What is Sec. 27 Evidence Act -Recovery or Discovery?

  • Should the Object be Recovered‘ from the Concealed ‘Place?
  • Answer – No.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam & Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract

  • 1. Sec. 27 says Only as to Discovery; Not Recovery.
  • 2. Sec. 27 – Discovery Embraces (i) Place from where the Object Produced and (ii) Knowledge of Accused.
  • 3. No Witnesses needed for Recording Accused’s Statement u/s 27.
  • 4. Contra-Observation in Subramanya v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2022 SC 5110, is Only Obiter.

Section 27 of the Evidence Act

Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads-

  • “27. How much of information received from accused may be proved. Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”

Section 27 is Not Artistically Worded

The Privy Council, in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King ­Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, (the ‘Best Known and Most Authoritative Decision’ in this subject, as shown below) observed that the Section 27 was not artistically worded. It is because of the hardheadedness of the following expressions:

  • 1. “Any fact is deposed to as discovered” – Who deposed; and where?
  • 2. “Fact discovered” – What are the facts embraced (or that may be attracted)?

Any fact is deposed to as discovered Refers to Facts Deposed to by Police Officer Before the Court (as Disclosed by the Accused)

  • In Sunil @ Chunnan v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 Crimes 1, after quoting Sec. 27, Evd. Act, it was observed as under:
  • “Therefore what is substantive evidence is the disclosure statement deposed to by the investigating officer in court and not what he had extracted in the seizure mahazar.”

Fact discoveredembraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this

The classic Privy Council verdict, Pulukuri Kotayya v. King ­Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, made it clear, as regards the concealment of a knife, as under-

  • “In their Lordships’ view it is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge; and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. If the statement of the accused contains the words ‘with which I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.”

Pulukuri  Kottaya – Best Known and Most Authoritative (Locus Classicus) Decision

In Ramanand @ Nandlal Bharti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2022 SC 5273, Supreme Court of India pointed out that the scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act were illuminatingly stated in Pulukuri  Kottaya v. Emperor that it has become locus classicus on this subject.

Pulukuri Kotayya v. King ­Emperor – Analysed

Pulukuri Kotayya v. King ­Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, on analysis, states the following-

  • It is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” as equivalent to the object produced.
  • The fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced (Note – Not ‘recovered’) and the knowledge of the accused as to this.
  • The information given must relate distinctly to this fact (place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this).
  • Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered.
  • Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife; (because) knives were discovered many years ago.
  • (But, Sec. 27 is attracted, because) it leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge;
  • and if the knife is proved (in Court) to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant.

There must have evidence to show the ‘concealment’

It is beyond doubt that there must have evidence (other than the mere confession of the accused) to show the ‘concealment’ of the object in the place it was said to have hidden (when it is not recovered from there); for, the Sec. 27 itself says as to ‘discovery’ of a ‘fact‘.

Significance of the “Place from which the object is produced

Pulukuri Kotayya v. King ­Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 says that the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced. The word produced is used purposefully.

Because-

  • From Pulukuri Kotayya v. King ­Emperor, it is clear –
    • even if the knife was discovered many years ago,
    • when the discovery of the fact that the knife was concealed in the house of the informant (to his knowledge) is proved (afterwards) under Sec. 27 Evd. Act,
    • it is relevant and admissible.

The Object Need Not be Recovered from Concealed place, under Law in India

From Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, it is clear that the words,

  • “the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced” (as used in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King)

cannot be equated, always, as-

  • “the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is recovered“.

True, in most cases where Sec. 27 is attracted, the relevant place may be the place from which the object is recovered. Referring Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, it is seen observed in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1293, as under:

  • “It is now well settled that the discovery of fact referred to in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not the object recovered but the fact embraces the place from which the object is recovered and the knowledge of the accused as to it.” (quoted in State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar, AIR 2002 SC 16.)

But, the proposition that the object (as such) must have been recovered from the place where the accused concealed it is against the law accepted in India. That is, there may be cases where the place of recovery of the object and the place relevant under Sec. 27 may be different.

