Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Does Indian Evidence Act Speak Anything as to Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents?

Answer – No.

• Indian Evidence Act Expounds Proof on ‘Existence’ of Documents and Proof on their ‘Contents’.
• TRUTH of Contents of Documents is left to the ‘Judicial Discretion’.

Key Takeaways

• Evidence Act does not expressly say as to “TRUTH“: Indian Evidence Act and other procedural laws do not expressly say anything as to “TRUTH of contents” of documents.
• Truth is left to the discretion of the court. In proper cases court can presume truth.
• Presumption as to truth: Presumption as to truth of the contents of a (proved) document can be invoked in proper cases. Official record is taken as correct on the presumption that the entries thereof are made only after satisfying its truth.
• Courts to save the TRUTH: Function of the Court is to save the TRUTH from falsehood, and the Courts are created for the very object of finding the TRUTH.
• Formal proof & Truth: Proof of documents includes – 
  • formal proof, and
  • truth of its contents.
• Proof by one who can vouchsafe: Generally, proof must be given through persons who can vouchsafe for the truth.
• Probative value: Probative value of a document, will be a matter for the court to determine.
• Admittance of contents & truth: Admission and Marking of a document may amount to admittance of its contents, but not necessarily its truth.
• Legal truth & substantive truth: In a well-designed system, judicial findings of formal legal truth should coincide with substantive truth.
• Inherently inadmissible document: Where an inherently inadmissible document is marked, objections thereto can be raised at a later stage.
• Objection to mode of proof, and truth can be waived: The objection to mode of proof, and proof as to truth of its contents, can be waived.
• Objection – earliest opportunity:The objection to mode of proof, and proof as to truth, have to be raised at the earliest opportunity.
• Admitted documents : Admitted documents (admitted by opposite side) need not be proved (Sec. 58 Evid. Act).
  • (Proviso to Sec. 58 says that the Court can require proof of admitted facts otherwise than by such admissions.)
• Common knowledge and internal evidence: Facts of common knowledge and internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document can also be invoked for placing truth of contents of documents.
• Document marked, probative value may be nil: Though a document is relevant and marked without objection, or on admission, the probative value of it may be low or nil, for want of proper proof (as to both ‘existence’ and ‘truth’).
• Where truth of a document is in issue: Where truth of a document is in issue, marking without objection does not absolve the duty on the concerned party to prove the truth.

PROOF – Two Types

First, Formal Proof: Proof as to existence of the document. The modes of proof of documents are governed under Sec. 64 to 73A of the Evidence Act.

Second, Substantive Proof:  Proof as to truth of the contents document. Besides the formal proof, in most cases (excepting a few cases where signature, hand-writing etc. alone are considered), the court acts upon a document, only when truth of the same is established.

Generally speaking, proof as to truth of a document is to be established-

• (i) by oral evidence of one who can vouchsafe the same,
• (ii) by circumstantial evidence,
• (iii) by invoking presumption or
• (iv) by express admission by the other side.

Modes of Proof of Documents

Proof of Documents (as to, both, ‘formal proof’ and ‘truth of the contents’) can be established invoking one of the following Modes:

• Admission of the person who wrote or signed the document (Sec. 17, 21, 58, 67, 70).
• Evidence of a person in whose presence the document was signed or written – ocular evidence (Sec. 59).
• An attesting witness (Sec. 59).
• Opinion of a person who is acquainted with the writing of the person who signed or wrote (Sec. 47).
• Admission made by the person who signed or wrote the document made in judicial proceedings (Sec. 32, 33).
• Evidence of a handwriting expert or other opinion/scientific-evidence (Sec.45).
• Evidence of a person who, in routine, has been receiving the document; or a document signed by such a person in the ordinary course of his business or official duty, though he may have never seen the author signing the document (Sec. 32, 34, 35 or 114).
• Invoking (specific) presumptions under Sec. 79 to 90A.
• Presumptions (general) under Sec. 114.
• Circumstantial evidence: on probability or inferences (Sec. 114).
• Court-comparison (Sec. 73).
• Facts judicially noticeable (Sec. 56 and 57).
• A fact of common-knowledge. (It does not require proof. See: Union Of India v. Virendra Bharti: 2011-2 ACC 886, 2010  ACJ 2353; Rakhal Chakraborty v. Sanjib Kumar Roy: 1998-1 GauLR 253, 1997-2 GauLT 705)
• Internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document; a link in a chain of correspondence; evidence of recipient of the document. (Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857)

Production, Admissibility & Proof of Documents

A document to be used in court has to pass through three steps. They are:

1. Production of documents in court
2. Admittance and exhibition
3. Proof (formal proof and truth of contents).

ADMISSIBILITY of Documents – Objection– 2 counts

Disputes on admissibility of documents arise on 2 domains. (See: Manakishore Lalbhai v. New Era Fabrics: AIR 2015 SC 3796)

1. document which is ab initio (or inherently) ‘inadmissible’
2. document liable to be objected on ‘mode or manner of proof’.

Even if an inherently-inadmissible document is marked, objections thereto can be raised ‘at a later stage’. Mode of proof (not inherent admissibility) falls within the realm of procedural law. Therefore, objection thereto can be waived.

Inherently-Inadmissible Documents

‘Inherent-inadmissibility of documents’ arises from the following:

1. Irrelevancy
2. Non-registration.

Section 5 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with relevancy. It reads as under:

• “5. Evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts — Evidence may be given in any suit or proceedings of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant, and of no others.”

In Jainab Bibi Saheb v. Hyderally Saheb, (1920) 38 MLJ 532, it was pointed out that neither an omission by an advocate to object to giving of irrelevant and inadmissible evidence nor the failure of the tribunal to exclude it of its own motion would validate a decree based on material which the Evidence Act declares to be inherently and in substance irrelevant to the issue. It was also held in this decision that the primary rule to prove relevant facts by the evidence of witnesses is to call them before the trial Judge and examine them viva voce in the manner stated in Chapter 10 of the Evidence Act.

Documents Marked Without Objection as to its MODE OF PROOF – Effect

The law prevails in India is the following –

• If documents marked without objection as to its mode of proof,  it is not open to the other side to object to their admissibility afterwards.
• Following are the decisive decisions in this line.

P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S.Perumal,(1972) 1 SCC 9 (Three Judge Bench – A.N. Grover, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Ray, JJ.)	Admissibility of police reports without examining the Head Constables who covered those meetings. Those reports were marked without any objection.  Hence it was not open to the respondent to object to their admissibility.	Relied on: Bhagat Ram v. Khetu Ram, AIR 1929 PC 110.
R.V.E. Venkatchalla Gounder v. Arulmighu Viswesaraswamy and V.P.Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752 (R.C. Lahoti, Ashok Bhan, JJ.)	Photo copies were admitted in evidence ‘without foundation‘ and without objection. They cannot be held inadmissible for originals were not produced.	Relied on: Padman v. Hanwanta, AIR 1915 PC 111 P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S.Perumal
Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082	Objection to be taken    at     trial before document is marked as an ‘exhibit’.	Relied on: Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji R.V.E. Venkatachalam Gounder
PC Thomas v. PM Ismail, AIR 2010 SC 905; 2009-10 SCC 239.	Non-examination and absence of “proof of acknowledgment” by the author – If no objection on ‘mode of proof’ in trial court, it will be too late (in appeal) to raise objection on the ground of mode of proof – that is, “non production of John K as a witness”	…
Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1986 ACJ 616; 1986 Guj LH 27; 1985-2 GujLR 1315	No objection about the truth of contents of Ex. 32. The witness of the defendant accepted the contents. Therefore, too late in the day to canvass that contents of Ex. 32 were not proved.	….
Sarkar on Evidence .	If copies of the documents are admitted without objection in the trial Court, no objection can be taken in appeal	Referred to in: Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082.

Who Should Object FIRST – Court or Opposite Side?

There is divergence of judicial opinion as to saying ‘NO’ by court to marking a document with formal defect, beforehand it is objected by the other side. Eg. Tendering copy of a document without furnishing the ‘foundational evidence’ to admit secondary evidence.

First view Court is under an obligation to exclude inadmissible materials.	H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492 (Followed in: U. Sree  v.  U. Srinivas: AIR 2013 SC 415.) Yeshoda v. Shoba Ram:  AIR 2007 SC 1721
Second view The court cannot object first. If no objection for other side, Court cannot refrain from marking a document on its own volition or choice (on the ground of formal defect).	R.V.E. Venkatchalla Gounder v. Arulmighu Viswesaraswamy and V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752 Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082. (This view is generally followed in India.)

It is pointed out in Hemendra Rasiklal Ghia v. Subodh Mody, 2009 (2) AIR Bom R 296, 2008-6 MhLJ 886 (FB) that the weight of the authorities suggests that the objection to the admissibility of evidence should be raised by the objector, and decided by the Court, at the earliest opportunity. (That is, it support the second view.)

Controversy resolved

• 1. The court cannot object first. If no objection for other side, Court cannot refrain from marking a document on its own volition (on the ground of formal defect).
  • R.V.E. Venkatchalla Gounder v. Arulmighu Viswesaraswamy and V.P.Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752;
  • Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082.
• 2. If the deficiency is pertaining to non-registration of a compulsory registrable document (as it falls under the head, inadmissible document) the court can desist the marking of the document.
• 3. By virtue of the decision, G. M. Shahul Hameed v. Jayanthi R. Hegde, AIR 2024 SC 3339, unless the court has not applied its mind to the insufficiency of stamp, and unless there is a ‘judicial determination‘, the objection thereof can be raised at any time.

