Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Part I

Legal Persons

‘Persons’ are of two kinds: human beings and legal persons. The second class is the institutions and associations of persons upon which the law incorporates or attributes legal personality. They are formed either on registration under a statute like Companies Act, or under a particular enactment such as English East India Company, Municipal Corporations, Life Insurance Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, etc. Apart from companies, corporations etc. our system accept idols in temples also as legal persons. 

Salmond reads:

  • “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases. Those which are actually recognised by our own system, however, are of comparatively few types. Corporations are undoubtedly legal persons, and the better view is that registered trade unions and friendly societies are also legal persons though not verbally regarded as corporations.”(Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., Page 305).

Though the legal personality of an unregistered association may not be a matter in dispute, the legal status of registered associations under Societies Registration Act remained as a potential question for quite long time. 


Part II

Idol as Representing “Pious Purpose” of Donor Is the Juristic Person

The Supreme Court, in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das, concluded the rationale of conferring legal personality to Idol as under:

  • “123. The recognition of the Hindu Idol as a legal or ‘juristic’ person is therefore based on two premises employed by courts. The first is to recognise the pious purpose of the testator as a legal entity capable of holding property in an ideal sense (absent the creation of a trust-sic). The second is the merging of the pious purpose itself and the Idol which embodies the pious purpose to ensure the fulfillment of the pious purpose. So conceived, the Hindu Idol is a legal person. The property endowed to the pious purpose is owned by the Idol as a legal person in an ideal sense. The reason why the court created such legal fictions was to provide a comprehensible legal framework to protect the properties dedicated to the pious purpose from external threats as well as internal maladministration. Where the pious purpose necessitated a public trust for the benefit of all devotees, conferring legal personality allowed courts to protect the pious purpose for the benefit of the devotees.”

Idol is the Embodiment of Pious Purpose

Relying mainly upon one of the oldest decisions in this subject, Manohar Ganesh Tambekar  Vs.  Lakhmiram (1887), ILR (1888) 12 Bom 247, our Apex Court held in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that juristic personality could not be conferred upon Ram Janmabhumi.  It is held as under:

  • “138. …The decision (Manohar Ganesh Tambekar  Vs.  Lakhmiram) clarifies that an Idol as a juridical person is the ‘ideal embodiment’ of a pious or benevolent idea. The status of a juristic person was conferred on the Idol as an entity which encompasses the purpose itself in which capacity the properties and offerings vest. The observations in this case affirm the position that juridical personality was conferred on the pious purpose and the property endowed or accumulated did not itself become a juristic entity. It is not the property endowed which is a juridical person – it is the Idol which as an embodiment of a pious purpose which is recognised as a juristic person, in whom the property stands vested.”

Intention of Founder stand Constant and Definite

A temple is founded on dedication of property and consecration of an Idol to indwell and reign. These intends of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the worshippers or their ardency.  (It stands contradistinct to the worship of Muslims in a mosque and of Christians in a church.)

Courts Recognises ‘Legal Personality’ to Idol to Give Effect to the Dedication

The Supreme Court observed in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case: 2020-1 SCC 1) that courts recognised the legal personality of the Hindu Idol to give effect to the dedication of the founder of the endowment. The ‘recognition of juristic personality’ was ‘devised by the courts to give legal effect to the Hindu practice of dedicating property for a religious or ‘pious’ purpose’. When the founder was not alive and the shebait was not the owner of the lands, the courts (and through them, the State) give effect to the original dedication conferring the legal personality to the idol. The legal personality of the idol, and the rights of the idol over the property endowed and the offerings of devotees, are guarded by the law to (a) protect the endowment against mal-administration by the human agencies entrusted with the day to day management of the idol,and (b) protect the interests of devotees. It was also found that legal rights entitled to by the idol was not dependent on the existence of an express trust.

Doctrine on ‘Merger’ – ‘Entity of the Idol’ Is Linked With ‘Pious Purpose’

It is pointed out in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that, as established in earlier decisions, neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law; and it is not correct that the idol or image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated. Juristic personality of an Idol stands connected to the ‘pious purpose’ of the founder. Therefore, to give a logical proposition as to the ‘juristic personality’ of idol, the ‘entity of the idol’ has to be linked with the ‘pious purpose’. 

It is obvious that the Court brings-forth the doctrine of “merger” based on the following well accepted jurisprudential notions:

  1. Legal entity of an idol is conceived only in an ideal sense.
  2. The idol is chosen as the centre for legal relations.
  3. Idol is the embodiment of the pious purpose of its founder.
  4. A material object that represents a ‘purpose’ can be a legal person.

The Supreme Court, in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1), quoted the following from Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1969): AIR 1969 SC 1089:

  • “6. …It should however be remembered that the juristic person in the idol is not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that the image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated and vivified by the Pran Pratishta ceremony. It is not also correct that the Supreme Being of which the idol is a symbol or image is the recipient and owner of the dedicated property.
  • …The correct legal position is that the idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests. As observed by Mr. Justice B.K. Mukherjea:
    • “With regard to the debutter… It is not only a compendious expression but a material embodiment of the pious purpose and though there is difficulty in holding that property can reside in the aim or purpose itself, it would be quite consistent with sound principles of Jurisprudence to say that a material object which represents or symbolises a particular purpose can be given the status of a legal person, and regarded as owner of the property which is dedicated to it. … The legal position is comparable in many respects to the development in Roman Law.”

Beneficiaries of Endowments Are Not Idols but Worshippers

The Supreme Court, in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya case: 2020-1 SCC 1), quoted the following from Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar (1957): AIR 1957 SC 133:  

  • “6. …The true purpose of a gift of properties to the idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship. In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v Ram Lal Maitra (1910) it was held on a consideration of these and other texts that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a ‘sentient being‘, and that the dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment of the owner of his dominion over them for the purpose of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J at p. 138 that “the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected” and that “the dedication to a deity” may be “a compendious expression of the pious purpose for which the dedication is designed”.
  • 7. When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof.”

Destruction of Idol Does Not Affect Legal Personality

Our Apex Court, explained in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) further as under:  

  • “127. … In the case of Hindu idols, legal personality is not conferred on the idol simpliciter but on the underlying pious purpose of the continued worship of the deity as incarnated in the idol. Where the legal personality is conferred on the purpose of a deity’s continued worship, moving or destroying the idol does not affect its legal personality. The legal personality vests in the purpose of continued worship of the idol as recognised by the court. It is for the protection of the continued worship that the law recognises this purpose and seeks to protect it by the conferral of juristic personality.”

Part III

Sri Guru Granth Sahib – Accepted as a Juristic Person

Guru Granth Sahib revered in a Gurudwara, has been held to be a juristic person by the Supreme Court in Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass, AIR 2000 SC 1421. The Apex Court explained that it was not necessary to equate Guru Granth Sahib with an Idol, for declaring it to be a juristic person. When belief and faith of two religions are different, there is no question of equating one with the other. In this case the Apex Court held that Guru Granth Sahib possessed all the qualities to be recognised as a Juristic Person; and observed that holding otherwise would be giving ‘too restrictive a meaning to a ‘juristic person’ and that would erase the very jurisprudence which gave birth to it’.

In Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee it was observed further that ‘installation’ of ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ was the nucleus of any Gurudwara; and that  without ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ the Gurudwara was only a building, and that therefore, ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ could be regarded as a juristic person. One of the reasons based on which Guru Grandh Sahib was not treated as a juristic person by the High Court was that if Guru Grandh Sahib was regarded as a juristic person, every copy of the same should also be regarded as a juristic person. In this context the Apex Court observed that an Idol became a juristic person only when it was consecrated and installed in a public place for the public at large. In other words, the emphasis was on the ‘installation’ of ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ for the benefit of the public at large.

It is held in Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee Amritsar v. Shri Som Nath Dass (AIR 2000 SC 1421) as under:

  • “There may be an endowment for a pious or religious purpose. It may be for an idol, mosque, church etc.. Such endowed property has to be used for that purpose. The installation and adoration of an idol or any image by a Hindu denoting any god is merely a mode through which his faith and belief is satisfied. This has led to the recognition of an idol as a juristic person.
  • In Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar & Ors, AIR 1957 SC 137, this Court held:
    • In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha Vs. Ram Lal Maitra, ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), it was held on a consideration of these and other text that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a sentient being, and that dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment by the owner of his demoinion over them for the purpoe of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J. at p. 138 that the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected and that the dedication to a deity may be a compendious expression of the pious purposes for which the deciation is designed. Vide also the observations of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at p. 155. In Hindu Relgious Endowments Board V. Veeraraghavacharlu, AIR 1937 Mad 750 (G), Varadachariar J. dealing with this question, referred to the decision in ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), and observed:
    • As explained in the case, that purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner. This is the sense in which a temple and its endowments are regarded as a public trust.
  • In Som Prakash Rekhi Vs. Union of India & Anr., 1981 (1) SCC 449, this Court held that a legal person is any entity other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. It was stated: Let us be clear that the jurisprudence bearing on corporations is not myth but reality. What we mean is that corporate personality is a reality and not an illusion or fictitious construction of the law. It is a legal person. Indeed, a legal person is any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of personalityis one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination. Corporations are one species of legal persons invented by the law and invested with a variety of attributes so as to achieve certain purposes sanctioned by the law.
  • This Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, 1969 (1) SCC 555, held that the consecrated idol in a Hindu temple is a juristic person and approved the observation of West J. in the following passage made in Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakshmiram, ILR 12 Bom 247;
    • The Hindu Law, like the Roman Law and those dervied from it, recognises not only incorporate bodies with rights of property vested in the Corporation apart from its individual members but also juridical persons called foundations. A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may according to his law express his purpose and endow it and the ruler will give effect to the bounty or at least, protect it so far at any rate as is consistent with his own Dharma or conception or morality. A trust is not required for the purpose; the necessity of a trust in such a case is indeed a peculiarity and a modern peculiarity of the English Law. In early law a gift placed as it was expressed on the altar of God, sufficed it to convey to the Church the lands thus dedicated. It is consistent with the grants having been made to the juridical person symbolised or personified in the idol. {Emphasis supplied} Thus, a trust is not necessary in Hindu Law though it may be required under English Law.
  • In fact, there is a direct ruling of this Court on the crucial point. In Pritam Dass Mahant Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1984 (2) SCC 600, with reference to a case under Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 this Court held that the central body of worship in a Gurdwara is Guru Granth Sahib, the holy book, is a Juristic entity. It was held:
    • From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the sine qua non for an institution being a Sikh gurdwara is that there should be established Guru Granth Sahib and the worship of the same by the congregation, and a Nishan Sahib as indicated in the earlier part of the judgment. There may be other rooms of the institution meant for other purposes but the crucial test is the existence of Guru Granth sahib and the worship thereof by the congregation and Nishan Sahib.
  • Tracing the ten Sikh gurus it records:
    • They were ten in number each remaining faithful to the teachings of Guru Nanak, the first Guru and when their line was ended by a conscious decision of Guru Gobind Singh, the last Guru, succession was invested in a collection of teachings which was given the title of Guru Granth Sahib. This is now the Guru of the Sikhs.
    • xx xx
    • he holiest book of the Sikhs is Guru Granth Sahib compiled by the Fifth Master, Guru Arjan. It is the Bible of Sikhs. After giving his followers a central place of worship, Hari-Mandir, he wanted to give them a holy book. So he collected the hymns of the first four Gurus and to these he added his own. Now this Sri Guru Granth Sahib is a living Guru of the Sikhs. Guru means the guide. Guru Granth Sahib gives light and shows the path to the suffering humanity. Where a believer in Sikhism is in trouble or is depressed he reads hymns from the Granth.”

The Supreme Court held as under:

  • “Thus, we unhesitantly hold Guru Granth Sahib to be a Juristic Person.”

Part IV

Mosque and Juristic Personality

Muslims worship the God Almighty. It is difficult to pin-point a tangible-nucleus or a core-element for a Mosque (as in the case of Gurugrantha Sahib in a Gurudwara or an Idol in a temple) so as to clinch the legal personality upon (See: Shriomani Gurudwara  Vs.   Shri Som Nath Dass: AIR 2000 SC 1421). 

For Muslims, worship in accordance with the tenets is important.  (It stands contradistinct to dedication and worship in a temple. A temple is founded on dedication of property, and consecration of an Idol to indwell and reign. These intends of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the worshippers or their ardency.)

In ‘Law of Endowments (Hindu and Mohammedan)’ by A. Ghosh Quoted in: Mahmood Hussain Vs. State Of UP:  2018-10 ADJ 249; 2018-128 All LR 71 with respect to ‘Mosque’as under:

  •  “A Mosque does not belong to any particular sect; for once it is built and consecrated, any reservation for people of a particular locality or sect is void, and persons not belonging to that locality or sect are entitled to worship in it, whether or not any particular sect had contributed towards the site or the building of the Mosque and had been saying their prayers in it and every person who believes in the unity of God and the mission of Mahammad as a prophet is a Mussalman, to whatever sect he may belong, and that the Shias satisfy the test; and that there is no such thing as a Sunni or a Shia Mosque though the majority of the worshippers at any particular Mosque may belong to one or other sect either generally or at various times.”

It is also added that in Mahomedan law there cannot be any private Mosque. When once a place is dedicated to be a Mosque, it becomes public property, it is property of God. But, it is pointed out that‘there can be right of exclusion in case of Mosques belonging to a particular sect’.

The Privy Council, in Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 PC 116, neither supported nor rejected the view that a mosque is a legal person, though it observed that ‘the argument that the land and buildings of a mosque are not property at all because they are a ‘juristic person’ involves a number of misconceptions’. The Privy Council specifically held as under:

  • “A gift can be made to a madrasah in like manner as to a masjid. The right of suit by the Mutawali or other manager or by any  person entitled to a benefit (whether individually or as a member of the public or merely in common with certain other persons) seems hitherto to have been found sufficient for the purpose of maintaining Mahomedan endowments. At best the institution is but a caput mortum, and some human agency is always required to take delivery of property and to apply it to the intended purposes. Their Lordships, with all respect to the High Court of Lahore, must not be taken as deciding that a ‘juristic personality’ may be extended for any purpose to Muslim institutions generally or to mosques in particular. On this general question they reserve their opinion.”

Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case – 2020-1 SCC 1

In Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Som Nath Dass, AIR 2000 SC 1421, the Supreme Court had (earlier) observed that it was held in ,  AIR 1940 P C 116, that a mosque was a juristic person.

After analysing, in detail, the same decision , Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 P C 116,  the Supreme Court affirmed in M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that the Privy Council ‘rejected’ the contention that a mosque was a juristic person. It is observed as under:

  • 195. This distinction, which highlights the features of immovable property received articulation by the Privy Council in The Mosque, Masjid Shahid Ganj v Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar. AIR 1940 PC 116. In that case, a mosque was dedicated in 1722 by one Falak Beg Khan. By the deed of dedication, Sheikh Din Mohammad and his descendants were appointed as Mutawallis. Since 1762, however, the building together with the court-yard, well and adjacent land, was in the occupation and possession of the Sikhs. The land adjacent to the mosque became the site of a Sikh shrine. At the time of the annexation by the British in 1849, the Sikhs were in possession of both the mosque and the adjacent lands.
  • 196. Thereafter, the building was demolished ‘by or with the connivance of its Sikh custodians’. A suit was instituted in 1935 against Shiromani Gurdawara Parbandhak Committee – who were in possession of the disputed property, seeking a declaration that the building was a mosque in which the plaintiffs and all the followers of Islam had a right to worship along with a mandatory injunction to reconstruct the building. One of the 18 plaintiffs was the mosque itself – the site and the building. The Privy Council assessed the contention that the mosque and the adjoining properties were a juristic person. Rejecting the contention, Justice George Rankin held:
    • “The argument that the land and buildings of a mosque are not property at all because they are a ‘juristic person’ involves a number of misconceptions. It is wholly inconsistent with many decisions whereby a worshipper or the mutwalli has been permitted to maintain a suit to recover the land and buildings for the purposes of the wakf by ejectment of a trespasser…
    • That there should be any supposed analogy between the position in law of a building dedicated as a place of prayer for Muslims and the individual deities of the Hindu religion is a matter of some surprise to their Lordships… the procedure in India takes account necessarily of the polytheistic and other features of the Hindu religion and recognizes certain doctrines of Hindu law as essential thereto, e.g. that an idol may be the owner of property…
    • The decisions recognising a mosque as a ‘juristic person’ appear to be confined to the Punjab : 153 PR 1884; Shankar Das v. Said Ahmad (1884) 153 PR 1884 59 PR 1914; Maula Bux v. Hafizuddin (1926) 13 AIR Lah 372: AIR 1926 Lah 372.
    • 6 In none of those cases was a mosque party to the suit, and in none except perhaps the last is the fictitious personality attributed to the mosque as a matter of decision. But so far as they go these cases support the recognition as a fictitious person of a mosque as an institution – apparently hypostatizing an abstraction. This, as the learned Chief Justice in the present case has pointed out, is very different from conferring personality upon a building so as to deprive it of its character as immovable property.” (Emphasis supplied)
  • 197. The Privy Council noted that if the mosque was a juristic person, this may mean that limitation does not apply to it and that ‘it is not property but an owner of property.’ Underlying the line of reasoning adopted by the Privy Council is that the conferral of legal personality on immovable property could lead to the property losing its character as immoveable property. “

In para 421 it is pointed out as under:

  • “421. In The Mosque, Masjid Shahid Ganj v Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar AIR 1940 PC 116, the Privy Council considered whether a mosque can be considered a juristic person and can be subject to adverse possession. Sir George Rankin observed:
    •  “That there should be any supposed analogy between the position in law of a building dedicated as a place of prayer for Muslims and the individual deities of the Hindu religion is a matter of some surprise to their Lordships. The question whether a British Indian Court will recognise a mosque as having a locus standi in judicio is a question of procedure. In British India the Courts do not follow the Mahomedan law in matters of procedure [cf. Jafri Begum v. Amir Muhammad Khan [I.L.R. 7 All. 822 at pp. 841, 842 (1885).], per Mahmood, J.] any more than they apply the Mahomedan criminal law of the ancient Mahomedan rules of evidence. At the same time the procedure of the Courts in applying Hindu or Mahomedan law has to be appropriate to the laws which they apply. Thus the procedure in India takes account, necessarily, of the polytheistic and other features of the Hindu religion and recognises certain doctrines of Hindu law as essential thereto, e.g., that an idol may be the owner of property. The procedure of our Courts allows for a suit in the name of an idol or deity though the right of suit is really in the sebait [Jagadindranath v. Hemmta Kumari [L.R. 31 I.A. 203: s.c. 8 C.W.N. 609 (1605).] ]. Very considerable difficulties attend these doctrines—in particular as regards the distinction, if any, proper to be made between the deity and the image [cf. Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lal [I.L.R. 37 Cal. 128, 153: s.c. 14 C.W.N. 18 (1910).] , Golapchandra Sarkar, Sastri’s ‘Hindu Law’,  7th Ed., pp. 865 et seq.]. But there has never been any doubt that the property of a Hindu religious endowment— including a thakurbari—is subject to the law of limitation [Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das [L.R. 37 I.A. 147 : s.c. 14 C.W.N. 889 (1810).] and Sri Sri Iswari Bhubaneshwari Thakurani v. Brojo Nath Dey [L.R. 64 I.A. 203 : s.c. 41 C.W.N. 968 (1937).] ]. From these considerations special to Hindu law no general licence can be derived for the invention of fictitious persons…” (Emphasis supplied).
  • It was concluded thus:
    • The property now in question having been possessed by Sikhs adversely to the waqf and to all interests thereunder for more than 12 years, the right of the mutawali to possession for the purposes of the waqf came to an end under Art. 144 of the Limitation Act and the title derived under the dedication from the settlor or wakif became extinct under sec. 28. The property was no longer, for any of the purposes of British Indian Courts, ―a property of God by the advantage of it resulting to his creatures…”

The Rajasthan High Court in Mohamed Shafindeen Vs. Chatur Bhaj (1958), 1958 Raj. LW 461 definitely held that mosque was not a juristic person. A similar view was taken by various High Courts including the Madras High Courtin Sunnath Jamath Mosque Committee, Puliampatti Vs. Land Administration Commissioner, 1998 (1) LW 69 (See also: Babu Vs. Khudial Qayum: 2013 0 ACJ 1614; 2013 8 ADJ 259; 2013 99 AllLR 123; 2013 2 ARC 839), and Gauhatti High Court in Sahida Khatun  Vs. Secretary, Tezpur Hindustani Muslim Panchayat, 2000 3 GauLJ 485; 2000 3 GauLT 152 .

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

It is trite law that dedicated property of a temple will be vested with the idol as the legal owner thereof, though such vesting is qualified to be in an ‘ideal or secondary sense’ (Bhupathi Nath v. Ramlal Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128) and the possession and management thereof will be with some human being identified as Shebait or Manager, though in the strict legal sense, they cannot be accepted as trustees.

In Wali Mohammed v. Rahmat Bee, (1999- 3 SCC 145), to the question whether the Mutawalli of a Wakf would be a trustee, our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “35. It will be seen that the main part of Sec. 10 (Limitation Act) states that no period of limitation applies for recovery of property from a trustee in whom the property is vested for a specific purpose, unless such a person is an assignee for valuable consideration. The Explanation further states that it shall be deemed that a person managing the property of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is to be deemed to be a trustee in whom such property has vested for a specific purpose. We shall explain these provisions in some detail.
  • 36. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] the Privy Council held that property comprised in a Hindu or Mohammedan religious or charitable endowment was not property vested in trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of the said words in the main section. The reason was that according to the customary law, where property was dedicated to a Hindu idol or mutt or to a Mohammedan wakf, the property vested in the idol or the institution or God, as the case may be, directly and that the shebait, mahant, mutawalli or other person who was in charge of the institution was simply a manager on behalf of the institution. As Sec. 10 did not apply unless these persons were trustees this judgment made recovery of properties of the above trusts from donees, from these managers, rather difficult.
  • 37. The legislature therefore intervened and amended Sec. 10 for the purpose of getting over the effect of the above judgment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill of 1929 makes this clear. It says: “The (Civil Justice) Committee’s recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] and Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das Aurora [(1922) 50 IA 84] which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutawalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Mohammedan religious endowment is vested, are not trustees within the meaning of the words as used in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in them. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person, not being an assignee for valuable consideration, endowments of this nature are not protected. The Committee’s recommendation is that Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Mohammedan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee.” (Quoted in: Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482).

In Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482, the Apex Court held that the Mutawalli is not a trustee in its true sense. The Supreme Court formulated a crucial question and answered it as under:

  • “127. Thus, the Mutawalli is treated as a trustee. But would the amendment made to Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make a Mutawalli a trustee generally?
  • Our answer is an emphatic No. This is for the reason that the change in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act was effected to overcome the judgment of the Privy Council, when it held that a Mutawalli would not be a trustee and when in view of the requirement in Sec. 10 that the suit must be one against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose and as a Mutawalli would not be a trustee in law per se, the legislature brought in the explanation. But what is striking are two features. Firstly, the change is brought by way of an Explanation. More importantly, the explanation begins with words “For the purpose of this section  and proceeds to declare that “any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be properly vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”

Therefore, apart from it being an Explanation, it also on its very terms, limits the deeming fiction to the purpose sought to be attained in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act.”


Part V

Legal personality of Churches

Halbury’s Laws of England,[1] gives the meaning of ‘Church’, as under:

  • “Church, when used in relation to a religious body, has two distinct meanings; it may mean either the aggregate of the individual members of the church or it may mean the quasi-corporate institution which carries on the religious work of the denomination whose name it bears.”

Blacks Law Dictionary defines church as under:

  • “Church. In its most general sense, the religious society founded and established by Jesus Christ, to receive, preserve, and propagate His doctrines and ordinances. It may also mean a body of communicants gathered into church order; body or community of Christians, united under one form of government by the profession of the same faith andthe observance of the same ritual and ceremonies; place where persons regularly assemble for worship; congregation; organization for religious purposes; religious society or body; the clergy or officialdom of a religious body.”

In the New International Bible Dictionary, Church is defined as under:

  • “Church. The English word derives from the Greek Kuriakos (belonging to the Lord), but it stands for another Greek word ekklesia (where “ecclesiastical’), denoting an assembly. This is used in its general sense in Acts 19:32, but had already been applied in the LXX as an equivalent for the “congregation” of the OT Stephen’s speech makes this equation (Acts 7:38), and in this sense it is adopted to describe the new gathering or congregation of the disciples of Jesus Christ”.

Juristic Personality of churches: Why Law Hesitates?

The ‘church’ being essentially associated with believers, and it is possessed with an endowment (church-building), technically, it can be recognised as a legal person. Salmond has emphasised that the law may attribute legal personality to a group of individuals; or, if it pleases (i.e. if it stands well-accepted), regard an institution also, as a legal person. But, our legal system does not uniformly accept church as a legal person. Following the Privy Council decision, Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar,[2]  the Supreme Court observed in M. Siddiq (Ayodhya Case) [3]  that a mosque is not a juristic person. The same principles apply to churches also. (See notes above – Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case.)

The following are the apparent reasons:

  • It is difficult to point out a tangible-nucleus[4] as Gurugrantha Sahib or Idol,for a church (building), to clinch the juristic personality upon. In this respect a church resembles Mosque. Christians also worship the invisible God Almighty.
  • As in the case of Muslims, for Christians also, worship is important, rather than the place where they worship. As pointed out earlier, juristic personality is conferred to the idol for its‘identity’on installation.The intentions of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the ardency of the worshippers.
  • Christians join together in churches in accordance with the divine command:
    • “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, I am there in the midst of them” (Mathew 18: 20).
  • The Bible elsewhere (Acts 17: 24) expresses the point more emphatically, as under:
    • “God that made the world and all things therein, since he is the Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands”

Are Churches and Dioceses Juridic persons it being so accepted in Canon Law

As shown by Salmond[5] and explained by the Supreme Court in Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass,[6] the law may, if it pleases, regard a church, a hospital, a university or a library as a legal person.

In James Chinnamma v. Joseph Abraham, ILR 1962-1 Ker 591; 1962 KLT 240, referring ‘Civil Ecclesiastical Law’ by Jerome A. Saldanha, it was pointed out that the provisions of canon depicted the diocese and church as legal or moral persons; without recording a definite finding on this point it was held by the High Court that there was no “legal impediment” to treat the parish church as a legal person. It was held that it could claim to be an ‘agriculturist’, inasmuch as the church was capable of holding property (of course, acting through human agency). The judge considered the postulation whether the church could be a voluntary association. It also referred to the theory that the church was under the authority of a corporation-sole, either Vicar or Bishop. It was pointed out that so long as the church retains the status of a Roman Catholic Church, the Diocesan Bishop alone would have the right in both the spiritual and the temporal matters in respect of the church and its property. (This decision is referred to in: Daisy AP  v. Bishop Dr.  Thomas Mar Koorilose, 2015-5 KHC 914; 2016-1 KLT 268).

In Seline Fernandez v. Bernard Francis, ILR 2013-1 Ker 56; 2012-4 KHC 427; 2012-4 KLT 283, it is held that on examining the Canon as a whole, what is discernible is that the temporal goods belonging to a parish which, by law, is a public juridic person do not belong to the diocese. It is observed in Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan (2016  AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51), also that a (parish) church is a legal person.

But, in M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case – 2020-1 SCC 1) our apex Court held that Mosque is not a legal person. The Apex Court rejected the the contention that mosque was held to be a juristic person by the Privy Council in Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 P C 116. In the light of the Supreme Court decision on Mosque, legally it is difficult to support the the view that churches are juristic persons.

Law may, if it pleases‘ (i.e. if it stands well-accepted) being the basis for determining a body or entity as a legal person, it is definite that the dioceses can never be treated as a juridic persons even though the Canon declares so.

Even if a (parish) church can be taken as comparable to a temple or Gurudwara (temple and Gurudwara are accepted by our law as juristic persons), a Diocese can never be taken as a juristic person; especially in the light of our Apex Court decision, Illachi Devi v. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397, which authoritatively held that even a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  Parish churches and trusts created for the benefit of a Church are public religious trusts (as detailed below).

As detailed in the notes below (under the heading – Juristic Personality in Canon), merely because Cannon law declares a church or a diocese as a legal person, it should not be assumed that the courts are bound by the assertion. It is a jurisprudential issue reigned by the common law. In the light of the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School (AIR 1958 MP 362) M. Hidayatullah, J. observed as under:

  • “In matters of property there is always a secular angle which is supplied by the law of the country, and that no religious denomination can make a law about its own property and thus nullify the law of the land.”

In the light of this decision it is illogical to go deep to search an authority to see whether the church or diocese is a legal person for it is so described in the Canon.

Churches are Usually Arrayed as Parties to Suits

Now, we see that our courts including the Supreme Court and High Courts make pronouncements with respect to matters of churches wherein they are arrayed as parties (represented by vicars, trustees etc.). But, when this matter is raised as a specific legal point, the opinion of courts are different.

As stated above, the Kerala High Court, in James Chinnamma Vs.  Joseph Abraham[7], while considering a question whether a Catholic church can claim to be ‘an agriculturist’ under a Debt Relief Act, it was observed that there was no ‘legal impediment’ in treating the church as a person.

It is also noteworthy that after analysing, in detail, Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 PC 116,  the Supreme Court affirmed in M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that the Privy Council ‘rejected’ the contention that a mosque was a juristic person. (See notes above – Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case.)

Church: Voluntary Association

Congregation of a church is a voluntary association in the eye of law.[8] The properties are also really vested with the congregation subject to the Bylaws or Cannons.

A Division Bench of Madras High Court in Gaspari Louis Vs. Gonsalves[9] pointed out that the Roman Catholic Church was described as a voluntary association in the English cases.

Catholic Church differs from the Church of England which is described as ‘established church’. Relying on the cases, Long Vs. The Bishop of Cape Town[10] and Merriman Vs. Williams,[11]it was observed in Gaspari Louis Vs. Gonsalves that the members who joined the church were ‘bound by any rules which it had framed for its internal discipline and for the management of its affairs’.

The Supreme Court held in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma[12] as under:

  • “A church is formed by the voluntary association of individuals. And the churches in the commonwealth are voluntary body organised on a consensual basis – their rights apart from statutes will be protected by the courts and their discipline enforced exactly as in the case of any other voluntary body whose existence is legally recognised. Therefore, all religious bodies are regarded by courts of law in the same position in respect of the protection of their rights and the sanction given to their respective organisations.”

ED Devadason in his book on Christian Law in India states as under:

  • “In regard to the Roman Catholic Church the Canon Law is to be recognised by the Courts of India as customary law binding on the members. However, since 1918 when the Canon Law was codified by the Vatican Council, the Canon Law cannot be regarded as customary law. Such a set of rules which lend themselves to change from time to time by the deliberations of a competent body cannot be classified as customary law. As the Canon Law can be changed by the Vatican, perhaps under recommendations of the curia or a General Council, there is a machinery which can effect the necessary changes in the Canon Law from time to time. Therefore, such a body of rules cannot any longer be treated as customary law. They can be recognised by the Courts in India only as the rules of voluntary associations binding on the members. They are like ‘Club Rules’. When a person becomes a member of a club, he not only subscribes to the existing rules and regulations but also agrees to accept the rules as they may be changed from time to time provided the procedure prescribed for changing them has been followed. As long as a person continues to be a member of a club he is bound by the rules of the club as they are amended from time to time. The rules are binding among the members interse and also between the members of the club. In fact the rules of the club are applicable as though each member has entered into an agreement between himself and the club by which he accepts the rules of the club as terms of the contract he has entered into to become a member of the club. Similarly in accepting membership in the Church a person binds himself with the rules and the regulations of the Church concerned as though he has entered into a contract with the Church binding himself with the rules and regulations of the Church on which conditions alone he has been admitted into membership of the Church.”[13]

Church: Impressed with Principles of Public Trust

Parish churches[14] and trusts created for the benefit of a Church[15]are public religious trusts. The parishioners or members are its beneficiaries. The parishioners have no right to take away the property on the basis of a majority decision or create a new system of administration. Our Apex Court, in KS Varghese v. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church,[16] held that the properties of a Church will ‘remain in trust, as it has for thetime immemorial, for the sake of the beneficiaries’.

The courts in India, from the early times, took the consistent view that the religious institutions, where people worship as of right in large number, have the characteristics of ‘public trust’[17] and that the properties thereof vest in the institution.[18]

S. 92 CPC Applies to Churches

Courts have jurisdiction and duty[19] to administer and enforce public trusts.[20] Interest of public is paramount in any religious trust.[21]  It is held by Privy Council in Ram Dulari Dularey Vs. Ram Lal[22] that ‘court has a duty, once it finds that it is a trust for public purposes, to consider what is best in the interest of the public’. This ruling is applied in a Church Case by our Apex Court in Varghese  Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church.[23]

As in the case of English Law, Indian Law also accepts court as the ultimate protector of all charities.[24] It is the guardian of the public charitable trusts/ institutions.[25] In In-Re, Man Singh,[26] it is held that in legal theory the Court is the guardian of charity, as it is of an infant. Courts in India, from the early times, took the view that the religious institutions, the persons who worship there as of right are large in number, have the characteristics of ‘public trust’. Sec. 92 CPC expressly authorises designated courts to give directions for administration of trusts.

But, in Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan[27] Kerala High Court held that the trust attached to Catholic (parish) church considered in that case was not a public trust to attract Sec. 92 CPC. It is observed that the properties of the (parish) church were vested with church authorities, and the (parish) church was a legal person. As shown above, our Apex Court, in Varghese  v. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church it is held that Parish churches and trusts created for the benefit of a Church are public religious trusts.

Vesting of Property – Congregational and Episcopal Churches

It is held in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan v.  Moran Mar Marthoma.[28]

  • “A Church is either Episcopal or congregational. It cannot be Episcopal in spiritual matters and congregational in temporal matters. …. That is the fundamental difference in congregational and Episcopal. In the former it vests in the parishioners. But in the latter, in endowment. …. The right to manage such property vests in the trustees under the bye-law subject to the control by the Catholicos and Metropolitan in accordance with the Constitution.”

Canon Law and Catholic Church

Canon law refers to the law internal to the church.[29] In disputes relating to spiritual or temporal affairs of a Roman Catholic Church, the parties should be presumed to be governed by the general law relating to the administration of churches, namely the Canon Law.[30]

The Canon Law postulates a detailed procedure for the administration of the Church and its properties; and so long as the church retains the status of a Roman Catholic Church the diocesan Bishop alone would have the right, in both the spiritual and the temporal matters, in respect of the church and its properties.[31] The rights in respect of the Roman Catholic churches and its property, in both the spiritual and the temporal matters, vest in the Diocesan Bishop alone.[32]

Madras High Court, in CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan,[33] held as under:

  • “Therefore we hold that once the church in question was constructed and consecrated by Arch Bishop of Trichy Diocese, the church and its properties would vest in the Pope and the fourth respondent, Arch Bishop as a delegate of the Pope, is entitled to the spiritual and temporal powers over the church and its properties. As already observed, though the church was constructed with the funds mostly provided by the Roman Catholic public of Vakkampatti Village, when the church was consecrated according to the Roman Catholic rites, the church and its properties would vest in the fourth respondent.”

It is held further as under:

  • “Therefore, on the basis of the law, particularly, the law governing the church in question, we hold that the church and its properties vest only in the fourth respondent herein and it is open to him to exercise his power through his delegates, namely, respondents 2 and 3. It is true that it would be open to the fourth respondent to authorise Villagers to administer the secular affairs of the church, but the plaintiffs have not established that they were authorised by the fourth respondent to administer the secular affairs of the church and even if they were so authorised, they would exercise the power of administration as authorised agents of the fourth defendant and not de hors the authorisation. Equally, it would have been open to the Villagers to form a trust to retain the administrative control over the church and its properties at the time of consecration of church subject to the grant of consent by the fourth respondent for retaining such a control. ….. It is, no doubt, true that it is open to the plaintiffs to show that notwithstanding the provisions of the Canon Law, the temporal affairs of the church are being governed by the custom of the Roman Catholic public of Vakkampatti Village. If the custom is established, then, the Roman Catholic people of Vakkampatti Village can claim right over the church and its properties by way of custom.”

A Division Bench of Madras High Court, as early as in the year 1915, in Michel Pillai  Vs. Rt. Rev. Bartle[34] held as under:

  • “According to Canon Law a Roman Catholic Church becomes, as soon as it is consecrated, the property of the church authorities, irrespective of the fact that any particular worshipper or worshippers contributed to its construction.  The Bishop and other church authorities have the exclusive right to the internal management of the church, whether relating to secular or religious matters, such as accommodating the congregation inside the church and prescribing the part to be taken by the congregation in the services and the ceremonies.”

Roman Catholic Churches are governed under Canon Law.[35] The Canon Law postulates a detailed procedure for the administration of the Church and its property. In disputes relating to spiritual or temporal affairs of a Roman Catholic Church, the parties should be presumed to be governed by the general law relating to the administration of churches, namely the Canon Law.[36] But, it will not nullify the law of the land.

In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School[37] it was observed that in matters of property there was always a secular angle which is supplied by the law of the country, and that no religious denomination could make a law about its own property and thus nullify the law of the land.[38]

In Molly Joseph Vs. George Sebastian[39] it is held by the Apex Court that the personal law (Canon Law) ‘cannot have any legal impact’ in view of the enacted law – Divore Act.[40]

Juristic Personality in Canon

The Catholic Community in India is governed[41] by either ‘Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches’ (CCEC) or ‘Code of Canon Law’ (CIC).The first one is applicable to Syro Malabar Rite and Syro Malankara Rite; and the second, to the Latin Rite.  The Canon Law recognises three categories of personalities; viz., the moral person, the physical person and the juridic person. The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See have the character of a moral person (Canon 113). By baptism an individual or physical person is incorporated into the Church of Christ (Canon 208-223). Both ‘parish’ and the ‘diocese’ are public juridic persons. Canon 1256 stipulates that,‘under the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff’, ownership of goods ‘belongs to’ that juridic person which has acquired them legitimately.

As shown above, in the light of the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School (supra), merely because Cannon law declares a church or a diocese as a legal person, it cannot be assumed that the courts that deal with the matters of those entities will be bound by the assertion. It is a jurisprudential issue reigned by the common law.

In CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan[42] it is pointed out that Can.1254 and 1257 make it clear that the Catholic Church has the inherent right, independently of any secular power to acquire, retain, administer and alienate temporal goods, in pursuit of its proper objectives, and all temporal goods would be regulated by the Canons as well as by their own statutes. Sub-clause (2) of Can.1257 provides that unless it is otherwise expressly provided, temporal goods belonging to a private juridical person are regulated by its own statutes, not by these Canons.

Fundamental Rights as to Religion & Administration of Trusts

Church Could Administer Property, Only in Conformity With Law

The secular aspect of the management of the property of a religious trust is to be carried out in accordance with the law of the land. The Supreme Court in Ratilal Panach and Gandhi Vs. State of Bombay: AIR 1954 SC 388: observed that a religious denomination was entitled to own and acquire property and administer the same; ‘but only in accordance with law’ and that the State could ‘regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws validly enacted’. Also See: Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333

In Rev. Father Farcisus Mascarenhas Vs. The State of Bombay,[43] it was contended that the Roman Catholic Churches were governed by the canon law and that the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which mandated registration  under the provisions of the Act contravened the fundamental rights of the Catholics; but, it was observed in the judgment that the provisions of the Bombay Act did not affect the fundamental rights of the Roman Catholics to hold property but they could only administer the property of the Church in conformity with law.

Right of Parishioners to Sue against Third Parties

As per the Canon Law of the Catholic Church the church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar.  But, in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez[44]  it is found, the parish being by law a public juridic person, that the plaintiffs (the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church) were competent to represent the juridic person and that they were competent to initiate civil proceedings before a Civil Court with the ultimate aim of protecting the property belonging to the church.  It is further held that by reading the Canon as a whole, the sanction of the ordinary was not necessary for initiation of such proceedings.

Registration of Church as a Society or Trust

Parish church properties vest in trust. Majority of parishioners have no right to take away the same or create a new system of administration.[45]

The functioning of a Church or other religious trust under a written (registered or unregistered) or unwritten bylaws is recognised by the Constitution of India under various Articles including Ar. 19(1)(c), 25, 26, etc. And, in various States, there is no law at all – such as Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 and Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 – that enables or requires registration of the Church or other religious trust, as a Trust. In such States, the registration of such an already existing Church, as a society, under the Societies Regn. Act for legal recognition, is inapt and uncalled for; because,

  • Every  member of such an existing Church has the Fundamental-Right, guaranteed by the Constitutional of India, to remain as a member of the Church even if he does not join, or refuses to join, the proposed society, as a member (assuming a society is formed officially by the church); and
  • The properties of such a Church will ‘remain in trust, as it has for the time immemorial, for the sake of the beneficiaries’ as held by our Apex Court in Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church.[46]

The registration of a Trust Deed or bye laws at a Sub Registry, under the Registration Act, is not ‘Registration of Trust’ as such.

Part VI

Registered Societies are NOT Juridical Persons

The enquiry as to the legal personality of an association of persons is essentially the enquiry whether it has the right of perpetuity in its own name, apart from its members. The basic tests to be applied for determining the same are the following:

  • (i)   Whether it can sue or be sued in its own name.
  • (ii)  Whether its property vests in itself.

Applying these tests authoritative decisions have definitively held that even the registered societies are also not juridical persons in law.

Unani Tibia College Case

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had unequivocally held in the celebrated Unani Tibia College Case,Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic &Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458, that a registered society was not a corporation and that the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 gave only certain privileges to a society registered under that Act. It is held that (i) the society, being unincorporated, is unable to sue or be sued in its own name and (ii) the phrase ‘property belonging to a society’in Sec. 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 did not give the society a corporate status as this phrase merely described the property which had been vested in trustees or governing body.It had been held by several High Courts earlier, giving undue importance to the expression ‘property belonging to a society’ in Sec. 5, that the registered societies possess juristic personality or status.

  • See also: Benares Hindu University Vs. Gauri Dutt Joshir AIR 1950 All 196. Also see: K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook: AIR 1970 Pat 163; Inder Chand Vs. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha: AIR 1977 Del 34.

Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society

The law on this point is further expounded by our Apex Court in Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397, as under:

  • i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
  • ii) A Society registered under the Societies Regn. Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  (Para 21)
  • iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22)
  • iv) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)

[1]      4th Edition

[2]      AIR 1940 PC116.

[3] M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1.

[4]      ShriomaniGurudwara  v.   ShriSomNathDass: AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[5]      Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th  Edition, page 307.

[6]      ShriomaniGurudwaraPrabandhak Committee, Amritsar v.   ShriSomNathDass: AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[7]      1962 Ker LT 240.

[8] CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; James Chinnamma Vs.  Joseph Abraham: 1962 Ker LT 240; Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725: 2012-1 KCCR 503, Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283; Major Arcbishop, Angamaly Vs. PA LalanTharakan: 2016  AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51.

[9]      35 Mad LJ 407; referred to in CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan: 2003-2 Mad LJ 254

[10]    (1863) 1 Moo. P.C.(N.S.) 411

[11]    (1882) L.R.7 A.C.484

[12]    AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[13] Quoted in: Major Arcbishop, Angamaly Vs. PA LalanTharakan: 2016  AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51

[14] Varghese Vs. St. Peters and  Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333; Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhas  Vs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790.

[15] Christopher Karkada, Bangalore Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725: 2012-1 KCCR 503

[16]    Para 184-xvii: (2017) 15 SCC 333. 

[17] Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhasVs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790; CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; Varghese Vs. St. Peters and  Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333; Sony Markose Vs. OusephCherian: ILR 2018-4 Ker 1056; Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. MaganlalMangaldasGameti: 2013-15 SCC 394; Fr.John Jacob Vs Fr.  N. I.  Paulose: AIR 2014  Ker 95; GheevargheseKoshyVsChacko Thomas: AIR 1963 Ker 191.

[18]M.M. Kathanar Vs. K.E. Kathanar: AIR 1954 TC 51; Referred to in: ThakurjiShrijiLaxmanji VS Shyama Devi: 1970 0 WLN 473

[19]    AG Vs. Pearson: (1817) 3 Mer 353; Referred to in Varghese  Vs. St. Peters and St. Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[20]    C.K. Rajan Vs. GuruvayoorDevaswom Managing Committee: AIR 1994 Ker 179 [Appeal Judgment: GuruvayoorDevaswom Managing Committee Vs. CK Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546]; Fakhuruddin Vs. Mohammad Rafiq: AIR  1916 All 115 (PC);  C  ChikkaVenkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915; Sridhar Vs. ShriJaganNath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; YogendraNathNaskar   Vs. Commr. of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089. ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265;  I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. MullaAlibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309. See also: Mulla’s Hindu Law (11th Ed. Page 489) Dr. B.K. Mukherjea: Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Fifth Ed, Page 407 and 412).

[21]    RambakeshwarDevasthan Trust Vs. President PurohitSangh: AIR  2012 SC 139.

[22]    AIR1946 PC 34.

[23]    (2017) 15 SCC 333: Para 181. Ram DulariDulareyVs. Ram Lal : Referred to in NarasimhiahVs. Y H Venkataramanappa: AIR 1976 Kar 43.

[24]    C ChikkaVenkatappaVs.DHanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Narayan   Krishnaji  Vs.  Anjuman E Islamia:  AIR 1952 Kar 14; Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier: AIR 1968 SC 915.

[25]    Ch. Hoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009-19 Dlh -265. See also Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam  Pastorate  AIR 2007 SC 1337; SubramoniaPillaiChellamPillai Vs. SubramoniaPillai: AIR 1953 TC 198;  M.G. Narayanaswami Naidu Vs. M. Balasundaram Naidu: AIR 1953 Mad 750.

[26]AIR 1974 Del. 228

[27] 2016(2) Ker LT 791

[28]    AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[29]Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001

[30] Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[31]    CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[32]    CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; James Chinnamma Vs.  Joseph Abraham: 1962 Ker LT 240.

[33]2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[34]ILR 39 Mad. 1056. Quoted in 2003-2 Mad LJ 254

[35]    Major Arch Bishop Vs. LalanTharakan, 2016(2) Ker LT 791.

[36]    Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[37]AIR 1958 MP 362

[38]    See also: Rev. Fr. Farcisus Mascarenhas Vs. State of Bombay: 1960-62 Bom LR 790 (Mudholkar& VM Tharkunde, JJ.); Gnanamuthu Udayar Vs. Anthoni: AIR  1960 Mad 430.

