‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law

Saji Koduvath & Jojy George

Propositions on Possession in a Nutshell

• Possession is a substantive right.
• It is heritable and transferable.
• Courts protect settled possession.
• Injunction is a possessory remedy.
• Possessory title is a good title as against everybody other than the lawful owner.
• Injunction will not be passed to favour a trespasser or a person in unlawful possession.
• It will suffice if he can prove his lawful possession (Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, 2004-1 SCC 769).
• Even if the plaintiff is a trespasser, injunction will be granted if he can prove that his possession is settled/established.
• If the possession of the plaintiff is ‘settled/established’, injunction will be ordered against a true owner. In such a case, the ‘injunction’ will be subject to the (result of) claim of recovery (if any) in a proper suit, by the true owner.
• It is not necessary for the person (in possession) claiming injunction, to prove his title – as long as the defendant does not claim title.
• Person in ‘settled/established possession’ may get injunction against true owner (not to disposes otherwise than on due process of law); but, it cannot be claimed after cancellation (by court) of the sale deed he relied (Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji v. Maniben Jagmalbhai, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 258.

Possession is a Substantive Right

Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law. It is heritable and transferable, as explained in the following decisions –

• Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165,
• Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179;
• Phirayalal Kapur v. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186;
• Nallammal v. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864). 

Settled Possession, Established Possession & Possessory Title

In A. Subramanian v. R. Pannerselvam, AIR 2021 SC 821, the Supreme Court held that even a trespasser, who is in established possession of the property could obtain injunction. But, it was cautioned that the matter would be different, if the plaintiff himself elaborated in the plaint about title dispute and fails to make a prayer for declaration of title along with injunction relief.

In Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813, it was pointed out in a case where there was no document to prove settled possession that ‘merely on doubtful material and cursory evidence, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was ever in possession of the property, and that too in settled possession’. It held further as under:

• “13. The crux of the matter is that a person who asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. Settled possession means such possession over the property which has existed for a sufficiently long period of time, and has been acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. Settled possession must be (i) effective,(ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. There cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine settled possession. Occupation of a property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual legal possession. The possession should contain an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser is to be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

Possessory Title

The term ‘Possessory Title’ (in contrast to legally recognised ‘title appertain to ownership’) arises in the following situations-

• 1. Acquisition of ‘Original Title’: It is acquisition of title contradistinct to ‘derivative’ acquisition of title.
• 2. Possessory Title: ‘Possessory Title’ against everybody other than the lawful owner (For, possession by itself is a substantive right and good title; and ‘Right to Possession’ is a “Property”, under law).
• 3. Statutory title by Adverse Possession: Perfection of title by ‘Adverse Possession’ against the true owner; i.e., (legal) acquisition of title as recognised by Sec. 27 of the Limitation Act. (K V Swamynathan v. E V Padmanabhan, 1991-1 JT 83, 1990-2 Scale 1326)

‘Possessory Title’- On the Premise that ‘Possession’ is a Substantive Right

One who captures a property belonging to none, or reduces such a property to his possession, gets good title against the whole world – as in the case of birds in the air and fishes in the water. And, if it belongs to another, possession of the holder of such property is good title against all but the true owner (Somnath Barman v. Dr. SP Raju AIR 1970 SC 846, 1969-3 SCC 129); because, possession is the most important objective expression of ownership. According to Salmond, possession is the most basic relationship between men and things, and the possessor should have the ‘animus’ to possess the ‘corpus’.

Settled ‘Possessory Title’, in Part Performance

In Ghanshyam v. Yogendra Rathi, AIR 2023 SC 2754, 2023-7 SCC 361, the Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff (purchaser in an agreement for sale) to recover property from the defendant/title-holder (true-owner). It was on two, main, grounds:  

• First, the plaintiff/purchaser was having settled-possessory- title, in part performance under Sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
• Second, the defendant/title-holder (allowed to occupy a portion of the property for a period of 3 months as a licencee) failed to vacate despite notice.

‘Rival Titles’ in Adverse Possession – Title by ownership & Title by possession

Possessory title by adverse possession is basically a philosophical concept of property law; and it is merely acknowledged in common law and in the Limitation Act. It is explained in the thought provoking article, “Possessory Title: Its True Nexus with the Law of Limitation and the ‘Theory of Relativity’ ” by Anoop Bhaskar, Advocate, Thiruvananthapuram (2022 KLT). It is also pointed out that there are two ‘rival titles’ in a case of adverse possession; i.e., title by ownership (pertain to true owner) & title by possession (pertain to trespasser).

When a plea on adverse possession is propped up, the judicial determination is warranted on rival claims on ‘title on ownership’ and ‘title by adverse possession’; and also, ‘presumptions on title’ and ‘presumptions on possession’. If the trespasser can prove adverse possession against the true owner, as provided under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the law favours the trespasser endorsing his Possessory Title. The learned author lays down the doctrine of ‘preference’ upon the two ‘rival titles’ as under:

• “It is true by the operation of limitation prescribed under Article 65, the prior owner loses his right or remedy to sue for possession based on title. At this point, the adverse possessor acquires title by the virtue of original acquisition. … In other words, the possessor will have an entitlement to the right to possess the land against others; i.e., he is having the title to possess. At the same time the prior owner will be denying the adverse possessor’s entitlement to possession and be claiming the entitlement to all the incidents of ownership, including possession. Basically, he will be claiming title to ownership on the land. This is how there will exist two rival titles in the case of a title dispute, i.e., title to ownership & title to possession. Now the Courts will be called upon to measure the strength of each title. If the adverse possessor proves that the prior owner has lost his right to recover possession by way of limitation, it will mean that the title of the prior owner will be weaker than adverse possessor.”

