Relevance of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases: Does a Civil Court Judgment Bind a Criminal Court?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

The Answer is – No.

Abstract

The relevancy of a previous judgment (in a subsequent case) is governed by Sections 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Section 43, inter alia, permits the production of earlier judgments that are deemed “relevant under other provisions of this Act.”
There are divergent views on the applicability of Sections 5, 8, 11 and 13, Evidence Act, under this clause in Section 43.
- First view—Sections 5, 8, 11 and 13 being delineate the general provisions, and the relevance of prior judgments is primarily governed by Sections 40 to 43, the previous judgments will not be liberally permitted (invoking the clause “relevant under some other provisions of this Act”).
- Second view—The phrase “relevant under some other provisions of this Act” as stated in Section 43, must be interpreted to encompass its complete and comprehensive significance.
Differences of opinion also exist as to the admissibility of a judgment not inter parties, under Section 13.
The legitimate view, it appears, is the following –
- (i) Previous judgments can be admitted in evidence (invoking the clause “relevant under some other provisions of this Act”) if they fall under Sections 5, 8, 11 and 13. Nevertheless, the admissibility of the previous judgments being essentially governed by Sections 40 to 43, they cannot be allowed to be freely imported, invoking the general provisions.
- (ii) The probative value of the previous judgment has to be determined by the court, even if such a previous judgment is marked in evidence as ‘relevant’.
- (iii) In any case, the use of the previous judgment is definitely relevant in certain contexts. For instance:
  - A motive for an offence (Section 8) – i.e., to see whether the judgment provoked anger in the accused.
  - The sentence or damages to be imposed – i.e., to see whether there would be double jeopardy.

Also Read

PART I

Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in a Criminal Case – Abstract Propositions

1. Independent evidence/finding needed.

M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397 (Vivian Bose, J.)
State of Rajasthan v. Kalyan Sundaram Cement Industries, AIR 1996 SC 2823,
K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87 (MB Shah, J.)
Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 (G.P. Mathur, J.)
P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765,
Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545 (SB Sinha, J.)
Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581.

2. It is not correct to say – a judgment of a civil court shall be binding on the criminal court.

K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87
Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545 (SB Sinha, J.)

3. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court, either in civil or criminal proceedings, shall be binding between the same parties (even) while dealing with the same subject-matter.

Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370,
Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, 2021-4 SCC 713 (R.F. Nariman, J.)

4. Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act deal with relevancy alone (Not conclusive except as provided in Section 41).

K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87
Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, 2021-4 SCC 713

5. Criminal liability must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, while civil liability is based on preponderance of probabilities; different principles and different standards of proof.

Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370
P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765
Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581.

“Other Provisions of this Act” in S. 43 Will Not Cover S. 13

A three-Judge Bench, in State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684 (Syed Murtaza Fazalali, A. Varadarajan, V. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ.) held as under:

“We are, however, of the opinion that where there is a specific provision covering the admissibility of a document, it is not open to the court to call into aid other general provisions to make a particular document admissible. In other words, if a judgment is not admissible as not falling within the ambit of sections 40 to 42, it must fulfil the conditions of s. 43. Otherwise, it cannot be relevant under s. 13 of the Evidence Act. The words “other provisions of this Act” cannot cover s. 13 because this section does not deal with judgments at all.“

Judgment not Inter Parties is Admissible under Section 13

But, a contra-view is taken in a Two-Judge Bench in Tirumala Tirupati Devsthanam v. K. M. Krishnaiah, AIR 1998 SC 1132; 1998 3 SCC 331 (S.P. Bharucha & M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.), which reads as under:

“9. In our view, this contention is clearly contrary to the rulings of this Court as well as those of the Privy Council. In Srinivas Krishna Rao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 379, speaking on behalf of a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, Venkatarama Ayyar, J. held that a judgment not inter parties is admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as evidence of an assertion of a right to property in dispute. A contention that judgments other than those falling under Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act were not admissible in evidence was expressly rejected.
Again B.K. Mukherjee, J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of a Bench of four learned Judges in Sital Das v. Sant Ram & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 606, held that a previous judgment not inter parties, was admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as a ‘transaction’ in which a right to property was ‘asserted’ and ‘recognised’.
In fact, much earlier, Lord Lindley held in the Privy Council in Dinamoni v. Brajmohini, (1902) ILR 29 Cal. 190 (PC), that a previous judgment, not inter partes was admissible in evidence under Section 13 to show who the parties were, what the lands in dispute were and who was declared entitled to retain them. The criticism of the judgment in Dinamoni v. Brajmohini and Ram Ranjan Chakerbati v. Ram Narain Singh, 1895 ILR 22 Cal. 533 (PC), by Sir John Woodroffe in his commentary on the Evidence Act (1931, P 181) was not accepted by Lord Blanesburgh in Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sunder, AIR 1934 PC 157.”

Note:

1. The apparent inconsistency between the two views remains unresolved, as the Supreme Court has yet to offer a definitive clarification addressing both views.
2. It is seen that it is legitimate to follow Tirumala Tirupati Devsthanam v. K. M. Krishnaiah, AIR 1998 SC 1132, in a limited sphere, such as (i) to prove motive for an offence (Section 8) and (ii) in consideration of the sentence or damages to be imposed – i.e., to see whether there would be double jeopardy.

It is Not Correct – Civil Decisions bind Criminal Courts (and Converse)

Our Apex Court had (earlier) observed in V. M. Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 5 SCC 767, that the finding recorded by the criminal court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court. A two-judge bench, in KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, doubted the correctness of V. M. Shah case and required reconsideration by a larger Bench. Hence, in KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87, the Three-Judge Bench (M.B. Shah, Bisheshwar Prasad Singh, H.K. Sema, JJ.) overruled V. M. Shah v. State of Maharashtra, holding that the finding recorded by a criminal court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court is not correct.

KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87, also considered Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India, 1970-3 SCC 694, wherein it was observed that the decisions of civil courts will be binding on criminal courts, but the converse is not true. KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87, also overruled Karam Chand Ganga Prasad.

Referring KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police (2002) 8 SCC 87, it is held in Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528 (Mukundakam Sharma, SB Sinha, JJ.) as under:

“It is, however, significant to notice a decision of this Court in M/s Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1970) 3 SCC 694], wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the civil court will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is not true, was overruled, stating:
- “33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M. Shah case that the finding recorded by the criminal court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court is not correct enunciation of law. Further, the general observations made in Karam Chand case are in context of the facts of the case stated above. The Court was not required to consider the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case (M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397) as well as Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act.”
11. Axiomatically, if judgment of a civil court is not binding on a criminal court, a judgment of a criminal court will certainly not be binding on a civil court. We have noticed hereinbefore that Section 43 of the Evidence Act categorically states that judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provisions of the Act. No other provision of the Evidence Act or for that matter any other statute has been brought to our notice.”

No Legal Principle – Findings of Civil Court bind Cril. Court

Except as provided in Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, there is no general legal principle that findings of a civil court are binding on a criminal court, and vice versa.

In Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited (Rohinton Fali Nariman, Navin Sinha, Indira Banerjee, JJ.) 2021-4 SCC 713, the principles in K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87: AIR 2002 SC 3372, are followed and held as under:

“18. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice versa. Standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties while dealing with the same subject-matter and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. However, there may be cases where the provisions of Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the relevance of previous judgments in subsequent cases may be taken into consideration.”

It is further pointed out in Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, 2021-4 SCC 713 –

“Moreover, the judgment, order or decree passed in previous civil proceedings, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case the court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matters decided therein. In each and every case the first question which would require consideration is, whether the judgment, order or decree is relevant; if relevant, its effect. This would depend upon the facts of each case.”

No Legal Principle – Previous Findings are treated as Final

Standards of proof required in civil and criminal proceedings are entirely different

Even if a document or fact is relevant under certain provisions of the Evidence Act, it doesn’t mean that it will be taken as a binding document or that it is substantive evidence, because its probative value may be less or nil.

In Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (R.C.Lahoti CJI, B.N. Agrawal, Hotoi Khetoho Sema, G.P. Mathur & P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.), 2005-4 SCC 370, (relying inter alia on M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397) it was held as under:

“32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standards of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.”

Also Read:

Judgment of a Court is relevant if only conditions u/s 40 to 43 are satisfied

The position of law is laid down in K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87: AIR 2002 SC 3372, as under:

“30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is –
(1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act;
(2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of res-judicata may apply;
(3) in a criminal case, Section 300 Cr.P.C. makes provision that once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied;
(4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of the civil Court would be relevant if conditions of any of the Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.”

Court has to Decide – To what Extent a Previous Judgment is binding

K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police continued as under:

“31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, Court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein.
Take for illustration, in a case of alleged trespass by ‘A’ on ‘B’s property, ‘B’ filed a suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession from ‘A’ and suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by ‘B’ against ‘A’ for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in civil proceedings would be relevant and Court may hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as possession of ‘B’ over the property. In such case, ‘A’ may be convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42** which is quoted above makes the position clear.
Hence, in each and every case, first question which would require consideration is whether judgment, order or decree is relevant?, if relevant its effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon facts of each case.
32. In the present case, the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case would be binding, wherein it has been specifically held that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down and that possibility of conflicting decision in civil and criminal courts is not a relevant consideration. The law envisages “such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for limited purpose such as sentence or damages”.
- **Note: Section 42 Evidence Act pertains to public right. Illustration also makes it clear. It is obvious that the Apex Court referred to it only to show that the earlier decision may be relevant – to show “motive or as a fact in issue” (under Section 43).
- That is, where the prosecution case is that ‘the civil court decree made the accused increase enmity towards the victim’, the previous civil court decision may be relevant under “some other provision” stated in Section 43 (as “motive or as a fact in issue“).
Section 42 Evidence Act reads as under:
- “42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41. Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry, but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.
- Illustration:
- A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public right of way over the land, which A denies.
- The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit by A against C for a trespass on the same land in which C alleged the existence of the same right of way, is relevant, but it is not conclusive proof that the right of way exists.”

Case to be determined on Evidence, not on Previous Judgment

In Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, AIR 2009 SC 2463, 2009 (11) SCC 545, it is pointed out that the observation in Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi [(2004) 1 SCC 438] that a judgment of a civil court shall be binding on the criminal court (but the converse is not true) may not be entirely correct being in conflict with a Three-Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and anr. [(2002) 8 SCC 87]. It is observed in Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad as under:

“Mr. Sharma also relies upon a decision of this Court in Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi [(2004) 1 SCC 438] to contend that a judgment of a civil court shall be binding on the criminal court but the converse is not true. Therein it was held:
- “(3) A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court binds the criminal court. An order passed by the Executive Magistrate in proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Code is an order by a criminal court and that too based on a summary enquiry. The order is entitled to respect and wait before the competent court at the interlocutory stage. At the stage of final adjudication of rights, which would be on the evidence adduced before the court, the order of the Magistrate is only one out of several pieces of evidence.”
With respect, the ratio laid down therein may not be entirely correct being in conflict with a Three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and anr. [(2002) 8 SCC 87].”

A judgment in rem (Section 43) is conclusive in criminal and civil proceedings

In Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528, it is held as under:

“Rendition of a final judgment which would be binding on the whole world being conclusive in nature shall take a long time. As and when a judgment is rendered in one proceeding subject to the admissibility thereof keeping in view Section 43 of the Evidence Act may be produced in another proceeding. It is, however, beyond any cavil that a judgment rendered by a probate court is a judgment in rem. It is binding on all courts and authorities. Being a judgment in rem it will have effect over other judgments. A judgment in rem indisputably is conclusive in a criminal as well as in a civil proceeding.” (Surinder Kumar v. Gian Chand, AIR 1957 SC 875, is relied on)

Civil or Criminal proceedings be stayed – Depends upon each case

In M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397, the Constitution Bench considered whether a civil suit or a criminal case should be stayed in the event both are pending; and it was opined that the criminal matter should be given precedence.