It can be demonstrated by an Illustration

  • An accused buried and hided certain material objects in a place.
  • Some how or other (say, because of the acts of certain animal) those articles were taken out and placed in a far away ‘public place’. The investigating officer ‘recovers’ it.
  • After arrest of the accused, thereafter, the accused reveals, to the I.O, the place the material objects were actually concealed by him.
  • The I.O. caused to make a scientific examination. It is proved (discovered) that the material objects were buried in the place, as ‘disclosed’ by the accused.
  • In such a circumstance, the fact discovered (Place and Knowledge of the accused) falls under Sec. 27 (though no material object as such, is “recovered” from that place).

Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor is Consistently Considered as the Authority

In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1293, it was pointed out that the principles in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, was followed in-

  • K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788,
  • Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra, (1969)2 SCC 872,
  • Earabhadrappa @ Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 SCC 330,
  • Shamshul Kanwar v. State of U.P., (1995) 4 SCC 430,
  • State of Rajasthan v. Bhup Singh, (1997) 10 SCC 675.

Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, is the most read and mot valuable decision on Sec. 27, Evd. Act. It is consistently considered as the authority in this subject, as revealed from the following Apex Court decisions also-

  • Boby v. State of Kerala, 2023-1 Ker LT 543 (SC),
  • Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, AIR 2022 SC 3627
  • Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, (SC), 2022 April, 19
  • Kusal Topo v. State of Jharkhand,2019-13 SCC 676,
  • Asar Mohammed v. State of UP, AIR 2018 SC 5264,
  • Charandas Swami v. State of Gujrat, AIR 2017 SC 1761,
  • Vasanth Sampath State of Maharashtra, 2015-1 SCC 253,
  • C. Muniappan v. State of TN, AIR 2010 SC 3718,
  • Limbaji v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 491

Sec. 27 is an Exception to Sec. 25 and 26

Sec. 27 is an exception to the two preceding sections, Sec. 25 and 26. They are as to-

  • No confession made to a Police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence (Sec. 25).
  • No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a Police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person (Sec. 26).

Sec. 162 CrPC is also relevant here. It says as to-

  • No statement made by any person to a police-officer in the course of an investigation be used for any purpose at any inquiry or trial (except for contradiction under Sec. 145 Evd. Act).

If “place” is already known, and not exclusively in knowledge of Accused, No Sec. 27 Recovery

It is trite law, as shown in recent decisions of our Apex Court, Subramanya v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2022 SC 5110,  and Boby v. State of Kerala, 2023-1 Ker LT 543, that Sec. 27 would not be attracted if the recovery was from a place which was already known and not exclusively within the knowledge of accused.

“Any object can be ‘concealed’ in places which are open or accessible to others”

In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1293, it is pointed out that it may be possible to hide articles in a place ‘open or accessible to others’. It is said, “For Example, if the article is buried on the main roadside or if it is concealed beneath dry leaves lying on public places or kept hidden in a public office, the article would remain out of the visibility of others in normal circumstances.” (Quoted in- Ibrahim Musa Chauhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2013-13 SCC 689; Lochan Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2022 SC 252.)

Credibility of the Investigating Officer, Important

But, in several cases it is emphasised that the credibility of the evidence of the investigating officer was really important (See- Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq v. State (NCT) of Delhi, (2011) 13 SCC 621, Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash, AIR 1972 SC 975.)

Failure to Record Information of the Accused, Not Fatal

It was pointed out in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420, that failure to record the information given by the accused and failure to examine public witnesses, are not fatal to the prosecution.

