SUIT on TITLE: Landlord can Recover Property on (General) TITLE if Defendant Challenge Title of Landlord

If the tenant challenges title of the Landlord, a land owner can obtain a decree, in a suit for eviction (of tenant), on the basis of his (General) TITLE, without proving tenancy.

Jojy George Koduvath

Introspection

             •➧1. Suit on title (on payment of ad valorem Court Fee) by the landowner against the tenant, otherwise than terminating tenancy by the statutory notice (under Sec. 106 TP Act) Tenant denies tenancy. Is the suit barred for no notice?   •➧ Answer: No. For the tenant denies title of landlord (in Pleadings), the tenant cannot argue on the requirement of Sec. 106 TP Act notice. He is estopped under Sec. 116 Evid. Act.

             •➧2. Unless jurisdiction is excluded (e.g., Rent Control Acts), determination of the tenancy takes place by any of the modes referred to in Sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act; and the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain an eviction suit. (As per Sec. 111, notice in writing must have been issued to the tenant).

             •➧3. It is well settled that the tenant would be precluded from challenging the title of the landlord and if he does so, general law makes him liable for eviction on that ground.

             •➧4. A land owner can, on payment of ad valorem Court Fee, obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his (general) TITLE, without proving tenancy if the tenant raises title (or forfeiting the tenancy under Sec. 111 by renouncing his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself).

             •➧5. In a suit for ejectment, defendant claiming right to continue as a tenant is bound to show such right .

             •➧6. If the landlord is not the owner of the property (Eg. An agent who leased-out a property; or, a lessee who gave sub lease), he has no other option but to file the suit ‘on Forfeiture’ of tenancy, under Section 111 Clause (g) of the TP Act.
             •➧Note: ‘Agricultural leases’ are exempted from the provisions of Chap. V of the TP Act (that deals with ‘leases of immovable property’) as per Section 117 of the TP Act.
Nonetheless, it is established (Amrit Lal v. Mamleshwar, AIR 1973 Del. 75, Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai, AIR 1953 SC 228) that such landlords can recover such agricultural properties applying the ‘principles’ of forfeiture in Clause (g) of Section 111 of the TP Act; because the doctrine of forfeiture is a common law doctrine based on justice, equity, and good conscience.
             •➧ Landlord (claiming ownership) Fails to Prove His Title, But Proves to be the Landlord and the Grounds to Evict. Can the suit be decreed (on Rights of Landlord)?
             •➧ The answer is affirmative on two legal propositions – (i) the question of title to a suit premises is not germane in eviction suit (Apollo Zipper India Ltd. v. W. Newman and Co. Ltd., AIR 2018  SC 2847; 2018-6 SCC 744) and (ii) a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord’s title. (State of Andhra Pradesh v. D. Raghukul Pershad, (2012) 9 SCC 584; Apollo Zipper India Ltd. v. W. Newman and Co. Ltd., AIR 2018  SC 2847; 2018-6 SCC 744; Kamaljit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh, 2014 (3) All RC 210.)

Part I

If Tenant Challenges Title of Landlord, it Makes himself liable for Eviction under the General Rule

The Supreme Court of India, in Biswanath Agarwala v. Savitri Bera 2009-15 SCC 693, S.B. Sinha and Deepak Varma, JJ.), quoted with approval the following from  Champa Lal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra (S.B. Sinha, J.), (1990) 1 BLJR 268 –

  • “It is also well settled that one such relationship is admitted or established, tenant would be estopped and precluded from challenging the title of the landlord and if he does so, under the general rule, make himself liable for eviction on that ground. (Quoted in: Radha Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sinha, 1998-2 BLJR 1061 also.)

IN RECOVERY SUIT LANDOWNER CAN WIN IF S. 60(b) CLAIMANT FAILS

Where the defendant seeks to rely on Sec. 60(b) of the Easements Act in a recovery suit, the landowner can succeed by establishing ‘general title’. This is for two main reasons:

  • Under Sec. 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, the defendant—being a tenant or licensee—is estopped from disputing the title of the landowner.
  • The burden of proving the applicability of Sec. 60(b) of the Easements Act lies on the defendant.

