What is Partnership, in Law? How to Sue a Firm?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Synopsis & Key Takeaways

General

  • ‘Partnership’ is the relation between partners under an agreement to share profits in a business.
  • A ‘Firm’ is the collection of partners (of the Partnership).
  • A firm is not a juristic person.
  • In law, it is a compendious name for all the partners.
  • A partnership deed is not necessary to form a partnership.
  • Registration of partnership (before the Registrar of Firms) is also not necessary.
  • The liability of each partner is joint and several.

Order 30 CPC

  • Rule 1 of Order 30 CPC provides only an enabling method to sue, or be sued, partners of a firm (both Registered and Unregistered), at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, in the name of the firm. Suit by or against a firm is suit by or against its partners.
    • Order 30 Rule 1 do not apply when suit is instituted not in the name of the firm (instead, suit by all partners).
    • One partner alone can sue, or be sued, in the firm name. Still, the decree binds all partners.
    • When all partners are in the party array (in a suit), impleading of the firm is surplusage,
  • The purpose of using the name of the firm, in a suit, is merely to encompass all the partners (even if none of them is not named as parties to the suit).
  • Though no partner need comes as a plaintiff (under Rules 1 of Order 30 CPC), if so demanded by the defendant, the names and details of such partners should be revealed, forthwith, by the plaintiffs (Rule 2 of Order 30).
  • Rule 3 of Order 30 provides that summons to firm shall be served either-
    • (a) upon any one or more of the partners, or
    • (b) upon any person having the control or management of the partnership business, at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried:
  • Judgment/Decree in the name of the firm (without joining any partner), has the same effect as a Judgment/ decree in favour of or against all its partners.
  • The partners are not necessary parties in trial-stage, to proceed in execution against all partners. The question as to who are the persons who constitute the firm can be decided in execution proceedings (Order 21, Rule 50 CPC).

Section 69 Partnership Act

  • Section 69(1) Partnership Act directs that the registration of the firm is mandatory, and a condition precedent, to institute a suit by one partner against the firm or another partner.
  • Section 69(2) directs that registration of the firm is necessary for suit by or on behalf of a firm (i) against a third party (ii) to enforce a contract with the firm.
    • Note: Sec. 69 (2) is not attracted when a suit is filed against a third party for reliefs other than enforcement of contract – like enforcement of a statutory right (trade mark) or a common law right or a right under TP Act (eviction of tenant) or cause of action on dishonour of cheques.
  • Section 69(3) directs that registration of firm is necessary for claiming ‘set off’.
    • Though the stipulation in Section 69 (which requires registration for filing certain suits) may appear harsh, the historical basis of this provision (enacted in 1932) justifies its legitimacy. English law, stood at that time, required compulsory registration of partnership, and contravention thereof was made punishable.
    • After independence also, the provisions as to registration of firms were not changed. Obviously, it is also because of the proclamations in Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India (in Fundamental Rights Chapter).
  • Section 69 requires that (i) all the partners at the time of the institution of the suit must be parties to the suit and (ii) their names also be in the Register of Firms, to proceed to obtain the reliefs stated in Sec. 69 (though Or. 30 r. I enables – two or more partners to sue).
  • Order 30 and Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act are independent provisions, that operate separately. They deal with different aspects.
  • Both these provisions must be complied with, when a suit is instituted (i) to enforce a contract, (ii)  by or on behalf of a firm and (iii) against a third party.
  • A partnership (that arises by an agreement to share profits or loss) cannot be put an end by a partner without consent of others; whereas in a co-ownership venture, a co-owner can transfer his interest. Because co-ownership activities are not governed by Partnership Act, Sec. 69 Bar is not applicable to the same.

Practical Note

  • Under Order 30 Rule 1, to sue a firm, either the firm be made as a party, in addition to one or more of the partners; or
  • the firm alone be made as the party, naming the (one or more) partners or any person having the control (or management of the partnership business, at its principal place of business) upon whom the summons be served by the conjuncture “by”, “through” or “represented by”; because, Order 30 rule 1 says – partners “may sue or be sued with (or, in) the name of the firm”.

Part I

Partnership Definition

Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, defines partnership as under:

  • 4. Definition of ‘partnership’, ‘partner’, ‘firm’ and ‘firm name’
  • ‘Partnership’ is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all.
  • Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually ‘partners’ and collectively a ‘firm’, and the name under which their business is carried on is called the ‘firm name’.

‘Partnership’ and ‘Firm’ in Law

  • ‘Partnership’ is the relation of persons under an agreement to share profits in a business.
  • A ‘Firm’ is the collection of partners (of the Partnership).

Elements of Partnership

From the above definition, it comes out that the following are the essential elements of a Partnership:

  • (1) Contract,
  • (2) two or more persons,
  • (3) business,
  • (4) object of sharing profits and
  • (5) business by all or any of them acting for all.

Co-ownership and Partnership: Distinction

Characteristics of a partnership, qua the Co-ownership, are the following:

  • Partnership arises by an agreement to share profits or loss.
  • It cannot be put an end by a partner without consent of others.
  • A partner cannot transfer his interest in partnership, of his own.

The basic distinction between co-ownership and partnership is laid down in Dr. Ramji Singh Properties v. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, 2013 SCC OnLine All 13873, as under:

  • The co-ownership is not necessarily the result of an agreement while the partnership is the result of an agreement.
  • The concept of involvement of community of profits or loss is not attached with the concept of co-ownership.
  • A co-owner can, without consent of others, transfer or discard his interest, but the result of the agreement for forming a firm does not allow a partner to transfer or discard his interest, unilaterally.

No Written or Registered Document is Needed to Contribute Land to Firm

In Dr. Ramji Singh Properties v. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, 2013 SCC OnLine All 13873, the decision, Firm Ram Sahay Mall Rameshwar Dayal v. Bishwanath Prasad, AIR 1963 Pat. 221, was referred which said as under:

  • “The legal position, therefore, appears to be that no written or registered document is necessary for an individual to contribute any land or immovable property as a contribution against his share of the capital of a new partnership business. The same view was taken by a bench of the Calcutta High Court in Prem Raj Brahmin v. Bhani Ram Brahmin, ILR (1946) 1 Cal 191. It was held that a written document, and, consequently registration, is not necessary to bring in the separate properties of the partners into the partnership stock, and by virtue of Sections 14 and 46 of the Indian Partnership Act and certain provisions of the Indian Contract Act, they become the properties of the firm as soon as the partners intend to so bring them in and Treat them as such. It was further laid down by their Lordships that this sort of contribution or transfer is hot prohibited by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or the Indian Registration Act, 1908.”

Maximum Number of Partners in a Partnership is 50

Indian Partnership Act, 1932 does not limit the number of partners in a firm. 

  • Sec. 464 of the Companies Act, 2013 provided that the maximum number of partners should not exceed one hundred; and it was left to the Government to fix the maximum (by rules). Rule 10 of the Companies (Miscellaneous) Rules, 2014, fixed the the maximum number partners as 50.
  • Under the erstwhile Companies Act, 1956, maximum partners allowed in a partnership firm was 10 persons in a banking business; and 20 persons in other business.

Sec. 464 of the Companies Act, 2013 reads as under:

  • Prohibition of association or partnership of persons exceeding certain number:
  • (1) No association or partnership consisting of more than such number of persons as may be prescribed shall be formed for the purpose of carrying on any business that has for its object the acquisition of gain by the association or partnership or by the individual members thereof, unless it is registered as a company under this Act or is formed under any other law for the time being in force:
  • Provided that the number of persons which may be prescribed under this sub-section shall not exceed one hundred.
  • (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to—
  • (a) a Hindu undivided family carrying on any business; or
  • (b) an association or partnership, if it is formed by professionals who are governed by special Acts.
  • (3) Every member of an association or partnership carrying on business in contravention of sub-section (1) shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees and shall also be personally liable for all liabilities incurred in such business.

Kinds of Partnership (on duration)

  • i. At will (when no fixed period is prescribed for the expiration)
  • ii. Partnership for a fixed period

Kinds of Partners

  • Active/managing partners
  • Sleeping/Dormant partners
  • Nominal partner (partner only by his name who has no real interest in the firm)
  • Partner in profit only: (He is not liable for any)
  • Minor partner (He will share the profit but his liability will be limited)
  • Partner by estoppel (If one represented himself to be the partner, he may be estopped from denying the status)

Status of Partners in a FirmAgent

Section 18 onwards declares Status of Partners in a Firm. They read as under:

Section 18: Partner to be Agent of the Firm.

  • Subject to the provisions of this Act, a partner is the agent of the firm for the purposes of the business of the firm.

Property purchased in the name of one Partner

Property purchased in the name of one Partner can be parnership property if the accounts reveal it. Merely because a property of a partner is used for partnership business, it will not become partnership property.

Power of Attorney executed by a Partner authorizing an Individual Bind the Firm.

Under S. 18 of the Act a partner is an agent of the firm.  Power of Attorney signed by one partner will bind the firm. In Purushottam Umedbhai v. Manilal and Sons, AIR 1961 SC 325 our Apex Court held as follows:

  • “One of the partners Manubhai Maganbhai Amin was the Manager of the firm Manilal & Sons. He had executed a Power of Attorney in favour of four persons including one Dunderdale. By this Power he authorized any one of these persons to sue for recovery of moneys due to the firm from the firm Purushottam Umedbhai & Co., the appellant. It also empowered these persons to appear and to represent the firm in any court, in any jurisdiction – civil, criminal, insolvency, original, appellate or otherwise-and before any official in any suit or proceeding or matter and to make, sign, verify, present and file any plaint. Dunderdale had signed and verified the plaint in the present case. We have no doubt, on a perusal of the Power of Attorney, that it authorized Dunderdale to file the plaint on behalf of the firm Manilal & Sons and also to verify it. It was suggested that this was a Power of Attorney by Manubhai Maganbhai Amin for himself and not for the firm of Manilal & Sons. As we understand the Power of Attorney that is not so. No doubt the Power of Attorney is not signed by all the partners of Manilal & Sons but only by Manubhai Maganbhai Amin. In our opinion, it was not necessary that the Power should have been signed by all the partners of the firm because Manubhai Maganbhai Amin was the manager of the firm. Under S. 18 of the Act a partner is an agent of the firm for the purposes of the business of the firm. Manubhai Maganbhai Amin was therefore the agent of the firm as well as its manager. It is to be noticed that under s. 19(2) of the Act instances are stated where, in the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary, the implied authority of a partner does not empower him to do matters mentioned in cls. (a) to (h). It is significant that in these clauses there is no prohibition to a partner executing a Power of Attorney in favour of an individual authorizing him to institute a suit on behalf of the firm. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that at the time the plaint was filed it was defective because the Power of Attorney in favour of Dunderdale was not a Power of Attorney on behalf of the firm and its partners. As the High Court has pointed out, there is on the record now Powers of Attorney on behalf of all the partners of the firm.”

Section 19 Implied Authority of Partner as Agent of the Firm.

  • (1) Subject to the provisions of section 22, the act of a partner which is done to carry on, in the usual way, business of the kind carried on by the firm, binds the firm.
  • The authority of a partner to bind the firm conferred by this section is called his “implied authority”.
  • (2) In the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary, the implied authority of a partner does not empower him to –
  • (a) submit a dispute relating to the business of the firm to arbitration,
  • (b) open a banking account on behalf of the firm in his own name,
  • (c) compromise or relinquish any claim or portion of a claim by the firm,
  • (d) withdraw a suit or proceeding filed on behalf of the firm,
  • (e) admit any liability in a suit or proceeding against the firm,
  • (f) acquire immovable property on behalf of the firm,
  • (g) transfer immovable property belonging to the firm, or
  • (h) enter into partnership on behalf of the firm.

Section 20 Extension and Restriction of Partner’s Implied Authority.

  • The partners in a firm may, by contract between the partners, extend or restrict the implied authority of any partner.
  • Notwithstanding any such restriction, any act done by a partner on behalf of the firm which falls within his implied authority binds the firm, unless the person with whom he is dealing knows of the restriction or does not know or believe that partner to be a partner.

Section 21 Partner’s Authority in an Emergency.

  • A partner has authority, in an emergency, to do all such acts for the purpose of protecting the firm from loss as would be done by a person of ordinary prudence, in his own case, acting under similar circumstances, and such acts bind the firm.

Section 22 Mode of Doing Act to Bind Firm.

  • In order to bind a firm, an act or instrument done or executed by a partner or other person on behalf of the firm shall be done or executed in the firm-name, or in any other manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm.

Section 23 Effect of Admission by a Partner.

  • An admission or representation made by a partner concerning the affairs of the firm is evidence against the firm, it is made in the ordinary course of business.

Section 24 Effect of Notice to Acting Partner.

  • Notice to a partner who habitually acts in the business of the firm of any matter relating to the affairs of the firm operates as notice to the firm, except in the case of a fraud on the firm committed by or with the consent of that partner.

Section 25 Liability of a Partner for Acts of the Firm.

  • Every partner is liable jointly with all the other partners and also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner

Section26: Liability of the Firm for Wrongful Acts of a Partner.

  • Where, by the wrongful act or omission of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of a firm or with the authority of his partners, loss or injury is caused to any third party, or any penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner.

Part II

Suit Against Firm or Partners

The liability of each partner is unlimited, under Sec. 25. There being joint and several liability, suit can be filed invoking Order 1 Rule 6, C.P.C.

Order 1 Rule 6 reads as under:

  • “The plaintiff may at his option, join as parties to the same suit all or any of the persons severally, or jointly and severally, liable on anyone contract, including the parties to bills of exchange, hundis and promissory notes”. 

Section 42 of the Indian Contract Act states as under:

  • “When two or more persons have made a joint promise, then, unless a contrary intention appears by the contract, all such persons, during their joint lives, and, after the death of any of them, his representative jointly with the survivor or survivors, and, after the death of the last survivor the representatives of all jointly, must fulfil the promise.”

Order 30 Rule 1: Suing of partners in name of firm

  • (1) Any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in India may sue or be sued with the name of the firm (if any) of which such persons were partners at the time of accruing of the cause of action, and any party to a suit may in such case apply to the Court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were, at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, partners in such firm, to be furnished and verified in such manner as the Court may direct.
  • (2) Where persons sue or are sued were partners in the name of their firm under Sub-rule (1), it shall, in the case of any pleading or other document required by or under this Code to be signed, verified or certified by the plaintiff or the defendant, suffice if such pleading or other document is signed, verified or certified by any one of such persons.

Rule 1 of Order 30 allows the partners to sue or be sued in the name of the firm which they were a part of the firm when the cause of action arose (Bharat Sarvoday Mills Co. Limited v. Mohatta Brothers, AIR 1969 Guj 178).

Characteristics of a firm

  • A firm is not a juristic person.
  • It is a compendious name for all the partners.
  • The purpose of using the name of the firm is merely to encompass all the partners (even if all of them are not named).
  • Rules 1 of Order 30 CPC provides only an enabling method to sue, or be sued, partners of a firm (both Registered and Unregistered), at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, in the name of the firm.
    • Order 30 Rule 1 do not apply when suit is instituted not in the name of the firm (instead, suit by all partners).
    • When all partners are in the party array (in a suit), impleading of the firm is surplusage,
  • The purpose of using the name of the firm, in a suit, is merely to encompass all the partners (even if none of them is not named as parties to the suit).
  • Though no partner need comes as a plaintiff (under Rules 1 of Order 30 CPC), if so demanded by the defendant, the names and details of such partners should be revealed, forthwith, by the plaintiffs (Rule 2 of Order 30).
  • Judgment/Decree in the name of the firm (without joining any partner), has the same effect as a Judgment/ decree in favour of or against all its partners.
  • The partners are not necessary parties in trial-stage, to proceed in execution against all partners. The question as to who are the persons who constitute the firm can be decided in execution proceedings (Order 21, Rule 50 CPC).

Therefore, it is clear:

  • A firm can sue or be sued in its name of the firm.
  • Pleadings can be signed by any one of the partners.
  • One partner alone can sue, or be sued, in the firm name (AIR 1931 Sind 121). Still, the decree binds all partners.
  • Even if all the partners are made parties to the suit, it can be taken that they represent the firm.

The Delhi High Court held in Shanker Hoursing Corporation v. Mohan Devi, AIR 1978 Del 255 (D.B), as under:

  • “(15) Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure was added newly in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Normally, when a person wishes to obtain a decree against several persons, or when several persons wish to obtain a decree against a person, al1 the said persons must be made parties to the suit. Similarly, when a person makes a promise to more than one person, the right to enforce the promise rests with them all under the provisions of Section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, so that all of them are necessary parties to a suit to enforce the promise. It was, therefore, held in some decisions under the old Code of 1882 which did not contain any provisions corresponding to the present Order 30, that in suits by or against firms, all the partners of the firm were necessary parties. It was to enable two or more partners alone to sue or be sued, as a kind of exception to the provisions of Section 45 of the Contract Act, that the present provisions in Order 30 were introduced in the Code of 1908. It is, however, provided in Rule I of Order 30 that any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners may sue or be sued in the name of the firm (if any) of which such persons were partners aft the time of the accruing of the cause of action. As stated by us earlier, a firm is not under the law a juristic person, but is a compendious name for all the persons who are members of the firm (partners). The effect of using the name of the firm, as provided in Rule I, is merely to bring all the partners before the Court and the procedure indicated in Rules 1 and 2 of Order 30 is only a convenient method for showing the persons who constituted the firm at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, and a decree in favour of or against a firm, in the name of the firm, has the same effect as a decree in favour of or against all the partners. The various rules of Order 30 make this clear. Rule 1 of Order 30, in providing the mode or form of the suit, prescribes a requirement that the two or more persons who, claiming or being liable as partners, sue or be sued in the name of the film must be persons who were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.

Order 30 Rule 2. Disclosure of partners’ names

  • (1) Where a suit is instituted by partners in the name of their firm, the plaintiffs or their pleader shall, on demanding writing by or on behalf of any defendant, forthwith declare in writing the names and places of residence of all the persons constituting the firm on whose behalf the suit is instituted.
  • (2) Where the plaintiffs or their pleader fail to comply with any demand made under sub-rule (1) all proceedings in the suit may, upon an application for that purpose, be stayed upon such terms as the Court may direct.
  • (3) Where the names of the partners are declared in the manner referred to in sub-rule (1) the suit shall proceed in the same manner, and the same consequences in all respects shall follow, as if they had been named as plaintiffs in the plaint:
  • Provided that all proceedings shall nevertheless continue in the name of the firm, but the name of the partners disclosed in the manner specified in sub-rule (1) shall be entered in the decree.

Names of the Partners disclosed shall be entered in the Decree

Though the suit can be proceeded without joining all partners, proviso makes it clear that ‘the name of the partners disclosed in the manner specified in sub-rule (1) shall be entered in the decree’.

Order 30 Rule 3. Service

  • Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, the summons shall be served either-
  • (a) upon any one or more of the partners, or
  • (b) at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within India upon any person having, at the time of service, the control or management of the partnership business, there, as the Court may direct; and such service shall be deemed good service upon the firm so sued, whether all or any of the partners are within or without India:
  • Provided that, in the case of a partnership which has been dissolved to the knowledge of the plaintiff before the institution of the suit, the summons shall be served upon every person within India whom it is sought to make liable.

Order 30 Rule 4. Rights of suit on death of partner

  • (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872) where two or more persons may sue or be sued in the name of a firm under the foregoing provisions and any of such persons dies, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the suit.
  • (2) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall limit or otherwise effect any right which the legal representative of the deceased may have-
  • (a) to apply to be made a party to the suit, or
  • (b) to enforce any claim against the survivor or survivors.

Order 30 Rule 5. Notice in what capacity served

  • Where a summons is issued to a firm and is served in the manner provided by rule 3, every person upon whom it is served shall be informed by notice in writing given at the time of such service, whether he is served as a partner or as a person having the control or management of the partnership business, or in both characters, and, in default of such notice, the person served shall be deemed to be served as a partner.

Order 30 Rule 6. Appearance of partners.

  • Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, they shall appear individually in their own names, but all subsequent proceedings shall, nevertheless, continue in the name of the firm.

Order 30 Rule 7. No appearance except by partners.

  • Where a summons is served in the manner provided by rule 3 upon a person having the control or management of the partnership business, no appearance by him shall be necessary unless he is a partner of the firm sued.

Order 30 Rule 8. Appearance under protest

  • (1) Any person served with summons as a partner under rule 3 may enter an appearance under protest, denying that he was a partner at any material time.
  • (2) On such appearance being made, either the plaintiff or the person entering the appearance may, at any time before the date fixed for hearing and final disposal of the suit, apply to the Court for determinig whether that person was a partner of the firm and liable as such.
  • (3) If, on such application, the Court holds that he was a partner at the material time, that shall not preclude the person from filing a defence denying the liability of the firm in respect of the claim against the defendant.
  • (4) If the Court, however, holds that such person was not a partner of the firm and was not liable as such that shall not preclude the plaintiff from otherwise serving a summons on the firm and proceeding with the suit; but in that event, the plaintiff shall be precluded from alleging the laibility of that person as a partner of the firm in execution of any decree that may be passed against the firm.]

Order 30 Rule 9. Suits between co-partners

  • This Order shall apply to suits between a firm and one or more of the partners therein and to suits between firms having one or more partners, in common; but not execution shall be issued in such suits except by leave of the Court, and, on an application for leave to issue such execution, all such accounts and inquiries may be directed to be taken and made and directions given as may be just.

Order 30 Rule 10. Suit against person carrying on business in name other than his own

  • Any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name, or a Hindu undivided family carrying on business under any name, may be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm name, and, in so far as the nature of such case permits, all rules under this Order shall apply accordingly.

Suit Against Deceased PartnerNot be necessary to join the legal representatives

On the death of a partner, the partnership business will not come to an end (unless otherwise provided in the partnership-deed); the partnership business may continue.

Rule 4 (1) of Order 30, C.P.C. stipulates that it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the Suit on death of a partner, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit. Rule 4 (1) reads as under:

  • “Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872) where two or more persons may sue or be sued in the name of a firm under the foregoing provisions and any one of such persons dies, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the Suit”.

The Supreme Court in Upper India Cable Co. v. Sri Krishna, AIR 1984 SC 1986, it is held as under:

  • “Now the question is where the suit is instituted against the firm and partners are impleaded as proper parties, in the event of death of a partner so sued, would the suit or appeal, as the case may be, abate if heirs and legal representatives of the deceased partner are not substituted within the prescribed period of limitation. There is a twofold answer to this question. Order 30 Rule 4 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, where two or more persons are sued in the name of the firm under the enabling provisions of Order 30, and any such person dies whether before the institution of the suit or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representatives of the deceased as a party to the suit. Secondly death of a proper party would have no impact on the suit more so where on death of a partner the partnership may stand dissolved or heirs do not desire to join the firm. Both these aspects were overlooked by the High Court”.
  • “On the death of two of the proper or formal parties impleaded in their capacity as partners by the plaintiff along with the firm, in the absence of substitution of heirs and legal representatives the appeal abates”? I may even go a step further in stating that even on the death of two necessary parties who are partners of a firm and the suit was filed against the firm, the impleading of legal representatives of the deceased as a party to the suit shall not be necessary as it is stated in Rule 4 of Order 30, C.P.C. The language in Rule 4 is unambiguous which states, “Whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the suit.”

Decree Obtained Against a Partner Cannot be Executed Against Legal Heirs

In SP Misra v. Mohd. Laiquddin Khan, (2019) 10 SCC 329, it is held that a partnership firm stands dissolved, on the death of a partner, by operation of law under Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932; and therefore, the decree obtained against a partner cannot be executed against his legal heirs.

When all Partners are Necessary Parties

  • Partition of partnership property
  • Suit for settling the accounts of the dissolved firm
  • When firm constituted to take up a venture – after the completion of such venture.

Apex Court Impleaded Partners, Suo Moto, as Proper Parties, in eviction Case

In Richard Lee v. Girish Soni, (2017) 3 SCC 194, our Apex Court it was ruled that there was no doubt that all the partners are not necessary parties ‘form the point of view of the eviction petitioners’ and that both the firm and all its partners should be on the array of parties as proper party for properly adjudicating the issue before the Rent Controller in view of the contentions taken by the parties. The Apex Court impleaded the partners suo moto observing that the Court has a duty to see whether the presence of the proper parties would facilitate the complete determination of the matter in dispute.

Clauses impose obligations to legal heirs are opposed to public policy

In SP Misra v. Mohd. Laiquddin Khan, (2019) 10 SCC 329, it is held as under:

  • “When such legal representative are not parties to the contract, such contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations arising under it on any third party, except parties to it. No one but the parties to the contract can be entitled under it or born by it. Such principle is known as ‘Privity of Contract’. When the partnership stands dissolved by operation of law under Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the question of execution in pursuance of the decree does not arise. There cannot be any contract unilaterally without acceptance and agreement by the legal heirs of the deceased partner. If there are any clauses in the agreement, entered into between the original partners, against the third parties, such clauses will not bind them, such of the clauses in the partnership deed, which run contrary to provisions of Indian Partnership Act, 1932, are void and unenforceable. Such clauses are also opposed to public policy.”

Bar under Sec. 69 Partnership Act is absolute

A partnership deed is not necessary to form a partnership. The deed, if any, also need not be registered. (However, it must be made on Proper Stamp). But:

  • Section 69(1) Partnership Act directs that the registration of a firm is mandatory, and a condition precedent, to institute a suit by one partner against the firm or another partner.
  • Section 69(2) directs that registration is necessary for suit by or on behalf of a firm (that is, by the firm or its partners) (i) against a third party (ii) to enforce a contract with the firm.
    • Note: Sec. 69 is not attracted when a suit is filed against a third party or reliefs other than enforcement of contract – like, enforcement of a statutory right (trade mark) or a common law right or a right under TP Act (eviction of tenant).
  • Section 69(3) directs that registration is necessary for claiming ‘set off’.

Sec. 69(2) and Order 30 Rule 1 deal with different aspects and operate separately

  • Rules I of Order 30 deals with the mode or form in which the suit to be instituted. It requires that the ‘persons suing in the name of the firm should be partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.
  • Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act should be satisfied in order that a suit can be instituted. That is, to institute a suit (i) to enforce a contract  (ii) by or on behalf of a firm  (iii) against a third party, (a) the registration of a firm is a condition precedent, and (b) the name of the partners suing must have been shown in the Register of Firms.
  • In short, these two independent provisions must be complied, when a suit is instituted (i) to enforce a right from a contract (ii) (in a contract) with the firm and (iii) against any third party.
  • Section 69 requires that (i) all the partners at the time of the institution of the suit must be parties to the suit and (ii) their names also be in the Register of Firms- to proceed with the matters stated in Sec. 69 (though Or. 30 r. I enables – two or more partners to sue). (See: Firm of V. Ramchandraiah Gupta v. Ravula Venkat Reddy, 1970 (1) Andhra WR 243 Hansraj Manot’s (1962) 66 Cal WN 262; Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791.
  • Note:
    • If the partners at the time of accruing of the cause of action (to enforce a contract) and the partners at the time of instituting the suit are different, to institute a suit in the name of the firm, against a third party following persons must be in the party array –
      • (i) all partners at the time of cause of action and
      • (ii) all partners at the time of filing the suit.
    • Note – Rule 1(1) of Order 30 CPC says – “with the name of the firm” and Rule 1(2) says – “in the name of their firm“.
  • The firm can be made as a party, in a suit, in addition to the partners; or the firm alone be made as the party, naming the partners thereafter followed by the words – “represented by”.

Plaint must be signed by Partners in the Register of Firms on the DATE OF THE SUIT

In M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769,  the Supreme Court has held that the plaint verified and signed by the partners as on the date of the suit who were not shown as partners in the register of firms, is not maintainable in view of S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. In para 6 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

  • “6. In the present case the suit filed by the appellants is clearly hit by the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 69 of the said Partnership Act, as on the date when the suit was filed, two of the partners shown as partners as per the relevant entries in the Register of Firms were not, in fact, partners, one new partner had come in and two minors had been admitted to the benefit of the partnership firm regarding which no notice was given to me Registrar of Firms. Thus, the persons suing, namely, the current partners as on the date of the suit were not shown as partners in the Register of Firms. In the result is that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 69 of the said Partnership Act and the view taken by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court in this connection is correct”.

S. 69(2) directs ‘all partners’ must sue

Prior to M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769 (supra), there was difference of opinion as to ‘persons suing’ in Section 69(2) –

  • (i) it is the partners on the date of the institution of the suit. (Shanker Housing Corporation v. Mohan Devi, AIR 1978 Del 255. Also see decisions referred to therein – given below)
  • (ii) it is the partners (also) at time of the accruing of the cause of action (Bharat Sarvodaya Mills Co. Ltd. v. Mohatta Brothers, AIR 1969 Guj 178; Gandhi Company v. Krishna Glass Pvt. Ltd. (1983) 85 BomLR 179; Gurushiddayya Kalkayye Delimath v. Shah Hirachand Venechand and Co., AIR 1972 Mys 209; Sohanlal Basant Kumar v. Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791)
    • The line of decisions in this way are not good law in the light of M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769.

In Shanker Housing Corporation v. Mohan Devi, AIR 1978 Del 255 (D.B), it is held that the expression ‘persons suing’ in Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act means “all the partners of the firm who are its partners at the time of the institution of the suit. But, Rule I of Order 30 CPC provides that two or more partners can sue.

The contention raised in the case (the court rejected it) was the following-

  • “Rule I of Order 30 requires that the ‘persons suing in the name of the firm’ should be partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, and, therefore, the same meaning should be given to the words “persons suing” in Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, 1932, and the “persons suing” in requirement (b) therein means the person who were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action and not on the date of the institution of the suit and it is sufficient for the purposes of requirement (b) if they have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.”