[39] AIR  1997 SC 109

[40] See also: Saly Joseph Vs. Baby Thomas: AIR 1999 Ker 66; Varkey Vs. Thresia: AIR  1955 Ker 255

[41]    See: Seline Fernandez Vs. Bernard Francis: ILR 2013-1 Ker 56

[42]2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[43]    62 Bom LR 790

[44]    2013(4) Ker LT 283

[45]    Varghese Vs. St. Peters and  Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[46]    Para 184-xvii: (2017) 15 SCC 333.  Churches are public religious trusts: Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhasVs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790.



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Relevant Provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act – on Purchase Certificate,  Plantation Exemption & Ceiling Area – in a Nutshell

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

CONTENTS

  • Part I — Chapters II & III, KLR Act – Outline
  • Part II — Chapter II – ‘Provisions Regarding Tenancies’
  • Part III —  Plantations
  • Part IV — Vesting of Land in Govt. & Right of Govt. to Collect Rent
  • Part V — Civil Court Jurisdiction : Decisions

PART I

CHAPTERS II & III, KLR Act – Outline

Objects of Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964

It is clear that the object of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 is –

  • to distribute excess land among landless people by taking it from landlords/persons holding beyond the ceiling limits.
  • It is also to help cultivation process in a most economic manner as well to promote agricultural growth. Needless to say that land reforms imparted drastic changes to economic and social outlook of the country.
  • (Shircy, J. in One Earth One Life V. State of Kerala : 2019 2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019 1 KLT 985)

Chapter II.

Chapter II (Sections 3 to 80G) of the KLR Act speaks about ‘Provisions Regarding Tenancies’. It deals, among other things, with:

  • fixity‘ (to tenants),
  • vesting of property in Govt.,
  • purchase of landlord’s rights by cultivating tenants,
  • issuance of ‘certificate of purchase‘,
  • rights and liabilities of Kudikidappukars.

Sec. 3(1) says that nothing in Chapter II shall apply to:

  • leases-lands belonging to or vested in the Government, Leases-of private forests, tenancies in respect of plantations exceeding thirty acres in extent, etc.

Chapter III.

Chaptr III (Sections 81 to 98A) of the KLR Act deals with ‘Restriction on Ownership and Possession of Land in Excess of Ceiling Area and Disposal of Excess Lands’.

Among other things, it procures provisions as to:

  • ceiling limit,
  • exemptions from ceiling limit,
  • filing ceiling return,
  • determining extent to be surrendered,
  • surrender,
  • taking possession by TLB,
  • effect of conversion of exempted land.

Sec. 81(1) says that the provisions of Chapter III shall not apply to –

  • lands owned or held by the Government, private forests, plantations, etc.
  • Note: 1. Section 81(1) exempts Government lands from the provisions of Chapter III. The Proviso says that the following Government lands will not stand exempted. 
    • 1. Government-lease-lands
    • 2. Lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and
    • 3. Lands that fall under Section 72 (Lease lands vest in Government).
  • 2. The effect of Chapter III on Government-lease-lands and on the lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and 72 (vest in Government) is that the tenants (both Government’s tenants and the erstwhile Private landholders’ tenants) have to pay ‘rent‘ to the Government under Sec. 72F(h).
  • 3. Section 81(4)permits use of the land not exceeding 5% of the extent of such holding for floriculture, dairy farms, hotels, restaurants, etc.
  • 4. Under Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act, on acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Sec. 72.
    Sec. 112 (5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the landowner shall be awarded to the Government; and clause (b) says that the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.

PART II

Chapter II Provisions Regarding Tenancies

S. 3(1)(viii)

  • “3. Exemptions – (1) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to -…. ….
    • (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
      • “Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.

Sec. 2(44)(c)

  • agricultural lands interspersed within the boundaries of the area cultivated by the said person with plantation crops, not exceeding such extent as may be determined by the Land Board [or the Taluk Land Board, as the case may be] as necessary for the protection and efficient management of such cultivation.”

Analysis of PLANTATION-Exemption under S. 3(1)(viii)

Nutshell

  • If tenant raised plantation on bare land leased –
  • Such tenants are not excluded (from Chapter II) by the ‘Exemption’ clause under S. 3(1)(viii).
  • Therefore, tenants of such tenancy-land are entitled for benefits under Chapter II such as
    • Fixity under Sec. 13,
    • purchase certificate within ceiling limit etc.
  • Such lands vest in Govt. under Sec. 72 also.

Plantation Lands & Tenancy – General

  • ‘Fixity’ to tenants to plantations below 30 acres: Provisions of Chapter II of the KLR Act, that gives ‘fixity’ to tenants will apply to all plantations below 30 acres (plantation put-up by tenant or by landlord).
  • ‘Plantation-tenancy’ exceeding 30 acres exempted from Chapter II: ‘Plantation-tenancy’ lands (That is, plantation put-up by land-lord; or, Plantation existed when land was leased) exceeding 30 acres are also exempted from Chapter II KLR Act. Therefore, provisions in the Lease deeds applicable, applies to termination of tenancy.
  • Landlord cannot recover ‘plantation lands’ above 30 acre: Landlord cannot recover possession of ‘plantation lands’ (where Tenant made plantation on bare land leased) above 30 acre from the tenant; because it falls under Chapter II that gives protection to tenant (Fixity, Purchase- Certificate etc.).
  • ‘Fixity’ to tenants will apply to all plantations exceeding 30 acres: Provisions of Chapter II, that gives ‘fixity’ to tenants will apply to all plantations exceeding 30 acres (if the plantation is put-up by tenant).
  • Government Lands exempted from Chapter II : Government Lands, are also exempted from Chapter II KLR Act (Chapter II grants Fixity, Purchase- Certificate etc.). Therefore, provisions in the Grant or Lease deeds applicable, applies to termination of grant/tenancy.
  • Landlord can recover ‘plantation-tenancy-lands’ above 30 acres: Landlord can recover possession of ‘plantation-tenancy-lands’ (plantation put-up by land-lord) above 30 acres, from the tenant, on the strength of lease deed; because it is exempted under Chapter II that gives protection to tenant (Fixity, Purchase- Certificate etc.).
  • Plantation (tenancy) lands vest in Govt: All such Plantation (tenancy) lands (put-up by tenant or by landlord) vest in Govt. under Sec. 72.
  • ‘Ceiling Limit’, not apply to Government Lands (not lease lands): Provisions of Chapter III of the KLR Act that says as to ‘Ceiling Limit’, its ‘Exemption’ etc. do not apply to (i) Government Lands (not Govt.-lease lands), (ii) plantations etc.

S. 3(1)(viii) deals with exemption of ‘Plantation-Tenancy’ (plantation, developed by the landlord), above 30 acres.

To exclude a plantation (from the benefits under Chapter II offered to Tenants) under S. 3(1)(viii), it should have been a plantation when it was leased;

  • that is, such land, above 30 acres, must have been developed as plantation by the landlord.
  • S. 3(1)(viii), exempt from Chapter II –
    • plantation-tenancy (plantation developed by the landlord) above 30 acres.
  • That is, if tenant has raised plantation on bare land leased, it is not excluded (from the benefits under Chapter II offered to Tenants) by the Exemption under S. 3(1)(viii).
    • That is, such tenants (who put up a plantation on the bare land) have the rights and benefits provided under Chapter II, such as
      • fixity under Sec. 13 and
      • vesting in the Government under Sec. 72 (Can get purchase certificate under Sec. 72B/72C within the ceiling limit.)
      • Note: There will be no benefit for it is a plantation. Because no rider to Sec. 72B and 72C, by way of proviso or otherwise, ‘exempting plantation’ property so that a purchase certificate can be obtained beyond the ceiling limit.

S. 3(1)(viii) provides benefit (fixity under Sec. 13) to

  • plantation-tenancy below 30 acres (because what is exempted from benefits of fixity is Plantation-Tenancies exceeding 30 acres).
  • See: Rev. Fr. Jerome Fernandes Vs. Be Be Rubber Estate, 1972 KLT 613; Poddar Plan. Ltd v. Thekkemariveettil Madhavi Amma, 2014 1 ILR(Ker) 813; 2013 4 KLJ 781; 2014 1 KLT 439 .
  • Therefore:
    • Contract applies to termination of tenancy, above 30 acre plantation–tenancy (land must have been a plantation when it was leased).
    • Land lord is entitled Sec. 81 exemption over such plantation.

Analysis of S. 3(1)(viii) Proviso

Proviso speaks about “agricultural lands interspersed within the plantation”. In Poddar Plantations Limited v.  Thekkemariveettil Madhavi Amma, 2014-1 ILR(Ker) 813; 2013-4 KLJ 781; 2014-1 KLT 439, it is held:

  • “Section 2(44) (c) cannot be read in isolation of Sec. 3(1)(viii) of the KLR Act. Reading the two provisions together, what can be discerned is only that if the tenant is entitled to fixity over the plantation (not being in excess of 30 acres), then, the land referred to in Sec. 2 (44)(c) of the KLR Act should also be counted and the tenant shall not be evicted from that land though he is not entitled to fixity over such land. This view is supported by the decisions in State of Kerala v. Amalgamated Tea Estates Co. (1980 KLT 728) and State of Kerala v. Hope Plantations Ltd. (1985 KLT SN 4 (Case No.6). If such an interpretation is not given, the result will be anomalous in that even if a person is liable to be evicted from the plantation, he can cling on to the land referred to in Sec.2(44)(c) of the KLR Act though not entitled to fixity. The intention of the Legislature was only to avoid eviction of the tenant from the land coming under Sec.2(44)(c) which is necessary for the proper management of area of plantation over which he is entitled to fixity.”

Government lands are covered by the exemption u/s 3(1)(x)

In Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair M.N.,  (2013) 3 KLT 132, (T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J ; A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J), it is observed as under:

  •  “75. … Apart from that, in the light of Section 27 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act and in the light of the settlement register and land register, the property is described as Temple puramboke and not Government puramboke. Further Government lands are covered by the exemption u/s 3(1)(x) of the Land Reforms Act and therefore he cannot claim any fixity of tenure. There is no claim by the Government here to the property.”

Fixity, Vesting in Govt. and Purchase Certificate:

  • Sec. 13 says every tenant has fixity. But, holdings held by cultivating tenants alone will vest in Govt., under Section 72(1).
  • Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of leasehold properties held by ‘cultivating tenants’ in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
  • Sec. 72 K provides that LT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.

Assignment of Purchase certificate

  • Sec. 72B provides for obtaining Purchase Certificate if applied within the period stipulated. Sec. 72C provides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit,)

The tenant who opts to avail benefits of plantation-exemption, under Sec. 81, cannot seek fragmentation (Sec. 87, Explanation II) of the plantation land so as to obtain purchase-certificate (under Sec. 72B or 72C) within ceiling limit. Still, he stands as a cultivating tenant, “entitled to assignment” of the right under Sec. 72B. As shown elsewhere, there is an option for the tenant – either to obtain purchase-certificate or to avail plantation-exemption. (Note: No rider to Sec. 72B and 72C, by way of proviso or otherwise, exempting plantation.)

  • Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 

Provisions as to Fixity, Purchase Certificate,  Ceiling Area, etc.

  1. Tenant & Fixity
    • Section 13(1) reads as under:
    • 13. Right of tenants to fixity of tenure.  (1) Notwithstanding any thing to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage or contract or in any decree or order of court, every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding, and no land from the holding shall be Limited except as provided in Sections 14 to 22.”
    • Tenant is defined in Sec 2 (57) as under:
    • (57) tenant moans any person who has paid or has agreed to pay rent or other consideration for his being allowed to possess and to enjoy any land by a person entitled to lease that land, and includes- …. ….. ….. “
  2. Cultivating Tenant & Vesting of land in Government
    • Section 72(1) reads:
    • 72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”
    • It provides (automatic) vesting of leasehold properties in Govt. Conditions thereof are:
      • (i) the land must be held by cultivating tenants;
      • (ii) they should be entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13.
    • Sec. 2(8) defines cultivating tenant as under:
    • cultivating tenant means a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate, the land comprised in his holding.”
  3. Issue of Purchase Certificate
    • Section 72B(1), 72C and 72K(1) & (2) read as under:
    • 72B.  Cultivating  tenant’s  right  to  assignment.  ­  (1)  The cultivating tenant of any holding or part of a holding, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Section 72, shall be entitled to assignment of such right, title and interest:
    • Provided that ­
    • (a) no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of any holding or part of a holding under this Section if he, or if he is a member of a family, such family, owns an extent of land not less than­ the ceiling area.
    • (b) where the cultivating tenant or, if he is a member of a family, such family, does not own any land or owns an extent of land which is less than the ceiling area, he shall be entitled to the assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of only such extent of land as will, together with the land, if any, owned by him or his family, as the case may be, be equal to the ceiling area.
    • Explanation. ­ In calculating the extent of land owned by the cultivating tenant or, where he is a member of a family, by such family, for the purposes of clauses (a) and (b) of the foregoing proviso, the portion of the land owned by such cultivating tenant or by the family, which is liable to be assigned to the cultivating tenants holding under him or such family, shall not be taken into account.
    • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub­section (1);
    • Provided that if no date has been notified under Section 83, the date notified under Section 72 shall be deemed to be the date notified under Section 83.
    • (3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.
    • (4) An application under Sub­section (3) shall contain the following particulars, namely:­
    • (a) the village, survey number and extent of the holding or part to which the assignment relates.
    • (b) the name and address of the landowner and intermediaries and also of every other person interested in the land and the nature of their interest so far as they are known to him;
    • (c) the particulars regarding the other lands owned or held by him or if he is a member of a family; by such family; and
    • (d) such other particulars as may be prescribed.
    • (5) Where a cultivating tenant is entitled to the assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of only a portion of the holding held by him, he may indicate in the application under Sub­section
    • (3) his choice of the portion to which the assignment shall relate.
    • 72C. Assignment where application is not made by cultivating tenantNotwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 72B [or Section 72BB], the Land tribunal may, subject to such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf, at any time after the vesting of the right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in tile Government under Section 72, assign such right, title and interest to the cultivating tenants entitled thereto, and the cultivating tenants shall be bound to accept such assignment.”
    • “72K. Issue of certificate of purchase. – (1) As soon as may be after the determination of the purchase price under Section 72F [or the passing of an order under Sub-section (3) of Section 72MM] the Land Tribunal shall issue a certificate of purchase to the cultivating tenant, and thereupon the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, in respect of the holding or part thereof to which the certificate relates, shall vest in the cultivating tenant free from all encumbrances created by the landowner or the intermediaries, if any.
    • (2) The certificate of purchase issued under Sub-section (1) shall be conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, over the holding or portion thereof to which the assignment relates.”
    • Note: Sec. 72F speaks as to ‘Land Tribunal to issue notices and determine the compensation and purchase price; and Sec. 72MM provides for jointly applying, by the cultivating tenant, the landowner, the intermediary, the holders of encumbrances, etc, to the Land Tribunal, for an order for ‘assignment by mutual agreement’ to the cultivating tenant.

Prohibition of future tenancies.

  • Sec. 74 provides for Prohibition of future tenancies.

In Secretary, TDB v. Mohanan Nair (T.R. Ramachandran Nair & A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, JJ.), ILR 2013-2 Ker 883; 2013-3 KLT 132, an important decision on Kerala Land Reforms Act, it is found –

  • There should be permission (for the tenant) to use and occupation of the land by a competent person.
  • The definition of ‘tenant’ will also show that there should be an agreement to pay rent or other consideration for being allowed to “possess and to enjoy the land”, with a person who is “entitled to lease the land.”  Without interest being created in the land, nobody can claim to be a cultivating tenant.
  • If there is no demise of the land in favour of one, if at all any tenancy right can be created, the same can be done by the Devaswom Board only by appropriate proceedings
  • If no right to cultivate and raise produce of land given; but, right to take usufructs alone granted; or a mere licence, it will not mature into a tenancy.
  • Kuthakapattom licence cannot mature into a tenancy.
  • Use of word “rent” in receipt will not be conclusive to show existence of tenancy agreement,
  • Purchase Certificate issued by Land Tribunal, for land belonging to Devaswom (exempted category under S.3(1)(x) of the Act), will be in total violation of Rules, and will be a nullity.
  • Misfeasance or non-feasance of trustee cannot affect trust itself.
  • Court can interfere even if some years have passed and there was inaction on the part of Devaswom Board for certain period.

Land Owners’s Right for Compensation

  • On Assignment to CULTIVATING TENANT: Sec. 55
  • On VESTING under Sec. 72:  Sec. 72A
  • Surrendering SURPLUS LAND: Sec. 88

Compensation On Assignment to CULTIVATING TENANT

  • Sec. 53 – Cultivating tenant’s right to purchase landlord’s rights.

Sec. 55Purchase price to land owner

It is 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees.

Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 72D(2).

  • Sec. 59 – Deposit purchase price by cultivating tenant before Land Tribunal.  Purchase Certificate is conclusive proof.
  • Sec. 64– Payment of purchase price to land owner – full discharge (from the part of land owner)

Sec. 72ACompensation to land owner for vesting under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter.

It is 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees. Note: Same rate under Sec. 55 & 72D(2) Land above ceiling limit payment is only under Sec. 88 – on surrendering land. (It is paid by Govt.)

  • Sec. 72D – Cultivating tenant to pay purchase price (for getting assignment).
  • Sec. 72D(1A)- No purchase price is land below One Hect.
  • Sec. 72D(2)  – Purchase price to Govt. – 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees) Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 55

Surrundering SURPLUS LAND: Land Owners’s Right for Compensation

Relevant provisions are Sec. 82, 83, 85 & 88 of the KLR Act.

  • Sec. 82 – Ceiling area is fixed (for an adult unmarried person – 5 standard acres; family of 2 or more persons – 10 standard acres; more than 5 persons – 10 standard acres increased by one standard acre for each member).
  • Sec. 83 – No person to own or hold land in excess of ceiling area.
  • Sec. 85(1): Surrender excess lands. 
  • Sec. 85 (2) File a Statement before the Land Board including lands exempted under Sec. 81 indicating the land proposed to be surrendered.
  • Sec. 85 (3) Special duty on tenant – Final settlement of claims under Sec. 72(4). (Right, title and interest of the land owner vest in Govt.  But claims for resumption can be filed within six months.)   After purchasing the land under Sec. 72B or 72C by the cultivating tenant, excess with the tenant shall be surrendered. 
  • Sec. 88Persons surrendering land entitled compensation. No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter.
    • Compensation is calculated at the rates specified in Schedule IV. Note: Maximum compensation is Rs. 2 Lakh.(Land Tribunal is the only authority that can decide on the tenancy-right.  If there is dispute on title/tenancy, LT has to go into the question of possession and tenancy – Ganapathy Acharya  v. Bhaskaran,  TLV Aiyer, J., 1993(2) KLT 962.)
    • Note: When Land Board  fixes land as exempted plantation-land there is implied declaration as regards excess land and implied surrender by land owner to Govt.
    • If it is a lease-land there is implied surrender in favour of  Govt. and also to the tenant.

Sec. 127 – Act to override other loss. (It overrides Land Acquisition Acts.)

PART III Plantations

Chapter III

Excess, Ceiling Return, Surrender, Exemption Etc.

Section 81:

S. 81, the first Section in Chapter III deals with exemption from ceiling limit of plantation, industrial land, etc.

Sec. 81 reads as under:

  • Exemptions: (1)The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to –
  • (a) lands owned or held by the Government of Kerala or
  • the Government of any other State in India or
  • the Government of India or
  • a local authority [or the Cochin Port Trust] [Inserted by Act 35 of 1969.] 
  • or any other authority which the Government may, in public interest, exempt, by notification in the Gazette, from the provisions of this Chapter.
  • [Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease whether current or time expired or otherwise.] [Inserted by Act 17 of 1972.]
  • [Explanation I. [Numbered as Explanation I by Act 35 of 1969.] – “Lands owned by the Government of Kerala” shall, for the purposes of this clause, have the same meaning as “Government Lands” under Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960; [but lands escheated to the Government and held by tenants entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 shall not be deemed to be lands owned by the Government of Kerala.]]
  • [Explanation II. [Inserted by Act 35 of 1969.] – Lands, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Sub-section (9) of Section 66 or Section 72, shall not be deemed to be “lands owned by the Government of Kerala” for the purposes of this clause;]
  • [Explanation III. [Inserted by Act 25 of 1971.] – For the purposes of this clause, “other authority”, shall include a corporation owned or controlled by the Government of Kerala or the Government of any other State in India or the Government of India;]
  • (b) lands taken under the management of the Court of Wards:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply at the end of three years from the commencement of this Act;
  • (c) lands comprised in mills, factories or workshops and which are necessary for the use of such mills, factories or workshops;
  • (d) private forests;
  • (e) plantations;
  • (f)[ cashew estate [Inserted by Act No. 6 of 2012.]
  • Explanation. – For the purpose of this clause “cashew estate” shall mean dry land principally cultivated with not less than 150 cashew trees per hectare.]
  • (g)[***] [Omitted by Act 35 of 1969.]
  • (h) lands mortgaged to the Government, or to a co-operative society (including a co-operative land mortgage bank) registered or deemed to be registered under the Co-operative Societies Act for the time being in force, or to the Kerala Financial Corporation, or to the Kerala Industrial Development Corporation or to the State Small Industries Corporation, as security for any loan advanced by the Government or by such Society or Corporation, so long as the mortgage subsists:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply at the end of three years from the commencement of this Act;
  • (i)lands purchased by the Kerala Co-operative Central Land Mortgage Bank or a Primary Mortgage Bank under Sec Lion 18 of the Kerala State Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks Act, 1960, or by the Kerala State Co-operative Bank Ltd., or by a primary agricultural credit co- operative society or by a scheduled bank as defined in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 so long as such lands continue in the possession of the bank;
  • (j)lands purchased by the Kerala Financial Corporation or lands the management of which has been taken over by that Corporation, under Section 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, so long as such lands remain in the ownership, or continue under the management, as the case may be, of the said Corporation:
  • [Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply in the case of lands the management of which has been taken over by the Corporation on or after the 1st day of April, 1964;] [Added by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (k)lands belonging to or held by an industrial or commercial undertaking at the commencement of this Act, and set apart for use for the industrial or commercial purpose of the undertaking:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply if such land is not actually used for the purpose for which it has been set apart, within such time as the District Collector may, by notice to the undertaking, specify in that behalf;
  • (l)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (m)[ house sites, that is to say, sites occupied by dwelling houses and lands, wells, tanks and other structures necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the dwelling houses.] [Substituted by Act No. 17 of 1972.]
  • Explanation. – For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that a compound wall shall not he deemed to he a structure necessary for the convenient enjoyment of a dwelling house, if the land on which the dwelling house is situated and enclosed by the compound waif is more than the (and necessary (or the convenient enjoyment of the dwelling house.
  • (n)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (o)sites of temples, churches, mosques and cemeteries and burial and burning grounds:
  • (p)sites of buildings including warehouses;
  • (q)commercial sites;
  • (r)land occupied by educational institutions including land necessary for the convenient use of the institutions and playgrounds attached to such institutions;
  • (s)lands vested in the Bhoodan Yagna Committee;
  • (t)lands owned or held by -(i)a University established by law; or(i)the entire income of such lands is appropriated for the University, institution or trust concerned; and(ii)where the University, institution or trust comes to hold the said lands after the commencement of this Act, the Government have certified previously that such lands are bona fide required for the purposes of the University, institution or trust, as the case may be; and(u)lands granted to defence personnel for gallantry.(ii)a religious, charitable or educational institution of a public nature; or(iii)a public trust which expression shall include a wakf;
  • Provided that-
  • (2)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (3)[ The Government may if they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the public interest -(a)on account of any special use to which any land is put; or(b)on account of any land being bonafide required for the purpose of conversion into plantation or for the extension or preservation of an existing plantation or for any commercial, industrial, educational or charitable purpose, by notification in the Gazette, exempt such land from the provisions of this Chapter, subject to such restrictions and conditions as they may deem fit to impose:
  • Provided that the land referred to in clause (b) shall be used for the purpose for which it is intended within such time as the Government may specify in that behalf; and, where the land is not so used within the time specified, the exemption shall cease to he in force.] [Substituted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (4)[ Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force of in any contract or other documents or in any judgement, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal or Taluk Land Board or Land Board or other authority, a person holding plantation and lands ancillary thereto or interspersed within such plantation, [may, subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed, use] [Inserted by Act No. 6 of 2012.] not exceeding five per cent of the extent of such holding for floriculture or for the cultivation of Vanila or medicinal plants or other [agricultural crops or for conducting dairy farms] [Substituted ‘agricultural crops’ by Act No. 6 of 2015.] or for establishing hotels or resorts or other tourism projects and for purposes ancillary or connected therewith.]

Section 82 & 83:

S. 82 & 83 deal with ceiling area and bars holding land excess of ceiling fixed. Sec. 82 reads as under:

  • 82. Ceiling area. – [(1) The ceiling area of land shall be,
  • (a) in the case of an adult unmarried person or a family consisting of a sole surviving member, five standard acres, so however that the ceiling area shall riot be less than six and more than seven arid a half acre in extent;
  • (b) in the case of a family consisting of two or more, but not more than five members, ten standard acres, so however that the ceiling area shall not be less than twelve and more than fifteen acres in extent.
  • (c) in the case of a family consisting of more than five members, ten standard acres increased by one standard acre for each member M excess of five, so however that the ceiling area shall not he less than twelve and more than twenty acres in extent; and
  • (d) in the case of any other person, other than a joint family, ten standard acres, so however that the ceiling are shall not be less than twelve and more than fifteen acres in extent.]

Section 83

Sec. 83 reads as under:

  • “83. No person to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. With effect from such dates as may be notified by the Government in the Gazette, no person shall be entitled to own or hold or to possess under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area.”

Section 85(1) reads as under:

  • 85. Surrender of excess land. (1) Where a person owns or holds land excess of the ceiling area on the date notified under Section 83, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided: …. ….”

Section 2 (3) defines ceiling area as under:

  • Ceiling area” means the extent of land specified in section 82 as the ceiling area”.

Plantation: Definition

  • “S.2.(44)” plantation” means any land used by a person principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon (hereinafter in this clause referred to as ‘plantation crops’) and includes.-
    • (a) land used by the said person for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of plantation crops or for the preparation of the same for the market;
    • [(b) xxxx]
    • (c) agricultural lands interspersed within the boundaries of the area cultivated by the said person with plantation crops, not exceeding such extent as may be determined by the Land Board [or the Taluk land Board, as the case may be] as necessary for the protection and efficient management of such cultivation.
  • Explanation:- Lands used for the construction of office buildings, godowns, factories quarters for workmen, hospitals, schools and play grounds shall be deemed to be lands used for the purposes of sub-clause (a).

Relevant Provisions: Excess, Ceiling Return, Surrender, Exemption Etc.

  • Sec. 85 (1) provides for Surrender excess.
  • Sec. 85 (2) provides – Owners and Tenants of plantation (who owns and hold properties) should furnish statement (ceiling return) to Land Board before March 31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
  • Sec. 85 (3) provides – Excess shall be surrendered.
  • Sec. 85 (5) provides – LAND BOARD shall DETERMINEextend to be surrendered
  • Sec. 85 (7) provides – Whereon a person fails to file statement (ceiling return) under 85(2), LAND BOARD shall intimate Taluk Land Board (TLB), TLB shall determine land to be surrendered.
    • “The statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit and if such a person fails to file the statement in accordance with law, the Board is enjoined to proceed against such person.” State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
    • [TLB not to do, suo motu, without direction from LB. State Of Kerala Vs Idiculla, 1980 KLT 120, referred to Shircy, J. in One Earth One Live Vs. State of Kerala, 2019(1) KLT 985.]
    • The effect of not filing ceiling return can be equated to ‘not applying for assignment’ of purchase certificate, See: Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283.
  • Sec. 85A provides – File ceiling return/statement within March  2, 1973 before Land Board.
  • Sec. 86(1) provides – On determination of the extent to be surrendered (by LB) under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
  • Sec. 86(3) provides – Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession.
  • Sec. 86(4) provides – Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
  • Sec. 86(6) provides – Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
  • Sec. 87 Exp. II  provides – If CONVERTED TO ANY OTHER CLASS and the person (who gets the property) owns excess of ceiling area – the excess shall be deemed to be land acquired (and fall under Sec. 87) .
  • Sec. 87(1A) provides – Person referred to above (transferee) also should file statement (Return).
    • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).

Analysis of S. 81, 82 and 83

CHAPTER III of the KLR Act deals with Ceiling Area and Excess Lands.

Sec. 81 provides for ‘Exemptions’ (See: Sec. 81 in the End Notes). Sec. 81 reads as under:

  • Exemptions: (1) The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to –
    • (a) lands owned or held by the Government ….
    • …. …..
    • (e) plantations;
    • …………

But, Exemption apply to lease-lands (with lessees) owned by the Government.

81(1)(a) Proviso says –

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease“.

Plantation: Under Sec. 2, clause (44), plantation means any land used by a person principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon.

Ceiling area 

  • Sec. 82 provides for ceiling.
  • Sec. 83 provides – No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  
  • It is a total bar. 
    • Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB),
    • The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137) – quoted in 2008(1) KLJ 571 (State Vs. Puliyangattu). Followed in State vs Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16; Bhikoba S. Vs. ML Punchand Tathed, AIR 1982 (SC) 865.

Does Exemption of Plantation Cover Exemption of ‘Plantation LAND‘?

No.

It is for the following reasons –

  • 1. The exemption is to the ‘plantation‘, and not to the ‘LAND‘.
  • 2. Exemption is conditional – for it exists (only) as long as the plantation exists or continues;
  • Because,
    • S. 2(44) defines ‘plantation’ as land used principally for the cultivation of a specific ‘plantation crop‘ like tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber etc.
    • Section 87, Explanation II states that if a plantation for which exemption is given on recognition of a specific ‘plantation-crop’ is converted into any other ‘plantation-crop’ or the plantation activity is not continued, the exemption may be lost; and the land will be taken for considering the ceiling limit.

Explanation II of Sec. 87 reads as under:

  • “Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.”

Purport of Sec. 87 and the Explanations in S.87(1)

Section 87 reflects the legislative intention in protecting plantations. The protection is on economic grounds. That is, certain crops and cultivations that made the land of Kerala renowned from ancient times were to be protected. Section 87 and the Explanations are to be read and interpreted in the light of their intentions. The Kerala High Court aptly appreciated these provisions in this background in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985.

In State Human Rights Protection Centre, Thrissur v. State of Kerala, 2009(3)KLJ 110, it is held as under:

  • “19.There is no restriction on alienation of lands exempted under Section 81 (1)(a) of the Land Reforms Act ,since such lands are exempted from the operation of Chapter III of the Kerala Land Reforms Act dealing with ceiling on holding. It is not the excess land that is alienated but the exempted land………”

It was further held in para 21-  

  • ”……Any exemption from ceiling provision under the Kerala Land Reforms Act has a purpose and the purpose in the present case is public interest and that public interest is the use of land for industrial purpose. Since under the Kerala Land Reforms Act there is no restriction on alienation of the exempted category of lands and since the transferee is subjected to the acid test of eligibility and entitlement for exemption in terms of use of the land, the transfer made by the HMT will also be subjected to the same test, namely use of the transferred land for industrial purpose. In other words, HMT is legally entitled to transfer 100 acres of land notified under Ext.R1(i) notification, but the transferee will have to use that land for industrial purpose and that purpose only. Therefore, the transfer is not vitiated in any way; but the transferee will have to use the land only for industrial purpose. That is a covenant on the land.” (Quoted in: One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985)

In Everest Stone Crusher and Granites v. District Collector, District Collectorate, Kannur (Anil K. Narendran, J.), 2020-6 KHC 289, it is held as under:

  • “Therefore, Ext.P13 prohibitory order issued by the 1st respondent District Collector, during the pendency of suo motu proceedings under Section 87 of the Act, cannot be said to be one issued without reasonable grounds to believe that any document relating to transfer of land of the land owned by the petitioner, which may be presented before the 3rd respondent registering officer, is intended to defeat the provisions of the said Act. The said order warrants no interference in this writ petition, invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

For Plantation Exemption, Tenant must have Approached LT

As shown above –

If the tenant had raised a plantation on bare land leased –

  • Such plantations are not excluded (from Chapter II) by the ‘Exemption’ clause under S. 3(1)(viii).
    • Therefore, tenants of such tenancy-land are entitled for benefits under Chapter II such as
      • Fixity under Sec. 13,
      • purchase certificate within ceiling limit etc.
    • Though the tenant has fixity, he is not the owner of such (entire) land. Because such lands vest in Govt. under Sec. 72. And, a purchase certificate cannot be obtained for the extent above the ceiling limit.

Land Tribunal is the only authority to determine “lease”

In Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it is pointed out – when a title claim is raised by the Government or the Devaswom, the person who claims to be a cultivating tenant

  • will have to first prove their claim of being a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, under the provisions of the KLR Act through a proper process of law.
  • “This is pertinent because, under Section 72B(3) of the KLR Act, it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant, entitled to assignment of right, title and interest in respect of any property, to apply to the Land Tribunal, within whose jurisdiction that the property is situated, within two years from the date of vesting of such title and interest.”

That is, for getting the Exemption under Chapter III, the tenant must have approached the Land Tribunal for getting the tenancy ‘declared’.

  • Note: Under the Scheme of the KLR Act, the Land Tribunal is the only authority to determine “lease”. Even the Civil Court has to send the matter to LT for determing ‘tenancy’. (Mathevan Padmanabhan @ Ponnan v. Parmeshwaran Thampi, 1995 SCC (SUPP) 1-479).

Sec. 73B(3) of the KLR Act reads as under:

  • “(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

It is definite: the principle applied in the Balanoor case (that it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant to apply to the Land Tribunal) is the following –

  • It is for adjudicating the ‘tenancy right’.
  • The reason is that the Land Tribunal is the only authority that can decide on the “tenancy right.”
  • Under Sec. 72A, the Landlord is entitled to Compensation and under Sec. 72D a tenant is bound to pay the Purchase Price. The Scheme of the KLR Act requires that there should be proceedings under Sec. 72 B or 72C.
  • Suo Motu proceedings may not be taken by the Government in favour of a Plantation Tenant (entitled to purchase certificate within the ceiling limit)
  • Note: A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and avail benefits – the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.
  • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).  In Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736; 1993 2 KLT 962, it is pointed out:
    • “If there is dispute on any of these points necessarily the Land Tribunal has to go into the question of possession and the alleged tenancy”.

Landlords Entitled Compensation

Section 72A reads as under:

  • 72A.  Compensation to landlords for vesting of their rights in Government. (1) Every landowner and intermediary whose right, title and interest in respect of any holding have vested in the Government under Section 72 shall be entitled to compensation as provided in Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4).
    (2) The compensation payable to the landowner and intermediaries under Sub-section (1) shall be the aggregate of:-(a)sixteen times the fair rent of the holding or part thereof, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government;
    (b) the value of structures, wells and embankments of a permanent nature belonging to the landowner and the intermediaries, if any; and
    (c) one-half of the value of timber trees belonging to the landowner and the intermediaries, if any:
    Provided that where the aggregate of the value of structures, wells and embankments and one-half of the value of the timber trees referred to in clauses (b) and (c) exceeds sixteen times the fair rent in respect of the holding or part thereof, as the case may be, such aggregate value shall, for the purpose of calculating the compensation under this Sub-section, be limited to sixteen times such fair rent.
  • Explanation I. – For the purposes of this Section and Section 72 D, “fair rent” means the fair rent under this Act as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969.
  • Explanation II. – For the purposes of this Section, where the rent is payable in kind, the money value of the rent shall be commuted at the average of the prices of the commodity for the six years immediately preceding the year in which the right, title and interest of the land owner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government, and in calculating the average of the prices, the prices, if any, published under Section 43 may also be taken into account.
    (3)Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (2), where the total compensation due to a landlord in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants, after deducting the value of encumbrances and claims for maintenance or alimony, is more than twenty thousand rupees, the compensation payable to such landlord shall be limited to the amount specified in the Table below:-
  • Table
  • Scales of Compensation : Total Amount Of Compensation : Rate
    On the first Rs. 20,000 : 100 percent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 95 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 90 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 85 percent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 80 percent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 75 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 70 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 65 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000: 60 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 55 percent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 and above: 50 percent
  • (4)Where the landowner or intermediary of a holding or part of a holding is entitled to receive fifty per cent of the compensation in respect of that holding or part in a lump under Section 72H, the compensation payable to such landowner or intermediary, as the case may be, in respect of that holding or part shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), be 75 per cent of the amount calculated under Sub-section (2).

Tenant Liable to Pay Purchase Price

Section 72D reads as under:

  • 72D. Purchase price. 
  • (1)The cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any.
  • (1A)[ Where the total extent of land held as tenant by a cultivating tenant is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay purchase price under Sub-section (1).
  • Explanation. – For the removal of doubt it is hereby clarified that the benefit conferred to a cultivating tenant until r this Sub-section shall not affect the eligibility of the landowner or intermediary, if any, to receive compensation to which he is entitled under the Act.

What is the Position if the Tenant holds Maximum Within the Ceiling

As shown above, before proceeding to the Land Board or Taluk Land Board as regards the ‘exemption’, the tenant has to “Purchase of the Right, Title and Interest of the Landowner under Sec. 73B(3). What is the position if the tenant already holds the maximum amount of property allowed by the ceiling limit (and no additional property can be purchased)?

  • In such a situation, it is legitimate to say that the tenant has to approach the Land Tribunal and obtain a Certificate stating that (i) he is a tenant of the property under consideration and (ii) he is already in possession of the maximum amount of property allowed by the ceiling limit.

Plantation Exemption, Fixity & Purchase Certificate for a Tenant below 30-acres-plantation

  • By virtue of S. 3(1)(viii), a Tenant (below 30-acres-plantation) will get fixity (Sec. 13) and can continue possession.
    • And, under Chapter III, Sec. 81(1)(e), he can also avail benefits of exemption for plantation (without being affected by the ceiling limit – Sec. 82 & 83).
    • Note: For getting benefits under Sec. 81 exemption, the tenant should have filed ceiling return (under Sec. 85(2); 85A).
  • Purchase Certificate being provided within ceiling limit alone under Sec. 72B or 72C, it is legitimate to state that a tenant cannot get Purchase Certificate on the plantation land, under Sec. 72B or 72C. (Note: No rider to Sec. 72B and 72C, by way of proviso or otherwise, exempting plantation.)

Combined Impact of Sec. 3(1)(viii) and Sec. 81 on Plantation-Tenancy-land

  1. Below 30 acres – Chapter II applies
    • By virtue of S. 3(1)(viii)Chapter II applies to all tenancies (both above and below 30 acres. It stands contradistinct to ‘leased-lands-upon-which-plantation-was-put-up’ by the tenant above 30 acres.
    • Such tenants also get benefit of exemption under Sec. 81 and they can continue without being affected by the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 and 83.
    • For getting benefits of Sec. 81 exemption ceiling return (Sec. 85(2); 85A). should have been filed.
  2. Above 30 acres ‘Plantation-Tenancy’– KLR Act will not Apply
    • S. 3(1)(viii) being exclude (from Chapter II) ‘Plantation-Tenancy’ (i.e. ‘leased-lands-upon-which-plantation-was-put-up’ by the landlord) above 30 acres, provisions of Chapter II do not apply to such plantations.
    • Hence, No ‘fixity’ under Sec. 13, for the tenants of ‘Plantation-Tenancy’ above 30 acres.
    • Contract applies to termination of tenancy, above 30 acre plantation–tenancy. But, until evicted lawfully, such tenants get benefit of exemption under Sec. 81 and they can continue without being affected by the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 and 83.
    • Land lord is entitled Sec. 81 exemption over such plantation.
    • For getting benefits of Sec. 81 exemption, ceiling return [Sec. 85(2); 85A] should have been filed.
  3. If tenant raised plantation on bare land leased: S. 3(1)(viii) does not apply.
    • S. 3(1)(viii) does not deal with plantations put up on bare land leased by the tenants. (Such property is not excluded from Chapter II, also.)
    • That is, the protection or benefits given to tenants (fixity) can be availed by such tenants (who put up plantation on land leased).
    • No purchase Certificate can be obtained, for, fragmentation of plantation will not be allowed (Sec. 87 Expl. II).
    • Under Sec. 81, such tenants can avail exemption and they can also continue without being affected by the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 and 83.
    • Such lands also vest in Government under Sec. 72.
    • For getting benefits of Sec. 81 exemption ceiling return [Sec. 85(2); 85A]. should have been filed.

Liability of Certain Planters to Pay Rent

(1) Following Plantation-Tenants are liable to pay rent to the Government according to the KLR Act.

  • (1) Tenants in Govt. land.
    • Because, no provision in the KLR Act affects the liability of the tenants of the Govt. lands to pay rent; and such Govt. lands are exempted from Chapter II (that deals with ‘fixity’, Purchase Certificate, vesting, etc..
  • (2) Tenants of Plantation lands who have taken the lease of extensive parambus or waste lands and in course of time by hard toil had developed those into plantations.
    • Because, the legislature had conferred the benefit of the fixity of tenure to such tenants; and such lands (over and above the land to which purchase certificate is given) vest in Govt. under Sec. 72.

(2) Following Plantation-Tenants are liable to pay rent to the Land-owner (or the Land-owner) according to the KLR Act.

  • The tenants of those Plantations (i) above 30 acres and (ii) the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing (that is, plantation existed when land was leased).
    • Because, no provision in the KLR Act affects the liability of the tenants of such lands to pay rent to the land owners; and such lands are exempted from Chapter II (that deals with ‘fixity’, Purchase Certificate, vesting, etc..                               

Relevant provisions in the KLR Act:

Section 3(1)(viii):

  • Provisions of Chapter II (that deals with fixity, Purchase Certificate, vesting of leased land in Govt., etc.) do not apply to tenements of Plantation above 30 acre (where the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing).

Section 13:

  • There will be fixity to cultivating tenants.
  • But, (1) Plantation-tenants in Govt. land and (2) The tenants of Plantation above 30 acre (where the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing) do not have the right of fixity (for. provisions of Chapter II do not apply to such tenements.

Section 72:

  • It provides – automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating-tenants, in Govt.
  • But, (1) Plantation-tenants in Govt. land and (2) The tenants of Plantation above 30 acre (where the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing) do not vest in Govt. (for. provisions of Chapter II do not apply to such tenements.

Section 81:

  • S. 81, the first Section in Chapter III, deals with exemption from ceiling limit of plantation, industrial land, etc.

Section 82 & 83:

  • S.82 & 83 deals with ceiling area and bars holding land excess of ceiling fixed.

Section 85(1):

  • S. 81 mandates surrender of excess land (to Govt). But it is not applicable to the plantations (as they are exempted)

Can the Govt. enact new Act for ensuring ‘Proper Rent’ (if it finds 1980 Act not effective)?

Yes; because,

  1. As the KLR Act does not affect rights of such land-owners/landlord  (including Govt.) for rent.
  2. The matter of fixation of rent is a State subject (subject to further discussion). 

The State Legislature is free, therefore, to make a proper enactment on public interest.  Here, it may also be noted that a large extent of Govt. land is in the possession of mighty and wealthy planters. 

In N. K. RAJENDRA MOHAN Vs. THIRVAMADI RUBBER CO.  LTD, AIR 2015 SC 2556; 2015-4 KLT 6, it is held as under:

  • “That the legislature had construed it to be unfair and improper to deny the benefit of the fixity of tenure to a lessee who might have taken the lease of extensive parambus or waste lands and in course of time by hard toil had developed those into plantations.

Analysis

Plantation leased
(Plantation existed when land was leased).
Land leased
Tenant made plantation.
Sec. 81 (exemption from ceiling limit) applies.
Plantation above 30 Acre. 
Will there be 
fixity to tenant?
No. 

Sec. 3 (1)(viii) (reversely) applies. (Poddar Plan. Ltd v. Thekkemariveettil Madhavi Amma, 2014 1 ILR(Ker) 813; 2013 4 KLJ 781; 2014 1 KLT 439,)
Yes. (Note: Ceiling limit (in Sec. 82) is not mentioned in Sec. 13 – as given in Sec. 72B and 72C.)
(Sec. 13 fixity is there for every tenant, if tenant toiled a plantation – See: Rev. Fr. Jerome Fernandes Vs. Be Be Rubber Estate, 1972 KLT 613.)
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72 E & 72F
Plantation below 30 Acre.  Can a tenant get purchase certificate for 5 or 10 acres?
May be.
No specific provision. So, by virtue of Chapter II, a tenant can get Purchase Certificate; but, within ceiling limit – Sec. 13 under Sec. 72B, 72C.
(See notes just below also)
No. 
No specific provision.
Fragmentation of plantation will not be allowed so as to get pur. certi. within ceiling limit (Sec. 87).
Plantation below 30 Acre. Will there be fixity to tenant?
Yes.
By virtue of S. 3(1)(viii), a Tenant has fixity (Sec.13). It is reasonable to say, a tenant cannot claim fixity and Purchase Certificate, simultaneously.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72 E & 72F
Yes.
(Because what is exempted is Plantation-Tenancies exceeding 30 acres)

Sec. 13 fixity, applies.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72 E & 72F
Who gets Sec. 81 exemption – land-owner or tenant – above 30 acre.
Land owner – For, plantation itself was leased.Tenant
Can landlord recover possession –
above 30 acre – from the tenant?
.
Yes.
No express provision.
But, contract holds the field (because no protection to tenant, under Chapter II).
No. (Because Plantation-Tenancies exceeding 30 acres is exempted, and therefore no protection to tenant)
Sec. 13 fixity, applies. See:
N. K. Rajendra Mohan Vs Thirvamadi Rubber Co.  Ltd.: AIR 2015 SC 2556; 2015-4 KLT 6
Will a tenant get Fixity (S. 13) or Purchase Certificate (S. 72) on “tenancies…”, ‘interspersed within the plantation’ S. 3(1)(viii)

(Not applicable)
Yes. But, within ceiling limit – Sec. 13 under Sec. 72B, 72C.
Proviso refers to a special category on independent-tenancy [from the plantation-tenancy, mentioned in the main Section, S. 3(1)(viii)].
Will there be vesting of land below 30 acres in Govt?

Yes.
Then what is the relation between Govt. and the original tenant? Relation that is recognised by the Statute. That is, fixity in the land vested in Government.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72 E & 72F
Yes (for both above and below 30 acres).

Then what is the relation between Govt. and the original tenant? Relation that is recognised by the Statute .That is, fixity in the land vested in Government.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72 E & 72F

Effect of Conversion of A Portion of Exempted Land into a Non-exempted Category

Section 87 reads as under:

  • “S.87. Excess land obtained by gift, etc. to be surrendered – (1) Where any person acquires any land dafter the date notified under Section 83 by gift, purchase, mortgage with possession, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, such excess shall be surrendered to such authority as may be prescribed.
  •        Explanation 1 – Where any land is exempted by or under Section 81 and such exemption is in force on the date notified under Section 83, such land shall, with effect from the date on which it ceases to be exempted, be deemed to be land acquired after the date notified under Section 83.
  •        Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.