Tenant challenges Title of Landlord: Landlord can win the TITLE SUIT if he Proves his GENERAL TITLE

S.B. Sinha, J. quoted further, in Biswanath Agarwala v. Savitri Bera 2009-15 SCC 693, the following with approval from Champa Lal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra (supra),  which reads as under:

  • “It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore** the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem Court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his general title. (Quoted in: Radha Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sinha, 1998-2 BLJR 1061; )
  • ** Tenant challenges title of landlord; and no special law (e.g., BRC Act) bars to give such a relief.

In Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani, AIR 1966 SC  1718, it was pointed out that unless jurisdiction was excluded the  civil court has jurisdiction entertain a suit based title.

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, it is held

  • “The landlord in a given case** although may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the event he proves his General TITLE, may obtain a decree on the basis thereof.”
  • **Tenant challenges title of landlord; and no special law (e.g., BRC Act) bars to give such a relief.
  • This decision is referred to in TribhuvanShankar v. Amrutlal (S.B. Sinha and Deepak Misra, JJ.), 2014-2 SCC 788.

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, the question was formulated by the Court as under:

  • “Whether a Civil Court can pass a decree on the ground that the defendant is a trespasser in a simple suit for eviction is the question involved in this appeal.”

The right of the plaintiff (landlord) to recover, on the basis of “GENERAL TITLE” is asserted by the Supreme Court (Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693) referring following decisions.

1. Radha Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sinha, 1998 (2) BLJR 1061. The Patna High Court accepted that a landlord is entitled to obtain a decree of eviction on the basis of his GENERAL TITLE, though he could not prove the relationship of landlord and tenant (when the tenant raised false claim of title).

2. Champa Lal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra, S.B. Sinha, J., (1990) 1 BLJR 268. It was held:

  • “It is also well settled that one such relationship is admitted or established, tenant would be estopped and precluded from challenging the title of the landlord and if he does so, under the general rule, make himself liable for eviction on that ground.
  • It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem Court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his general TITLE.”

3. Hajee Golam Hossain Ostagar v. Sheik Abu Bakkar, AIR 1936 Cal. 351. It was held – in a suit for ejectment, if the defendant claims the right to remain on a land permanently, he was ‘bound to show‘ the right ‘wherefore the onus would be on him‘.

Payment of ad valorem court fee needed to obtain a decree on general title

In Anil Bansal v. Dinesh Kohli, ILR 2017-4  HP 524, it is held as under: 

  • “22. It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore, the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his general title.”

Tenant Denied Title of Landlord, No Requirement of S. 106 Notice

  • (But Notice under Sec. 111 needed.)

When the tenant denies the title of the landlord, notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not required for determination of the termination of the lease. See:

  • Madan Lal v. Ram Pal, AIR 2010 P & H 142
  • Phulan Devi v. Anand Saroop, 1995 AIHC 1590

In Jaswinder Singh v. Jagjiwan Singh, 2015-1 LawHerald 610; 2015-2 RCR(Civ) 480, it is observed as under:

  • “In Madan Lal v. Ram Pal, 2010(1) RCR 382 (P&H), it is held that the tenant of land claiming ownership by way of adverse possession forfeits his status as a tenant in a suit filed by owner for dispossession and no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is required to be given.

In Madan Lal v. Ram Pal, AIR 2010 P & H 142, it is observed as under:

  • “14, Admittedly, in their plaint, the appellants did not plead the termination of tenancy as a cause of action to file the suit, but pleaded that the cause of action arose to them in June, 2000 when the respondents denied their title and forfeited the right of tenancy. Therefore, the law laid down in Rambaran Paswans case, (AIR 1974 Pat 333) is not applicable to the facts of the instant case and rather, the observations made in Abdul Rahims case (Abdul Rahim v. Md. Azimuddin, AIR 1965 Pat 156) apply because of the fact that the eviction of the respondents had been sought on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy and, thus, the requirement of notice under Section 106 of the Act was not mandatory and the suit of the appellants was maintainable and ought, to have been answered in their favour.”

