Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon [2024] 4 S.C.R. 29 – An Odd Decision on ‘Civil Court Judgment Does Not Bind Criminal Court’

Also Read: Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases: Does a Civil Court Judgment Bind a Criminal Court?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

•➧ Sections 41 – 43, Evidence Act deal with the Relevancy of Previous Judgments.
•➧ Judgment of a civil court is not binding on a criminal court.
•➧ Judgment of a criminal court will also not be binding on a civil court.
•➧ A judgment in rem is conclusive in a criminal as well as in a civil proceeding.
•➧ It is appropriate that the disputes of title be adjudicated in appropriate civil procedure.
•➧ The Supreme Court in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397, held that the decision of one court will Not be binding on the other, except for certain limited purposes; such as – awarding  “sentence or damages. That is, both courts should not award damages or compensation, simultaneously.
•➧ In Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon, [2024] 4 S.C.R. 29, adopted the stand – while imposing sentence or damages, “the Court in criminal jurisdiction would be bound by the civil Court having declared the cheque, the subject matter of dispute, to be only for the purposes of security”.

PART I

Introduction

Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases – Propositions in a Nutshell

1. Independent evidence/finding needed

  • M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397,
  • State of Rajasthan v. Kalyan Sundaram Cement Industries, AIR 1996 SC 2823,
  • K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87
  • Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370,
  • P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765,
  • Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545 (SB Sinha, J.)
  • Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581.

2. It is not correct to say – a judgment of a civil court shall be binding on the criminal court.

  • K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87.

3. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court, either in civil or criminal proceedings, shall be binding between the same parties (even) while dealing with the same subject-matter.

  • Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370,
  • Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, 2021-4 SCC 713.

4. Civil proceedings may be relevant under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

  • State of Rajasthan v. Kalyan Sundaram Cement Industries, AIR 1996 SC 2823,
  • K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87.

5. That is, there may be cases where the provisions of Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act dealing with the relevance of previous judgments in subsequent cases may be taken into consideration (Not conclusive).

  • Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, 2021-4 SCC 713.

6. Criminal liability must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, while civil liability is based on preponderance of probabilities; different principles and different standards of proof.

  • Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370
  • P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765
  • Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581.

Also Read:

             •➧ Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent; Not the Final Order or Conclusion.
             •➧ Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases: Does a Civil Court Judgment Bind a Criminal Court?
             •➧ Cheating and Breach of Contract: Distinction lies in Fraudulent Intention ‘at the time of Promise’.  No Criminal Case endures on a Dispute Essentially Civil in Nature.
             •➧ No Res judicata on Finding on Title in an Injunction Suit
             •➧ Res Judicata and Judicial Precedent
             •➧ What are “Relevant Under Some Other Provisions of this Act” in Sec. 43?
             •➧ Judicial Precedent and Res Judicata – a Couplet
             •➧ Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
             •➧Alternative Pleadings on Title and Adverse Possession: Mutually Inconsistent or Mutually Destructive?
             •➧Res Judicata: ‘Same issue’ must have been ‘Adjudicated’ in the former suit

The Law on this matter is evolved taking the following course.

1. M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397

The Constitution Bench, in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397, held –

  • (i) that the criminal matters should be given precedence in trial (for, the public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure)
  • (ii) that the civil/criminal court refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages.
  • (iii) Civil or Criminal proceedings may be stayed – depends upon each case

It is held as under:

  • “15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings, we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.
  • 16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.”

2. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India, 1970-3 SCC 694 (Overruled)

Our Apex Court observed in Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India, 1970-3 SCC 694, that the decisions of the civil courts will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is not true.

It is held as under:

  • “…….It is a well-established principle of law that the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is not true.”

Note:

  • This view is overruled in KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, 2002-8 SCC 87. In Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra, 2009-13 SCC 729, it is observed as under:
    • “26. It is, however, significant to notice a decision of this Court in Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India (1970) 3 SCC 694, wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the civil court will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is not true, was overruled therein.”

3. The Land Acquisition Officer v. H. Narayana, 1976–4 SCC 9; AIR 1976 SC 2403

Sections 41 – 43, Evidence Act deal with the Relevancy of Previous Judgments.

Sec. 43 Evidence Act reads as under:

  • “43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to 42, when relevant. Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue or is relevant under some other provisions of this Act.”

