Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

PART I

Admission – Sections 17 to 21 of the Evidence Act

Admission is discussed, in Sections 17 to 21 of the Evidence Act. The general and important propositions on admission are the following:

• An unambiguous and straightforward admission is the best evidence in a case.
• An admission is not conclusive.
• It can be explained as provided under Sec. 31 of the Evidence Act.
• In many cases it may be conclusive; in some cases, it may shift the burden of proof.

Sec. 31 of the Evidence Act – Admissions are not conclusive proof, but may estop

Sec. 31 of the Evidence Act lays down that admissions are not conclusive proof, but may estop. It reads as under:

• “31. Admissions not conclusive proof, but may estop – Admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but they may operate as estoppels under the provisions hereinafter contained.”

Facts Admitted need not be Proved

Order VIII Rule 5 of the CPC lays down that a fact not specifically denied in written statement shall be taken to be admitted.

In Badat and Co. v. East India Trading Co., 1963 SCC OnLine SC 9, it is held that evasive denial in pleadings is tantamount to an admission, which obviates the need for further proof.

Admission is Substantive Evidence

In Thiru John v. Returning Officer, AIR 1977 SC 1724, the Supreme Court held that it is well settled that a party’s admission is substantive evidence – proprio vigore.

But at the same time the Court, in its discretion, may require such fact to be proved and established.

Judgment on Admissions: Order XII Rule 6

Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 reads as under:

• “6. Judgment on admissions – (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise; whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question-between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.
• (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.”

In Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust, (2010) 4 SCC 753, after considering Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120, the Supreme Court pointed out that Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC is not limited to admissions contained in pleadings. The Supreme Court held in Karam Kapahi as follows:

• “40. If the provision of Order 12 Rule 1 is compared with Order 12 Rule 6, it becomes clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 is wider inasmuch as the provision of Order 12 Rule 1 is limited to admission by “pleading or otherwise in writing” but in Order 12 Rule 6 the expression “or otherwise” is much wider in view of the words used therein, namely: “admission of fact … either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing”.
• 41. Keeping the width of this provision (i.e. Order 12 Rule 6) in mind this Court held that under this Rule admissions can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case (see Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan [(2005) 11 SCC 279] , SCC at p. 285, para 8). Admissions in answer to interrogatories are also covered under this Rule (see Mullas’s Commentary on the Code, 16th Edn., Vol. II, p. 2177).
• xxx xxx xxx
• 47. Therefore, in the instant case even though statement made by the Club in its petition under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act does not come within the definition of the word “pleading” under Order 6 Rule 1 of the Code, but in Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code, the word “pleading” has been suffixed by the expression “or otherwise”. Therefore, a wider interpretation of the word “pleading” is warranted in understanding the implication of this Rule. Thus the stand of the Emphasis supplied.
• Club in its petition under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act can be considered by the Court in pronouncing the judgment on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 in view of clear words “pleading or otherwise” used therein especially when that petition was in the suit filed by the Trust.” (Quoted in: Rattan India Power Ltd. vs Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (Delhi) 6 March, 2025).

Judicial Admissions & Order XII of CPC Rule 1 to 6.

• “1. Notice of admission of case. – Any party to a suit may give notice, by his pleading, or otherwise in writing, that he admits the truth of the whole or any part of the case of any other party.
• 2. Notice to admit documents. – Either party may call upon the other party [to admit, within 7 [seven] days from the date of service of the notice any document,] saving all exceptions; and in case of refusal or neglect to admit, after such notice, the costs of proving any such document shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs; and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice is given, except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the Court, a saving of expense.
• 2A. Document to be deemed to be admitted if not denied after service of notice to admit documents. (1) Every document which a party is called upon to admit, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of that party or in his reply to the notice to admit documents, shall be deemed to be admitted except as against a person under a disability: Provided that the Court may, in its discretion and for reasons to be recorded, require any document so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. (2) Where a party unreasonably neglects or refuses to admit a document after the service on him of the notice to admit documents, the Court may direct him to pay costs to the other party by way of compensation.]
• 3. Form of notice – A notice to admit documents shall be in Form No. 9 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.
• 3A. Power of Court to record admission. Notwithstanding that no notice to admit documents has been given under rule 2, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding before it, of its own motion, call upon any party to admit any document and shall, in such a case, record whether the party admits or refuses or neglects to admit such document.]
• 4. Notice to admit acts. – Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not later than nine days before the day fixed for the hearing, call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of the suit only, any specific fact or facts, mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six days after service of such notice, or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court, the costs of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs: Provided that any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular suit, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other occasion or in favour of any person other than the party giving the notice.
• 5. Form of admissions. – A notice to admit facts shall be in Form No. 10 in Appendix C, and admissions of facts shall be in Form No. 11 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.
• 6. Judgment on admissions. – (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced”

Judicial Admissions, Stand on a Higher Footing

Admissions in pleadings are judicial admissions. They stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions.

• They may give rise to ‘Foundation of Rights’.
• They are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proofs.
• Evidentiary admissions are not conclusive by themselves and they can be shown to be wrong.

Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions 

In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam, AIR 1974 SC 471, it was held by the Supreme Court as under:

• “26. Admissions if true and clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admission. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the rival as evidence are by themselves not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.” (Quoted in: Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad: AIR 2005 SC 809, 2005 (11) SCC 314.)

A party will not be permitted to resile from admission

• at subsequent stage
• in the subsequent proceedings

In State of Haryana v. M.P. Mohla, 2007 (1) SCC 457 (SB Sinha), it is held as under:

• “25. The law as regards the effect of an admission is also no longer res integra. Whereas a party may not be permitted to resile from his admission at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings, it is also trite that an admission made contrary to law shall not be binding on the State.
• 26. Reliance has been placed on Sangaramsinh P. Gaekwad vs. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad, 2005 (11) SCC 314 wherein the court was considering the effect of an admission made in the pleadings which was binding on the party proprio vigore in the subsequent proceedings.”

In Ranganayakamma v. K. S. Prakash, 2008-15 SCC 673 (SB Sinha), it is held as under:

• “The pleadings of the appellants in the said suit in which they were parties are binding on them in the subsequent proceedings proprio vigore.”

See also:

• Biswanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1974 SC 117,
• Steel Authority of India Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 3229, 2006 (12) SCC 233,
• Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, (2005) 12 SCC 1.

In Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co., (1976) 4 SCC 320 it was held as under:

• “10. It is true that inconsistent pleas can be made in pleadings but the effect of substitution of paras 25 and 26 is not making inconsistent and alternative pleadings but it is seeking to displace the plaintiff completely from the admissions made by the defendants in the written statement. If such amendments are allowed the plaintiff will be irretrievably prejudiced by being denied the opportunity of extracting the admission from the defendants. The High Court rightly rejected the application for amendment and agreed with the trial court.”

In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly and others, (2008) 7 SCC 85, it was held as under::

• “28. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other.”

Burden on party who made Admission to show that it was Erroneous.

In Nizar v. Raseena, 2018-5 Ker HC 356; 2018-4 KerLT 870, it is held as under:

• “An admission by a party in a previous suit or proceedings is admissible in evidence in a subsequent suit or proceedings. What a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so. The burden is upon the party who has made the admission to show that it was wrong or erroneous. Admission is only a piece of evidence to prove a fact. It does not operate as estoppel unless the other party has acted upon it.”

Admission in pleadings cannot be Permitted to be withdrawn by Amendment

Our Apex court, in Ram Niranjan Kajaria v. Sheo Prakash Kajaria, (2015) 10 SCC 203, held – by amendment of pleadings, admission made in the pleadings cannot be permitted to be withdrawn. It reads (para 22 and 23) as under:

• “22. Delay in itself may not be crucial on an application for amendment in a written statement, be it for introduction of a new fact or for explanation or clarification of an admission or for taking an alternate position. It is seen that the issues have been framed in the case before us, only in 2009. The nature and character of the amendment and the other circumstances as in the instant case which we have referred to above, are relevant while considering the delay and its consequence on the application for amendment. But a party cannot be permitted to wholly withdraw the admission in the pleadings, as held by this Court in nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatram Ichharam. To quote para 27: (SCC pp. 251-52)
  • “27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the Bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”
• 23. We agree with the position in Nagindas Ramdas and as endorsed in Gautam Sarup that a categorical admission made in the pleadings cannot be permitted to be withdrawn by way of an amendment. To that extent, the proposition of law that even an admission can be withdrawn, as held in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava (Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahay, (1984) Supp. SCC 594 ), does not reflect the correct legal position and it is overruled.”

Admission on Contents of (Inadmissible) Document in Pleadings

In Perumal Chettiar v. Kamakshi Ammal, AIR 1938 Mad 785; (1938) 2 MLJ 189, it is observed, as to pleadings, as under:

• “The result, in India, is that if by reason of the document being unstamped, no evidence of its contents whether primary or secondary is admissible, evidence of admissions by the defendant is equally inadmissible. The position may be different where admissions are made in the pleadings themselves (cf. Huddleston v, Briscoe (1805) 11 Ves. 583 (596) : 32 E.R. 1215 (1220) and Thynne v. Protheroe (1814) 2 M. & S. 553 : 105 E.R. 488), because by reason of Section 58 of the Evidence Act, it may not be necessary to prove admitted facts and the objection under Section 91 will not arise unless the plaintiff is called upon to go into evidence. (Mallappa v. Mat an Naga Chetty (1918) 35 M.L.J. 555 : I.L.R. 42 Mad. 41 (F.B.))
• This was the position in Pramatha Nath Sandal v. Dwarka Nath Dey (1896) I.L.R. 23 Cal. 851; cf. however Chenbasappa v. Lakshman Ramchandra (1893) I.L.R. 18 Bom. 369, where it was suggested that in a suit on an unstamped promissory note, even an admission in the written statement may not avail the plaintiff, as the Court when giving a decree on such admission may be “acting on” the document within the meaning of Section 35 of the Stamp Act; see also Ankur Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Madhub Chunder Gkose (1873) 21 W.R. 1.”

Admission is a Mode of Proof; ‘Facts Admitted Need Not be Proved’

Usually, a document is proved through its author, or through a witness or a person acquainted with handwriting. Concession or admission by the opposite side is an acceptable form of proving documents in evidence (under Sec. 17, 21, 58, 59 Evidence Act). ‘Truth of the contents’ of documents can also be established by concession or admission from the other side (“at the hearing”). Sec. 58, Evidence Act reads as under:

• “58. Facts admitted need not be proved: No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings:
• Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.”

Sec. 58 says that no fact need be proved in any proceeding in three circumstances:

1. the parties or their agents agree to admit at the hearing
2. before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands
3. by any rule of pleading they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings.