No Total Prohibition in using Exempted Land for a Different Purpose

Explanation II does not make a total bar. It only causes to lose benefit of the exemption to a certain extent. That is, if a person converts any portion of his exempted land to any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit; and the Taluk Land Board can proceed upon that (excess) land. In short, the exemption will be lost for that portion. In this premises, in Wayanad Granites v. District Collector, 2023-4 KLT 874, it is held that ‘fragmentation is per se not illegal’. similarly, in District Collector v. Sajith Lal, 2023-4 KLJ 851, it is held that ‘there is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non-exempted purposes as well’.

In Mathew K.T v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024, in the light of earlier decisions, observed that there is no total prohibition in using an exempted land for a different purpose under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The impediment or restriction is (only) the following –

  • If a portion of the exempted land is utilised for any other purpose, that would fall within his ceiling area and the authorities may be able to initiate ceiling proceedings.

The Full Bench decision, Mathew K. Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority [AIR 2019 Ker. 67, affirmed by the Supreme Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob, 2020-14 SCC 126] held as under:

  • “We however add that any class of land earlier exempted in the ceiling case can be converted into any class of land not liable to be exempted under Explanation II to Section 87 of the Act. The consequence is that the benefit of the exemption would be lost and the extent added to the account of the assessee or the declarant in determination of his ceiling area. That is a matter to be dealt with by the Taluk Land Board with the assessee or the declarant and other interested parties on the party array and we desist from elaborating further.”

In District Collector v. Sajith Lal (2023-4 KLJ 851; 2023 KLT OnLine 1225) it is held as under:

  • “5. There is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non- exempted purposes as well. If the land is used for non-exempted purposes, the holder of the land will lose the qualification for exemption, thus giving authority to the Land Board to initiate ceiling proceedings.” (Quoted in: Mathew K.T v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024)

No Embargo to Transfer Plantation Land

In R. V.  Devassia v. Sub Registrar, Idukki, 2015-1 ILR(Ker) 1047; 2015-1 KHC 805; 2015-2 KLJ 17, it is held as under:

  • “9. On promulgation of the KLR Act in the State, the entire landed property in the State is subjected to State control as envisaged under the provisions of the KLR Act. No piece of the land escapes the clutches of the KLR Act including exempted land for ceiling purposes. The ceiling proceedings is a continuing proceedings and can be reopened in any of the circumstances, if so warranted, as contemplated under Section 87 of the KLR Act. Exemption granted from ceiling is the qualification to use the land in a particular manner, which means a burden is imposed on the land. The moment the qualification for exemption is vanished by conversion of the land, the protection from ceiling will also be extinguished to bring the land within the fold of the ceiling area. The exemption is in the nature of a burden on the land to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted. The eminent domain power of the State can be exercised for acquiring land without consent and also to regulate the use of land in public interest. The eminent domain is power inherent in any Sovereign State. This burden would bind the holder of the land as on 01/01/1970 and the successor-in-interest. The Division Bench of this Court in the State Human Rights Protection Centre, Thrissur and another v. State of Kerala and others [2009 (3) ILR 695] held that exemption granted under S.81(1)(a) is for the land and would continue to operate irrespective of change of ownership of the exempted land and the transferee would have to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted.”

In Everest Stone Crusher and Granites v. District Collector, Kannur, 2020-6 KHC 289, it is observed as under:

  • “16. In Devassia R.V. this Court noticed that, the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act do not place any embargo on transfer. The transfer of registry is for fiscal purposes. The power of the competent authority to reopen the ceiling proceedings to include the land exempted for the purpose of ceiling is not lost on account of effecting mutation. Therefore, the Revenue Officials cannot refuse to effect mutation of the property purchased by the transferee.”

Effect of Fragmentation for Non-exempted Category

The decision in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985, arose from the Writ Petition filed for a declaration that the fragmentation and sale of a Rubber Plantation for non-plantation purposes was illegal as it defeated the purpose of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. When the matter was placed before the Taluk Land Board under Sec 87, KLR Act, it found that there was no change in classification of the land and therefore dropped the proceedings. The Court held as under:

  • “34. Section 81 of the KLR Act is in pith and substance a special provision, with its main objective of giving exemption to certain lands including the lands maintained as plantations is to prevent fragmentation of the land and to keep it as plantation itself to improve the economy of the state for welfare of people as a whole while the Act creates a regime, the State is under an obligation to safeguard, the intended purpose of the provisions of the Act in its spirit. ….. …… It could be gathered from the records that the proposal to transfer 1.03 acres of land to each workers in discharge of their service or retrenchment benefits will definitely divide the plantation into separate slots and that would definitely change the character/nature of the plantation, which could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act.”

Read Blog: Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell

Can a Tenant of Plantation Transfer his Rights, Fragmenting the Plantation

Possession is a heritable and transferable right. [See: Nallammal v. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864; Phirayalal Kapur Vs. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186]. Therefore, a tenant of plantation having rights of fixity (Sec. 13) may have the right to transfer it to another. In any case, the change of character or nature of the plantation by fragmentation being amount to ‘conversion’ (as Provided in Sec. 87 Expl. II) that will be against the provisions of the Act, as pointed out in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985.

In Secretary, TDB v. Mohanan Nair (T.R. Ramachandran Nair & A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, JJ.), ILR 2013-2 Ker 883; 2013-3 KLT 132, an important decision on Kerala Land Reforms Act, it is found that Purchase Certificate issued by Land Tribunal, for land belonging to Government Devaswom (exempted category under S.3(1)(x) of the Act), will be in total violation of Rules, and will be a nullity.

PART – IV VESTING OF LAND IN GOVT. & RIGHT OF GOVT. TO COLLECT RENT

According to the provisions of the KLR Act, lands held by individuals (or associations of persons) vest in Govt. under two provisions. They are-

  • First, Sec. 72 – Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government. (Obviously it applies to tenancy-land alone.)
  • Second, Sec. 86. Vesting of excess lands in Government.
    • Note: Sec. 86 does not apply to Plantations, for (i) they being already vest in Govt. under Sec. 72, and (ii) if Govt. land, no question of vesting arises.

Section 72(1) reads:

  • 72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”

Sec. 81 exemptions do not apply to Govt. lands; But, Exemption apply to lease-lands

Government lands are exempted under Sec. 81(1)(a).

81(1)(a) Proviso says –

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease“.

This proviso is introduced in 1971. By virtue of this amendment (introducing Section 81(1)(a) Proviso) “Plantation-Exemption” takes effect on Government-lease-land (with tenants).

But it must be noted that a ‘valid lease’ must exist. That is, the person in possession of government land should be a “lessee”; he must not be trespasser or a person who forfeit the title of Government.

Section 81(1)(a) Proviso reads as under:

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease whether current or time expired or otherwise.”

The word “otherwise” must be understood as a permissive occupation

In MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28, it is held-

  • “Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 81 by which “Government lands held under a lease current or time expired or otherwise” can be understood only as referring to such lands which are held by persons in permissive possession. The word “otherwise” must be understood as a permissive occupation otherwise than under a lease. The word “otherwise” has no wider meaning in the context. So understood, the exemption to Clause (a) of that Section is perfectly legal and in that limited sense we uphold that provision as valid.”

Tenant is defined in Sec 2 (57) as under:

  • (57) tenant moans any person who has paid or has agreed to pay rent or other consideration
  • for his being allowed to possess and to enjoy any land by a person entitled to lease that land, and includes- …. ….. ….. “

Section 86 reads:

  • 86. Vesting of excess lands in Government. (1) On the determination of the extent and other particulars of the lands, the ownership or possession or both of which is or are to be surrendered under Section 85, the ownership or possession or both, as the case may be of the land shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances and the Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
  • (2) On receipt of [the order of the Taluk Land Board under Sub-section (1)] such person shall make the surrender demanded, in such manner as may he prescribed.
  • (3) Where any person fails to make the surrender demanded, the [Taluk Land Board] may authorise any officer to take possession or assume ownership of the land in such manner as may be prescribed.
  • [(4) Where the ownership of any land vests in the Government under Sub-section (1), the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of the land shall stand extinguished, and where possession of any land which was in the possession of a cultivating tenant vests in the Government under that Sub-section, the ownership of such land shall vest in the Government and the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of such land shall stand extinguished.]

Who is the OWNER of Exempted (Private-Leasehold) Plantation Lands in Kerala?

It is Government, though by virtue of Chapter II (Sec. 13) the tenant has ‘Fixity’. 

  • 1. Plantation (lease) Lands VEST in GOVT, automatically
  • Because,
  • Sec. 72 provides for 
    • mandatory and involuntary vesting in Government
    • of leasehold lands that is held by cultivating tenants entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13 (even if the extent exceeds ceiling limit).
    • See: Perumal Smaraka Nidhi vs M/S Harrisons Malayalam Ltd., 31. 01. 2013.
  • 2.  ‘Vesting’ in Govt. is ‘Vesting of Ownership
  • It is for the reasons –
    • Declared to be ‘vested’ in Government (Sec. 72).
    • Such a tenant is liable to pay ‘rent’ (Sec. 72E) to the Government for the unassigned land, like plantation-exempted-land, vested in Govt. under Sec. 72.
  • 3. ‘Exemption’ in Chapter III Cannot be read into Sec. 72B(2)
  • The provision of law for giving Purchase-Certificate under Sec. 72B specifies that the provisions of Sec. 82 (as to ceiling limit) shall apply for the calculation of the ceiling area (alone).
  • Sec. 72B(2) reads-
    • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1)
  • The exemption provision in Sec. 81 (Chapter III), which excludes plantation lands from the ceiling limit, cannot be brought-forth or read-into Sec. 72B (provision for assignment of purchase-certificate) in Chapter II.
    • In other words, purchase-certificates cannot be given for land above ceiling-limit, rigging the exemption provisions (for plantations etc.).
  • Because,
    • Sec. 72B(1), in Chapter II shows – Sec. 72B(1) is an independent provision (though the Proviso says –  no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest … (more than) … the ceiling area, mentioned in Sec. 82 in Chapter III)
    • When a provision in a latter Chapter of an Act (here, Sec. 82 that deals with extent of ceiling limit, in Chapter III) is referred to in an independent provision in an earlier Chapter (here, Sec. 72B, as regards issuing purchase certificate, in Chapter II), for a specific purpose (here, to state the limit in area alone), it cannot be said – the attributed colour or smell of the provision in the latter chapter (by virtue of other provisions, i.e., entire characteristics or attributions added to Sec. 82 by virtue of other provisions in Chapter III), would stand reflected on the earlier provision (here, Sec. 72B).
  • Further –
    • Chapter II of the KLR Act (dealing with ‘Tenancy’) is exclusive and exhaustive as to ‘fixity’, and ‘vesting’ of land in Government.
    • It is not stated anywhere in the Act – the right and title of the (leased-plantation) land legitimately vested in Government under Sec. 72, will be divested in any manner (in favour of the previous owner, or of the tenant or anybody else), in any circumstance.
    • Sec. 72E provides for collection of ‘rent‘ from the holders of the plantation (for the unassigned land(e.g. exempted plantation land) vested in Government under Sec. 72) and Sec. 72F(5)(h) authorises the Land Tribunal to fix the rent. (It goes without saying saying that it is for the reason that the ownership of the land vests in Govt.)
    • Note: Proceedings initiated by Taluk Land Board under Chapter III (in respect of plantation) do not confer title.
    • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).
  • 4. Government Need Not Pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, if Acquired
    • For the above (plantation land vest in Govt.), the Government Need Not Pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, to the tenant, or the former owner, if such Lands are Acquired.
  • 5. Tenant cannot ‘Sell’ Plantation Land as his absolute property
    • A tenant who got ‘fixity’ over such land cannot ‘sell’ this land as his absolute (ownership) property.

Rights of ‘tenants’ of Plantations, after vesting the land with Govt.? It is a ‘Legal Right conferred by Statute’

  • It is not Tenancy – For no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt.
  • Not Grant or Licence/Permission – For Grant as well as Licence/Permission arise from a contract (express or implied).
  • Therefore, it can termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act.
  • What are the Stipulations attached to that “Legal Right”?
    • Subject to the condition – not to “convert” it for any other use, other than the specific plantation (Sec. 87).
  • When Such a land is Required for Govt., Should it be Acquired?
    • The ownership being vested in Govt. it need not be ‘strictly’ “acquired”.
    • But no provision In Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’, if and when Govt. needs it.
  • Sec. 112 of the KLR Act
    • But, Sec. 112 of the KLR Act says as to ‘Apportionment of land value in cases of acquisition’.
    • Because of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“ upon the former tenants of the plantation, they are entitled for certain compensation, when that land is required for the Govt..
    • In cases falling under Chapter II (pertaining to, tenants entitled for fixity, issuance of purchase certificate etc.) Section 72 deals with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants; and says -the land will be free from encumbrances created by the land-owners and intermediaries.
    • However, insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment (within ceiling limit) subject to the payment of purchase price – as stated in Section 72D. (See: Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439.)
    • No ‘authority’ is also named in any law to fix the compensation to be given to the former tenants, when the Govt. requires it.
  • Therefore, it is said – Apportionment of land value in cases of ‘acquisition’.
    • Note:  It makes no difference (SUBSTANTIALLY, IN DETERMINING COMPENSATION) whether such a plantation land is “acquired” or not. Because, even if the land is not ‘acquired’, Govt. has to pay compensation for improvements to the former tenants (who holds the land by virtue of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act).

Apportionment’s of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 of the KLR Act reads-

  • “112. Apportionment’s of land value in cases of acquisition – (1) Where any land is acquired under the law for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, the compensation awarded under such law in respect of the land acquired shall be apportioned among the landowner, intermediaries, cultivating tenant and the kudikidappukaran in the manner specified in this Section.
  • (2) The compensation for any building or other improvements shall be awarded to the person entitled to such building or other improvements.
  • (3) The kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to the value of the land occupied by his homestead or hut subject to a minimum of-
    • three cents in a city or major municipality; or
    • five cents in any other municipally; or
    • ten cents in a panchayat area or township.
  • (4) The difference between the value of three cents or five cents or ten cents, as the case may be, and the value of the extent of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, be borne by the Government or the local authority or the company or other person on whose behalf the land is acquired.
  • (5) The balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in Sub-section (2) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall he apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land acquired immediately before such acquisition.
    • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to (i) in the case of a landowner, the rent which he was entitled to get from the tenant holding immediately under him; (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord; and (iii) in the case of a cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent payable by him; and the rent payable by the cultivating tenant and the intermediary for the purposes of this Explanation shall be as calculated under the provisions of this Act.
  • (5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
    • (a) the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to such landowner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government; and
    • (b) the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to-
    • in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
    • in the case of the Government, such rent.
  • (7) In this Section, “homestead” includes a dwelling house occupied by a person who is deemed to be a kudikidappukaran under Explanation IIA to clause (25) of Section 2.”

Apportionment depends upon rights on the date of acquisition

  • Valia Raja v. Veeraraghava Iyer, 1961 Ker LT 103, it was held that the question of apportionment of compensation has to depend upon the rights of the parties on the date of the acquisition. Referrd to in: Varkey Thomas Vs. Annamma Abraham,  1969 Ker LT 903.

Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439

  • In Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439, the question as to ‘rival claims raised by the cultivating tenant and landlord for compensation on acquisition’ arose. The land was leased out by landlords. The lease-rights came in the cultivating tenants by transfer. The Government contended that the tenant was a cultivating tenant and the land vested upon the Govt. under Sec. 72 KLR Act. Hence tenant alone would be entitled to get compensation for the improvements to be determined under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, in view of Section 20(1) of the KLR Act.
  • The landlords argued that the land was a plantation (over 30 acres) when it was (originally) leased, and therefore, they are entitled to claim exemption and benefits in the light of the exemption under clause (viii)  of Section 3 (1) of the KLR Act. Since there would be no fixity of tenure, it being a plantation, there would not be vesting of rights of the land owner in the Government. Hence, there should be the apportionment of the compensation between the lessor and the lessee and it should be decided in the acquisition proceedings.
  • The single Judge dismissed the writ petition, ‘leaving open the liberty of the lessee as well as the landlords, to approach the civil court seeking relief against the Government, and also to resolve the inter se dispute by and between the tenant and the landlords’.
  • The Division Bench, in appeal held that ‘land acquisition’ proceedings are to be initiated. It is pointed out that (even if it is a land vested in Govt.) there is no provision in Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’ if and when Govt. need it. The court also observed as under –
    • “31. On an analysis of the provisions of Section 72(1) of the Act, 1963, it is clear that when the Government notified the said provision with effect from 01.01.1970, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under sub-Section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, vested in the Government.
    • 32. Therefore, it is clear from Section 72 that what is vested with the Government is the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants. It is nothing but a legal fiction by which the interest held by a cultivating tenant in a property of a landlord or intermediary is protected from 01.01.1970 .
    • 34. On a conjoint reading of Sections 72 and 72A, it can be seen that vesting of rights in the Government contained under Section 72 is the rights held by the landlord and the intermediary in respect of holdings held by the cultivating tenants. However, the same will not, in any manner, interfere with the rights enjoyed by a cultivating tenant in contemplation of the provisions of the Act, 1963.”
    • 42. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 72 of Act, 1963 would only deal with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants free from encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries. However, the legal provisions discussed above would make it clear that insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.
  • While considering the right of landlord, it is pointed out (basing on the principle, or scheme of the KLR Act**) that the landlord may have right for compensation under Section 72BB. The Division Bench said-
    • “36. So also, sub-Section (1) of Section 72BB dealing with ‘the right of landlord to apply for assignment and compensation’ specifies that any landowner or intermediary, whose right, title and interest in respect of any holding have vested in the Government, may apply to the Land Tribunal for the assignment of such right, title and interest to the cultivating tenant and for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A.”
  • **Note: 1. If plantation-lease-(leasing a land when plantation existed)-above-30-acre-
    • Sec. 72, 72 BB etc. will not apply (such land being excluded from Chapter II, under Sec. 3(1)(viii), KLR Act).
  • 2. In case of a plantation-lease-above-30-Acre-
    • on termination of the lease period, the land lord can resume the land, on the basis of his title; for, the tenant will not have fixity in such case, the land being exempted from the benefits of Chapter II (as per Sec. 3(1)(viii) of the KLR Act).
  • 3. The landlords of such plantation will get the benefits (under Sec. 81) and protection from ceiling limit that is stipulated under the provisions of Sec. 82, 83 etc. (that is, there will be no ceiling limit).
  • 4. In such a case, the right of landlord may be on a higher level or footing than the tenant (to get compensation).
  • 5. It cannot be compared with a plantation that is put up by the tenant. The tenants of such plantation will-
    • get fixity under Sec. 13 (though they will not get Purchase Certificate),
    • get the benefits and protection (under Sec. 81) from ceiling limit that is stipulated under the provisions of Sec. 82, 83 etc. (that is, there will be no ceiling limit).
    • In such a case, the right for compensation, if any, of the landlord will be nil or negligible.
  • The Division Bench, inter alia, on the above observations directed ‘the State and its officials to take proceedings for the acquisition of the land’.

Criticism on Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439

The Division Bench failed to consider–

  • The right, title and interest of the land (above ceiling limit) ‘vest’ with the Government under Sec. 72. It is absolute. It is not a ‘fiction.
  • In K. Jayaprakashan v. State of Kerala, 2023-3 KLT 541, it is observed as under:
    • “Section 72 of the Act deals with vesting of landlord’s rights in Government. As per sub-section (1) of Section 72 ….  all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyiruppus and holders of karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 … shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon on the said date”.
  • In V.N. Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (P.T. Raman Nayar, T.C.Raghavan, K.K.Mathew, JJ.) , AIR 1971 Ker 98, it is held as under:
    • “By Section 72 the rights of landlords whose rights have not been purchased by cultivating tenants vest in the Government free of all encumbrances on a date to be notified by the Government in that behalf -the date has been notified as the 1st January, 1970”
  • The absolute nature of vesting is further clear from Sec. 72E and Sec. 112(5A).
  •  The nature of this statutory ‘vesting in Govt’ (under Sec. 72) is further clear from – Sec. 72E (tenant has to pay rent for the unassigned land(e.g. exempted plantation land) vested in Government under Sec. 72). Such payments are required in two occasions – (i) after vesting in Government for there is cultivating tenant and fixity of tenure and the tenant has not got his rights purchased under ‘Purchase Certificate’ and (ii) holding exempted-plantation land excess of ceiling limit.
  • In Lakshmi v. Rama Iyer, 1992-1 ILR-Ker 398; 1991-2 KLT 897it is pointed out:
    • “Consequently the title and interest of the land-lord would vest in the Government on the appointed day that is, on 1-1-1970. Then as per S. 72Q the land owner would be entitled to recover rent accrued till 1-1-1970 only”.
  • In Aru v. Nakunni (Padmanabhan, J.), 1987-1 KLT 177, it is held as under:
    • “Under S.72 of the Act all the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of a holding held by a cultivating tenant entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 shall, subject to the various provisions of S.72, vest in the Government free of all encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries and subsisting on the date notified by the Government. ….. When once vesting has taken place there cannot be any further rights in any body. …. By assignment all such rights vest in the tenant”.
  •  Sec. 112(5A) deals with unassaigned land (that is, no purchase certificate is given). Under this sub section land-value need not be given to the land-owner or the tenant over and above the “value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” – that is, the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
  • This provision is applied to lease-lands vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 and no purchase certificate is given (to the tenant)., in case of acquisition).
  • Sec. 72B(2) KLR Act spells-out that a cultivating tenant will get Purchase Certificate for the extent below the ‘ceiling limit’ alone. That is, the tenant has no “absolute rights” above the ceiling limit.
  • Plantation-lands, usually, involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land. The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be miniscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres). Therefore, the analogy drawn by the Bench (tenant has a right seek assignment) is not apt at all.
  • When land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 is acquired, in the light of Sec. 112(5A) land-value need not be given to the land-owner or the tenant, over and above the “value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” – that is, the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
  • The aforesaid provision of law in the KLR Act is legislated following Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
  • The rights of ‘tenants’ of Plantations, to continue in the land till the plantation exists, after vesting the land with Govt., is a ‘Legal Right conferred by Statute’. It is not Tenancy – for no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt. It is not a Grant or Licence/Permission – for such rights arise from a contract (express or implied). Therefore, it can be termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act.
  • It goes without saying – If no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.
  • It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation-tenants (majority are BIG Companies) which had not been given to Maharaja of Travancore (whose 191 acres of lands in Thiruvananthapuram – above the ceiling limit, 15 acres – in the City was ‘mercilessly’ taken under the Orders of the Land Board Trivandrum, No. LB(B)2-18919/70, dated 15.01.1972). It is a sheer fact that lands of thousands of middleclass property owners was also harshly taken by under the provisions of the Act. (Note: Only limited right to continue the specified plantation-crop alone is given by the ‘exemption’; and, according to law, in case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost.)

No Land value to be given for the “excess” land (Beyond Ceiling Limit)

From the following words in Sect. 112, it is beyond doubt that no Land value to be given for the entire land and it is limited to a portion.

  • building or other improvements
  • land occupied by the homestead or hut”
  • any building or other improvements“.

It is true, “exemption” is given to plantation, to hold land over and above ceiling limit. It is only a statutory permission to continue, subject to conditions. It will be lost when it is “fragmented” or the crop is abandoned. As stated elsewhere, it is also most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation owners or tenants (majority are BIG Companies) which had not been given to thousands of middleclass property owners whose property had been harshly sized or expropriated under the provisions of the KLR Act.

The Govt. is Entitled Reasonable ‘Rent and Land Tax (for previous leasehold land)

The land being vest in Govt., it can collect reasonable ‘rent’ (for the unassigned land(e.g. exempted plantation land) vested in Government under Sec. 72) . Sec. 72E reads as under:

  • 72E. Rent of holdings vested in Government but not assigned to cultivating tenants. – Where in respect of any holding or part thereof, the right, title and interest of the landowner and intermediaries have vested in the Government under Section 72 and the cultivating tenant is not entitled to the assignment of such right, title and interest by virtue of Sub-section (1) of Section 72, the cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay to the Government the rent payable under this Act from the date of vesting under Section 72.

With respect to payment of tax it is stated as under in Sec. 72S:

  • 72S. Liability for assessment alter the date of vesting under Section 72. (1)] Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract, where the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, in respect of a holding have vested in the Government under Section 72, the cultivating tenant of that holding shall be liable to pay the basic tax payable in respect of that holding under the said Act and other taxes and cesses due in respect of that holding.
  • (2) In the case of a holding or part of a holding in respect of which an application for resumption under the provisions of this Act is rejected, the cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay the basic tax and other taxes and cesses in respect of such holding or part of the holding, as the case may be, with effect on and from the date notified under Sub-section (1) of Section 72.

CAN AN AN EXEMPTED PLANTATION LAND BE SOLD AS AN ABSOLUTE PRIVATE PROPERTY?

No.

  • In the event – plantation activities cease or are discontinued, that land would also be treated as ‘excess land’.
  • Hence, it is indisputably explicit – NO VESTED RIGHT or OWNERSHIP is conferred on LAND by the ‘plantation-exemption’.
  • It is beyond doubt – the legislature never intended (where a large extent of land had been forcibly got surrendered from other land owners), to bring an inequitable and discriminatory disparity, while ‘plantation-exemption’ was conferred under Sec. 81 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

Sec. 82 and 83 apply to Plantation Lands also

  • Sec. 82 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act deals with ceiling area.
  • Sec. 83 mandates that no person shall be entitled to own or hold lands in excess of the ceiling area.
    • Sec. 83 reads – “83. No person to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. With effect from such dates as may be notified by the Government in the Gazette, no person shall be entitled to own or hold or to possess under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area.”
  • Sec. 85 directs that excess land shall be surrendered to Government (accepting the compensation fixed under Sec. 88).
  • Though Sec. 81 (generally?) exempts plantations from the provisions of Chapter III, Sec. 87 directs that the protection of plantation is available only so long as the plantation subsists.

PART – V Civil Court Jurisdiction : Decisions

Supreme Court Decision – Plantation put up by tenant on land leased.

The Supreme Court held in Rt. Rev. Jerome Fernandez vs. Be Be Rubber Estate, 1972 KLT 613.  It is observed as under:

  • “It may well be that the legislature thought that it will not be fair or proper to deny the benefit of fixity of tenure to lessees who might have taken on lease extensive parambas or waste land and might have in course of time by their hard toil developed them into plantations.”

When Civil Court can Interfere

  • Even when a tribunal is provided for redressal of remedies, the civil courts will have jurisdiction to examine the allegation of non-compliance of the provisions of the statute or of any of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. If the challenge is only as to the ‘erroneous’ character of the order, other than ‘jurisdictional error’, the suit will not be maintainable. (South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt.  Ltd.  2019-4 CivCC 150 (SC); 2019-3 CurCC 370(SC); 2019-11 Scale 33).
  • When an order is passed by a statutory Land-Tribunal violating a mandatory provision, the order will be illegal, without jurisdiction and a nullity. The civil courts which are courts of “general jurisdiction” can decide whether a tribunal or authority exercising statutory jurisdiction has acted in excess or beyond the statutory powers. The civil courts can interfere when the order of the statutory tribunal or authority is really not an order under the Act conferring jurisdiction on it. In other words, if a tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions (Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Ludhiana Municipality AIR 1963 SC 1547), the jurisdiction of the civil court will not be excluded. The ultimate decision can be challenged, in spite of finality and exclusionary clauses (or provision for appeal/revision), since the jurisdiction had been assumed by the tribunal, where it did not exist, and the decision was not a decision under the Act, but a nullity(Muhammad Haji v. Kunhunni Nair, AIR  1993 Ker 104).

A purchase certificate shall not bind one who was not party to the proceedings

In Thayukutty v. Manikandan, the Kerala High Court (2023) held as under:

  • “Doubtlessly, a purchase certificate shall not bind a party, who is not party to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, having better title over the property covered by the purchase certificate.”

Civil court to declare and decide on title

Civil court alone has the jurisdiction to make the declaration and decide on title.  

  • In Joginer Singh v. Pushpa, AIR 1969 P& H 397 it was pointed out – all civil matters have to be settled by the civil Courts unless their jurisdiction is taken away either expressly or by necessary implication.
  • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).

Taluk Land Board cannot initiate action of its own, otherwise than directed by Land Board

  • State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR1996 SC 1009:
  • “Section 85(7) provides that where any person fails to file the statement, the Land Board shall intimate the fact to the Taluk Land Board and thereupon the Taluk Land Board shall, after necessary enquiries, determine the extent and other particulars of the land or lands which is or are to be surrendered. In other words, the statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit and if such a person fails to file the statement in accordance with law, the Board is enjoined to proceed against such person.”

Whether Private Land or Government Land – Outside jurisdiction of TLB

  • The Kerala High Court, in Jagadeesachandran Nair Vs. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584, refused to call for the TLB proceedings in the Writ Petition filed by the State of Kerala before the High Court for calling for the records of the Taluk Land Board constituted under the Kerala Land Reforms Act to quash certain proceedings, claiming that the large extent of land held by the respondent was liable to be forfeited under the Kerala Escheats and Forfeitures Act, 1950. The State contended that there was gross violation of the land laws and FERA. The State also asserted a fraud on the Constitution of India, warranting immediate action in public interest and based on public policy as enjoined under Article 296 of the Constitution.
  • Analysing this decision it is pointed out in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd, v. State of Kerala, 2018 (2) Ker LT 369, that in Jagadeesachandran’s case it was noticed that the question whether the land was a private land or a government land was totally outside the scope of the proceedings pending before the TLB.
  • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).

Ancillary relief could also be granted by the civil court

In law, when the main relief, title declaration, is cognisable by civil court the ancillary relief would be immaterial for determination of proper forum; and in such cases the ancillary relief could also be granted by the civil court (Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, 1969 All. 526). 

In Gurucharansingh v. Gurdayal Kaur, AIR 1982 Raj  91, it is held as under:

  • “Once the suit is maintainable for the main relief in the civil court then there is no bar for the civil court to grant all possible reliefs flowing from the same cause of action. The determination of the question as to which out of the several reliefs arising from the same cause of action is the main relief will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

The High Court quoted the following principles laid down in Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, 1969 All. 526, FB:

  • “(1) Where, on the basis of a cause of action, the main relief is cognizable by a revenue court, the suit would be cognizable by the revenue court only. The fact that the ancillary reliefs claimed are cognizable by civil court would be immaterial for determining the proper forum for the suit;
  • (2) Where, on the basis of a cause of action, the main relief is cognizable by the civil court, the suit would be cognizable by the civil court only and the ancillary reliefs, which could be granted by the revenue court may also be granted by the civil court.”

Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, 1969 All. 526 is referred to several decisions. It include the following recent decisions –

  • Jagir Singh v. Kulwant Kaur, 2023-1 CurCC 291;
  • Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Jitendra Pratap Singh, 2021-7 ADJ 651;
  • 2021-6 AllLJ 91; Vijay Pal v. Rajendra Kumar, 2021-4 ADJ 182; 2021-4 AllLJ 351;
  • Shanti @ Satiya v. Phoolan Dullaiya, AIR 2016 All  137

Is the Tenant of a Plantation a Cultivating Tenant?

  • Yes.
  • Sec. 2(8) defines cultivating tenant as under:
  • Cultivating tenant means a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate, the land comprised in his holding.”

Can Purchase-Certificate be given to Plantation-Land, over & above Ceiling-Limit?

  • No.
  • Because, under Sec. 72B(2) a cultivating tenant is entitled to get assigned the area within the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 alone.

Sec. 72B reads as under:

  • “72B. Cultivating tenants right to assignment. – (1) The cultivating tenant of any holding or part of a holding, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Section 72, shall be entitled to assignment of such right, title and interest: ….. ….
  • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1);
  • (3) (4) (5)

Is Purchase Certificate (inaccurate on its face, or fraud, for excess of the ceiling area) Conclusive Proof?

  • No.

Our Apex Court considered this matter in Chettian Veetil Ammad v. Taluk Land Board, AIR 1979 SC 1573; 1980 1 SCC 499 (P.N. Shinghal & O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.) where Purchase Certificate was issued, excess of the ceiling area, as under:

  • “27. It would thus appear that even though the certificate of purchase issued under sub-section (1) of Section 72-K is conclusive proof of the assignment of the right, title and interest of the landowner in favour of the holder in respect of the holding concerned under sub-section (2), that only means that no contrary evidence shall be effective to displace it, unless the so called conclusive proof is inaccurate on its face, or fraud can be shown (Halsburys – Laws of England, fourth edition, Vol. 17, page 22 paragraph 28), It may be stated that “inaccuracy on the face” of the certificate is not as wide in its connotation as an “error apparent on the face of the record.” It will not therefore be permissible for the Board to disregard the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase merely on the ground that it has not been issued on a proper appreciation or consideration of the evidence on record, or that the. Tribunals finding suffers from any procedural error. What sub-section (2) of Section 72-K provides is an irrebuttable presumption of law, and it may will be regarded as a rule of substantive law. But even so, for reasons already stated, it does not thereby take away the jurisdiction of the Taluk Land Board to make an order under Section 85 (5) after taking into consideration the “conclusive” evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase according to Section 72-K (2) as far as it goes.”

It is also noteworthy (as stated above) that a purchase certificate shall not bind one, who was not party to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, having better title over the property covered by the purchase certificate (Thayukutty v. Manikandan, the Kerala High Court (2023).

Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy’; TLB to Fix Plantation Exemption.

In Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it is pronounced that the tenants who have not approached the Land  Tribunal and established rights as “cultivating tenant” are not entitled to avail benefits on “Fixity of Tenure”, under Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

It is pointed out – when a title claim is raised by the Government or the Devaswom, the person who claims to be a cultivating tenant –

  • will have to first prove their claim of being a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, under the provisions of the KLR Act through a proper process of law.

It is held as under:

  • “This is pertinent because, under Section 72B(3) of the KLR Act, it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant, entitled to assignment of right, title and interest in respect of any property, to apply to the Land Tribunal, within whose jurisdiction that the property is situated, within two years from the date of vesting of such title and interest.”

It is based upon the following principles of law:

  • A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and claim benefits under KLR Act.
  • Land Tribunal is the sole authority to determine if someone is a Cultivating Tenant or not.
  • The TLB, deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues etc., and determines the land to be surrendered.

Cultivating Tenants (‘Entitled to Assignment’) are Obligated to Apply LT

Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it was laid down that only cultivating tenants, entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, would be “entitled to hold possession over the property and to resist action under the KLC Act”.

Sec. 72B provides for cultivating tenant’s rights to get assignment by purchase certificate (through LT) – within ceiling area. A Tenant was “obligated to apply” for the purchase certificate within 2 years from 1-1-1970.

Sec. 73B(3) reads as under:

  • “(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

The Legal Basis of Balanoor Plantations case

  • A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and avail benefits – the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.

It is similar to the principle – title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54). [See also: Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736; 1993 2 KLT 962.]

Extent of Land that for which a Purchase Certificate can be issued by LT

If a cultivating tenant (of a plantation land) possessed land at or above the ceiling limit, no purchase certificate can be issued to him, from the plantation property in question. 

If a tenant holds some land, he will receive a Purchase Certificate for the extent – equal to the Ceiling Limit minus the land he already possesses.

If such a tenant holds land at or above the ceiling limit (and, for that reason,  no purchase certificate can be given with respect to the plantation property), proceedings are to be promulgated, or an order is to be issued, by the Land Tribunal  to that effect, if it finds that he is a cultivating tenant of that plantation. This proceedings also has to be presented with the lease-agreement and other documents, before the Taluk Land Board, for getting the order of exemption.  

Tenant has to pay Rent to the Government

In any case, the tenants who are found to be cultivating tenants entitled to hold the plantation tenancy land, under exemption, have to pay rent to the Government as provided under Sec. 72E for the unassigned land(e.g. exempted plantation land) vested in Government under Sec. 72 (and the Land Tribunal has to fix the rent under subsection (5)(h) of Sec. 72F).  If such land is acquired by the Government  compensation for improvements alone need be paid to the tenant [and no land-value be given, under Sec. 112(5A)]. 

Effect of Travancore Govt. Leases after Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061

The Proclamation of 1040 reads thus:

“PROCLAMATION

By His Highness the Maha Rajah of Travancore, issued under date the 2nd June 1865, corresponding to the 21st Edavam 1040.

Whereas we earnestly desire that the possession of landed as well as other property in Our territory should be as secure as possible; and whereas We are of opinion that, with this view, Sirkar Pattom lands can be placed on a much better footing than at present so as to enhance their value; We are pleased to notify to Our ryots

  • Istly- that the Sirkar hereby and for ever surrenders, for the benefit of the people all optional power over the following classes of lands, whether wet, garden or dry, and whether included in the Ayacut accounts or registered since:
  • Ven Pattom, Vettolivoo Pattom, Maraya Pattom, Olavoo Pattom, Mara Pattom, and all such Durkast Pattom the tax of which is understood to be fixed till the next Survey and Assessment;
  • 2ndly. that the ryots holding these lands may regard them fully as private, heri-table, saleable, and otherwise transferable, property;
  • 3rdly. accordingly, the sales, mortgages, & e., of these lands will hence-forward be valid; may be effected on stamped cadjans and will be duly registered; the lands may be sold for arrears of tax, in execution of decrees of Courts and such other legitimate purposes, and may also be accepted as security by the Sirkar as well as by private individuals;
  • 4thly. that the holders of the lands in question may rest assured that they may enjoy them undisturbed so long as the appointed assessment is paid;
  • 5thly. that the said holders are hence-forth at full liberty to lay out labour and capital on their lands of the aforesaid description to any extent they please, being sure of continued and secure possession;
  • 6thly. that the aforesaid description of lands will be resumable by the Sirkar like Jenmom and other private lands only for purely public purposes, as for instance, for making roads, canals, public buildings, & e., and when resumed for such purposes compensation will be paid by the Sirkar not for improvements only as here to fore, but equal, to the full market value of such lands;
  • 7thly. that the foregoing concessions are not however to be understood to affect in any way the rights of the Sirkar to regulate the land tax, to resume escheats, to confiscate the property of criminals, and generally such rights as have heretofore been exercised upon all property in general;
  • 8thly. that it is to be understood that when Pattom land being a portion of a holding, is transferred to a pauper, with the view of defrauding the Sirkar of the tax due to it, the Sirkar will have the right of apportioning the tax so as to prevent loss of revenue; and,
  • 9thly. (Repealed by Proclamation dated the 5th Karkadakam 1059). (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 : Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez Vs Albert Fernandez, AIR 1971 Ker 168; 1971 Ker LT 1.)

Royal Proclamation of 1061 (1886) Brings in Further Radical Changes

Paragraph 9 of the Proclamation of 1061 says, with reference to Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, as regards Pandarapattam lands, as under:

  • “these lands were originally the absolute property of Government, and the tenants were mere tenants-at-will; but, by the Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, Government generously waived all right to these lands, and declared them to be the private, hereitable, saleable property of the holders.”

Section 22 of the Settlement Proclamation of 1061 (1886) made radical changes in land tenure.

Those changes were:

  • (1)   no debt shall be recognised as due to the holder;
  • (2) no interest shall be deducted from the Pattom on such debt;  
  • (3) no reduction of debt or a corresponding enhancement of the Sirkar demand shall be made when such properties were transferred by sale.
  • The properties held on the tenures in question shall be recognised as so many favourably assessed lands or Inams and confirmed to the holders as such.

Clause 7 of Section 24 of the Proclamation provided as under:

  • “There shall be no further interference on the part of the Government with these free holds, except such as might be necessary for the punctual realization of the quit rent payable”.(Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.)

Now a question arises: What is the impact of 1040 and 1061 (1886) Proclamations over the ‘Government Land Leases’ made after 1061 (1886)? Do such leased lands qualify as “estate” under Article 31A of the Constitution?

The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out (by the Government) after 1061 (1886) do not acquire the rights of ‘permanency of tenure’ or attain the ‘proprietary interest’ conferred by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061. If such rights are axiomatically conferred as a matter of course, the result would be that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands (after the Proclamations), for, the lease character would be lost at the moment it is made.

In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (five Judge Bench), 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.), concluded that the land covered by the Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 were “estates” falling under Art. 31A of the Constitution. It was on the finding that the Proclamation “secured permanency of tenure”, and “proprietary interest” in the soil. It was observed as under:

  • “7. It is impossible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that,even after the Proclamation of 1040, the holders of these lands had no proprietary interest whatsoever in the soil and remained tenants in the strict sense of that term, with only the right of enjoyment, the only difference being that they secured permanency of tenure, the Government still remaining the full and absolute proprietor of the soil.”

Therefore, there is a clear difference between leases made before and after the Proclamations, and the rights conferred by the Proclamations do not apply to leases made after them.

‘Pandarappattoms’ before 1061 (1886) were Recorded as “Thettoms

The ‘pandaravakappattoms’ before 1061 (1886) to which benefits of proprietary rights were conferred under the Proclamations (1040 and 1061) were recorded in 1910 Travancore Settlement Register as “Thettoms” (such as Devaswom Thettom, Namboori Thettom etc.)

  • Note: When those properties (upon which Brhamins or Devaswoms had pandarappattom rights) were sold or leased, they were termed in the transfer-deeds as “Devaswom Thettom”, “Namboori Thettom”.

Also Read: Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board

End Notes

Relevant provisions of KLR Act, in a Nutshell

Section Provisions in a Nutshell
Chap. II 
3(1)
Exemptions – (i) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to – (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
“Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.
7 EPersons acquired lands (before 2005 amendment in KLR Act) for consideration below 1 Hec. 61 Are 87 Sq.m. (4 acre) will be deemed to be tenants .
13Fixity: “Every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding.”
22Landlord desiring to resume any land shall apply to the Land Tribunal.
31Fair rent determined by Land Tribunal.
51BLandlord not to enter on land surrendered or abandoned by the tenant. 
Contravention is made punishable.
54(1)
55
57
57 (3)
57 (6)
61
54(1). A cultivating tenant (to purchase the right) has to apply LT.
55. Purchase price is fixed by LT (on fair rent u/s. 31) to be paid u/s. 59
57. The LT, after enquiries, passes orders determining purchase price.
(3). The Land Tribunal allows the purchase of the land it determines.
(6). The Land Tribunal forwards  orders to the Land Board.
61. Tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) pending proceedings.
59When Sec. 54 application is allowed (by the LT), the purchase price (determined u/s. 57 by the LT) shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal to the credit of the Land Board and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
72
Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating tenants in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
72(1) says: Holdings upon which tenanat entilted fixity under sec. 13 vest in govt.
72BProvides for ‘cultivating tenants’ rights to get assignment  – purchase certificate (through LT) within ceiling area as provided under sub-section (2) ; (apply within 2 years from 1-1-1970). Effect of non-applying – See: Balanur Plantations case. 2018(3) KLT 283.
72DThe cultivating tenant has to pay the purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
72ESuch tenant is liable to pay rent to the Government (for the unassigned land (e.g. exempted plantation land) vested in Government under Sec. 72) .
72CProvides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit). Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 
72KLT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.
74Prohibition of future tenancies.
Chap. III 
81
Exemption from ceiling and excess for Govt. lands, private forests, plantations, industrial or commercial undertaking etc.
Proviso – There will be exemption (as plantation, land given to educational institution, trust etc.) on Government lands, given under grant, lease etc.
See: HMT (Machine Tools) Limited v. Taluk Land Board, 2009 (3) KLJ 110; MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28.
82Ceiling area – 5/10 standard acres.
83No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  It is a total bar. (Note:  plantations, industrial area etc. are exempted.)
Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB), Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137)
The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571.
84Certain transfers – void.
85(1)Surrender excess.
85(2)Owners and Tenants of plantation (who owns and hold properties) should furnish ceiling return to Land Board before March31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
Effect of non-filing: See – Balanoor Plantations case – 2018(3) KLT 283.State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
 According to S. 3(1) (viii), “tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres” is exempted from Chapter II. Therefore, the landlord can recover such plantation lands after the period of tenancy. Such landlords also had to file a ceiling return within the time stipulated.
85(3)Excess shall be surrendered.
Note: Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant) It is clear from the following provisions: 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT (or the purchase of right, title and interest.)
55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case. Note: (i) The sub-section (3) itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant, (ii) LT is the only authority to determine tenancy (Land Board cannot determine it), and (iii) it is clear that even if it is a plantation-exemption-land (beyond ceiling limit), the tenant has to file petition under Section 54 – for fixing Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT and for allotting the land under section 57(3) and for effecting the payments of ‘rent’ and ‘purchase price’(to the credit of the Land Board)  under sec. 61 and 59.
85(3A)The person bound to file a statement under sub-section (2) (that is, Owners and Tenants – having land in excess of the ceiling area)  shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.
85(5)On receipt of the statement under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3A), the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Board and such Taluk LandBoard shall determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered.
85(7)Whereon a person fails to file statement under 85(2), LB shall intimate TLB  –  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered.
It is obvious – The LB can intimate TLB as to non-filing, on the basis of the records it obtained under Sec. 57(6) and 59. That is, those tenants who are not entitled to get a purchase certificate also have to file an application under Sec. 54(1) and 85(2) or (3A).
Effect of non-filing: See – Balanur Plantations case (With respect to Sec. 72B application) – 2018(3) KLT 283. Statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit to file a statement:  State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
[TLB not to do, suomotu, without direction from LB. 1980 KLT 120, referred to in 2019(1) KLT 985.]
85AFile ceiling return within March  2, 1973 before Land Board..
86(1)On determination of the extent to be surrendered under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
86(3)Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession
86(4)Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
86(6)Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
87
Exp. II
If a person gets a portion of plantation-land on converion/ fragmentation (sale/transfer) of an exempted-plantation-land, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit. That is, the exemption will be lost for that portion. (Mathew K Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913)

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Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

State-Interference in Affairs of Societies & Clubs

Saji Koduvath, Advocate

Synopsis

  • 1.      Introduction
  • 2.      Article 19(1)(c) ‘Reasonable Restrictions’
  • 3.      Management and Vesting of Property of Societies, Separate
  • 4.      TN So. Regn. Act Provides for Compulsory Election
  • 5.      Co-op. Registrar’s Powers Supervisory in Nature
  • 6.      Art. 19 (1)(c) & Takeover – Considerations: Public interest
  • 7.      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. State
  • 8.      Take-Over: Enactment Struck Down
  • 9.      Parliament Cannot Infringe Constil. Rights:  Damyanti’s Case
  • 10.    Damyanti’s Case Distinguished in Subsequent Cases
  • 11.    Authorities Required To Record Reasons
  • 12.    Take-Over: Bad, Where No Provision in the Acts Concerned
  • 13.    Co-operative Societies – Created by Statute
  • 14.    A Member Cannot Assail Statutory Interference:
  • 15.    Take-over and Appointment of Administrator
  • 16.    Take-over: Balance Between Institutional and Public Interest
  • 17.    Take Over: Management of Property, for a limited period
  • 18.    Admission of New Members: State Cannot Compel
  • 19.    Action of Legislature: If Violative of Article 14, Arbitrary
  • 20.    Formation of Assons. – Different From Running Business
  • 21.    Escheat

1. Introduction

Article 19(1)(c) of our Constitution guarantees freedom and right ‘to form associations or unions’. The right to ‘form’ association includes in itself the right for effective functioning of the association so as to enable it to achieve its lawful objectives.  Article 19 lays down

  • Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. – 
  • (1) All citizens shall have the right. –
    • (a)….  (b) …. 
    • (c) to form associations or unions, co -operative societies; 
    • (d) … (e) … (f) … (g) . … 
  • (2) ….
  • (3) … 
  • (4) Nothing in Sub -clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause.
  • (5) … 
  • (6) ….”