Document Liable to be Objected on ‘Mode or Manner of Proof’

Following are improper modes (liable to objection):

• Seeking exhibition through one who cannot vouchsafe veracity or truth.
• Objectionable (mode of) secondary evidence. Eg:
  • Certified copy produced without proving circumstances that entitles to give secondary evidence under Sec. 65 of the Evd. Act.
  • Secondary evidence other than that is recognised under Sec. 63.
• Unstamped or insufficiently/improperly stamped document.

Whether Proof of Admitted Documents Includes ‘Truth’ of its Contents

Sec. 58 of the Evidence Act says that ‘Admitted facts need not be proved’. Order VIII, Rule 5 CPC stipulates that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability.

Effect of marking a document without formal proof (on admission or without objection) brings-about divergent views.

First view (a) Proof (Contents) stands established.  It cannot be questioned afterwards. (b) Truth also: See: Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission, 1986 ACJ 616; 1985-2 GujLR 1315. (c) Admission of contents – but, does not dispense with proof of truth of its contents.	(a) RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami: AIR 2003  SC  4548; Narbada Devi  v. Birendra Kumar: (2003) 8 SCC 745; Dayamati Bai v. K.M. Shaffi : AIR 2004 SC 4082; Oriental Insurance Co v. Premlata:  (2007) 8 SCC 575; Thimmappa Rai v. RamannaRai,(2007) 14 SCC 63; KalitaIqbal Basith v. N Subbalakshmi, (2021) 2 SCC 718. (b) Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1985-2 GujLR 1315: No objection about the truth of contents … before the trial Court. … It is therefore too late in the day for Miss Shah for the Commission to canvass for the first time before us in appeal. Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Govt. of Delhi) [2023] 4 SCC 731: If no objection as to mode of proof (secondary evidence) when marked, no such objection could be allowed to be raised at any later stage. (c) Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865; Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796.
Second View Even if no objection, it does not dispense with proof (as to, both, existence of the document and its truth). In such a case the document will not be taken as proved. (Note: It may not be legitimate to apply this principle literatim)	LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen: 2010-4 SCC 491 (Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry); H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240 (Copy of a power of attorney alone was shown to the respondent during cross-examination and he admitted his signature thereon only, and not its contents); Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohith: 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 (date of birth).
Third view If truth is in issue, mere proof of contents, or marking without objection, is not proof of truth.	See: Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745; Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085.
Fourth view Admission of contents, and dispenses with proof and truth; but its probative value will be a matter for appreciation by court.	See: State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684 (Admission and probative value – different); Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri: 2015  AIR(SCW) 6271; Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758;  H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492;  Rasiklal Manikchand  v. MSS Food Products: 2012-2 SCC 196.
Fifth view Admission of contents, and dispenses with proof and truth; but Court should require (in proper cases) the party producing the document to adduce proper evidence, and to cure formal defects, invoking –               • Sec. 165 of Evidence Act               • Sec. 58 of Evidence Act               • O. XII, r. 2A Proviso, CPC and               • Sec. 294 of the CrPC.	See: Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh, (2005) 13 SCC 511; Umesh Challiyil v. K.P. Rajendra, (2008) 11 SCC 740; KK Ramachandran Master v. MV Sreyamakumar, (2010) 7 SCC 428; AIR 2015

Objection to be Raised When Document is Admitted; Otherwise, Opportunity Lost

It was observed by the Supreme Court in 2001 in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2001 SC 1158, that that ‘it is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection’. And the Court directed as under:

• “When so recast, the practice which can be a better substitute is this: Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment.”

But, the subsequent decisions in RVE Venkatachala Gounder: AIR 2004 SC 4082; Dayamathi Bai (2004) 7  SCC 107 took a contra view. It was held that the objection as to ‘mode of proof’ should be taken at the time of marking of the document as an exhibit, so that the defect can be cured by the affected party.

Privy Council in Padman v. Hanwanta, AIR 1915 PC 111,held that the objection to marking of documents and its admissibility should have been taken in the trial court. It was observed as under:

• “The defendants have now appeal to the Majesty in Council, and the case has been argued on their behalf in great detail. It was urged in the course of the argument that a registered copy of the will of 1898 was admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation being led for its admission. No objection, however, appears to have been taken in the first court against the copy obtained from the Registrar’s office being put in evidence. Had such objection being made at the time, the District Judge, who tried the case in the first instance, would probably have seen that the deficiency was supplied. Their lordships think that there is no substance in the present contention.”

In P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S Perumal, 1972 (2) SCR 646,it was observed as under:

• “Counsel contended that the police reports referred to earlier are inadmissible in evidence as the Head-constables who covered those meetings have not been examined in the case. Those reports were marked without any objection. Hence it is not open to the respondent now to object to their admissibility.”

Our Apex Court held in Lachhmi Narain Singh v. Sarjug Singh, AIR 2021 SC 3873, as under:

• “24. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that plea regarding mode of proof cannot be permitted to be taken at the appellate stage for the first time, if not raised before the trial Court at the appropriate stage. This is to avoid prejudice to the party who produced the certified copy of an original document without protest by the other side. If such objection was raised before trial court, then the concerned party could have cured the mode of proof by summoning the original copy of document. But such opportunity may not be available or possible at a later stage. Therefore, allowing such objection to be raised during the appellate stage would put the party (who placed certified copy on record instead of original copy) in a jeopardy & would seriously prejudice interests of that party. It will also be inconsistent with the rule of fair play as propounded by Justice Ashok Bhan in the case of RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu, AIR 2003 SC 4548.”

Effect of marking document without objection is laid down in the following two recent decisions of the Supreme Court. In both these cases, it is seen, the Apex Court has taken the view that the ‘truth’ is also stood proved.

Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi)

The Constitution Bench of our Apex Court laid down in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 330; 2023 4 SCC 731, as under:

• Section 61 deals with proof of contents of documents which is by either primary or by secondary evidence.
• When a document is produced as primary evidence, it will have to be proved in the manner laid down in Sections 67 to 73 of the Evidence Act.
• Mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence. On the other hand, when a document is produced and admitted by the opposite party and is marked as an exhibit by the court, …  (sic – no objection can be raised at any later stage with regard to proof of its contents).
• The contents of the document must be proved either by the production of the original document i.e., primary evidence or by copies of the same as per Section 65 as secondary evidence.
• So long as an original document is in existence and is available, its contents must be proved by primary evidence.
• It is only when the primary evidence is lost, in the interest of justice, the secondary evidence must be allowed.
• Primary evidence is the best evidence and it affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.
• Thus, when a particular fact is to be established by production of documentary evidence, there is no scope for leading oral evidence.
• What is to be produced is the primary evidence i.e., document itself. It is only when the absence of the primary source has been satisfactorily explained that secondary evidence is permissible to prove the contents of documents.
• Secondary evidence, therefore, should not be accepted without a sufficient reason being given for non-production of the original.
• Once a document is admitted, the contents of that document are also admitted in evidence, though those contents may not be conclusive evidence.
• Moreover, once certain evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence.
• There is a prohibition for any other evidence to be led which may detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence and the court has no option to hold the existence of the fact otherwise when such evidence is made conclusive.

It is held further as under:

• “44. Section 64 of the Evidence Act states that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in certain cases mentioned above. ….. Thus, once a document has been properly admitted, the contents of the documents would stand admitted in evidence, and if no objection has been raised with regard to its mode of proof at the stage of tendering in evidence of such a document, no such objection could be allowed to be raised at any later stage of the case or in appeal vide Amarjit Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1995 Cr LJ 1623 (Del) (“Amarjit Singh”). But the documents can be impeached in any other manner, though the admissibility cannot be challenged subsequently when the document is bound in evidence.”

In PC Thomas v. PM Ismail, AIR 2010 SC 905; 2009-10 SCC 239, it is observed  as under:

• “No objection on pleas of “inadmissibility” or “mode of proof” was raised at the time of their exhibition or any time later during trial, when most of the witnesses, produced by the parties were confronted with these, as duly exhibited, bearing stamp marking with particulars, prescribed under Order XIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and duly signed as such.
• In our opinion, it is too late in the day now to object to their exhibition on the ground of “prescribed procedure” i.e. mode of proof.
• Moreover, we also find that it was nobody’s case that the said documents were got printed by John K or distributed amongst voters by him. Absence of proof of acknowledgment by him because of non production of John K as a witness, in the circumstances, in our view, is inconsequential.
• Admittedly, John K was a well known leader of high stature, recognized as such by Christian/Catholic voters including those mentioned in Para 17 (supra) and, therefore, there is no question of drawing an adverse inference against the election petitioner for not examining him, as strenuously urged on behalf of the appellant, particularly when the printing and circulation of offending material (Exts.P1 and P2) has been proved by the election petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.”

Mere Execution of a document, no Conclusion Recitals are Correct

In Gangamma v. Shivalingaiah, 2005 9 SCC 359, it is held as under:

• “We may furthermore notice that even if a formal execution of a document is proved, the same by itself cannot lead to a presumption that the recitals contained therein are also correct. The mere execution of a document, h in other words, does not lead to the conclusion that the recitals made therein are correct, and subject to the statutory provisions contained in Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, it is open to the parties to raise a plea contra thereto.”