In The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board v. H. Narayana, 1976 – 4 SCC 9; AIR 1976 SC 2403 our Apex Court approved the view that in land acquisition cases judgments, not inter partes, are relevant, under Sec. 11 and 13 Evidence Act, if such judgments relate to similarly situated properties and contain determinations of value on dates fairly proximate to the relevant date in a case.

4. State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, 1983-3 SCC 118

In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, 1983-3 SCC 118, our Apex Court approved the view of the Calcutta High Court, that the judgments not inter partes were not admissible in evidence, as under:

  • “129. In Gadadhar Chowdhury v. Sarat Chandra Chakravarty [AIR 1941 Cal 193 : (1940) 44 Cal WN 935 : 195 IC 412 : 72 Cal LJ 320] it was held that findings in judgments not inter partes are not admissible in evidence. In this connection a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows :
    • ‘Though the recitals and findings in a judgment not inter partes are not admissible in evidence, such a judgment and decree are, in our opinion, admissible to prove the fact that a decree was made in a suit between certain parties and for finding out for what lands the suit had been decreed.’
  • 130. This, in our opinion, is the correct legal position regarding the admissibility of judgments not inter partes.” (Quoted in: V. Kalyanaswamy v. L. Bakthavatsalam, 2020-9 SCALE. 367)

5. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur v. Kamla Town Trust, 1996-7 SCC 349

In Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur v. Kamla Town Trust, 1996-7 SCC 349, it was held that the Order that directed rectification of Trust Deed would be relevant under Sec. 11 Evidence Act.

6. K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87: AIR 2002 SC 3372

It is held that the Judgment of a Court is relevant if only conditions u/s 40 to 43 are satisfied.

The position of law is laid down in K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87: AIR 2002 SC 3372, as under:

  • “30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is –
  • (1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act;
  • (2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of res-judicata may apply;
  • (3) in a criminal case, Section 300 Cr.P.C. makes provision that once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied;
  • (4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of the civil Court would be relevant if conditions of any of the Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.”

In K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police continued to hold that that the Court has to Decide – To what extent previous Judgment is Binding. It is held as under:

  • “Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, Court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein.”
  • “Take for illustration, in a case of alleged trespass by ‘A’ on ‘B’s property, ‘B’ filed a suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession from ‘A’ and suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by ‘B’ against ‘A’ for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in civil proceedings would be relevant and Court may hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as possession of ‘B’ over the property. In such case, ‘A’ may be convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which is quoted above makes the position clear.”
  • “Hence, in each and every case, first question which would require consideration is whether judgment, order or decree is relevant?, if relevant its effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon facts of each case.”
  • “In the present case, the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff’s case (supra) would be binding, wherein it has been specifically held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down and that possibility of conflicting decision in civil and criminal Courts is not a relevant consideration. The law envisages “such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for limited purpose such as sentence or damages.”

7. Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, 2005-4 SCC 370,

In Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, 2005-4 SCC 370, (relying inter alia on M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397) it was held by the Constitution Bench –

  • An effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts.
  • No Statutory Provision nor any Legal Principle – Findings in one is treated as Final; both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.
  • Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397, gave a complete answer to the problem posed – That is, the law refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages.

It is observed as under:

  • “32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standards of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given.
  • There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. While examining a similar contention in an appeal against an order directing filing of a complaint under Section 476 of the old Code, the following observations made by a Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras [1954 SCR 1144: AIR 1954 SC 397: 1954 Cri LJ 1019] give a complete answer to the problem posed: (AIR p. 399, paras 15-16)
    • “15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings, we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.
    • 16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.”
  • This, however, is not a hard-and-fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished.”

8. P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu, AIR 2008 SC 1884

In P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu, AIR 2008 SC 1884, it was held as under:

  • “13. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case.” (Quoted in: Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528)

9. Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528

It is held in Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528 

  • Criminal proceeding will have precedence over the Civil proceeding.
  • The decision in Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India (1970) 3 SCC 694, wherein it was held that the decisions of the civil courts will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is not true, was overruled (in KG Premshanker).
  • A judgment in rem (Section 43) is conclusive in criminal and civil proceedings.