Possession is Good Title against all but the True Owner

In Somnath Barman v. Dr. SP Raju AIR 1970 SC 846, 1969-3 SCC 129 our Apex Court relied on Narayana Row v. Dharmachar, ILR 26 Mad. 514, where the Madras High Court consisting of Bhashyam Ayyangar and Moore, JJ., held that possession was, under the Indian, as under the English law, good title against all but the true owner. In Somnath Barman v. Dr. SP Raju, AIR 1970 SC 846, 1969-3 SCC 129 (KS Hegde & JC Shah, JJ.), it was observed as under:

• “In our opinion the possession of the plaintiff prior to 1945 is a good title against all but the true owner. The defendants who are mere trespassers cannot defeat the plaintiff’s lawful possession by ousting him from the suit property. Possessory title is a good title as against everybody other than the lawful owner. In Ismail’ Ariff v. Mohamed Ghouse(I.L.R.20 1.A.99), the Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that a person having possessory title can get a declaration that he was the owner of the land in suit and an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. Therein it was observed that the, possession of the plaintiff was a sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant.”

True Owner

Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act allows one to file a suit for recovery of property, on the strength of his prior possession, if he had lost his possession within 6 months of the suit. It can be invoked even when the true owner evicts a person in legal or settled possession (like tenant) otherwise than on due process of law. In such a case, he need not prove his ownership to the property; and he can succeed on establishing that he has been dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law within six months.

‘Possession is Good Against All but the True Owner’ & Sec. 6 of the Sp. Relief Act

The principle ‘Possession is Good against all but the True Owner’ is declared in Parry v. Clissold, (1907) AC 73. In this decision it was also pointed out that if the rightful owner did not come forward and assert his title within the period of limitation, his right would be extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.

The Supreme Court of India while accepting this principle in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, pointed out that the law in India allows a plaintiff to maintain a possessory suit under Sec. 9 (preset Sec. 6) of the Specific Relief Act. Such a suit can be filed against a title holder, if he had dispossessed the plaintiff ‘otherwise than in due course of law’.

In Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, it is observed as under:

• “17. … To express our meaning we may begin by reading 1907 AC 73 (Perry V. Clissold), to discover if the principle that possession is good against all but the true owner has in any way been departed from.
• 1907 AC 73 reaffirmed the principle by stating quite clearly:
  • “It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.”
• Therefore, the plaintiff who was peaceably in possession was entitled to remain in possession and only the State could evict him. The action of the Society was a violent invasion of his possession and in the law as it stands in India the plaintiff could maintain a possessory suit under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act in which title would be immaterial or a suit for possession within 12 years in which the question of title could be raised.”

In Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813, our Apex Court explained the principle ‘possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better’ as under:

• “9. The law in India, as it has developed, accords with jurisprudential thought as propounded by luminaries like Salmond. Salmond on Jurisprudence states:­
  • “These two concepts of ownership and possession, therefore, may be used to distinguish between the de facto possessor of an object and its de jure owner, between the man who actually has it and the man who ought to have it. They serve also to contract the position of one whose rights are ultimate, permanent and residual with that of one whose rights are only of a temporary nature.
  • x x x x x
  • In English law possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who takes his own, may be forced in this way to  restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law.
  • Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit).”
• 10. As far back as 1924, in the case of Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144, the learned Judge observed that in India, persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a court. Later, in the case of Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, this Court ruled that when the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. It was further held that if Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (corresponding to the present Section6) is employed, the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. When, however, the period of six months has passed, questions of title can be raised by the defendant, and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words, such a right is only restricted to possession in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (corresponding to the present Section 6) but does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years from the date of dispossession, and title need not be proved unless the defendant can provide one.
• 11. It was also observed by this Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. (supra) that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against the entire world except the rightful owner. In such a case, the defendant must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title and probably a possession prior to the plaintiff’s, and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time.”

Possessory Title – Recognised in Law

A person in possession is at liberty to file a suit to recover his possession (with or without declaration) by a regular suit for recovery of possession, even if he failed to exercise his option to file a suit under Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, within six months of losing possession. It can be based on title, or on his possession in assumed or presumed character of ownership (even if title not perfected by doctrine of adverse possession). It is on the principle that ‘possession is good title against all the world but the rightful owner’. The law on this matter is laid down in detail in Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179, referring various authoritative authors and previous illuminative decisions. It is pronounced as under:

• “6. Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law and has legal incidents attached to it apart from ownership. Even before the acquisition of statutory title by adverse possession for the requisite period under the Limitation Act, the possessory owner has well defined rights in property. It is now settled beyond all dispute that this interest is heritable, devisable and transferable. This interest is referred to as possessory title as distinct from proprietary title. A person having such interest must be allowed to enforce those rights against all the world except those who have a better title or better right than himself.
• Salmond on Jurisprudence, Eleventh edition, observes at page 345 :
  • “In English law possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself.”
• and at pages 473 and 474 it is observed:
  • “On the other hand, the thing of which possession is taken may already be the property of some one else. In this case the title acquired by possession is good, indeed, against all third persons, but is of no validity at all against the true owner. Possession, even when consciously wrongful, is allowed as a title of right against all persons who cannot show a better, because a prior title in themselves. Save with respect to the rights of the original proprietor, my rights to the watch in my pocket are much the same whether. I bought it honestly, or found it, or abstracted it from the pocket of some one else. If it is stolen from me, the law will help me to the recovery of it. I can effectually sell it, lend it, give it away, or bequeath it, and it will go on my death intestate to my next of kin. Whoever acquires it from me, however, acquires in general nothing save my limited and imperfect title to it, and holds if, as I do, subject to the superior claims of the original owner.
  • XX XX XX
  • If a possessory owner is wrongfully deprived of the thing by a person other than the true owner he can recover it. For the defendant cannot set up as a defence his own possessory title since it is later than and consequently inferior to, the possessory title of the plaintiff. Nor can he set up as a defence the title of the true owner–the jus tertii as it is called; the plaintiff has a better, because an earlier, title than the defendant, and it is irrelevant that the title of some other person, not a party to the suit, is better still. The expediency of this doctrine of possessory ownership is clear. Were it not for such a rule, force and fraud would be left to determine all disputes as to possession, between persons of whom neither could show an unimpeachable title to the thing as the true owner of it.”
• Pollock & Wright in their book ‘Possession in the Common Law’ expressed themselves thus at page 91:
  • “Existing possession, however acquired, is protected against any interference by a mere wrongdoer; and the wrongdoer cannot defend himself by showing a better title than the plaintiff’s in some third person though or under whom he docs not himself claim or justify. ‘Any possession is a legal possession‘–i.e. lawful and maintainable–against a wrong doer.”
• and at page 95:
  • “It would be possible at first sight to suppose that, as between a succession of independent occupiers who were all wrongdoers as against the true owner, the law must be indifferent, with the result of conferring an absolute title upon the person who happens to he in possession when the time of limitation expires. Reflection, however, shows this to be contrary to the reason and principles of the law. Possession being once admitted to be a root of title, every possession must create a title which, as against all subsequent intruders, has all the incidents and advantages of a true title. In the language of the modern authorities, ‘Possession is good title‘– nothing less–‘against all but the true owner‘.”
• 7. The English doctrine of possessory title is expressed in the following terms by Cockburn, C. J., in Asher v. Whitelock, (1865) 35 LJQB 17:
  • “I take it to be established by authority that possession is good against all the world except the person who can show a better title than the one in possession Doe d Hughes v. Dyeball, (1829 Moo & M 346) shews that possession, even for a year, is sufficient against a mere subsequent possession. The whole law of disseisin was founded upon the principle that the desseisin gives title to the disorder against all the world but the disseisee.”
• 8. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Perry v. Clissold, 1907 AC 73 at p. 79 decided:
  • “It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the Statute of Limitations applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.”
• 9. The above is certainly the doctrine of English Law. The rule of English Law that possession is good title against all but the true owner has been adopted by the decisions of the Indian High Courts and also by the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Councilin the Indian cases. In Khajah Enaetoollah Chowdhry v. Kishen Soondur Surma, (1867) 8 Suth WR 386 at pp. 387 and 388, Dwarkanath Mitter, J. posed the question thus:
  • “Can the Civil Courts give a decree for immovable property on the bare ground of illegal dispossession in a suit brought after six months from the date of such dispossession, it being borne in mind, however, that the defendant has failed to prove his own title to the same?”
• and answered the same in the following terms:
  • But we do not see any reason why a mere wrongful dispossess or should require proof from his adversary of anything beyond the illegal dispossession complained of. He himself has not got and never had any title to the land. The act of dispossession committed by him has been entirely without any sanction from law. Justice and equity require that he should be compelled to restore the party wronged by him to the same position which the latter enjoyed before the dale of the illegal ejectment. To adopt the contrary view appears to us to be tantamount to holding out a premium in favour of wrong and violence”
• and in Hari v. Dhondi, (1906) 8 Bom LR 96 Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C. J. said:
  • “Possession is evidence of ownership, and is itself the foundation of a right to possession.”
• and Subramania Ayyar, J. in Mustapha Saheb v. Santha Pillai, (1900) ILR 23 Mad 179 at p. 182 said:
  • “that the rule of law that a party ousted by a person who has no better right is, with reference to the person so ousting, entitled to recover by virtue of the possession he had held before the ouster even though that “possession was without any title” is so firmly established as to render a lengthened discussion about it quite superfluous.”
• 10. In Sundar v. Parbati, (1890) ILR 12 All 61 (PC) decided by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the suit was for partition and recovery of possession filed by the junior widow of a deceased Hindu against the senior widow who denied the junior widow’s right to separate possession and contended that she was entitled to manage the whole estate. The Subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiff’s suit. A Bench of the Allahabad High Court reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the suit. Lord Watson delivering the Judgment of the hoard, observed at page 57:
  • “If it were necessary to determine the point, their Lordships would probably have little difficulty in accepting the opinion of the High Court that a Hindu Brahman cannot lawfully adopt his own sister’s son. But apart from that question, and also from any question touching the legal effect of Baldeo Sahai’s will the fact of joint possession by the two widows of the estates which belonged to the testator, ever since the death of Premsukh in 1879, appears to them to be sufficient for disposing of this suit in favour of the appellant. Their Lordships are at a loss to understand, at all event to appreciate, the grounds upon which the Chief Justice endeavours to differentiate between the authorities which he cites, the import of which he correctly states, and the position of the parties to this action. Their possession was lawfully attained, in this sense, that it was not procured by force or fraud, but peaceably, no one interested opposing. In these circumstances, it does not admit of doubt that they were entitled to maintain their possession against all coiners except the heirs of Premsukh or of Baldco Sahai, one or other of whom (it is unnecessary to say which) is the only person who can plead a preferable title. But neither of these possible claimants is in the field, and the widows have therefore, each of them, an estate or interest in respect of her possession, which cannot be impaired by the circumstance that they may have ascribed their possession to one or more other titles which do not belong to them. It is impossible to hold that a joint estate is not also partible; and their Lordships will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty that the judgment of the High Court ought to be reversed, and that of the Subordinate Judge restored.”
• The above principle was reiterated by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghous, (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC). At page 843 their Lordships observed:
  • “It appears to their Lordships that there is here a misapprehension of the nature of the plaintiff’s case upon the facts stated in the judgment. The possession of the plaintiff was sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant. By Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (Act 1 of 1877), if the plaintiff had been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, he could, by a suit instituted within six months from the date of the dispossession, have recovered possession, notwithstanding any other title that might be set up in such suit. If he could thus recover possession from a person who might be able to prove a title, it is certainly right and just that he should be able, against a person who has no title and is a mere wrongdoer, to obtain a declaration of title as owner, and an injunction to restrain the wrong-doer from interfering with his possession. Die Appellate Court, in accordance with the judgment above quoted, has dismissed the suit. Consequently, the defendant may continue to wilfully, improperly and illegally interferes with the plaintiff’s possession, as the learned Judge say he has done, and the plaintiff has no remedy. Their Lordships are of opinion that the suit should not have been dismissed; and that the plaintiff was entitled in it to a declaration of his title to the land.”
• The principle underlying the rule that possession is a good title against all the world except the person who can show a better title is staled thus in Narayana Row v. Dharma-char, (1903) ILR 26 Mad 514 at p. 518:
  • “The principle underlying the rule of law in question seems to be that acquisition of title by operation of the law of limitation being a lawful mode of acquiring title, the person in peaceable possession is entitled to maintain such possession against all but the true owner and that therefore a third party who has no better title than the person in possession has no right to invade upon the possession of the latter and interrupt or arrest his lawful acquisition of title by his continuing to remain in possession for the statutory period. It is the true owner alone that is entitled to assert his title as against the person wrongfully in possession, and prevent such wrongful possession ripening into prescriptive title. But a third party who without deriving title under the true owner and without his authority, interrupts such possession before it has ripened into prescriptive title, is a trespasser, not only against the true owner, but also against the party actually in possession; and, subject to the law of limitation, either of them is entitled to maintain a suit in ejectment against such intruder as a trespasser.”
• 11. We are therefore of the view that a person in juridical possession, if dispossessed by a trespasser without title, can recover possession on the sole ground of his prior possession even beyond six months from the date of dispossession and this is enough to dispose of the second appeal.
• 12. But the learned advocate for the appellant relying on the decision in Nisa Chand Gaita v. Kanchiram Bagani, (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 submitted that mere previous possession for any period short of the statutory period of twelve years will not entitle a plaintiff to a decree for recovery of possession in a suit brought more than six months after dispossession, even if the defendant could not establish any title to the disputed land. The point which arose for decision in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 was whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree merely upon proof of previous possession for a period less than twelve years, on the ground that the defendant has established no title, the suit having been brought more than six months after the date of dispossession. (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) was distinguished thus:
  • “There (in 1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) the plaintiff was in possession when he brought his suit, whereas in the present case the plaintiff is out of possession. What the plaintiff asked for in the case of Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghous (1893-20 Cal 834 PC) was a decree declaring his right, and an injunction restraining the defendant from disturbing his possession; what the plaintiff asks for in this case is only recovery of possession; and what was said by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee with reference to the plaintiff’s right to obtain this relief is to be found in the following passage of their judgment:
  • “It appears to their Lordships that there is here a misapprehension of the nature of the plaintiff’s case upon the facts stated in the judgment. The possession of the plaintiff was sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant. By Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (1 of 1877), if the plaintiff had been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, he could by a suit instituted within six months from the date of the dispossession, have recovered possession, notwithstanding any other title that might be set up in such suit. If he could thus recover possession from a person who might be able to prove a title, it is certainly right and just that he should he able, against a person who has no title and is a mere wrongdoer, to obtain a declaration of title as owner, and an injunction to restrain the wrong-doer from interfering with his possession.”