2. Article 19(1)(c) ‘Reasonable Restrictions’

The right to form associations is not absolute. It is not incapable of regulation; because, it is subject to ‘reasonable restrictions’, which the State can impose, as laid down in clause (4) of Article 19.[1] In A. Umarani Vs. Registrar, Co-operative Societies[2] the Apex Court has observed that except playing supervisory role, the State has no administrative control over the day-to-day affairs of a co-operative society. 

Following are the important Apex Court rulings on this point:

  • Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd Vs. State of Kerala.[3]
  • Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India.[4]
  • SP Mittal V. Union of India.[5]
  • LN Mishra Institute of Economic Development Vs. State of Bihar.[6]
  • Daman Singh  Vs. State of Punjab.[7]
  • Kamareddy Suryanarayana Vs. District Co-operative Officer[8]
  • All India Bank Employees’ case.[9]
  • The Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi.[10]
  • State of Madras v. V.G. Row.[11]

3. Management and Vesting of Property of Societies[12], Separate

In Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[13] it is observed in para 27:

  • “If what is vested in the College Committee or its governing body is a right of management simpliciter, there is no question of the members of the society or the members of the governing body being beneficially interested in its property. It necessarily follows that by the fact of appointment of a treasurer, there can be no deprivation of the society of its rights in property. The consequence, which would flow on the appointment of a treasurer by the Government under the provisions of the Charitable Endowments Act, would be that he will take charge of the management of the properties held by the society. There is no divesting of the rights of the society in its properties. As already stated, what all the society is deprived of would be right of management which cannot be equated to any right in the property.”[14]

In Rev. Father Farcisus Mascarenhas Vs. The State of Bombay,[15] it was contended that the Roman Catholic Churches were governed by the canon law and that the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which mandated registration  under the provisions of the Act contravened the fundamental rights of the Catholics; but, it was observed in the judgment that the provisions of the Bombay Act did not affect the fundamental rights of the Roman Catholics to hold property but they could only administer the property of the Church in conformity with law.

4. T.N. Societies Registration Act Provides for Compulsory Election

No Violation of ‘Fundamental Right to Form Association’

No Constitutional Guarantee – Without Interference by Law

Deviating from the (Central) So. Registration Act, 1860, T.N. Societies Registration Act, 1975, Sections 15(3) and 15(4) provide that the office of any member of the Committee cannot ensure beyond a period of three years and thereafter the election process has necessarily got to be adopted. S. 26(4) enables the Registrar to depute an officer to be present at the general meetings of the Institution and the Charitable Society.

In Periyar Self-respect Propaganda Institution, Trichy Vs. State of TN[16] the constitutional validity of these provisions were upheld observing the following:

  • “By putting an end to the life membership or life offices, there is no putting an end to the right to form an association as such. The holding of an office for a particular tenure or for that matter for life is a matter of internal arrangement amongst members constituting the Institution or the Charitable Society arid certainly it cannot assume the colour of a fundamental right. …..  As rightly contended by the learned Advocate General appearing for the State, neither the Institution nor the Charitable Society, nor the present incumbents of the life offices could claim that they could form associations only with the life offices engrafted in the rules, or if they had already formed, they must be allowed to continue to have that set up and any disturbance thereof would amount to violation of the right to form an association guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c). If at all, such a right could be characterised as a peripheral or concomitant right which may facilitate the fulfillment of the objectives of the founders of the Institution and the Charitable Society. But, there is no constitutional guarantee that every association formed shall effectively achieve its objectives without interference by law. This is not a case where the composition of the association is being altered. Neither the members nor the association of members could claim that they have a fundamental right to have office for life.”

5. Co-op. Registrar’s Powers Regulatory or Supervisory in Nature

Our Apex Court in Thalappalam Ser. Co-op. Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala[17] observed as under:

  • “34. … Powers exercised by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and others under the Co-operative Societies Act are only regulatory or supervisory in nature, which will not amount to dominating or interfering with the management or affairs of the society so as to be controlled.”[18]

6. Art. 19 (1)(c) & TakeoverConsiderations: Public interest[19]

Within its sphere of activity, an association has the right of internal management. Nevertheless, if its functioning is deleterious to the interests of its members or the general public,[20] the association-right in the Constitution of India [Art. 19 (1)(c)] does not render the institution immune from take-over of management by the State or the executive agencies invoking the powers given in the statute concerned,[21] or by proper legislation.[22] The existence of the association-right, ipso facto, is no guarantee that if the functioning of  the  institution  is  not  conducive  to  its  objects,  it  would nevertheless be left alone.[23] 

The Supreme Court, in LN Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna Vs. State of Bihar,[24] upheld the Constitutional validity of an Ordinance (later replaced by an Act) under which an Institute (Lalit Narain Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna – started by a Society with the same name) was taken over by the State Government ‘to ensure a high level of educational and training facilities and the co-ordination of the training with important industrial and business units’. The Ordinance had been challenged alleging mala fides, and on the ground of infraction of fundamental right to form an association under Article 19(1)(c). It is held:

  • “The fundamental right guaranteed under Art.19 (1)(c) does not extend to or embrace within it the objects or purposes or the activities of an association. In other words, it does not carry with it a further guarantee that the objects or purposes or activities of an association so formed shall not be interfered with by-law except on grounds as mentioned in Article 19 (4), viz., sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality.”

Our Apex Court, in Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India,[25] summarised the finding in L.N. Mishra Institute as under:

  •  “All assets and properties were vested in the State Government, and the Commissioner was deemed to have taken charge of the Institute. As all incidence of ownership and management were taken over by the State, what was left to the Society was paper ownership and management. Turning down the challenge, this Court held that the impugned Ordinance and the Act merely took over the Institute. Although, the name of the Society and of the Institute are the same, they were two different entities. The impugned legislations took over the Institute and not the Society. No restriction whatsoever was imposed on the functioning of the Society. The provisions of the Act referred to the Institute. The Institute constituted one of the activities of the Society. The petitioner-Society had constituted itself into an association in exercise of the fundamental right conferred by Article 19(1)(c). That right of that Society remains unimpaired and un-interfered with by the impugned Act and Ordinance.”

In OK Ghose Vs. EK Joseph[26] the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court held that the restriction placed on Government Servants to form unions infringed the fundamental right of the Government servants to form associations or unions guaranteed under Art.19 (1) (c) and could not be justified as a reasonable restriction imposed in the interest of public order under Art.19 (4). But, the Court reiterated what had been said by other Constitution Benches earlier that the rule prohibiting Government Servants from striking was valid as there was no fundamental right to strike.

7. Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. State

In this celebrated decision[27] our Apex Court upheld the right of State Legislature to enact The Tibia College Act, 1952 with respect to the management of a registered society. The enactment was necessitated when the College had been mismanaged and struggle ensued between the trustees. 

8. Take-Over: Enactment Struck Down

As Failed to Make Provision for Restoration of Elected Body

In Asom Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti Vs. State of Assam,[28] the impugned Act was enacted to meet a contingency for taking over of the management of the Prachar Samiti, temporarily. However, it failed to make any provision for the restoration of the elected body in due course. Not only were new members introduced into the Samiti, no norms were laid down for nominating the government nominees (who could be any one), and the elected members were kept away from the control of the Samiti. On the facts of the case and the implications of the provisions contained in the impugned enactment, the Court concluded that the right of association was virtually taken away; and in the name of temporary control and management on the affairs of the society, what was done was a permanent deprivation. In response to a query raised by the Court it had been stated by the State that the State had no desire to restore the Samiti. The impugned legislative provision was, therefore, struck down as violative of Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.

9. Parliament Cannot Infringe Constitutional Rights:  Damyati’s Case

The Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act considered in Smt. Damyanti Naranga Vs. The Union of India,[29] compulsorily altered the composition of the Sammelan, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Our Apex Court held that the Act was a breach of the ‘right to form association’; because, it violated the composite right of forming an association and the right to continue it as the original members desired. The Parliament had enacted the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act under which outsiders were permitted to become members of the Sammelan, without the volition of the original members.

It was held that the Parliament cannot alter the composition of the society itself. The members, who voluntarily formed the Association, cannot be compelled to act in that Association with other members who have been imposed as members by the Act and in whose admission to membership they had no say. The Constitution confers an association and its members the right to refuse membership to those who are not acceptable to the existing body of members.

The alteration in the composition of the Association itself clearly interferes with the right to continue to function as members of the Association which was voluntarily formed by the original founders.

The Court held further:

  • “The right to form an association, in our opinion, necessarily implies that the persons forming the Association have also the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the Association. Any law, by which members are introduced in the voluntary Association without any opinion being given to the members to keep them out, or any law which takes away the membership of those who have voluntarily joined it, will be a law violating the right to form an association”.[30]

10. Damyanti’s Case Distinguished in Subsequent Cases

Damyanti’s case is distinguished in several cases, including the following cases, pointing out that the Government had, in that case, interfered in the management of the Society:

  • Rajasthan Cricket Association case;[31]
  • Delhi Police, NKG Sangh case;[32]  
  • Bhandara Distt. Central Co-op Societies case;[33] and 
  • Dharam Dutt’s case.[34]

In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab,[35] Damyanti’s case was distinguished on the ground that it was a case where an unregistered society was, by statute, converted into a registered society which bore no resemblance whatever to the original society; and that the new members could be admitted in large numbers so as to reduce the original members to an insignificant minority. In State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Co-op. Society Ltd[36] it was pointed out that the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, considered in Damyati’s case, was violative of Article 31 of the Constitution of India, as it stood then.

The composition of the society itself was transformed by the Act and the voluntary nature of the association of the members who formed the original society was totally destroyed. And, it contravened the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(l)(f).[37]

11. Authorities Required To Record Reasons

It has been held in Km. Neelima Misra Vs. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal[38] and S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India[39] that an administrative order which involves civil consequences must give reasons. S.N. Mukherjee’s case it was observed:

  • “For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision”.

In Union of India Vs. E.G. Nambudiri[40] it is observed:

  • “Where an administrative authority is required to act judicially it is also under an obligation to record reasons. But every administrative authority is not under any legal obligation to record reasons for its decision, although, it is always desirable to record reasons to avoid any suspicion. Where a statute requires an authority though acting administratively to record reasons, it is mandatory for the authority to pass speaking orders and in the absence of reasons the order would be rendered illegal. But in the absence of any statutory or administrative requirement to record reasons, the order of the administrative authority is not rendered legal for absence of reasons. If any challenge is made to the validity of an order on the ground of it being arbitrary or mala fide, it is always open to the authority concerned to place reasons before the court which may have persuaded it to pass the orders. Such reasons must already exist on records as it is not permissible to the authority to support the order by reasons not contained in the records. Reasons are not necessary to be communicated to the Government servant. If the statutory rules require communication of reasons, the same must be, communicated but in the absence of any such provision absence of communication of reasons does not affect the validity of the order”.

12. Take-Over: Bad, Where No Provision in the Acts Concerned

In IIT College of Engineering Vs. State of HP[41] our Apex Court did not approve the take-over of the management of an unaided private college by the Administrator as there was no provision in the AICTE Act or the H.P. Education Act or the University Act authorizing such an action. The Court observed that the imposition of an Administrator to take over the reins of administration for an indefinite period[42] would undoubtedly amount to interference with the right of administering and managing a private educational institution which is now recognised to be a part of the fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g) as held by this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka.

13. Co-operative Societies – Created by Statute

Co-operative societies being creatures of the statute, once a Co-operative Society is formed and registered, the rights of the society and that of its members stand abridged by the provisions of the Act. The activities of the societies are controlled by the statute. Therefore, there cannot be any objection to statutory interference with their composition or functioning merely on the ground of contravention of individual’s right of freedom of association by statutory functionaries.[43]

14. A Member Cannot Assail Statutory Interference:

In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab[44] it is held, distinguishing Smt. Damyanti Naranga Vs. The Union of India, [45] as under:

  • “In the cases before us we are concerned with Co-operative societies which from the inception are governed by statute. They are created by statute, they are controlled by statute and so, there can be no objection to statutory interference with their composition on the ground of contravention of the individual right of freedom of association.”[46]

Our Apex Court further held that once a person becomes a member of a Co-operative Society, he loses his individuality qua the Society and he has no independent rights except those given to him by the statute and the bye laws. This view has also been approved in State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Coop. Society Ltd.[47] wherein our Apex Court has held that no individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, rules and the bye-laws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot rise higher than the source.

15. Take-over and Appointment of Administrator: Allowed Prayer

For No Action by Authorities, in spite of Mismanagement.

In a Public Interest Litigation in Sanjay Gupta Vs. State of M.P.[48] it was pleaded that due to irregularities and mismanagement of the society the future of near about 1200 students who were getting education in the college and schools run by a Society was in dark. The petitioner prayed to takeover the society and to appoint an administrator. The Court found that in spite of the adverse reports, no action had been taken by the authorities. Observing that the right to receive proper education is a part and parcel of Article 21 of the Constitution and considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal Vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal[49] it was held that a writ petition in the shape of PIL was maintainable.

The Court appointed the Additional Collector, Gwalior as Administrator of the Society and gave directions for election and investigation in regard to financial irregularities in the light of Sec. 32 and 33 of the M.P. Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973.

16. Take-over: Balance Between Institutional and Public Interest

In Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India[50] the impugned legislation was held to be a reasonable legislation enacted in the interest of the general public and to govern an institution of national importance, and therefore, it was found to be valid.

It is held in this decision:

  • “The new body takes over the activities of the pre-existing society by running the Institution which too is known as ICWA. So far as the society ICWA is concerned, it has been left intact, untouched and un-interfered with. There is no tampering with the membership or the governing body of the society. The society is still free to carry on its other activities. No membership of the old society has been dropped. No new member has been forced or thrust upon the society. The impugned legislation nominates members who will be members of the council, the new body corporate, different from the society. The pith and substance of the impugned legislation is to take-over an institution of national importance and an individual activity which would fall outside the purview of these Articles.”

Gandhi Harijan Ucchar Madhyamik Vidyalay Vs. Director of Education,[51] arose when the management of a school was taken over under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, after issuing show cause notice, pointing out confrontation between the management of the school and a section of the teaching staff as also .the conflict between the management of the school and the authorities. It was observed that taking over of management of the school would involve a conflict between individual or institutional interest on the one hand, and public interest, which is sought to be served by the takeover, on the other. There is the imperative need to balance the two requirements. It was observed:

  • “While it is not possible to put the conditions which may justify a takeover of a management in the strait-jacket of a judicially evolved definition, there could be no doubt that the takeover of a management of an institution would, ordinarily, be resorted to where other measures to deal with the affairs of an institution complained of, have failed to achieve the desired result.”

17. Take Over Management of Property, for a limited period:

In SP Mittal Vs. Union of India,[52] the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court held, inter alia, that assuming but not holding that the Society or Auroville were a religious denomination, the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act,  which took over the management of Auroville, for a limited period, was not hit by Article 25 or 26. It did not curtail the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate one’s own religion. It was observed in this case that ‘the right of management in matters of religion of a religious denomination’ under Article 26(b) was not taken away by this enactment; what was taken away was the right of management of the property of Auroville which was a secular matter. So also the Act did not curtail the right of any section of citizens to conserve its own language, script or culture conferred by Article 29. An activity, secular in nature, though assumed to be of the Society or the organization to be of religious denomination, did not adversely affect the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate one’s own religion. The Constitution Bench has drawn a distinction between such activities of the institution which would necessarily fall within the purview of Articles 25, 26 or 29.

It is observed: The disciples and devoted followers of Sri Aurobindo formed the Aurobindo Society in Calcutta and got it registered as a Society with the object of preaching and propagating the ideals and teachings of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother. The Society for its Auroville project received grants and subventions from UNESCO and also from the Government of India. However, after the death of the Mother, complaints started pouring in with the Central Government which, on enquiry, revealed mismanagement of the affairs of the Society, misuse of the funds thereof and diversion of the funds meant for Auroville to other purposes. There was in-fighting between the groups of members and the situation went out of control. The Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 1980, was promulgated followed by an Act, whereby the management of Auroville was taken over, though for a limited period. The constitutional validity of the Act was challenged on the ground that Articles 25, 26 29 and 30 and also Article 14 were infringed; and that the Parliament had no legislative competence to enact the said Act.

18. Admission of New Members: State Cannot Compel

What is in the interest of the society is primarily for the society alone to decide and it is not for an outside agency to say.[53]

The bye laws of a Society or a Club prescribe the qualifications of the Members to be admitted. They are in the nature of contract between the members. Therefore the right of admission of new members also remains at the will and option of the members.[54] The State or an enactment cannot compel admission of members, contrary to the bye laws of a Society.[55]

It is held in A P Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy[56] as under:

  • “It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness because an action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality. This doctrine of arbitrariness is not restricted only to executive actions, but also applies to legislature. Thus, a party has to satisfy that the action was reasonable, not done in unreasonable manner or capriciously or at pleasure without adequate determining principle, rational, and has been done according to reason or judgment, and certainly does not depend on the will alone. However, the action of legislature, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, should ordinarily be manifestly arbitrary. There must be a case of substantive unreasonableness in the statute itself for declaring the act ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution …. The constitutional right to freely associate with others encompasses associational ties designed to further the social, legal and economic benefits of the members of the association. By statutory interventions, the State is not permitted to change the fundamental character of the association or alter the composition of the society itself. The significant encroachment upon associational freedom cannot be justified on the basis of any interest of the Government. …  However, when the association gets registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, it is governed by the provisions of the Act and rules framed thereunder.”

It held further: 

  • “Importing the fiction to the extent that the societies registered under the Act 1995, could be deemed to have been registered under the Act 1964 tantamount to forcing the members of the society to act under compulsion/direction of the State rather than on their free will. Such a provision is violative of the very first basic principles of cooperatives. More so, the Act is vitiated by non-application of mind and irrelevant and extraneous considerations.”

19. Action of Legislature: If Violative of Article 14, Arbitrary

When the association/society has an option/choice to get it registered under a particular (Co-operative Societies’) statute, [57] if there are more than one statute operating in the field, the State cannot force the association/society to get itself registered under a statute for which the association/society has not applied. If the State does so, it will ‘violate Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India’.  It is not permissible in law to do something indirectly, if it is not permissible to be done directly.’[58]

20. Formation of Associations Is Different From Running Business

The right of the citizens to form the association is different from running the business by that association. Therefore, right of individuals to form a society has to be understood in a completely different context. A fundamental right to form the association cannot be coupled with the fundamental right to carry on any trade or business. [59]  After an Association has been formed and the right under Art. 19(1)(c) has been exercised by the members forming it, they have no right to claim that its activities must also be permitted to be carried on in the manner they desire.[60]

In TK Rangarajan Vs State of Tamil Nadu[61] the Supreme Court has held that the right to form an association does not carry with it the right to strike work.

21.  Escheat

If a club or society is defunct and no one claims that the club or society functions, the principles and law on escheat allows the vesting of property in Government. But in case of dispute, the onus will be heavy on the State to make out a case of escheat or bona vacantia. Though only a few members of the society  have shown any interest in matters pertaining to the society for 36 years or so, it might  still not be presumed that the society was defunct that would warrant dissolution under the So. Rgn. Act.[62]


[1]      Darius Rutton Kavasmaneck Vs. Gharda Chemicals: 2014 AIR (SCW) 6441, 2015-188 Comp. Cases 291

[2]      AIR 2004 SC 4504 

[3]      2013 (16) SCC 82: 2013 Sup AIR (SC) 437; 2013 AIR(SCW)  5683

[4]      AIR  2004 SC 1295

[5]      AIR 1983 SC 1

[6]      AIR 1988 SC 1136

[7]      AIR 1985 SC 973

[8]      AIR 1976 SC  340

[9]      AIR 1962 SC 171

[10]    AIR 1962 SC 458

[11]    AIR 1952 SC 196

[12]    See Chapter: Vesting of Property.

[13]    AIR 1958 AP 773

[14]    Quoted in: Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. H Narasimhaiah: AIR 1991 Kar 392.

[15]    62 Bom LR 790

[16]    AIR1988 Mad 27

[17]    Thalapalam Service Co Operative Ltd Vs. Union of India: AIR 2010 Ker  6.         Appeal Judgment: Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Vs. State of Kerala: 2013 (16) SCC 82; 2013 Sup AIR (SC) 437; 2013 AIR (SC) (CIV) 2758, 2013 AIR(SCW)  5683.

[18]    See Chapter: Effect of Registration & Incorporation

[19]    See: Tika Ramji’s case: AIR 1956 SC 676;          P. Balakotaiash’s case: AIR 1958 SC 232; All India Bank Employees’ case: AIR 1962 SC 171;           Balmer Lawrie Workers Union’s case: AIR 1985 SC 311;          Daman Singh  Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1985 SC 973.

[20]    P K Dash, Advocate Vs. Bar Council of Delhi: AIR 2016 Del 135.

[21]    By virtue of Article 12.

[22]    The Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic And Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; S.P. Mittal vs. UOI: AIR 1983 SC 1.

[23]    P K Dash, Advocate Vs. Bar Council of Delhi: AIR 2016 Del 135; Daman Singh  Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1985 SC 973. Also see: L.N. Mishra Institute of Econ.Development Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1988 SC 1136; Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India: AIR  2004 SC 1295:  S.P. Mittal Vs. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 1: Gandhi Harijan Ucchar Madhyamik Vidyalay Vs. Director of Education:  AIR  1977 Del 240.

[24]    AIR  1988 SC 1136

[25]    AIR 2004 SC 1295. It followed SP Mittal V. Union of India: AIR 1983 SC 1.

[26]    AIR 1963 SC 812

[27]    AIR 1962 SC 458

[28]    AIR 1989 SC 2126.

[29]    AIR 1971 SC 966.

[30]    Quoted in A P Dairy Development Corpn Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[31]    Rajasthan Cricket Association Vs. State of Rajasthan:   AIR 2005 Raj 144.

[32]    Delhi Police Non Gazetted Karmachari Sangh Vs. Union Of India: AIR 1987 SC 379

[33]    AIR 1993 SC 59

[34]    Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India: AIR  2004 SC 1295

[35]    AIR  1985 SC 973.         See also: Sumangalam Hous. Soty Vs. Suo Motu High Court of Gujarat: AIR  2007 SC 671;        Zoroastrian Co Operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar: AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[36]    AIR 1997 SC 1413

[37]    See also: L.N. Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna Vs. State of Bihar:  AIR 1988 SC 1136.

[38]    AIR  1990 SC 1402

[39]    AIR  1990 SC 1984

[40]    AIR 1991 SC 1216

[41]    (2003) 7 SCC 73)

[42]    See also: Shri Rangaswami Vs. The Sagar Textile Mills:AIR 1977 SC 1516;         State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Jogendra Singh:  AIR 1963 SC 1618.

[43]    A P Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298

[44]    AIR 1985 SC 973

[45]    AIR 1971 SC 966.

[46]    Quoted in Sumangalam Co-op Housing Society Ltd Vs. Suo Motu High Court of Gujarat: AIR  2007 SC 671;         State of U.P. Vs. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees’ Coop. Society Ltd : AIR 1997  SC  1413;         Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Vs. District Registrar AIR 2005  SC  2306.

[47]    AIR 1997  SC  1413:         Followed in Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar, Co-op. Societies AIR 2005  SC  2306;        Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;        Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. Devinder Singh: AIR 2007 SC 1723.

[48]    2014-2 MPLJ 520

[49]    (2010) 3 SCC 402

[50]    AIR  2004 SC 1295

[51]    AIR  1977 Del 240

[52]    AIR 1983 SC 1.

[53]    State of Maharashtra Vs. Karvanagar Sahakari Griha (2000) 9 SCC 295;        Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[54]    Damyanti Naranga Vs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966;        Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973

[55]   Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[56]    AIR 2011 SC 3298

[57]    A P Dairy Development Corn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[58]    See: Sant Lal Gupta Vs. Modern Co-op. Group Housing Society: JT 2010 (11) SC 273

[59]    Tata Engineering & Locomotives Vs. The State of Bihar:  AIR 1965 SC 40;        AP Dairy Devlopnt. Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[60]    Smt. Damyanti Naranga Vs. The Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966

[61]    AIR 2003 SC 3033

[62]    Mrigan Maity Vs. Daridra Bandhab Bhandar: 2011-4 Cal LT.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

Election & Challenge in Societies and Clubs

Saji Koduvath, Advocate

Synopsis

  • 1.      Principles of General Election: Extended in General
  • 2.      “Democracy” and “Free and Fair Election”
  • 3.      Holding Annual General Meeting is Statutory; Election Not
  • 4.      Permanent Gov. Body and Right of Vote to Life-Members
  • 5.      No Fundamental Right or Common Law Right to Contest
  • 6.      Candidature:  An Individual Membership Right
  • 7.      Definition of ‘Member’ & Right to Vote
  • 8.      Non-Payment of Subscription & Right to Vote in Election
  • 9.      T.N. So. Regn. Act Provides for Compulsory Election
  • 10.    Strict Pleading and Standard of Proof
  • 11.    Validity of Election: Jurisdiction with Courts
  • 12.    Courts Sparingly Exercise Jurisdiction
  • 13.    Right To Vote or Stand as a Candidate, Not a Civil Right
  • 14. Right to Challenge an Election Is Not a Common Law Right
  • 15.    Locus Standi of a Member to Challenge Election
  • 16.    Individual Can Maintain Cause of the Collective Body 
  • 17.    Individual and Corporate Membership Rights
  • 16.    Election Process
  • 17.    Powers of a Returning Officer
  • 18.    Duties of Returning Officer
  • 19.    Ordinarily, Courts will not Interfere withElection Process
  • 20.    Jurisdiction of Civil Courts is ‘Rather Limited’: Principles
  • 21.    Standard of Proof in Election Matters:
  • 22.    Temporary Injunctions
  • 23.    Technicalities of Election Petitions
  • 24.    Instances of Courts Interference before Completion
  • 25.    Court Interfere for Fair and Impartial Election
  • 26.    No Question of Estoppel if inherent illegality
  • 27.    Nomination Paper Rejected: Writ Petition not Maintainable
  • 28.    Electoral Roll:  Illegality in Preparation: Remedy
  • 29.    Electoral Roll:  Illegality in Preparation: Courts Interfere
  • 30.    Electoral Rolls: Non-inclusion: Courts Will Not Interfere
  • 31.    Electoral Roll: Preparation on Invalid Provisions
  • 32.    Electoral Roll: Election on Nonexistent Rules
  • 33.    Acceptance of List of Gov. Body District Registrar – Effect
  • 34.    Section 25 of So. Regn. Act as Amended by State of U.P
  • 35.    Non-convening of the Meetings and Acquiescence
  • 36.    Courts Order Election and Appoint Receivers
  • 37.    If Violation of Bye laws Court Sets Right the Illegalities
  • 38.    Effect of Failure to File Documents u/s 4

Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:

  • 2. Memorandum of association: The memorandum of association shall contain the following things, that is to say, the name of the society; the object of the society; the names, addresses, and occupations of the governors, council, directors, committee, or other governing body to whom, by the rules of the society, the management of its affairs is entrusted. A copy of the rules and regulations of the society, certified to be a correct copy by not less than three of the members of the governing body, shall be filed with the memorandum of association.
  • 4. Annual list of managing body to be filed: Once in every year, on or before the fourteenth day succeeding the day on which, according to the rules of the society, the annual general meeting of the society is held, or, if the rules do not provide for an annual general meeting, in the month of January, a list shall be filed with the Registrar of joint-stock Companies, of the names, addresses and occupations of the governors, council, directors, committee or other governing body then entrusted with the management of the affairs of the society.
  • 15.Member defined: For the purposes of this Act a member of a society shall be a person who, having been admitted therein according to the rules and regulations thereof, shall have paid a subscription, or shall have signed the roll or list of members thereof, and shall not have resigned in accordance with such rules and regulations;
  • Disqualified members: But in all proceedings under this Act, no person shall be entitled to vote or be counted as a member whose subscription at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months.

1. Principles of General Election Extended to Elections in General

The principles of law under the Representation of People Act, 1951 have been extended by our courts to elections in general[1] including that in Societies and Educational Institutions.[2]

2. “Democracy” and “Free and Fair Election”

‘Democracy’ and free and fair election’ are inseparable twins. If no other authority is expressly or impliedly constituted by the bye laws of an association, the responsibility to conduct the election vests with the managing body that be in power.

In Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Union of India,[3] our Apex Court held as under:

  • “…Therefore, the well recognised position in law is that purity in the electoral process and the conduct of the elected representatives cannot be isolated from the constitutional requirements. ‘Democracy’ and free and fair election’ are inseparable twins. There is almost an inseverable umbilical cord joining them. In a democracy the little man-voter has overwhelming importance and cannot be hijacked from the course of free and fair elections…….”

In KihotoHollohanVs.Zachillhu[4] it is held by the Supreme Court:

  • “Democracy is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution; and rule of law and free and fair elections are basic features of democracy. One of the postulates of free and fair elections is provision for resolution of election disputes as also adjudication of disputes relating to subsequent disqualifications by an independent authority.”

In NimbaRajaram Mali Vs. Collector, Jalgaon[5] held as under:

  • “In a democratic society what is important is the Will of the majority and the elected representatives must honour the will of the majority. It is immaterial to analyse and debate on the reasons behind the will of the majority or the specific reasons for such will being expressed. The will of the majority is of paramount importance and it must be respected by all elected representatives responsible for the governance of such democratic institutions. … Unless it is shown that while passing such a resolution of No Confidence Motion, there was flagrant violation of any of mandatory procedure laid down, such a resolution cannot be interfered with by the Court or statutory authorities adjudicating such disputes.”

3. So. Regn. Act: Holding Annual General Meeting is Statutory; Election Not

Sec. 4 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 postulates holding of Annual General Meeting. These provisions (also the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the society) as to holding Annual General Meetings, are mandatory; and not directory.[6]As per Sec. 2 of the Societies Registration Act the management of the affairs of a society is entrusted with the governing body.  The rules of the society have to direct the details of such entrustment.

It is pertinent to note that the Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not specifically direct ‘election’ of the governing body. But various States’ amendments (and State-Acts) provide for the same. The mode and modalities of formation of the governing body is determinedly left,under Sec. 16, to the ‘Rules and Regulations of the society’.

Sec. 16 reads:

  • Governing body defined: The governing body of the society shall be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees, or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted.

Article 243ZK of the Constitution Mandates Election in Co-operative Societies

Part IXBof the Constitution of India,that deals with the Co-operative Societies, is incorporated by the 97th Amendment of the Constitution. Article 243ZK, under Part IXB, reads as under:

  •  “243ZK. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law made by the Legislature of a State, the election of a board shall be conducted before the expiry of the term of the board so as to ensure that the newly elected members of the board assume office immediately on the expiry of the office of the members of the outgoing board.
  • (2) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to a cooperative society shall vest in such an authority or body, as may be provided by the Legislature of a State, by law:
  • Provided that the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide for the procedure and guidelines for the conduct of such election.”

4. Permanent Governing Body and Right of Vote to Life-Members

Holding election in a society (not Co-operative Societies) being not statutory, it can be demonstrated that the requirements in the definition of a member in Section 15 (payment of subscription and signature in the roll/list of members) do not control the right to vote in an election and to stand as a candidate (an individual membership right). It is also noteworthy that the definition of ‘Member’ (in Sec.15) is not exhaustive; and it is limited to ‘for the purposes of this Act’ alone. It is clear that it is a matter left for the bye laws. 

Sec. 15 reads as under:

  • Member defined: For the purposes of this Act a member of a society shall be a person who, having been admitted therein according to the rules and regulations thereof, shall have paid a subscription, or shall have signed the roll or list of members thereof, and shall not have resigned in accordance with such rules and regulations;
  • Disqualified members:…. …

If the provisions in the bye laws of a Society gives right of vote to the life-members or honourary-members, who have not signed the roll/list of members, or even members in arrears, they may be valid. It can as well be argued that in case the bye laws of a society provide for permanent governing body, without an election, the same (so also nomination of governing body by an ‘outsider’) will not be illegal; and it may not be legitimate to argue that the provisions of such bye laws are unreasonable or opposed to ‘public policy’[7] on the premise that bye laws of a society or a club is a contract[8] amongst its members.

The above argument may be countered by urging that when a person becomes a member of the society, he would have no independent rights, and lose his individuality[9] qua the society except those that are given to him by the statutes concerned and bye laws;[10] and the rights of members merge in the rights of the society.[11] In State of UP Vs. CD Chheoki Employees Co-operative Society,[12] our Apex Court explicated it with the analogy that the stream cannot rise higher than the source.

7. Disqualified Members

As shown above, the definition of ‘Member’ (in Sec.15) in the Societies Registration Act, 1860, is not exhaustive, as it is ‘for the purposes of this Act’alone.

The second limb of Section 15 reads as under:

  • Disqualified members: But in all proceedings under this Act, no person shall be entitled to vote or be counted as a member whose subscription at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months.

The words in the second limb of Section 15, refers to ‘all proceedings under this Act’.Therefore, the disqualifications (in votingand counting as a member)are confined[13] to the activities enjoined in the Act alone –that is, to take part in the meeting (i) to make bye laws (S. 9), (ii) to amend the ‘purposes’ (S. 12), (iii) to take decision to ‘amalgamate’ with another society (S.12), and (iv) for dissolution (S. 13).

The wording, ‘whose subscription at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months’, may also support the view that there can be ‘permanent members’.

5. No Fundamental Right or Common Law Right to Contest Election

 The rights of a person to contest an election or to challenge it is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right; but are statutory rights[14]or rights originate from the bye laws of an association.[15]

6. Candidature:  An Individual Membership Right

Right to stand as a candidate for election as a Director of the Company is well accepted as an individual membership right.[16] Our courts have held that the general principles governing the individual membership rights, and right of suit, of an individual share holder (or a member) of the company would apply to the members of societies or clubs also.[17]

8. Non-Payment of Subscription & Right to Vote in Election

Section 15 of the Societies Registration Act does not direct expulsion or removal of member from the society for nonpayment of subscription; in any case, unless an opportunity of hearing is given to the member.[18] Section 15 of the Societies Registration Act only lays down that such member cannot be entitled to vote or participate in the meeting. However, that does not mean that notice of the meeting itself should not be issued to him.

9. T.N. Societies Registration Act Provides for Compulsory Election

Deviating from the (Central) So. Registration Act, 1860, T.N. Societies Registration Act, 1975, Sections 15(4) provides that ‘the term of office of the members of the committee shall not exceed three years from the date of their appointment’.S. 26(4) enables the Registrar to depute an officer to be present at the general meetings of the Institution and the Charitable Society.

In Periyar Self-respect Propaganda Institution, TrichyVs. State of TN[19] the constitutional validity of these provisions were upheld observing the following:

  • “By putting an end to the life membership or life offices, there is no putting an end to the right to form an association as such. The holding of an office for a particular tenure or for that matter for life is a matter of internal arrangement amongst members constituting the Institution or the Charitable Society arid certainly it cannot assume the colour of a fundamental right. …..  As rightly contended by the learned Advocate General appearing for the State, neither the Institution nor the Charitable Society, nor the present incumbents of the life offices could claim that they could form associations only with the life offices engrafted in the rules, or if they had already formed, they must be allowed to continue to have that set up and any disturbance thereof would amount to violation of the right to form an association guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c). If at all, such a right could be characterised as a peripheral or concomitant right which may facilitate the fulfillment of the objectives of the founders of the Institution and the Charitable Society. But, there is no constitutional guarantee that every association formed shall effectively achieve its objectives without interference by law. This is not a case where the composition of the association is being altered. Neither the members nor the association of members could claim that they have a fundamental right to have office for life.”

10.Strict Pleading and Standard of Proof

An election petition is a strict statutory proceeding.[20]In JaganNathVs.Jaswant Singh[21] it is observed:

  • “The general rule is well settled that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and the Court possesses no common law power.”[22]

In election matters the standard of proof is high and burden is on the election petitioner. Mere preponderance of probabilities or presumptions cannot be the basis to challenge an election. The election proceedings are akin to criminal proceedings.[23]

It is held in Gajanan Krishnaji Barat Vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe[24] that in an election petition, based on allegations of commission of corrupt practice, the onus lies heavily on the petitioner to establish the charge of corrupt practice and in case of doubt the benefit goes to the returned candidate.

11.Validity of Election: Jurisdiction with Courts; not with Registrar.

            Though Section 36(1) of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 empowers the Registrar, either of his own motion or on the Application of a majority of the members of the committee of management or on the Application, of not less than one third of the members of the Society to hold an enquiry into the Constitution, working and financial condition of a registered Society, it is held in S. Thamil Arasan President of Chennai Vyasarpadi Nadar Nagar Progressive Association Chennai Vs. R. Narayanan[25] that the Registrar is not competent to enquire into the validity of an election, while performing a mere ministerial function; the jurisdiction is vested with the Courts.

12.Courts Sparingly Exercise Jurisdiction

The decision taken by the concerned authority during the course of election is not open to judicial review except on the ground of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power.[26]Courts will not interfere with discharging duties by the elected office bearers of an organization, without cogent and compelling grounds. A simple breach of any Rule will not give rise to a cause of action for any member unless there is manifest illegality, or act or omission that goes to the root of the matter.  In other words, the alleged violation should be so grave that it could not be condoned by the general body.[27]

13.Right To Vote or Stand as a Candidate, Not a Civil Right

Right to Challenge an Election Is Not a Common Law Right

It is observed in S Thamil ArasanVs. R Narayanan[28] that since there is no specific provision permitting the challenge of an election to the society, the only remedy for challenging such election is by means of a civil suit.

NP PonnuswamiVs. Returning Officer, Namakkal[29] it was observed:

  • “The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it.”

The rights arising out of elections including the right to contest or challenge an election are not common law rights but are creatures of the statutes which create, confer or limit those rights; and, therefore, for deciding the question whether an election can be set aside on any alleged ground, the Courts have to function within the framework of that law and not travel beyond it.[30] It is a special right conferred under a self contained special law. Right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right, but is a creature of a statute or a special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it. It will, therefore, be advantageous to look into the scheme of the Act.[31]

13.Locus Standi of a Member to Challenge Election

In TejBahadurvsShriNarendraModi[32] the Apex Court considered the question of the validity of the appellant’s nomination since that had a direct bearing on the question whether he had a right to question the election. After finding that the appellant was not a duly nominated candidate, it is held as under:

  • “We find that the averments in the petition do not disclose that the appellant has a cause of action which invest him with right to sue. It is settled that where a person has no interest at all, or no sufficient interest to support a legal claim or action he will have no locus standi to sue. The entitlement to sue or locus standi is an integral part of cause of action. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467, V.R. Krishna Iyer J., speaking for this Court held that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing.”

The Apex Court held in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[33]:

  • A voter could challenge the election.
  • Merely because he took part in the election by standing as a candidate or by exercise of his right of franchise he cannot be estopped from challenging the whole election when the election was glaringly illegal and void on the basis of the obnoxious proviso. There is no question of approbation and reprobation at the same time in such a case.
  • A voter could come to the High Court even earlier before the election was held. But merely because he came to challenge the election after it was held it cannot be said that he was guilty of any latches and must be non-suited only on that account.

A member of a Society does not have the right to challenge Election unless his rights are personally affected by the impugned action.[34] He should have been a candidate or acquired the right to vote.

In Committee of Management, Sri Kachcha Baba inter College, Varanasi Vs. Regional Committee, PanchamMandal[35] it was held that a group of members of the General Body (and not by a rival committee of management) had no locus standi to challenge the result of the elections.[36]

There were divergent views, in UP, on the right of an individual member to file a writ petition. In certain cases[37] it was held that an individual member had no right to file the writ petition. The other set of decisions[38] observed that the writ petition could be maintained, subject to the existence of efficacious alternative remedy, when there was a breach of right of a person affecting his right to form an association, which was a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, or there was a breach of the Statute. Both the divergent views had been considered by a Division Bench in Committee of Management, AryaKanyaPathshala Inter College, Bulandshahar v. State of U.P.[39] The Division Bench observed as under:

  •  “There is no such proposition that an individual member cannot, in no circumstance, challenge the election of the Committee of Management….. It is clear that the question as to whether an individual member has locus to challenge the election of Committee of Management depends on facts of each case…..”[40]

14.Individual Can MaintainCause of the Collective Body 

Where the right of an individual is affected or infringed, and, he has no other effective remedy, and where there are no vitiating circumstances such as delay, latches, etc., the cause of the collective body will be maintainable at the instance of an individual.[41]

15. Individual Membership Rights and Corporate Membership Rights

The Kerala High Court in Joseph Vs. Jos[42] observed as under:

  • “…  There are two kinds of rights for a member of the company, one the individual membership right, and the other the corporate membership right. So far as the corporate membership rights are concerned, a shareholder can assert those rights only in conformity with the decision of the majority of the shareholders. An individual membership right is a right to maintain himself in full membership with all the rights and privileges appertaining to that status. …”

16.Election Process

Elections in associations are conducted in accordance with their Rules. If it is warrented, the court may intervene. In Hardeo Singh Vs. Union of India[43] the High Court of Uttarakhand being found it necessary that there should be a duly elected Management Committee for a Gurudwara for its proper management and administration, inter alia, following directions were issued with respect to election:

  • “The Election Officer for the purposes of the completion of the election process including
    • de-limitation/re-determination of wards,
    • preparation of electoral rolls,
    • verification of electors,
    • qualification of members,
    • election process,
    • publication of results,
    • first meeting of elected committee,
    • election of office bearers,
    • first meeting of the committee,
    • constitution of sub-committees etc.,
  • may constitute a committee not exceeding five members, whom the Election Officer finds suitable. Such five persons should be respectable and educated persons with no criminal record and no history of association with election of Gurudwara Sri Nanakmatta Sahib. These persons should have no interest or association with any candidate or group. They will also give an undertaking to the Election Officer that they have no interest in the election and they will not participate in canvassing or election etc. in any manner. The Election Officer shall follow such procedure, which is reasonable and on the basis of the principles of natural justice and in accordance with the Sikh principles and values.”

ElectionNorms and Procedure

In Food Corporation of India Staff Union Vs. Food Corporation of India[44] the Supreme Court laid down‘norms and procedure’to be followed for assessing the representative character of trade unions. A detailed and exhaustive election procedure is laid down therein. It reads as under:

  •        “(i) As agreed to by the parties the relative strength of all the eligible unions by way of secret ballot be determined under the overall supervision of the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) (CLC).
  •        (ii) The CLC will notify the Returning Officer who shall conduct the election with the assistance of the FCI. The Returning Officer shall be an officer of the Government of India, Ministry of Labour.
  •        (iii) The CLC shall fix the month of election while the actual date/dates of election shall be fixed by the Returning Officer.
  •        (iv) The Returning Officer shall require the FCI to furnish sufficient number of copies of the lists of all the employees/works (category III and IV) governed by the FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971 borne on the rolls of the FCI as on the date indicated by the CLC. The list shall be prepared in the proforma prescribed by the CLC. The said list shall constitute the voters list.
  •        (v) The FCI shall display the voters list on the notice boards and other conspicuous places and shall also supply copies thereof the each of the union for raising objections, if any. The unions will file the objections to the Returning officer, within the stipulated period and the decision of the Returning Officer shall be final.
  •        (vi) The FCI shall make necessary arrangement to:
    •        (a) give wide publicity to the date/dates of election by informing the unions and by affixing notices on the notice board and also at other conspicuous places for the information of all the workers;
    •        (b) print requisite number of ballot papers in the proforma prescribed by the CLC incorporating therein the names of all the participating unions in an alphabetical order after ascertaining different symbols of respective unions ;
    •        (c) the ballot papers would be prepared in the proforma prescribed by the CLC in Hindi/English and the concerned regional language;
    •        (d) set up requisite number of polling stations and booths near the premises where the workers normally work; and
    •        (e) provide ballot boxes with requisite stationery, boards, sealing wax etc.
  •        (vii) The Returning officer shall nominate Presiding Officer for each of the polling station/booth with requisite number of polling assistants to conduct the election in an impartial manner. The Presiding Officers and the polling assistants may be selected by the Returning Officer from amongst the officers of the FCI.
  •        (viii) The election schedule indicating the dates for filing of nominations, scrutiny of nominations papers, withdrawal of nominations, polling, counting of votes and the declaration of results, shall be prepared and notified by the Returning Officer in consultation with the FCI. The election schedule shall be notified by the Returning Officer well in advance and at least one month’s time shall be allowed to the contesting unions for canvassing before the date of tiling the nominations.
  •        (ix) To be eligible for participating in the election, the unions must have valid registration under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 for one year with an existing valid registration on the first day of filing of nomination.
  •        (x) The Presiding Officer shall allow only one representative to be present at each polling station/booth as observer.
  •        (xi) At the time of polling, the polling assistant will first score out the name of the employee/workman who comes for voting, from the master copy of the voters’ list and advise him thereafter to procure the secret ballot paper from the Presiding Officer.
  •        (xii) The Presiding Officer will hand over the ballot paper to the workman/employee concerned after affixing his signatures thereon. The signatures of the workman/employee casting the vote shall also be obtained on the counterfoil of the ballot paper. He will ensure that the ballot paper is put inside the box in his presence after the voter is allowed to mark on the symbol of the candidate with the inked rubber stamp in camera. No employee/workman shall be allowed to cast his vote unless he produces his valid identity card before the Presiding Officer concerned In the event of non production of identity card due to any reason, the voter may bring in an authorisation letter from his controlling officer certifying that the voter is the bona fide employee of the FCI.
  •        (xiii) After the dose of the polling, the Presiding Officer shall furnish detailed ballot paper account in the proforma prescribed by the CLC indicating total ballot papers received, ballot papers used, unused ballot papers available etc. to the Returning Officer.
  •        (xiv) After the close of the polling, the ballot boxes will be opened and counted by the Returning Officer or his representative in the presence of the representative of each of the unions. All votes which are marked more than once, spoiled, cancelled or damaged etc. will not be taken into account as valid votes but a separate account will be kept thereof.
  •        (xv) The contesting unions through their representatives present at the counting place may be allowed to file applications for re- counting of votes to the Returning Officer. The request would be considered by the Returning Officer and in a give case if he is satisfied that there is reason to do so he may permit recounting. However, no application for recounting shall be entertained after the results of the votes are declared.
  •        (xvi) The result of voting shall the compiled on the basis of valid votes polled in favour of each union in the proforma prescribed by the CLC and signatures obtained thereon from the representatives of all the unions concerned as a proof of counting having been done in their presence.
  •        (xvii) After declaring the results on the basis of the votes polled in favour of each union by the Returning Officer, he will send a report of his findings to the CLC.       (xviii) The union/unions obtaining the highest number of votes in the process of election shall be given recognition by the FCI for a period of five years from the date of the conferment of the recognition.
  •        (xix) It would be open to the contesting unions to object to the result of the election or any illegality or material irregularity which might have been committed during the election. Before the Returning Officer such objection can only be raised after the election is over. The objection shall be heard by the CLC and dispose of within 30 days of the filing of the same. The decision of the CLC shall be final subject to challenge before a competent court, if permitted under law.”