Objection as to Truth of Contents, First Time In Appeal – Effect

In Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1986 ACJ 616; 1986 Guj LH 27; 1985-2 GujLR 1315 it is observed as under:

• “It was never the case of the Commission that report which was submitted in a sealed cover was not the genuine and true report of the committee appointed by the Commission itself. Thus in short no objection about the truth of contents of Ex. 24/1 i. e. Ex. 32 was ever put forward before the trial Court and rightly so as that was the report of its own committee of experts appointed by the Commission for enlightening itself about the causes of the accident and about the future safety steps which were required to be taken to avoid such accidents. … Not only that but the witness of the defendant accepted the contents of the said document Ex. 32. Nothing was suggested by him or even whispered to the effect that the contents of the said report were in any way untrue. …. In fact both the sides have relied upon different parts of Ex. 32 in support of their rival contentions on the aspect of negligence and contributory negligence. It is therefore too late in the day for Miss Shah for the Commission to canvass for the first time before us in appeal that contents of Ex. 32 were not proved in accordance with law and hence the document was required to be taken off the record. It is now well settled that objection about mode of proof can be waived by a party and that such objection is raised by the party at the earliest opportunity in the trial Court such objection will be deemed to have been waived and cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in appeal (vide P. C. Purushottamman v. S. Perumal AIR 1972 SC 608; Pandappa v. Shivlingappa 47 BLR. 962; and Gopaldas and another v. Shri Thakurli, AIR 1943 PC 83 at page 87 ). In view of this settled legal position the objection raised by Miss Shah against admissibility of Ex. 32 viz. that its contents were not proved in accordance with law has to be repelled.”

PROBATIVE VALUE of a Document is a Matter for the Court

Etymology of ‘Probative’ is from ‘Probare’ (Latin), means to prove; and ‘Probatio’ (Latin), means experience, proof, testing, probation etc. In law, ‘probative value’ imparts –

• Sufficiency of evidence to prove something in a trial.
• Probability of proof or truth while appreciating a fact.
• Value or weight of evidence, considered by the court, in proof of something.
• Extent of evidentiary value that can be taken to prove a proffered proposition.

Whenever a document is admitted in court, the probative value thereof will be a matter for the court to determine. It is important to note that probative value may ‘include’ truth of contents of documents; but, precisely it is independent from ‘truth’ of contents of documents.

Probative Value – Date of Birth in School Register has More Value Than Horoscope

If there is a dispute regarding age, the Supreme Court, in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, AIR 2005 SC 1868, held that the date of birth available in the School Admission Register has more probative value than the horoscope.

• Similarly the probative value of –
  • FIR,
  • Scene-Mahazar,
  • Post-Mortem Report,
  • Photocopy of a Registered Deed, etc.,
• by itself, will be lesser. In such cases the court can refrain from acting upon such documents until substantive or regular evidence is offered by examining proper witness.

In Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, 1993(2) CLR 395, and in Jora Singh v. State of Punjab, 1984(2) Crimes 837, it has been held that an entry in the school leaving certificate regarding date of birth of a student is not a conclusive proof or high ‘probity evidence’ because it is a matter of common knowledge that the date of birth given at the time of the admission of a boy or girl in a school is seldom correct and more often than not the age given is less than the actual age of the child. (See also: C. Doddanarayana Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy, AIR 2020 SC 1912; Commissioner of Central Excise And Service Tax v. M/S. Sanjivani Non-Ferrous Trading: AIR 2019 SC 203.)

Trial is an inquiry into the Truth

In American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, 2007, it is stated as to the purpose of ‘trial’:

• “The purpose of trial is to determine the validity of the allegations. The objective is to secure a fair and impartial administration of justice between the parties to the litigation ….Trial is not a contest between lawyers but a presentation of facts to which the law may be applied to resolve the issues between the parties and to determine their rights. It is also not a sport; it is an inquiry into the truth, in which the general public has an interest.” (Quoted in: Mohammed Abdul Wahid v. Nilofer, 2024-2 SCC 144)

Definition of “Fact” – Evid. Act does Not Specifically say as to ‘TRUTH’

Though ‘Truth’ may fall under ‘Fact’, Evidence Act does not specifically say as to ‘TRUTH’ when defines ‘Fact’. Sec. 3 Evidence Act reads as under:

• “Fact” —“Fact” means and includes—
• .(1) any thing, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses;
• (2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious. Illustrations
  • .(a) That there are certain objects arranged in a certain order in a certain place, is a fact.
  • (b) That a man heard or saw something, is a fact.
  • (c) That a man said certain words, is a fact.
  • (d) That a man holds a certain opinion, has a certain intention, acts in good faith, or fraudulently, or uses a particular word in a particular sense, or is or was at a specified time conscious of a particular sensation, is a fact.
  • (e) That a man has a certain reputation, is a fact.

“Proof” – Evid. Act, CPC & CrPC do Not Specifically say as to ‘TRUTH’

The express provisions of the procedural laws state only ‘Proof’ as to existence and contents of documents, and not TRUTH.

Sec. 58 of the Evidence Act emphasises that ‘Admitted Facts’ (admitted by opposite side) need not be proved.

• Proviso to Sec. 58 says that the Court can require proof of admitted facts otherwise than by such admissions.

Besides Sec. 58 and the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts (CPC and CrPC) shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove admitted (by opposite side) documents. We can see it in – 

• Order VIII Rule 5 CPC
• Order XII, Rule 2A(1) Proviso of the CPC and 
• Sec. 294 of the CrPC .

Proviso to Sec. 58 of the Indian Evidence Act provides as under:

• “Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.”

Order VIII Rule 5 Proviso of the CPC says as under:

• “Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.”

Order XII, Rule 2A(1) Proviso of the CPC says as under: 

• Provided that the Court may, in its discretion and for reasons to be recorded, require any document so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.

Proviso to Sec. 294(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

• “Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved.”

Therefore, it is clear –

• Admitted documents stand ‘proved’, according to procedural laws. Its existence and contents cannot be challenged by the party which admit it.
• But, the Court can, in its discretion, require proof of these admitted facts (existence and contents) “otherwise than by such admissions”.
• The procedural laws contemplate here – ‘Proof’ (existence and contents) and not TRUTH.

Proof must be by one who can Vouchsafe for Truth – Not Correct in All Cases

In Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745, it is held:

• “Reliance is heavily placed on behalf of the appellant on Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085. The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue”.

Though it is the “normal principle” that Proof must be by one who can vouchsafe for truth (Assistant Commissioner of Customs v. Edwin Andrew Minihan, ILR 2024-1 Ker 596; 2023-7 KHC 512; 2024-1 KLT 24), it may not be correct in all cases; because, there may be cases where proof (as to ‘existence and contents’ of a document) can be given by a witnesses who cannot vouchsafe truth – e.g., a letter or a deed obtained by a witness in ‘due/common course’. In such cases, when ‘truth’ as to the contents of a document is in dispute, it has to be proved by a competent person.

Time for Consideration of ‘Truth‘ by the Court

In any case, the truth of the contents of a document is not considered by the court at the time of marking a document; and, it comes for consideration at the fag end, while considering entire evidence on the matter including the cross examination of the witness through whom the document is marked.

In Harendra Rai v. State of Bihar, , AIR 2023 SC 4331, 2023- 9 SCC 702, it is observed as under:

• “At the stage of evidence, when any document/paper is formally produced for being treated as a piece of evidence, the Court looks at two basic aspects. Firstly, the existence of the document on the Court’s record and, secondly, the proof of its execution or its contents being sufficiently deposed to by a witness having requisite knowledge thereof, whereafter, the document in question is marked as exhibit. At the stage of exhibiting any document as a piece of evidence, the truth of what is stated in the document is not considered. It is left open to final evaluation at the trial after cross-examination, and the entire testimony of the witness about the existence and contents of the document is weighed in conjunction with various other factors emerging during a trial. At the final evaluation stage, the Trial Court concludes whether the document speaks the truth and decides what weight to give it for final decision. In other words, its evidentiary value is analysed by the Courts at the time of final judgment. In this view of the matter, the marking of a piece of evidence as ‘exhibit’ at the stage of evidence in a Trial proceeding is only for the purpose of identification of evidence adduced in the trial and for the convenience of the Court and other stakeholders in order to get a clear picture of what is being produced as evidence in a Trial proceeding.”

Courts are Created for the Very Object of Finding TRUTH

Following decisions of our Apex Court bespeak, as to the significance of TRUTH in judicial determinations, as under:

It is the function of the Court to save the truth from falsehood–

• Bhagwan Tana Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1974

There is a legal duty for the courts to find the truth and administer justice–

• Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271.

The Courts are created for the very object of finding the truth–

• Mohan Singh v. State of MP, (1999) 2 SCC 428.

Right from the inception of the judicial system establishment of truth is the main purposes underlying existence of Courts of justice–

• Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374.

The trial should be a search for the truth–

• Himanshu Singh Sabharwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 3 SCC 602,

The people would have faith in Courts when they would find that truth alone triumphs in Courts–

• Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421.  

The truth should be the guiding starin the entire legal process and it is the duty of the Judge to discover truth to do complete justice–

• Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria, (2012) 5 SCC 370,.

It is the bounden duty of the Court to uphold the truth and do justice–

• Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya, (2012) 6 SCC 430.