The Delhi High Court pointed out that Section 69(2), makes the registration of a firm a condition precedent to the institution of a suit by or on behalf of a firm against a third party. It deals with the question as to when a firm can sue, or be sued by, a third party in respect of a right arising from a contract, and provides certain requirements as conditions precedent for the institution of the suit, viz.. (a) that the firm is a registered firm, and (b) the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm. On the other hand, Rules I and 2 of Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide the mode or form and the procedure for suits by or against a firm. In other words, the requirements in Section 69(2) should be satisfied first in order that a suit can be instituted, and then the provisions of Rules I and 2 of Order 30 are attracted as regards the mode or form in which the suit may be instituted as well as the procedure applicable to the said suit. In providing the mode Rule I prescribes a certain requirement, viz., that the persons mentioned therein must have been partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.

Then the court observed as under:

  • (16) Thus, the provisions in Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act and those in Rule 1 of Order 30 deal with different aspects and operate separately. The former deals with the question as to when a firm can sue or be sued by a third party in respect of a right arising from a contract and prescribes certain requirements for the same, while the latter deals with the mode or form and the procedure for suits by or against firms, and prescribes a certain requirement for the same. It would not, therefore, be correct to interpret the. words “persons suing” in Section 69(2) and the point of time at which the requirements in Section 69(2) are to be fulfilled, by referring to the provision in Rule 1 of Order 30. In our opinion, the scope and effect of the two sets of provisions may be stated thus :
  • (17) Under Section 69(2), a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract can be instituted by or on behalf of a firm against any third party only if (a) the firm is registered and (b) the persons suing, i.e., the persons suing, i.e., all the partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit, are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm, while under Rule I of Order 30 two or more persons who claim as partners may sue, or who are liable as partners may be sued, in the name of the firm (if any), provided such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action. It the facts in a given case are such as to attract the applicability of the provisions in both Section 69(2) and Rule I of Order 30, the requirements in both the provisions should be fulfilled. In such a case, if a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract is to be instituted by or on behalf of a firm against any third party, the firm has to be a registered firm, and the partners ‘ of the firm as on the date of the institution of the suit must have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm, and further they must have been partners of the firm at the time of the accruing of the cause of action.
  • (18) As regards the scope and effect of Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, at view similar to the one expressed by us above baa been taken in the following decisions, vide-
  • (1)Firm Manghoomal Jethamal v. Finn Aratmal Satramdas Air 1922 Sind 13 ;
  • (2)Pratapchand Ramchand &Co. v. Jehangiriji Air 1940 Bom 257;
  • (3)Sri Meenakshi Mills v. C. Swaminatha Mudaliar and Bros. AIR 1944 Mad 443;
  • (4)Bank of Koothathikulam v. Itten Thomas. Air 1955 Travancore-Cochin, 155.
  • (5)Dr. V. S. Bahl v. M/s. S. L. Kapur ami Co., AIR 1978 Delhi 255;
  • (6)Kesrimal v. Dalichand A.IJt. 1959 Raj 140;
  • (7)Hansraj Manot. M/s. Goraknatth Champalal Pandey, 66 C.W.N. 262;
  • (8)Firm Buta Mal Dev Raj v.-Chanan Mal and others. A.I.R. 1964 Punjab 270;
  • (9)Firm Alwar Iron Syndicate v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Raj 86,
  • (10)M/s. Badrimal Ramcharan & Co. v. M/s. Gana Kaul & Sons Air 1971 J&K 109;
  • (11)M/s. Chandrabhan Bansilal Ramratan Dass v. Municipal Council, Bikaner, AIR 1975 Raj 35 and
  • (12)Ram Kumar Shew Chandrai v. Dominion of India. AIR 1977 Cal 37.”

In Firm Buta Mai Dev Raj v. Chanan Mai, AIR 1964 Punj 270 it was pointed out that in order to institute a suit, a partnership firm must not only be a registered firm but also all the persons who are partners in the firm at the time of the institution of the suit must be, or have been, shown as such in the Register. The expression “the persons suing” in Section 69(2) must mean the partners in the firm. The use of the plural “persons” is obviously deliberate, since -while a singular may also mean the plural, the plural can never mean, singular. When a suit is instituted in the name of a firm the suit is on behalf of all the partners, and not only such of them as are shown, in the Register as such, and all the partners must be “the persons suing” contemplated in Section 69(2).

In Firm Alwar Iron Syndicate v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Raj 86, it is observed as under:

  • “6. It appears to me, however, that there is really no room for any controversy in regard to the correct meaning and purpose of Sub-section (2) of Section 69. It is well settled that a firm as such is not an entity in aw and is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 4 of the Partnership Act. Its name is therefore a mere abbreviated name of all its partners: Dulichand Laxminarayan v. Commr. of Income-tax, Nagpur, AIR 1956 SC 354. It is for this reason that special provisions have been made in Order 30, P. C. regarding suits by or against firms and persons carrying on business in names other than their own. So it is beyond doubt that even if a suit is brought in the name of a firm, it is really a suit by all its partners under the firm name. In other words, the persons suing are all the partners of the firm at the relevant date and none of them can, or obvious reasons, be left out for purposes of the suit. So it is incorrect to say that subsection (2) of Section 69 merely requires that only the person or persons actually signing the plaint on behalf of the firm should be shown in the Register of Firms as its partners. The word “persons” in the subsection has been used in the plural by design and serves an important purpose for it brings, out the real nature of a partnership firm which cannot consist of a single person. This is the view taken in –
  • Kapur Chand Bhagaji, Firm v. Laxrnan Trimbak, AIR 1952 Nag 57 and
  •  Dr. VS Bahal v. SL Kapur, AIR 1956 Punj 24.
  • The decision in Dr. VS Bahal’s case, AIR 1956 Punj 24 does not appear to have been noticed in AIR 1959 Punj 530 on which reliance has been placed by Mr. JP Jain, but it has been followed in AIR 1964 Punj 270.
  • It has also been followed in Hansraj Manot v. Gorak Natb Champalal Pandey, (1962) 66 Cal WN 262 and, if I may say so with respect, these judgments lay down the correct law on the point.”

Defect (not signing by Partner) Cannot be Cured by Amendment of Plaint

The plaintiff in Popular Automobiles v. Chami, was a partnership firm and the plaint is verified, signed and filed by the Manager claiming that he had been authorised by one of the partners. The Kerala High Court (1 February, 2001) relying on M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769, held that the suit was filed in violation of the mandatory provisions of S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act; and therefore, the petition to amend the plaint was not sustainable.

If the parties were not properly described, it will be allowed to be corrected

In M/S CS Company v. The Kerala State Electricity Board (2022) it is held by the Kerala High Court that it was open to the court to allow to amend the pleadings if the parties were not properly described or if there was a defective description of the parties. Such defect cannot be said to be fundamental or in the nature which cannot be permitted to be corrected. Therefore, it was held that if at all there was a defect in the cause title, an amendment could have been permitted by the court below. Such defect if any cannot be made a ground to hold the suit to be not maintainable.

Registration of the Firm Must be proved by Certified Copy of Register

Nagpur High Court in Kapurchand Begaji Firm v. Laxman Triabuk, AIR 1952 Nag 57, held that the Register of Firms being a public document the requirements of Section 69(2) were to be complied with by producing a certified copy of an entry from that register; and that the oral evidence of the plaintiff-partner is not admissible as secondary evidence. The same view was taken in Chhotelal Darbarilal v. Mohammed Hussain AIR 1955 VP 44, M/s Badrimal Ramcharan and Co. v. M/s. Gama Kaul and Sons, AIR 1971 J&K 103; Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791.

Firm Need not be a Party

In M.S. Pearl Sound Engineer v. M/s. Poonam Chand, it was held that when the suit is instituted by all the partners, it was not necessary to implead the firm, and impleading the firm was merely a surplusage. (Referred to in: Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791).

Death of a Partner in the Registered Firm

In M/s Durga Das Janak Ram v. Preete Shah Sant Ram, AIR 1959 P H 530, Punjab High Court, following the decision of the Bombay High Court in Pratapchand Ramchand & Co. v. Jahangirji Bomanji, AIR 1940 Bom 237 held that the firm continued to be registered in spite of the death of one of the partners (and non-reporting of this fact to the Registrar) and the remaining partners were was entitled to institute a suit. But, in Krishna Chandra Agarwalla v. Shanti Prasad Jain, AIR 1981 Cal 199, it was held that if firm could not be maintained without the son of the deceased partner and his name did not appear in the Register of Firms, the suit filed by the firm could not be proceeded with. (See also: Maddi Sudarsanam v. Borogu Viswanadham Brothers, AIR 1955 AP 12; Sohanlal Basant Kumar vs Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791).

Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit in violation of Section 69(1)

In Abani Kanta Pal v. Unknown, AIR 1986 Cal. 143, it is stated as under:

  • “9. In our opinion, it may be that S. 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act puts an embargo on the plaintiff and does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. A defendant in a suit for eviction may waive service of a notice under Section 13 (6). Section 69 (1) of the Partnership Act, however, stands on a different footing. The embargo that has been put on the plaintiff under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 is not for the purpose of protecting the interest of any party, but it is based on public policy. The requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 cannot be waived by the defendant, and the Court is debarred from entertaining a suit ignoring the fulfilment of such requirements. So, if a firm is not registered, excepting a suit as contemplated by Section 69 (3), the Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit in violation of Section 69(1). In other words, the plaint that has been filed by the plaintiff will be considered a void plaint, if it contravenes the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. This view finds support from a decision of the Supreme Court in Loonkaran Sethia Vs. Ivan E. John, AIR 1977 SC 336. In that case, sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 were involved. The Supreme Court made the following observations;
    • “A bare glance at the section is enough to show that it is mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by a plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired by him under a contract which he entered into as a partner of an unregistered firm, whether existing or dissolved void. In other words, a partner of an erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of Section 69 of the Partnership Act.”

 “Share between the parties” is a prayer for “Dissolution”

In Mukund Balkrishna Kulkarni v. Kulkarni Powder Metallurgical Industries, (2004) 13 SCC 750, the Supreme Court considered the applicability of Section 69(1). The suit was for declaration that the respondent no. 1 was a partnership business in which both the appellant and the respondent no. 2 had equal shares along with the prayer for dissolution of the firm and rendition of accounts.

Section 69(1) Partnership Act directs that the registration of a firm is mandatory, and a condition precedent, to institute a suit  by one partner against the firm or another partner.

It was pointed out that the two embargoes which must co-exist for the plaintiff to be non-suited under Section 69(1) would be that:

  • .i. The suit should be filed by a person “suing as a partner in a firm” and;
  • ii. The suit must be to enforce a right arising from a contract.

The High Court held that the prayer of the appellant, namely,

  • for a declaration of the existence of the partnership and
  • the share between the parties

was a suit to enforce a right under a contract against the firm.

Allowing the appeal the Apex Court held as under:

  • “A prayer for such declaration could not be said to be made by person suing as a partner. It was a prayer to be a partner and is therefore not debarred under the provisions of Section 69(1). Furthermore, what was in fact being prayed for by the appellant was a declaration of the existence of a contract between the parties. That could not be said to be a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract. The second prayer of the appellant was not to continue as a partner of the firm but to dissolve the firm. To that extent the appellant was suing “as a partner”.
  • This he was entitled to do under Section 69(3)(a) which insofar as it is relevant, reads as follows:
    • “69. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) … shall not affect—
    • (a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm;”
  • This decision is referred to in: Sunkari Tirumala Rao vs Penki Aruna Kumari (2025 INSC 92).

Sunkari Tirumala Rao v. Penki Aruna Kumari on 17 January, 2025

Our Apex Court, in Sunkari Tirumala Rao vs Penki Aruna Kumari (2025 INSC 92, 17 January, 2025), the plaintiffs filed the suit for recovery of money in their capacity as partners of an unregistered partnership firm, against the defendant in her capacity as a partner of the same unregistered partnership firm. The Apex Court (referring Seth Loonkaran Sethiya v. Mr. Ivan E. John, (1977) 1 SCC 379 and Mukund Balkrishna Kulkarni v. Kulkarni Powder Metallurgical Industries, (2004) 13 SCC 750) found –

  • (i) a partner of an unregistered Partnership cannot sue against the firm or its partners for recovery of money and
  • (ii) instead, the petitioner should have preferred a suit for dissolution of the partnership firm and rendition of accounts.

It is held as under:

  • “8. It is evident from a reading of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 that it assumes a mandatory character. Section 69(1) prohibits a suit amongst the partners of an unregistered partnership firm, for the enforcement of a right either arising from a contract or conferred by the Act, unless the suit amongst the partners is in the nature of dissolution of the partnership firm and/or rendition of accounts. Section 69(2) prohibits the institution of a suit by an unregistered firm against third persons for the enforcement of a right arising from a contract. As a consequence, a suit filed by an unregistered partnership firm and all proceedings arising thereunder, which fall within the ambit of Section 69 would be without jurisdiction.
  • 15. It is a clear as a noon day that the present suit had not been instituted by or on behalf of the firm against any third persons so as to fall under the ambit of  Section 69(2). The petitioners have also not filed the instant suit for enforcing any statutory right conferred under any other law or a common law right so as to exempt the application of  Section 69. Hence, the rigours of  Section 69(1) would apply on such a suit and the partnership firm being unregistered would prevent the petitioners from filing a bare suit for recovery of money from the respondent.
  • 16. It would have instead been appropriate for the petitioner to have preferred a suit for dissolution of the partnership firm and rendition of accounts, especially considering that the factum of non-registration of the partnership firm would not have acted as bar in a suit for dissolution in light of the exception carved out under  Section 69(3). The defence that the partnership business had not yet commenced and thus, such a suit for dissolution could not have been preferred, would not be of any avail to the petitioners, particularly for overcoming the jurisdictional bar under  Section 69(1). The High Court is right in taking the view that a suit of such nature could not be said to be maintainable in the absence of the registration of the partnership firm.”

Part III

Unregistered Partnership Firm Cannot Bring A Suit for Enforcement of Contract

A suit hit by Sec. 69 Partnership will be struck off at the threshold – Mr. S.Thiagarajan v. M/S.Supreme Pipe Syndicate, 2018-1 Civil CC 775.

In Loon Koran v. Ivan E. John, AIR 1977 SC 336, it is observed as under:

  • “A bare glance at the section is enough to show that it mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by a plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired by him under a contract which he entered into as a partner of an unregistered firm whether existing or dissolved, void. In other words, a partner of a erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of section 69 of the Partnership Act.” (quoted in: V.A. Abdul Wahab Sahib v. Abdul Subhan Sahib, (1998) 2 MLJ 720).

A co-ownership venture is not a Partnership; It is not Affected by Sec. 69 Bar

A partnership (that arises by an agreement to share profits or loss) cannot be put an end by a partner without consent of others; whereas in a co-ownership venture, a co-owner can transfer his interest. Because co-ownership activities are not governed by Partnership Act, Sec. 69 Bar is not applicable to the same.

Bar under Section 69 to ‘Other Proceedings’ also – to Get Rent Reduced

A suit by a tenant to get the rent reduced is thus a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract of tenancy. The suit therefore falls under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. See: Gappulal Gordhandas v. Chunilal Shyam Lal, AIR 1961 Raj 286.

Bar to Claim Restoration of Benefits under S. 65 Contract Act

According to Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, when an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. Because of the bar under the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act, it is found in Bijendra Prasad v. Smt. Duleshwari Devi, AIR 1998 Pat 122, that the partners of the unregistered partnership cannot claim benefits under Sec. 65 of the Contract Act.

Partnership Cannot Amend to Become a Proprietorship

S. Krishnan v. Aruna and Associates, (1979) 2 MLJ 1, it is held that a suit filed as a partnership cannot amend to become a proprietorship. It is observed as under:

  • “When once he takes up a stand that it is a partnership firm, he should stand by it. Once he takes up the position that it is a dissolved firm, equally he should be prepared to substantiate it. But he cannot have a third way out of it by bringing in a person who was a quondam partner of the unregistered firm as if he has become the proprietor thereto on dissolution. This metamorphosis is not available in law.”

The Supreme Court Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar, in (2000) 3 SCC 250, observed as under:

  • “The points that arise for consideration are:
  • (I)Whether Section 69 (2) bars a suit by a firm not registered on the date of suit where permanent injunction and damages are claimed in respect of a trademark as a statutory right or by invoking common law principles applicable to a passing-off action?
  • (II) Whether the words “arising from a contract” in Section 69 (2) refer only to a situation where an unregistered firm is enforcing a right arising from a contract entered into by the firm with the defendant during the course or its business or whether the bar under Section 69 (2) can be extended to any any contract referred to in the plaint unconnected with the defendants, as the source of title to the suit property?

On question No. 1 the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “(9) The question whether Section 69(2) is a bar to a suit filed by an unregistered firm even if a statutory right is being enforced or even if only a common law right is being enforced came up directly for consideration in this Court in Raptakas Brett Co. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184. In that case, Majumdar J.. speaking for the Bench clearly expressed the view that Section 69 (2) can not bar the enforcement by a way of a suit by an unregistered firm in respect of a statutory right or a common law right. On the facts of that case, it was held that the right to evict a tenant upon expiry of the lease was not a right ” arising from a contract” but was a common law right or a statutory right under the Transfer of Property Act. The fact that the plaint in that case referred to a lease and to its expiry, made no difference. Hence, the said suit was held not barred. It appears to us that in that case the reference to the lease in the plaint was obviously treated as a historical fact. That case is therefore directly in point. Following the said judgment, it must be held in the presence case too that a suit is not barred by Section 69 (2) if a statutory right or a common law right is being enforced.

It is held while answering question No. 2:

  • “The above provision clearly signifies that the right that is sought to be enforced by the unregistered firm and which is barred must be a right arising out of a contract with a third party – defendant in respect of the firm’s business transactions….. The real crux of the question is that the legislature when it used the word “arising out of a contract” in Section 69(2), it is referring to a contract entered into in course of business transaction by the unregistered plaintiff firm with its customers – defendants and the idea is to protect those in commerce who deal with such a partnership firm in business. Such third parties who deal with the partners ought to be enabled to know what the names of the firm are before they deal with them in business.”

In this case our Apex Court pointed out as under:

  • if the firm is not registered on date of suit and the suit is to enforce a right arising out of a contract with the third party- defendant in the course of its business, then it will be open to the plaintiff to seek withdrawal of the plaint with leave and file a fresh suit after registration of the firm subject of course to the law of limitation and subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act. This is so even if the suit is dismissed for a formal defect. Section 14 of the Limitation Act will be available inasmuch as the suit has failed because the defect of non-registra-tion falls within the words “other cause of like nature” in section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. See Surajmal Dagduramji Shop v. M/s. Srikishan Ram Kishan, AIR (1973) Bom. 313.”

In Ramachandraiah Gupta v. Ravula Venkat Reddy, 1971 Andhra WR. 243 (Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy) held as under:

  • “Now, a firm is not a legal entity at all, but is a mere abbreviated name for the several partners of which it consists. Ordinarily, therefore, a suit may not be brought by a firm in its own name but a suit may be brought by all the partners acting together or by some of the partners only but impleading the other partners also as parties to the suit. However Order 30, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code prescribes a special procedure by which a suit may be brought in the name of the firm. It provides that any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business may sue or be sued in the name of the firm of which such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action and that in such a case it shall suffice if one of such persons signs, verifies or certifies any pleadings or document required by the Code to be signed, verified and certified by the plaintiff or the defendant. The effect of a suit instituted in the name of the firm in the manner, prescribed by Order 30, Rule 1 is as if the suit is filed by all the partners collectively. Whether the suit is filed by all the partners collectively or by some only of the partners impleading the rest as parties to the suit or whether it is filed in the name of the firm prescribed by Section 69(2) must be fulfilled. They are (1) that the firm must be registered and (2) that the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the Firm….”

S. 69(2) No Bar for Enforcement of a Statutory Right or a Common Law Right

Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932 is not a bar to a suit filed by an unregistered firm, if the same is for enforcement of a statutory right (like, trade mark) or a common law right or a right under TP Act (like, eviction of tenant – Govindaraja Naicker v. Sapthagiri Complex, ILR 1994 Kar 1832).

To attract the bar of Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932, the contract in question (i) must be the one entered into by firm with the third-party defendant and (ii) must also be the one entered into by the plaintiff firm in the course of its business dealings.

  • Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property: (1998) 7 SCC 184, Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar: (2000) 3 SCC 250. Referred to in: Shiv Developers v. Aksharay Developers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 114.

S. 69(3) – No Bar for Suit for Dissolution

Sec. 69(3)(a) reads as under:

  • (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect,—
  • (a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, 

See: Sharda Ginning Pressing & Oil Mills v. Smt. Bimla Devi, (2007) 146 PLR 807

S. 69(2) Bar – Contract must be one in the Course of the Business Dealings

In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184, it is held as under:

  • “23 The further and additional but equally important aspect which has to be made clear is that the contract by the unregistered firm referred to in Section 69(2) must not only be one entered into by the firm with the third-party defendant but must also be one entered into by the plaintiff firm in the course of the business dealings of the plaintiff firm with such third-party defendant.
  • 24… The real crux of the question is that the legislature, when it used the words “arising out of a contract” in Section 69(2), it is referring to a contract entered into in course of business transactions by the unregistered plaintiff firm with its defendant customers and the idea is to protect those in commerce who deal with such a partnership firm in business. Such third parties who deal with the partners ought to be enabled to know what the names of the partners of the firm are before they deal with them in business.”
  • 25 Further, Section 69(2) is not attracted to any and every contract referred to in the plaint as the source of title to an asset owned by the firm. If the plaint referred to such a contract it could only be as a historical fact. For example, if the plaint filed by the unregistered firm refers to the source of the firm’s title to a motor car and states that the plaintiff has purchased and received a motor car from a foreign buyer under a contract and that the defendant has unauthorisedly removed it from the plaintiff firm’s possession — it is clear that the relief for possession against the defendant in the suit does not arise from any contract which the defendant entered into in the course of the plaintiff firm’s business with the defendant but is based on the alleged unauthorised removal of the vehicle from the plaintiff firm’s custody by the defendant. In such a situation, the fact that the unregistered firm has purchased the vehicle from somebody else under a contract has absolutely no bearing on the right of the firm to sue the defendant for possession of the vehicle. Such a suit would be maintainable and Section 69(2) would not be a bar, even if the firm is unregistered on the date of suit. The position in the present case is not different. (Quoted in: Shiv Developers v. Aksharay Developers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 114)

In Shiv Developers v. Aksharay Developers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 114, it is held as under:

  • “The relevant principles, when applied to the facts of the present case, leave nothing to doubt that the transaction in question was not the one entered into by the plaintiff firm during the course of its business (i.e., of building construction); and it had been an independent transaction of sale, of the firm’s share in the suit property, to the contesting defendants. The bar of Section 69(2) is not attracted in relation to the said sale transaction. Moreover, the subject suit cannot be said to be the one for enforcement of right arising from a contract; rather the subject suit is clearly the one where the plaintiff seeks common law remedies with the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation as also of the statutory rights of injunction and declaration in terms of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as also the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (while alleging want of the sale consideration). Therefore, the bar of Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932 does not apply to the present case.”

Cause of action on dishonour of cheques & contract under Sec. 69

  • In Afsal Baker vs. Maya Printers, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 29914, it is held that the suit on the cause of action on dishonour of cheques can be brought independent of Sec. 69 of the Partnership Act, as it is not on a ‘contract’ stated in Sec. 69.

Suit by Sole (remaining) Partner Maintainable

In Gujarat Water Supply and Severage v. Sundardas Hukumatram Shivanani, AIR 1991 Guj 170, a contract was entered into by a partnership firm with the Government. One among the three partners of the firm was the plaintiff. Before filing the suit, other two partners had been retired. The plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of rights and liabilities of the dissolved firm. The High Court held that the suit was maintainable though the partnership firm was not registered.

A suit by one partner against another for damages on the grounds of the misconduct of his partner was held to be maintainable in Navinchandra Jethabhai v. Moolchand Sadaram Gindodiya, AIR 1966 Bom 111.

No Bar to Arbitration

It is held by our Apex Court in Kamal Pushp Enterprises v. DR Construction Company, AIR 2000 SC 2676, that Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act has no application to proceedings before an Arbitrator; and therefore, an Arbitration and Award would not be vitiated. (But see: Jagdish Chander Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1882)

Subsequent Registration Will Not Cure the Defect

In Delhi Development Authority v. Kochhar Construction Work, (1998) 8 SCC 559, following Shreeram Finance Corporation, it was held that proceedings under  the Arbitration Act were ab initio defective for the firm was not registered; and that the subsequent registration of the firm could not cure that defect. (Followed in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd vs Jain Construction Co. (2004) 8 SCC 559) See also: Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar, 2000(3) SCC 250.

In Dwijendra Nath Singh v. Govinda Chandra, AIR 1953 Cal 497 (Dasgupta, G Ray, JJ.) the suit was brought by two persons who are described as the owners of the firm Samanta Naskar and Co. When the suit was instituted this firm had not been registered. It however was registered before the suit came to be heard. It was held following Firm Laduram Sagarmal v. Jamuna Prasad, AIR 1939 Pat 239 and Varadarajulu v. Rajmanika, AIR 1937 Mad 767, that a suit which was not maintainable by reason of non-compliance with S. 69 of the Partnership Act cannot become maintainable at a later stage by reason of registration and the subsequent registration cannot cure the initial defect.

Part IV

Benefits of Registration Partnership

The Partners of a registered partnership alone can –

  • 1. file suits against third parties to enforce rights arising from a contract
  • 2. claim set-off on such contracts.
    • (Note: A third party is free to file suits against a Firm irrespective of its registration status.)
  • 3. sue Co-partners (or firm) for enforcing the clauses of Partnership Deed.
    • (Note: The Partners of an unregistered Partnership cannot enforce the clauses of Partnership Deed.)

When can a Partner of an Unregistered Firm File Suits against a Firm

The Partners of an unregistered firm can file suits against a firm  (i) for accounts of a dissolved firm, (ii) for the dissolution of a firm or (iii) for realising the property of a dissolved firm.

Effect of Non-Registration of a Firm

Section 69 deals with it. It reads as under:

  • 69. Effect of Non-registration
  • 1. No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.
  • 2. No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.
  • 3. The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect,—
    • (a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or
    • (b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920) to realise the property of an insolvent partner.
  • 4. This section shall not apply,—
    • (a) to firms or to partners in firms which have no place of business in[the territories to which this Act extends], or whose places of business in [the said territories], are situated in areas to which, by notification under [section 56], this Chapter does not apply, or
    • (b) to any suit or claim of set-off not exceeding one hundred rupees in value which, in the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), or, outside the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in the Second Schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (9 of 1887), or to any proceeding in execution or other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim.

Execution Against a Partner who was not a Party in Trial

In J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Firm Birdhichand Sumermal (Mukerji, Beg, Agarwala, JJ), AIR 1958 All 176, while interpreting Order 21, Rule 50 CPC, Beg, J. (concurred by Mukerji, J.) referring earlier judgments, it was held that all the partners were not necessary parties in trial, to proceed in execution. Beg, J. summed up his Judgment observing the following:

  • The decree can be satisfied not only from the property of the partnership, but also from the personal property of each of the partners.
  • The question as to who are the persons who constitute the firm can be decided in execution proceedings.
  • Order 21, Rule 50 is designed to define the scope and to lay down the mode and method of such an enquiry.
  • Effect of Contrary View: If a partner (not impleaded or served) succeeds when re-agitate in execution proceedings, he would be fully bound by the decree which has already been passed in the suit against the firm, yet according to the order of the same Court at the execution stage in the same suit, he would not be so bound.
  • A contrary view might result in a conflict between the findings at the trial and at the execution stage in the same case.
  • Further, in such a case he would have to be held to be immune from personal liability as a partner even though his property as a partner would be liable for the satisfaction of the decree under Order 21, Rule 50(1) (a).
  • Again, if a partner not impleaded or served in the suit is allowed to re-agitate the whole matter on merits, then it would be open to him to raise again the same pleas which were raised by other partners who were served in the suit.
  • If the decision in the suit is not to be treated as res judicata against all partners, then it would be open to the same Court at the execution stage to take a different view of the same plea.
  • The result would be that on the same point there would be two conflicting findings at two stages of the same case.
  • Moreover, as a result of his objection at the execution stage, the claim might be found to be good against the firm only partially, even though the decree in the suit might postulate the liability in respect of the entire claim.
  • The contrary view might result not only in a conflict between the decree in the suit and the order in execution proceedings in the same suit, but also in a conflict between various orders at the execution stage itself.
  • Thus, where the number of partners who had not been served in the proceedings and against whom applications under Sub-rule (2) might be given is a very large and they are allowed to re-agitate the whole matter, the result would be that each time a fresh application against each of such persons is made, fresh objections might be taken.
  • If this procedure is allowed, then there would neither be any consistency in findings nor would there be any finality of decisions in the same matter. The situation thus created would be a highly embarrassing and confusing one.
  • If collusion, the matter has to be re-agitated either by a separate suit to have the decree set aside or by reviving the proceedings in the same suit itself.
  • The Legislature has, also, provided some safeguard by making the leave of the Court necessary for proceedings under Sub-rule 2.
  • Where facts are such as to raise the suspicion of collusion between the parties, the Court may refuse such permission. The enquiry contemplated against a person proceeded against under Sub-rule (2) was of a restricted character.

