Seesaw of Supreme Court in NN Global Mercantile v. Indo Unique Flame

Stamp Act v. Arbitration Act

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Abstract

•➧ In NN Global Mercantile v Indo Unique Flame, (2023) 7 SCC 1, Five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, held (on 25. 4. 2023) – if an arbitration agreement was not sufficiently stamped it could not be sent for Arbitration (by a court).
•➧  Seven Judge Bench of the Apex Court, in a ‘curative petition‘, on December 13, 2023, held – sufficiency of stamp could not be a subject for the Court.
•➧  It was laid down – the objections as to insufficiency of stamp lies in the domain or ambit of the Arbitral Tribunal.

The Seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held-

  • Defect on non-stamping of a document is curable.
  • Such a document is not void (though “inadmissible” under Sec. 35 of the Stamp Act)
  • The courts, only examine whether the arbitration agreement “prima facie exists (under Sec. 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act)
  • The objection as to non-stamping fall within the ambit of the arbitral tribunal (Sec. 16) 

Reference to Seven-Judge Bench

The Five Judge Bench decision in NN Global Mercantile v Indo Unique Flame, (2023) 7 SCC 1,  was placed before the  Seven Judge Bench, in a ‘curative petition’, considering the “larger ramifications and consequences” (within the shortest time?).

Findings of the Seven-Judge Bench – on Stamp Act, in Nutshell

  • The Stamp Act is a fiscal statute only.
  • The Act itself provided for curing defects on non-stamping.
  • Hence such unstamped agreements are not void.

Findings of the Seven-Judge Bench – on Arbitration Act, in Nutshell

  • The Arbitration Act provided for minimum judicial interference.
  • Arbitration Act is a self-contained code.
  • It provides for the separability of the arbitration agreement from the main contract.
  • Arbitral tribunals had jurisdiction to determine the limits of their own jurisdiction. Thereby, the Arbitral Tribunal can decide “the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement“.
  • Harmonious interpretation of  Stamp Act and Arbitration Act is needed, for-
    • The Arbitration Act, a comprehensive legal code.
    • It is a “special” statute.
    • It did not specify stamping as a pre-condition of a valid arbitration agreement.
    • It requires courts to confine at the referral stage to examination of the existence of arbitration agreement.

The Seven Judge Bench highly relied on Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which declares the competence of arbitration tribunal to determine the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement .

The Supreme Court has overruled Earlier Decisions

  • NN Global Mercantile v. Indo Unique Flame, (2023) 7 SCC 1
  • SMS Tea Estates v. Chandmari Tea Co, (2011) 14 SCC 66
  • Garware Wall Ropes v. Coastal Marine Constructions, (2019) 9 SCC 209

These (earlier) decisions held –

  • Existence of a valid arbitration agreement (with sufficient stamp) was necessary, for ‘reference to arbitrator’ under Sec. 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
  • These decisions relied, mainly, on Sec. 8(1) which reads as under:
    • “A judicial authority …. shall … refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.”

FINDINGS OF THE APEX COURT

Non-Stamping Does Not Render a Document Invalid or Nonexistent.

  • “194. The interpretation accorded to the Stamp Act by this Court in the present judgment does not allow the law to be flouted. The arbitral tribunal continues to be bound by the provisions of the Stamp Act, including those relating to its impounding and admissibility. The interpretation of the law in this judgment ensures that the provisions of the Arbitration Act are given effect to while not detracting from the purpose of the Stamp Act. 195. The interests of revenue are not jeopardised in any manner because the duty chargeable must be paid before the agreement in question is rendered admissible and the lis between the parties adjudicated. The question is at which stage the agreement would be impounded and not whether it would be impounded at all. The courts are not abdicating their duty but are instead giving effect to:
    • a. The principle of minimal judicial intervention in Section 5 of the Arbitration Act;
    • b. The prima facie standard applicable to Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act; and
    • c. The purpose of the Stamp Act which is to protect the interests of revenue and not arm litigants with a weapon of technicality by which they delay the adjudication of the lis.
    • d. The interpretation of the law must give effect to the purpose of the Arbitration Act in addition to the Stamp Act.” (emphasis in original).

Referral Court Not to Impound Unstamped Instrument

The Apex Court held as under:

  • “218. The discussion in preceding segments indicates that the referral court at Section 11 stage should not examine or impound an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument, but rather leave it for the determination by the arbitral tribunal. When a party produces an arbitration agreement or its certified copy, the referral court only has to examine whether an arbitration agreement exists in terms of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. The referral court under Section 11 is not required to examine whether a certified copy of the agreement/ instrument/ contract discloses the fact of payment of stamp duty on the original. Accordingly, we hold that the holding of this Court in SMS Tea Estate (supra), as reiterated in N N Global 2 (supra), is no longer valid in law.”

Conclusions of the Apex Court

The Apex Court held further as under:

“224. The conclusions reached in this judgment are summarised below:

  • Agreements which are not stamped or are inadequately stamped are inadmissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. Such agreements are not rendered void or void ab initio or unenforceable;
  • b. Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect;
  • c. An objection as to stamping does not fall for determination under Sections 8 or 11 of the Arbitration Act. The concerned court must examine whether the arbitration agreement prima facie exists;
  • d. Any objections in relation to the stamping of the agreement fall within the ambit of the arbitral tribunal; and
  • e. The decision in NN Global 2 (supra) and SMS Tea Estates (supra) are overruled. Paragraphs 22 and 29 of Garware Wall Ropes (supra) are overruled to that extent.”

End Notes

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Sec. 7, 8 and 16

7. Arbitration agreement.

  • In this Part, “arbitration agreement” means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.
  • An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.
  • An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.
  • An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in
    • (a) a document signed by the parties;
    • (b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication including communication through electronic means which provide a record of the agreement; or
    • (c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.
  • The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract.

8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.

  • (1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.
  • (2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof:
    • Provided that where the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy thereof is not available with the party applying for reference to arbitration under sub-section (1), and the said agreement or certified copy is retained by the other party to that agreement, then, the party so applying shall file such application along with a copy of the arbitration agreement and a petition praying the Court to call upon the other party to produce the original arbitration agreement or its duly certified copy before that Court.
  • (3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.

16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction

  • (1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and for that purpose,–
  • an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract; and
  • a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.

(2) Where an award is remitted under sub- section (1) the Court shall fix the time within which the arbitrator or umpire shall submit his decision to the Court: Provided that any time so fixed may be extended by subsequent order of the Court.

(3) An award remitted under sub- section (1) shall become void on the failure of the arbitrator or umpire to reconsider it and submit his decision within the time fixed.

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Major Changes in the Evidence Act by Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Major Changes are made in Three Facets

They are in –

  • (i) Status of Documents and Electronic Evidence
  • (ii) Sec. 65B (Electronic Records) of the Evidence Act.
  • (iii) Sec. 27 (Recovery/Discovery on confession by accused before Police) of the Evidence Act and
ReadBNSS – Major Changes from CrPC
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Important Changes from the Indian Penal Code

Part I

Documents and Electronic Evidence

Following are the Major changes made in the new Bharatia Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, as regards ‘Documents’(when compared to Indian Evidence Act, 1872).

Changes in the Definition

Abstract:

  • It is made clear – Electronic Evidence is included in the category of ‘Documentary Evidence’.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872Bharatia Sakshya Act, 2023
Sec. 3. Interpretation-clause. “Document”. –– “Document” means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter.
Illustrations
A writing is a document; Words printed lithographed or photographed are documents; A map or plan is a document; An inscription on a metal plate or stone is a document; A caricature is a document.
Sec. 2(1) In this Adhiniyam, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(d) “document” means any matter expressed or described or otherwise recorded upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or any other means or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter and includes electronic and digital records. 
Illustrations.
(i) A writing is a document.
(ii) Words printed, lithographed or photographed are documents.
(iii) A map or plan is a document.
(iv) An inscription on a metal plate or stone is a document.
(v) A caricature is a document. 
(vi) An electronic record on emails, server logs, documents on computers, laptop or smartphone, messages, websites, locational evidence and voice mail messages stored on digital devices are documents;
Sec. 3. Interpretation-clause. “Evidence”. ––“Evidence” means and includes ––
(1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence;
(2) all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court; such documents are called documentary evidence.
Sec. 2(1) In this Adhiniyam, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(e) “evidence” means and includes—
(i) all statements including statements given electronically which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters of fact under inquiry and such statements are called oral evidence;
(ii) all documents including electronic or digital records produced for the inspection of the Court and such documents are called documentary evidence;

Under the Indian Evidence Act, electronic evidence could have been taken as a third category of ‘evidence’, other than ‘oral’ and ‘documentary’ evidences. It is more so in view of the interpretation given to Sec. 65B by the Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216. In this decision it was said that Electronic Evidence is (specially) dealt with “notwithstanding anything contained” in the Act.

By virtue of the definitions in the new act, it is made clear – Electronic Evidence is included in the ‘Documentary Evidence’. It is definite that it is with a view to expand the scope of the application of Electronic Records in evidence.

Changes on Primary Evidence – Electronic Records are also Included in the category, Primary Evidence

Abstract:

  • (i) electronic record that is stored in another electronic devise along with that in the ‘creating’ devise; and
  • (ii) video recordings (a) simultaneously stored in electronic form and (b) broadcasted.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872Bharatia Sakshya Act, 2023
62. Primary evidence. –– Primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court.
Explanation 1. ––Where a document is executed in several parts, each part is primary evidence of the document. Where a document is executed in counterpart, each counterpart being executed by one or some of the parties only, each counterpart is primary evidence as against the parties executing it.
Explanation 2. –– Where a number of documents are all made by one uniform process, as in the case of printing, lithography or photography, each is primary evidence of the contents of the rest; but, where they are all copies of a common original, they are not primary evidence of the contents of the original.
57. Primary evidence Primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court.
Explanation 1.—Where a document is executed in several parts, each part is primary evidence of the document.
Explanation 2.—Where a document is executed in counterpart, each counterpart being executed by one or some of the parties only, each counterpart is primary evidence as against the parties executing it.
Explanation 3.—Where a number of documents are all made by one uniform process, as in the case of printing, lithography or photography, each is primary evidence of the contents of the rest; but, where they are all copies of a common original, they are not primary evidence of the contents of the original.
Explanation 4.—Where an electronic or digital record is created or stored, and such storage occurs simultaneously or sequentially in multiple files, each such file is primary evidence.
Explanation 5.—Where an electronic or digital record is produced from proper custody, such electronic and digital record is primary evidence unless it is disputed.
Explanation 6.—Where a video recording is simultaneously stored in electronic form and transmitted or broadcast or transferred to another, each of the stored recordings is primary evidence.
Explanation 7.—Where an electronic or digital record is stored in multiple storage spaces in a computer resource, each such automated storage, including temporary files, is primary evidence.

The scope of application of Electronic Records in evidence is further expanded by the Additional Explanations 4 to 7 in Sec. 57 (as to ‘Primary Evidence’). Major changes having practical importance are the following:

  • Under Explanation 4, electronic or digital record that is stored in an electronic devise, simultaneously(or sequentially in multiple files) with that in the ‘creating’ devise, is also taken as ‘primary evidence’.
    • Core-computer system in Banks and storing in ‘iCloud’ etc. are good examples for such storage.
  • Sixth explanation has also wider application. As is clear from the explanation, video recordings (a) simultaneously stored in electronic form and (b) transmitted or broadcasted can also be taken as primary evidence.
  • Explanation 5 renders a rider. Production of electronic or digital record from proper custody (unless it is disputed) is to be treated as ‘primary evidence’.
    • Admission of electronic record contained in a stolen devise seized from the custody of accused is a good example for it.

Scope of Secondary Evidence also Expanded

Abstract:

  • Oral and written admissions, as well as the evidence of ‘skilled persons’, are added in the list of Secondary Evidence.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872Bharatia Sakshya Act, 2023
63. Secondary evidence. –– Secondary evidence means and includes ––
(1) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained;
(2) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies;
(3) copies made from or compared with the original;
(4) counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them;
(5) oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it.
58. Secondary evidence Secondary evidence includes—
(i) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained;
(ii) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves ensure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies;
(iii) copies made from or compared with the original;
(iv) counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them;
(v) oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it;
(vi) oral admissions;
(vii) written admissions;
(viii) evidence of a person who has examined a document, the original of which consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.

The new clauses in Sec. 58, that speaks about Secondary Evidence, also show the legislative intent of liberalization in evidence in legal proceedings. Certificates and Reports of ‘skilled persons’ (as regards the documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court) are added in the list of Secondary Evidence.

Part II

Changes made to Sec. 65A & 65B (Electronic Records) in Evidence Act

Sec. 61, a New Provision

Abstract:

  • It widened the scope of admissibility of Computer output. It permits to invoke other provisions of the Act also to prove secondary evidence of Electronic Record (other than Sec. 63, old 65B).
Indian Evidence Act, 1872Bharatia Sakshya Act, 2023
    (No specific provision in the Act)61. Electronic or digital record.  Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital record and such record shall, subject to section 63, have the same legal effect, validity and enforceability as other document.

Importance of this New Provision

The words in the new Sec. 61, “Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility” has great significance. It is made to expand the scope of admissibility of Electronic Evidence.

The non-obstante clause (‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’) in Sec. 65B (Sec. 63, BSA) is capable of giving two (divergent) interpretations –

  • First, Sec. 65B (Sec. 63, BSA) is an enabling provision to admit ‘computer output’ (derived from original)  as ‘document’ itself, in a simpler manner, by the deeming provision (“shall be deemed to be also a document”) notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’. That is, computer output (copy) can also be proved by any other manner provided for proving any other document.
  • Second, a computer output (copy) can be proved only under the provisions of Sec. 65 B, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’. (It is the view taken by the Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao,  2020-3 SCC 216.)

