Can a Power of Attorney Holder file a Civil Suit? Is there any bar by virtue of Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024-6 SCC 130?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

In Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024-6 SCC 130 (Pankaj Mithal,  Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.) held –

  • it is settled in law that Power of Attorney holder can only depose about the facts within his personal knowledge.

It is observed in this case –

  1. The law as understood earlier was that
    • a General Power of Attorney holder can appear, plead and act on behalf of a party he represents; but
    • he cannot become a witness on behalf of the party represented by him as no one can delegate his power to appear in the witness box to another party.
  2. In A.C Narayan v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC 790  upheld the principle of law laid down in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (2005-2 SCC 217) and clarified that Power of Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the court but he must have witnessed the transaction as an agent and must have due knowledge about it.  

The Supreme Court said in Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024-6 SCC 130 as under:

  • “28. The law as understood earlier was that a General Power of Attorney holder though can appear, plead and act on behalf of a party he represents but he cannot become a witness on behalf of the party represented by him as no one can delegate his power to appear in the witness box to another party. However, subsequently in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani vs. IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217, this Court held that the Power of Attorney holder can maintain a plaint on behalf of the person he represents provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question. It was opined that the Power of Attorney holder or the legal representative should have knowledge about the transaction in question so as to bring on record the truth in relation to the grievance or the offence. However, to resolve the controversy with regard to the powers of the General Power of Attorney holder to depose on behalf of the person he represents, this Court upon consideration of all previous relevant decisions on the aspect including that of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra) in A.C Narayan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC 790  concluded by upholding the principle of law laid down in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra) and clarified that Power of Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the court but he must have witnessed the transaction as an agent and must have due knowledge about it. The Power of Attorney holder who has no knowledge regarding the transaction cannot be examined as a witness. The functions of the General Power of Attorney holder cannot be delegated to any other person without there being a specific clause permitting such delegation in the Power of Attorney; meaning thereby ordinarily there cannot be any sub-delegation.
  • 29. It is, therefore, settled in law that Power of Attorney holder can only depose about the facts within his personal knowledge and not about those facts which are not within his knowledge or are within the personal knowledge of the person who he represents or about the facts that may have transpired much before he entered the scene. The aforesaid Power of Attorney holder PW-1 had clearly deposed that he is giving evidence on behalf of plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4 i.e. the Gala’s. He was not having any authority to act as the Power of Attorney of the Gala’s at the time his statement was recorded. He was granted Power of Attorney subsequently as submitted and accepted by the parties. Therefore, his evidence is completely meaningless to establish that Gala’s have acquired or perfected any easementary right over the disputed rasta in 1994 when the suit was instituted.”
  • In Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217, it was held that the Power of Attorney holder can maintain a plaintprovided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question.

It is observed (obvious, clerical-mistake) in Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024-6 SCC 130, as regards maintaining a plaint, as under:

  • “However, subsequently in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani vs. IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217, this Court held that the Power of Attorney holder can maintain a plaint on behalf of the person he represents provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question.”

But, it is seen that Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217, did not observe anything as to  ‘maintaining a plaint (as observed in Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani). Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd. referred to “complaint only“. It is said in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd. as under:

  • “Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, empowers the holder of power of attorney to “act” on behalf of the principal. In our view the word “acts” employed in Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, confines only in respect of “acts” done by the power of attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term “acts” would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power of attorney holder has rendered some “acts” in pursuance to power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined.
  • On the question of power of attorney, the High Courts have divergent views. In the case of Shambhu Dutt Shastri Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1986 2WLL 713 it was held that a general power of attorney holder can appear, plead and act on behalf of the party but he cannot become a witness on behalf of the party. He can only appear in his own capacity. No one can delegate the power to appear in witness box on behalf of himself. To appear in a witness box is altogether a different act. A general power of attorney holder cannot be allowed to appear as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff in the capacity of the plaintiff.
  • The aforesaid judgment was quoted with the approval in the case of Ram Prasad Vs. Hari Narain & Ors. AIR 1998 Raj. 185. It was held that the word “acts” used in Rule 2 of Order III of the CPC does not include the act of power of attorney holder to appear as a witness on behalf of a party. Power of attorney holder of a party can appear only as a witness in his personal capacity and whatever knowledge he has about the case he can state on oath but be cannot appear as a witness on behalf of the party in the capacity of that party. If the plaintiff is unable to appear in the court, a commission for recording his evidence may be issued under the relevant provisions of the CPC.
  • In the case of Dr. Pradeep Mohanbay Vs. Minguel Carlos Dias reported in 2000 Vol.102 (1) Bom.L.R.908, the Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court held that a power of attorney can file a complaint under Section 138 but cannot depose on behalf of the complainant. He can only appear as a witness.
  • However, in the case of Humberto Luis & Anr. Vs. Floriano Armando Luis & Anr. reported in 2002 (2) Bom.C.R.754 on which the reliance has been placed by the Tribunal in the present case, the High Court took a dissenting view and held that the provisions contained in Order III Rule 2 of CPC cannot be construed to disentitle the power of attorney holder to depose on behalf of his principal. The High Court further held that the word “act” appearing in order III Rule 2 of CPC takes within its sweep “depose”. We are unable to agree with this view taken by the Bombay High Court in Floriano Armando (supra).
  • We hold that the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Shambhu Dutt Shastri (supra) followed and reiterated in the case of Ram Prasad (supra) is the correct view. The view taken in the case of Floriano Armando Luis (supra) cannot be said to have laid down a correct law and is accordingly overruled.”

A.C Narayan v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC 790  

In view of difference of opinion amongst various High Courts as also the decisions of this Court in M.M.T.C.v. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd., 2002 (1) SCC 234, and in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd., 2005 (2) SCC 217, the following question (main) question was referred to the three judge bench:

  • “If the Power of Attorney holder fails to assert explicitly his knowledge in the complaint then can the Power of Attorney holder verify the complaint on oath on such presumption of knowledge?”

In the light of Sec. 142 of the NI Act the three Judge Bench answered the reference in negative. Sec. 142 reads as under:

  • “142. Cognizance of offences. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) –
  • no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;…”

The Bench answered the question as under:

  • “23) In the light of the discussion, we are of the view that the power of attorney holder may be allowed to file, appear and depose for the purpose of issue of process for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. An exception to the above is when the power of attorney holder of the complainant does not have a personal knowledge about the transactions then he cannot be examined. However, where the attorney holder of the complainant is in charge of the business of the complainant-payee and the attorney holder alone is personally aware of the transactions, there is no reason why the attorney holder cannot depose as a witness. Nevertheless, an explicit assertion as to the knowledge of the Power of Attorney holder about the transaction in question must be specified in the complaint.”

From the above, it is clear –

  • A civil suit can be filed by the plaintiff through a power of attorney;
  • but, he can furnish evidence on the ‘transaction’ (if so necessitated) if only he has direct knowledge.
  • Power of Attorney holder can maintain a complaint under Sec. 138 NI Act on behalf of the person he represents provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question.

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Judicial Admissions in Pleadings: Admissible Proprio Vigore Against the Maker

Saji Koduvath Advocate, Kottayam.

Taken from the Blog: Modes of Proof of Documents

Judicial Admissions, Stand on a Higher Footing

Admissions in pleadings (in the same, not earlier, proceedings) are judicial admissions. They stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions.

  • They may give rise to ‘Foundation of Rights’.
  • They are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proofs.
  • Evidentiary admissions  (including that in the previous pleadings or separate proceedings) are not conclusive by themselves and they can be shown to be wrong.

Judicial Admission Must Be in the very Same Litigation

In Umesh Agarwal v. Mahesh Agarwal (Sikkim), 06 Aug 2013, Indian Kanoon, Pius Kuriakose, CJ., held as under:

  • “42. A survey of the various decisions cited before me at the Bar, particularly, the judgment of the Supreme Court in 
    • Karan Kapahi v. Lalchand Public Charitable Trust, AIR 2010 SC 2077, 
    • Basant Singh v. Janki Singh, AIR 1967 SC 341, 
    • Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, (1974) 1 SCC 242,
  • shows that the law contemplates two kinds of admissions – judicial admissions and evidentiary admissions. It is judicial admissions which are contemplated under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act. In order to that an admission is a judicial admission, the same has to be an admission through his pleadings or by other materials in writing produced in the very same litigation. All other admissions are evidentiary admissions. Judicial admissions stand on a higher pedestal than evidentiary admissions. Evidentiary admissions will have to be proved against the makers like any other relevant fact.” 

Admission Contained in Pleadings and that in Evidentiary Admissions

An admission made by a party to a suit in an earlier proceeding is admissible against him.

In Ammini Tharakan v. Lilly Jacob, Thottathil B.Radhakrishnan & SS Satheesachandran, JJ. (7 Oct 2013) the Kerala High Court held that admission contained in a plaint or written statement or in an affidavit or sworn deposition by a party in a previous litigation would be regarded as an admission in a subsequent action. It can be explained by the maker thereof, unless thereis no estoppel (Sec. 31, Evi. Act). Such an admission is a relevant fact. The courts can arrive at a decision on the basis of the admissions. See:

  • Thimmappa Rai v. Ramanna Rai, (2007) 14 SCC 63 .
  • Deb Prosanna v. Hari Kison, AIR 1937 Cal. 515 ,
  • Chendikamba v. Viswanathamayya, AIR 1939 Mad 446 ,
  • Lal Singh v. Guru Granth Sahib, AIR(38) 1951 Pep 101,  and
  • Mst. Ulfat v. Zubaida Khatoon, AIR 1955 All. 361.

In Ammini Tharakan v. Lilly Jacob (7 Oct 2013) it is observed that Section 17 of the Evidence Act says that a document or a statement which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, is an admission. It was pointed out in this decisions as under:

  • Admissions in pleadings are governed under Section 58 Evidence Act.
  • Section 31 of the Evidence Act, says as to evidentiary admissions.
  • There is distinction between the two.
  • The evidentiary admissions are merely relevant and not conclusive unless they operate as estoppel.
  • An admission by a party in a previous suit is admissible in evidence in a subsequent suit.The burden is upon the party making it to show that it was wrong on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so, though the party making the admission may give evidence to rebut this presumption.
  • Unless and until that is satisfactorily done, the fact admitted must be taken to be established.
  • This is true notwithstanding the fact that the statement which amounts to an admission was not put to the party making it, when that person came into the witness box.

The High Court further held as under in Ammini Tharakan v. Lilly Jacob (7 Oct 2013) –

  • “Here, the plaintiff, who was a defendant in Lucy’s suit, had filed Ext.B10 written statement through her power of attorney holder and mother Martha. That written statement contained the clear stand that neither Lucy nor the plaintiff herein had any share in any of the assets forming the estate of late David Tharakan. This statement which amounts to an admission as to a particular state of affairs, has not been explained by the plaintiff either in the plaint or at any point of time in any manner worthy of being accepted as a rebuttal. While it is the law that admission does not confer title, what we treat as admissions here is demonstrative of the plaintiff’s animus in re inheritance to her father’s estate. We proceed to discuss that aspect further in the succeeding paragraph.”

Categorical Admission cannot be Resiled but, may be Explained or Clarified

In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly, 2008-7 SCC 85, it is held, after considering various decisions including Panchdeo Narain Srivastava (1984-Supp. SCC 594) and Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co. (AIR 1977 SC 680; 1976-4 SCC 320), as under:

  • “28. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other.” (Quoted in: Ram Niranjan Kajaria v. Sheo Prakash Kajaria, 2015-10 SCC 203; S. R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma, 2010-5 SCC 274, )

Admissions in the pleadings are Admissible Proprio Vigore

Admissions in the pleadings are admissible proprio vigore against the maker thereof.

  • See: Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India, AIR 2022 SC 5058;
  • National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rattani, (2009) 2 SCC 75
  • Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, 2009-5 SCC 713.
  • Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2009 SC 120; 2008-14 SCC 589.
  • Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash, 2008 15 SCC 673
  • State of Haryana v. M. P. Mohla (SB Sinha, J.), 2007-1 SCC 457
  • Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India, 2006 (12) SCC 233,

Admissions – Best Evidence. Evidentiary Admissions – Not Conclusive

In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi (M. Hidayatullah, S.K. Das), AIR 1960 SC 100, it was held as under:

  • “In view of all these admissions and the revenue records, it was necessary for the appellant to prove that the admissions were erroneous, and did not bind him. An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous.”