  • This shows, as we understand the judgment, that the reason for their Lordships’ decision was this that as the plaintiff, had his position been rendered somewhat worse by his being dispossessed, could, by instituting a suit within six months for recovery of possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, have recovered possession even as against a person who might establish a better title, it was only right and just that if he brought his suit before he was dispossessed he could be declared entitled to retain possession as against a mere wrong-doer, and should obtain an injunction restraining the wrong-doer from interfering with his possession. But, though that was so in the case of a plaintiff who was in possession, and had, therefore, a possibility open to him of being restored to possession upon mere proof of possession, by instituting a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act upon being dis-possessed, it does not follow that it should be so in the case of a plaintiff who had been in possession, and allowed more than six months to elapse after his dispossession, and therefore, lost the possibility of recovering possession, by a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, upon mere proof of previous possession.”
• 13. Distinguishing (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) in the above manner, the Calcutta High Court in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 sought support for the dictum in the following observations of the Privy Council in J. P. Wise v. Ameerunnissa Khatoon, (1879-80) 7 Ind App 73 at p. 80 (PC):
  • “It is quite clear that the plaintiffs have failed to make out a title. The Defendants were put into possession by the Government, who were entitled to the lands, and they were ordered by the Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure to be retained in possession. If the Plaintiffs had wished to contend that the Defendants had been wrongfully put into possession and that the Plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the strength of their previous possession without entering into a question of title at all, they ought to have brought their action within six months under Section 15 of Act XIV of 1859; but they did not do so. The High Court, with reference to this point say (and in their Lordships’ opinion, correctly say) : “Further, de facto possession having been given to the Defendants under Section 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in accordance with the Deputy Collector’s award, the plaintiff will not be entitled to a decree until and unless he can show a better title to these lands than the Defendants. The fact that the Plaintiffs’ posses sion as regards B, C, and D was confirmed under Act IV of 1840, and that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 unsuccessfully endeavoured to dis-turb them by regular suit, does not bar the right of Government. Section 2 of Act IV of 1840 only affects persons concerned in the dispute. If Kalkini-hud belonged to a private individual he might have reduced into his own possession lands which had accreted to the estate and which undoubtedly were his. But lands to which he is unable to make out a title cannot he recovered on the ground of previous possession merely, except in a suit under Section 15 of Act XIV of 1859, which must be brought within six months from the time of that dispossession.”
• The Calcutta High Court on an interpretation of (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) and (1879 80) 7 Ind App 73 (PC) has therefore taken the view that Section 9 of the Act operates as a bar to the institution of suits in which the claim for possession of any immovable property is based on anything but proprietary title.
• 14. On the other hand, the decision in (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) was relied on by the other High Courts for the position that possessory title can be made the foundation for suits in ejectment filed after six months from the date of dispossession against trespassers who have no title.
• 15. The effective answer to the basis of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 has been furnished by Subra-mania Ayyar and O’ Farrell JJ. in (1900) ILR 23 Mad 179 at p. 183. Subramania Ayyar, J. at page 183 observed:
  • “And with reference to the grounds on which decision in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 seems to rest, it is necessary to make but two observations. The first is that Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act cannot possibly be held to take away any remedy available with reference to the well-recognised doctrine expressed in Pollock and Wright on Possession thus:–Possession in law is a substantive right or interest which exists and has legal incidents and advantages apart from the true owners title, (at page 19). The second observation is that in (1879-80) 7 Ind App 73 (PC) relied on in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 the defendant had a better right than the plaintiff, since the possession of the former was authorised by the Government whose properly the land in dispute was and consequently nothing said by their Lordships in a case wherein such were the facts can rightly be con-strued as intended to lay down the law differently from what it bad been all along understood to be.” and O’ Farrell, J. observed:
  • “All the dictum of the Privy Council in (1879-80) 7 Ind App 73 (PC) appears to amount to is this, that where a plaintiff in possession without any title seeks to recover possession of which be has been forcibly deprived by a defendant having a good title, he can only do so under the provisions of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and not otherwise.”
• 16. The Madras High Court again in (1903) ILR 26 Mad 514 relying on (1893 ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) took the view that Section 9 of the Act is in no way inconsistent with the position that as against a wrong-doer, prior possession of the plaintiff in an action of ejectment is sufficient title, even if a suit is brought more than six months after the date of dispossession and the wrong-doer cannot successfully resist the suit by showing that the title and right to possession are in a third person, and a plea of jus tertii is no defence unless the defendant can show that the act complained of was done by authority of the true owner and it is immaterial however short or recent the plaintiff’s possession was. The only effect of Section 9 of the Act is that if a summary suit be brought within the time prescribed by that Section, the plaintiff therein who was dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law will be entitled to be reinstated even if the defendant who thus dispossessed him be the true owner or a person authorised by or claiming under him, but a decree in such a suit will not have the force of res judicata on the question of title.
• 17. We are in respectful agreement with the observations in (1900) ILR 23 Mad 179 and hold that the decision in (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579 has proceeded on an incorrect interpretation of the decisions in (1893) ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC) and (1879-80) 7 Ind App 73 (PC):
• 18. There remains only to consider the decision of Mr. Justice Raman Nayar in Vasudeva Kurup v. Ammini Amma 1964 Ker LT 468 where it was held that a person in possession without title is entitled to remain in possession even as against the lawful owner until evicted in due course of law and is therefore entitled to get an order of injunction restraining the true owner from disturbing his possession. The right of a person in possession without title to get an injunction on the basis of possessory title against the true owner is not a point arising in the second appeal and we are not expressing any opinion on that aspect. The point decided in 1964 Ker L. T. 468 has no direct bearing on the question to be decided in the second appeal except that possessory title is recognised as the foundation of a claim for maintaining one’s possession. This only sup ports the view we are taking in this appeal.”