The words in the new Sec. 61, “Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility” makes an emphatic delineation of the legislative intent on the following two matters –

  • 1. Sec. 65B (Sec. 63, BSA) is an enabling provision to admit ‘computer output’ (copy)  by the  deeming provision notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’.
  • 2. The interpretation given to Sec. 65B that a ‘computer output (copy) can be proved only’ under the provisions of Sec. 65B,  ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’(the view taken in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, 2023 SCC 216), is not accepted by the legislature.
    •  “Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility” applies to Sec. 63 also. Therefore, the interpretation given in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, 2023 SCC 216, will not remain in force.
  • Subject to Section 63
    • The words, “subject to section 63” (BSA), in Section 61 (BSA), denotes two things-
    • 1. Sec. 61 covers Sec. 63 also. That is, Sec. 61 is not confined to (original) ‘electronic record’; but it covers ‘computer output’ (copy) also.
    • 2. To avoid a misinterpretation – that Sec. 61 is independent of Sec. 63 which directs to comply with certain requirements to accept ‘computer output’ (copy) (that is production of Sec. 63(4) certificate and HASH certificate etc.) one opts to prove ‘computer output’ (copy) under the provisions of Sec. 63.

Note: 1. If this interpretation is not given, Sec. 61 stands meaningless.

Note: 2. This interpretation is also necessary to give effect to the legislative intent (liberalization of evidence).

Note: 3. Invoking Sec. 61, a copy taken in a CD or pen-drive (which is obviously ‘made by mechanical processes which in itself insure the accuracy’) can be given in evidence, with the oral evidence to the effect that it is the copy taken from the Electronic Record (original). Now, because of Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, 2023 SCC 216, we cannot give evidence in this manner; for, according to Arjun Panditrao ‘computer output (copy) can be proved only’ under the provisions of Sec. 65B, that is with the “Sec. 65B Certificate” (‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’).

Changes to Sec. 65A and 65B

Abstract:

  • No substantial change to Sec. 65A.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872Bharatia Sakshya Act, 2023
65A. Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record. –– The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B.62. Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record. The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of section 63.

No material change is made by this new provision which stands as an introductory provision to Sec. 63.

Abstract of changes to Sec. 65B:

  • Sec. 63 read with Sec. 61 (BSA) allows to prove the copy or print-out of an electronic record invoking other provisions of the Sakshya Act, also.
  • Mandatory requirement of HASH certificate is introduced.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872Bharatia Sakshya Act, 2023
65BAdmissibility of electronic records – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:–
(a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer;
(b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
(c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
(d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
(3) Where over any period, the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by computers, whether–
(a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
(b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
(c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or
(d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers
,

all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
(4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say, —
(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate,
and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this subsection it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.
(5) For the purposes of this section,
(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment; —
(b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any official, information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities;
(c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.
Explanation. — For the purposes of this section any reference to information being derived from other information shall be a reference to its being derived therefrom by calculation, comparison or any other process  
63. Admissibility of electronic records –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:—
(a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer or communication device during the period over which the computer was used regularly to create, store or process information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer or communication device;
(b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
(c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer or communication device was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
(d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
(3) Where over any period, the function of creating, storing or processing information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by means of one or more computers or communication device, whether—
(a) in standalone mode; or
(b) on a computer system; or
(c) on a computer network; or
(d) on a computer resource enabling information-creation or providing information—processing and storage; or
(e) through an intermediary
a
ll the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
(4) In any proceeding where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things shall be submitted along with the electronic record at each instance where it is being submitted for admission, namely:—
(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication device referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3);
 (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.
 (5) For the purposes of this section,—
(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer or communication device if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
(b) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer or communication device whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment or by other electronic means as referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3).

Changes made to Sec. 65B

The proposed Bhartiya Sakshya Act, 2023 introduces significant changes in Sec. 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It updates Sec. 65B, as under:

  • Now, under Sec. 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, copy or print-out of an electronic record can be proved only by producing the certificate provided under Sec. 65B(4), in view of the Supreme Court decision in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, 2020-3 SCC 216.  
  • The proposed Bhartiya Sakshya Act, 2023, (Sec. 63 read with Sec, 61) allows to prove the copy or print-out of an electronic record invoking other provisions of the Evidence Act (such as Sec. 63 and 65 IEA = Sec. 58 and 60 BSA) that permits to prove a secondary evidence (copy) of a document.
  • If  a computer output (copy) is sought to be proved invoking Sec. 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Act, 2023, the “certificate (HASH) specified in the Schedule” is necessary. It is to be produced “along with the electronic record” also.

A Discordant Note

The Certificate required in Sec. 63(4)(c) of the new Act must be “in the form specified in the Schedule”. It appears that this certificate is needed in addition to the Certificate that is required in sub-section (4) as regards the matters enumerated therein; or the Certificate should contain (additionally) the matters enumerated in sub-section (4).

The Form in the Schedule directs to state as under:

  • “I state that the HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s is …… ……… …… , obtained through the following algorithm –
  • SHA1:
  • SHA256:
  • MD5:
  • Other …….. …….. …….. (Legally acceptable standard)
  • (Hash report to be enclosed with the certificate)”

The requirement for this certificate is unnecessary, especially in situations where there is no dispute regarding the computer output (copy or print-out). It may be more feasible for many litigants to bring the original device, such as a computer, laptop, or mobile phone, to court than to get the HASH value fixed through an expert.

  • Note: Hash value is needed/possible in electronic evidence alone.

What is HASH value (in simplest terms)?

  • HASH value is a string of unique characters, usually represented by letters and numbers.
  • It is a scientific method (algorithm) commonly used to find out tampering, if any, on an electronic record.
  • HASH value of every electronic record can be fixed.
  • Any modification or change made thereto – no matter how small, even addition of a comma (,) – will result in a completely different hash value.

Part III

Changes made in Sec. 27 (Recovery/Discovery)

Abstract:

  • Sec. 25, 26 and 27 of IEA are consolidated to one section.
  • The word “thereby” in Sec. 27 is removed.
Section 25, 26 and 27, Indian Evidence ActSection 23, Bhartiya Sakshya Act
25. Confession to police officer not to be proved. –– No confession made to a police-officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.
26. Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him. –– No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a policeofficer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.
Explanation.––In this section “Magistrate” does not include the head of a village discharging magisterial functions in the Presidency of Fort St. George or elsewhere, unless such headman is a Magistrate exercising the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 18827 (10 of 1882).
27. How much of information received from accused may be proved. –– Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered inconsequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
23. Confession to police officer.  
(1) No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.  

(2) No confession made by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate shall be proved against him:  

Provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered, may be proved

The proposed Bhartiya Sakshya Act, 2023 introduces two significant changes in Sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Changes in the New Act (Made to Sec. 27, IEA)

First –

  • Now, from the words of Sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is clear (i) what is to be proved by Sec. 27 is the fact deposed by the Investigating Officer in court; and (ii) it must be as to the ‘discovery’ on ‘information’ (or disclosure) from the accused.
  • From the words of Sec. 27 of the Evidence Act, it could be shown or argued (though not correct) that the fact ‘discovered’ embraces (a) the “recovery” (b) of the “object” (c) in the immediate presence of the accused – to have it “in consequence of (his) information”.
  • The possibility of these (incorrect) arguments are averted by removing the word “thereby” in Section 27 (in the proviso to Section 23 of the new Bhartiya Sakshya Act).

Second –

  • Now, the Sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act begins with a ‘Proviso’.
  • This impropriety is removed by clubbing Section 25, 26 and 27 (of the Indian Evidence Act) in the new  Bhartiya Sakshya Act (in Sec. 23).

A Discordant Note

  • Now, under Sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. But, if it falls under Sec. 27 (that is, if it leads to a discovery as provided in Sec. 27), it can be proved.
  • Though Section 25 is retained in the new Bhartiya Sakshya Act, 2023, under Sec. 23(1), the proviso is not made applicable to the Section, 23(1).
  • Note: 1. The proviso is limited (or made applicable) to subsection (2) of Section 23 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Act (alone) – See the colon (:) at the end of subsection (2).
  • Note: 2. It appears to be a mistake in drafting the section; because,
    • (i) Sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act is a general provision which governs Sec. 26 also; and Sec. 27 applies to both Sec. 25 and 26;
    • (ii) but, the proviso in Sec. 23 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Act is made applicable to Sec. 23(2) alone, and not to Sec. 23(1); thereby the vigor of Sec. 23(1) prevails – without being governed by the Proviso to Section 23(2);
    • (iii) and, in such a case, Section 23(2) of the Bhartiya Sakshya Act, cannot work at all, inasmuch as Sec. 23(1) makes a total bar – “No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence”.  

Sec. 27 Indian Evidence Act (Proviso to Sec. 23 Bhartiya Sakshya Act) Analysed

Who has to “depose” – It is by the police officer, and before the court. 

What is to be Deposed – It is the fact he discovered as disclosed by the accused.

As Discovered” (in consequence of information from accused)

  • It is the fact deposed to (as disclosed by the accused) by the police officer before the court. It should have been ‘discovered’ from the “Place of Concealment”.

Fact discovered‘ embraces Place of Concealment and Knowledge of Accused

The classic Privy Council verdict, Pulukuri Kotayya v. King ­Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, consistently followed by the courts in India, made it clear, as regards the concealment of a knife, as under-

  • “In their Lordships’ view it is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge; and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. If the statement of the accused contains the words ‘with which I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.”

‘Fact Discovered’ is the “Place to the Knowledge of the Accused”

From Pulukuri Kotayya v. King ­Emperor it is clear –

  • Even if the knife was discovered many years ago,
  • if the fact that the knife was concealed in a place (to the knowledge of the accused) is discovered,
  • it is relelvent and admissible under Sec. 27 Evd. Act.

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Evidence Act – General

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Sec. 27 Recovery/Discovery in Evidence Act and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

Taken From: Major Changes in the Evidence Act by Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam,

Saji Koduvath & James Joseph, Advocates, Kottayam.

Section 25, 26 and 27, Indian Evidence ActSection 23, Bhartiya Sakshya Act
25. Confession to police officer not to be proved. –– No confession made to a police-officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.
26. Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him. –– No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a policeofficer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.
Explanation.––In this section “Magistrate” does not include the head of a village discharging magisterial functions in the Presidency of Fort St. George or elsewhere, unless such headman is a Magistrate exercising the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 18827 (10 of 1882).
27. How much of information received from accused may be proved. –– Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered inconsequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
23. Confession to police officer.  
(1) No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.  

(2) No confession made by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate shall be proved against him:  

Provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered, may be proved

Introduction

The proposed Bhartiya Sakshya Act, 2023 introduces two significant changes in Sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Changes in the New Act (Made to Sec. 27, IEA)

First –

  • Now, from the words of Sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is clear (i) what is to be proved by Sec. 27 is the fact deposed by the Investigating Officer in court; and (ii) it must be as to the ‘discovery’ on ‘information’ (or disclosure) from the accused.
  • From the words of Sec. 27 of the Evidence Act, it could be shown or argued (though not correct) that the fact ‘discovered’ embraces (a) the “recovery” (b) of the “object” (c) in the immediate presence of the accused – to have it “in consequence of (his) information”.
  • The possibility of these (incorrect) arguments are averted by removing the word “thereby” in Section 27 (in the proviso to Section 23 of the new Bhartiya Sakshya Act).

Second –

  • Now, the Sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act begins with a ‘Proviso’.
  • This impropriety is removed by clubbing Section 25, 26 and 27 (of the Indian Evidence Act) in the new  Bhartiya Sakshya Act (in Sec. 23).

A Discordant Note

  • Now, under Sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. But, if it falls under Sec. 27 (that is, if it leads to a discovery as provided in Sec. 27), it can be proved.
  • Though Section 25 is retained in the new Bhartiya Sakshya Act, 2023, under Sec. 23(1), the proviso is not made applicable to the Section, 23(1).
  • Note: 1. The proviso is limited (or made applicable) to subsection (2) of Section 23 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Act (alone) – See the colon (:) at the end of subsection (2).
  • Note: 2. It appears to be a mistake in drafting the section; because,
    • (i) Sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act is a general provision which governs Sec. 26 also; and Sec. 27 applies to both Sec. 25 and 26;
    • (ii) but, the proviso in Sec. 23 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Act is made applicable to Sec. 23(2) alone, and not to Sec. 23(1); thereby the vigor of Sec. 23(1) prevails – without being governed by the Proviso to Section 23(2);
    • (iii) and, in such a case, Section 23(2) of the Bhartiya Sakshya Act, cannot work at all, inasmuch as Sec. 23(1) makes a total bar – “No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence”.  

End Notes

Sec. 27 Indian Evidence Act (Proviso to Sec. 23 Bhartiya Sakshya Act) Analysed

Who has to “depose” – It is by the police officer, and before the court. 

What is to be Deposed – It is the fact he discovered as disclosed by the accused.

As Discovered” (in consequence of information from accused)

  • It is the fact deposed to (as disclosed by the accused) by the police officer before the court. It should have been ‘discovered’ from the “Place of Concealment”.

Fact discovered embraces Place of Concealment and Knowledge of Accused

The classic Privy Council verdict, Pulukuri Kotayya v. King ­Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, consistently followed by the courts in India, made it clear, as regards the concealment of a knife, as under-

  • “In their Lordships’ view it is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge; and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. If the statement of the accused contains the words ‘with which I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.”

‘Fact Discovered’ is the “Place to the Knowledge of the Accused”

From Pulukuri Kotayya v. King ­Emperor it is clear –

  • Even if the knife was discovered many years ago,
  • if the fact that the knife was concealed in a place (to the knowledge of the accused) is discovered,
  • it is relelvent and admissible under Sec. 27 Evd. Act.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Principles and Procedure

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Will

Arbitration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Sec. 65B (Electronic Records) and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

Taken From: Major Changes in the Evidence Act by Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam

Jojy George Koduvath & Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Section 65B, Indian Evidence ActSection 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Act
65B. Admissibility of electronic records – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:–
(a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer;
(b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
(c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
(d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
(3) Where over any period, the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by computers, whether–
(a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
(b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
(c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or
(d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more
combinations of computers,
all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
(4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say, —
(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate,
and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this subsection it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.
(5) For the purposes of this section,
(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment; —
(b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any official, information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities;
(c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.
Explanation. — For the purposes of this section any reference to information being derived from other information shall be a reference to its being derived therefrom by calculation, comparison or any other process.
63. Admissibility of electronic records –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:—
(a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer or communication device during the period over which the computer was used regularly to create, store or process information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer or communication device;
(b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
(c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer or communication device was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
(d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
(3) Where over any period, the function of creating, storing or processing information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by means of one or more computers or communication device, whether—
(a) in standalone mode; or
(b) on a computer system; or
(c) on a computer network; or
(d) on a computer resource enabling information-creation or providing information—processing and storage; or
(e) through an intermediary
all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
(4) In any proceeding where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things shall be submitted along with the electronic record at each instance where it is being submitted for admission, namely:—
(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication device referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3);
 (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.
 (5) For the purposes of this section,—
(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer or communication device if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
(b) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer or communication device whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment or by other electronic means as referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3).