In Phulan Devi v. Anand Saroop, 1995 AIHC 1590, it is held as under:

  • “The Defendants have taken contradictory plea in their written statement. They have denied the ownership of the Plaintiffs over the suit land. They have further averred that in case the Plaintiff are found to be the owners of the suit land even then Defendants have acquired title by adverse possession to the knowledge of the Plaintiffs. …. In the written statement the Defendants denied the title of the Plaintiffs, that is sufficient to disentitle the occupants to a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is settled law that a tenant denying tenancy and setting up adverse title in himself cannot plead want of notice to quit.” (Quoted in: People Charity Fund v. Bajaj Electrical Limited , 2001-3 Kar CCR 1675)

In Payal Vision Ltd. v. Radhika Choudhary, 2012-11 SCC 405, it is held that if the lease deed is not registered, the tenant becomes month to month tenant and tenancy can be terminated by notice under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Also Read: Tenancy at Sufferance in Indian Law

It did not lie in his mouth to contest that there should be a notice

In Abdul Rahim v. Md. Azimuddin, AIR 1965 Pat 156, it was held as under:

  • If a defendant challenges a plaintiff’s title to the suit premises, he cannot at the same time plead that his tenancy has not been terminated according to law. A Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Palak Mahton v. Bilas Mahton, AIR 1952 Pat 69 held such two pleas as based on facts which were wholly incompatible with one another, and, therefore, it was not open to the defendant to assert in one breath that he was not a tenant of the plaintiff and in another to assert that he was a tenant and that his tenancy has not been properly determined. In that case, the suit was for ejectment of the defendant who challenged the plaintiff’s title and also pleaded that the notice to quit served on him was not valid.”

It was also pointed out in Abdul Rahim v. Md. Azimuddin (supra) that in Lalu Gagal v. Bai Motan Bibi, ILR 17 Bom 631 –

  • “Learned Judges of the Bombay High Court … held that as the plaintiff in his plaint and during trial of the suit denied his landlords’ title (defendants) as he had claimed to be the full owner, he could not be permitted afterwards to be restored to possession on the ground that he was an yearly tenant entitled to notice to quit which was not given’.

In S. A. Henry v. J.V.K.  Rao, AIR 1972 Mad 64,1971 2 MLJ 297, apprised the above decision as under:

  • “On the merits, the Bench (Abdul Rahim v. Md. Azimuddin) took the view that when the tenant denied the title of the landlord, it did not lie in his mouth to contest that there should be a notice determining the lease for that reason.”

Read also: Suit under Sec. 6, Specific Relief Act – Is it a ‘Summary Suit’ under Order XXXVII CPC?

Section 111 & 117, Transfer of Property Act

Section 111, Transfer of Property Act reads as under:

  • “111. Determination of lease – A lease of immoveable property determines—
  • (a) …  to … (f)
  • (g) by forfeiture; that is to say,
    • (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or
    • (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or
    • (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event;
  • and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease;
  • (h) ….”

Sec.117 of the Transfer of Proper Act provides as follows:

  • “117. Exemption of leases for agricultural purposes – None of the provisions of this Chapter apply to leases for agricultural purposes, except in so far as the State Government may by notification published in the Official Gazette declare all or any of such provisions to be so applicable in the case of all or any of such leases, together with, or subject to, those of the local law, if any, for the time being in force.
  • Such notification shall not take effect until the expiry of six months from the date of its publication.”