Admissions are Substantive Evidence by themselves

In Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405: [1966] 1 SCR 606, it was observed as under:

• “Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of ss. 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of opinion that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appeared as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. The purpose of contradicting the witness under s. 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence.”

Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi is Quoted/referred to in:

• Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State Of Gujarat, AIR 2019 SC  3363; 2019-16 SCC 547.
• Union Of India v. Moksh Builders And Financiers Ltd., 1977 AIR SC 409; 1977-1 SCC 60.
•  Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad AIR 1974 SC 117, 1974-1  SCC 78
• Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1971 SC 1153; 1971-1 SCC 864.

“Hearing” Partakes ‘recording evidence’

Legal implication of the term ‘hearing’ is clear from Rule 2 (1) of Order XVIII (Hearing of the suit and examination of witnesses) of the CPC – that is, hearing partakes ‘recording evidence’. Rule 2 (1) reads as under:

• “2. Statement and production of evidence – (1) On the day fixed for the hearing of the suit or on any other day to which the hearing is adjourned, the party having the right to begin shall state his case and produce his evidence in support of the issues which he is bound to prove.”

Recitals in a Judgment – no evidence of Admission made by a Witness

In Ishar Dass v. Arjan Singh, 1966 CurLJ 537 (P&H), it is observed as under:

• “It is not denied that the appellant sought to prove the previous admission from a recital in the judgment delivered by the learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Class on 23rd February, 1962 copy Exhibit D.3. It is equally clear that recitals in a judgment are no evidence to prove the exact admission made by a party or a witness unless whole of the statement is recited therein. In this connection reference may be made to the cases, Sardar Bahadur Sardar Indra Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax Bihar and Orissa, A.I.R. 1943 Patna 169, and Saradamba v. Pattabhiramayya, A.I.R. 1931 Madras 207.”

Modes of Proof of Documents

Modes of Proof of Documents (as to, both, ‘formal proof’ and ‘truth of the contents’) include the following:

• Admission of the person who wrote or signed the document (Sec. 17, 21, 58, 67, 70).
• Evidence of a person in whose presence the document was signed or written – ocular evidence (Sec. 59).
• An attesting witness (Sec. 59).
• Opinion of a person who is acquainted with the writing of the person who signed or wrote (Sec. 47).
• Admission made by the person who signed or wrote the document made in judicial proceedings (Sec. 32, 33).
• Evidence of a handwriting expert-opinion evidence/scientific evidence (Sec.45).
• Evidence of a person who in routine has been receiving the document; or a document signed by such a person in the ordinary course of his business or official duty, though he may have never seen the author signing the document (Sec. 32, 34, 35 or 114).
• Invoking (specific) presumptions under Sec. 79 to 90A.
• Presumptions (general) under Sec. 114.
• Circumstantial evidence: on probability or inferences (Sec. 114).
• Court-comparison (Sec. 73).
• Facts judicially noticeable (Sec. 56 and 57).
• A fact of common-knowledge. (It does not require proof. See: Union Of India v. Virendra Bharti: 2011-2 ACC 886, 2010  ACJ 2353; Rakhal Chakraborty v. Sanjib Kumar Roy: 1998-1 GauLR 253, 1997-2 GauLT 705)
• Internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document; a link in a chain of correspondence; recipient of the document. (Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857)

Truth of Contents of Document Invoking ADMISSION

Truth of the contents of a document, can be established

• (i)   by oral evidence of one who can vouchsafe the same,
• (ii)  by invoking circumstantial evidence or ‘presumption’ or
• (iii) by express admission by the other side.

Admission of Contents of Documents  

• Admission may dispense with proof; but probative value may be less or nil.
• Admissibility & probative value – two matters.

In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684, it is observed by our Apex Court as under:

• “Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”

Secondary Evidence – Marked without Objection – Court Examines Probative Value

It is well settled that if a party wishes to lead secondary evidence, the Court is obliged to examine the probative value of the document produced in the Court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence [Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri: 2015  AIR(SCW) 6271; Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758;  H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492;  Rasiklal Manikchand  v. MSS Food Products: 2012-2 SCC 196].

See Notes below under the heading –

• “Court examines probative value of secondary evidence.”

Court Has Obligation to Decide Admissibility of Secondary Evidence

As shown above, it is held in Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758 (relying on  H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492, and Rasiklal Manikchand  v. MSS Food Products: 2012-2 SCC 196) that the court is obliged to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence.

In H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492 it is held as under:

• “12. The provisions of Section 65 of the 1872 Act provide for permitting the parties to adduce secondary evidence. However, such a course is subject to a large number of limitations. In a case where the original documents are not produced at any time, nor has any factual foundation been laid for giving secondary evidence, it is not permissible for the court to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence. Thus, secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non-production of the original is accounted for, so as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the section. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, the documentary evidence is required to be proved in accordance with law. The court has an obligation to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. (Vide Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1457] , State of Rajasthan v. Khemraj [(2000) 9 SCC 241 : AIR 2000 SC 1759] , LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [(2010) 4 SCC 491 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1072 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 191] and M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu [(2010) 9 SCC 712 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 907])”.
• H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam is followed in U. Sree  v.  U. Srinivas: AIR 2013 SC 415

Documents Marked by Consent – Does Oral Evidence Need to Prove Contents

There are three different views on this matter. They are-

• 1. There must be oral evidence. Even if consent is given for marking the documents, it will only absolve the parties from formally proving the documents and nothing beyond that. That is, though documents are marked by consent, they could not be relied on unless there is no oral evidence to prove their contents.
• 2. Document stands proved. When documents are marked by consent, there is no further need for a formal proof of the documents, it would amount to proof of whatever the documents contained.
• 3. If truth is in question it should be specifically proved by proper evidence. In most of the cases, the truth may not remain in question if the contents thereof are proved. But, in rare occasions, even if contents of documents are proved, truth thereof may remain (expressly or implicitly) in question or unrevealed.

If No Objection, Can a Photocopy of Document be Marked?

Yes.

It would not be legitimate for the court to refrain from exhibiting a relevant document which could be received in evidence on the (express or implied) concession or admission of the opposite side (as regards mode of proof, including production of a photocopy), in the scheme of our Procedure Codes and Evidence Act.   

In Kalita Iqbal Basith v. N Subbalakshmi, (2021) 2 SCC 718, our Apex Court considered admission of a photocopy of an official document, in the following factual matrix:

• The failure to produce the originals or certified copies of other documents was properly explained as being untraceable after the death of the brother of P.W.1 who looked after property matters.
• The attempt to procure certified copies from the municipality was also unsuccessful as they were informed that the original files were not traceable. 
• The photocopies were marked as exhibits without objection.
• The respondents never questioned the genuineness of the same. 
• Despite the aforesaid, and the fact that these documents were more than 30 years old, were produced from the proper custody of the appellants along with an explanation for non­production of the originals, they were rejected (by the High Court) without any valid reason holding that there could be no presumption that documents executed by a public authority had been issued in proper exercise of statutory powers.

In this premises the Supreme Court held as under:

• “This finding in our opinion is clearly perverse in view of Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, which provides that there shall be a presumption that all official acts have been regularly performed. The onus lies on the person who disputes the same to prove otherwise.”

Delhi High Court held in Sumita @ Lamta v. Devki, (Valmiki J.Mehta, J.), 25 Sep 2017 (Indiakanoon), as under:

• “…. it is conceded by the counsel for the appellants/defendants that before commencement of cross-examination of PW-1 and PW-2 there was no objection raised that the Will cannot be proved inasmuch as the Will only is a photocopy. Once no objection is raised to the mode of proof on account of lack of original, then now the objection cannot be raised to the mode of proof as the objection to the mode of proof stands waived in view of the ratio as laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 752.”

Can the Court Refrain from Marking Documents for no Formal Proof?

No.

Relevant and Admissible Documents have be received in evidence ‘Subject to Proof’ or ‘Subject to Objection’?

In M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, (Ayodhya Case), 2020-1 SCC 1, the practice of marking documents “subject to objection and proof” was referred to as under:

• “539. On 7 February 2002, counsel for the plaintiffs in Suit 5 filed a report dated 3 February 2002 before the High Court of Dr K V Ramesh, pertaining to the “Ayodhya Vishnu Hari temple inscription”. The documents were taken on record “subject to objection and proof” as required by the provisions of the Evidence Act 1872. During the course of the trial, the plaintiffs of Suit 5 claimed that the above inscription was recovered on 6/7 December 1992 from the debris of the disputed structure which was demolished. The inscription is in stone with a dimension of 115cm X 55cm. Under the orders of the Court, an e-stampage (paper no. 203 C- 1/1) was prepared and was deciphered by Dr K V Ramesh (OPW-10) who is an epigraphist. The translation of the text was marked as Exhibit 2 in Suit 5. The case of the plaintiffs is that there was a Vishnu Hari temple at the site in dispute and it was on the demolition of the temple that a mosque was constructed in its place. In this segment, the inscription forms the fulcrum of the submission.”

In Uttaradi Mutt v. Raghavendra Swamy Mutt, 2018 0 AIR(SC) 4796; 2018-10 SCC 484,it is obserd as under:

• “As regards this plea, we find that the High Court has made it amply clear that the fact that the applications are allowed per se is not to give any direction to straightaway exhibit the additional documents, but that it could be exhibited subject to proof. The High Court has unambiguously observed that the documents will have to be proved in accordance with law. We make it amply clear that by allowing the three applications filed by the respondent/defendant under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC, it would not follow that the additional documents/additional evidence can be straightaway exhibited rather, the respondent would have to not only prove the existence, authenticity and genuineness of the said documents but also the contents thereof, as may be required by law.”

In Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2022 SC 3350: 2022-10 SCC 451, acquitting the accused it is held as under:  

• “13. From the above statements of the Inspecting Team, they failed to firstly prove the recovery of the tickets to have been validly made. Secondly, they also failed to prove the enquiry report as only a photocopy was filed and objections to the same was recorded in the statement itself, that the same would be exhibited subject to proof of the existence of the documents in original and loss thereof. The prosecution did not make that effort to prove the existence of the original and loss thereof in order to take an order for leading secondary evidence.”

The practice of exhibiting documents ‘subject to proof and relevancy’ is referred to in  Ameer Minhaj v. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar, 2018-7 SCC 639, and State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma, AIR 1991 SC 1260: 1992 Supp1 SCC 222.