Read blogs:

• The Law and Principles of Mandatory Injunction
• Civil Rights and Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
• Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?

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Also read:

• How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?
• Government of Kerala v. Joseph – Law on Adverse Possession Against Government
• Ouster and Dispossession in Adverse Possession
• POSSESSION is a Substantive Right in Indian Law

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Read in this Cluster  (Click on the topic):

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

• Civil Rights and Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
• Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
• Order II, Rule 2 CPC – Not to Vex Defendants Twice
• Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
• Pleadings in Defamation Suits
• UNDUE INFLUENCE and PLEADINGS thereof in Indian Law
• PLEADINGS IN ELECTION MATTERS
• Declaration and Injunction
• Law on Summons to Defendants and Witnesses
• Notice to Produce Documents in Civil Cases
• Production of Documents: Order 11, Rule 14 & Rule 12
• Sec. 91 CPC and Suits Against Wrongful Acts
• Remedies Under Sec. 92 CPC
• Mandatory Injunction – Law and Principles
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• Interrogatories: When Court Allows, When Rejects?
• Decree in OI R8 CPC-Suit & Eo-Nomine Parties
• Pecuniary & Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• Doctrine of Substantial Representation in a Suit by or against an Association
• Who are Necessary Parties, Proper Parties and Pro Forma Parties in Suits
• What is Partnership, in Law? How to Sue a Firm?
• ‘Legal Representatives’, Not ‘Legal Heirs’ to be Impleaded on Death of Plaintiff/Defendant
• Powers and Duties of Commissioners to Make Local Investigations, Under CPC
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Is it Mandatory to Set Aside the Commission Report – Where a Second Commissioner is Appointed?
• Can a Commission be Appointed to Find Out the Physical Possession of a Property?
• Rules on Burden of proof and Adverse Inference
• Pendente Lite Transferee Cannot Resist or Obstruct Execution of a Decree
• Family Settlement or Family Arrangement in Law
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law

Power of attorney

• No Adjudication If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney Sufficient for Registration
• Permission when a Power of Attorney Holder Files Suit
• If Power of Attorney himself Executes the Document, S. 33 Registration Act will NOT be attracted
• Is Registered Power of Attorney Necessary for Registration of a Deed? No.

Title, ownership and Possession

• Sale Deeds Without Consideration – Void
• Recovery of Possession Based on Title and on Earlier Possession
• Title and Ownership in Indian Law
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• POSSESSION is a Substantive Right in Indian Law
• 22nd Law Commission  Report on ‘Law on Adverse Possession’
• Government of Kerala v. Joseph – Law on Adverse Possession Against Government
• How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?
• Ultimate Ownership of All Property Vests in State; It is an Incident of Sovereignty.
• ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’
• Preemption is a Very Weak Right; For, Property Right is a Constitutional & Human Right
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Family Settlement or Family Arrangement in Law
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal – Does Something Remain Untold?
• Grant in Law

Adverse Possession

• How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?
• Government of Kerala v. Joseph – Law on Adverse Possession Against Government
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Ouster and Dispossession in Adverse Possession

Principles and Procedure

• Doctrines on Ultra Vires, Rule of Law, Judicial Review, Nullification of Mandamus, and Removing the BASIS of the Judgment
• Will – Probate and Letters of Administration
• Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
• Declaration and Injunction
• Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
• Does Alternate Remedy Bar Civil Suits and Writ Petitions?
• Void, Voidable, Ab Initio Void, and Sham Transactions
• Can Courts Award Interest on Equitable Grounds?
• Natural Justice – Not an Unruly Horse
• ‘Sound-mind’ and ‘Unsound-Mind’
• Prescriptive Rights – Inchoate until the Title thereof is Upheld by a Competent Court
• Can a Party to Suit Examine Opposite Party, as of Right?
• Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
• Doctrine of ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Indian Law

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

• Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
• Proof and Truth of Documents
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Production, Admissibility & Proof Of Documents
• Modes of Proof – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting 
• Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