17. Powers of a Returning Officer

In the absence of express or implied regulations to the contrary,[45] the returning officers, domestic tribunals, syndicate of a university, enquiry committees, etc. are also free to evolve and follow their own procedure as they are ‘masters of their own procedure’;[46] but, they must ensure natural justice in their proposed actions.[47] Lord Denning, Master of Rolls, in the Court of Appeal in England observed, in the matter of a non-statutory domestic tribunal, as under:[48]

  • “Is a party who is charged before a domestic tribunal entitled as of right to be legally represented, much depends on what the rules say about it. When the rules say nothing, then the party has no absolute right to be legally represented. It is a matter for the discretion of the tribunal. They are masters of their own procedure: and, if they, in the proper exercise of their discretion, decline to allow legal representation, the Courts will not interfere….”[49]

It is held in Guru Nanak University Vs. Iqbal Kaur Sandhu[50] as under:

  • “It is not the province and the function of this Court to lay down either the time or the mode and manner in which autonomous and high-powered bodies like the Syndicate of the appellant-University are entitled to conduct their business in the meetings. They are equally masters of their own procedure and unless there is an infraction of the clear statutory rules in carrying out their duties and in conforming to the procedure prescribed by law, this Court would be ill-advised to render any gratuitous advice to them in their autonomous field in dealing and disposing of their business.”

The election schedule (fixing the dates for filing of nominations, scrutiny of nominations papers, withdrawal of nominations, polling, counting of votes and the declaration of results etc.)is, usually, made and announced by the Returning Officer in consultation with the authority responsible to conduct the election.

A Returning Officer merely conducts the election and has no power to consider the question as to whether a member is eligible to vote or not.[51] He cannot also cancel the membership of a person. After the declaration of the result, the Returning Officer becomes functus officio and he has no power or jurisdiction to change the declaration or to make any other declaration or to make an order to recount or to reconsider the result of election. The returning officer who makes the scrutiny of nominations has the power to reject nomination on proper grounds and he can decide on the eligibility of a candidate.

18.Duties of Returning Officer

The Returning Officer has to be perform his duties with detachment and impartiality.[52] Our Apex Court, in Food Corporation of India Staff Union Vs. Food Corporation of India,[53]  propounded norms and procedures to be followed for assessing the representative character of the trade union.

19. Ordinarily, Courts will not Interfere with Election Process

In Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik[54]  our Apex Court held:

  • “Since 1952 this Court has authoritatively laid down that once election process has started the courts should not ordinarily interfere with the said process by way of granting injunction.”

In JaganNathVs.Jaswant Singh[55] it is observed:

  •  “… It is also well settled that it is a sound principle of natural justice that the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law.”

Remedies with respect to the disputes as to elections will have to be sought for after elections are over. This time-honoured principle is emphasised in the following decisions also.

  • Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath[56]
  • N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer[57]
  • Nanhoo Mal and Others Vs. Hira Mal[58].
  • Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commr.[59]:
  • Boddula Krishnaiah Vs. State Elec. Commissioner, A.P.[60]
  • ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra[61]
  • AnugrahNarain Singh Vs. State of U.P.[62]
  • Election Commissioner of India Vs. Ashok Kumar[63]
  • Abdulla Khan Vs. State of Orissa[64].
  • Abdul Latheef C.K. Vs. K.M. Haneefa[65]
  • Medical Council of India Vs. Regar/Returning Officer, TN[66]
  • Avtar Singh Vs. Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Mgmnt. Comtee,[67]
  • C. Subrahmanyam Vs. K. Ramanjaneyullu[68]
  • Ashok Kumar Jain Vs. NeetuKathoria[69]
  • K.K. Shrivastava Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Jain[70]

It is observed in Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath[71] while considering election to Dental Council of India under Section 3 (a) of the Dentists Act, 1948:

  • “So far as the issue with regard to eligibility of Respondent no.1 for contesting the election is concerned, though prima facie it appears that Respondent No.1 could contest the election, we do not propose to go into the said issue because, in our opinion, as per the settled law, the High Court should not have interfered with the election after the process of election had commenced. The judgments referred to herein above clearly show the settled position of law to the effect that whenever the process of election starts, normally courts should not interfere with the process of election for the simple reason that if the process of election is interfered with by the courts, possibly no election would be completed without court ‘s order. Very often, for frivolous reasons candidates or others approach the courts and by virtue of interim orders passed by courts, the election is delayed or cancelled and in such a case the basic purpose of having election and getting an elected body to run the administration is frustrated. For the aforestated reasons, this Court has taken a view that all disputes with regard to election should be dealt with only after completion of the election.”

In K.K. ShrivastavaVs.Bhupendra Kumar Jain[72] with respect to election to the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh under the Advocates Act our Apex Court held:

  • “Where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hands off. This is more particularly so where the dispute relates to an election. Still more so where there is a statutorily prescribed remedy which almost reads in mandatory terms.”[73]

In Proper Cases Courts Order Election and Appoint Receivers

Though not specifically sought for in relief, in proper cases, Courts order election and appoint receivers.

The courts interfere and grant relief in a given situation[74]disregarding the technicalities. For example:

  • (i)   where the issue was not properly expressed and it was of formal nature;[75]
  • (ii) when a larger relief was prayed for and the claim for the same was not duly established but the evidence justified grant of smaller relief;[76]
  • (iii) where the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage;[77] and
  • (iv) to promote substantial justice; subject, of course to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances where equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated – as procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process.[78]

Kerala High Court, in KP Muhammed Vs.  M Abdurahiman,[79]held that when there was no validly elected committee for the proper management of an association, the civil courts would have jurisdiction to order election of the committee even if it was not sought for by the parties.

20.Jurisdiction of Civil Courts is ‘Rather Limited’: Principles

See Chapter: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs

21.Standard of Proof in Election Matters:

The election of a returned candidate will not be set aside unless there are cogent and convincing reasons.[80] In election matters the standard of proof is high and burden is on the election petitioner. The court proceedings on election disputes are akin to criminal proceedings.[81] It is held in Gajanan Krishnaji Barat Vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe[82] that in an election petition, based on allegations of commission of corrupt practice, the standard of proof required is, generally speaking, that in a criminal trial.  The onus lies heavily on the petitioner to establish the charge of corrupt practice and in case of doubt the benefit goes to the returned candidate.

It is pointed out in Seth Gulabchand v. Seth Kudilal[83] that the rules applicable to circumstantial evidence in criminal cases would not apply to civil cases. The ordinary rules governing civil cases of balance of probabilities will continue to apply. Mere preponderance of probabilities or presumptions cannot be the basis to challenge an election.

22.Temporary Injunctions

Interference of courts after election-process commenced [84]and stopping an electionare very much against public policy.[85]  But, there is no absolute restriction upon court; it is only limited.[86]

Election Tribunals under the Representation of Peoples Act are not conferred with power to grant temporary injunctions.When granting injunction is subject to the declaration sought for, in election matters it will be proper not to grant temporary injunction.[87]The success of a winning candidate at an election cannot be lightly interfered with; more so when no fault of his.[88] If ultimately, the suit is dismissed, the court cannot compensate for granting a temporary injunction.[89]

23.Technicalities of Election Petitions

In UmeshChalliyill Vs. K.P. Rajendran[90] our Apex Court ruled that the election petitions should not be dismissed at the threshold on technical defects which were purely cosmetic and do not go to the root of the matter. It is observed: 

  • “However, in fairness whenever such defects are pointed out then the proper course for the Court is not to dismiss the petition at the threshold. In order to maintain the sanctity of the election the Court should not take such a technical attitude and dismiss the election petition at the threshold. On the contrary after finding the defects, the Court should give proper opportunity to cure the defects and in case of failure to remove/cure the defects, it could result into dismissal on account of Order 6 Rule 16 or Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Though technically it cannot be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act of 1951 but it can be rejected when the election petition is not properly constituted as required under the provisions of CPC but in the present case we regret to record that the defects which have been pointed out in this election petition were purely cosmetic and do not go to the root of the matter  and secondly even if the Court found them of serious nature then at least the Court should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to rectify such defects.”[91]

24.Instances of Courts Interference before Completion of Election:

  1. Election process was not in conformity with the relevant statutory provisions.[92]
  2. Election Meeting not in conformity with Articles.[93]
  3. Conduct of elections was not in accordance with the Bye laws of the Association.[94]
  4. Voters’ list had been prepared on the basis of nonexistent rules.[95]
  5. Violation of the essential provisions of the Election Rules and the Act and validity of the entire election is in challenge.[96]
  6. Mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power.[97] Court interferes for fair and impartial election.[98]
  7. Where validity of the entire election is in challenge beyond the election of a particular candidate, on the ground of the violation of the essential provisions of the Election Rules and the Act [99]
  8. Where alternative remedy is no remedy in the eye of law.[100]

When the challenge of whole election is such that the alternative remedy is no remedy in the eye of law to cover the challenge; or, in any event, is not adequate and efficacious remedy, then the remedy of writ petition to challenge the whole election is available. In Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[101] the Court interfered since the Election Tribunal would have found itself incompetent to declare the proviso to R. 3 (3) of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules ultra vires and that being so the alternative remedy provided in R. 34 (8) was no remedy at all.The illegalities made the entire election void and the statutory rulesunder which the election was conducted was invalid.

25.Court Interfere for Fair and Impartial Election

In proper cases the courts appoint Returning Officers or administrators for societies. The Calcutta High Court in East Bengal Club Vs. Paltu Mukherjee[102] appointed an impartial special officer to hold the election under his supervision for ensuring fair and impartial election of the club. In Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society[103] the court appointed Retired Chief Justice of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh to be the Administrator of the Society and gave him directions for convening GB and election.

26.No Question of Estoppel if Inherent Illegality

If a member participated in a meeting or election knowing the illegality of the same he would be deemed to have acquiesced or concurred in the election and would be estopped from challenging its validity.[104]

But, neither the principle of estoppel nor the principle of approbation and reprobation can be pressed into service in case of an election which is liable to be set aside by a court. Therefore,evena defeated candidates can challenge an election on its inherent illegality.[105]

27.Nomination Paper Rejected: Writ Petition not Maintainable

In N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer[106] the nomination paper of the appellant for election to the Madras Legislative Assembly was rejected by the Returning Officer. The appellant challenged the rejection of the nomination paper by filing a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Returning Officer on account of Article 329(b) of the Constitution, which says that no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature. In appeal, our Apex Court with a Bench of six learned Judges examined the question whether the writ petition would be maintainable at the initial stage against an order rejecting the nomination paper.

It was observed in this decision:

  • “The law of elections in India does not contemplate that there should be two attacks on matters connected with election proceedings, one while they are going on by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts having been expressly excluded), and another after they have been completed by means of an election petition. Any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a special tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any court.”

28.Electoral Roll:

Illegality in Preparation: Remedy is Election Petition

Even as to alleged illegality or breach of rules while preparing the electoral roll, courts will not interfere in the election process, once it is started.[107]

With regard to elections in a society registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, the Supreme Court[108] observed in ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra as under:

  • “In view of our finding that preparation of the electoral roll being an intermediate stage in the process of election of the Managing Committee of a specified society and the election process having been set in motion, it is well settled that the High Court should not stay the continuation of the election process even though there may be some alleged illegality or breach of rules while preparing the electoral roll. It is not disputed that the election in question has already been held and the result thereof has been stayed by an order of this Court, and once the result of the election is declared, it would be open to the appellants to challenge the election of the returned candidate, if aggrieved, by means of an election petition before the election Tribunal.”

29.Electoral Roll: 

Illegality in Preparation: Courts Interfere

If the electoral roll itself has been challenged on the ground that the members enrolled are in violation of the provisions of the Scheme of Administration then in such cases the courts can interfere. A valid electoral role is the basic requirement of a fair election.[109]

In Chief Commissioner, Ajmer Vs. RadheyShyamDani,[110] the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court upheld the decision of the Chief Commissioner on the ground that the electoral roll prepared was invalid as it was prepared in accordance with some invalid rules.[111]

In RamgulamShriBaijnath Prasad Vs. Collector, Guna[112]it was observed that when election held on the basis of rolls which had not been prepared in accordance with law, the petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground of delay.

In Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra[113] it is held by our Apex Court that where the voters’ list had been prepared on the basis of non-existent Rules, it would be illegal and the Court could interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In Dev Prakash Balmukund Vs. Babu Ram Rewti Mal[114], it is held that if the very foundation of the election, namely, the electoral roll was illegal, no election on its basis could be proceed or be allowed to stand, but that did not mean that any kind of defect in the roll, however technical in its nature, would be suffice to reach such a conclusion.[115]

Courts Interferes if Result Materially Affected

Following Chief Commissioner, Ajmer Vs. Radhey Shyam Dani,[116]the Supreme court held in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[117]  that the question as to whether a writ petition on the ground of illegal preparation of the electoral roll would be maintainable or not depends upon the nature and the intensity of the error committed in the preparation of the electoral roll and its effect on the whole election. It is held:

  • “10. The illegal preparation of the electoral roll by the Delhi Bar Council on the basis of the invalid proviso to Rule 3(j) goes to the very root of the matter and no election held on the basis of such an infirmity can be upheld. There is no question of the result being materially affected in such a case.”

30.Electoral Rolls

Non-inclusion: Courts Will Not Interfere

In MARVS Sai Baba Vs. Commissioner and Registrar of Co-Op. Societies,[118] held as under:

  • “7. . . It is pertinent to mention that the issue relating to the validity of membership of a society including that of wrong admission of a member or non-inclusion of a valid member in the rolls of the society is an issue to be decided before the election process begins and that can be a valid ground to invoke Section 32 (7) (a) of the Act to set right the things and then proceed for the elections and appoint a Person-in-charge to manage the affairs of the society in the interregnum. But, once a decision is taken to hold the elections and the election process commences by issue of notification, Section 32 (7) (a) of the Act has got no role and any dispute in connection with the election, be it of the nomination, of improper electoral roll and other aspects, have to be settled only by way of a judicial adjudication contemplated in Section 61 (3) of the Act. “

31.Electoral Roll:

Preparation on Invalid Provisions, Court Interferes

In Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[119] it was found by our Apex Court that the electoral roll prepared on the basis of invalid provisions resulted in vitiating the entire election, and that the writ petition for setting aside the election of the Bar Council of Delhi was maintainable. The Supreme Court while considering the validity of an electoral roll of Delhi Bar Council, omitting as many as 2000 Advocates on the basis of an invalid Rule framed by that Council, observed:

  • “9. We, therefore, hold that the impugned proviso to R. 3 (j) to the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules is ultra vires and invalid and the electoral roll prepared by the Delhi Bar Council on the basis of the same resulting in the exclusion of the names of about 2000 Advocates from the said roll was not valid in law. We are further of the opinion that the whole election was invalid on that account and it could be challenged as such in a writ petition. It was not a case of challenging the preparation of the electoral roll on the factual basis of wrong exclusion of a few names. For the said purpose R.4 occurring in Chapter I of the Bar Council of India Rules could come into play. But here, because of the invalidity of the Rules itself, the preparation of the electoral roll was completely vitiated-a matter which cannot be put within the narrow limit of the said rule. 10. The illegal preparation of the electoral roll by the Delhi Bar Council on the basis of the invalid proviso to R. 3(j) goes to the very root of the matter and no election held on the basis of such an infirmity can be upheld. There is no question of the result being materially affected in such a case.” [120]

32. Electoral Roll:

Court Interfere when Election on Nonexistent Rules

In N Thippanna Vs. State of Karnataka[121] Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court by its interim order directed to hold the election but withheld the results. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeeth Singh[122] the Karnataka High Court in its final Judgment held that the electoral rolls prepared by the University, omitting a very large number of registered graduates, was not in conformity with the Act, the statutes and the general principles for preparation of electoral rolls, and that it was void in law.  A valid electoral role is the basic requirement of a fair election.[123]

Though it is observed by our Apex Court in ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra that when the process of election has been commenced it would be impermissible for the court to go into the questions as to breach of the Rule in the preparation of the voters’ list, it observed that where the voters’ list had been prepared on the basis of nonexistent rules, it would be illegal and the Court could interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In Ahmednagar Zilla SDV and P Sangh Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra[124] though the appeal was dismissed following the principles of law laid down in Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra,[125]the Court directed the District Collector, Ahmednagar, to conduct fresh election of the Board of Directors to the appellant Society, forthwith.

33.Acceptance of List of Governing Body District Registrar – Effect

If a dispute arises as to whom among the two sets were the lawful members of the Governing Committee, the Registrar has the power to decide upon such a dispute under the Societies Registration Act as an incidental or consequential power in itself.The Registrar has to prima facie satisfy from the materials and evidences. There may not be an elaborate enquiry. However, such an enquiry made by the Registrar and the decision taken from it does not become final and the aggrieved party can take up the matter before a competent court for a decision as to who are the members of the governing body.[126]

34.Section 25 of So. Regn. Act as Amended by State of U.P[127]

Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act as amended by State of U.P. endows the ‘prescribed authority’ with the right to hear and decide in a summary manner disputes in respect of the election or continuance in office of office-bearers of societies.

Section 25 of the Societies Registration  Act as amended by State of U.P. reads as under:

  • “25(1) The prescribed authority may, on a reference made to it by the registrar or by a least one-fourth of the members of a society registered in Uttar Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office -bearer of such society, and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit:
  •       Provided that the election of an office-bearer shall be set aside where the prescribed authority is satisfied –
  • (a) that any corrupt practice has been committed by such office-bearer; or               
  • (b) that the nomination of an candidate has been improperly rejected; or
  • (c) that the result of the election in so far it concerns such office bearer has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void or by any non -compliance with the provisions of any rules of the society.
  • Explanation I. – …………….. ………… …
  • Explanation II. – ………………… ……..
  • Explanation III. –  ……………. ………..

But, when disputed questions of fact are involved, summary proceedings under Section 25 of the Act, 1860 will not be a bar for seeking remedy before the Civil Court as the summary proceedings under Section 25 is not an efficacious remedy.[128]

35.Non-convening of the Meetings: Acquiescence and Estoppel

Non-convening of Annual General Meetings is a serious allegation against the office-bearers of a Society.  But in proper cases courts can invoke doctrine of acquiescence and estoppel.

In TJ Thomas Vs. CS Joseph[129] reliefs were claimed under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 read with 3 and 4 of the Kerala Non-Trading Companies Act, 1961 alleging, inter alia, that the respondents were not convening the Annual General Meetings regularly. The prayers were, among other grounds, rejected  because it had come out in evidence that the non-convening of the meetings was due to the inaction on the part of petitioners; that the petitioners, if they were really interested in the affairs of the Sangam, should have taken appropriate steps at the appropriate time and seen that the Annual General Meetings were convened without fail; and that the conduct of the petitioners in this regard would show that they had without demur, acquiesced in the various activities of the respondents.

36.In Proper Cases Courts Order Election and Appoint Receivers

In K.P. MuhammedVs. M. Abdurahiman[130] both sides did not want an election to be conducted; and both were aiming at the administration or control of the Society, and for that purpose they were not so eager or anxious to have an election conducted in the manner suggested by the Court. The Kerala High Court, in order to resolve stalemate, orderedelection and appointed Receivers to manage its affairs.

37.If Violation of Bye laws Court Sets Right the Illegalities

In V. ArulkumarVs. Tamil Nadu Government Nurses Association[131] it is held that the court has to necessarily see as to whether the conduct of elections was in accordance with the Bye laws of the Association. If the same was in total violation of the Bye laws of the Association the court was certainly empowered to set right the illegalities and put the election process in motion to be performed in accordance with the Bye laws. Therefore it was held that the suit was maintainable.

38.Effect of Failure to File Documents u/s 4& Court Interference

Non-renewal of the registration of a society may be a bar to avail the benefits offered to registered societies, but the same by itself will not lead the inference that the society is not in existence.[132] 

It is held in Nand Deo Pandey Vs. Committees of Management[133] that properly constituted committee of management was required to continue the proceedings of inquiry against the Principal of a Vidyalaya. The Managing Committee had ceased to be valid due to non-renewal of the registration of the society and non-holding of periodical elections under the provisions of the Societies’  Registration (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960.

But in Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate[134] it is held that the courts cannot set aside elections on the sole ground of non compliance of certain statutory provisions by it, and that in the event of becoming a society defunct, or failure to file documents under Sec. 4 of the So. Regn. Act, there is no bar for its members to revive its activities and to conduct the election of the office bearers.


[1]      See: Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982

[2]      Ram Pal Singh Vs. State of U P: LAWS(ALL)-2015-5-99

[3] AIR 2006 SC 980

[4] AIR1993 SC 412

[5]   AIR 1999 Bom 335

[6]      Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts & Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585.

[7]    See Contract Act, Sec. 23.

[8]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Siddheshwar Sahkari Sakhar Karkhana Vs. Commissioner of I T: AIR 2004 SC 4716;Hyderabad Karnataka Edn. Society Vs. Registrar of Societies: AIR 2000 SC 301;Co- op. Central Bank Vs. Addl. Industrial Tribunal, AP: AIR 1969  SC 245; Naresh Chandra Sanyal Vs. Calcutta Stock Exchange Assn Ltd. : AIR 1971  SC 422;Damyanti Naranga Vs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966; Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973.Municipal Board Vs. Rizwan Beg: AIR 1964 All 544.

[9]      Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1985  SC 973; DamyantiNarangaVs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966.

[10]    Syed MunirHoda Vs. Bader Sayeed: TLMAD-2012-0-2262; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: : (2011) 13 SCC 774; State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Coop. Society Ltd : AIR 1997  SC  1413.

[11]    Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar: AIR 2005  SC 2306

[12]    AIR 1997  SC  1413: Quoted in Zoroastrian Co-op. H. Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar: AIR 2005  SC  2306; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774; Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. Devinder Singh: AIR 2007 SC 1723.

[13]    See: Sec. 9-14, 17 and 20

[14]    JyotiBasu Vs. Debi Ghosal AIR 1982 SC 983

[15]    SatyaNarainTripathiVs. State of UP: 2008 – 2 ADJ 222; 2008-71 All LR 698.

[16]    NagappaChettiar Vs. Madras Race Club: AIR 1951 Mad 831;         C L Joseph Vs. Jos: AIR 1965 Ker 68;         Star Tiles Works Vs. N. Govindan: AIR 1959 Ker  254

[17]    A. S. Krishnan Vs. M. Sundarum: AIR 1941 Bom 312;         SatyavartSidhantalankar Vs. AryaSamaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516;         Nagappa Vs. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831;        ShridharMisraVs.Jihandra, AIR 1959 All 598. 

[18]    ShriSarbjit Singh Vs All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society : ILR (1989) 2 Delhi 585.

[19]    AIR1988 Mad 27

[20]    P NallaThampyThera Vs. B L Shanker: AIR1984 SC 135

[21]    (1954) SCR 892

[22]    Referred to in Ram Sukh Vs. Dinesh Aggerwal: AIR 2010 SC 1227; Ram PhalKundu Vs. Kamal Sharma : AIR 2004 SC 1657; IndrajitBarua Vs. Election Commission Of India: AIR 1986 SC 103;  P NallaThampyThera Vs. BL Shanker AIR 1984 SC 135; Samant N Balkrishna Vs. George Fernandez ; AIR 1969 SC 1201; Kumaranand Vs. Brij Mohan Lal; AIR1965 SC 628; Mahila Krishna Kumari Vs. MahilaSakunBhatnagar: AIR 1972 MP 155; Jagannath Dalai Vs. Rama Chandra Nahak: AIR 1959 Ori 26.

[23]    Md. MajidHussain Vs. MdAqueel, AIR 2015 AP 21, that See also: TanajiRamchandraNimhan Vs. Swati VinayakNimhan: AIR  2006 SC 1218.

[24]    1995-5 SCC 347

[25]   2005 (1) CTC 399 : 2005 (2) MLJ 102. Referred to in TheniMelapettai Hindu NadarkalUravinmuraiVs. The District Registrar: 2007 6 MLJ 1528.

[26]    Manish Kansal Vs. State of U P: LAWS(ALL)-2015-5-194

[27]    A. S. Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram: A. I. R. 1941 Bom. 312,         See also: ShridharMisra Vs. Jaihandra, AIR 1959 All 598;        SatyavartSidhantalankar Vs. AryaSamaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516 ;        NagappaVs. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831.

[28]    2005-1 CTC 399, (2005) 2 Mad LJ 102.        See also: V. ArulkumarAndOrs.  Vs. Tamil Nadu Government Nurses Association (Government Recognised): 2015-5 CTC 17: (2015) 5 Mad LJ 673.

[29]    (1952) SCR 218; AIR 1952 SC 64.

[30]    CharanLalSahu v. GianiZail Singh: AIR 1984 SC 309; Referred to in Mithilesh Kumar Sinha Kaka Joginder Singh Vs. Returning Officer for Presidential Election: DrShankerDayal Sharma: AIR1993 SC 20; P NallaThampyThera Vs. B L Shanker: AIR  1984 SC 135. Also See: SatyaNarain Vs. Dhuja Ram: AIR 1974 SC 1185; U S Sasidharan Vs. K Karunakaran: AIR1990 SC 924; JyotiBasu Vs. Debi Ghosal: AIR 1982 SC 983: Sukumarakurup Vs. District Judge: AIR 1998 Ker 332; Ram Shankar Chaudhary Vs. Rama Shankar Singh: 1978 JLJ  401.

[31]    Sukumarakurup Vs. District Judge: AIR  1998 Ker 332

[32]AIR 2021 SC 217

[33]AIR 1980 SC 1612

[34]    Ram Pal Singh Vs. State of U P: LAWS (ALL)-2015-5-99.        Referred to: Ram PyareLal Vs. State of U.P. 2015 3 ADJ 577;        Indian Sugar Mills Association Vs. Secretary to Government, UP: AIR 1951 All 1;        Dr. PP Rastogi Vs. Meerut University, 1997 1 UPLBEC 415;        Vimla Devi Vs. Deputy Director of Education, 1997-3 ESC 1807;  2010 (1) ADJ 262

[35]   2007-7 ADJ 414; 2007-3 All LR 14

[36]    Referred to in SatyaNarainTripathiVs. State of U P: 2008 – 2 ADJ 222, 2008-71 ALLLR 698.

[37]Dr. P.P. Rastogi v. Meerut University, Meerut, 1997-1 UPLBEC 415; Smt. Vimla Devi v. The Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra, 1997-3 ESC 1807; BhagwanKaushik v. State of U.P., 2006-2 UPLBEC 1372; Amanullah Khan v. State of U.P. and others, 2009-75 All LR 29

[38]Kamla Kant Agrawal v. State of U.P., 2008-7 ADJ 601; Committee of Management, Janta Inter College, Sultanpur, District Haridwar v. Joint Director of Education, I Region, Meerut, 1999-1 UPLBEC 170;Ratan Kumar Solanki v. State of U.P., 2010-1 ADJ 262 (DB).

[39]2011-2 ADJ 65

[40] See: Laxman Singh Vs. State of UP, ADJ 2014 9 242, AWC 2014 5 4382, LBESR 2014 3 415

[41]    Committee of Managt.AryaKanyaPathshala Inter College Vs. State of UP: 2011- 2 ADJ 65; Gopal Y Unkal Vs. Karnataka VidyaVardhakaSangha, Dharwad, Dist: KarCCR 2018 2 1880

[42]    AIR 1965 Ker 68.         Quoted in Rajeev Saumitra Vs. Neetu Singh: 2016-198 Comp Cases 359.

[43]    2016 3 UAD 656

[44]AIR 1995 SC 1344

[45]    See: ShyamNarainShukla, Committee of Management Vs. State of UP: 1995-25 All LR 100; 1995-1 LBESR 174.

[46]    Kurukshetra University Vs. Vinod Kumar: AIR 1977 Pj&Hr 21;        Sarup Singh Vs. State of Punjab: 1990-1 LLJ 285.        See with respect to statutory tribunal: AnnamalaiVs. R Doraiswamy: 1982 ACJ 371.

[47]    Ramesh Kapur Vs. Punjab University:  AIR 1965 Punj 120; Rakesh Kumar Vs. J & K State Board of School Education: AIR 1992 J&K 22.

[48]    Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. Vs. Football Association Ltd. (1971 Chancery Div. 591)

[49]    Quoted in J K Aggarwal Vs. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation:  AIR 1991 SC 1221.

[50]    AIR  1976 P & H 69.

[51]    K V Vijayakumar Vs. Joint Registrar of Co Operative Societies: AIR  1996 Ker 150

[52]    Pritam Singh Vs. S. Ranjit Singh: AIR 1965 Punjab 39.

[53]    AIR 1995 SC 1344.

[54]    (2011) 13 SCC 774

[55]    (1954) SCR 892. Also See: JayantaSamal Vs. KulamaniBehera: 2004 13 SCC 552

[56]    AIR  2016 SC 1094.

[57]    AIR 1952 SC 64

[58]    (1976) 3 SCC 211

[59]    AIR 1978 SC 851.

[60]    AIR 1996 SC 1595

[61]    AIR 2001 SC 3982;        Followed in AhmednagarZilla SDV P Sangh Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 1 SCC 133

[62]    (1996) 6 SCC 303

[63]    AIR 2000 SC 2977

[64]    2008 (Supp.) O.L.R. 251

[65]    2015-3 Ker LT 299.

[66]    AIR 2014 Mad 34

[67]    (2006) 8 SCC 487.

[68]    (1998) 8 SCC 703.

[69]    (2004) 12 SCC 73; Also see: Harcharan Singh Vs. Mohinder Singh: AIR 1968  SC 1500; Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner: AIR 1978  SC 851; JyotiBasu Vs. Debi Ghosal: AIR  1982  SC  983; HarikrishnaLal Vs. BauLalMarandi: 2003-8 SCC 613; Shyamdeo Pd. Singh Vs. Naval Kishore Yadav: 2000-8 SCC 46; Election Commission of India Vs. Ashok Kumar : AIR 2000 SC 2977

[70]    AIR 1977 SC 1703.

[71]    AIR  2016 SC 1094: Referred: Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer: AIR 1952 SC 64;  ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2001 (8) SCC 509 Nanhoo Mal and others Vs. Hira Mal: 1976 (3) SCC 211.

[72]    AIR 1977 SC 1703.

[73]    See also: Abdul Latheef C.K. Vs. K.M. Haneefa:  2015-3 Ker LT 299.

[74]    UP State Brassware Corporation Ltd. Vs. UdaiNarainPandey: AIR 2006 SC 586

[75]    Manugobinda Vs. BrajabanduMisra – AIR 1986 Orissa 281

[76]    Lavu Sri Krishna Rao Vs. Dr. MoturiNagendraRao: AIR 2007 A P 25

[77]    Rameshwar Vs. Jot Ram:  AIR 1976 SC 49

[78]    PasupuletiVenkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders:  AIR 1975 SC 1409.

[79]LAWS(KER) 2013 3 137

[80]Kalyan Kumar Gogoi Vs. AshutoshAgnihotri:AIR 2011 SC 760

[81]    MdMajidHussain Vs. MdAqueel, AIR 2015 AP 21, that See also: TanajiRamchandraNimhan Vs. Swati VinayakNimhan: AIR  2006 SC 1218.

[82]1995-5 SCC 347

[83][1966]3 SCR 623

Referred to in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Vs. K S Gandhi: 1991 AIR-SCW 879.

[84]    Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath AIR  2016 SC 1094

[85]    In Re: T BalajiRao Naidu Garu Vs. State: AIR 1933 Mad 103 (PC).

[86]    Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum, AIR 1963 SC 1144;        ShridharMisraVs.JaichandraVidyalankar:   AIR 1959 All 598.

[87]    RaghubarDayalMisra Vs. Shankar Lal: AIR  1934 All 876.

[88]    Kalyan Kumar Gogoi Vs. AshutoshAgnihotri:AIR 2011 SC 760. Referred to in:Ashok Vs. RajendraBhausahebMulak: 2012-12 SCC 27;  Ravinder Kumar Rawal Vs. V.K. Sood: ILR 2011-2  P&H 704.See also: JaganNath Vs. Jaswant Singh (1954) SCR 892;JayantaSamal Vs. KulamaniBehera: 2004-13 SCC 552

[89]    Saheed Sporting Club Vs. Kalyan Ray Choudhury : 2008 CLT Supp 338. AIR 1963 All 518 referred to.

[90]    (2008) 11 SCC 740.

[91]Quoted in G.M. Siddeshwar Vs. Prasanna Kumar: AIR  2013 SC 1549.

[92]    ChandrakantMahadevPatole Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2010 All MR 457

[93]    Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585:

[94]    V. Arulkumar Vs. TN Government Nurses Association: 2015-5 CTC 17

[95]    Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 2001 SC 3982;  Ahmednagar Zilla SDV.  Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2004-1 SCC 133; Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2005 SC 3746;  Dev Prakash Balmukund Vs .Babu Ram Rewti Mal: AIR 1961 Punj 429 referred to in Bar Council Of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612. Electoral Roll is a fundamental factor: DevassyVs. Asst. Regtr.: ILR 1976 (1) Ker. 95. See also: Ajmer Vs. RadheyShyamDani: AIR 1957 SC 304; Gopalan Vs. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies 1985 Ker LT 446; Joseph Vs. Kothamangalam Co-op. M. Society: 1994 (1) Ker LT 828. See Contra view Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;  Shri Sant SadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982; Radheshyam Vs. Chairman, Sahakari Samiti, : AIR 1976 MP 156; Ram Swaroop, Dohare Vs. AyuktaSahkarita: AIR 1996 MP 187.[96]    Umakant Singh Vs. Bindra Chaudhary AIR 1965 Pat 459;        Referred to in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612

[97]    Manish Kansal Vs. State of U P: LAWS(ALL)-2015-5-194

[98]    East Bengal Club Vs. Paltu Mukherjee : 2011-1 Cal HN 184

[99]    Umakant Singh Vs. BindraChaudhary AIR 1965 Pat 459;        Referred to in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612.        Also: ParmeshwarMahaseth Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 Pat 149:        Referred to in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612.

[100]  Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612.

[101]  Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612

[102]  2011-1 Cal HN 184

[103]  ILR 1989-2 Del 585

[104] MaksudanRaut Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1983 Pat 186. Followed in SatyaNarain Singh Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1984 Pat 26. See also: R. NanjundegowdaVs Revenue Secretary-Ii, Bangalore: AIR 2006-6 (Kar)(R) 523; NandParkashVohra Vs. State of H P: AIR 2000 HP 65.

[105]  Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612; KangluBaulaKotwal Vs. Chief Executive Officer, JanpadSabha, Durg: AIR 1955 Nag 49; RamgulamShriBaijnath Prasad Vs. Collector, Guna, AIR 1975 MP 145 (Oza J.)  referred to.

[106]  AIR 1952 SC 64

[107]  See: Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;   ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982; Radheshyam Vs. Chairman, SahakariSamiti, : AIR 1976 MP 156; 2008 (4) MPLJ 353 (Ram Singh Vs. State of MP and others); Ram Swaroop, Dohare Vs. AyuktaSahkarita: AIR 1996 MP 187

[108]  ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982

[109]  Laxman Singh Vs. State of U P: 2014 – 9 ADJ 242

[110]  AIR 1957 SC 304

[111]  Referred to in Bar Council Of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612

[112]AIR 1975 MP145 (Oza J.)

[113] AIR 2005 SC 3746

[114]  AIR 1961 Punj 429; referred to in Bar Council Of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612. Electoral Roll is a fundamental factor: DevassyVs. Asst. Registrar of Cooperative Societies: ILR 1976 (1) Ker. 95.

[115]  See also: Gopalan Vs. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies 1985 Ker LT 446; Joseph Vs. Kothamangalam Co-op. M. Society Ltd: 1994 (1) Ker LT 828

[116]  AIR 1957 SC 304

[117]  AIR 1980 SC 1612. Referred: Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 1975 MP145; Bhupendra Kumar Jain Vs. Y. S. Dharmadhikari, AIR 1976 MP 110.

[118]  1999(2) ALD 319 (DB)

[119]  AIR 1980 SC 1612

[120]  Relied on in: Sanjeev Kumar and Vs. Registrar of Co-Operative Societies LAWS(DLH)-2015-8-175.

[121] 1982-2 Kant LJ 313

[122]AIR 1980 SC 1612

[123]DevassyVs. Asst. Registrar of Cooperative Societies: ILR 1976 (1) Ker. 95; Gopalan Vs. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies 1985 Ker LT 446; Joseph Vs. Kothamangalam Co-op. M. Society Ltd: 1994 (1) Ker LT 828).

[124]  AIR 2004 SC 1329; followed in  Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2005 SC 3746

[125]  AIR 2001 SC 3982

[126]  AP AboobakerMusaliarVs. Dist. Registrar (G), Kozhikode: (2004) 11 SCC 247.See also:  CMZ Musliar Vs. Aboobacker: ILR 1998-2 Ker 76. GyanBhartiShikshaSadan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2014 5 ADJ 263

[127]  See Chapter: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs.

[128]  NagriPrachariniSabha Vs. Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi: 1991 Supp (2) SCC 36

[129]  ILR1988-1 Ker 429

[130]  LAWS (KER)-2013-3-137

[131]  2015-5 CTC 17

[132]  Committee of Management  Vs. Commissioner, Kanpur Region: 2008 -1 AWC 695; 2008 -1 ADJ 706; 2008-70 All LR 368.

[133]  AIR 1991 SC 413

[134]  AIR 2007 SC 1337.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society/Trust

Rights & Liabilities of Members of Clubs and Societies

Saji Koduvath, Advocate

Synopsis

  • 1.      Definition of ‘Member’ & Right to Vote
  • 2.      State-Acts Empower Registrar to Call Elections
  • 3.      Membership in a Society, not a Fundamental Right
  • 4.      ‘Subscription in Arrears’: Afford Opportunity of Payment
  • 5.      Individual Membership Rights
  • 6.      Individual Can Maintain Cause of the Collective Body 
  • 7.      Individual and Corporate Membership Rights
  • 8.      When Minority can File Suits Without Sanction of Majority
  • 9. Exceptions to the rule in Foss Vs. Harbottle
  • 9.      No Personal Liability on Members & Gov. Body
  • 10.    Co-op: Society has Corporate Personality & Its Liability
  • 11.    Elected Representatives of a Church can Protect Property
  • 12.    No Taxing When Members Avail the Facilities
  • 13.    Admission of New Members
  • 14.    Instances When Court Interferes

Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:

  • 15. Member defined: For the purposes of this Act a member of a society shall be a person who, having been admitted therein according to the rules and regulations thereof, shall have paid a subscription, or shall have signed the roll or list of members thereof, and shall not have resigned in accordance with such rules and regulations;
  • Disqualified members: But in all proceedings under this Act no person shall be entitled to vote or be counted as a member whose subscription at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months

1. Definition of ‘Member’ & Right to Vote

Norms & Formation of Governing Body is Left to Bye Laws.

The definition of ‘Member’ in the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (in Sec.15) is not exhaustive, as it is ‘for the purposes of this Act’ alone. Therefore it is legitimate to say that the disqualifications specified in the second limb of Section 15 (restriction to vote; and not to count as a member, because of subscription-arrears) is confined[1] to the activities enjoined to the ‘members’ in the So. Registration Act: ie. to take part in the meeting to make bye laws (S. 9), amend the ‘purposes’ (S. 12), take decision to ‘amalgamate’ with another society (S.12), dissolution (S. 13), etc.

So. Regn. Act does not specifically deal with or direct ‘election’ of the governing body.[2] The mode and modalities of formation of the governing body is resolutely left, under Sec.16, to the ‘rules and regulations of the society’.

Sec.16 reads:

  • Governing body defined: The governing body of the society shall be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees, or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted.

It cannot be understated as an omission in the Act. Pointing out the fundamental right guaranteed (Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India) to form associations, and that the bye laws bind the members as a contract, even if it can be argued that the founders of a society are free to make bye laws which provide for permanent governing body, without an election, it appears that such a society cannot be recognised under the Societies Registration Act in our country which values democratic principles as paramount. Bye laws of a society or a club is a contract amongst its members; and therefore, it must be reasonable.[3]

It is also possible to demonstrate that the right to vote can be conferred upon the life-members or honorary-members even in a registered society (who have not signed the roll/list of members or are in arrears). In Periyar Self-Respect Propaganda Institution Vs. State of Tamil Nadu[4] it is observed: 

  • “By putting an end to the life membership or life offices, there is no putting an end to the right to form an association as such. The holding of an office for a particular tenure or for that matter for life is a matter of internal arrangement amongst members constituting the Institution or the Charitable Society and certainly it cannot assume the colour of a fundamental right. Neither the Institution nor the Charitable Society, or the present incumbents of the life offices could claim that they could form associations only with the life offices engrafted in the rules, or if they had already formed, they must be allowed to continue to have that set up and any disturbance thereof would amount to violation of the right to form an association guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c). If at all, such a right could be characterized as a peripheral or concomitant right which may facilitate the fulfillment of the objectives of the founders of the Institution and the Charitable Society. But, there is no constitutional guarantee that every association formed shall effectively achieve its objectives without interference by law. Neither the members nor the association of members could claim that they have a fundamental right to have office for life.”

2. State-Acts Empower Registrar to Call Meeting for Elections

Societies Registration Act, 1960 as amended by the State of UP empowers the Registrar to call a meeting of the General Body of a society for electing its office bearers. In such cases, it is legitimate to say that the Registrar has to resort the definition in the Act to determine the members entitled to attend the meeting and to vote.

3. Membership in a Society, not a Fundamental Right

It is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India to become a member of a society, though it is a Co-operative Society established under a statute.[5]

The Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Vs. Jagdish Swamp[6] is the authority for the proposition that the right to form an association enjoins with it a right to continue to be associated with it as well as to ensure that only those persons are admitted to the association whom they voluntarily admitted.

In Satya Narain Tripathi Vs. State of UP[7] it is observed as under

  • “But a right to form an association on the one hand and the right to be elected to an office of such association or to participate in the elections on the other hand have been held to be distinct rights and the latter can be claimed only in accordance with the provisions of the bye-laws of the association or under a statute while the former can be claimed also as a fundamental right.”

Vide 97th Amendment to the Constitution of India[8] the right to form Co-operative Societies has been made a fundamental right. But the same would not alter the principle of membership in such societies; because, the right to form a Co-operative Society is different from the right to become a member therein which continues to be governed by the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the Bye laws.[9]

4. ‘Subscription in Arrears’

Affording Opportunity of Making Payment

Non-payment of subscription will not amount to relinquishment of membership, unless the person had been afforded a specific opportunity of making payment by calling upon him to pay the arrears or face the consequences.  The Societies Registration Act does not provide for automatic expulsion or removal/termination of membership for non-payment of subscription fees.

While considering Section 2 (b) of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act (similar provision to Sec. 15 of the Societies Registration Act), the High Court of Karnataka (R.P. Sethi, G. Patri Basavana Goud JJ.), in Lingappa Police Patil Vs. Registrar of Societies[10] after referring to dictionary meaning of ‘resignation’ and various Supreme Court decisions[11] it is held as under:

  • “In view of what we have noted hereinabove, it cannot be said that mere non-payment of the subscription would amount to resignation within the meaning of Section 2 (b) of the Act. Non-payment of subscription would also not amount to relinquishment of membership, unless a person is afforded a specific opportunity of making payment by calling upon him to pay the arrears or face the consequences. The society may be justified and the respondents may prescribe any such rule which provides for affording an opportunity to the defaulting member to make the payment of the arrears of subscription and upon failure, without valid reasons, declare the defaulter to cease to be the member for the purposes of the Act and the Rules. A reference to the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act clearly indicates that save as otherwise provided by the Act, no rule or regulation of the society can exclude any member from being entitled to vote.”

In Lingappa Police Patil Vs. Registrar of Societies[12] it is also held that the Rule of the Society which declared a person would cease to be a member merely on his default to make the subscription, without even providing him an opportunity to show cause[13] for not making the payment within a specified period appeared ‘to be very harsh’; and that ‘confiscatory and deprivatory provisions made, resulting in civil consequences, should not have been allowed’ to be incorporated in the bye laws. The Division Bench struck down the impugned Rule it being contrary to the provisions of the Act.

5. Individual Membership Rights

(See Chapter: Individual Membership Rights)

With respect to the individual membership rights of a member of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, the general principles governing the rights of an individual share holder or a member of a company would apply.[14]

Following are recognised by Courts as ‘individual membership rights’ in a company[15]

  • (i)  Right to vote,
  • (ii) right to stand as a candidate as a director and 
  • (iii) set-right illegal acts.

These rights can be asserted by a member in his personal capacity without the sanction of the majority or without impleading the company as a co-plaintiff or defendant.

In the often quoted decision, Nagappa Chettiar Vs. Madras Race Club[16] it is observed:

  • “A share-holder is entitled to institute a suit to enforce his individual rights against the Company such as his right to vote or his right to stand as a director of a company at an election ……….. It is open to a majority always to set right a thing which was done by the majority either illegally or irregularly if thing complained of was one which the majority of the company were entitled to do legally and was within the powers of the company, by calling a fresh meeting.  That is the reason why in such cases the court refuses to interfere at the instance of a share-holder even in a representative action brought by him. If the majority, however, acts in an oppressive manner, it is not as if the minority are without a remedy. …… From this it follows that a share-holder or share-holders are entitled to bring an action:
    • (1) In respect of matters which are ultra vires the company and which the majority of share-holders were incapable of sanctioning (See Burland Vs. Earl, 1902 AC 83);
    • (2) Where the act complained of constitutes a fraud on the minority and
    • (3) Where the action of the majority is illegal“.

