the Court for directions and it is for the Court to decide whether it will permit the remaining person or persons to whom the original sanction was given to continue to prosecute or defend the suit or appeal or it will give directions to bring on record additional person or persons.”

In a subsequent suit, Ram Kumar v. Jiwanlal, AIR 1960 Mad 288, the Madras High Court took a liberal view. It was held in this decision that a representative suit does not abate on the death of the representative as he or she can be substituted by another member of the plaintiff on defendant. (See also: Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram, AIR 1921 PC 123, State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Parwati Devi, AIR 1966 Raj 210).

Removal of Trustees

See Blog: Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees

Suit Against Deity: Appointment of Next Friend

See Blog: Is an Idol a Perpetual Minor?

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe

[1]    Government of the Province of Bombay Vs. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia:  AIR 1949 PC 143; Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir  Pershad  Trilok Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144; Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 Raj LW 273; Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs.  CIT: [1963] 50 ITR 798 (Mad).

[2]    Kishorelal  Asera Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endwts.: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367

[3]    Cheriyathu  Vs.  Parameswaran  Namboodiripad: 1953 Ker LT 125;  Thenappa  Chettiar  Vs.  Karuppan  Chettiar: AIR 1968 SC 915, Also 1953 Ker LT 117; AIR1922 P. C. 253 AIR 1925 PC 139.                                          

[4]    AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[5]    See Chapter: State & Court – Protectors of All Charities

[6]    AG Vs. Pearson: (1817) 3 Mer 353; Ram Dularey Vs. Ram Lal: AIR 1946 PC 34. Quoted in KS VargheseVs. St. Peters and St. Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333. Rajendra Gupta VS Corporation of Chennai, rep. by its Commissioner: 011 4 LW 633,  Rajagopal v. Balachandran: 2002 (2) CTC 527, See also: Narasimhiah Vs. Y H Venkataramanappa: AIR 1976 Kar 43.

[7]    C.K. RajanVs. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee: .AIR 1994 Ker 179. [Appeal Judgment: Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee Vs. C.K. Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546]; Fakhuruddin Vs. Mohammad Rafiq: AIR  1916 All 115 (PC);  C  ChikkaVenkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915; Sridhar Vs. Shri Jagan Nath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner Of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089. Ch Hoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265;  I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309. See also: Mulla’s Hindu Law (11th Ed. Page 489) and Dr. B.K. Mukherjea: Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Fifth Ed, Page 407 and 412).

[8]    C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296: Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia:  AIR 1952 Kar 14; Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915; Subramonia PillaiChellam Pillai Vs. Subramonia Pillai Chathan Pillai: AIR 1953 TC 198;  M.G. Narayanaswami Naidu Vs. M. Balasundaram Naidu: AIR 1953 Mad 750.

[9]    ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh Laws(Dlh)-2009-4-105 ILR (Dlh)- 2009-19-265, See also Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate  AIR 2007 SC 1337.  

[10] Sujan Mohinder Charitable Trust VS Mohinder Kaur: 2019 0 Supreme(Del) 281, AM Shamsudeen Vs AM Mohamed Salihu: 2004 2 LW 487; 2003 2 MLJ 526.

[11] In-Re, Man Singh AIR 1974 Del. 228

[12] 2017-8 MadLJ 529

[13] Referred to in: Thatha Sampath Kumar Vs. Vupputur Alwar: 2019-3 MadLW 705

[14]   Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs. Mahomed Jaffar Mohamed Hussein: AIR 1954 SC 5; Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir  Pershad  Trilok Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144. Kishorelal  Asera  Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endowments: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367; KR Rajan Vs. Cherian K. Cherian: LAWS(KER) 2019 11 168

[15]   K. Dhondoji  Rao Vs Dominion of India: AIR 1957  Kar 94.

[16]   KR Rajan Vs. Cherian K. Cherian: LAWS(KER) 2019 11 168

[17] Kishorelal  Asera  Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endowments: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367

[18]   See: Profulla  Chorone  Requitte   Vs. Satya  Chorone  Requitte: AIR 1979  SC 1682

[19] Sk. Abdul Kayum  Vs. Mulla  Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309; Uttar Pradesh Vs. Bansi  Dhar: AIR 1974 SC 1084; Bai  Dosabai  Vs.  Mathurdas  Govinddas: AIR 1980 SC 1334.

[20] Sheikh Abdul Kayum  Vs. Mulla  Alibhai:  AIR 1963 SC 309

[21]   Shanti Vijay Co. v. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR 1980 SC 17 , Vaidyaratnam P. S. Variers Arya Vaidyasla Vs. K. C. Vijaikumar: ILR 1990-1 Del 124, Lala Man Mohan Das Vs. Janki Prasad: AIR 1945 PC 23; L. Janakiraina lyer Kayum Vs. P.M. Nilakanta lyer: AIR 1962 SC 633; Sheikh Abdul Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309; Shanii Vijay Co. Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia : AIR 1980 SC 17; Dull Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Trilok Chand; AIR. 1984 Del. 145

[22] Vaidyaratnam P. S. Variers Arya Vaidyasla Vs. K. C. Vijaikumar: ILR 1990-1 Del 124. Abdul Kayum Vs. Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309; Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973  Guj 113; Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir  Pershad  Trilok Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144.

[23]   Sk. Abdul Kayum  Vs. Mulla  Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309.

[24]   Vaidyaratnam P. S. Variers Arya Vaidyasla Vs. K. C. Vijaikumar: ILR 1990-1 Del 124

[25]   Kishorelal  Asera Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endowments: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367

[26]   Shanti Vijay Co. Vs. Princess Fatima: AIR 1980 SC 17. Lewin’s Law of Trusts referred to. Vaidyaratnam P. S. Variers Arya Vaidyasla Vs. K. C. Vijaikumar: ILR 1990-1 Del 124.

[27] Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973  Guj 113; Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Trilok Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144.

[28]   Kansara Abdulrahman Vs. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj. 184; Uma Ray Vs. Smt. Meghamala: AIR 1989  NOC. 166 (Cal); Iswardas Vs. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal: AIR 1968 SC 1364; Baisnab Das Sen Vs. Bholanath Sen: AIR 1986 Cal 118; M. M. Nagalinga Nadar Vs. Sri. Lakshmi Family Trust: 2001- 3 MLJ 523.

[29]   (2005) 1 SCC 172.

[30]   AIR 1965 SC 271

[31] 2014-4 AIR Bom R 657

[32]   Quoted in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. LaxminathjiMaharaj: AIR 1985 All 228

[33]   ProfullaChoroneRequitte   Vs. SatyaChoroneRequitte: AIR 1979  SC 1682

[34]   GopalDatt Vs. Babu Ram: AIR 1936 All 653; Kishore Joo Vs. GumanBehariJooDeo: AIR  1978 All -1.

[35] AIR 1925 Cal 140

[36] It is referred to in Kishore Joo Vs. Guman  Behari  Joo  Deo: AIR  1978 All-1

[37] (1904) 31 Ind App 203 (PC)

[38] Quoted in Bishwanath  Vs. Sri Thakur Radha  Ballabhji: AIR 1967 SC 1044; AIR 1983 All 202.

[39] AIR 1967 SC 436. Referred to in M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case):2020-1 SCC 1.

[40]   AIR 1967 SC 1044: (1967) 2 SCR 618

[41]  2020-1 SCC 1.

[42]   See: Union Bank Of India Vs. Khader International Construction: AIR  2001 SC 2277; Gendalal Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Basant  Kumaribai: AIR 1961 Bom 1; Syed Ali Vs. Deccan Commercial Bank Ltd.: AIR 1951 Hydr 124

[43]   See: Union Bank Of India Vs. Khader International Construction: AIR  2001 SC 2277; Mathew Vs. Kerala United Corporation Ltd.: AIR 1961 Ker 180; Jogesh Chandra Bera Vs. Sri Iswar  Braja Raj Jew Thakur: AIR 1981 Cal 259; Shree Shankarji  Maharaj Vs. Mt. Godavaribai: AIR 1935 Nag 209; Moorti Shree BehariJi Vs. Prem Das AIR 1972 All 287.

[44]  M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case):2020-1 SCC 1.

[45]   Hangi Mal Vs. PannaLal:  AIR 1957 All 743

[46] AIR 1939 Cal 699

[47]   Haripada  Vs.  Elokeshi: AIR 1940 All 254. 

[48] AIR 1952 Pat. 438

[49] AIR 1942 Cal  99

[50] Quoted in Thakurji  Maharaj Vs. Dankiya: AIR 1986 All 247.

[51]  2020-1 SCC 1.

[52] AIR 1947 All. 18

[53] AIR 1957 Cal 342

[54]   Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar  Radha  Ealla:  AIR 1937 Cal 338.  Sukumaran Vs. Akamala  Sree Dharma Sastha Idol: AIR 1992  Ker  406. 

[55] See also: Chamelibai  Vallabhdas  Vs. Ramchandrajee, AIR 1965 M.P. 167.

[56] AIR 1947 All 375; refered to in: Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73

[57]   Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar  Radha  Ealla:  AIR 1937 Cal 338.  See also: Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan Shegaon Vs. Ramrao Kashinath: AIR 1954 Nag. 212; Thakur   Govind  Deoji  Birajman Vs. Susalli: AIR 1967 All. 278; Jogesh Chandra Bera Vs. Sri Iswar Braja Raj Jew Thakur: AIR 1981 Cal. 259. Further see:  Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar Radha Ealla: AIR 1937 Cal 338;  Monindra Mohan Vs. Shamnagar Jute factory: AIR 1939 Cal 699;  Upendra Nath Vs. Nilmony: AIR 1957 Cal 342.

[58]   Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale Vs. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi: AIR 1960 SC 100. 

[59] A. Subramania Iyer Vs. P. Nagarathna Naicker: 1909-20 MLJ 151

[60] 2019-1 KHC 270; 2019-1 KLJ 783; 2019-1 KLT 534

[61]   1993-2 BomCR 329

[62]   Chhatra  Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887; Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Kripashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463; Bai  Dosabai Vs. Mathurdas: AIR 1980 SC 1334; Bomi  Munchershaw  Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Operative Housing Society Limited: 1993-2 BCR 301; 1993-2 BCR 32; In Hem Chandra Vs. Suradham  Debya: AIR 1940 PC 134; ME Moolla Sons Ltd Vs. Official Assignee, Rangoon: 38 Bom LR 1011 (PC); Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs. CIT [1963] 50 ITR 798, 807 (Mad); Thanthi Trust Vs. Wealth Tax Officer: 1989-78 CTR 54: 1989-45 TAXMAN 121: 1989-178  – ITR 28.

[63]   In both Common law and under the Indian Trusts Act.  See Chapter: JURISTIC PERSONALITY OF TRUSTS

[64]   Thakurji  Maharaj  Vs. Dankiya AIR 1986 All 247; Jangi  Lal Vs. B. Panna  Lal, AIR 1957 All 743; Tarit  Bhushan  Rai Vs. Sri Iswar Sridhar Saligram  Shila, AIR 1942 Cal 99.

[65]   Vemareddi  Ramaraghava  Reddi  Vs. Kondaru  Seshu  Reddi, AIR 1967 SC 436. Tarit  BhushanRai Vs. Sri Iswar Sridhar Saligram  Shila, AIR 1942 Cal  99: Thakurji  Maharaj Vs. Dankiya AIR 1986 All 247.

[66]   Gopal  Datt  Vs. Babu Ram, AIR 1936 All 653.

[67]   Behari  Lal  Vs. Thakur Radha  Ballabhji, AIR 1961 All 73. Referred to in Thakurji  Maharaj Vs. Dankiya AIR 1986 All 247.

[68]   Ramchand  Vs. Janki  Ballabhji  Maharaj, AIR 1970 SC 532; Referred to in Thakurji  Maharaj Vs. Dankiya: AIR 1986 All 247.

[69] Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar: AIR 1968 SC 915.

[70] AIR 1967 SC 436. Referred to: Pramathanath  Nath Vs. Pradyumna: AIR 1925 PC 139

[71] Also: Bishwanath Vs. Sri Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1967 SC 1044; M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case):2020-1 SCC 1.

[72] Quoted in M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case):2020-1 SCC 1. Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228

[73] Quoted in: Yelandau Arasikere Deshikendra Sammthana Vs. Gangadharaiah: 2007-5 AIR Kar R 565: 2008-4 Kat LJ 323. See also: Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

[74] AIR 1933 PC 75

[75] AIR 1935 PC 44

[76]Referred in  M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case):2020-1 SCC 1.

[77] AIR 1956  SC 382

[78] AIR 1935 PC 44

[79] AIR 1933 PC 75

[80] 2020-1 SCC 1.

[81] AIR 1940 Mad 617

[82]   Cheriyathu Vs. Parameswaran Namboodiripad: 1953 Ker LT 125; Also Manohar Mukherji Vs. Raja Peary Mohan Mukherji: 24 CalWN 478; Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar Radha Balla: AIR 1937 Cal 338; Rajasekharan Naicker Vs. Govindankutty 1983 KerLJ 506.

[83]   2013-5 Mad LJ 744.

[84] Nar Hari Vs. Badri Nath Temple: AIR 1952 SC 245; Ugamsingh and Mishrimal Vs. Kesrimal : 1971  SC 2540; District Council of United Basel Mission Church Vs. Salvador Nicholas Mathias:1988-2 SCC 31; Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma AIR 1995 SC 2001, [85] Vemareddi Ramaraghava  Reddi Vs. Kondaru  Seshu  Reddi: AIR 1967 SC 436,Chandrasekhara Menon VS Divakaran Namboodiri, 30 Nov 2018, 2019 1 KHC 270; 2019 1 KLJ 783; 2019 1 KLT 534.

[86]   AIR 1967 SC 1044:

[87]   See Chapter: RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF TRUSTEES

[88] Radhabai Vs. Chimnaji: (1878) ILR 3 Bom 27, Zafaryab Ali Vs. Bakhtawar Singh: (1883) ILR 5 All 497; Chidambaranatha Thambirarn Vs. P. S. Nallasiva Mudaliar: AIR 1918 Mad 464, Dasondhay Vs. Muhammad Abu Nasar: AIR 1917 Mad 112  (FB), Radha Krishnaji Vs. Rameshwar Prasad Singh: AIR 1934 Pat 584; Manmohan Haldar Vs. Dibbendu Prosad Roy: AIR 1949 Cal 199; Pramatha Nath Mullick Vs. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick: AIR 1925 PC 139, KanhaiyaLal Vs. Hamid Ali, 60 Ind App 263: AIR 1933 PC 198 (1).

[89]   AIR 1970 SC 532. See also Kt. N. Ram Thenappa Chettiar Vs. NS Kr. Karuppan Chettiar, AIR 1968 SC 91f5

[90]Sri Ishwar Vs. Gopinath Das: AIR 1960 Cal 741, Samit  Pani  Brahmachary Vs. Mayapur  Chaitanya Math: AIR1999 Cal  132; Thakurji  Maharaj Vs. Dankiya: AIR 1986 All 247

[91] 2020-1 SCC 1.

[92] AIR 1967 SC 436. Referred to: Pramathanath  Nath Vs. Pradyumna: AIR 1925 PC 139

[93] Quoted in M Siddhiq

[94]   Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddi Vs. KondaruSeshuReddi, AIR 1967 SC 436; Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228 , In this case distinguished (pointing out actual worship of the idol sans right to worship) Sri Thakur Krishna Chandramajiu Vs. Kanhayalal, AIR 1961 All 206. See also Jangi Lal Vs. B. PannaLal, AIR 1957 All 743; Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji, AIR 1961 All 73

[95]   AIR 1957 SC 133

[96]   Note: Not the ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner; it is the interest pertaining to beneficiaries.

[97]   Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73 

[98]   Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73 

[99]   ILR 1990-1 Del 124   

[100] AS Krishna Murthy Vs. CN Revanna: AIR 2009 Kar 2692.       Thangachi Nachial  Vs. Ahmed Hussain Malumiar: AIR 1957 Mad 194; Maulvi muhammad Fahimul Haq v. Jagat Ballay: AIR 1923 Pat 475

[101] 2013(4) Ker LT 283

[102] See Sec. 1.

[103] Cheriyathu  Vs. Parameswaran  Namboodiripad: 1953 Ker LT 125, Also see: 1953 Ker LT 117; AIR1922 P C 253 A I R 1925 P C 139.

[104] AIR 1968 SC 915

[105] Chand Bibi v. Esmail, AIR 1949 Cal 21; A D Vehvalwala Vs. M C H Rustomji: 1970 CalLJ  312, 1970-1 Cal LT 292.

[106] 24 CWN 478

[107] AIR 1937 Cal 338. See:  Subramonia  Pillai  Chellam  Pillai Vs. Subramonia  Pillai  Chathan  Pillai: AIR 1952 Ker 198; AIR 1953 TC 198 also.

[108] AIR  1959 SC 951

[109] (2013) 2  Bank   Case  133: 2012 (5) CTC 203. Relied on in Hakkimuddin  Taherbhai  Shakor  (Trustee) Vs. State of Gujarat: 2017  CrLJ 3143.

[110] Bishwanath Vs. Sri Thakur Radha Ballabhji, AIR 1967 SC 1044; Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.



Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Synopsis.

  1. Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees: Grounds
  2. Denial of Trust Itself
  3. Assertion to Private Ownership
  4. Betrayal of Fiduciary Position
  5. Obligations Cannot be Faithfully Discharged
  6. Removal Necessary to Save Trust Property
  7. No Removal of Trustees: Bona Fide Action
  8. Mistake or Misunderstanding
  9. Removal of Trustees: Valid Grounds
  10. Removal of Trustees Cannot be by Executive Order
  11. Mismanagement: Judged not by Result; but, by Situation at Relevant Time
  12. If Breach of Trust or Mismanagement, Suit Can be Brought
  13. Doctrine of ‘Conditions of Modern Life’
  14. Accounting by Trustees
  15. Trustee Acted Under Competent Legal Advice: No Answer to Charge
  16. Removal of Pujaries

Introduction

Under the law of associations, it is a trite principle that an act done beyond the objects mentioned in the memorandum of the association or company would be ultra vires. It is also well accepted that such an ultra vires action is void[1] and cannot be ratified[2] by any body of the company or association. These principles attached to companies and associations would also equally apply to Trusts.[3] Under law of trusts, such acts constitute ‘breach of trust’.  Madras High Court in Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO,[4] dealing with the question whether the founder of a trust had power to revoke the same, observed as follows:

  • “If the trust had been really and validly created, any deviation by the founder of the trust or the trustees from the declared purposes would amount only to a breach of trust and would not detract from the declaration of trust. Therefore, the subsequent conduct of the founder in dealing with the funds of the trust long after the creation of the trust may not put an end to the trust itself.”

This passage of Madras High Court has been quoted with approval by our Apex Court in Agasthyar Trust Vs. Commr. IT Madras.[5]

Appointment of Trustees Irrevocable

A dedication of property to a public trust or deity is irrevocable, and the rules, if any, laid down by the founder at the time of dedication regulating succession to the office of the trustee or shebait should also be deemed to be irrevocable unless the power of revocation is reserved by the grantor. The condition relating to the rule of succession of trusteeship or shebaitship forms an integral part of the dedication itself.[6]

Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees: Grounds

1. Denial of Trust Itself

The denial of validity of trust by a trustee, by itself, is sufficient to remove him from the trusteeship.[7]

2. Deviation by the Trustees from the Declared Purposes

Any deviation by the trustees from the declared purposes of the trust[8] or ultra vires acts[9]would amount to a breach of trust.

3. Assertion to Private Ownership and Adverse Title

Indian Trusts Act , 1882 reads as under:

  • Sec. 13. Trustee to protect title to trust property.—A trustee is bound to maintain and defend all suits, and to take such other steps as may be reasonably requisite for the preservation of the trust property.
  • Sec. 14. Trustee not to set up title adverse to beneficiary.—The trustee must not for himself or another set up or aid any title to the trust property adverse to the interest of the beneficiary.

A trustee cannot claim adverse title.  An assertion to private ownership is enough ground for removal of a trustee.[10]  Apart from Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a Shebait or Mutawalli is not permitted, under Common Law, to make any adverse assertion of title upon a property of the temple or wakf he holds.  When a property is assigned for a public purpose in perpetuity it is burdened with obligations. A transferee of such property will not acquire title without qualifications.[11]

The Supreme Court has held as to the claim of Shebaits, in Sree Sree Ishwar Sridhar Jew Vs. Sushila Bala Dasi (1952),[12] as under:

  • “If a Shebait by acting contrary to the terms of his appointment or in breach of his duty as such Shebait could claim adverse possession of the dedicated property against the idol it would be putting a premium on dishonesty and breach of duty on his part and no property which is dedicated to an idol would ever be safe. The Shebait for the time being is the only person competent to safeguard the interests of the idol, his possession of the dedicated property is the possession of the idol whose Shebait he is, and no dealing of his with the property dedicated to the idol could afford the basis of a claim by him for adverse possession against the idol. “

The Supreme Court held as to adverse possession, with respect to mosque-property, in Mohammad Shah Vs.  Fasihuddin (1956),[13] as under:

  • “A stranger to the trust can encroach on the trust estate and will in course of time acquire a title by adverse possession. But Mutawalli cannot take up such a position. If the Mutawallis of a mosque choose to build on part of the mosque property in such a way as to integrate the whole into one unit then the Court is bound to regard this as an accretion to the estate of which they are trustees, and they will be estopped from adopting any other attitude because no trustee can be allowed to set up a title adverse to the trust or be allowed to make a benefit out of the trust, for his own personal ends.”

In Abdul Rahim Khan Vs.  Fakir Mohammad Shah (1946)[14] it was heldby High Court at Nagpur as under:

  • “Where a person is a Mutawalli of a public charitable trust, all his acts which are claimed as acts showing adverse possession are referable to his lawful fiduciary position as Mutawalli. Adverse possession, in such circumstances, is a notion almost void of content. …. Having entered into possession as trustee he is estopped from setting an adverse title until he obtains a proper discharge from the trust . . . The mere fact that a person is described in the record of rights as the owner or describes himself as the “Mutawalli of a private mosque or imambada will not make that property his own if there is evidence on record to prove that the property was wakf. Nor will the mere fact that in certain applications the person uses expressions like “my mosque” or “my imambada” make the mosque his own when to his knowledge the property was held as wakf. “[15]

In Hafiz Mohammad FatehNasib Vs.  Sir Swarup Chand Hukum Chand, a Firm (1948)[16], the same principle is reiterated by the Privy Council as under:

  • “In law a title by adverse possession can be established against wakf property, but it is clear that a trustee for a charity entering into possession of property belonging to the charity cannot, whilst remaining a trustee, change the character of his possession and assert that he is in possession as a beneficial owner.”[17]

Apart from Section 116 Evidence Act, a Shebait or Mutawalli is not permitted to make any adverse assertion of title upon a property of the temple or wakf, he holds. Betrayal of fiduciary position of a trustee entails his removal. Assertion to private ownership was enough ground for removal of a trustee.[18] A Mahant is liable to be removed if he sets up an adverse title to the properties of the Math.[19]

4. Betrayal of Fiduciary Position

Betrayal of fiduciary position of a trustee entails his removal. It is not open to the court on any sound principles, either of administration or of law, to permit the continuance of the trustee in the office in such a case.

5.  Obligations Cannot be Faithfully Discharged

In Peary MohunVs. Manohar,[20] the Privy Council observed:

  • “… As a part of office it is indisputable that there are duties which must be performed, the estate does need to be safeguarded and kept in proper custody and it be found that a man in the exercise of his duties has put himself in a position in which the Court thinks that the obligations of his office can no longer be faithfully discharged that is sufficient ground for his removal.”

6. Mismanagement and  Removal Necessary to Save Trust Property

Courts will order removal of trustees when such removal is necessary or desirable for the good of the charity, necessary in the interests of the trust,or to save the trust property.[21]  In Bapugouda Yadagouda PatilVs.Vinayak Sadashiv Kulkarni[22] it was held that proof of breach of trust or mismanagement was not essential for the removal of a trustee of a charitable institution and the court had a wide discretion under Sec. 92 to take such action as it thought necessary or desirable for the good of the charity.

In S. Veeraraghava Achariar  Vs. Parthasaruthy Iyengaar[23] it was held that once a person accepted an office of trusteeship the motive for all his actions should be the interest of the institution and that alone. Even though the evidence in a case against the trustees may not be sufficient to warrant, generally speaking, their removal from office on the ground of misconduct or negligence, still their removal may be ordered, if, in the opinion of the court, such removal is necessary in the interests of the trust to be administered.

Mismanagement:

Judged not by Result; but, by Situation at Relevant Time

It was observed by Allahabad High Court in Jagat Narain Vs. Mathura Das[24] that the degree of prudence expected from a manager of an endowment would be the prudence which an ordinary man would exercise with the knowledge available to him and the transaction would have to be judged not by the result, but by what might have been expected to be its results at the time it was entered into.

