Golden Rule of Interpretation is Misapplied in Several Cases in India

The “Golden Rule of Interpretation” is destined to be employed, opening the tool-box of interpretation, in the following circumstances:

  • (i) the ordinary sense of the words in a document requires modification to avoid absurdity or inconsistency,
  • (ii) the application of ‘literal rule of interpretation’ is inappropriate or unsuitable.

But, mere “literal interpretation” (the interpretation in conformity with the plain language) is (inadvisedly) characterised, in several decisions, as the “Golden Rule of Interpretation”.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

Rules of Interpretation of Statutes and Documents (Mohan v. Kanagavalli, 2014-6 MLJ 582) are as follows:
            1. ‘Plain meaning rule’ or Literal rule – words are taken in its plain meaning.
            2.  Golden rule – when the words require modification to avoid absurdity.
            3. Mischief rule – gives effect to the intention of the legislature/author looking at the mischiefs which intended to redress.

THE LITERAL RULE

According to this rule, the words in the statute or the document are taken in its literal or plain meaning. It is also called the ‘plain meaning rule or Grammatical Rule’.

  • This rule can be applied only when the language in the statute or the document renders only one meaning, and the intention of the legislature or author is unambiguous and completely clear. When a court has to give effect to the statute or document, it has to simply give effect to the language of the statute or document and it need not look into the consequences that may be arisen therefrom.

Literal Rule of Interpretation mandates ‘Reading-through-the-Lines’

The Literal Rule of Interpretation mandates ‘reading-through-the-lines’, whereas the other two interpretations, Golden Rule and Mischief Rule require ‘reading-between-the-lines’.

THE GOLDEN RULE – Grey v. Pearson, 1857

The ‘golden rule of interpretation’ was laid down by the House of Lords in Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC 61 (Shilpa Mittal v State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2020 SC 405, 2020-2 SCC 787; Vasant Ganpat Padave v. Anant Mahadev Sawant,2019-19 SCC 577).

The rule, propounded for the first time by Lord Wensleydale (Grey v. Pearson), declared as under:

  • “I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted, at least in the Courts of Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. This is laid down by Mr Justice Burton, in a very excellent opinion, which is to be found in Warburton v. Loveland [Warburton v. Loveland, (1831) 2 Dow & Cl 480 : 6 ER 806] (see ante, p. 76. n.)

This celebrated passage has since come to represent what has been described as the ‘golden rule‘ of interpretation of statutes (Ms. Eera v.  State  (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133).

This Golden Rule of interpretation (in Grey v. Pearson) is quoted/referred in the following decisions:

  • Shilpa Mittal v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2020-2 SCC 787
  • Vasant Ganpat Padave v. Anant Mahadev Sawant, 2019-19 SCC 577
  • Nova Ads v. Metropolitan Transport Corpn., 2015-13 SCC 257
  • Nandinisatpathy v. P. L. Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025; 1978-2 SCC 424
  • Corporation of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island, AIR 1921 PC 240.

It is beyond doubt that this ‘golden rule’ is not a simple declaration of the ‘literal rule of interpretation’. It is invoked (and marked in jurisprudence as a Characteristic Rule) when a deviation from the literal rule is necessitated, or a modification is warranted to the ‘ordinary sense’ of the words.

  • In other words, this rule is applied when ‘literal rule’ fails for the words used by the author of a document or legislature could not be given their natural meaning for, its lack of clarity, or it renders another meaning also. In such cases the apt meaning is given by interpretation, modifying  the meaning of the absurd term, or choosing one meaning from more than one meaning.

Thus the golden rule of interpretation aims (minimum) modification of the ‘ordinary sense’ of the words used in a statute or a document so as to avoid the ‘absurdity and inconsistency’ convey by those words and to give effect to the meaning of the words (actually) intended in those statutes or documents. 

Golden Rule of Interpretation – Courts add or subtract words

Our Apex Court, in Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67, held as under:

  • “67. While interpreting any statutory provision, it has always been accepted as a Golden Rule of Interpretation that the words used by the legislature should be given their natural meaning. Normally, the courts should be hesitant to add words or subtract words from the statutory provision. An effort should always be made to read the legislative provision in such a way that there is no wastage of words and any construction which makes some words of the statute redundant should be avoided. No doubt, if the natural meaning of the words leads to an interpretation which is contrary to the objects of the Act or makes the provision unworkable or highly unreasonable and arbitrary, then the courts either add words or subtract words or read down the statute, but this should only be done when there is an ambiguity in the language used.” Quoted in: V. Senthil Balaji Vs. The State represented by Deputy Director (2023)

Golden Rule of Interpretation – Examples

Lee v. Knapp, (1967) 2 QB 442. 