In P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu, AIR 2008 SC 1884, it was held as under:

“13. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case.” (Quoted in: Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528)

A Dissonant Note

The Kerala High Court, in Mathew Kunju Mathew v. K.V. Kuriakose, ILR 2024-1 (Ker) 721; 2024-1 KLT 588, proceeded to answer the following question in the affirmative.

“12. Here the interesting question is whether a criminal court is bound by the decree and judgment passed by a competent civil court taking shelter under Sections 11 and 43 of the Indian Evidence Act.”

In Mathew Kunju Mathew v. K. V. Kuriakose, High Court said –

‘If the criminal case and the civil proceeding are for the same cause, judgment of the Civil Court would be relevant, if conditions stipulated in S.40 to 43 are satisfied.’

Inaccurate Reading of K.G. Premshanker by the Kerala High Court

K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87, is interpreted in (i) Mohandas v. P Abdul Azeez, 2011 (3) KHC 41: 2011 (3) KLJ 142, and (ii) Mathew Kunju Mathew v. K. V. Kuriakose, ILR 2024-1 (Ker) 721; 2024-1 KLT 588, giving emphasis to the following observation in K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police –

“Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, Court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein.
In other words, the Court laid down that the issue will depend upon facts of each case.”

In Mohandas v. P Abdul Azeez (quoted and followed in Mathew Kunju Mathew v. K. V. Kuriakose) it is stated as under:

“It is trite that if the criminal case and the civil proceeding are for the same cause, judgment of the Civil Court would be relevant, if conditions stipulated in S.40 to 43 are satisfied. It has been so held by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Prem Sankar v. I.G. of Police, 2002 KHC 792 : 2002 (3) KLT 389 (SC) : ILR 2003 (1) Ker. 153 : AIR 2002 SC 3372 : 2002 (8) SCC 87 : 2002 CriLJ 4343.”

Technically, the observation may be accurate; however, within the context in which it is employed (to determine whether civil court decision binds criminal case), it becomes unsuitable. These decisions seem to be in direct conflict with the principles laid down in –

the Five Judge Bench decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (G.P. Mathur, J.), 2005-4 SCC 370
the Three Judge Bench decision in K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police (2002) 8 SCC 87 (M.B. Shah, J.) and
Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, AIR 2009 SC 2463, 2009 (11) SCC 545 (S.B. Sinha, J.).

Sections 11 and 13, Evidence Act

Sections 11 and 13 of the Evidence Act read as under:

“11. When facts not otherwise relevant become relevant :(1) if they are inconsistent with any fact in issue or relevant fact. (2) If by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable.”
13. Facts relevant when right or custom is in question. Where the question is as to the existence of any right or custom, the following facts are relevant –
(a) Any transaction by which the right or custom, in question, was created, claimed, modified, recognised, asserted or denied, or which was inconsistent with its existence;
(b) Particular instances in which the right or custom was claimed, recognised or exercised, or in which its exercise was disputed, asserted or departed from.
Illustration
The question is whether A has a right to a fishery. A deed conferring the fishery on A’s ancestors, a mortgage of the fishery by A’s father, a subsequent grant of the fishery by A’s father, irreconcilable with the mortgage, particular instances in which A’s father exercised the right, or in which the exercise of right was stopped by A’s neighbours, are relevant facts.

Sections 41 – 43, Evidence Act

Section 40, Evidence Act reads as under:

“40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial. The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Courts from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.”

Section 41 reads thus:

“41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction. A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.

Section 42 reads:

“42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41. Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry, but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.”
Illustration:
A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public right of way over the land, which A denies.
The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit by A against C for a trespass on the same land in which C alleged the existence of the same right of way, is relevant, but it is not conclusive proof that the right of way exists.