Administration Should Not be Ultra Vires

The trustees are bound to administer the affairs of the trust in accordance with the direction of the founder in the trust-deed; and it should not be ultra vires. In the leading case in this subject, Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar Vs. LIC,[25] the Supreme Court, in the context of interpretation of the Object Clause of a Memorandum of Association of a Company, observed as under:

  •  “Power to carry out an object, undoubtedly includes power to carry out what is incidental or conducive to the attainment of that object, for such extension merely permits something to be done which is connected with the objects to be attained, as being naturally conducive thereto.”

In Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust Vs. Director of Income Tax[26] it was pointed out that although the above observation of the Apex Court was made, in the context of interpretation of the Object Clause of a Memorandum of Association of a Company, the principle would also be applicable to determine whether any activity is ultra vires the purpose of a Trust.

If Breach of (private) Trust or Mismanagement, Civil Suit Can be Brought

If there is a breach of trust or mismanagement on the part of the trustee of a private trust, a suit can be brought in a Civil Court by any person interested for the removal of the trustee and for the proper administration of the endowment.[27] With respect to public trusts it is governed under Sec. 92 CPC. A suit can also be filed for settlement of a scheme for the purpose of effectively carrying out the objects of the trust.[28]

Doctrine of ‘Conditions of Modern Life’

In KC Kappor Vs.Radhika Devi,[29] the Supreme Court has held that the expression “compelling necessity” (qua alienation of property held by a trustee-Kartha) must be interpreted with due regard to the ‘conditions of modern life’. The Apex Court quoted from with approval the Bombay decision, NagindasManeklalVs. Mahomed Yusuf Mithcella[30].

Trustee Acted Under Competent Legal Advice:

No Answer to Charge

It is no answer to a charge of breach of trust that the trustee acted under competent legal advice.[31] Our Apex Court, in TMA Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka,[32]observed that a wrong legal advice may not give protection to the contemnor.[33]

Who can File Suit for Removal of Mahant

For the removal of aMahant or for recovery of endowed property, the action can be initiated by a person having legal authority to do so. It can be:

  •        1. Shebait,
  •        2. Trustee, Manager or Pujari,
  •        3. Persons having interest
  •        4. Worshipper,
  •        5. State or its officers.[34]

No Removal of Trustees:

Bona Fide Action of a Trustee

When an action is taken bona fide, though it be a mistaken one, that will not entail actions on breach of trust.[35]In the absence of any proved and deliberate dishonesty on the part of the trustee he is not liable to be removed, though he is held to have been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties.[36] The test which must be applied is whether the acts or omissions complained of disclose conditions which render intervention necessary in order to save the trust property; whether such state of affairs were brought about deliberately or willfully; and whether the trustees were actuated by dishonest and corrupt motives.[37]

Mistake or Misunderstanding

There must be gross negligence or misconduct for removal of trustees. Want of capacity or of fidelity which is calculated to put the trust in jeopardy will be actionable. But, failure in the discharge of duty on account of mistake or misunderstanding is not a ground for removal unless such failure shows want of capacity to manage the trust.[38]

Where there is no willful default but merely a misunderstanding, the court will not necessarily visit the trustee with removal. Some degree of latitude is also allowed by the courts which do not order accounts against managers where there is no fraud or dishonesty but only mere error of judgment.[39]

In Azizor RehmanVs. Ahidennessa[40] it is held by Calcutta High Court as under:

  • “In the case of removal of a trustee the Court should be guided by considerations of the welfare of the trust estate, and before a removal of the trustee is directed, a clear necessity for the intervention of the Court to save the trust property must be established. It is not every mismanagement or neglect of duty which will induce the Court to remove a trustee. There must be such gross negligence or misconduct as to evidence a want either of capacity or of fidelity which is calculated to put the trust in jeopardy. Failure in the discharge of duty on account of mistake or misunderstanding is not a ground for removal unless such failure shows want of capacity to manage the trust.”[41]

In Managing Committee Vs. Hakim Mohd.[42] it is held by Oudh High Court as under:

  • “Errors of judgment or miscarriage of discretion have to be disregarded unless they be sufficiently chronic. One is apt occasionally to magnify such shortcomings into what are sometimes characterised as breaches of duty, misconduct, misfeasance or gross neglect. But if they are not the result of want of fidelity they cannot be made the basis of interference.”

Losses out of ‘Ultra Vires’, But ‘Bona Fide’,Acts of Directors

The Madras High Court in Karnataka Films Ltd. Vs. Official Liquidator, Chitrakala Movietone Ltd.[43] considered the judgment in the case of Liverpool Household Stores Association Ltd., In re, [1890] 59 LJ Ch 616 where the directors were charged with misfeasance on several grounds. The Madras High Court referred to the said decision in the said case and quoted the following passage therefrom (at p. 159):

  • “Section 165 of the Companies Act, 1862, enables a creditor of a company to obtain by summary process any relief to which he is entitled in respect of damages incurred through the misfeasance of an officer of the company, but the remedy afforded by the section is only for the recovery of damages for losses incurred. The misfeasance to which the section is directed is not restricted to acts of commission, but extends to all breaches of trust in relation to a company through which loss is incurred. Misfeasance is not to be imputed to a director unless he has dishonestly acted, or abstained from acting, in conflict with his plain duty and the burden of proof lies on the party making the charge; but in considering the question of the director’s liability, there must be imputed to him a special knowledge of the business which he has undertaken. Directors are liable for losses occasioned through acts done by them as directors in matters which are ‘ultra vires’ the company, and this liability is not dependent upon any question of honesty of intention. “
  • 10. THE principles are well -settled but the question is whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the principles laid down by the aforesaid decisions can be applied at all. There is no allegation of misapplication of the assets of the company by the directors. The ground now urged by Mr. Sinha, learned advocate for the official liquidator, is that the company carried on business which is ultra vires the object clause and, accordingly, the directors are liable to make good the loss arising therefrom. Even if the business carried on by the directors is ultra vires, it cannot by itself constitute an act of misfeasance. The word “misfeasance” does not cover every misconduct by a director. There must be a breach of trust. Unless a director has done something wrongly by misapplying or retaining in his own hands any money of the company or the director has done something by which the company’s properties had been wasted resulting in actual loss to the company, there cannot be any misfeasance. The case of misfeasance in this case is on the ground that the company has indulged in speculation business. The auditor has stated in his evidence what, according to him, is speculation business. According to the auditor, the company indulged in a speculative transaction within the meaning of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The speculative transaction is not something like a wagering contract. Unless it is proved that at the very inception, the intention was only to deal in difference and in no circumstances to call for or give delivery, there cannot be any wagering contract. The mere fact that on settlement of same contract, the differences were entered into the book cannot establish that it was the intention of the parties not to call for and give delivery. The basic ingredients of a speculative transaction are that the contracts are to be periodically or ultimately settled and the settlement would be otherwise than by actual delivery or transfer of commodity. There is no evidence in this case that there was no delivery. The evidence is that the goods were bought and sold. Speculation business is separately treated under the Income Tax Act. It is treated as distinct and separate from any other business. No evidence whatsoever has been produced to show that the Income Tax Officer treated the business of the company as speculation business. On the contrary, in the report of the auditor, the auditor has referred to the assessment order where the Income Tax Officer held that in view of the financial difficulties, M/s. Abdul Karim Md. (1963) Company at 59, Biplabi, Rash Behari Avenue, Calcutta, took delivery of the goods and sold the same on behalf of the assessee-company. For this the company paid additional commission and ‘arat’ charges. The auditor has also referred that commission and ‘arat’ charges were paid as the company was unable to sell its goods. The directors were sought to be made liable for the amount of commission and arat charges paid. I am unable to appreciate the comment of the auditor “that instead of doing regular business in the normal course, the directors were found doing transactions of adventure, some of a wholly risky nature, but offering a chance of great or unusual gain in complete disregard of the objects clauses of the company. Upon scrutiny of the objects clauses, it would be evident that the company was not permitted to do any speculative businesses per objects clauses contained in the memorandum of association of the company. But the directors were found doing purely ” fatka ” business on behalf of the company in clear violation of the objects clauses.”
  • 11. THE said comment is not based on facts. The auditor has drawn from his own imagination facts and circumstances which are not apparent from the records. There is no material to hold that the directors were engaged in speculation business. Even the Income Tax Officer did not go to the length of holding that the business was not carried on in the usual course. For the reasons aforesaid, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sinha.

Removal of Trustees:

Valid Grounds

When a Junior is legally nominated to succeed to the Mahanthe cannot be removed, arbitrarily, even by the Head of the Mutt, except for a good and valid cause.[44]In Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma,[45] BP Jeevan Reddi, J., held:

  • “We are, therefore, of the opinion that the charges, at any rate the main charges, on which the excommunication is based were not available as grounds of excommunication and could not constitute valid grounds therefore. Accordingly, it is held that the excommunication of Catholicos is not valid and legal.”

Cannot be by Executive Order

The Supreme Court, in Bishan Das Vs. State of Punjab,[46] held that a trustee can be removed only by procedure known to law and that he cannot be removed by an executive fiat. It is held in this decision:

  • “Even if the State proceeded on the footing that the trust was a public trust it should have taken appropriate legal action for the removal of the trustee as was opined by the State’s Legal Remembrancer. It is well recognised that a suit under S. 92, Civil Procedure Code, may be brought against persons in possession of the trust property even if they claim adversely to the trust, that is, claim to be owners of the property, or against persons who deny  the validity of the trust.”

In Wazir Chand Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh[47] it is held that the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts.[48]

Removal of Mahant: Where Duties as Administrator

A Mahant is answerable as a trustee in the general sense for maladministration since he has to administer the endowed properties as trustee for general, pious and religious purposes and obligations attached to his office.[49]

Where the office of a Mahant is attached to administration of endowments he can be removed by a court of law when misconduct is proved. Even when no misconduct is established, he may be removed if it is proved that his continuance would prevent due execution of the trust.[50]

Removal of Mohants: Where Duties Purely Spiritual

In Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs. Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi[51] Allahabad High Court observed that a Mahant possesses two capacities. He is spiritual head of the Mutt and administrator of its properties. Both are closely intermingled.[52] The whole assets are vested in him as the owner thereof in trust[53] for the institution itself.  If it is found that the Mahant cannot faithfully discharge his functions without danger to the endowment, he can be removed from both the offices.

Where the duties of an office are purely spiritual[54] and moral, entirely unconnected with any office, with no pecuniary benefit attached to it, or property,[55]the Civil Court may not have jurisdiction to interfere. Even if the Mahantship on its spiritual side is regarded as purely an office of dignity, notwithstanding that the functions of such office are associated with religious rites and ceremonies, the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain a suit, as being of a civil nature under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code.[56]

Religious Acts: No Court-Interference, Unless Whimsical, Arbitrary, Capricious etc.

If a spiritual or ecclesiastical offence is committed by anybody, his spiritual superior or ecclesiastical tribunal has to punish him in a proper proceeding. The civilcourt has nothing to do with such spiritual offence,[57]unconnected with office[58] or property.[59]

Math is an institutional sanctum presided over by a superior, the Mahanth.  The dual office of being the religious or spiritual head of the particular cult of religious fraternity and the office of the manager of the secular properties of the institution are combined in him.[60] The succession to Mahantship is regulated by custom or usage of the particular institution.[61]Selection of the successor to the post of Mahanth and withdrawal of such person after selection are purely spiritual matters and religious in nature. They are not administrative or secular acts. Therefore, if such actions were the result of bone fide acts of the authorities concerned, the court will not interfere.[62]

It is a well-known custom that the Heads in several Mutts nominate their successors.[63] When a Junior is legally nominated to succeed to the Mahant and a status as such is created, it cannot be withdrawn or cancelled at the mere will of the parties.[64] But, in His Holiness Kasi-viswanatha Pandara Sannidhi Vs. State of Tamil Nadu[65] the High Court of Madras did not interfere in the action of removal of the petitioner as Junior PandaraSannathi holding that the act on the basis of bone fide consideration by the then Head of the Mutt and such action was purely religious in nature and the same fell outside the judicial reach. The said act of removal was found to be purely religious in nature and it was pointed out that such act cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny unless the same appears to be for an extraneous consideration or the same was per se out of extraneous consideration, whimsical, arbitrary,capriciousoragainst the public interest. It was pointed out that the court exercising its judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in judgment[66] over what is good cause except for the factors as stated above. Referring to Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt[67] and Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar Vs. The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments[68] it was pointed out that generally a sanyasin is a person who has renounced wordly affairs. It would appear that he will not have any career at all. The High Court relied heavily on its earlier decision, His Holiness Sri-La-Sri Ambalavana Pandara Sannathi Avergal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu,[69] where it was held that the act of nomination of Pandara Sannathi is purely in religious nature and not an administrative act.

The Madras High Court also referred to the Supreme Court decision, AKKaulVs. Union of India,[70]arose from disciplinary action taken against certain Govt. Intelligence Officers in the intelligence Bureau, in a summary manner, by President of India, in the interest of the security of the State. Our Apex Court pointed out that ‘on account of want of judicially manageable standards, there may be matters which are not susceptible to the judicial process’.

Removal of Pujaries and Sevadars

In Balram Chunnilal Vs. Durgalal Shivnarain[71] it was found that an appointed pujari, for the purpose of worship and of maintaining the temple, was a servant and he got possession of temple property in a fiduciary capacity and that he was estopped as long as he continued to be in possession in that capacity from asserting his own title. When a servant occupied or came into possession of property belonging to his employer he was nothing more than a licensee or a bailee. In a general sense it was also a trust. Unless the pujuari handed over the temple to the panchas and acquires the capacity of a third party–of somebody other than a servant–he could not have been heard either to question the panchas’ title or to set up his own. It was held that plaintiffs (panchas as the trustees) were entitled to remove the pujaries who were in possession of the temple.

In Bhagwan DassVs.Jairam Dass[72] it was held by P&J High Court that the Sevadarwas liable to be removed where Sevadar asserted title hostile and failed to keep regular accounts.

The property vests in deity. It being a religious concern and there is no public element in it, Writ jurisdiction on the basis of public interest cannot be  invoked.[73]

Parens Patriae Jurisdiction

In Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014, T.R. Ramachandran Nair, P.V. Asha, JJ.) held as under:

  • “60. As far as the property of the Temple is concerned, this Court will be right in exercising the parens patriae jurisdiction. The Division Bench in paragraphs 61 and 63 of the judgment in Mohanan Nair’s case (2013 (3) KLT 132) has considered two aspects, viz. the power of this Court to interfere even if there is inaction on the part of the Board and the importance of protecting the interest of Deity. Herein, what we find from Ext. P7 order is that a complaint was made by the Temple Advisory Committee which was considered by the learned Ombudsman appointed by this Court for Travancore and Cochin Devaswom Boards. The learned Ombudsman had also directed the third respondent to take urgent action for recovery of Devaswom property. In paragraph 62 of the judgment in Mohanan Nair’s case (2013 (3) KLT 132) this Court relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board (2007 (4) KLT 965) wherein the duty of the courts to protect and safeguard the interest of the Deity has been highlighted.”

It is held in Mohanan Nair’s case, 2013 (3) KLT 132, as under:

  • “62. The Apex Court, in a recent decision reported in Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board (ILR 2007 (4) Ker. 181), has emphasised that it is the duty of the Courts to protect and safeguard the interest and properties of the religious and charitable institutions. The Bench presided over by Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan (as he then was), in para 10 has held as follows:
  • “10. The properties of deities, temples and Devaswom Boards, require to be protected and safeguarded by their Trustees/Archaks/Sebaits/employees. Instances are many where persons entrusted with the duty of managing and safeguarding the properties of temples, deities and Devaswom Boards have usurped and misappropriated such properties by setting up false claims of ownership or tenancy, or adverse possession. This is possible only with the passive or active collusion of the concerned authorities. Such acts of ‘fences eating the crops’ should be dealt with sternly. The Government, members or trustees of Boards/Trusts, and devotees should be vigilant to prevent any such usurpation or encroachment. It is also the duty of courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation.”
  • That was also a similar case wherein the alleged encroachment of Temple property was raised in a complaint filed by a devotee.” (quoted in: Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014)

In Mohanan Nair’s case, 2013 (3) KLT 132, it is further held as under:

  • “61. We will now come to the decisions relied upon by both sides. A Full Bench decision of this Court in Achuthan Pillai and others v. State of Kerala and others (1970 KLT 838 – FB) was relied upon by the learned counsel for the Temple Advisory Committee to show that in respect of matters concerning Hindu Religious Institutions and Temples, a contention regarding limitation/delay, etc. alone cannot deny the jurisdiction and hence this Court will be properly justified in considering the matter in detail. That was a case where the Full Bench considered the validity of an order passed by the Government under Section 99 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras). By the said order the Government cancelled the sanction given for transfer of immovable property of a Devaswom. The initial order was passed by the Commissioner for sanction to lease 600 acres of forest land belonging to Emoor Bhagavathy Devaswom. The said order was passed in the year 1960 and the Government cancelled the same by Ext. P5 order dated 23.2.1967. The Full Bench, speaking through K.K. Mathew, J. (as he then was), traced the principles regarding the rights of an authority to protect the institution like Devaswom in order to prevent fraud. The relevant parts of the discussion contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 are extracted below:
  • “5………… The power to cancel a sanction and thereby to make null and void an improvident transfer or alienation of immovable property of a Devaswom, though exercised under the guise of revision, is visitorial in character. It is a matter of common knowledge that even from very early times religious and charitable institutions in India came under the special protection of the ruling authority. The rulers of the country always asserted their right to visit these institutions in order to prevent fraud and redress the abuses in their management. In the celebrated Rameswar Pagoda case, LR. 1 I. A. 299 it was pointed out by the Judicial Committee that the former rulers of this country always asserted the right to visit endowments of this kind to prevent and redress the abuses in their management…………….”

In Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014, T.R. Ramachandran Nair, P.V. Asha, JJ.) held further as under:

  • 60. As far as the property of the Temple is concerned, this Court will be right in exercising the parens patriae jurisdiction. The Division Bench in paragraphs 61 and 63 of the judgment in Mohanan Nair’s case (2013 (3) KLT 132) has considered two aspects, viz. the power of this Court to interfere even if there is inaction on the part of the Board and the importance of protecting the interest of Deity. Herein, what we find from Ext. P7 order is that a complaint was made by the Temple Advisory Committee which was considered by the learned Ombudsman appointed by this Court for Travancore and Cochin Devaswom Boards. The learned Ombudsman had also directed the third respondent to take urgent action for recovery of Devaswom property. In paragraph 62 of the judgment in Mohanan Nair’s case (2013 (3) KLT 132) this Court relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court

In Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board (2007 (4) KLT 965) the duty of the courts to protect and safeguard the interest of the Deity has been highlighted as under:

  • “6. The authorities, therefore, support the conclusion that supervision and control of Hindu Religious and Charitable Institutions is a function of government and that government at all times asserted and exercised the power. Although India is today a secular State, “that would not preclude the secular administration of religious institutions”.
  • (See the observations of B.K. Mukherjee, J. in Commr. HRE v. Swamdur – AIR 1954 SC 282).
  • The fact that government did not exercise the power immediately when it became aware of the circumstances vitiating Ext. P1 order cannot prejudice the interest of the devaswom. If the contention of the petitioner were to prevail, it would mean that because the government was not very vigilant in exercising the power the interest of the devaswom should suffer. S.10 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides no period of limitation for a suit against a person in whom the trust property has become vested for any specific purpose or against his legal representatives or assigns for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property. The reason behind the section is that an express trust ought not suffer by the misfeasance or non-feasance of a trustee…………. “
  • Their Lordships were of the view that “an express trust ought not suffer by the misfeasance or non-feasance of a trustee.” (quoted in: Mohanan Nair’s case, 2013 (3) KLT 132, and Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014, T.R. Ramachandran Nair, P.V. Asha, JJ.)

The Full Bench, in Mohanan Nair’s case, 2013 (3) KLT 132, held that the misfeasance or non-feasance of a trustee and the time lag in the matter and inaction on the part of the Board will not deter the court from passing appropriate orders.

In Achuthan Pillai’s case (1970 KLT 838 – FB) it is held as under:

  • “63. The relevant principles under the Hindu law will show that the Deity is always treated similar to that of a minor and there are some points of similarity between a minor and a Hindu idol. This Court therefore is the guardian of the Deity and apart from the jurisdiction under Section 103 of the Land Reforms Act, viz. the powers of revision, this Court is having inherent jurisdiction and the doctrine of parens patriae will also apply in exercising the jurisdiction. Therefore, when a complaint has been raised by the Advisory Committee which was formed by the devotees of the Temple about the loss of properties of the Temple itself, the truth of the same can be gone into by this Court in these proceedings.” (quoted in: Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014, T.R. Ramachandran Nair, P.V. Asha, JJ.)

In Prasannakumar v. The State of Kerala,(WP No.  6689 of 2013, 16-10-2014), it is further held that the absence of a revision petition under Section 103 of the Act (Kerala Land Reforms Act) against the Order of Land Tribunal will not prevent the High Court, from acting, especially in the light of the inherent jurisdiction available to the High Court and the applicability of the doctrine of parens patriae in the light of the principles rendered by the Full Bench in Achuthan Pillai’s case (1970 KLT 838 – FB) as well as that of the Apex Court in Gopalakrishnan’s case (2007 (4) KLT 965),


[1]Claude Lila ParulekarVs. Sakal Papers:  AIR 2005 SC 4074: 2005-11 SCC 73.

[2]LakshmanaswamiMudaliar Vs. LIC: AIR 1963 SC 1185;

Gajadhar Prasad Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1984 Pat 105.

[3]Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust Vs. Director of Income Tax: 2015-280 CTR 121: 2015-222 DLT 102: 2015-377 ITR 650: TAXMAN 2015-234 222

[4]Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO: 91 ITR 261,

[5] 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;1998-5 SCC 588

[6]      Radhika Mohan Nandy v. Amrita LalNandy and another: AIR1947 Cal  301

Virbala K. Kewalram Vs. Ramchand Lalchandlaws: AIR 1997 Bom 46

[7]      Mrs. KalidhaAdib Begum Vs. S.A. Bashirunnissa Begum Hussaini: 1970-83 Mad LW 116.

[8] Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO: 91 ITR 261

[9]Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust Vs. Director of Income Tax: 2015-280 CTR 121: 2015-222 DLT 102: 2015-377 ITR 650: TAXMAN 2015-234 222

[10]    Srinivas Chariar Vs. C.N. Evalappa Mudaliar: AIR 1922 PC 325.

See also: Janardhana Mishra Alias Janardhana Prasad Vs. State (1996) 1 Mad LJ 588;

Idol of A M Kamakala Kameshwarar Temple Vs. Sri Siddaraja Manicka Prabha Temple: 2011-6 Mad LJ  386;

Deputy Commissioner Judicial Vs. M Perumal: 2003-3 Mad LJ  151 .

[11]    Gnanasambanda Pandora Sannadhi Vs. Valu Pandaram: 27 I.A. 69

Bonnerji Vs. Sitanath Das: 491 A. 46:

Referred to in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

[12] AIR 1954 SC 69

[13]    AIR 1956 SC 713

[14]    AIR 1946 Nag 401

[15]    Quoted in: Balram Chunnilal Vs. Durgalal Shivnarain: AIR1968 MP 81

[16]    AIR 1948 PC 76

[17] It is quoted in Balram Chunnilal  Vs. Durgalal Shivnarain: AIR1968 MP 81

[18]    Srinivas Chariar and another Vs. C.N. EvalappaMudaliar: AIR 1922 P.C. 325.

See also: Janardhana Mishra Alias Janardhana Prasad Vs. State (1996) 1 Mad LJ 588.

[19]Ajudhia Das v. Laky Malik, AIR 1923 Lah 131; Miyaji v. Sk. Ahmed Sahib, ILR (1908) 31 Mad 212; Chintaman v. Dhondo, 15 Bom 612.

[20]    (1921) ILR 48 Calcutta 1019

[21]    Managing Committee of S.S. Endowment Vs. Mohd. Ahsan: A.I.R. 1947 Oudh 28.

[22] AIR 1941 Bom 317

[23] AIR 1925 Mad. 1070

[24]    AIR 1928 All 454 (FB).