In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Icharam, AIR 1974 SC 471, 1974-1 SCC 242, held:

  • “Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted.
  • Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under s. 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case,
    • stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions.
  • The former class of admissions are
    • fully binding on the party that makes them and
    • constitute a waiver of proof.
  • They by themselves
    • can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties.
  • On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”

The propositions in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalptram Iccharam, 1974-1 SCC 242 (admissions in pleadings stand on higher footing and are admissible as per Section 58 of the Evidence Act) is referred to in the following decisions:

  • Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar, 2022-10 SCC 496,
  • Alagu Pharmacy v. N. Magudeswari, AIR 2018 SC 3821; 2018-8 SCC 311,
  • Ram Niranjan Kajaria v. Sheo Prakash Kajaria, 2015-10 SCC 203,
  • D. N. Jeevaraju v. D. Sudhakar, AIR 2011 SC 1158; 2010-14 SCC 69,
  • S. R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma, 2010-5 SCC 274,
  • Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (SB Sinha, J.), AIR 2005 SC 809; 2005-11 SCC 314,
  • Epoch Enterrepots v. M. V. Won Fu, AIR 2003 SC 24; 2003-1 SCC 305,
  • Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas, AIR 1993 SC 1449;
  • Arjun Khiamal Makhijani: Prithdayal Chetandas v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani, 1989-4 SCC 612,
  • Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, AIR 1987 SC 1986; 1987-4 SCC 1.

Inconsistent  Pleadings Not Possible by Addl. or Subsequent Pleadings

In Mohammed Ali v. Khutejatul Kubra, ILR 2001 Kar 4580, 2002(1) KarLJ 596, the Karnataka High Court has held as under:

  • “6. A perusal of the aforesaid order makes it clear that if a party wants to plead a new ground of claim or a statement containing allegation of fact inconsistent with the previous pleadings of the party pleading the same shall be raised by way of amendment only. There is a total prohibition for pleading new claims and inconsistent statements by any other mode except by way of amendment to the existing pleadings. Though subsequent pleadings is permitted under Order 8, Rule 9 of CPC the same cannot be made use for raising pleas which are altogether new and inconsistent with the original pleadings in the written statement. Order 6, Rule 7 of the CPC deals with departure from the previous pleadings, Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC deals with the amendment of pleadings and Order 8, Rule 9 of the CPC deals with subsequent pleadings. When they are read together distinction becomes apparent. Then it is clear by way of subsequent pleadings under Order 8, Rule 9 of the CPC new claims and inconsistent pleas cannot be raised and for raising such pleas one has to resort to Order 6, Rule 18 of the CPC only”.

Amendment of Written Statement to Prejudice Plaintiff – Not Allowed

The Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court held in Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co., (1977) 1 SCR 728: AIR 1977 SC 680: 1976-4 SCC 320 – cannot be allowed to withdraw an amendment if such withdrawal would amount to totally displacing the case of the plaintiff and which would cause him irretrievable prejudice. In Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal,1998 (1) SCC 278, the Supreme Court followed the decision, Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co., observing as under:

  • “Even that apart the said decision of two learned judges of this Court Akshaya Restaurant v. P. Anjanappa, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 303), runs counter to a decision of a Bench of three learned judges of this court in the case of Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. Ladha Ram & Co., (1977) 1 SCR 728. In that case Ray, CJ., Speaking for the Bench had to consider the question whether the defendant can be allowed to amend his written statement by taking an inconsistent plea as compared to the earlier plea which contained an admission in favour of the plaintiff. It was held that such an inconsistent plea which would displace the plaintiff complete from the admissions made by the defendants in the written statements cannot be allowed. If such amendments are allowed in the written statement plaintiff will be irretrievably prejudiced by being denied the opportunity of extracting the admission from the defendants. In that case a suit was filed by the plaintiff for claiming a decree for Rs. 1,30,000/- against the defendants. The defendants in their written statement admitted that by virtue of an agreement date 07th April 1967 the plaintiff worked as their stockist-cum-distributor. After three years the defendants by application under order VI Rule 17 sought amendment of written statement by substituting paragraphs 25 and 26 with a new paragraph in which they took the fresh plea that plaintiff was mercantile agent cum-purchaser, meaning thereby they sought to go behind their earlier admission that plaintiff was stockist- cum-distributor. Such amendment was rejected by the Trial Court and the said rejection was affirmed by the High Court in Revision. The said decision of the High Court was upheld by this Court by observing as aforesaid. This decision of a Bench of three learned judges of this the written statement contains an admission in favour of the plaintiff, by amendment such admission of the defendants cannot be allowed to be withdrawn if such withdrawal would amount to totally displacing the case of the plaintiff and which would cause him irretrievable prejudice. Unfortunately the aforesaid decision of three member Bench of this Court was not brought to the notice of the Bench of two learned judges that decided the case in Akshaya Restaurant (supra). In the latter case it was observed by the Bench of two learned judges that it was settled law that even the admission can be explained and even inconsistent pleas could be taken in the pleadings. The aforesaid observations in the decision in Akshaya Restaurant (supra) proceed on an assumption tat it was the settled law that even the admission can be explained and even inconsistent pleas could be taken in the pleadings. However the aforesaid decision of the three member Bench of this Court in Modi Spinning (supra) is to the effect that while granting such amendments to written statement no inconsistent or alternative plea can be allowed which would displace the plaintiff’s case the cause him irretrievable prejudice.
  • … We were then taken to another decision of this Court in the case of Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahay and another [ 1984 (Supp.) SCC 594]. In that case the plaintiff was held entitled to amend his plaint by submitting that though earlier he stated that the defendant was uterine brother, the plaintiff by amendment in his plaint could submit that the defendant was his brother and the word ‘uterine’ could be dropped. Even in that case the main case put forward by the plaintiff did not get changed as the plaintiff wanted submit that the defendant was his brother. whether the was uterine brother or real brother was a question of decree and depended on the nature of evidence that may be led before the Court. Therefore, the deletion of word ‘uterine’ was not found to be displacing the earlier case of the plaintiff. On the facts of the present case also, therefore, the aid decision cannot be of any assistance to the learned counsel for respondents.
  • In our view, therefore, on the facts of this case and as discussed earlier, no case was made out by the respondents, contesting defendants, for amending the written statement and thus attempting to go behind their admission regarding 5 out of 7 remaining items out of 10 listed properties in Schedule-A of the plaint. However, so far as Schedule-B properties are concerned from the very inception the defendants’ case qua those properties was that plaintiff had no interest therein. By proposed amendment they wanted to introduce an event with reference to those very properties by submitting that they had been in possession of trespassers. Such amendment could not be said to have in any way adversely or prejudicially affected the case of the plaintiff or displaced any admission on their part qua Schedule-B properties which might have resulted into any legal right in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, so far as Schedule-B properties were concerned, the amendment could not be found fault with. Hence exercising the powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India we would not be inclined to interfere with that part of the decision of the High Court allowing the amendment in the written statement, even though strictly speaking High Court could not have interfered with even this part of the order under Section 115, CPC.

Erroneous Admissions & Earlier Findings -Effect

In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi, AIR 1960 SC 100, it was held further as under:

  • “In view of these admissions, the question of burden of proof, as we have already pointed out, is really academic, and if any burden lay upon any party, it was upon the appellant to displace by cogent and convincing evidence that these admissions were erroneous and need not be accepted in proof.”

S, 17, Evidence Act: No distinction – Admission in a pleading and other Admissions

In Basant Singh v. Janki Singh, AIR 1967 SC 341, 1967-1 SCR 1, it is observed as under:

  • “In Phipson on Evidence, 10th Edn, Art. 741, the English law is thus summarised:
    • “Pleadings, although admissible in other actions, to show the institution of the suit and the nature of the case put forward, are regarded merely as the suggestion of counsel, and are not receivable against a party as admissions, unless sworn, signed, or otherwise adopted by the party himself.”
  • Thus, even under the English law, a statement in a pleading sworn, signed or otherwise adopted by a party is admissible against him in other actions. In Marianski v. Cairns (1 Macq. 212 (H.L.).), the House of Lords decided that an admission in a pleading signed by a party was evidence against him in another suit not only with regard to a different subject-matter but also against a different opponent. Moreover, we are not concerned with the technicalities of the English law. Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes no distinction between an admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions. Under the Indian law, an admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits. In other suits, this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive, and it is open to the party to show that it is not true.”

Admission is Not Conclusive as to the Truth of the matter

In Kishori Lal v. Mr. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504, it was held that admissions were not conclusive and that the maker of the admissions is at liberty to prove that the admissions were made mistakenly or that the admissions were untrue, unless such admissions otherwise operate as estoppel. The Supreme Court also noticed in that case that admissions are mere pieces of evidence and that if the truth relating to the matter admitted is known to the parties, the admissions would not be considered as admissions in the true sense. In Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “An admission is not conclusive as to the truth of the matter stated therein. It is only a piece of evidence, the weight to be attached to which must depend on the circumstances under which it is made. It can be shown to be erroneous or untrue, so long as the person to whom it was made has not acted upon it to his detriment, when it might become conclusive by way of estoppel.”

Court’s Jurisdiction to Require to Prove an Admitted Document

In any case, besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts (Evidence Act, CPC and CrPC) shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove that document. We can see it in Sec. 58 of Evidence Act, Order XII, Rule 2A Proviso of the CPC and Sec. 294 of the CrPC .

Section 294 of Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

  • “294. No formal proof of certain documents. (1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document.
  • (2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government.
  • (3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed:
  • Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

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Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

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Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

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Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

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Document Exhibited in the Writ Petition as ‘True Copy’ – Can it be Used as ‘Admission’, in a Civil Suit ?

Saji Koduvath Advocate, Kottayam.

Taken from the Blog: Modes of Proof of Documents

Inquisition

Can a document exhibited in a writ petition as ‘true copy’ be marked in a civil court as ‘admission’ – producing the certified copy of the writ petition; for example:
(i) a letter written by the Petitioner (in the Writ Petition)
(ii) a letter or a private document obtained to him (apparently original of the same is with the Petitioner)
(iii) copy of a Public Document.

The Answer is:

  • Yes, it can be ‘marked’ on ‘admission’.
  • The existence of the contents of the first and third documents (letter written by the Petitioner and copy of a Public Document) can be ‘presumed’ by the court, against the petitioner, in a subsequent civil suit, under Sec. 114, Evidence Act (which lays down a rebuttable presumption).
    • Note:
    • 1. Sec. 58, Evidence Act says – Admitted facts need not be proved.
    • 2. Certified copy of a public document need not be proved by a witness – Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633.
    • 3. Even in a case where a document exhibited in the Certified Copy of the Writ Petition is marked in the civil court, if it falls under Sec. 65 (e) or (f) of the Evidence Act, it has to be ‘proved’ by producing a certified copy of the same, in view of the stringent directives in Sec. 65 (“In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible”.)
  • Though the existence of the second class of documents (a letter or a private document obtained to him – original of which are apparently with the Writ-Petitioner) can be presumed, if truth of contents of those documents is in question or denied the adverse party, it has to be proved independently .
    • Note: Proviso to Sec. 58 Evidence Act reads as under:
    • “Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.”
    • Also Note: Normally the documents relied of in the Writ petition will not be denied by the petitioner therein.

Certified copy of a public document need not be proved by a witness

In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa (P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta), AIR 1963 SC 1633, it is held as under:

  • “The document in question being a certified copy of a public document need not have been proved by calling a witness.”

See also:

  • State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, (1983) 3 SCC 118.

This proposition in Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633, is referred to in the following decisions:

  • Sarojini Amma v. Palace Administration Board, 2024 Ker 75727; 2024 KLT(Online) 2545; 2024-6 KLT(SN) 36,
  • Shail v. Nasib Khan, 2018-3 CGLJ 450 (Chh)
  • State of Gujarat v. Ashokkumar Lavjiram Joshi (J.B. Pardiwala, J), 2018-2 Glh 166 (Guj)
  • Raj Moti Dal Mills v. Sales Tax Officer (B. S. Chauhan and D. P. Gupta, JJ.), 2004-136 STC 576 (All)
  • United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hamu Ram, 2004 5 WLC 513 (Raj).

Admissions in the pleadings are Admissible Proprio Vigore

Admissions in the pleadings are admissible proprio vigore against the maker thereof.

  • See: Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India, AIR 2022 SC 5058;
  • National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rattani, (2009) 2 SCC 75
  • Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, 2009-5 SCC 713.
  • Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2009 SC 120; 2008-14 SCC 589.
  • Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash, 2008 15 SCC 673
  • State of Haryana v. M. P. Mohla (SB Sinha, J.), 2007-1 SCC 457
  • Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India, 2006 (12) SCC 233,

Judicial Admissions, Stand on a Higher Footing

Admissions in pleadings (in the same proceedings) are judicial admissions. They stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions.

  • They may give rise to ‘Foundation of Rights’.
  • They are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proofs.
  • Evidentiary admissions  (including that in the previous pleadings in the earlier proceedings) are not conclusive by themselves and they can be shown to be wrong.

In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Icharam, AIR 1974 SC 471, 1974-1 SCC 242, held that admissions in pleadings are judicial admissions under Section 58 of the Evidence Act. They are made by parties or their agents at or before the hearing of a case and stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. Former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proofs. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of parties. On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence are by themselves not conclusive and they can be shown to be wrong.

