Shirur Mutt and Durgah Committee Decisions-

Two important Verdicts on Art. 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India*

*^{Part I of the Blog – Secularism and Art. 25 & 26 of the Indian Constitution.}

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

It is the unique characteristic of Indian Constitution that the Government in India protects all religions and the religious practices. Unlike other secular countries like United States, which follow the principle of ‘non-interference in the matters of religion’, the secular Government in India is destined to deal with all religions equally and in a neutral manner. Yet, the Government in India will never be openly or virtually religious.

The framers of the Constitution of India positioned the heart and soul of the religious rights and freedom in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.

Shirur Mutt and Durgah Committee – Two important Decisions on Art. 25 and 26

Several enactments passed in India, pertaining to the administration of property owned by predominant religious bodies, were challenged in courts alleging that they violated the fundamental rights guaranteed in Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

Following are the two important decisions of our Apex Court that articulated and verbalized the law on Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India:

(i) The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282) – Seven Judge Bench – MC Mahajan, CJ, BK Mukherjea, , SR Das, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan, NH Bhagwati, TL Venkatarama Aiyyar.
(ii) Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (AIR 1961 SC 1402). Five Judge Bench – Gajendragadkar, CJ., Sarkar, Das Gupta, Rajagopala Ayyangar, KN Wanchoo.

Article 25 reads as under:

“25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law –
- (a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice;
- (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.
Explanation I – The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.
Explanation II – In sub clause (b) of clause reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.”

Article 26 reads as under:

“26. Freedom to manage religious affairs – Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.”

Art. 25 and 26 Allows Enactment of Laws Relating to ‘Secular’ Matters

Article 25 speaks about making law on ‘secular activity which may be associated with religious practice‘. Article 26 says as to ‘administer such property in accordance with law‘.

Article 26 proclaims, inter alia, about freedom to manage religious affairs. The principles underlying these provisions come for consideration when legislature makes law as regards the property that has been acquired, possessed or owned by religious bodies.

Doctrine of Essential Religious Practice

It is clear from the words in clause (d) of Article 26 (‘administer such property in accordance with law’) that the legislature is empowered to enact laws relating to ‘secular’ matters related to the administration of property owned by religious denominations. Laws made as above had been questioned in Shirur Mutt case and Durgah Committee case as detailed below. The doctrine of Essential Religious Practice is emerged from the analysis and synthesis of the Articles 26 and 26.

Shirur Mutt Case

In The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954) the Constitutional validity of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 passed by the Madras Legislature was challenged. It was alleged that the Act interfered with the management of the Math and its affairs by the Mathadhipati, and it conflicted with the provisions fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution in matters of religion and religious institutions belonging to particular religious denominations. It was held by our Apex Court, inter alia, as under-

(1) Protection under Article 25(1) of the Constitution extends to (all) religious ‘acts’.
(2) ‘Organizations’, ‘Sects, Sub-sects‘, etc. have the “right to manage its own affairs ” under Article 25(2).
(3)(a) “What constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself.” (Therefore the provisions of the concerned legislation was held to be bad.)
(3)(b) It is also held: Under Article 26(b), “a religious DENOMINATION or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what RITES and CEREMONIES are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters”. (Therefore the provisions of the concerned legislation was held to be bad.)

Edict of the Shirur Mutt Case

Thus, Shirur Mutt brings-to-bear that when it is necessary to make a pronouncement as to what constitutes the ESSENTIAL PART OF A RELIGION or what RITES and CEREMONIES are essential according to the tenets of the religion, the same has to be ascertained–

(i) with reference to the Doctrines of that religion itself
AND
(ii) what the DENOMINATION HELD as essential, as regards the RITES and CEREMONIES, according to the Tenets of their religion.

Shirur Mutt – Not a Case from Dispute Within the Community

It is noteworthy that in this case it was not required to record a finding – what would be the stand of the court when a dispute came within the community or denomination as to the rites and ceremonies.

Durgah Committee Case

The tomb Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti at Ajmeer, known as Durgah Khwaja Saheb, gained high reputation. In 1955 the Parliament of India enacted the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955, with regard to the administration of the tomb. Alleging violation of the fundamental rights, a Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution was filed. In Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (1961) it was held by the Apex Court, inter alia, as under

The ‘essential practices‘ of RELIGION alone is considered.
The religious practices ‘that may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs’ and ‘unessential accretions to religion’ may have to be carefully scrutinised by the COURT.