Referred to in: Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs.Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[25]AIR1963 SC 1185

[26]2015-280 CTR 121: 2015-222 DLT 102: 2015-377 ITR 650: TAXMAN 2015-234 222

[27]    Thenappa Chettiar Vs.Karuppan Chettiar: AIR 1968 SC 915 

[28]    Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Karuppan Chettiar: AIR 1968 SC 915;

Cheriyathu Vs. Parameswaran Namboodiripad: 1953 Ker LT 125;

Also Manohar Mukherji  Vs. Raja Peary Mohan Mukherji: 24 Cal WN 478;

Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar RadhaBalla: 1937 Cal 338;

Rajasekharan Naicker Vs. Govindankutty: 1983 KerLJ 506.

[29]    AIR 1981 SC 2128.

[30]    AIR 1922 Bom 122.

[31]    S. Chettiar Vs. R. Dorai, (1909) ILR 32 Mad 490

[32] 1995 Cr. LJ 3220

[33] Referred to in: Arun Kumar Gupta and Eleven VS Jyoti Prasanna Das Thakur: 1996-2 CalLJ 89; 1996-2 CHN

[34]Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi (2018) 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591

[35]    Vidyodaya Trust Vs. Mohan Prasad: AIR 2008 SC 1633.

[36]    Sivasankara  Vs. Vadagiri: ILR 13 Mad. 6.

Refered to in: Janardhana Mishra Vs. State (1996) 1 Mad LJ 588.

[37]    Managing Committee of SS Endowment Vs. Mohd. Ahsan AIR 1947 Oudh 28

[38]    Azizor Rahman Choudhury Vs. Ahidennessa Choudharani: AIR 1928 Cal. 225

[39]    Janardhana  Mishra Alias Janardhana Prasad Vs. State (1996) 1 Mad LJ 588.

[40] AIR 1928 Cal 225

[41] Also See:  Balmakund Vs. Nanak Chand AIR 1929 All 433.

[42] AIR 1947 Oudh. 22

[43] [1951] 21 Comp Cas 138 (Mad)

Referred to in Bholanath Kundu Vs. Official Liquidator, Bholanath Kundu : 1987-61 CC 10.

[44]Mahalinga Thambiran v. ArulnandiThambiran : AIR 1974SC 199;

Relied on:Tiruvambala Desikar v. Chinna Pandaram1915 30 M.L.J. 274 : I.L.R. (1915) Mad. 177.

[45]    AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[46]    AIR 1961 SC 1570.

[47] AIR 1954 SC 415,

[48] See also: Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi Vs. The State of Bihar:  AIR 1953 SC 215; 

State of U.P. Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh: AIR 1989 SC 997.

[49]Nillappa Achari v. Punnai Vanam Achari, AIR 1927 Mad 614;

Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591.

[50] Satish Chandra Vs. Dharnidhar, AIR 1940 PC 24;

Perumal Nayak Vs. Swaminatha Pillai, ILR 19 Mad 498;

Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs. Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591

[51]2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591

[52] Ram PrakashVs. Ananda Das: AIR 1916 PC 256: ILR (1916) 43 Cal 707.

[53]    Baijaynanda Giri Vs. State of Bihar:AIR 1954 Pat 266;

       Ram Parkash Das Vs. Anand Das: AIR 1916 PC 256.

[54] His Holiness Kasi-viswanatha Pandara Sannidhi Vs. State of TN: 2018 6 MLJ 32;

His Holiness Sri-La-Sri Ambalavana Pandara Sannathi Avergal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu:  1982 (2) MLJ 221;

AB  Seshadri Vs. State of AP: 2019 3 ALD 209; 2019 1 ALT 235;

MG Chari  Vs. Government of AP: (1997) 5 SCC 388.

[55] VarkeyVs. St. Marys Catholic Church: AIR 1997 Ker 337.

[56] Satish Chandra GiriVs.Dharanidhar Singh Roy: (1940) 1 MLJ 371.

[57] Moran Mar BasseliosCatholicosVs.Thukalan Paulo Avira: AIR1959 SC 31.

[58] His Holiness Kasi-viswanatha Pandara Sannidhi Vs. State of TN: 2018 6 MLJ 32.

[59]Varkey Vs. St. Marys Catholic Church: AIR 1997 Ker 337.

[60] Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir: AIR 1980 SC 707

[61] Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir: AIR 1980 SC 707;

Mahalinga Thambiran Vs. La Sri Kasivasi Arulnandi Thambiran: AIR 1974SC 199

[62] His Holiness Sri-La-Sri Ambalavana Pandara SannathiVs. St. of TN: 1982 -2MLJ 221

Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir: AIR 1980 SC 707

[63] Mahalinga Thambiran Vs. La Sri KasivasiArulnandi Thambiran: AIR 1974SC 199;

Relied on Gnana Sambanda Pandara Sannadhi Vs. Kandaswami Thambiran: ILR1887 Mad. 375.

[64] MahalingaThambiran v. Arulnandi Thambiran : AIR 1974SC 199;

Relied on: Tiruvambala  Desikar v. Chinna Pandaram1915 30 M.L.J. 274 : I.L.R. (1915) Mad. 177.

[65] 2018-6 MLJ 32.

[66] Riju Prasad SarmaVs State of Assam: (2015) 9 SCC 461

[67] AIR 1954  SC 282

[68] AIR 1963 SC 966

[69] 1982 -2MLJ 221

[70] AIR 1995 SC 1403

[71]    AIR1968 MP 81.

[72]AIR 1965 P&H 260;

Referred to in: GhatTalabKaulanWala Vs. Baba GopalDass: 2020  Supreme(SC) 104.

[73] Shree Shree Ram JankiJiAsthanTapovanMandirVs State of Jharkhand: 2019-6 SCC 777



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Trustees and Administration of Public Trusts

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Synopsis.

  1. Administration of Trusts
  2. Rights and Duties/Liabilities of Trustees in a Nut Shell
  3. Rights of a Trustee
  4. Duties of a Trustee
  5. Liabilities of a Trustee
  6. Trustee ‘Holds’ Trust-Property for ‘Administration’
  7. How Can a Trust Execute Deeds and Enter Contract?
  8. Is Trusteeship a Property?
  9. Application of Indian Trusts Act
  10. Trustee is bound to fulfill the purpose of the trust
  11. Trustees Should Act Jointly
  12. Suit by One of its Trustees: Effect
  13. In Strict Legal Sense, Shebait is not Trustee
  14. Trustee Cannot Renounce
  15. ‘Cy pres’ Doctrine
  16. Representation of Beneficiaries, Under O 31 R 1 CPC
  17. Trustee has to Act Gratuitously
  18. Doesn’t Revert Even If Trustee Refuses to Accept Office
  19. Trustee not to Benefit
  20. Trustee Must Exercise on His Own Judgment
  21. Fiduciary Capacity
  22. Trustee Cannot Claim Adverse Title
  23. Claim of Adverse Title by a Trustee Entails his Removal
  24. Accounting by Trustees
  25. Shebait: Whether Similar to Guardian of Infant Heir
  26. Degree of Prudence Expected
  27. Doctrine of ‘Conditions of Modern Life’
  28. Shebait has, to some extent, Rights of a Limited Owner
  29. Succession of Office of Shebait
  30. Right of Suit in the Shebait; and Not in the Idol
  31. Dharmakartha/Shebait has Vide Discretion
  32. When Estate of a Deceased Trustee Liable
  33. Removal of Trustees on Breach of Trust

Introduction

A trust is what the author intended. The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 is basically meant for private trusts. Still, the principles of English Law of Trusts which have been incorporated in this Act will apply to public trusts also. Those principles will not become untouchable for it is incorporated in the Trusts Act.[1] Sec. 92 of the CPC and various (State) Public Trusts Acts govern public trusts. With respect to the applicability of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, upon public trusts the Supreme Court observed, in Sheikh Abdul Kayum  Vs. Mulla Alibhai,[2] as under:

  • “It is true that Sec. 1 of the Trusts Act makes provisions of the Act inapplicable to public or private religious or charitable endowments; and so these sections may not in terms apply to the trust of that kind. These sections however embody nothing more or less than the principles which have been applied to all trusts in all countries.”

The rights and liabilities of the trustees and beneficiaries are given in detail in the Indian Trusts Act enacted in 1882. The courts in India thoroughly followed the principles in the Trusts Act in the matters of public and religious trusts with regard to various rights, duties and liabilities of the trustees. The trustee is bound to fulfill the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation.[3] Usually, trustees are appointed by the founders, and new trustees are selected as directed by the founders.

Life is Bestowed upon Endowment When Trustee is Appointed

An ‘endowment’ is created by dedication of property for the purpose of religion or charity. For a valid trust both the subject and object should be certain and capable of ascertainment.[4] Though a trust is not a juristic person, legal recognition and vitality is bestowed upon the endowment by the appointment of a trustee. An endowment, sans trustee, remains static.

Trustee ‘Holds’ Trust-Property

Indian Trusts Act Sec. 10 states that every person capable of ‘holding’ property may be a trustee. The trustee ‘holds’ trust-property, for administration, as its legal owner. The Trusts Act denotes the relation between the trust property and trustee as ‘holding’, in preference to ‘possessing’.  Apart from Sec. 10, it is clear from Sec. 29, 83 etc. and illustrations in Sec. 10, 61 etc. 

‘Obligation Annexed to the Ownership of Property’  Imports  ‘Administration’

The obligation, or fiduciary duty, in a trust, annexed to the ownership of property, is for ‘executing the trust’ by ‘administering’ the endowed property.  The trustee has to administer the trust-property as if he is its (legal) owner.  Because, as per the definition of trust, the obligation stands attached to the endowed property. By the very nature of ‘Trust’, the obligation ‘annexed’ to the trust-property is for administration.[5]  It is clear from Sec. 11 of the Indian Trust Act. Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act casts duty on trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling the purpose of the trust ‘obeying the directions of the author of the trust’.  Therefore, the pertinent linkage  of obligation to the endowed property is ‘management or administration’. 

Sec. 11 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 11. Trustee to execute trust.—The trustee is bound to fulfill the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation…
  • Nothing in this section shall be deemed to require a trustee to obey any direction when to do so would be impracticable, illegal or manifestly injurious to the beneficiaries.

As per the Indian Trust Act. 1882, the trustee holds the trust-property for ‘management’ or ‘administration’.  The legal ownership vests in the trustee for the purposes of the trust, and its administration should be in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust.[6] Sections 34, 35 and 60 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 specifically refer ‘administration’. Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads:

  • Sec.34. Right to apply to Court for opinion in management of trust property.—Any trustee may, without instituting a suit, apply by petition to a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction for its opinion, advice or direction on any present questions respecting the management or administration of the trust property ….
  • Sec. 35. Right to settlement of accounts.—When the duties of a trustee, as such, are completed, he is entitled to have the accounts of his administration of the trust property examined and settled; ….
  • Sec. 60. Right to proper trustees.—The beneficiary has a right (subject to the provisions of the instrument of trust) that the trust property shall be properly protected and held and administered by proper persons and by a proper number of such persons.
    •        Explanation I.—…
    •        Explanation II.—When the administration of the trust involves the receipt and custody of money, the number of trustees should be two at least.

Trustee Administers as the ‘owner’of Trust

A trust is administered by the trustee, as its legal owner. As per the definition, a trust is (i) an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and (ii) arising out of a confidence accepted by the trustee as owner. And, the ‘beneficial interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.

The trustee should have been appointed with clear directions for management. The trustee is bound to obey the directions of the author. The mode and modalities of administration of trusts are primarily determined under the terms of the trust (written or otherwise). Lewin on Trusts[7] reads as under:

  • “The person who created the trust may mould it in whatever form he pleases.”

Duty of the trustees may be passive or active according to the nature of the trust. With regard to duties of trustees it is stated in ‘Principles of Equity’ by H. A. Smith[8] as under: 

  • “A trust is a duty seemed in equity to rest on the conscience of a legal owner. This duty may be either passive, such as to allow the beneficial ownership to be enjoyed the some other person, named the cestui que trust, in which case the legal owner is styled a bare trustee; or it may be some active duty, such as to sell, or to administer for the benefit of some other person or persons; such for example are the duties of a trustee in bankruptcy.”[9]

Underhill has defined a simple trust as a trust in which the trustee is a mere repository of the trust property, with no active duties to perform.[10]Trustees are bound by customs and usages. Apart from the enactments applicable, trusts and trustees are also governed under the directions of the competent authorities concerned.

A Compny can be a Trustee of a Public Trust

It was held in See M.Gomathinarayagam Pillai v. Sri.Manthramurthi High School Committee, Tirunelveli, AIR 1963 Mad 387, as under:

  • “For the application of that section (Section 92 CPC)  it makes no difference whether the trustees is an individual or a company, nor is there any distinction between a company in whom the office of trustee vests and one which is specially formed for the purpose of executing the trust.” (Referred to in: S.N.D.P.  Yogum v. G.  Krishnamoorthy, ILR 2022-3 Ker 494; 2022-4 KHC 168; 2022-4 KLT 36)

Trustee is Bound to Fulfill the Purpose of the Trust

Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 11. Trustee to execute trust.     The trustee is bound to fulfill the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation, except as modified by the consent of all the beneficiaries being competent to contract.
  •        Where the beneficiary is incompetent to contract, his consent may, for the purposes of this section, be given by a principal civil court of original jurisdiction.
  •        Nothing in this section shall be deemed to require a trustee to obey any direction when to do so would be impracticable, illegal or manifestly injurious to the beneficiaries.
  •        Explanation – Unless a contrary intention be expressed, the purpose of a trust for the payment of debts shall be deemed to be (a) to pay only the debts of the author of the trust existing and recoverable at the date of the instrument of trust, or, when such instrument is a will, at the date of his death, and (b) in the case of debts not bearing interest, to make such payment without interest. The trustee is bound to fulfill the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author…..
  • 13. Trustee to protect title to trust property.—A trustee is bound to maintain and defend all suits, and to take such other steps as may be reasonably requisite for the preservation of the trust property.

Sec. 11 of the Indian Trusts Act casts an obligation on the trustees to fulfill the purpose of the trust. The trustees are bound to obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the lime of its creation, except as modified by consent of all the beneficiaries who are being competent to contract. The liability of trustees is also subject to the exception that the trustees are under no obligation to obey the directions that would be impractical illegal or manifestly injurious to the beneficiaries. The only way in which the directions of the testament may be varied is by applying cy-prus doctrine. It is applied where from lapse of time and change of circumstances it is no longer possible to apply the property left by the founder or donor in the precise way in which it was directed to be applied.[11] Correspondingly if the trustees fail or disclaim to carryout the lawful directions of the settlement it would amount to a breach of trust and any person having interest in the trust has a right to approach the competent authority for appointment of new trustees or for appropriate directions as the nature of the case may require.

In Abdul Kayum Vs. Alibhai[12] our Apex Court expounded the following legal incidents of trusteeship:

  • (i) Trustees cannot transfer their duties, functions & powers to some other body of men and create them trustees in their own place unless this is clearly permitted by the trust deed, or agreed to by the entire body of beneficiaries (Sec. 48);
  • (ii) A trustee is not bound to accept the trust; but having once entered upon the trust he cannot renounce the duties and liabilities except with the permission of the Court or with the consent of the beneficiaries or by the authority of the trust deed itself (Sec. 46).
  • (iii) A trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his functions except in some specified cases (Sec. 47).

Public Trust Depends on Charity and Donatins

Referring Sec. 14 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, it is observed in Khasgi (Devi Ahilyabai Holkar Charities) Trust, Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar,  2022-11 SCALE 1,  2022-17 SCR 173, as under:

  • “A Public Trust invariably depends on charity done by individuals by donating immovable property or by making cash donations.”

Eventhough the above observation is made invoking Sec. 14 of the BPT Act, it is clear that it is a common law principle applicable to all Public Trusts.

Legal Obligations of Trustees to Administer and Give Effect to Objects of Trust

It is held further in Khasgi (Devi Ahilyabai Holkar Charities) Trust, Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar,  2022-11 SCALE 1,  as under:

  • “Though in law, the assets and properties of a Public Trust vest in its Trustees, they hold the Trust property in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the Trust. They hold the property for giving effect to the objects of the Public Trust. A Trust property cannot be alienated unless it is for the benefit of the Trust and/or its beneficiaries. The Trustees are not expected to deal with the Trust property, as if it is their private property. It is the legal obligation of the Trustees to administer the Trust and to give effect to the objects of the Trust. …. There are statutory constraints on the power of the Trustees to alienate the property of a Public Charitable Trust. …. The Trustees are the custodians of Trust properties. The Trustees have a duty to safeguard the interests of the beneficiaries of the Public Trust. That is how, a provision in Public Trust Law, like Sec.  14 of the Public Trusts Act, is of importance. This provision seeks to protect the Trust property in the hands of the Trustees from unwarranted alienations.”  

Administration Should Not be Ultra Vires

The trustees are bound to administer the affairs of the trust to attain the objects[13] envisioned by the founder and in accordance with his directions laid down in the trust-deed; and the acts and actions of trustees ultra vires such objects or directions are void.  If a trustee fails to administer in accordance with the terms of the trust, it amounts to breach of trust.[14]

The basic principle of foundation of a trust cannot be changed.  Tudor on Charities[15] explained it as under:

  • “When a charity has been founded and trusts have been declared, the founder has no power to revoke, vary or add to the trusts. This is so irrespective of whether the trusts have been declared by an individual, or by a body of subscribers, or by the trustees. “[16]

Fundamental principles upon which an association is founded are also not open to alter even for the majority of its members, unless such a power is specifically reserved. This principle laid down in Milligan Vs.  Mitchel,[17]Attorney General Vs. Anderson[18] and Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun[19] is referred to in Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao.[20]

Ultra Vires Acts, Void & Constitutes ‘Breach of Trust’.

A company is a juristic person. The actions and functioning of a company differ from that of a natural person who is free to act on his whims and fancies. The actions and functioning of a company are limited by its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association.[21] A corporation, an association or a company has no inherent or natural common law rights. A company is competent to carry out its objects specified in the Memorandum of Association and cannot travel beyond the objects.[22] Any act of a company (save a case of indoor management) ultra vires its Memorandum and Articles of Association, even if backed by the Resolution of the Board of Directors, is void and not enforceable.[23]

These principles on doctrine of ‘ultra vires’ that are attached to companies and associations, equally apply to Trusts.[24]  Under law of trusts, such acts constitute  ‘breach of trust’.

Doctrine of Indoor Management

In MRF Ltd. Vs. Manohar Parrikar[25] our Apex Court discussed the concept of indoor management as under:

  • “The doctrine of indoor management is in direct contrast to the doctrine or rule of constructive notice, which is essentially a presumption operating in favour of the company against the outsider. It prevents the outsider from alleging that he did not know that the constitution of the company rendered a particular act or a particular delegation of authority ultra vires. The doctrine of indoor management is an exception to the rule of constructive notice. It imposes an important limitation on the doctrine of constructive notice. According to this doctrine, persons dealing with the company are entitled to presume that internal requirements prescribed in memorandum and articles have been properly observed. Therefore doctrine of indoor management protects outsiders dealing or contracting with a company, whereas doctrine of constructive notice protects the insiders of a company or corporation against dealings with the outsiders. However suspicion of irregularity has been widely recognized as an exception to the doctrine of indoor management. The protection of the doctrine is not available where the circumstances surrounding the contract are suspicious and therefore invite inquiry. This exception to the doctrine of indoor management has been subsequently adopted in many Indian cases. They are B. Anand Behari Lal v. Dinshaw and Co. (Bankers) Ltd, AIR 1942 Oudh 417 and Abdul Rehman Khan and Anr. v. Muffasal Bank Ltd. and Ors, AIR 1926 All 497. “

Ultra Vires Contracts

A contract made by the directors of a company upon a matter not included in the Memorandum of Association is ultra vires. Such a contract does not become binding on the company, even if, afterwards, expressly assented to by the shareholders at a General Meeting, it being void in its inception.

An ultra vires contract by a company is analogous to and stands on the same footing as a contract by an infant and in which case there is total incapacity. Just like a consent decree founded on the fortitude of an incompetent minor is void and a nullity, a contract founded by an incompetent company is void and a nullity.[26] An agreement arrived at between the shareholders and directors of a company with respect to management of the affairs of the company, without being incorporated in the Articles of Association is not enforceable against the company.[27]  These principles are recapped in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. Vs. Riche.[28]

The principles in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. Vs. Riche[29]  have been followed by our Apex Court in A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India,[30] In Re Steel Equipment and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. etc.[31]

In A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India[32]it is observed as under:

  • “A company is competent to carry out its objects specified in the memorandum of association and cannot travel beyond the objects.”

As to the applicability of doctrine of ultra  vires in relation to the contractual capacity of a Corporation or a Company, it is stated in Anson’s Law of Contract 24th  Edition[33] as follows:

  • “The contractual capacity of a Corporation incorporated by statute is limited by the fact that any act done by the Corporation outside its statutory powers is, at common law, Ultra Vires and void. Since the Corporation has no existence independent of the Act of Parliament which creates the Corporation or authorities its creation, it follows that its capacity is limited to the exercise of such powers as are actually conferred by, or may reasonably be deduced from, the language of the statute.  Thus a company incorporated under the Companies Act is bound by the objects listed in its  memorandum of association, for it is incorporated  for the purposes set out in the  memorandum. The company can make no contracts inconsistent with, or foreign to, those objects,  and if it does so, the contract so made is, at common law, void and unenforceable as being Ultra Vires the company.  The leading case on the application of  the ultra vires doctrine is Ashbury Railway carriage And Iron Co. Vs Riche (1875 LR 7 HL 653): A company was incorporated with  objects (set out in the memorandum of association)as follows: (i) to make, and sell, or  to lend on hire, railway wagons and carriages  and other rolling stock, (ii) to carry on the  business of mechanical engineers and general  contractors, (iii) to purchase, lease, work  and sell mines, minerals, land and buildings,  and (iv) to buy and sell as merchants, timber,  coal, metals, or other materials. The Company  contracted to assign to another company a  concession which it had bought for the construction  of a railway in Belgium.  The House of Lords held that the contract,  being related to the actual construction of  a railway, as opposed to railway stock, was  Ultra Vires the objects in the memorandum and  void. Even if the shareholders subsequently  ratified the contract, it could not thereby  be rendered binding on the company.”[34]

A. Ramaiya, in ‘Companies Act’ stated as under:

  • “It is ultra vires for a company to act beyond the scope of its memorandum. Any attempted departure will be invalid and cannot be validated even if assented to by all the members of the company. By ultra vires is meant an act or transaction of a company, which, though it may not be illegal, is beyond the company’s powers by reason of not being within the objects of the memorandum is, so to speak, the area beyond which a company cannot travel. Ashbury Ry. Carriage Company v. Riche, (1875) 7 HL 653. An act beyond the objects mentioned in the memorandum is ultra vires and void and cannot be ratified. Dr. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar v. Life Insurance Corporation, (1963) 1 Com LJ 248 : (AIR 1963 SC 1185)”.

These principles pertained to companies and associations, equally apply to Trusts.[35]

Breach of Trust Will Not Put An End to the Trust

In Agasthyar Trust Vs. CIT, Madras[36]our Apex Court quoted with approval the following passage of Madras High Court in Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO.[37]

  • “If the trust had been really and validly created, any deviation by the founder of the trust or the trustees from the declared purposes would amount only to a breach of trust and would not detract from the declaration of trust. Therefore, the subsequent conduct of the founder in dealing with the funds of the trust long after the creation of the trust may not put an end to the trust itself.”

Ultra Vires Acts Cannot Be Ratified

The Articles of Association of a Company are contract between members and are binding not only on the members but also on the company.[38] It is not permissible for directors to act contrary to the powers conferred by the Articles. Any such action would be ultra vires the Articles, as also Section 10 of the Companies Act, 2013.[39]

Consequently, any action contrary to or in defeasance of these participatory rights or objects mentioned in the memorandum is ultra vires and void;[40] and for its inherent illegalities, the issue of ratification of such acts would not arise at all.[41]

Trustee is the Legal Owner for Limited Purpose

Under Common Law of India and as per the definition[42]  of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 the trustee holds the trust property as its legal owner.The properties ‘vest in the trustee’, or he holds the same, for the limited purpose of administration and management.[43] He has the obligation to use this ownership for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[44] It is not the legal (or trust) ownership referred to in English law. In English law, when ‘legal ownership’ is referred, it denotes: ‘legal estate’; one of the ownerships bifurcated from the ‘duel ownership’.

Similarly, the Indian Trusts Act does not refer to ‘beneficial ownership’ with the beneficiary; it refers to ‘interest’ or ‘beneficial interest’ alone with the beneficiary[45]. In English law, when ‘beneficial interest’ is referred, it denotes: ‘beneficial ownership’ or ‘beneficial estate’; the other bifurcated ownerships in the ‘duel ownership’.