It is observed as under:

  • “It is, however, significant to notice that the decision of this Court in   Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India (1970) 3 SCC 694, wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the civil courts will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is not true, was overruled (in KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, stating:
    • “33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M. Shah case that the finding recorded by the criminal court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court is not correct enunciation of law. Further, the general observations made in Karam Chand case are in context of the facts of the case stated above. The Court was not required to consider the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case (M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397) as well as Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act.”
  • “10. It is, however, now well settled that ordinarily a criminal proceeding will have primacy over the civil proceeding. Precedence to a criminal proceeding is given having regard to the fact that disposal of a civil proceeding ordinarily takes a long time and in the interest of justice the former should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible.” (relied on: M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397.)
  • 11. Axiomatically, if judgment of a civil court is not binding on a criminal court, a judgment of a criminal court will certainly not be binding on a civil court. We have noticed hereinbefore that Section 43 of the Evidence Act categorically states that judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provisions of the Act. No other provision of the Evidence Act or for that matter any other statute has been brought to our notice.”
  •  “Rendition of a final judgment which would be binding on the whole world being conclusive in nature shall take a long time. As and when a judgment is rendered in one proceeding subject to the admissibility thereof keeping in view Section 43 of the Evidence Act may be produced in another proceeding. It is, however, beyond any cavil that a judgment rendered by a probate court is a judgment in rem. It is binding on all courts and authorities. Being a judgment in rem it will have effect over other judgments. A judgment in rem indisputably is conclusive in a criminal as well as in a civil proceeding.” (Surinder Kumar v. Gian Chand, AIR 1957 SC 875, is relied on)

10. Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545

In Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545, it is observed that a Case to be determined on Evidence, not on Previous Judgment.

It is held as under:

  • “16. If a primacy is given to a criminal proceeding, indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own keeping in view the evidence which has been brought on record before it and not in terms of the evidence brought in the criminal proceeding.

In Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, AIR 2009 SC 2463, 2009 (11) SCC 545, it is pointed out that the observation in Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi [(2004) 1 SCC 438] that a judgment of a civil court shall be binding on the criminal court (but the converse is not true) may not be entirely correct being in conflict with a Three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and anr. [(2002) 8 SCC 87].

11. Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings, 2021-4 SCC 713

It is held in this decision as under:

  • Other than Sec. 41 – 43, No Legal Principle – Findings of Civil Court Bind  Criminal Court.
  • Standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases.

In this decision, the principles in K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87: AIR 2002 SC 3372, is followed and held –

  • “18. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice versa. Standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties while dealing with the same subject-matter and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. However, there may be cases where the provisions of Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the relevance of previous judgments in subsequent cases may be taken into consideration.

It is further pointed out in Avitel Post Studioz Limited–

  • “Moreover, the judgment, order or decree passed in previous civil proceedings, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case the court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matters decided therein. In each and every case the first question which would require consideration is, whether the judgment, order or decree is relevant; if relevant, its effect. This would depend upon the facts of each case.”

Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon, 02 April, 2024 (Sanjay Karol, Aravind Kumar, JJ.)

Our Apex Court held in Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon, 02 April, 2024, that conviction under Section 138 NI Act is not sustainable when the “civil Court having declared the cheque, the subject matter of dispute, to be only for the purposes of security”.

Facts in a nutshell

  • Accused/Appellant (Prem Raj) issued a cheque.
  • The cheque was dishonored.
  • The Complainant filed the complaint under Sec. 138 NI Act.
  • The accused had filed an Original Suit
  • The prayers were “to declare cheque… as a security cheque, issue mandatory injunction directing the 1st defendant to return the said cheque and issue a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendants .. from taking any steps to encash the said cheque.” 
  • The Munsiff decreed the Suit (in favour of the accused in the criminal case).
  • The civil appeal was dismissed.
  • The Criminal Court convicted the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 year as well as pay compensation of Rs. 2,00,000 in default and he was to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months.
  • The First Appellate Court and the High Court confirmed the conviction.
  • Thus it was placed before the SC. 

The main question addressed was the following –

  • “Whether, a criminal proceeding can be initiated and the accused therein held guilty with natural consequences thereof to follow, in connection with a transaction, in respect of which a decree by a competent Court of civil jurisdiction, already stands passed?”