Abstract

The proposed Bhartiya Sakshya Act, 2023 introduces significant changes as regards ‘Electronic Evidence’. It updates Sec. 65B .

One of the key requirements of the new Act is the production of a ‘HASH’ certificate to prove the copy or print-out (computer output). It is seen as introduced with a view to avert tampering. But it appears that this requirement is harsh and unwanted.

What are the Major Changes made in Section? 65B IEA?

  • Now, under Sec. 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, copy or print-out of an electronic record can be proved only by producing the certificate provided under Sec. 65B(4).  
  • The proposed Bhartiya Sakshya Act, 2023, allows to prove the copy or print-out of an electronic record invoking other provisions of the Evidence Act (such as Sec. 63 and 65 IEA = Sec. 58 and 60 BSA) that permits to prove a secondary evidence (copy) of a document.
  • If an electronic record is sought to be proved invoking Sec. 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Act, 2023, “the certificate specified in the Schedule” is necessary. It is to be produced “along with the electronic record”.

Other Major Changes in this regard, in the New Act

First – The existing Evidence Act contains three explanations alone while escribing ‘Primary Evidence’ in Sec. 62.

Explanation 4, 5, 6 and 7 are added in the new Sakshya Act, in the Sec. 57. It reads as under:

  • “57. Primary evidence
  • Primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court.
  • Explanation 1.—Where a document is executed in several parts, each part is primary evidence of the document.
  • Explanation 2.—Where a document is executed in counterpart, each counterpart being executed by one or some of the parties only, each counterpart is primary evidence as against the parties executing it.
  • Explanation 3.—Where a number of documents are all made by one uniform process, as in the case of printing, lithography or photography, each is primary evidence of the contents of the rest; but, where they are all copies of a common original, they are not primary evidence of the contents of the original.
  • Explanation 4.—Where an electronic or digital record is created or stored, and such storage occurs simultaneously or sequentially in multiple files, each such file is primary evidence.
  • Explanation 5.—Where an electronic or digital record is produced from proper custody, such electronic and digital record is primary evidence unless it is disputed.
  • Explanation 6.—Where a video recording is simultaneously stored in electronic form and transmitted or broadcast or transferred to another, each of the stored recordings is primary evidence.
  • Explanation 7.—Where an electronic or digital record is stored in multiple storage spaces in a computer resource, each such automated storage, including temporary files, is primary evidence.”

From Explanations 4, 5, 6 and 7 it is clear that the scope of primary evidence is widened.

Second – A new provision is made – Sec. 61, which stipulates that –

  • “61. Electronic or digital record – Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital record and such record shall, subject to section 63, have the same legal effect, validity and enforceability as other document.”

The words “nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility” in Sec. 61 are also made to expand the scope of admissibility of Electronic Evidence. The non-obstante clause in Sec. 65B is capable of giving two (divergent) interpretations –

  • First, Sec. 65B is an enabling provision to admit ‘computer output’ (derived from original)  as ‘document’ itself, in a simpler manner, by the deeming provision (“shall be deemed to be also a document”) notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’. That is, computer output (copy) can also be proved by any other manner provided for proving any other document.
  • Second, a computer output (copy) can be proved only under the provisions of Sec. 65 B, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’. (It is the view taken by the Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216.)

The words in the new Section 61, “Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility” has great significance. It is an emphatic delineation of the legislative intent on the following two matters –

  • 1. Sec. 65B is an enabling provision to admit ‘computer output’ (copy)  as a ‘document’ itself, in a simpler manner, by the deeming provision notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’, as stated above.
  • 2. The interpretation given to Sec. 65B that a ‘computer output (copy) can be proved only’ under the provisions of Sec. 65 B, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’, is not accepted by the legislature (that is the view taken by the Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216.)
    • The the words, “subject to section 63” in Section 61, only directs to undergo the requirements in Sec. 65B (that is production of Sec. 65B(4) certificate, and HASH certificate) to prove the Computer output, in case (or, only when) one opts to prove it under the provisions of Sec. 65B.

Note: If this interpretation is not given, Section 61 stands meaningless.

Methods to Prove Secondary Evidence (copy) in the BSA

HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s”

The Certificate required in Sec. 63(4)(c) of the new Act must be “in the form specified in the Schedule”. It appears that this certificate is needed in addition to the Certificate that is required in sub-section (4) as regards the matters enumerated therein; or the Certificate should contain (additionally) the matters enumerated in sub-section (4).

The Form in the Schedule directs to state as under:

  • “I state that the HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s is …… ……… …… , obtained through the following algorithm –
  • SHA1:
  • SHA256:
  • MD5:
  • Other …….. …….. …….. (Legally acceptable standard)
  • (Hash report to be enclosed with the certificate)”

A Discordant Notes

  • Hash Value Certificate: Mandatory or Merely Illustrative?
  • What is the purpose of ascertaining Hash Value of the Original?

The requirement for this certificate is unnecessary, especially in situations where there is no dispute regarding the computer output (copy or print-out). It may be more feasible for many litigants to bring the original device, such as a computer, laptop, or mobile phone, to court than to get the HASH value fixed through an expert.

Read Blog: Hash Value Certificate – Mandatory or Directory?

It is not clear –

  • (i) What is the precise purpose of ascertaining the hash value(s) of the (original) electronic or digital record?
    • Note: It appears that the hash value(s) of the original record are expected to be stated, rather than that of the copy (or “computer output”) actually produced before the court. This raises several questions, including: how is the court to verify the authenticity of the copy, if only the original’s HASH is referenced?
  • (ii) Why does the requirement of including hash value(s) appear only in the Schedule (certificate format) and not in the main body of Section 63 itself?

The lack of explicit mention in the section text also creates uncertainty about whether hash values are mandatory or merely illustrative of best practices.

END NOTE – 1

What is HASH value (in simplest terms)?

  • HASH value is a string of unique characters, usually represented by letters and numbers.
  • It is a scientific method (algorithm) commonly used to find out tampering, if any, on an electronic record.
  • HASH value of every electronic record can be fixed.
  • Any modification or change made thereto – no matter how small, even addition of a comma (,) – will result in a completely different hash value.

END NOTE – 2

Sections 58 to 63 of BSA read as under:

58. Secondary evidence – Secondary evidence includes—

  • .(i) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained;
  • (ii) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves ensure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies;
  • (iii) copies made from or compared with the original
  • (iv) counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them;
  • (v) oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it;
  • (vi) oral admissions;
  • (vii) written admissions;
  • (viii) evidence of a person who has examined a document, the original of which consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.
  • Illustrations.
    • .(a) A photograph of an original is secondary evidence of its contents, though the two have not been compared, if it is proved that the thing photographed was the original.
    • (b) A copy compared with a copy of a letter made by a copying machine is secondary evidence of the contents of the letter, if it is shown that the copy made by the copying machine was made from the original.
    • (c) A copy transcribed from a copy, but afterwards compared with the original, is secondary evidence; but the copy not so compared is not secondary evidence of the original, although the copy from which it was transcribed was compared with the original.
    • (d) Neither an oral account of a copy compared with the original, nor an oral account of a photograph or machine-copy of the original, is secondary evidence of the original.

59. Proof of documents by primary evidence – Documents shall be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereinafter mentioned

60. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents maybe given.

Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases, namely:–

  • .(a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power–
  • .(i) of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved; or
  • (ii) of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court; or
  • (iii) of any person legally bound to produce it,
  • and when, after the notice mentioned in section 64 such person does not produce it;
  • (b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;
  • (c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
  • (d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;
  • (e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74;
  • (f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Adhiniyam, or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence;
  • (g) when the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection.

Explanation.–For the purposes of–

  • clauses (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible;
  • clause (b), the written admission is admissible;
  • clause (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible;

61. Admissibility of electronic or digital record – Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital record and such record shall, subject to section 63, have the same legal effect, validity and enforceability as other document

62. Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record – The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of section 63.

63. Admissibility of electronic records –

  • .(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
  • (2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:—
    • .(a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer or communication device during the period over which the computer or Communication device was used regularly to create, store or process information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer or communication device;
    • (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer or Communication device in the ordinary course of the said activities;
    • (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer or communication device was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
    • (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer or Communication device in the ordinary course of the said activities.
  • (3) Where over any period, the function of creating, storing or processing information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by means of one or more computers or communication device, whether–
    • .(a) in standalone mode; or
    • (b) on a computer system; or
    • (c) on a computer network; or
    • (d) on a computer resource enabling information creation or providing information processing and storage; or
    • (e) through an intermediary,
  • all the computers or communication devices used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer or communication device; and references in this section to a computer or communication device shall be construed accordingly.
  • (4) In any proceeding where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things shall be submitted along with the electronic record at each instance where it is being submitted for admission, namely:–
    • .(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication device referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3);
    • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate,
    • and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.
  • (5) For the purposes of this section,—
    • .(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer or communication device if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
    • (b) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer or communication device whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment or by other electronic means as referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3).

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Principles and Procedure

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Will

Arbitration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Tenant at Sufferance in Indian Law

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Key Takeaways

  • What is Tenancy at Sufferance? – Tenancy at Sufferance is continuance of tenant after expiry of lease without the landlord’s permission or approval. (If it is with permission of landlord, it is ‘holding over’).
    • Possession of a ‘tenant at sufferance’ is unlawful, as it is after the extinction of a lawful title - as tenant (Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 140, 1995 -5 SCC 698).
    • Still, it is recognised as juridical possession; and it is protected by Common law (Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 140, 1995 -5 SCC 698).
    • For such protection the the tenant must have accepted the title of the landlord; and he must not have asserted title hostile to landlord (Sheo Dulare Lal Sah v. Anant Ram, AIR 1954 All. 475).
  • Is Tenant at Sufferance a Trespasser? Though the possession of ‘tenant at sufferance’ is unlawful, and possession of such a tenant is akin to that of a trespasser, there is little difference between the two.
    • Tenant at Sufferance can remain in possession until he is ejected in due course (in the suit filed by the landlord (Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 140, 1995 -5 SCC 698).
    • His possession cannot be considered to be ‘settled possession‘ (Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 140, 1995 -5 SCC 698).
    • Tenancy at sufferance is litigious – liable to ejectment in due course of law (Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 140, 1995 -5 SCC 698).
    • ‘Tenant at Sufferance’ is recognised in law as a device to avoid the term ‘trespasser’ (MEC India Pvt. Ltd. v. Lt. Col. Inder Maira, 80 (1999) DLT 679).
  • Can Tenancy at sufferance be converted into a ‘holding over’? Yes. Tenancy at sufferance can be converted into a ‘holding over’ (by accepting rent by the landlord). Sec. 116, TP Act statutorily recognises holding over. (Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 140, 1995 -5 SCC 698)
  • Has the Tenant got a right to transfer his right of continuance? No. A tenant who becomes a tenant at sufferance, he has no right to transfer (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Sudera Realty Private Limited, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1161).
  • Whether the possession of such a tenant would be Adverse to the landlord? No.

Also Read: SUIT on TITLE: Landlord can Recover Property on GENERAL TITLE (though Tenancy Not Proved) if Defendant Falsely Claimed Independent Title

Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh

These principles are laid down by the Supreme Court of India in Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 140, 1995 -5 SCC 698, as under:

  • “8. Tenant at sufferance is one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, but who holds it by wrong after the termination of the term or expiry of the lease by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance is, therefore, one who wrongfully continues in possession after the extinction of a lawful title. There is little difference between him and a trespasser. In Mulla’s Transfer of Property Act [7th End.] at page 633, the position of tenancy at sufferance has been stated thus:
    • A tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction to avoid continuance in possession operating as a trespass. It has been described as the least and lowest interest which can subsist in reality. It, therefore, cannot be created by contract and arises only by implication of law when a person who has been in possession under a lawful title continues in possession after that title has been determined, without the consent of the person entitled. A Tenancy at sufferance does not create the relationship of landlord and tenant.
  • At page 769, it is stated regarding the right of a tenant holding over thus:
    • The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not necessarily create a tenancy of any kind. If the lessee remaining in possession after the determination of the term, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance.
  • The expression “holding over” is used in the sense of retaining possession. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the lease, without the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so with the landlord’s consent. The former is called a tenant by sufferance in the language of the English law and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor is in a better position than a mere tenant at will. The tenancy on sufferance is converted into a tenancy at will by the assent of the landlord, but the relationship of the landlord and tenant is not established until the rent was paid and accepted. The assent of the landlord to the continuance of the tenancy after the determination of the tenancy would create a new tenancy. The possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, his possession is juridical.
  • “13. In view of the settled position of law, the possession of the appellant is as tenant at sufferance and is liable to ejectment in due course of law. But his possession is not legal nor lawful. In other words, his possession of the the- atre is unlawful or litigious possession. The appellant may remain in possession until he is ejected in due course in execution of the decree in the suit filed by the respon- dent. His possession cannot be considered to be settled possession. He is akin to a trespasser, though initially he had lawful entry.”
  • (Quoted in Kewal Chand Mimani v.  S.K. Sem, 2001-6 SCC 512, AIR 2001 SC 2569; Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393)

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Sudera Realty Private Limited

In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Sudera Realty Private Limited, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1161, it is observed by our Apex Court as under:

  • “60. A tenant continuing in possession after the expiry of the lease may be treated as a tenant at sufferance, which status is a shade higher than that of a mere trespasser, as in the case of a tenant continuing after the expiry of the lease, his original entry was lawful. But a tenant at sufferance is not a tenant by holding over. While a tenant at sufferance cannot be forcibly dispossessed, that does not detract from the possession of the erstwhile tenant turning unlawful on the expiry of the lease. Thus, the appellant while continuing in possession after the expiry of the lease became liable to pay mesne profits.”
  • “83. Once the lease comes to an end, the erstwhile tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance. He cannot be dispossessed, except in accordance with law. But he cannot, in law, have any right or interest anymore. Even though, under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, if there is no contract to the contrary, the tenant may have the right, under Section 108(j), to transfer his interest absolutely or even by sub-lease or mortgage, when the lease expires by afflux of time, his interest as lessee would come to an end. In this context, we may notice the following statement of the law in Bhawanji Lakhamshi and Others v. Himatlal Jammnadas Dani and Others, (1972) 1 SCC 388:
    • “9. The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not create a tenancy of any kind. If a tenant remains in possession after the determination of the lease, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance…”
  • Thus, on the expiry of a lease, the erstwhile tenant, who remains a tenant at sufferance, would have no right to transfer.”