The propositions in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalptram Iccharam, 1974-1 SCC 242 (admissions in pleadings stand on higher footing and are admissible as per Section 58 of the Evidence Act) is referred to in the following decisions:

  • Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar, 2022-10 SCC 496,
  • Alagu Pharmacy v. N. Magudeswari, AIR 2018 SC 3821; 2018-8 SCC 311,
  • Ram Niranjan Kajaria v. Sheo Prakash Kajaria, 2015-10 SCC 203,
  • D. N. Jeevaraju v. D. Sudhakar, AIR 2011 SC 1158; 2010-14 SCC 69,
  • S. R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma, 2010-5 SCC 274,
  • Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (SB Sinha, J.), AIR 2005 SC 809; 2005-11 SCC 314,
  • Epoch Enterrepots v. M. V. Won Fu, AIR 2003 SC 24; 2003-1 SCC 305,
  • Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas, AIR 1993 SC 1449;
  • Arjun Khiamal Makhijani: Prithdayal Chetandas v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani, 1989-4 SCC 612,
  • Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, AIR 1987 SC 1986; 1987-4 SCC 1.

In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly, 2008-7 SCC 85, it is held, after considering various decisions including Panchdeo Narain Srivastava (1984-Supp. SCC 594.) and Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co. (AIR 1977 SC 680; 1976-4 SCC 320), as under:

  • “28. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other.” (Quoted in: Ram Niranjan Kajaria v. Sheo Prakash Kajaria, 2015-10 SCC 203; S. R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma, 2010-5 SCC 274, )

Judicial Admission must be in the very Same Litigation

In Umesh Agarwal v. Mahesh Agarwal (Sikkim), 06 Aug 2013, Indian Kanoon, Pius Kuriakose, CJ., held as under:

  • “42. A survey of the various decisions cited before me at the Bar, particularly, the judgment of the Supreme Court in
    • Karan Kapahi v. Lalchand Public Charitable Trust, AIR 2010 SC 2077, 
    • Basant Singh v. Janki Singh, AIR 1967 SC 341, 
    • Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, (1974) 1 SCC 242,
  • shows that the law contemplates two kinds of admissions – judicial admissions and evidentiary admissions. It is judicial admissions which are contemplated under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act. In order to that an admission is a judicial admission, the same has to be an admission through his pleadings or by other materials in writing produced in the very same litigationAll other admissions are evidentiary admissions. Judicial admissions stand on a higher pedestal than evidentiary admissions. Evidentiary admissions will have to be proved against the makers like any other relevant fact.” 

Court’s Jurisdiction to Require to Prove an Admitted Document

In any case, besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts (Evidence Act, CPC and CrPC) shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove that document. We can see it in Sec. 58 of Evidence Act, Order XII, Rule 2A Proviso of the CPC and Sec. 294 of the CrPC .

Section 294 of Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

  • “294. No formal proof of certain documents. (1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document.
  • (2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government.
  • (3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed:
  • Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved.”

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Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

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Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

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Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

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“Title Thereto” in the Definition of ‘Prescriptive Easement’ in Sec. 15 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Sec. 15 Easement Act

Sec. 15 Easement Act reads as under:

  • “15. Acquisition by prescription: Where …… a right of way or any other easement has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming title thereto, as an easement and as of right, without interruption, and for twenty years, the right to such access and use of light or air, support, or other easement, shall be absolute.”

What does “claiming title thereto” refer to?

  • Answer: It is claiming of ‘title to (the legal right of) easement’.

Following decisions refer this proposition –

  • Ramlal v. Tulsi Ram, 2014-3 CGLJ 369 (Chh),
  • Deo Kumar v. Kailash Chand, 2007-4 MPHT 151; 2008-1 MPLJ 123,
  • Patel Karshanbhai Bababhai v. Patel Bhaichandbhai Khushalbhai, 21 Jun 2001 (Guj),
  • Unnikrishnan v. Ponnu Ammal, AIR 1999 Ker 405,
  • Ibrahimkutty Koyakutty v. Abdul Rahumankunju Ibrahimkutty (K.S. Paripoornan, J.), AIR 1993 Ker 91, 1992 (1) Ker LT 775,
  • D. Ramanatha Gupta v. S. Razaack, AIR 1982 Kar  314,
  • Surendrasingh v. Phirosahah, (Sinha C.J. & Hidayatullah, J.), AIR 1953 Nag. 205,
  • Siti Kantapal v. Radha Gobinda Sen, AIR 1929 Cal. 542,
  • Sultan Ahamed v. Waliullah, (1912) 17 Indian Cases 22.

Peacock in his treatise, “Law Relating to Easements in British India”, Third Edn., at page 608 said as under:

  • “As an easement is not one of the ordinary rights of ownership, it is necessary that either party claiming or relying on an easement should plead the nature of his title thereto so as clearly to show the origin of the right, whether it arises by statutory prescription, or express or implied grant, or the old common law method of a lost grant“.

Quoting Peacock, in Surendrasingh v. Phirosahah, (Sinha C.J. and Hidayatullah, J.), AIR 1953 Nag. 205, it is held as under:

  • “No doubt, the words ‘title thereto‘ refers tile of ‘easement’ claimed; and the word ‘title’ was not used in the general sense now used (that is, absolute ownership) in the Indian Easements Act, 1882.” (Quoted in: Ibrahimkutty Koyakutty v. Abdul Rahumankunju Ibrahimkutty (K.S. Paripoornan, J.), AIR 1993 Ker 91, 1992 (1) Ker LT 775.)

In Maharani Rajroop Koer v. Syed Abul Hossein, 1879-7 Ind. App. 240, the Privy Council, referring Sec. 27 of the Limitation Act, No. IX. of 1871, (similar to Sec. 15, Easements Act 1882) observed as under:

  • “The object of the statute was to make more easy the establishment of rights of this description, by allowing an enjoyment of twenty years, if exercised under the conditions prescribed by the Act, to give, without more, a title to easements.”

Gale on Easements (15th Edn.),Pages 415, reads as under:

  • “Under the present system of pleading, it is conceived that, whether the section be brought against the servient owner or a stranger, a party cannot safely allege his right to an easement generally, but should state specifically the manner in which he claims title to the easement, whether by grant (actual or lost), prescription at common law, or under the Prescription Act, and in many cases it is advisable to plead, alternatively, a title by all three methods.” (Quoted in: Ibrahimkutty Koyakutty v. Abdul Rahumankunju Ibrahimkutty (K.S. Paripoornan, J.), AIR 1993 Ker 91, 1992 (1) Ker LT 775.)

MullaCode of Civil Procedure (14th Edn.) Volume II, at page 986, states the law thus :

  • “Easement — A party claiming or relying on an easement should plead the nature of the title thereto, so as to clearly show the origin of the right, whether it arises by statutory prescription or express or implied grant, or the old common law method of a lost grant.”

Rent Control Acts

Rent Control Acts enacted by various States say – where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court.

It is definite that this provision does not speak about the “ownership”; but only ‘title as the landlord‘.

Conclusion

Though the word ‘title’ is now generally used to denote absolute ownership, in the Indian Easements Act, 1882, the phrase title thereto refers – the title to an easement.

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Principles and Procedure

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Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

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Negotiable Instruments Act

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Can Documents be Marked In Cross Examination, if Witness Admits Them?

Jojy George Koduvath

The Answer is, YES.

Documents can be used in two ways in cross-examination. They are:

  • 1. For marking it, to use it as a substantive evidence.
    • Note: It must be a document that is produced in the regular way, invoking provisions of Orders VII, VIII and XIII, CPC.
  • 2. For the cross examination, invoking Sec. 145 of the Evidence Act.
    • Note: It can be done – even without producing the document in court. But, it must be a document written by the witness.

Relevant Provisions in the Civil Procedure Code for the Production of Documents

Order VII

  • Rule 14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.— (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
  • (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
  • (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
  • (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiffs witnesses, or handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.

Order VIII

  • Rule 1-A. Duty of defendant to produce documents upon which relief is claimed or relied upon by him.—(1) Where the defendant bases his defence upon a document or relies upon any document in his possession or power, in support of his defence or claim for set-off or counter-claim, he shall enter such document in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the written statement is presented by him and shall, at  the same time, deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the written statement.
  • (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the defendant, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
  •  (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the defendant under this rule, but, is not so produced shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
  • (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to documents —
    • (a) produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or
    • (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.

Order XIII

  • Rule 1. Original documents to be produced at or before the settlement of issues.—(1) The parties or their pleader shall produce on or before the settlement of issues, all the documentary evidence in original where the copies thereof have been filed along with plaint or written statement.
  • (2) The Court shall receive the documents so produced:
  • Provided that they are accompanied by an accurate list thereof prepared in such form as the High Court directs.
  • (3) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to documents—
    • (a) produced for the cross-examination of the witnesses of the other party; or
    • (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.

Inherent power u/s. 151 CPC  to be invoked if failure to produce documents before the Settlement of Issues

Documents liable to be produced along with Plaint (Order VII Rule 14) or Written Statement (Order VIII Rule 1-A(4) can be produced subsequently with the leave of the Court” as provided under these rules itself.

  • No such provision in Order XIII.
  • Therefore, inherent power u/s. 151 CPC has to be invoked.

Documents Produced for the Cross-Examination and used to Refresh his Memory

Relevant provisions of the Evidence Act are the following:

  • Cross examination – Sec. 145, Evid. Act
  • Refresh memory – Sec. 159, Evid. Act

Note: In both these cases, the statements in the document must be that of the witness.

If Witness Admits Document In Cross Examination, it can be Marked

Relevant provisions as to admission are Sec. 21 and 58 Evidence Act.

  • Section 21: Admission is relevant and may be proved.
  • Section 58: Facts admitted need not be proved.

A document properly produced invoking Order VII Rule 14 or Order VIII Rule 1-A(4) CPC or Order XIII Rule 1 CPC (or invoking inherent power u/s. 151 CPC) can be marked as an exhibit under Sec. 21 or 58 Evidence Act.

Following Decisions Say as to Valid Marking of Documents in Cross Examination

  • Trimurti Charitable Public Trust v. Muni Kumar Razdan, 2024-1 RN 25 (MP)
  • Bhag Singh Gambhir v. Rama Arora, on 8 July, 2022
  • S.  Raj v. S.  Gopalakrishnan 2022 Supreme(Mad) 831
  • Tamun Impex Company Private Limited v. Ozone Projects Private Limited, 2019-5 CTC 432; 2019 1 LW 29
  • Prabhakara Alias Suresh v. State of Karnataka, 2018-5 KarLJ 661
  • A.  Sennimalai Gounder v. E. S. Selambanan, 22 Aug 2017, 2017 Supreme (Mad) 1592;
  • Narayan Singh v. Ram Chandra Mandal, 2016-3 BLJ 248
  • Kannusamy Naicker v. Nataraja Naicker, 2012 Supreme(Mad) 3664
  • Bommanayaka v. Bommanayaka, 2013-3 AIR(Kar)(R) 299; ILR 2012 (Kar) 3391; 2013-2 KarLJ 114
  • Bharath Electronics Contract Labour Union v. Bharat Electronics Ltd, Bangalore, 2012-3 AIR(Kar)(R) 150; ILR 2012 (Kar) 1653; 2012-6 KarLJ 61.

In Prehlad Krishan v. Smt.  Mohini Devi, 1999-2 Raj CJ 282; 1999-1 RLR 518 (Raj), it was contended that no rent note was executed by the tenant in favour of the plaintiff though the plaintiff has got signature of defendant on a blank rent note. The High Court held that the argument, in its considered view, ‘is contrary to his own admission regarding execution of the rent note, which is a duly exhibited document on record of the trial Court during cross-examination of the tenant and, therefore, it is not open to the appellant to raise such a plea in second appeal before this Court’.

In Bhima Jewellery and Diamonds (P) Ltd.  v. O. Sandeep Kumar (Devan Ramachandran, J.), AIR 2021 Ker  8; 2020-3 ILR (Ker) 1028; 2020-5 KLT 40, it is held as under:

  • “28. In such confines, the production of a document under Order VII Rule 14(4), Order VIII Rule 1A (4) and Order XIII Rule 1(3)(a) of the CPC, axiomatically, will have to be construed to happen when it is physically put to the witness during cross examination and when the Court then receives it on record. Hence no Court can refuse a document being put to a witness during cross examination merely for the reason that it had not been produced earlier or not produced as per the manner in which it ought to have been normally produced.
  • 29.  Therefore so concluded, an adjunct question arises as to how the Trial Court should deal with a document produced at the cross examination of a witness. The answer to this is fairly easy when the witness admits the document – the Court then will mark it and admit it in evidence, subject to its relevance and probative value.”

In Chalil Kalliani v. Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan, 18 Jan 2008 (KT Sankaran, J.), 2008 Supreme (Ker) 43, it is held as under:

  • “It is relevant to note that Ext. B1 dated 7.5.1900 relied on by the defendants is also a registration copy of the original document. It was marked in evidence during the cross examination of PW1.”