In Rajathi v. Arukkani Ammal, 2001-3 CTC 34; 2001-2 MLJ 364 it is held by F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.,  as under:

• “Therefore, there should not be any impediment for the court below to receive the document in question subject to the proof of the said document, so as to rely upon the same at later point of time, I am of the view that to reject the receipt of the very document at the threshold, under the facts and circumstances of the case is totally unjustified and not in accordance with law. In fact as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the court below unfortunately concentrated it’s whole attention towards the validity of the said document, instead of finding out as to whether it could be received as secondary evidence under Section 65(a) of the Indian Evidence Act. The mere receipt of the said document subject to the proof as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner would not, in any way, cause prejudice to the respondent.
• 4. In the result, this revision petition is allowed. The order impugned in this petition is set aside. The court below is directed to receive of it the document, subject to proof by the petitioner in the manner known to law.”

Court’s Jurisdiction to Require to Prove an Admitted Document

The principles in the proviso to Sec. 58 Evidence Act (that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions) apply to category of documents that require specific evidence as to proof of its contents (other than the mere statements in the document).

• See: Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013 10 SCC 758; Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri: 2015 AIR SCW  6271.

In any case, besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts (Evidence Act, CPC and CrPC) shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove that document. We can see it in Sec. 58 of Evidence Act, Order XII, Rule 2A Proviso of the CPC and Sec. 294 of the CrPC .

Section 294 of Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

• “294. No formal proof of certain documents. (1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document.
• (2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government.
• (3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed:
• Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved.”

Relevancy Stand on Another Footing

In Pandappa Mahalingappa v. Shivalingappa Murteppa, AIR 1946 Bombay 193, it is observed as under:

• “As held in 10 L.A. 79 and 5 Bom. L.R. 708 the discretion exercised by the trial Court in admitting secondary evidence on the ground that the original is lost should not be interfered with in appeal. But it is urged that the certified copy should not have been exhibited without proof of the execution. From the application (Ex.66) and the roznama it appears that the trial Court exhibited it under S. 90, Evidence Act, on the ground that it was more than 30′ years old. In the lower appellate court the admissibility of the document does not appear to have been challenged. It is urged that as held in 44 Bom. 192 the erroneous omission before the lower Courts to object to the admission of evidence does not make that evidence relevant. The principle of that ruling, however, applies only where the document is per se irrelevant or inadmissible and no objection was taken to its admissibility: 8 Pat. 788. Where evidence is admitted in the trial Court without any objection to its reception, and the evidence is admissible and relevant, then no objection will be allowed to be taken to its reception at any stage of the litigation on the ground of improper proof. But if the evidence is irrelevant or inadmissible, as for instance, owing to want of registration, omission to take objection to its reception does not make it admissible, and the objection may be raised even in appeal for the first time; 28 L.A. 106. As observed by Das J. in A.L.R. 1922 Pat. 122 “the question of relevancy is a question of law and can be raised at any stage, but the question of proof is a question of procedure, and is capable of being waived.“
• In this case the secondary evidence of the mortgage-deed was held to be admissible as the original was lost. What is now urged is that the execution should have been proved and this objection was not raised either in the trial Court or in the lower appellate Court. It is however true that no evidence was adduced to prove the execution of the original of Ex.68 as the trial Court was prepared to raise the presumption in favour of the genuineness of the document under S. 90, Evidence Act. Whether such a presumption can be raised or not is a question of law, and it can, therefore, be urged at any stage of the litigation. It is now well settled by the ruling of the Privy Council in 37 Bom. L.R. 805 that the statutory presumption under S. 90, Evidence Act, cannot be made in respect of a document merely on production of its copy under S. 65 of the Act. Their Lordships observed (p. 811) “Section 90 clearly requires the production to the Court of the particular document in regard to which the Court may make the statutory presumption. If the document produced is a copy, admitted under S.65 as secondary evidence, and it is produced from proper custody, and is over 30 years old, then the signatures authenticating the copy may be presumed to be genuine.”

PART II

EFFECT OF MARKING DOCUMENTS WITHOUT OBJECTION

Effect of marking a document without formal proof on admission (or without objection) is also a subject of controversy.

Effect of Marking Documents Without Objection

Effect of marking a document without formal proof, or on admission (or without objection), is also a subject of controversy.

First view (a) Proof (Contents and ‘Truth of its Contents’) stands established.  It cannot be questioned afterwards. (b) Truth also: See: Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission, 1986 ACJ 616; 1985-2 GujLR 1315. (c) Admission of contents – but, does not dispense with proof of truth of its contents.	a) RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami: AIR 2003  SC  4548; (b) Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1985-2 GujLR 1315: No objection about the truth of contents … before the trial Court. … It is therefore too late in the day for Miss Shah for the Commission to canvass for the first time before us in appeal. Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) reported in [2023] 4 SCC 731: If no objection as to its mode of proof , no such objection could be allowed to be raised at any later stage. (c) Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865; Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796.
Second View Even if no objection, it does not dispense with proof (as to, both, existence of the document and its truth). (Note: It may not be legitimate to apply this principle literatim)	M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, 2010-9 SCC 712 (Foundational evidence as to secondary evidence essential); LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen: 2010-4 SCC 491 (Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry); Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohitb: 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 (date of birth).
Third view If truth is in issue, mere proof of contents, or marking without objection, is not proof of truth.	See: Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745; Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085.
Fourth view Admission of contents, and dispenses with proof and truth; but its probative value will be a matter for appreciation by court.	See: State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684 (Admission and probative value – different); Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri: 2015  AIR(SCW) 6271; Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758;  H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492;  Rasiklal Manikchand  v. MSS Food Products: 2012-2 SCC 196.
Fifth view Admission of contents, and dispenses with proof and truth; but Court should require (in proper cases) the party producing the document to adduce proper evidence, and to cure formal defects, invoking –               • Sec. 165 of Evidence Act               • Sec. 58 of Evidence Act               • O. XII, r. 2A Proviso, CPC and               • Sec. 294 of the CrPC.	See: Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh, (2005) 13 SCC 511; Umesh Challiyil v. K.P. Rajendra, (2008) 11 SCC 740; KK Ramachandran Master v. MV Sreyamakumar, (2010) 7 SCC 428; AIR 2015 SC 3796.

Propositions Analysed

1. Marked Without Objection – Its ‘Contents’ Stand Proved, as Admission

(a)  Admission, or exhibiting, of documents in evidence and proving the truth of its contents (veracity of the same) are two different processes. In certain cases, as comes out from Sec. 56, 57 and 58 of the Evidence Act, when a document is admitted, or marked without objection, separate proof need not be warranted. Similarly, separate proof may not be required when presumptions can be invoked  (e.g. document in ordinary course of business, a letter obtained in reply).

When a document is marked without objection, its ‘contents’ stand proved. See: RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami: AIR 2003  SC  4548. See also:

• Narbada Devi  v. Birendra Kumar: (2003) 8 SCC 745
• Dayamati Bai v. K.M. Shaffi : AIR 2004 SC 4082
• Oriental Insurance Co v. Premlata:  (2007) 8 SCC 575
• Thimmappa Rai v. Ramanna Rai,(2007) 14 SCC 63.

Effect of marking document without objection is laid down in the following two recent decisions of the Supreme Court. In both these cases, it is seen, the Apex Court has taken the view that the ‘truth’ is also stood proved.

Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi)

The Constitution Bench of our Apex Court laid down in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 330; 2023 4 SCC 731, as under:

• Section 61 deals with proof of contents of documents which is by either primary or by secondary evidence.
• When a document is produced as primary evidence, it will have to be proved in the manner laid down in Sections 67 to 73 of the Evidence Act.
• Mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence. On the other hand, when a document is produced and admitted by the opposite party and is marked as an exhibit by the court, …  (sic – no objection can be raised at any later stage with regard to proof of its contents).
• The contents of the document must be proved either by the production of the original document i.e., primary evidence or by copies of the same as per Section 65 as secondary evidence.
• So long as an original document is in existence and is available, its contents must be proved by primary evidence.
• It is only when the primary evidence is lost, in the interest of justice, the secondary evidence must be allowed.
• Primary evidence is the best evidence and it affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.
• Thus, when a particular fact is to be established by production of documentary evidence, there is no scope for leading oral evidence.
• What is to be produced is the primary evidence i.e., document itself. It is only when the absence of the primary source has been satisfactorily explained that secondary evidence is permissible to prove the contents of documents.
• Secondary evidence, therefore, should not be accepted without a sufficient reason being given for non-production of the original.
• Once a document is admitted, the contents of that document are also admitted in evidence, though those contents may not be conclusive evidence.
• Moreover, once certain evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence.
• There is a prohibition for any other evidence to be led which may detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence and the court has no option to hold the existence of the fact otherwise when such evidence is made conclusive.

It is held further as under:

• “44. Section 64 of the Evidence Act states that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in certain cases mentioned above. ….. Thus, once a document has been properly admitted, the contents of the documents would stand admitted in evidence, and if no objection has been raised with regard to its mode of proof at the stage of tendering in evidence of such a document, no such objection could be allowed to be raised at any later stage of the case or in appeal vide Amarjit Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1995 Cr LJ 1623 (Del) (“Amarjit Singh”). But the documents can be impeached in any other manner, though the admissibility cannot be challenged subsequently when the document is bound in evidence.”

In PC Thomas v. PM Ismail, AIR 2010 SC 905; 2009-10 SCC 239, it is observed  as under:

• “No objection on pleas of “inadmissibility” or “mode of proof” was raised at the time of their exhibition or any time later during trial, when most of the witnesses, produced by the parties were confronted with these, as duly exhibited, bearing stamp marking with particulars, prescribed under Order XIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and duly signed as such.
• In our opinion, it is too late in the day now to object to their exhibition on the ground of “prescribed procedure” i.e. mode of proof.
• Moreover, we also find that it was nobody’s case that the said documents were got printed by John K or distributed amongst voters by him. Absence of proof of acknowledgment by him because of non production of John K as a witness, in the circumstances, in our view, is inconsequential.
• Admittedly, John K was a well known leader of high stature, recognized as such by Christian/Catholic voters including those mentioned in Para 17 (supra) and, therefore, there is no question of drawing an adverse inference against the election petitioner for not examining him, as strenuously urged on behalf of the appellant, particularly when the printing and circulation of offending material (Exts.P1 and P2) has been proved by the election petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.”