6. Individual Can Maintain Cause of the Collective Body 

Where the right of an individual is affected or infringed, and, he has no other effective remedy, and where there are no vitiating circumstances such as delay, latches, etc., the cause of the collective body will be maintainable at the instance of an individual.[17] 

7. Individual Membership Rights and Corporate Membership Rights

The Kerala High Court in Joseph Vs. Jos[18] observed as under:

  • “…  There are two kinds of rights for a member of the company, one the individual membership right, and the other the corporate membership right. So far as the corporate membership rights are concerned, a shareholder can assert those rights only in conformity with the decision of the majority of the shareholders. An individual membership right is a right to maintain himself in full membership with all the rights and privileges appertaining to that status. …”

8. When Minority can File Suits Without Sanction of Majority

Exceptions to the rule in Foss Vs. Harbottle

See Chapter: How to Sue Societies & Clubs

9. Liability of So: No Personal Liability on Members & Gov. Body

See Chapter: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs.

10. Co-op: Society has Corporate Personality; Liability It’s Own

Merely because of a person having been its president for some time will not be liable for payment of the dues of a Co-operative Society; because, a Co-operative Society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act is a legal entity invested with a corporate personality which makes it distinct and different from the various members constituting it. The liability of the society is its own and not that of its members or office bearers, and has to be met by the society itself.[19] It is held in State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor[20] as under:

  • “Since the Board was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and as per rules and regulations it could acquire and sell property, the recovery of arrears of sales tax imposed on the Board could only be recovered from the property of the Board and not from the members of the Board.”

Ninety Seventh Amendment of our Constitution provided constitutional status to the Co-operative Societies and it has brought out radical changes in the concept of Co-operative Societies. Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a Co-operative Society.

11. Elected Representatives of a Church can Protect Property

In Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez[21] the question came whether the plaintiffs were competent to represent the parish and claim rights against the third party defendants. The third parties (though were also parishioners of the very same Church), by the nature of the claim set up by them, as against the Church, with reference to the property, stood as rival claimants with the Church.

The court found that the suit having been initiated and prosecuted with the ultimate aim of protecting the Church property (as per the Canon Law Church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar and clearly mandates a consent from either of these two personalities for initiating a litigation) the sanction of the ordinary was not necessary; and that the plaintiffs who were the elected representatives, entrusted with the administration of the Church, were competent to initiate civil proceedings before the Civil Court. And that under the Canon law, the temporal goods belong to the parish (which, by law, was a public juridic person) and every administrator was bound to protect the property of the Church with the diligence of a good house holder; and also that the plaintiffs, individually, being the parishioners of the Church, were competent to represent the ‘juridic person’.

  The right of worshippers to file suits, for reliefs outside S. 92 CPC, is well accepted.[22] It has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar[23]  that the worshippers have a ‘beneficial interest’ (not the ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owners). A worshipper has his own right to institute a suit to protect his right to worship and for that purpose to protect the debuttar property and that he can do so in his personal capacity as worshipper and not as a next friend of the deity. [24] Even in matters where Indian Trusts Act applies, Section 63 of the Indian Trusts Act is not exhaustive of remedies available to a beneficiary. Where the trustee has improperly alienated trust property the beneficiary can sue third parties for more effective reliefs than those contemplated by Section 63.[25]

When the Shebait acted adversely to the interest of the idol and fails to take action to safeguard its interest, it was held by our Apex Court in Bishwanath Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji[26] that there was no justification for denying the right to a worshipper to file suit to seek appropriate reliefs. The Supreme Court observed that it had been held in a number of decisions[27] that worshippers may file a suit praying for possession of a property on behalf of an endowment. It was also observed that an idol was in the position of a minor and when the person representing it leaves it in a lurch, a person interested in the worship of the idol could certainly be clothed with an ad hoc power of representation to protect its interest.  In Ramchand Vs. Janki Ballabhji Maharaj[28] the Supreme Court held that a person, who has made large donations for the maintenance of the temple, has clearly a substantial interest to maintain a suit for possession of the temple and its property against the Pujari or Manager, on behalf of the deity to protect the property from mismanagement or misappropriation.

12. No Taxing When Members Avail the Facilities

In Commissioner of Income-tax Vs. Darjeeling Club Ltd.[29]  a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court observed that there was a long line of decisions in which it had been held that supplies made by a club to its members or the facilities afforded by a club to its members for a price would not amount to business activity of the club, even though there might be surplus of revenue over expenditure and the surplus could not be taxed as business profits if the sales were confined to the members of the Club only. There cannot be any distinction, with respect to this matter, between a temporary member and an honorary member. Any surplus contribution will be held for the benefit of the members. The benefit of the surplus fund must go back to the members as a class.

Where facilities including accommodation is provided to the members through the instrumentality or agency of the Club, neither the Club is the landlord, nor the members – during their stay – are the tenants of the Club. The members by virtue of their membership are entitled to avail of the facilities of their Club (accommodation) according to its rules, as of right. What is paid by the members for their accommodation cannot be treated as rent and the income cannot be regarded as income from the house-property under the Income Tax Act.[30]

13. Admission of New Members

The bye laws of a Society or a Club prescribe the qualifications of the Members to be admitted. They are in the nature of contract between the members. Therefore the right of admission of new members also remains at the will and option of the members.[31] The State or an enactment cannot compel admission of members, contrary to the bye laws of a Society.[32] What is the ‘interest’ of the Society or a Club is to be determined by the society.[33]

14. Instances When Court Interferes

See Chapter: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs.

15. Disqualification of Members

Section 21(1)(g) of the Telangana Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, provides that a person shall be disqualified for being a member if he fails to attend two consecutive annual General Body meetings without leave of absence. Proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 21 states that “no member shall be removed under this sub-Section unless he had an opportunity of making a representation against the proposed action of removal and a copy of resolution removing the member shall be communicated to such person and on such communication, he shall be deemed to have ceased to be a member of the  society”.

In Bollineni Ravindranath Vs. Sate of Telangana[34] the The High Court of Telangana held that exclusion of members of the society from the voters list of eligible voters for not attending two consecutive General Body meetings of the society was patently illegal. It was pointed out that there was no material to show that they followed the procedure in Section 21(3) proviso to disqualify any member who did not attend two consecutive Annual General Body meetings without leave of absence, by giving him an opportunity of being heard as mandated by the proviso thereto, and thereafter such member was removed by the General Body of the society.

In Arun Laxman Ashan Vs. Jeevan C Idnani[35]  details furnished by respondents as to forming front were rejected on the ground that the same were not in accordance with the requirement under the rules. Though steps were taken by respondents within time limit, certain documents were not filed within the time limit. No opportunity was given to respondents to cure such defects. The Bombay High Court held that the provisions of Rule 5, directing time-limit to furnish (proper) application, was directory and not mandatory.

Whether the edict in a statute is mandatory or directory is to be determined with reference to the nature and circumstance in which it is given. In Pratap Singh Vs. Krishna Gupta[36] the Supreme Court has observed that some rules are vital and go to the root of the matter; that they cannot be broken; that others are only directory and breach of them can be overlooked provided there is substantial compliance with the Rules read as a whole and provided no prejudice ensues; and that it is a well settled general rule that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly but it is sufficient if a directory enactment is obeyed or fulfilled substantially. In Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Ahmad Ishaque[37]  it is stated as under:

  • “It is well-established that an enactment in form mandatory might in substance be directory and that the use of the word shall does not conclude the matter. The question was examined in length in Lulius v. Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 AC 214 and various Rules were laid down for determining when a statute might be construed as mandatory and when as directory. They are well-known and there is no need to repeat them. But they are all of them only aids for ascertaining the true intention of the Legislature which is the determining factor and that must ultimately depend on the context.”

[1]      See: Sec. 9-14, 17 and 20.

[2]  But various States’ amendments (and State-Acts) provide for the same.

[3]     Alty Vs. Farrell: (1896) 1 QB 638;      Kruse Vs. Johnson: (1898) 2 QB 91,      Scott Vs. Pilliner: (1904) 2 KB 855,      Repton School Governors Vs. Repton Rural District Council:(1918) 2 KB 133;      Chester Vs. Bateson: (1920) 1 KB 829;      Attorney General Vs. Denhy: 1925 Ch 596:      All referred to in: Municipal Board Vs. Rizwan Beg: AIR 1964 All 544.

[4]    AIR 1988 Mad 27

[5]   Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar, Co -operative (Urban) AIR  2005 SC 2306;        State of U.P. Vs. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees’ Co-op. Society Ltd : AIR 1997  SC  1413;        Supreme Court Bar Association and Ors. Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774. 

[6]      AIR 1971 SC 966

[7]      2008 – 2 ADJ 222, 2008-71 All LR 698

[8]      Implemented with effect from 15th February, 2012

[9]      Lok Sevak Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. Vs. S.P. Goyal: 1997 (1) RCR(Civil) 14

[10]    ILR 1997 Kar 3127

[11]    J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of UP: AIR1990 SC 1808;        Union of India Vs. Gopal Chandra Misra: AIR 1978 SC 694

[12] ILR 1997 Kar 3127

[13]    Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585: AIR 1990 NOC 26(Del).

[14]    Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay: AIR 1946 Bom 516;         Nagappa Vs. Madras Race Club: AIR 1951 Mad 831;        Shridhar Misra Vs. Jaihandra: AIR 1959 All 598.

[15]    See also: CL Joseph Vs. Jos: AIR 1965 Ker 68;        Star Tiles Works Vs. N. Govindan: AIR 1959 Ker  254

[16]    AIR 1951 Mad 831

[17] Committee of Management Arya Kanya Pathshala Inter College Vs. State of U P: 2011- 2 ADJ 65.

[18]    AIR 1965 Ker 68.

Quoted in: Rajeev Saumitra Vs. Neetu Singh: 2016-198 Comp Cases 359.

[19]    Baby Mathew Vs. Agricultural Income Tax Officer: 1994-207 ITR 967: 1996-131 CTR 214: 1994 (1) KLT 786.

[20]    [1990] 79 STC 315 (P & H); ILR1991- 2 (P&H) 218

[21] 2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[22]    Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddi Vs. Kondaru Seshu Reddi, AIR 1967 SC 436;        Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.         In this case distinguished (pointing out actual worship of the idol sans right to worship) Sri Thakur Krishna Chandramajiu Vs. Kanhayalal, AIR 1961 All 206.        See also: Jangi  Lal Vs. B. Panna Lal, AIR 1957 All 743;        Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji, AIR 1961 All 73

[23]    AIR 1957 SC 133

[24]    Sri Ishwar Vs. Gopinath Das: AIR 1960 Cal 741:        See also : Samit Pani Brahmachary Vs. Mayapur Chaitanya Math: AIR1999 Cal  132;        Thakurji Maharaj Vs. Dankiya: AIR 1986 All 247.

[25]    See: Janakirama Iyer Vs. Nilkanth Iyer: AIR 1962 SC 633

[26]    AIR 1967 SC 1044.

[27]    Radhabai Vs. Chimnaji: (1878) ILR 3 Bom 27,        Zafaryab Ali Vs. Bakhtawar Singh: (1883) ILR 5 All 497;        Chidambaranatha Thambirarn Vs. P. S. Nallasiva Mudaliar: AIR 1918 Mad 464,        Dasondhay Vs. Muhammad Abu Nasar: AIR 1917 Mad 112  (FB),        Radha Krishnaji Vs. Rameshwar Prasad Singh: AIR 1934 Pat 584;        Manmohan Haldar Vs. Dibbendu Prosad Roy: AIR 1949 Cal 199.        Following two decisions of the Privy Council were also referred to:        Pramatha Nath Mullick Vs. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick: 52 Ind App 245: AIR 1925 PC 139        Kanhaiya Lal Vs. Hamid Ali: 60 Ind App 263: AIR 1933 PC 198 (1).

[28]    AIR 1970 SC 532.  See also Kt. N. Ram Thenappa Chettiar Vs. N. S. Kr. Karuppan Chettiar: AIR 1968 SC 915

[29]    1985 (153) ITR  676:  Referred to in Saturday Club Vs. Asst. Commr. Service Tax: 2005-1 Cal LT 575.

[30]    Saturday Club Vs. Asst. Commissioner Service Tax Cell Calcutta : 2005-1 Cal LT 575

[31]    Damyanti Naranga Vs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966; Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973

[32]   Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar, Co -operative (Urban) AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[33]    State of Maharashtra Vs. Karvenagaar Sahakari Griha (2000) 9 SCC 295:  Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar, Co -operative (Urban) AIR  2005 SC 2306

[34] LAWS(TLNG) 2021 1 2

[35] 2018-5 MHLJ 59A

[36] AIR 1986 SC 140

[37] AIR 1955 SC 233



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Synopsis

  • 1.      Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860
  • 2.      How to Sue an Unregistered Society or a Club
  • 3.      Decision Binds all Represented
  • 4.      Virtually Suit By or Against Entire Members
  • 7.      How Sec. 6 is an Enabling Provision
  • 8.      Suit shall be in the Name of President, Chairman
  • 9.      Our Law Does Not Favour ‘Corporation Sole’
  • 10.    Sec. 6 Impliedly Bars Filing a Suit in the Name of Society
  • 11.    When Society need not be Necessary Party?
  • 12.    Is Society, a Necessary Party?
  • 13.    Personal Liability of Members and Governing Body
  • 14.    Sec. 6 is Not Strictly Followed by our Courts
  • 15.    Notice to a Society, Notice to all Members

Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:

  • “6. Suits by and against societies – Every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the president, chairman, or principal secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society, and, in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion.
    •    Provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society, to sue the president or chairman, or principal secretary or the trustees thereof, if on application to the governing body some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant.
  • 7. Suits not to abate -No suit or proceeding in any Civil Court shall abate or discontinue by reason of the person, by or against whom such suit or proceedings shall have been brought or continued, dying or ceasing to fill the character in the name whereof he shall have sued or been sued, but the same suit proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person.
  • 8. Enforcement of judgment against society – If a judgment shall be recovered against the person or officer named on behalf of the society, such judgment shall not be put in force against the property, movable or immovable, or against the body of such person or officer, but against the property of the society. The application for execution shall set forth the judgment, the fact of the party against whom it shall have been recovered having sued or having been sued, as the case may be, on behalf of the society only, and shall require to have the judgment enforced against the property of the society.
  • 9. Recovery of penalty accruing under bye laws – Whenever by any bye laws duly made in accordance with the rules and regulations of the society, or, if the rules do not provide for the making of bye laws, by any bye laws made at a general meeting of the members of the society convened for the purpose (for the making of which the concurrent votes of three-fifths of the members present at such meeting shall be necessary), any pecuniary penalty is imposed for the breach of any rule or bye laws of the society, such penalty, when accrued, may be recovered in any court having jurisdiction where the defendant shall reside, or the society shall be situate, as the governing body thereof shall deem expedient.
  • 10. Members liable to be sued as strangers – Any member who may be in arrear of a subscription which according to the rules of the society he is bound to pay, or who shall possess himself of or detain any property of the society in a manner or for a time contrary to such rules, or shall injure or destroy any property of the society, may be sued for such arrear or for the damage accruing from such detention, injury, or destruction of the property in the manner hereinbefore provided.
  • Recovery by successful defendant of costs adjudged – But if the defendant shall be successful in any suit or other proceedings brought against him at the instance of the society, and shall be adjudged to recover his costs, he may elect to proceed to recover the same from the officer in whose name the suit shall be brought, or from the society, and in the latter case shall have process against the property of the said society in the manner above described.
  • 11. Members guilty of offences punishable as strangers – Any member of the society who shall steal, purloin, or embezzle any money or other property, or willfully, and maliciously destroy or injure any property of such society, or shall forge and deed, bond, security for money, receipt, or other instrument, whereby the funds of the society may be exposed to loss, shall be subject to the same prosecution, and, if convicted, shall be liable to be punished in like manner, as any person not a member would be subject and liable to in respect of the like offence.”

Introduction:

Societies, Clubs and Companies are formed by the teamwork and co-operation of the people associated with them, at its beginning.

  • A Company is a Juristic person. Hence it can sue or be sued in its name.
  • Proceedings in a suit by or against a registered society is different from that of an unregistered society or a club. 

How to Sue an Unregistered Society or a Club

An unregistered society or a club is not a legal person;[1]and therefore, it has to sue or be sued only in the names of all its members. It can be done invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC which enables the society to sue, or be sued, in a representative character.

When a suit is filed by a member seeking reliefs concerning the society or a club, relating to a matter common to all members, he has to file it (also) as representing other members of the society, other than the defendants (usually office-bearers); and if it is a personal matter of the plaintiff, seeking relief against all other members, the plaintiff has to sue against one or two members (usually office-bearers) as representatives of others.

Objective of Order I Rule 8 CPC and Manner of its Publication

The objective of Order I Rule 8 CPC, which is an enabling provision, is avoidance of multiplicity in litigation; and the decision in such a suit binds both present and future members.[2] Such a suit can be proceeded with even where the person sought to be made a representative refuses to do so.

In Sukadev Tapaswai v. Sri Sidheswar Mahadev Bija Silod[3] it is pointed out that Order I Rule 8 CPC ‘notice of the institution of the suit’ should include the names of the persons who have been permitted to represent others, so that the persons interested may have an opportunity of knowing who have been selected to represent them.

Decision Binds all Represented, and Constitutes Res Judicata

To bring an action under Order I Rule 8 CPC, the persons on whose behalf the suit is brought must have the same interest. The decision in such a representative suit will bind all the persons sought to be represented; and it will constitute res judicata, under Section 11, CPC.[4]

Registration does not Confer Juristic Personality

Registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status.[5] In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India[6] it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
  • ii) A Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  (Para 21)
  • iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)

‘Suit By or Against a Regd. So.’ is Virtually Suit By or Against Entire Members

A society or a club, both registered and unregistered, is the compendium of its members. When it sues or is sued all its members should be made parties. As shown above, registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status. [7]

Expressions in the Societies Registration Act, ‘property belonging to a society[8] and ‘property of the society’,[9] do not give the society a corporate status; and it “merely describes the property which vests in trustees or Governing Body”.[10]

Following the above propositions, it can be legitimately concluded that the common expression, ‘suit by or against a society’, legally and virtually denotes suit by or against its entire members.

How Sec. 6 is an Enabling Provision

The earlier view taken by various courts in India was that the registered societies were legal persons and they could sue or be sued in their own name;[11] and that Sec. 6 was only an enabling (or added) provision to sue or be sued ‘in the name of the president, secretary’, etc. This view does not hold good in the light of Unani Tibia College case[12]and Illachi Devi case.[13]

Suing entire members of the society, either in person or invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC, is the normal rule. But, Sec. 6 enables to sue (or be sued) every registered society (i.e., all its members) in the name of its president, secretary, etc., as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society (or through such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion).

Suit shall be in the Personal Name of President, Chairman, etc.

From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act, that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ “as” President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees.

Person who Signs Pleadings must be Authorised by the Bye­laws

The Supreme Court, in  P. Nazeer Vs. Salafi Trust, AIR 2022 SC 1580, held:

  • (i) A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is entitled to sue and be sued, only in terms of its bye­laws.
  • (ii) The bye­laws may authorise the President or Secretary or any other office bearer to institute or defend a suit for and on behalf of the society,
    • since section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, provides that ‘every society registered under the Act may sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society and,
    • in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion’.
  • (iii) Unless the plaintiff, which claims to be a society, demonstrates that it is a registered entity and that the person who signed and verified the pleadings was authorised by the bye­laws to do so, the suit cannot be entertained
    • The fact that the plaintiff in a suit happens to be a local unit or a Sakha unit affiliated to a registered society is of no consequence, unless the bye­laws support the institution of such a suit.

Suits by a Company

Proper authorisation is essential for signing a plaint on behalf of a Company.  Though, the Secretary or any Director or other Principal officer can sign pleadings by virtue of their office, as per Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, the view taken in some decisions was that neither the directors nor the managing director would have the right to represent the Company, in a suit unless they were duly authorised by a resolution taken by the Board of Directors at a meeting duly constituted for the said purpose.[14]

The Delhi High Court, in Nibro Limited Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. (1991),[15] it is observed, with regard to the source of power of the Directors, as under:

  • “25. It is well-settled that under Section 291 of the Companies Act except where express provision is made that the powers of a company in respect of a particular matter are to be exercised by the company in general meeting-in all others cases the Board of Directors are entitled to exercise all its powers. Individual directors have such powers only as are vested in them by the Memorandum and Articles. It is true that ordinarily the court will not unsuit a person on account of technicalities. However, the question of authority to institute a suit on behalf of a company is not a technical matter. It has far-reaching effects. It often affects policy and finances of the company. Thus, unless a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on a particular director, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of the company. Needless to say that such a power can be conferred by the Board of Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard.”

It was observed by in Nibro Limited that a director or a secretary of a Company could certainly give the authority to institute a suit to another person, as provided under Order III Rule 1 CPC, if the director or secretary was authorised by law to file a suit on behalf of the company.

Order III Rule 1 provides that ‘any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. Provided, that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person’. 

If an authority is given to a pleader or a recognised agent, under Order III Rule 1, that recognised agent or pleader can, certainly, file an appearance as authorised.

The Bombay High Court, in Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd Vs. Celem (2015),[16] observed, with respect to the source of power of the Directors, as under:

  • “The essential requirement of this provision is that the Company which is a juristic person must itself decide to sue. Once that is done, it would authorise one of its Directors who is the agent of the Company or its principal officers the Secretary of the Company or the Managing Director to file the Suit. The suing in each case is a separate act. The Company acts only through its meetings. Hence the Board of Directors in the day to day management of the company must decide and resolve to sue or not to sue. A blanket authority cannot be given to a particular Managing Director or Director to sign the papers and document/s, including the power to sue. The power to sue requires application of mind upon the particular cause of action. It requires the Company to pay the requisite Court fee. It requires the Company to be represented by a legal officer being an Advocate of the Court. It is an act which, therefore, is not a part of the day to day management of the Company. A Company would decide in a given case upon legal advice or otherwise whether or not it would sue upon a given cause of action. Such exercise is imperatively required to be performed if the intention of the Company, which is only a juristic person, is to be deciphered. That act, of course, may be undertaken even after the filing of the Suit and ratified by the Board as all other acts of management. However, the seminal requirement is to see the act of the Company though its Board or members (dependent upon whether the resolution is passed in the Board meeting or a general meeting) or is given by the Company itself (under its Articles of Association).”

The Delhi High Court pointed out in Radico Khaitan Limited Vs. JD Wines (2020),[17] that the impropriety, if any, in signing the pleadings by the officers of a Company can be ratified.

It is held in Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasia[18] (in a Sec. 138, NI Act – criminal – proceedings) that there cannot be a fundamental defect merely because the name of the Managing Director is stated first followed by the post held in the Company; and that the format itself cannot be said to be defective though it may not be perfect (The Apex Court followed: Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshavanand, (1998-1 SCC 687).

Locus Standi of a Member to Challenge Election

In Tej Bahadur vs Shri Narendra Modi[19] the Apex Court considered the question of the validity of the appellant’s nomination since that had a direct bearing on the question whether he had a right to question the election. After finding that the appellant was not a duly nominated candidate, it is held as under:

  • “We find that the averments in the petition do not disclose that the appellant has a cause of action which invest him with right to sue. It is settled that where a person has no interest at all, or no sufficient interest to support a legal claim or action he will have no locus standi to sue. The entitlement to sue or locus standi is an integral part of cause of action. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467, V.R. Krishna Iyer J., speaking for this Court held that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing.”

The Apex Court held in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[20]:

  • A voter could challenge the election.
  • Merely because he took part in the election by standing as a candidate or by exercise of his right of franchise he cannot be estopped from challenging the whole election when the election was glaringly illegal and void on the basis of the obnoxious proviso. There is no question of approbation and reprobation at the same time in such a case.
  • A voter could come to the High Court even earlier before the election was held. But merely because he came to challenge the election after it was held it cannot be said that he was guilty of any laches and must be non-suited only on that account.

A member of a Society does not have the right to challenge Election unless his rights are personally affected by the impugned action.[21] He should have been a candidate or acquired the right to vote.

In Committee of Management, Sri Kachcha Baba inter College, Varanasi Vs. Regional Committee, PanchamMandal[22] it was held that a group of members of the General Body (and not by a rival committee of management) had no locus standi to challenge the result of the elections.[23]

There were divergent views, in UP, on the right of an individual member to file a writ petition. In certain cases[24] it was held that an individual member had no right to file the writ petition. The other set of decisions[25] observed that the writ petition could be maintained, subject to the existence of efficacious alternative remedy, when there was a breach of right of a person affecting his right to form an association, which was a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, or there was a breach of the Statute. Both the divergent views had been considered by a Division Bench in Committee of Management, Arya Kanya Pathshala Inter College, Bulandshahar v. State of U.P.[26] The Division Bench observed as under:

  •  “There is no such proposition that an individual member cannot, in no circumstance, challenge the election of the Committee of Management….. It is clear that the question as to whether an individual member has locus to challenge the election of Committee of Management depends on facts of each case…..”[27]

Right of an individual member to Challenge

In Jagdambika Prasad Pandey Vs. State of UP[28] it is held that where an individual is aggrieved by an action of Authorities, such individual has the right to approach the Court in writ jurisdiction. It is observed as under:

  • “33. With regard to the arguments regarding maintainability of the writ petition on behalf of the petitioners, this Court has perused the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in Ratan Kumar Solanki Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2010 (1) ADJ 262. This Court finds that after considering two Division Bench judgments rendered in Dr. P.P. Rastogi Vs. Meerut University and Others reported in 1997 (1) U.P.LBEC 415 and Umesh Chandra Vs. Mahila Vidyalaya and others, 2019 (8) ADJ 536, as well as two Single Judges’ decisions in Smt. Vimla Devi Vs. Dy. Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra, reported in 1997 (3) ACC 1807 and Bhagwati Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2006 (2) ADJ 361; the Division Bench observed that a writ petition at the instance of an individual member of the Society would be maintainable, since, recognition of illegally constituted committee affects the democratic rights of the individual Member of the Society and his Fundamental Right to form an association. The Division Bench observed that no doubt it is true that an individual Member cannot represent the Committee of Management and challenge the order or action of any Authorities whereby the Committee of Management is allegedly affected and if an action or order affects the Committee of Management, the Collective Body, the Body itself can challenge the same or may authorize an individual to represent it and to challenge such an action or order of the Authorities. However, where the individual is aggrieved by an action of the Authorities, such individual has locus-standi, to approach this Court in Writ jurisdiction.” [29]

Review by members

In Dr. PP Rastogi Vs. Meerut University[30] it was observed that an individual member of a Committee of Management had no locus standi to file Review Petition and it was only the Committee of Management alone which could appear as a party in the case; and that to permit individual members of the Committee of Management to appear would create a lot of problems because any individual member or several members may file applications at any time through his/their own separate counsel, would result in confusion.

Procedural Defects Should Not Defeat a Just Cause

It is trite law that one should not be non-suited for technical reasons, and that the procedural defects or procedural irregularities which are curable, or which do not go to the root of the matter, should not be permitted to defeat a just cause.[31]  It is pointed out in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar[32] by our Apex Court that there is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case.

Suit in the name of ‘wrong’ plaintiff, out of inadvertent mistake – Effect

In Varun Pahwa v. Renu Chaudhary, AIR 2019 SC 1186, original Plaintiff has filed the suit as Director of a Private Limited Company.  Supreme Court [after referring State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Limited Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal, (1969) 1 SCC 869 and Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, (2006) 1 SCC 75], permitted the Private Limited Company to correct the mistake (and allowed to continue the suit as Plaintiff) – finding that the director had filed the suit, as plaintiff, out of an inadvertent mistake.

In State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Limited, (2010) 4 SCC 518, Supreme Court held as under:-

  • “17. Insofar as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) is concerned, Order 6 Rule 17 provides for amendment of pleadings. It says that the court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.
  • 18. The matters relating to amendment of pleadings have come up for consideration before the courts from time to time. As far back as in 1884 in Clarapede & Co. v. Commercial Union Assn. (1883) 32 WR 262 (CA)  – an appeal that came up before the Court of Appeal, Brett M.R. stated:
  • “… The rule of conduct of the court in such a case is that, however negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs; but, if the amendment will put them into such a position that they must be injured, it ought not to be made….”

In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal, (1969) 1 SCC 869 our Apex Court held as under:

  • “5. …. Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the Rules of procedure. The court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. However negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side.”
  • “7. …The power to grant amendment of the pleadings is intended to serve the ends of justice and is not governed by any such narrow or technical limitations.”

In Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, (2006) 1 SCC 75, our Apex  Court held that procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice by any oppressive or punitive use. The Court held as under:-

  • “17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well-recognised exceptions to this principle are:
  • .(i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of non- compliance;
  • (ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
  • (iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
  • (iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court;
  • (v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.”

Supreme Court Expanded Powers of Authorities of Companies in Filing Pleadings

Order 6 Rule 14 read with Order 29 Rule 1 CPC

Under Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer can sign pleadings by virtue of his office. A Company being a juristic entity, Board of Directors can authorise any person to sign pleadings, by passing a resolution or giving a power of attorney, by virtue of Order 6 Rule 14 read with Order 29 Rule 1 CPC. If pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, the Company can ratify it. Such ratification can be express or implied.

In Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta Versus Union of India[33] it is held by Our Apex Court that the ratification would relate back to the date of the act ratified.

It is held by our Apex Court in the aforesaid decision of Naresh Kumar (1997)[34] that a Court can, after taking all the circumstances of the case, come to the conclusion that the Company must have ratified the act of signing the pleading. It is pointed out that the courts below must have, in any case, directed the company to produce a proper power of attorney, or they must have allowed a competent person to be examined to prove the apparent ratification. The Court’s own words in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar (1997)[35] read as under:

  • “10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and de hors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement or its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a Corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.”

In a subsequent decision, in State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers (2011)[36] it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “14. In our view, the judgment under challenge is liable to be set aside because the Respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was appointed as a Director of the company and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the company to file suit against the Appellant and authorized Shri Ashok K. Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K. Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers to Shri Raj K. Shukla to authorise another person to file suit on behalf of the company.”

In this decision (of Kingston Computers) there had neem no scope to ponder on the doctrines as to ‘technical or procedural defects’ as done in the earlier decision in Naresh Kumar (1997).[37] The decision, in Kingston Computers may be distinguishable from Naresh Kumar on the ground that there was no evidence in Kingston Computers to show that the signatory was a Director of the Company, and no resolution of the Board of Directors was produced to prove that the signatory was authorised to file the suit.

Effect of Complaint in the (Personal) name followed by ‘MD

In Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, (2022) 2 SCC 355, in a Criminal Complaint under Sec. 138 of the NI Act, (personal) name of the Managing Director was stated first; followed by official status, ‘Managing Director’ (he held in the Company). An affidavit was filed by the Managing Director stating that the Company had authorised him to file the complaint. A copy of the Board Resolution was also presented. In the body of the complaint it was not stated that he was the MD. The respondent contended that the complaint was filed in the personal capacity not on behalf of the Company. The Supreme Court held as under:

  • “The body of the complaint need not be required to contain anything more in view of what has been set out at the inception coupled with the copy of the Board Resolution.”
  • “It would be too technical a view to take to defeat the complaint merely because the body of the complaint does not elaborate upon the authorisation. The artificial person being the Company had to act through a person/official, which logically would include the Chairman or Managing Director. Only the existence of authorisation could be verified.”

Our Apex Court  explained that a Manager or a Managing Director ordinarily by the very nomenclature can be taken to be the person in-charge of the affairs Company for its day-to-day management and within the activity would certainly be calling the act of approaching the court either under civil law or criminal law for setting the trial in motion.

Any Authorised Person Can Continue the proceedings for the Company

In Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, (supra) held further as under:

  • “If a complaint was made in the name of the Company, it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court and the court looks upon the natural person for all practical purposes. It is in this context that observations were made that the body corporate is a de jure complainant while the human being is a de facto complainant to represent the former in the court proceedings. Thus, no Magistrate could insist that the particular person whose statement was taken on oath alone can continue to represent the Company till the end of the proceedings.”

Even if Initially No Authority, the Company Rectify the Defect

In Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, (supra) held further:

  • “Not only that, even if there was initially no authority the Company can at any stage rectify that defect by sending a competent person.”

Our Law Does Not Favour ‘Corporation Sole’

Our law does not favour characterising a ‘Corporation Sole’ as a Juristic Person,[38] except officials such as President of India, District Collectors, Secretaries/Office-Heads of various Departments of Government, Village Officers, etc.

But, under the specific provision in Order XXX, rule 7 CPC, read with Order XXI rule 50 (1)(b) CPC, it appears that ‘a person having the control or management of the partnership business’ can appear before the court otherwise than “in his own name” (that is, in the official capacity in the firm).

Order XXX, rule 7 CPC postulates as under:

  • “No appearance except by partners: Where a summons is served in the manner provided by rule 3 upon a person having the control or management of the partnership business, no appearance by him shall be necessary unless he is a partner of the firm sued.”        

Order XXI rule 50 (1)(b) CPC posits as under:

  • “(b) against any person who has appeared in his own name under rule 6 or rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be, a partner.”       

Sec. 6 Impliedly Bars Filing a Suit in the Name of Society

As already stated, our Apex Court has repeatedly[39]made it clear that Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act provides that a registered society must sue or be sued through the office bearer or a nominee, as provided in that section.  Therefore, it can be concluded that Sec. 6 impliedly bars filing a suit in the name of the society, otherwise than through its President, Secretary or the nominated person.

When Society (or All Its Members) need not be Necessary Party?

Suit to protect or recover property.

As held by the Privy Council in Jagadinadra Nath Vs.  Hemanta Kumari Debi[40] and our Apex Court in Vemareddi Ramaraghava ReddiVs. Kondaru Seshu Reddi,[41] Shebait of a temple has the authority to institute a suit in his own name to protect and recover property belonging to the deity.[42] By various authoritative decisions, it is made clear that when the trust is admitted, or where the right or title over the property is not in dispute, the deity will not be a necessary party, in suits for protection of the property and the rights of the trust.[43] Same is the case for framing a scheme.[44]In Monindra Mohan Vs. Shamnagar Jute Factory[45]  a Division Bench held that the deity is not a necessary party in a suit filed on behalf of the Hindu public for declaration that the land in question was a debasthan of the idol and that it is a public place of warship.

It is appropriate to import this analogy to matters of societies also. Where the right or title over the property is not in dispute, and the suit is filed by a person who is bound to protect the property of a society, it can be concluded that the suit is not liable to be dismissed holding that the society as such (that is, all its members) is a necessary party. The ‘necessary party’ is not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. But from the judicial dicta it may be laid down that there are two tests. Firstly, there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceedings in question, and secondly it will not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such a party.[46]

It is observed in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez[47] that, though, as per the Canon Law the church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar, the parish being by law a public juridic person, and the plaintiffs (the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church) were entitled to represent the juridic person, the plaintiffs were competent to initiate civil proceedings (with the ultimate  aim of  protecting  the  property belonging  to  the church) before a Civil Court. 

Is Society, a Necessary Party?

Kania, J., in AS Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram,[48] laid down (earlier view) as under:

  • “In my opinion as the position of the members of this society is similar to that of the share holders of the company and as the acts of the defendants which are challenged are in respect of the society it is necessary that the society should be a party to this litigation. I do not think it is competent to the plaintiff either alone or representing himself and the other members of the society other than defendants to bring a suit. …… In the absence of the society as a party to this litigation, I am of opinion that the suit as framed is not maintainable and the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in the absence of the society.”

Since it is unequivocally held by our Apex Court in Illachi Devi case[49] that a society cannot sue or be sued in its name, it is peremptory that the suit by or against a society should be brought as provided under Sec. 6 of the So. Regn. Act.

As regards the internal management of the society, whether the society as such, and not its individual members, has to sue is considered in Ram Charan Agarwala Vs. Shridhar Misra.[50] It was held as under:

  • “There have been a large number of cases both in India as also in England where courts has to consider whether a suit can be brought in respect of the internal management of a company otherwise than in the name of the company itself, by individual members thereof. There is good authority for the proposition that the case of society registered under the Act is similar to that of a club or a joint-stock company, (See A. S. Krishnan v. M. Sundaram, AIR 1941 Bom 312). A Full Bench of this Court in the case of 1947 All LJ 637 (AIR 1948 All 146) (supra), has held that the same principles apply to a club which applied to a joint-stock company. In the leading case on the subject Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, it was held that the normal rule is that the corporation should sue in its own name and in its corporate character, or in the name of some one whom the law has appointed to be its representative. Mozley v. Alston, (1847) 16 LJ Ch 217, is an authority for the proposition that ordinarily individual share-holders cannot sustain a Bill in their own names in respect of a matter common to all or relating to the internal management of the company. In the case of Mac Doughall v. Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 13, the Court held that it could not interfere in the internal management of a company and dismissed an action brought by one Share-holder on behalf of himself and all other share-holders excluding the Directors, against the Directors and the company complaining against certain matters decided at a meeting. To the same effect is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhajekar v. Shinkar, AIR 1934 Bom 243 and of the Madras High Court in Nagappa v. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831. The Bombay High Court took the same view in S. Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516, which was a case of a registered society. This general rule however has got an exception as pointed out in the Madras and Bombay cases referred to above. The exception is that a share-holder can bring an action even with regard to an internal management of a company if (1) the action of the majority is ultra vires the company; (2) where the act complained of constitutes a fraud on the minority; (3) where the action of the majority is illegal and (4) where a special resolution is required by the Article of the Company and the assent of the majority to such special resolution is obtained by a trick, or even where a Company authorised to do a particular thing only by a special resolution does it without a special resolution duly passed.”

Sec. 6 is Not Strictly Followed by our Courts

If Sec. 6 is strictly followed:

  • no  suit can be filed  the name of the society (even if it is a registered one);
  •  in the absence of provisions in the bye-laws empowering the president/ secretary or anybody else to file a suit or writ-petition,and in the absence of due appointment by resolution by the General/Governing Body, the suit or writ-petition filed by the president/secretary or anybody else would not be maintainable;[51]
  • if the rules and regulations of the society do not determine the person against whom a suit is to be filed, any person having a claim or demand against a society can sue the president, secretary or the trustees thereof (in their name), only if in-spite-of-an-application to the governing body, some other officer or person is not nominated (to be the defendant); and
  • a general statement in the bylaw[52]authorising an office-bearer to ‘represent the society in any legal proceedingdoes not enable him to file a suit on behalf of the society; because, this provision, in the bye laws, would only authorise such office bearer to represent the society in a properly instituted suit; and the authority to file a suit is quite different from the authority to represent the society in a suit which has been validly instituted.

Doctrine of Substantial Representation

It is noteworthy that the diktats in Sec. 6 are not invariably followed by our courts; but, adopted the doctrine of ‘substantial representation’.[53] In SinghaiLal Chand Jain Vs. RashtriyaSwayamsewakSangh, Panna[54] our Apex Court observed as under, with respect to an unregistered association, RashtriyaSwayam-sewakSangh (RSS):[55]

  • “Procedure is the handmaid to the substantive justice. …. It is true that no permission of the Court was taken to be sued in a representative capacity by or on behalf of the Sangh. But Clause (b) of Order 1, Rule 8 indicates that it may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of all persons so interested. Clause (b) clearly applies to the facts in this case. The President of the Sangh, the Manager of the Sangh and a Member have duly represented the Sangh and defended the suit for the benefit of all the persons so interested in the Sangh.”

In this decision the following passage from Surayya Begum Vs. Mohd. Usman[56] was quoted:

  • “The principle of representation of the interest of a person, not impleaded by name in a judicial proceeding, through a named party is not unknown. A karta of a Joint Hindu Family has always been recognised as a representative of the other members of the Joint Hindu Family, and so has been a trustee. In cases where the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code are attracted a named party in a suit represents the other persons interested in the litigation, and likewise a receiver appointed in one case represents the interest of the litigating parties in another case against a stranger. Similarly the real owner is entitled to the benefits under a decree obtained by his benamidar against a stranger and at the same time is also bound by the decision. Examples can be multiplied. It is for this reason that we find Explanation VI in the following words in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure: ‘Explanation VI. – Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating’.”

Notice to a Society, Notice to all Members

The notice to a Co-operative Society will be deemed as notice to all its members. In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana[57]  it is pointed out by our Apex Court, with respect to a Co-operative Society, that S. 13(9)(a) provides for the issue of notice to the societies and not to individual members and that S. 13(9)(b), however, gives the members an opportunity to be heard.

It is legitimate to maintain that,in appropriate cases, it may be proper to extend these principles as to service of notice,to both registered and unregistered societies,and a club also, with regard tothe matters-touching-rights-or-duties of the society ‘as a body’; for example, notice as to nonpayment of tax or revenue.The notice to the society or a proper office bearer will be deemed as notice to all its members.


Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India


[1]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.

[2]      TN Housing Board Vs. TN Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1990 SC 642; Jamiat Ulama Vs. Maulana Mahmood Asad Madni: ILR 2008-17 Dlh 1950

[3]      AIR 1986 Ori 100; Anang Pal Vs. UOI: 2010-1 CivCC 168, 2009-164  DLT 10; Veerabhadrappa Dandappa Hanchinamani Vs. Nannesab Goususab Pathan: 2006-5 AIR KarR 354,CIVCC 2007 1 147; Jogiram Mohapatra Vs. Sibaram Pradhan: 2005-1 Ori LR 612; K. Devi Vs. Laishram Ningol Leinambi Devi: 1995-3 GauLT 367.

[4]      Mahboob Sahab Vs. Syed Ismail: AIR1995 SC 1205; T N Housing Board Vs. T N Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1990 SC 642; Venugopala Naidu Vs. Venkatarayulu: (1989) Supp 2 SCC 3 56: AIR 1990 SC 444. Ahmed Adam SaitVs. M. E. Makhri AIR 1964 SC 107. Arumughathan Vs. S Muthusami Naidu: 1993-1 CivCC 79: 1992-1 Mad LJ 532

[5]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458.

[6]      AIR2003 SC 3397

[7]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458. Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India: AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata, AIR 2010 SC 2943.

[8]      Societies Registration Act: Sec. 5

[9]      Societies Registration Act: Sec. 8 and 10

[10]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458

[11]    Shanti Sarup Vs. RadhaswamiSatsangSabha, Dayalbagh Agra: AIR 1969 All. 248; K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook, AIR 1970 Pat 163;  Khiri Ram Gupta and Another versus Nana Lal:  AIR 1964 Pat. 114, SatyavartSidhantalankar Vs. AryaSamaj, Bombay : AIR 1946 Bom. 516; NabadwipBhajanAsram Vs. Commissioner of Nabadwip Municipality : AIR 1959 Cal 361; Sonar Bangala Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College: AIR 1960 Cal 409.

[12]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458.

[13]    Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.

[14]B. MookerjeeVs State Bank of India: AIR1992 Cal 250; Nibro Limited Vs National Insurance Co:  AIR 1991  Del 25

[15]AIR 1991 Delhi 25: Quoted in: United India Periodicals Pvt. Ltd.  Vs. CMYK Printech Ltd. : 2018-248 DLT 227

[16]2015-1MhL852

[17]2020-2 AD(Del)  421.

[18] 2022-2 SCC 355

[19] AIR 2021 SC 217

[20] AIR 1980 SC 1612

[21]    Ram Pal Singh Vs. State of U P: LAWS (ALL)-2015-5-99. Referred to: Ram PyareLal Vs. State of U.P. 2015 3 ADJ 577;  Indian Sugar Mills Association Vs. Secretary to Government, UP: AIR 1951 All 1; Dr. PP Rastogi Vs. Meerut University, 1997 1 UPLBEC 415; Vimla Devi Vs. Deputy Director of Education, 1997-3 ESC 1807;  2010 (1) ADJ 262

[22]   2007-7 ADJ 414; 2007-3 All LR 14

[23]    Referred to in SatyaNarainTripathi Vs. State of U P: 2008 – 2 ADJ 222, 2008-71 ALLLR 698.

[24] Dr. P.P. Rastogi v. Meerut University, Meerut, 1997-1 UPLBEC 415; Smt. Vimla Devi v. The Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra, 1997-3 ESC 1807; Bhagwan Kaushik v. State of U.P., 2006-2 UPLBEC 1372; Amanullah Khan v. State of U.P. and others, 2009-75 All LR 29

[25] Kamla Kant Agrawal v. State of U.P., 2008-7 ADJ 601; Committee of Management, Janta Inter College, Sultanpur, District Haridwar v. Joint Director of Education, I Region, Meerut, 1999-1 UPLBEC 170; Ratan Kumar Solanki v. State of U.P., 2010-1 ADJ 262 (DB).

[26] 2011-2 ADJ 65

[27] See: Laxman Singh Vs. State of UP, ADJ 2014 9 242, AWC 2014 5 4382, LBESR 2014 3 415.

[28] 2019 (8) ADJ 536

[29] Quoted in: Dr. Dheeraj Singh Vs. State Of U.P.Thru Addl.Chief Secy./ Prin.Secy. Finance: 2021-3 AWC 2776.

[30] 1997-1 UPLBEC 415

[31] United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar:AIR 1997 SC 3; Uday Shankar Triyar Vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh: AIR  2006 SC 269; VarunPahwa Vs. Mrs. RenuChaudhary: AIR  2019 SC 1186: 2019-3 JT 109

[32]AIR 1997 SC 3

[33] AIR 1973 SC 2389. See also: Punjab University Vs. VN Tripathi: AIR 2001 SC 3672

[34]AIR 1997 SC 3

[35]AIR 1997 SC 3

[36]2011-11 SCC 524

[37]AIR 1997 SC 3

[38]    Samatha Hyderabad Abrasives And Minerals Vs. State of AP: AIR 1997 SC 3297; T.K. SanthanagopalaChettiar Vs. Thimmi M. SeetharamaChettiar 1968-2 Mad LJ  41; S GovindaMenon Vs. Union of India: AIR 1967 SC 1274; S C Sreemanavikraman Raja Vs. Controller of Estate Duty: 1957-2 Mad LJ  226.

[39]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.

[40]    (1904) 31 Ind App 203 (PC); AIR 1983 All 202

[41]    AIR 1967 SC 436: Referred to: PramathanathNathVs.Pradyumna: AIR 1925 PC 139.

[42]    Kishore Joo Vs. GumanBehariJooDeo: AIR  1978  All  1. Referred to: JagadindraNathVs. HemantaKumari, (1904) 31 Ind App 203.