Order 21 Rule 50 CPC Reads As Under:

50. Execution Of Decree Against Firm.

  • (1) Where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted-
    • (a) against any property of the partnership;
    • (b) against any person who has appeared in his own name under rule 6 or rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be, a partner;
    • (c) against any person who has been individually served as a partner with a summons and has failed to appear:
  • Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the provisions of section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932).
  • (2) Where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in sub-rule (1), clauses (b) and (c), as being a partner in the firm he may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such court may grant such leave, or, where such liability is disputed, may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined. 
  • (3) Where the liability of any person has been tried and determined under sub-rule (2) the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. 
  • (4) Save as against any property of the partnership, a decree against a firm shall not lease, render liable or otherwise affect any partner therein unless he has been served with a summons to appear and answer. 
  • (5) Nothing in this rule shall apply to a decree passed against a Hindu Undivided Family by virtue of the provision of rule 10 of Order XXX.”

Indian Law and English Law on Registration of Partnership Firm

English law required compulsory registration of partnership; contravention was punishable. In India it is optional. The Supreme Court, in Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar, (2000) 3 SCC 250, referred the Report of the Special Committee (1930-31, consisted of Sir Brojendra Lal Mitter, Sir Dinshah F. Mulla, Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Iyer and Mr. Arthur Eggar.) which examined the draft Bill and made recommendations to the legislature. Para 17 of the Report reads as under:

  • “17. The outlines of the scheme are briefly as follows. The English precedent, in so far as it makes registration compulsory and imposes a penalty for non-registration has not been followed, as it is considered that this step would be too drastic for a beginning in India, and would introduce all the difficulties connected with small or ephemeral undertakings. Instead, it is proposed that registration should lie entirely within the discretion of the firm or partner concerned; but, following the English precedent, any firm which is not registered will be unable to enforce its claim against third parties in the civil Court; and by partner who is not registered will be unable to enforce his claims either against third parties or against fellow partners”.

The Apex Court further pointed out that changes were made to the English law. The Court said:

  • “Business Names Act, 1985 has replaced the above Act of 1916 and Section 4 of the new Act refers to the ‘Civil Remedies for breach of Section 4’. It provides for dismissal of the action ‘to enforce a right arising out of a contract made in the course of a business’ if the firm is not registered.”

Conclusion

Considering the Indian situations, while enacting the Partnership Act for India, in 1932, registration of firms was not made compulsory. After independence also, the provisions as to registration of firms were not changed. Obviously, it is also because of the proclamations in Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India (in Fundamental Rights Chapter) which read as under:

  • (1) All citizens shall have the right
    • (a) to freedom of speech and expression;
    • (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
    • (c) to form associations or unions;
    • (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
    • (e)to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
    • (f) (omitted)
    • (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.

‘Right to property’ was a Fundamental Right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. By the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, this right was omitted; and the right to property was belittled to a ‘Constitutional Right’ under Article 300A. It reads as under:

  • “No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”


End Notes

Dissolution of Partnership

Withdrawal of some Partners, and not by all, will not dissolve the firm. When any of the partner dies, retires or incapacitated and the remaining partners continue the business there will not be dissolution of the firm. Section 39 of the Partnership Act, 1932, as to the ‘dissolution of the firm’ says as under:

“39. Dissolution of A Firm:

  • The dissolution of a partnership between all the partners of a firm is called the ‘dissolution of the firm’.”

Dissolution of a Partnership firm – Two Ways

  • Dissolution otherwise than the intervention of the Court.
  • Dissolution by Court.

Provisions of the Partnership Act

Sections 40 to 43 of the Partnership Act are the relevant provisions as to dissolution ‘otherwise than through the intervention of the Court’. They read as under:

Section 40: Dissolution By Agreement:

  • A firm may be dissolved with the consenas to dissolution otherwise than through the t of all the partners or in accordance with a contract between the partners.  

Section 41: Compulsory Dissolution:

  • A firm is dissolved (a) by the adjudication of all the partners or of all the partners but one as insolvent, or (b) by the happening of any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the firm to be carried on or for the partners to carry it on in partnership :
  • Provided that, where more than one separate adventure or undertaking is carried on by the firm, the illegality of one or more shall not of itself cause the dissolution of the firm in respect of its lawful adventures and undertakings

Section 42: Dissolution on the Happening of Certain Contingencies: 

  • Subject to contract between the partners a firm is Dissolution On The Happening Of Certain Contingencies dissolved (a) if constituted for a fixed term, by the expiry of that term; (b) if constituted to carry out one or more adventures or undertakings, by the completion thereof; (c) by the death of a partner; and (d) by the adjudication of a partner as an insolvent.

Section 43: Dissolution By Notice of Partnership At Will:

  • (1) Where the partnership is at will, the firm may be dissolved by any partner giving notice in writing to all the other partners of his intention to dissolve the firm.
  • (2) The firm is dissolved as from the date mentioned in the notice as the date of dissolution or, if no date is so mentioned, as from the date of the communication of the notice.

Dissolution by the Intervention of Court

Section 44: Dissolution By The Court:

  • At the suit of a partner, the Court may dissolve a firm on any of the following grounds, namely:
  • (a) that a partner has become of unsound mind, in which case the suit may be brought as well by the next friend of the partner who has become of unsound mind as by any other partner;
  • (b) that a partner, other than the partner suing, has become in any way permanently incapable of performing his duties as partner;
  • (c) that a partner, other than the partner suing, is guilty of conduct which is likely to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business regard being had to the nature of the business;
  • (d) that a partner, other than the partner suing, wilfully or persistently commits breach of agreements relating to the management of the affairs of the firm of the conduct of its business; or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the business that it is not reasonably practicable for the other partners to carry on the business in partnership with him;
  • (e) that a partner, other than the partner suing, has in any way transferred the whole of his interest in the firm to a third party, or has allowed his share to be charged under the provisions of rule 49 of Order XXI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or has allowed it to be sold in the recovery of arrears of land revenue or of any dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue due by the partner;
  • (f) that the business of the firm cannot be carried on save at a loss; or
  • (g) on any other ground which renders it just and equitable that the firm should be dissolved.

In Sohanlal Basant Kumar v. Umraomal Chopra, 1985 (1) WLN 791, after referring various previous decisions the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court (D P Gupta, K Lodha, JJ.) came to the following conclusions:

  • A firm is not a legal entity at all but is the collective term or an abbreviated name for all the persons who are partners thereof.
  • All such persons who have entered into a partnership with one another are individually called partners and collectively they are called a firm and the name under which their business is carried on is called the firm name.
  • Ordinarily, a suit may not be brought by a firm in its own name but a suit may be filed by all the partners acting together or by some of the partners only, but impleading the remaining partners also as parties to the suit.
  • However, Order 30 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes a special procedure by which a suit may be brought in the name of the firm.
  • Order 30 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables two or more persons, claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in partnership, to sue or be sued in the name of the firm, of which such persons are partners at the time of the accrual of the cause of action.
  • Any party to a suit, in such a case, may apply to the court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were at the time of the accrual of the cause of action partners in such firm.
  • Where persons sue or are sued as partners in the name of the firm, it shall suffice if any of the partners may sign, verify or certify any pleadings or other documents required under the Code of Civil Procedure to be signed, verified or certified by the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be.
  • If a demand is made as mentioned above, in the case of a suit instituted by the partners in the name of the firm, the plaintiffs shall forthwith declare in writing the names and places of residence of all partners constituting the firm on whose behalf the suit is instituted.
  • Thus, there can be no doubt that a suit brought in the name of the firm is actually one by all the persons who were partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit.
  • Thus although the firm is not a legal entity, yet the provisions of Order 30 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. enable several persons doing business as partners to sue or be sued in the name of the firm.
  • The effect of a suit instituted in the name of the firm in the manner prescribed by Order 30 Rule 1 C.P.C. is as if the suit is filed by all the persons collectively.
  • Whether the suit is filed by all the partners collectively or by some only of the partners impleading the rest as parties to the suit or whether it is filed in the name of the firm by one or more partners in the manner indicated by Order 30 rule I C.P.C. the conditions prescribed by Section 69(2) must be fulfilled.
  • They are:
    • (1) that the firm must be registered; and
    • (2) that the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the Firm.
  • The second condition requires that the names of the persons suing are presently shown or have been previously shown in the Register of Firm as partners in the firm. That appears to fallow pliantly from the provisions of Section 69(2).
  • The use of the conjunction ‘and’ shows that both the aforesaid conditions must exist together on the date of the institution of the suit.
  • As a matter of fact, these two requirements constitute the conditions precedent to the institution of the suit.
  • It may be pointed out that merely filing a statement under Section 58(1) of the Act in the office of the Registrar of Firms in the prescribed form, giving the particulars of the partnership firm and its partners together with the prescribed fee would not be enough for the fulfillment of the aforesaid conditions.
  • A certificate of registration in the prescribed form should be made available to the partners of the firm and an entry of the statement filed under Section 58(1) should be recorded by the Registrar in the Register of Firms before the institution of the suit.
  • Thus, even if the certificate of registration is made available, yet the second requirement of Sub-section (2) of Section 69 cannot be fulfilled merely by sending or delivering to the Registrar of Firms the statement required by Section 58, but it must also be shown that an entry of the statement so furnished was made by the Registrar in the Register of Firms before the date of the institution of the suit.
  • Similar is the position of a statement sent to the Registrar under Section 65 of the Act intimating the alterations or changes occurring in the constitution of the firm on account of addition, death or retirement of some of the partners.
  • Use of the expression ‘person suing” in Section 69(2) of the Act is significant.
  • Ordinarily a singular used in an enactment includes a plural, but the use of the word ‘persons’ in the aforesaid provision indicates that the legislature intended to refer to all those persons who are the partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit.
  • The reason is simple, as all these persons who desire to obtain a decree in their favour in a suit must become plaintiffs in the suit and all those persons against whom a decree is to be passed must similarly be made defendants in the suit.
  • When the suit is filed by or on behalf of the partnership firm, either all the partners of the firm should individually be named as plaintiffs in the suit or some of them maybe named as plaintiffs, while the remaining partners may be named as proforma defendants in the plaint.
  • Another alternative mode has been provided by Order 30 Rule 1 C.P.C. in such cases and the suit may be filed in the name of the firm, which name collectively represents all the partners of the firm at the time of institution of the suit.
  • Such a suit filed in the name of the firm shall be deemed to be a suit on behalf of all the partners of the firm.
  • The other limb of the requirement contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 69 is that all such persons who are partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit must be or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners of the plaintiff firm.
  • The expression “is or have been” refers to such persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm at the time of accrual of the cause of action and continues to remain so entered in the Register of Firms at the time of the institution of the suit. (It stands contrary to M/s. Shreeram Finance Corpn. v. Yasin Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1769.)
  • Thus either the persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm at the time of the accrual of cause of action and continued to remain so entered therein until the institution of the suit or persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms as partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit could maintain a suit in the name of the firm or on behalf of the firm.
  • It has also been held in some of the cases that all the persons whose names were entered in the Register of Firms on the date of the institution of the suit could file a suit notwithstanding the fact that the names of some other persons also find place in the Register of Firms as partners of the firm, who have either died or have since retired and thus ceased to be partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit.
  • The crux of the matter is that the names of all those persons, who continued to hold together as partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit must be shown to be entered in the Register of Firms on the date of the institution of the suit.
  • If the relevant entry in the Register of Firms containing some other names of persons who have either died or have retired from the partnership, the same would not affect the maintainability of the suit, in as much as the suit in the name of the firm could be filed only by or on behalf of the surviving partners of the firm.
  • But if the name of one or more of the existing partners of the firm at the time of institution of the suit does not find place in the Register of Firms on that date, then the suit by or on behalf of the partnership firm is not maintainable.
  • It is also clear that no oral evidence can be taken for the purpose of deciding as to who were the partners of the plaintiff firm at the time of the institution of the suit and the names of the persons suing must be shown in the Register of Firm as partners of the plaintiff firm at the time of the institution of the suit, as the suit in the name of the firm is virtually a suit by all the partners of the firm and in order to prove the fact as to who were the partners of the plaintiff firm at the time of the institution of the suit, the only evidence admissible is a certified copy of the relevant entry in the Register of Firms.
  • Thus the only possible interpretation to be placed on the expression ‘are or have been shown in the Register of Firms’ could be the persons suing must either be presently shown in the Register of Firms as partners of the firm at the time of the institution of the suit or they must have been earlier shown in the said Register of Firms as partners of the firm, no other interpretation is possible so as to give a rational meaning to the provision.

Read in this Cluster:

Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Principles and Procedure

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Contract Act

Easement

Stamp Act

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Time Limit for Registration of Documents

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introspection:

  • What is the time-limit for the registration of documents executed within India? Answer – Four Months. 
  • Is there provision for extension paying fine, after the 4 months? Answer – Yes. (within further 4 months)
  • Can a document already executed and registered by some (alone) can again be re-registered after signing by others who were left out? Answer – Yes. (within four months from the date of each execution)
  • Can a document be re-presented for improper earlier presentation? Answer – Yes.

Time Limit for Registration of Documents (executed within India)– Four Months

Time limit for registration of documents before a Sub-Registrar is four months under section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908. Time is calculated from the date of execution (signature) of the deed.

  • 23. Time for presenting documents. Subject to the provisions contained in sections 24, 25 and 26, no document other than a will shall be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution:
  • Provided that a copy a of a decree or order may be presented within four months from the day on which the decree or order was made, or, where it is appealable, within four months from the day on which it becomes final.

Re-registration of certain documents not duly Presented

If a person not duly empowered to present a document registers a document the defect can be cured by re-registration of the document within four months of becoming aware of the defect, under Sec. 23A.

  • 23A. Re-registration of certain documents. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, if in any case a document requiring registration has been accepted for registration by a Registrar or Sub-Registrar from a person not duly empowered to present the same, and has been registered, any person claiming under such document may, within four months form his first becoming aware that the registration of such document is invalid, present such document or cause the same to be presented, in accordance with the provisions of Part VI for re-registration in the office of the Registrar of the district in which the document was originally registered; and upon the Registrar being satisfied that the document was so accepted for registration from a person not duly empowered to present the same, he shall proceed to the re-registration of the document as if it has not been previously registered, and as if such presentation for re-registration was a presentation for registration made within the time allowed therefore under Part IV, and all the provisions of this Act, as to registration of documents, shall apply to such re-registration; and such document, if duly re-registered in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall be deemed to have been duly registered for all purposes from the date of its original registration.

Documents executed by several persons at different times.

A document already executed and registered by some (alone) can again be re-registered after signing by others who were left out. But, it must be within four months from the date of each execution, according to Sec. 24..

  • 24. Documents executed by several persons at different times. Where there are several persons executing a document at different times, such document may be presented for registration and re-registration within four months from the date of each execution.

Document Executed out of India – can be registered

A document executed outside India can be registered in India. Sec. 23 of the Registration Act allows it.

Registration of Documents Executed out of India – Four Months from Receipt in India

The period of four months for registration (stated above) will be counted from the date of receipt of that document in India, as per Sec. 26 of the Registration Act. Sec. 26 of the Registration Act is the relevant provision. It reads as under:

  • “26. Documents executed out of IndiaWhen a document purporting to have been executed by all or any of the parties out of India is not presented for registration till after the expiration of the time hereinbefore prescribed in that behalf, the registering officer, if satisfied—
    (a) that the instrument was so executed, and
    (b) that it has been presented for registration within four months after its arrival in India,
    may, on payment of the proper registration-fee accept such document for registration.”

Unavoidable Delay – Registration with Fine – within Eight Months

After four months, document can be presented within another four months to the District Registrar. The District Registrar may impose a penalty up to a maximum of ten times the registration fees and grant permission to Sub-Registrar to register the document (as per Sec. 25 – quoted below).

  • 25. Provision where delay in presentation is unavoidable. (1) If, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, any document executed, or copy of a decree or order made, in India is not presented for registration till after the expiration of the time hereinbefore prescribed in that behalf, the Registrar, in cases where the delay in presentation does not exceed four months, may direct that, on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper registration-fee, such document shall be accepted for registration.
  • (2) Any application for such direction may be lodged with a Sub-Registrar, who shall forthwith forward it to the Registrar to whom he is subordinate.

Registering authority cannot cancel registration

Our Apex Court has held in Satya Pal Anand vs. State of M.P, 2016 (10) SCC 767, as under:

  • “21. The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged, once the document is registered (see Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan (supra). Section 17 of the Act of 1908 deals with documents which require compulsory registration. Extinguishment Deed is one such document referred to in Section 17(1)(b). Section 18 of the same Act deals with documents, registration whereof is optional. Section 20 of the Act deals with documents containing interlineations, blanks, erasures or alterations. Section 21 provides for description of property and maps or plans and Section 22 deals with the description of houses and land by reference to Government maps and surveys. There is no express provision in the Act of 1908 which empowers the Registrar to recall such registration. The fact whether the document was properly presented for registration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its registration. The power to cancel the registration is a substantive matter. In absence of any express provision in that behalf, it is not open to assume that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) would be competent to cancel the registration of the documents in question. Similarly, the power of the Inspector General is limited to do superintendence of registration offices and make rules in that behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel the registration of any document which has already been registered.”

Read in this Cluster:

Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Principles and Procedure

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Contract Act

Easement

Stamp Act and Registration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Registration of Documents Executed out of India

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introspection:

  • Can foreign Documents (documents executed outside India) can be registered in India? Answer – Yes
  • What is the time-limit for the registration of documents executed within India? Answer – Four Months.
  • Is there provision for extension paying fine, after the 4 months? Answer – Yes. (within further 4 months)

Document Executed out of India – can be registered

A document executed outside India can be registered in India. Sec. 23 of the Registration Act allows it.

Time Limit for Registration of Documents (executed within India)– Four Months

Time limit for registration of documents before a Sub-Registrar is four months under section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908. Time is calculated from the date of execution (signature) of the deed.

  • 23. Time for presenting documents. Subject to the provisions contained in sections 24, 25 and 26, no document other than a will shall be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution:
  • Provided that a copy a of a decree or order may be presented within four months from the day on which the decree or order was made, or, where it is appealable, within four months from the day on which it becomes final.

Re-registration of certain documents not duly Presented

If a person not duly empowered to present a document registers a document the defect can be cured by re-registration of the document within four months of becoming aware of the defect, under Sec. 23A.

  • 23A. Re-registration of certain documents. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, if in any case a document requiring registration has been accepted for registration by a Registrar or Sub-Registrar from a person not duly empowered to present the same, and has been registered, any person claiming under such document may, within four months form his first becoming aware that the registration of such document is invalid, present such document or cause the same to be presented, in accordance with the provisions of Part VI for re-registration in the office of the Registrar of the district in which the document was originally registered; and upon the Registrar being satisfied that the document was so accepted for registration from a person not duly empowered to present the same, he shall proceed to the re-registration of the document as if it has not been previously registered, and as if such presentation for re-registration was a presentation for registration made within the time allowed therefore under Part IV, and all the provisions of this Act, as to registration of documents, shall apply to such re-registration; and such document, if duly re-registered in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall be deemed to have been duly registered for all purposes from the date of its original registration.

Documents executed by several persons at different times.

A document already executed and registered by some (alone) can again be re-registered after signing by others who were left out. But, it must be within four months from the date of each execution, according to Sec. 24..

  • 24. Documents executed by several persons at different times. Where there are several persons executing a document at different times, such document may be presented for registration and re-registration within four months from the date of each execution.

Registration of Documents executed out of India – Four Months from Receipt in India

The period of four months for registration (stated above) will be counted from the date of receipt of that document in India, as per Sec. 26 of the Registration Act. Sec. 26 of the Registration Act is the relevant provision. It reads as under:

  • “26. Documents executed out of India. When a document purporting to have been executed by all or any of the parties out of India is not presented for registration till after the expiration of the time hereinbefore prescribed in that behalf, the registering officer, if satisfied—
    (a) that the instrument was so executed, and
    (b) that it has been presented for registration within four months after its arrival in India,
    may, on payment of the proper registration-fee accept such document for registration.”

Unavoidable DelayRegistration with Fine – within Eight Months

After four months, document can be presented within another four months to the District Registrar. The District Registrar may impose a penalty up to a maximum of ten times the registration fees and grant permission to Sub-Registrar to register the document (as per Sec. 25 – quoted below).

  • 25. Provision where delay in presentation is unavoidable. (1) If, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, any document executed, or copy of a decree or order made, in India is not presented for registration till after the expiration of the time hereinbefore prescribed in that behalf, the Registrar, in cases where the delay in presentation does not exceed four months, may direct that, on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper registration-fee, such document shall be accepted for registration.
  • (2) Any application for such direction may be lodged with a Sub-Registrar, who shall forthwith forward it to the Registrar to whom he is subordinate.

Registering authority cannot cancel registration

Our Apex Court has held in Satya Pal Anand vs. State of M.P, 2016 (10) SCC 767, as under:

  • “21. The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged, once the document is registered (see Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan (supra). Section 17 of the Act of 1908 deals with documents which require compulsory registration. Extinguishment Deed is one such document referred to in Section 17(1)(b). Section 18 of the same Act deals with documents, registration whereof is optional. Section 20 of the Act deals with documents containing interlineations, blanks, erasures or alterations. Section 21 provides for description of property and maps or plans and Section 22 deals with the description of houses and land by reference to Government maps and surveys. There is no express provision in the Act of 1908 which empowers the Registrar to recall such registration. The fact whether the document was properly presented for registration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its registration. The power to cancel the registration is a substantive matter. In absence of any express provision in that behalf, it is not open to assume that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) would be competent to cancel the registration of the documents in question. Similarly, the power of the Inspector General is limited to do superintendence of registration offices and make rules in that behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel the registration of any document which has already been registered.”

Read in this Cluster:

Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Principles and Procedure

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Contract Act

Easement

Stamp Act

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Rule Against Perpetuity – Simplified

Restrictions on Transfer of Property & ‘Rule Against Perpetuity’

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Prologue

  • ‘Perpetuity’ or constancy is not the rule, in all spheres of life.
  • In law of transfer of property, the rule is ‘rule against perpetuity or permanency’. 
  • The Acts on Transfer of Property and Succession expressly disfavor  ‘perpetuity’; and, stand against stagnancy in transference.

Our Apex Court has said in R. Kempraj v. Barton Son & Co, AIR 1970 SC 1872 as under:

  • “It is well known that the rule against perpetuity is rounded on the principle that the liberty of alienation “shall not be exercised to its own destruction and that all contrivances shall be void which tend to create a perpetuity or place property for ever out of the reach of the exercise of the power of alienation”.

Part – I

Section 10 and 11, TP Act

Sec. 10. Condition absolutely restraining alienation – Analysed

  • Sec. 10 of the Transfer of Property Act (Condition absolutely restraining alienation) directs that if there is a condition in a transfer of property ‘absolutely restraining the transferee from disposing of his interest’, that condition is void.

Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:

  • “11. Restriction repugnant to interest created.— Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.
    Where any such direction has been made in respect of one piece of immoveable property for the purpose of securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property, nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any right which the transferor may have to enforce such direction or any remedy which he may have in respect of a breach thereof.”

Instances of “Absolute Restraint” and “Reasonable Restraint” 

  • Sale or gift (transfer) with direction – transferee should not sell (absolute restraint). The direction is void.
  • Sale or gift (transfer) with direction – transferee should sell to a particular person alone (in-effect absolute restraint). The direction is void.
  • Sale or gift (transfer) with direction – transferee should not sell outside family (in-effect absolute restraint). The direction is void.
  • Sale or gift (transfer) with direction – transferee should not sell for 3 years (reasonable restraint). The direction is valid.
  • Direction to members of Zoroastrian Housing Society – not to sell property other than Zoroastrians (reasonable restraint). The direction is valid.

In Gayasi Ram v. Shahabuddin, AIR 1935 All 493, the sale deed contained a clause that the vendee shall not transfer the house by mortgage, gift or sell to any one except the vendor or his heirs and if in contravention of the clause, the property is sold the vendor or his heir would have a right to get back the house by paying Rs. 175/- and if the property was to be sold in court auction sale, the sale would be invalid. The sale consideration for the house was Rs. 150/-. It was held (relying on Dal Singh v. Khub Chand, AIR 1921 All 97, Asghari Begam v. Maula Bakhsh, AIR 1929 All 381, and Gomti Singh v. Anari Kuar, AIR 1929 All 492) that this impugned clause in a sale between strangers was an absolute restraint on alienation; and therefore the same was void, in view of Section 10 of Transfer of Property Act; and that in such cases question of pre-emption did not arise. (See also: Manohar Shivram Swami v. Mahadeo Guruling Swami, AIR 1988 Bom 116)

In Trichinopoly Varthaga Sangam Ltd. v. T. N. Shanmughasundaram, AIR 1939 Mad. 769, the Clause in the Partition deed – the property should not be sold to any stranger; and lease only to brothers or their heirs for a sum not exceeding Rs. 1000/-. The court found that there was “no obligation” for a member to buy “even at Rs. 1000/-“. Hence it was held – Restriction is ‘absolute’, and hence, void. (See also: Rosher v. Rosher, (1884) 26 Ch D 801).  

Similarly, it was held in Manohar Shivram Swami v. Mahadeo Guruling Swami, AIR 2008 Bom 116, that the condition in the Sale Deed prohibiting sale ‘outside family’ was void – as it was absolute restraint.

Assignment Can be Limited to Establishing a Nursery School

In Jayasree Jayaprakash v. State Of Kerala, ILR 2021-2 Ker 1096; 2021-3 KHC 70; 2021-3 KLT 26 the Kerala High Court considered an assignment deed clause 2 of which provided that the purchaser was precluded from using it for any use except the construction of a nursery school building. It is argued to have been hit by Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The High Court accepted the contention and held as under:

  • “True, in the light of the said provision, once an interest is created absolutely in favour of a person on a transfer of property, there cannot be any fetters on the enjoyment of the interest so created. As indicated, what is transferred in terms of Ext.P1 assignment deed is only limited interest for the purpose of establishing and running a nursery school in the plot and since no fetters whatsoever is created in terms of the document in the matter of the transferee enjoying the said limited interest, Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, according to me, has no application.”

    No Rule Against Perpetuity in Public Law;

    The Government cannot assign land on their whims and fancies

    Section 11 of the TP Act says – where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.

    But, in Mahindra Holidays & Resorts India Limited v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 ILR(Ker) 828; 2019 3 KHC 233; 2019-2 KLT 978 (A. Muhamed Mustaque, J.), it is held as under:

    • “6. In private law, any restriction repugnant to the interest created is void except to the extent of securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of property belonged to the transferor. (See Section 11 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882). The transferee, therefore, in such cases is free to enjoy property absolutely as if there were no stipulations.
    • 7. In public law, the transfer of an interest or assignment of Government land stands on a different footing. The Government is only a public trustee of the land belonging to the State. The Government cannot assign land on their whims and fancies. The land is a natural resource of utmost importance. Therefore, the Government can distribute the natural resources only adhering to the principles of public trust. No land can be assigned ignoring the public interest and detrimental to the public interest.
    • 8. The subsequent incorporation of Rule 8(3) of the Rules for cancellation of patta cannot be relied upon in this matter as the assignment was prior to the amendment. In the absence of any specific condition for cancellation of assignment in the patta or in the statutory provisions at the relevant time, this Court needs to examine the decision taken to cancel the assignment in the light of the public trust doctrine.
    • 9. In Illinois Cent Co. v. State of Illinois City of Chicago [146 US 387 (1892)], principles relating to public trust doctrine were expounded. It is appropriate to refer the opinion in that judgment which reads as follows:
      • ‘The trust devolving upon the state for the public, and which can only be discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein’.
    • 10. In M.C.Mehta v. Kamal Nath and others [(1997) 1 SCC 388], the Apex Court observed that the State is the natural trustees of all resources, which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment, and the State is a trustee under a legal duty to protect the natural resources.
    • 11. In Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd. v. Minguel Martins, (2009) 3 SCC 571], the Apex Court held as follows:
      • “53. The public trust doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes. This doctrine puts an implicit embargo on the right of the State to transfer public properties to private party if such transfer affects public interest, mandates affirmative State action for effective management of natural resources and empowers the citizens to question ineffective management thereof.
      • 54. The heart of the public trust doctrine is that it imposes limits and obligations upon government agencies and their administrators on behalf of all the people and especially future generations….”
    • 12. Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. v. Reliance Industries Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 1] at para.114 it was observed as follows:
      • “114. It must be noted that the constitutional mandate is that the natural resources belong to the people of this country. The nature of the word “vest” must be seen in the context of the public trust doctrine (PTD). Even though this doctrine has been applied in cases dealing with environmental jurisprudence, it has its broader application.”
    • 13. In the Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1] at para.75, it was held as follows:
      • “75. The State is empowered to distribute natural resources. However, as they constitute public property/national asset, while distributing natural resources the State is bound to act in consonance with the principles of equality and public trust and ensure that no action is taken which may be detrimental to public interest. Like any other State action, constitutionalism must be reflected at every stage of the distribution of natural resources. In Article 39(b) of the Constitution it has been provided that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community should be so distributed so as to best subserve the common good, but no comprehensive legislation has been enacted to generally define natural resources and a framework for their protection. Of course, environment laws enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures deal with specific natural resources i.e. forest, air, water, coastal zones, etc.””
    • Note: Appeal to Division Bench (from Mahindra Holidays & Resorts India Limited v. State of Kerala) is dismissed in Raphy John v. Land Revenue Commissioner, Thiruvananthapuram (DB), 2022-3 KLT 679.