Section 43, Evidence Act reads as under:

43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to 42, when relevant. Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provisions of this Act.
Illustrations
.(a) A and B separately sue C for a libel which reflects upon each of them. C in each case says, that the matter alleged to be libellous is true, and the circumstances are such that it is probably true in each case, or in neither. A obtains a decree against C for damages on the ground that C failed to make out his justification. The fact is irrelevant as between B and C.
(b) A prosecutes B for adultery with C, A’s wife. B denies that C is A’s wife, but the court convicts B of adultery. Afterwards, C is prosecuted for bigamy in marrying B during A’s lifetime. C says that she never was A’s wife. The judgment against B is irrelevant as against C.
(c) A prosecutes B for stealing a cow from him, B, is convicted. A afterwards sues C for the cow, which B had sold to him before his conviction. As between A and C, the judgment against B is irrelevant.
(d) A has obtained a decree for the possession of land against B, C, B’s son, murders A in consequence. The existence of the judgment is relevant, as showing motive for a crime. 1[(e) A is charged with theft and with having been previously convicted of theft. The previous conviction is relevant as a fact in issue.
(f) A is tried for the murder of B. The fact that B prosecuted A for libel and that A was convicted and sentenced is relevant under section 8 as showing the motive for the fact in issue because the existence of the earlier Judgment in the civil case showed that ‘motive’ under Section 8 from the latter crime; in (e), relevancy is accepted because it is a ‘fact in issue’ in the latter case; in (f) relevancy is accepted because the earlier judgment is evidence of motive under Section 8 in the latter case.

Conclusion

Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act reflects the policy of law adopted by Indian courts. It mandates independent findings in civil and criminal proceedings even if they arise from the same subject matter—such as a cheque bouncing or forging a document. Sections 40 to 43 guard against substituting the adjudication by the courts with the findings of a parallel civil or criminal proceeding.

PART II

What are “Relevant Under Some Other Provisions of this Act” in Sec. 43

Following provisions are pointed out frequently, in this regard –

Sec. 5 (Facts in issue);
Sec. 8 (which refers to motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct);
Sec. 11 (which says when facts not otherwise relevant become relevant);
Sec. 13 (when existence of right or custom is in question then any transaction or particular instances where the right or custom is claimed, recognized etc. become relevant),
Sec. 54 Explanation (2), when a previous conviction is relevant as evidence of bad character), etc.
Sec. 58 (Admitted Facts)

Disputes of Title, be adjudicated in Civil Procedure

In Smt. Janak Vohra v. DDA, 103-2003-DLT 789, it was held that in case of disputed questions of title, and mutation being asked for, it is appropriate that the disputes of title be adjudicated in appropriate civil procedure and no direction be issued to mutate the property in the name of a party. (Referred to in Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528)

Land Acquisition judgments, not inter partes, Relevant under S. 11 and 13

In The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board v. H. Narayana, 1976 – 4 SCC 9; AIR 1976 SC 2403 our Apex Court approved the view that in land acquisition cases judgments, not inter partes, are relevant, under Sec. 11 and 13 Evidence Act, if such judgments relate to similarly situated properties and contain determinations of value on dates fairly proximate to the relevant date in a case.

Order directed rectification of Trust Deed Relevant under Sec. 11

In Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur v. Kamla Town Trust, 1996-7 SCC 349, it was held that the Order that directed rectification of Trust Deed would be relevant under Sec. 11 Evidence Act.

Judgment not inter partes admissible to find what lands involved

In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, 1983-3 SCC 118, our Apex Court approved the view of the Calcutta High Court as under:

“129. In Gadadhar Chowdhury v. Sarat Chandra Chakravarty [AIR 1941 Cal 193 : (1940) 44 Cal WN 935 : 195 IC 412 : 72 Cal LJ 320] it was held that findings in judgments not inter partes are not admissible in evidence. In this connection a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows : ‘Though the recitals and findings in a judgment not inter partes are not admissible in evidence, such a judgment and decree are, in our opinion, admissible to prove the fact that a decree was made in a suit between certain parties and for finding out for what lands the suit had been decreed.’
130. This, in our opinion, is the correct legal position regarding the admissibility of judgments not inter partes.” (Quoted in V. Kalyanaswamy v. L. Bakthavatsalam, 2020-9 SCALE. 367)

Criminal proceeding will have precedence over the Civil proceeding

In Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528, it is held as under:

“10. It is, however, now well settled that ordinarily a criminal proceeding will have primacy over the civil proceeding. Precedence to a criminal proceeding is given having regard to the fact that disposal of a civil proceeding ordinarily takes a long time and in the interest of justice the former should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible.” (relied on: M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397.)