[43]    Hangi Mal Vs. PannaLal:  AIR 1957 All 743

[44]    Bimal Krishna Vs. IswarRadhaEalla:  AIR 1937 Cal 338.

[45]   AIR 1939 Cal 699

[46]    The Banaras Bank Ltd. Vs. Bhagwan Das: AIR 1947 All 18.

[47]    2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[48]    AIR 1941 Bom. 312

[49]    Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397

[50] AIR 1962 All 610

[51]    Advocates Association Vs. District Registrar and Registrar of Societies: AIR 2006-4 Kar R 218: 2006-4 Kar LJ 526;  Relied on: Muddappa Vs. Panchaksharaiah: ILR1985 Kar 1230; Inamdar Vs. BF Swamy: ILR1991 Kar 1654

[52]    See: Inamdar Vs. BF Swamy, ILR1991 Kar 1654. Referred to in Advocates Association Vs. District Registrar : 2006-4 AIR Kart 218

[53]    SubramaniaPillai Vs. Masterly: AIR1976 Mad 303

[54]    AIR1996 SC 1211

[55]    Note: RSS was a defendant; and not plaintiff.

[56]   (1991) 3 SCC 114

[57]    AIR 1985 SC 973



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Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy in a Nutshell

Saji Koduvath.

Relevant provisions of KLR Act, in a Nutshell

KLR Act

Section Provisions in a Nutshell
Chap. II
Sec. 3
Exemptions – (i) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to – (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
“Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.
7EPersons acquired lands (before 2005 amendment in KLR Act) for consideration below 1 Hec. 61 Are 87 Sq.m. (4 acre) will be deemed to be tenants .
13Fixity: “Every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding.”
22Landlord desiring to resume any land shall apply to the Land Tribunal.
31Fair rent determined by Land Tribunal.
51A
51B
Landlord not to enter on land surrendered or abandoned by the tenant. 
Contravention is made punishable.
54(1)
55
57
57 (3)
57 (6)
61
54(1). A cultivating tenant (to purchase the right) has to apply Land Tribunal.
55. Purchase price is fixed by LT (on fair rent u/s. 31) to be paid u/s. 59
57. The LT after enquiries, pass orders determining purchase price.
(3). The Land Tribunal allows the purchase of the land it determines.
(6). The Land Tribunal forwards  orders to the Land Board.
61. Tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) pending proceedings
59When Sec. 54 application is allowed (by the LT), the purchase price (determined u/s. 57 by the LT) shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal to the credit of the Land Board and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
72
Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating tenants in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
72(1) says: Holdings upon which tenanat entilted fixity under sec. 13 vest in govt.
72BCultivating-tenant “shall be entitled to assignment” of land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 –within ceiling area and get purchase certificate (through LT) (2 years from 1-1-1970). Effect of non-filing (See Balanoor Plantations case. 2018(3) KLT 283.)
72DThe cultivating tenant has to pay the purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
72ESuch a tenant is liable to pay rent to the Govt. for the unassigned land – under Purchase Certificate (E.g., exempted-plantation-land). The Land Tribunal fixes the rent under Sec. 72F(5)(h).
72CProvides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit). Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 
72KLT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.
74Prohibition of future tenancies.
Chp. III Sec. 81Exemption from ceiling and excess for Govt. lands, private forests, plantations, industrial or commercial undertakings, etc.
Note: 1. Section 81(1) exempts Government lands from the provisions of Chapter III. The Proviso says that the following Government lands will not stand exempted. 
1. Government-lease-lands
2. Lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and
3. Lands that fall under Section 72 (Lease lands vest in Government).
4. Section 81(4)permits use of the land not exceeding 5% of the extent of such holding for floriculture, dairy farms, hotels, restaurants, etc.
82Ceiling area – 5/10 standard acres.
83No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  It is a total bar. (Note:  plantations, industrial area etc. are exempted.)
Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB); RaghunathLaxmanWani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137)
The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571.
84Certain transfers – void.
85(1)Surrender excess.
85(2)Owners and Tenants (in excess of the ceiling area) should furnish ceiling return to Land Board before March 31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
Effect of non-filing: See – Balanoor Plantations case – 2018(3) KLT 283.State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
 According to S. 3(1) (viii), “tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres” is exempted from Chapter II. Therefore, the landlord can recover such plantation lands after the period of tenancy. Such landlords also had to file a ceiling return within the time stipulated.
85(3)Excess shall be surrendered.
Note: Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant) It is clear from the following provisions: 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT (or the purchase of right, title and interest.)
55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case. Note: (i) The sub-section (3) itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant, (ii) LT is the only authority to determine tenancy (Land Board cannot determine it), and (iii) it is clear that even if it is a plantation-exemption-land (beyond ceiling limit), the tenant has to file petition under Section 54 – for fixing Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT and for allotting the land under section 57(3) and for effecting the payments of ‘rent’ and ‘purchase price’(to the credit of the Land Board)  under sec. 61 and 59.
85(3A)The person bound to file a statement under sub-section (2) (that is, Owners and Tenants – having land in excess of the ceiling area)  shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.
85(5)On receipt of the statement under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3A), the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Board and such Taluk LandBoard shall determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered.
85(7)Whereon a person fails to file statement under 85(2), LB shall intimate TLB  –  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered.
It is obvious – The LB can intimate TLB as to non-filing, on the basis of the records it obtained under Sec. 57(6) and 59. That is, those tenants who are not entitled to get a purchase certificate also have to file an application under Sec. 54(1) and 85(2) or (3A).
Effect of non-filing: See – Balanur Plantations case (With respect to Sec. 72B application) – 2018(3) KLT 283. Statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit to file a statement:  State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
[TLB not to do, suomotu, without direction from LB. 1980 KLT 120, referred to in 2019(1) KLT 985.]
85AFile ceiling return within March  2, 1973 before Land Board..
86(1)On determination of the extent to be surrendered under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. andTaluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
86(3)Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession
86(4)Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
86(6)Nothing appliesto property of Govt. under KLC Act.
87
Exp. II
If a person converts any portion of his exempted land to any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit. That is, the exemption will be lost for that portion. (Mathew K Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913)
Sec. 112 (5A)On acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Sec. 72.
Sec. 112 (5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the landowner shall be awarded to the Government; and clause (b) says that the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.


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Sec. 65B Evidence Act Simplified

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

PART I – Sec. 65B ON FIRST PRINCIPLES.

  • Note: Analysis of the author and the law rendered by the Supreme Court of India are given.

Point No. 1

What is brought about by Section 65B, Evidence Act?

  1. It enables a litigant to prove computer output (secondary evidence)
    • without further proof or production of electronic record’ (original), and
    • by producing a ‘certificate’ (as provided in this Section.
  2. Presumption is provided as to the correctness of the computer output (copy or print out) under Sec. 65B(5)(c).

Sec. 65B deals with ‘Computer Output’ (copy) and not ‘Electronic Record’ (original) as authoritatively pointed out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

  • Sec. 65B is invoked only when a ‘computer output’ (copy) is used in evidence; and it does not pertain to use of (original) ‘electronic record‘ as evidence in court.
  • Relevant portions of Sec. 65B read as under:
    • Sec. 65B. Admissibility of electronic records:
      • (1) … any information contained in an electronic record which is PRINTED ….. or COPIED ….. (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be admissible ….. as evidence of any contents of the original ….”
  • Supreme Court (Anver PV v. PK Basheer, 2014-10 SCC 473) held as under:
  • “24. …… If an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65B of the Evidence Act.”
  • This observation is followed in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216)

Point No. 2A.

Non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding Anything’) in Sec. 65B – Not exclude Sec. 65. (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • What is enabled by the non-obstante clause is – a copy or printout of electronic evidence ‘shall be deemed to be also a document’.
  • Notwithstanding-clause’ in Sec. 65B keeps all other sections in the Evidence Act undisturbed; and it provides for an additional enabling provision – without disabling the force of existing provisions to prove the copy or printout of electronic evidence. Therefore, the copy or printout can be proved under Sec. 65 of the Evidence Act.
  • Relevant portions of Sec. 65A and Sec. 65B read as under:
    • Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:
      • The contents of electronic records MAY BE proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. 
    • Sec. 65B: Admissibility of electronic records:
      • (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information … which is printed …… or copied …….. shall be Deemed to be ALSO a Document
  • Supreme Court (Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao) held as under
  • “31. The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) makes it clear that when it comes to information contained in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf – Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose. …...”
  • 34. …. in Anvar P.V. (supra) … this Court made it clear …… and also that a written certificate under Section 65B(4) is a sine qua non for admissibility of such evidence ……

Point No. 2B.

Sec. 65B deals with ‘Admissibility’ (alone) of a Computer Output/Copy. If ‘truth’ is in question, it must be proved according to other provisions of the Evidence Act. (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • Sec. 65B does not deal with ‘truth’ of the contents of the electronic record; it deals with ‘admissibility of copy’ alone.
  • The electronic record mentioned in Sec. 65B is – that which is ‘relevant‘; for, it must be one “of which direct evidence would be admissible”.
  • For, Sec. 65B deals with ‘admissibility of copy’ alone, if truth is in question, it must be proved according to other provisions of the evidence act; ie. by oral, documentary or presumptive evidence.

See Blog (Click): Admissibility of Visual and Audio Evidence (Including Photographs, Cassettes, Tape-recordings, Films, CCTV Footage, CDs, e-mails, Chips, Hard-discs, Pen-drives)

  • Relevant portions of 65A & 65B read as under:
    • Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:
      • The contents of electronic records MAY BE proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. 
    • Sec. 65B: Admissibility of electronic records:
      • (1) … any information contained in an electronic record which is printed ….. or copied ….. shall be ADMISSIBLE in any proceedings ….. as evidence of any contents of the original … of which direct evidence would be admissible.”
  • Supreme Court (Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216, held as under
  • “31. The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) makes it clear that when it comes to information contained in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf – Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose. …...”
  • “34. …. in Anvar P.V. (supra) … this Court made it clear that the special provisions of Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are a complete Code in themselves ……

Point No. 2C.

Sec. 65B does NOT bar proving copy (by) invoking Sec. 65; Sec. 65B is an enabling provision that enables to prove copy otherwise than (by) laying the foundation or conditions laid down in Sec. 65 (such as loss of original). (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • Sec. 65B is an added and enabling provision to prove the copy or printout – otherwise than proving the conditions laid down in Sec. 65 (such as loss of original, original with other side).
  • By the deeming provision (fiction) in Sec. 65B, a ‘copy’ is raised to the states of a (original) document.
  • Relevant portion of Sec. 65B reads as under:
    • Sec. 65B: Admissibility of electronic records:
      • (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information … which is printed …… or copied …….. shall be Deemed to be ALSO a Document ….
  • Supreme Court (Arjun Panditrao), held as under
  • 35. …….. Hence, the declaration of law in Tomaso Bruno (supra) following Navjot Sandhu (supra) that secondary evidence of the contents of a document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to make CCTV footage admissible would be in the teeth of Anvar P.V., (supra) and CANNOT be said to be a correct statement of the law. The said view is accordingly overruled.”

Point No. 3A.

STATEMENTS’ alone can be PROVED by ‘Certificate’ under S. 65B(4). (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • The ‘statements‘ (such as bank account statements) alone can be PROVED in evidence under S. 65B, through a ‘certificate’ provided under Sec. 65B(4). It is clear from a simple reading of 65B(4). 
  • Sec. 65B(2) conditions are to be satisfied for ADMISSIBILITY; and not proof. But, it appears that Sec. 65B(4) which takes care of ‘statements‘, deals with authenticity or proof of truth, also;
    • because, it is laid down
    • (i) that the certificate “shall be EVIDENCE (proof?) of any(?matter stated” therein, and
    • (ii) that, for the purposes of this sub-section, “it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.”

Sec. 65B(4) reads:

  • “(4) In any proceedings where it is DESIRED TO GIVESTATEMENT  in evidence, by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,—
    • (a) identifying the electronic record CONTAINING the STATEMENT and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
    • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be EVIDENCE of any matter stated in the certificate;
  • and for the purposes of this sub-section
  • it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.”

See Blog: ‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be proved by ‘CERTIFICATE’ u/s. 65B

Supreme Court (Arjun Panditrao) held as under

  • 59. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of ELECTRONIC RECORD…. . “

Point No. 3C.

Conditions in S. 65B(2) are to be satisfied through oral evidence or affidavit, (except for ‘Statements’). (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • The computer output (copy) containing the information, such as CCTV footage, photo or video in a CD, can be admitted in evidence under S. 65B if only the conditions mentioned in S. 65B(2)  (such as: computer was used regularly, information was regularly fed in the ordinary course, computer was operating properly) are satisfied, through oral evidence or affidavit. Only exception is to “statements”.

Relevant portions of Sec. 65B read as under:

  • Sec. 65B: Admissibility of Electronic Records:
  • (1) …. (computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the CONDITIONS mentioned in this section are SATISFIED ….. without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein (Isn’t “or of any fact stated therein” surpussage?) ……
  • (2) The conditions ….. shall be the following, namely:—
    • (a) …. the computer was used regularly to storeinformation for the purposes (?) of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer;
    • (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which ….. information …… was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities (Isn’t the words “during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which” a surplusage?);
    • (c) throughout the material part …. the computer was operating properly ……; and
    • (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities. (Isn’t the words “or is derived from such information fed into the computer” a surplusage – especially in view of the wordings of clause (b)?)
  • Supreme Court (Arjun Panditrao) held as under
  • “59. ….. Oral evidence in the place of such certificate CANNOT possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. … Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose.”

Point No. 4

Photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc. cannot be used under Sec. 65B. (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • It is clear that the computer output (copy) is ‘deemed to be (also) a document’ if only the conditions mentioned in S. 65B(2) are fulfilled, that is:
    • S. 65B(2)(a) computer was USED REGULARLY to STORE or process information
      • of the activities REGULARLY CARRIED ON
      • BY THE PERSON having lawful control,
    • S. 65B(2)(b) information was REGULARLY FED
      • in the ORDINARY COURSE,
    • S. 65B(2)(d) the information is REPRODUCED in the
      • ORDINARY COURSE of the SAID ACTIVITIES.
    • (For example – Computer Account statements in a Bank.)
  • For all other computer outputs (copy of, photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc.), one has to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act, by producing the original or by producing the copy after satisfying the circumstances under Sec. 65.
  • Therefore, it is beyond any doubt that the following computer output (copy) cannot be used under Sec. 65B:
    • CCTV footage
      • (i) not used to store or process information BY any PERSON [65B(2)(a)] and
      • (ii) not reproduced in the ordinary course [65B(2)(d)] .
    • CDs containing speech
    • Videograph of the scene of crime
    • trap-video
      • (i) not used REGULARLY to store or process information [65B(2)(a)],
      • (ii) not regularly fed in the ordinary course [65B(2)(b)] and
      • (iii) not reproduced in the ordinary course [65B(2)(d)].
  • But, the Supreme Court dealt with CCTV footage in the following landmark cases:
    • State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,
    • Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015-7 SCC 178),
  • CDs/VCDs in respect of video recording by the Election Commission
    • Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216
  • CDs containing election speeches and songs in:
    • Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473).
  • Call Detail Records – CDR – of mobile phones in:
    • Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570)
  • Tape recorded conversation on the landline phone
    • Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017-8 SCC 518
  • Propriety of videography of the scene of crime or scene of recovery during investigation, in:
    • Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 ).

See Blog: How to Prove WhatsApp Chats, Facebook Messages and Website Information in Courts?

Point No. 5.

Should the ‘Correctness’ of Copy or Print-out Must be Proved?

No.

S. 65B(5)(c) lays down a presumption as to correctness (not truth) of the computer out-put; because,  S. 65B(5)(c) lays down-

  • ‘a computer out-put shall be taken to have been produced by a computer’. 

Sec. 65B(5)(c) reads:

  • S. 65B(5)(c) lays down a presumption as to correctness (not truth) of the computer out-put, inasmuch as S. 65B(5)(c) lays down that ‘a computer out-put shall be taken to have been produced by a computer’. 
  • Sec. 65B(5)(c) reads:
    • ‘a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.

Mere marking– not dispense with proof (of truth of contents): See Blog: EFFECT OF MARKING DOCUMENTS WITHOUT OBJECTION


PART II

Admissibility and Presumption as to correctness of Computer Output

Sec. 65B declares and expressly lays down that computer output (copy or print)

  • (i) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and
  • (ii) shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence
    • of any contents of the original or
    • of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.

If the conditions mentioned in this Section Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied, by necessary implication, it will bring a presumption under Sec. 114 with respect to regularity of the computer output . Because, admissibility of ‘any fact stated therein‘ ‘without further proof’ is nothing but ‘presumption’ of its regularity and correctness. The net result is that (if the conditions in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied) the burden to prove otherwise is cast on the person who opposes it.

The requirement in Sec. 65B(2) as to ‘proof’ (through witnesses or certificate) for ‘regularity‘ of feeding information into the computer in the ‘ordinary course‘ eloquently support this proposition.

  • Note:
    • (i) ‘Statements’ alone can be proved by ‘certificate’ under Sec. 65B(4); other ‘information’ are to be proved by proper evidence.
    • (ii) Presumption of ‘regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act can be applied in Sec. 65B.
    • (iii) Presumption of a ‘fact or regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act is, essentially presumption of ‘Truth’ and ‘Correctness’.

Presumption of Fact Means Truth/Correctness of Fact

St. of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar (AIR 2000 SC 2988) it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the Court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process Court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.”
  • (See: Blog: EFFECT OF MARKING DOCUMENTS WITHOUT OBJECTION)

Section 65B is a borrowed provision

Section 65B is brought to Indian law from Section 5 of the UK Civil Evidence Act, 1968. It remains a sheer fact that by the time we borrowed this provision (2000) from the UK law, they repealed (1995) it. (It is pointed out in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020) 3 SCC 216.)

The present UK Act (Civil Evidence Act 1995) does not make any special provision for Electronic Evidence or Computerised Records. It deals this matter under the head ‘hearsay evidence’ and makes ‘safeguards’ with respect to the hearsay evidence.

Who can give Certificate under Sec. 65 B

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020)3 SCC 216 makes it clear-

  • The certificate can be given by anyone out of several persons who occupy a ‘responsible official position’ in relation to the operation of the relevant device.
  • The person who may otherwise be in the ‘management of relevant activities’ spoken of in Sub-section (4) of Section 65B. (It is provided to give the certificate to the “best of his knowledge and belief”.) See also – Smriti Madan Kansagra Vs. Perry Kansagra 2020-12 SCALE 450.

Can the Certificate u/s 65B be Given Long After the Electronic Record was Produced

  • In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020)3 SCC 216 it was held that by virtue of Section 65B(4), the Certificate u/s 65B can be given long after the electronic record has actually been produced by the computer. (Note: the certificate to be given is to the “best of his knowledge and belief”.) See also – Smriti Madan Kansagra Vs. Perry Kansagra 2020-12 SCALE 450.

PART III – LANDMARK DECISIONS

  1. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,  two- judge bench decision (on CCTV footage). It is held:
    • “Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-section (4) of Section 65-B is not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 63 and 65.”
  2. Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473), three- judge bench decision (on CDs containing election speeches). It is held:
    • “That (Sections 65A & 65B) is a complete code in itself. Being a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield.”
    • But finally held: “It is clarified that notwithstanding what we have stated herein in the preceding paragraphs on the secondary evidence of electronic record with reference to Sections 59, 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act, if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65B of the Evidence Act.”
  3. Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015-7 SCC 178), three-bench decision (on CCTV footage).
    • It is held, as to make CCTV footage admissible, as under:
    • Secondary evidence of contents of document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act”.
  4. Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570): two- judge bench decision (on Call Detail Records – CDRs – of mobile phones). It is held:
    • “The crucial test, as affirmed by this Court, is whether the defect could have been cured at the stage of marking the document. Applying this test to the present case, if an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked without a certificate, the court could have given the prosecution an opportunity to rectify the deficiency.”
  5. Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 ), two- judge bench decision (on videography of the scene of crime). Tomaso Bruno (2015) was followed in. It was held as under:
    • “(11) The applicability of procedural requirement under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act of furnishing certificate is to be applied only when such electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in a position to produce such certificate being in control of the said device and not of the opposite party. In a case where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device, applicability of Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be held to be excluded. In such case, procedure under the said Sections can certainly be invoked. If this is not so permitted, it will be denial of justice to the person who is in possession of authentic evidence/witness but on account of manner of proving, such document is kept out of consideration by the court in absence of certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, which party producing cannot possibly secure. Thus, requirement of certificate under Section 65B(h) [sic-65B(4)] is not always mandatory.
    • (12) Accordingly, we clarify the legal position on the subject on the admissibility of the electronic evidence, especially by a party who is not in possession of device from which the document is produced. Such party cannot be required to produce certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act. The applicability of requirement of certificate being procedural can be relaxed by Court wherever interest of justice so justifies.”
  6. Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216, three-judge bench decision (on CCTV footage). It substantially followed PV Anwar (2014) with a ‘clarification’.
    • Because it is held in Anver PV v. PK Basheer that Section 62, 63 and 65 are not applied for electronic evidence – for Sec. 65A & B are ‘complete code’ – the further observation that ‘if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62’ stood incongruent and contradictory. Therefore, it is ‘clarified’ and directed to ‘read’ Anver “without the words – ‘under Section 62 of the Evidence Act’ “.
    • “59. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed (supra). Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. … Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose.”
    • In Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao it is found – Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP is per-incurium as under:
    • “What is clear from this judgment (Tomaso Bruno) is that the judgment of Anvar P. V. (supra) was not referred to at all. In fact, the judgment in State v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 was adverted to, which was a judgment specifically overruled by Anvar P. V. (supra). It may also be stated that Section 65B(4) was also not at all adverted to by this judgment. Hence, the declaration of law in Tomaso Bruno (supra) following Navjot Sandhu (supra) that secondary evidence of the contents of a document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to make CCTV footage admissible would be in the teeth of Anvar P. V., (supra) and cannot be said to be a correct statement of the law. The said view is accordingly overruled.”

PART IV

Presumptions Incorporated in Evidence Act While Introducing Sec. 65 A and 65 B

  • Sec. 81A. Presumption as to Gazettes in electronic forms
  • The Court shall presume the genuineness of every electronic record purporting to be the Official Gazette or purporting to be electronic record directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such electronic record is kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody
  • 85A Presumption as to electronic agreements
  • The Court shall presume that every electronic record purporting to be an agreement containing the electronic signature of the parties was so concluded by affixing the electronic signature of the parties.
  • 85B Presumption as to electronic records and electronic signatures
  • (1) In any proceedings involving a secure electronic record, the Court shall presume unless contrary is proved, that the secure electronic record has not been altered since the specific point of time to which the secure status relates.
  • (2) In any proceedings, involving secure electronic signature, the Court shall presume unless the contrary is proved that—
  • (a) the secure electronic signature is affixed by subscriber with the intention of signing or approving the electronic record;
  • (b) except in the case of a secure electronic record or a secure electronic signature, nothing in this section shall create any presumption, relating to authenticity and integrity of the electronic record or any electronic signature.
  • 85C Presumption as to Electronic Signature Certificates
  • The Court shall presume, unless contrary is proved, that the information listed in a 86 Electronic Signature Certificate is correct, except for information specified as subscriber information which has not been verified, if the certificate was accepted by the subscriber.
  • 88A. Presumption as to electronic messages
  • The Court may presume that an electronic message, forwarded by the originator through an electronic mail server to the addressee to whom the message purports to be addressed corresponds with the message as fed into his computer for transmission; but the Court shall not make any presumption as to the person by whom such message was sent.
  • “Explanation: For the purposes of this section, the expressions “addressee” and “originator” shall have the same meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses (b) and (za) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.


End Note:

Sec. 65A and Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act read:

  • Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:
    • The CONTENTS of electronic records may be PROVED in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. 
  • Sec. 65B. Admissibility of electronic records:
  • (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
  • (2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:—
    • (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer;
    • (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
    • (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
    • (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
  • (3) Where over any period, the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by computers, whether—
    • (a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
    • (b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
    • (c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or
    • (d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers, all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
  • (4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,—
    • (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
    • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate)
      • shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate;
    • and for the purposes of this sub-section
    • it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.
  • (5) For the purposes of this section,—
    • (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
    • (b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any official information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities;
    • (c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.
  • Explanation.—For the purposes of this section any reference to information being derived from other information shall be a reference to its being derived therefrom by calculation, comparison or any other process.


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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Mullaperiyar Dam Issues: There Should Be No BAR of Law That MAR Life of People.

Mullaperiyar Disputes and Adjudication of Legal Issues.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Foreword

Laws are made for better life and safety of men. Various rules as to bars and barriers are introduced in the legal system on this principle; whether it be Res Judicata, Constructive Res judicata, Order II rule 2 Bar, Estoppel or Judicial Precedent. Can such negative legal principles be allowed to successfully sound and strike-out in the SUPREME COURT, when the Life and Safety of a Large Number of Citizens of India are reasonably (apprehended to be) in peril, is one of the main questions that arise in Mullaperiyar Dam issue. Those legal doctrines, though interminable, cannot stand as a bar for the SUPREME COURT, especially when it reverberates devastating danger arising out of a structure made by the hands of man. The findings that are made in such a matter arose quarter a century back, should not be allowed to remain constant and untouched. Raising bar by law in this matter will be harsh and imprudent.

Brief History of Mullaperiyar.

Mullaperiyar is situated in Idukki District of the State of Kerala. The dam at Mullaperiyar was built between 1887 and 1895. During that time, this area was under the Kingdom of (erstwhile) Travancore. The purpose of making the dam was irrigation of the severely draught affected, otherwise fertile, land under the Madras Presidency, situated east of Travancore. The designer and builder of this masonry gravity-dam was a British engineer. Before constructing the dam, a lease agreement had been executed on October 29, 1886 between the Maharaja of Travancore and the Secretary of State for India in Council.

“I SIGN WITH BLOOD OF MY HEART”

The lease project under the agreement covered a long period of 999-years. It is said to be unconscionable inasmuch as it came into being out of the mighty clout of the British, and it was practically a unilateral agreement. Certain historians say that the Maharaja of Travancore had bewailed: “I SIGN THIS WITH THE BLOOD OF MY HEART”.

1970 Supplemental Agreements

After independence, two supplemental agreements were executed, in 1970, by the State of Tamil Nadu and State of Kerala. The first one increased the rent from Rs. 5 per acre to Rs. 30 and gave fishing rights in the Periyar lake to Kerala. And, it was recorded that all other
covenants in the 1886 lease deed would remain in force. The second supplemental agreement allowed Tamil Nadu to generate electricity and to pay a nominal consideration to Kerala.

Disputes triggered by the end of the 20th century

The disputes that triggered by the end of the 20th century, between the State of Kerala and the State of Tamil Nadu with respect to the maintenance of maximum height of water level of the dam, lead to the formation of an Expert Committee. The committee gave its final report on 16.03.2001. It suggested that the water level in the Mullaperiyar reservoir could be raised up to 142 ft.

Despite the recommendation of the Expert Committee, the Government of Kerala, pointing out safety hazards, continued its protest against the move to raise the water level in the reservoir beyond 136 ft.

Is Mullaperiyar Dam Really a Water-Bomb?

Mullaperiyar dam is constructed in Periyar river above the level of Idukki reservoir. Mullaperiyar is situated 36 kms away (south-east) from Idukki. Water from Mullaperiyar dam will reach the Idukki reservoir when the shutters of Mullaperiyar dam are opened.

On October 29, 2021, while the water-level of the Mullaperiyar dam surpassed limit prescribed by the Supreme Court, and the Tamil Nadu raised shutters, Kerala water resources minister urged people, through a press release, not to be panic, and he declared that there was nothing to be ‘concerned about’. It is seen pointed out by the minister that the storage capacity of Idukki is 70.5 Thousand Million Cubic feet (TMC) as compared to 12.758 TMC of Mullaperiyar; and therefore, the water ‘released’ from the latter would only raise the former’s level by a quarter of a foot (hindustantimes.com : Oct 29, 2021). 

But, those people who raise alarm on Mullaperiyar issue say that the dam is in an area where the seismic activity is high; and that the people there feel tremors, frequently. It is a sheer fact that the people of Kerala believe that Vallakadavu, Vandiperiyar, Chappathu and Upputhara towns, situated between Idukki and Mullaperiyar, will be engulfed in flood waters if Mullaperiyar dam is damaged. They further point out that the people of Kerala experienced, in the 2018-flood, that mere rain water (pored for a few days) was capable of immersing a good number of towns and villages; and they compare it with the incomparable water in Idukki reservoir!

Besides Idukki dam, the water in Idukki reservoir is held-back by the service of Cheruthoni and Kulamavu dams also. There are people who believe that the galloping rushy water (if) exploded from the Mullaperiyar dam would be capable of destroying various dams of Idukki reservoir. In case water in Idukki reservoir is burst-out, no doubt, the damage will be devastating. And, it is feared, in such an event, the water in the dam will reach the Arabian sea only after submerging Aluva, Eranakulam Town, Kcohi Airport etc. among many other townships and villages.

Is Idukki dam large enough to hold the entire water that is stopped by Mullaperiyar?

In rainy season both dams will be filled in. But the water level of both dams will be lower in summer. Therefore, the the answer to the question, depends upon the ‘season’. So far as rainy a season is concerned, the storage capacity of both dams itself (Idukki – 70.5 TMC; Mullaperiyar – 12.758 TMC) gives the answer.

History of Union Carbide Disaster

It appears that no effective study is conducted, or it is not published, as to what all villages or towns will be affected, if a mishap occurs; and what all places will give shelter to the the people who may be affected by flooding. The history of Union Carbide disaster at Bhopal should not be allowed to be repeated; in Bhopal, people rushed to the factory premises, seeking help, when the devastating gas outburst took place in the factory compound!

Validity of the century old agreement

After promulgation of the Constitution of India, or after independence, there is only ‘one country and one land’. It is seen argued that the agreement that was executed at a time where this land stood divided should not be allowed to be used as a weapon of oppression, especially since the agreement was an unconscionable one; and the provisions therein should not be pointed out against the reconstruction of the dam by the State of Kerala spending from its own pouch.

Mullaperiyar Litigation – In a Nutshell

  • First Case – 2006 – Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union of India
  • Second Case – 2014 – State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala
  • Third Case – Originated in 2020 – Dr. Joe Joseph v. State of Tamil Nadu

First Mullaperiar Dam Case Before the Supreme Court

A writ petition was filed by Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum before the Supreme Court (Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union of India) raising disputes as to the water level to be maintained in the dam. The Apex Court gave its decision on 27.02.2006 (reported in (2006) 3 SCC 643). The Apex Court permitted to rise the water level in the Mullaperiyar dam up to 142 ft. The State of Kerala and its officers were restrained from causing any obstruction to the rising of level. It was also observed that, after the strengthening-work was completed to the satisfaction of CWC, independent experts would examine the matters ‘on safety angle before the water level is permitted to be raised up to 152 ft’.

Second Mullaperiar Dam Case Before the Supreme Court

State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala, (2014) 12 SCC 696, is the second prominent Supreme Court decision on Mullaperiyar dam related issues. It is pronounced in the matter of validity of an enactment made by the State of Kerala; viz, The Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006. The crux of the issue in that case was as regards the maximum water level to be maintained in the Mullaperiyar dam. The State of Tamil Nadu argued that the rights implored in this dispute had already been crystallised in the earlier Judgment on the (first) Mullaperiyar dam case, Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union of India, (2006) 3 SCC 643. Accepting the claim of Tamil Nadu, the Apex Court restrained the State of Kerala by a decree of permanent injunction from obstructing the State of Tamil Nadu from increasing the water level to 142 ft.

Third Mullaperiar Dam Case Before the Supreme Court

Urging that the matters involved in the Mullaperiyar dam issues require a reconsideration in the ‘safety and security’ angle, a third round of litigation (Dr. Joe Joseph v. State of Tamil Nadu) is originated in 2020 before the Supreme Court.

Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006

Within less than three weeks of the decision in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union of India, (2006) 3 SCC 643, the Kerala State Legislature amended Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation Act, 2003, by passing the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006. The Amendment Act, in its application to and effect on the Mullaperiyar dam (as found by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala, 2014-12 SCC 696), seeks to attain the following:

  • “(a) It substitutes Section 62 with a new provision whereby, notwithstanding the judgment of this Court and notwithstanding anything contained in any treaty, contract, 1886 Lease Agreement and 1970 supplemental agreements, the function of evaluation of safety of the Mullaperiyar dam and the power to issue directions to Tamil Nadu as custodian are conferred upon Dam Safety Authority;
  • (b) the Dam Safety Authority is empowered, inter alia, to restrict the functioning of Mullaperiyar dam and/or to conduct studies on the advisability of raising or lowering of the maximum water level or the full reservoir level;
  • (c) Mullaperiyar dam is considered by Kerala legislature to be endangered and by virtue of Section 62(A), it takes away the right of Tamil Nadu to increase, expand the FRL or in any manner increase the water level as set out in the Second Schedule except in accordance with the provisions of the Act;
  • (d) under Section 62A(4), Tamil Nadu as custodian has to submit an application to the Dam Safety Authority for its prior consent for the increase in the water level;
  • (e) it takes away all rights of Tamil Nadu including the right which has passed into judgment of this Court to increase the water level;
  • (f) the Dams Safety Authority has power to order de-commissioning of the Mullaperiyar dam.

Challenge by the State of Tamil Nadu

The Kerala (Amendment) Act, 2006 led the State of Tamil Nadu to challenge the Act contending, inter alia, the following:

  • Usurpation of judicial power
  • (a) The impugned legislation amounts to usurpation of judicial power inasmuch as Kerala State Legislature has arrogated to itself the role of a judicial body and has itself determined the questions regarding the dam safety and raising the water level when such questions fall exclusively within the province of the judiciary and have already been determined by this Court in its judgment dated 27.02.2006.
  • Violation of legislative competence
  • (b) 2006 Amendment Act is beyond the legislative competence of the State of Kerala insofar as it affects the Mullaperiyar dam in view of Section 108 of the SR Act which is a law made by Parliament under Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution, which confer plenary power to traverse all legislative entries in all the three lists including Entry 17 List II.
  • Violation of rule of law and separation of power
  • (c) The impugned legislation, in its application to the Mullaperiyar dam, violates the rule of law and the federal structure and the separation of power under the Constitution. The Kerala State Legislature has taken the law in its own hands after the declaration of law by this Court. Kerala having participated in the adjudicatory process before the Apex  Court, it cannot become a Judge in its own cause and seek to reverse the decision of this Court because it has gone against it.
  • Disobeyance of Apex Court decision
  • (d) The impugned legislation not only fixes and limits the FRL to 136 ft. in direct contravention of the judgment of the Apex Court but also proceeded to authorise the Dam Safety Authority of Kerala – to disobey and disregard the decision of the Apex Court by various other provisions.
  • (Amendment) Act Overturned and nullified Apex Court verdict
  • (e) 2006 (Amendment) Act is not a validation act but a mere device to defy, obstruct and nullify the judgment of this Court and constitutionally interfere with, restrict or extinguish the legal rights of Tamil Nadu as upheld by this Court. A Legislature cannot by mere declaration and enactment overrule and nullify a judicial decision. The direct object and effect of the impugned legislation is to overturn the judgment of the Apex Court and to arrogate to Kerala the power to prevent Tamil Nadu from exercising its legal rights which have already been upheld by this Court.

Reliefs sought for

The State of Tamil Nadu had sought for two-fold relief:

  • (i) to declare the 2006 (Amendment) Act passed by the Kerala legislature as unconstitutional in its application to and effect on the Mullaperiyar dam and
  • (ii) to pass a decree of permanent injunction restraining the first defendant from applying and enforcing the impugned legislation interfering with or obstructing the plaintiff from increasing the water level to 142 ft. and from carrying out the repair works as per the judgment of this Court dated 27.02.2006 in W. P. (Civil) No. 386 of 2001 with connected matters.

Defence by State of Kerala

The State of Kerala resisted the suit raising, among others, the following contentions:

  • The suit itself is not maintainable.
  • Contract Unconscionable
  • 1886 Lease Agreement is an unconscionable contract because of its duration (999 years) as well as the fact that the lease conveys for a small rent a vital resource of Kerala. The lease was obtained by the Secretary of State for India in England obviously by holding threat of paramountcy over Maharaja of Travancore, who was his vassal.
  • The two supplemental agreements of 1970 have not been executed in terms of mandatory provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution and, therefore, they do not constitute contracts in the eye of law. In any event, these agreements do not bind the State legislature at all.
  • 999 years Agreement lapsed under Indian Independence Act
  • The 1886 Lease Agreement for 999 years stood lapsed under the provisions of Section 7(1)(b) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947.
  • From 1947 to 26.01.1950, the lease was continued as a temporary lease on annual basis. After 26.01.1950, even the temporary continuation of the lease came to an end. The possession of the land held and continued by the then Government of Madras and now Tamil Nadu, after 26.01.1950 has no juridical basis.
  • Kerala legislature competent to modify the terms in public interest
  • Entries 17 and 18 of List II (State List) and Entries 17, 17-A and 17-B of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution justify the competency of Kerala legislature to enact the 2006 (Amendment) Act.
  • It is competent for the Kerala legislature to modify Kerala legislature to modify the terms the terms of the lease in public interest (if the lease has survived as contended by the Tamil Nadu), as the lease inherited under Article 295 of the Constitution does not bind the legislature of the state and that it is always open to the legislature to modify such conditions by law.
  • 2006 (Amendment) Act – dams fall within the territory of Kerala
  • Kerala legislature enacted the 2006 (Amendment) Act for regulating the storage levels of 22 dams listed in the Second Schedule read with Section 62A (1), as these dams fall entirely within the territory of Kerala and these dams are considered to be endangered on account of their age, degeneration, degradation, structural or other impediments. Such a law is perfectly valid.
  • Under Section 62A(3) of the 2006 (Amendment) Act, the FRL can be increased beyond 136 ft. after obtaining prior consent of the Dam Safety Authority headed by a retired Judge of the High Court.
  • If Tamil Nadu approaches under Section 62A(3), Kerala reserves its right to oppose such plea by demonstrating how such increase would lead to spread of backwater beyond the contour line of 155 ft. and how the flora and fauna including ecology would be destroyed.
  • 2006 (Amendment) Act creates a working mechanism to deal with a problem like displacement of those whose lands are likely to be affected by the backwater effect.
  • Safety of the dam
  • The impact of increased storages on the safety of the dam will also be demonstrated before the Dam Safety Authority. This was not the matter that was required to be considered by this Court in the previous case, since in that case, the focal issue was the implications of the increase in height upon the safety and integrity of the dam.
  • Structure of the Mullaperiyar dam
  • It is not constructed entirely with rubble masonry in lime mortar. The front and rear faces are constructed of uncoursed rubble masonry in lime mortar. The hearting (center core) is of lime surkhi concrete, therefore, dam cannot be considered as homogeneous masonry dam under any circumstances. In view of Kerala, a dam could never have been intended to remain for long years without decommissioning at some point of time. For this background, people in Kerala living in the downstream region of the Mullaperiyar dam have raised serious apprehensions against the safety of the structure.
  • Periyar is not an inter-state river
  • River Periyar is not an inter-state river. It has asserted that river Periyar is an intra-state river as it rises in Quilon District in Kerala and traverses only through the territory of Kerala before falling into the Arabian sea. The total catchment of Periyar basin is 5398 sq. km. of which only about 113 or 114 sq. km. lie within the territory of Tamil Nadu. Even this small catchment of 113 sq. km. lying in Tamil Nadu, is in the downstream region of the Mullaperiyar dam. Therefore, no water from this catchment is contributed to the kitty of Mullaperiyar dam.
  • Earlier judgment of the Court: No res judicata in public interest Matters
  • The judgment concluded the issue relating to safety of the people and degradation of the environment, apart from issue arising from Article 363 of the Constitution. The doctrine of res judicata or constructive res judicata has no relevance to the question of powers on the Kerala legislature to regulate the storage level of the Mullaperiyar dam in larger public interest by legislation. Kerala states that the impugned legislation removes the legal basis of the judgment, i.e., the right of Tamil Nadu to store water up to 142 ft. in Mullaperiyar reservoir. The legislature is competent to remove the basis of any judgment and, therefore, it is not permissible for Tamil Nadu to claim any right to store water at Mullaperiyar dam beyond 136 ft. Kerala has assailed the findings and conclusions in the earlier judgment dated 27.02.2006 on all possible grounds.
  • Suit Not Maintainable under Article 131 of the Constitution
  • The basis of claim made by Tamil Nadu lies in the 1886 Lease Agreement which is a contractual right leading to civil dispute, if any, but it is not in dispute in the constitutional context as required under Article 131 of the Constitution of India. Kerala’s further case is that 1886 Lease Agreement was executed between the Maharaja of Travancore and Secretary of State for India in England and as such the agreement is in the nature of treaty and act of state, the enforcement of which is barred by proviso to Article 131 of the Constitution. Tamil Nadu, therefore, cannot seek enforcement of 1886 lease deed before this Court.
  • Report of the Expert Committee for assessing the structural safety of the dam
  • This report was relied upon by the Court in its judgment on 27.02.2006. Both the interim report and final report submitted by the Expert Committee are riddled with inconsistencies and the views of the Committee do not constitute an authoritative opinion. Kerala has denied that storages at Mullaperiyar dam beyond 136 ft. will not pose any danger.
  • Water beyond 136 ft. would not be required
  • Storage at Mullaperiyar dam beyond 136 ft. would not be required to meet the irrigation requirement of 2,08,144 acres in 5 southern districts of Tamil Nadu, although the irrigation originally planned was not more than 1.5 lakh acres. The contention of Tamil Nadu that due to non-restoration of FRL from 136 ft., Tamil Nadu’s irrigation is getting suffered is not correctet. Tamil Nadu was able to irrigate more area with Mullaperiyar water, even after lowering the water level to 136 ft.

Nub of the Findings in the 2nd Mullaperiar Dam Case

The 2014 Judgment in the 2nd Mullaperiar dam case went against the stance of Kerala, mainly, on the following observations and findings of the Supreme Court:

  1. When dispute already adjudicated, one of the parties cannot overturn the final judgment. When the dispute between two States has already been adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court, any unilateral law enacted by one of the parties results in overturning the final judgment. A judicial decision can be reopened in the changed circumstances by the Court alone and no one else.
  2. A final judgment remains in force until altered by the court. A categorical finding has been recorded by the Court in the earlier judgment that the Mullaperiyar dam is safe and that judgment has become final and binding. A final judgment remains in force until it is altered by the court. Legislature cannot reopen or alter a judicial decision rendered on a finding of fact.
  3. Kerala Act infringes the doctrine of separation of powers and rule of law. The impugned 2006 (Amendment) Act is bad because it infringes the doctrine of separation of powers and rule of law. Legislature cannot indirectly control the Courts. The Amendment Act is a classic case of nullification of a judgment.
  4. Legislature has clearly usurped the judicial power. If the judgment of this Court and the 2006 (Amendment) Act are placed side by side, both cannot stand together. By such law, the legislature has clearly usurped the judicial power.
  5. If substantial changes the Court can be approached. If substantial changes in the circumstances occur and such circumstances are shown to the Court necessitating departure from the earlier finding on the issue of safety, the Court can be approached and in that event the Court itself may exercise its discretion to reopen the safety aspect having regard to the drastic change in circumstances or in emergent situation as to the safety of dam.

Issues, and Findings of the Supreme Court (in 2014 Judgment in the 2nd Mullaperiar dam case) in a Nutshell

Issue NosIssuesFindings in Nutshell
1.Whether the suit is maintainable under Article 131 of the Constitution of India.Maintainable.
5.Whether the suit based on a legal right claimed under the lease deed executed between the Government of the Maharaja of Travancore and the Secretary of State for India on 29.10.1886, is barred by the proviso to Article 131 of the Constitution of India?  Not barred.  
6.Whether the first defendant is estopped from raising the plea that the deed dated 29.10.1886 has lapsed, in view of subsequent conduct of the first defendant and execution of the supplemental agreements dated 29.05.1970 ratifying the various provisions of the original Deed dated 29.10.1886.The State of Kerala (first defendant) is estopped.  
7Whether the lease deed executed between the Government of the Maharaja of Travancore and Secretary of State for India on 29.10.1886 is valid, binding on first defendant and enforceable by plaintiff against the first defendant.The lease deed is valid and binding on the first defendant and it is enforceable by plaintiff.
2. (a)Whether the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act 2006 is unconstitutional and ultra vires, in its application to and effect on the Mullai Periyar Dam?  Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006 is unconstitutional and ultra vires.  
3.Whether the rights of the plaintiff, crystalised in the Judgment dated 27.02.2006 passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 386/2001 can be nullified by a legislation made by the Kerala State Legislature?(ii.) The rights crystallized in the Judgment cannot be nullified by a legislation.  
4. (a)Whether the judgment dated 27.2.2006 of this Court in WP(C) No. 386/2001 operated as res judicata, in respect of all or any of the defences set up by the first defendant in its written statement?  The earlier judgment operates as res judicata on the issue of the safety of Mullaperiyar dam for raising water level to 142 ft. and ultimately to 152 ft. after completion of further strengthening measures on the Mullaperiyar dam.
4(b)Whether the pleas relating to validity and binding nature of the deed dated 29.10.1886, the nature of Periyar River, structural safety of Mullai Periyar Dam etc. raised by the first defendant in its defence, are finally decided by the judgment of this Court dated 27.2.2006 in WP(C) No. 386/2001, and consequently first defendant is barred from raising or reagitating those issues and pleas in this suit, by the principle of res judicata and constructive res judicata?The plea raised by Kerala relating to the lease deed dated 29.10.1886 and structural safety of Mullaperiyar dam have been finally decided by the judgment of this Court dated 27.2.2006 and Kerala is estopped from raising or re-agitating these issues in the present suit.  
10Whether the first defendant can obstruct the plaintiff from increasing the water level of Mullai Periyar Dam to 142 ft. and from carrying out repair works as per the judgment dated 27.2.2006 of this Court in WP(C) No. 386/2001.Kerala cannot obstruct Tamil Nadu from increasing the water level of Mullaperiyar dam to 142 ft. and from carrying out repair works as per judgment dated 27.2.2006.
8Whether the first defendant is estopped from contending that Periyar River is not an inter-State river.Kerala cannot be permitted to contend that river Periyar is an intra-State river.
9Whether the offer of the first defendant, to construct a new dam across River Periyar in the downstream region of Mullai Periyar Dam would meet the ends of justice and requirements of plaintiff.For the construction of new dam, there has to be agreement of both the parties. The offer made by Kerala cannot be thrusted upon Tamil Nadu.
11  To what relief is the plaintiff entitled to?”  Tamil Nadu is entitled to the reliefs as prayed in para 40 (i) and (ii) of the suit. Consequently, it is declared that the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006 passed by the Kerala legislature is unconstitutional in its application to and effect on the Mullaperiyar dam.  
2(b)  Whether plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction restraining the first defendant from applying and enforcing the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006 with reference to Mullai Periyar Dam?  The 1st defendant – State of Kerala – is restrained by a decree of permanent injunction from applying and enforcing the impugned legislation or in any manner interfering with or obstructing the State of Tamil Nadu from increasing the water level to 142 ft. and from carrying out the repair works as per the judgment of this Court dated 27.2.2006 in W.P.(C) No. 386/2001 with connected matters.