Edict of the Durgah Committee Decision

Durgah Committee brought forward application of consciousness of the Court in ‘essential religious practice’ of the RELIGION (without regard to what had been HELD by the DENOMINATION).

Durgah Committee paved a broad way, that gave wide discretion to court, when it propounded-

the court has to ‘scrutinise‘ whether religious practices are ‘sprung from merely superstitious beliefs’ or it is an ‘unessential accretions to religion’.

As indicated in Sabarimala case, the result of Durgah Committee decision is that the courts determine what are the secular practices or superstitious beliefs.

Seervai Tells – Observation in Dargah Committee Case, only an Obiter

From Dargah Committee decision, it may appear that the matters discussed in the decision – such as, what were the secular practices or what were superstitious beliefs – dwell within the domain of Courts. (That is, the yardstick would be the consciousness of Court.)

The observation in Dargah Committee case as to “…practices though religious may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense is extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself” is criticised by Seervai in his treatise ‘Constitutional Law of India’ and observed that it was only an obiter as it was “wholly unnecessary to do so”. Seervai also pointed out that ‘the above obiter runs directly counter to the judgment of Mukherjea, J. in the Shirur Mutt Case and substitutes the view of the court for the view of the denomination on what is essentially a matter of religion’.

Seervai continued as under:

“The reference to superstitious practises is singularly unfortunate, for what is ‘superstition’ to one section of the public may be a matter of fundamental religious belief to another. Thus, for nearly 300 years bequests for masses for the soul of a testator were held void as being for superstitious uses, till that view was overruled by the House of Lords in Bourne v. Keane. It is submitted that in dealing with the practise of religion protected by provisions like those contained in s. 116, Commonwealth of Australia Act or in Article 26(b) of our Constitution, it is necessary to bear in mind the observations of Latham C.J. quoted earlier, namely, that those provisions must be regarded as operating in relation to all aspects of religion, irrespective of varying opinions in the community as to the truth of a particular religious doctrine or the goodness of conduct prescribed by a particular religion or as to the propriety of any particular religious observance. The obiter of Gajendragadkar J. in the Durgah Committee case is also inconsistent with the observations of Mukherjea J. in Ratilal Gandhi Case,*^* that the decision in Jamshedji v. Soonabai afforded an indication of the measure of protection given by Article 26(b).” (quoted in Indian Young Lawyers Association Vs. State of Kerala, 2019-1 SCC 1-Indu Malhotra, J.)
*^* ^{Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388}.

It is noteworthy that in this case also, as in Shirur Mutt case, disputes that arose for consideration were not that arose within the community or denomination as regards the ‘rites and ceremonies’. It was a case that challenged an enactment passed by the Parliament of India.

All five Judges in Durgah Committee Changed their Views

All the five Judges in Durgah Committee (1961) changed their views, by two subsequent decisions, as to the ‘role of the court‘ in determining the essential religious practice; and observed that what was REGARDED by the COMMUNITY on essential religious practice was important.

In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853, it was held by a Constitution Bench (Sinha, C. J. dissenting) of five Judges (consisted of three Judges in Dargah Committee Case – A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.)
- that the protection is extend to acts done in pursuance of religion and it contains a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of religion; and
- that what constitutes an essential part of a religion or religious practice has to be decided by the courtswith reference to the doctrine of a particular religion and include practices which are REGARDED by the COMMUNITY as a part of its religion.
In the Constitution Bench decision in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. St. of Rajasthan, 1963 AIR SC 1638, Justice Gajendragadkar himself (who authored Dargah Committee Case) and two other Judges in Dargah Committee Case, K.N. Wanchoo and K.C. Das Gupta, JJ. explained, as to the enquiry on integral part of religion held as under:
- In deciding the question as to whether a given religious practice is an integral part of the religion or not, the test always would be whether it is REGARDED as such by the COMMUNITY following the religion or not.
- This question (as to essential religious practice) will always have to be decided by the Court and in doing so, the Court may have to enquire whether the practice in question is religious in character and if it is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion, and the finding of the Court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the CONSCIENCE of the COMMUNITY and the tenets of its religion.