Also Read:

End Notes 1

1. Document Marked Collectively in Cross Exam. – Contents are to be Specifically Proved

The substantial question of law raised in Mahalaxmi Shikshan Samiti v. Manikrao Kishnarao Dessai, 2021-5 AllMR 50; 2022-1 MhLJ 262, is the following:

  • “Whether the reliance by the First Appellate Court on the document marked at Exhibit 76 is erroneous when the contents of such document were not proved and such document was exhibited in the cross examination of PW 1 which is not permissible in law in the facts of the case?”

It is answered in the affirmative by holding, inter alia, that ‘the reliance by the Appellate Court on the documents marked as Exhibit 76-C collectively’ was erroneous, ‘since the contents of the documents are not proved’.

The Court pointed out –

  • Chapter V of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relate to documentary evidence.
  • Section 61, says that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence.
  • In terms of Section 62, primary evidence means the document itself being produced for inspection of the Court.
  • As per Section 63, secondary evidence means and includes, (1) Certified copies, (2) Copies made from the original by mechanical processes, and copies compared with such copies, and (3) Copies made from or compared with the original, (4) Counterparts of documents, and (5) Oral accounts of the contents of a document.
  • Section 64 mandates that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in cases fall under Sec. 65.
  • Section 65 stipulates the conditions in which the secondary evidence may be given. It requires that the ‘foundation’ is to be laid before production of secondary evidence.

The Bombay High Court further pointed out –

  • Mere production of the document is no proof of its contents as the legal position is that mere production and marking of the document as exhibit by the Court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents.
  • Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, by the evidence of those persons, who can vouch or state the truth of the facts in issue.
  • A document can be proved primarily by examining the person, who has executed or created the document by writing and signing the same, but when such examination is not possible, execution of a document can be proved by examining a person, who saw the document being written and signed.
  • In absence of direct evidence relating to writing and signature on the document, its execution may be proved by examining a person, who is (i) qualified and competent to express his opinion as to the handwriting and signature , (ii) by acquaintance of otherwise and (iii) by comparison of the handwriting as envisaged under Section 73 of the Evidence Act (S. Gopal Reddy V. State of A.P. 1996-4 SCC 596, referred to)

The High Court pointed out the following in Kaliya v. State of M.P. 2013-10 SCC 758, observing that it ‘highlighted the parameters regarding permissibility of secondary evidence’-

  • “Section 65(c) of the Act 1872 provides that secondary evidence can be adduced relating to a document when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason, not arising from his own default, or neglect, produce it in reasonable time. The court is obliged to examine the probative value of documents produced in court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence. (Vide: H. Siddiqui (dead) by Lrs. v. A. Ramalingam, AIR 2011 SC 1492; and Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal and Anr. v. M.S.S. Food Products, (2012) 2 SCC 196).
  • However, the secondary evidence of an ordinary document is admissible only and only when the party desirous of admitting it has proved before the court that it was not in his possession or control of it and further, that he has done what could be done to procure the production of it. Thus, the party has to account for the non-production in one of the ways indicated in the section. The party further has to lay down the factual foundation to establish the right to give secondary evidence where the original document cannot be produced. When the party gives in evidence a certified copy/secondary evidence without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, the opposite party must raise an objection at the time of admission. In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage. Further, mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. (Vide: The Roman Catholic Mission v. The State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1457; Marwari Khumhar and Ors. v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri and Anr., AIR 2000 SC 2629; R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple and Anr., AIR 2003 SC 4548; Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaff, AIR 2004 SC 4082; and Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr. v. Rampal Singh Bisen, (2010) 4 SCC 491).”

The High court relied on M.Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, 2010-9 SCC 712 which held as under:

  • “We do not agree with the reasoning of the High Court. It is true that a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of a document must adduce primary evidence of the contents, and only in the exceptional cases will secondary evidence be admissible. However, if secondary evidence is admissible, it may be adduced in any form in which it may be available, whether by production of a copy, duplicate copy of a copy, by oral evidence of the contents or in another form. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. It should be emphasized that the exceptions to the rule requiring primary evidence are designed to provide relief in a case where a party is genuinely unable to produce the original through no fault of that party.”

The Bombay High Court, in Mahalaxmi Shikshan Samiti v. Manikrao Kishnarao Dessai, 2021-5 AllMR 50; 2022-1 MhLJ 262, appraised the legal position authoritatively laying down as under:

  • “27. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. When a document is merely exhibited, while exhibiting the same, it does not finally decide the right of the party or form any opinion or express any opinion on the document. The document will have to be proved qua its contents in terms of Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act as the said provision contemplate proof of contents of the documents, either by primary or secondary evidence.”

End Notes 2

Can Photocopies of documents be used in cross examination?

Yes.

Document Marked Without Objection: Courts in India consistently follow RVE Venkatachala Gounder

RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu (R.C. Lahoti & Ashok Bhan, JJ.), AIR 2003 SC 4548: (2003) 8 SCC 752,considered the effect of marking a secondary evidence (photocopy of rent-note) without any objection. It is the well-established decisive leading decision in the following propositions of law.

  • Objection as to the irregularity of mode adopted for proving the document should be taken when the evidence is tendered;
  • Once the document has been marked as an exhibit, the objection cannot be allowed to be raised at any subsequent stage.
  • Failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of that right.
  • The objection enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility.
  • It is a rule of fair play for it would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect by giving formal proof of a document.

Following earlier decisions were relied on in RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu (supra) :

  • The Roman Catholic Mission v. The State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1457;
  • Padman and Others v. Hanwanta, AIR 1915 PC 111;
  • P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S.Perumal, 1972 (2) SCR 646.

RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu (supra) held as under:

  • “17. The other document is the rent note executed by Defendant 2 in favour of the plaintiff. Here also the photocopy of the rent note was produced. Defendant 2 when in the witness box was confronted with this document and he admitted to have executed this document in favour of the plaintiff and also admitted the existence of his signature on the document. It is nobody’s case that the original rent note was not admissible in evidence. However, secondary evidence was allowed to be adduced without any objection and even in the absence of a foundation for admitting secondary evidence having been laid by the plaintiff.
  • 18. …
  • 19. ….
  • 20. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has relied on Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1457] in support of his submission that a document not admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the abovesaid case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as “an exhibit”, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly,  in the event of finding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiverof the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior court.
  • 23. Since documents Exts. A-30 and A-34 were admitted in evidence without any objection, the High Court erred in holding that these documents were inadmissible being photocopies, the originals of which were not produced.”

RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu, AIR 2003 SC 4548: (2003) 8 SCC 752, is referred to and quoted with approval in the following decisions:

Lachhmi Narain Singh v. Sarjug Singh, AIR 2021 SC 3873;
Sonu @ Amar Vs State Of Haryana, 2017 AIR SC 3441; 2017-8 SCC 570;
Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics Pvt.  Ltd., 2015-9 SCC 755;
Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd.  v. Surendra Oil & Dal Mills, 2010-8 SCC 423;
Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Sukumar Mukherjee, 2009-9 SCC 221;
Directorate of Revenue v. Mohammed Nisar Holia, 2008 2 SCC 370;
Dayamathi Bai v. K. M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082; 2004-7 SCC 107.

See: Anil Madan vs R.K.Madan & Ors. on 21 August, 2009 (Indian Kanoon). In this decision the plaintiff was confronted with a photocopy of an affidavit jointly executed by the plaintiff, defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 which had been exhibited.

Read Blogs:

Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents – Not applied

1. Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745

  • This proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was neither attracted nor applied in Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745, for – the rent receipts were taken as proved, for, it was not disputed’ by the other side.

2. Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh2013-10 SCC 758

  • In Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh2013-10 SCC 758, also the proposition was neither attracted nor applied, for – the secondary evidence of dying declaration produced in this case (with foundational evidence) was accepted by the Court.

3. Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085

  • In Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, also the proposition was neither attracted nor applied  for the  truth of the facts in the document was in issue.

Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents – Applied

1. M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, 2010-9 SCC 712

  • But in M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, 2010-9 SCC 712, the proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was applied for – the Validity and Genuineness of the photocopy (of the Caste Certificate) was very much in question.

2. H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240

  • In H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240, also the proposition was applied , for – the photocopy was shown to the witness during cross-examination alone, and signature alone was admitted by the witness. 

3. Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865

  • Similarly in Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865, also the proposition was applied , for – the accounts of the Plaintiff would not be proved by itself.

End Notes 3

Exhibiting of a document is an administrative act.

In Bama Kathari Patil v. Rohidas Arjun Madhavi, 2004-2 AllMR 290; 2004-3 BomCR 509; 2004-3 CivCC 14; 2004-2 MhLJ 572, it is observed as under:

  • “3. By an application dated 20th October, 2003, the petitioner (original defendant No. 1) made a prayer for recalling the plaintiff for further cross-examination on the ground that the agreement dated 14th August, 1986 was exhibited after the cross-examination of the plaintiff was concluded. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that as the document was not exhibited at the time of cross-examination, the defendant No. 1 did not cross examine the plaintiff on that document. Since the document has been exhibited after the cross-examination of the plaintiff was over, he should be given an opportunity of cross-examining the plaintiff regarding the said document. Exhibiting of an document is an administrative act. It is true that a document which is produced in Court is ordinarily exhibited only after its proof. But, exhibiting a document does not mean that the document is proved and non-exhibiting a document does not mean that the document is not proved. A document is required to be proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. Merely for administrative convenience of locating or identifying a document, it is given an Exhibit number in courts. Exhibiting a document has nothing to do with the proof though, as a matter of convenience, only the proved documents are exhibited.”

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BURDEN of PROOF is Static; ‘ONUS’ alone Shifts, According to Indian Law

Jojy George Koduvath & Saji Koduvath.

Introduction

The doctrine of ‘burden of proof’ indicates the party upon whom the responsibility lies to establish the truth of a relevant fact in a legal proceeding.

In certain cases, the entire burden of proof may rest on one party to the litigation. In others, it may ‘shift’ to the other side when the first party prima facie discharges its obligation. It is, in most cases, depended upon the standard of proof expected from the parties to the litigation. In criminal cases, the standard of proof rests upon the prosecution and is ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’; whereas in civil cases, it is simply the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ or ‘balance of probabilities.’

Part I

Burden of Proof as a Legal Concept in Indian and English Law

Sec. 104 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (corresponding to Sec. 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872) defines Burden of Proof as under:

  • “104. Burden of proof: Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist, and when a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.”

The Evidence Act in force in India systematically codifies the rules of evidence in civil and criminal cases, and provides clear guidelines on what is admissible in court and how evidence is to be presented.

But, in the UK (especially England and Wales), there is no full-fledged or comprehensive single enactment similar to the ‘Evidence Act’ in India.

Fundamentally, English courts follow the Common Law (judge-made law) with respect to the basic doctrines of evidence, such as the burden of proof, standard of proof, probative evidence, relevance, the res gestae rule, direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, and primary evidence. Various procedural enactments also provide piecemeal statutory provisions. The important statutes in this regard are –

  • Criminal Justice Act, 2003,
  • Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999,
  • Civil Evidence Act, 1995,
  • Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 (PACE).

Burden of Proof – Primary Principles

1. Burden of Proof is Static; It never Shifts

As shown above, the “burden of proof” is depended upon the obligation upon each party in a legal proceeding to furnish evidence. The fundamental rules regarding the burden of proof in the Indian judicial system, as established by judicial authorities, can be summarized as under:

  • The burden of proof is always static and does not shift.
  • Burden of proof lies on the person who would fail if no evidence is adduced on either side.
  • Ordinarily, the burden of proof would be on the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.

2. ‘Onus’ of proof ‘shifts’

‘Onus’ literally means – ‘the responsibility or duty to do something‘. In Indian law, “onus of proof” has a distinct connotation:

  • Though Indian Evidence Act does not use the word “onus”, authoritative judicial pronouncements have clarified that it differs from the ‘static’ burden of proof.
  • The doctrine of onus of proof ‘shifts’ the duty of proving a fact upon one party (when sufficient or proper evidence is furnished by it) to the other party. That is, when the ‘onus’ on the first party is discharged, it shifts to the opposing party to provide rebuttal or counter evidence.

In Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, AIR 2023  SC5018; 2023-10 SCC 148, it is observed as under:

  • “29. There are two senses in which the phrase ‘burden of proof ’ is used in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872…. One is the burden of proof arising as a matter of pleading and the other is the one which deals with the question as to who has first to prove a particular fact. The former is called the legal burden and it never shifts, the latter is called the ‘evidential burden’ and it shifts from one side to the other. [See: Kundanlal v. Custodian Evacuee Property (AIR 1961 SC 1316)].
  • 30. The legal burden is the burden of proof which remains constant throughout a trial. It is the burden of establishing the facts and contentions which will support a party’s case.
  • On the other hand, the evidential burden may shift from one party to another as the trial progresses according to the balance of evidence given at any particular stage; the burden rests upon the party who would fail if no evidence at all, or no further evidence, as the case may be is adduced by either side (See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition para 13). While the former, the legal burden arising on the pleadings is mentioned in Section 101 of the Evidence Act, the latter, the evidential burden, is referred to in Section 102 thereof. [G. Vasu v. Syed Yaseen (AIR 1987 AP 139) affirmed in Bharat Barrel v. Amin Chand [1999- 3 SCC 35].”