Our Apex Court held in Bhawanji Lakhamshi v. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani , (1972) 1 SCC 388, as under:

  • “9. The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not create a tenancy of any kind. If a tenant remains in possession after the determination of the lease, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so without his consent. The former is a tenant at sufferance in English Law and the latter a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. In view of the concluding words of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lessee holding over is in a better position than a tenant at will. The assent of the land- lord to the continuance of possession after the determina- tion of the tenancy will create a new tenancy. What the section contemplates is that on one side there should be an offer of taking a new lease evidenced by the lessee or sub-lessee remaining in possession of the property after his term was over and on the other side there must be a definite consent to the continuance of possession by the landlord expressed by acceptance of rent or otherwise. ….” (Quoted in Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393)

Tenant at Sufferance – Owners Entitled Recovery under Art. 65 Limit. Act

In Sevoke Properties Ltd. v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. (2020) 11 SCC 782, the respondent continued in possession after the expiry of lease period. A suit for possession was filed without serving a notice under Section 106 of the TP Act. The stand of the defendant was that he was a tenant holding over. Such argument was not accepted and it was held that after the expiry of lease period in terms of unregistered document of lease, the possession of the respondent was that of a tenant at sufferance. In view thereof, as owners, the appellants were entitled to possession of the land in terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act as the possession of respondent was that of a tenant at sufferance. (Referred to in Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393)

  • (Note: Article 67 deals with right of the “landlord” to claim possession after determination of tenancy; and Article 65 deals with recovery on “title”. Unless there is no adverse-possession-claim from the tenant such a suit under Art. 65, on title, will not be barred. In sum, a “landlord” can recover under Art. 67 on the basis of determination of tenancy; but, “title” holder alone can recover under Art. 65.)

In Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393, it is observed as under:

  • “After the expiry of lease period, and in the absence of payment of rent by the lessee, the status of the lessee will be that of tenant at sufferance and not a tenant holding over. Section 116 of the TP Act confers the status of a tenant holding over on a yearly or monthly basis keeping in view the purpose of the lease, only if the lessor accepts the payment of lease money. If the lessor does not accept the lease money, the status of the lessee would be that of tenant at sufferance.”

The court referred the  following decisions in this regard:

  • Bhawanji Lakhamshi and Others v. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani and Others , (1972) 1 SCC 388
  • Badrilal v. Municipal Corpn. of Indore  (1973) 2 SCC 388
  • R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P and Others 15 (1995) 5 SCC 698
  • Sevoke Properties Ltd. v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. (2020) 11 SCC 782

Possession as a Tenant at Sufferance – should be without asserting Hostile Title

In Sheo Dulare Lal Sah v. Anant Ram, AIR 1954 All. 475, it was held that in order to create a tenancy at sufferance the tenant should have lawfully entered into possession in recognition of the landlord’s superior title and should have continued to remain in possession in the same right after the termination of the tenancy without asserting any title hostile to that of the landlord. The Court held as under:

  • “12. In order to create a tenancy at sufferance the tenant should have lawfully entered into possession in recognition of the landlord’s superior title and should have continued to remain in possession in the same right after the termination of the tenancy without asserting any title hostile to that of the landlord and without his assent or dissent. The continuance in possession should be due to the laches of the owner in not asking for payment of the rent or vacation of the premises or taking over possession of the property. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 51, p. 780,  175, it is pointed out that:
    • “The holding of a tenant at sufferance is the most shadowy estate recognized at common law, and practically the only distinction between such a tenant’s holding and the possession of a trespasser is that the land-owner may, by his acquiescence, at any time base on the tenancy at sufferance the relation of landlord and tenant, which he cannot establish at law against a mere trespasser, and that the tenant cannot be subjected to an action in trespass before entry or demand for possession.”
  • The law thus enunciated is in line with the provisions of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act (No. 4 of 1882) which pointed out that:
    • “If a lessee or under-lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or under-lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased as specified in S. 106.”
  • (Quoted in Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393)

Whether Possession of the Tenant could be Adverse to Landlord

S. 116 (holding-over) of the TP Act

To the question – whether the possession of the tenant would become adverse to the landlord, upon the expiration of the tenancy period, merely because the tenant has not paid rent is considered by the Bombay High Court in Sidram Lachmaya v. Mallaya Lingaya Chilaka, ILR 1949 Bom 135 (FB) with reference to S. 116 (holding-over) of the Transfer of Property Act.

S. 108(q) of the TP Act (possession remains permissive till restored to landlord)

The Delhi High Court considered the matter in MEC India Pvt. Ltd. v. Lt. Col. Inder Maira 80 (1999) DLT 679, in terms of Section 108(q) of the TP Act (unless the landlord is actually put into possession, the premises remain under a tenancy; that is, a semblance of relationship subsists) and his continuing in possession is expressive of his continuing stand that the tenancy, in whatever form, continues and not adversely to the landlord till he has unequivocally renounced his status as a tenant and asserted hostile title, but even that appears to be doubtful, for in law his possession remains permissive till it has been actually restored to the landlord.

Referring these decisions it is observed in MEC India Pvt. Ltd. v. Lt. Col. Inder Maira 80 (1999) DLT 679, that there is presumption, in law, in favour of the continuity of the tenancy and against the possession of the tenant becoming adverse. It is held in this decision as under:

  • “Furthermore, the doctrine of tenant estoppel, which continues to operate even after the termination of the tenancy, debars a tenant who had been let into possession by a landlord, from disputing the latter’s title or pleading adverse possession, without first openly and actually surrendering possession of the tenanted premises and restoring them to the landlord. 
  • 42. A tenant who upon determination of the tenancy does not deliver up possession to the landlord as required by Section 108(q), cannot be heard to say that he is not a tenant—be he one at sufferance or be he one from month-to-month. Therefore, unless the landlord is actually put into possession, the premises remain under a tenancy, which unless assented to by the landlord, has the character of one at sufferance.” (Quoted in: Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393)

Principle of ‘Tenant at Sufferance’ – Device to Avoid ‘Trespass’ and Adverse Possession

In MEC India Pvt. Ltd. v. Lt. Col. Inder Maira, 80 (1999) DLT 679, it is held further as under:

  • “43. Thus, a tenant at sufferance is one who wrongfully continues in possession after the extinction of a lawful title and that a tenancy at sufferance is merely a legal fiction or device to avoid continuance in possession from operating as a trespass. A tenant remaining in possession of the property after determination of the lease does not become a trespasser, but continues as a tenant at sufferance till possession is restored to the landlord. The possession of an erstwhile tenant is juridical and he is a protected from dispossession otherwise than in due course of law. Although, he is a tenant, but being one at sufferance as aforesaid, no rent can be paid since, if rent is accepted by the landlord he will be deemed to have consented and a tenancy from month-to-month will come into existence. Instead of rent, the tenant at sufferance and by his mere continuance in possession is deemed to acknowledge both the landlord’s title and his (tenant’s) liability to pay mesne profits for the use and occupation of the property.
  • 44. To sum up the legal position or status of a lessee whose lease has expired and whose continuance is not assented to by the landlord, is that of a tenant at sufferance. If, however, the holding over has been assented to in any manner, then it becomes that of a tenant from month-to-month. Similar, i.e. from month-tomonth, is the status of a lessee who comes into possession tinder a lease for a period exceeding one year but unregistered. He holds it not as a lessee for a fixed term, but as one from month-to-month or year-to-year depending on the purpose of the lease. If upon a tenant from month-to-month (or year-to-year) and in either of the aforesaid two contingencies, a notice to quit is served, 29 then on the expiry of the period, his status becomes of a tenant at sufferance. Waiver of that notice, or assent in any form to continuation restores to him his status as a tenant from month-to-month, but capable, of once again being terminated with the expiry of any ensuing tenancy month.” (Quoted in: Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393)

Claim of Adverse Possession by Tenant

In Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393, the claim of adverse possession by the tenant was negatived by the Apex Court on the following grounds:

  • The respondent-tenant had admitted the ownership of the landlord in earlier proceedings.
  • Such plea operates as estoppel. The subsequent claim of adverse possession of the tenant as owner is not sustainable.
  • The respondent was to prove his continuous, open and hostile possession to the knowledge of true owner for a continuous period of 12 years. The respondent has not led any evidence of hostile possession to the knowledge of true owner.
  • He has also not surrendered possession before asserting hostile, continuous and open title to the knowledge of the true owner. (In terms of Sec. 108(q) of the TP Act possession of tenant remains permissive till it has been actually restored to the landlord.)
  • The claim of adverse possession without admitting the title of the real owner is not tenable. (Such question has been examined by the Apex Court in  Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram,  (2020) 11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461).

Acceptance of Rent, After Issuing Quit Notice is Not Waiver

In Sarup Singh Gupta v. S. Jagdish Singh, AIR 2006 SC 1734: (2006) 4 SCC 205, our Apex Court considered whether mere acceptance of rent, after issuing quit notice by itself constitute an act of the nature envisaged by Section 113, Transfer of Property Act showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. It was held as under:

  • “It cannot, therefore, be said that mere acceptance of rent amounts to waiver of notice to quit unless there be any other evidence to prove or establish that the landlord so intended.” (Quoted in: Sameerali v. Muhammed, 2024-1 KLT 20).

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Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Principles and Procedure

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Will

Arbitration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Previous Owner (of Defendant) is Not a Necessary Party in a Recovery Suit

Taken From: Who are Necessary Parties, Proper Parties and Pro Forma Parties in Suits

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Order 1 rule 10 CPC reads as under:

Rule 10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.

  • .(1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted thought a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just.
  • (2) Court may strike out or add parties– The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
  • (3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent.

Plaintiff claims Ownership; Suit against Trespasser – Not Necessary to Implead ‘Previous Owners’ (Alleged by the Defendants)

R. K. S.  Builders v. Bhupinder Kumar , 2001-2 Punj LR 804, 2001-2 RCR (Civil) 497.

Facts of the Case

  • Plaintiff alleged that he is owner of the property and that the said property is in the illegal possession of the defendants.
  • The defendants contended that they have purchased the same from its rightful owners.
  • During the pendency of the suit, the defendants have further sold the property to various persons.
  • Application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC read with Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was filed.

This application was resisted by the defendants, inter alia, on the ground that the plaintiff had not added the previous owners of the property from whom the defendants purchased it. The trial court allowed the Petition.

The High Court, dismissing the Revision Petition, held as under:

  • When the case of the plaintiff is that he is the owner of the property which has been illegally occupied by the defendants, it is not necessary to implead previous (rightful) owners (alleged by the defendants).

Land Reforms Act Conferred Title on Tenants: Previous Owners, Not Necessary Parties

Bir Singh v. Kishan Chand, AIR  2007 HP 24

  • Non-joinder of the previous owners, divested of their ownership by virtue of the Land Reforms Act, and the ownership rights stood conferred upon the tenants, are not necessary parties.

Original Owner Not Necessary Party, When Dispute is Solely Between Purchaser and another

Kaleem Pasha v. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka Vidhana, ICC 2018 4 810,

  • In the absence of the plaintiff claiming any relief against the previous owners of a vehicle nor their participation in the suit was in any manner of help in the proper adjudication of the matter and also the disputed fact was solely between the plaintiff and defendant in the original suit, the original owner and the auction purchaser were not necessary parties.

Agreement for sale – Prior owner Necessary Party

Pamujula Narayana v. Ramachandruni Malakondaiah,  2006-3 ALD 278, ALT 2006 4 247.

Facts of the case

  • Suit was for specific performance.
  • Agreement was executed by the defendant as Power of Attorney holder of the Owner.
  • Owner died even prior to the filing of the suit.
  • Plaint was silent about the owner; and read as if PoA was the owner.

Court held:

  • It is well known that the owner of the property agreed to be sold is a necessary party to the suit (and PoA not sufficient).

Suit dismissed if Prior owner, a Necessary Party, is not impleded within Limitation

In the above case, Pamujula Narayana v. Ramachandruni Malakondaiah,  2006-3 ALD 278, ALT 2006 4 247, it was further held –

  • The suit will be barred, in view of Sec. 21 of Limitation Act, if prior owner (or successor) is not  impleaded within time prescribed. 

Vendee Becomes the Sole Owner

In Hardeva v. Ismail, AIR 1970 Raj 167, it was held – if it is possible to determine the rights and interests of the parties, not to dismiss a suit. It was also observed as under:

  • “When the vendor has sold his property and has delivered the possession of the property to the vendee, the vendee becomes the sole owner of the property and it is upto the vendee to defend his title against any person who claims any right in the property. The vendor may be a proper party, but he is not a necessary party inasmuch as an effectual decree can be passed in favour of third person against the vendee.”

Two tests for determining who is a necessary party

It was laid down in the Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1947 All 18 (FB), there were two tests –

  • Firstly, there must be a right to some relief against the defendant, and
  • Secondly, in the absence of such a party it could not be possible to pass an effective decree. (Approved in Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain, AIR 1953 SC 521)

It was further pointed out in the Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1947 All 18 (FB) – where the plaintiff files a suit against a defendant who is not the full owner of the property and has only a limited right, the owner is a necessary party as no effectual decree could be passed against the defendant (Subbaraya Sastri v. Seetha Rama-swami, AIR 1933 Mad 664; Rahima Bi v. Vellore Municipal Council, AIR 1954 Mad 495, Brojanath Bose v. Durga Prosad Singh. (1907) ILR 34 Cal 753, Narahari Mohanti v. Ghanshyam Bel, AIR 1963 Orissa 186, Chenthiperumal Pillai v. D. M. Devasa-hayam, AIR 1956 Trav-Co. 181 (FB), and Chandra Nath Sarma v. Guna Ram Kalita, AIR 1949 Assam 21).


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Is it Mandatory to Lift the Attachment on Dismissal of the Suit? Will the Attachment Orders Get Revived on Restoration of Suit?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Is it Mandatory to Lift the Attachment (before judgment) on Dismissal of the Suit?