A founder can also be a beneficiary of a trust after its dedication. (But, he cannot claim any special right on that score, unless he reserved the same positively.) It is observed by the Kerala High Court in Mohammed Basheer Vs. Ahmed Kutty,[46] following the decision of the Privy Council in Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram[47] and the definition of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, that, ‘unlike English law, in Indian law the owner of the trust property is the trustee, and beneficial interest of course is to be conveyed to the beneficiary’. Under Indian law, beneficiaries have beneficial interest (pertaining to beneficiaries) alone; and it is not ‘proprietary interest’ or ‘beneficial interest pertaining to owner’. ‘Beneficial interest pertaining  to the owner’ is also dedicated ‘in the trust’ when a trust is established.

Property Vests in Trustee; But No  ‘Proprietary Interest’

Under Indian law, beneficial interest pertaining to beneficiaries alone is with beneficiaries; and it is not beneficial interest pertaining to owner. ‘Beneficial interest pertaining to the owner’ is also ‘dedicated’ in favour of the ‘trust’ when a trust is established.

As pointed out in WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh[48]  by our Apex Court the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 declares legal ownership with trustees while defining trust and beneficial interest in Sec. 3. Trust is defined to be an obligation annexed to the ownership of property for the benefit of another, the ‘beneficial interest’ as the beneficiary’s right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.

Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act lays down that transfer of the dedicated property to the trustee is essential for creation of a trust. Inasmuch as the vesting of ownership of trust property with the trustee is under an obligation to manage it for the benefit of the beneficiaries (Sec 3, definition of trust of in the Indian Trusts Act), it can be concluded that the trust properties vest in the (sole) ‘legal ownership’ of the trustees.[49]

Though legal or trust ownership[50] is ‘vested’ with the trustee, as in English law, in Indian law also, the trustee has no ‘proprietory interest’, inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’, or impressed upon, in the property itself.  In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[51]

The Privy Council explained in M. E. Moolla Sons Vs Official Assignee of The High Court of Judicature at Rangoon (1936)[52]  that the beneficiary has no interest(proprietary interest) in immovable property because his right was only to call upon the trustees to carry out their trust, or because the distinction between legal and equitable estates did not as such exist in the law of India.

Sec. 10 and 75 of the Indian Trusts Act denotes ‘vesting of property in trustees’.

Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 10. ….. Disclaimer of trust.—Instead of accepting a trust, the intended trustee may, within a reasonable period, disclaim it, and such disclaimer shall prevent the trust property from vesting in him. A disclaimer by one of two or more co-trustees vests the trust property in the other or others and makes him or them sole trustee or trustees from the date of the creation of the trust.

Sec. 75 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 75. Vesting of trust property in new trustees.—Whenever any new trustee is appointed under section 73 or section 74, all the trust property for the time being vested in the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, or in the legal representative of any trustee, shall become vested in such new trustee, either solely or jointly with the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, as the case may require.

Trustee Must Exercise on His Own Judgment

A trustee cannot delegate the exercise of powers which he ought to personally perform. Although a trustee may listen to the opinions and wishes of others, he must exercise his own judgment. Thus a trustee for sale of property, cannot leave the whole conduct of the sale to his co-trustees. The reason for this proposition is that the settler has entrusted the trust property and its management to all the trustees, and the beneficiaries are entitled to the benefit of their collective wisdom and experience[53].

Fiduciary Capacity of Trustees of Religious Trusts

Because of the fiduciary position, liability of a Shebait or Mutawalli equates trustee.[54] Archakas[55] are also deemed to be in possession in a fiduciary capacity and as such they could not claim adverse possession.

In Balram Chunnilal Vs. Durgalal Shivnarain[56]  it was found that an appointed pujari, for the purpose of worship and of maintaining the temple, was a servant and he got possession of temple property in a fiduciary capacity and that he was estopped as long as he continued to be in possession in that capacity from asserting his own title. When a servant occupied or came into possession of property belonging to his employer he was nothing more than a licensee or a bailee. In a general sense it was also a trust.

Trustee has to Act Gratuitously

Trustee, under English Law, has to perform his duties gratuitously. No remuneration can be claimed from the trust property or income unless the terms of the trust do not allow it.  But that does not mean that the trustee has to meet the expenses from his pocket. He can charge actual expenses from the trust/property.

Indian Trusts Act , 1882 reads as under:

  • 32.Right to re-imbursement of expenses.—Every trustee may re-imburse himself, or pay or discharge out of the trust property, all expenses properly incurred in or about the execution of the trust.
  • 36. General authority of trustee.— A trustee may do all acts which are reasonable and proper for the realisation, protection or benefit of the trust property.
  • 44. Power to several trustees of whom one disclaims or dies.—When an authority to deal with the trust property is given to several trustees and one of them disclaims or dies, the authority may be exercised by the continuing trustees.

West and Buhler in Digest of Hindu Law[57] states as under:

  • “Even when no emoluments are attached to the office of a Shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the endowed property which has partially at least the characteristics of a proprietary right….. The Shebait’ spower to alienate the debutter property is very much limited and can be exercised only when there is a justifying legal necessity or benefit to the Deity; yet he can create derivative tenures in respect of the endowed property, which, even if not supported by legal necessity, cannot be impeached so long as he is alive and remains in office. The Shebait therefore has to some extent the rights of a limited owner.”

West and Buhler in Digest of Hindu Law[58]reads further as under:

  • “Like the trustee in English law, a Shebait has to act gratuitously and he cannot charge the debutter estate for any remuneration on account of the time and labour he spends over his affairs. The position would certainly be different if there is a provision in the deed of dedication to that effect; or, in the absence of any deed of endowment, there is a usage sanctioning such remuneration to the Shebait. The law is well established that, in the absence of any provision in the deed of dedication or any usage to that effect, a Shebait has no right to take any portion of the income of the debutter estate nor even the surplus that remains after meeting the expenses of the deity. In this income would be included not merely the rents and profits of the debutter property but the offerings which are made to the deity by its devotees. “

Underhill in his treatise Law relating to Trusts and Trustees under the caption, Right to Reimbursement and Indemnity, it has been stated as under:

  • “Trustee is entitled to be reimbursed out of the trust property all expenses which he has properly incurred having regard to the circumstances of each particular case but without interest unless he has paid an interest bearing claim in which case he stands in the shoes of the creditor by subrogation.”

Section 32 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 which provides that the trustee is entitled to get reimbursement out of the trust property all expenses properly incurred in relation to the execution of the trust property and for preservation of the trust property is a principle of the English law of Trusts which has been incorporated in the Indian Trusts Act. Therefore such principles in Sec. 32 of the Indian Trusts Act are applied to public trusts also.[59]

Trustee not to Benefit

It is the duty of the trustee to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries. He is not permitted to place himself in a position where it would be for his own benefit or to violate his duty to the beneficiaries.[60]

Indian Trusts Act , 1882 reads as under:

  • Sec. 50.  Trustee may not charge for services.—In the absence of express directions to the contrary contained in the instrument of trust or of a contract to the contrary entered into with the beneficiary or the Court at the time of accepting the trust, a trustee has no right to remuneration for his trouble, skill and loss of time in executing the trust.

Indian Trusts Act , 1882 reads as under:

  • 51. Trustee may not use trust property for his own profit.—A trustee may not use or deal with the trust property for his own profit or for any other purpose unconnected with the trust.

Appointment of Trustees Irrevocable

A dedication of property to a trust is irrevocable, and the rules, if any, laid down by the founder at the time of dedication regulating succession to the office of the trustee should also be deemed to be irrevocable unless the power of revocation is reserved by the grantor. The condition relating to the rule of succession of trusteeship forms an integral part of the dedication and formation of trust itself.[61]

Can a Foreigner be Appointed as a Trustee

Unless an enactment explicitly prevents, a foreigner can be a trustee of a trust in India. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court, in an appeal, Government of TamilnaduVs. K. Sevanthinatha Pandarasannathi,[62]upheld an amendment effected to the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act which barred non-citizens to be qualified to be trustees of any religious institution under Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. This appeal arose from the decision in K. Sevanthinatha Pandarasannathi Vs. Government of Tamilnadu.[63]Calling upon Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the Single Judgehad observed that there was no bar for a Christian or Muslim to be a Head of the Wakf or Church in India, even though he may happen to be a foreigner. The Division Bench, in appeal, pointed out that the State was not prevented from making a special provision with regard to Hindu Religious and Charitable Institutions, without making a similar provision for other Religious Minority Institution.

Trustee Cannot Renounce

Indian Trusts Act , 1882 reads as under:

  • 46. Trustee cannot renounce after acceptance.—A trustee who has accepted the trust cannot afterwards renounce it except (a) with the permission of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, or (b) if the beneficiary is competent to contract, with his consent, or (c) by virtue of a special power in the instrument of trust.

A person/trustee is not bound to accept the trust; but having once accepted, he cannot renounce the duties and liabilities except with the permission of the Court or with the consent of the beneficiaries or under the authority of the trust deed itself.

Trustee Cannot Delegate

S. 47 of the Trusts Act reads as follows:

  • 47. Trustee cannot delegate.—” A trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his duties either to a co-trustee or to a stranger unless (a) the instrument of trust so provides, or (b) the delegation is in the regular course of business, or (c) the delegation is necessary, or (d) the beneficiary, being competent to contract, consents to the delegation.”

Section 48 provides:

  • 48. Co-trustees cannot act singly.—”When there are more trustees than one, all must join in the execution of the trust, except where the instrument of trust otherwise provides.”

Delegatus Non Potest Delegare (a delegate has no power to delegate, unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words by the terms of the deed or necessary implication[64]) is a well-settled principle of law;[65] but, they can appoint a manager in the absence of any indication prohibiting the same or get him appointed through court. Our Apex Court held in Barium Chemicals Limited  Vs. The Company Law Board[66] that the maxim Delegatus Non Potest Delegare did not embody a rule of law. It indicates a rule of construction of a statute or other instrument conferring an authority.

The trustee may be allowed to delegate his functions, in cases of necessity or with the consent of the entire beneficiaries if the beneficiaries are identifiable. Trustees can appoint servants or managers.[67] If manager appointed is one among the trustees, he acts as agent of other trustees. The principles arise in Sec. 46 and 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, which deal with renunciation and delegation of the powers and duties of the trustees, are applied to matters of public trust by our Courts, as they contain the common law principles of the universal rules of equity, justice and good conscience upheld by the English judges. Sec. 46 and 47 of the Indian Trusts Act make it clear that the fiduciary relationship, and duties[68] attached thereto, should not be allowed to be unilaterally terminated or varied, as it would be against the interests of society in general.

These principles would apply with equal force to servants and, in fact, to anybody who has entered on another’s property in a fiduciary capacity.[69]

Appointment and Succession of Trustees

Method of appointment of trustees and the mode of their succession are the matters for the author of the trust. If sought for, court will give effect to the same. In the absence of an instrument of trust, custom and usage will hold the field. Under Sec. 92 CPC, when the trustees fail to take administration of the trust, the designated court is destined to interfere in the appointment of new trustees if the trust deed is silent as to the appointment of the new trustees.

Under Hindu Law, when there is no provision in the deed of endowment about the succession of office of Shebait, or the succession provided therein comes to an end, the management and control of the property follows the ordinary rule of inheritance from the founder and passes to his heirs.[70] Where a founder does not provide for the management of the property, the right to nominate trustees remains vested in him until his death and continues to his heirs after him.[71]The property dedicated to a trust beingre-vested in the donor or his legal representatives when all the trustees failed to administer the trust, the Court would interfere for the purpose of appointing of trustees if only the legal representatives were not available or they do not take charge of the trust.[72]

Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Trustees in a Nut Shell

Trustee has all rights as a legal-owner of the trust property. It includes possession of the trust property. Rights enumerated under Chapter IV (The Rights And Powers of Trustee) of the Indian Trusts Act, in a nut shell, are the following:

  • Sec.31. Right to title-deed.
  • 32. Right to re-imbursement of expenses.
  • Right to be recouped for erroneous over-payment.
  • 33. Right to indemnity from gainer by breach of trust.
  • 34. Right to apply to Court for opinion in management of trust property.
  • 35. Right to settlement of accounts.
  • 36. General authority of trustee.
  • 37. Power to sell in lots and either by public auction or private contract.
  • 38. Power to sell under special conditions power to buy-in and re-sell.
  • 39. Power to convey.
  • 40. Power to vary investments.
  • 41. Power to apply property of minors, etc., for their maintenance, etc.
  • 42. Power to give receipts.
  • 43. Power to compound, etc.
  • 44. Power to several trustees of whom one disclaims or dies.
  • 45. Suspension of trustee’s powers by decree.
  • The Duties and Liabilities of a Trustee:

The duties and liabilities of trustees include the following:

  • voluntarily accept the position.
  • must be aware of the responsibilities.
  • faithfully discharge obligations, solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.
  • should not use the trust property for his own profit.
  • not to comingle trust property and personal property.
  • cannot renounce without the consent of all of the beneficiaries or the court.
  • do not delegate duties (even to a co-trustee) that would reasonably be required to personally perform.
  • take reasonable care and caution when selecting agents and attorneys.
  • if co-trustees, do not act unilaterally unless the duties are effectively divided.
  • should not purchase or appropriate the trust property (even as an agent of a third person)
  • act gratuitously (but, entitled reimbursement)
  • if one trustee breaches, the other trustees to compel him to redress it.

Liabilities of a Trustee:

  • personally liable for a breach of duties.
  • beneficiaries can recover trust property if a trustee misappropriates or wrongfully disposes.
  • beneficiaries can enforce the trust on the newly acquired property purchased utilising the proceeds of the wrongful sale.
  • account to beneficiaries if they enforce the same.

The duties and liabilities of trustees enumerated under Chapter III (The Duties and Liabilities of Trustees) of the Indian Trusts Act, in a nut shell, are the following:

  • 11. Trustee to execute trust.
  • 12. Trustee to inform himself of state of trust property.
  • 13. Trustee to protect title to trust property.
  • 14. Trustee not to set up title adverse to beneficiary.
  • 15. Care required from trustee: as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence. would deal with such property if it were his own
  • 16. Convert perishable property.
  • 17. Trustee to be impartial.
  • 18. Trustee to prevent waste.
  • 19. Keep clear and accurate accounts and information.
  • 20. Investment of trust-money as directed in the Trusts Act.
  • 20A. Power to purchase redeemable stock at a premium.
  • 21. Mortgage of land pledged to Govt: Deposit in Govt. Savings Bank.
  • 22. Sale by trustee directed to sell within specified time.
  • 23. Liable for breach of trust.
  • 24. No set-off allowed to trustee.
  • 25. Non-liability for predecessor’s default.
  • 26. Non-liability for co-trustee’s default.
  • 27. Several liability of co-trustee.
  • 28. Non-liability of trustee paying without notice of transfer by beneficiary.
  • 29. Liability of trustee where beneficiary’s interest is forfeited to Govt.
  • 30. Indemnity of trustees- Chargeable for such amounts actually received.

Trustees may Execute Title Deeds and Enter into Contracts

As explained in previous chapters, jurisprudentially, trust is neither an association of persons nor a juristic person.[73] The affairs of a trust have to be dealt with in the name of its trustees; and not in the name of the trust, it being not a legal person. The trusts are not authorised in the CPC to sue in their name, as allowed in the case of firms.[74]

Therefore, the proper way to execute title deeds or enter into contracts relating to matters of a trust is to execute the same by the trustees in their name for and on behalf of the trust. It must also be in accordance with the specific directions in the trust deed, if any.

All Trustees Should Act Jointly

Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 48. Co-trustees cannot act singly.—When there are more trustees than one, all must join in the execution of the trust, except where the instrument of trust, otherwise provides.

The instrument of trust may provide that one or more trustees shall be managing trustees and where such provision is made, those who are empowered to act as managing trustees would be entitled to execute the duties of the office without the concurrence of the other co-trustees.

Lewin on Trusts reads as under:[75]

  • “In the case of co-trustees of a private trust, the office is a joint one. Where the administration of the trust is vested in co-trustees, they all form as it were but one collective trustee and therefore must execute the duties of the office in their joint capacity. Sometimes, one of several trustees is spoken of as the acting trustees, but the Court knows of no such distinction: all who accept the office are in the eyes of the law acting trustees. If anyone refuses or is incapable to join, it is not competent for the others to proceed without him, and, if for any reason they are unable to appoint a new trustee in his place under Section 36(1) of the Act, the administration of the trust must devolve upon the Court. However, the act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee may be regarded as the act of both, though such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.”[76]

No trustee can delegate his powers and duties to another trustee and any agreement to do so would be against the obligations he had undertaken, illegal and void.[77] But in the absence of such provision, all co-trustees must join in the execution of the duties of the office.[78]This principle applies both to Public and private trusts.[79]

In Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joodeo[80]it has been held that the trustees would join to file an application to execute the decree obtained on behalf of the idol of a temple. However, it was also observed that it was a settled law that it was Shebait alone who can file a suit. But in exceptional circumstances, persons other than Shebait can institute a suit on behalf of the idol. Our Apex Court in M/s. Shanti Vijay and Co. Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzfa[81] held as under:

  • “The act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee may be regarded as the act of both. But such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.”[82]

Is Trusteeship a Property?

Shebaits and Mahants have proprietary interest in the properties of the trust. Such a right to receive beneficial interest creates proprietary interest in them. But, in most other cases, the trustees are ‘bare trustees’ to administer the trust property and to perform their duties without any proprietary interest.[83]

Managing Trustees Would be Entitled to Execute the Duties

The instrument of trust may provide that one or more trustees shall be managing trustees and where such provision is made, those who are empowered to act as managing trustees would be entitled to execute the duties of the office without the concurrence of the other co-trustees. But in the absence of such provision, all co-trustees must join in the execution of the duties of the office.[84]

In JP Srivastava and Sons Ltd. Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co[85] it is held by the Supreme Court as follows:

  • “Therefore, although as a rule, trustees must execute the duties of their office jointly, this general principle is subject to the following exceptions when one trustee may act for all:
  • (1) where the trust deed allows the trusts to be executed by one or more or by a majority of trustees;
  • (2) where there is express sanction or approval of the act by co-trustees;
  • (3) where the delegation of power is necessary;
  • (4) where the beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation;
  • (5) where the delegation to a co-trustee is in the regular course of the business,
  • (6) where the co-trustee merely gives effect to a decision taken by the trustees jointly.”

Doesn’t Revert Even If Trustee Refuses to Accept Office

It is an established principle of equity jurisprudence that a trust never fails even if there is no trustee;[86] that in proper cases the court enforces trust; and that the beneficiaries can enforce the trust. The property does not revert to the settlor or his heirs. Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts reads as follows:

  • “The trust itself does not fail. Only the property ceases to vest in the trustee who refuses to accept the office. The person in possession of the property undertakes the obligation in the nature of trust. The property does not revert to the representatives or the heirs of the settlor testator who has already divested himself of the title and interest in the property by creating a valid and complete trust. Refer to Narasingha Charan Vs.  Radha Kant, ILR 1950 Cut 374. But compare Robson Vs.  Flight (1865) 4 De G. J. & Subject matter 608 with Mallot Vs. Wilson (1980) Ch 494. In the latter case it was held that where all the trustees disclaim, the property reverts in the disposer, or if he is dead, in his legal representative, who becomes, by operation of law, the trustee thereof for the purpose of the trust. In the former case, it was held that so far as the trust itself is concerned, the disclaimer by a trustee or by all the trustees does not have the effect of avoiding the trust. That is, the beneficiaries can enforce it, or the object of the trust can be enforced where beneficiaries are not capable of suing”[87]

Trustee Cannot Claim Adverse Title

See Chapter: Breach Trust and Removal of Trustees

Accounting by Trustees

Indian Trusts Act , 1882 Sec. 19 and 23 read as under:

  • 19. Accounts and information.—A trustee is bound (a) to keep clear and accurate accounts of the trust property, and (b) at all reasonable times, at the request of the beneficiary to furnish him with full and accurate information as to the amount and state of the trust property.
  • 23. Liability for breach of trust.—Where the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is liable to make good the loss which the trust property or the beneficiary has thereby sustained.

No trustee can get a discharge unless he renders accounts of his management even when there is no allegation of misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance and also gross negligence Courts have discretion in regard to the fixing the period of accounting in a suit for accounting against a trustee of a charity. [88]

In Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple Vs. Induru Pattabhirami Reddi[89] new trustees alleged misfeasance, malfeasance and non-feasance and also gross negligence against former trustees. On the questions whether the present trustees can demand rendition of account from the ex-trustees in respect of their management without alleging against them any acts of negligence or willful default and, if so, whether there was a bar to the maintainability of a suit for the relief of rendition of accounts in a civil court, it was observed by our Apex Court that  it was ‘common place that no trustee can get a discharge unless he renders accounts of his management’ and that this liability was irrespective of any question of negligence or wilful default. They are, therefore, held liable to render accounts of their management to the present trustees.

When Estate of a Deceased Trustee Liable

In Gore-Browne, Handbook of Joint Stock Companies,[90] it is stated:

  • “In the case of the death of a director his estate remains liable for any breach of trust he may have committed (including any wrongful dealing with the company’s property, such as a payment of dividend out of capital or sale of its assets at an undervalue).”

An action for misrepresentation or negligence survives against the personal representatives of deceased director. In Halsbury’s Laws of England[91] it is stated:

  • “A director who has misapplied or retained or become liable or accountable for any money or property of the company, or who has been guilty of any breach of trust in relation to the company must make restitution or compensate the company for the loss. Where the money of the company has been applied for purposes which the company cannot sanction, the directors must replace it, however honestly they may have acted. The estate of a deceased director has always been liable for his breaches of trust.”

‘Cy pres’ Doctrine

When it is found by the court that the particular mode of charity, indicated by the donor, cannot be carried on for impossibility or impracticability, the court will execute and accomplish the donor’s intention applying ‘cy pres’ doctrine.  It is applied where from lapse of time or change of circumstances it is no longer possible to apply the property left by the founder or donor in the precise way in which it was directed to be applied.[92] It is based on the principle that the court is the protector of all charities;[93] and that the court will not allow to fail a validly created trust or objects of foundation. 

Invoking ‘cy pres’ doctrine the court will apply the property of the Trust to a charitable purpose ‘as nearly as possible’[94] resembling the original Trust. Besides physical impossibility, becoming the trust valueless, owing to attendant circumstances, also invites application of cy pres doctrine[95].

The trustees are bound to carry out the directions of the author under Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act and the only way in which the directions of the testament may be varied is by applying ‘cy  pres’ doctrine.

Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920

This Act permits ‘any trustee of an express or constructive trust created or existing for public purpose of a charitable or religious nature’ to apply “ for the opinion, advice or direction of the Court on any question affecting the management or administration of the trust property”.

Following are the important provisions.

  • “2. Interpretation. — In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, ‘the Court’ means the Court of the District Judge or any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government and includes the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
  • 7. Powers of trustee to apply for directions.
  • .(1) Save as hereinafter provided in this Act, any trustee of an express or constructive trust created or existing for public purpose of a charitable or religious nature may apply by petition to the Court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any substantial part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate, for the opinion, advice or direction of the Court on any question affecting the management or administration of the trust property, and the Court shall give its opinion, advice or direction, as the case may be, thereon:
  • Provided that the Court shall not be bound to give such opinion, advice or direction on any question which it considers to be a question not proper for summary disposal.
  • (2) The Court on a petition under sub-section (1), may either give its opinion, advice or direction hereon forthwith, or fix a date for the hearing of the petition, and may direct a copy thereof, together with notice of the date so fixed, to be served on such of the person interested in the trust, or to be published for information in such manner, as it thinks fit.
  • (3) On any date fixed under sub-section (2) or on any subsequent date to which the hearing may be adjourned, the Court, before giving any opinion, advice or direction, shall afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to all persons appearing in connection with the petition.
  • (4) A trustee stating in good faith the facts of any matter relating to the trust in a petition under sub-section (1), and acting upon the opinion, advice or direction of the Court given thereon, shall be deemed, as far as his own responsibility is concerned, to have discharged his duty as such trustee in the matter in respect of which the petition was made.

9. Savings.— No petition under the foregoing provisions of this Act in relation to any trust shall be entertained in any of the following circumstances, namely:—

  • .(a) if a suit instituted in accordance with the provisions of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (5 of 1908), is pending in respect of the trust in question;
  • (b) if the trust property is vested in the Treasurer of Charitable Endowments, the Administrator General, the Official Trustee, or any Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860); or
  • (c) if a scheme for the administration of the trust property has been settled or approved by any Court of competent jurisdiction, or by any other authority acting under the provisions of any enactment.
  • 12. Barring of appeals.— No appeal shall lie from any order passed or against any opinion, advice or direction given under this Act.”