• Does ‘Pandaravaka Pattom’ in Kerala Denote Full-Ownership?
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder
• Vested interest and Contingent Interest
• Ultimate Ownership of All Property Vests in State; It is an Incident of Sovereignty.
• Land Acquired Cannot be Returned – Even if it is Not Used for the Purpose Acquired
• ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’
• FERA, 1973 And Transfer of Immovable Property by a Foreigner
• Marumakkathayam – A System of Law and Way of Life Prevailed in Kerala
• Relevant provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act in a Nutshell
• Land Tenures, and History of Land Derivation, in Kerala
• Government is the OWNER of (Leasehold) Plantation Lands in Kerala.
• Sale Deeds Without Consideration – Void
• Law on Acquisition of Private Plantation Land in Kerala
• Law on SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE and LEGAL HEIRSHIP CERTIFICATE
• Grant in Law

Evidence Act – General

• Evidence in Court – General Principles
• Expert Evidence and Appreciation of Evidence
• How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
• Rules on Burden of proof and Adverse Inference
• Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
• What is Collateral Purpose?
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Modes of Proof – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• Significance of Scientific Evidence in Judicial Process
• Polygraphy, Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping Tests
• What is Section 27 Evidence Act – Recovery or Discovery?
• How ‘Discovery’ under Section 27, Evidence Act, Proved?
• Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witnesses Theory

Sec. 65B

• Sec. 65B, Evidence Act: Arjun Paditrao Criticised.
• Sec. 65B Evidence Act Simplified
• ‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be proved by ‘CERTIFICATE’ u/s. 65B
• Sec. 65B,  Evidence Act: Certificate forms
• Certificate is Required Only for ‘Computer Output’; Not for ‘Electronic Records’: Arjun Panditrao Explored.
• How to Prove ‘Whatsap Messages’, ‘Facebook’ and ‘Website’ in Courts?

Law on Documents

• Production, Admissibility & Proof Of Documents
• Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Time Limit for Registration of Documents
• Registration of Documents Executed out of India
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• Are RTI Documents Admissible in Evidence as ‘Public Documents’?
• Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant
• Effect of Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Stand Proved?
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Notary-Attested Documents: Presumption, Rebuttable
• What is Collateral Purpose?
• No Application Needed for Filing or Admitting Copy
• Presumptions on Registered Documents & Truth of Contents
• Notice to Produce Documents in Civil Cases
• Production of Documents: Order 11, Rule 14 & Rule 12
• Modes of Proof – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Proof and Truth of Documents
• Secondary Evidence of Documents & Objections to Admissibility – How & When?
• 30 Years Old Documents and Presumption of Truth of Contents, under Sec. 90 Evidence Act
• Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
• Adjudication as to Proper Stamp under Stamp Act
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Settlement Deeds & Powers of Sub-Registrar in Registering Deeds
• Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting 
• How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
• Visual and Audio Evidence (Including Photographs, Cassettes, Tape-recordings, Films, CCTV Footage, CDs, e-mails, Chips, Hard-discs, Pen-drives)
• Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witnesses Theory
• No Adjudication Needed If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance
• Impounding of Documents – When Produced; Cannot Wait Till it is Exhibited

Interpretation

• Interpretation of Statutes – Literal Rule, Mischief Rule and Golden Rule
• Interpretation of Documents – Literal Rule, Mischief Rule and Golden Rule
• Interpretation of Wills

Contract Act

• ‘Sound-mind’ and ‘Unsound-Mind’ in Indian Civil Laws
• Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
• Who has to fix Damages in Tort and Contract?
• UNDUE INFLUENCE and PLEADINGS thereof in Indian Law
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance

Law on Damages

• Law on Damages
• Who has to fix Damages in Tort and Contract?
• Law on Damages in Defamation Cases
• Pleadings in Defamation Suits

Easement

• Easement Simplified
• What is Easement? Does Right of Easement Allow to ‘Enjoy’ After Making a Construction?
• Prescriptive Rights – Inchoate until the Title thereof is Upheld by a Competent Court
• Will Easement of Necessity Ripen into a Prescriptive Easement?
• What is “period ending within two years next before the institution of the suit”?
• Is the Basis of Every Easement, Theoretically, a Grant
• Extent of Easement (Width of Way) in Easement of Necessity, Quasi Easement and Implied Grant
• Can Easement of Necessity and of Grant be Claimed in a Suit (Alternatively)?
• “Implied Grant” in Law of Easements
• Can an Easement-Way be Altered by the Owner of the Land?
• Village Pathways and Right to Bury are not Easements.
• Custom & Customary Easements in Indian Law
• ‘Additional Burden Loses Lateral Support’ – Incorrect Proposition
• Grant in Law

Stamp Act & Registration

• Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Settlement Deeds & Powers of Sub-Registrar in Registering Deeds
• Time-Limit For Adjudication of Unstamped Documents, before Collector
• Time Limit for Registration of Documents
• Registration of Documents Executed out of India
• LAW ON INSUFFICIENTLY STAMPED DOCUMENTS 
• Adjudication as to Proper Stamp under Stamp Act
• Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
• Impounding of Documents, When Produced; Cannot Wait Till it is Exhibited
• No Adjudication Needed If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney Sufficient for Registration

Will

• Interpretation of Wills
• Interpretation of Inconsistent Clauses in a Will
• Will – Probate and Letters of Administration
• Executors of Will – Duties & their Removal
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• How to Write a Will? Requirements of a Valid Will

Arbitration

• N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. and Ground Realities of Indian Situation
• What are Non-Arbitrable Disputes? When a Dispute is Not Referred to Arbitration in spite of Arbitration Clause
• Termination or Nullity of Contract Will Not Cease Efficacy of the Arbitration Clause
• No Valid Arbitration Agreement ‘Exists’ – Can Arbitration Clause be Invoked?