  • Yes (Order 38, Rule 9 directs so);
  • hence the attachment will not be (automatically) restored.

Interlocutory Applications Get Revived on Restoration of Suit

In Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese, (2004) 6 SCC 378, the majority found that on restoration of the suit dismissed for default all interlocutory matters shall stand restored, unless the order of dismissal to show to the contrary, and unless the order of restoration says otherwise. The Apex Court considered the following decisions:

  • .(i) Saranatha Ayyangar v. Muthiah Moopanar, AIR 1934 Mad 49
  • (ii) Bankim Chandra v. Chandi Prasad reported in AIR 1956 Pat 271.
  • (iii) Shivaraya v. Sharnappa reported in AIR 1968 Mysore 283.
  • (iv) Abdul Hamid v. Karim Bux, AIR 1973 All 67.
  • (v) Nandipati Rami Reddi v. Nandipati Padma Reddy, AIR 1978 AP 30.

Dismissal of the Suit in Default, Attachment before Judgment Automatically Ceases

It is pointed out in Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese –

  • Order 38, Rule 9 directs that the Court shall order withdrawal of attachment when the suit is dismissed.
  • Therefore, Rule 9 makes it mandatory for the Court to lift the attachment at the time of the dismissal of the suit.
  • Such a provision is not there under Order 39 or under Order 40.

It is Mandatory to Lift the Attachment on Dismissal of the Suit

In Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese, (2004) 6 SCC 378, the majority relied on the following decisions also:

(i) Raj Chandra Gupta v. Ramesh Kishore reported in AIR 1965 All 546. Relying on Ram Chand v. Pitam Mal, (1888) ILR 10 All. 506, it was held that on the dismissal of the suit either on merit or for default attachment before judgment shall cease and it shall not revive automatically on restoration of the suit.

(ii) Nancy John Lyndon v. Prabhati Lal Chowdhury reported in 1987 (4) SCC 78, it has been held that in view of Order 21, Rule 57, C. P. C. it is clear that with the dismissal of the title execution suit for default, the attachment levied earlier ceased. However, it has been further held that when the dismissal was set aside and the suit was restored, the effect of restoring the suit was to restore the position prevalent till the dismissal of the suit or before dismissal of the title execution suit. It was further pointed out that the scheme under Order 21, Rule 57 was similar to Order 38, Rule 11 and Rule 11-A, C P C and therefore, it cannot be applied to all interlocutory orders on the same basis.

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Sec. 65B

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Will Interlocutory Orders Get Revived on Restoration of Suit?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Will Interlocutory Orders (automatically) Get Revived on Restoration of Suit?

  • Yes;
  • unless the order of dismissal, or of restoration, shows to the contrary.

Is it Mandatory to Lift the Attachment (before judgment) on Dismissal of the Suit?

  • Yes (Order 38, Rule 9 directs so);
  • hence the attachment will not be (automatically) restored.

The authority is -Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese,  (2004) 6 SCC 378.

  • Majority (V. N. Khare, CJ. & S. H. Kapadia, J.) held – if the suit is dismissed for default without any reference to the ancillary orders passed earlier, then the interim orders shall revive as and when the suit is restored.
  • But, S.B. Sinha, J. dissented observing –  “… the court cannot say that although such a sale (after the suit is dismissed for default and before the same is restored) shall be valid but the order of attachment shall revive. Such a conclusion by reason of a judge-made law may be an illogical one.”  Quoted in: T.  Ravi v. B.  Chinna Narasimha, 2017-7 SCC 342.

Interlocutory Orders Get Revived on Restoration of Suit

In Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese, (2004) 6 SCC 378, the majority considered the following decisions:

(i) Saranatha Ayyangar v. Muthiah Moopanar, AIR 1934 Mad 49. It was held that on restoration of the suit dismissed for default all interlocutory matters shall stand restored, unless the order of restoration says to the contrary. That as the matter of general rule on restoration of the suit dismissed for default, all interlocutory orders shall stand revived unless during the interregnum between the dismissal of the suit and restoration, there is any alienation in favour of the third party.

(ii) Bankim Chandra v. Chandi Prasad reported in AIR 1956 Pat 271. This case arose under Order 39. It was held that the orders of stay pending disposal of the suit were ancillary orders and they are all meant to supplement the ultimate decision arrived at in the main suit and, therefore, when the suit, dismissed for default, is restored by the order of the Court all ancillary orders passed in the suit shall revive, unless there is any other factor on record or in the order of dismissal to show to the contrary.

(iii) Shivaraya v. Sharnappa reported in AIR 1968 Mysore 283. It was also a case under Order 39. The question arose whether the restoration of the suit revives ancillary orders passed before the dismissal of the suit. It was held that it depends upon the terms in which the order of dismissal is passed and the terms in which the suit is restored.

If the Court dismisses the suit for default, without any reference to the ancillary orders passed earlier, then the interim orders shall revive as and when the suit is restored. However, if the Court dismisses the suit specifically vacating the ancillary orders, then restoration will not revive such ancillary orders.

(iv) Abdul Hamid v. Karim Bux, AIR 1973 All 67. Relying again on Ram Chand v. Pitam Mal, (1888) ILR 10 All. 506, the same view has been taken.

(v) Nandipati Rami Reddi v. Nandipati Padma Reddy, AIR 1978 AP 30. It was held that when the suit is restored, all interlocutory orders and their operation during the period between dismissal of the suit for default and restoration shall stand revived. That once the dismissal is set aside, the plaintiff must be restored to the position in which he was situated, when the Court dismissed the suit for default.

Therefore, it follows that interlocutory orders which have been passed before the dismissal would stand revived along with the suit when the dismissal is set aside and the suit is restored unless the Court expressly or by implication excludes the operation of interlocutory orders passed during the period between dismissal of the suit and the restoration.

Nagar Mahapalika v. Ved Prakash, AIR 1976 All. 264 – an Odd Decision

In Nagar Mahapalika v. Ved Prakash, AIR 1976 All. 264, it was observed with respect to interim injunction, relying on Ram Chand v. Pitam Mal, (1888) ILR 10 All. 506, that the interim injunction would not automatically revive on restoration of the suit dismissed for default.

The Supreme Court (in Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese) did not approve this decision and observed –

  • “However, this is the only judgment which has equated order of temporary injunction with attachment before judgment as interlocutory orders without considering provisions of Order 38, Rule 9 and Rule 11.”

The Apex Court continued  –

  • This has not been noticed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Nagar Mahapalika v. Ved Prakash (supra). All the earlier judgments of the Allahabad High Court related to Order 38 and not to Order 39. Moreover as stated above, attachment is a part of execution process. It is granted to protect the decree. Under Order 38, Rule 11 it is further provided that when the suit is decreed the Courts will continue attachment before judgment and the plaintiff is not required to re-apply for attachment. The scheme of Order 38 is different from Order 39 or Order 40. Hence, we cannot compare attachment under Order 38 with power of the Court to grant temporary injunction under Order 39 as interlocutory orders. Similarly, Order 21, Rule 57 indicates the duty on the Courts to order whether the attachment shall continue or cease on the dismissal of the execution suit.”

Dismissal of the Suit in Default, Attachment before Judgment Automatically Ceases

It is pointed out in Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese –

  • Order 38, Rule 9 directs that the Court shall order withdrawal of attachment when the suit is dismissed.
  • Therefore, Rule 9 makes it mandatory for the Court to lift the attachment at the time of the dismissal of the suit.
  • Such a provision is not there under Order 39 or under Order 40.

It is Mandatory to Lift the Attachment on Dismissal of the Suit

In Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese, (2004) 6 SCC 378, the majority relied on the following decisions also:

(i) Raj Chandra Gupta v. Ramesh Kishore reported in AIR 1965 All 546. Relying on Ram Chand v. Pitam Mal, (1888) ILR 10 All. 506, it was held that on the dismissal of the suit either on merit or for default attachment before judgment shall cease and it shall not revive automatically on restoration of the suit.

(ii) Nancy John Lyndon v. Prabhati Lal Chowdhury reported in 1987 (4) SCC 78, it has been held that in view of Order 21, Rule 57, C. P. C. it is clear that with the dismissal of the title execution suit for default, the attachment levied earlier ceased. However, it has been further held that when the dismissal was set aside and the suit was restored, the effect of restoring the suit was to restore the position prevalent till the dismissal of the suit or before dismissal of the title execution suit. It was further pointed out that the scheme under Order 21, Rule 57 was similar to Order 38, Rule 11 and Rule 11-A, C P C and therefore, it cannot be applied to all interlocutory orders on the same basis.

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Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

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Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

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Stamp Act & Registration

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Negotiable Instruments Act

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

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Freehold Property in Law

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Abstract

  • In land-law, FREEHOLD means ‘Free from Hold’ of anyone else; or in complete ownership.
  • It doesn’t mean that such lands are free from payment of tax.
  • In common law countries,freehold‘ is used to contrast leasehold.
  • A ‘janmam’ right is the freehold interest in a property.
  • Edavagai Rights Acquisition Act, 1955 (State of Travancore-Cochin) did not change the character of the holdings. Lease holdings of the Edavagais continued as lease holdings, but with liability to pay Tax.

Freehold means ‘Free from hold’ of Anyone Else

  • Freehold means ‘Free from hold’ of anyone else; or in complete ownership. It is also used to contra-distinct, leasehold nature of land (a leasehold land is ‘held by another’).
  • It doesn’t mean that such lands are free from payment of tax or revenue to the Government.
  • “In common law jurisdictions such as England and Wales, Australia, Canada, and Ireland, a freehold is the common mode of ownership of real property, or land, and all immovable structures attached to such land. It is in contrast to a leasehold, in which the property reverts to the owner of the land after the lease period expires or otherwise lawfully terminates” (Wikipedia).
  • A janmam right is the freehold interest in a property situated in Kerala.

.

This Article is Included in the Printed Book:
Saji Koduvath on
 Kerala Land History
&
KLR Act

Pages – 294: Rs. 850
Gpay/Whatapp/Phone No. 91-9387560056

.

‘Freeholds (Adhikara Ozhivus)’ in Edavagai Lands of Travancore

In erstwhile Travancore,

  • Edapally Swaroopam, Kilimanoor Kottaram, Poonjar Koickal and Vanjipuzha Madom

administered Edavagais of –

  • Edapally, Kilimanoor, Poonjar and Vanjipuzha.

The chiefs or administers of those Edavagais were vassals of erstwhile Kingdom of Travancore. Those chiefs were allowed to administer (collect rent or tax from the tenants) of those Edavagais. The Travancore Govt. did not collect tax directly from those Edavagai Lands. Therefore, it was said that those lands were ‘freeholds (Adhikara Ozhivus)’. 

In Harska Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR  1960 Ker 345, 1960 Ker LT 378, the reason for non-collection of Tax from Edavagais was also laid down as under:

  • “Edavagais were petty kingdoms or principalities which remained independent or quasi-independent until the consolidation of Travancore in the 18th century. They were outside the State Ayacut and paid no land tax. The Chiefs, however, in exercise of their ancient sovereign powers, collected Melvaram or Melvara Rajabhogam from the jenmis inside the Edavagais (See: 1945 TLR 581 and 728).”

Concept of ‘Freehold‘ in 10 Sq. Miles Concession Order, Travancore

The term ‘Freehold‘ is used in erstwhile Travancore to denote two ideas –

  • 1. Exempted from payment of any kind of tax to Government.
  • 2. Free to cultivate any crop (inasmuch as crop is specified in ordinary leases/grants).

Exempted from payment of any kind of tax to Government

Travancore State Manual Vol. III published by the Travancore Government in 1940, while listing various classes of jenmom lands, it says about a class which were entirely ‘freehold‘ and exempted from payment of any kind of tax to Government under any circumstances. These were the special properties given by the Ruler to certain individuals considering their valid services, or to certain institutions including temples.

Free to cultivate any crop

In the proceedings of the Chief Secretary to the Travancore Government, dated 28.03. 1906, the request of the tenant to ‘convert the lease hold into free-hold’ in the light of the promise “to pay 3 annas instead of 2 1/2 annas, the rent payable at present per acre” is seen allowed. The tenants represented that they were ‘prepared to pay tax that may be payable on lands under coffee, tea or other products at the rates which may prevail at that times’.

It was added further:

  • “If any portion of land is brought under rubber cultivation he also agreed to pay tax at the rate Rs. 2 per acre per annum on such land. He also agreed to pay an upset price of Rs. One per acre on the 10 sq. miles of land granted to them as consideration for converting the leasehold into freehold tenure”.

The intention and objective of the term “freehold” in the Order of the Chief Secretary is clear from the following statement –

  • “The other terms of the grant shall be the same as those that apply to waste lands granted under the Coffee land Rules dated 7th July 1898″. (Quoted in: Majeed v. State of Kerala,(2006) 1 KerLT 19.)
    • Note: Under the aforesaid Rules, 1898 the grantees were allowed to cultivate only “coffee”.

The aforesaid view is fortified by the decision in Kannan Devan Hills Produce v.  The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, which states as under:

  • “It thus appears that the State grants like Kanan Devan Hills Concession and Ten Square Miles Concession, and Munro Lands, were treated under the heading ‘Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar.”

‘Jenmam’ (freehold right) is ‘Estate’ within Article 31A

  • In K. K. Kochunni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080 and Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, 1962 Ker LT 913 :  AIR 1963 Ker 86 it was held that jenmom right was the freehold right with ‘proprietary interest’.

The concepts on ‘janmam’ continued even after introduction of Tax system by Government. ‘Jenmom’ was taken the proprietary interest of a landlord in lands (Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080). Subba Rao, J., observed as under:

  • “Under the definition, any janmam right in Kerala is an “estate”. A janmam right is the freehold interest in a property situated in Kerala.
  • Moor in his “Malabar Law and Custom” describes it as a hereditary proprietorship. A janmam interest may, therefore, be described as  “proprietary interest of a landlord in lands” and such a janmam right is described as “estate” in the Constitution. Substituting “janmam right” in place of “estate” in cl. 2 (b), the “rights” in Art. 31A (1) (a) will include the rights of a proprietor and subordinate tenure-holders in respect of a janmam right.
  • It follows that the extinguishment or modification of a right refers to the rights of a proprietor or a subordinate tenure-holder in the janmam right. A proprietor called the janmi or his subordinate tenure-holder has certain defined rights in janmam right”. Land-tenures in Malabar are established by precedents or immemorial usage. Janmam right is a freehold interest in property and the landlord is called  “janmi”. He can create many subordinate interests or tenures therein.” (Quoted in: Kannan Devan Hills Produce v.  The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301)

“Janmam right” can be vested with Sircar (Not with holders, alone)

The Supreme Court, in Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State Of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301 (Sikri (Cj), Shelat, A.N. Ray, I.D. Dua, , H.R.  Khanna, JJ.) held that Kenan Devan Hills Concession (on grant deeds) fall within the expression “Janmam right” vested with Sircar (not solely with holders of the land). This land is dealt with under the heading – Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar.