PART III

Binding Judicial Precedent and Res Judicata – a Couplet

Binding Judicial Precedent refers to a judicial rule or principle established in an earlier binding decision that must be followed in subsequent similar cases. It is distinct from Res Judicata.

Res Judicata applies to findings of both law and fact. It bars the same parties from re-litigating issues that have already been finally decided.
Binding Precedent pertains strictly to legal principles and technically binds courts, not parties.

No ‘Binding Precedent’ if earlier decision was –

without taking into account the statutory provision or factual situation
wrong in law.

Ratio Decidendi is the Binding Precedent; Not Findings on Facts or Issues

In Jagdish Prasad v. State of MP, 2004(4) MPLJ 537, it was held by the Supreme Court as under:

“Any observation made or relief given by a Court, out of sympathy, compassion, sentiments and not based on any discernible principle of law or de hors the merits of the case, cannot be a binding precedent. A judgment of a Court contains three parts :
(i) finding of facts;
(ii) statement of principle of law applicable to the legal problem raised on the facts, based on which the case is decided; and
(iii) decision which is based on the finding of fact, applicable principles of law, and in some cases, discretion and the need to mould the relief in a particular manner.
Out of the three parts, it is only the second part, that is ratio decidendi or statement of law applied and acted upon by the Court, that is a binding precedent. Neither the findings on facts nor the ultimate decision, that is, the relief given or the manner adopted to dispose of the case, is a precedent.” (Quoted in: Satpura Narmada Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Chhindwara v. A. K. Chaturvedi, 2012-1 JLJ 78; 2012-1 MPLJ 282)

In A-One Granites v. State of U.P. [(2001)3 SCC 537], the Supreme Court observed that where no consideration was given to the question, the decision cannot be said to be binding and precedents sub silentio and without arguments are of no moment. (Referred to in: Satpura Narmada Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Chhindwara v. A. K. Chaturvedi, 2012-1 JLJ 78; 2012-1 MPLJ 282)

A deliberate judicial decision alone is Judicial Precedent

As regards binding precedent it is observed in Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44, as under:

“9…..It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates-
- (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts;
- (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and
- (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides.
What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. “

Res Judicata Binds Parties; Ratio Decidendi (as Binding Precedent) Binds Courts

In The Modern English Legal System (4th Edition) by Smith, Bailey and Gunn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), pages 518-519, says as under:

“…. Thus the Court’s order is binding on the parties under the res judicata doctrine; the ratio decidendi is binding on other Courts in accordance with the principles outlined above under the doctrine of binding precedent. A startling illustration of the distinction was provided by the following series of cases. A testator, John Arkle Waring, left annuities to Mr. Howard and Mrs. Louie Burton-Butler ‘free of income tax’. In 1942 the Court of Appeal in Re warning, Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Awdry : (1942) Ch. 426 on an appeal in which Howard was a party, held that income tax had to be deducted. Louie was not a party as she was in an enemy occupied country. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. Four years later the House of Lords in Berke¬ley v. Berkeley : (1946) A.C. 555 overruled the Awdry case. Subsequently, Jenkins J. held that the Awdry case was res judica¬ta so far as Howard was concerned notwithstanding that its ratio had been overruled in Berkeley v. Berkeley and that Louie’s annuity would be dealt with in accordance with the later case. (See Re Warning, Westminster Bank v. Burton-Butler : (1948) Ch. 221).”
(Quoted in: Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India (AK Ganguly, CJ, then) 2007-104 CLT 737, Ori)

Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley’s Commentary on the Doctrine of res judicata (Butterworths: London, Edinburgh, Dublin – 1996, pages 8 and 9), explains the concept of res judicata as under:

“There is an essential difference between res judicata, estoppel and the doctrine of judicial precedent. Under the former a final decision in fact or law by any Court having jurisdiction precludes either party (except on appeal) from again raising the same issue against the other in any Court. The doctrine of judicial precedent, on the other hand, is not concerned with issues between parties. …
The difference is illustrated by the cases of Re Waring decided in 1942 and 1948. In the first Farwell J held that Section 25 of the Finance Act 1941 was not applicable (1942) Ch. 309 to an annuity; but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision. (1942) Ch. 426. The effect was two-fold; it decided as res judicata between the parties that Section 25 applied, and it bound Courts up to the Court of Appeal in other cases. In Berkeley v. Bekeley (1946) AC 555, the House of Lords overruled Re Waring. In 1948 the trustees sought a decision as between themselves and the annuitant who had not been joined in the first proceedings. (1948) Ch. 221. The other annuitant remained bound by the earlier decision, but the result (see Duke of Bedford v. Elliz : (1901) AC 1 at 8), was otherwise governed by Berkeley v. Berkeley: Gisborne Sheepfarmers’ Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. IRC : (1962) NZLR 810 at 814.” (Quoted in: Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India (AK Ganguly, CJ, then) 2007-104 CLT 737, Ori)

In State of M.P. v. Mulam Chandi, AIR 1973 MP293, it has been held as under:

“As between a decision which operates a s res judicata and a decision which is binding as a precedent but not res judicata, the former must prevail.”

Interpretation of a Document can Be A Binding Judicial Precedent

In Sahu Madho Dass v. Mukand Ram, 1955 AIR SC 481, it was observed out as under:

“Mukand Ram was not a party to that litigation and the decision does not bind him but it operates as a judicial precedent about the construction of that document, a precedent with which we respectfully agree.” (Referred to in: Syed Hafiz Mir v. Abdul Nayeemkhan, AIR 1960 MP 50; Potluri Saraswathi v. Vallabhaneni Veerabhadra Rao, 2004-7 ALT 120; Harabati v. Jasodhara Debi, AIR 1977 Ori 143; Ramachandra Bhat v. Srideviamma, AIR 1976 Kar 217; Katragadda China Anjaneyulu v. Kattragadda China Ramayya, 1965 AIR AP 177)

In R. V. Bhupal Prasad v. Saleha Begum, 2002 Supp2 ALD 735; 2001-5 ALT 770, it is pointed out that in Anjaneyulu v. Ramaiah, 1965-1 ALT 149, a Full Bench of the Andhra High Court held that interpretation of a material document in a prior proceeding between the same parties even if does not operate as res judicata would be a binding judicial precedent in a subsequent proceeding between the parties based on that document.

Even an erroneous decision operates as Res Judicata

In Bindeswari v. Bageshwari, AIR 1936 PC 46, it was held as under:

“Where the decision of the Court in a previous suit determined that the section had never applied to a transaction, a Court in a new suit between the same parties with regard to the same transaction cannot try a new the issue as to its applicability in face of the express prohibition in Section 11 of the Code. “

In Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna, AIR 1953 SC 65 it was laid down as under:

“(23) There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as res judicata. A decision in the previous execution case between the parties that the matter was not within the competence of the executing court even though erroneous is binding on the parties; see Abhoy Kanta Gohain v. Gopinath Deb Goswami AIR 1943 Cal. 460.”

No Binding Precedent if relevant statutory provision was Not considered

In Union of India v. Maniklal Banerjee, AIR 2006 SC 2844, the Apex Court has held as under:

“It is now well-settled that if a decision has been rendered without taking into account the statutory provision, the same cannot be considered to be a binding precedent. This Court, in Pritam Singh, while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, might have refused to interfere with the decision. The same, therefore, did not constitute any binding precedent.” (Referred to in: Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain (Arun Misra, J.), ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472)

Arun Misra, J., referred to the House of Lords’ decision in Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain, ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472, and said as under:

“(35) Another decision relied upon is rendered by the House of Lords in Watt vs. Ahsan (2007) UKHL 51. In the aforesaid case, question arose on Section 12 of the Race Relations Act, 1976. The submission was made that they were party and that All vs. Mcdonagh (2002) ICR 1026 was wrongly decided. In any case, the interpretation given to Section 12 by the EAT in Sawyer v. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 is res judicata between him and the Labour Party, not only for the purposes of his first complaint but for the other two as well. It was opined that the EAT was wrong in Sawyer vs. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 to hold that the Labour Party was a qualifying body, but there was no appeal against the decision of EAT , it was held that decision was binding upon the parties though wrong in law. When the Tribunal was-having the jurisdiction to decide the question, it is binding upon the parties though erroneous.
There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition, but here we are concerned with the fresh cause of action on which suit is based and previously relevant statutory provision of Section 111 (d) of TP Act was not taken into consideration, question of determination of tenancy was also not decided.”

Modern English Practice

In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, it is pointed out as under:

“47. Though English Courts in the past accepted the Blackstonian theory and though the House of Lords strictly adhered to the doctrine of ‘precedent’ in the earlier years, both the doctrines were practically given up by the “Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)” issued by the House of Lords, recorded in (1966) 1 WLR 1234. Lord Gardiner L.C., speaking for the House of Lords made the following observations;
“Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so.”

Article 141 in Constitution of India 141

Article 141 mandates the courts in India to follow the law declared by the Apex Court. It reads as under:

“Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts: The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.”

The enacted laws do not speak about binding judicial precedents. But, the common law expounds the principles thereon, following the principles adopted by English Courts. By virtue of this convention, the principle of law applied in an earlier case is followed in subsequent cases, and the decision of a larger bench is honoured by the smaller bench.

Article 141 declares that the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India will be a ‘Source of Law’.

Larger Bench Decision is Binding on Bench of lesser strength

It is observed in Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, AIR 2024 (SC) 714; 2024-3 SCC 224 (Vikram Nath, Rajesh Bindal, JJ.) as under:

“1. The rule of ‘Judicial Discipline and Propriety’ and the Doctrine of precedents has a merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to individuals as to the consequences of their actions. The Constitution benches of this court have time and again reiterated the rules emerging from judicial Discipline. Accordingly, when a decision of a coordinate Bench of same High court is brought to the notice of the bench, it is to be respected and is binding subject to right of the bench of such co-equal quorum to take a different view and refer the question to a larger bench. It is the only course of action open to a bench of co-equal strength, when faced with the previous decision taken by a bench with same strength.”

The Apex Court referred the following decisions –

Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673
State of Punjab , v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 26

In Sita Soren v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 1701; 2024-5 SCC 629, it is pointed out as under:

“24. A decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. A Bench of lesser strength cannot disagree with or dissent from the view of the law taken by the bench of larger strength. However, a bench of the same strength can question the correctness of a decision rendered by a co-ordinate bench. In such situations, the case is placed before a bench of larger strength. [Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community vs. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673, Para 12]”

Minority Decision may a binding precedent (when no disagreement by majority)

In Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 INSC 835; 2024 KLT(Online) 2648; 2024 8 Supreme 387; 2024 0 Supreme(SC) 990, it is pointed out (in the Majority View: DY Chandrachud, CJI, Hrishikesh Roy, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George Masih, JJ.- Minority, B.V. Nagarathna, Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ.) as under:

“102. It must be noted, however, that there is a difference between whether an observation is a binding precedent and whether it is a position of law that may have persuasive value on subsequent benches. In the absence of disagreement by a majority of judges (either express or implied), nothing precludes subsequent benches of this Court from relying on observations made in a concurring opinion (on behalf of the minority of judges) which are not discussed by the other judges at all. It is assumed in such cases, that all judges on the bench have read the opinions of one another, and did not deem it necessary to either state their express disagreement with the opinion or lay down a different understanding of the proposition of law (implied disagreement).”

End Notes:

Sec. 11 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, reads as under:

Res Judicata -No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
Explanation I– The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court.
Explanation III.- The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.
Explanation IV.- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.
Explanation VI– Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
Explanation VII.- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to proceedings for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.
Explanation VIII.-An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in as subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.

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