    Original Patta for Personal Cultivation; Assignee cannot have a Better Title

    In Mahindra Holidays & Resorts India Limited v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 ILR(Ker) 828; 2019 3 KHC 233; 2019-2 KLT 978, it is held further as under:

    • “17. Admittedly, the present use of land is for commercial purposes. It is for personal gain and to subserve the private interest. Commercial purpose is not one on which the land can be assigned. The Government being a trustee is answerable to the public. The public can question if the Government had failed in its duties when it is found that the land is used for other purposes other than for it was assigned. The beneficiary of cultivation is public. That interest of the public is superadded in such assignment. Thus, even in the absence of statutory provisions or conditions in the patta, anyone can question such use of land for commercial purposes.
    • 18. This Court, in fact, had considered use of land for commercial purposes by the assignee of a patta holder, who was assigned land for personal cultivation in Haridas v. State of Kerala [2016 (4) KLT 707] and held that the assignee of original pattadhar cannot have any better claim conferred on him other than the one conveyed to the pattadhar by the assignment. The use of land for commercial purposes is a fraud on the State. The pattadhar or his assignee has a legal obligation to use the land for cultivation.
    • 19. The learned Senior Counsel argued that the Government authorities have issued certificates to run the resort and, therefore, they are estopped from urging that the petitioner had violated the patta conditions. It was also argued that the Government have waived their right to proceed against the petitioner by acknowledging the acceptance of basic tax and conferring certificates relating to tourism.      
    • 20. The equitable principles relating to estoppel and waiver cannot have a bearing when the Government is acting as a trustee. This action to protect the interest of the State. No wrong can give rise to a right. The land belongs to the State. If the Government had failed in its duty to check illegal use of land that will not give rise to an equitable right to a wrongdoer. The principles of estoppel cannot be advanced to promote one’s own wrong. This is not a case between the Government and the holder of the land. It is a matter between public interest and breach of trust by a person, who was in relation with the Government to promote the public interest. The principles of estoppel and waiver cannot be pressed against an action of the Government based on public policy. No action of the Government would bind them if it was against the public policy of the State.”

    If Land Assigned for Specific Purposes, it Cannot be used for Other Purposes

    Kerala High Court, in Haridas v. State of Kerala, 2016 (5) KHC 615 (K. Vinodchandran, J.), had taken a view that when land is assigned for specific purposes, it cannot be said that if there is no prohibition in using it for any other purpose then, an assignee or a subsequent owner could use it for any purpose to which a land is normally put to. Among others, it was further observed therein that the essence is in the assignment made, for a specific purpose, which survives time and tide. (Referred to in: Raphy John v. Land Revenue Commissioner, Thiruvananthapuram (DB), 2022-3 KLT 679).

    Subsequent Assignees of Pattadar Cannot Claim More Rights

    In R.  Haridas v. State of Kerala, 2016-5 KHC 615; 2016-4 KLT 707, held further as under:

    • “8. … The title acquired of the property, which, admittedly, were Government lands assigned under a statute. The petitioners are assignees of the original pattaadar and cannot have any rights over and above that possessed by the original assignee.
    • 9. The Assignment Rules, by Rule 4, as has been pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate General, has three specific purposes; for which alone land may be assigned. These are – personal cultivation, house-sites and beneficial enjoyment of adjoining registered holdings. ….  The original assignment made, as evidenced by Exhibit P2 in both the writ petitions, admittedly, is not for house-site or for beneficial enjoyment. Such an extent could have been assigned only under Rule 5 for the purpose of personal cultivation. The assignment having been specifically made under a statute and the Rules framed thereunder, none can have a legitimate expectation of enjoyment of the property over and above the purpose for which the same has been assigned.
    • 10. The subsequent assignees of the original pattaadar cannot claim any right other than that conferred on the original assignee, which Assignment on Registry was specifically for the purpose of personal cultivation. …. The prohibition has to be read into the terms of assessment when by virtue of a statutory provision the assignment is made for a specific purpose. The passage of time would not change the character of the assignment ….. . These conditions are also incorporated as ‘Conditions’ in the Patta and the respective Pattas produced are incomplete copies as will be presently noticed.
    • 13. …  It is a matter of concern and quiet a surprise that the revenue authorities in the district have been issuing recommendations like Exhibit P6; for carrying out construction activities without noticing the embargo created insofar as the constructions intended at promoting commercial activity.
    • 14. … The prescription for a permit to be obtained from the local authority is only so far as complying with any master plan for development applicable to the area and compliance of the building rules applicable to the panchayats and municipalities, as brought out under the respective statutes. This cannot create a carte blanche in favour of a permit holder to make a construction in an assigned land which would go specifically against the prescriptions laid down in the statute for such assignment. ….
    • 16. …. Hence any time it is found that the purpose for assignment is diverted from, the State could definitely take proceedings for cancellation of the assignment and either vest the lands back with the Government or assign it to others for the purpose of cultivation.
    • 17. … The assignee would have a right to hold the land and enjoy it under the terms of assignment and any violation thereat would be a reason for cancellation of the assignment made. …
    •  20. … The Revenue authorities, a law unto themselves, have been violating the provisions and colluding with the assignees causing gross damage to the ecology and environment. Be that as it may; the petitioners herein were quite aware of the conditions of assignment; though their ignorance, if at all, would have been of little consequence in the teeth of the statutory prescriptions. ….
    • 21. In any event the loss caused to the petitioners would be of no consequence when weighed with the larger public interest of averting ecological imbalance and preserving pristine lands from haphazard development; which otherwise as studies reveal; would even affect the climate of the Indian peninsula. …”

    Reasonable Restraint is Allowed in Law

    The words ‘absolute restraint‘ in Sec. 10 of the TP Act makes it clear that ‘reasonable restraint’ is allowed in law. Hence, it is clear that the cases in this subject has to be dealt with on the facts of each case.

    Therefore, it is not possible to place a hard and fast rule on the validity of the restrictions of enjoyment for a particular period, enjoyment in a particular manner, restrictions on transfer etc. In Renand v. Tourangeaon, (1867) LR 2 PC 4, it was held that a condition prohibiting transfer the property for twenty years was held to be an absolute restraint and hence void. But it was opined that if it were for a period of 3 years, it would have been a partial restraint and valid. This decision is referred to in Athmaram Rao v. Shanthan Phawar (2018 Madras High Court).

    Our Apex Court held in Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Urban ), AIR 2005 SC 2306, that in the matter of a Housing Society, the restriction imposed in the light of the byelaws of the Society that the property should not be sod to others, other than Zoroastrians, was a valid condition.

    Sec. 11. Restriction repugnant to Absolute interest created  – Analysed

    • Sec. 11 of the TP Act (Restriction repugnant to Absolute interest created) cautions that the terms, in an absolute transfer, that direct enjoyment of interest in a particular manner, is invalid.
    • But the direction for securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property is valid.

    Instances of ‘Absolute Sale & Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’ in S. 11, TP Act

    • Absolute sale or gift with direction – transferee should reside there. The direction is invalid.
    • Absolute sale or gift with direction – transferee should not cut trees. The direction is invalid.

    Instances of ‘No Absolute Transfer in S. 11, TP Act

    • On a ‘Harmonious Construction’ of the deed, sale or gift subject to a condition – transferee should reside there, or look after transferor (that is, no absolute transfer). The direction is valid.
    • In a transfer, life interest alone is created (that is, no absolute transfer) and a direction – assignee should not cut trees. The direction is valid.

    In Bhavani Amma Kanakadevi v. CSI, Dakshina Kerala Maha Idavaka, AIR 2008 Kerala 38, the question came for consideration was whether a provision in a sale deed that in the event of failure to construct a private college in the property sold thereunder, the property shall be re-conveyed by the vendee to the vendor for the same sale consideration is barred under the provisions of Sections 10 or 11 of Transfer of Property Act. Observing that (though) Ext.A2 did not contain a specific clause prohibiting respondent from alienating the property to third parties, the implied clause – that in the event of failure to construct a college, the property shall be reconveyed to the assignor at the same price – shut out any other option. The High Court held that it was an absolute restraint on the right of respondent to deal with the property including alienation, which was void as provided under Section 10. 

    The court referred to the following decisions:

    • Jatru Pahan v. Mahatma Ambikajit Prasad ( AIR 1957 Patna 570),
    • Gayasi Ram v. Shahabuddin (AIR 1935 All. 493)
    • Manohar Shivram Swami v. Mahadeo Guruling Swami (AIR 1988 Bombay 116)
    • Fatima v. Saraswathi Amma (AIR 1986 Kearla 56).
    • Thomas v. AA Henry, 2008(2) KLT 63, ILR 2008(2) Ker. 12
    • Trichinopoly Varthaga Sangam Ltd. v. T. N. Shanmughasundaram, AIR 1939 Mad. 769.

    LIFE INTEREST created in a Settl. Deed is Not Hit by S. 11  TP Act

    Santha Bai v.  Anusuya Bai, ILR 2024-4 Ker 686; 2024 KLT(Online) 2537

    Facts

    • (Deceased) Padmavathy executed Ext.A1 Settlement deed.
    • (Deceased) Krishna Prabhu and (deceased) Saraswathy Bhai are the children of Padmavathy.
    • Plaintiffs are the wife and son of Krishna Prabhu.
    • The defendants are the children of Saraswathy Bhai.
    • Ext. A1 Settlement deed contained a clause that Saraswathy Bhai, her husband, and children will have the right to live therein during the lifetime of the said persons.
    • The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court dismissed the suit holding that the defendants have a life interest in the plaint B schedule building as per Ext.A1.
    • The questions of Law came in the High Court was whether ‘interest’ created in Ext.A1 settlement deed in favour of Saraswathy Bhai husband and children.

    Plaintiffs/Appellants argued as under:

    • If ‘interest’ is conferred in favour of Saraswathy Bhai and children,  it is repugnant to the interest created in favour of Krishna Prabhu. It is hit by S. 11 of the Transfer of Property Act.
    • Ext. A1 gives absolute interest over the plaint A schedule property in favour of Krishna Prabhu. Therefore, the status of the defendants is that of licensees.
    • Supreme Court in Kedar Lal Seal v. Hari Lal C, AIR 1952 SC 47, held that technicality shall not stand in the matter of pleading, and the substance of the thing is important if no prejudice is caused to the other side.

    The defendants contended –

    • The ownership over immovable property carries a bundle of rights. It is not necessary that the entire bundle of rights should be transferred to make it a vested interest.
    • Creation of an interest in the immovable property amounts to a vested interest, under Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act.
    • A life interest was created in favour of the defendants. Supreme Court in Smt. Rukhamanibai v. Shivaram, AIR 1981 SC 1881, held that a life interest is a vested interest; and that the interest created in favour of the transferee is only a contingent interest (Section 21 of the Transfer of Properties Act).
    • Life interest could not be termed as a license since the latter does not create any interest in the land, as revealed by Section 52 of the Easement Act. [Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262, and ICICI v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 5 SCC 708, relied on].
    • The provision applicable is Section 24 of the Transfer of Property Act (Transfer to such of certain persons as survive at some period not specified.) Such right in favour of Saraswathy Bhai, her husband, and her children is not a license. On a bare reading of Ext.A1, it is clear that the right given is a life interest.
    • The learned Counsel cited the decision of this Court in Joseph T.T. v. Valsamma Varghese, 2022 (3) KHC 443, and contended that even recital in the Settlement Deed to the effect that the settlor had retained the right of alienation with respect to a part of the property would not create a restriction repugnant to the interest created in favour of the settlee as provided under Section 11 with respect to the larger extent of property covered by the Deed.

    Findings

    • The ownership over immovable property carries a bundle of rights. It is not necessary that the entire bundle of rights should be transferred to make it a vested interest.
    • Creation of an interest in the immovable property amounts to a vested interest, under Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act.
    • A life interest was created in favour of the defendants. Supreme Court in Smt. Rukhamanibai v. Shivaram, AIR 1981 SC 1881, held that a life interest is a vested interest; and that the interest created in favour of the transferee is only a contingent interest (Section 21 of the Transfer of Properties Act).
    • Life interest could not be termed as a license since the latter does not create any interest in the land, as revealed by Section 52 of the Easement Act. [Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262, and ICICI v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 5 SCC 708, relied on].

    Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable when a life interest is created

    The Kerala High Court pointed out as under:

    • To attract Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, restriction repugnant to the absolute interest should be in the matter of enjoyment of the property.
    • If there is such restriction, the transferee is entitled to absolutely enjoy the property as if there is no such direction.
    • In the case on hand, there is no such direction with respect to the manner of enjoyment.
    • The life interest created in favour of another person does not in any way affect the right of the transferee to enjoy the property on the extinction of the life interest. 

    Contingent Interest and Contingent Remainders

    Read Blog: Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests

    Part – II

    RULE AGAINST PERPETUITY

    Rule against perpetuity, in Indian law, is applicable when property is transferred to an ‘unborn’ person. Sec. 14 of the Transfer of property Act directs that such (unborn) person must have born within the life-time of ‘one or more persons’ named in the transfer deed (who must be one living at the date of such transfer).

    Under the English jurisprudence, it is pertaining to and for ‘controlling the duration of private trusts‘. The Rule Against Perpetuities Applied to Trusts, 9 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 286 (1924) speaks as under:

    • “Under the rule against perpetuities, private trusts may be created for the life of the last survivor of any number of designated persons, in being at the commencement of the trust, and for period of 21 years thereafter.”

    Indian law specifies, and limits, the doctrine to the transfer of property to ‘unborn’ persons. Sections 13 and 14 of the TP Act are the relevant provisions.

    Sec. 13. Transfer for benefit of Unborn Person

    (Similar provision in Section 113 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925)

    Sections 13 and 14 of the TP Act are worded in a tiresome manner. It is too difficult to understand the purport of the Section, in its correct perspective, without a thorough exploration. Both these sections says about transfer of property to unborn persons.

    Sec. 13 of the TP Act reads as under:

    • 13. Transfer for benefit of unborn person. Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence at the date of the transfer, subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer, the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property.

    As articulated in Sec. 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, ‘Transfer of Property’ must be by a living person, to another living person. Sec. 13 is an enabling provision to transfer property to an unborn person. It directs that following conditions must be satisfied for a valid transfer to an unborn person:

    • (i) Prior interest must have been created in ‘someone’:
      • The interest in the property (referred to in this Section as prior interest), for the period between the transfer and the birth of the unborn person, must have been created (in someone), by the same transfer.
        • [The aforesaid proposition can be deduced from the clause in Sec. 13 – “subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer”];
    • (ii) Whole of the remaining interest of the transferor must be created in the unborn person – purport and principle:
      • The ‘prior interest-holder’ must have been directed (by the transferor) to create/transfer the whole remaining interest (directly) to such unborn person.
      • The transfer under Sec. 13 cannot be limited to ‘life interest’ alone (as in English law) of the ‘unborn’ (Life-interest is the interest that remains only in his/her life time – thereafter it will go to a named person or another ‘unborn’).
      • The transfer under Sec. 13 must be definite in nature; it cannot be unlimited or ‘perpetual’.
      • That is, if a life-interest stands created, or continues, on an intermediary, (after the birth of the said ‘unborn’) it will nottake effect.
        • [These can be deduced from the clause in Sec. 13 – “the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property”; and from the illustration in Sec. 13.]
      • Note: 1. ‘Whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property may by be the the whole fractional interest of the transferor (originally he had).
      • 2. Though it may appear worded otherwise, it can also be the fractional interest (of the whole interest) that is intended to be transferred to the ‘unborn’.

    The Illustration in Sec. 13 of the TP Act reads as under:

    • Illustration: A transfers property of which he is the owner to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for their lives, and, after the death of the survivor, for the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death for A’s second son. The interest so created for the benefit of the eldest son does not take effect, because it does not extend to the whole of A’s remaining interest in the property.

    For the benefit of” – Implies ‘TRUST’

    Sec. 13 begins with the words – “Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence”. The words ‘for the benefit of‘ definitely brings-in the concept of ‘trust’.

    • Note: Trust is ‘an obligation’ upon the trustee to administer the trust property, as if he is its owner and as required by the author, for the benefit of the beneficiaries.

    Read Blogs: What is Trust in Law

    Trustees and Administration of Public Trusts

    Transfer to Unborn can only be made by a Machinery of Trust

    Mulla, on The Transfer of Property Act, in commentary to Sec, 122, Gifts, it is stated:

    • “A gift may be made by the equitable machinery of a trust; and the interposition of the trustees enables a gift to be made to a person not yet in existence and, therefore, incapable of being the donee of a direct gift.” (See: Controller of Estate Duty, Bombay v. Bhagwandas Velji Joshi, 1983-139 ITR 316 (Bom); 1981-6 TAXMAN 202; Saraswathi v. Devaki Amma, ILR 1986-1 Ker 550; 1985 KLT 217.)

    In Mathen Mathew v. Kunjika Bharathi: AIR 1968 Ker 12, it is held as under:

    • “18. The gift can be to the named donees as representing the group of persons composed of the wife and children including children to be born. Such a gift can be made only through the machinery of a trust, the named donees holding as trustees for themselves and the other beneficiaries.”

    In The Commissioner of Income Tax v. Brig. Kapil Mohan, [2001] 252 ITR 830: 118 Taxman 430 (Delhi ) observed as under:

    • “5. A transfer cannot be made directly to an unborn person, for the definition of transfer in Section 5 is limited to living persons. Such transfer can only be made by the machinery of trusts. Possibly, to express this distinction, the expression “for the benefit of” has been used, since trustees being the transferees hold the property for the benefit of the unborn person.”

    The Madras High Court in T Subramania Nadar v. T Varadharajan, AIR 2003 Mad 364, pointed out as under:

    • “12. Under Section 13 of Transfer of Property Act transfer cannot be made directly to an unborn person as the definition of transfer in Section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is limited to living persons. The transfer in favour of an unborn person can be made by a machinery. It is intended to express this distinction by the words “for the benefit of, the trustees being the transferees who hold the property for the benefit of the unborn persons. The estate must vest in some person between the date of the transfer and the coming into existence of the unborn person. The interest of the unborn person must therefore be in every case preceded by a prior interest. Section 13 says that the interest of the unborn person must be the whole remainder.” 

    “TRANSFER OF PROPERTY” and ‘CREATION OF INTEREST’ in Sec. 13

    It is clear that the words, ‘transfer of propertyandan interest created therein’ are used in Sec. 13 to denote two different notions. Transfer of property to the ‘unborn’ should take place on his/her birth. Creation of interest can be done only on attaining his/her majority.

    Can a limited ‘beneficial enjoyment’ be allowed to ‘prior-interest-holder’

    It appears that there is no impediment in giving a limited ‘beneficial enjoyment’ (like appropriating income derived; right to reside in the building) to the ‘prior-interest-holder’- up to the birth of the ‘unborn’ person. If it is not so specifically provided, the prior-interest-holder will be a mere ‘trustee’ for the unborn person (the beneficiary). These propositions are made from the following:

    • Sec. 13 only directs -‘the whole of the remaining interestmust have been directed to be vested in the (unborn) person (when he/she born). The word ‘remaining’ persuades only one reasoning.
    • The prohibition in Sec. 13 is that ‘life interest’ (interest that remains only in his/her life time) alone can be conferred upon the ‘unborn’; that is, creation of life-interest alone is bad in law.
    • Sec. 13 speaks about ‘Transfer of Property’ to the ‘unborn’ on his/her birth, and, therefore, it can also be a ‘conditional transfer’.
    • Generally speaking, the question of ‘trust’ comes only on birth of the ‘unborn’. Though property can be given to ‘unborn’, it is only because of specific enacted provisions (Section 9 of the Indian Trusts Act; Section 14 of the TP Act). Since those provisions do not expressly prohibit, the aforesaid ‘conditional transfer’ can be made validly (provided it does not be bad under Sec. 11 of the TP Act – as shown above.
    • The owner of a property is free to deal with his property in any manner he wishes, unless expressly or impliedly restricted by law. ‘Conditional transfer’ is permitted by the TP Act itself.
    • If a ‘conditional transfer is made, it can only be upto the birth of the ‘unborn’. [It is clear from the words in Sec. 13 – “the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property”; and from the illustration in Sec. 13.]

    In either case, the ‘the whole of the remaining interestmust have been directed to be vested in the (unborn) person (when he/she born).

    Even if no trustee is appointed, and it does not come out from the deed of transfer as to who should be the trustee, the court will appoint a trustee, on the principle – ‘no trust will fail for want of trustees’.

    Sec. 13 does not specifically refer to Prior Interest “HOLDERS”. Why?

    • The (main) object of this section is to provide – ‘whole remainder interest … in the unborn person‘.
    • The creation of interest, in a prior interest HOLDER, for the period between the transfer and the birth of such unborn person, is an inevitable coincident.
    • As stated earlier, a limited ‘beneficial enjoyment’ could be given, to the prior interest HOLDER, up to the birth of the ‘unborn’ .
    • For the above, only an indication as to creation of prior interest was apposite.

    Sec. 14. Rule against Perpetuity – Analysed.

    (Similar provision in Section 114 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925)

    Sec. 14 of the TP Act reads as under:

    • 14. Rule against perpetuity. No transfer of property can operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the life-time of one or more persons living at the date of such transfer, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the interest created is to belong.

    Sec. 14 of the TP Act lays down the following:

    • Property can be transferred to an unborn person.
    • Sec. 14 basically declares the maximum period (perpetuity period) for creating an interest in an unborn person as regards an immovable property.
    • For transferring property to an unborn person, such (unborn) person must have born within the life-time of ‘one or more persons’ named in the transfer deed (who must be one living at the date of such transfer).
    • The interest in the property can be created in favour of such (unborn) person only on attaining majority by such (unborn) person (i.e., 18 years).
      • Therefore, the maximum period (perpetuity period) for creating the interest in the property in favour of such (unborn) person will be the remaining (after transfer) ‘life-time‘ of such ‘one or more persons(who were living at the date of such transfer) plus (+) the ‘minority’ of such (unborn) person (i.e., 18 years).
      • It is clear – such (unborn) person must have born at least on the day of death of such ‘one or more persons‘.
    • Sec. 14 allows the transferor to name any ‘one or more persons‘ whose ‘life-time’ is to be taken into consideration for Sec. 14.
    • Who are such ‘one or more persons‘ has to be inferred from the transfer deed.
    • As stated in Sec. 13, the interest in the property, for the period between the transfer and the birth of such unborn person (referred to as prior interest), must have been created in ‘some’ (prior interest) holder.
      • Note: The prior interest holder in Sec. 13 need not necessarily be the ‘one or more persons‘ stated in Sec. 14.

    G. Ramakrishniah v. Dasaratharama Reddiar, AIR 1970 Mad 484 ( Natesan, J.), vividly explains these matters, as under:

    • “The perpetuity period under Section 14 of the Act consists of the lifetime of one or more persons living at the time the transfer takes effect, and the further period of the minority of a person in existence at the close of the person living at the time of the transfer. ….. Section 14 of the Act however does not place any restriction as to who can be the living person whose existence can postpone the vesting. It allows the settlor to use any life for the purpose…… It may be any person or any number of persons, but the person or persons must be living at the date of such transfer. True, one must infer from the document itself the person or persons whose life has to be considered.”

    Status of the one or more personswhose ‘life-time’ is to be taken into consideration

    • As stated earlier, the prior interest holder in Sec. 13 need not necessarily be the ‘one or more persons‘ stated in Sec. 14.
    • They are not ‘trustees’ inasmuch as no property is entrusted for their administration, and no obligation is casted upon them.

    Therefore, they are persons merely chosen by the transferor of property (to an unborn), for the purpose of Sec. 14.

    The exceptions to the rule against perpetuity

    1. Transfer for Public Benefit (Not for private trusts): Read Blog: Dedication of Property in Public Trusts
    2. Covenants of Redemption of mortgage.
    3. Personal Contracts
    4. Pre-emption: Read Blog: Preemption is a Very Weak Right; For, Property Right is a Constitutional & Human Right
    5. Perpetual Lease

    Part – III

    ‘Absolute‘ Transfer of Property in a Will, with Stipulation: ‘If property Remains’ on Death of Transferee, it will Go to Another – If Valid

    The following important points require consideration in this regard:

    1. In Indian practice, though the words used in the deeds might be ‘absolute transfer’, on a true construction, on a reading of the entire document, it might only be a salable/transferable right during lifetime; and the left-over property might be given to another.
    2. The common law in India requires reading the whole document altogether, and give effect to the document on a harmonious interpretation, rather than giving effect to the legal terms used in a deed.
    3. Illustrations in Sections 24 and 27 make it clear that Indian law recognises ‘vested remainder’ and ‘contingent remainder‘ (as detailed in the notes above).
    4. It is also beyond doubt that such a transfer is not hit by Sec. 10 and 11 of the TP Act; inasmuch as Sec. 10 and 11 cumber only when ‘conditions’ impose ‘Absolute Restraint’ or ‘Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’.
    5. First illustration in Sec. 88 of the Indian Succession Act reads as under:
      • “The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.”

    Various court decisions make it clear that one can validly transfer or bequeath a property to another, with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights, with the stipulation that after that (first) transferee’s lifetime, if whole or any part remains, it (contingent remainder) may go to another.

    In K. S.  Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017  SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.), Palaniappa Chettiar and his wife by registered Will created a Trust. The Will indicated that after the death of one of the testators, the survivor had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same.  Certain alienations were made by Rangammal after death of Palaniappa Chettiar.  It is held as under:

    • “49. The intention in testamentary disposition has to be primarily found out from the actual words used in the Will. The court is not entitled to ignore clear words or add something of its own or dilute the meaning of any clear word used in the Will. The solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention. On the reading of the Will, the intendment of testator/testatrix is clear that survivor shall have absolute right of enjoyment of properties. There is no reason not to give effect to said intendment on the ground that the testator and testatrix have mutually intended to set apart the property for charity and holding that survivor shall have right of disposition be not in the interest of the trust.”

    Other Erudite Decisions on the Topic

    In Sanford v. Sanford(1901) 1 Ch. 939, the gift to the wife conferred a power of disposal limited explicitly to her lifetime. But, the gift-over to son was of a quite absolute estate. The gift did not include a power of disposition by will, but allowed power of disposition inter vivos. It was provided in the gift deed that if any property remained at her death it was to pass ‘from father to son, from generation to generation’.   Therefore, it was held that the widow was conferred with only a limited right; and the gift-over, which was ‘the will of the testator’ was to ‘settle its destination’. (This decision is referred to in Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, 1976-2 MLJ 381.)

    In Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381, the Madras High Court rendered a well-read decision in this topic. The facts of this case, in a nutshell, are as under:

    • (i) The settlement deed considered in the case provided:
    • (a)  the wife of the settlor should enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights.
    • (b) the respondent should take the properties remained at the time of her death, with absolute rights.
    • (ii) the appellant contended that the clause providing for the respondent taking absolutely such of the properties as at the time of the death of the settler’s wife was repugnant to the earlier clause conferring an absolute estate on her, and has, therefore, to be ignored as void.
    • (iii) the respondent contended that if the settlement deed had to be read as a whole  and the effect would be:
      • there was no absolute transfer to the wife of the settler as stated in Sec. 11 of the TP Act.

    It is seen that the High Court accepted the contentions of the respondent that the settlement deed was to be read as a whole and that the respondent had taken absolutely such of the properties covered by the settlement deed as remained undisposed of by the settlee, the wife of the settlor; as she had only a right to enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) powers of disposal during her lifetime. The clause as to acquiring property by respondent was not repugnant and void.

    The High Court relied on the following cases. The facts of these were ‘very near’ to the facts of that case.

    • Thayalai Achi v. Kannammal, AIR 1935 Mad 704,
    • S.M. Hara Kumari v. Mohim Chandra Sarkar, (1908) 12 CWN 412,
    • Anantnasayana v. Kondappe AIR 1940 Mad 479,
    • Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247,
    • Ramasreenivasa Iyengar v. Padmasani Ammal, (1973) 1 MLJ 34.

    In Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247, it was held, as regards a Will, as under:

    • “After giving an absolute estate to his wife over the two items of scheduled properties, he provided that these scheduled properties, after the wife’s lifetime should devolve – item 1 on the first daughter and item 2 on the second daughter – who would have absolute rights. When the testator took care to indicate that the properties without any distinction even after his wife’s lifetime should go to each of the daughters, it should be presumed that it was clearly in his mind that the wife’s estate was only to be a limited estate or life estate, and not an absolute one.” (Quoted in: Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381).

    Reconcile all clauses in the Will, Even if an apparent Absolute Estate Given

    In Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, AIR 2006 SC 3282, 2006-8 SCC 75 (B.P. Singh & P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.), it is held as under:

    • “20. Thus the first attempt must be to reconcile all the clauses in the will and give effect to all of them. When we make that attempt in the context of what this Court had indicated in the decision quoted above, we find that the apparent absolute estate given to his wife by the testator is sought to be cut down by the stipulations that the property must go to his nephews after the death of the wife, that the wife cannot testamentarily dispose of the property in favour of any one else and the further interdict in the note that the wife during her life time would not be entitled to mortgage or sell the properties. Thus on reconciling the various clauses in the will and the destination for the properties that the testator had in mind, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the apparent absolute estate in favour of Isher Kaur has to be cut down to a life estate so as to accommodate the estate conferred on the nephews.
    • 21. Thus understood, it has necessarily to be held, as was held by the first appellate court, that Isher Kaur was not competent to gift away the properties in favour of the Gurdwara as she had done. Even if the gift were to be treated as valid, the donee thereunder cannot resist the claim for eviction by the legatees under the will, the nephews of Ralla Singh, on the cessation of the life estate of Isher Kaur. Admittedly, that life estate has ceased and once it is found that the plaintiff has acquired a title to the property as a legatee under the will, he would be entitled for and on behalf of himself and his brother to recover possession of the property from the Gurdwara in view of the death of Isher Kaur.”
    • Note: In Tej Bhan v. Ram Kishan,2024 INSC 945, the Apex Court referred this decision and various other decisions to a ‘larger bench for reconciling the principles laid down in various judgments of this Court and for restating the law on the interplay between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

    End Notes

    Sec. 10 to 15 of the TP Act

    Sec. 10. Condition restraining alienation.