The Apex Court found the following:

  • The janmam rights (even if remained with the Poonjar Chief, H.H. the Maharaja became the janmi by the Royal proclamation of 1899.
  • The nature of ‘janmam right’ has been examined by this Court previously in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887 Subba Rao, J., observed that janmam right in Kerala is an “estate” and it is the freehold interest.
  • The Sircar itself is one of these janmis and it was the largest Janmi. It came to possess janmam lands by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation and other ways
  • If any person wants land in Travancore, he must obtain it from, some one of the body of Janmis, i.e. from the Sircar, which is the Chief Janmi, or from some other Janmi.

Grant’ will not confer Absolute Proprietary Rights

In State of Kerala v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272 the Apex Court came to the conclusion that the the company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession/granted Area. With respect to the same property  it was held in State of Kerala v. Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272as under:

  • “The Trial Court in a detailed and well-reasoned judgment dismissed the suit of the company. The Trial Court on the interpretation of First Concession (Exhibit P- 1), Second Concession (Exhibit P-2), deed of ratification (Exhibit P-62) and the Government agreement with the Society dated August 2, 1866 (Exhibit P-64) came to the conclusion that the company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession Area or the trees and timber in the said area. It was held that the Poonjar Chief had only conveyed heritable and transferable possessory rights over the Concession area to the grantee. It was also held that absolute rights over the trees and timber in the Concession Area did not pass to the grantee and it had only the right to use and remove timber subject to the restrictions imposed in the deeds of conveyance/ratification.”

The Apex Court referred to a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in George A Leslie v. State of Kerala, [1969] K. L.T. 378, K. K. Mathew, J. (as the learned Judge then was) that interpreted the clause in a similar deed.

Then it is observed further:

  • We agree with the interpretation given to the clause by Mathew, J. and hold that the respondent- company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession Area or the trees and the timber therein.”

The Apex Court (in State of Kerala v. Kannan Devan Hills, (1991) 2 SCC 272) upheld and approved “the judgment and findings” of the Trial Court.

History of Land Tax Collection from Edavagai Lands

Harska Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR  1960 Ker 345, 1960 Ker LT 378, clearly lays down the history. It is pointed out that the collection of Basic-Tax was first introduced by the Travancore Land Tax Proclamation, 1121. Sec. 6 of the Proclamation provided that the Proclamation would not be applicable to certain classes of lands. One of those classes was-

As pointed out in Harska Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR  1960 Ker 345, the next enactment was the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955 which came into force on 1-4-1956. Sec. 17 of the Land Tax Act, 1955, repealed the Travancore Land Tax Proclamation, 1121 (1946).

Jenmam – Proprietary right in the soil

In K. K. Kochunni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080, the Supreme Court, while dealing with Article 31A of the Constitution, said:

  • “Under the definition, any jenmom right in Kerala is an ‘estate’. A jenmom right is the freehold interest in a property situated in Kerala. Moor in his “Malabar Law and Custom” describes it as a hereditary proprietorship. A jenmom interest may, therefore be described as ‘proprietary interest of a landlord in lands‘.”

Edavagai Rights Act, 1955 did Not change Character of Holdings

The object behind the act is very clear – it was only to ‘acquire’ the rights of the Edavagais; it was not to change the character of the land held by the tenants or purchasers.

Lease holdings of the Edavagais continued as Lease holdings, but with liability to pay Tax.

In Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, 2018-2 KLT 369, it is pointed out analysing Edavagai Rights Acquisition Act, 1955 as under-

  • “There was also a saving clause in Section 11 which exempted from vesting, those lands held by the Chiefs as a Jenmy or as a pattadar under the Government and those held by the families, already settled and assessed, as also those lands in the direct possession of the Chiefs and any of the members of the respective families.”

Then it is observed by the High Court of Kerala as under:

  • Hence land existing on a lease from either of the Edavagais or
    • as freehold on valid purchase made
  • continues in the possession and ownership of the land holder/lessee and
  • the liability to payment of rent or other levies to the Edavagais would stand altered as liability to tax imposed by the Government.
  • This does not change the character of the holdings and
    • only interferes with the right, title and interest of the respective Edavagais; which stands vested with the Government.”

Meaning of the Word ‘Thettom’

  • Generally meant – acquisition by Mortgage.
  • When ‘Thettom’ refers to a property dealing with a Jenmam holder, it can be any ‘subordinate tenure falling short of the full proprietary title‘.
  • When it refers to a property dealing with a Non-Jenmom holder, it may mean a sale’

As regards ‘Thettom’, Raman Menon, C.J., said, in Augusti v. The Dewan of Travancore, 8 Travancore LJ 438, as under:

  • “In S.A. 17 of 1074, this Court remarked:-‘In the Sirkar registry of 1011, the plaint property is entered as ‘Thettom’ in the name of defendants’ Tarwad.
  • That expression, according to its ordinary meaning, implies at least a mortgage lien, if not more, as held by this Court in A.S.166 of 1070 and A.S. 285 of 1071. It always implies something more than a simple lease’.
  • In S.A. 61 of 1075, the terms was taken to be generic and to include ‘all subordinate tenures falling short of the full proprietory title‘.
  • In S.A. 302 of 1075, it was observed that the word ‘Thettom’, as applied to Nambudiri Jenmies, had been held by this court to mean ordinarily a Kanom.
  • In S.A. 48 of 1076, Vencoba Chariar, C.J. and Mr. Justice Kunhiraman Nair construed the words thus:- ‘The chief ground of the plaintiff’s second appeal is that in arriving at this finding the lower courts have not given sufficient weight to the fact appearing from the Ext. B – an old Revenue account – in which the land in dispute is entered as ‘Thettam’ from plaintiff’s Illom; but the word ‘Thettom’ is a somewhat ambiguous one and though, as remarked in the case in 15 TLR 161 and in other cases, it is generally used in the Revenue accounts to signify the Kanom tenure under Jenmies, it is also sometimes used to denote other subordinate tenures‘.
  • In S.A. 343 of 1078, we find the following remarks:-‘Thettom ordinarily means a’Kanom’, and in any case, a derivative title when used in connection with Brahmaswam or Devaswom properties, as in the present case’.
  • Lastly, in A.S. Nos. 59 and 101 of 1083, Sadasiva Iyer, C.J., and Sankara Menon, J., observed thus:-‘Mr. Kochukrishna Marar quotes 15 TLR 161 and says the word ‘Thettom’ means a Kanom or mortgage.
  • No doubt, in the case of Jenmies, it has been so held; but we doubt whether in the case of non jenmies, any meaning other than the ordinary meaning of the word can be given to the word ‘Thettom’. The plaintiffs are Nairs and the tenure claimed is not Jenmom. The ordinary meaning of the word is acquisition. We are inclined to hold that a word ‘Thettom’, in cases of this sort, means only sale’.”
  • (Quoted in: Travancore Devaswom Board v. Uzhithiraru Uzhithiraru, 1957 KLT 315)

In Damodaran v. Sankaranarayanan Namboothiripad, ILR 1963-2 Ker. 707; 1964 KLT 25, the High Court referred to thanathu thettom land (nilam); and observed – it conveys the idea of ‘acquisition’.

‘Pandarappattoms’ before 1061 (1886) were Recorded as “Thettoms

The ‘pandaravakappattoms’ before 1061 (1886) to which benefits of proprietary rights were conferred under the Proclamations (1040 and 1061) were recorded in 1910 Travancore Settlement Register as “Thettoms” (such as Devaswom Thettom, Namboori Thettom etc.)

  • Note: When those properties (upon which Brhamins or Devaswoms had pandarappattom rights) were sold or leased, they were termed in the transfer-deeds as “Devaswom Thettom”, “Namboori Thettom”.

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What is Patta or Pattayam?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Part – I

Patta manifests two ideas:

  • First, Title-Certificate issued by the Government
  • Second, mere revenue -document prepared for collecting tax.

Even when Patta is referred to as a Title Certificate it denotes –

  • (i) either conferment of ownership upon Govt. property,
  • (ii) or recognition of tenancy/granteeship/licence on Govt. property, for cultivation, residence etc.

Patta was ‘Rent-Deed’ in the 1st Regulation on Land Matters

The first Regulation of Madras Presidency in which Patta is referred to is the Permanent Settlement Regulation, No. 25 of 1802. Section 14 of the regulation reads as under:

  • “Zamindars or landholders shall enter into engagements with their ryots for rent, either in money or in kind, and shall within a reasonable period of time grant to each ryot a patta or kaul defining the amount to be paid by him and explaining every condition of the engagement. And the said Zamindars or land- holders shall grant regular receipts to the ryots for discharges in money or in kind, made by the ryots on account of the Zamindars.”  (See: Land Law in Madras Presidency, BR Chakravarthy, 1927, page62)

In State of Madras v. Parisutha Nadar, 1961-74 LW 338; 1961-2 MLJ 285, it was observed as under:

  • “The Act (Madras Surveys and Boundaries Act) does not create new rights of ownership and the grant of ryotwari patta under the Act is not a conferment of rights by way of grant or conveyance. The obtaining of ryotwari patta by the persons entitled to such patta under the Act, can if at all be only in recognition of pre-existing rights of ownership. A ryotwari patta granted by the Revenue authorities in respect of lands in a Government village is not a title deed but is only a bill for rent.” (Quoted in: T. M. Laksminarayana Ayyar v. Nallachi Ammal, 1974-1 MLJ 424; The State of Madras v. Ramalingaswamigal Madam, 1969 2 MLJ 281)

Patta Regulation of 1802

Land Law in Madras Presidency, BR Chakravarthy, 1927, page65 reads as under:

  • “Regulation 30 is the well-known patta regulation of 1802. The preamble to the regulation stated, that it was necessary that the terms of the holding between the landholder and the ryots should be reduced to writing.
  • Section 2 provided, that the landholders and the ryots should exchange written engagements containing the terms of the holding that given by the landholder being called the patta and the counter-part executed by the ryot being called the muchilika. Section 3 described the contents of these documents – the patta and the muchilika. The patta should contain a description of the property, the terms of the holding, such as the rent payable by the ryot and the time or duration of the tenure. These pattas and muchilikas must be registered in the office of the Kernam.”

In Earlier times, Pattah was Not Considered as a Document of Title

In Narayan Madhavan v. Kumaran Velayudhan, XV (1900) TLR 187 (Travancore Law Reports), it was observed as under:

  • “The grant of Pattah is merely for convenience of Government for purpose of revenue and confers no title not previously possessed.”

The Secretary of State for India v. T. V.  Raghavachariar, 83 IndCas 1009; 1924 20 LW 815; 1924-47 MLJ 503, it is observed as under:

  • “15. I should have thought that it was well-known law that a patta is not a document of title, or a deed of grant.
    • See: The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Kasturi Reddi, (1902) ILR 26 M 268. and
    • Muthu Veera Vandayan v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (1906) ILR 29 M 461.
  • It is a record of demand by Government that such and such an amount is due as land revenue on such and such an area. Plaintiff admitted before us, when pressed, that the stream in question within Survey Nos. 13, 14 and 17 was Government property prior to the grant of patta to his vendor. It follows that neither his vendor nor himself has succeeded to the ownership of that portion of the stream unless the grant of patta or the grant of these survey numhers on darkhast* somehow carried with it also the transfer of ownership of that portion of the stream. As noted, the patta implies no such grant, and plaintiff has not chosen to produce or call for the darkhast records. I wholly fail then to find any proof that the ownership of Government admitted prior to the darkhast has been lost by Government.
  • *’darkhast’ refers to ‘application’.

In The Official Assignee of Madras v. Basudevadoss Badrinarayan Doss, 1925-21 LW 538; 1925-48 MLJ 423, it is pointed out as under:

  • “It is quite true that a patta is not a title deed in all senses of that expression or for all purposes …”

Patta is not a document of title. It can only be evidence title

As time went on, the courts began to value patta more, and recognised it as a document of title,  although it was not acknowledged as a title deed, as such.

In The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Reddipalle Hussain Saheb,  AIR 1940 Mad 788; 1940-52 LW 205; 1940-2 MLJ 13, it is stated as under:

  • “2. In appeal, the learned District Judge disposed of the matter briefly by saying that a patta was not a document of title but was a mere bill for rent or tax which, being of little or no value, proved nothing. As that was the only evidence on which the Government could rely, the plaintiff was entitled to succeed.
  • 3. With due deference to the opinion of the learned District Judge, I do not consider that a patta is quite such a valueless document as he thinks. As was pointed out by Srinivasa Ayyangar, J. in The Official Assignee of Madras v. Badri Narayan Doss (1924) 48 M.L.J. 423: I.L.R. 48 Mad. 454, although a patta is not a title deed, it is a document of title, to which great weight is generally given both by the possessor and by the Government. It is true that a patta is not a title deed in the sense of a document, the grant of which conclusively passes title from the Government to the pattadar; but with regard to a first grant, at any rate, a patta is granted as a matter of course to the person to whom the Government has granted the land. The value of a patta generally comes up for consideration in proceedings between the pattadar and a third party; but as between the Government and the pattadar, a patta clearly has a greater value. The Government cannot say that the pattadar is not entitled to the land or the trees granted under the patta nor can the pattadar say that he is not holding title from the Government. A tree patta, moreover, differs from an ordinary ryotwari patta in being more in the nature of a lease, which was the original meaning of the word patta.”

Gopalakrishna v. M.  Srinivas, 2010-2 Ker HC 235; 2010 2 Ker LT 216 (Thomas P. Joseph, J.), is pointed out to show Patta is not a document of title; but, it can only be evidence title. It reads as under:

  • “Exhibit A5, copy of Patta is produced to show that the said property belonged to one Sarojini Amma. Patta is not a document of title. It can only be evidence title .”