Right on Forfeiture is a Right Arose in Common Law

Section 111, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 says as to forfeiture as to lease. It being based on the common law principles as to justice, equity and good conscience, the principles can be applied to ‘grants’ also; for, (i) the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable, as such, to ‘grants’ and (ii) no provision of law (as regards grant) stands contrary these principles (Vasudeva Menon v. K.J. Plantation (KM Joseph, J.), 2012 (3) KerLT 730).

Principles of S. 111 TP Act Apply To Agricultural Leases

Agricultural leases are exempted from the whole Chapter (Chapter V of the TP Act that deals with ‘leases of immoveable property’) under Sec.117 of the Transfer of Proper Act. And, ‘Grants’ are not mentioned in Sec. 111. Does it mean–

  • 1. There will be no forfeiture of tenancy even if the agricultural tenant or Granteeforfeit’ tenancy or grant by claiming ownership or adverse possession?
  • 2. “Notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease” is essential under Sec. 111(g) (on his claiming title). Whether it is required to be issued to (i) agricultural tenants and (ii) Grantees on forfeiture of tenancy/grant (on his claiming title) – on principle of justice, equity and good conscience?

The right of forfeiture (for claiming title as owner, by tenant) being a right that arises in common law (that is, on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience (Maharaja of Jaipore  v. Rukmini Pattamahadevi, 46 Ind App 109; AIR 1919 PC 1; Ratan Lal v. Vardesh Chander AIR 1976 SC 588), it can be applied in “agricultural leases” also, if no express prohibition.

Analogy with Sec. 116 TP Act (‘Effect of Holding Over’)

Sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act speaks about effect of holding over. The principles thereof apply fully to agricultural leases also; despite the fact that agricultural leases are entirely exempted from the provisions of the Chapter V of the TP Act (that deals with ‘leases of immoveable property’), as laid down in Section 117 of the TP Act. The same analogy can be profitably extended to ‘forfeiture’ in Sec. 111.

Sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:

  • 116. Effect of holding over: If a lessee or under-lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or under-lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in section 106.

KM Joseph, J. held in  Vasudeva Menon v. K.J. Plantation, 2012 (3) KerLT 730, as under:

  • “Whether the principle of Sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply in regard to agricultural lease in view of Sec.117 Act ? …
  • … But there we may notice that the principle of Sec. 116 would apply even to agricultural leases on the basis of it embodying principles of equity, justice and good conscience. In this connection we may refer to a Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Amrit Lal v. Mamleshwar (AIR 1973 Del. 75).”

The relevant passage in Amrit Lal v. Mamleshwar (AIR 1973 Del. 75) reads as under:

  • “16. Shri Bindra placed reliance on Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act which exempts leases for agricultural purposes from the provisions of Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act. In Anantmal v. Lala, AIR 1964 Raj 88, it was held that the principle underlying Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is based upon considerations of equity, justice and good conscience and in the absence of anything to the contrary the provisions are applicable to cases not governed by the Transfer of Property Act. The principles of Section 116 are applicable to leases of agriculture lands. Similarly in Alphanso Pinto v. Thukru Hengsu, AIR 1955 Mad 206, it was held if there is no agreement fixing the terms of a new lease, the terms of the old lease must be deemed to be applicable. Where the tenant holds over after the expiration of the term, he holds subject to all the covenants in the lease which are applicable to the new situation. Therefore, clause 9 must be held to be one of the terms of the tenancy by holding over. The tenancy must be held to be one subject to the covenants in respect of Sardarkhti rights contained in the original lease deed. The rule that principles of equity, justice and good conscience apply to agricultural leases and that the principle contained in Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is a principle of equity, justice and good conscience has been enunciated in a number of rulings, for example in
    • Krishna Shetti v. Gilbert Pinto, 2nd 42 Mad 654 (AIR 1919 Mad 12),
    • Gangamma v. Phommakka, (1910) 33 Mad 253,
    • Mt. Kesarbai v. Rajabhau Sadasheo Rao, AIR 1944 Nag 94, 
    • Nanjappa Goundan v. Rangaswami Gounda, AIR 1940 Mad 410, 
    • Moore v. Makhan Singh, Air 1919 Pat 254,
    • Eayo George v. Kacki Muthaliyar, AIR 1953 Trav-Co 299, 
    • Bainani Properties Private Ltd. v. M. Gulamali Abdul Hossain and Co., and
    • Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai, AIR 1953 SC 228.)”