Court is Guardian or Protector of All Public Trusts

In Sennimalai Swamy Madam Trust, Palani v. NIL, 1999-3 CTC 390 it is observed as under:

  • “10. In view of these decisions, it has to be held that petitioner is competent to file an application before lower court seeking opinion. Unless Court finds that the opinion cannot be given since there are complicated facts or question of law is to be decided, it may not be proper on its part to refuse to give opinion.  After all, Court is guardian or Protector of all public trusts and it cannot refuse to give its opinion, when the same is sought for by a Trustee.” (Avoch Thevar v. Chummar, AIR 1957 Ker 171, In Re Birla Jankalyan Trust, AIR 1971 Cal. 290, In Re Dhanalat, AIR 1975 Cal. 67, referred to)

Courts desist if Complicated Facts or Question of Law

In Avoch Thevar v. Chummar, AIR 1957 Ker 171, it is observed that serious questions of res judicata, estoppel, good faith etc. could not be adjudicated under Sec. 7 of the  Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920. It is said as under:

  • “6. …. “The Court under the section exercises what might be called its consultative jurisdiction, giving guidance to the trustee. The court is not, however, to grant sanction merely because it is applied for. The limitation is that the court will refuse to consider the matter if in its opinion the question is one not capable of summary disposal e.g. if it is one of the detail or difficulty. In any event the court will consider judicially the matters placed before it before disposing of the matter.”

This Kerala decision is followed in Hasan Bin Mubarak v. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad AIR 1999 AP 11, observing as under:

  • “Section 34 of the Act contemplates only a summary disposal on non-controversial issues. The mental condition of a person being an important personal problem, the Court cannot dispose of the same in a summary manner. What the Court below has done was to examine 3rd respondent, who is alleged to be an insane person and give the opinion on the basis of her statement. Though Ex.R-1, certificate, alleged to have been given by a psychiatrist, was marked, the Court made no effort to examine the said doctor. Obviously, this could not have been done because the matter has to be disposed of in a summary manner. Thus, it is evident that the advice that was sought for by the trustee required a determination on contentious facts and the jurisdiction of the Court under section 34 being only in the nature of giving guidelines or directions without entering into the merits, the application ought not to have been entertained by the Court. The trustee might have got a valid and satisfactory opinion had he approached a qualified medical man or the Court in a properly instituted suit.
  • 23. In Avoch Thevar case (supra) following the decision in Armugan Chetty vs. Raja Jagaveera ILR 28 Madras 444, it was clearly held that while providing the trustees a right to apply to the Court for opinion to the Management and the Members, Section 34 embodied at the same time, a limitation governing the questions to be asked viz. that there should not be hypothetical and any questions of details or difficulty or importance, not proper in the opinion of the Court for summary disposal……” (quoted in Ashok Kumar Kapur VS Ashok Khanna, AIR 2007 SC  6; 2007-5 SCC 189)

Avoch Thevar v. Chummar, AIR 1957 Ker 171, is followed in P. D. Jaiswal v. Dwarikadhish Temple Trust, 2006 2 ADJ 680; 2006 3 AllLR 21; 2006 3 AWC 2823 saying as under:

  • “39. The last strand of Mr. Ravi Kant’s arguments was a Kerala Division Bench decision given in the case of Avoch Thevar v. Chummar, A.I.R. 1957 Ker 171, which was delivered for the Court by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Varadaraja lyengar. With the greatest of respect, it is a beautiful learned judgment which should be read by any reader of this judgment and we do not set out the materials collected therein simply because we cannot do it better or in a briefer way. We respectfully referred the reader to paragraph-6, 7, 8 and 9 of the said judgment.
  • 40. Following the said judgment and the authorities quoted there, which are fully persuasive in our respectful opinion, we must opine that a decision under Section 7 of the 1920 Act is not to be given at all by the District Court in matters which are seriously disputed or contested, or which required difficult decisions on questions of fact or law,”

Appointment of Manager by Trustees or Courts

A public trust is perpetual. Rule against perpetuities does not apply to it. It is the onerous duty of the persons entrusted with such endowment, to carry out the objectives of this entrustment. It can never be put to an end through its nature may be changed.[96] If entrustment is to any juristic person, mere absence of a manager would not negate the existence of a juristic person.

The Supreme Court held in SGPC Vs. Som Nath Dass[97] that the identity of an endowment or juristic person is not depended on the appointment of a manager. It may be proper or advisable to appoint such a manager while making any endowment but in its absence, it may be done either by trustees or courts in accordance with law. Mere absence of a manager does not negative the existence of a juristic person.

The Rights and Liabilities of the Beneficiaries

Indian Trusts Act, 1882 permits the beneficiaries, as a whole, who are competent to contract, to do, act or perform the following matters, as stated in those sections.

  • Sec.11. Modify the purpose of the trust and the directions for management.
  •          23.  Acquiesce a breach of trust of trustee.
  •          46.  Allow the trustee to renounce.
  •          47.  Allow the trustee to delegate his office or any of his duties.
  •          56.  Require trustee to transfer the trust property to them, or to another.
  •          58.  Transfer the interest of beneficiary.
  •          62.  Ratify the sale to the trustee.
  •          71.  Discharge the trustee.
  •          77.  Allow to extinguish trust.
  • 78.  Revoke the trust.

Chapter VI of the Indian Trusts Act speaks the rights and liabilities of the beneficiaries. The following are substance of such enumerated rights and liabilities in the Act:

  • 55. Right to rents and profits.—The beneficiary has a right to the rents and profits of the trust property.
  • 56. Right to specific execution.—The beneficiary is entitled to have the intention of the author of the trust specifically executed.
  • Right to transfer of possession.—where thebeneficiaries may require the trustee to transfer the trust property to them, or to such person as they may direct.
  • 57. Right to inspect and take copies of instrument of trust accounts, etc.—
  • 58. Right to transfer beneficial interest.—The beneficiary may transfer his interest and dispose of such interest.
  • 59. Right to sue for execution of trust.—Where no trustees are appointed or all the trustees die, disclaim or are discharged, the beneficiary may institute a suit for the execution of the trust.
  • 60. Right to proper trustees.—The beneficiary has a right (subject to the provisions of the instrument of trust) that the trust property shall be properly protected and held and administered by proper persons and by a proper number of such persons.
  • 61. Right to compel to any act of duty.—The beneficiary has a right that his trustee shall be compelled to perform any particular act of his duty and restrained from committing any breach of trust.
  • 62. Wrongful purchase by trustee.—Where a trustee has wrongfully bought trust property, the beneficiary has a right to have the property declared subject to the trust or re-transferred by the trustee.
  • 63. Following trust property into the hands of third persons.—Where trust property comes into the hands of a third person inconsistently with the trust, the beneficiary may institute a suit for a declaration, that the property is comprised in the trust.
  • Where the trustee has disposed of trust property, the beneficiary has rights as nearly as may be the same as his rights in respect of the original trust property.
  • 64. Saving of rights of certain transferees.—…
  • 65. Acquisition by trustee of trust property wrongfully converted.—Where a trustee wrongfully transfers trust property and afterwards himself becomes the owner of the property, the property again becomes subject to the trust.
  • 66. Right in case of blended property.—Where the trustee wrongfully mingles the trust property with his own, the beneficiary is entitled to a charge on the whole fund for the amount due to him.
  • 67. Wrongful employment by partner-trustee of trust property for partnership purposes.—If a partner, being a trustee, wrongfully employs trust property in the business, other partners having such notice of the breach of trust are jointly and severally liable for the breach of trust.
  • 68. Liability of beneficiary joining in breach of trust.—Where one of several beneficiaries joins in committing breach of trust, the other beneficiaries are entitled to have all his beneficial interest impounded as against him
  • 69. Rights and liabilities of beneficiary’s transferee.—Every person to whom a beneficiary transfers his interest has the rights of the beneficiary in respect of such interest at the date of the transfer.

Removal of Trustees on Breach of Trust

See Chapter: Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees.

All Trustees Together to File the Suit for Eviction

See Chapter: How to Sue trust and Trustees

In our law, trustee alone is the ‘landlord’ to file a suit for eviction as held in Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin  Vs. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat Ahmedabad.[98] It is observed in Kishorelal Asera  Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endowments[99] as under:

  • “Order XXXI, Rule 1 C.P.C. dealing with the representation of beneficiaries in suits concerning property vested in Trustees says that the Trustee shall represent the persons so interested. …. Therefore, in a suit for evicting the tenant from the Trust premises, the Trustees jointly or any one of them, when authorised in that behalf by the rest of them, can maintain the suit.”

TRUST in Transfer of Property to MINORS, under the TP Act

Transfer for benefit of Unborn Person

(Similar provision in Section 113 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925)

Sections 13 and 14 of the TP Act are worded in a tiresome manner. It is too difficult to understand the purport of the Section, in its correct perspective, without a thorough exploration. Both these sections says about transfer of property to unborn persons.

Sec. 13 of the TP Act reads as under:

  • 13. Transfer for benefit of unborn person. Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence at the date of the transfer, subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer, the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property.

As articulated in Sec. 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, ‘Transfer of Property’ must be by a living person, to another living person. Sec. 13 is an enabling provision to transfer property to an unborn person. It directs that following conditions must be satisfied for a valid transfer to an unborn person:

  • (i) Prior-Interest must have been created in ‘someone’:
    • The interest in the property (referred to in this Section as prior interest), for the period between the transfer and the birth of the unborn person, must have been created (in someone), by the same transfer.
      • [The aforesaid proposition can be deduced from the clause in Sec. 13 – “subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer];
  • (ii) Whole of the remaining interest of the transferormust be created in the unborn person:
    • The ‘prior-interest-holder’ must have been directed (by the transferor) to create/transfer the whole remaining interest (directly) to such unborn person.
    • That is, if a life-interest stands created, or continues, on another, (even after the birth of the said ‘unborn’) it will not ‘take effect‘.
      • [These can be deduced from the clause in Sec. 13 – “the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property”; and from the illustration in Sec. 13.]

The Illustration in Sec. 13 of the TP Act reads as under:

  • Illustration: A transfers property of which he is the owner to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for their lives, and, after the death of the survivor, for the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death for A’s second son. The interest so created for the benefit of the eldest son does not take effect, because it does not extend to the whole of A’s remaining interest in the property.

For the benefit of” – Implies ‘TRUST’

Sec. 13 begins with the words – “Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence”. The words ‘for the benefit of‘ definitely brings-in the concept of ‘trust’.

Prior interest holders will be ‘TRUSTEES’ for unborn personsif not directed otherwise

The transferor of property to the unborn person is free to provide ‘beneficial enjoyment’ to the ‘prior-interest-holder’. If it is not so specifically provided, going by the principles of law, the prior-interest-holder (in Sec. 13) will be a mere ‘trustee’ for the unborn person (the beneficiary).

  • Note: Trust is ‘an obligation’ upon the trustee to administer the trust property, as if he is its owner and as required by the author, for the benefit of the beneficiaries.

“TRANSFER OF PROPERTY” and ‘CREATION OF INTEREST’ in Sec. 13

It is clear that the words, ‘transfer of property‘ and ‘an interest created therein’ are used in Sec. 13 to denote two different notions. Transfer of property to the ‘unborn’ should take place on his/her birth. Creation of interest can be done only on attaining his/her majority.

Upto the birth of the ‘unborn’, the enjoyment can be had by two ways:

  • One, creating beneficial enjoyment on anyone.
  • Second, creating a trustee (for administering the property; and if so provided by the transferor, he would continue upto the majority of the ‘unborn’).

Even if no trustee is appointed, and it does not come out from the deed of transfer as to who should be the trustee, the court will appoint a trustee, on the principle – ‘no trust will fail for want of trustees’.

Transfer to Unborn can only be made by a Machinery of Trust

Mulla, on The Transfer of Property Act, in commentary to Sec, 122, Gifts, it is stated:

  • “A gift may be made by the equitable machinery of a trust; and the interposition of the trustees enables a gift to be made to a person not yet in existence and, therefore, incapable of being the donee of a direct gift.” (See: Controller of Estate Duty, Bombay v. Bhagwandas Velji Joshi, 1983-139 ITR 316 (Bom); 1981-6 TAXMAN 202; Saraswathi v. Devaki Amma, ILR 1986-1 Ker 550; 1985 KLT 217.)

In Mathen Mathew v. Kunjika Bharathi: AIR 1968 Ker 12, it is held as under:

  • “18. The gift can be to the named donees as representing the group of persons composed of the wife and children including children to be born. Such a gift can be made only through the machinery of a trust, the named donees holding as trustees for themselves and the other beneficiaries.”

In The Commissioner of Income Tax v. Brig. Kapil Mohan, [2001] 252 ITR 830: 118 Taxman 430 (Delhi ) observed as under:

  • “5. A transfer cannot be made directly to an unborn person, for the definition of transfer in Section 5 is limited to living persons. Such transfer can only be made by the machinery of trusts. Possibly, to express this distinction, the expression “for the benefit of” has been used, since trustees being the transferees hold the property for the benefit of the unborn person.”

The Madras High Court in T Subramania Nadar v. T Varadharajan, AIR 2003 Mad 364, pointed out as under:

  • “12. Under Section 13 of Transfer of Property Act transfer cannot be made directly to an unborn person as the definition of transfer in Section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is limited to living persons. The transfer in favour of an unborn person can be made by a machinery. It is intended to express this distinction by the words “for the benefit of“, the trustees being the transferees who hold the property for the benefit of the unborn persons. The estate must vest in some person between the date of the transfer and the coming into existence of the unborn person. The interest of the unborn person must therefore be in every case preceded by a prior interest. Section 13 says that the interest of the unborn person must be the whole remainder.” 

Sec. 13 does not specifically refer to Prior Interest “HOLDERS”. Why?

  • The (main) object of this section is to provide – ‘whole remainder interest … in the unborn person‘.
  • The creation of interest, in a prior interest HOLDER, for the period between the transfer and the birth of such unborn person, is an inevitable coincident.
  • The prior interest HOLDER may be a person who is entitled for ‘beneficial enjoyment’; or, he may be a mere trustee, not entitled for ‘beneficial enjoyment’. In either case, the ‘the whole of the remaining interest‘ must have been directed to be vested in the (unborn) person (when he born).
  • For the above, only an indication as to creation of prior interest was sufficient.

Sec. 14. Rule against perpetuity – Analysed.

(Similar provision in Section 114 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925)

Sec. 14 of the TP Act reads as under:

  • 14. Rule against perpetuity. No transfer of property can operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the life-time of one or more persons living at the date of such transfer, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the interest created is to belong.

Sec. 14 of the TP Act lays down the following:

  • Property can be transferred to an unborn person.
  • Sec. 14 basically declares the maximum period (perpetuity period) for creating an interest in an unborn person as regards an immovable property.
  • For transferring property to an unborn person, such (unborn) person must have born within the life-time of ‘one or more persons’ named in the transfer deed (who must be one living at the date of such transfer).
  • The interest in the property can be created in favour of such (unborn) person only on attaining majority by such (unborn) person (i.e., 18 years).
    • Therefore, the maximum period (perpetuity period) for creating the interest in the property in favour of such (unborn) person will be the remaining (after transfer) ‘life-time‘ of such ‘one or more persons‘ (who were living at the date of such transfer) plus (+) the ‘minority’ of such (unborn) person (i.e., 18 years).
    • It is clear – such (unborn) person must have born at least on the day of death of such ‘one or more persons‘.
  • Sec. 14 allows the transferor to name any ‘one or more persons‘ whose ‘life-time’ is to be taken into consideration for Sec. 14.
  • Who are such ‘one or more persons‘ has to be inferred from the transfer deed.
  • As stated in Sec. 13, the interest in the property, for the period between the transfer and the birth of such unborn person (referred to as prior interest), must have been created in ‘some’ (prior interest) holder.
    • Note: The prior interest holder in Sec. 13 need not necessarily be the ‘one or more persons‘ stated in Sec. 14.

G. Ramakrishniah v. Dasaratharama Reddiar, AIR 1970 Mad 484 ( Natesan, J.), vividly explains these matters, as under:

  • “The perpetuity period under Section 14 of the Act consists of the lifetime of one or more persons living at the time the transfer takes effect, and the further period of the minority of a person in existence at the close of the person living at the time of the transfer. ….. Section 14 of the Act however does not place any restriction as to who can be the living person whose existence can postpone the vesting. It allows the settlor to use any life for the purpose…… It may be any person or any number of persons, but the person or persons must be living at the date of such transfer. True, one must infer from the document itself the person or persons whose life has to be considered.”

Status of the ‘one or more persons‘ whose ‘life-time’ is to be taken into consideration

  • As stated earlier, the prior interest holder in Sec. 13 need not necessarily be the ‘one or more persons‘ stated in Sec. 14.
  • They are not ‘trustees’ inasmuch as no property is entrusted for their administration, and no obligation is casted upon them.

Therefore, they are persons merely chosen by the transferor of property (to an unborn), for the purpose of Sec. 14.


[1]      Sk. Abdul Kayum  Vs. MullaAlibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309;

Uttar Pradesh Vs. BansiDhar: AIR 1974 SC 1084;

BaiDosabai  Vs.  MathurdasGovinddas: AIR 1980 SC 1334.

[2]      AIR 1963 SC 309

[3] Sec. 11 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[4]      Pratap SinghjiVs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064.

M R Goda Rao Sahib Vs. State of Madras: AIR 1966 SC 653.

See also: Ram Charan Das Vs. Mst. Girjanandani Devi: AIR 1959 All 473;

S. Shanmugam Pillai Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai: AIR 1972 SC 2069;

Controller of Estate Duty WB Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312.

[5]      State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30;

Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529;

Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106. 

[6]      Ramabai Govind  Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[7]      12th Edn., p.805

[8] 4th Edition, Page 23

[9] Quoted in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain: ILR 1982-1 Del 11.

[10] Underhill: ‘Law relating to Trusts and Trustees’:13th Edition, Page 23;

Quoted in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain: ILR 1982-1 Del 11

[11] Balkrishna Vishvanath Vs. Vinayak Narayan: AIR 1932 Bom 191;

AP Shah Vs. BM Institute of Mental Health: 1986  GLH 262.

[12]    AIR 1963 SC 309

[13]   Commr of IT Vs. Rajmitra Bhailal: 1964-54 ITR 241

[14]    RP Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Educational Trust:1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801

[15]   6th Edn.  At p. 131,

[16]    Agasthyar Trust Vs. Commr IT Madras ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;1998-5 SCC 588

[17]    40 ER 852

[18]    (1888) 57 LJ Ch 543

[19]    (1904) AC 515:

[20]    AIR 1931 Mad. 12. See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547; 

        Allahabad High School Society Vs. State of UP: 2010-5 ADJ 734, 2010-82 All LR 83;

        P. Jayader  Vs. Thiruneelakanta Nadar Chinnaneela Nadar: ILR  1966-2 Mad 92.

[21]   Jaiveer Singh Virk Vs. Sir Sobha Singh: LAWS(DLH) 2020-3 120;

Maniuddin Bepari Vs. The Chairman Municipal Commrs, Dacca: 40 CWN 17

Scotte (P) Ltd. Vs. Corporation of Calcutta: 79 CWN 883

Sasanka Sekhar Panda Vs. State of West Bengal: 90 CWN 924.

[22]Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar Vs. LIC: AIR 1963 SC 1185

[23]   Jaiveer Singh Virk Vs. Sir Sobha Singh: LAWS(DLH) 2020-3 120.

[24]    Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust Vs. Director of Income Tax: 2015-280 CTR 121: 2015-222 DLT 102: 2015-377 ITR 650: TAXMAN 2015-234 222

[25]2010-11 SCC 374

[26]Jaiveer Singh Virk Vs. Sir Sobha Singh: LAWS(DLH) 2020 3 120,

[27] V.B. Rangaraj Vs. V.B. Gopalakrishnan: (1992) 1 SCC 160;

Vodafone International Holdings Vs. Union of India: (2012) 6 SCC 613;

World Phone India Vs. WPI Group Inc.: (2013) SCC OnLine Del 1098.

[28] (1875) LR 7 HL 653 (DC)

[29] (1875) LR 7 HL 653 (DC)

[30] AIR 1963 SC 1185

[31] 1966 SCC OnLine Cal 44

[32] AIR 1963 SC 1185

[33]At pages 219 and 229.

[34]Quoted in: B. UmeshVs. Bangalore Development Authority: ILR1991 Kar 824.

[35]Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust Vs. Director of Income Tax: 2015-280 CTR 121: 2015-222 DLT 102: 2015-377 ITR 650: TAXMAN 2015-234 222

[36] 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;1998-5 SCC 588

[37]Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO: 91 ITR 261

[38]Naresh Chandra Sanyal Vs. Calcutta Stock Exchange Assn: 1971-1 SCC 50

[39]Section: 10, Companies Act, 2013 reads as under:

10. Effect of memorandum and articles: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and articles shall, when registered, bind the company and the members thereof to the same extent as if they respectively had been signed by the company and by each member, and contained covenants on its and his part to observe all the provisions of the memorandum and of the articles.

(2) All monies payable by any member to the company under the memorandum or articles shall be a debt due from him to the company.

[40]Claude Lila ParulekarVs. Sakal Papers:  AIR 2005 SC 4074: 2005-11 SCC 73.

[41] Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. Vs. Riche:  (1875) LR 7 HL 653 (DC)

Re. Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Building Society, (1912) 2 Ch 183;

Folloed in: Lakshmanaswami MudaliarVs. LIC: AIR 1963 SC 1185.

Gajadhar Prasad Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1984 Pat 105

Asma AlsamVs. State of UP: 2015- 4 ADJ 607: 2015 -4 AWC 3615: 2015-111 All LR 341;

Nirbhay Kapoor Vs. Kamero Technosys: 2019-8 ADJ 11: 2019-135 AllLR606,

[42]    Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[43]    Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam VS Comner. IT, Madras: AIR 1964   Mad 483

[44]   Kansara Abdulrehman SadruddinVs. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184.

[45]   See: Ram Bharose Sharma Vs. Mahant Ram Swaroop: 2001 AIR- SCW  4062: 

Mitar Sain Vs. Data Ram: AIR 1926 All 7;

UrshottamVs. Kanhaiyalal: AIR 1966 Raj 70.

[46]    2011 (3) Ker L J 767.

[47]    AIR 1931 PC 196.

[48]   AIR1957 SC 887;

See also: Ramabai GovindVs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[49]   Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196;

Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin  Vs. Trustees, Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184.

See also: Ramabai GovindVs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[50]   Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th  Edition, page 256.

[51] Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332.

Kapoorchand Rajendra Kumar Jain Vs. Parasnath Digambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199

[52] 1936  AIR PC 230

[53]    Shanti Vijay And Co Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia AIR  1980 SC  17;

Also see: Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309;

Underhill’s Law relating to Trusts and Trustees, 12th Ed., PP. 434, 442-43;

Scot on Trusts, Vol. 2, p. 1033.

[54]    See: AIR 1952 Mad 613.

[55]    Padmanabha  Vs. Ramachandra Rao; AIR 1953 Mad 842

[56]    AIR1968 MP 81

[57] at page 199

[58] at page 248

[59]    Kishore Joo Vs. Guman BehariJooDeo: AIR  1978 All 1;

Bapalal Godadbhai Kothari Vs. Charity Commissioner Gujarat: 1966  GLR 825

[60]    Scott on Trusts Vol. II Sec. 170.

        The leading case on the subject is Kench  Vs. Gandford (1726) (White and Tudor Leading Cases in Equity page 693)

        Referred to in: Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

[61]    Radhika Mohan Nandy v. Amrita Lal Nandy and another: AIR1947 Cal  301

Virbala K. Kewalram Vs. Ramchand Lalchandlaws: AIR 1997 Bom 46

[62]    2009 5 MLJ 571

[63]    2006-1 Mad LJ 134

[64]    Director General, ESI Vs. T. Abdul Razak AIR 1996  SC 2292.

Shanti Vijay And Co Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR1980 SC  17;

Also see: Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309.

[65]    Sidhartha Sarawgi Vs. Board of Trustees For The Port of Kolkata  2014 (5) Scale 113. 2014-5 MadLJ  377: JT-2014-6-629. 

[66]    AIR 1967 SC 295

[67]    See: Vrandan Bhaichand Shah Vs. Parshottam Motichand Shah: 1927 Bom 75.

[68]    Bonnerji  Vs. Sitanath 49 IA 46:

Referred to in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

See also: Sk. Abdul Kayum  Vs. MullaAlibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309;

State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. BansiDhar:  AIR 1974 SC 1084.

[69]    BalramChunnilal  Vs. DurgalalShivnarain: AIR1968 MP 81

[70]    Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[71]Sukbir Singh Vs.Nihal Singh: (1913) 18 IndCas 232 (All);

Bhabatarini Devi Vs.AshalataDevi:AIR 1943 PC 89;

Gauranga SahuVs.Sudevi Matha:AIR 1918 Mad 1278 

R Venugopala Reddiar Vs. Krishnaswamy:AIR 1971 Mad 262.