    • Where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee or any person claiming under him from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property, the condition or limitation is void, except in the case of a lease where the condition is for the benefit of the lessor or those claiming under him: provided that property may be transferred to or for the benefit of a women (not being a Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist), so that she shall not have power during her marriage to transfer or charge the same or her beneficial interest therein.

    Sec. 11. Restriction repugnant to interest created.

    • Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.
    • Where any such direction has been made in respect of one piece of immoveable property for the purpose of securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property, nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any right which the transferor may have to enforce such direction or any remedy which he may have in respect of a breach thereof.

    Sec. 12. Condition making interest determinable on insolvency or attempted alienation.

    • Where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation making any interest therein, reserved or given to or for the benefit of any person, to cease on his becoming insolvent or endeavouring to transfer or dispose of the same, such condition or limitation is void. Nothing in this section applies to a condition in a lease for the benefit of the lessor or those claiming under him.

    Sec. 13. Transfer for benefit of unborn person.

    • Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence at the date of the transfer, subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer, the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property.
    • Illustration: A transfers property of which he is the owner to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for their lives, and, after the death of the survivor, for the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death for A’s second son. The interest so created for the benefit of the eldest son does not take effect, because it does not extend to the whole of A’s remaining interest in the property.

    Sec. 14. Rule against perpetuity.

    • Rule against perpetuity.No transfer of property can operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the life-time of one or more persons living at the date of such transfer, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the interest created is to belong.

    Sec. 15. Transfer to class some of whom come under sections 13 and 14.

    • If, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a class of persons with regard to some of whom such interest fails by reason of any of the rules contained in sections 13 and 14, such interest fails 1[in regard to those persons only and not in regard to the whole class].

    Sec. 16. Transfer to take effect on failure of prior interest.

    • Where, by reason of any of the rules contained in sections 13 and 14, an interest created for the benefit of a person or of a class of persons fails in regard to such person or the whole of such class, any interest created in the same transaction and intended to take effect after or upon failure of such prior interest also fails.

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    Suits and Criminal Complaints By and Against a Company

    Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

    Key Takeaways

    • Company is a Juristic Person.
    • It can sue and be sued in its own name.
    • A natural person has to represent the Company.
    • Proper authorisation is essential for signing a plaint.
    •  A person may be authorised to sign pleadings by a resolution.
    • Procedural defects should not be permitted to defeat a just cause.
    • Secretary or any Director or other Principal Office can sign pleadings.
    • Any Authorised Person Can Continue the proceedings for the Company.
    • A person may be authorised to sign pleadings by a power of attorney also.
    • If pleadings were signed by officers, a Company can ratify it; impliedly also.
    • Even if there was initially no authority, the Company can rectify that defect ‘by sending a competent person’.

    Suits by a Company

    Company is a Juristic Person. Under Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of a Company can sign pleadings by virtue of his office.

    A Company can ratify the act of signing the pleading, also.

    It is held by our Apex Court in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3 that a Court can, after taking all the circumstances of the case, come to the conclusion that the Company must have ratified the act of signing the pleading. It is pointed out that the courts below must have, in any case, directed the company to produce a proper power of attorney, or they must have allowed a competent person to be examined to prove the apparent ratification. The Court’s own words in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3, read as under:

    • “10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and de hors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement or its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. ”

    In a subsequent decision, in State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers, 2011-11 SCC 524, it is held by our Apex Court as under:

    • “14. In our view, the judgment under challenge is liable to be set aside because the Respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was appointed as a Director of the company and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the company to file suit against the Appellant and authorized Shri Ashok K. Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K. Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers to Shri Raj K. Shukla to authorise another person to file suit on behalf of the company.”

    In this decision (of Kingston Computers) there had been no scope to ponder on the doctrines as to ‘technical or procedural defects’ (as done in the earlier decision in Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3). The decision, in Kingston Computers may be distinguishable from Naresh Kumar on the ground that there was no evidence in Kingston Computers to show that the signatory was a Director of the Company, and no resolution of the Board of Directors was produced to prove that the signatory was authorised to file the suit.

    See Blogs:

    A De Facto Complainant to Represent the Company in Criminal Proceedings

    Pointing out that a complaint can be filed in the name of a juristic person because it is also a person in the eye of law, it is observed in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshavanand, 1998-1 SCC 687: AIR 1998 SC 596, as under:

    • “Section 200 (CrPC) as the starting provision of that chapter (Chapter XV) enjoins on the magistrate, who takes cognizance of an offence on complaint, to examine the complainant on oath. Such examination is mandatory as can be discerned from the words ‘shall examine on oath the complainant…’ The magistrate is further required to reduce the substance of such examination to writing and it ‘shall be signed by the Complaint’. ….. The above scheme of the new Code makes it clear that complainant must be a corporeal person who is capable of making physical presence in the court. Its corollary is that even if a complaint is made in the name of an incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court and it is that natural person who is looked upon, for all practical purposes to be the complainant in the case. In other words, when the component to a body corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessarily associate a human being as de facto complainant to represent the former in court proceedings.”

    Proper authorisation is essential for signing a plaint

    Proper authorisation is essential for signing a plaint on behalf of a Company.  Though, the Secretary or any Director or other Principal officer can sign pleadings by virtue of their office, as per Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, the view taken in some decisions was that neither the directors nor the managing director would have the right to represent the Company, in a suit unless they were duly authorised by a resolution taken by the Board of Directors at a meeting duly constituted for the said purpose. B. Mookerjee Vs State Bank of India: AIR1992 Cal 250; Nibro Limited Vs National Insurance Co:  AIR 1991  Del 25.

    The Delhi High Court, in Nibro Limited Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., AIR 1991 Delhi 25 (Quoted in: United India Periodicals Pvt. Ltd.  Vs. CMYK Printech Ltd.: 2018-248 DLT 227), it is observed, with regard to the source of power of the Directors, as under:

    • “25. It is well-settled that under Section 291 of the Companies Act except where express provision is made that the powers of a company in respect of a particular matter are to be exercised by the company in general meeting-in all others cases the Board of Directors are entitled to exercise all its powers. Individual directors have such powers only as are vested in them by the Memorandum and Articles. It is true that ordinarily the court will not unsuit a person on account of technicalities. However, the question of authority to institute a suit on behalf of a company is not a technical matter. It has far-reaching effects. It often affects policy and finances of the company. Thus, unless a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on a particular director, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of the company. Needless to say that such a power can be conferred by the Board of Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard.”

    It was observed by in Nibro Limited that a director or a secretary of a Company could certainly give the authority to institute a suit to another person, as provided under Order III Rule 1 CPC, if the director or secretary was authorised by law to file a suit on behalf of the company.

    Order III Rule 1 provides that ‘any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. Provided, that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person’. 

    If an authority is given to a pleader or a recognised agent, under Order III Rule 1, that recognised agent or pleader can, certainly, file an appearance as authorised.

    The Bombay High Court, in Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd Vs. Celem (2015), 2015-1MhL852, observed, with respect to the source of power of the Directors, as under:

    • “The essential requirement of this provision is that the Company which is a juristic person must itself decide to sue. Once that is done, it would authorise one of its Directors who is the agent of the Company or its principal officers the Secretary of the Company or the Managing Director to file the Suit. The suing in each case is a separate act. The Company acts only through its meetings. Hence the Board of Directors in the day to day management of the company must decide and resolve to sue or not to sue. A blanket authority cannot be given to a particular Managing Director or Director to sign the papers and document/s, including the power to sue. The power to sue requires application of mind upon the particular cause of action. It requires the Company to pay the requisite Court fee. It requires the Company to be represented by a legal officer being an Advocate of the Court. It is an act which, therefore, is not a part of the day to day management of the Company. A Company would decide in a given case upon legal advice or otherwise whether or not it would sue upon a given cause of action. Such exercise is imperatively required to be performed if the intention of the Company, which is only a juristic person, is to be deciphered. That act, of course, may be undertaken even after the filing of the Suit and ratified by the Board as all other acts of management. However, the seminal requirement is to see the act of the Company though its Board or members (dependent upon whether the resolution is passed in the Board meeting or a general meeting) or is given by the Company itself (under its Articles of Association).”

    The Delhi High Court pointed out in Radico Khaitan Limited Vs. JD Wines (2020), 2020-2 AD(Del)  421, that the impropriety, if any, in signing the pleadings by the officers of a Company can be ratified.

    Even if Initially No Authority, the Company can Rectify the Defect

    A Company being a juristic entity, Board of Directors can authorise any person to sign pleadings, by passing a resolution or giving a power of attorney, by virtue of Order 6 Rule 14 read with Order 29 Rule 1 CPC. If pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, the Company can ratify it. Such ratification can be express or implied.

    In Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta Versus Union of India AIR 1973 SC 2389 (See also: Punjab University Vs. VN Tripathi: AIR 2001 SC 3672), it is held by Our Apex Court that the ratification would relate back to the date of the act ratified.

    It is held in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3, as under:

    • “In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, a Corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.”

    In Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, (2022) 2 SCC 355, held as under:

    • “Not only that, even if there was initially no authority, the Company can at any stage rectify that defect by sending a competent person.”

    Effect of Complaint in the name of MD followed by the post (MD)

    In Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, (2022) 2 SCC 355, in a Criminal Complaint under Sec. 138 of the NI Act, name of the Managing Director was stated first followed by the post (Managing Director) he held in the Company. An affidavit was filed by the Managing Director stating that the Company had authorised him to file the complaint. A copy of the Board Resolution was also presented. In the body of the complaint it was not stated that he was the MD. The respondent contended that the complaint was filed in the personal capacity not on behalf of the Company. It is pointed out in Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasia that there cannot be a fundamental defect merely because the name of the Managing Director was stated first; and that the format itself cannot be said to be defective though it may not be perfect (The Apex Court followed: Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshavanand, (1998-1 SCC 687: AIR 1998 SC 596).

    The Supreme Court held as under:

    • “The body of the complaint need not be required to contain anything more in view of what has been set out at the inception coupled with the copy of the Board Resolution.”
    • “It would be too technical a view to take to defeat the complaint merely because the body of the complaint does not elaborate upon the authorisation. The artificial person being the Company had to act through a person/official, which logically would include the Chairman or Managing Director. Only the existence of authorisation could be verified.”

    Our Apex Court explained that a Manager or a Managing Director ordinarily by the very nomenclature can be taken to be the person in-charge of the affairs Company for its day-to-day management and within the activity would certainly be calling the act of approaching the court either under civil law or criminal law for setting the trial in motion.

    Any Authorised Person Can Continue the proceedings for the Company

    It is observed in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshavanand, 1998-1 SCC 687: AIR 1998 SC 596, as under:

    • “Be that so, we suggest as a pragmatic proposition that no magistrate shall insist that the particular person, whose statement was taken on oath at the first instance, alone can continue to represent the company till the end of the proceedings. There may be occasions when a different person can represent the company e.g. the particular person who represents the company at the first instance may either retire for, the company’s service or may otherwise cease to associate therewith or he would be transferred to a distant place. In such cases it would be practically difficult for the company to continue to make the same person represent the company in the court. In any such eventuality it is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission of the court for sending any other person to represent the company in the court.” (Referrd to in Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, 2022-2 SCC 355)

    Procedural Defects Should Not Defeat a Just Cause

    It is trite law that one should not be non-suited for technical reasons, and that the procedural defects or procedural irregularities which are curable, or which do not go to the root of the matter, should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. (United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar: AIR 1997 SC 3; Uday Shankar Triyar Vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh: AIR  2006 SC 269; VarunPahwa Vs. Mrs. RenuChaudhary: AIR  2019 SC 1186: 2019-3 JT 109.) 

    It is pointed out in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3, by our Apex Court that there is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case.

    How to Establish the Validity of Resolutions of a Company: Are Minutes Essential?

    • Yes. Relevant provision is Section 118 of Companies Act, 2013.

    Section 118 reads as under:

    • 118:  Minutes of proceedings of general meeting, meeting of Board of Directors and other meeting and resolutions passed by postal ballot.
    • .(1) Every company shall cause minutes of the proceedings of every general meeting of any class of shareholders or creditors, and every resolution passed by postal ballot and every meeting of its Board of Directors or of every committee of the Board, to be prepared and signed in such manner as may be prescribed and kept within thirty days of the conclusion of every such meeting concerned, or passing of resolution by postal ballot in books kept for that purpose with their pages consecutively numbered.
    • (2) The minutes of each meeting shall contain a fair and correct summary of the proceedings thereat.
    • (3) All appointments made at any of the meetings aforesaid shall be included in the minutes of the meeting.
    • (4) In the case of a meeting of the Board of Directors or of a committee of the Board, the minutes shall also contain–
      • (a) the names of the directors present at the meeting; and
      • (b) in the case of each resolution passed at the meeting, the names of the directors, if any, dissenting from, or not concurring with the resolution.
    • (5) There shall not be included in the minutes, any matter which, in the opinion of the Chairman of the meeting,–
      • (a) is or could reasonably be regarded as defamatory of any person; or
      • (b) is irrelevant or immaterial to the proceedings; or
      • (c) is detrimental to the interests of the company.
    • (6) The Chairman shall exercise absolute discretion in regard to the inclusion or non-inclusion of any matter in the minutes on the grounds specified in sub-section (5).
    • (7) The minutes kept in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein.
    • (8) Where the minutes have been kept in accordance with sub-section (1) then, until the contrary is proved, the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly called and held, and all proceedings thereat to have duly taken place, and the resolutions passed by postal ballot to have been duly passed and in particular, all appointments of directors, key managerial personnel, auditors or company secretary in practice, shall be deemed to be valid.
    • (9) No document purporting to be a report of the proceedings of any general meeting of a company shall be circulated or advertised at the expense of the company, unless it includes the matters required by this section to be contained in the minutes of the proceedings of such meeting.
    • (10) Every company shall observe secretarial standards with respect to general and Board meetings specified by the Institute of Company Secretaries of India constituted under section 3 of the Company Secretaries Act, 1980 (56 of 1980), and approved as such by the Central Government.
    • (11) If any default is made in complying with the provisions of this section in respect of any meeting, the company shall be liable to a penalty of twenty-five thousand rupees and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of five thousand rupees.
    • (12) If a person is found guilty of tampering with the minutes of the proceedings of meeting, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees.

    Only way to prove a resolution is proving the Minutes Book

    In Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos , (1991) 72 Comp Cas. 483 (Delhi); 42(1990) DLT 446, it was held, referring Section 194 of Companies Act, 1956, that the only way to prove a resolution at a meeting of Board of Directors of a Company is proving the minutes book in which said Resolution was recorded, and it should have been produced in the court. (Referred to in: Havells India Ltd.  v. Dilip Rathi, 16 Feb 2018, Delhi High Court;  Manoj Kumar Kanuga v. Marudhar Power Pvt.  Ltd. , 23 Apr 2013, AP High Court).

    In Shri Kishan Rathi v. Mondal Bros, and Co. (Private) Ltd. [1967] 37 Comp Cas 256 (Cal), it is held as under:

    • “Whether there was a resolution by the board of directors delegating power on the manager to borrow money is a fact which is within the special knowledge of the company and its directors. They can easily produce the resolution book or the minute book and show that there was no such delegation. If they do not do so an adverse inference must be drawn against them that had they produced them, the books would have shown such delegation to the manager.” (Quoted in: Hoshiarpur Azad Transport Co. Ltd.  v. Sutlej Land Finance Pvt. Ltd., 2001-103 CC 969; 1995-109 PLR 506 (P&H).

    Shri Kishan Rathi v.  Mondal Brothers And Co. (Private) Ltd. , AIR 1967 (Cal) 75, it is held as under:

    • “The minute books and the book of resolution of the board of directors are books of the company and are not open to strangers and outsiders. This was also within the special knowledge of the defendant company. If the defendant company was trying to prove that its manager and director had no authority to borrow money, then it was for the company to prove from its own books of minutes and resolutions that no authority was given to Naresh Chandra Mondal, its manager and director. Section 106 of the Evidence Act says that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. It is strange that neither the defendant company nor its witness, director Sambhu Nath Mondal, produced the minute book or the book of resolutions in this case. The only inference that can be drawn from such non-production on the facts and circumstances of this case is that, had they been produced, they would have shown that there was good authority and resolution in favour of Naresh Chandra Mondal. That presumption is irresistible in this case. Articles 103 and 114 of the articles of association of this company cast a mandatory duty upon the directors to record minutes of the proceedings of all meetings of the directors in the minute book. The defendant company or its director witness, Sambhu Nath Mondal, being in possession of such minute book and being in special knowledge of the contents of that minute book, it was their duty to produce them and not the duty of the plaintiff.”

    Cheque Dishonour Case against a Company, Firm or Society

    Sec. 141 of the NI Act is the relevant provision. It reads as under:

    • 141 Offences by companies — (1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
    • Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence:
    • Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.
    • (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
    • Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—
    • (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
    • (b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.

    Following are clear from Sec. 141 of the NI Act-

    • Company, Firm and Society are treated alike (under Sec. 141).
    • A partner in a firm or Governing Body member in a Society is treated like a director in a Company.
    • Every person (director, partner or Governing Body member) who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible (to the company, firm or society for the conduct of its business), shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
    • Apart from the director, partner or Governing Body member, the company, firm or society shall be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
    • The company, firm or society shall be a necessary party.
    • If the director, partner or Governing Body member proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, such person will not be liable to punishment.
    • The nominated Director of a Government  company or a financial corporation shall not be liable for prosecution.
    • If the offence has been committed by a company, firm or society and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of any any director, manager, secretary or other officer, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished.

    Relevant Decisions

    • Pawan Kumar Goel v. State of U.P., (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1598,
    • Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, 2022 SC OnLine SCC 945,
    • Secretary to Govt of Kerala v. james Varghese, (2022) 9 SCC 593,
    • S.P. Mani v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2022) SCC Online SC 1238,
    • Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, (2022) 10 SCC 152
    • P. Saravana Kumar v. S.P. Vijaya Kumar, (2022) SCC Online Mad 1387,
    • P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258,
    • Dr. Shah Faesal v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 1,
    • Peerless General Finance v. Commissioner of IT, (2020) 18 SCC 625,
    • Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi (2020) 2 SCC 514,
    • G.J. Raja v. Tejraj Surana (2019) 19 SCC 469,
    • Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi (2019) 11 SCC 341,
    • Nandkishor Prallhad Vyvhare v. Mangala, (2018) 3 MhLJ 913,
    • Rodger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma, (2017) 14 SCC 1,
    • Eerra Through Dr. Manjula v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133,
    • South Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society v. B. Yashodabai (2015) 2 SCC 727,
    • Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129,
    • Pooja Ravinder Devidsani v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 1,
    • Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 623,
    • Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661,
    • Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours, 2012-5 SCC 661,
    • National Small-Scale Industries v. Harmeet Singh, (2010) 3 SCC 330,
    • K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48,
    • N. Harihara v. J Thomas, (2008) 13 SCC 663,
    • Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal, (2005) 2 SCC 638,
    • S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) SCC 89,
    • S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2007) 4 SCC 70,
    • Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd v. Meena Variyal, (2007) 5 SCC 428,
    • Steel Authority of India v. National Union Waterfront, (2001) 7 SCC 1,
    • Special Officer , Urban Land Ceilings v. P.S. Rao, (2000) 2 SCC 451,
    • Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty, (2000) 2 SCC 455.

    Read Blogs:


    Read in this Cluster:

    Civil Procedure Code

    Power of attorney

    Title, ownership and Possession

    Principles and Procedure

    Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

    Evidence Act – General

    Contract Act

    Easement

    Stamp Act

    Will

    Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

    Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

    Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

    Who are Necessary Parties, Proper Parties, and Pro Forma Parties, in Suits

    Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

    Introduction

    The leading case, Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786, beholds the whole law on the topic.

    • Key Takeaways from this Decision, Udit Narain
    • Necessary Party
      • A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively.
      • The parties whose rights are directly affected are the necessary parties.
      • A tribunal exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial act cannot decide against the rights of one person without giving him a hearing or an opportunity to present his case in the manner known to law.
      • If the provisions of a particular statute or rules made thereunder do not provide for it, principles of natural justice demand it.
      • Any order that may be issued behind the back of such a party can be ignored by the said party.
      • Any such order made without hearing the affected parties would be void.
    • Proper Party
      • A proper party is one whose presence is not necessary for making an effective order; but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding, or whose presence may facilitate the settling of all the questions that may be involved in the controversy.
      • The question of making such a person as a party to a writ proceeding depends upon the judicial discretion of the High Court in the circumstances of each case.
      • Either one of the parties to the proceeding may apply for the impleading of such a party or such a party may suo motu approach the court for being impleaded therein.

    Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar

    In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar AIR 1963 SC 786 our Apex Court held, in para 7 and 9, as under:

    • “7. To answer the question raised it would be convenient at the outset to ascertain who are necessary or proper parties in a proceeding. The law on the subject is well settled: it is enough if we state the principle. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively’; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.”   
    • “A tribunal, therefore, exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial act cannot decide against the rights of one party without giving him a hearing or an opportunity to represent his case in the manner known to law. If the provisions of a particular statute or rules made thereunder do not provide for it, principles of natural justice demand it. Any such order made without hearing the affected parties would be void.
    • 9. The next question is whether the parties whose rights are directly affected are the necessary parties to a writ petition to quash the order of a tribunal. As we have seen, a tribunal or authority performs a judicial or quasi- judicial act after hearing parties. Its order affects the right or rights of one or the other of the parties before it. In a writ of certiorari, the defeated party seeks for the quashing of the order issued by the tribunal in favour of the successful party. How can the High Court vacate the said order without the successful party being before it? Without the presence of the successful party the High Court cannot issue a substantial order affecting his right. Any order that may be issued behind the back of such a party can be ignored by I the said party, with the result that the tribunal’s order would be quashed but the right vested in that party by the wrong order of the tribunal would continue to be effective. Such a party, therefore, is a necessary party and a petition filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari without making him a party or without impleading him subsequently, if allowed by the court, would certainly be incompetent. A party whose interests are directly affected is, therefore, a necessary party. In addition, there may be parties who may be described as proper parties, that is parties whose presence is not necessary for making an effective order but whose presence may facilitate the settling of all the questions that may be involved in the controversy. The question of making such a person as a party to a writ proceeding depends upon the judicial discretion of the High Court in the circumstances of each case. Either one of the parties to the proceeding may apply for the impleading of such a party or such a party may suo motu approach the court for being impleaded therein.”

    Following are the recent Supreme Court Judgments that followed Udit Narain Singh

    • (1) Vishal Ashok Thorat v. Rajesh Shrirambapu Fate, 2019 AIR SC 3616
    • (2) Swapna Mohanty v. State of Odisha, 2018 17 SCC 621
    • (3) Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das, 2018 AIR SC 682
    • (4) Poonam v. State of U. P. , 2016 2 SCC 779
    • (5) Asstt. G.M State Bank of India v. Radhey Shyam Pandey, 2015 (3) SCALE 39
    • (6) Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji VS State of Gujarat, 2015 AIR SC 3623
    • (7) Census Commissioner v. R. Krishnamurthy, 2015 2 SCC 796
    • (8) H. C. Kulwant Singh v. H. C. Daya Ram, 2014 AIR SC 3083,
    • (9) Ranjan Kumar v. State Of Bihar, 2014 16 SCC 187
    • (10) State of Rajasthan v. Ucchab Lal Chhanwal, (2014) 1 SCC 144
    • (11) Manohar v . State of Maharashtra, 13 Dec 2012
    • (12) Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India, (2012) 7 SCC 610
    • (13) Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma, AIR 2011 SC 428
    • (14) State of Assam v. Union of India, 30 Sep 2010
    • (15) Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. , (2010) 10 SCC 744
    • (16) Public Service Commission v. Mamta Bisht, (2010) 12 SCC 204       
    • (17) JS Yadav v. State of UP (2011) 6 SCC 570
    • (18) T. Vijendradas v. M. Subramanian , 09 Oct 2007
    • (19) Avtar Singh Hit v. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Mangt. Comte., (2006) 8 SCC 487
    • (20) Assam Small Scale Ind. Dev. Corp. v. J. D. Pharmaceuticals, 2005 (13) SCC 19

    Necessary Party” and “Proper Party

    The fundamental distinction between a “necessary party” and a “proper party” was explained in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay  (1992) 2 SCC 524, wherein it is held as under:

    • “6. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.” (Quoted in: NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 INSC 8)

    In Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. (2010) 7 SCC 417, it is held as under:

    • “A ‘necessary party‘ is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a ‘necessary party’ is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed.
    • A ‘proper party‘ is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made.
    • If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.” (Quoted in: NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 INSC 8)

    In Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd.  (2012) 8 SCC 384, the broad principles governing impleadment were summarized:

    • “41.2. A necessary party is the person who ought to be joined as party to the suit and in whose absence an effective decree cannot be passed by the court.
    • 41.3. A proper party is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be made.
    • 41.4. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court does not have the jurisdiction to order his impleadment against the wishes of the plaintiff.” (Quoted in: NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 INSC 8)

    In Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal (2005) 6 SCC 733, this Court crystallized the twin tests for a necessary party:

    • “The question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party proposed to be added has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the suit. two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question as to who is a necessary party. The tests are:
    • .(1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings;
    • (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party.” (Quoted in: NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 INSC 8)

    Dominus Litis and Non Joinder of a Necessary Party at the Plaintiff’s Risk

    In NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah (Pankaj Mithal, Prasanna B. Varale J.) 2026 INSC 8, the Supreme Court pointed out that the appellant was not a necessary party to the suit as there was no material to indicate that the relief, if granted, would be implemented against the appellant. It was also found that the appellant was not a proper party also for the appellant was not a successor to the defendant. Thereafter the Apex Court concluded as under:

    • “39. This apart, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 who have instituted the suit are dominus litis and it is for them to choose their adversaries. If they do not array the proper and necessary parties to the suit, they do it at their own risk. However, they cannot be compelled to add a party to defend a suit against their wishes. The decree, if any, passed in the suit would be binding only between the parties to the suit and would not infringe upon any right of a third party, much less of the appellant that is not a party to the suit.”

    The Apex Court relied on the fundamental principle as to dominus litis laid down in Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das, (2018) 2 SCC 352, wherein it had been observed as under:

    • “11.4. the plaintiff being a dominus litis cannot be compelled to make any third person a party to the suit, be that a plaintiff or the defendant, against his wish unless such person is able to prove that he is a necessary party to the suit and without his presence, the suit cannot proceed and nor can be decided effectively. In other words, no person can compel the plaintiff to allow such person to become the coplaintiff or defendant in the suit. It is more so when such person is unable to show as to how he is a necessary or proper party to the suit and how without his presence, the suit can neither proceed and nor it can be decided or how his presence is necessary for the effective decision of the suit.
    • 11.5. a necessary party is one without whom, no order can be made effectively, a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.”

    Non-joinder of a Party – Relevant Provision of CPC

    Section 99 of the CPC reads as under:

    • 99. No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction: No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.
    • Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party.

    Rule 9 of Order I CPC reads as under:

    • 9. Misjoinder and nonjoinder: No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it:
      Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to nonjoinder of a necessary party.

    Non-joinder or misjoinder of Parties – Objection

    • 13. Objections as to non-joinder or misjoinder.
      All objections on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, unless the ground of objection has subsequently arisen, and any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived.

    Necessary Party – for Effectually and Completely settle the questions

    In Razia Begum vs. Anwar Begum,  AIR 1958 SC 886, our Apex Court observed as under:

    • “The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights.” Quoted in: Poonam VS State of UP, 2016-2 SCC 779

    Court has Discretion to add a Necessary Party or Proper Party

    Order I Rule 10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.

    • .(1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted thought a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just.
    • (2) Court may strike out or add parties– The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
    • (3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent.

    The court has no Discretion to add Unless a Necessary Party or Proper Party

    In Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417, it is held  as under:  

    • “15. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party.”

    After explaining the difference between the necessary party and proper party (stated above), it is held as under:

    • “If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.”

    It is pointed out in Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd.   v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd. that the Apex Court held in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, 2005 (6) SCC 733, that a purchaser of the suit property subsequent to the suit agreement would be a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased it with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims a title adverse to that of the defendant-vendor will not be a necessary party. If the owner of a tenanted property enters into an agreement for sale of such property without physical possession, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party.

    No Pleading – who are necessary parties; suit cannot be dismissed

    In Laxmishankar Harishankar Bhatt v. Yashram Vasta, AIR 1993 SC 1587, it was observed that the suit for recovery of possession-plaintiff purchaser claiming to have acquired entire ownership of suit property and the plea by defendant-tenant that suit is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of co-owners. No averments, however, in written statement as to who are other co-owners and what rights they claim the suit cannot be dismissed for non-joinder on such vague plea. (Referred to (1991) 4 SCC 17, AIR 1989 SC 758, AIR 1977 SC 1599, AIR 1976 SC 2335, AIR 1973 Gujarat 131 (FB).