Forfeiture on Claim of Ownership By ‘Grantees’

As shown above, there is no specific provision for forfeiture of grant for claiming ‘title as owner’, by Grantee (similar to the forfeiture of tenancy for claiming ‘ownership’ by a tenant under Sec. 111(g) of the TP Act). Will claim of ownership (over the granted-property) by Grantee amount to forfeiture?

The answer is – Yes. Following are the reasons:

  • 1. Applying the Principles of ‘Forfeiture of Tenancy’ it being on principles on justice, equity and good conscience. The right of forfeiture (for claiming title as owner, by tenant, under Sec. 111(g), TP Act) is a right that arises in common law (that is, on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience (Maharaja of Jaipore  v. Rukmini Pattamahadevi, 46 Ind App 109; AIR 1919 PC 1; Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander AIR 1976 SC 588).
  • 2. Analogy to Holding-over in agricultural lease. The right of ‘holding over’ on termination of lease (if lessor accept rent even after termination of the lease period) is provided under Sec. 116 of the TP Act. Though Sec. 117 of the TP Act exempts ‘leases for agricultural purposes’ (from the whole Chapter), it is pointed out in a good number of decisions that the principles thereof (holding over) would apply to agricultural leases also, if no express prohibition, for it contains the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. (See: Amrit Lal v. Mamleshwar, AIR 1973 Del. 75.)
  • 3. Analogy to Forfeiture (itself) in agricultural lease. agricultural leases, being specifically exempted in Sec. 117 (it may be argued), the principles on justice, equity and good conscience may not apply to them as regards forfeiture (under Sec. 111).

But, the principles thereon (forfeiture) definitely apply to grants, for it is not governed by the TP Act (See: Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai, AIR 1953 SC 228).

S. 111  TP Act and Notice Provided under Clause (g)

Section 111 Clause (g) of the TP Act (which requires a notice in writing) applies to cases where the Owner of a property had to sue the defendant as a tenant. If the position of the defendant is that of a trespasser (or agricultural leasee or grantee), there would be no question of invoking Clause (g) of Section 111.

It is observed in Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, AIR 2002 SC 1264; 2002-3 SCC 375, as under:

  • “Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, insofar as relevant for our purpose, provides that a lease of immovable property determines by forfeiture in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. This provision contemplates two facts – situations which entail the lessee having renounced his character as such and they are: (i) when the lessee sets up a title in a third person, or (ii) when he claims title in himself. In either case, the tenant has disputed and denied the title of his landlord because a title in third person or title in himself cannot co-exist with the title in the landlord.”

Part II

Suit For Eviction On Jural Relationship of Landlord and Tenant

When Courts “convert” suit for eviction into one for recovery of possession on title

Whether the Courts can convert the suit for eviction of the tenant (based on the ground of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant) into one for recovery of possession (based on the title of the plaintiff) is considered in the following two decisions of the Supreme Court:

  • Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693
  • Tribhuvanshankar v. Amrutlal, (2014) 2 SCC 788.

The Apex Court remanded the first case, a civil suit, and allowed to amend the plaint so as to claim the plea of adverse possession, invoking Article 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to do complete justice to the parties. In the latter case the suit was dismissed for it was filed under a special enactment (Accommodation Control Act), and it could not have been permitted to seek ‘recovery’ by an amendment.

Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693

It was a Civil Suit for eviction of defendant after issuing notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiffs pleaded, in a nutshell, as under:

  • There was a rental arrangement with the defendant.
  • The defendant denied the jural relationship.
  • The trial Court had dismissed the suit though found
    • that the plaintiffs proved to be the owner; and
    • the defendant had failed to prove independent title.
  • The trial Court dismissed the suit on the finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish the jural relationship of landlord and tenant.
  • The Court of first appeal held that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for possession on the basis of their general title.
  • In the second appeal, it was found by the High Court that the defendant was a trespasser and as such upheld the decree of eviction.
  • The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the defendant on the following grounds:
    • no issue as to whether the defendant was a trespasser or not,
    • non-valuation of the relief of recovery of possession based on title (and non-payment of ad-valorem Court-fee)
    • lack of opportunity to the defendant to take a plausible plea of acquisition of indefeasible title by adverse possession.
  • However, it is held by the Apex Court, inter alia, as under:
  • “The plaintiffs may file an application for grant of leave to amend their plaint so as to enable them to pray for a decree for eviction of the defendant on the ground that he is a trespasser.”
  • “For the aforementioned purpose, he shall pay the requisite Court-fee in terms of the provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870.”
  • “The appellant-defendant would in such an event, be entitled to file his additional written statement” (to raise the plea of adverse possession).
  • “The learned Trial Judge shall frame an appropriate issue and the parties would be entitled to adduce any other or further evidence on such issue.”

The Apex Court pointed out –

  • The directions were given in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to do complete justice to the parties.
  • Note:
    • Article 142 had been invoked for there was (i) no issue as to whether the defendant was a trespasser or not, (ii) non-valuation of the relief of recovery of possession based on title and (iii) lack of opportunity to defendant to take a plausible plea adverse possession; and
    • it would not have been needed if the plaintiff had sought for relief of recovery(on title), alternatively.

Tribhuvanshankar v. Amrutlal, (2014) 2 SCC 788

It was a suit for eviction under the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act.

The plaintiffs pleaded, in a nutshell, as under:

  • The defendant was a tenant under the earlier owner.
  • The rents were not paid by him.
  • The tenancy was terminated.
  • The defendant disputed the landlord and tenant relationship
  • The original owner sold the property without obtaining any sale consideration.
  • It was with the sole intention of obtaining possession by colluding with the plaintiff.
  • The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that –
    • The sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was without any consideration
    • The relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was not established
    • The defendant had perfected title on adverse possession.
  • The first appellate Court held to the following effect –
    • The relationship of landlord and tenant was not established
    • The finding of the trial Court that the sale deed is not supported by consideration is neither justified nor correct
    • There was no clinching evidence to establish that the defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession.
  • In the second appeal, one of the substantial questions of law formulated was – whether a decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff though such plaintiff fails to establish relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • The High Court had allowed the appeal and restored the decree and judgment of the trial Court. It was held –
    • Once the plaintiff had failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant which is a sine qua non in a suit for eviction, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to fall back on his title to seek eviction.
  • The Supreme Court distinguished Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, pointing out that it was a Civil Suit and not one under Accommodation Control Act (or Rent Control Act). Dismissing the suit, the Apex Court held as under:
    • “On a seemly analysis of the principle stated in the aforesaid authorities,**it is quite vivid that there is a difference in exercise of jurisdiction when the civil court deals with a lis relating to eviction brought before it under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and under any special enactment pertaining to eviction on specified grounds.”
    • **LIC v. India Automobiles & Co., (1990) 4 SCC 286, Dr. Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal (1995) 6 SCC 580 and Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad (2002) 1 SCC 90.

Title-Suit for Rcovery (by Owner): Lease not Proved, Entitled Relief

In Bandaru Venugopala Rao v. Allure Anasuya, 2024-2 And LT 605, following Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, it is held that in a suit for recovery on title, failure to prove lease would not disentitle relief to the plaintiff.

Following are the facts in Bandaru Venugopala Rao v. Allure Anasuya (supra).