Objection as to Truth of Contents, First Time In Appeal – Effect

In Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1986 ACJ 616; 1986 Guj LH 27; 1985-2 GujLR 1315 it is observed as under:

• “It was never the case of the Commission that report which was submitted in a sealed cover was not the genuine and true report of the committee appointed by the Commission itself. Thus in short no objection about the truth of contents of Ex. 24/1 i. e. Ex. 32 was ever put forward before the trial Court and rightly so as that was the report of its own committee of experts appointed by the Commission for enlightening itself about the causes of the accident and about the future safety steps which were required to be taken to avoid such accidents. … Not only that but the witness of the defendant accepted the contents of the said document Ex. 32. Nothing was suggested by him or even whispered to the effect that the contents of the said report were in any way untrue. …. In fact both the sides have relied upon different parts of Ex. 32 in support of their rival contentions on the aspect of negligence and contributory negligence. It is therefore too late in the day for Miss Shah for the Commission to canvass for the first time before us in appeal that contents of Ex. 32 were not proved in accordance with law and hence the document was required to be taken off the record. It is now well settled that objection about mode of proof can be waived by a party and that such objection is raised by the party at the earliest opportunity in the trial Court such objection will be deemed to have been waived and cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in appeal (vide P. C. Purushottamman v. S. Perumal AIR 1972 SC 608; Pandappa v. Shivlingappa 47 BLR. 962; and Gopaldas and another v. Shri Thakurli, AIR 1943 PC 83 at page 87 ). In view of this settled legal position the objection raised by Miss Shah against admissibility of Ex. 32 viz. that its contents were not proved in accordance with law has to be repelled.”

(b) Proof of Execution may not be Enough: Exhibiting of documents in evidence, without objection, and proving the same before the court are two different process.

In certain cases, as comes out from Sec. 56, 57 and 58 of the Evidence Act, when a document is admitted, separate proof need not be warranted. Separate proof may not be required when presumptions can be invoked (e.g. document in ordinary course of business, a letter obtained in reply).

(c) Factual foundation to give secondary evidence must be established: 

Contents of documents are presented in two ways:

1. documents in original
2. (by way) of secondary evidence.

The party has to lay down the factual foundation to establish the right to give secondary evidence where the original document cannot be produced [Rakesh MohindraVs. Anita Beri: 2015AIR(SCW) 6271].

Secondary-evidence – Marked Without Objection – Objection stands waived. When the party gives in evidence a certified-copy/secondary-evidence without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, the opposite party must raise his objection (if so) at the time of admission of such documents. In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage. It stands waived. [Iqbal Basith v. N Subbalakshmi, (2021) 2 SCC 718; Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758]

2. Mere Marking – Not Dispense with Proof (of truth of contents)

Following are the often-cited cases on this subject.

The Proposition -Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents  – was NOT applied in the following decisions. 

Decision	Did the Documents Mark without Proper Proof  was accepted in evidence?	Reason for NOT Appling the Proposition Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents
Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745	Yes. The rent receipts were received in evidence. (without formal proof)	The rent receipts were ‘not disputed’ by the other side.
Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2013-10 SCC 758	Yes. The secondary evidence of dying declaration produced in this case was accepted by the Court.	Secondary evidence was adduced with foundational evidence (for producing copy; not original)

The Proposition -Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents  – was  applied in the following decisions; but, not unreservedly.

Decision	Did the proposition – Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents – unreservedlyapply?	Reason for NOT applying the Proposition Mere Marking Does Not Prove  Contents, unreservedly
Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085	No. Truth of contents of a letter and two telegrams were not taken. (though marked)	Truth of the facts in the document was “in issue“
M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, 2010-9 SCC 712	No. Validity and Genuineness of the Photocopy (of the Caste Certificate) was not accepted (though marked)	Validity and Genuineness of the Caste Certificate was very much in question
H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240	No. Contents of the Photocopy was not received as proof (though marked)	Photocopy was shown to the witness during cross-examination alone, and Signature alone was admitted by the witness.
Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865	No. Accounts of the Plaintiff was not received as proof (though marked)	The accounts of the Plaintiff would not be proved by itself

In Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865, the Supreme Court observed that mere marking of documents (day book and ledger) as exhibits do not dispense with the proof of documents. In Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796, it is observed that mere marking as exhibit and identification of executor’s signature by one of witnesses do not prove contents of a document.

In Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013-10 SCC 758) it is held as under:

• “Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. (Vide: The Roman Catholic Mission v. The State, AIR 1966 SC 1457; Marwari Khumhar v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri AIR 2000 SC 2629; RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu AIR 2003 SC 4548; Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082; and LIC of India  v. Rampal Singh Bisen,2010-4 SCC 491).”
• [Note: Further held: “In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.”]

In Dibakar Behera v. Padmabati Behera, AIR 2008 Ori 92, it is observed [referring RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003  SC  4548, Dayamati Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, 2004 SC 4082, Bhagyarathi Das v. Agadhu Charan Das, 62 (1986) CLT 298,  Budhi Mahal v. Gangadhar Das, 46 (1978) CLT 287 etc.] that a close reading of the above judicial pronouncements would show that whenever a document is marked as exhibit without objection, it will be presumed that a party having right of objection has waived formal proof of the document and in such situation, the entire contents of the document would be admissible in evidence. How ever, by such admission of document, the truth and correctness of the contents by it self would not be established and there must be some evidence to support the contents of such document.

Secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non-production of the original is accounted for. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, the documentary evidence is required to be proved in accordance with law.

The court has an obligation to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. [H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492; Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics: AIR  2015  SC 3796]

In Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri [2015AIR(SCW) 6271] it is held:

• “Mere admission of secondary evidence, does not amount to its proof. The genuineness, correctness and existence of the document shall have to be established during the trial and the trial court shall record the reasons before relying on those secondary evidences.”

Court can Reject Irrelevant or Inadmissible Document at any stage

Order 13 Rule 3 CPC reads as under:

• “Rejection of irrelevant or inadmissible documents. ― The Court may at any stage of the suit reject any document which it considers irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, recording the grounds of such rejection.

Order 13 Rule 3 CPC speaks only as to irrelevant or inadmissible documents alone; and it is not applicable to a document which can be received in evidence on the concession or admission of the opposite side.

Objection to be Raised When document is admitted

It was observed by the Supreme Court in 2001 in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2001 SC 1158, that that ‘it is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection’. And the Court directed as under:

• “When so recast, the practice which can be a better substitute is this: Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment.”

But, the subsequent decisions in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder: AIR 2004 SC 4082; Dayamathi Bai (2004) 7  SCC 107 took a contra view. It was held that the objection as to ‘mode of proof’ should be taken at the time of marking of the document as an exhibit, so that the defect can be cured by the affected party.

In Re: To Issue Certain Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies And Deficiencies In Criminal Trials v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2021-10 SCC 598, overruled (ruled – stood modified) Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2001 SC 1158. It is directed as under:

• “The presiding officer therefore, should decide objections to questions, during the course of the proceeding, or failing it at the end of the deposition of the concerned witness.”

It appears that the decision taken by a Magistrate to mark the document – “subject to objection” is improper; nevertheless, marking – “subject to proof” is a permissible action, for it is a “decision” ruled-down in In Re: To Issue Certain Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies And Deficiencies In Criminal Trials v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2021-10 SCC 598.

Objection About Mode of Proof Can Be Waived

RVE Venkatachala v. Arulmiga Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple: AIR 2004 SC 4082, is often relied on by the courts to establish the proposition – mode of proof can be waived..

In Sk. Farid Hussinsab v. State of Maharashtra, 1983 CrLJ 487, it was held as under:

• “6. In civil cases mode of proof can be waived by the person against whom it is sought to be used. Admission thereof or failure to raise objection to their tendering in evidence amount to such waiver. No such waiver from the accused was permissible in criminal cases till the enactment of the present Code of Criminal Procedure in 1973…
• Section 294(1) of the Code enables the accused also, to waive this mode of proof, by admitting it or raising no dispute as to its genuineness when called upon to do so under sub-section (1). Sub-section (3) enables the Court to read it in evidence without requiring the same to be proved in accordance with the Evidence Act. There is nothing in Section 294 to justify exclusion of it, from the purview of “documents” covered thereby. The mode of proof of it also is liable to be waived as of any other document.”
• (Quoted in Sonu @ Amar v. State of Haryana, AIR  2017  SC 3441; 2017-8 SCC 570)

It is held in Rafia Sultan Widow of Mirza Sultan Ali Baig v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C.Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1986 GujLH 27; 1985-2 GujLR 1315, as under:

• “It is now well settled that objection about mode of proof can be waived by a party and that such objection is raised by the party at the earliest opportunity in the trial Court such objection will be deemed to have been waived and cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in appeal (vide P. C. Purushottamman v. S. Perumal AIR 1972 SC 608; Pandappa v. Shivlingappa 47 BLR. 962; and Gopaldas and another v. Shri Thakurli AIR 1943 PC 83 at page 87 ).”

3. IF ‘TRUTH’ IS IN ISSUE- Mere Marking Not Amounts to ‘Waiver’

The fundamental principles as to proof of a document is that the proof must be given by a person who can vouchsafe for the Truth of its contents (Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745).

It is legitimate to say that this requirement as to proof of ‘truth’ is independent from inviting ‘proof of signature and handwriting’ in Sec. 67 to 71 of the Evidence Act. This proposition is clear from Sec. 67, which lays down the fundamental principles as to the proof of documents. Sec. 67 reads as under:

• “67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced—If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person’s handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting.”

Though proof of execution (dealt with in Sec. 67 to 71) is independent from proof as to ‘truth’ of contents of a document, proof as to ‘truth’ can be presumed by the court, in most cases, on ‘proof of execution’. It is more so, when a document is admitted without objection. Proof as to ‘truth’ of contents is essential if ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute. It rarely occurs.

If ‘TRUTH’ is in issue, or in dispute, marking a document without objection, or mere proof of handwriting or execution,by itself, need not absolve the duty to prove the truth as to the contents of the documents. (Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import, AIR 1981 SC 2085; Achuthan Pillai vs Marikar (Motors) Ltd., AIR 1983 Ker 81; Suresh v. Tobin, 2013-1 KerLT 293). Court has a duty to see that the statement of a witness gets independent corroboration, direct or circumstantial, in proper cases (Ahalya Bariha v. Chhelia Padhan, 1992 Cri.LJ 493).

In Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, it us held as under:

• “If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”

Presumption on a registered document and undue influence under S. 16, Contract Act: In Lakshmi v. Muthusamy, 2012(1) CTC 53 it was contended that there was presumption on a registered document that the contents of the said document are true and genuine (Vimalchand Ghevarchand Jain v.  Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, 2009-5 SCC 713, relied on). The Madras High Court (S. Nagamuthu, J.) rejected the argument for, there was another question – whether the plaintiff had discharged the burden of proving ‘absence of undue influence’ as contemplated in Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act which provided for the burden of proof of absence of undue influence. It was pointed out that once the initial burden of proving the position of the plaintiff to dominate the will of the defendant was discharged, the burden was shifted on the plaintiff to prove absence of undue influence. The Court found it not safe to rely on the evidence of the plaintiff alone to hold absence undue influence on the part of the plaintiff. The High Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Krishnamohan Kul v. Pratima Maity, (2004) 9 SCC 468, where it was held as under:

• “The onus to prove the validity of the deed of settlement was on Defendant 1. When fraud, mis-representation or undue influence is alleged by a party to the suit, normally, the burden is on him to prove such fraud, undue influence or mis-representation. But when a person is in a fiduciary relationship with another and the latter is in a position of active confidence the burden of proving the absence of fraud, mis-representation or undue influence is upon the person in the dominating position, and he has to prove that there was fair play in the transaction and that the apparent is the real, in other words, that the transaction is genuine and bona fide. In such a case, the burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is thrown upon the dominant party, that is to say, the party who is in a position of active confidence. A person standing in a fiduciary relation to another has a duty to protect the interest given to his care and the court watches with jealously all transactions between such persons so that the protector may not use his influence or the confidence to his advantage. When the party complaining shows such relation, the law presumes everything against the transaction and the onus is cast upon the person holding the position of confidence or trust to show that the transaction is perfectly fair and reasonable, that no advantage has been taken of his position. This principle has been ingrained in Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act.”

If payment disputed, mere marking of a registered sale deed not sufficient. In Suresh CV v. Tobin, ILR 2013(1) Ker. 30: 2013-1 KLT 293, the Kerala High Court held that if payment of price for sale was disputed, such fact would not be proved by mere production and marking of a registered sale deed which stated or narrated the payment, and that it was necessary to adduce oral evidence to prove such fact. The Court relied on Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import (AIR 1981 SC 2085) which held that if the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document and that the truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.

4. Admission of Contents – May dispense with proof; but Probative Value may be less or nil

Admissibility & probative value – two matters. State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh (AIR 1983 SC 684) it is observed:

• “Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”

Court examines probative value of secondary evidence:

It is well settled that if a party wishes to lead secondary evidence, the Court is obliged to examine the probative value of the document produced in the Court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence, Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri: 2015  AIR(SCW) 6271.

Contents of the document cannot be proved by mere filing the document in a court. Under the Law of Evidence, it is necessary that contents of documents are required to be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Mere marking a document as an ‘exhibit’ will not absolve the duty of to prove the documents in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. At the most, marking ‘exhibit’may amount to proof of contents, but not its truth.

Documents which are not produced and marked as required under the Evidence Act cannot be relied upon by the Court.

• See: LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen: 2010-4 SCC 491 (Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry);
• M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, AIR 2015 SC 3796.
• Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta Vs.New Era Fabrics: AIR 2015 SC 3796;
• Birad Mal SinghviVs. Anand Purohitb: 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 (date of birth)

Even when a document is technically admitted in court, the probative value thereof will always be a matter for the court to determine. That is, it is depended upon the nature of each case. The probative value of Scene-Mahazar, Postmortem Report, photocopy of a Registered Deed etc. without supporting legal evidence may be lesser. In such cases the court can refrain from acting upon such documents until regular evidence is tendered.

In Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758 (relying on  H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492, and Rasiklal Manikchand  v. MSS Food Products: 2012-2 SCC 196) held as under:

• “The court is obliged to examine the probative value of documents produced in court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence.”
• [Note: Further held: “In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.”]

In Life Insurance Corporation of India  v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [2010-4 SCC 491], it is observed as under:

• “26. We are of the firm opinion that mere admission of document in evidence does amount to its proof. In other words, mere marking of exhibit on a document does dispense with its proof, which is required to be done in accordance with law. …..27. It was the duty of the appellants to have proved documents Exh.-A-1 to Exh. A-10 in accordance with law. Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry would partake the character of admissible evidence in Court of law. That documentary evidence was also required to be proved by the appellants in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, which they have failed to do.”

The Calcutta High Court quoting Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, 2010-4 SCC 491, it is observed in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company v. Smt. Santa, 2019-2 ACC 36,  that ‘even if the document had been marked as Exhibit-A without objection, without a formal proof thereof in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, such document lost its credibility and is of no probative value’.

In Kalyan Singh, v. Chhoti, AIR 1990 SC 396, it is observed as under:

• “A certified copy of a registered sale deed may be produced as secondary evidence in the absence of the original. But in the present case Ex. 3 is not certified copy. It is just an ordinary copy. There is also no evidence regarding content of the original sale deed. Ex.3 cannot therefore, be considered as secondary evidence. The appellate Court has a right and duty to exclude such evidence.”

5. Court should allow concerned party, to adduce proper evidence to prove documents

As stated in detail above, besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove that document. (Sec. 58 of Evidence Act and Order XII, Rule 2A Proviso of the CPC and Sec. 294 of the CrPC).

Defect for not producing a proper power of attorney being curable, in Haryana State Coop.  Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd. v. Jayam Textiles, 2014 AIR SC 1926 (a case under Section 138 Negotiable instruments Act), the Apex Court gave opportunity to the petitioner to produce the authorization of Board of Directors. It is observed that the in Raj Narian v. Indira Nehru Gandhi, (1972) 3 SCC 850 it was held that the rules of pleadings are intended as aids for a fair trial and for reaching a just decision. This principle is reiterated in ever so many cases. They include:

• F.A. Sapa v. Singora, (1991) 3 SCC 375;
• H.D. Revanna v. G. Puttaswamy Gowda, (1999) 2 SCC 217;
• V.S. Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis, (1999) 3 SCC 737;
• Mahendra Pal v. Ram Dass Malanger, (2000) 1 SCC 261;
• Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh, (2007) 3 SCC 617 (observed that facta probanda (material facts) are to be set out in the pleadings and facta probantia (particulars or evidence) need not be set out in the pleadings);
• Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar v. Sukh Darshan Singh, (2004) 11 SCC 196 (held that defective verification or affidavit is curable);
• Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh, (2005) 13 SCC 511;
• Umesh Challiyil v. K.P. Rajendra, (2008) 11 SCC 740;
• KK Ramachandran Master v. MV Sreyamakumar, (2010) 7 SCC 428; AIR 2015 SC 3796

In Shail Kumari v. Saraswati Devi, 96 (2002) DLT 131, it is observed as under:

• “14. In case a document is marked exhibit without an objection from the party which is affected by that document ordinarily its admissibility cannot be questioned at a later stage of the proceedings in the suit. But in cases where such document is marked exhibit without due application of mind in violation of provisions of a statute requiring a particular mode of proof etc., the opposite party may still show during the hearing of final arguments that the document is inadmissible in evidence and should be excluded from consideration because of statutory bar or non-compliance of statutory requirement about mode of proof or otherwise. For instance a will is required to be proved by examining at least one of the attesting witnesses in accordance with Section 68 of the Evidence Act. A document which is inadmissible for want of registration or proper stamp is inadmissible in evidence, unless use of it is permissible for collateral purposes or extracts of accounts book without production of books of account and proof that they were kept in ordinary course of business. Mere putting of exhibits number on these documents in the absence of their proof in accordance with law does not make them part of the evidence to be read for deciding the suit.”

No Objection to Marking; If Court sees Deficiency, it should bring notice of it to counsel

In T.C. Lakshamanan v. Vanaja, ILR 2011-3 (Ker) 228; 2011-3 KHC 86; 2011-3 KLT 347, it is pointed out as under:

• “There was no case for the respondent that before marking Ext.A1 any objection was raised as to the admissibility of Ext.A1. Since the affidavit was filed in lieu of chief-examination, through which documents were sought to be received in evidence, before starting cross examination the trial court has to record that an affidavit has been filed in lieu of chief examination and that such and such documents have been marked. It is not to be done mechanically. The Court has to apply its mind while marking the documents to ensure that those documents have been properly admitted in evidence. Simply because the counsel appearing for the other side did not raise any objection the Court is not absolved of its duty to see whether the marking of the documents was done correctly and whether any inadmissible document was sought to be admitted in evidence. If the Court finds that any inadmissible document, especially a document which cannot be admitted in evidence as it is unstamped or insufficiently stamped, is sought to be admitted, it should be brought to the notice of the counsel appearing for the parties and an order should be passed with regard to the same. It is not a case where the documents were tentatively marked, subject to objection regarding the admissibility and the ruling as to the admissibility of the same happened to be deferred, as it warranted a detailed argument. The Apex Court in the decision in 2000 (1) SC 1158 (Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat) has held that such a procedure can be resorted to. Therefore, though document can be admitted tentatively reserving ruling on the admissibility to a later stage, in the case on hand no such objection was raised; on the other hand, it is argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that questions were put to PW1 with regard to the relevancy and other aspects of that document treating that document as having been properly admitted.”

When Execution of Will is Admitted, Should it be Proved?

Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 mandates examination of one attesting witness at least to prove documents required by law to be attested (including Wills). When execution of a Will is ‘Admitted’ by the opposite side, should it be ‘Proved’?

There is difference of opinion.

Following latest decisions assuredly lay down that when execution of the will is ‘admitted’ by the opposite side, it need not be ‘proved’ as required in Sec. 68 (by examining at least one witness).

• Boomathi v. Murugesan, 2023-2 Mad LJ 684 (DB)
• P. Radha v. Irudayadoss, 2022 SCCOnline Mad 886
• Rajeev Gupta v. Prashant Garg, 2022-1 All LJ 435.

Following decisions laid down that even when execution of a will was ‘admitted’ by the opposite side, it must have been ‘proved’ by examining at least one attesting witness.