    In Meghavaranam v. Md. Mohideen Sahib, AIR 1936 Mad. 782, Wadsworth, J., also held that if the defendants wish to object to a suit on the ground of non-joinder of parties, it is incumbent upon them to state who are the parties. (Referred to in : Durvasula Dakshina Murthy v. Vajjala Vijaya Kumari, 2008 1 AndLD 347)

    Defendant Pleaded the land belonged to Municipal Council. It became a necessary party

    In Subbaraya v. Seetha Ramaswami, AIR 1933 Mad. 664, Walsh, 1., the learned Judge of the Madras High Court, observed that if a person has a right to defend, it is the same thing as saying that he is a necessary defendant, for it is not within the discretion of the Court to say whether it will add him or not. Plaintiff brought a suit to eject the defendant from a site and to remove a pial erected by him thereon. The plea of the defendant was that the land belonged to the Municipal Council, that he put up a pial with its permission and that the Municipal Council was a necessary party to the suit. The trial Court held that, as plaintiff claimed the suit property as his, it was unnecessary to implead the Municipality on the contention of the defendant, and it was held that the Municipality was a necessary party to the suit and not having been made one, in spite of objection taken from the staI1, the suit must be dismissed.

    Non-Joinder Of A Necessary Party Cannot, By Itself, Be A Ground For Dismissing

    In Mt. Zabaishi Begam v. Naziruddin Khan, AIR 1935 All. 110, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court observed that the non-joinder of a necessary party cannot, by itself, be a ground for dismissing the suit, and the Court is bound to adjudicate on the rights of the parties actually before it. A Court will refrain from passing a decree which would be ineffective and infructuous and the reason for this rule is obvious. It would be idle for a Court to pass a decree which would be of no practical utility to the plaintiff, and be a waste paper in the sense that the relief that it purports to grant to the plaintiff cannot be vouchsafed to him because of the objection of some person who is not bound by that decree. But this rule has no application to cases in which, notwithstanding the fact that some of the persons interested in the subject-matter of the suit are not parties to the suit, the Court is in a position to pass a decree that is capable of execution and cannot be rendered nugatory at the instance of persons not made parties to the suit. . (Referred to in : Durvasula Dakshina Murthy v. Vajjala Vijaya Kumari, 2008 1 AndLD 347)

    Plea As To Non Joinder Not Allowed To Be Raised At Later Point Of Time

    In Ramachandran v. Valliammal, 1992 (1) MLJ 188, Srinivasan, J., the learned Judge of Madras High Court, observed that where the defendant has not raised a specific plea as to existence of co-owners at the time of filing suit and raising the said question at later point of time should not be allowed.

    Necessary Party – Persons Likely to be Affected must be parties

    In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar AIR 1963 SC 786

    • “35. ……….  It is well-settled principle consistent with natural justice that if some persons are likely to be affected on account of setting aside a decision enuring to their benefit, the Court should not embark upon the consideration and the correctness of such decision in the absence of such persons.” (Quoted in Poonam VS State of U. P. , 2016 2 SCC 779; State of Assam v. Union of India [2010] 12 S.C.R. 413)

    The Court of Appeal of California in California C.C. Corp. v. Superior Court, (1932) 122 Cal.App. 404 it is held as under:

    • “In Powell v. People (1905), 214 Ill. 475 [105 Am. St. Rep. 117, 2 Ann. Cas. 551, 73 N.E. 795], it is directly held that mandamus will not lie where it appears upon the face of the petition or the face of the record that a necessary party, or a party whose interests are directly affected has been omitted, the court of its own motion will decline to issue the writ. There, as here, the want of the necessary party appeared upon the record, and it was there held that a plea of such want of the necessary party was not necessary to bring the fact to the attention of the court.”  

    In Ranjan Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2014-16 SCC 187, it is held as under:

    • 4. On a perusal of the orders impugned, we find that only 40 persons were made respondents before the High Court and hardly a few appointees filed applications for intervention. It is well settled in law that no adverse order can be passed against persons who were not made parties to the litigation.

    The court referred the following decisions:

    • Prabodh Verma and others v. State of UP, (1984) 4 SCC 251;
    • Indu Shekhar Singh and others v. State of UP, (2006) 8 SCC 129;  
    • Km. Rashmi Mishra v. M.P. Public Service Commission, (2006) 12 SCC 724;
    • Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCC 768; 
    • Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal v. Mamta Bisht, (2010) 12 SCC 204, referred to – Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 SC 786, Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153, Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706, Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT, (1987) 1 SCC 5;
    • State of Rajasthan v. Ucchab Lal Chhanwal, (2014) 1 SCC 144;
    • Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India, (2012) 7 SCC 610;    
    • J.S. Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 6 SCC 570;      
    • Union of India v. S. Vinod Kumar,  AIR 2008 SC 5;
    • Chandra Prakash Tiwari and others v. Shakuntala Shukla, (2002) 6 SCC 127;
    • Madan Lal v. State of J & K, (1995) 3 SCC 486;      
    • Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, 1986 (Supp) SCC 285.

    Easement – owners of properties who obstruct alone are necessary parties

    If easement right is claimed over a way that passes through various (servient) properties, the owners of properties who obstruct the way alone are necessary parties; and those who do not raise any obstruction are not necessary parties.

    • Madan Mohan Chakravarthy v. Sashi Bhusan, AIR 1915 Cal 403  (19 Cal WN 1211);
    • Lal Mohammad Biswas v. Emajuddin Biswas, AIR 1964 Cal 548;
    • Varkey Joseph v. Mathai Kuriakose, (1992) 2 Ker LJ 135; (1992) 2 Ker LT 169.

    Owners Of Other Servient Fields Are Not Necessary Parties

    In K.Palaniappa Moopan v. Angammal, (1967) I M.L.J. 177, it was held as under:  

    • “It may be that the owners of other fields over which the channel flows are proper parties, but certainly they are not necessary parties. Their non- joinder cannot be fatal to the suit. There are several servient tenements over which the channel passes, but the defendants alone have obstructed according to the plaintiffs. There has been no obstruction from the State or from the owner of field S.No.15 of the exercise of the right claimed by the plaintiffs. I am unable to appreciate the contention that the plaintiffs cannot have effectual relief in their absence. If any of them should interfere with the mamool flow of water or at any subsequent period, that would give a fresh cause of action to the plaintiffs and a cause of action to the defendants also if they are inconvenienced and injured. In my view, it would be unreasonable to compel the plaintiffs to implead the owners of the servient lands all along the course of the channel whether they had any cause of action against them or not and even though there was no obstruction to or denial of the plaintiffs right by these persons. “

    All persons interested in Easement are not Necessary Parties

    In S. Narain Bera v. Chandra Bera, AIR 1924 Cal. 1050, the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court observed that all persons interested in the right of easement are not necessary parties to the suit where the cause of action on the pleadings is against those persons only who are alleged to have interfered with the plaintiffs right. The persons who have the right of easement cannot be held to be necessary parties so long as their right is not interfered with. In order to determine whether a suit is maintainable and whether certain parties are necessary parties or not, it is necessary to ascertain the nature of the plaintiffs case as set out in the plaint. . (Referred to in : Durvasula Dakshina Murthy v. Vajjala Vijaya Kumari, 2008 1 AndLD 347)

    In Mukherjj v. Kalipada Bhattacharji, A. I. R. 1936 Cal. 534, it was held that every owner of servient tenement denying the plaintiffs right and every person obstructing the use of the right were necessary parties. (Referred to in: Ram Singh Sharma v. Parmod Kumari, 1992-102 PujLR 396)

    Not Necessary To Add Who Are Not Parties To Obstruction

    Justice B.K.Mukherjea in Kedaruddin Ahamad v. Sm. Samsur Mata, (41 Cal.WN 769) took the view that it was not necessary to add as defendants those persons who are not parties to the act of obstruction complained of.

    In Varkey Joseph v. Mathai Kuriakose, 1992-2 KerLJ 135; 1992-2 KerLT 169, it is held as under:

    • “The said decision (Kedaruddin Ahamad v. Sm. Samsur Mata) also took note of the decision reported in Surja Narain V. Chandra Bera (AIR 1924 Cal.1050) to hold that the absence of other servient owner is in no way fatal to the plaintiffs suit complaining of obstruction by a servient land owner. These authorities were considered elaborately by his Lordship P.B. Mukharji, J. in the decision reported in Lal Mohd. v. Emajuddin (AIR 1964 Cal.548). After noticing the conflict of authorities the learned judge preferred to follow the view expressed in the decision reported in 19 Cal.WN 1211 which was affirmed by a Division Bench of which Chief Justice Jenkins himself was a party and that of B.K. Mukherjea, J. in the decisions reported in 41 Cal WN. 769. His Lordship Justice P.B. Mukharji observed:
    • “The actual complaint in this case against the defendants is that they put two obstructions at two places on the road over which a right of way was claimed by the plaintiffs. The real nature of the suit is for removal of those obstructions. The persons who obstruct in my judgment are the only proper and necessary persons to be joined as defendants in such a suit, Hundred and thousand of villagers who have done nothing to obstruct such a way are neither necessary nor proper parties.
    • If that were so then a single obstruction by a single villager will make it necessary to make the whole village,. i.e., all the villagers, parties. In that view a person who suffers has to join all other numerous persons as defendants although they have done nothing and there is no cause of action or grievance against them. I do not think that is the law….”
    • Read in the light of 0.1 R.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the practical considerations put forward by Mr. Justice P.B. Mukharji I respectfully agree with the view taken by Mr. Justice P.B. Mukharji in the decision reported in AIR 1964 Cal.548.”

    Owner Of The Servient Tenement – Not Necessarily a Party

    In Varkey Joseph v. Mathai Kuriakose, 1992-2 KerLJ 135; 1992 2 KerLT 169, it is observed as under:

    • In Thayappan v. Kunhahammed (S.A, No.629 of 1986) considered this question in the light of the decision reported in AIR 1964 Cal. 548 and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Udti Narain Singh Malpharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar (1963(1) SCR 676) and has held as follows:
    • “…The learned counsel for the appellant raised a contention that the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary parties, as the owner of the servient tenement is not made a party to the suit and therefore it is contended that no effective decree for declaration could be passed in this case and the lower appellate court erred in reversing the findings of the trial court. The respondent’s counsel contended that the owner of the servient tenement is not a necessary party and it is pointed out that the appellant has not raised this contention in the written statement. Who is a ‘necessary party’ has been explained by the Supreme Court in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar (1963-1 SCR 676) wherein it was held,
    • “Necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding”.
    • It is true that if the owner of the servient tenement is a necessary party and whose presence is necessary for passing an effective decree, he is to be impleaded as a party and the non-joinder of such a party may entail the dismissal of the case. I do not think that the owner of the servient tenement is a necessary party in all cases where a declaration of easement right is claimed by the plaintiff. In the present case the real dispute is between the plaintiff and the defendant. Defendant is the owner of an adjacent property and according to the plaintiff he is causing obstruction to the pathway. The plaintiff has no case that the owner of the servient tenement caused any obstruction to the use of the pathway. Even if the court passed a declaration of his easement right in respect of the plaint schedule pathway it would bind only the defendant, who allegedly caused the obstruction. Therefore, the owner of the servient tenement is not a necessary party in all suits for declaration of easement right. An effective decree can be passed even without impleading the owner of the servient tenement as a party to the suit,…”

    Necessary Party – Person Likely to Suffer has to be Impleaded

    Census Commissioner v. R. Krishnamurthy, 2015-2 SCC 796, it is observed as under:

    • 19. As we evince from the sequence of events, the High Court in the earlier judgment had issued the direction relating to carrying of census in a particular manner by adding certain facets though the lis was absolutely different. The appellant, the real aggrieved party, was not arrayed as a party-respondent. The issue was squarely raised in the subsequent writ petition where the Census Commissioner was a party and the earlier order was repeated. There can be no shadow of doubt that earlier order is not binding on the appellant as he was not a party to the said lis. This view of ours gets fructified by the decision in
    • H.C. Kulwant Singh v. H.C. Daya Ram JT 2014 (8) SC 305 wherein this Court,
      • after referring to the judgments in
        • Khetrabasi Biswal v. Ajaya Kumar Baral, (2004) 1 SCC 317
        • UditNarain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 SC 786
        • Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. (1984) 4 SCC 251 and
        • Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. (2009) 1 SCC 768
      • has ruled thus:      
    •  ‘….. if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of the court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice’.”

    Necessary parties in suit on Partial destruction of Stair Case and its Removal

    Smt. Subhra Sinha Roy v. Iman Kalyan Dey, (2011) 2 CalHN 959, considered it and stated as under:

    • “In CWN (19) 1211 (Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J., Justice D. Chatterjee Madan Mohan Chakravarty v. Sashi Bhusan Mukherji, (1915) 31 Ind. Cas. 549 : 19 C.W.N. 1211) it is held, inter alia, that a dominant owner has no cause of action against servant owners who have neither caused obstruction nor raised any objection to the exercise of his right of easement. In a suit for declaration of his right of way he is not bound to make parties any servant owners other than those who have so obstructed or challenged his right. The said case relates to a suit for declaration of right of way, for restoration of the path to its former condition and for perpetual injunction. The said suit was decreed against which appeal was preferred with the contention that the suit ought to have failed as the owners of all the servant tenements over which the way is claimed have not been made parties to the suit. The instant case relates to removal of partial obstruction from the existing pathway in terms of a compromise decree which has been waived or relinquished. There is no denial of the fact that the said staircase is now in occupation of the tenants inducted by co-sharers. If such a staircase is to be removed affecting the rights of all the co-owners, they must be treated as necessary party and in such case in absence of all the co-owners no effective decree can be passed. From this point of view the learned Trial Court as well as the Hon”ble Division Bench has not committed any error apparent on the face of record which may be reviewed and the ratio in the aforesaid case is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

    Claim of possessory right over Govt. land: State need not be a party

    In Vavvakkavu Muslim Thaikkavupally v. Narayanan Purushan, ILR 1992-1 Ker 221; 1991-2 KLJ 526; 1991-2 KLT 477, it was held as under:

    • “Regarding the first question it is clear from the pleadings and evidence in the case that the plaintiffs have not claimed either possession of the plaint B schedule property or even an easement right over it as against the State. The gist of their claim in the plaint is that as the owners of the property abutting plaint B schedule property they are using the same as a passage to have access from their residential house in plaint B schedule property to N.H. 47. Of course they have also stated that they have no other pathway to have access to any public road. However, they have not even alleged and proved any of the ingredients to establish an easement right of way through the plaint B schedule property. Learned counsel for the respondents has also not advanced any such contention before me. Probably being land kept for the purpose of N.H. 47 State has also not chosen to obstruct the plaintiffs in the matter of using plaint B schedule property as a passage so far. In these circumstances, I do not think that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to have impleaded the State as a party to the suit. In a more or less similar case, a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in the decision reported in Girish Chandra v. Nagendranath (AIR 1978 Orissa 211) has held that the owner of land is not a necessary party to the suit so long as none of the parties to the suit have claimed any right specifically against the owner. In the said decision, the Division Bench has actually referred to two earlier decisions of the Calcutta High Court reported in Sabirer Ma v. Behari Mohan Lai (AIR 1928 Cal. 23) and in Kedaruddin v. Asrafali (AIR 1937 Cal. 355) in support of thier view. In AchutKalsai v. MadhuKalsai (1972) 38 Cut.LT 105) the Orissa High Court in a more or less similar case has held thus:
    • “In this case there is no allegation of any resistance from the State of Orissa to the flow of Avatar over the Government land intervening between the plaintiffs premises and the channel by the side of the village road. The entire obstruction came from the defendants and the plaintiffs really aggrieved by the defendants action. There may be cases where the owner of the servant tenement would not resist and the resistance would come from quite a different quarter. In such cases the Owner of the servant tenement would certainly not be required to be before the Court as a necessary party to the litigation. The present case seems to be one of that type and the State of Orissa which is the owner of the intervening plot not being before the Court would not affect the suit in any manner”.
    • I am in agreement with the view expressed in the above decisions and would hold that the State is not a necessary party to the suit and the suit is not liable to be dismissed on that ground.”

    In Ramachandran v. Omanakuttan, 2021-4 KLJ 204, it is held as under:

    • “In Vavvakkavu Muslim Thaikkavupally v. Narayanan Purushan, 1991 (2) KLT 477, Packiyam Ammal v. Pattu Ammal, 1999 KHC 3552, and Appukuttan Chettiyar v. Lathikadevi Amma, 2005 (1) KLT 260, it was held that the possessory right can be claimed as between persons who assert rival claims over Government land and that in such actions the State need not be a party subject to the rider that the Government will not be bound by any such decrees.
    • Such being the legal position, the view of the first appellate court that the Government ought to have been made a party to the suit is untenable particularly in view of the decisions in Philip’s case (supra), Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathai, 1966 KLT 1, Rev.Fr.K.C.Alexander v. N.S.S. Ltd., 1966 KLT 333,  Rame Gowda v. M.Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769, Pathukutty v. Aisakutty, 2014 (2) KHC 212, and Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813. All the above cases, dealing with dispossession of the persons in occupation of the property without title by trespassers, considered and affirmed the above legal position. Hence it is settled law that even before the acquisition of statutory title by adverse possession for the requisite period under the Limitation Act, the possessory owner has well defined rights in the property. This possessory right is heritable, divisible and transferable as distinct from proprietary title. The Land Conservancy Act, 1957 prohibits only regarding matters for in the Act and the Rules. In Packiyam Ammal’s case (supra) this position has been unmistakably clarified in paragraph 14 of the judgment as hereunder:-
    • “14. In regard to item No.10, the only reason for dismissing the suit was that the family is not having title to the property. Under Ext.A2, it is found that the family is in possession. It could be a Government land. The possessory right continues in the family. Any arrangement between the members of the family may not bind the Government. But, as between them, it has to be treated as a family asset and available for partition. A preliminary decree also will have to be passed with regard to item No.10.”

    Order behind the back, in Violation of Natural Justice, can be ignored

    JS Yadav v. State of UP, (2011) 6 SCC 570, it is held as under:

    • “32. No order can be passed behind the back of a person adversely affecting him and such an order if passed, is liable to be ignored being not binding on such a party as the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The principles enshrined in the proviso to Order I Rule 9, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provide that impleadment of a necessary party is mandatory and in case of non-joinder of necessary party, the plaintiff/petitioner may not be entitled for the relief sought by him. The litigant has to ensure that the necessary party is before the Court, be it a plaintiff or a defendant, otherwise the proceedings will have to fail. In Service Jurisprudence if an unsuccessful candidate challenges the selection process, he is bound to implead at least some of the successful candidates in representative capacity. In case the services of a person is terminated and another person is appointed at his place, in order to get relief, the person appointed at his place is the necessary party for the reason that even if the plaintiff/petitioner succeeds, it may not be possible for the Court to issue direction to accommodate the petitioner without removing the person who filled up the post manned by plaintiff/petitioner. (Vide:
      • Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. , AIR 1985 SC 167;
      • Ishwar Singh v. Kuldip Singh, 1995 (supp) 1 SCC 179; 
      • Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of WB, (2009) 1 SCC 768;
      • State of Assam v Union of India, (2010) 10 SCC 408; and 
      • PSC, Uttaranchal v. Mamta Bisht , AIR 2010 SC 2613.)”

    Who are Entitled to Defend the Orders, are Necessary Parties

    In Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat, 2015 AIR SC 3623, it is observed as under:

    • “Every adjudicating authority may be nomenclatured as a tribunal but the said authority(ies) are different that pure and simple adjudicating authorities and that is why they are called the authorities. An Income Tax Commissioner, whatever rank he may be holding, when he adjudicates, he has to be made a party, for he can defend his order. He is entitled to contest. There are many authorities under many a statute. Therefore, the proposition that can safely be culled out is that the authorities or the tribunals, who in law are entitled to defend the orders passed by them, are necessary parties and if they are not arrayed as parties, the writ petition can be treated to be not maintainable or the court may grant liberty to implead them as parties in exercise of its discretion. There are tribunals which are not at all required to defend their own order, and in that case such tribunals need not be arrayed as parties.”

    In Poonam v. State of UP, 2016-2 SCC 779, referring Savitri Devi Vs. District Judge, Gorakhpur, AIR 1999 SC 976, it is held as under:

    • “17. The term “entitled to defend” confers an inherent right to a person if he or she is affected or is likely to be affected by an order to be passed by any legal forum, for there would be violation of natural justice. The principle of audi alteram partem has its own sanctity but the said principle of natural justice is not always put in strait jacket formula. That apart, a person or an authority must have a legal right or right in law to defend or assail.
    • 34. … If a non-selected candidate challenges the selection, he is under legal obligation to implead the selected candidates as they are necessary parties and there can be no two opinions as regards such a proposition of law.”

    Representative action

    In Poonam v. State of UP, 2016-2 SCC 779, it is observed as under:

    • “39. The aforesaid decisions do not lay down as a proposition of law that in every case when a termination is challenged, the affected person has to be made a party. What has been stated is when one challenges a provision as ultra vires the persons who are likely to be affected, some of them should be made parties in a representative capacity. That has been the consistent view of this Court in service jurisprudence.”

    Necessary Party – Each case has to be understood in proper perspective

    In Savitri Devi Vs. District Judge, Gorakhpur, AIR 1999 SC 976, the Court took exception to courts and tribunals being made parties. It is apposite to note here that propositions laid down in each case has to be understood in proper perspective. (Referred to in Poonam v. State of UP, 2016-2 SCC 779)

    In Sh Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat, 2015 AIR SC 3623, referring Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233, Udit Narain Singh (supra) and Savitri Devi (supra) it is observed as under:

    • “It is apposite to note here that propositions laid down in each case has to be understood in proper perspective. Civil courts, which decide matters, are courts in the strictest sense of the term. Neither the court nor the Presiding Officer defends the order before the superior court it does not contest. If the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction, as the case may be, calls for the records, the same can always be called for by the High court without the Court or the Presiding Officer being impleaded as a party. Similarly, with the passage of time there have been many a tribunal which only adjudicate and they have nothing to do with the lis.  We may cite few examples;
      • the tribunals constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985,
      • the Custom, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal,
      • the Income Tax Appellate Tribunals,
      • the Sales Tax Tribunal and such others.
    • Every adjudicating authority may be nomenclatured as a tribunal but the said authority(ies) are different that pure and simple adjudicating authorities and that is why they are called the authorities. An
      • Income Tax Commissioner,
    • whatever rank he may be holding, when he adjudicates, he has to be made a party, for he can defend his order. He is entitled to contest. There are many authorities under many a statute. Therefore, the proposition that can safely be culled out is that the authorities or the tribunals, who in law are entitled to defend the orders passed by them, are necessary parties and if they are not arrayed as parties, the writ petition can be treated to be not maintainable or the court may grant liberty to implead them as parties in exercise of its discretion. There are tribunals which are not at all required to defend their own order, and in that case such tribunals need not be arrayed as parties. To give another example:-in certain enactments, the
      • District Judges function as Election Tribunals
    • from whose orders a revision or a writ may lie depending upon the provisions in the Act. In such a situation, the superior court, that is the High Court, even if required to call for the records, the District Judge need not be a party. Thus, in essence, when a tribunal or authority is required to defend its own order, it is to be made a party failing which the proceeding before the High Court would be regarded as not maintainable.”

    In Poonam v. State of UP, 2016-2 SCC 779, it is observed as under:

    • “40. In this regard, we may refer to the rule stated by Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem[37]:-
    • “Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but govern and are qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.”
    • 41. A three-Judge Bench in Union of India and others v. Dhanwanti Devi and others[38] while discussing about the precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution, held that:
    • “….. 10. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents……”

    Pro forma Party

    A pro forma party to a litigation is one against whom no relief is sought for in a legal proceeding (at its beginning) on the posit that he is a proper party. It is usually done with a view to seek reliefs in future, amending the pleading, if the changed situation so warrants.

    Plaintiff claims Ownership; Suit against Trespasser – Not Necessary to Implead ‘Previous Owners’ (Alleged by the Defendants)

    R. K. S.  Builders v. Bhupinder Kumar , 2001-2 Punj LR 804, 2001-2 RCR (Civil) 497.

    Facts of the Case

    • Plaintiff alleged that he is owner of the property and that the said property is in the illegal possession of the defendants.
    • The defendants contended that they have purchased the same from its rightful owners.
    • During the pendency of the suit, the defendants have further sold the property to various persons.
    • Application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC read with Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was filed.

    This application was resisted by the defendants, inter alia, on the ground that the plaintiff had not added the previous owners of the property from whom the defendants purchased it. The trial court allowed the Petition.

    The High Court, dismissing the Revision Petition, held as under:

    • When the case of the plaintiff is that he is the owner of the property which has been illegally occupied by the defendants, it is not necessary to implead previous (rightful) owners (alleged by the defendants).

    Land Reforms Act Conferred Title on Tenants: Previous Owners, Not Necessary Parties

    Bir Singh v. Kishan Chand, AIR  2007 HP 24

    • Non-joinder of the previous owners, divested of their ownership by virtue of the Land Reforms Act, and the ownership rights stood conferred upon the tenants, are not necessary parties.

    Original Owner Not Necessary Party, When Dispute is Solely Between Purchaser and another

    Kaleem Pasha v. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka Vidhana, ICC 2018 4 810,

    • In the absence of the plaintiff claiming any relief against the previous owners of a vehicle nor their participation in the suit was in any manner of help in the proper adjudication of the matter and also the disputed fact was solely between the plaintiff and defendant in the original suit, the original owner and the auction purchaser were not necessary parties.

    Agreement for sale – Prior owner Necessary Party

    Pamujula Narayana v. Ramachandruni Malakondaiah,  2006-3 ALD 278, ALT 2006 4 247.

    Facts of the case

    • Suit was for specific performance.
    • Agreement was executed by the defendant as Power of Attorney holder of the Owner.
    • Owner died even prior to the filing of the suit.
    • Plaint was silent about the owner; and read as if PoA was the owner.

    Court held:

    • It is well known that the owner of the property agreed to be sold is a necessary party to the suit (and PoA not sufficient).

    Suit dismissed if Prior owner, a Necessary Party, is not impleded within Limitation

    In the above case, Pamujula Narayana v. Ramachandruni Malakondaiah,  2006-3 ALD 278, ALT 2006 4 247, it was further held –

    • The suit will be barred, in view of Sec. 21 of Limitation Act, if prior owner (or successor) is not  impleaded within time prescribed. 

    Vendee Becomes the Sole Owner

    In Hardeva v. Ismail, AIR 1970 Raj 167, it was held – if it is possible to determine the rights and interests of the parties, not to dismiss a suit. It was also observed as under:

    • “When the vendor has sold his property and has delivered the possession of the property to the vendee, the vendee becomes the sole owner of the property and it is upto the vendee to defend his title against any person who claims any right in the property. The vendor may be a proper party, but he is not a necessary party inasmuch as an effectual decree can be passed in favour of third person against the vendee.”

    Two tests for determining who is a necessary party

    It was laid down in the Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1947 All 18 (FB), there were two tests –

    • Firstly, there must be a right to some relief against the defendant, and
    • Secondly, in the absence of such a party it could not be possible to pass an effective decree. (Approved in Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain, AIR 1953 SC 521)

    It was further pointed out in the Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1947 All 18 (FB) – where the plaintiff files a suit against a defendant who is not the full owner of the property and has only a limited right, the owner is a necessary party as no effectual decree could be passed against the defendant (Subbaraya Sastri v. Seetha Rama-swami, AIR 1933 Mad 664; Rahima Bi v. Vellore Municipal Council, AIR 1954 Mad 495, Brojanath Bose v. Durga Prosad Singh. (1907) ILR 34 Cal 753, Narahari Mohanti v. Ghanshyam Bel, AIR 1963 Orissa 186, Chenthiperumal Pillai v. D. M. Devasa-hayam, AIR 1956 Trav-Co. 181 (FB), and Chandra Nath Sarma v. Guna Ram Kalita, AIR 1949 Assam 21).


    Foot Note

    Section 99, and Rule 9 to 13 of Order I, CPC are the relevant provisions. They read as under:

    Section 99 of the CPC reads as under:

    • 99. No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction: No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.
    • Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party.

    Rule 9 to 13 of Order I CPC read

    • 9. Misjoinder and nonjoinder: No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it:
      Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to nonjoinder of a necessary party.
    • 10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff
    • (1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted thought a bona fide mistake, and that it is
    • necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, Order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just.
    • (2) Court may strike out or add parties.-
    • The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, Order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in Order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
    • (3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent.
    • (4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended-
    • Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant.
    • (5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons.
    • 11. Conduct of suit The Court may give the conduct of 1[a suit] to such persons as it deems proper.
    • 12. Appearance of one of several plaintiffs or defendants for others
    • (1) Where there are more plaintiffs than one, any one or more of them may be authorized by any other of them to appear, plead or act for such other in any proceeding; and in like manner, where there are more defendants than one, any one or more of them may be authorized by any other of them to appear, plead or act for such other in any proceeding.
    • (2) The authority shall be in writing signed by the party giving it and shall be filed in Court.
    • 13. Objections as to non-joinder or misjoinder.
    • All objections on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, unless the ground of objection has subsequently arisen, and any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived.


    Read in this Cluster:

    Civil Procedure Code

    Power of attorney

    Title, ownership and Possession

    Principles and Procedure

    Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

    Evidence Act – General

    Contract Act

    Easement

    Stamp Act

    Will

    Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

    Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

    Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

    A Registered Society is Not a Legal Person; How to File a Suit by or against a Society?

    Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

    Abstract

    1. An unregistered society or a club is not a legal person;
                    and therefore, it has to sue or be sued
                    only in the name of all its members.
                    It can be done by invoking Order I Rule 8CPC.
    2. For ordering notice under OI r 8 CPC, by a court,
    the following two essential conditions are to be satisfied.
                    i. numerous persons
                    ii. having same (or common) interest
                    (or community of interest).
    3. A society registered under the Societies Registration Act,
                    does not become distinct from its members
                    and does not become a separate legal person
                    like a company.
    4. Even a (registered) society cannot sue or be sued
                    in its name. It is peremptory that the suit
                    by or against a registered society should be brought
                    as provided under Sec. 6 of the So. Regn. Act.
    5. Sec. 6 enables ‘to sue or be sued‘ every registered society
                    in the name of its president, secretary, etc.,
                    as shall be determined by the rules and regulations
                    of the society (or through such person
                    as shall be appointed by the governing body
                    for the occasion)

    How to Sue an Unregistered Society or a Club

    An unregistered society or a club is not a legal person; and therefore, it has to sue or be sued only in the name of all its members. It can be done by invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC which enables one or more of ‘numerous’ persons having common (community of) interest to sue or be sued in a representative character. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State, AIR 1962 SC 458; Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India, AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.)

    When an Association be represented by the Plaintiff; when by the Defendants?

    When a suit is filed by a member seeking reliefs concerning the society or a club, relating to a matter common to all members, he has to file it (also) as representing other members of the society other than the defendants (usually office-bearers of the society or club); and if it is a personal matter of the plaintiff, seeking relief against all other members, the plaintiff has to sue against one or two members (usually office-bearers) as representatives of others.

    Order I Rule 8 CPC

    The objective of the enabling provision, Order I Rule 8 CPC, is avoidance of multiplicity in litigation; and the decision in such a suit binds all present and future members. (TN Housing Board Vs. TN Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1990 SC 642; Jamiat Ulama Vs. Maulana Mahmood Asad Madni: ILR 2008-17 Dlh 1950).

    TN Housing Board Vs. TN Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608, was a case where the suit was filed by allottees of plots of low-income groups against the appellant-Housing Board seeking injunction from demanding and collecting any additional price and the suit was held maintainable under Order I Rule 8, even though separate demand notices were issued to each allottees (Referred to in Manish Kumar v. Union of India, 2021-5 SCC 1).

    Decision Binds all Represented, and Constitute Res Judicata

    The condition necessary for the application of Order I Rule 8 is that the persons on whose behalf the suit is brought must have the same interest and the decision in a representative suit would bind all the persons sought to be represented, and constitute res judicata, under Section 11, CPC. (Mahboob Sahab Vs. Syed Ismail: AIR1995 SC 1205; T N Housing Board Vs. T N Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1990 SC 642; Venugopala Naidu Vs. Venkatarayulu: (1989) Supp 2 SCC 3 56: AIR 1990 SC 444. Ahmed Adam Sait Vs. M. E. Makhri AIR 1964 SC 107. C Arumughathan Vs. S Muthusami Naidu: 1993-1 CivCC 79: 1992-1 Mad LJ 532

    Registration does not Confer Juristic Personality

    In Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State, AIR 1962 SC 458, it is held that the registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status.

    In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India: AIR 2003 SC 3397, it is held that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act as a society even after registration does not become distinct from its members and does not become a separate legal person like a company. (Referred to in Vivek Narayan Sharma Vs. Union of India, 2023-3 SCC 1)

    In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India, AIR2003 SC 3397, says as under: 

    • i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
    • ii) A Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  (Para 21)
    • iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)

    Society is the Compendium of its Members

    A society or a club, both registered and unregistered, is the compendium of its members. When it sues or is sued all its members should be made parties. Registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458. Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India: AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata, AIR 2010 SC 2943)

    Property Belonging to a Society’, “Merely Describes” Property Vests in Gover. Body

    Expressions in the Societies Registration Act, ‘property belonging to a society’ (Societies Registration Act: Sec. 5) and  ‘property of the society’, (Societies Registration Act: Sec. 8 and 10) do not give the society a corporate status; and it “merely describes the property which vests in trustees or Governing Body”. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458)

    ‘Suit By or Against a Regd. So.’ is Virtually Suit By or Against Entire Members

    Following the above propositions, it can be legitimately concluded that the common expression, ‘suit by or against a society’, legally and virtually denotes suit by or against its entire members.

    How Sec. 6 is an Enabling Provision

    The earlier view taken by various courts in India was that the registered societies were legal persons and they could sue or be sued in their own name; and that Sec. 6 was only an enabling (or added) provision to sue or be sued in the name of the president, secretary, etc.. (Shanti Sarup Vs. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha, Dayalbagh Agra: AIR 1969 All. 248; K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook, AIR 1970 Pat 163;  Khiri Ram Gupta and Another versus Nana Lal:  AIR 1964 Pat. 114, Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay : AIR 1946 Bom. 516; Nabadwip Bhajan Asram Vs. Commissioner of Nabadwip Municipality : AIR 1959 Cal 361; Sonar Bangala Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College: AIR 1960 Cal 409)

    This view does not hold good in the light of Unani Tibia College case, AIR 1962 SC 458, Illachi Devi case,  AIR 2003 SC 3397, and Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.

    Suing entire members of the society, either in person or invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC, is the normal rule. But, Sec. 6 enables ‘to sue or be sued’ every registered society in the name of its president, secretary, etc., as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society (or through such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion).

    Suit shall be in the Personal Name of President, Chairman, etc.

    From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ as President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees.

    Sec. 6 Impliedly Bars Filing a Suit in the Name of Society

    As already stated, our Apex Court has repeatedly  made it clear that Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act provides that a registered society must sue or be sued through the office bearer or a nominee, as provided in that section. Therefore, it can be concluded that Sec. 6 impliedly bars filing a suit in the name of the society, otherwise than through its President, Secretary or the nominated person. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.)

    Procedural Defects Should Not Defeat A Just Cause

    It is trite law that one should not be non-suited for technical reasons, and that procedural defects or curable procedural irregularity which is curable or which does not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. (United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar: AIR 1997 SC 3; Uday Shankar Triyar Vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh: AIR  2006 SC 269; Varun Pahwa Vs. Mrs. Renu Chaudhary: AIR  2019 SC 1186: 2019-3 JT 109.)

    It was pointed out in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3, by our Apex Court that there is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case.  

    Supreme Court Expanded Powers of Authorities of Companies in Filing Pleadings

    Under Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, Secretary or any Director or other Principal officer of a Corporation can sign pleadings by virtue of their office. A company being a juristic entity, Board of Directors can authorise any person to sign pleadings by passing a resolution or giving a power of attorney, by virtue of Order 6 Rule 14 read with Order 29 Rule 1 CPC. If pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, a Company can ratify it. Such action can be express or implied.

    It is held in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar (1997), AIR 1997 SC 3, that a Court can, after taking all the circumstances of the case, come to the conclusion that the company must have ratified the act of signing the pleading. It was pointed out that the courts below should have, in any case, directed the company to produce a proper power of attorney or they must have allowed a competent person to be examined to prove ratification.

    United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar (1997), AIR 1997 SC 3, reads as under:

    • “10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and de hors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement or its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a Corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.”

    Proper Authorisation Essential

    It is beyond doubt that a proper authorisation is essential for filing suit by a Company. Though, Secretary or any Director or other Principal officer can sign pleadings by virtue of their office, as per Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, the view followed in some earlier decisions was that neither the directors nor the managing director would have the right to represent the Company in the suit unless duly authorised by a resolution taken by the Board of Directors to that effect, at a meeting duly constituted for the said purpose.(B. Mookerjee Vs State Bank of India: AIR 1992 Cal 250; Nibro Limited Vs National Insurance Co:  AIR 1991  Del 25)

    In State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers, 2011-11 SCC 524, it is held by our Apex Court as under:

    • “14. In our view, the judgment under challenge is liable to be set aside because the Respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was appointed as a Director of the company and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the company to file suit against the Appellant and authorised Shri Ashok K. Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K. Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers to Shri Raj K. Shukla to authorise another person to file suit on behalf of the company.”

    In this decision (State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers) there was no scope to ponder on the doctrines as to ‘technical or procedural defects’ as done in the earlier decision in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar,  AIR 1997 SC 3.

    The decision, State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers may be distinguishable from United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar. In State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers there was no evidence to show that the signatory was a Director of the Company, and no resolution of the Board of Directors was produced to prove that the signatory was authorized  to file the suit. 

    It was observed by Delhi High Court in Nibro Limited Vs National Insurance Co., AIR 1991  Del 25, that if a director or a secretary was authorised by law to file a suit on behalf of a company, then he could certainly give the authority to another person as provided under Order III Rule 1 CPC. Order III Rule 1 provides that ‘any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. Provided, that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person’. However, if there is an express provision of law, then that will prevail. Thus, if an authority is given to a pleader or a recognised agent as provided by law, the recognised agent or pleader can file an appearance or file a suit in court if the party himself is not in a position to file it.

    The Bombay High Court held, in Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd Vs.  (2015), 2015-1 Mh L 852, with respect to the source of power of the Directors, as under:

    •  “The essential requirement of this provision is that the Company which is a juristic person must itself decide to sue. Once that is done, it would authorise one of its Directors who is the agent of the Company or its principal officers the Secretary of the Company or the Managing Director to file the Suit. The suing in each case is a separate act. The Company acts only through its meetings. Hence the Board of Directors in the day to day management of the company must decide and resolve to sue or not to sue. A blanket authority cannot be given to a particular Managing Director or Director to sign the papers and document/s, including the power to sue. The power to sue requires application of mind upon the particular cause of action. It requires the Company to pay the requisite Court fee. It requires the Company to be represented by a legal officer being an Advocate of the Court. It is an act which, therefore, is not a part of the day to day management of the Company. A Company would decide in a given case upon legal advice or otherwise whether or not it would sue upon a given cause of action. Such exercise is imperatively required to be performed if the intention of the Company, which is only a juristic person, is to be deciphered. That act, of course, may be undertaken even after the filing of the Suit and ratified by the Board as all other acts of management. However, the seminal requirement is to see the act of the Company though its Board or members (dependent upon whether the resolution is passed in the Board meeting or a general meeting) or is given by the Company itself (under its Articles of Association).”

    In Nibro Limited Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., AIR 1991 Delhi 25, it is observed, with regard to the source of power of the Directors, as under:

    • “25. It is well-settled that under Section 291 of the Companies Act except where express provision is made that the powers of a company in respect of a particular matter are to be exercised by the company in general meeting–in all others cases the Board of Directors are entitled to exercise all its powers. Individual directors have such powers only as are vested in them by the Memorandum and Articles. It is true that ordinarily the court will not unsuit a person on account of technicalities. However, the question of authority to institute a suit on behalf of a company is not a technical matter. It has far-reaching effects. It often affects policy and finances of the company. Thus, unless a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on a particular director, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of the company. Needless to say that such a power can be conferred by the Board of Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard.” Quoted in: United India Periodicals Pvt. Ltd.  Vs. CMYK Printech Ltd. : 2018-248 DLT 227

    The law as to the authority of ratification of the act of the officers in signing pleadings, by a Company is detailed by the Delhi High Court in Radico Khaitan Limited Vs. J D Wines,  2020-2 AD(Del)  421, .

    Persons Represented need not have “same cause of action“; must have “common interest”

    In Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madras vs. T. N. Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608, it was held by this Court that the persons who may be represented in a suit under Order 1 Rule 8 of Civil Procedure Code need not have the same cause of action and all that is required for application of said provision is that the persons concerned must have common interest or common grievance. What is required is sameness of interest. Paragraphs 7 and 9 of the decision says as under:

    • 7. On the question of maintainability of the suit in a representative capacity under Order I, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been contended that since the injury complained of is in regard to demand of money and that too by a separate demand against each of the allottees, giving rise to different causes of action, Rule 1 has no application. … The provisions of Order I of Rule 8 have been included in the Code in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The condition necessary for application of the provisions is that the persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must have the same interest. In other words either the interest must be common or they must have a common grievance which they seek to get redressed. In Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar (ILR 1955 Mad 339: AIR 1955 Mad 281) a Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed that on the plain language of Order I Rule 8, the principal requirement to bring a suit within that rule is the sameness of interest of the numerous persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is instituted. The court, while considering whether leave under the rule should be granted or not, should examine whether there is sufficient community of interest to justify the adoption of the procedure provided under the rule. The object for which this provision is enacted is really to facilitate the decision of questions, in which a large number of persons are interested, without recourse to the ordinary procedure. The provision must, therefore, receive an interpretation which will subserve the object for its enactment. There are no words in the rule to limit its scope to any particular category of suits or to exclude a suit in regard to a claim for money or for injunction as the present one. … … …
    • 9. It is true that each of the allottees is interested individually in fighting out the demand separately made or going to be made on him and, thus, separate causes of action arise in the case, but, that does not make Order I Rule 8 inapplicable. Earlier there was some doubt about the rule covering such a case which now stands clarified by the Explanation introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, which reads as follows:
    • “Explanation.— For the purpose of determining whether the persons who sue or are sued, or defend, have the same interest in one suit, it is not necessary to establish that such persons have the same cause of action as the persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or defend the suit, as the case may be.” (Quoted in: Anjum Hussain Vs. Intellicity Business Park Pvt.  Ltd., 2019-6 SCC 519)

    Doctrine of Substantial Representation

    Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act provides that a registered society must sue or be sued through the office bearer or a nominee, as provided in that section. Therefore, as shown above, it can be concluded that Sec. 6 impliedly bars filing a suit in the name of the society, otherwise than through its President, Secretary or the nominated person.

    It is noteworthy that the diktats in Sec. 6 of the So. Registration Act are not invariably followed by our courts; but, adopted the doctrine of ‘substantial representation’ (Subramania Pillai Vs. Masterly, AIR1976 Mad 303). 

    In Singhai Lal Chand Jain Vs. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, Panna, AIR 1996 SC 1211, the High Court had held that the objection was sustainable as to the maintainability of representative suit for eviction against an unregistered association, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), without Order 1 Rule 8 CPC steps; and that the decree was a nullity and non est; and the execution was not maintainable. Our Apex Court observed as under:

    • “Procedure is the handmaid to the substantive justice. …. It is true that no permission of the Court was taken to be sued in a representative capacity by or on behalf of the Sangh. But Clause (b) of Order 1, Rule 8 indicates that it may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of all persons so interested. Clause (b) clearly applies to the facts in this case. The President of the Sangh, the Manager of the Sangh and a Member have duly represented the Sangh and defended the suit for the benefit of all the persons so interested in the Sangh.”

    It was also pointed out:

    • “Thus it could be held that the Sangh having been duly represented in the previous proceedings and conducted the litigation on behalf of the Sangh bona fide and were unsuccessful in the suit, no one on behalf of the Sangh can lay any objection in the execution nor plead nullity of the decree. The doctrine of res judicata prohibited the members of the Sangh to obstruct the execution of the decree. The decree of ejectment binds every member of the Sangh and, therefore, the appellant is entitled to have the decree executed and possession taken.”

    In this decision the following passage from Surayya Begum Vs. Mohd. Usman, (1991) 3 SCC 114, was quoted:

    • “The principle of representation of the interest of a person, not impleaded by name in a judicial proceeding, through a named party is not unknown. A karta of a Joint Hindu Family has always been recognised as a representative of the other members of the Joint Hindu Family, and so has been a trustee. In cases where the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code are attracted a named party in a suit represents the other persons interested in the litigation, and likewise a receiver appointed in one case represents the interest of the litigating parties in another case against a stranger. Similarly the real owner is entitled to the benefits under a decree obtained by his benamidar against a stranger and at the same time is also bound by the decision. Examples can be multiplied. It is for this reason that we find Explanation VI in the following words in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure: ‘Explanation VI. – Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating’.”
    • Note:
      • 1. RSS was a defendant in Singhai Lal Chand Jain Vs. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, Panna (supra); and the suit was for eviction of RSS through its Manager, its President; and the Head Master of Saraswati Shishu Mandiras a member of the Sangh.
      • 2, It is not legitimate to take this decision as an authority for ‘substantial representation’ in an internal matter of an association in which all members of the association may be ‘interested’ or ‘affected’.

    In Ramubai v. Jiyaram Sharma, AIR 1964 Bom  96, it was held as under:

    • “18. Another aspect of the question may be considered so far as the facts of the case are concerned. The interest claimed is an interest in the leasehold property. That interest is claimed by defendants 9 to 11 who are admittedly residing out of the town in which the premises are located. The nexus which creates a relationship between the lessors and the defendants claiming interest in the leasehold is the leasehold property which is occupied by defendants 1 to 8. The question is whether there could be implied in such circumstances a jointness in interest which would clothe the persons in occupation the capacity to receive notice or to do acts which will be binding on all those joint tenants. It is urged on behalf of the defendants that the moment it is held that the leasehold interest is inherited as ten-ants-in-common with defined shares inter se among them, the capacity of any one of those tenants-in-common to represent the other is at an end. Such a capacity to represent others could only be assumed or inferred in the case of persons who own only as joint tenants, but never in case of persons who hold as tenants-in-common. I find it difficult to accept this interpretation. If there is a unity of interest, common enjoyment and possession of the property, if all these joint tenants hold qua landlord as one tenant, if each of these joint tenants had an interest in the whole of the leasehold, if the acts of any one of them are the acts of all such tenants, such as act of re-entry or act of wrongful conversion, then it is difficult to hold why a notice received by one of them should not have the effect of a valid notice in respect of all on whom the notice is meant to operate. There is sufficient community of interest and joint interest inter se in them which clothes everyone of them with a representative, character vis-a-vis the landlord. I therefore hold agreeing with the Court below, that notice to one ; of them was enough and served as a good notice I to all as the notice was meant to be/ operative against all the joint tenants.”

    Who is a Necessary Party

    The ‘necessary party’ is not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. But, from the judicial dicta following are the matters that come for consideration:

    • There must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceedings in question, and
    • It will not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such a party (The Banaras Bank Ltd. Vs. Bhagwan Das: AIR 1947 All 18; Udit Narain Singh, Malpatharia vs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786).
    • Whether such a party is directly affected by the decision (Udit Narain Singh, Malpatharia vs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786).

    In Udit Narain Singh, Malpatharia vs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786, the Constitution Bench held as under:

    • “7. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.
    • 9. The next question is whether the parties whose rights are directly affected are the necessary parties to a writ petition to quash the order of a tribunal. … Without the presence of the successful party the High Court cannot issue a substantial order affecting his right. Any order that may be issued behind the back of such a party can be ignored by the said party, with the result that the tribunal’s order would be quashed but the right vested in that party by the wrong order of the tribunal would continue to be effective. Such a party, therefore, is a necessary party and a petition filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari without making him a party or without impleading him subsequently, if allowed by the court, would certainly be incompetent. A party whose interests are directly affected is, therefore, a necessary party.”

    Suit to protect or recover property

    The Privy Council in Jagadinadra Nath Vs.  Hemanta Kumari Debi, (1904) 31 Ind App 203 (PC), and our Apex Court in Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddi Vs. Kondaru Seshu Reddi,  AIR 1967 SC 436, (Referring: Pramathanath Nath Vs. Pradyumna: AIR 1925 PC 139) held that Shebait of a temple has the authority to institute a suit in his own name to protect and recover property belonging to the deity. (Also see: Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joo Deo, AIR  1978  All  1 – Referring: Jagadindra Nath Vs. Hemanta Kumari, (1904) 31 Ind App 203.)

    By various authoritative decisions, it is made clear that when the trust is admitted, or where the right or title over the property is not in dispute the deity will not be a necessary party, in suits for protection of the property and the rights of the trust (Hangi Mal Vs. Panna Lal:  AIR 1957 All 743).

    The same is the case for framing a scheme also (Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar Radha Ealla:  AIR 1937 Cal 338).

    In Monindra Mohan Vs.  Shamnagar Jute Factory, AIR 1939 Cal 699, a Division Bench held that the deity is not a necessary party in a suit filed on behalf of the Hindu public for declaration that the land in question was a debasthan of the idol and that it is a public place of warship.

    It is appropriate to import this analogy to matters of societies also. Where the right or title over the property is not in dispute, and the suit is filed by a person who is bound to protect the property of a society, it can be concluded that the suit is not liable to be dismissed holding that the society as such (that is, all its members) is a necessary party.

    It is observed in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez, 2013(4) Ker LT 283, that, though, as per the Canon Law the church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar, the parish being by law a public juridic person, and the plaintiffs (the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church) were entitled to represent the juridic person, the plaintiffs were competent to initiate civil proceedings (with the ultimate  aim of  protecting  the  property belonging  to  the church) before a Civil Court. 

    Is Society, a Necessary Party?

    Kania, J., in AS Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram,  AIR 1941 Bom. 312, laid down (earlier view) as under:

    • “In my opinion as the position of the members of this society is similar to that of the share holders of the company and as the acts of the defendants which are challenged are in respect of the society it is necessary that the society should be a party to this litigation. I do not think it is competent to the plaintiff either alone or representing himself and the other members of the society other than defendants to bring a suit. …… In the absence of the society as a party to this litigation, I am of opinion that the suit as framed is not maintainable and the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in the absence of the society.”

    Since it is unequivocally held by our Apex Court in Illachi Devi case, AIR 2003 SC 3397, that a (registered) society cannot sue or be sued in its name, it is peremptory that the suit by or against a society should be brought as provided under Sec. 6 of the So. Regn. Act.

    Notice to a Society, Notice to all Members

    The notice to a Co-operative Society will be deemed as notice to all its members. In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana, AIR1985 SC 973, it is pointed out by our Apex Court, with respect to a Co-operative Society, that S. 13(9)(a) provides for the issue of notice to the societies and not to individual members and that S. 13(9)(b), however, gives the members an opportunity to be heard.

    It is legitimate to maintain that, in appropriate cases, it may be proper to extend these principles as to service of notice, to both registered and unregistered societies, and a club also, with regard to the matters-touching-rights-or-duties of the society ‘as a body’; for example, notice as to nonpayment of tax or revenue. The notice to the society or a proper office bearer will be deemed as notice to all its members.

    Our Law Does Not Favour ‘Corporation Sole’  

    Our law does not favour characterising a ‘Corporation Sole’ as a Juristic Person except officials such as President of India, District Collectors, Secretaries/Office-Heads of various Departments of Government, Village Officers, etc.  [See: Samatha Hyderabad Abrasives And Minerals Vs. State of AP: AIR 1997 SC 3297; T.K. Santhanagopala Chettiar Vs. Thimmi M. Seetharama Chettiar 1968-2 Mad LJ  41; S Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India: AIR 1967 SC 1274; S C Sreemanavikraman Raja Vs. Controller of Estate Duty: 1957-2 Mad LJ  226].

    S Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India: AIR 1967 SC 1274

    Our Apex Court held in S Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India: AIR 1967 SC 1274 as under:

    • “It was also contended by the appellant in this connection that as the Commissioner was made a Corporation sole under s. 80 of the Act as a separate and independent personality, he was not subject to the control of the Government and no disciplinary proceedings ‘Could be initiated against him. We do not think there is any substance in this argument. It is true that the Commissioner has been made a Corporation sole under s. 80 of the Act which states that the Commissioner shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be sued in his corporate name. Section 81(1) of the Act provides for the establishment of a Fund called ‘The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Administration Fund’ and further states that the Fund shall vest in the Commissioner. It was argued for the appellant that the corporate entity created by s. 80 of the Act has a separate legal personality. But there is a juristic distinction between a Corporation sole and a Corporation aggregate, and the Corporation sole is not endowed with a separate legal personality as the Corporation aggregate. As Maitland said:
      • “If our corporation sole really were an artificial person created by the policy of man we ought to marvel at its incompetence. Unless custom or statute aids it, it cannot (so we are told) own a chattel, not even a chattel real. A different and an equally inelegant device was adopted to provide an owning ‘subject’ for the ornaments of the church and the minister thereof-adopted at the end of the Middle Ages by lawyers who held themselves debarred by the theory of corporations from frankly saying that the body of parishioners is a corporation aggregate. And then, we are also told that in all probability a corporation sole ‘Cannot enter into a contract except with statutory authority or as incidental to an interest in land ………. Be that as it may, the ecclesiastical corporation sole is no juristic person‘; he or it is either natural man or juristic abortion.” (See ‘Selected Essays of’ Maitland” pp. 100 & 103).
    • Keeton has also observed as follows
      • “It was a device for transmitting real property to a, succession of persons without the necessity for periodic. conveyances. It was never intended that this device should’ be erected into a psychological person with a developed existence of its own In dealing with a corporation sole, the courts have never treated it as a conception similar in essential characteristics to a corporation aggregate. They have restricted its utility to the transmission of real, or exceptionally, by custom, as in Byrd v. Wilford, and now by statute, personal property from one holder of an office, lay or ecclesiastical, to his successor” (See ‘Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence’ by Keeton, 2nd Edn. pp. 155 & 162).”
    • We accordingly reject the contention of the appellant that the Commissioner has a separate legal personality as corporation sole under s. 80 of the Act and that he is exempt from disciplinary proceedings for any act or omission committed in his capacity as. Commissioner. In our opinion, the object of the legislature in enacting ss. 80 and 81 of the Act was to constitute a separate Fund and to provide for the vesting of that Fund in the Commissioner as a corporation sole and thereby avoid the necessity of periodic conveyances in the transmission of title to that Fund.”

    Read in this Cluster:

    Civil Procedure Code

    Power of attorney

    Title, ownership and Possession

    Principles and Procedure

    Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

    Evidence Act – General

    Contract Act

    Easement

    Stamp Act

    Will

    Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

    Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

    Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

    Interpretation of Inconsistent Clauses in a Will

    Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

    PART – 1

    ‘Irreconcilable/Inconsistent’ clauses in a Will

    Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act says:

    • “88. The last of two inconsistent clauses prevails.–Where two clauses of gifts in a Will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail.

    The Illustrations given in this Section make it clear what is an ‘inconsistent clause‘. It reads as under:

    • (i) The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.
    • (ii) If a man, at the commencement of his Will gives his house to A, and at the close of it directs that his house shall be sold and the proceeds invested for the benefit of B, the latter disposition will prevail.”

    Section 138 of Indian Succession Act, which reads as under:

    • Direction that fund be employed in particular manner following absolute bequest of same to or for benefit of any person.
    • Where a fund is bequeathed absolutely to or for the benefit of any person, but the will contains a direction that it shall be applied or enjoyed in a particular manner, the legatee shall be entitled to receive the fund as if the will had contained no such direction.”

    From the above, it comes out that when a Will is construed, it must be considered:

    • Whether ‘on a whole-reading‘, there is irreconcilable inconsistency between two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – the last of two inconsistent clauses prevails – in earlier clause property was given to A; latter clause, to B) so that harmonious interpretation is not possible?
    • Contingent transfers are legal and valid. Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)
    • Under Sec. 11 of the TP Act also, the latter condition is taken into consideration if only there is an ‘absolute‘ transfer. Under Sec. 11 of the TP Act (which reads: 11. Restriction repugnant to interest created– Where transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, …. ) the earlier ‘irreconcilable’ clause will prevail.
    • An attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible. It is only when this is not possible, e.g, where an absolute title is given is in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void. (Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain, AIR 1963 SC 890.).

    Reconciliation of Apparent Inconsistent Provisions’ and ‘Harmonious interpretation

    Section 11 of Transfer of Properties Act makes it clear that where a property is transferred absolutely, subsequent restraints are invalid. Therefore, the questions in such matters would be (i) whether the transfer effected stands ‘absolute’ or not and (ii) whether the restriction brings-up is one that canvases the section or not.

    Section 11 of Transfer of Properties Act reads as under:

    • 11. Restriction repugnant to interest created– Where transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.
    • Where any such direction has been made in respect of one piece of immoveable property for the purpose of securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property, nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any right which the transferor may have to enforce such direction or any remedy which he may have in respect of a breach thereof.

    Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder

    What is ‘Legal Remainder’ is explained in “Modern Law of Real Property” by Chesire, Twelfth Edition as under:

    • Legal Remainders. Common law permitted future interests, called remainders, to be carved out of a legal estate, though as we shall see presently, there were several restrictive rules which had to be observed. If a stellar decided to create two or more successive estates in his land, and drafted the desired limitations in one instrument, as for instance by a fulfilment to A for life and then to B, for life and then to C, in fee simple, the first estate which preceded the next following remainder was called the “particular estate” and those which followed were denominated “remainders”. (Quoted in Bomi Munchershaw Mistry v. Kesharwani Co-Operative Housing Society, 1993 (2) BomCR 329.)

    Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder in TP Act

    Transfer of Property Act does not specifically speak about ‘Legal Remainder’. But, the illustrations in Sections 13, 24, 27 and 126 (mentioned below) clearly lay down this right. Indian courts apply the doctrine of ‘legal remainder’, inasmuch it hold – both the reversioner (future right that accrues by operation of law) and the legal remainder (future right that accrues by act of persons – executing documents) have the right to protect their (future) right, through court [Yellarayhala Surayya v. Yellaraghahs Subbamma, (1920) ILR 43 Mad 4].

    See Blog: Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests

    Can a property be ‘transferred’ (successively) to one, and after his death (or on happening an event) to another?

    Yes. It is clear from the following illustrations in the TP Act.

    No.Sec.Illustration
     113. Transfer for benefit of unborn person  A transfers property of which he is the owner to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for their lives, and, after the death of the survivor, for the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death for A’s second son. The interest so created for the benefit of the eldest son does not take effect, because it does not extend to the whole of A’s remaining interest in the property.
     224. Transfer to such of certain persons as survive at some period not specifiedA transfers property to B for life, and after his death to C and D, equally to be divided between them, or to the survivor of them. C dies during the life of B. D survives B. At B’s death the property passes to D.
     327. Conditional transfer to one person coupled with transfer to another on failure of prior dispositionA transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B that which he had transferred to her. A and his wife perish together, under circumstances which make it impossible to prove that she died before him. The disposition in favour of B does not take effect.
    4126. When gift may be suspended or revoked.A gives a field to B, reserving to himself, with B’s assent, the right to take back the field in case B and his descendants die before A. B dies without descendants in A’s lifetime. A may take back the field.
    • Note: Illustration in Sec. 24 given above lays down ‘Vested Remainder’; and that in Sec. 27 lays down lays down an instance of ‘Contingent Remainder’.