Now a question comes – Which provision of the Indian Evidence Act deals with ‘deducing or deriving’ TRUTH ?

In such an inquisition, we legitimately arrive at in-

• (i) the definition of “Proved” in Sec. 3, and
• (ii) “Presumption” in Sec. 114, Evidence Act.

The definition of “Proved” in Sec. 3 gives vast discretion to the court. It reads as under:

• ” ‘Proved‘ — A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court; either BELIEVES it to exist, or CONSIDERS its existence so PROBABLE that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.”

To fulfill the prime and onerous duty on the court, that is deducing or deriving TRUTH from the disputed matters, the Evidence Act further enables and authorises the court to invoke PRESUMPTION under Sec. 114 Evidence Act, wherever it is required.

Sec. 114 reads as under:

• “114. Court may presume existence of certain facts —The Court may PRESUME the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.”

Presumption of Truth is taken ‘on something Proved‘, or taken for granted

In Izhar Ahmad Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052, the Supreme Court definitely observed that presumption of truth is taken ‘on something proved or taken for granted ‘. It reads as under:

• “The term ‘presumption’ in its largest and most comprehensive signification, may be defined to mean inference, affirmative or dis-affirmative of the truth or falsehood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn by a process of probable reasoning from something proved or taken for granted.”

The Apex Court further quoted James Bradley Tayer (American jurist and author of Treatise on Evidence) which reads as under:

• “Presumptions are aids to reasoning argumentation, which assume the truth of certain matters for the purpose of some given inquiry. …”.

In State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar, 2000-8 SCC 382, it is observed as under:

• “33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Sec. 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.”

TRUTH is left to Discretion or Presumption of Court

Sec. 67, Evidence Act lays down the fundamental principles as to the proof of documents. Sec. 67 reads as under:

“67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced—If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person’s handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting.”

Sec. 67 says as to ‘proof of signature and handwriting’ alone. Neither Sec. 67 nor any other section of the Ev

In this premise, it is legitimate to deduce the following inferences –

• Evidence Act does not expressly proffer anything as to “TRUTH of contents” of documents.
• It is left to the discretion (Sec. 3) of the court. In proper cases court can presume (Sec. 114) truth.
• In most cases, ‘proof of execution’ may lead the court to presume ‘proof of truth’.
• It is more so, when a document is admitted (by the other side) without objection.
• But, when proof as to ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute, the party in whom the burden thereof rests has to discharge it.

Our Apex Court in Mahasay Ganesh Prasad Ray v. Narendra Nath Sen, AIR 1953 SC 431, while dealing with 30-year-old Book of Accounts, though it came from the possession of its keeper, held as under:

• “3. … … … Exhibit 32 series as noticed by the High Court, consists of loose sheets of papers. They have not the probative force of a book of account regularly kept. Being old documents, naturally, the writer is not called and barring the fact that they were produced from the Receiver’s possession there is nothing to show their genuineness. Section 90, Evidence Act, does not help the appellants because this is not a case where the signature of a Particular person is in question or sought to be established. … …”.

In Harihar Prasad Singh v. Deonarain Prasad, AIR 1956 SC 305, the Apex Court observed as under:

•  “8. Strong reliance was placed by the respondents on Exhibits F-1 and F-1(1), which are khatians relating to the suit lands published on 7-12-1909, recording them as in the possession of the defendants of the second party as ‘kaimi’ and on the presumption under S. 103-B that entry is correct.

Court to invoke Presumptions Judiciously

Though discretionary presumptions (such as those under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act) do not bind the court, judicial discretion is not unbridled. As a matter of principle, such presumptions should not be ignored without justification.

The court –

• is expected to assess whether the circumstances warrant drawing the presumption and record its reasons thereof; and
• cannot disregard available presumptions, without furnishing adequate justification.
• “Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the same it becomes lifeless”: (Arijit Pasayat J.) AIR 2008 SC 1589, 2008 (15) SCC 711, and Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, 2003 (7) Supreme 152.
• See also: State of U.P. v. Battan,2001 (10) SCC 607;  State of Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, AIR 1982 SC 1215; Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh, 1987 (2) SCC 222.

In Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (Govt.  of NCT of Delhi), 2023 CrLJ 311; 2022-4 JT 477; 2022-6 Scale 794; 2022-4 SCR 989, it is held as under:

• “In any case, when there is legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

‘Loose and Unfettered Discretion is a Dangerous Weapon‘

In Naresh Chandra Mital v. Bishamber Nath Chopra, 1966-2 DLT 352, it is observed as under:

• “The Court has in exercising its discretion to keep in view the desirability of facilitating speedy decisions of suits upon bills of exchange, promissory notes and hundis and also to keep in view the drastic nature of the provisions contained in Rules 2 and 3 of Order 37. The presumption of consideration in the case of negotiable instruments on the one hand and the plea of the defendant and the attending circumstances tending to discount such presumption have to be considered and weighed judiciously by the Court. In otherwords, the Court has to exercise judicial discretion, keeping in view the basic dictates of justice when determining the question whether or not to permit the defendant to contest the suit and if so, whether unconditionally or on terms and what terms. The idea of discretion, which is always to be exercised in a disciplined and responsible manner, really represents a compromise between the idea that those who possess power should be trusted with free hand and not tied down to narrow and rigid groves and the competing notion that loose and unfettered discretion is a dangerous weapon to entrust to any one including Courts.”

Adjudication to Find Out Truth & Doctrines of Substantive Rights, Prejudice to Other Side, Procedure – a Handmaid Matter

In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal, (1969) 1 SCC 869 our Apex Court held, while dealing with amendment of pleadings, as under:

• “5. …. Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the Rules of procedure. (Quoted in Varun Pahwa v. Renu Chaudhary, AIR 2019 SC 1186)

In Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, (2006) 1 SCC 75, our Apex  Court held that procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice by any oppressive or punitive use. The Court held as under:-

• “17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice.
• Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well-recognised exceptions to this principle are:
• .(i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of non- compliance;
• (ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
• (iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
• (iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court;
• (v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.” (Quoted in Varun Pahwa v. Renu Chaudhary, AIR 2019 SC 1186.)

Adjudication is to Render Justice; it is Unmindful of Consequences

It was held by the Kerala High Court in Gopalakrishnan v. Joint Registrar of Co operative Societies (General), 08 Dec 2015, (Dama Seshadri Naidu, J) as under:

• “23. I am very conscious that this Court, as a constitutional adjudicatory machinery, is called upon to interpret the statute straight and simple and render justice. Justice is not an inventive judicial instrument; it is rather a necessary corollary to the judicious application of the law to the facts following certain accepted cannons of construction of the statutes and the Constitution, too. The whole process is compendiously called judicial adjudication. Trite is the truth that adjudication is unmindful of consequences; it is, on the other hand, in the legislative wisdom to consider all the eventualities and bring about legislation or legislative changes to see that the varied needs of the organisations and institutions, including the administrative agencies, are best served—adverse fallout on the application of law is avoided.

Sec. 90, Evid. Aact – Not Truth of Contents; But, Genuineness Drawn

Under Sec. 90, Not Truth of Contents, but, only presumption of Genuineness of a document (i.e., existence or handwriting), is drawn (Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin: (2012) 8 SCC 148). Therefore, besides TRUTH, the contents of the documents also have to be proved by cogent evidence.

• No doubt, under Sec. 114, TRUTH can be presumed, directly, in proper cases, in their peculiar ensuring facts (regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case).
• That is, if the document is a public document an “added presumption” (as to correctness) under Section 114(e) is available -KalitaIqbal Basith and others v. N Subbalakshmi, (2021) 2 SCC 718.

Sec. 90 CPC, basically, speaks about two things – as regards 30-year-documents:

• 1. A document purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person is presumed to be in his handwriting.
• 2. A document purports to be executed or attested is presumed to be duly executed and attested.

Our Courts Act Upon ‘LEGAL TRUTH’; and not ‘ULTIMATE TRUTH’

As shown above, the very duty of a court is to find TRUTH. Our courts are said to be functioning in ‘adversarial system’ where advocates present the case of their parties before an impartial judge for determining the truth and for getting a judgment accordingly. In such a system, the courts are concerned with ‘PROCEDURAL TRUTH’ or ‘LEGAL TRUTH’ as emerged from the pleadings and evidence; and not ULTIMATE TRUTH.

In State of Rajasthan v. Asharam @ Ashumal, AIR  2023 SC 2228, it is observed as under:

• “In a well-designed system, judicial findings of formal legal truth should coincide with substantive truth.” (Also see: Kailash Vijayvargiya v. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri, 2023-6 JT 138.)

Viscount Simon LC, explained it in Hickman v.  Peacey, [1945] AC 304, as under:

• “A court of law … is not engaged in ascertaining ultimate verities: it is engaged in determining what is the proper result to be arrived at, having regard to the evidence before it.”

Conjectures and Suspicion Should Not take the place of Legal Truth.

In Ritesh Chakarvarti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2007-1 SCC(Cr) 744, our Apex Court warned as under:

• “There is another aspect of the matter, which cannot be lost sight of. While dealing with a case of grave nature like the present one, there is always a danger that conjectures and suspicion may take the place of legal truth.” (See also: Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of West Bengal, 2007-12 SCC 230.)