The Apex Court (in Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon, 02 April, 2024) analysed the matter and Held as under:

  • “11. The position as per Premshanker (supra) is that sentence or damages would be excluded from the conflict of decisions in civil and criminal jurisdictions of the Courts. Therefore, in the present case, considering that the Court in criminal jurisdiction has imposed both sentence or damages, the ratio of the above-referred decision dictates that the Court in criminal jurisdiction would be bound by the civil Court having declared the cheque, the subject matter of dispute, to be only for the purposes of security.
  • 12. In that view of the matter, the criminal proceedings resulting from the cheque being returned unrealised due to the closure of the account would be unsustainable in law and, therefore, are to be quashed and set aside. Resultantly, the damages as imposed by the Courts below must be returned to the appellant herein forthwith.”

Conclusion

In the earlier decisions, M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397, and K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87: AIR 2002 SC 3372, while considering the relevancy and binding nature of ‘Former Judgments’, our Apex Court considered only the “sentence/ damages portion (of the former judgment) alone; and not the rest part of the previous judgment.

  • That is, the former decisions were used for the limited purpose – while awarding “sentence or damages”, so that both civil and criminal courts may not award compensation or damages (simultaneously).

Nevertheless, it appears, our Apex Court, in Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon [2024] 4 S.C.R. 29, used the former civil court decision not only while imposing sentence or compensation (in the criminal case), but also for finding on ‘guilt’. The final Appeal Court set aside the conviction in the criminal case, in the light of the finding (in favour of the accused) in the civil court, following (?) K.G. Premshankar v. Inspector of Police.

PART II

Sections 41 – 43, Evidence Act

Section 40, Evidence Act reads as under:

  • “40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial. The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Courts from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.”

Section 41 reads thus:

  • “41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction. A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.

Section 42 reads:

  • “42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41. Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry, but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.”
  • Illustration:
  • A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public right of way over the land, which A denies.
  • The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit by A against C for a trespass on the same land in which C alleged the existence of the same right of way, is relevant, but it is not conclusive proof that the right of way exists.

Section 43, Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to 42, when relevant. Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provisions of this Act.
  • Illustrations
  • .(a) A and B separately sue C for a libel which reflects upon each of them. C in each case says, that the matter alleged to be libellous is true, and the circumstances are such that it is probably true in each case, or in neither. A obtains a decree against C for damages on the ground that C failed to make out his justification. The fact is irrelevant as between B and C.
  • (b) A prosecutes B for adultery with C, A’s wife. B denies that C is A’s wife, but the court convicts B of adultery. Afterwards, C is prosecuted for bigamy in marrying B during A’s lifetime. C says that she never was A’s wife. The judgment against B is irrelevant as against C.
  • (c) A prosecutes B for stealing a cow from him, B, is convicted. A afterwards sues C for the cow, which B had sold to him before his conviction. As between A and C, the judgment against B is irrelevant.
  • (d) A has obtained a decree for the possession of land against B, C, B’s son, murders A in consequence. The existence of the judgment is relevant, as showing motive for a crime. 1[(e) A is charged with theft and with having been previously convicted of theft. The previous conviction is relevant as a fact in issue.
  • (f) A is tried for the murder of B. The fact that B prosecuted A for libel and that A was convicted and sentenced is relevant under section 8 as showing the motive for the fact in issue because the existence of the earlier Judgment in the civil case showed that ‘motive’ under Section 8 from the latter crime; in (e), relevancy is accepted because it is a ‘fact in issue’ in the latter case; in (f) relevancy is accepted because the earlier judgment is evidence of motive under Section 8 in the latter case.

What are “Relevant Under Some Other Provisions of this Act” in Sec. 43

Following provisions are pointed out frequently, in this regard –

  • Sec. 8 (which refers to motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct);
  • Sec. 11 (which says when facts not otherwise relevant become relevant);
  • Sec. 13 (when existence of right or custom is in question then any transaction or particular instances where the right or custom is claimed, recognized etc. become relevant),
  • Sec. 54 Explanation (2), when a previous conviction is relevant as evidence of bad character), etc.
  • Sec. 58 (Admitted Facts)

End Notes:

Sec. 11 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, reads as under:

  • Res Judicata -No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
  • Explanation I– The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
  • Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court.
  • Explanation III.- The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.
  • Explanation IV.- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
  • Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.
  • Explanation VI– Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
  • Explanation VII.- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to proceedings for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.
  • Explanation VIII.-An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in as subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Principles and Procedure

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Will

Arbitration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

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