Patta by Sirkar in one’s name does not Confer Title

Patta As Such Does Not Confer Title/Ownership

In Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, AIR 2023 SC 379; 2023-1 SCR 355, our Apex Court noticed the fact that a lease can be given on ‘Deed of Patta’ when referred to “demarcation of land given on lease vide the Deed of Patta”.

In Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op.  Housing Society Ltd. , AIR 2014 SC 937; 2014-2 SCC 269, it is said as under:

  •  “18. The Plaintiff has also maintained the stand that their predecessor-in- interest was the Pattadar of the suit land. In a given case, the conferment of Patta as such does not confer title. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in Syndicate Bank v. Estate Officer & Manager, APIIC Ltd. & Ors. (2007) 8 SCC 361 and Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu & Ors. (1991) Supp. (2) SCC 228.
  • 20. We are of the view that even if the entries in the Record of Rights carry evidentiary value, that itself would not confer any title on the plaintiff on the suit land in question. Ext.X-1 is Classer Register of 1347 which according to the trial court, speaks of the ownership of the plaintiff’s vendor’s property. We are of the view that these entries, as such, would not confer any title. Plaintiffs have to show, independent of those entries, that the plaintiff’s predecessors had title over the property in question and it is that property which they have purchased.”

In Amba Thampuratti v. Kerala Varma Thampuran, 1954  Ker LT 700, it was pointed out that ‘the Patta did not confer any title’. In Parukutti Amma v. Sundara Ayyar (1949 TCLR 59) the Travancore-Cochin High Court held that the issue of patta by Sirkar in one’s name did not confer title to the property, if he had not already obtained title to it. (Referred to in: Narayana Iyer v. Vella, 1988-1 Ker LJ 231; 1988-1 Ker LT 856)

Patta is not a document of title. It only evidences title

Aiysumma v. Mariyamma, 1994-1 KLT 570 (TL Viswanatha Iyer, J.), it is held as under:

  • “Patta by itself does not confer any title. … but only an evidence of title.”

It had been held in Mooka Kone v. Ammnakutti Ammal, AIR 1928 Mad 299 (FB ) as under:

  • “Patta would at least have served as some evidence of possession, although a patta by itself cannot be regarded as a document or evidence of title or a title-deed.  (Referred to in: Mathaluru Bajjappa v. Madamanchi Venkanna, AIR 1960 AP 397.)

In Periyaayya v. R.  Pitchaimuthu, 04 Jul 2019, 2019 0 Supreme(Mad) 1116, it is held as under:

  • “Though patta is not a document of title, patta can be accepted as an evidence for possession.”

In L.  Duraivel v. N.  Padmavathy, 2023-3 LW 202 (Mad), it is held as under:

  • “It is true that patta is not a document of title. However, patta can still be an evidence to show ones prima facie title and enjoyment particularly when the person disputing the title is unable to produce any material evidence to contradict or controvert such revenue documents.”

Patta – Not A Document of Title; it Establishes Possession

In M. Karuppiah Thevar v. John Victor (Mad), 2017-1 CTC 67, it is held as under:

  • “Though it is a well settled proposition of law that patta is not a document of title and it can only be a piece of evidence to establish one’s possession in a case where there is no rival claim.”

Patta is not a document of title. Still, it can be Mortgaged as Title-Deed u/s. 58, TP Act

In Angu Pillai v. M.S.M. Kasiviswanathan Chettiar, AIR 1974 Mad 16, it was noticed as under:

  • “15.In Indian law, deposit of patta has been held to constitute a valid equitable mortgage, though patta is not in itself a deed of title, but is only an evidence of title. This Court has consistently taken the view that the main object of tender of patta is merely to give information of the land revenue payable and the details of the property and that the exact weight to be given to the patta would depend upon the circumstances of the case. In Dohganna v. Jammanna, AIR 1931 Mad 613 it is pointed out that in case of pattas in respect of a land in Zamindari, if the land be at the disposal of the landlord at the time of granting the patta, prima facie such patta would not be mere bill of rent but something more and that if it is not so it would not create any rights in the pattadar in derogation of the rights of a person who would be entitled to the land subject to the proper and regular payment of rent. The question directly arose before a Bench of this Court in Official Assignee v. Basudevadoss, AIR 1925 Mad 723, as to whether a deposit of patta is enough to constitute an equitable mortgage. The Bench answered the question in the affirmative. Srinivasa Aiyangar, J. who delivered the leading judgment in that case, has pointed out that the answer to the question as to whether the pattas in respect of a land is a document which would be sufficient, by being deposited, to evidence the intention required for an equitable mortgage would vary according to the conditions of the country and the consciousness on the part of the members of the community and that though a patta is not a document of title still a deposit of the same with intent to create an equitable mortgage would create an equitable mortgage.” (Quoted with approval in: Syndicate Bank v. Estate Officer,  AIR 2007 AIR SC 3169; 2007-8 SCC 361)

Not to Set Aside Patta; for, Patta was Prepared not after hearing

In Godavarma Valia Raja v. Bhoothi Swamiyar,  AIR 1952 TC/Ker 408, ir is observed as under:

  • Therefore, so far as the assessment is concerned it was not at all necessary to set aside the order of the Settlement Officer. It is only in case the Devaswom impeaches the order in so far as it refused to issue patta in favour of the Devaswom for some of the properties claimed by it that the Devaswom would be bound to set aside the order. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the plaintiff was bound to set aside the decision of the settlement Officer mentioned in the notice, Ex. VIII. The further question for consideration is whether the plaintiff was bound to set aside the patta, Ex. G. There is nothing to show that the patta was prepared after hearing the plaintiff or after giving him an opportunity to show cause why the assessment should not be fixed in the manner in which it was fixed in Ex. G. The preparation of the patta appears to have been a mere executive order of the Settlement Officer. It was not an order passed between two parties. Again, even if the declaration asked for in the plaint is allowed it will not have the effect of setting aside the patta. It will only have the effect of correcting the patta with respect to the assessment.”

Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960

The Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960, Sec. 8 shows that ‘Pattah is a document evidencing the assignment of Government land or of any interest therein’. Sec. 2(2) denotes that ‘assignment includes a transfer of land by way of lease and a grant of licence‘.

Section 2(2) of the Land Assignment Act, 1960 reads as under:

  • “2. Definitions.- (1) ….
    • (2). In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) assignment includes a transfer of land by way of lease and a grant of licence for the use of land.”

Section 8 of the Land Assignment Act, 1960 reads as under:

  • “8. Assignment to take effect with restrictions, conditions, etc., according to their tenor .- All the provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any Pattah or other document evidencing the assignment of Government land or of any interest therein shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, notwithstanding any law for the time being in force or any custom or contract to the contrary.”

Following decisions speak as to patta issued to Tenants

  • Nature Lovers Movement Vs. State of Kerala, AIR  2009 SC 1573
  • Kamala Bakshi Vs. Khairati Lal, AIR  2000 SC 1808
  • Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd Vs. State of TN, AIR  2010 SC 795 (Ryotwari Patta).
  • Harska Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR  1960 Ker 345
  • M Chinnathambi Alias Muthiah Vs. Ponnathal, 2010-1 Mad WN 725;
  • Umapathi, K.  Vs. Addl. Collector, Thanjavur, 2000-2 Mad LJ 725
  • KS Shanthilal Vs. Sarojini Ammal, 1996-1 Mad LJ 562, (Ryotwari Patta)

Lessee is Referred to as Pattadhar

  • In Revenue documents (‘record of rights’) of various States in India, the lessee is referred to as pattadhar.
  • Several enactments, relating to revenue, also refer patta as lease-document.

Who is a Pattadar in a Revenue Document?

Is he the Real Owner?

‘Holder of property’ – ‘Pattadaran’. In Kerala, under the Land Tax Act Rules, 1972, and the Tax Receipt, the ‘holder of property’ is described as ‘Pattadaran’. It is definite – he need not be the title holder.

In Mathai Kitho v. Godananda Brahmananda Boothi Swamiar, 1956 KLT 313, the suit was filed by the owner (before the revenue sale). But, the “Patta” stood in the name of the “kanamdar. The properly was subjected to a revenue sale, proceeding against Pattadar. It was held as under:

  • “4. …Kanomdar, was the pattadar i.e., the registeted holder, of the property. For purposes of the Revenue Recovery Act, the registered holder for the time being of the property is the “land holder” … Even if the registered holder is not the real owner of the property, for purposes of the Revenue Recovery Act he, and he alone, can be treated as the landholder or owner, and a sale after notice to him will convey not merely the rights which he in fact has in respect of the property but the full ownership of the property…”

The following decisions were relied on:

  • Thoma Varkey v. The Dewan of Travancore, XXVII T.L.J. 13,
  • Mathew v. The Dewan of Travancore, XXXII TLJ 160,
  • Varkey v. The Dewan of Travancore, XXXII T.L.J. 325,
  • Zamorin of Calicut v. Sitarama, ILR VII Madras 405,
  • Eravi Pillai Krishna Pillai v. Maluk Mohamed Sahul Hameed, 1953 KLT 802.

Pokkuvaravu Rules, 1921 and Settlement Pattas

The Pokkuvaravu Rules, dated 6th March 1921, provided as follows:

  • “6. The Settlement Department having issued pattas at the Settlement to all holders of land liable to the payment of revenue, all changes subsequent to Settlement have to be brought to book in order to keep the land revenue accounts up to date. The process by which these changes or mutations of names are ascertained and recorded in the Government accounts is known as Pokkuvaravu.”
  • “8. Pokkuvaravu or transfer of registry falls under three clauses :
  •        (a) by voluntary transfer;
  •        (b) by decree of court or by Revenue sale ;
  •        (c) by succession.”
  • Rule 6 and 8 quoted in: Kochu Narayanan v. Janaki Amma, ILR 1962-2 (Ker) 302; 1962 KLJ 951.

Transfer of Registry Rules (Kerala)

The Transfer of Registry Rules, 1966, replaced Pokkuvaravu Rules, 1921.

Rule 15 of the Transfer of Registry reads thus:

  • “15. With the help of the details furnished in the statement in Form ‘A’ prepared by the Village Officers and such further information as the Tahsildar may receive from parties and village officials at the time of enquiry regarding the fact of possession and enjoyment, payment of tax and other particulars, the Tahsildar shall determine the person in whose name the transfer of registry shall be made. No case shall be rejected solely for the default of appearance of the parties as it is the immediate concern of the Land Revenue Department to keep the thandaper accounts (Chitta) upto date and bring into it the names of the real land-holders who shall be held liable for the payment of Government revenue due on the land. (Quoted in: Rahulan v. Tahasildar, 2021-4 KHC 562; 2021-4 KLT 689)

Rule 16 reads as under:

  • “16. The summary enquiry and decision thereon is only an arrangement for fiscal purposes and does not affect the legal rights of any person in respect of the lands covered by the decisions in transfer of registry cases. The question of legal rights is always subject to adjudication by Civil Courts and pattas will be revised from time to time in accordance with judicial decisions.”(Quoted in: Mohandas N. S v. Tahsildar Kanayannur Taluk Office, 2020-6 KLT 554)

Therefore, it is clear that (here) ‘Patta’ refers to a document unilaterally prepared by the Revenue Department.

This rule makes it clear – Patta and Title stand for Different Concepts. In Moideen v. Village Officer, 9 January, 2019 (Alexander Thomas, J.) Kerala High Court pointed out with reference to Rule 16 of the Transfer of Registry Rules that the mutation or acceptance of basic land tax, by itself, will not confer or extinguish title and that in accordance with the decisions of the Civil Court pattas will be revised from time to time. Rule 16 of the Transfer Registry Rules reads as under:

  • “The summary enquiry and the decision thereon is only an arrangement for fiscal purposes and does not affect the legal rights of any person in respect of the lands covered by the decisions in transfer of registry cases. The question of legal rights is always subject to adjudication by civil courts and pattas will be revised from time to time in accordance with judicial decisions.”

Significance of Patta – Possession, though not Title

In Sankaran v. Rajamma, AIR 1975 Ker 155,it is held as under:

  • “On the basis of the Court sale and delivery, the plaintiff has obtained patta in her name. Though patta is never conclusive evidence of title or possession, it certainly should be given due weight in considering the question of possession. Mutation in the registry is not without any significance. Official acts are presumed to be properly done unless proved otherwise. Therefore, I do not think the Courts below committed any error in this respect.”

Part – II

Patta in Madras Presidency

Following early decisions makes it clear that Patta is the document issued to the tenants by the landholders.

1. Vellayan Chetti v. Tiruvakone, 1882-5 ILR(Mad) 76

  • (The earliest legislation respecting the granting of pattas by landlords to tenants in this Presidency is to be found in Regulation XXV of 1802, which introduced the permanent assessment. The 14th section of that Regulation required “Zamindars” and ‘ Landholders'” to enter into engagements with their raiyats for a rent and within a reasonable time to grant to each raiyat a patta or cowle defining the amount to be paid by him and explaining every condition of the engagement and to give receipts for all payments made to them by their raiyats, and it declared a Zamindar, who, after the expiry of a reasonable time from the execution of a kabulyat, should neglect or refuse to comply with the demands of his under-farmers or raiyats for pattas or receipts, liable to a suit for damages in the Civil Court.)

2. Krishnasami Pillai v. Varadaraja Ayyangar, 1882-5 ILR (Mad) 345

  • (Patta is applied to describe the lease granted to a cultivator and, in this Presidency, the revenue engagement of a raiyat.)

Palaniappa v. Raya, 1883-7 ILR (Mad) 325

  • (Patta prescribes payment of the revenue, and, having regard to the terms of the inam grant, the patta must embrace the share of the Government as well as of inamdar.)

3. Theivu Pandithan v. Secretary of State For India, 1898-21 ILR(Mad) 433

4. Panduranga Pai and Kuchur Subba Row v. The Secretary of State for India in Council, 1905-15 MLJ 147

Patta in Estates Land Act, 1908

As shown above, patta was not a document of title, or a deed of grant in the erstwhile Madras State. (It is so observed in Secretary of State for India v. T. V.  Raghavachariar, 83 IndCas 1009; 1924 20 LW 815; 1924-47 MLJ 503, also.) The landholders had to issue pattas (rent deeds) and the ryots had to pay muchilikas (rent/rent receipt). They were to be exchanged ‘yearly basis’. (See: Land Law in Madras Presidency, BR Chakravarthy, 1927) Going by Estates Land Act, 1908, ‘Patta’ was originally a word connected to land-lease.