  • In this case, it was required to interpret the world ‘stop’. Under the relevant Act, a driver causing an accident had to ‘stop’ after the accident. But, the driver in this case stopped the vehicle for a moment after causing the accident and then moved away. Applying the Golden Rule the Court held that requirement of the section had not been followed for the driver did not ‘stop for a reasonable period of time’ and made an attempt to look for the interested persons to make necessary inquiries for him about the accident.

U. P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore, AIR 1988 SC 2239

  • In this case Section 14 of the UP Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 had to be interpreted. This Section provided land for “landless person”. It was interpreted as the “landless agricultural labourers” though the Section did not specify that such landless persons should be agricultural labourers or whose source of livelihood should be agriculture; and source of livelihood of those persons should not be trade and business.

‘Golden Rule’ is applied as a “Deviation From” Literal Rule

The “golden rule of interpretation” as established in Grey v. Pearson, 1857 (6) HLC 61, is adhered to by the Courts in India in numerous rulings.

In Authorised Officer v. S. Nagamatha Ayyar, AIR 1979 SC 1487; 1979-3 SCC 466, our Apex Court quoted from the article of Prof. R. B. Stevens of the Yale University (Modern Law Review, Vol. 28, 1965, p. 525) which explains ‘Golden Rule of interpretation’. It reads as under:

  • “Whenever the Judges purport to depart from the literal or ordinary meaning, and apply the mischief rule or the golden rule, there is a danger that in place of those irrelevant criteria, the canons of construction, they have more obviously substituted their own (perhaps more harmful) impressions, views, prejudices or predispositions. Such conflicts between what Parliament intended and what the Judges assumed Parliament to have intended have long been appreciated.”

In A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531; 1988-2 SCC 602, it is held as under:

  • “It is only, where the literal meaning is not clear that one resorts to the golden rule of interpretation or the mischief rule of interpretation.”

In Hindustan Lever v. Ashok Vishnu Kate, AIR 1996 SC 285; 1995-6 SCC 326, our Apex Court expressly approved the observation in the decision of the Full Bench of Industrial Court of Maharashtra which said as under:

  • “I have no doubt in my mind in observing that here the language is not plain. It does not admit of but one meaning. Therefore, one would be justified in adverting to the Mischief Rule also the Golden Rule while interpreting the words appearing in Item 1 of Schedule IV.”

Craies on Statute Law, Pages 86-88, says as under:

  • “The fourth rule known as the golden rule is a variation  of the primary rule of literal or grammatical construction. Adherence to the grammatical or literal meaning of words of a statute may lead to interpretation which is manifestly absurd, at variance wither repugnant to the legislative intent. In such cases the language of the statute may be varied or modified. In other words, a construction based on literal or grammatical meaning of words, which by reason by its absurdity, or repugnance to the legislative intent, reduces the legislation to futility, should be avoided. In such cases the bolder construction based the view that the legislature would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result should be accepted” (The Federal Bank Ltd  v K. Meenakshi Kanikan, ILR 1992-2 Ker 295).

In Cross Statutory Interpretation by Dr. John Bell and Sir George Engle (II Edition), it is stated as under:

  • “.. The mischief rule came to be largely, though not entirely, superseded by the ‘literal‘ or, as it came to be called in America, the ‘plain meaning’ rule. …. This had been recognised by Parker CB in the middle of 18th Century; but his words may be thought to have contained the germs of a third rule which, in order that it may be distinguished from the mischief and literal rules, is commonly called the ‘golden rule‘. It allows for a departure from the literal rule when the application of the statutory words in the ordinary sense would be repugnant to or inconsistent with some other provision in the statute or even when it would lead to what the Court considers to be an absurdity. The usual consequence of applying the golden rule is that words which are in the statute are ignored or words which are not there are read in.” (Quoted in: Baburao Vishvanath  Mathpati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1996 Bom 227)

Rupert Gross in ‘Statutory Interpretation’ said as under:

  • “… this had been recognised by Parker, C. B. in the middle of the 18th century; but his words may be thought to have contained the germs of a third rule which, in order that it may be distinguished from the mischief and literal rules, is commonly called the “golden” rule. It allows for a departure from the literal rule when the application of the statutory words in the ordinary sense would be repugnant to or inconsistent with some other provision in the statute or even when it would lead to what the Court considered to be an absurdity. The usual consequence of applying the golden rule is that words which are in the statute are ignored or words which are not there are read in…. . ” (Quoted in: Bansidhar v. Duryodhan, AIR 1985 Ori 84)

Maxwell in his treatise 12th edition at page 43 observed as under:

  • “The so-called golden rule is really a modification of the literal rule. It was stated in this way by Parke B :
  • “it is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical constriction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the Legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further”. (Quoted in: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. J. B. Bottling Company Private Limited, ILR 1978-1 Del. 129)

In Annaya Kocha Shetty v. Laxmibai Narayan Satose: 8.4. 2025; 2025 INSC 466, it is authoritatively held as under

  • “The contract is first constructed in its plain, ordinary and literal meaning. This is also known as the literal rule of construction.
  • If there is an absurdity created by literally reading the contract, a shift from literal rule may be allowed. This construction is generally called the golden rule of construction.
  • Lastly, the contract may be purposively constructed in light of its object and context to determine the purpose of the contract. This approach must be used cautiously..”

‘Golden Rule’ is Misconceived as “Literal Rule of Interpretation”

As shown above, ‘Golden Rule of Interpretation‘ is a “departure from” or “modification of” the literal rule.

This rule is destined to be employed, opening the tool-box of interpretation, in the following circumstances:

  • (i) the ordinary sense of the words in a document requires modification to avoid absurdity or inconsistency,
  • (ii) the application of ‘literal rule of interpretation’ is inappropriate or unsuitable.

However, the concept of “literal interpretation” (giving effect to the plain meaning of the language), has been (mistakenly) referred to in some court decisions as the “Golden Rule of Interpretation”.

The Golden Rule of Interpretation is referred to in the following decisions

  • NBCC (India) Ltd.  v. State of West Bengal, 10 Jan 2025, 2025 INSC 54
  • M/S Patil Automation Private Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Private Ltd., AIR 2022 SC 3848, 2022-10 SCC 1.
  • National Highways Authority of India v. Pan Dari Nathan Govindarajulu, AIR 2021 SC 560
  • Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister, 2021-8 SCC 1
  • State of Andhra Pradesh v. Linde (India) Ltd., (2020) 16 SCC 335;
  • Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys, (2011) 11 SCC 334
  • Karnataka State Financial Corpn. v. N. Narasimahaiah, (2008) 5 SCC 176
  • Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash, (2001) 8 SCC 61
  • Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India, (2002) 3 SCC 722

Bifurcation of the ‘Golden Rule‘

Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J., in Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors, AIR 2008 SC 668; 2008-13 SCC 369 (and in several other decisions rendered by his lordship), bifurcated the ‘Golden Rule‘ in Grey v. Pearson into two parts and observed as under:

  • “22. The latter part of this “Golden Rule” must, however, be applied with much caution. “If”, remarked Jervis, C.J.,  “the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it do lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied, where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely, because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning”. (See Abley v. Dale, ER p.525).

It appears that the bifurcation is not proper for two reasons:

  • 1. The ‘first part’ definitely refers to ‘literal interpretation’; it is not the ‘Golden Rule‘. Fundamentals of this rule lie in the latter part. The ‘first part’ is only an introductory one.
  • 2. The bifurcation stands against the ‘Golden Rule‘. The Golden Rule is a departure from (or modification of) the ‘literal interpretation’ as laid down in Supreme Court of India itself (Authorised Officer v. S. Nagamatha Ayyar, AIR 1979 SC 1487, Hindustan Lever v. Ashok Vishnu Kate, AIR 1996 SC 285; 1995-6 SCC 326 and A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531; 1988-2 SCC 602), and the treatises stated above (Craies on Statute Law; Cross Statutory Interpretation by Dr. John Bell and Sir George Engle; Rupert Gross in ‘Statutory Interpretation’ and Maxwell).