[72]    Vadivelu MudaliarVs.Kuppuswamy Mudaliar: 1972 (1) Mad LJ 265.

[73]    Government of the Province of Bombay Vs. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia:  AIR 1949 PC 143

Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Trilok Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144;

Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 Raj LW 273;

Referred to in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Ad Comr IT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-336  ITR 611;  

See also: Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs.  CIT: AIR 1964 Mad 483; 

Kishorelal Asera Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endts: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367.

Thanthi Trust Vs. Wealth Tax Officer: 1989-78 CTR 54: 45 TAXMAN 121: 1989-178-ITR 28

Sambandam Died Vs. NatarajaChettiar: 2012-1 Mad LW 530. 

[74]    K. R. Rajan Vs. Cherian K. Cherian

K. Dhondoji Rao Vs Dominion of India, AIR 1957  Kar 94;

Devireddy Sulochanamma Vs. RebalaPattabhiramireddy Charities: AIR  2005 AP 64;

Union of India Railway Administration Vs. Eastern Match Co: AIR  1964 AP 172;

Goshir Gyaltsab Rinpoche Vs. Karmapa Charitable Trust: 2018-192 AIC 708.

[75]    Sixteenth Edition, page 181

[76]    Quoted in: Atmaram Ranchhodbhai  Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin, AIR 1973 Guj 113

Also See: Man Mohan Das Vs. Janki Prasad: AIR 1945 PC 23.

[77]    H.E.H. The Nizam’s Jewellery Trust (in re:): AIR 1980 SC 17

[78]    Atmaram Ranchhodbhai  Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113

[79]   Atmaram RanchhodbhaiVs.Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113. Also See: Man Mohan Das Vs. Janki Prasad, AIR 1945 PC 23.

[80]    AIR 1978 All 1 

[81]    AIR 1980 SC 17

[82]    Quoted in: JP Srivastava and Sons Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co.AIR2005 SC 83.

[83]    Bai Zabu Khima vs. Amardas Balakdas AIR 1967 Guj. 214;

Ram Nath Das Vs. Ram Nagina Choubey; AIR 1962 Pat. 481;

Sm. Angurbai Mullick Vs. Debabrate Mullick: AIR 1951 SC 293;

Banku B. Das Vs. Kashi N. Das: AIR 1963 Cal. 88;

TulsidasKalichand Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax: AIR 1961 SC 1023 .

[84]   Atmaram Ranchhodbhai Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113;

Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joo Deo: AIR 1978 All 1;

Shanti Vijay and Co. Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzfa: AIR 1980 SC 17.

[85]AIR 2005 SC 83.

[86]    Yelandau Arasikere Deshikendra Sammthana  Vs. Gangadharaiah: 2007-5 AIR Kar R 565: 2008-4 Kat LJ 323.

[87]    Quoted in: Yelandau Arasikere Deshikendra Sammthana Vs.Gangadharaiah: 2007-5 AIR Kar R 565: 2008-4 Kat LJ 323.

See also: Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

[88]    Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple Vs. Induru Pattabhirami Reddi: AIR 1967 SC 781;

Attorney General Vs. Exetor Mayor: (1822) 37 ER 918;

Anyasayya Vs. Muthamma: AIR 1919 Mad 943;

Hariharabrahman Vs. Janakiramiah: AIR 1955 Andhra 18

[89]    AIR 1967 SC 781

[90]    Forty-First Edition, Page 374.

        Quoted in: V S RamaswamyIyer  Vs. Brahmayya and Company Official Liquidators Hanuman Bank: 1966 36 Comp. Cases270, 1966-1 Mad LJ 234.

[91]    Third Edition, page 307.

        Quoted in: V S RamaswamyIyer  Vs. Brahmayya and Company Official Liquidators Hanuman Bank: 1966-36 Comp. Cases 270, 1966-1 Mad LJ 234.

[92]Balkrishna Vishvanath Vs. Vinayak Narayan: AIR 1932 Bom 191;

AP Shah Vs. BM Institute of Mental Health: 1986  GLH 262.

[93]    C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296;

Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia: AIR 1952 Kar14 .

[94]    In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228

[95]    Hormusji Franji Warden, ILR 32  B. 214.

[96]    In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228

[97]    Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs.   Shri Som Nath Dass: AIR 2000 SC 1421

[98]   AIR 1968 Guj 184.

See also: Ramabai GovindVs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106;

Uma Ray Vs. Smt. Meghamala: AIR 1989  NOC. 166 (Cal);

Iswardas  Vs. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal: AIR 1968 SC 1364;

Baisnab Das Sen Vs. Bholanath Sen: AIR 1986 Cal 118;

MM Nagalinga Nadar Sons Vs. Sri. Lakshmi Family Trust: (2001) 3 MLJ 523.

[99]   2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

Business by Charitable Trusts & Institutions

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Introduction

An association of persons can engage in any lawful activity including business. When a ‘charitable’ institution is engaged in a business activity, its legitimacy is tested on four important counts.

  • First:    Is the business activity clearly predicated as an ‘object’ in its trust deed or bye laws; or, at least, is such business activity one ‘fairly incidental or reasonably ancillary’[1] to its declared object?[2]
  • Second: Is the business activity, by itself,a ‘charitable’ one; or, at least, is such activity one ‘fairly incidental or reasonably ancillary’[3] to its declared ‘charitable’ object?[4]
  • Third:   Is the intent or purpose of such business activity predominantly to carry out the charitable objective; and not to earn profit?[5]
  • Fourth: Has the profit been utilised for the charitable activity?[6]

The negative answer to the first enquiry results in rendering the activity of the trust or other institution, ‘ultra vires’ its objects; and therefore, illegal and void. The negative answer to the second, third or fourth enquiry will not render the business activity, totally illegal; but, it will result in losing the protection or benefit,[7] as a ‘charitable institution’, that had already been extended to the establishment.[8]

Business Activity Not Supported By ‘Object-Clause’ Will Be ‘Ultra-Vires’

The activities of a company or an association differ from that of a natural person who is free to act on his whims and fancies.[9] An ultra vires contract executed by a company is analogous to, and stands on the same footing as, a contract entered into by an infant.[10]  Such an  ultra vires contract  executed by a company  will be a nullity.  It will be  just like a consent-decree passed on the basis of a compromise signed by a  minor.[11] The acts of the companies and associations are limited by their Memorandum or bye laws. Any activity of a company or an association – especially a significant profit oriented business activity[12] – not supported by the ‘object  clause’ of its memorandum or bye laws, will be ‘ultra  vires’ the company or association itself;[13] and therefore,  void and unenforceable.  An agreement arrived at between the shareholders and directors of a company with respect to the management of the affairs of the company, without being incorporated in the Articles of Association is not enforceable against the company.[14] Any action referable to the articles and contrary thereto would be ultra vires.[15]

These principles are recapped in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. Vs. Riche.[16]They have been followed by our Apex Court in A. Lakshmana-swami Mudaliar Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India,[17] In Re Steel Equipment and Construction Co. (P) Ltd.[18]etc.It is held in A. Lakshmana-swami Mudaliar Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India[19] as under: 

  • “A company is competent to carry out its objects specified in the  memorandum of association and cannot travel beyond the objects.”

It was also pointed out in this decision that acts done beyond the objects mentioned in the memorandum would be ultra vires. 

The bye laws of a society and its terms constitute a binding contract, not just between the members and the society but also between the members inter se. In Sinclair Vs. Brougham[20] it had been held that a building-society cannot involve  in  a banking-business.[21]  In re Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Building Society,[22]it was pointed out that a building-society cannot validly engage in ‘the business of banking as an independent and substantial business; not merely ancillary to, or in aid of, the building-society business’;  and, it was held that such a business was ‘ultra vires’ its powers.[23]

These principles fully apply to trusts also.[24]The trustees are bound to administer the affairs of the trust to attain the objects[25] envisioned by the founder and in accordance with his directions laid down in the trust-deed; and the acts of trustees, ultra vires such objects or directions are void.  If a trustee fails to administer the trust in accordance with the terms of its trust deed, it would amount to breach of trust.[26]

The fundamental principles of an association  are not open to alter even by the majority of its members, unless such a power is specifically reserved. This principle laid down in Milligan Vs.  Mitchel,[27]Attorney General Vs. Anderson[28]and Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun[29] is referred to in Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao.[30]

Tudor on Charities[31] explained this principle as under:

  • “When a charity has been founded and trusts have been declared, the founder has no power to revoke, vary or add to the trusts. This is so irrespective of whether the trusts have been declared by an individual, or by a body of subscribers, or by the trustees. “[32]

Business Activities, Fairly Incidental to the Objects are Not Ultra Vires

Acts beyond the powers conferred by law, or acts  that are violative of the objects envisaged in the memorandum of a company (or in the bye laws of an association, or in the foundational documents of a trust), are termed ‘ultra vires’ acts.  But, if the acts done by an administrator of such company,  association or trust  are fairly incidental or reasonably ancillary to its main objectives, they cannot be held to be ultra vires,[33]  unless such acts  are expressly prohibited. While explaining the doctrine of ultra vires,it is specified in the Palmer’s Company Law that a company is expected to have the following powers:

  • “(i) Power to do whatever (such things) is necessary to do with a view to the attainment of the objects specified in the memorandum.
  • (ii)   Power to do whatever else (all such other things), which may fairly be regarded as incidental to, and consequential upon, its objects.
  • (iii) Power to do such other things as are authorised to be done by the companies act or by any other statute.”

The transactions, which do not fall under any of the three categories mentioned above, alone are regarded as ‘ultra vires’ acts.[34]

Any legitimate step taken to augment the working capital of the company is undoubtedly incidental to the business of the company; and the same will be  conducive to the attainment of the objects mentioned in the Memorandum.[35]But, as pointed out by our Apex Court in A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India,[36] such activity must at least be incidental or ancillary to its declared objects and must have a ‘reasonably proximate-connection with the objects’.[37]In such a case, though a particular activity may yield profit, it would not alter its ‘charitable’ character.

In CIT Vs. Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust[38]  it is observed as under:

“Wherever, the terms of the trust permit its operation ‘for profit’ they become, prima facie, evidence of a purpose falling outside the ambit of ‘charity’. Ordinarily, profit motive is a normal incident of business activity and if the activity of a trust results in yielding profit, it could be concluded that the object of the trust involves the carrying on of an activity for profit. Wherever predominant object of the trust is charitable purpose and ancillary business activity results in profit, the profit earned is required to be utilized for the purposes of charity and if it is shown that the ‘profits of the business’ as per term of the trust are utilized for the purposes of the trust, the factum of activities yielding profit would not alter the charitable character of the trust.”[39]

Ultra Vires Acts Cannot Be Ratified

The Articles of Association of a Company are contract between members and are binding not only on the members but also on the company.[40] It is not permissible for the directors to act contrary to the powers conferred by the Articles. Any such action would be ultra vires the Articles, as also Section 10 of the Companies Act, 2013.[41]

Consequently, any action contrary to or in defeasance of these participatory rights or objects mentioned in the memorandum is ultra vires and void;[42] and for its inherent illegalities, the issue of ratification of such acts would not arise at all.[43]

If the trust had been validly created, any deviation by the founder of the trust or by the trustees from the declared purposes would amount to ‘breach of trust’though it would not put an end to the trust itself.[44]

Business by Charitable Trust ItselfMust be a ‘Charitable’  One

A charitable trust or institution can engage in a business activity,lawfully retaining its charitable nature,[45] if

  • (i)the business activity itself  is a charitable  one  (or a public-utility service)[46],  or it is ‘fairly incidental or reasonably ancillary’ to the‘charitable’ objectives;[47]
  • (ii) such activity forms an ‘object’  of such institution or trust under the bye laws or trust deed; and
  • (iii) the sole or predominant purpose of the same is to carry out the charitable object and not to earn profit. That is, business activity done by a  trust or institution with the predominant objective of charity  will not lose its identity as a charitable institution, merely because some profit or benefit is gained from such business.[48]

Nevertheless, when the business activity carried on by an institution is one that is generally considered as a profit oriented one, and not a common public-utility service,[49] the burden will be heavy on the administrators of such institution to show that the  business activity is ‘fairly incidental or reasonably ancillary’ to its main charitable objectives.

If Predominant Object, Profit-making: It will Destroy  Charitable-Character

Ordinarily, business is a profit motive activity[50]  and stands antithesis to benevolent undertakings and charitable activities.[51]

Reiterating the earlier view in CIT Vs. Andhra Chambers of Commerce,[52] the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, pointed out in Addl. CIT Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association,[53] that the business activities with the sole or predominant object of making profit will disentitle such trust or institution to claim benefits as a ‘charitable’ trust or institution.[54]It will not make any difference even if the business  carried on is  in advancement of a charitable purpose or it is  an object of general public utility.

The purpose of a charitable trust must be ‘essentially charitable in nature’[55]and the extent of profit must have been so designed that it is confined to what is actually required to carry-on or fulfil its‘charitable’objectives;[56]and it must not be a cover for carrying on a predominant profit making activity.[57]

Resulting  ‘Some Profit’ Will Not Lose Charitable-Character

Where an institution carries on business activity primarily for supporting the charitable purpose,and not with predominant object of making profit,such institution would not deprive[58] of the benefits lawfully entitled to by a charitable organisation.

The Supreme Court observed in Addl. CITVs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association[59] as under:

  • “But where the predominant object of the activity is to carry out the charitable purpose and not to earn profit, it would not lose its character of a charitable purpose merely because some profit[60]arises from the activity.”[61]

It is observed in this decision that though publication of a newspaper is an object of general public utility and hence charitable in character, if the activity of publication of the newspaper is carried on, on commercial lines with the object of earning profit, it would no longer be a charitable activity. It is also pointed out that the activity need  not be in such a manner that it does not result in any profit. It would indeed be difficult for persons in charge of a trust or institution to so carry on the activity in a manner that the expenditure balances the income and there is no resulting profit. That would not only be difficult of practical realisation, but would also reflect unsound principle of management.

Permission to Apply Income for Non-Charitable Purpose – No More Charitable

If the objects for the trust or institution included both charitable and non-charitable purposes, and the trustees or the managers were permitted to apply the income of the trust or institution,in their discretion,to those objects, the trust or institution would not be liable to be regarded as charitable; and no part of its income would be exempted from tax.[62]

Tax Exemption

Ordinarily,a business is doing for ‘profit’;[63]and profit making activities stand in contrast to benevolent undertakings.Where the predominant object[64] of a trust or an institution is to earn‘profit’ from business,[65] it cannot claim the status as a ‘charitable’ institution.[66]But, if a lawful ancillary business activity of a trust or an institution results in profit and the profit earned is utilized[67] for the purposes of charity, the mere fact that the said activities yielded profit would not alter or destroy its charitable character.[68]

Acts ultra vires the byel aws of  an institution being void, the  institution that is engaged in the business activity must have been  fully supported by the ‘object clause’ of its constitution or the bye laws, to retain the charitable nature;or the business activity must have been ‘fairly incidental or reasonably ancillary’ to its objectives. For getting exemption from payment of tax, the business activity of a charitable institution must not be one that is ultra vires its constitution.In other words, for availing tax exemption the business itself must be a ‘property’ held by the trust. And, the business must also be a charitable activity, and the income generated by the same must have been applied to the charitable purposes.[69]

The Income Tax Act, Sec. 11 (4A)[70] specifically provides that a trust or an institution is entitled tax exemption only when ‘the business is incidental to the attainment of the objectives’ of such trust or institution, and ‘separate books of account are maintained by such trust or institution in respect of such business.’[71]

The following decisions elucidate the principles.

In re: Bennett(Ch: 1892):[72] The articles of association of the company provided that no dividend or bonus should be payable except out of profits. No profits were made by the company; but the directors paid interest to the shareholders out of the capital of the company. The Court of Appeal, affirming the judgment of the court of the first instance, held that the payment of interest out of the capital was ultra vires. Lindley L.J. observed:

“As soon as the conclusion is arrived at that the company’s money has been applied by the directors for purposes which the company cannot sanction, it follows that the directors are liable to replace the money, however honestly they may have acted. “

A  LakshmanaswamiMudaliar Vs. LIC (SC: 1963):[73] In this leading case the Supreme Court emphasided that ‘a company is competent to carry out its objects specified in the  memorandum of association and cannot travel beyond the objects’, and that the power  to carry out ‘incidental or conducive’ acts to the attainment of the object[74] of a company did not allow it to travel beyond its  ‘object’ or to do an act ‘which has not a reasonably proximate connection with the object and which would only bring an indirect or remote benefit to the company’. It was also pointed out that acts done beyond the objects mentioned in the memorandum would be ultra vires. 

It was laid down that the objects of the Life Insurance Corporation, inter alia, included only the investment of funds and assets upon securities; and the memorandum of association having not included the giving of donation of Corporation fund for the benefit of a charitable trust, that act would be ultra vires as there was no discernible connection between the donation and the objects of the Corporation. 

The Supreme Court held:

  • “The trust has numerous objects one of which is undoubtedly to promote art, science, industrial, technical or business knowledge including knowledge in banking, insurance, commerce and industry. There is no obligation upon the trustees to utilise the fund or any part thereof for promoting education in insurance and even if the trustees utilised the fund for that purpose, it was problematic whether any such persons trained in insurance business and practice were likely to take up employment with the Company. Thus the ultimate benefit which may result to the Company from the availability of personnel trained in insurance, if the trust utilises the fund for promoting education, insurance, practice and business, is too indirect, to be regarded as incidental or naturally conducive to the objects of the Company. We are, therefore, of the view that the resolution donating the funds of the Company was not within the objects mentioned in the Memorandum of Association and on that account it was ultra vires.”

Bell Houses Ltd. Vs. City Wall Properties Ltd. (QB: 1966)[75]: In the Memorandum of the Company considered in this case there was a clause which provided that the company could do all such  other things as were incidental or conducive to the laid down objects or any of them. It was held that the trade or business which the directors had done was ultra vires, though they bona fide believed that it could be advantageously carried on by the plaintiff company in connection with or as ancillary to its main business.[76]

DM Co-op. Bank Vs. Dulichand(SC: 1969):[77]The Supreme Court observed that the nature of business of a society can be ascertained from the objects of the society.

Indian Chamber of Commerce  Vs. CIT Kerala Ernakulam (SC: 1976): The matters as to Sales Tax exemption came for consideration in  Indian Chamber of Commerce  Vs. CIT Kerala Ernakulam & Commissioner of Income Tax West Bengal II Vs. Calcutta Cochin Chamber of Commerce and Industry Cochin.[78] Justice Krishna Iyer has said in this decision as under:

  • “The true test is to ask for answers to the following questions:
    • (a) Is the object of the assessee one of general public utility?
    • (b) Does the advancement of the object involve activities bringing in moneys?
    • (c) If so, are such activities undertaken, (i) for profit, or (ii) without profit?
  • Even if (a) and (b) are answered affirmatively, if Clause (i) is answered affirmatively, the claim for exemption collapses. The solution to the problem of an activity being one for or irrespective of profit is gathered on a footing of facts.
  • What is the real nature of the activity?
  • One which is ordinarily carried on by ordinary people for gain?
  • Is there a built-in-prescription in the constitution against making a profit?
  • Has there been in practice, profit from this venture?, although this last is a weak test.
  • The mere fact that a service is rendered is no answer to chargeability because all income is often derived by rendering some service or other.”

Justice Krishna Iyer explained:

  • “We will illustrate to illumine. If there is a restrictive provision in the bye-laws of the charitable organisation which insists that the charges levied for services of public utility rendered are to be on a ‘no profit’ basis, it clearly earns the benefit of Section 2(15). For instance, a funeral home, an SPCA or a co-operative may render services to the public but write a condition into its constitution that it shall not charge more than is actually needed for the rendering of the services,–may be it may not be an exact equivalent, such mathematical precision being impossible in the case of variables– may be a little surplus is left over at the end of the year–the broad inhibition against making profit is a good guarantee that the carrying on of the activity is not for profit. As an antithesis, take a funeral home or an animal welfare organisation or a super-bazar run for general public utility by an institution which charges large sums and makes huge profits. Indubitably they render services of general public utility. Their objects are charitable but their activities are for profit. Take the case of a blood bank which collects blood on payment and supplies blood for a higher price thereby making profit. Undoubtedly, the blood bank may be said to be a general public utility but if it advances its public utility by sale of blood as an activity for (making) profit, it is difficult to call its purpose charitable. It is just blood business.”

In Queens Educational Society Vs. CIT, [79] our Apex Court after citing the afore-quoted passage of Justice Krishna Iyer it is observed:

  • “Now we entirely agree with the learned Judges who decided these two cases that activity involved in carrying out the charitable purpose must not be motivated by a profit objective but it must be undertaken for the purpose of advancement or carrying out of the charitable purpose. But we find it difficult to accept their thesis that whenever an activity is carried on which yields profit, the inference must necessarily be drawn, in the absence of some indication to the contrary, that the activity is for profit and the charitable purpose involves the carrying on of an activity for profit. We do not think the Court would be justified in drawing any such inference merely because the activity results in profit. It is in our opinion not at all necessary that there must be a provision in the constitution of the trust or institution that the activity shall be carried on no profit no loss basis or that profit shall be proscribed. Even if there is no such express provision, the nature of the charitable purpose, the manner in which the activity for advancing the charitable purpose is being carried on and the surrounding circumstances may clearly indicate that the activity is not propelled by a dominant profit motive. What is necessary to be considered is whether having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, the dominant object of the activity is profit making or carrying out a charitable purpose. If it is the former, the purpose would not be a charitable purpose, but, if it is the latter, the charitable character or the purpose would not be lost.”

Addl. CIT Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association[SC: 1980][80]:The assesse in this case was an association established to promote commerce and trade in Art Silk Yarn, Raw Silk, Cotton Yarn, Art Silk Cloth, Silk Cloth and Cotton Cloth. Its objects, as evidenced from the memorandum of association, included, inter alia, carrying on business in Art Silk Yarn, Raw Silk, Cotton Yarn, Art Silk Cloth, Silk Cloth, and Cotton Cloth belonging to and on behalf of its members as well as buying and selling and dealing in all kinds of cloth and yarn belonging to and on behalf of its members. The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court held that, if there are several objects of the institution, some of which are charitable and some non-charitable, and the trustees or the managers in their discretion may apply the income of the institution of those objects, the trust or institution would not be liable to be regarded as charitable and no part of its income would be exempted from tax. Where the main or primary objects are distributive, each and every one of the object must be charitable in order that the trust be held as a valid charity. But, if the primary or dominant purpose of the institution is charitable and another which, by itself, may not be charitable, but is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant object, it would not prevent the institution from validly being recognised as a charity. It is pointed out that the test to be applied is, whether the object which is said to be non-charitable is the main or primary object of the trust or institution or it is ancillary or incidental to the dominant object which is charitable. Reiterating its earlier view in CIT Vs. Andhra Chamber of Commerce,[81] the Supreme Court said that if the primary purpose is advancement of objects for general public utility, the institution would remain charitable, even if an incidental non-charitable object for achieving that purpose was contemplated.

All important subsequent decisions in this subject have noticed and followed this judgment.

Gajadhar Prasad Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar (Pat: 1984):[82] The main business of the Samiti, a co-operative institution, mentioned in this case was distribution of seeds to the agriculturists. The members of the Samiti were agriculturists. The Samiti, for the purposes of distribution of seeds, adopted cultivation of land for growing desirable seeds treating it to be efficient, economical and safe way to serve the purpose of its object. The act was found to be having a reasonable and proximate connection with the object; and it was held that the cultivation was not an ultra  vires act.

Thanthi Trust Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes (Mad: 1995):[83] The charitable object of the Thanthi Trust was imparting of education. The trust carried on the business of a newspaper. It was held that the newspaper business was certainly incidental to the attainment of the object of the trust, namely that of imparting education.

Commissioner of Sales Tax Vs. Sai Publication Fund (SC: 2002):[84] In this case our Apex Court considered the issue whether the Trust,Sai Publication Fund, which had been set up by some devotees of Saibaba of Shirdi for spreading his message, can be held to be a “dealer”. It was observed that whether a particular person was a ‘dealer’ and whether he was carriying on ‘business,’ were matters to be decided on facts and in the circumstances of each case. The main and dominant activity or object of the Trust was to spread message of Saibaba. It was not a ‘business’.  Publication for the purpose of spreading message was incidental to this main activity.  Hence, it was held that such activity also did not amount to ‘business’ and entitled for Sales Tax exemption. 