• S.R. Srinivas v. S. Padmavathamma, (2010) 5 SCC 274 – It is observed – the execution of a Will can be held to have been proved only when the statutory requirements for proving the Will are satisfied. Admission in the pleadings as to the Will can only be about the “making of the Will” and not the “genuineness of the Will”.
• Vadakkayil Gopalan v. Vadakkayil Paru, (2013) 3 KerLT 69 –It is observed – proof of the Will by examining at least one witness was necessary (even if the Will has been admitted in the pleadings).
• Poulose A. V. v. Indira M.R., 2010 (3) KerLT Suppl. 185 : ILR 2010 Ker.388  – It is observed – No distinction is drawn, by Sec. 68, between an admitted Will and a disputed Will in the mode of proof of execution; and therefore, in all cases in which the Will is set up the procedure prescribed in Sec. 68 will have to be followed.
• Ramesh Verma v. Lajesh Saxena (2017) 1 SCC 257 – It is observed – the mandate of Section 68 of the Evidence Act has to be followed even in a case where the opposite party does not specifically deny the execution of the document in the written statement.
• Sarada v. Radhamani, 2017 (2) KLT 327. In this decision, rendered in a ‘Refence’ to resolve the dispute in the question we discuss, the Kerala High Court (DB) referred all the above decisions. And, declared the following decisions, as Per Incuriam
  1. Princelal G. v. Prasannakumari, 2009 (3) KerLT Suppl. 1342: ILR 2009 (3) Ker. 221 – It is observed – where the execution of the Will is expressly admitted, neither Section 68 nor its proviso is attracted obliging the propounder of the Will to prove due execution of the Will (for, admitted facts need not be proved: Sec. 58 of the Evidence Act).
  2. Thayyullathil Kunhikannan v. Thayyullathil Kalliani, AIR 1990 Ker.226 – Relying on Order VIII Rule 5 C.P.C. and Sec. 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is held that when the execution of the Will is admitted, there will not be any requirement to prove the Will.
• P. Malliga v. P. Kumaran, 2022 (2) LW 393, (Followed in Ranga Pillai v. Mannar Pillai, 2022, Mad) – It is held by the Madras High Court that a Will shall not be used as evidence until it is proved in the manner prescribed under Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The judge did not agree the view in P. Radha v. Irudayadoss, 2022 SCCOnline Mad 886. (Note: This decision, P. Malliga v. P. Kumaran, is overruled in Boomathi v. Murugesan, 2023-2 Mad LJ 684, DB)

S. 68 to be Followed, Even When the Opp. party does not Deny Execution

Sec. 68 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

• “68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested—If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence:
• Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied.

In Ramesh Verma v. Rajesh Saxena, 2017-1 SCC 257, our Apex Court held as under:

• “13. A will like any other document is to be proved in terms of the provisions of Sec. 68 of the Evidence Act and the Succession Act, 1925. The propounder of the will is called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the disposition and put his signature to the document on his own free will and the document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. This is the mandate of Sec. 68 of the Evidence Act and the position remains the same even in a case where the opposite party does not specifically deny the execution of the document in the written statement.”

Effect of ‘Admission’ of Execution of Will (by the other side)

It may be pointed out that the Apex Court did not consider in this decision, Ramesh Verma v. Rajesh Saxena – what is the position when the opposite party expressly admit the execution of the document.

Boomathi v. Murugesan, 2023-2 Mad LJ 684 (DB)

It is held in a recent Division Bench decision in Boomathi v. Murugesan, 2023-2 Mad LJ 684, that the position will be different if the Will is ‘categorically’ and ‘clearly’ admitted. The Madras High Court referred Sec. 17 (Admission) and Sec. 58 (Facts admitted need not be proved) and came to the conclusion , Sec. 68 will not be attracted where the Will is “admitted” by the other side. The Division Bench held as under:

• “23. First and foremost, it is to be borne in mind that before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Chand Sharma Vs. Narain Singh Saini [Dead] through Legal Representatives and Others, reported in 2015 [8] SCC 615, the validity of the Will was a core issue and the Hon’ble Supreme Court  proceeded to discuss the law with regard to proof of a Will in accordance with the statute. In such context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the position with regard to proof of a Will remains the same even if the opposite party does not specifically deny execution of the same.
• 24. The above judgment has been followed by learned Single Judges of this Court in  P. Malliga Vs. P. Kumaran reported in 2022 [2] LW 393 and Akkinirajan Vs. Maheswari and Others reported in 2023 [1] LW 72.
• 25. This Court draws the distinction between ‘specifically denied’, ‘not specifically denied’ and ‘admitted‘. The first two instances, namely, ‘specifically denied’ and ‘not specifically denied’, would fall within one category. Insofar as proof of a Will in both cases in this category, the Will would have to be necessarily proved by the propounder. However, where the opposite party categorically admits to the Will, the position would be certainly different. In India, we follow what is called the system ‘adversarial proceedings’, which is also followed in the British Courts. The foundation of this School is that parties before a Court would have to deal with facts in issue namely facts that are asserted and denied by the parties to the lis and the Court would proceed to adjudicate on such issues. When there is no dispute between the parties on certain matters, the Court would not venture to require proof of such admitted facts.”
• “33. This Court has applied its mind to the various principles laid down by the Hon’ble  Supreme Court as well as this Court and other High Courts, especially in the context of Sec. 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, proof of a Will where execution is not specifically denied and in cases where the execution is categorically admitted. The ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Verma’s case [cited supra] reported in 2017 [1] SCC 257, cannot be a precedent for the proposition where the opposite party clearly admits to the execution of the subject Will as in the instant case. Therefore, we are not in respectful agreement with the judgments in P. Malliga’s case(P. Malliga v. P. Kumaran, 2022 (2) LW 393) andAkkinirajan’s case (Akkinirajan Vs. Maheswari, 2023 [1] LW 72) following the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Chand Sharma’s case. On the contrary, we approve the ratio laid down in P. Radha Vs. Irudayadoss and Others reported in 2022 SCC Online Mad 886 and Vanjiammal and Others Vs. Vidya and Others in the order dtd. 21/4/2017 made in CRP.[PD] No.3659/2013.”

The same view is taken in Rajeev Gupta v. Prashant Garg, 2022-1 All LJ 435. The court held as under:

• “The admission were in the pleadings of the parties and therefore there was no requirement of proving the will in the present suit. Admittedly, the defendant Nos. 2 to 4/appellants have claimed their title through Ramesh Chand Garg who never disputed the validity of the will rather in the Original Suit No. 458 of 1992, he admitted its validity and therefore, the lower appellate court has rightly decreed the suit and held that the will was neither required to be proved in the present suit nor the filing of original will was necessary.”

Do General Provisions of S. 58 give way to Special Provisions of S. 68

Three views are possible:

• First: Requirement of calling at lest one witness to prove those documents that requires attestation, remains the same even in a case where the opposite party expressly admit the execution of the document in the written statement.
• Second: If the Will is (even impliedly) admitted, Sec. 68 need not be invoked.
• Third: If only the Will is expressly admitted, then only there will be alleviation of burden laid down in Sec. 68.

In the light of the Apex Court decision in Ramesh Verma v. Rajesh Saxena, 2017-1 SCC 257, _{(that the position – as to proof of documents requires attestation – remains the same even in a case where the opposite party does not specifically deny the execution of the document in the written statement)} it appears that the second view stated above (taken in Thayyullathil Kunhikannan v. Thayyullathil Kalliani, AIR 1990 Ker 226) is not sustainable.

But, the proposition of law in the third view above, applied in Boomathi v. Murugesan (supra), and other decisions _{(that the position – as to proof of documents requires attestation – will be different if the Will is “categorically admitted“),} sounds good.

Authoritative Judicial Pronouncement is yet to be Arrived

It is also pertinent to note that the Kerala High Court, in Sarada v. Radhamani (supra), pointed out that the general provisions of Sect. 58 of the Evidence Act has ‘to give way to the special provisions’ of Sec. 68 of the Act; and it was remarked that there was no distinction between an ‘admitted Will’ and a ‘disputed Will’ as to the mode of proof.

It appears that the placing the doctrine of ‘specific provisions override general provisions‘ is rational; for, the following words in Sec. 68 places a ‘non-obstante clause’ –

• “it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution”.

However, it will also be a forceful argument if one says that a section in the Evidence Act cannot be protected from certain fundamental principles of the Evidence Act which include ‘best evidence rule’, ‘admitted facts need not be proved’ etc., unless strong persuasive indications are laid down in the provision concerned. (It is also noteworthy that Sec. 68 does not proceed with a non-obstante clause.) In any event, the scheme of the Evidence Act shows that Chapter III (the beginning Chapter of Part II) which deals with “Facts Need Not be Proved”, is meant to govern the succeeding chapters including the Chapter V that deals with ‘Documentary Evidence’ wherein Sec. 68 is included.

It is also significant – Sec. 58 says that ‘Admitted facts need not be proved’; and Sec. 68 speaks as to “Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested” and that the attesting witness is called “for the purpose of proving its execution”. That is, the question of ‘proof’ under Sec. 68 does not arise if ‘execution of document’ has already been admitted by the other side.

• Note: Proviso to Sec. 58 enables the court to require proof, despite the admission of the other side, if it finds proper. Proviso to Sec. 58 reads as under:
• “Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.”

Therefore, an authoritative judicial pronouncement is yet to be arrived, taking note of various potential contentions in this regard.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

• Order IX Rule 9 CPC: Earlier Suit for Injunction; Subsequent Suit for Recovery & Injunction – No Bar
• H. Anjanappa v. A. Prabhakar: An ‘Aggrieved’ Stranger or a ‘Prejudicially Affected’ Third-Party (also) Can File Appeal with the ‘Leave of the Court’.
• Replication, Rejoinder and Amendment of Pleadings
• Does Registration of a Document give Notice to the Whole World?
• Suit under Sec. 6, Specific Relief Act – Is it a ‘Summary Suit’ under Order XXXVII CPC?
• Is it Mandatory to Lift the Attachment on Dismissal of the Suit? Will the Attachment Orders Get Revived on Restoration of Suit?
• Will Interlocutory Orders and Applications Get Revived on Restoration of Suit?
• Can an ‘Ex-parte’ Defendant Cross Examine Plaintiff’s Witness?
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Civil Rights and Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
• Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
• Order II, Rule 2 CPC – Not to Vex Defendants Twice
• A Land Mark Decision on Order II rule 2, CPC – Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd., Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 73
• Order I rule 8, CPC (Representative Suit) When and How? Whether Order I rule 8 Decree is Enforceable in Execution?
• Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
• Pleadings in Defamation Suits
• Previous Owner is Not a Necessary Party in a Recovery Suit
• UNDUE INFLUENCE and PLEADINGS thereof in Indian Law
• PLEADINGS IN ELECTION MATTERS
• Declaration and Injunction
• Law on Summons to Defendants and Witnesses
• Notice to Produce Documents in Civil Cases
• Production of Documents: Order 11, Rule 14 & Rule 12
• Sec. 91 CPC and Suits Against Wrongful Acts
• Remedies Under Sec. 92 CPC
• Mandatory Injunction – Law and Principles
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• Interrogatories: When Court Allows, When Rejects?
• Decree in OI R8 CPC-Suit & Eo-Nomine Parties
• Pecuniary & Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Doctrine of Substantial Representation in a Suit by or against an Association
• Who are Necessary Parties, Proper Parties and Pro Forma Parties in Suits
• What is Partnership, in Law? How to Sue a Firm?
• ‘Legal Representatives’, Not ‘Legal Heirs’ to be Impleaded on Death of Plaintiff/Defendant
• Powers and Duties of Commissioners to Make Local Investigations, Under CPC
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Burden on Plaintiff to Prove Title; Weakness of Defence Will Not Entitle a Decree
• Is it Mandatory to Set Aside the Commission Report – Where a Second Commissioner is Appointed?
• Can a Commission be Appointed to Find Out the Physical Possession of a Property?
• Withholding Evidence and Adverse Inference
• Pendente Lite Transferee Cannot Resist or Obstruct Execution of a Decree
• Family Settlement or Family Arrangement in Law
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Will Findings of a Civil Court Outweigh Findings of a Criminal Court?
• Relevancy of Civil Case Judgments in Criminal Cases
• Waiver and Promissory Estoppel
• Can a Christian Adopt? Will an adopted child get share in the property of adoptive parents?
• Principles of Equity in Indian Law
• Thangam v.  Navamani Ammal: Did the Supreme Court lay down – Written Statements which deal with each allegation specifically, but not “para-wise”, are vitiated?
• No Criminal Case on a Dispute Essentially Civil in Nature.
• Doctrine of Substantial Representation in Suits
• Order I rule 8, CPC (Representative Suit) When and How? Whether Order I rule 8 Decree is Enforceable in Execution?
• Appointment of Guardian for Persons Suffering from Disability or Illness: Inadequacy of Law – Shame to Law Making Institutions