See also: Gian Chand & Brothers v. Rattan Lal, AIR 2013 SC 1078,

Burden of proof never shifts; Onus of proof shifts

In Addagada Raghavamma v. Addagada Chenchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136, it was pointed out – there is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof. It reads as under:

  • Burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which never shiftsOnus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence.”

This principle in Addagada Raghavamma v. Addagada Chenchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136 (burden of proof never shifts, and onus of proof shifts) is affirmed in the folloing decisions of our Apex Court-

  • Mahakali Sujatha v. Branch Manager, Future Generali India Life Insurance Company Limited, AIR 2024 SC 2019; 2024-8 SCC 712;
  • Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, AIR 2023 SC 379;
  • Mohd.  Abdullah Azam Khan v. Nawab Kazim Ali Khan, 2022-11 JT 214; 2022-16 Scale 689
  • Union of India v. Vasavi Coop. Housing Society, 2014- 2 SCC 269;
  • Gian Chand & Brothers v. Rattan Lal @ Rattan Singh, AIR 2013 SC 1078: 2013-2 SCC 606;
  • Sebastiao Luis Fernandes v. K.V.P.  Shastri, 2013-15 SCC 161;
  • Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 2006 SC 1971; 2006-5 SCC 558;
  • R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, AIR 2003 SC 4548; 2003-8 SCC 752.

Burden of Proof’ and ‘Onus of Proof‘- English Law

These terms (‘burden of proof’and ‘onus’) are often regarded as synonymous expressions by English courts, and are used interchangeably. (See: R v Hunt [1987] AC 352: (1987) I All ER I (HL); Cross and Tapper on Evidence.)

The terms ‘Legal burden‘ and ‘Evidential burden‘ are legal concepts primarily rooted in English Law. The ‘legal burden’ identifies the party responsible for proving a fact; the ‘evidential burden’ pertains to whether sufficient evidence has been presented to warrant proper adjudication.

Halsbury’s Laws of England

Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 17, para 13 and 14, explains these legal concepts under the head, ‘Legal burden‘ and ‘Evidential burden‘. It reads as under:

  • “13. The legal burden is the burden of proof which remains constant throughout a trial; it is the burden of establishing the facts and contentions which will support a party’s case. If at the conclusion of the trial he has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, he will lose. The legal burden of proof normally rests upon the party desiring the court to take action; thus, a claimant must satisfy the court or tribunal that the conditions which entitle him to an award have been satisfied. In respect of a particular allegation, the burden lies upon the party for whom substantiation of that particular allegation is an essential of his case. There may therefore be separate burdens in a case with separate issues.”
  • “14. The legal burden is discharged by way of evidence, with the opposing party having a corresponding duty of adducing evidence in rebuttal. This constitutes evidential burden. Therefore, while both the legal and evidential burdens initially rested upon the appellant, the evidential burden may shift in the course of trial, depending on the evidence adduced. As the weight of evidence given by either side during the trial varies, so will the evidential burden shift to the party who would fail without further evidence”. (Referred to in: Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, AIR 2023 SC 5018; 2023-10 SCC 148).

Part II

Burden of Proof Loses its Importance

  • (a) if both parties adduced evidence
  • (b) if there is sufficient evidence on an issue.

Burden of Proof Gets Significance

  • (a) when no evidence at all on the question in dispute
  • (b) when a person on whom the burden of proof lay, failed to adduce any evidence altogether
  • (c) when no adequate evidence so as to shift onus, or
  • (d) when best evidence is withheld (Sriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd.  v. Mahak Singh, AIR 2007 SC  1370; 2007-4 SCC 94).
  • (e) when Court cannot “Make Up its Mind” (Kumbhan Lakshmanna v. Tangirala Venkateswarlu, AIR 1949 PC 278) from the evidence adduced.

Rule of ‘Best Evidence’

Rule of ‘Best Evidence’ requires a party to produce all material evidence with him. If he fails to produce the best evidence, then illustration ‘g’ of Section 114 of the Evidence Act allows the court to take the presumption that, had that evidence been produced, it would have been unfavourtable to him.

Weakness of the Defence & High Degree of Probability

A Plaintiff has to win the title-suit on his evidence; not on the weakness of the adversary. But it must be noted that the plaintiff need to show only a high degree of probability; and that it shifts the onus on the defendant.

This principle applies in both civil and criminal cases. In M. Srinivasulu Reddy v. State Inspector of Police, 1991 (3) ALT 542, 1993 CriLJ 558, it is held as under:

  • “The prosecution cannot take advantage of the weaknesses of the defence or cannot take advantage of the inconsistent stand taken by the accused from time to time. The prosecution must stand on its own legs basing on the evidence that has been let in by it.”

The Supreme Court of India, in Ratnagiri Nagar Parishad v. Gangaram Narayan Ambekar, 2020-7 SCC 275, held as under:

  • “The initial burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to substantiate his cause, if he failed to discharge the same, the weakness in the defense cannot be the basis to grant relief to the plaintiffs and burden cannot be shifted on the defendants.”

Ownership & Title – High degree of Probability, Onus would Shift

In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003 SC 4548: 2003-8 SCC 752, the law is stated in the following terms :

  • “A fact is said to be ‘proved’ when, if considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of a particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. It is the evaluation of the result drawn by applicability of the rule, which makes the difference. …”
  • In a suit for recovery of possession based on title it is for the plaintiff to prove his title and satisfy the court that he, in law, is entitled to dispossess the defendant from his possession over the suit property and for the possession to be restored to him. However, as held in A. Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma there is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof:
    • burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which never shifts. Onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence.
  • In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff’s title.
  • In the present case, the trial Court and the first appellate Court have noted that the plaintiff has not been able to produce any deed of title directly lending support to his claim for title and at the same time the defendant too has no proof of his title much less even an insignia of title. Being a civil case, the plaintiff cannot be expected to proof his title beyond any reasonable doubt; a high degree of probability lending assurance of the availability of title with him would be enough to shift the onus on the defendant and if the defendant does not succeed in shifting back the onus, the plaintiff’s burden of proof can safely be deemed to have been discharged. In the opinion of the two Courts below, the plaintiff had succeeded in shifting the onus on the defendant and, therefore, the burden of proof which lay on the plaintiff had stood discharged. …”.
  • … A high degree of preponderance of probability proving title to the suit property was raised in favour of the appellant and the courts below rightly concluded the burden of proof raised on the plaintiff having been discharged while the onus shifting on the defendant remaining undischarged. ..”
  • (Quoted in: Anil. Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, 2006-5 SCC 558; City Municipal. Council, Bhalki v. Gurappa, (2016) 2 SCC 200)

Adverse Inference Drawn (even if no burden), if Withheld Documents

The Supreme Court held in Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413, as under:

  • Even if a party to the suit has no burden, the Court can draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession.

From the above, it is definite that, in a proper case, if the defendant who withholds important document (admittedly) in his possession, the court can take the adverse presumption against the defendant, even if the plaintiff (who has the burden of proof or who is bound to create a high degree of probability) did not adduce any evidence.

Duty to Produce Helpful Document

In National Insurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi v. Jugal Kishore, 1988-1 SCC 626, Our Apex Court stated the law as under:

  • “This Court has consistently emphasized that it is the duty of the party which is in possession of a document which would be helpful in doing justice in the cause to produce the said document and such party should not be permitted to take shelter behind the abstract doctrine of burden of proof.” (Quoted in: Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, 2003-8 SCC 673)

Modern Trend in English Law

In a leading Scottish case, Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd., 1967 SC (HL) 79; [1968] AC 107, the majority of the House of Lords held that, where a statute does not expressly indicate the burden of proof in respect of a particular fact, the court should consider practical considerations in determining on whom the burden lies — particularly the relative ease or difficulty with which each party might face in discharging the burden. Analysing Nimmo, in R v Hunt [1987] 1 AC 352, Lord Griffiths said:

  • “When all the cases are analysed, those in which the courts have held that the burden lies on the defendant are cases in which the burden can be easily discharged.”

R v Hunt [1987] 1 AC 352, is followed in subsequent cases which include –

  • R v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14
  • R v Wright [2009] EWCA Crim 2169
  • R v Sheldrake [2004] UKHL 43.

Burden of Proof Not Relevant when “Both Sides had Adduced Evidence”

In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan paulo Avira, AIR 1959 SC 31, the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court held as under:

  • The question of burden of proof at the end of the case when both the parties have adduced their evidence is not of very great importance and the Court has to come to a decision on a consideration of all the materials.

In Kalwa Devadattam v. Union of India,  1964-3 SCR 191, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “The question of onus probandi is certainly important in the early stages of a case. It may also assume importance where no evidence at all is led on the question in dispute by either side; in such a contingency the party on whom the onus lies to prove a certain fact must fail. Where however evidence has been led by the contesting parties on the question in issue; abstract considerations of onus are out of place; truth or otherwise of the case must always be adjudged on the evidence led by the parties. ” 

In Arumugham v. Sundarambal, AIR 1999 SC 2216, it has been held as under:

  • “On the question of burden of proof we are of the view that even assuming burden of proof is relevant in the context of the amended provision of Sec. 100 C.P.C., the same would not be relevant when both sides had adduced evidence. It would be relevant only if a person on whom the burden of proof lay, failed to adduce any evidence altogether.”

The Supreme Court, in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 2006 SC 1971, referring Sec. 102 of the Evidence Act (The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side), explained ‘burden of proof’ as under:

  • “Pleading is not evidence, far less proof. Issues are raised on the basis of the pleadings. The defendant-appellant having not admitted or acknowledged the fiduciary relationship between the parties, indisputably, the relationship between the parties itself would be an issue. The suit will fail if both the parties do not adduce any evidence, in view of Section 102 of the Evidence Act. Thus, ordinarily, the burden of proof would be on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue and it rests, after evidence is gone into, upon the party against whom, at the time the question arises, judgment would be given, if no further evidence were to be adduced by either side.”

Burden of Proof Remains Only Academic

In Narayan v. Gopal, AIR 1960 SC 100, it was held as under:

  • “The burden of proof is of importance only where by reason of not discharging the burden which was put upon it, a party must eventually fail, where, however, parties have joined issue and have led evidence and the conflicting evidence can be weighed to determine which way the issue can be decided, the abstract question of burden of proof becomes academic.”

In Raghunathi v. Raju Ramappa Shetty, AIR 1991 SC 1040, it is observed that it is a settled law that once the parties have been permitted to produce evidence in support of their respective cases and it is not their grievance that any evidence was shut out the question of burden of proof loses significance and remains only academic.

See also:

  • Seturatnam Aiyar v. Venkatachala Gounden, (1919)   47 IA 76,
  • Chidambara Sivaprakasa v. Veerama Reddi, 49 IA 286 303: AIR 1922 PC 292,
  • Kumbham Lakshmanna v. Tangirala Venkateswarlu, AIR 1949 PC 278,
  • Mohd.  Abdullah Azam Khan v. Nawab Kazim Ali Khan, 1976-3 SCC 32,
  • Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, 2003-8 SCC 673.

Courts prefer Substantial Justice in the Judicial Process

In Lakshmi v.  Chinnammal (Mukundakam Sharma, S.B. Sinha), AIR 2009 SC 2352, 2009-13 SCC 25, it is held as under:

  • “12. If bringing on record a document is essential for proving the case by a party, ordinarily the same should not be refused; the Court’s duty being to find out the truth. The procedural mechanics necessary to arrive at a just decision must be encouraged. We are not unmindful of the fact that the court in the said process would not encourage any fishing enquiry. It would also not assist a party in procuring a document which he should have himself filed.”

In Kailash v. Nanhku, 2005-4 SCC 480, it was held as under :

  • “All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice.” (Quoted in: Lakshmi v.  Chinnammal, AIR 2009 SC 2352, 2009-13 SCC 25)

In Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, 2006-1 SCC 75, it was observed as under:

  • “17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a hand-maiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well recognized exceptions to this principle are:
  • where the Statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of non-compliance.
  • where the procedural defect is not rectified even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
  • where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
  • where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court.
  • in case of Memorandum of Appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.” (Quoted in: Lakshmi v.  Chinnammal, AIR 2009 SC 2352, 2009-13 SCC 25)

Conclusion

From Chapter VII, (Of the Burden of Proof) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (corresponding to Chapter VII of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872), it is deciphered by our courts –

  • Burden of proof is constant, and
  • Onus of proof alone shifts.

Authoritative judicial pronouncements enjoin that it is improper to say: ‘the burden of proof shifts.’