Divorce

• Validity of Foreign Divorce Decrees in India
• Is ‘Irretrievable Brake-down of Marriage’, a Valid Ground for Divorce in India?
• Foreign Divorce Judgment against Christians having Indian Domicile

Negotiable Instruments Act

• “Otherwise Through an Account” in Section 142, NI Act
• Where to file Cheque Bounce Cases (Jurisdiction of Court – to file NI Act Complaint)?
• Cheque Dishonour Case against a Company, Firm or Society

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

• Judicial & Legislative Activism in India: Principles and Instances
• Can Legislature Overpower Court Decisions by an Enactment?
• Separation of Powers: Who Wins the Race – Legislature or Judiciary?
• Kesavananda Bharati Case: Never Ending Controversy
• Mullaperiyar Dam: Disputes and Adjudication of Legal Issues
• Article 370: Is There Little Chance for Supreme Court Interference
• Maratha Backward Community Reservation: SC Fixed Limit at 50%.
• Polygraphy, Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping Tests
• CAA Challenge: Divergent Views
• FERA, 1973 And Transfer of Immovable Property by a Foreigner
• Doctrine of ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Indian Law
• Doctrines on Ultra Vires and Removing the BASIS of the Judgment, in ED Director’s Tenure Extension Case (Dr. Jaya Thakur Vs. Union of India)
• Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India – Mandamus (Given in a Case) Cannot be Annulled by Changing the Law
• Art. 370 – Turns the Constitution on Its Head

Religious issues

• Secularism and Art. 25 & 26 of the Indian Constitution
• Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
• ‘Ban on Muslim Women to Enter Mosques, Unconstitutional’
• No Reservation to Muslim and Christian SCs/STs (Dalits) Why?
• Parsi Women – Excommunication for Marrying Outside
• Knanaya Endogamy & Constitution of India
• Sabarimala Review Petitions & Reference to 9-Judge Bench
• SABARIMALA REVIEW and Conflict in Findings between Shirur Mutt Case & Durgah Committee Case
• Ayodhya Disputes: M. Siddiq case –Pragmatic Verdict

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

• General
  • General Features
  • Bye Laws Fundamental
  • Effect of Registration of Societies and Incorporation of Clubs
  • Societies and Branches
• Property & Trust
  • Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs
  • Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies
• Juristic Personality
  • Juristic Personality of Societies and Clubs
  • Legal Personality of Trustees and Office Bearers
• Suits
  • Suits and Criminal Complaints By and Against a Company
  • Suits By or Against Societies, Clubs
  • Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs
  • How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies
• Amendment and Dissolution
  • Amendment of Bye laws of Societies and Clubs
  • Dissolution of Societies and Clubs
• Rights and Management
  • Rights & Liabilities of Members of Clubs and Societies
  • Individual Membership Rights in Societies & Clubs
  • Management – Powers of General Body and Governing Body
  • Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers
  • Law on Meetings: An Overview
• Election
  • Election & Challenge in Societies and Clubs
  • Court Interference in Election Process
• State Actions
  • State-Interference in Affairs of Societies & Clubs

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

• General Principles
  • What is Trust in Law?
  • Classification of Trusts
  • Public & Private Trusts in India.
  • Trust is ‘An Obligation’; Not a Legal Entity
  • Indian Law Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership
• Dedication and Vesting
  • Dedication of Property in Public Trusts
  • Vesting of Property in Trusts
  • Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies
• Trustees and Management
  • Trustees and Administration of Public Trusts
  • Alienation of Public Trust Property
  • Extinction, Discharge, Revocation, etc. of Public Trusts
• Breach of Trust
  • Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees
• Suits by or against Trusts
  • Suits By or Against Trusts and Trustees
  • Remedies Under Sec. 92 CPC
• Law on Hindu Religious Endowments
  • Philosophy of Idol Worship
  • Is an Idol a Perpetual Minor?
  • Hindu Temples & Law of Trusts
  • Public & Private Trusts
  • Law of Mutts and Other Hindu Endowments
  • Shebaits & Mahants and Law of Trustees
• Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques – General
  • Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques
• Constitutional Principles
  • Secularism and Art. 25 & 26 of the Indian Constitution
  • Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
  • ‘Muslim Women: Ban to Enter Mosques, Is it Unconstitutional
  • Parsi Women Excommunication, Unconstitutional.
  • Knanaya Endogamy & Constitution of India
  • State & Court – Protectors of All Charities
• Ayodhya and Sabarimala Disputes
  • Ayodhya Disputes: M. Siddiq case – Pragmatic Verdict
  • Sabarimala Review Petitions & Reference to 9-Judge Bench
  • SABARIMALA REVIEW and Conflict in Findings between Shirur Mutt Case & Durgah Committee Case
• General
  • Public Trusts and (State) Endowments/Trusts Acts
  • Public Trusts and Indian Trusts Act – An Overview
  • Business by Charitable Trusts & Institutions