  • Plaintiff claimed to be the title holder.
  • Plaintiff sent a lawyer’s notice to defendant terminating the lease.
  • In the reply defendant alleged title for himself.
  • Hence,the plaintiff sued for declaration of title and possession.
  • Defendant claimed that an agreement for sale was entered into by him with the prior owner and claimed rights under Sec. 53A TP Act.
  • Plaintiff failed to prove lease.
  • Still the suit on title claiming possession was decreed.
  • It was held that the failure to prove the lease, by itself, did not disentitle the plaintiff.

It is held as under:

  • “Even if plaintiff alleged that the possession of defendant No.1 is only as lessee and even if plaintiff failed to prove it that by itself does not disentitle a title holder from claiming possession. In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India laid the law that in a case where the plaintiff sues for declaration of title and for recovery of possession alleging that the person in possession is a tenant, even if the plaintiff fails to prove such jural relationship of landlord and tenant he still is entitled for a decree for recovery of possession on proof of his GENERAL TITLE. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that on failure to prove the lease alleged by plaintiff, the suit ought to have been dismissed is a contention which lacks any legal basis. Therefore, point is answered against the appellant.”

Plaintiff in a suit against Tenant Failed to Prove Tenancy; Can he Win on Title

Plaintiff filed the suit, as landlord, for ejectment of a tenant. The plaintiff failed to establish the tenancy. Will he be entitled to a decree for possession on the basis of his title?

‘No’ was the argument for the defendant/appellant in Sri Venkateswara Oil Company, Tirupathi  v.  Guduru Jalaja Reddy, 2002-1 ALD 182; 2001-6 ALT 567. Following decisions were relied on.

  • Brahmanand v. Neki Puri, AIR 1965 SC 1506;
  • Bhagwari Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966  SC 735;
  • Sita Ram v. Radha Bai, AIR 1968  SC 534; and  
  • Bibt Rehana Khatun V. Iqtidar Uddin Hasan, AIR  1943 All. 184

The argument was not accepted by the Andhra High Court pointing out that the parties, had known that title to the suit land was in dispute, and they adduced evidence in that regard. Following decisions were relied on by the Court –

  • Ponnia Pillai v. Pannai, AIR 1947 Mad. 282 (relying on Bala Mukund V. Dalu, 25 All. 498 (FB) and 
  • Jagamohan Garnaik v. Sankar Samal,  AIR 1990 Ori. 124.

Court is Entitled to Consider the Title set up by the Defendants also 

In Ram Chandra Sakharam Mahajan Vs. Damodar Trimbak, AIR 2007 SC 2577, it is observed –

  • In a recovery on title suit, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish title.
  • Court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants
  • But, weakness of defence to establish title, would not enable plaintiff to a decree.

The Apex Court held:

  • “The suit is for recovery of possession on the strength of title. Obviously, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that title. No doubt in appreciating the case of title set up by the plaintiff, the Court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants. But the weakness of the defence or the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these propositions.”
  • “14. We find that the trial Court and the appellate Court were not justified in refusing the amendment of the plaint sought for by the plaintiff. No doubt there had been delay in seeking amendment but that delay could have been compensated by awarding costs to the contesting defendants 1 to 9. Therefore, we are satisfied that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff ought to have been allowed. We are inclined to allow the amendment sought for, since it would enable the Court to pin-pointedly consider the real dispute between the parties and would enable it to render a decision more satisfactorily to its conscience. We, therefore, allow the amendment as sought for by the plaintiff at a belated stage. The amendment will be carried out by the plaintiff in the trial Court within three months from this date as per the practice followed in the trial Court. Obviously defendants 1 to 9 would have an opportunity to file an additional written statement to the amended plaint. They will be entitled to file an additional written statement within a period of four months from the date of this judgment.”

Document ex-facie reveals no title – specific declaration as to invalidity not necessary

The Supreme Court held in Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki (Aniruddha Bose & Sudhanshu DhuliaJJ.), 2024 3 KerHC 169; 2024-2 KerLT 789; 2024-4 SCR 383, held as under:

  • “If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence. Chiruthey could not convey any property over which she did not have any right or title. Her right, if any, would stem from the second deed of lease (Exhibit A-1). We are conscious of the fact that no claim was made before any forum for invalidating the deed dated 14th July 1910 (Exhibit A-20).”