It is also noteworthy that Indian courts prefer substantial justice in the judicial process and they consistently emphasize that it is the duty of the party in possession of a document (which would aid in delivering justice) to produce it; and such a party would not be allowed to take shelter behind the abstract doctrine of the burden of proof.

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Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Public Documents Admissible Without Formal Proof

Taken from: Public Documents: Proof and Presumption

Jojy George Koduvath.

Relevant Provisions

Sec. 74  of the Evidence Act defines Public Documents. It reads as under:

  • 74. Public documents.
  • The following documents are public documents :
  • (1)Documents forming the acts or records of the acts
    • (i) of the sovereign authority;
    • (ii) of official bodies and tribunals; and
    • (iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth or of a foreign country;
  • (2) public records kept in any State of private documents.

Sec. 76  of the Evidence Act defines Certified copies of public documents. It reads as under:

  • 76. Certified copies of public documents.
  • Every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies.
  • Explanation. – Any officer who, by the ordinary course of official duty is authorized to deliver such copies, shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of this section.

Section 77 in The Indian Evidence Act, reads as under:

  • 77. Proof of documents by production of certified copies.
  • Such certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or part of the public documents of which they purport to be copies.

Public Documents can be Proved by Certified copy

In R. V. E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V. P. Temple, AIR 2003 SC 4548; 2003-8 SCC 752it is held as under:

  • “It is not disputed that the order of Charity Commissioner is a public document admissible in evidence without formal proof and certified copy of the document is admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the existence and contents of the original. An order of Charity Commissioner is not per se the evidence of title inasmuch as the Charity Commissioner is not under the law competent to adjudicate upon questions of title relating to immovable property which determination lies within the domain of a Civil Court.”

In Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti, AIR 1990  SC 396, it is held that correctness of certified copies can be presumed under Section 79.

Certified copies of the public documents can be proved without formal proof. See:

  • Jaswant Singh v. Gurdev Singh, 2012-1 SCC 425 ,
  • Shyam Lal @ Kuldeep v. Sanjeev Kumar, AIR 2009 SC  3115; 2009-12 SCC 454
  • P. Purushottam Reddy v.  Pratap Steels LTD. , AIR 2002 SC 771; 2002-2 SCC 686
  • Harpal Singh and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361
  • Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633
  • Vijayamma v. G.  Venugopal, 2024-2 Ker HC 553
  • Arti Meena v. Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, 2020-1 SCT 1 (Raj).
  • Collector (L. A. ), South Andaman v. Himangshu Mondal, 2015-2 CalLT 1
  • Poddar Plantations Limited v. Thekkemariveettil Madhavi Amma, ILR 2014-1 Ker 813; 2014 1 KLT 439
  • Rajasthan State Road Trans. Corp. v. Nand Kishore, 2002 ACJ 1564 (Raj)
  • Md. Akbar v. State of A.P., 2002 CrLJ 3167 (And)

In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa (Gajendragadkar , J.), AIR1963 SC1633; 1964-2 SCR 673, it is held as under:

  • “9. … The document in question being a Certified copy of a public document need not have been proved by calling a witness.”(Referred to in Rangaraju v. Kannayal, 10 Jan 2012, (Mad).

In Harpal Singh and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361, it is held as under:

  • “3.…  We cannot agree with him for the simple reason that the entry was made by the concerned official in the discharge of his official duties, that it is therefore clearly admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine its author ” (Quoted in: Manikanta v. State of Karnataka, 2024 Kar HC 21233)

In Shyam Lal @ Kuldeep v. Sanjeev Kumar, AIR 2009 SC  3115; 2009-12 SCC 454, it was observed as under:

  • “25. The findings of the learned District Judge holding Ex. P. 2 to be a public documentand admitting the same without formal proof cannot be questioned by the defendants in the present appeal sinceno objection was raised by them when such document was tendered and received in evidence.
  • It has been held in Dasondha Singh and Others v. Zalam Singh and Others [1997(1) P.L.R. 735] that an objection as to the admissibility and mode of proof of a document must be taken at the trial before it is received in evidence and marked as an exhibit.
  • Even otherwise such a document falls within the ambit of Section 74, Evidence Act, and is admissible per se without formal proof”.

The Supreme Court, in Jaswant Singh v. Gurdev Singh, 2012-1 SCC 425, it is held that certified copy of a public document prepared under Section 76 of the Act, in terms of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is admissible in evidence under Section 77 of the said Act, without being proved by calling witness. It is said as under:

  • “9. … To put it clear, the compromise had become a part of the decree which was passed by the court of Sub-Judge Ist Class, Hoshiarpur. Hence, it is a public document in terms of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short ‘the Act’) and certified copy of the public document prepared under Section 76 of the Act is admissible in evidence under Section 77 of the said Act. A certified copy of a public document is admissible in evidence without being proved by calling witness. Inasmuch as the decree was passed and drafted in the light of the compromise entered into between the parties, viz., the plaintiff and the defendants, the certified copy of such document which was produced before the Court, there is presumption as to the genuineness of such certified copy under Section 78 of the Act.”

See also the following cases where documents were accepted in evidence and acted upon on the basis of Section 35 Evidence Act:

  • Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1982 SC 1057 (admission forms as also the School’s register)
  • Harpal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361 (certified copy of the birth register).

In Mosomat Jago Devi v. Mahabir Prasad Joshi, 2007-2 PCCR 164; 2007-3 PLJR 197 (Pat), it is held as under:

  • “It is true that this order-sheet is not an exhibited document but admittedly, it is a public document and since it is on record, as such judicial notice of the public document can be legally taken.”

In Silli Man Subba VS Man Bahadur Subba, 2015 ACJ 2575, it is pointed out as under:

  • “there was no necessity to examine the BDO to prove as the certificate would fall within the meaning of a public document as provided under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and that judicial notice can be taken of it under Clauses (6) and (7) of Section 57 thereof.”

In Sumer v. Bator, 2020-143 AllLR 55; 2020-4 AWC 4072 (All) it is held as under:

  • “Certified copies of these documents that are public documents, do no require formal proof. They are read in evidence as public documents.”

The Court can Take Judicial Notice of Public Records

In Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 2493; 2018-7 SCC 1

  • “123. There can be no dispute that parliamentary standing committee report being in the public domain is a public document. Therefore, it is admissible under Section 74 of the Evidence Act and judicial notice can be taken of such a document as envisaged under Section 57(4) of the Evidence Act. There can be no scintilla of doubt that the said document can be taken on record.”

In Bangalore Development Authority v. Bhagavandas Patel 2017 2 AIR(Kar)(R) 695; ILR 2017 Kar 1319, it is held as under:

  • “25. The documents now sought to be produced along with I.A.2/2007 are public documents and merely compliment the exhibits already marked as D1 and D2. The same being public documents, this Court takes judicial notice of the same.”

In Juhi Chawla v. Gangandeep Singh, 2020-1 MPWN 7, it is held as under:

  • “8. The Income Tax Return of the respondent cannot be treated a public document and the Court cannot take judicial notice of the same.”

Rama Association Private Limited v. Delhi Development Authority, 1998-74 DLT 653 (Del), it is held as under:

  • “It is a document emanating from DDA and it is a document for public use and, therefore. Court can take judicial notice of it and can look into the contents of the Master Plan.”

In Income Tax Officer v. Abdul Majeed, 1987-2 KLT 303 (KT Thomas, J.) observed as under:

  • “Proceedings under S.279(1) of the Act are official acts and the document evidencing the proceedings of the Commissioner is a public document, the production of which would be sufficient to enable the court to take judicial notice thereof. Even if the document containing the proceedings of the Commissioner has not been formally marked as an exhibit, the document cannot be overlooked by the Criminal Court. No formal proof through oral evidence is required for a public document. In Income tax Officer, Hassan v. Dharmchand Multanmul (1972 (Vol. 86) ITR 70) a similar situation arose. In Chat case the counsel for the accused pointed out at the time of argument that there was no sanction to prosecute him and hence the complaint was liable to be dismissed. At that stage, the Income-tax Officer filed an application for recalling the first witness for the purpose of formally proving the proceedings by which sanction was accorded. As the Magistrate did not accede to the request, the matter was taken up before the High Court of Mysore. It was observed by the High Court that recalling of the witness for the purpose of proving the sanction was not necessary “as it would be open to the Magistrate to look into the sanction produced by the prosecution”. I respectfully agree with the aforesaid reasoning of the learned single judge of the Mysore High Court. I therefore hold that the acquittal, on the ground that there was no formal proof of sanction, cannot be sustained.”

In Mangilal v. Mankunwarbai, 1986-2 MPWN 231, it is pointed out as under:

  • “Ex. D-1 being a public document, the Court below should have taken a judicial notice of the same.”

Official Document Relevant by itself, and no other proof required

In Shiv Ram v. Shiv Charan Singh, AIR 1964 Raj 126, it is observed as under:

  • “Where Section 35 properly comes into play, an entry made by a public servant in any public or official book in the discharge of his official duty becomes relevant by itself, and no other proof of such entry is required as a matter of law by our Evidence Act, but this, does not exclude the possibility that such an entry may become admissible otherwise if it is properly proved to have been made by a person ordinarily competent to make it.” (Quoted in Mayadhar Nayak vs Sub-Divisional Officer, Jajpur, AIR 1982 Ori 221).

Tax Paid Receipts are “Public Documents”

  • Bangli Nagappa v. G. Venkatakrishana Rao, AIR 2022 Kar 164
  • Boopathiammal v. Ranganayaki Ammal, 2021-4 CTC 451 (Mad)
  • Cazi Mohammad Patchmiam v. Sitabai Balaram Nipanikar, 2010-3 AllMR 823; 2010-5 BomCR 285; 2010 4 MhLJ 102;
  • M. S. Meiyappan v. The Special Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Revenue, Chepauk, 1994-1 LW 501 (Mad)
  • Laxmikant Slnal Lotlekar v. Raghuvir Sinai Lotlekar: 1984 MhLJ 938,
  • Yella Papayya v. Yella Suryanarayana: 1947-1 MLJ 79.

Author Need Not be Examined for Proving Document Admissible under S35

In Harpal Singh v. State of H. P. , AIR 1981 SC 361; 1981-1 SCC 560, it was held as under:

  • A certified copy of the relevant entry in the birth register which shows that Saroj Kumari, who according to her evidence was known as Ramesh during her childhood, was born to Lajwanti wife of Daulot Ram on 11-11-1957. Mr. Hardy submitted that in the absence of the examination of the officer/chowkidar concerned who recorded the entry, it was inadmissible in evidence. We cannot agree with him for the simple reason that the entry was made by the concerned official in the discharge of his official duties, that it is therefore clearly admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine its author.”

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Sub-Registrar has no Authority to Ascertain whether the Vendor has Title

Read also:

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Sub Registrar cannot refuse registration on the ground, No Title

In K. Gopi v. The Sub-Registrar our Apex Court (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 462: Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.; 7. 4. 2025) held that the registering officer cannot refuse to register a document, on the ground that the vendor has not established his title and ownership.

SC declared TN Rules, ultra vires the 1908 Act

The Supreme Court declared Rule 55A of the Registration Rules under the Registration Act, 1908,  framed by the Government of Tamil Nadu, as ultra vires the 1908 Act. This rule provided that the Sub-Registrar was entitled to refuse the registration of the sale deed on the ground that the vendor has not established his title and ownership.

The court said as under:

  • “15. The registering officer is not concerned with the title held by the executant. He has no adjudicatory power to decide whether the executant has any title. Even if an executant executes a sale deed or a lease in respect of a land in respect of which he has no title, the registering officer cannot refuse to register the document if all the procedural compliances are made and the necessary stamp duty as well as registration charges/fee are paid. We may note here that under the scheme of the 1908 Act, it is not the function of the Sub-Registrar or Registering Authority to ascertain whether the vendor has title to the property which he is seeking to transfer.
  • Once the registering authority is satisfied that the parties to the document are present before him and the parties admit execution thereof before him, subject to making procedural compliances as narrated above, the document must be registered. The execution and registration of a document have the effect of transferring only those rights, if any, that the executant possesses. If the executant has no right, title, or interest in the property, the registered document cannot effect any transfer.
  • 16. Therefore, assuming that there is a power under Section 69 of the 1908 Act to frame the Rules, Rule 55A(i) is inconsistent with the provisions of the 1908 Act. Due to the inconsistency, Rule 55A(i) will have to be declared ultra vires the 1908 Act. The rulemaking power under Section 69 cannot be exercised to make a Rule that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 1908 Act.”

Earlier Decision of the Apex Court

Earlier, the Supreme Court, in Satya Pal Anand v. State of MP, AIR 2016 SC 4995; 2016-10 SCC 767, held as under:

  • “He is not expected to evaluate the title or irregularity in the document as such. The examination to be done by him is incidental, to ascertain that there is no violation of provisions of the Act of 1908. In the case of Park View Enterprises (Park View Enterprises v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1990 Mad 251) it has been observed that the function of the Registering Officer is purely administrative and not quasi-judicial. He cannot decide as to whether a document presented for registration is executed by person having title, as mentioned in the instrument.”