Third Round of Litigation: Dr. Joe Joseph v. State of Tamil Nadu

Fresh spurt of arguments are surged in the Supreme Court on filing the Writ Petition, Dr. Joe Joseph v. State of Tamil Nadu, in 2020, beseeching a re-look on the issues on the premises of ‘safety and security’ . The Apex Court has already taken notice of the need to ‘ensure the safety of people’; and it directed the State of Tamil Nadu, on March 16, 2021, to furnish requisite information to the Supervisory Committee. The Court further directed that the Supervisory Committee should take necessary steps including issuance of appropriate directions to the concerned party-States as may be necessary and to submit an action taken report before the Court.

Now the matter is in the process of settlement of issues to be addressed in the case.



End Notes:

Important observations & findings in State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala, (2014) 12 SCC 696:

  • Arguments of State of Kerala: “135. On the other hand, the argument of Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel for Kerala, is that the legislature of every State has not just the power but the obligation to take appropriate legislative measures to ensure the safety and security of its residents. Where the legislature of a State is satisfied that there is a need to curtail the use or storage of a water reservoir to protect its citizenry and elects to enact legislation as a precautionary measure, the legislation cannot be said to be in excess of the legislative competence of the State if it relates to reservoir and dam within the legislating State. Kerala legislature has imposed precautionary measures by placing pro tem restrictions on the storage level of the dams mentioned in the Second Schedule read with Section 62A(2) of the 2006 (Amendment) Act and the said restrictions are based on the legislative wisdom of the Kerala legislature that these dams are endangered on account of their age, degeneration, degradation, structural or other impediments. While adjudicating upon the constitutional validity, Mr. Harish Salve argues that the Court must proceed on the premise that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people and its laws are directed to the problems made manifest by its experience and are based on adequate grounds.
  • 136. Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel for Kerala heavily relies upon ‘precautionary principle’ and ‘public trust doctrine’ and argues that Kerala legislature was competent to override the contracts and regulate safety of the Mullaperiyar dam situated within its territory across river Periyar. His submission is that the State as sovereign retains continuing supervisory control over navigable waters and underlying beds. It is his submission that the State has a duty of ‘continuing supervision’ even after such rights have been granted. In this regard strong reliance is placed by him on Pfizer Animal Health.”
  • Legislature cannot indirectly control the Courts: “141. It is true that the State’s sovereign interests provide the foundation of the public trust doctrine but the judicial function is also a very important sovereign function of the State and the foundation of the rule of law. The legislature cannot by invoking ‘public trust doctrine’ or ‘precautionary principle’ indirectly control the action of the Courts and directly or indirectly set aside the authoritative and binding finding of fact by the Court, particularly, in situations where the executive branch (Government of the State) was a party in the litigation and the final judgment was delivered after hearing them.”
  • Legislature cannot alter a judicial decision rendered on a Finding of Fact. “143. This Court in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum, after hearing the State of Kerala, was not persuaded by Kerala’s argument that Mullaperiyar dam was unsafe or storage of water in that dam cannot be increased. Rather, it permitted Tamil Nadu to increase the present water level from 136 ft. to 142 ft. and restrained Kerala from interfering in Tamil Nadu’s right in increasing the water level in Mullaperiyar dam to 142 ft. Thus, a judgment has been given by this court in contest between the two States in respect of safety of Mullaperiyar dam for raising water level to 142 ft. The essential element of the judicial function is the decision of a dispute actually arising between the parties and brought before the court. Necessarily, such decision must be binding upon the parties and enforceable according to the decision. A plain and simple judicial decision on fact cannot be altered by a legislative decision by employing doctrines or principles such as ‘public trust doctrine’, ‘precautionary principle’ ‘larger safety principle’ and, ‘competence of the State legislature to override agreements between the two States’. The Constitutional principle that the legislature can render judicial decision ineffective by enacting validating law within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing its character retrospectively has no application where a judicial decision has been rendered by recording a finding of fact. Under the pretence of power, the legislature, cannot neutralise the effect of the judgment given after ascertainment of fact by means of evidence/materials placed by the parties to the dispute.”
  • A final judgment remains in force until altered by the court: “A decision which disposes of the matter by giving findings upon the facts is not open to change by legislature. A final judgment, once rendered, operates and remains in force until altered by the court in appropriate proceedings.
  • 145. Section 62A declares the dam to be endangered. The Second Schedule appended to the Act fixes the height of the water level at 136 ft. though this Court in its judgment had declared Mullaperiyar dam safe and permitted the increase of the water level to 142 ft. Moreover, the 2006 (Amendment) Act authorises the Dam Safety Authority to adjudge its safety to allow raising of water level. The provision is in direct disregard of the judgment of this Court. Section 62A also freezes all work on the dam allowed by this Court in its judgment dated 27.2.2006. In our opinion, by 2006 (Amendment) Act, the Kerala legislature has overturned a final judgment in the interest of its own executive Government. The impugned law amounts to reversal of the judgment of this Court which determines directly the question of safety of Mullaperiyar dam for raising water level to 142 ft. and whereunder Tamil Nadu’s legal right has been determined.”
  • Judicial decision on a particular fact cannot be reopened by legislature: “146. On behalf of Kerala, it is strenuously argued by Mr. Harish Salve that right to safety of the people being a public right could not have passed into 2006 judgment of this court. In this regard, heavy reliance is placed on the majority decision of the Wheeling Bridge. Firstly, public right qualification in Wheeling Bridge has no application in the present case as there is a critical difference between the provisions impugned before us and the provisions which were impugned before US Supreme Court in Wheeling Bridge. The principle question before the US Supreme Court in Wheeling Bridge was whether or not the compact could operate as a restriction upon the power of courts under the Constitution to regulate commerce among several States. In response to the argument urged before it that the Congress cannot have the effect to annul the judgment of the court already rendered or the rights determined thereby was accepted as a general proposition but this proposition was held not applicable in the matters of adjudication upon the public rights. In our view, a legislation violating the separation of powers principle cannot be saved by carving out an exception that the legislature has regulated a public right. We think that the act of legislature designed to achieve a legitimate regulatory measure does not grant constitutional immunity to such law enacted in violation of separation of powers principle or in other words, rule of law. Once a judicial decision on ascertainment of a particular fact achieves finality, we are afraid the legislature cannot reopen such final judgment directly or indirectly. In such cases, the courts, if brought before them, may reopen such cases in exercise of their own discretion.
  • 147. In our view, Wheeling Bridge qualification by the majority decision of U.S. Supreme Court cannot be read to permit the actual revision of the final judgment by the legislature. If Wheeling Bridge lays down the proposition that a judgment declaring a public right may be annulled by subsequent legislation as contended by Mr. Harish Salve, then we say, as we must, that we are not persuaded to accept such proposition of majority judgment in Wheeling Bridge29. The two separate opinions in Wheeling Bridge one by McLean J. and the other by Wayne J. – though in minority- also did not accept such proposition.
  • 148. The above discussion must also answer the argument of Mr. Harish Salve that rules of inter partes litigation do not determine the obligation of the State for safety of its people. We do not think it is necessary to consider the opinion of Weeramantry, J. in Gobcikovo-Nagymaros Project (ICJ) in detail. The stress laid by Weeramantry, J. is that where issue of serious or catastrophic environmental danger arises, the Court must look beyond inter partes adversarial procedures.”
  • It is open to approach court for re-assessing safety aspect: “149. It is true that safety of dam is an aspect which can change from time to time in different circumstances but then the circumstances have to be shown based on which it becomes necessary to make departure from the earlier finding. It is always open to any of the parties to approach the court and apply for re-assessing the safety aspect but absent change in circumstances, factual determination in the earlier proceedings even on the questions such as safety of dam binds the parties. If the circumstances have changed which necessitates a re-look on the aspect of safety, the Court itself may exercise its discretion to reopen such case but legislative abrogation of judgment for even the very best of reasons and genuine concern for public safety does not clothe the legislature to rescind the judgment of the court by a legislation.”
  • Mullaperiyar dam was found safe and that finding was not imaginary: “150. The contention of Mr. Harish Salve that by declaring dam unsafe, the legislature has not rendered any finding of fact; it deems dam unsafe and sets up an Authority to regulate it, is noted to be rejected. What has been found as a fact by judicial determination cannot be declared otherwise by applying legal fiction. We are, however, persuaded to accept the submission of Mr. Vinod Bobde, learned senior counsel for Tamil Nadu that the fact that the Mullaperiyar dam is safe was found by this Court and that finding of fact can never be deemed to be imaginary by a legal fiction which then proceeds to deem the opposite to be real, viz., that the dam is endangered. This is not a matter of legislative policy as it is being made out to be, rather in our opinion, it is incursion in the judicial process and functions of judicial organ. The declaration in Section 62A read with item No. 1 of the Second Schedule leaves no manner of doubt that the enactment is intended to reach the question decided by the Court.
  • The impugned law is a classic case of nullification of a judgment: “151. The question whether or not the legislature has usurped the judicial power or enacted a law in breach of separation of powers principle would depend on facts of each case after considering the real effect of law on a judgment or a judicial proceeding. One of the tests for determining whether a judgment is nullified is to see whether the law and the judgment are inconsistent and irreconcilable so that both cannot stand together. In what we have already discussed above, it is abundantly clear that on the one hand there is a finding of fact determined by this Court on hearing the parties on the basis of the evidence/materials placed on record in the judgment of this Court in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum and on the other in 2006 (Amendment) Act, the Kerala legislature has declared the dam being an endangered one and fixed the water level in the dam at 136 ft. If the judgment of this Court in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum1 and the 2006 (Amendment) Act are placed side by side insofar as safety of the Mullaperiyar dam for raising the water level from 136 ft. to 142 ft. is concerned, it is obvious that the judgment of this Court and the law enacted by Kerala State legislature cannot stand together and they are irreconcilable and inconsistent. The impugned law is a classic case of nullification of a judgment simpliciter, as in the judgment of this Court the question of safety of dam was determined on the basis of materials placed before it and not on the interpretation of any existing law and there was no occasion for the legislature to amend the law by altering the basis on which the judgment was founded. When the impugned law is not a validation law, there is no question of the legislature removing the defect, as the Court has not found any vice in the existing law and declared such law to be bad.
  • 152. There is yet another facet that in federal disputes, the legislature (Parliament and State legislatures) cannot be judge in their own cause in the case of any dispute with another State. The rule of law which is basic feature of our Constitution forbids the Union and the States from deciding, by law, a dispute between two States or between the Union and one or more States. If this was permitted under the Constitution, the Union and the States which have any dispute between them inter se would enact law establishing its claim or right against the other and that would lead to contradictory and irreconcilable laws. The Constitution makers in order to obviate any likelihood of contradictory and irreconcilable laws being enacted has provided for independent adjudication of federal disputes. Article 131 of the Constitution confers original jurisdiction upon this Court in relation to the disputes between the Government of India and one or more States or between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more States on the other or between two or more States insofar as dispute involves any question on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. The proviso appended to Article 131 carves out an exception to the jurisdiction of this Court to a dispute arising out of treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which have been entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution and continues in operation after such commencement, which are political in nature. In relation to dispute relating to waters of inter-State river or river valleys, Article 262 provides for creation of tribunal or forum for their adjudication. In federal disputes, Parliament or State legislatures by law, if seek to decide a dispute between the two States or between the Union and one or more States directly or indirectly, the adjudicatory mechanism provided in Articles 131 and 262 of the Constitution would be rendered nugatory and, therefore, such legislation cannot be constitutionally countenanced being violative of separation of powers doctrine.
  • 153. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel is right in his submission that a legislation can never be challenged on the principles of res judicata and that it binds a party and not the legislature. The question here is not that the 2006 (Amendment) Act is unconstitutional on the ground of res judicata but the question is, when a categorical finding has been recorded by this Court in the earlier judgment that the dam is safe for raising the water level to 142 ft. and permitted the water lever of the dam being raised to 142 ft. and that judgment has become final and binding between the parties, has the Kerala legislature infringed the separation of powers doctrine in enacting such law? In what has already been discussed above, the answer to the question has to be in the affirmative and we hold so.
  • 154. Where a dispute between two States has already been adjudicated upon by this Court, which it is empowered to deal with, any unilateral law enacted by one of the parties that results in overturning the final judgment is bad not because it is affected by the principles of res judicata but because it infringes the doctrine of separation of powers and rule of law, as by such law, the legislature has clearly usurped the judicial power.”
  • Court can be approached if emergent situation as to safety of dam.: “165. Shri Harish Salve, learned senior counsel for Kerala, placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in N.D. Jayal . In N.D. Jayal, Dharmadhikari, J. made general observations on the dam safety aspect that plea like res judicata on the earlier decisions passed by the Supreme Court cannot be allowed to be raised. The observations made by Dharmadhikari, J. in N.D. Jayal have to be read as an exception to the res judicata rule in the matters where, by their very nature, the factual situation has drastically changed in course of time. If substantial changes in the circumstances occur and such circumstances are shown to the Court necessitating departure from the earlier finding on the issue of safety, the Court can be approached and in that event the Court itself may exercise its discretion to reopen the safety aspect having regard to the drastic change in circumstances or in emergent situation as to the safety of dam. In our view, a judicial decision, having achieved finality, becomes the last word and can be reopened in the changed circumstances by that Court alone and no one else.
  • 166. On behalf of Kerala, it is contended that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution is ousted or excluded in respect of disputes between two or more States: since such disputes fall within the ambit of the original jurisdiction of this Court under Article 131 of the Constitution or jurisdiction of a tribunal constituted under the provisions of Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 read with the provisions of Article 262 of the Constitution. Thus, it was submitted that the 2006 judgment is not binding and that the rule of res judicata can hardly be attracted in this situation.
  • 167. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel for Kerala. The label of jurisdiction exercised by this Court is not material for applicability of principles of res judicata if the matter in issue in the subsequent suit has already been concluded by the earlier decision of this Court between the same parties. The 2006 judgment was the result of judicial investigation, founded upon facts ascertained in the course of hearing. The plea of lack of jurisdiction of this Court was taken in the earlier proceedings on both the grounds, viz., (1) whether the jurisdiction of this Court is barred in view of Article 262 read with Section 11 of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, and (2) whether Article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of this Court. On both these questions the findings were recorded against Kerala. It is too much for Kerala to say that the 2006 judgment is without jurisdiction and not binding.”
  • Safety of Mullaperiyar dam – Evidence and EC Report
  • 195. Having done elaborate and detailed appraisal and analysis of the voluminous tests and reports of experts and having regard to the concerns expressed by Kerala about the safety of the Mullaperiyar dam, EC has summarized its conclusions on the three aspects, viz.,
    • (a) hydrologic safety;
    • (b) structural safety; and
    • (c) seismic safety as follows:
  • “A) Hydrologic Safety
  • 23. The MPD is found hydrologically safe. The Probable Maximum Flood (PMF), with a peak flow of 2.12 lakh cusecs (6003 cumecs) is accepted by EC. It can be routed over the reservoir FRL 142 ft (43.28
  • m) to safely pass over the MPD spillway with 13 gates operative, resulting into a peak out flow of 1,43,143 cusecs (4053 cumecs), raising the Maximum Water Level (MWL) to elevation 153.47 ft (46.78 m) transiently. Even for the Test Case of one gate remaining inoperative, the MWL raises to elevation 154.10 ft (46.97 m) when PMF impinges the reservoir at FRL 142 ft (42.28 m).
  • B) Structural Safety
  • 24. Both the main and Baby Dam (gravity and earth), are structurally safe. FRL can be restored to the pre-1979 position. Following maintenance and repair measures, should however be carried out in a time-bound manner: i) treatment of upstream surface, ii) reaming of drainage holes, iii) instrumentation, iv) periodical monitoring, analysis and leading away the seepage from toe of the dam towards downstream, v) geodetic re-affirmation, etc., vi) the dam body should be grouted with a properly designed grout mix of fine cement / suitable chemical / epoxy / polymer according to expert advice so that its safety continues to remain present.”
  • C) Seismic Safety
  • 25. MPD is found to be seismically safe for FRL 152 ft (46.33 m) / MWL 155 ft (47.24 m) for the identified seismic design parameters with acceleration time histories under 2-D FEM Analysis. The strength and other properties of dam material presently available, indicate ample reserve against the likely stresses / impacts assessed under this analysis. In addition, reserve strength of cable anchors makes the dam further safe. The suspicion about existence of a geological fault in the Baby Dam foundation is ruled out. The recent earthquake activity in the dam area is considered of no consequence to the seismic safety. Also, it has caused no distress to MPD / Idukki dams.”
  • CC investigations carried out with representatives of both the States: “196. Kerala has vehemently challenged the EC report and its conclusions. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel for Kerala, argues that the ITS reports contained in 50 CDs and 4 DVDs are not admissible and should not be considered as part of material on record before this Court. He submits that EC suo motu decided to conduct investigations, tests and studies on various aspects related to the case through the apex organizations, the Coordination Committee was formed, headed by Dr. C.D. Thatte, member of the EC, and consisting of representatives of Kerala and Tamil Nadu and though the representatives of States were made part of the Coordination Committee, but their role was limited to more of being an observer and unilateral decisions regarding the studies, etc., were taken by Dr. C.D. Thatte, which were prejudicial to the interest of Kerala. Kerala’s grievance is that the EC on 5.12.2011 declined to disclose and supply the copies of results and ITS reports without dealing with the question of prejudice. Subsequently, EC submitted its report before this Court and the Court directed the Registry on 4.5.2012 to supply copy of the report of the EC to party States and, accordingly, the Registry of this Court made available a photocopy of the report. The report supplied by the Registry to Kerala did not include the results and reports of the ITS listed in Annexure 6.1 of the report but later on pursuant to the order of this Court dated 31.8.2012, all 50 CDs and 4 DVDs were supplied to the counsel for Kerala. It is submitted on behalf of Kerala that the fair procedure and rules of natural justice demanded that the EC should have disclosed the results and reports of ITS relied upon by it and given an opportunity to Kerala on the acceptability of the ITS reports. It is strenuously urged by learned senior counsel for Kerala that the ITS reports are the opinions of experts and, therefore, the EC could not have relied upon such results and reports without giving an opportunity to it to meet the adverse contents and Kerala has the right to cross-examine the authors and also to lead evidence of experts, if any, challenging the adverse results and reports of the ITS. In this regard, Kerala referred to the application made before EC on 21.11.2011. Kerala also relied upon the decision of Queens Bench in Regina.
  • 197. We are not persuaded by the submissions of Mr. Harish Salve. It is true that 50 CDs and 4 DVDs containing ITS reports were supplied to Kerala pursuant to the order of this Court dated 31.8.2012 after the report had been submitted by the EC but the fact of the matter is that the EC decided to conduct the investigations, tests and studies on various aspects relating to the safety of the Mullaperiyar dam through the apex organizations pursuant to the task given to it by this Court. The EC in its proceedings dated 17.2.2011 formed a Coordination Committee which comprised the representatives of both the States. It is very difficult to accept that the role of the representatives of the States in the Coordination Committee was limited to that of being an observer. The ITS reports have been given by the organizations and bodies which are expert on the job. We have no hesitation in holding that the investigations, tests and technical studies were directed to be carried out by the EC in association with representatives of both the States.”


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Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant

Also Read: Contents of a Document are to be Proved in Court by Producing Original or Secondary Evidence

Jojy George Koduvath.

Abstract.

  • Oral evidence on contents of documents (unless secondary evidence is permitted, and unless fall under the exceptions in Sec. 92 Evidence Act) will be of no use, as it will be ‘irrelevant’.

Part I

Best-Evidence Rule.

Indian Evidence Act lays down the following principles of ‘Rule of Best-Evidence’:

No.PropositionsSec. in Evd. Act
1Best available evidence must be produced.
If not, adverse presumption may be taken.
114 (g)
2Oral evidence must be direct. Hearsay evidence is accepted in rare instances (that falls under Sec. 6 of the Evid. Act).60
3Documents must be proved by Primary Evidence.
Contents of documents and electronic records are not allowed to be proved by oral evidence; nevertheless, secondary evidence is allowed when it is so permitted.
64 & 65; 59;
22, 22A & 144.
4To prove the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, document itself, or secondary evidence, must be produced.91
5No evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms.92
6Sec. 93 and 94 speaks as to exclusion of evidence. 93 & 94
7Sec. 94 to 99 lays down the circumstances in which evidence can be given with respect to documents.94 to 99
8Circumstantial and Presumptive evidence can be resorted to in proper cases.114
9Substantive evidence that requires corroboration must be corroborated.157
10When secondary evidence is permitted (under Sec. 65), Oral Evidence is a kind of secondary evidence.63(5)

See Blog: Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law

Documents must be Proved by Primary Evidence

Contents of documents are to be proved by producing the document itself, or its copy; oral evidence is permitted only in rare occasions.

Best evidence rule insists production of original (i.e., primary evidence) when it exists. ‘Oral evidence as to the contents of a document is admissible only in rare occasions’. It is the purposive layout and scheme of the Evidence Act – as emanated from Sections 59, 61, 62, 64, 65 and 144.

Sec. 59 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • “59. Proof of facts by oral evidence:  All facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence.”

Sec. 61 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 61. Proof of contents of documents.—The contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence.

Sec. 62 defines primary evidence to mean ‘the document itself’ produced for the inspection of the Court.

Sec. 64 of the Act requires that that the documents are to be proved primarily by ‘primary evidence’, except in cases where secondary evidence is provided under Sec. 65.  

Sec. 65 clause (a) to (g) delineates the cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.

Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 144. Evidence as to matters in writing.—Any witness may be asked, whilst under examination, whether any contract, grant or other disposition of property, as to which he is giving evidence, was not contained in a document, and if he says that it was, or if he is about to make any statement as to the contents of any document, which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to be produced, the adverse party may object to such evidence being given until such document is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.
  • Explanation.—A witness may give oral evidence of statements made by other persons about the contents of documents if such statements are in themselves relevant facts.
  • Illustration. The question is, whether A assaulted B. C deposes that he heard A say to D—”B wrote a letter accusing me of theft, and I will be revenged on him”. This statement is relevant as showing A’s motive for the assault, and evidence may be given of it, though no other evidence is given about the letter.

Sec. 22 says that oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant if the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document.

Sec. 22A says as to oral admissions as to contents of electronic records as under:

  • When oral admissions as to contents of electronic records are relevant
  • Oral admissions as to the contents of electronic records are not relevant, unless the genuineness of the electronic record produced is in question.”

‘Rule of Best Evidence’ Sections 22, 59, 61, 62, 64 and 144 of the Evidence Act

These Sections of the Evidence Act project the ‘rule of best evidence’ and it directs that the contents of the document are to be proved by the original document itself, unless secondary evidence is provided under Sec. 65. (See: Bimla Rohal v. Usha, 2002-2 HLJ 745; 2002-2 Shim LC 341)

Sec. 91 and 92 provides that when terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, their terms alone are taken to be the sources of what the parties wished to state; and oral evidence to the contrary, are excluded.

The word ‘disposition’ is not a ‘term of law’ as observed in Pushpalatha N V v. V Padma, AIR 2010 Kant 124.  It is said as under:

  • “The term ‘disposition’ has been defined in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary as a devise ‘intended to comprehend a mode by which property can pass, whether by act of parties or by an act of the law’ and ‘includes transfer and change of property. The word ‘disposition’ means giving away or giving up by a person of something which was his own. It is not a term of law. In has no precise meaning. Its meaning has to be gathered from the context in which it is used. The word ‘disposition’ in relation to property means disposition made by deed or will and also disposition made by or under a decree of a court. The word ‘disposition’ would ordinarily be used in reference to a written document and not to the effect of that document. The removal of a thing from one’s self is involved in a disposal. The disposition is the provision creating the interest, not the interest itself. Therefore, disposition means a plan or arrangement for the disposal, distribution of something; definite settlement with regard to some matter.”

Both Sec. 91 and 92 are based on “best evidence rule”. (Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thadani AIR 2003 SC. 2418: 2003-6  SCC 595; S. Saktivel v. M. Venugopal Pillai 2007-7  SCC 104; Mumbai International Airport v. Golden Chariot Airport, (2012) 10 SCC 422; Tulsi v. Chandrika Prasad, AIR 2006 SC 3359).

The Supreme Court held in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani: AIR 2003 SC 2418, as under:

  • “The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence are (i) to admit inferior evidence when law requires superior would amount to nullifying the law, (ii) when parties have deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory.” (Quoted in Placido Francisco Pinto v. Jose Francisco Pinto, 2021-10 SCR 676; V Anantha Raju v. T M Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)

In Bhima Tima Dhotre v. The Pioneer Chemical Co. (1968) 70 Bom LR 683,  it is observed as under:

  • Documentary evidence becomes meaningless if the writer has to be called in every case to give oral evidence of its contents. If that were the position, it would mean that, in the ultimate analysis, all evidence must be oral and that oral evidence would virtually be the only kind of evidence recognised by law. That, however, is not the position under the Evidence Act. … Section 59 of the said Act enacts that all facts, except the “contents” of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. This provision would clearly indicate that to prove the contents of a document by means of oral evidence would be a violation of that section.”

However, oral evidence can be given on a matter (adoption) which is not required by law to be in writing and it is not barred for the mere reason it was contained in a document (Taburi Sahai v. Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1967 SC 106).

Sec. 22 of the Evidence Act – Only a Declaratory Provision

Sec. 22 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 22. When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant.—Oral admissions as to the contents of a document are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under the rules hereinafter contained, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22 emphasises one thing positively – excepting the circumstances exempted (when entitled to give secondary evidence, and the genuineness of a document is in question) oral admissions on contents of the document are not relevant. That is even if such an evidence is tendered it will be discarded.

Is the principle, ‘Oral admissions as to the contents of a document are not relevant’, (originally) emerged from Sec. 22?

The answer is, ‘No’.

Because:

  • Sec. 22 primarily refers to ‘admission’; and it does not deal with the ‘entitlement’ to produce a Secondary Evidence as ‘Proof’.
  • Sec. 22 is included in the sections that pertains to ‘Admissions’ (comes in Part I), in Chapter II, which speaks on ‘Relevancy of Facts’, and not in Part II that deals with ‘Proof’.
  • As the marginal note (or heading) denotes, it is meant for setting forth – ‘When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant’. Two circumstances are laid down in Sec. 22. They are:
    • (i) When the party proposing to prove the contents of a document is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under the rules “hereinafter contained“, and
    • (ii) When the genuineness of a document produced is in question.
  • Therefore, it is clear that we have to resort to other provisions of the Evidence Act (Sections 59, 61, 62, 64, 65 and 144) to see the ‘entitlement’ (as to) – ‘When a party to the litigation can give secondary evidence of the contents of such document’.

Sec. 22 – Variance from English Law on Admission of Contents of Document

In Perumal Chettiar v. Kamakshi Ammal, (1938) 2 MLJ 189, it is observed, with reference to Sec, 22 Evid. Act, as under:

  • 23. Tyte v. Jones (referred to in the foot-note to Farr v. Price (1800) 1 East. 55 : 102 E.R. 22) seems to rest on another principle of the English law which the Indian Legislature had deliberately departed from, in enacting Section 22 of the Evidence Act. The proof that was permitted in Tyte v. Jones was to the effect that when the money for which the unstamped promissory note had been given was demanded of the defendant, he acknowledged the debt. This is explicable in the light of the rule supported by some authority in England that admissions by a party, even when proved by parol evidence, constitute an exception to the ‘best evidence’ rule (see Singleton v. Barrett (1832) 2 C. & J. 368 : 149 E.R. 157). This view has been criticised even in England (see Taylor on Evidence, Sections 410 to 412), and Section 22 of the Indian Evidence Act adopted the stricter view and relegated ‘oral’ admissions as to the contents of a document to the category of “secondary evidence”.

“Better Evidence” Rule in English Law Despite Admission of Contents of Document

Bimla Rohal v. Usha, 2002-2 HLJ 745; 2002-2 ShimLC 341, referred English decisions on insistence of “better evidence”, as under:

  • “Greenleaf in his evidence at page 82 explained and stated the rule thus:
    • ‘.. A fourth rule which governs the production of evidence that which requires the best evidence of which the case, in its nature, is susceptible. This rule does not demand the greatest amount of evidence which can possibly be given of any fact but its design to prevent the introduction of any, which from the nature of the case, supposes that better evidence is in the possession of the party. It is adopted for the prevention of fraud; for when it is apparent, that the better evidence is withheld, it is fair to presume that the party has some sinister motive for not producing and that if offered, his design would be frustrated….’
  • In Earl of Suffolk v. Greenwill, Ch. Rep. 89 (92), the Court ruled that it was dangerous to admit the contents and sufficiencies of deeds to be proved by the testimony of witnesses, the construction of deeds being the office of the Court. Tinterden, L.C.J. in Vincent v. Cole, M & M. 257, observed:
    • ‘I have always (perhaps more so than other Judges), acted most strictly on the rule that what is in writing shall be proved by the writing itself. My experience has taught me the extreme danger or relying on the recollection of the witnesses, however, honest, as the contents of the written instruments; they may be so easily mistaken that I think the purposes of justice require the strict enforcement of the rule’.”

Rule of ‘Next Best Evidence’

Under the Rule of Best Evidence the law requires, production of the next best evidence if it is not possible to produce the best evidence. See the following:

  • Balkar Singh v. State of Punjab, 2005 (1) RCR (Criminal) 576 : 2005 Cri LJ (NOC) 180 (the school record is the  next best evidence in the absence of any entry in the office of Registrar of Births and Deaths.)
  • Jagdamba Tea Factory Vs. Parshotam Kishan, 2008-3 PunLR 388, 2008-3 RCR(CIVIL) 17,
  • 2008-1 RCR (RENT) 507 (Where there is no lease deed nor any receipt, the rate of rent could well be determined on the basis of house-tax register, which was the  next best evidence available. Gurinder Singh v. Kundan Lal, 2005(1) RCR(Rent) 332 : 2005(2) CCC 128 was relied on where entries in the municipal house tax register was considered.)
  • Chiman Lal v. Datar Singh, 1998 CriLJ 267, 1997 (1) WLN 396.
  • M/s. MAVR Nataraja Nadar v. State Bank of India, 1993(1) LW 456

In C. Assiamma v. State Bank of Mysore, 1992 -74 Com Cas 139, it is pointed out that the copy of a deed of transfer is not ordinarily a document of title for the purposes of an equitable mortgage, and that there may be cases where the original document is lost and there are no chances of that document being made use of for any purpose; and in such a circumstance the  next best evidence of the owner’s title to the property would be a certified copy of that document.

Best Evidence Rule insists evidence of High Probative Value

Though various kinds of secondary evidences are provided under Sec. 63, the probative value of one kind (say, a photograph of an original, as stated in Illustration (a) of Sec. 63) will definitely be higher when compared with another (say, oral account). The best evidence rule insists evidence bearing high probative value.

Part II

When Document Available, Oral Evidence NOT admitted; Even if Admitted, NO use

Oral Admission of Witnesses on document is Bad and Barred in Indian Law as that of ‘hearsay evidence’.

Will Erroneous or Misguided Oral Evidence on Contents of a Document Harm its Author? No. Because, such evidence is ‘irrelevant’.

It is beyond doubt that ‘it is settled principle of law that where documentary evidence is available, no amount of oral evidence against the admitted document is admissible nor can be considered by the Court’ (Shiba Sankar Nanda v. Padmini Naik ILR 2011-1 Cut (Ori) 792).

When Document Available, Oral EVIDENCE as to its Contents Discarded. Oral evidence as to the contents of a document is admissible only in rare occasions. As observed in Shiba Sankar Nanda v. Padmini Naik, ILR 2011-1 Cut (Ori) 792, ‘it is settled principle of law that where documentary evidence is available, no amount of oral evidence against the admitted document is admissible nor can be considered by the Court’. Sections 22, 59, 61, 6264, 65 and 144 of the Evidence Act support this view.

Sec. 22 – If Document Available, Oral ADMISSIONS of its Author Ignored. Sec. 22 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 22. When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant.—Oral admissions as to the contents of a document are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under the rules hereinafter contained, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22 emphasises one thing positively – excepting the two circumstances exempted (when entitled to give secondary evidence and the genuineness of a document is in question) oral admissions on contents of a document (i.e. admission by its author or a person under him) are not relevant. In other words, even if such an evidence is tendered it will not be looked into by the court.

Sec. 22 primarily pertains to ‘admission’; and it does not deal with the ‘entitlement’ to produce a Secondary Evidence as ‘Proof’. Because, Sec. 22 is included in the sections that deal with ‘Admissions’; and it comes in Part I, Chapter II, which speaks on ‘Relevancy of Facts’; and not in Part that relates to ‘Proof’, that is Part II. It is further clear from the marginal note (or heading) of Sec. 22 (‘When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant’).

At the same time it must be seen that Section 22 marches in Chapter II, which speaks on ‘Relevancy of Facts’. Sec. 5 raises a total bar to irrelevant ‘evidence’. Sec. 5 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • “Section 5: Evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts:
  • Evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant, and of no others.”

Therefore, Sec. 22 bars the author and persons under him from giving oral evidence as to contents of the document, if the document is available.

Bulk of Evidence Waste Time and Space of the Courts

It is very important to note that the oral statements of witnesses as regards the contents in an admitted document is irrelevant and therefore liable to be eschewed. Therefore, such statements could not harm or benefit the party to the suit or the maker thereof. Still, it is a sheer fact that bulk of such evidence is adduced in court wasting the time and space of the courts.

Statements of Witnesses as Explanation of Admitted Document is also Excluded. As already shown, the oral statements of witnesses as regards the contents in an admitted document is irrelevant; and therefore they are liable to be eschewed. Further, Sec. 93 and 94 speak as to exclusion of evidence (i) that intend to ‘explain or amend ambiguous document’ and (ii) that stands ‘against application of the document to existing facts’.

  • Sec. 93 and 94 speaks as to exclusion of evidence.
  • Sec. 94 to 99 lays down the circumstances in which evidence can be given with respect to documents.

Interpretation of Documents (Except Wills)Provisions under Evidence Act

Produce Document itself (Sec. 91); and No oral evidence can be given

  • (i) for varying, adding to, etc. its terms (S. 92).
  • (ii) to explain a document, on its face, ambiguous (S. 93).
  • (iii) to show a plain document not meant to apply such facts (S. 94).

Evidence can be given –

  • (i) to show language of a plain – (but)  unmeaning to facts –  document is used in a peculiar sense (S. 95).
  • (ii) to show language used – (though) applies to several persons – in a document apply to one only  (S. 96).
  • (iii) to show language used – (though) applies partly to one set facts and partly to another set – in a document apply to which of the two sets  (S. 97).
  • (iv) to show language used – (though) applies partly to one set facts and partly to another set – in a document apply to which of the two sets  (S. 97).
  • (v) to show the meaning of illegible characters of technical expressions of words used in a peculiar sense (S. 98).

Interpretation of Wills

  • .(i) Sec. 91 to 99 of the Evidence Act do not affect construction of wills (S. 100).
  • (ii) Sec. 74 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, contains the armchair rule. It conveys – intention of the testator is important.

Sec. 93 to 100 Evidence Act read as under:

  • 93. Exclusion of evidence to explain or amend ambiguous document. –– When the language used in a document is, on its face, ambiguous or defective, evidence may not be given of facts which would show its meaning or supply its defects.
  • 94. Exclusion of evidence against application of document to existing facts. –– When language used in a document is plain in itself, and when it applies accurately to existing facts, evidence may not be given to show that it was not meant to apply to such facts.
  • 95. Evidence as to document unmeaning in reference to existing facts. –– When language used in a document is plain in itself, but is unmeaning in reference to existing facts, evidence may be given to show that it was used in a peculiar sense.
  • 96. Evidence as to application of language which can apply to one only of several persons. –– When the facts are such that the language used might have been meant to apply to any one, and could not have been meant to apply to more than one, of several persons or things, evidence may be given of facts which show which of those persons or things it was intended to apply to.
  • 97. Evidence as to application of language to one of two sets of facts, to neither of which the whole correctly applies. –– When the language used applies partly to one set of existing facts, and partly to another set of existing facts, but the whole of it does not apply correctly to either, evidence may be given to show to which of the two it was meant to apply.
  • 98. Evidence as to meaning of illegible characters, etc. –– Evidence may be given to show the meaning of illegible or not commonly intelligible characters, of foreign, obsolete, technical, local and provincial expressions, of abbreviations and of words used in a peculiar sense.
  • 99. Who may give evidence of agreement varying terms of document. –– Persons who are not parties to a document, or their representatives in interest, may give evidence of any facts tending to show a contemporaneous agreement varying the terms of the document.
  • 100. Saving of provisions of Indian Succession Act relating to wills.––Nothing in this Chapter contained shall be taken to affect any of the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1865 (10 of 1865) as to the construction of wills

Part III

EXCEPTIONS to the Rule of Irrelevancy of Oral Evidence on Documents

Sec. 92 Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement—When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms

Following are the exceptions in Sec. 92 Evidence Act to the general rule as to bar of oral evidence on contents of documents:

  • Provisos to Sec. 92:
    • Proviso (1). –– Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure] of consideration, or mistake in fact or law.
    • Proviso (2). ––The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document.
    • Proviso (3). ––The existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved.
    • Proviso (4). ––The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents.
    • Proviso (5). –– Any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved:Provided that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract.
    • Proviso (6). –– Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts.

Admission of Contents of Document in Pleadings

In Perumal Chettiar v. Kamakshi Ammal, (1938) 2 MLJ 189, it is observed, as to pleadings, as under:

  • “The result, in India, is that if by reason of the document being unstamped, no evidence of its contents whether primary or secondary is admissible, evidence of admissions by the defendant is equally inadmissible. The position may be different where admissions are made in the pleadings themselves (cf. Huddleston v, Briscoe (1805) 11 Ves. 583 (596) : 32 E.R. 1215 (1220) and Thynne v. Protheroe (1814) 2 M. & S. 553 : 105 E.R. 488), because by reason of Section 58 of the Evidence Act, it may not be necessary to prove admitted facts and the objection under Section 91 will not arise unless the plaintiff is called upon to go into evidence. (Mallappa v. Mat an Naga Chetty (1918) 35 M.L.J. 555 : I.L.R. 42 Mad. 41 (F.B.)) This was the position in Pramatha Nath Sandal v. Dwarka Nath Dey (1896) I.L.R. 23 Cal. 851; cf. however Chenbasappa v. Lakshman Ramchandra (1893) I.L.R. 18 Bom. 369, where it was suggested that in a suit on an unstamped promissory note, even an admission in the written statement may not avail the plaintiff, as the Court when giving a decree on such admission may be “acting on” the document within the meaning of Section 35 of the Stamp Act; see also Ankur Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Madhub Chunder Gkose (1873) 21 W.R. 1.”

Secondary evidence allowed only when permitted under Sec. 65

Sec. 61 of the Evidence Act directs that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Sec. 62 says that Primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court.

Sec. 63 lays down the mode of secondary evidence permitted by the Act.  It reads as under:

  • “63. Secondary evidence means and includes—
    • (1) Certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained;
    • (2) Copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies;
    • (3) Copies made from or compared with the original;
    • (4) Counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them;
    • (5) Oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it.”

As pointed out earlier, Sec. 64 stipulates that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases mentioned in Sec.65. Clauses (a) to (g) of Sec. 65 delineate the cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given. They read as under:

  • (a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power –– of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it;
  • (b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;
  • (c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
  • (d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;
  • (e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74;
  • (f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in 1 [India] to be given in evidence;
  • (g) when the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection.

Oral Evidence on ‘Sham’ Document

Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 directs exclusion of evidence or oral agreement as to the terms of any contract. But, under the first proviso to Section 92 any fact that may invalidate any document, such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution can be led into evidence. It permits the plaintiff to assert that the document was never intended to be acted upon and the document is a sham.

Read Blog: Void, Voidable, Ab Initio Void, and Sham Transactions

The question as to ‘sham’ nature arises only when one party asserts that there has been a different transaction altogether than what is recorded in the document. Oral evidence is admissible in law for that purpose. [See: Placido Francisco Pinto v. Jose Francisco Pinto, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 842. Referred: Smt. Gangabai v. Smt. Chhabubai (1982) 1 SCC 4, and Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595].

In Roop Kumar it is held as follows:

  • “22. This Court in Gangabai v. Chhabubai [(1982) 1 SCC 4 : AIR 1982 SC 20] and Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal [(2000) 1 SCC 434 : AIR 2000 SC 426] with reference to Section 92(1) held that it is permissible to a party to a deed to contend that the deed was not intended to be acted upon, but was only a sham document. The bar arises only when the document is relied upon and its terms are sought to be varied and contradicted. Oral evidence is admissible to show that document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties.”

Construction of a Document Raises a Question of Law

In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314, it is observed as under:

  • “Indeed it is well settled that the construction of a document of title or of a document which is the foundation of the rights of parties necessarily raises a question of law.”

In Hero Vinoth Minor v. Seshammal, AIR 2006 SC 2234, it is observed as under:

  • “It is now well settled that an inference of fact from a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms or a term of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of a principle of law, is a question of law. Therefore, when there is a misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law while interpreting a document, it is open to interference under Section 100 CPC. If a document creating an easement by grant is construed as an ‘easement of necessity’ thereby materially affecting the decision in the case, certainly it gives rise to a substantial question of law.”

Part IV

Words in the Instruments Matters; Not to the Presumed Intention

Brett L.J. in Re Meredith, ex parte Chick, (1879) 11 Ch D 731, observed as under:

  • “I am disposed to follow the rule of construction which was laid down by Lord Denman and Baron Parke ……. They said that in construing instruments you must have regard not to the presumed intention of the parties, but to the meaning of the words which they have used.” (Quoted in: VS Talwar v. Prem Chandra Sharma, AIR 1984 SC 664; Damodaram Pillai v. Dhanalakshmi Ammal, (1981) 1 MLJ 171; Thomas v. AA Henry, 2008(2) KLT 63.)

Oral Evidence must be Direct; Hearsay  Evidence, Inadmissible

As per the Evidence Act (Sec. 3), ‘evidence’ means and includes oral evidence and documentary evidence. As stated earlier, Sec. 59 of the Evidence Act says that all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records may be proved by oral evidence. Sec. 60 directs that the oral evidence must be direct.

Best available evidence must be produced; If Not, Adverse Presumption will be Taken

Generally, it is the duty of the party to lead the best evidence in his possession even though onus of proof do not lie on him, and he is not called upon to produce the said evidence; and the Court will draw adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act if such evidence is withheld.

But this rule cannot be applied blindly. Mere non-production of documents would not result in adverse inference, invariably (as shown below). Courts take into consideration the pleadings and decide whether the document/evidence withheld has any relevance. The court also cannot lose sight of the fact that burden of proof is on the party which makes a factual averment. The conduct and diligence of the other party is also important. Existence of some other circumstances may justify non-production (Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148).

The rule that best available evidence must be produced is taken in the following cases: Murugesam Pillai v. Gnana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi, AIR 1917 PC 6; Hiralal v. Badkulal, AIR 1953 SC 225; A. Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136; The Union of India v. Mahadeolal Prabhu Dayal, AIR 1965 SC 1755; Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413; M/s. Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. v. State of U.P.,  AIR 2003 SC 3024; Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126.

In Mohan Lal Shamlal Soni v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1346, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the best available evidence should be brought before the Court to prove a fact or the points in issue. But it is left either for the prosecution or for the defence to establish its respective case by adducing the best available evidence and the Court is not empowered under the provisions of the Code to compel either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness or witnesses on their sides. Nonetheless if either of the parties withholds any evidence which could be produced and which, if produced, be unfavorable to the party withholding such evidence, the court can draw a presumption under illustration (g) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act.”

Invoking best evidence rule it is observed by the Supreme Court in Musauddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, (2009) 14 SCC 541, as under:

  • “13. It is the duty of the party to lead the best evidence in its possession which could throw light on the issue in controversy and in case such a material evidence is withheld, the Court may draw adverse inference under Section 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act notwithstanding that the onus of proof did not lie on such party and it was not called upon to produce the said evidence (vide Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar vs. Mohamed Haji Latif & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 1413).”

In Jitendra v. State of M.P (2003) our Apex Court observed that charas and ganja seized from the accused was the best evidence in that case and the non-production of the same in court was seriously taken note of by the court and observed that that mere oral evidence as to the same was insufficient. (See also: Mohd. Aman, Babu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 2960.)

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of U.P, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it is observed as under:

  • “22. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by the prosecution is that the accused persons were present in the hotel room at the relevant time. PW-1 Ram Singh-Hotel Manager stated that CCTV cameras are installed in the boundaries, near the reception, in the kitchen, in the restaurant and all three floors. Since CCTV cameras were installed in the prominent places, CCTV footage would have been best evidence to prove whether the accused remained inside the room and whether or not they have gone out. CCTV footage is a strong piece of evidence which would have indicated whether the accused remained inside the hotel and whether they were responsible for the commission of a crime. It would have also shown whether or not the accused had gone out of the hotel. CCTV footage being a crucial piece of evidence, it is for the prosecution to have produced the best evidence which is missing. Omission to produce CCTV footage, in our view, which is the best evidence, raises serious doubts about the prosecution case.”

With regard to adverse presumption the Apex Court held in Tomaso Bruno as under:

  • “28. As per Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act, if a party in possession of best evidence which will throw light in controversy withholds it, the court can draw an adverse inference against him notwithstanding that the onus of proving does not lie on him. The presumption under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act is only a permissible inference and not a necessary inference. Unlike presumption under Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act, where the court has no option but to draw statutory presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.”

Non examination of the best person as a witness was also taken seriously by our Apex Court in Jagga Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 135, observing that ‘the best evidence having not been brought on record’ the it would not be justified, ‘to hold that it was the appellant who had done the mischief’.

In Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 4 SCC 522 also the Apex Court found fault for making no attempt to examine material witnesses and observed that the best evidence which would have been thrown light on the controversy in question was withheld.

Need for placing best evidence in cases of circumstantial evidence is emphasised in Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 2019 SC 1 also.

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