Gajendragadkar J. Explained Essential Religious Practices in Tilkayat

Justice Gajendragadkar himself (who authored Dargah Committee Case) explained, in a subsequent decision, as to enquiry on integral part of religion in the Constitution Bench decision, in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj Vs. St. of Rajasthan (1963 AIR SC 1638) as under:

“In Shri Venkataramana Devara v. The State of Mysore, Venkatarama Aiyar, J., observed ‘that the matter of religion in Art. 26 (b) include even practices which are regarded by the community as parts of its religion’. It would thus be clear that religious practice to which Art. 25 (1) refers and affairs in matters of religion to which Art. 26 (b) refers, include practices which are an integral part of the religion itself and the protection guaranteed by Art. 25(1) and Art. 26(b) extends to such practices. In deciding the question as to whether a given religious practice is an integral part of the religion or not, the test always would be whether it is regarded as such by the community following the religion or not. This formula may in some cases present difficulties in its operation. Take the case of a practice in relation to food or dress. If in a given proceeding, one section of the community claims that while performing certain rites while dress is an integral part of the religion itself, whereas another section contends that yellow dress and not the white dress is the essential part of the religion, how is the Court going to decide the question? Similar disputes may arise in regard to food. In cases where conflicting evidence is produced in respect of rival contentions as to competing religious practices the Court may not be able to resolve the dispute by a blind application of the formula that the community decides which practice is an integral part of its religion, because the community may speak with more than one voice and the formula would, therefore, break down. This question will always have to be decided by the Court and in doing so, the Court may have to enquire whether the practice in question is religious in character and if it is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion, and the finding of the Court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the conscience of the community and the tenets of its religion. It is in the light of this possible complication which may arise in some cases that this Court struck a note of caution in the case of the Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, and observed that in order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they ‘must be -regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part ; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of Art. 25 (1).”

The Tilkayat contended in this case that the idol of Shri Shrinathji in the Nathdwara Temple and all the property pertaining to it were his private properties; and as such, the State Legislature was not competent to pass the Act.

Seervai criticised Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan also as under:

“In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji v. Rajasthan Gajendragadkar J. again adverted to the rights under Arts. 25(1) and 26(b) and stated that if a matter was obviously secular and not religious, a Court would be justified in rejecting its claim to be a religious practise, as based on irrational considerations. It is submitted that the real question is whether the religious denomination looks upon it as an essential part of its religion, and however irrational it may appear to persons who do not share that religious belief, the view of the denomination must prevail, for, it is not open to a court to describe as irrational that which is a part of a denomination’s religion. The actual decision in the case, that the right to manage the property was a secular matter, is correct, but that is because, as pointed out by Mukherjea J., Art. 26(b) when contrasted with Art. 26(c) and (d) shows that matters of religious belief and practises are distinct and separate from the management of property of a religious denomination. The distinction between religious belief and practises which cannot be controlled, and the management of the property of a religious denomination which can be controlled to a limited extent, is recognised by the Article itself and must be enforced. But this distinction is not relevant to the question whether a religious practise is itself irrational or secular.” (quoted in Indian Young Lawyers Association Vs. State of Kerala, 2019-1 SCC 1-Indu Malhotra, J.)

View of Setalvad, the Attorney General who Argued the Case

MC Setalvad the all time powerful and brave Attorney-General, who led the argument for the Government in Shirur Mutt case laid stress upon clause (2)(a) of the Article 25 and contented that all secular activities, which may be associated with religion but did not really constitute an essential part of it, were amenable to State regulation. This argument was not accepted by the Apex Court, as shown above. But, in his auto-biography, ‘My Life, Law and Other Things’, Setalvad said about the Judgments in Shirur Mut case and Ratilal Panchand Gandhi Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388, as under:

“The Judgments delivered by Justice Mukherjea, in these two cases were the first enunciation of the true scope of the provisions safeguarding religious liberty in the Indian Constitution. The exposition of the fundamental rights was comprehensive and precise, and completely in harmony with Indian practice and sentiment.
A later decision (Durgah Committee, Ajmer Vs. Syed Hussain Ali) has however sought to modify these principles . It has been said that “In order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; …… practices though religions may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself. …… the protection under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised, in other words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential and integral part of it and no other.“

Setalvad expressed his displeasure to the Durgah decision emphatically by raising the following question:

“Is the court study the religion and in its reforming zeal to weed out the superstitions from the essential practices, which are an integral part of Religion?