Note: No Rules had to be looked into in this case (as one came for consideration in K. Gopi v. The Sub-Registrar).

Registering officer is not permitted to inquire into validity of the Deed

The same view (in Satya Pal Anand v. State of MP) was taken in State of Gujarat v. Rajiv Maheshkumar Mehta (09 Aug 2016, Guj.) holding that the registering officer is not permitted to undertake inquiry into legality and validity of the title and document; and that the registering officer is not empowered to act like a judicial officer. The Gujarat High Court referred to the following decisions:

  • (1) Krishna Gopal Kataria v. State of Punjab, AIR 1986 P & H 328. That powers of Registrar are clearly defined and demarcated and any instruction by the State Government to the Registrar and in turn to the Sub-Registrar not to register sale deeds or lease deeds in respect of properties belonging to religious/charitable institutions in absence of any statutory provision was held to be illegal. It was further held that Act 1908 is a complete code of deeds.
  • (2) Bihar Deed Writers Association v. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 Pat 144, in which, it was held that it is not for registering authority to ascertain title to its own satisfaction and in the fact of that case absence of any declaration by the parties in respect of Bihar Land Reforms Act 1961 and refusal to register the sale deed was held bad in law.
  •  (3) E. Eshaque v. Sub-Registrar, Kozhikode, AIR 2002 Ker 128 whereby it was held that registering authorities is not required to satisfy title, possession or encumbrances in respect of property sought to be registered. In this case also reliance was placed by the High Court of Kerala on the decision in the case of Bihar Deed Writers Association v. State of Bihar.
  • (4) State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC 77 In the above case Section 22A inserted by Registration Amendment Act 16 of 1976 whereby documents to be registered if found opposed to public policy and notifications issued in this regard was held to be unconstitutional and secondly notifications issued thereunder where quashed and set aside. In the above decision even power of attorney was also interpreted in light of Chapter X of Contract Act, 1872.
  • (5) Captain Dr. R. Bellie v. Sub-Registrar, Sulur, AIR 2007 Mad 331. It was the case when registration of document was denied on the ground that it was opposed to public policy and relying on decision in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, AIR 2005 SC 3401 provision made vide Government Order No. 150 pertaining to commercial taxes was set aside and provisions of Section 22A inserted by registration (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1994) was held to be unconstitutional.
  • (6) Pandurangan v. Sub-Registrar, Reddiar-palayam Pondicherry, AIR 2007 Mad 159, in which it was held that withholding of registration of document is not permissible based on executive instructions in absence of any statutory rule and that registering authority has no power to make inquiry relating to title. In this case even amendment made to Rule 54 framed in exercise of powers under Section 69 of the Act 1908, by which, scope of power conferred upon registering authority under Sections 34 and 35 of the Act came to be enlarged and was held to be illegal by holding that statutory rules cannot override express provisions of the statute and execution instructions cannot override either of the two.
  • (7) Rajni Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar, 2009 (3) GLH 533 whereby the Apex Court held that holder of power of attorney himself is executant of the document to be registered is entitled to present such document before registering officer for registration and in such a case namely where a deed is executed by a agent for principal and the same agent signs, appears and presents the deed or admits an execution before Registering Officer, it is not a case of presentation under Section 32(c) of the Act 1908. In other words, only in cases where the person signing the document cannot present the document before the registering officer and gives a power of attorney to another to present the document that the provisions of Section 33 get attracted. It is only in such a case, that the said power of attorney has to be necessarily executed and authenticated in the manner provided under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act 1908.
  • (8) Shakuntala Devi v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2010 Jha 56 keeping in mind Sections 34 and 35 of the Act 1908, whereby it is held that registering officer can only see whether document is duly stamped to valuation given and that he has no jurisdiction to withhold or refuse registration of sale deed on the ground that vendor has no title.

No provision empowers Sub Registrar to satisfy himself as to the title

In Eshaque v. Sub Registrar, 2002 (1) KLT 330, it is held that there is no provision which empowers the Sub Registrar to satisfy himself as to the title; and that the Sub Registrar is not justified in requiring the executant of the deed to produce possession certificate from the competent authority to establish possession of property. It is followed in the following decisions:

  • Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959
  • Nilambur Rubber Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2024-4 KLT 642 (Held- registration of a sale deed cannot be refused, on the premise that the executant has no ownership, but only possession over the property conveyed.)
  • Pankaj Kumar Harlalka v. State of Jharkhand, 2002-3 JCR 152; 2005-2 JLJR 118.

High Courts were unanimous on this issue

In Makhanbala Chakraborty v. Pranab Kanti Basu, 26 Sep 2014, the Tripura High Court observed that the High Courts seem to be unanimous on this issue that the Registrar/Sub-Registrar cannot refuse to register a conveyance entered into by a squatter, since the Registrar does not have the authority to question the title of the transferor. Following decisions were referred to:

  • Bihar Deed Writers Association v. State of Bihar: AIR 1989 Pat 144(DB) (para 3);
  • Hari Singh v. Sub-Registrar, : (1998) 120 PLR 787 (DB) (paras 8 to 11),
  • K. Eshaque v. Sub-Registrar, : AIR 2002 Ker 128 (paras 7 to 9);
  • Gopal v. District Collector, Bhandara, (2003) 3 Mah LJ 883 (para 11);
  • Yadla Ramesh Naidu v. Sub-Registrar, : (2009) 1 ALD 337 (paras 22 to 25);
  • Ashwini Ashok Khirsagar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 3 AIR Bom R (NOC 318) 90 (paras 4 to 8);
  • Deep Apartment v. State of Maharashtra, : (2012) 6 Bom LR 3782; (paras 6 to 9);
  • Gurjeet Singh Madaan v. Sub-Registrar, CS (OS) 340/2013, decided on 26-09-2013 (Delhi High Court, paras 23 to 25).

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Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

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Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

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Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

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Stamp Act & Registration

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Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

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How to Prove Resolutions of a Company; Are Minutes Necessary?

Jojy George Koduvath.

How to Prove the Validity of Resolutions of a Company: Are Minutes Essential?

  • Yes.

Section 118 of the Companies Act, 2013 speaks about ‘Minutes’. It reads as under:

  • 118:  Minutes of proceedings of general meeting, meeting of Board of Directors and other meeting and resolutions passed by postal ballot.
  • .(1) Every company shall cause minutes of the proceedings of every general meeting of any class of shareholders or creditors, and every resolution passed by postal ballot and every meeting of its Board of Directors or of every committee of the Board, to be prepared and signed in such manner as may be prescribed and kept within thirty days of the conclusion of every such meeting concerned, or passing of resolution by postal ballot in books kept for that purpose with their pages consecutively numbered.
  • (2) The minutes of each meeting shall contain a fair and correct summary of the proceedings thereat.
  • (3) All appointments made at any of the meetings aforesaid shall be included in the minutes of the meeting.
  • (4) In the case of a meeting of the Board of Directors or of a committee of the Board, the minutes shall also contain–
    • (a) the names of the directors present at the meeting; and
    • (b) in the case of each resolution passed at the meeting, the names of the directors, if any, dissenting from, or not concurring with the resolution.
  • (5) There shall not be included in the minutes, any matter which, in the opinion of the Chairman of the meeting,–
    • (a) is or could reasonably be regarded as defamatory of any person; or
    • (b) is irrelevant or immaterial to the proceedings; or
    • (c) is detrimental to the interests of the company.
  • (6) The Chairman shall exercise absolute discretion in regard to the inclusion or non-inclusion of any matter in the minutes on the grounds specified in sub-section (5).
  • (7) The minutes kept in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein.
  • (8) Where the minutes have been kept in accordance with sub-section (1) then, until the contrary is proved, the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly called and held, and all proceedings thereat to have duly taken place, and the resolutions passed by postal ballot to have been duly passed and in particular, all appointments of directors, key managerial personnel, auditors or company secretary in practice, shall be deemed to be valid.
  • (9) No document purporting to be a report of the proceedings of any general meeting of a company shall be circulated or advertised at the expense of the company, unless it includes the matters required by this section to be contained in the minutes of the proceedings of such meeting.
  • (10) Every company shall observe secretarial standards with respect to general and Board meetings specified by the Institute of Company Secretaries of India constituted under section 3 of the Company Secretaries Act, 1980 (56 of 1980), and approved as such by the Central Government.
  • (11) If any default is made in complying with the provisions of this section in respect of any meeting, the company shall be liable to a penalty of twenty-five thousand rupees and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of five thousand rupees.
  • (12) If a person is found guilty of tampering with the minutes of the proceedings of meeting, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees.

‘Minutes’ must be “Proved” by Producing the Original

From Sec. 118(8) it is clear that the ‘Minutes’ must be “proved” by a competent witness like signatory or a person who wrote or who has seen it recording.

There is no provision in the Companies Act or in any other Act which allows ‘extracts’ of the board minutes, or a certified copy to be given in evidence without producing the original. Therefore only way to prove a ‘resolution’ is to prove the ‘minutes’.

Only way to prove a resolution is “Proving” the Minutes

In Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos , (1991) 72 Comp Cas. 483 (Delhi); 42(1990) DLT 446, it is observed as under:

  • “(14) The manner in which such a resolution of the Board of Directors of Companies are to be proved, is clearly stated by Hardayal Hardy, J. in a judgment passed in Suit No. 469 of 1986 in M/s. Oberoi Hotels (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Observer Publications (P) Ltd. and others. In this judgment it has been stated that “the ONLY WAY to prove that a particular resolution was passed at a meeting of the Board of Directors of a company is that the minutes book in which the said resolution was recorded as having been passed should be produced in Court as that alone can form evidence of the fact under section 194 of the Act”. Section 194 of the Companies Act reads as under :
    • “194. Minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of section 193 shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein”.
  • (Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos is referred to in: Havells India Ltd.  v. Dilip Rathi, 16 Feb 2018, Delhi High Court;  Manoj Kumar Kanuga v. Marudhar Power Pvt.  Ltd. , 23 Apr 2013, AP High Court).

Even when exhibit number is given, it cannot be treated as proved

In Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd., CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506, it is held as under:

  • Section 194 of the Companies Act provides that the minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of section 193 shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein. However, no provision in the Companies Act is brought to my notice which provides that the certified copy or extract of the minutes would be admissible in evidence without proof of the original. Section 65(f) of the Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition and contents of the document when the original is the document of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence. As no provision from the Companies Act is brought to my notice under which the certified copy of the minutes of the meetings of the board of directors is admissible in evidence without proof of the original, it must be said that the copy of the minutes cannot be admitted in evidence directly unless the original is proved or the copy is admitted by opposite party. Therefore, even though that document is given exhibit number, it cannot be treated to have been proved unless the  complainant leads appropriate evidence to prove the minutes.”

Minute Books Not open for inspection to the Strangers

In Shri Kishan Rathi v.  Mondal Brothers And Co. (Private) Ltd. , AIR 1967 (Cal) 75, [1967] 37 Comp Cas 256, it is held as under:

  • “The minute books and the book of resolution of the board of directors are books of the company and are not open to strangers and outsiders. This was also within the special knowledge of the defendant company. If the defendant company was trying to prove that its manager and director had no authority to borrow money, then it was for the company to prove from its own books of minutes and resolutions that no authority was given to Naresh Chandra Mondal, its manager and director. Section 106 of the Evidence Act says that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. It is strange that neither the defendant company nor its witness, director Sambhu Nath Mondal, produced the minute book or the book of resolutions in this case. The only inference that can be drawn from such non-production on the facts and circumstances of this case is that, had they been produced, they would have shown that there was good authority and resolution in favour of Naresh Chandra Mondal. That presumption is irresistible in this case. Articles 103 and 114 of the articles of association of this company cast a mandatory duty upon the directors to record minutes of the proceedings of all meetings of the directors in the minute book. The defendant company or its director witness, Sambhu Nath Mondal, being in possession of such minute book and being in special knowledge of the contents of that minute book, it was their duty to produce them and not the duty of the plaintiff.”

It continued as under:

  • “Whether there was resolution by Board of Directors delegating such power again is a fact within the special knowledge of the defendant company and its Directors. They could have easily produced the resolution book or the minute book to show that there was no such delegation But they had not done so and therefore, an adverse inference must be drawn against them to the effect that had they produced them, they would have shown such delegation to the Manager, Naresh Chandra Mondal.” (Quoted in: Hoshiarpur Azad Transport Co. Ltd.  v. Sutlej Land Finance Pvt. Ltd., 2001-103 CC 969; 1995-109 PLR 506 (P&H).