Patta‘ is issued by Landholder to Ryot, stating rate of Rent

  • As per Sec. 50, 51 and 52 of the Estates Land Act, 1908Patta‘ was a document issued by the landholder (person owning land and entitled to collect rent) to the ryot (person holds ryoti land on condition to pay rent) stating rate of rent, among other things, for the period, usually, one year.

Rayotwari Patta in Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Rayotwari) Act, 1948

  • Under Sec 11 of the Act every ryot would be entitled for Rayotwari Patta.
  • Note: A ryotwari pattadar was not a proprietor of land in its full sense, but only a tenant.

Ryotwari System in Malabar 

In ‘Land Law in Madras Presidency’, BR Chakravarthy, 1927, it is said as under:

  • “The land Revenue settlement in Malabar differed from the ordinary ryotwari settlement in the rest of the presidency, in that in Malabar. The existence of a landlord between the state and the actual cultivator is recognised in the theoretical distribution of the produce, on which the rates of assessment are based.”

The tradition as regards the Malabar-land is pointed out by Chkravarthy as under:

  • “The tradition with regard to Malabar is that the God Parasurama, who created it, granted it to a set of Brahmins to be held by them tax free; that accordingly these Brahmins held and cultivated the lands, without -even the obligation to pay any tax”.

Lease by Government, under Pattas

  • Sir Thomas Munro, Madras Governor, introduced ryotwari system throughout the Madras Presidency in 1820.  
  • Under the ryotwari system, land was given on lease by the government to the ryot under a patta.
  • A ryotwari pattadar was not a proprietor of land in its full sense, but only a tenant.
  • British Government collected taxes directly from the peasants. The rate of tax was 50% in dry-lands and 60% in irrigated land.

“Record of Rights” in Madras Presidency

In ‘Land Law in Madras Presidency’, 1927, BR Chakravarthy says as regards the first larger step for survey of lands as under:

  • “Record of Rights: The Local Government may make up order directing that a Survey be made and a. Record of Rights prepared by a revenue officer in respect of any estate or part there-of in the following cases.
  • (l) Where an application is made by the landholder or landholders, if there are more than one, and of the ryots;
  • (2) Where the Local Government considers, that the preparation of a record is necessary for securing the rights of the landholder; and of the ryots and for preventing disputes arising between them;
  • (3) Where an estate is managed by the Government or is under the superintendence of the Court of Wards.
  • The first step in the preparation of the Record, will be a survey of the lands under the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act 1897; the next step will be, if the Government so directs, to inquire into the rights and obligations of the ryots and of the landholder in respect of the several holdings. ‘When both these steps are completed, a preliminary record will be made of the results of the inquiries and of the survey by the Revenue Officer in .charge and published in such manner and for such period as the Government may direct. During the period of publication, all objections to any entries or omissions in the Record will be heard and determined by the Revenue Officer himself, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Government.”

‘Ryotwari’ Land also included in ‘Estate’ in Article 31A

In S. Thenappa Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1986 SC 1117, it was held, following Khajamian Wakf Estates v. State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 161, that the expression ‘estate’ in Article 31A included ‘ryotwari’ land also by virtue of the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution on June 20, 1964 with retrospective effect.

Part – III

In Travancore & Cochin – “Patta” denoted both Lease and Janmam

‘Patta’ was originally used in Travancore and Cochin also to denote Government-recognition of ‘holding’ lands, other than that with ‘ownership’ or ‘janmam’ rights; and subsequently it had been used for both lease, grant/licence and Janmam lands.

In the 1910 Indenture executed by an English citizen, Henry Mansfield Knight, in favour of Malayalam Rubber and Produce Co. Ltd. it is seen stated that the vendor (HM Knight) obtained land (Gudempara Estate) under ‘Pattas’ of 1907 and 1909 from the Travancore government subject to ‘terms conditions and covenants’ and also subject to ‘assessment’, for a period of 20/30 years. The indenture also provided for applying and obtaining ‘grant or title deed’ by the purchaser (from the Government). From this deed it can be seen that it conferred only lesser right than lease/grant.

In Harska Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR  1960 Ker 345, it is pointed out as under –

  • ‘According to the petitioners, the issue of the Patta under that Act in respect of these lands was something duly done and the repeal of the Act cannot in any way affect the right granted under that Patta, namely, the right to continue in possession of the lands till the end of 1144 on payment of Rs. 2,665 (about) per year as rent against the basic tax now demanded of over Rs. 12,000 per year’.

Part – IV

Presumptions in Favour of Govt. Lands

(a) There is a presumption in favour of Government – all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the Government.

(b) In order to defeat the title of the Government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the Government.

(c) In Pierce Lessley & Company Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlong Waoshare, AIR 1969 SC 843, it was held as under –

  • “In this country escheat is not based on artificial rules of common law; and is not an incident of feudal tenure.  It is incident sovereignty and rests on principle of ultimate ownership by the State of all property within the jurisdiction.”

(d) In Chotte Khan v. Muhammed Obedulla Khan, AIR 1953 Nag. 361, held

  • “the State is the ultimate owner of all property situate within its boundaries”.

(e) In Ameer Hussain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 204, 1977 AWC 1, it is held that it would be deemed that the disputed land vested in State and if the other side fails, in law,  it would be taken that the land was vested in State. (Followed in: Mohd. Shafiq v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, 2011-9 ADJ 24)

(f)  In R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, (2010) 5 SCC 203, it was held as under:

  • “15. …… All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the government, is not available to any person or individual.

(g) The law as to title of property is laid down in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, 2012(8) SCC 148 as under –

  • “The appellate courts examined the title of Government instead the plaintiff/respondent No. 1.  Such a course was not warranted.  The title of Government cannot be disputed.  In any event, possession of Government for decades is not disputed.  The plaintiff shifted the case from time to time; but failed to prove his title……….   The said courts did not realize that this was not the issue to be determined, rather the issue had been as to whether the plaintiff was the owner of the suit-land.”

(h) In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988 – It was pointed out –

  • “When the land subject to proceedings wherein adverse possession has been claimed, belongs to Government, the court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property.”

(i) In R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, (2010) 5 SCC 203, it was held as under:

  • “15. Suits for declaration of title against the government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects.
  • The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the government, is not available to any person or individual. …”

(j) In State of Kerala v. Pathrose Mathai, 1970 Ker LJ 517; 1969 KerLT 507, it was held as under:

  • “There is also no presumption that a person who enters Government land, improves the same & keeps possession, is exercising acts hostile to the title of the State. This is because it is not uncommon for persons to enter upon Government land & reclain and improve such land in the hope of ultimately getting registry or lease of such land.”

Period of Limitation – 30 years

R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, (2010) 5 SCC 203, continues (as regards period of limitation) as under:

  • ” … The second difference is in regard to the period for which title and/or possession have to be established by a person suing for declaration of title. Establishing title/possession for a period exceeding twelve years may be adequate to establish title in a declaratory suit against any individual. On the other hand, title/possession for a period exceeding thirty years will have to be established to succeed in a declaratory suit for title against government. This follows from Article 112 of Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a longer period of thirty years as limitation in regard to suits by government as against the period of 12 years for suits by private individuals. The reason is obvious. Government properties are spread over the entire state and it is not always possible for the government to protect or safeguard its properties from encroachments. Many a time, its own officers who are expected to protect its properties and maintain proper records, either due to negligence or collusion, create entries in records to help private parties, to lay claim of ownership or possession against the government.
  • Any loss of government property is ultimately the loss to the community. Courts owe a duty to be vigilant to ensure that public property is not converted into private property by unscrupulous elements.
  • 16. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration of title and injunction against government, in a casual manner, ignoring or overlooking the special features relating to government properties. Instances of such suits against government being routinely decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries are common. Whether the government contests the suit or not, before a suit for declaration of title against a government is decreed, the plaintiff should establish, either his title by producing the title deeds which satisfactorily trace title for a minimum period of thirty years prior to the date of the suit (except where title is claimed with reference to a grant or transfer by the government or a statutory development authority), or by establishing adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years.
  • In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring the presumptions available in favour of the government, grant declaratory or injunctive decrees against the government by relying upon one of the principles underlying pleadings that plaint averments which are not denied or traversed are deemed to have been accepted or admitted.

‘Mutation’ Only for Fiscal Purposes; Legal Rights are subject civil court decision

Following propositions can be culled out from the very rules of The Transfer of Registry Rules made applicable in the State of Kerala (Rule 15 and 16):

  1. It is the duty of the Tahsildar to determine the person in whose name the transfer of registry shall be made.
  2. It is the immediate concern of the Land Revenue Department to keep the thandaper accounts (Chitta) up to date.
  3. It is the immediate concern of the Land Revenue Department bring into the thandaper accounts (Chitta) the names of the real land-holders who shall be held liable for the payment of Government revenue due on the land.
  4. No case shall be rejected solely for the default of appearance of the parties.
  5. Only a summary enquiry is to be made by the Revenue authorities.
  6. The summary enquiry and the decision thereon is only an arrangement for fiscal purposes.
  7. The summary enquiry and the decision thereon do not affect the legal rights of any person in respect of the lands covered by the decisions in transfer of registry cases.
  8. The question of legal rights is always subject to adjudication by civil courts.
  9. And, pattas will be revised from time to time in accordance with judicial decisions.

In Sawarni vs. Inder Kaur and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 223, it was held that mutation in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title, nor does it have any presumptive value on title. (Referred to in: P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278)

In Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137 it was held that mere mutation of records would not divest the owners of a land of their right, title and interest in the land. (Referred to in: P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278, and Jitendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802)

In Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil, (1977) 2 SCC 49, it was held that there exists no universal principle that whatever will appear in the record of rights will be presumed to be correct, when there exists evidence to the contrary. (Referred to in: P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023 4 CurCC(SC) 278)

Part – IV

Does the Principle ‘Possession Follows Title’ Applies to Govt. Property?

It is so held in Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collectors, AIR 2003 SC 1805.

  • But, it is held it does not apply in the following situations-
  • The facts (on title/possession) are known (M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1)
  • There is evidence of independent possession/title (Bhavnagar Municipality Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 717).

Contra view

  • Mutation will not confer ‘title’ (see notes below)
  • Revenue Records Do Not Confer Presumptive Value on Title (see notes below).

Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collectors, AIR 2003 SC 1805

It is held in Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collectors, AIR 2003 SC 1805, that Section 110 embodies the principle that possession of a property furnishes prima facie proof of ownership of the possessor and casts burden of proof on the party who denies his ownership, and that the presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted-

  • “when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has no title”.

The Supreme Court observed further as under:

  • “Section 110 of the Evidence Act reads thus:
    • “110. Burden of proof as to ownership.-When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner.”
  • It embodies the principle that possession of a property furnishes prima facie proof of ownership of the possessor and casts burden of proof on the party who denies his ownership. The presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has no title.
  • This Court in Nair Service Society Limited v. K.C. Alexander and Ors., A.I.R. (1968) S.C. 1165 observed,
    • “the possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known, when the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.”
  • The pattedars proved their possession of the lands in question from 1312 Fasli (1902 A.D.) as pattedars. There is long and peaceful enjoyment of the lands in question but no proof of conferment of patta on the late Raja and the facts relating to acquisition of title are not known. The appellant- State could not prove its title to the lands. On these facts, the presumption under Section 110  of the Evidence Act applies and the appellants have to prove that the pattedars are not the owners. The appellants placed no evidence on record to rebut the presumption. Consequently, the pattedars, title to the land in question has to be upheld.”

When the principles in Sec. 110 and 114 CANNOT be invoked

As we find in M.  Siddiq  v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case), 2020-1 SCC 1, Section 110 or the principle ‘title follows possession‘ applies when the facts disclose no title in either of the disputants in which case, possession alone decides (presumption cannot be invoked when the facts are known). But, with respect to the principle ‘possession follows title‘, as we find in Anathula Sudhakar  v. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2033, if only title is proved by one party, then only the principle ‘possession follows title’ comes in.

It is equally important that both these principles on presumption, ‘possession follows title’ and ‘title follows possession’, cannot be invoked in cases where:

  • (i) the defendants do not claim title/possession to the suit property (Devasia @ Kutty v. Jose, 2014-4 KLJ 41; 2014-3 KLT(SN) 50).
  • (ii) the facts (on title/possession) are known (M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1), or
  • there is evidence of independent possession/title (Bhavnagar Municipality Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 717).

Mutation will not confer ‘title’

It is a settled proposition of law (i) that the mutation entry in revenue documents will not confer any right, title or interest in favour of any person and (ii) that the mutation in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose. After pointing out these legal propositions it is observed in Jitendra Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802, as under:

  • “6. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the case of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 137 , this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is observed and held that mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive value on title. Such entries are relevant only for the purpose of collecting land revenue. Similar view has been expressed in the series of decisions thereafter.
  • 6.1 In the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186 , it is observed and held by this Court that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose”, i.e., payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. It is further observed that so far as the title of the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court. Similar view has been expressed in the cases of Suman Verma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58; Faqruddin v. Tajuddin (2008) 8 SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368; Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689; T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342; Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259; and Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70.”

Revenue Records Do Not Confer Presumptive Value on Title

The Supreme Court in  Smt. Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import and Export Company (2019) and Commissioner, Bruhath Bangalore Mahanagra Palike vs Faraulla Khan (2021)observed that mutation in revenue records will not confer or lose title (Relied on Sawarni (Smt.) Vs. Inder Kaur (1996) 6 SCC 223, Balwant Singh & Anr. Vs. Daulat Singh (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. (1997) 7 SCC 137,  Narasamma & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2009) 5 SCC 591).

As pointed out above, it is observed by the Apex Court in State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 that revenue record is not a document of title; it merely raises a presumption in regard to possession (Quoted in M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1). The argument as to ownership based upon entries in the revenue records had been negated in Prahlad Pradhan  v. Sonu Kumhar,(2019) 10 SCC 259. It was held that the revenue record does not confer title to the property nor do they have any presumptive value on the title. (Quoted in Prabhagiya Van Adhikari Awadh Van Prabhag v. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj (SC): 2021)

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