    Vested Remainder

    Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B …. (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)

    • A ‘vested remainder’ has to satisfy following ingredients:
      • (i) the person to whom the property is given must be a living person,
      • (ii) the estate must be (when the transfer is effected) with another,
      • (iii) the (actual) transfer is to take effect as soon as the estate with whom its remained (when the transfer is effected) is terminated,
      • (iv) the person in enjoyment (when the transfer is effected) holds the property subject to the rights of ‘vested remainder’ (in other words, it is one which is ready from its commencement to its end).

    In Law of Property by Strahan – 4th Edition at page 152, it is observed as follows:

    • A vested remainder is a remainder of the more ancient kind, that is, one of the owner which is living and ascertained, and which is an actual estate in the land, complete in interest though deferred to the precedent estate in enjoyment. Being complete, it is ready, and must continue ready, from its commencement as a vested remainder till its expiration in natural course, to come into possession immediately on the determination of the preceding interest, the existence of which is the  only thing which prevents it being complete not merely in interest, but also in enjoyment. It is true it may fail, or, rather, determine before the period arrives, when it would vest in possession, but such determination must arise from its own natural expiration, not from any outside event or contingency.
    • Thus, take a limitation to A. for life and then to B. for life – B. being a living person. If B. predeceases A., his life estate will never become an interest in possession; but as long as B. lives, his estate is ready to come into possession the moment A.’s life estate determines.” (quoted in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36)

    In Law of Property by GC Venkata Subbarao – 2nd Edition, at page 130, it is observed as under:

    • Vested Remainder is Heritable.- Vested remainders and reversions are treated as future interests only for the reason that they do not carry immediate possession of the property. They are for all practical purposes present proprietary interests. As such they are heritable. Even if the person entitled to the vested remainder dies before the determination of the particular estate, his interest does not lapse but is transmitted to his heir. Of course, if the remainderman’s estate is a life-estate this rule can have no application. Where, he has an estate of inheritance, notwithstanding his death, before the estate falls in possession, his representative in interest can claim possession as soon as it becomes vacant by the expiration of the precedent interests. In this respect the vested estate resembles the reversion which is also a heritable or transmissible interest in property.” (quoted in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36)

    Contingent Remainder

    Example – A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B ….. (Illustration in Sec. 27, TP Act)

    The principle of ‘Contingent Remainder’ is seen applied extensively, in India. It is usually applied in the following instances:

    1. Property is given to A for life; then to B, if A dies unmarried.
    2. Property is given to A (with saleable rights), then to B if property (or any part) remains unsold/un-transferred by A.
    • A ‘contingent remainder’ must have the following ingredients:
      • (i) the person to whom the property has to reach, finally, must be a living person,
      • (ii) the estate must be (when the transfer is effected) with another,
      • (iii) there will be a chance only to get the property to the (final) transferee; the transfer being contingent upon the stipulations or conditions (in other words, it is one which is not ready from its commencement to its end),
      • (iv) the (actual) transfer takes effect
        • (a) only on satisfying the conditions, and
        • (b) as soon as the estate with whom it is remained is terminated.

    It is clearly laid down in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36) it is observed in Para 32, 38 and 41 as under:

    • “32. The principle that can be carved out from the above literature is that a vested remainder is one which is ready from its commencement to its end, to take effect as soon as a particular estate shall determine. … … In the case of vested interest, the distribution is predetermined while in contingent interest, it may or may not. A contingent remainder is one which is not ready from its commencement to its end and it is to take effect as soon as particular estate is terminated.”
    • “38. In the decision reported in Narayani v. Sreedharan (2011(4) K.L.T. SN 107) it is held as follows:
    • “Even if by a document, the property which exclusively belongs to the executant is settled in favour of another, retaining his life interest in the property and providing that on his death the other would get absolute right in the property, it cannot be said that there was no transfer of interest in praesenti because of the retention of the life interest of the executant as there was divesting of the rights of the executant, except his life interest.”
    • “41. … But certain propositions emerge from a reading of the above decisions (Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi, 1996 Ker HC 1200, Kokilambal v. N. Raman. AIR 2005 SC 2468) and they are ;
      • i) There is no straight jacket formula to ascertain the nature of interest created.
      • ii) Each case depends upon the facts of that case and the deed that comes up for interpretation.
      • iii) Merely because the enjoyment or possession is postponed by itself is not a ground to hold that no vested interest is created.
      • iv) If interest in praesenti is created with condition, the transfer becomes effective immediately. But the interest is to take effect after the condition is satisfied, then it becomes a contingent (sic – vested) interest.”

    PART – 2

    Discordant Knots

    It is a serious question – whether the observation in the following decisions as to ‘conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses’ (in Wills) stand unsusceptible to (i) the doctrine of ‘harmonious interpretation’ and (ii) the following illustration in Sec. 27 of the TP Act: A transfers property to his wife; but, in case she should die in his life-time, transfer to B

    The decisions are:

    • Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727
    • Sadaram Suryanarayana v.  Kalla Surya Kantham, AIR 2011 SC 294
    • Madhuri Ghosh v. Debobroto Dutta, AIR 2016 SC 5242.

    I. In Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727 (two Judge Bench) considered a will containing the following provision –

    • “The first part of the Will provided that after the death of the testator or author of the Will, his wife whose name is Smt. Sona Devi would be entitled to the entire assets and properties of Jamuna Prasad with the right of transfer.
    • The second part of the Will is that after the death of Smt. Sona Devi nine sons of daughters’ would inherit the property.”

    The Apex Court held that latter clause will not take effect observing as under:

    • “Where a testator having conferred an absolute right on anyone, the subsequent bequest for the same property in favour of other persons would be repugnant to the first bequest in the will and has to be held invalid.”

    The Apex Court referred to Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim wherein it was held that where there was conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses and it was not possible to give effect to all of them, then the rule of construction was well established that it was the earlier clause that must override the later clauses and not vice versa. It was also pointed out that in Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj Kuar it was laid down that where an absolute estate was created by a will in favour of devisee, the clauses in the will which were repugnant to such absolute estate could not cut down the estate; but they must be held to be invalid. The Court held:

    • “In Ramkishorelal and another vs. Kamalnarayan, 1963 Suppl. (2) SCR 417, AIR 1963 SC 890, it was held that in a disposition of properties, if there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion, in such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded. In Radha Sundar Dutta Vs. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim & others (AIR 1959 SC 24 ), it was held where there is conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses and it is not possible to give effect to all of them, then the rule of construction is well established that it is the earlier clause that must override the later clauses and not vice versa.” 

    II. In Sadaram Suryanarayana v.  Kalla Surya Kantham, AIR 2011 SC 294, the two Judge Bench had to find whether the following clause in the will expressed an unequivocal intention of the Testatrix to make an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters. The relevant clause read as under:

    • “2nd item … shall devolve to my 2nd daughter …  and the Western wing 2 rooms shall devolve upon my elder daughter … with absolute rights of Sale, Gift, Mortgage etc., and this will come into force after my demise. After demise of my daughters the retained and remaining property shall devolve upon their female children only.”

    Referring (i) Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad (supra – AIR 2002 SC 727) (ii) Ramki shore lal v. Kamalnarayan (supra – AIR 1963 SC 890) and (ii) Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahimheld (supra – AIR 1959 SC 24), it is held in Sadaram Suryanarayana v.  Kalla Surya Kantham as under:

    • “We are, on the contrary, dealing with a case where the intention of the Testatrix to make an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters is unequivocal. Secondly, the expression “after demise of my daughters the retained and remaining properties shall devolve on their female children only” does not stricto sensu amount to a bequest contrary to the one made earlier in favour of the daughters of the Testatrix. The expression extracted above does not detract from the absolute nature of the bequest in favour of the daughters. All that the Testatrix intended to achieve by the latter part of clause 6 was the devolution upon their female offsprings all such property as remained available in the hands of the legatees at the time of their demise. There would obviously be no devolution of any such property upon the female offsprings in terms of the said clause if the legatees decided to sell or gift the property bequeathed to them as indeed they had every right to do under the terms of the bequest. Seen thus, there is no real conflict between the absolute bequest which the first part of clause 6 of the Will makes and the second part of the said clause which deals with devolution of what and if at all anything that remains in the hands of the legatees.”

    III.  Madhuri Ghosh v. Debobroto Dutta AIR 2016 SC 5242 (Two Judge Bench): The testator bequeathed his property jointly to his wife and daughter. It was provided that in the event of the death of his wife the property would stand vested with the daughter as “exclusive owner”; and, in the event of the death of his daughter the property would stand vested with the wife as “exclusive owner”.  Thereafter, it was provided that various other lineal descendants would become owners of specified parts of the property. The Apex Court held that the will provided for ‘absolute’ bequest and not ‘limited interest’. Therefore, the direction that the lineal descendants would become owners of specified parts had no effect. The Court, inter alia, relied on Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad (2002) 2 SCC 468.

    Analysis of the Above Three Decisions

    Following doubts, legitimately, come up for Consideration:

    1. The common law in India requires reading the whole document, and give effect to the provisions on a harmonious interpretation. The apparent conflict mooted in the above cases can be harmonised on reading the document as a whole.
    2. Illustrations in Sections 24 and 27 make it clear that Indian law recognises ‘vested remainder’ and ‘contingent remainder‘. (See illustrations given in these Sections.)
    3. It is also beyond doubt that such a transfer is not hit by Sec. 10 and 11 of the TP Act; inasmuch as Sec. 10 and 11 cumber only when ‘conditions’ impose ‘Absolute Restraint’ or ‘Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’. It does not invite Sec. 138 of the Indian Succession Act also, for the same reasons.
    4. Following decisions relied on in Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2002 SC 727 (and the subsequent decisions followed it) were not applicable in the fact-situation (that emerged) inasmuch as they dealt with independent earlier transfers; and not two parts of the same deed. The decisions are:
      1. Ramkishore lal v. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890 (Constitution Bench)
      2. Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR 1959 SC 24 (three judge bench)
    5. It is noteworthy that the Apex Court (in Mauleshwar Mani – in the matter of a Will) considered cases (Ramkishore lal and Radha Sundar Dutta) in which Sec. 11, TP Act is attracted- for Sec. 138 of the Indian Succession Act is pari materia to Sec. 11 of the TP Act.
    6. In K. S.  Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017  SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.) the joint Will executed by a couple created a Trust; but, it had been indicated that after the death of one of the spouse, the other (survivor) had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same.  Certain alienations were made by the wife after death of the husband. Our apex Court held as under:
      • “49. The intention in testamentary disposition has to be primarily found out from the actual words used in the Will. The court is not entitled to ignore clear words or add something of its own or dilute the meaning of any clear word used in the Will. The solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention.
      • 57. We, thus, are of the view that giving absolute right to the survivor during his lifetime to deal with the properties in no manner cannot be said to be right given in disregard of object of trust. The charitable purpose of the Will is not lost even if survivor is given absolute right.”

    Why Ramkishore lal and Radha Sundar Dutta Do Not Apply

    In Ramkishore lal v. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890 (Constitution Bench), dealt with the matter of a partition-award and the question arose was as to independent earlier dedication of property to a temple. It was held as under:

    • “We are inclined to agree with the contention of the learned Attorney-General that Mr. Bagchi’s award gives the property to Ramsaran Lal absolutely with only a charge on the property for the expenses of the temple and did not make an absolute dedication of the village to the temple. We are of opinion however that Mr. Bagchi’s award can have no legal effect in respect of the dedication already made. Once an absolute dedication of the property had been made in December 1896 in favour of Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple the former owners of the property had no legal authority to go behind that dedication.”

    Similarly, in Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR 1959 SC 24 (three judge bench), considered was an independent earlier grant. It was held as under:

    • “But it is open to the parties to agree that the Chaukidari Chakaran lands should form a new and distinct Patni, and the result of such an agreement will be that while the grantee will hold those lands in Patni right, that is to say, the tenure will be permanent, heritable and alienable so far as his liability to pay jama and the corresponding right of the Zamindar to sell it under the Regulation if there is any default in the payment thereof are concerned, the now grant will be an entity by itself independent of the original Patni.”

    ‘Reconciliation of Apparent Inconsistent Provisions’ and ‘Repugnant Provisions’

    As stated already, if only there is irreconcilable inconsistency between two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – that is, in earlier clause, property was given to A; latter clause, to B – whereby a harmonious interpretation is not possible) then only the principle, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away‘ (or, the last of two inconsistent clauses prevails), be applied. It is emphasised by our Supreme Court (Constitution Bench consisting of BP Sinha (CJ), KC Das Gupta, PB Gajendragadkar, KN Wanchoo, JC Shah, JJ.) in  Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain, AIR 1963 SC 890, as under:

    • “Sometimes it happens in the case of documents as regards disposition of properties, whether they are testamentary or non-testamentary instruments, that there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another. A familiar instance of this is where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion. What is to be done where this happens? It is well settled that in case of such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title already given (See: Sahebzada Mohd. Kamgar Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo, (1960) 3 SCR 604. It is clear, however, that an attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible. It is only when this is not possible, e.g, where an absolute title is given is in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void.” (quoted in : H B Yeshwant Rao Ghorpade v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bangalore, AIR 1967 SC 135)

    In Ramachandra Shenoy v. Mrs. Hilda Brite, AIR 1964 SC 1323, our Apex Court (N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, JJ) observed with respect to a will as under:

    • 5. If the said Julia does not marry or if she has no issues, the said Julia should enjoy the said property up to her deathand thereafter this property of mine should be enjoyed by my eldest daughter, Severina obina Coelho and after her by her male descendants with permanent rights”.
    • “It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interest, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will. It if for this reason that where there is a bequest to A even though it be in terms apparently absolute followed by a gift of the same to B absolutely “on” or “after” or “at” A’s death, A is prima facie held to take a life interest and B an interest in remainder, the apparently absolute interest of A being cut down to accommodate the interest created in favour of B.”

    It is held in Navneet Lal alias Rangi v. Gokul, AIR 1976 SC 794, as under:

    • “It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will.”

    In K. S.  Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017  SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.), Palaniappa Chettiar and his wife by registered Will created a Trust. The Will indicated that after the death of one of the testators, the survivor had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same.  Certain alienations were made by Rangammal after death of Palaniappa Chettiar.  Relying on Navneet Lal alias Rangi v. Gokul, AIR 1976 SC 794 it is held that the solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention. The Court held as under:

    • “41. The above in plain words provides that on the death of any of the spouse, survivor shall enjoy the entire properties absolutely with all the rights. What is the connotation of words ‘absolutely with all the rights?’, whether the above provision in the Will can be read as only life estate i.e. right of enjoyment and receiving of rent, income or absolute right indicates the exercise of all the rights including the right of alienation.”
    • 42. The High Court after noticing the contention of Learned Counsel for the defendants formed the opinion that expression ‘absolutely’ should be read to mean that the surviving testator, namely, Rangammal would have only the life interest.
    • 50. We do not find any word or any indication in the Will to give a life estate to survivor. The Will clearly intended that survivor shall have absolute right to the properties and after his/her death; the charity shall be carried out from the income of the properties without alienation of the properties.
    • “57. We, thus, are of the view that giving absolute right to the survivor during his lifetime to deal with the properties in no manner cannot be said to be right given in disregard of object of trust. The charitable purpose of the Will is not lost even if survivor is given absolute right. The obligation of survivor to act in furtherance of object as agreed by both the testators survives and binds the survivor. Although the Will was irrevocable after the death of survivor but the Will expressly granted absolute right to survivor.
    • 58. In view of the foregoing discussion, we endorse the view of High Court that the Will dated 27.9.1968 was a joint and mutual Will, but with a rider that said joint and mutual Will was with an express condition that survivor shall have absolute right to deal with the property keeping the object of trust alive.”

    Followed in : Prabhakumari v. S.  Mohanarajan 2021-4 Ker HC 514

    Reconcile all clauses in the Will, Even if an apparent Absolute Estate Given

    In Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, AIR 2006 SC 3282, 2006-8 SCC 75 (B.P. Singh & P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.), it is held as under:

    • “20. Thus the first attempt must be to reconcile all the clauses in the will and give effect to all of them. When we make that attempt in the context of what this Court had indicated in the decision quoted above, we find that the apparent absolute estate given to his wife by the testator is sought to be cut down by the stipulations that the property must go to his nephews after the death of the wife, that the wife cannot testamentarily dispose of the property in favour of any one else and the further interdict in the note that the wife during her life time would not be entitled to mortgage or sell the properties. Thus on reconciling the various clauses in the will and the destination for the properties that the testator had in mind, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the apparent absolute estate in favour of Isher Kaur has to be cut down to a life estate so as to accommodate the estate conferred on the nephews.
    • 21. Thus understood, it has necessarily to be held, as was held by the first appellate court, that Isher Kaur was not competent to gift away the properties in favour of the Gurdwara as she had done. Even if the gift were to be treated as valid, the donee thereunder cannot resist the claim for eviction by the legatees under the will, the nephews of Ralla Singh, on the cessation of the life estate of Isher Kaur. Admittedly, that life estate has ceased and once it is found that the plaintiff has acquired a title to the property as a legatee under the will, he would be entitled for and on behalf of himself and his brother to recover possession of the property from the Gurdwara in view of the death of Isher Kaur.”
    • Note: In Tej Bhan v. Ram Kishan,2024 INSC 945, the Apex Court referred this decision and various other decisions to a ‘larger bench for reconciling the principles laid down in various judgments of this Court and for restating the law on the interplay between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

    PART – 3

    If only ‘Absolute‘ Bequest or Transfer, then only Adversities in S. 11 TP Act and S. 138 Succn. Act Attracted

    ‘Inconsistency’ and ‘absolute transfer’ are explained in Sec. 88 of the Indian Succession Act. First illustration reads as under:

    • “The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.”

    The law on this point is eruditely explained in Rajinder Singh Chowdhary v. Sardar Manjit Singh Chowdhary, AIR 2002 Del 135 (Vijender Jain, J.). The facts of the case, in a nutshell, are the following:

    • (a)  The father of the parties executed a Will bequeathing all his properties in favour of his wife ‘as the sole and absolute (in the sense, saleable) owner with full powers of disposal in any manner she likes’.
    • (b) The will further provided how the properties were to be distributed ‘in case she expires intestate and without disposing of the properties’.
    • (c) The mother died intestate.
    • It was contended by the plaintiff that the bequest to the mother was ‘absolute and anything which was repugnant to the absolute bequest was void and inconsequential under Section 138 of Indian Succession Act.
    • Plaintiffs relied on
      • Gopala Menon v. Sivaraman Nair, AIR 1979 SC 1345
      • Lalit Mohan Mondal v. Profulla Kumar Mondal, AIR 1982 Cal 52.
      • Shantilal babubhai v. Bai Chhani, AIR 1973 Gujarat 146,
    • The defendants contended that will had to be read as a whole and different parts of the will should be considered harmoniously. The defendants further contended that provision of Section 138 of the Act was not applicable to the present case and further contended that even if there was inconsistency, Section 88 of the Indian succession Act saves such inconsistency as the last clause prevails.  Section 88 of the Indian succession Act reads as under:  
    • “The last of two inconsistent clauses prevails. Where two clauses of gifts in a will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail.”
    • Defendants relied on following decisions:
      • Gopala Menon v. Sivaraman Nair, (1981) 3 SCC 586
      • Lt. Col. Kanwaljet Singh Chowdhary v. Chowdhary Harnam Singhand, 60 (1995) DLT 827.

    Finally the court held as under:

    • “The principles enunciated in Gopala Menon s case (supra), Shantilal Babubhai (supra) and Lalit Mohan Mondal s case (supra) are well established principles that once a bequest has been made which is absolute and anything which is inconsistent would be repugnant and that has to be ignored.
    • But can it be said that the present case while interpreting the will at hand in view of the concern and anxiety of the testator with regard to his two sons and his intention to bequeath the property after the demise of Smt. Ved Kaur and words which are used signifying the concern and well being of aforesaid two sons are superfluous it is in this context court has to see as to whether bequest made in favour of Smt. Ved Kaur was absolute?
    • The answer is in the negative.
    • From the well laid down principle regarding interpretation of will and harmonious construction of the same, I hold that what was intended by the testator was to create a life estate in favour of Smt. Ved Kaur and not an absolute interest. The issue is answered accordingly.”

    Theory of ‘Dominant Intention’

    The will considered in Ramasreenivasa Iyengar v. Padmasani Ammal, (1973) 1 MLJ 34, provided that the two daughters of the testator should take the properties in equal shares with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights, but the share of the lady without issues would, however, after her death, be taken by the daughter with issues along with her children. It was found that the testator intended only a life estate if no issue to anyone. It was held that the dominant intention was to preserve the estate to his grandchildren.

    Deeds must be read as a whole

    House of Lords (Lord Davey) in North-Eastern Railway Company v. Hastings, (1900) AC 260, held as under:

    • “The deed must be read as a whole in order to ascertain the true meaning of its several clauses, and the words of each clause should be so interpreted as to bring them into harmony with the other provisions of the deed if that interpretation does no violence to the meaning of which they are naturally susceptible.”

    After quoting the House of Lords, our Supreme Court held in Provash Chandra Dalui v. Biswanath Banerjee, AIR 1989 SC 1834, as under:

    • “In construing a contract the Court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the Court can do about it. In the construction of a written instrument’ it is legitimate in order to ascertain the true meaning of the words used and if that be doubtful it is legitimate to have regard to the circumstances surrounding their creation and the subject matter to which it was designed and intended they should apply.”

    After referring Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi, 1996 Ker HC 1200, and Kokilambal v. N. Raman. AIR 2005 SC 2468, it is observed in Nikhil v. Sarojini (2014-3 Ker LT SN 36) that there is no straight jacket formula to ascertain the nature of interest created and that each case depends upon the facts of that case and the deed that comes up for interpretation.

    If onlyAbsolute Transfer’ or ‘Irreconcilable Inconsistency’, the doctrine ‘once granted cannot be taken away’, applied

    Same principles as to ‘irreconcilable inconsistency’ apply to ‘absolute’ transfer, when the doctrine, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away’, is applied.

    The Supreme Court has explained in Sahebzeda Mohammad Kamgarh Singh v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb, AIR 1960 SC 953, that if only there is irreconcilable inconsistency between two provisions (as stated in the illustration of Sec. 88 – that is, in earlier clause, property was given to A; latter clause, to B – whereby a harmonious interpretation is not possible) then only the principle, ‘once granted cannot next be taken away‘, be applied.

    • “The task being to ascertain the intention of the parties, the cases have laid down that that intention has to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves. In doing so the parties must be presumed to have used the words in their strict grammatical sense. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be out down by later clause. Where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the Court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantor’s document it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee.”

    PART – 4

    Absolute‘ Transfer with stipulation: ‘if property remains’ on death of transferee, it will go to another – If Valid?

    Yes.

    Following important points gain consideration in this regard:

    1. In Indian practice, though the words used in the deeds might be ‘absolute transfer’, on a true construction, on a reading of entire document, it might only be a salable/transferable right during life time; and the left-over property might be given to another.
    2. The common law in India requires reading the whole document altogether, and give effect to the document on a harmonious interpretation, rather than giving effect to the legal terms used in a deed.
    3. Illustrations in Sections 24 and 27 make it clear that Indian law recognises ‘vested remainder’ and ‘contingent remainder‘ (as detailed in the notes above).
    4. It is also beyond doubt that such a transfer is not hit by Sec. 10 and 11 of the TP Act; inasmuch as Sec. 10 and 11 cumber only when ‘conditions’ impose ‘Absolute Restraint’ or ‘Enjoyment in a Particular Manner’.
    5. First illustration in Sec. 88 of the Indian Succession Act reads as under:
      • “The testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar “to A”, and by the last clause of his Will leaves to “to B and not to A”. B will have it.”

    Various court decisions make it clear that one can validly transfer or bequeath a property to another, with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights, with the stipulation that after that (first) transferee’s lifetime, if whole or any part remains, it (contingent remainder) may go to another.

    In K. S.  Palanisami v. Hindu Community Citizens of Gobichettipalayam, AIR 2017  SC 1473 (Ashok Bushan, J.), Palaniappa Chettiar and his wife by registered Will created a Trust. The Will indicated that after the death of one of the testators, the survivor had Absolute right to deal with the property and there was no embargo on the right of survivor to dispose of the same.  Certain alienations were made by Rangammal after death of Palaniappa Chettiar.  It is held as under:

    • “49. The intention in testamentary disposition has to be primarily found out from the actual words used in the Will. The court is not entitled to ignore clear words or add something of its own or dilute the meaning of any clear word used in the Will. The solemn duty of the court is to find out the intention of testator and thereafter to give effect to such intention. On the reading of the Will, the intendment of testator/testatrix is clear that survivor shall have absolute right of enjoyment of properties. There is no reason not to give effect to said intendment on the ground that the testator and testatrix have mutually intended to set apart the property for charity and holding that survivor shall have right of disposition be not in the interest of the trust.”

    Other Erudite Decisions on the Topic

    In Sanford v. Sanford, (1901) 1 Ch. 939, the gift to the wife conferred a power of disposal limited explicitly to her lifetime. But, the gift-over to son was of a quite absolute estate. The gift did not include a power of disposition by will, but allowed power of disposition inter vivos. It was provided in the gift deed that if any property remained at her death it was to pass ‘from father to son, from generation to generation’.   Therefore, it was held that the widow was conferred with only a limited right; and the gift-over, which was ‘the will of the testator’ was to ‘settle its destination’. (This decision is referred to in Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, 1976-2 MLJ 381.)

    In Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381, the Madras High Court rendered a well-read decision in this topic. The facts of this case, in a nutshell, are as under:

    • (i) The settlement deed considered in the case provided:
    • (a)  the wife of the settlor should enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) rights.
    • (b) the respondent should take the properties remained at the time of her death, with absolute rights.
    • (ii) the appellant contended that the clause providing for the respondent taking absolutely such of the properties as at the time of the death of the settler’s wife was repugnant to the earlier clause conferring an absolute estate on her, and has, therefore, to be ignored as void.
    • (iii) the respondent contended that if the settlement deed had to be read as a whole  and the effect would be:
      • there was no absolute transfer to the wife of the settler as stated in Sec. 11 of the TP Act.

    It is seen that the High Court accepted the contentions of the respondent that the settlement deed was to be read as a whole and that the respondent had taken absolutely such of the properties covered by the settlement deed as remained undisposed of by the settlee, the wife of the settlor; as she had only a right to enjoy the properties with absolute (in the sense, saleable) powers of disposal during her lifetime. The clause as to acquiring property by respondent was not repugnant and void.

    The High Court relied on the following cases. The facts of these were ‘very near’ to the facts of that case.

    • Thayalai Achi v. Kannammal, AIR 1935 Mad 704,
    • S.M. Hara Kumari v. Mohim Chandra Sarkar, (1908) 12 CWN 412,
    • Anantnasayana v. Kondappe AIR 1940 Mad 479,
    • Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247,
    • Ramasreenivasa Iyengar v. Padmasani Ammal, (1973) 1 MLJ 34.

    In Lakshmi Ammal v. Allauddin Sahib, AIR 1962 Mad 247, it was held, as regards a Will, as under:

    • “After giving an absolute estate to his wife over the two items of scheduled properties, he provided that these scheduled properties, after the wife’s lifetime should devolve – item 1 on the first daughter and item 2 on the second daughter – who would have absolute rights. When the testator took care to indicate that the properties without any distinction even after his wife’s lifetime should go to each of the daughters, it should be presumed that it was clearly in his mind that the wife’s estate was only to be a limited estate or life estate, and not an absolute one.” (Quoted in: Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar, (1976) 2 MLJ 381).

    Reconcile all clauses in the Will, Even if an apparent Absolute Estate Given

    In Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, AIR 2006 SC 3282, 2006-8 SCC 75 (B.P. Singh & P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.), it is held as under:

    • “20. Thus the first attempt must be to reconcile all the clauses in the will and give effect to all of them. When we make that attempt in the context of what this Court had indicated in the decision quoted above, we find that the apparent absolute estate given to his wife by the testator is sought to be cut down by the stipulations that the property must go to his nephews after the death of the wife, that the wife cannot testamentarily dispose of the property in favour of any one else and the further interdict in the note that the wife during her life time would not be entitled to mortgage or sell the properties. Thus on reconciling the various clauses in the will and the destination for the properties that the testator had in mind, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the apparent absolute estate in favour of Isher Kaur has to be cut down to a life estate so as to accommodate the estate conferred on the nephews.
    • 21. Thus understood, it has necessarily to be held, as was held by the first appellate court, that Isher Kaur was not competent to gift away the properties in favour of the Gurdwara as she had done. Even if the gift were to be treated as valid, the donee thereunder cannot resist the claim for eviction by the legatees under the will, the nephews of Ralla Singh, on the cessation of the life estate of Isher Kaur. Admittedly, that life estate has ceased and once it is found that the plaintiff has acquired a title to the property as a legatee under the will, he would be entitled for and on behalf of himself and his brother to recover possession of the property from the Gurdwara in view of the death of Isher Kaur.”

    Note: In Tej Bhan v. Ram Kishan, 2024 INSC 945, the Apex Court referred this decision and various other decisions to a ‘larger bench for reconciling the principles laid down in various judgments of this Court and for restating the law on the interplay between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

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