The distaste to Durgah decision is further demonstrated by Setalvad by giving the following answer to the above question, formulated by him, referring Mukherjea, as under:

“That would be contrary to what Justice Muhkerjea laid down: No outside authority had any right to say that those religious practices and performances were not an essential part of religion.”

Reflections of Justice Gajendragadkar in his Autobiography

It is interesting to note what was the reflection of Justice Gajendragadkar in his Autobiography, “To the Best of My Memory” as to the ‘role of the court‘ in determining the essential religious practice.

Justice Gajendragadkar pointed out that the finding was needed when disputes came as to religious practices and other matters, and said that ‘the finding of the court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the conscience of the community and the tenets of its religion’.

Justice Gajendragadkar speaks as under:

“Similarly under Article 26, one of the questions which agitated public opinion was in respect of the meaning of the expression “matters of religion” under Article 26 (b) and “religious practices” under Article 25(2)(a). The earlier trend of the Supreme Court judgments was that religious practices and matters of religion have to be decided in the light of the opinion of the community and not by the court. This view meant that, in case a controversy arose between the parties in regard to the meaning of these two expressions, in deciding “whether a given religious practice is an integral part of the religion or not, the test always would be whether it is regarded as such by the community following the religion or not”. This view however was dissented from by the court in two decisions^**^* in both of which I spoke for the unanimous court. We held that where a dispute arises as to what is the religious practice or what are matters of religion, the question will always have to be decided by the court. In doing so, the court may have to enquire whether the practice in question is religious in character and, if it is, can it be regarded as an integral and essential part of the religion? The finding of the court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the conscience of the community and the tenets of its religion.”
- ^**^* ^{(i) Durga Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussein Ali, (1962) SCR 353.}
- ^{(ii) Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v, The State of Rajasthan, (1964) SCR 561,620,623.}

Sabarimala Case Pointed out – Apparent Conflict is on Role of the Court

In the Sabarimala review-reference (to higher Bench) Judgment, Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, 2020-2 SCC 1, it is pointed out that there is apparent conflict between the Shirur Mutt Case and Durgah Committee Case, on the ‘Role of the Court’.

It is observed –
- Seven Judges bench of the Apex Court, in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt (Shirur Mutt), held that what were essential religious practices of a particular religious denomination should be left to be determined by the denomination itself.
- The subsequent Five Judges bench in Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali carved out a role for the court in this regard to exclude what the courts determine to be secular practices or superstitious beliefs.
- Both these decisions ‘seem to be in apparent conflict‘.
- It requires consideration by a larger Bench.

End Notes

The law handed down by the Supreme Court in these two rulings are divergent, mainly, in three material parts. They are:

1. Whether protection is limited to practices that are ESSENTIAL and INTEGRAL part of religion (as held in Durgah)?	Do Article 25 and 26 that give right ‘to manage its own affairs in matters of religion’ and freedom to ‘practice of religion’ protect (all) ‘Acts Done in pursuance of a religion (as held in Shirur Mutt)?
2. When it is necessary to make a pronouncement as to what constitutes the essential part of a RELIGION, can it be scrutinised by the COURT so as to eschew what are sprung from merely superstitious beliefs’ or ‘unessential accretions to religion’ (as held in Durgah)?	Is it to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If it is necessary to to make a pronouncement as to what RITES and CEREMONIES are essential to a DENOMINATION, is it to be left to be determined with reference to the decisions (and practices) of that denomination itself (as held in Shirur Mutt)?
3. Whether the Protection is limited to ESSENTIAL and INTEGRAL part of ‘RELIGION’ in a strict sense (as held in Durgah)?	Whether it Extends to Religious practices of Denomination/Section, ‘Organization’, ‘Sect, Sub-sect‘, etc. (as held in Shirur Mutt)? Whether freedom of religion is guaranteed to all practices, except that which run counter to public order, health and morality? A Religion or any section thereof hold the fundamental right to‘manage its own affairs’ (which no legislature can take away) and enjoy complete autonomy (so that no outside authority has any jurisdiction).