Subjective Satisfaction and Objective Consideration by the Court

It is evident from Sec. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act that TRUTH (or otherwise) of a disputed matter is left to the Subjective Satisfaction of the court. The definition of ‘proved’ in Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act says that ‘a fact is said to be proved when (after considering the matter before it) the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists’.  Further, S.114 of the Evidence Act allows the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc.

The Evidence Act itself lays down the objective methods, including adequate restrictions, to arrive at the subjective satisfaction to determine the truth. The definition of ‘proved’ itself provides for ‘consideration of the matters before it’. The provision in Sec. 27 which bars the use of statement, given to police while an accused is in custody, is an important restriction in that line.  

In Karunakaran v. State, (1960) 2 Ker LR 247, it is observed as under:

• “The practice of attestation of confessional statement by witnesses is an objectionable one. It prejudices the accused to safeguard whose interest the Legislature has enacted Ss. 24 fo 26 of the Evidence Act. It has no legal sanction behind it. There is no harm in recording the accused’s statement in the first person at any great length in the case diary when the accused is arrested and questioned and in the preamble to the recovery mahazar reference to the reasons leading to the recovery may be made.
• The whole thing appears to be an “intentional whittling down” of the wholesome provisions of Ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. It is very easily said that the incriminating portion of a lengthy confessional “statement should be excluded. But it is a very difficult mental process to close your eyes to the details in the confessional statement and see only the bracketed portion and remain uninfluenced by the confession of the accused. This feat is possible of performance only by a few specially trained experts. There is no reason why the overburdened judicial officers should be saddled with an additional burden which has not the support of law or procedure.” (Quoted in: Mohammed v. State of Kerala, 1963 Cri LJ 175; Thadiyanevida Nazeer @ Ummer Haji v. State of Kerala (2022) and K Babu v. State of Kerala, 2023(6) KLT 96)

Our Courts Apply Different ‘STANDADARDS of Proof’

In the process to take a fact ‘proved’, ‘disproved’, or ‘not proved’ the courts have to weigh probabilities. In Bater v Bater,  (1950) 2 All ER 458, Lord Denning pointed out –  ‘there is no absolute standard’, and higher degree of proof is required for more serious matters like criminal cases. Therefore, the courts apply different ‘STANDADARDS of Proof’ in different cases and the courts use distinctive scales in the judicial process of pondering on probabilities.

From the above, it can be concluded –

1. ‘Proof of Documents’ envisaged in the Evidence Act is proof of ‘facts’ as to the ‘existence’ or ‘contents’ of a document.
2. TRUTH of contents of documents being remain in the judicial discretion, it could not have been expressly or directly dealt with in Evidence Act with precision.
3. According to Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act ‘a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either BELIEVES it to exist, or CONSIDERS its existence so PROBABLE that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of the particular case to act upon the supposition that it exists …’.
4. According to Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act ‘the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it THINKS likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business …’
5. That is, TRUTH (or otherwise) of a disputed point is left to the SUBJECTIVE SATISFATION of the court inasmuch as the question whether a fact is proved (or not) is left to the evaluation of the court. Further, the court is specifically required to appraise – how a prudent man in the given circumstances “acts upon“. The court is also authorised to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened “regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct” etc.
6. It is equally important – TRUTH of a disputed item is to be appreciated on the legal (subjective) reasoning after OBJECTIVE “consideration of the matters before it” (Sec. 3 Evid. Act).

Old Document: Recent Challenge – Direct Evidence Need Not Be as Strong as might be Naturally Expected in a Recent Transaction.  

In Jagna Sanyasiah v.  Mycherla Peda Atchanna Naidu, AIR 1921 Mad 624, it is held as under:

• “5. The respondents’ contention in their memorandum of objections would, in my opinion, have to be allowed as the passing of consideration for a document which is more than 30 years old and which was ever questioned till this suits was brought should be taken as proved even if the direct evidence is not as strong as might be naturally expected in respect of recent transactions.”

Mechanical Interpretation with Dictionary and Grammar Inadequate

MH Beg, J. (as he then was) in Rishi Kesh Singh v. The State, AIR 1970 All. 51, pointed out as under:

• “100. The concepts of ‘proved’, ‘disproved’, and ‘not proved,’ defined in alluringly simple terms in the Act, compress a great deal of judicial wisdom with history and processes of evolution and development behind them which have not yet ended. …. It is obvious that a mechanical interpretation with the help of a dictionary and rules of grammar, found to be inadequate on several occasions by our Supreme Court (e.g. Deputy Custodian Evacuee Property New Delhi v. Official Receiver of the Estate of Daulat Ram Surana, AIR 1965 SC 951 at p. 957; Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871 at p. 875; R.L. Arora v. State of U. P., AIR 1964 SC 1230 at p. 1237; State of U. P. v. C. Tobit. AIR 1958 SC 414), may not suffice here also.”

Facts of Common Knowledge and Internal Evidence

The following things can also be invoked for placing ‘truth’ of contents of documents –  

1. The matters of common knowledge (It does not require proof. See: Union of India v. Virendra Bharti: 2011-2 ACC 886, 2010  ACJ 2353; Rakhal Chakraborty v. Sanjib Kumar Roy: 1998-1 GauLR 253, 1997-2 GauLT 705) and
2. internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document (a link in a chain of correspondence; recipient of the document – Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857).

Admissibility of a Document is One Thing and its Probative (Proof) Value Quite Another

Admittance of documents in evidence, and its proof are two different matters. In Baldeo Sahai v. Ram Chander, AIR 1931 Lahore 546, it is held as under:

• “There are two stages relating to documents. One is the stage when all the documents on which the parties rely are filed by them in Court. The next stage is when the documents proved and formally tendered in evidence. The word “proved” has been used by the Division Bench in the sense of ‘proposed to be proved’ as is clear from its having been used along with the word ‘tendered’ or “admitted” in evidence. The word proved has been loosely used for describing the stage after fling of the documents, when the Court would decide only whether they should be admitted or rejected. The Division Bench cannot be read as holding that the document is not to be endorsed with an Exhibit number unless and until proved. As stated hereinabove, the stages of tendering/admitting/rejecting in evidence and holding a document proved – are two distinct and different stages, not one. They are respectively the second and third stages. Admission of a document in evidence is not to be confused with proof of a document.”

Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2013-10 SCC 758 – Victim in a murder case had been admitted in the hospital with burns. The dying declaration was recorded by the Doctor.  The original dying declaration had not been filed by the prosecution and the carbon copy was produced. The Doctor deposed that even after conducting an extensive search, the original dying declaration could not have been traced. Pointing out that the secondary evidence can be adduced in any form, provided it is authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original, the Apex Court held as under:

• “Section 65(c) of the Act 1872 provides that secondary evidence can be adduced relating to a document when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason, not arising from his own default, or neglect, produce it in reasonable time. The court is obliged to examine the probative value of documents produced in court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence. (Vide: H. Siddiqui (dead) by Lrs. v. A. Ramalingam, AIR 2011 SC 1492; and Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal & Anr. v. M.S.S. Food Products, (2012) 2 SCC 196).

In Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal v. M.S.S. Food Products, (2012) 2 SCC 196, it was held as under:

• “Proviso appended to sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of Order XVIII further clarifies that where documents are filed and the parties rely upon the documents, the proof and admissibility of such documents which are filed along with the affidavit shall be subject to the order of the court.”

In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684, it is observed:

• “Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.” (Quoted in: H. Siddiqui (dead) by Lrs. v. A. Ramalingam, AIR 2011 SC 1492)

E.g. – A per se ‘objectionable document’ marked without objection; un-cross-examined testimony of a witness; Photocopy of a deed certified copy of which is provided in law.

In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Rampal Singh Bisen, (2010) 4 SCC 491, it is held as under:

• “26. We are of the firm opinion that mere admission of document in evidence does not amount to its proof. In other words, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is required to be done in accordance with law. As has been mentioned herein above, despite perusal of the record, we have not been able to come to know as to under what circumstances respondent plaintiff had admitted those documents. Even otherwise, his admission of those documents cannot carry the case of the appellants any further and much to the prejudice of the respondent.
• 27. It was the duty of the appellants to have proved documents Exh. A-1 to Exh. A-10 in accordance with law. Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry would not partake the character of admissible evidence in a court of law. That documentary evidence was also required to be proved by the appellants in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, which they have failed to do.”
• “31. Under the Law of Evidence also, it is necessary that contents of documents are required to be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. At the most, admission of documents may amount to admission of contents but not its truth. Documents having not been produced and marked as required under the Evidence Act cannot be relied upon by the Court. Contents of the document cannot be proved by merely filing in a court.”

Marking Document Without Objection – Not Dispense with Proof of Contents 

When a document is marked without objection –

• the affected party is precluded from raising objection to the existence of the document and its contents.
• Still, he can point out – mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof; and the probative value of it is low or nil, for want of proper proof.

In Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865, the Supreme Court observed that mere marking of documents (day book and ledger) as exhibits do not dispense with the proof of documents. In Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796, it is observed that mere marking as exhibit and identification of executor’s signature by one of witnesses do not prove contents of a document.

In Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. KM Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082, it is observed as under:

• “In the present case the objection was not that the certified copy of Ex.P1 is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof was irregular and insufficient. Objection as to the mode of proof falls within procedural law. Therefore, such objections could be waived. They have to be taken before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record (See: Order XIII Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure). This aspect has been brought out succinctly in the judgment of this Court in RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & VP Temple & Another reported in [(2003) 8 SCC 752] to which one of us, Bhan, J., was a party vide para 20:
• “20. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has relied on Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1457] in support of his submission that a document not admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the abovesaid case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes:
  • (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and
  • (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient.
• In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as “an exhibit”, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision.
• In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit.
• The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties.
• Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior court.”

In Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2013-10 SCC 758, it is held as under:

• “However, the secondary evidence of an ordinary document is admissible only and only when the party desirous of admitting it has proved before the court that it was not in his possession or control of it and further, that he has done what could be done to procure the production of it. Thus, the party has to account for the non-production in one of the ways indicated in the section. The party further has to lay down the factual foundation to establish the right to give secondary evidence where the original document cannot be produced. When the party gives in evidence a certified copy/secondary evidence without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, the opposite party must raise an objection at the time of admission. In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.
• Further, mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. (Vide:
  • The Roman Catholic Mission v. The State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1457;
  • Marwari Khumhar & Ors. v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri & Anr., AIR 2000 SC 2629;
  • R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 4548;
  • Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082; and
  • Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Rampal Singh Bisen, (2010) 4 SCC 491).”

Execution of a Document – Question of Fact; Can be proved by Circumstantial Evidence Also

In Kishan Arjuna Khansole v. Ababuwa Baba Khansole, 2000-4 BomCR 433; 2000-4 MhLJ 854, it is pointed out that the execution of a document is a question of fact and can be proved like any other fact by direct as well as circumstantial evidence.

TRUTH has to be Established, Despite Waiver of Formal Proof

No doubt, presumption in Sec. 114 Evidence Act is wide enough, in the circumstance of a particular case, to presume ‘truth’ of contents of a ‘proved’ document.

In Dibakar Behera v. Padmabati Behera, AIR 2008 Ori 92, it is observed as under [referring various judgments including RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003  SC  4548, Dayamati Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, 2004 SC 4082, Bhagyarathi Das v. Agadhu Charan Das, 62 (1986) CLT 298,  Budhi Mahal v. Gangadhar Das, 46 (1978) CLT 287]:

• “A close reading of the above noted judicial pronouncements would show that whenever a document is marked as exhibit without objection, it will be presumed that a party having right of objection has waived formal proof of the document and in such situation, the entire contents of the document would be admissible in evidence. However, by such admission of document, the truth and correctness of the contents by itself would not be established and there must be some evidence to support the contents of such document.”

IF ‘TRUTH’ IS IN ISSUE – Mere Marking Not Amounts to ‘Waiver’

IF the TRUTH is IN ISSUE mere proof of handwriting or execution not evidence of truth:   IF the TRUTH of the facts stated in a document is IN ISSUE mere proof of the hand-writing and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document.

In Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, it us held as under:

• “If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”

If ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute, marking without objection by itself does not absolve the duty to prove the truth as to the contents of the documents. (See: Achuthan Pillai v. Marikar (Motors) Ltd., AIR 1983 Ker 81, 1976 Cr.LJ 1507; 2016 (1) Gau. LJ 88,  2012(1) CTC 53; 2013-1 KLT 293.)

Secondary Evidence Relating to the Contents of a Document

Secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non-production of the original is accounted for. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, the documentary evidence is required to be proved in accordance with law.

The court has an obligation to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. [H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492; Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics: AIR  2015  SC 3796]

In Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri, 2015 AIR(SCW) 6271, it is held:

• “Mere admission of secondary evidence, does not amount to its proof. The genuineness, correctness and existence of the document shall have to be established during the trial and the trial court shall record the reasons before relying on those secondary evidences.”

Court Examines Probative Value of Secondary Evidence

It is well settled that if a party wishes to lead secondary evidence, the Court is obliged to examine the probative value of the document produced in the Court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence [Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri: 2015  AIR(SCW) 6271].

Admission may Dispense with Proof; but Probative Value May Be Less or Nil

The discretion vested with the court to take presumption and evaluate probative value are to be exercised judiciously.

Contents of the document cannot be proved by mere filing the document in a court. Under the Law of Evidence, it is necessary that contents of documents are required to be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Mere marking a document as an ‘exhibit’ will not absolve the duty of to prove the documents in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. At the most, marking ‘exhibit’may amount to proof of contents, but not its truth.

Documents which are not produced and marked as required under the Evidence Act cannot be relied upon by the Court. 

• See: LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, 2010-4 SCC 491 (Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry);
• M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu. Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta Vs.New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796;
• Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohitb, 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 (date of birth).

Even when a document is technically admitted in court, the probative value thereof will always be a matter for the court to determine. That is, it is depended upon the nature of each case. The probative value of Scene-Mahazar, Postmortem Report, photocopy of a Registered Deed etc. without supporting legal evidence may be lesser. In such cases the court can refrain from acting upon such documents until regular evidence is tendered.

In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, 2010-4 SCC 491, it is observed as under:

• “26. We are of the firm opinion that mere admission of document in evidence does amount to its proof. In other words, mere marking of exhibit on a document does dispense with its proof, which is required to be done in accordance with law. …..
• 27. It was the duty of the appellants to have proved documents Exh.-A-1 to Exh. A-10 in accordance with law. Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry would partake the character of admissible evidence in Court of law. That documentary evidence was also required to be proved by the appellants in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, which they have failed to do.”

The Calcutta High Court (DB) quoting Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [2010-4 SCC 491] it is observed in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company v. Smt. Santa Dey (2019-2 ACC 36: 2018-3 TAC 473) as under:

• “On the authority of the aforesaid decision, we hold that even if the document had been marked as Exhibit-A without objection, without a formal proof thereof in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, such  document lost its credibility and is of no probative value.”

In Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti, AIR 1990 SC 396, it is observed as under:

• “A certified copy of a registered sale deed may be produced as secondary evidence in the absence of the original. But in the present case Ex. 3 is not certified copy. It is just an ordinary copy. There is also no evidence regarding content of the original sale deed. Ex.3 cannot therefore, be considered as secondary evidence. The appellate Court has a right and duty to exclude such evidence.”

Should the Court Allow to Adduce Proper Evidence to Prove Documents

As stated in detail above, besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts (Sec. 58 of Evidence Act and Order XII, Rule 2A Proviso of the CPC and Sec. 294 of the CrPC) show that the courts have jurisdiction to require the parties concerned to prove documents that are marked on admission (by the opposite side) –

• without proper proof (of contents of the document or its truth), and
• without ‘foundational evidence’ for a secondary evidence. 

In such a case, it is legitimate to say that the court should, before taking an adverse stance as to proof in this count, give an opportunity to cure the deficiency by the party who relies on such document.

PROOF INVOKING PRESUMPTION – Sec. 114, read with Sec. 35, Evid. Act

The evidence/proof of contents of document may be given by proving circumstances for the same or by invoking presumption also. ‘Common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’ etc. under S. 114, Evd. Act can be used to prove the existence and genuineness/ truth of a document.

Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

• “35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty: An entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.

Under S. 114, Illustration (e) for Judicial and official acts there is presumption as to ‘regularity’.  It is not presumption as to correctness or truth. For such presumption, one can resort to main section, Sec. 114 – that is, ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’ etc. (and not ‘regularity’ in Illus.–e).

Presumption and Truth

As shown above, in Izhar Ahmad Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052, it was observed that the term ‘presumption’ includes, in its largest and most comprehensive signification, inference of the truth or falsehood of a doubtful fact. And in St. of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar, AIR 2000 SC 2988, it is held that the Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved.

In Dalchand Mulchand v. Hasanbi, AIR 1938 Nag 152 (Vivian Bose and Puranik JJ.), held as under:

• “The initial burden of proving execution of a document when it is denied is upon the person alleging execution. But if nothing else is known the mere fact that a document is admitted to bear a certain signature and that it comes from proper custody ought to be enough to raise an inference that it was signed with the intention of execution. This inference arises in India directly from Sec. 114, Evidence Act. Persons do not ordinarily sign documents without intending to execute them: that is not the common course of human conduct, nor yet the common course their public or private business. Consequently if any person wants to rely on an exceptional circumstance, if he wants to show that in some particular instance the ordinary rule was abrogated surely he must prove it and thus the burden shifts on him”.

Referring relevant provisions of Himachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Sec. 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is held in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: AIR 2020 SC 1382, that Record-of-rights (Revenue document) carries the ‘presumption of correctness‘.

Presumption of Correctness to Revenue Record Entries

In Vishwa Vijay Bharathi v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642, it is held as under:

• “It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry in to their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry is the revenue record states but the entry is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title.”

In Karewwa v. Hussensab Khansab Khansaheb Wajantri, AIR 2002 SC 504 : (2002) 10 SCC 315 , it is held as under:

• “We do not dispute the legal position as stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, but the presumption of correctness of an entry in revenue record cannot be rebutted by a statement in the written statement. Mere statement of fact in the written statement is not a rebuttal of presumption of correctness of an entry in the revenue record. The respondent was recorded as a tenant in the revenue record in the year 1973 and under law the presumption is that the entry is correct. It was for the appellant to rebut the presumption by leading evidence. The appellant has not led any evidence to show that entry in the revenue record is incorrect. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention.”