Principles and Procedure

• H. Anjanappa v. A. Prabhakar: An ‘Aggrieved’ Stranger or a ‘Prejudicially Affected’ Third-Party (also) Can File Appeal with the ‘Leave of the Court’.
• Our Courts Apply Different ‘STANDADARDS of Proof’
• Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent, Not a Final Order
• BNSS – Major Changes from CrPC
• Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Important Changes from the Indian Penal Code
• Substantive Rights and Mistakes & Procedural Defects in Judicial Proceedings
• Will Boundaries of Properties (Always) Preferred Over Survey Number, Extent, Side Measurements, etc.?
• All Illegal Agreements are Void; but All Void Agreements are Not Illegal
• Doctrines on Ultra Vires, Rule of Law, Judicial Review, Nullification of Mandamus, and Removing the BASIS of the Judgment
• Can an ‘Ex-parte’ Defendant Cross Examine Plaintiff’s Witness?
• Will – Probate and Letters of Administration
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence
• Effect of Not Cross-Examining a Witness & Effect of Not Facing Complete Cross-Examination by the Witness
• Suggestions & Admissions by Counsel, in Cross Examination to Witnesses
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
• Declaration and Injunction
• Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
• Does Alternate Remedy Bar Civil Suits and Writ Petitions?
• Void, Voidable, Ab Initio Void, and Sham Transactions
• Can Courts Award Interest on Equitable Grounds?
• Natural Justice – Not an Unruly Horse
• Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State Of M.P, 29 January, 2025 – Law on Natural Justice Revisited
• ‘Sound-mind’ and ‘Unsound-Mind’
• Prescriptive Rights – Inchoate until the Title thereof is Upheld by a Competent Court
• ‘Title’ and ‘Ownership’ in Indian Law
• Can a Party to Suit Examine Opposite Party, as of Right?
• Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
• Doctrine of ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Indian Law
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Cheating and Breach of Contract: Distinction – Fraudulent Intention at the time of Promise.
• Declaration of Title & Recovery of Possession: Art. 65, not Art. 58, Limitation Act Governs
• What is COGNIZANCE and Application of Mind by a Magistrate?
• Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle: Rejection of Plaint on ‘Bar of Limitation’ on Plea of Fraud.

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

• ‘Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet’
• Section 27, Limitation Act Gives-Rise to a Substantive Right so as to Seek Declaration and Recovery
• Sale Deeds Without Consideration – Void
• Tenancy at Sufferance in Indian Law
• Revenue Settlement Registers of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters
• Recovery of Possession Based on Title and on Earlier Possession
• Declaration of Title & Recovery of Possession: Art. 65, not Art. 58, Limitation Act Governs
• Title and Ownership in Indian Law
• Does Registration of a Document give Notice to the Whole World?
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• POSSESSION is a Substantive Right in Indian Law
• 22nd Law Commission  Report on ‘Law on Adverse Possession’
• Adverse Possession Against Government
• Government of Kerala v. Joseph – Law on Adverse Possession Against Government
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?
• Ultimate Ownership of All Property Vests in State; It is an Incident of Sovereignty.
• ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’
• Preemption is a Very Weak Right; For, Property Right is a Constitutional & Human Right
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Family Settlement or Family Arrangement in Law
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal – Does Something Remain Untold?
• Grant in Law
• Termination of Tenancy (& Grant) by Forfeiture (for Claiming Title)
• Survey under Survey Act – Raises a Presumption on Boundary; though Not Confer Title
• SUIT on TITLE: Landlord can Recover Property on GENERAL TITLE (though Tenancy Not Proved) if Defendant Falsely Claimed Independent Title
• Even the Rightful Owner is NOT entitled to Eject a Trespasser, by Force

Adverse Possession

• What is Adverse Possession in Indian Law?
• Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta (October 14, 2024) – Supreme Court Denied the Tenant’s Claim of Adverse Possession
• How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• Adverse Possession Against Government
• Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?
• Government of Kerala v. Joseph – Law on Adverse Possession Against Government
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• Ouster and Dispossession in Adverse Possession
• Declaration of Title & Recovery of Possession: Art. 65, not Art. 58, Limitation Act Governs
• Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021, Composite Suit (Cancellation & Recovery) – Substantive Relief Determines Limitation  

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Acta

• Travancore Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 (1865 AD) and 1061 (1886 AD), And 1922 Devaswom Proclamation
• Revenue Settlement Registers of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters
• Tenancy at Sufferance in Indian Law
• Freehold Property in Law
• What is Patta or Pattayam?
• Does ‘Pandaravaka Pattom’ in Kerala Denote Full-Ownership?
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Previous Owner is Not a Necessary Party in a Recovery Suit
• Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder
• Vested interest and Contingent Interest
• Ultimate Ownership of All Property Vests in State; It is an Incident of Sovereignty.
• Land Acquired Cannot be Returned – Even if it is Not Used for the Purpose Acquired
• ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’
• FERA, 1973 And Transfer of Immovable Property by a Foreigner
• Marumakkathayam – A System of Law and Way of Life Prevailed in Kerala
• Land Tenures, and History of Land Derivation, in Kerala
• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
• Sale Deeds Without Consideration – Void
• Law on SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE and LEGAL HEIRSHIP CERTIFICATE
• Sec. 7 Easements Act – Natural Advantages Arising from the Situation of Land & Natural Flow of Water
• Grant in Law
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• Survey under Survey Act – Raises a Presumption on Boundary; though Not Confer Title

Land Reform Laws

• Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land Owners?
• Relevant provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act in a Nutshell
• Land Tenures, and History of Land Derivation, in Kerala
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• ‘Janmam’ Right is FREEHOLD Interest and ‘Estate’ in Constitution – By Royal Proclamation of 1899, The Travancore Sircar became Janmi of Poonjar Raja’s Land
• Government is the OWNER of (Leasehold) Plantation Lands in Kerala.
• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
• Law on Acquisition of Private Plantation Land in Kerala
• Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell
• Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy
• Grant in Law
• Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy’; TLB to Fix Plantation Exemption.  
• 1910 Settlement Register of Travancore – Basic Record of Land Matters

Power of attorney

• M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula: Mere Word ‘Irrevocable’ Does Not Make a POWER OF ATTORNEY Irrevocable
• No Adjudication If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney Sufficient for Registration
• Notary-Attested Documents and Presumptions
• Permission when a Power of Attorney Holder Files Suit
• If Power of Attorney himself Executes the Document, S. 33 Registration Act will NOT be attracted
• Should a Power of Attorney for Sale must have been Registered –
• Is Registered Power of Attorney Necessary for Registration of a Deed? No.

Evidence Act – General

• Newspaper Reports are ‘Hearsay Secondary Evidence’
• Major Changes in the Evidence Act by Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Sec. 27 Recovery/Discovery in Evidence Act and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Evidence in Court – General Principles
• Expert Evidence and Appreciation of Evidence
• How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
• Withholding Evidence and Adverse Inference
• Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
• What is Collateral Purpose?
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence
• Effect of Not Cross-Examining a Witness & Effect of Not Facing Complete Cross Examination by the Witness
• Suggestions & Admissions by Counsel, in Cross Examination to Witnesses
• Proof of Documents – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• Significance of Scientific Evidence in Judicial Process
• Polygraphy, Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping Tests
• What is Section 27 Evidence Act – Recovery or Discovery?
• How ‘Discovery’ under Section 27, Evidence Act, Proved?
• Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witnesses Theory
• Sec. 35 Evidence Act: Presumption of Truth and Probative Value
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act

Sec. 65B

• Sec. 27 Recovery/Discovery in Evidence Act and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Sec. 65B (Electronic Records) and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Sec. 65B, Evidence Act: Arjun Paditrao Criticised.
• Sec. 65B Evidence Act Simplified
• ‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be proved by ‘CERTIFICATE’ u/s. 65B
• Sec. 65B,  Evidence Act: Certificate forms
• Certificate is Required Only for ‘Computer Output’; Not for ‘Electronic Records’: Arjun Panditrao Explored.
• How to Prove ‘Whatsap Messages’, ‘Facebook’ and ‘Website’ in Courts?