The findings of the Apex Court, in Shirur Mutt and Durgah Committee cases, on Article 25 and 26, are as follows:

Durgah Committee (1961) Five Judge Bench. (Author: Gajendragadkar, J.)	Shirur Mutt (1954) Seven Judge Bench. (Author: BK Mukherjea, J.)
1. The rights protected are limited to practices of ‘RELIGION’ in a strict sense. “Unless such practices arefound to constitute an essential and integral part of a RELIGION their claim for the protection under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised. In other words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential and an integral part of it (RELIGION) and no other.“ “If these practises were found to be purely secular practices or mere practices sprung from ‘superstitious beliefs and may in that sense is extraneous and UNESSENTIAL accretions to RELIGION’ the State was free to enact laws on such matters.“	Extends to religious DENOMINATION or a SECTION THEREOF, and includes ‘Organization‘, ‘Sects, Sub-sects‘, etc. “After Sankara, … religious teachers … founded the different sects and sub-sects …. Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination …” “The word ‘’denomination’ … mean … a religious sect or body ….” “If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food … be regarded as parts of religion. “A religious denomination or organization enjoys complete autonomy …” “There could be other affairs of .. denomination or a section thereof .. not matters of religion … guarantee given ….” [In Sardar Syedna Taher Saiffuddin Saheb Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853, “Community” is considered.]
2. COURT determines “Unless such practices are found to constitute an essential and integral part of a RELIGION their claim for the protection under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential and an integral part of it and no other.” (That is, court determines and ‘carefully scrutinises’. That is, there is scope for the court to apply its own conscience.) Note: This proposition is not followed in (i) Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj Vs. St. of Rajasthan, 1963AIR SC 1638, authored by Gajendragadkar, J himself; (ii) Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853, Authored by BP Sinha.	It is found in this decision: “What are essential religious practices of a particular religious denomination should be left to be determined by the denomination itself” (So observed in Sabarimala Reference decision). What rites and ceremonies are essential –No outside authority has any jurisdiction. “What constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself.” “A religious denomination or organization enjoys COMPLETE AUTONOMY in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters.” “The ‘right to manage its own affairs in matters’ of religion “is a fundamental right which no legislature can take away“.
3. The rights protected are limited to such RELIGIOUS PRACTICES as are ESSENTIAL and INTEGRAL part of religion and no other. “Unless such practices are found to constitute an essential and integral part of a RELIGION their claim for the protection under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential and an integral part of it and no other.” Note: This proposition is not followed in (i) Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj Vs. St. of Rajasthan, 1963 AIR SC 1638 [Held: The Court may have to enquire whether the practice in question is religious in character and if it is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion]; (ii) Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853 [Held: Include practices which are regarded by the COMMUNITY as a part of its religion].	The rights protected are extended to (ALL) ACTS DONE IN PURSUANCE OF A RELIGION. “Our Constitution not only protects the freedom of religious opinion but it protects also acts done in pursuance of a religion and this is made clear by the use of the expression ‘practice of religion‘. “The contention in broad terms that all secular activities (which may be associated with religion) which do not really constitute an essential part of it, are amenable to State regulation cannot be supported.” “If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or ablations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of them are religious practices and should be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of article 26(b).”
4. Not refer to public order, health and morality “Unless such practices are foundto constitute an ESSENTIAL and INTEGRAL part of a RELIGION their claim for the protection under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised.” (That is, emphasis is given to (i) ESSENTIAL and integral part of a RELIGION and (ii) assigns serious ROLE FOR THE COURT.)	Extends to (ALL) PRACTICES except when they do not run counter to public order, health and morality “What article 25(2)(a) contemplates is not regulation by the State of religious practices as such, the freedom of which is guaranteed by the Constitution except when they run counter to public order, health and morality, but regulation of activities which are economic, commercial or political in their character though they are associated with religious practices.” “There could be other affairs ofa religious denomination or a section thereof which are not matters of religion and to which the guarantee given by this clause would not apply.”

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Shirur Mutt and Durgah Committee Decisions-

Two important Verdicts on Art. 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India*

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Two important Verdicts on Art. 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India*

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