In Avadh Kishore Das v. Ram Gopal, AIR 1979 SC 861, (1979) 4 SCC 790, it is observed as under:

• “Wajibularz is village administration paper prepared with due care and after due enquiry by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. It is a part of the settlement record and a statutory presumption of correctness attaches to it. Properly construed, this Wajibularz shows that the entire revenue estate of village Bahawalpura vests in the Temple or the Math as a juristic person.”

In Inder Singh v. S. Raghbir Singh, AIR 1978 P&H 98, it is observed as under:

• “The principle is that an official record, kept by a person, upon whom there is a public duty to make entries in it only after satisfying himself of the truth of those entries, is presumed to be correct. Such a document itself is evidence of the truth of its contents unless and until its falsity can be demonstrated by any of the various methods by which the evidentiary value of any public book, register or document may be attacked.”

Evidence in Old Transaction – Vigor in RECENT TRANSACTIONS could Not be EXPECTED

In Muthialpet Benefit Fund Ltd.  v. V.  Devarajulu Chetty, AIR 1955 Mad 455, it is held as under:

• “7. To my mind, neither of the first two points is convincing because the first is based on the rather over-optimistic and facile profession of faith made in every minors suit that he the minor is going to win and to which the statistics of our Courts do not unfortunately lend any support and especially so in this case and in the circumstances set out above, which make out prima facie that the mortgagee public institution made proper and bona fide enquiry as to the existence of necessity and did all that was reasonable to satisfy itself as to the existence of such necessity. In such a case even if there was no necessity in fact or even if the money borrowed was not applied to meet the necessity, the alienation will be upheld. The recitals of necessity in the deed are admissible in evidence as admissions of the Manager or father and also amount to representation of necessity though in the case of RECENT TRANSACTIONS evidence aliunde*^* would be NORMALLY EXPECTED. These elementary propositions require no buttressing by citations (See Mulla, Hindu Law, Edn.10, p.285; Raghavachari: Hindu Law, Edn.3, p.335 and following; Mayne: Hindu Law, Edn.11, Re-print pp.474-475). Secondly, it is in the best interest of the mortgagors themselves to prevent the deterioration of the value of the corpus and market it into cash and keep the sale proceeds in Court pending and abiding the result of the suit.”
• (*^*from other sources)

Exhibits in a Writ Petition

A certified copy of a writ petition is marked by the plaintiff as an exhibit in a civil suit. The petitioner in the writ petition was the defendant. Can the documents that were proved and exhibited by the defendant, in the writ petition, be read in evidence in the civil suit as admission or otherwise?

The answer can be derived from the following decisions –

1. M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, (2010) 9 SCC 712

• “Documents filed in writ proceedings may be relevant but cannot be treated as substantive evidence unless properly proved in accordance with law.“

2. Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865

• “The mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with its proof.“

3. Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148

• “An admission can be used in subsequent proceedings, but must be clear and proved. Documentary evidence must still be tested under the Evidence Act.“

Conclusion

From the above, the accepted position of law, as regards the PROOF and TRUTH of documents, can be summarised as under:

• 1. Probative value of a document will be a matter for the court to determine on the basis of legal reasoning.
• 2. Though a document is relevant and marked without objection, or marked on admission, the probative value of it may be low or nil, for want of proper PROOF.
• 3. Admittance and Marking of a document may amount to admission of its contents, but not necessarily its TRUTH.
• 4. The Evidence Act and other procedural laws do not expressly say as to TRUTH of contents of Documents. It is left to the ‘judicial discretion’ of the Court to be ‘deduced or derived’ by legal reasoning.
• 5. The scheme of the Evidence Act is to presume TRUTH of contents of documents (in proper cases) when ‘existence and contents’ of the same are proved.
• 6. For ‘deducing or deriving’ TRUTH of contents of Documents, the party concerned can place for consideration of the court – (i) oral evidence of one who can vouchsafe the same, (ii) express admission by the other side and (iii) circumstantial evidence or ‘presumptions’ available in the matter.

It can be seen that the ‘discretion’ conferred on the courts as regards TRUTH of contents of documents is founded in Indian Law following, the English Legal Principles which allows high degree of discretion to the trial courts to determine whether a document stands proved or not and it is honoured by the appellate courts.

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Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Civil Rights and Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
• Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
• Order II, Rule 2 CPC – Not to Vex Defendants Twice
• Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
• Pleadings in Defamation Suits
• UNDUE INFLUENCE and PLEADINGS thereof in Indian Law
• PLEADINGS IN ELECTION MATTERS
• Declaration and Injunction
• Law on Summons to Defendants and Witnesses
• Notice to Produce Documents in Civil Cases
• Production of Documents: Order 11, Rule 14 & Rule 12
• Sec. 91 CPC and Suits Against Wrongful Acts
• Remedies Under Sec. 92 CPC
• Mandatory Injunction – Law and Principles
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• Interrogatories: When Court Allows, When Rejects?
• Decree in OI R8 CPC-Suit & Eo-Nomine Parties
• Pecuniary & Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• Doctrine of Substantial Representation in a Suit by or against an Association
• Who are Necessary Parties, Proper Parties and Pro Forma Parties in Suits
• What is Partnership, in Law? How to Sue a Firm?
• ‘Legal Representatives’, Not ‘Legal Heirs’ to be Impleaded on Death of Plaintiff/Defendant
• Powers and Duties of Commissioners to Make Local Investigations, Under CPC
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Is it Mandatory to Set Aside the Commission Report – Where a Second Commissioner is Appointed?
• Can a Commission be Appointed to Find Out the Physical Possession of a Property?
• Rules on Burden of proof and Adverse Inference
• Pendente Lite Transferee Cannot Resist or Obstruct Execution of a Decree
• Family Settlement or Family Arrangement in Law
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law

Power of attorney

• No Adjudication If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney Sufficient for Registration
• Permission when a Power of Attorney Holder Files Suit
• If Power of Attorney himself Executes the Document, S. 33 Registration Act will NOT be attracted
• Is Registered Power of Attorney Necessary for Registration of a Deed? No.

Title, ownership and Possession

• Sale Deeds Without Consideration – Void
• Recovery of Possession Based on Title and on Earlier Possession
• Title and Ownership in Indian Law
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• POSSESSION is a Substantive Right in Indian Law
• 22nd Law Commission  Report on ‘Law on Adverse Possession’
• Government of Kerala v. Joseph – Law on Adverse Possession Against Government
• How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?
• Ultimate Ownership of All Property Vests in State; It is an Incident of Sovereignty.
• ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’
• Preemption is a Very Weak Right; For, Property Right is a Constitutional & Human Right
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Family Settlement or Family Arrangement in Law
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal – Does Something Remain Untold?
• Grant in Law

Adverse Possession

• How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?
• Government of Kerala v. Joseph – Law on Adverse Possession Against Government
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Ouster and Dispossession in Adverse Possession

Principles and Procedure

• Doctrines on Ultra Vires, Rule of Law, Judicial Review, Nullification of Mandamus, and Removing the BASIS of the Judgment
• Will – Probate and Letters of Administration
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court
• Effect of Not Cross-Examining a Witness & Effect of Not Facing Complete Cross-Examination by the Witness
• Suggestions & Admissions by Counsel, in Cross Examination to Witnesses
• Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
• Declaration and Injunction
• Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
• Does Alternate Remedy Bar Civil Suits and Writ Petitions?
• Void, Voidable, Ab Initio Void, and Sham Transactions
• Can Courts Award Interest on Equitable Grounds?
• Natural Justice – Not an Unruly Horse
• ‘Sound-mind’ and ‘Unsound-Mind’
• Prescriptive Rights – Inchoate until the Title thereof is Upheld by a Competent Court
• Can a Party to Suit Examine Opposite Party, as of Right?
• Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
• Doctrine of ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Indian Law
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

• Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Proof and Truth of Documents
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court
• Production, Admissibility & Proof Of Documents
• Modes of Proof – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting 
• Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

• Does ‘Pandaravaka Pattom’ in Kerala Denote Full-Ownership?
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder
• Vested interest and Contingent Interest
• Ultimate Ownership of All Property Vests in State; It is an Incident of Sovereignty.
• Land Acquired Cannot be Returned – Even if it is Not Used for the Purpose Acquired
• ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’
• FERA, 1973 And Transfer of Immovable Property by a Foreigner
• Marumakkathayam – A System of Law and Way of Life Prevailed in Kerala
• Relevant provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act in a Nutshell
• Land Tenures, and History of Land Derivation, in Kerala
• Government is the OWNER of (Leasehold) Plantation Lands in Kerala.
• Sale Deeds Without Consideration – Void
• Law on Acquisition of Private Plantation Land in Kerala
• Law on SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE and LEGAL HEIRSHIP CERTIFICATE
• Grant in Law

Evidence Act – General

• Evidence in Court – General Principles
• Expert Evidence and Appreciation of Evidence
• How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
• Rules on Burden of proof and Adverse Inference
• Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
• What is Collateral Purpose?
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court
• Effect of Not Cross-Examining a Witness & Effect of Not Facing Complete Cross Examination by the Witness
• Suggestions & Admissions by Counsel, in Cross Examination to Witnesses
• Modes of Proof – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• Significance of Scientific Evidence in Judicial Process
• Polygraphy, Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping Tests
• What is Section 27 Evidence Act – Recovery or Discovery?
• How ‘Discovery’ under Section 27, Evidence Act, Proved?
• Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witnesses Theory
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act

Sec. 65B

• Sec. 65B, Evidence Act: Arjun Paditrao Criticised.
• Sec. 65B Evidence Act Simplified
• ‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be proved by ‘CERTIFICATE’ u/s. 65B
• Sec. 65B,  Evidence Act: Certificate forms
• Certificate is Required Only for ‘Computer Output’; Not for ‘Electronic Records’: Arjun Panditrao Explored.
• How to Prove ‘Whatsap Messages’, ‘Facebook’ and ‘Website’ in Courts?