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

• ‘Admission’ in Indian Law
• Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• Modes of Proof of Documents
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Burden on Plaintiff to Prove Title; Weakness of Defence Will Not Entitle a Decree
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence
• Production, Admissibility & Proof Of Documents
• Proof of Documents – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting 
• Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Relevancy of Civil Case Judgments in Criminal Cases
• Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon (SC), April 2, 2024 – An Odd Decision on ‘Civil Court Judgment does not Bind Criminal Court’

Law on Documents

• Admitted Documents – Can the Court Refrain from Marking, for no Formal Proof?
• Does Registration of a Document give Notice to the Whole World?
• Production, Admissibility & Proof Of Documents
• Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Effect of Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Stand Proved?
• Time Limit for Registration of Documents
• Registration of Documents Executed out of India
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• Are RTI Documents Admissible in Evidence as ‘Public Documents’?
• Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Notary-Attested Documents and Presumptions
• What is Collateral Purpose?
• No Application Needed for Filing or Admitting Copy
• Presumptions on Documents and Truth of Contents
• Presumptions on Registered Documents & Truth of Contents
• Notice to Produce Documents in Civil Cases
• Production of Documents: Order 11, Rule 14 & Rule 12
• Modes of Proof of Documents
• Secondary Evidence of Documents & Objections to Admissibility – How & When?
• 30 Years Old Documents and Presumption of Truth of Contents, under Sec. 90 Evidence Act
• Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
• Adjudication as to Proper Stamp under Stamp Act
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Settlement Deeds & Powers of Sub-Registrar in cancelling Deeds
• Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting 
• How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
• Visual and Audio Evidence (Including Photographs, Cassettes, Tape-recordings, Films, CCTV Footage, CDs, e-mails, Chips, Hard-discs, Pen-drives)
• Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witnesses Theory
• No Adjudication Needed If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance
• Impounding of Documents – When Produced; Cannot Wait Till it is Exhibited
• Sec. 35 Evidence Act: Presumption of Truth and Probative Value

Documents – Proof and Presumption

• Can the Court Refuse to Mark a (Relevant and Admissible) Document, for (i) there is No Formal Proof or (ii) it is a Photocopy?
• Marking of Photocopy and Law on Marking Documents on Admission (Without Formal Proof)
• Proof of Documents – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Modes of Proof of Documents
• ‘Admission’ in Indian Law
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Admitted Documents – Can the Court Refrain from Marking, for no Formal Proof?
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Effect of Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Stand Proved?
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Presumptions on Documents and Truth of Contents
• Presumptions on Registered Documents & Truth of Contents
• Secondary Evidence of Documents & Objections to Admissibility – How & When?
• 30 Years Old Documents and Presumption of Truth of Contents, under Sec. 90 Evidence Act

Interpretation

• Interpretation of Statutes – Literal Rule, Mischief Rule and Golden Rule
• Interpretation of Documents – Literal Rule, Mischief Rule and Golden Rule
• Interpretation of Wills
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence

Contract Act

• Godrej Projects Development Limited v. Anil Karlekar, 2025 INSC 143 – Supreme Court Missed to State Something
• ‘Sound-mind’ and ‘Unsound-Mind’ in Indian Civil Laws
• Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
• Who has to fix Damages in Tort and Contract?
• UNDUE INFLUENCE and PLEADINGS thereof in Indian Law
• All Illegal Agreements are Void; but All Void Agreements are Not Illegal
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance
• Cheating and Breach of Contract: Distinction – Fraudulent Intention at the time of Promise.

Law on Damages

• Law on Damages
• Who has to fix Damages in Tort and Contract?
• Law on Damages in Defamation Cases
• Pleadings in Defamation Suits
• Godrej Projects Development Limited v. Anil Karlekar, 2025 INSC 143 – Supreme Court Missed to State Something

Easement

• Easement Simplified
• What is Easement? Does Right of Easement Allow to ‘Enjoy’ Servient Land After Making Improvements Therein ?
• Prescriptive Rights – Inchoate until the Title thereof is Upheld by a Competent Court
• Will Easement of Necessity Ripen into a Prescriptive Easement?
• What is “period ending within two years next before the institution of the suit” in Easement by Prescription?
• Is the Basis of Every Easement, Theoretically, a Grant
• Extent of Easement (Width of Way) in Easement of Necessity, Quasi Easement and Implied Grant
• Easement of Necessity and Prescriptive Easement are Mutually Destructive; But, Easement of Necessity and Implied Grant Can be Claimed Alternatively
• Can Easement of Necessity and of Grant be Claimed in a Suit (Alternatively)?
• “Implied Grant” in Law of Easements
• Can an Easement-Way be Altered by the Owner of the Land?
• Village Pathways and Right to Bury are not Easements.
• Custom & Customary Easements in Indian Law
• ‘Additional Burden Loses Lateral Support’ – Incorrect Proposition
• Grant in Law
• Right of Private Way Beyond (Other Than) Easement
• Easement – Should Date of Beginning of 20 Years be pleaded?
• One Year Interruption or Obstruction will not affect Prescriptive Easement
• Should the Plaintiff Schedule Servient Heritage in a Suit Claiming Perspective Easement?

Stamp Act & Registration

• Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Settlement Deeds & Powers of Sub-Registrar in Cancelling Deeds
• Time-Limit For Adjudication of Unstamped Documents, before Collector
• Time Limit for Registration of Documents
• Presumptions on Registered Documents & Truth of Contents
• Registration of Documents Executed out of India
• LAW ON INSUFFICIENTLY STAMPED DOCUMENTS 
• Adjudication as to Proper Stamp under Stamp Act
• Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance
• Impounding of Documents, When Produced; Cannot Wait Till it is Exhibited
• No Adjudication Needed If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney Sufficient for Registration

Divorce/Marriage

• Presumption of Valid Marriage – If lived together for Long Spell
• Validity of Foreign Divorce Decrees in India
• Is ‘Irretrievable Brake-down of Marriage’, a Valid Ground for Divorce in India?
• Foreign Divorce Judgment against Christians having Indian Domicile

Negotiable Instruments Act

• Does Cheque-Case under Sec. 138, NI Act Lie Against a Trust?
• Sec. 138 NI Act (Cheque) Cases: Presumption of Consideration u/s. 118
• Even if ‘Signed-Blank-Cheque’, No Burden on Complainant to Prove Consideration; Rebuttal can be by a Probable Defence
• “Otherwise Through an Account” in Section 142, NI Act
• Where to file Cheque Bounce Cases (Jurisdiction of Court – to file NI Act Complaint)?
• Cheque Dishonour Case against a Company, Firm or Society
• What is ‘Cognizance’ in Law
• What is COGNIZANCE and Application of Mind by a Magistrate?

Arbitration

• Seesaw of Supreme Court in NN Global Mercantile v. Indo Unique Flame
• N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. and Ground Realities of Indian Situation
• What are Non-Arbitrable Disputes? When a Dispute is Not Referred to Arbitration in spite of Arbitration Clause
• Termination or Nullity of Contract Will Not Cease Efficacy of the Arbitration Clause
• No Valid Arbitration Agreement ‘Exists’ – Can Arbitration Clause be Invoked?

Will

• Witnesses to the Will Need Not See the Execution of the Will
• Interpretation of Wills
• Interpretation of Inconsistent Clauses in a Will
• Will – Probate and Letters of Administration
• Executors of Will – Duties & their Removal
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• How to Write a Will? Requirements of a Valid Will
• When Execution of a Will is ‘Admitted’ by the Opposite Side, Should it be ‘Proved’?
• A Witness to Hindu-Will will not Lose Benefit

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

• Judicial & Legislative Activism in India: Principles and Instances
• Can Legislature Overpower Court Decisions by an Enactment?
• Separation of Powers: Who Wins the Race – Legislature or Judiciary?
• Kesavananda Bharati Case: Never Ending Controversy
• Mullaperiyar Dam: Disputes and Adjudication of Legal Issues
• Article 370: Is There Little Chance for Supreme Court Interference
• Maratha Backward Community Reservation: SC Fixed Limit at 50%.
• Polygraphy, Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping Tests
• CAA Challenge: Divergent Views
• FERA, 1973 And Transfer of Immovable Property by a Foreigner
• Doctrine of ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Indian Law
• Doctrines on Ultra Vires and Removing the BASIS of the Judgment, in ED Director’s Tenure Extension Case (Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India)
• Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India – Mandamus (Given in a Case) Cannot be Annulled by Changing the Law
• Art. 370 – Turns the Constitution on Its Head

Religious issues

• Secularism and Art. 25 & 26 of the Indian Constitution
• Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
• ‘Ban on Muslim Women to Enter Mosques, Unconstitutional’
• No Reservation to Muslim and Christian SCs/STs (Dalits) Why?
• Parsi Women – Excommunication for Marrying Outside
• Knanaya Endogamy & Constitution of India
• Sabarimala Review Petitions & Reference to 9-Judge Bench
• SABARIMALA REVIEW and Conflict in Findings between Shirur Mutt Case & Durgah Committee Case
• Ayodhya Disputes: M. Siddiq case –Pragmatic Verdict

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

• General
  • General Features
  • Bye Laws Fundamental
  • Effect of Registration of Societies and Incorporation of Clubs
  • Societies and Branches
• Property & Trust
  • Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs
  • Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies
  • Juristic Personality of Societies and Clubs
  • Legal Personality of Trustees and Office Bearers
• Suits
  • Suits and Criminal Complaints By and Against a Company
  • Suits By or Against Societies, Clubs
  • Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs
  • How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies
  • Members of a Charitable Society which Runs a College are Tractable to Prevention of Corruption Act
• Amendment and Dissolution
  • Amendment of Bye laws of Societies and Clubs
  • Dissolution of Societies and Clubs
• Rights and Management
  • Rights & Liabilities of Members of Clubs and Societies
  • Individual Membership Rights in Societies & Clubs
  • Management – Powers of General Body and Governing Body
  • Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers
  • Law on Meetings: An Overview
• Election
  • Election & Challenge in Societies and Clubs
  • Court Interference in Election Process
• State Actions
  • State-Interference in Affairs of Societies & Clubs

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

• General Principles
  • What is Trust in Law?
  • Classification of Trusts
  • Public & Private Trusts in India.
  • Trust is ‘An Obligation’; Not a Legal Entity
  • Indian Law Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership
  • Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab, 2024-2 SCR 847
• Dedication and Vesting
  • Dedication of Property in Public Trusts
  • Vesting of Property in Trusts
  • Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies
  • What is Munambam Wakf Land Issue? If there is No Permanent Dedication, there will be No Wakf.
• Trustees and Management
  • Trustees and Administration of Public Trusts
  • Alienation of Public Trust Property
  • Extinction, Discharge, Revocation, etc. of Public Trusts
  • Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920: Provisions as regards opinion, advice or direction of the Court.
• Breach of Trust
  • Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees
• Suits by or against Trusts
  • Suits By or Against Trusts and Trustees
  • Remedies Under Sec. 92 CPC
  • Does Cheque-Case under Sec. 138, NI Act Lie Against a Trust?
• Law on Hindu Religious Endowments
  • Philosophy of Idol Worship
  • Is an Idol a Perpetual Minor?
  • Hindu Temples & Law of Trusts
  • Law of Mutts and Other Hindu Endowments
  • Shebaits & Mahants and Law of Trustees
• Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques – General
  • Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques
• Constitutional Principles
  • Secularism and Art. 25 & 26 of the Indian Constitution
  • Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
  • ‘Muslim Women: Ban to Enter Mosques, Is it Unconstitutional
  • Parsi Women Excommunication, Unconstitutional.
  • Knanaya Endogamy & Constitution of India
  • State & Court – Protectors of All Charities
• Ayodhya and Sabarimala Disputes
  • Ayodhya Disputes: M. Siddiq case – Pragmatic Verdict
  • Sabarimala Review Petitions & Reference to 9-Judge Bench
  • SABARIMALA REVIEW and Conflict in Findings between Shirur Mutt Case & Durgah Committee Case
• General
  • Public Trusts and (State) Endowments/Trusts Acts
  • Public Trusts and Indian Trusts Act – An Overview
  • Business by Charitable Trusts & Institutions