CIT Vs. Mehta Charitable PrajnalayTrust (Dlh: 2012):[85]The Delhi High Court, in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust explored the scope of matters that had connection with ‘the attainment of the objects of the trust’. It was observed that the carrying on of the Katha business had no connection with the attainment of the objects of the trust, which were basically for the advancement of education, inculcation of patriotism, Indian culture, running of dispensaries hospitals, etc; and it was held that the mere fact that whole or some part of the income from Katha business was ear-marked for application to the charitable objects would not render the business itself being considered as incidental to the attainment of the objects. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Addl. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat Vs. Surat Art Silk[86]  it was pointed out that there was difference between business held under trust as ‘trust property’ (where the business itself is trust property[87]) and a business carried on by or on behalf of the trust.

Director of Income Tax Vs. Sabarmati Ashram Gaushala Trust (2014):[88] Sabarmati Ashram Gaushala Trust, the assesee in this Tax matter was created with object to breed the cattle and to improve the quality of the cows and oxen. The income was generated by the trust from the activity of milk production and sale thereof. The trust was thus marketing products which were incidental to its main activity of improving breeding of milch cows, and therefore, it was held as noncommercial activity. It is submitted that therefore, in the aforesaid facts, the Division Bench has held that “merely because while carrying out activities for the purpose of achieving objects of trust, certain incidental surpluses were generated, would not render activity in nature of trade, commerce or business”.

Mool Chand Khairati Vs. Director of IT (Dlh: 2015):[89] It is observed in this case that a plain reading of the objects-clause of the trust deed indicated that it included “devising means for imparting education and improving Ayurvedic system of medicine and preaching the same”. It was also expressly clarified that the Assessee was not prohibited to take help from the English, Unani or any other system of medicine for its object. It is observed that it was clear that the object did not prohibit running of an Allopathic hospital or drawing from any the other system of medicine for improving the Ayurvedic system of medicine inasmuch as any activity reasonably incidental to the object would not be ultra vires the objects.

Queens Educational Society Vs. CIT (SC: 2015):[90] In this case the Supreme Court, quoting the a passage from an earlier decision, Aditanar Educational Institution Vs. Additional CIT (1997),[91] it is emphasised that we should bear in mind the corpus, the objects and the powers of the concerned entity. The said passage reads as under:

  • “The High Court has made an observation that any income which has a direct relation or incidental to the running of the institution as such would qualify for exemption. We may state that the language of Section 10(22) of the (IT) Act is plain and clear and the availability of the exemption should be evaluated each year to find out whether the institution existed during the relevant year solely for educational purposes and not for the purposes of profit. After meeting the expenditure, if any surplus results incidentally from the activity lawfully carried on by the educational institution, it will not cease to be one existing solely for educational purposes since the object is not one to make profit. The decisive or acid test is whether on an overall view of the matter, the object is to make profit. In evaluating or appraising the above, one should also bear in mind the distinction/difference between the corpus, the objects and the powers of the concerned entity.”

Director of Income Tax Vs. Shri Vile Parle Kelavani Mandal (2016):[92]Where an educational trust generated income by letting out various halls and properties of the institution only on Saturdays and Sundays and on public holidays when they were not required for educational activities, it was observed in Director of Income Tax (Exemptions) Vs. Shri Vile Parle Kelavani Mandalthat this cannot be said to be a business which is not incidental to attain the objects of the trust.

This decision was followed in  Director of Income Tax Vs. M/S Lala Lajpatrai Memorial Trust[93] where the educational trust let out certain surplus parts of its building for running another educational institution and derived income. It was held in that it could not be said to be a business which was not incidental to attain the objects of the trust.  It was pointed out that this was merely an incidental educational activity and the income derived from it was used for the educational institute.

Trust Misusing status under Sec. 12AA is not entitled to retain Exemption

In Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions), Kolkata v. Batanagar Education and Research Trust, 2021-9 SCC 439, our Apex Court considered the answers given by the Managing Trustee of the Trust to the questions put by the Tax Authorities, and observed that they show the extent of misuse of the status enjoyed by the Trust. The Court held as under:

  • “These answers also show that donations were received by way of cheques out of which substantial money was ploughed back or returned to the donors in cash. The facts thus clearly show that those were bogus donations and that the registration conferred upon it under Sections 12AA and 80G of the Act was completely being misused by the Trust. An entity which is misusing the status conferred upon it by Section 12AA of the Act is not entitled to retain and enjoy said status. The authorities were therefore, right and justified in cancelling the registration under Sections 12AA and 80G of the Act.”

Trustees&  Administrators Who Commit Ultra Vires Acts Have To Answer

The directors and administrators of the companies and associations, so also its general bodies, are expected to engage in and execute their activities honouring the objectives in the memoranda or bye laws of the institutions.   The trustees are obliged to administer the trust property as directed by the author of the trust. The directors, administrators or trustees who commit breach,or who take the institution or trust to such acts, are liable to answer the ultra vires acts it if they are challenged.[94]

The Supreme Court has held in Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar Vs. LIC[95]that the directors of a Company who were responsible for passing the ultra vires resolution were personally liable[96] to make good the amount belonging to the Company which was unlawfully disbursed in pursuance of the resolution.

It was observedin Karnataka Films Ltd. Vs. Official Liquidator, Chitrakala Movietone Ltd.[97]that the directors were liable for losses occasioned through acts done by them in matters which were ‘ultra vires’ the company, and this liability was not dependent upon any question of honesty or intention.

In Kathiawar Trading Co. Vs. Virchand Dipchand[98] it was held that the directors were liable to replace the moneys of the company which had been misapplied by them to a purpose which was ultra vires.

The Madras High Court referred various English decisions in this subject in Brahmayya and Co Vs. VS Ramaswami Aiyar.[99]It included the following.

Joint Stock Discount Co. vs. Brown, 1869-8 EqCas 381: In this decision the directors were held liable for unauthorised investments which were ultra vires of their powers. The fact that a director was not present at all the meetings in which the unauthorised investments were sanctioned was held to be no defence.

In re, Sharpe; Bennett Masonic and General Life Assurance Co. Vs. Sharpe, 1892-1 Ch D 154:It was held in this case that the payment of interest from out of the capital when there were no profits was ultra vires.

Ramskill Vs. Edwards, 1885-31 Ch D 100: In this case the directors of a company advanced moneys of the company upon an unauthorised security. It was held that the directors were liable for breach of trust.

In re, Oxford Benefit Building and Investment Society, (1886) 35 Ch D 502: In this decision it was that it was settled by authorities that directors were quasi trustees of the capital of the company, that directors who improperly paid  dividends out of capital were liable to repay such dividends personally upon the company being wound up and that such an act was a breach of trust and the remedy was not barred by the statute of limitation.


[1]      Manufacturing or conducting sale of drugs by a medical institution, Conducting a nursing-school by a hospital etc.

[2]      Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar Vs. LIC: AIR 1963 SC 1185, Bholanath Kundu Vs. Official Liquidator: 1987-61 CC 10; Jaiveer Singh Virk Vs. Sir Sobha Singh: 2020-3 LAWS(DLH) 120.

[3]      Printing and publishing books or newspapers by an educational institution, Sale of articles made by inmates of an asylum etc.

[4]      Addl. CIT Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association: AIR 1980 SC 387; Queens Educational Society Vs. CIT:AIR  2015 SC 3253.

[5]      AP State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Income Tax Officer: AIR 1964 SC 1486; CIT Vs. Andhra Chambers of Commerce AIR 1965SC 1281 Addl. CIT Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association: AIR 1980 SC 387; CIT Vs. Bar Council of Maharashtra:  AIR 1981 SC 1462; Queens Educational Society Vs. CIT: AIR  2015 SC 3253.

[6]      Queens Educational Society Vs. CIT:AIR  2015 SC 3253; CIT Vs. Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust: 2013-263 CTR 61: 2013-92 DTR 185; The Tribune Trust Vs. CIT: 2017-291 CTR 352: 2017-390-ITR 547; Swadeshi Stores Vs. CIT, Punjab: 1944- 12-ITR 385 (Lahore) approved in:  JK Trust Vs. CIT: 1957-32-ITR 535 and  CIT Vs. Krishna Warriar: 1964-53-ITR 176.

[7]      Like tax exemptions, right to receive donation etc.

[8]      Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs. Thanthi Trust: 2001- 247-ITR 785 (SC); Addl. CIT Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Assn: AIR 1980 SC 387

[9]      Jaiveer Singh Virk Vs. Sir Sobha Singh: LAWS(DLH) 2020-3 120; ManiuddinBepari Vs. The Chairman Municipal Commrs, Dacca: 40 CWN 17, Scotte (P) Ltd. Vs. Corporation of Calcutta: 79 CWN 883, Sasanka Sekhar Panda Vs. State of West Bengal: 90 CWN 924.

[10]    Jaiveer Singh Virk Vs. Sir Sobha Singh: LAWS(DLH) 2020-3 120.

[11] Om Prakash Mohta Vs. Steel Equipment and Construction:   1968-38 CC 82; Jaiveer Singh Virk Vs. Sir Sobha Singh: LAWS(DLH) 2020 3 120,

[12] Gajadhar Prasad Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1984 Pat 105; Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar Vs. LIC: AIR 1963 SC 1185; Indian Steel And Wire Products Ltd Vs. CIT: 1968-38 CC 660, 1968-69ITR 379;

[13]    Jaiveer Singh Virk Vs. Sir Sobha Singh: LAWS(DLH) 2020-3 120; BholanathKunduVs. Official Liquidator: 1987-61 CC 10. Maniuddin Bepari Vs. The Chairman Municipal Commrs, Dacca: 40 CWN 17, Scotte (P) Ltd. Vs. Corporation of Calcutta: 79 CWN 883, SasankaSekhar Panda Vs. State of West Bengal: 90 CWN 924.

[14] V.B. Rangaraj Vs. V.B. Gopalakrishnan: (1992) 1 SCC 160; Vodafone International Holdings Vs. Union of India: (2012) 6 SCC 613; World Phone India Vs. WPI Group Inc.: (2013) SCC OnLine Del 1098.

[15] Claude Lila Parulekar  Vs. Sakal Papers: AIR 2005 SC 4074: 2005-11 SCC 73; Quoted in: Tin Plate Dealers Association Vs. Satish Chandra Sanwalka: AIR 2016 SC 4705

[16] (1875) LR 7 HL 653 (DC)

[17] AIR 1963 SC 1185

[18] 1966 SCC OnLine Cal 44

[19] AIR 1963 SC 1185

[20]1914 AC 398

[21] ModiVanaspati Manufacturing Co. Vs. Katihar Jute Mills: AIR1969 Cal 496

[22] (1912) 2 Ch 183. Folloed in: Lakshmanaswami MudaliarVs. LIC: AIR 1963 SC 1185

[23]Mahaluxmi Bank Ltd Vs. Registrar of Companies WB: AIR  1961 Cal 666

[24]    Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust Vs. Director of Income Tax: 2015-280 CTR 121: 2015-222 DLT 102: 2015-377 ITR 650: TAXMAN 2015-234 222

[25]   Commr of IT Vs. RajmitraBhailal: 1964-54 ITR 241

[26]    RP Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Educational Trust:1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801

[27]    40 ER 852

[28]    (1888) 57 LJ Ch 543

[29]    (1904) AC 515:

[30]    AIR 1931 Mad. 12. See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547;          Allahabad High School Society Vs. State of UP: 2010-5 ADJ 734, 2010-82 All LR 83;         P. Jayader Vs. Thiruneelakanta Nadar Chinnaneela Nadar: ILR  1966-2 Mad 92.

[31]   6th Edn.  At p. 131,

[32]    Agasthyar Trust Vs. Commr IT Madras ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;1998-5 SCC 588

[33]    CIT Vs. Thanthi Trust: 2001- 247-ITR 785 (SC)

[34]    Radhabari Tea Company Vs. Mridul Kumar Bhattacharjee: 2010-153 CC 579

[35]    Turner Morrison and Co Vs. Hungerford Investment: AIR  1972 SC 1311.

[36]    AIR 1963 SC 1185

[37]    See also: Gajadhar Prasad Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1984 Pat 105.

[38]    CIT Vs. Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust: 2013-263 CTR 61: 20 13-92 DTR 185

[39]    Quoted in: The Tribune Trust Vs. CIT: 2017-291 CTR 352: 2017-390 ITR 547.

[40]    Naresh Chandra Sanyal Vs. Calcutta Stock Exchange Assn: 1971-1 SCC 50

[41]    Section: 10, Companies Act, 2013 reads as under: 10. Effect of memorandum and articles: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and articles shall, when registered, bind the company and the members thereof to the same extent as if they respectively had been signed by the company and by each member, and contained covenants on its and his part to observe all the provisions of the memorandum and of the articles.

(2) All monies payable by any member to the company under the memorandum or articles shall be a debt due from him to the company.

[42]    Claude Lila Parulekar Vs. Sakal Papers:  AIR 2005 SC 4074: 2005-11 SCC 73.

[43]    Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. Vs. Riche:  (1875) LR 7 HL 653 (DC), Re. Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Building Society, (1912) 2 Ch 183; Folloed in: Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar Vs. LIC: AIR 1963 SC 1185. Gajadhar Prasad Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1984 Pat 105, Asma Alsam Vs. State of UP: 2015- 4 ADJ 607: 2015 -4 AWC 3615: 2015-111-All LR 341; Nirbhay Kapoor Vs. Kamero Technosys: 2019-8 ADJ 11: 2019-135 AllLR 606,

[44]    Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO: 91-ITR 261 (Mad); Quoted with approval in Agasthyar Trust Vs. CIT, Madras: 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;1998-5 SCC 588.

[45]    Dharmodayam Co. v. CIT : 1962-45-ITR 478 (Ker), Referred to in: Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs. Dharmodayam Co. 1997-141 CTR 524, 1997-225 ITR 686, 1998-99 TAXMAN 465.

[46]    Eg: a hospital, educational activities etc.

[47]    Addl. CIT Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association: AIR 1980 SC 387; Queens Educational Society Vs. CIT:AIR  2015 SC 3253.

[48]    AP State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Income Tax Officer: AIR 1964 SC 1486; CIT Vs. Andhra Chambers of Commerce AIR 1965 SC 1281, Addl. CIT Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association: AIR 1980 SC 387; CIT Vs. Bar Council of Maharashtra:  AIR 1981 SC 1462; Queens Educational Society Vs. CIT: AIR  2015 SC 3253.

[49] Like blood-bank, diagnostic-service, business in essential articles etc.

[50]    Chandrakant Manilal Shah Vs. CIT: AIR  1992  SC 66; CIT Vs. Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust: 2013-263 CTR 61: 2013-92 DTR 185, Serum Institute of India Ltd. Vs.  UOI: 2012-48 VST 99; Tarsem Kumar Garg Vs. D D A: ILR  2006-1Del  481, C J International Hotels Vs. New Delhi Municipal Council: 2003-105 DLT 545, [51] Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority Vs. Asst CIT: 2017-396- ITR 323

[52]    AIR 1965SC 1281

[53]    AIR 1980 SC 387

[54] Also see: Bengal National Chamber of Commerce Vs. CIT: 1978-111- ITR 514

[55] Dharmadeepti v. CIT

[56]    AP State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Income Tax Officer: AIR 1964 SC 1486; CIT Vs. Andhra Chambers of Commerce AIR 1965SC 1281, Addl. CIT Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association: AIR 1980 SC 387; CIT Vs. Bar Council of Maharashtra:  AIR 1981 SC 1462; Queens Educational Society Vs. CIT: AIR  2015 SC 3253.

[57] Addl. CIT  Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association AIR 1980 SC 387.

[58] Director of Income Tax Vs. Bharat diamond Bourse: 2003-259-ITR 280

[59] AIR 1980 SC 387:1980-121-ITR 1

[60] AP State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Income Tax Officer: AIR 1964 SC 1486; CIT Vs. Andhra Chambers of Commerce AIR 1965 SC 1281, CIT Vs. Bar Council of Maharashtra:  AIR 1981 SC 1462. [61] Referred to in: CIT Vs. AP  State Road Transport Corporation: AIR  1986 SC 1054; Thiagarajar Charities Madurai Vs. Additional CIT: AIR  1997 SC 2541, Queens Educational Society Vs. CIT: AIR  2015 SC 3253.

[62] AIR 1980 SC 387

[63]    Chandrakant Manilal Shah Vs. CIT: AIR  1992  SC 66; CIT Vs. Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust: 2013-263 CTR 61: 2013-92 DTR 185, Serum Institute of India Ltd. Vs.  UOI: 2012-48 VST 99; Tarsem Kumar Garg Vs. D D A: ILR  2006-1Del  481, C J International Hotels Vs. New Delhi Municipal Council: 2003-105 DLT 545

[64]    The Tribune Trust Vs. CIT, Chandigarh: 2017-291CTR 352

[65] CIT Vs. Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust: 2013-263 CTR 61: 2013-92 DTR 185; The Tribune Trust Vs. CIT: 2017-291 CTR 352: 2017-390 ITR 547

[66]    Addl. CIT Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Assn: AIR 1980 SC 387

[67] CIT Vs. Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust: 2013-263 CTR 61: 2013-92 DTR 185;

The Tribune Trust Vs. CIT: 2017-291 CTR 352: 2017-390-ITR 547

[68] Queens Educational Society Vs. CIT:AIR  2015 SC 3253.

[69] Queens Educational Society Vs. CIT:AIR  2015 SC 3253; CIT Vs. Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust: 2013-263 CTR 61: 2013-92 DTR 185; The Tribune Trust Vs. CIT: 2017-291 CTR 352: 2017-390-ITR 547; Swadeshi Stores Vs. CIT, Punjab: 1944- 12 ITR 385 (Lahore) approved in:  JK Trust Vs. CIT: 1957-32 ITR 535 and  CIT Vs. Krishna Warriar: 1964-53 ITR 176.

[70]With effect from April 1, 1992.

[71] CIT Vs. Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust: 2013-263 CTR 61: 2013-92 DTR 185

[72] [1892] 1 Ch 154, Referred to in Bholanath Kundu Vs. Official Liquidator: 1987-61 CC 10.

[73]   AIR 1963 SC 1185

[74]   Mool Chand Khairati Vs. Director of IT: 2015-280 CTR 121; 2015-222 DLT 102

[75]   (1966) 2 QB 656

[76]   Referred to in: Gajadhar Prasad Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1984 Pat 105, Kumarapuram Gopal Krishnan  Vs. Burdwan Cutwa Railway Co: 1978-1 Cal LJ 6504

[77]   AIR 1969 SC 1320

[78] AIR  1976 SC 348: 1975-101 ITR 796

[79] (2015) 8 SCC 47,

[80]    AIR 1980 SC 387

[81]   AIR 1965 SC 1281:  1965-55-ITR 722

[82]   AIR 1984 Pat 105

[83]   Thanthi Trust Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes: 1995-213-ITR 639 (Mad)

[84] AIR  2002 SC 1582

[85] 2013-255 CTR 232: 2013-81 DTR 104: ILR 2012-22 Dlh 4992: ITR 2013-357 560.

[86] 1998-121 ITR 1, See also: Raja PC Lall Choudhary Vs. CIT, Bihar: 1957-31 ITR 226 (Pat); and CIT Vs. Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust: ILR 2012-22 Dlh 4992: 2013-357 ITR 560.

[87] CIT  Vs. Sadhu Singh Hamdard Trust: 2013-263 CTR 61: 2013-92 DTR 185

[88]2014-362 ITR 539

[89]   2015-280 CTR 121; 2015-222 DLT 102

[90] AIR  2015 SC 3253

[91]1997-224 ITR 310

[92]2016-286 CTR 219: 2015-378ITR 593

[93]2016-383 ITR 345: 2016-240 TAXMAN 557.

[94]    Thenappa Chettiar Vs.Karuppan Chettiar: AIR 1968 SC 915 , Eninsular Locomotive Co Ltd Vs. Hlangham Reed: AIR  1937 Pat 293; Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar Vs. LIC: AIR 1963 SC 1185, In re: Bennett: 1892-1 Ch 154:  Referred to in Bholanath Kundu Vs. Official Liquidator : 1987-61 CC 10.

[95]AIR 1963 SC 1185.

[96]Edavan Kavingal Kelappan Vs. Moolakal Kunhi Raman: AIR  1957 Mad 164, Babubhai Chandulal Vs. Official Liquidator Atlas 1996-86 CC 580; 1994 -1 MadLW 445; Brahmayya and Co Vs. V S Ramaswami Aiyar: AIR 1966 Mad 247; In re: Bennett: [1892] 1 Ch 154, Referred to in Bholanath Kundu Vs. Official Liquidator: 1987-61 CC 10.

[97]1951- 21 CC 138 (Mad).

[98] ILR 18 Bom 119

[99] AIR 1966 Mad 247



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

Alienation of Public Trust Property

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Synopsis

  1. Introduction
  2. Transfer of Property To or By Trust & S. 5 of the TP Act 
  3. Can transfer be made to or by Unregd. Associations
  4. Effect of Common Law in Sec. 5 TP Act
  5. Alienation for Necessity
  6. No Power to Alienate the Site of the Temple
  7. Variation of Trust
  8. Trustee Cannot Sell and Invest Price for Larger Income
  9. Fundamental Principles Cannot Be Altered
  10. Degree of Prudence Expected in Sale
  11. Alienation of Shebaitship
  12. Whether Similar to Management of Estate of an Infant Heir
  13. Alienation: Doctrine of ‘Conditions of Modern Life’
  14. Abuse of Trust – Dedication Will Remain Valid
  15. Is Mortgage Valid Beyond Period-of-office of Transferor
  16. Perpetuities and Alienation of Trust Property
  17. Sale in Public Auction
  18. Shifting of a church

Introduction

Trust is a relationship arising out of confidence reposed in trustee and it casts upon the trustee a special duty of loyalty to the purpose or object of the trust.  There is no principle of law or precedent which permits transfer of a public trust (as such) in favour of another trustee or body of persons not intended by the founder, even if it may appear profitable to the institution in certain respects.[1] The trustee himself has to manage the trust property, prudently, for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust. He stands in a fiduciary position.[2]The endowment and its dedication will remain valid even if there is misappropriation or abuse of trust by the trustees subsequent to a valid dedication.[3]

Alienation for Necessity

In certain circumstances the trustee holds the power to dispose of the property entrusted to his management,[4]  though it can be exercised sparingly and cautiously.As a general rule, immovable trust properties entrusted to the trustee are, by their very nature,[5] inalienable.[6] A trustee including a Shebait can alienate trust property only in exceptional cases,such as legal necessity,[7]for the benefit or preservation of the property etc.[8] In Prosunno Kumari Debya Vs. Golab Chand Baboo,[9]the Privy Council, as early as in 1875, it was observed as under:

  • “But, notwithstanding that property devoted to religious purposes is, as a rule, inalienable, it is, in their Lordships’ opinion, competent for the shebait of property dedicated to the worship of an idol, in the capacity as shebait and manager of the estate, to incur debts and borrow money for the proper expenses of keeping up the religious worship, repairing the temples or other possessions of the idol, defending hostile litigious attacks, and other like objects. The power, however, to incur such debts must be measured by the existing necessity for incurring them.”

A Shebait can sell the property only for benefit of the estate.[10]An alienation or permanent lease of lands dedicated to a religious endowment is valid only if it is made for a legal  necessity[11]It is not justified by a local custom, or by a practice of the institution, to grant lands in a particular manner.[12]

The Privy Council, in Hanoomanh Persaudh Panday Vs. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1856)[13] considered the power of the manager for alienation of the joint family property and held that the lender is bound to inquire into the necessities of the loan. In Sri Krishan Das Vs. Nathu Ram (1927)[14] it was held by the Privy Council that where the purchaser acted in good faith and after due enquiry, and was able to show that the sale itself was justified by legal necessity, he was under no obligation to enquire into the application of any surplus and was, therefore, not bound to make repayment of such surplus to the members of the family challenging the sale.

Mulla’s Treatise on ‘Principles of Hindu Law’ states as under:

  • “As a general rule of Hindu Law, property given for the maintenance of religious worship, and all charities connected with it, is inalienable. It is competent, however, for the Shebait or Mahanth in charge of the property, in his capacity of Shebait or Mahanth and as Manager of the property, to incur debts and borrow money on a mortgage of the property for the purpose of keeping up the religious worship, and for the benefit and preservation of the property. The power, however, to incur debts must be measured by an existing necessity for incurring them.”[15]

Shebait or Mahant is only a custodian of property.He has no beneficial interest pertaining to the owner, in the endowment and in the property entrusted to him. His right in the property is not unqualified so that he could pass title over the same in favour of a vendee or to a lessee. The vendee or lessee derives right to the property of the temple or Math if only there is legal necessity.[16]

A Shebait or Mahant will not be justified in selling land owned by the temple or Mutt, solely for the purpose of getting capital to embark in the money-lending business, even if such an act will be benefited by larger returns by way of interest.[17] But, the sale of an inconveniently situated, encumbered and unprofitable property to purchase in its stead another property,[18] or for the construction of a temple for the better housing of the idols,[19] may be justified on the principle, ‘benefit the estate’.