By proving a deed, title of the executing person is not automatically confirmed

The Supreme Court held in Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki (Aniruddha Bose & Sudhanshu DhuliaJJ.), 2024 3 KerHC 169; 2024-2 KerLT 789; 2024-4 SCR 383, also held as under:

  • “18. ….But it would be trite to repeat that even if subsistence of a deed is proved in evidence, the title of the executing person (in this case Chiruthey) does not automatically stand confirmed.. ….. … But in absence of proper title over the subject property, that lease deed even if she was its sole lessor would not have had been legally valid or enforceable. If right, title or interest in certain property is sought conveyed by a person by an instrument who herself does not possess any such form of entitlement on the subject being conveyed, even with a subsisting deed of conveyance on such property, the grantee on her successors-in-interest will not have legal right to enforce the right the latter may have derived from such an instrument.”

End Notes:

Following were the facts Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, 2009-15 SCC 693, S.B. Sinha and Deepak Varma, JJ.):

  • The defendant-tenant entered the suit shop in 1970.
  • Plaintiffs purchased the suit premises in 1980. in
  • The plaintiffs served a notice on the defendant under Sec. 106, TP Act.
  • Plaintiffs filed Suit for eviction claiming to be the owners and landlords.
  • Defendant denied that he had ever been a tenant.
  • He claimed independent title. He claimed to have an agreement for sale with the owner.

The trial judge dismissed the suit on the following findings, in a nutshell –

  • .i. The plaintiffs proved to be the owner.
  • ii. The defendant failed to prove his independent title.
  • iii. The plaintiffs failed to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant.  
  • iv. The plaintiffs having failed to prove the tenancy, not entitled to a decree.

Appellate Court, relying on AIR 1984 ROC 78 (All.), page 35, and AIR 1984 All. 66  allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.

The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal.

Hence the appeal before the Apex Court.

The Plaintiffs- respondents contended as under:

  • .i. Even in a suit for eviction, the plaintiffs would be entitled to obtain a decree for possession relying on or on the basis of his title.
  • ii. In a suit for eviction, it is for the defendant to show that he has a right to remain on the tenanted premises either as a permanent tenant or otherwise.

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, it is held 

  • “The landlord in a given case** although may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the event he proves his General TITLE, may obtain a decree on the basis thereof.”
  • **Tenant challenges title of landlord; and no special law (e.g., BRC Act) bars to give such a relief.
  • This decision is referred to in TribhuvanShankar v. Amrutlal (S.B. Sinha and Deepak Misra, JJ.), 2014-2 SCC 788.

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera , the question was formulated by the Court as under:

  • “Whether a Civil Court can pass a decree on the ground that the defendant is a trespasser in a simple suit for eviction is the question involved in this appeal.”

The right of the plaintiff (landlord) to recover, on the basis of “GENERAL TITLE” is asserted by the Supreme Court (Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera) referring following decisions.

1. Radha Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sinha, 1998 (2) BLJR 1061. The Patna High Court accepted that a landlord is entitled to obtain a decree of eviction on the basis of his GENERAL TITLE, though he could not prove the relationship of landlord and tenant (when the tenant raised false claim of title).

2. Champa Lal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra, SB Sinha,  J., (1990) 1 BLJR 268. It was held:

  • “It is also well settled that one such relationship is admitted or established, tenant would be estopped and precluded from challenging the title of the landlord and if he does so, under the general rule, make himself liable for eviction on that ground.
  • It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem Court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his general TITLE.”

3. Hajee Golam Hossain Ostagar v. Sheik Abu Bakkar, AIR 1936 Cal. 351. It was held – in a suit for ejectment, if the defendant claims the right to remain on a land permanently, he was ‘bound to show‘ the right ‘wherefore the onus would be on him‘.

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