Law on Documents

• Production, Admissibility & Proof Of Documents
• Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Time Limit for Registration of Documents
• Registration of Documents Executed out of India
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• Are RTI Documents Admissible in Evidence as ‘Public Documents’?
• Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant
• Effect of Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Stand Proved?
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Notary-Attested Documents: Presumption, Rebuttable
• What is Collateral Purpose?
• No Application Needed for Filing or Admitting Copy
• Presumptions on Registered Documents & Truth of Contents
• Notice to Produce Documents in Civil Cases
• Production of Documents: Order 11, Rule 14 & Rule 12
• Modes of Proof – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Proof and Truth of Documents
• Secondary Evidence of Documents & Objections to Admissibility – How & When?
• 30 Years Old Documents and Presumption of Truth of Contents, under Sec. 90 Evidence Act
• Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
• Adjudication as to Proper Stamp under Stamp Act
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Settlement Deeds & Powers of Sub-Registrar in Registering Deeds
• Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting 
• How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
• Visual and Audio Evidence (Including Photographs, Cassettes, Tape-recordings, Films, CCTV Footage, CDs, e-mails, Chips, Hard-discs, Pen-drives)
• Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witnesses Theory
• No Adjudication Needed If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance
• Impounding of Documents – When Produced; Cannot Wait Till it is Exhibited

Interpretation

• Interpretation of Statutes – Literal Rule, Mischief Rule and Golden Rule
• Interpretation of Documents – Literal Rule, Mischief Rule and Golden Rule
• Interpretation of Wills
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court

Contract Act

• ‘Sound-mind’ and ‘Unsound-Mind’ in Indian Civil Laws
• Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
• Who has to fix Damages in Tort and Contract?
• UNDUE INFLUENCE and PLEADINGS thereof in Indian Law
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance

Law on Damages

• Law on Damages
• Who has to fix Damages in Tort and Contract?
• Law on Damages in Defamation Cases
• Pleadings in Defamation Suits

Easement

• Easement Simplified
• What is Easement? Does Right of Easement Allow to ‘Enjoy’ After Making a Construction?
• Prescriptive Rights – Inchoate until the Title thereof is Upheld by a Competent Court
• Will Easement of Necessity Ripen into a Prescriptive Easement?
• What is “period ending within two years next before the institution of the suit”?
• Is the Basis of Every Easement, Theoretically, a Grant
• Extent of Easement (Width of Way) in Easement of Necessity, Quasi Easement and Implied Grant
• Can Easement of Necessity and of Grant be Claimed in a Suit (Alternatively)?
• “Implied Grant” in Law of Easements
• Can an Easement-Way be Altered by the Owner of the Land?
• Village Pathways and Right to Bury are not Easements.
• Custom & Customary Easements in Indian Law
• ‘Additional Burden Loses Lateral Support’ – Incorrect Proposition
• Grant in Law

Stamp Act & Registration

• Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Settlement Deeds & Powers of Sub-Registrar in Registering Deeds
• Time-Limit For Adjudication of Unstamped Documents, before Collector
• Time Limit for Registration of Documents
• Registration of Documents Executed out of India
• LAW ON INSUFFICIENTLY STAMPED DOCUMENTS 
• Adjudication as to Proper Stamp under Stamp Act
• Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
• Impounding of Documents, When Produced; Cannot Wait Till it is Exhibited
• No Adjudication Needed If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney Sufficient for Registration

Will

• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?Interpretation of Wills
• Interpretation of Inconsistent Clauses in a Will
• Will – Probate and Letters of Administration
• Executors of Will – Duties & their Removal
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• How to Write a Will? Requirements of a Valid Will
• When Execution of a Will is ‘Admitted’ by the Opposite Side, Should it be ‘Proved’?

Arbitration

• N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. and Ground Realities of Indian Situation
• What are Non-Arbitrable Disputes? When a Dispute is Not Referred to Arbitration in spite of Arbitration Clause
• Termination or Nullity of Contract Will Not Cease Efficacy of the Arbitration Clause
• No Valid Arbitration Agreement ‘Exists’ – Can Arbitration Clause be Invoked?

Divorce

• Validity of Foreign Divorce Decrees in India
• Is ‘Irretrievable Brake-down of Marriage’, a Valid Ground for Divorce in India?
• Foreign Divorce Judgment against Christians having Indian Domicile

Negotiable Instruments Act

• “Otherwise Through an Account” in Section 142, NI Act
• Where to file Cheque Bounce Cases (Jurisdiction of Court – to file NI Act Complaint)?
• Cheque Dishonour Case against a Company, Firm or Society
• What is ‘Cognizance’ in Law

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

• Judicial & Legislative Activism in India: Principles and Instances
• Can Legislature Overpower Court Decisions by an Enactment?
• Separation of Powers: Who Wins the Race – Legislature or Judiciary?
• Kesavananda Bharati Case: Never Ending Controversy
• Mullaperiyar Dam: Disputes and Adjudication of Legal Issues
• Article 370: Is There Little Chance for Supreme Court Interference
• Maratha Backward Community Reservation: SC Fixed Limit at 50%.
• Polygraphy, Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping Tests
• CAA Challenge: Divergent Views
• FERA, 1973 And Transfer of Immovable Property by a Foreigner
• Doctrine of ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Indian Law
• Doctrines on Ultra Vires and Removing the BASIS of the Judgment, in ED Director’s Tenure Extension Case (Dr. Jaya Thakur Vs. Union of India)
• Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India – Mandamus (Given in a Case) Cannot be Annulled by Changing the Law
• Art. 370 – Turns the Constitution on Its Head

Religious issues

• Secularism and Art. 25 & 26 of the Indian Constitution
• Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
• ‘Ban on Muslim Women to Enter Mosques, Unconstitutional’
• No Reservation to Muslim and Christian SCs/STs (Dalits) Why?
• Parsi Women – Excommunication for Marrying Outside
• Knanaya Endogamy & Constitution of India
• Sabarimala Review Petitions & Reference to 9-Judge Bench
• SABARIMALA REVIEW and Conflict in Findings between Shirur Mutt Case & Durgah Committee Case
• Ayodhya Disputes: M. Siddiq case –Pragmatic Verdict

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

• General
  • General Features
  • Bye Laws Fundamental
  • Effect of Registration of Societies and Incorporation of Clubs
  • Societies and Branches
• Property & Trust
  • Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs
  • Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies
• Juristic Personality
  • Juristic Personality of Societies and Clubs
  • Legal Personality of Trustees and Office Bearers
• Suits
  • Suits and Criminal Complaints By and Against a Company
  • Suits By or Against Societies, Clubs
  • Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs
  • How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies
• Amendment and Dissolution
  • Amendment of Bye laws of Societies and Clubs
  • Dissolution of Societies and Clubs
• Rights and Management
  • Rights & Liabilities of Members of Clubs and Societies
  • Individual Membership Rights in Societies & Clubs
  • Management – Powers of General Body and Governing Body
  • Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers
  • Law on Meetings: An Overview
• Election
  • Election & Challenge in Societies and Clubs
  • Court Interference in Election Process
• State Actions
  • State-Interference in Affairs of Societies & Clubs

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

• General Principles
  • What is Trust in Law?
  • Classification of Trusts
  • Public & Private Trusts in India.
  • Trust is ‘An Obligation’; Not a Legal Entity
  • Indian Law Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership
• Dedication and Vesting
  • Dedication of Property in Public Trusts
  • Vesting of Property in Trusts
  • Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies
• Trustees and Management
  • Trustees and Administration of Public Trusts
  • Alienation of Public Trust Property
  • Extinction, Discharge, Revocation, etc. of Public Trusts
• Breach of Trust
  • Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees
• Suits by or against Trusts
  • Suits By or Against Trusts and Trustees
  • Remedies Under Sec. 92 CPC
• Law on Hindu Religious Endowments
  • Philosophy of Idol Worship
  • Is an Idol a Perpetual Minor?
  • Hindu Temples & Law of Trusts
  • Public & Private Trusts
  • Law of Mutts and Other Hindu Endowments
  • Shebaits & Mahants and Law of Trustees
• Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques – General
  • Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques
• Constitutional Principles
  • Secularism and Art. 25 & 26 of the Indian Constitution
  • Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
  • ‘Muslim Women: Ban to Enter Mosques, Is it Unconstitutional
  • Parsi Women Excommunication, Unconstitutional.
  • Knanaya Endogamy & Constitution of India
  • State & Court – Protectors of All Charities
• Ayodhya and Sabarimala Disputes
  • Ayodhya Disputes: M. Siddiq case – Pragmatic Verdict
  • Sabarimala Review Petitions & Reference to 9-Judge Bench
  • SABARIMALA REVIEW and Conflict in Findings between Shirur Mutt Case & Durgah Committee Case
• General
  • Public Trusts and (State) Endowments/Trusts Acts
  • Public Trusts and Indian Trusts Act – An Overview
  • Business by Charitable Trusts & Institutions