Golden Rule of Interpretation Covers Wills, Statutes and Instruments

Ms. Eera Through Dr. Manjula v.  State (Govt. Of NCT of Delhi), AIR 2017 SC 34577

After quoting Grey v. Pearson, 1857 (6) HLC 61, it is observed in Ms. Eera Through Dr. Manjula v.  State (Govt. Of NCT of Delhi), AIR 2017 SC 34577, as under:

  • “This celebrated passage has since come to represent what has been described as the ‘Golden Rule’ of interpretation of statutes. The construction of a clause in a will was before the House of Lords and not the construction of a statute. Nevertheless, the “Golden Rule” was held to cover the construction of wills, statutes and all other written instruments.”

Advantages of Golden Rule

  • This rule simply puts the words in the statute or deed work. It is intended to operate in between ‘literal interpretation’ and ‘mischief-rule interpretation’.
  • Applying the Golden Rule, one can deviate from the meaning of words given previously, if it is susceptible to more than one meaning.
  • It gives effect to the words used by the legislature or author, in its ordinary meaning; but, picking up the most sensible and apt meaning to the words used the statute or deed – susceptible to more than one meaning.
  • Drafting errors in status and documents can be corrected without much effort.

Disadvantages of Golden Rule

  • It has no clear framework or guidelines.
  • It is susceptible for change according to the interpreter or court.

THE MISCHIEF RULE (Purposive Construction Rule)

It applies basically to the interpretation of Statutes; and usually not to (private) documents. The aim of this rule is to cure or prevent the mischief of the language in a statute, and give effect to its intention or purpose. Therefore, it is called purposive construction rule.

The Mischief Rule (Purposive Construction Rule) is applied when the court finds ambiguity in the language of the statute, and determines it necessary to give effect to the “intention” of the legislature. Thus, this rule of interpretation is broader in its application when compared to the ‘Golden Rule’.

In Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1988) 3 SCC 609, a three-judge Bench of our Apex Court held as under:

  • “Before I come to consider the arguments put forward by each side, I venture to refer to some general observations by way of approach to the questions of construction of statutes. In the past, the Judges and lawyers spoke of a ‘Golden Rule’ by which statutes were to be interpreted according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word. They took the grammatical or literal meaning unmindful of the consequences. Even if such a meaning gave rise to unjust results which legislature never intended, the grammatical meaning alone was kept to prevail. They said that it would be for the legislature to amend the Act and not for the Court to intervene by its innovation. 
  • During the last several years, the “Golden Rule” has been given a go-by. We now look for the “intention” of the legislature or the “purpose” of the statute. First, we examine the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation in hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word, every section and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We look at the mischiefs which the legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole situation and not just one-to-one relation. We will not consider any provision out of the framework of the statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences.” (Quoted in: X v. Principal Secretary, Health And Family Welfare Department, Govt.  of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2022 SC 4917; Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. Union of India, 2003-7 SCC 589, National Insurance Co.  Ltd.  v. Laxmi Narain Dhut,  2007-3 SCC 700)

Heydon’s case, (1584)

The mischief rule is also called Heydon’s rule, as it is originated by Lord Poke in Heydon’s case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: (1584) 76 ER 637. As per this rule, the meaning and purport of the statute or document is explored and interpreted in that way.  The rule of purposive interpretation was articulated in this case  in the following terms:

  • “for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered:
    • 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
    • 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
    • 3rd. What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth.
    • And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico” (Quoted in: X v. Principal Secretary, Health And Family Welfare Department, Govt.  of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2022 SC 4917)

Smith v. Huges, 1960 WLR 830

  • In 1959, the Street Offences Act was enacted in the UK with a view to prohibit prostitutes from soliciting public passing on the roads. Thereon, the prostitutes started soliciting from balconies and windows of the buildings by the side of the roads. The prostitutes were charged under the Act. The courts applied the mischief rule of interpretation and gave effect to the intention of the Act.

Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871

  • Facts of the case were as follows-  Delhi Corporation Act, 1902 authorised the corporation to round up the abandoned cattle grazing on the government land. The MCD rounded up the cattle belonging to Kanwar Singh. It was contended by Kanwar Singh that the word abandoned means the loss of ownership and those cattle which were round up belonged to him and hence, was not abandoned. The court held that the mischief rule had to be applied and the word abandoned must be interpreted to mean let loose or left unattended and even the temporary loss of ownership would be covered as abandoned.

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