The common law in this regard requires that the extent of the property subjected to sale or encumbrance should not be beyond the limit sufficient to meet the necessity.[20]

Alienation by Mahanth as Personal Property

An alienation of a trust property by the Mahant as his personal property is also void ab initio. In Hemanta Kumari Vs. Iswar Sridhar Jiu[21] Mukherjea, J., held:

  • “If the manager transfers the property beloning to the deity as his own property asserting his own personal interest in the same, his act is adverse to the trust. The transferee in such cases would acquire no title to the property and his possession would be unlawful from the beginning. A long line of cases has clearly expressed the distinction between alienations made by the trustee in his professed capacity as a trustee and alienations by the trustee of trust property treating it as his personal property”.[22]

Public Trust Depends on Charity and Donatins

Referring Sec. 14 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, it is observed in Khasgi (Devi Ahilyabai Holkar Charities) Trust, Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar,  2022-11 SCALE 1,  2022-17 SCR 173, as under:

  • “A Public Trust invariably depends on charity done by individuals by donating immovable property or by making cash donations.”

Eventhough the above observation is made invoking Sec. 14 of the BPT Act, it is clear that it is a common law principle applicable to all Public Trusts.

Legal Obligations of Trustees to Administer and Give Effect to Objects of Trust

It is held further in Khasgi (Devi Ahilyabai Holkar Charities) Trust, Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar,  2022-11 SCALE 1,  as under:

  • “Though in law, the assets and properties of a Public Trust vest in its Trustees, they hold the Trust property in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the Trust. They hold the property for giving effect to the objects of the Public Trust. A Trust property cannot be alienated unless it is for the benefit of the Trust and/or its beneficiaries. The Trustees are not expected to deal with the Trust property, as if it is their private property. It is the legal obligation of the Trustees to administer the Trust and to give effect to the objects of the Trust. …. There are statutory constraints on the power of the Trustees to alienate the property of a Public Charitable Trust. …. The Trustees are the custodians of Trust properties. The Trustees have a duty to safeguard the interests of the beneficiaries of the Public Trust. That is how, a provision in Public Trust Law, like Sec.  14 of the Public Trusts Act, is of importance. This provision seeks to protect the Trust property in the hands of the Trustees from unwarranted alienations.”  

Sale by Mahanth Otherwise Than for Legal Necessity

A Mahant is only the custodian of property and not the owner thereof. He has no right to pass, title or interest in favour of the vendee by execution of a sale-deed unless it is shown that there was legal necessity of the same. The purchaser of such property has the duty to discharge the burden of proof that the sale-deed executed by Mahant in his favour was for legal necessity of such institution and, hence, the sale-deed will be a void document if the duty is not discharged.  Therefore, cancellation of such a document is not necessary as it is clearly without title and authority.[23]

Can be Equated to Sale of Property of a Minor

Alienation of debenture property can be equated to the sale of the property of a minor.[24]Mulla’s ‘Treatise on Principles of Hindu law’reads as under:

  • “The power of a Shebait or a Mohunt to alienate debutter property is analogous to that of a manager for an infant heir as defined by the Judicial Committee in Hanooman Pershand Vs. Mt. Babooee, (1856) 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC). As held in that case, he has no power to alienate dubutter property except in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate. He is not entitled to sell the property for the purpose of investing the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than that derived from the property itself. Nor can he, except for legal necessity grant a permanent lease of debutter property, though he may create proper derivative tenures and estates conformable to usage.”[25]

No Power to Alienate the Temple or its Site

The endowment as a whole can never be the subject-matter of alienation. It cannot be permitted even pointing out the ground, legal necessity. Such a step will destroy the basic principles upon which the trust is founded. A trust is what designed by the founder. It will annihilate the very purpose and the object for which the endowment was created.[26] Under any circumstance, a Shebait or Mahant has no power to alienate the institution they hold. Such attempts, if any, will be void ab initio.[27]

The Calcutta High Court in Panna Banerjee Vs Kali Kinkor Ganguli[28] held that the legal necessity of the deity was not so unruly that it could rule over the deity.Such transfers are illegal and void in its inception. Hindu law does not permit transfer of religious endowments for pecuniary consideration.It is held in this decision as under:

  • “The deity is entitled to be worshipped in its permanent abode. Its permanent residence cannot be disturbed. The idol cannot be removed like a chattel from such a temple by its shebaits. That temple cannot be vivisected. It is impartible. No part of it can be sold even for the deity’s legal necessity. It is res extra commercium.
  • To sell a part of the temple is to endanger the very existence of the consecrated idol and to put an end to the sanctity attached to it. If saleable, it can be sold to any non-Hindu. He, being a disbeliever in the Hindu faith and religion, shall have no respect or regard for the sanctity attached to the place of worship. If saleable, it can be passed on from hand to hand in the open market. The very argument of Mr. Roy is a shocking inroad to the Hindu Philosophy and the Faith. It is opposed to the basic concept of the Hindu Jurisprudence. If there is any such custom it must be held to be unreasonable, illegal and opposed to public policy and should be treated as null and void.”

The Supreme Court, in Kali Kinkor Ganguly Vs. Panna Banerjee,[29]setting aside the appeal, it is held that neither the temple nor the deities nor the Shebaiti right can be transferred, invoking the doctrine of transfer for the benefit of the deity.[30]

Transfer of Institution Itself

An institution like math, temple, mosque, church or school cannot be transferred by a transfer deed. Untwalia, J., in Bishop SK Patro Vs. State of Bihar[31] observed as under:

  • “To all intents and purposes, the transfer of the trusteeship or the properties of the institution may vest the right to administer the school in the transferee. Yet it is difficult to take the view that the educational organisation which was founded, created or brought into existence and thus established by one founder by such transfer becomes transferred to, and re-established by, the transferee. If I may draw an analogy from our experience of religious institutions like math, temple, mosque or church, it has never been heard that the institution has ever been transferred by a transfer deed.What can be the subject-matter of transfer is the property appertaining to the institution including the right of management. But in a continuing institution when its property or trusteeship or right to management is transferred, I cannot persuade myself to take the view that by such transfer, the transferee brings into existence or re-brings into existence, to quote the phrase used by the learned counsel for the petitioners, and establishes the institution within the meaning of Article 26 or 30 of the Constitution.”

Sale of Math properties in execution of decree against Mahant

Sale of the properties of a Math in execution of a decree against the Mahant is also void.[32] A Mahanth is not the owner of the surplus income of a Mutt. It is clear from the fact that after his death the savings are not regarded as his personal property and cannot be proceeded against for satisfaction of his personal debts.[33] A Mahant is therefore accountable if he uses the surplus fund for purposes alien to those for which the institution was founded.

Burden on the Alienee

In all cases where a public trust property is sold or mortgaged, the burden will be on the alienee to prove that it was for the benefit of the institution or was for legal necessarily.[34]In Sri Raghavendra Swami Mutt Vs. Panchapakesa Iyer[35] it is observed by the Madras High Court as under:

  • “It is well-settled that the trustee is not prevented from alienating the trust property, but the alienation of the mutt property should be bona fide and there must be actual pressure on the estate or there must be some danger which was sought to be averted or there must be benefit to be conferred upon the trust by such transaction. The transaction is challenged nearly after a period of 44 years and that is also a relevant fact in considering the question of validity of the transaction and the burden is on the alienee to show that the alienation was for the benefit of the trust. The alienee must establish that the alienation was for the benefit of the trust.”

Burden of Proof and Recitals in The Deeds

Our Apex Court in Iswar Gopal Vs. Pratapmal Bagaria (1951)[36] it was observed that if all the original parties to the transfer, and those who could have given evidence on the relevant points such as legal necessity, have passed away, a recital consisting of the principal circumstances of the case assumes importance and cannot be lightly set aside.

However, in Rani Vs. Santa Bala (1971)[37]  the Supreme Court held that though the recitals are admissible in evidence, their value would vary according to the circumstances in which the transaction was entered into and the weight to be attached to the recitals varies according to the circumstances. The Supreme Court also held that where the evidence which could be brought before the Court is within the special knowledge of the person who seeks to set aside the sale and is withheld by him, such evidence being normally not available to the alienee, the recitals go to his aid with greater force and the court may be justified in appropriate cases in raising an inference against the party seeking to set aside the sale on the ground of absence of legal necessity wholly or partially when he withholds evidence in his possession.

Voidable Alienations

Where an alienation of endowed properties is for valuable consideration, but not for legal necessity or benefit to the institution, the same enures for the lifetime of the Mahant alone and becomes voidable at the instance of the succeeding Mahant.[38]

Trustee Cannot Sell Property and Invest Price for Larger Income

A trustee is not entitled to sell trust property for the purpose of investing the price so as to bring income larger than that derived from the property itself.[39]

Mayne’s Treatise on Hindu Law reads on this point as follows:

  • “It is beyond the powers of a manager to grant a permanent lease at a fixed rent in the absence of unavoidable necessity (See: Talaniappa Chetty Vs. Streemath Devasikamony, AIR 1917 PC 33); for, to fix the rent, though adequate at the time, in perpetuity in lieu of giving the endowment the benefit of an augmentation of a variable rent from time to time would be a breach of duty on the part of the manager.”[40]

Degree of Prudence Expected in Sale

Our Apex Court pointed out in Cyrus Rustom Patel VS Charity Commissioner, Maharashtra[41] that ordinarily, the trust property is to be protected; and that ‘in case its condition was not good, there could be several other ways to improve it; it could not have been achieved by virtually throwing away the property’.

It was observed in Jagat Narain Vs. Mathura Das[42] that the degree of prudence expected from a manager of an endowment would be the prudence which an ordinary man would exercise with the knowledge available to him and the transaction would have to be judged not by the result, but by what might have been expected to be its results at the time it was entered into.

While considering the sale of an old house by the manager of a temple, which was not in a dilapidated condition but it required extensive repairs, it was held in BehariLal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji[43] that the sale was neither a prudent act nor it was for the benefit of the estate.

In KPLS Palaniappa Chetty Vs. Shreenath Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi[44]  it was laid down that a Shebait would not be justified in selling debutter land solely for the purpose of getting capital to embark in the money lending business. Mulla’s Hindu Law reads:

  • “He (Shebait) is not entitled to sell the property for the purpose of investing the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than that derived from the property itself.”[45]

Alienation: Doctrine of ‘Conditions of Modern Life’

In KC Kappor Vs. Radhika Devi,[46] the Supreme Court has held that the expression ‘compelling necessity’ (qua alienation of property held by a trustee-Kartha) must be interpreted with due regard to the ‘conditions of modern life’. The Apex Court quoted from with approval the Bombay decision, Nagindas Maneklal Vs. Mahomed Yusuf Mithcella[47].

Is Mortgage Valid Beyond Period-of-office of Transferor Shebait?

In Iswar Radha Kanta Jew Thakur Vs. Gopinath Das[48] it was held that the mortgage effected by the Shebait without legal necessity and not for the benefit of the deity was not void and the mortgagor acquires some interest in the mortgaged property, that is, the interest of the Shebait which enures only during the incumbency of the Shebait. It was further held that the Shebait may alienate by way of lease, mortgage or sale the debutter property even without legal necessity and not for the benefit of the deity but in such a case the purchaser would not acquire title in the debutter property beyond the period during which the Shebait continues in office.

Dr. B K Mukherjea “On The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts” enlightens us as under:

  • “The sale of a Debutter property by a Shebait is prima facie an act amounting to a breach of trust, and to make it binding on the endowment, imperative necessity must be proved, or else it must be established that the purchaser did make enquiries and satisfy himself in good faith that such necessity existed. When there is no justifying necessity for a sale of Debutter property, is the transaction void altogether and the purchaser acquires no interest in the purchased property. The answer is the same as has been given already in the case of alienation by way of permanent lease. The transfer is valid during the lifetime or the tenure of office of the alienating manager, and the possession of the alienee becomes adverse to the endowment when the alienating Shebait ceases to be manager by reason of death, retirement or otherwise.”[49]

Similarly in H. S. Gour’s Hindu Code[50]  the legal position has been explained in the following words:

  • “An alienation of such property, made by its manager for a purpose other than legal necessity or benefit is not valid beyond the term of the manager’s office, or his death, nor can such alienation, if consented to by his successor, inure beyond his own term.”[51]

Perpetuities and Alienation of Trust Property

S.14 of the TP Act lays down rule against perpetuity as under: 

  • “No transfer of property can take operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the life time of one or more persons living at the date of such transfer, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the interest created is to belong.”

Apart from S. 18 of the T.P. Act (which states that the restrictions in S. 14 shall not apply in a case of transfer for the benefit of public), Mayne’s Hindu Law[52] speaks that S. 14 of the T.P. Act, and similarly worded S. 114 of the Indian Succession Act, do not apply to gifts or bequests for religious and charitable purposes. 

Sale in Public Auction

In R. Venugopal Naidu Vs. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities[53] the Apex Court has held that property belonging to religious and charitable endowments should not be sold in private negotiations and the same can be sold in public auction after giving wide publicity.

Alienation and (State) Public Trusts Acts

(State) Public Trusts Acts impose restrictions for sale, mortgage, exchange, lease etc. of immovable properties of public trust. From Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act it is apparent that sale, exchange or gift of any immovable property or lease, extending beyond ten years in the case of agricultural land, or for a period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or a building, belonging to a public trust shall not be valid without previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner. It is also open to the Charity Commissioner, in exercise of power of Section 36(2) of the Act, to revoke the sanction, given under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 36 of the Act, on the ground that the sanction had been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation or those material facts have been suppressed while obtaining sanction. The intendment of the revocation provision is also to sub-serve the interest, benefit, and protection of the Trust and its property.

  • Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act reads as under:
  • Alienation of immovable property of public trust:
  • (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of trust –
    • (a) no sale, exchange or gift of any immovable property, and
    • (b) no lease for a period exceeding ten years in the case of agricultural land or for a period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or a building, belonging to a public trust, shall be valid without the previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner. Sanction may be accorded subject to such conditions as the Charity Commissioner may think fit to impose, regard being had to the interest, benefit or protection of the trust;
    • (c) if the Charity Commissioner is satisfied that in the interest of any public trust any immovable property thereof should be disposed of, he may, on application, authorise any trustee to dispose of such property subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose, regard being had to the interest or benefit or protection of the trust.
  • (2) The Charity Commissioner may revoke the sanction given under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) on the ground that such sanction was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation made to him or by concealing from the Charity Commissioner, facts material for the purpose of giving sanction; and direct the trustee to take such steps within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the date of revocation (or such further period not exceeding in the aggregate one year as the Charity Commissioner may from time to time determine) as may be specified in the direction for the recovery of the property.
  • (3) No sanction shall be revoked under this section unless the person in whose favour such sanction has been made has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the sanction should not be revoked.
  • (4) If, in the opinion of the Charity Commissioner, the trustee has failed to take effective steps within the period specified in sub-section (2), or it is not possible to recover the property with reasonable effort or expense, the Charity Commissioner may assess any advantage received by the trustee and direct him to pay compensation to the trust equivalent to the advantage so assessed.

 In Cyrus Rustom Patel VS Charity Commissioner Maharashtra (2017)[54]  our Supreme Court pointed out that ‘the power to grant sanction has to be exercised by the Charity Commissioner, taking into consideration three classic requirements i.e. “the interest, benefit, and protection” of the Trust. The expression that sanction may be accorded subject to such conditions as Charity Commissioner may think fit under section 31(1)(b) and Section 36 (1)(c). The Charity Commissioner has to be objectively satisfied that property should be disposed of in the interest of public trust; in doing so, he has right to impose such conditions as he may think fit, taking into account aforesaid triple classic requirements’.

Transfer of Property To or By Trust & S. 5 of the TP Act 

See Chapter: Vesting of Property in Trusts

Limitationto Challenge Voidable Sale

See: Chapter Limitation


[1]      Abdul Kayua Vs. Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309: Referred to in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982-1  Del 11.

[2]      Pawan Kumar Vs. Babulal: 2019-4 SCC 367;

CBSE Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay: 2011- 8 SCC 497

[3]      ILR 1936 Cal. 420.Kuldip Chand Vs.A G Government of H P (AIR 2003 SC 1685); AIR 1954 M. 1110.

[4] RK Joshi Vs. State of Karnataka: 1984-1 KantLJ 158.

[5]      Ratilal Panachand Gandhi Vs. State of Bombay: AIR 1954  SC 388.

[6]      Hanooman Persaud Panday v. Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1856) 6 MIA 393 (PC) Referred to in: Sri Raghavendra Swami VS Panchapakesa Iyer: AIR 2005  Mad 129

[7]      Ramchandraji Maharaj. Vs. Lalji Singh: AIR 1959 Pat 305; Referred to in: Ranjit Mullick VS Aparesh Mullick: 2018 0 Supreme(Cal) 483;

[8]      Iswar Gopal Vs. Pratapmal Bagaria: AIR 1951 SC 214, Palanniappa Chetty Vs. Sreemath Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi: AIR 1917 PC 33; Balmukand Vs. Kamla Wati: AIR 1964 SC 1385; Radhakrishnadas Vs. Kaluram: AIR 1967 SC 574;  Jagat Narain Vs. Mathura Das: AIR 1928 All 454; A. Subrahmanian Asari Vs. Jayadevan Nair: AIR 1985 , Mad 372;  B Ranga Rao Vs. G Venkata Krishna Rao: AIR1996 AP 5; D. J. Prasad Vs. D. Vs. Subbaiah: AIR 1973 A P 214; Durga Prasad Vs. Jewdhari Singh: AIR 1936 Cal 116;  Ram Sundar Vs. Lachhmi Narain: AIR 1929 PC 143;  SurajBhan Singh Vs. Sah Chain Sukh: AIR 1927 PC 244; In the matter of A. T. Vasudevan: AIR 1949 Mad 260;  Sengoda Goundan Vs. Muthu Vellappa Goundan: AIR 1955 Mad 531;  Medikendhri Vs. Venkatayya: AIR 1953 Mad 210; Krishnamoorthi Vs. Nataraja Iyer, AIR 1949 Mad 67; Sengoda Goundan Vs. Muthu Vellappa Goundan, AIR 1955 Mad 531; Chheda Lai Vs. Ujiarey Lal, AIR 1987 All 127.

[9] (1875)  LR 2 Ind. App. 145

[10] Bhagauti Prasad KhetanVs. LaxminathjiMaharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[11]    Shridhar  Vs.  Jagannathji Temple, A I R 1976 S C 1860. Ram Chandraji Maharaj  Vs. Lalji Singh, AIR 1959 Pat 305. Refered to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan  Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228. See also: JagatNarain Vs. Mathura Das, AIR 1928 All 454, Ram Chandraji Maharaj Vs. Lalji Singh, AIR 1959 Pat 305; Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji, AIR 1961 All 73; KPLS Palaniappa Chetty Vs. Shreenath vasikamonyndarannadhi: AIR 1917 PC 33, Sridhar Vs. Sri Jagannath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; IswarRadhaKanta Jew Thakur   Vs. Gopinath Das, AIR 1960 Cal 741.

[12]    Palaniappa Chetty Vs. Devasikamony Pandara, 44 Ind App 147: AIR 1917 PC 33; Shibessouree Debai Vs. Mothooranath Acharjo, (1869) 13 Moo Ind. App 270 (PC); Sridhar Suar  Vs. Jagannath Temple: AIR1976 SC 1860.

[13] (1856) 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC)

[14] AIR 1927 PC 37

[15] Quoted in: AIR 1976  All 64

[16] Sridhar Suar Vs. ShriJagan Nath Temple: AIR 1976 SC 1860. Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal MohallaVs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 All LR 591

[17] Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony, 11 IA 147; Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 All LR 591

[18]    Sadhu Saran Prasad Vs. Brahmadeo Prasad: AIR 1921 Pat 99; Jado Singh Vs. Nathu Singh:  AIR 1926 All 511; Sital Prasad Singh Vs. Mander: AIR 1939 Pat 370

[19]    Ramsaroop Dass Vs. Ramnachhaya: AIR 1945 Pat 326

[20]    Muttu Swamy Vs. M. Swamiyar: AIR 1916 Madras 332; Swamy Hathiramjee Mutt Vs. Komma Venkatamuni: 2018 5 ALD 428; 2018 4 ALT 354

[21]    AIR 1946 Cal 473

[22] Quoted in: Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal MohallaVs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591

[23]Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591

[24]    Prosunno Kumari Debya V. Golab Chand Baboo, (1875) L.R.2 I.A.145; Palaniappa Chetty Vs. Sreemath Devasikamony Pandarasannadhi: ILR 40 Mad709 (PC) 

[25] Quoted in Sridhar Suar Vs. Jagannath Temple: AIR1976 SC 1860.

[26]    Panna Banerjee Vs. Kali Kinkor Ganguli (AIR 1974 Cal 126). It relied on: Gnannsambanda Pandara Samadhi Vs. Velu Pandaram: (1900) 27 Ind App 69 (PC); Damodar Das Vs. Adhikari Lakhan (1910) 37 Ind App 147 (PC); Hemanta Kumari Bose Vs. Sree SreeIswar Sridhar Jew reported: AIR 1946 Cal 473. See also Bairagi Das Vs. Sri Uday Chandra Mahatab: AIR 1965  Ori 201; GovindaJiew Thakur Vs. Surendra Jena: AIR 1961 Ori  102 .

[27]    Gnaansambanda Vs. Velu: 23 Mad 271 (PC). Damodar Das Vs. Lakahan Das: ILR (1910) 37 Cal 885; Bisseshwar Dass Vs. SashinathJha: AIR 1943 Pat 289; Balmukund Vs. Kamalwati: AIR 1964 SC 1385; Jagat Narain Vs. Mathurada: (1928) ILR 50 All 969: Sital Prasad Vs. AjvelMander: (1939) ILR 18 Pat 306; Manikka Narasimhachari Vs. Ramasubbier: (1970) 1 MLJ 337; Gurbux Singh Vs. Bishan Dass: AIR 1970 Punj 182; Sree Siddhi Budhi Vinayakagar Sundareswarar  Vs. SV Marimuthu: AIR 1963 Mad 369. MurtiShivjiMaharajBirajmanAsthalMohallaVs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 All LR 591

[28] AIR 1974  Cal 126. Appeal Judgment:  Kali Kinkor Ganguly  Vs. Panna Banerjee AIR 1974 SC 1932

[29] AIR 1974 SC 1932

[30] See: Raja Vurmah Vs. Ravi Vurmah: (1877) ILR 1 Mad 235: (1876-77) 4- Ind App 76(PC); Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Choron Requitte: AIR 1979 SC 1682; Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. LaxminathjiMaharaj: AIR 1985 All 228; JagatNarainVs. Mathura Das, AIR 1928 All 454 (FB).

[31]AIR 1969 Pat 394

[32]    Subbaya Vs. Mohammed: AIR 1923 PC 175

[33]    Appa Rao Vs. VignesamSubudhi: AIR 1937 Mad 118

[34]    Murugesan Vs. Manickavsaka: 40 Mad 402; Narasingha Swami Vs. P. Sahuani: AIR 1957 Ori 86

[35]    AIR 2005 Mad 129

[36]    AIR 1951 S.C. 214; Considered in: Sri Raghavendra Swami Mutt VS PanchapakesaIyer AIR 2005 Mad 129

[37]    AIR 1971 SC 1028; Considered in: Sri Raghavendra Swami Mutt Vs. PanchapakesaIyer AIR 2005 Mad 129

[38]    Ram CharanVs. Naurangi Lal: AIR 1933 PC 75.

[39]    Shridhar  Vs.  Jagannathji Temple, A I R 1976 S C 1860. Refered to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan  Vs.  Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[40]Quoted in Sridhar Suar Vs. Jagannath Temple: AIR 1976 SC 1860.

[41] 2018-14 SCC 761

[42]    AIR 1928 All 454 (FB). Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[43]    AIR 1961 All 73. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[44]    AIR 1917 PC 33. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[45]    Quoted with approval in Sridhar Vs. Sri Jagannath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad KhetanVs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[46]    AIR 1981 SC 2128.

[47]    AIR 1922 Bom 122.

[48]    AIR 1960 Cal 741

[49] Quoted in: Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228

[50]    1980 Edition Vol. IV at page 346

[51]    Quoted in: Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[52]    Page 892 (10th Edition)

[53]    AIR 1990 SC 444

[54] 2018-14 SCC 761



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