It is held in Hoshiarpur Azad Transport Co. Ltd.  v. Sutlej Land Finance Pvt. Ltd. (P&H, Ashok Bhan, J.), 2001-103 CC 969; 1995-109 PLR 506, (quoting above passage in Shri Kishan Rathi v.  Mondal Brothers And Co. (Private) Ltd. , AIR 1967 (Cal) 75, [1967] 37 Comp Cas 256) as under:

  • “The petitioner-company did not produce its book of resolution. The minutes regarding the resolution passed are in possession of the company and are not open for inspection to the strangers. Since the petitioner had taken the stand that its general manager had no authority to borrow the money, it was for the company to prove from its own books of minutes and resolution that no authority was given to its general manager to borrow any money. The only inference which under the circumstances can be drawn from the non-production of these books would be that had these books been produced then the same would have shown that there was a resolution passed by the company authorising its general manager to borrow the money.”

Unpleasant and Inharmonious Judgment of Kerala High Court

Kerala High Court (Single Judge) in Sree Gokulam Chit & Finance Co.(P) v. P.R. Balakrishnan on 8 November, 2024,Crl. A No. 1029 of 2008, 2024: KER:82742, distinguished (i) Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos, (1991) 72 Comp Cas. 483 (Delhi); 42(1990) DLT 446, and (ii) Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd., CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506, saying as under:

  • “8. Learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 would contend that, Ext.P8 extract of the minutes is not admissible in evidence and the minutes has to be proved by producing the original. He would rely on a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Others reported in [CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506], to say that, Section 194 of the Companies Act provides that, the minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of Section 193, shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein. No provision in the Companies Act was brought to the notice of that court(see End Notes) which provides that, certified copy or extract of the minutes would be admissible in evidence, without proof of the original. Section 65(f) of the Evidence Act provides that, secondary evidence may be given, of the existence, condition and contents of the document, when the original is the document, of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India, to be given in evidence.
  • He would rely on another decision of the Delhi High Court in Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos and Others [1991 Company Cases Volume 72 Page 483] to say that, copy of resolution was not enough and the original of the minutes book, containing the resolution relied on, has to be brought to the court.
  • 9. Section 119 of the Companies Act, 2013 which corresponds to Section 196 of the Companies Act, 1956 says that, the books containing the minutes of the proceedings of any general meeting of a company or of a resolution passed by postal ballot shall be kept at the registered office of the company, and it shall be open for inspection by any member during business hours and if any member make a request, for a copy of the minutes, it shall be furnished within seven days, on payment of prescribed fees. So, Section 119 of the Companies Act provides for copy of the minutes, and moreover, learned counsel for the appellant would say that, copy of every resolution shall be sent to the Registrar for recording the same within 30 days of passing the same.
  • Moreover, as per Section 54 of the Companies Act, 1956, a document which requires authentication by a company may be signed by a director, the manager, the secretary or other authorised officer of the company, and need not be under its common seal. So, according to the appellant, Ext.P8 extract of the minutes, which contains the resolution authorising the Assistant Manager to file criminal or civil cases or to give evidence etc., signed by the director of Sree Gokulam Chit & Finance Co. (P) Ltd., was sufficient authority for PW1, to file the complaint and to give evidence, on behalf of the company.

The Single Judge took the stand – the requirement that some law must have been “permitted” to give certified copy in evidence, as provided in Sec. 65 (f), is satisfied (and a resolution or extract can be exhibited), for the Companies Act “provides for copy of the minutes” to “any member“. The stance is totally baseless. Because, a member’s right to to get copy of the minutes is different from the right to “be given in evidence the certified copy, as “permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India.

  • The minutes is not a document open for inspection to the strangers” as held by Ashok Bhan, J. in Hoshiarpur Azad Transport Co. Ltd.  v. Sutlej Land Finance Pvt. Ltd., 2001-103 CC 969; 1995-109 PLR 506).

And, the aforesaid legal position has no connection at all with Section 54 of the Companies Act, 1956, also.

In any event, if Sec. 65 (f) is attracted, “a certified copy of document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible”; and the certified extract or copy of “resolution” (other than the certified copy of the “minutes”) is insufficient.

End Notes I

Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd., CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506, observed as under:

  • “15. Next comes the document No.1 – the certified true copy of the resolution dated 16.2.2009, whereby the complainant company had allegedly resolved to give consent of the Board of Directors to execute power of attorney in favour of Ashwin Sheth, Managing Director and/or Sharad Doshi, Executive Assistant to the Managing Director to institute or defend any suit or criminal proceedings. The learned trial Court observed in the impugned order that there is no clear-cut provision about issuance of certified copy of extract of minutes book but if sub-sec. (2) of Section 196 of the Companies Act is read, it may be stated that certified copy of the minutes can be given. The learned trial Court observed that the witness Sharad Doshi in his affidavit had deposed about the said document and thereby he has proved the genuineness of the document. Under Section 195 of the Companies Act, where minutes of the proceedings of any general meeting of the company have been kept in accordance with the 17 WP-40-11.sxw provisions of section 193, then, until the contrary is proved, the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly called and held, and all proceedings thereat to have duly taken place. Section 194 of the Companies Act provides that the minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of section 193 shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein. However, no provision in the Companies Act is brought to my notice which provides that the certified copy or extract of the minutes would be admissible in evidence without proof of the original. Section 65(f) of the Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition and contents of the document when the original is the document of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence. As no provision from the Companies Act is brought to my notice under which the certified copy of the minutes of the meetings of the board of directors is admissible in evidence without proof of the original, it must be said that the copy of the minutes cannot be admitted in evidence directly unless the original is proved or the copy is admitted by opposite party. Therefore, even though that document is given exhibit number, it cannot be treated to have been proved, unless the 18 WP-40-11.sxw complainant leads appropriate evidence to prove the minutes.”

In Escorts Limited vs Sai Autos, (1991)72 Comp Cas 483 (Delhi), 42(1990) DLT 446, it is observed as under:

  • “(16) The next question that arises is what amount is due from defendants No. to 3 to the plaintiff company. For this purpose, copies of accounts have been produced by the plaintiff company. Copies of the accounts produced by the plaintiff company deals with the transaction between the plaintiff defendants No. to 3. In none of the affidavits filed by the plaintiff, have these accounts been proved in accordance with the provision of section 34 of the Evidence Act, which sets out the manner in which any person can be charged with liability on accounts, and how the liability is to be proved.
  • (17) Section 34 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
    • “Entries in books of account regularly kept in the course of business are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to inquire, but each statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability”.
  • (18) In view of the provisions of section 34 of the Evidence Act, entries in the books of account are not alone sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability. Nor can copies of entries in the books of account be sufficient to charge any person with liability. The manner in which entries in the books df account are to be proved to charge any person with liability, has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in (Chandradhar Goswami & others v. Gauhati Bank Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1058), the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the entries in the books of account are not primary evidence of indebtedness. A plaintiff has to lead evidence in the shape of vouchers, bills etc. to prove the entries in the books of account.
  • (19) In this view of the matter, neither the copy of the ledger account, nor the ledgers themselves, in respect of account of defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 is enough evidence to charge them with liability, and no decree can be passed against the defendants on the basis thereof.”

End Notes III

Section 34 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as under:

  • 34. Entries in books of accounts including those maintained in an electronic form, when relevant: Entries in books of accounts, including those maintained in an electronic form, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to inquire, but such statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability.

Section 4 in The Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891 reads as under:

  • 4. Mode of proof of entries in bankers books: Subject to the provisions of this Act, a certified copy of any entry in a bankers book shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of the existence of such entry, and shall be admitted as evidence of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded in every case where, and to the same extent as, the original entry itself is now by law admissible, but not further or otherwise.

S. 4 Banker’s Books Evidence Act cannot charge any person liability

In Chandradhar Goswami v. Gauhati Bank Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1058, it is held, after quoting Sec. 34, Evidence Act, as under:

  • “It is clear from a bare perusal of the section that no person can be charged with liability merely on the basis of entries in books of account, even where such books of account are kept in the regular course of business. There has to be further evidence to prove payment of the money which may appear in the books of account in order that a person may be charged with liability thereunder, except where the person to be charged accepts the correctness of the books of account and does not challenge them. In the present case, however, the appellants did not accept the correctness of the books of account.
  • …. But all that the bank did was to produce a certified copy of account under s. 4 of the Banker’s Books Evidence Act, No. XVIII of 1891. Section 4 of that Act reads thus-
  • “Subject to the provisions of this Act, a certified copy of any entry in a banker’s book shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of the existence of such entry, and shall be admitted as evidence of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded in every case where, and to the same extent as, the original entry itself is now by law admissible, but not further or otherwise”.
  • It will be clear that s. 4 gives a special privilege to banks and allows certified copies of their accounts to be produced by them and those certified copies become prima facie evidence of the existence of the original entries in the accounts and are admitted as evidence of matters, transactions and accounts therein, but such admission is only where, and to the same extent as, the original entry itself would be admissible by law and not further or otherwise.
  • Original entries alone under s. 34 of the Evidence Act would not be sufficient to charge any person with liability and as such copies produced under s. 4 of the Banker’s Books Evidence Act obviously cannot charge any person with liability.
  • Therefore, where the entries are not admitted it is the duty of the bank if it relies on such entries to charge any person with liability, to produce evidence in support of the entries to show that the money was advanced as indicated therein and thereafter the entries would be of use as corroborative evidence. But no person can be charged with liability on the basis of mere entries whether the entries produced are the original entries or copies under s. 4 of the Banker’s Books Evidence Act.
  • … We are therefore of opinion that in view of s. 34 of the Evidence Act the appellants cannot be saddled with liability for the sum of Rs. 10,000/- said to have been advanced on March, 19,1947 on the basis of a mere entry in the amount. Section 34 says that such entry alone shall not be sufficient evidence, and so some independent evidence had to be given by the bank to show that this sum was advanced.”

This decision (Chandradhar Goswami v. Gauhati Bank Ltd.) is referred to in:

  • Kottayam District Co-operative Bank Ltd.  v. P. S. Mohanan Nair, 2008-2 KerHC 125,
  • Gobind Singh v. State Bank of India, AIR 2016 CC 2225; ILR 2016-3 HP 336,
  • Corporation Bank v. Shri Ganpati, 1992-2 WLC 48,
  • State Bank of India v. Hegde and Golay Limited, ILR 1987 Kar 2364

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Can a Suit be Withdrawn in Appeal, on the Ground that Appeal is Continuation of the Suit?

  • Yes; but, it is not an unqualified right.
  • There must be very strong reasons.

Jojy George Koduvath.

Decree’ Definition in CPC

Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure defines “decree” as under:

  • “2(2). “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as ragards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 144, but shall not include-
  • .(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or
  • (b) any order of dismissal for default.
  • Explanation.- A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final.”

Order 23 Rule 1 CPC

Order 23 Rule 1 CPC provides as under:-

  • “1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim:
  • (1) At any time after the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim: ….
  • (2) ……..
  • (3) Where the Court is satisfied,-
  • that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or
  • that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject- matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim.
  • (4) …..
  • (5) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorise the Court to permit one of several plaintiffs to abandon a suit or part of a claim under sub-rule (1), or to withdraw, under sub-rule (3), any suit or part of a claim, without the consent of the other plaintiffs.”

Restriction To Withdraw From The Suit At The Appellate Stage

There is restriction on the right to withdraw from the suit at the appellate stage. The plaintiff has no absolute right, at the appellate stage, to withdraw from the suit. An application made at the appellate stage to withdraw the suit cannot be allowed by the court if granting such permission would have the effect of depriving or destroying or nullifying or annulling any right which has come to be vested with the defendant under the decree. The court shall keep in mind the fact that, when permission is granted to withdraw from the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit, the parties are placed in the same position as they would have been, had the suit not been instituted at all. (Sabu Issac v. Antony Chacko, ILR 2020-4 Ker 725)

Rights under a decree cannot be taken away Unless Very Strong Reasons

In Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup (SB Sinha, J.), (2009) 6 SCC 194, referring Order 23 of the CPC it has been held that the parties are bound by the compromise. It is observed as as under:

  • “22. In view of the above discussion, it comes out that where a decree passed by the trial court is challenged in appeal, it would not be open to the plaintiff, at that stage, to withdraw the suit so as to destroy that decree. The rights which have come to be vested in the parties to the suit under the decree cannot be taken away by withdrawal of the suit at that stage unless very strong reasons are shown that the withdrawal would not affect or prejudice anybody’s vested rights.”

In Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup, the Apex Court relied on the earlier judgment, R. Rathinavel Chettiar v. V. Sivaraman, (1999) 4 SCC 89, where the case of the respondent was placed as under:

  • “As a desperate bid to save the lost battle, learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent No. 1 contended that since the appellants had obtained the sale-deed by fraud, which would not have the effect of conveying any title to them, they cannot, in the matter of withdrawal of suit, intervene nor can they be heard to oppose withdrawal.”

The Apex Court did not agree with the plaintiff; and held as under:

  • “We are not entering into the legality of the sale-deed as it is not the subject matter of the suit under appeal. Since appellants had already been impleaded as respondents in the appeal on the basis of that sale-deed, they have a right to be heard in the matter of withdrawal of suit.”

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