Exact Statement of the Accused must be deposed by the Police Officer

Courts in India insists (unduly?) that the exact disclosure statement of the accused should be stated by the police officer, in the “Recovery Mahazar” and before the court. In Subramanya v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2022 SC 5110, it is observed as under:

  • 83. The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence of all the aforesaid prosecution witnesses is that none of them have deposed the exact statement said to have been made by the appellant herein which ultimately led to the discovery of a fact relevant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

Accused’s Statement under Section 27 Need Not be in the presence of witnesses

In Praveen Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 12 SCC 199, our Apex Court held that Section 27 does not lay down that the statement made to a Police Officer should always be in the presence of independent witnesses. It reads-

  • “21. Section 27 does not lay down that the statement made to a Police Officer should always be in the presence of independent witnesses. Normally in cases where the evidence led by the prosecution as to a fact depends solely on the Police witnesses, the courts seek corroboration as a matter of caution and not as a matter of rule. Thus it is only a rule of prudence which makes the court to seek corroboration from independent source, in such cases while assessing the evidence of Police. But in cases where the court is satisfied that the evidence of the Police can be independently relied upon then in such cases there is no prohibition in law that the same cannot be accepted without independent corroboration. In the instant case nothing is brought on record to show why evidence of PW-33 I.O. should be disbelieved in regard to the statement made by the accused as per Ex. P-35. Therefore, the argument that statement of the appellant as per Ex.P-35 should be rejected because the same is not made in the presence of independent witness has to be rejected.”
  • Also see- State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh: AIR 1999 SC 1293.

In Nisar Khan @ Guddu v. State of Uttaranchal, (2006) 9 SCC 386, it was held that the discovery statement and the recovery memo need not bear the signature of the accused.

Subramanya v. State – Witnesses needed for Accused’s Information, Only Obiter

Subramanya v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2022 SC 5110, reads as under:

  • 84. If, it is say of the investigating officer that the accused appellant while in custody on his own free will and volition made a statement that he would lead to the place where he had hidden the weapon of offence, the site of burial of the dead body, clothes etc., then the first thing that the investigating officer should have done was to call for two independent witnesses at the police station itself. Once the two independent witnesses would arrive at the police station thereafter in their presence the accused should be asked to make an appropriate statement as he may desire in regard to pointing out the place where he is said to have hidden the weapon of offence etc. When the accused while in custody makes such statement before the two independent witnesses (panch­-witnesses) the exact statement or rather the exact words uttered by the accused should be incorporated in the first part of the panchnama that the investigating officer may draw in accordance with law. This first part of the panchnama for the purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is always drawn at the police station in the presence of the independent witnesses so as to lend credence that a particular statement was made by the accused expressing his willingness on his own free will and volition to point out the place where the weapon of offence or any other article used in the commission of the offence had been hidden. Once the first part of the panchnama is completed thereafter the police party along with the accused and the two independent witnesses (panch­ witnesses) would proceed to the particular place as may be led by the accused. If from that particular place anything like the weapon of offence or blood stained clothes or any other article is discovered then that part of the entire process would form the second part of the panchnama. This is how the law expects the investigating officer to draw the discovery panchnama as contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. If we read the entire oral evidence of the investigating officer then it is clear that the same is deficient in all the aforesaid relevant aspects of the matter.” (It is quoted and followed by the Apex Court in Boby v. State of Kerala, 2023-1 Ker LT 543).
    • Note: In Praveen Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 12 SCC 199, our Apex Court held that Section 27 does not lay down that the statement made to a Police Officer should always be in the presence of independent witnesses.

In any case, the observation in Subramanya v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2022 SC 5110 – ‘when the accused while in custody makes such statement before the two independent witnesses (panch-­witnesses)’, is only obiter; in view of the earlier observation in the judgment, which reads as under:

  • “The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence of all the aforesaid prosecution witnesses is that none of them have deposed the exact statement said to have been made by the appellant herein which ultimately led to the discovery of a fact relevant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.”

Conclusion

Law must be specific and accurate. If not, those who enforce it, may be free to handle it according to their speculation.

It is really disgraceful to continue Section 27 of the Evidence Act, in its present tough-and-rough form, without change, in spite of the observation of the Privy Council, in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King ­Emperor as early as in 1947 that it was not artistically worded.


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