Judicial Precedent and Res Judicata – a Couplet

Taken from: Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases: Does a Civil Court Judgment Bind a Criminal Court? Also Read:  Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent; Not the Final Order or Conclusion.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Preface

No Binding Precedent if relevant statutory provision was Not considered; It Must be ‘Ratio Decidendi’ also.

Ratio Decidendi Is Binding Precedent: Mere Casual Expressions – Not of Much Avail.

• Binding Judicial Precedent refers to a judicial rule or principle established in an earlier binding decision that must be followed in subsequent similar cases. Ratio Decidendi is the binding precedent; Not  findings on facts or issues
• Res Judicata applies to findings of both law and fact. It bars the same parties from re-litigating issues that have already been heard and finally decided. If only a finding is “Necessary”, then only it is “Directly and Substantially” in issue

Binding precedent pertains strictly to legal principles and technically binds courts, not parties. In any event, there will be no ‘binding precedent’ if the earlier decision was –

• without taking into account the statutory provision or factual situation
• wrong in law.

Ratio Decidendi is the binding precedent; Not  Findings on Facts or Issues

In Jagdish Prasad v. State of MP, 2004(4) MPLJ 537, it was held by the Supreme Court as under:

• “Any observation made or relief given by a Court, out of sympathy, compassion, sentiments and not based on any discernible principle of law or de hors the merits of the case, cannot be a binding precedent. A judgment of a Court contains three parts :
• (i) finding of facts;
• (ii) statement of principle of law applicable to the legal problem raised on the facts, based on which the case is decided; and
• (iii) decision which is based on the finding of fact, applicable principles of law, and in some cases, discretion and the need to mould the relief in a particular manner.
• Out of the three parts, it is only the second part, that is ratio decidendi or statement of law applied and acted upon by the Court, that is a binding precedent. Neither the findings on facts nor the ultimate decision, that is, the relief given or the manner adopted to dispose of the case, is a precedent.” (Quoted in: Satpura Narmada Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Chhindwara v. A. K.  Chaturvedi, 2012-1 JLJ 78; 2012-1 MPLJ 282)

In A-One Granites v. State of U.P. [(2001)3 SCC 537], the Supreme Court observed that where no consideration was given to the question, the decision cannot be said to be binding and precedents sub silentio and without arguments are of no moment. (Referred to in: Satpura Narmada Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Chhindwara v. A. K.  Chaturvedi, 2012-1 JLJ 78; 2012-1 MPLJ 282)

Decision without Argument, Crucial words, Citation of Authority: Not binding

In Gerard vs. Worth of Paris Ltd. (K), (1936) 2 All ER 905 (CA), it was observed that a decision which is rendered without argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule, and without any citation of authority is not binding and need not be followed. The Court further observed that precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. (Referred to in: Bindu K.B. vs. State of Kerala, 2014 (4) KHC 772.)

‘PER INCURIAM’ and Decision of Co- equal Bench

Per Incuriam If Not Obeyed Provision In A Statute, Earlieer Judgment

 “Incuria” literally means “carelessness”. Per Incuriam gives the idea – ‘out of ignorance’.

Black’s Dictionary, explains per incuriam as under:

• “A judgment per incuriam is one which has been rendered inadvertently.”

A Judgment rendered in total ignorance of law or earlier decision alone constitute the principles of per incurium; erroneous appreciation or misconstruction of a binding precedent is not a per incuriam decision. Total ignorance of earlier judgments of co-equal bench also renders a decision per incuriam. Such judgments will not be treated as precedent. [See: State of State of M.P. Vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639, Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, (1990) 3 SCC 682, Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd. (2001) 6 SCC 356, Subhash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, (2009) 15 SCC 458]

Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra [2014] 16 SCC 623, it is observed that the Latin expression “per incuriam” means through inadvertence. A decision can be said generally to be given per incuriam when the Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court. (Punjab Land Devl., & Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court : (1990) 3 SCC 682; Commissioner of Income Tax v. B.R. Constructions, 1992 SCC OnLine AP 121).

Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, para 578 at page 297 states the rule of per incuriam as follows:—ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having statutory force.”

Larger Strength Is Binding On Any Subsequent Bench Of Lesser Or Co-Equal Strength Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and another vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2005) 2 SCC 673), Referred in  P.A.Thomas v.Authority Under the Minimum Wages Act   2008 1 KHC 800 ;  2008 1 KLT 858 (S.Siri Jagan,J.)

Subsequent Bench Would Follow Earlier Co-Ordinate Bench
 Judicial Discipline-Binding Precedent-Except in compelling circumstances, such as where order of earlier Bench is per incuriam, subsequent Bench would follow earlier co-ordinate Bench. (Para 23) Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 2010 9 SCC 385 (B.Sudershan Reddy and Surinder Singh Nijjar, JJ.)

Kerala High Court View: Two benches of equal strength of the APEX COURT: Later Decision will Prevail

The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, in a reference, in Raman Gopi v. Kunju Raman Uthaman [2011 (4) KLT 458], had to decide – how to deal with conflicting views in the decisions of two benches of equal strength of the Apex Court. It was held that in case of conflicting decisions taken in the two Benches of equal strength of the Apex Court, the decision later in point of time, will prevail over the earlier one. It was pointed out that

• a decision of the Apex Court on a declaration of law is binding on all High Courts and Subordinate courts under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and
• it may not be proper for the High Courts or Subordinate Courts to criticise and characterise a decision of the Apex Court which has laid down a point of law as per incuriam.

Raman Gopi v. Kunju Raman Uthaman [2011 (4) KLT 458 (FB)] is followed in M/s. Norman Printing Bureau v. P.M. Mammu Haji, 2013 4 ILR(Ker) 84; 2013 3 KHC 798; 2013-4 KLT 606 (K.M. Joseph & A. Hariprasad, JJ.) observing as under:

• “10. Question as to which of the decisions pronounced by Benches of the Supreme Court of co-equal strength is the binding precedent was considered by this Court on many occasions. In Joseph v. Special Tahsildar (2001 (1) KLT 958) Full Bench of this Court considered the above question in extenso. Law laid down therein is the following:
  •  “We may now refer to a few High Court decisions on the question where an apparent conflict between an earlier and a later decision of the Apex Court by Benches consisting of equal number of Judges is pointed out. In our view, in such a situation the later decision must prevail over the earlier decision.”
•  11. Later, a Full Bench of this Court in Raman Gopi v. Kunju Raman Uthaman (2011 (4) KLT 458) answered a reference order relating to the binding nature of decisions, where conflicting views are expressed in the decisions of two Benches of co-equal strength of the Supreme Court. After an elaborate precedential survey, following propositions have been laid down:
• “The legal position, which therefore emerges on a discussion and analysis of the principles stated in various decisions of the Apex Court and other High Courts including this Court, so as to act as guidance to the High Courts and Subordinate Courts, when faced with a conflicting decisions, are summarised below:-
  •  (i) In case of conflicting views taken in the decisions of two Benches of equal strength of the Apex Court, the decision later in point of time, will prevail over the earlier one;
  • (ii) What is binding is the ratio decidendi. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides.
  •  (iii) A decision which is not expressed and is not found on reasons nor proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Art.141 of the Constitution. Similarly, any declaration made or conclusion arrived at without application of mind or preceded without a reason, cannot be a declaration of law, or authority as a binding precedent.
  •  (iv) It is well settled that what is the essence of a decision is the ratio and not every observation, nor what logically follows from various observations made in it.
  •  (v) The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Art.141 of the Constitution.
  •  (vi) A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn. p.153).
  •  (vii) A Division Bench, in case of conflict between the decision of a Division Bench of two Judges and the decision of a larger Bench and in particular, a Constitution Bench, would be bound by the latter decision.
  •  (viii) Per incuriam means a decision rendered by ignorance of a previous binding decision such as a decision of its own or of a court of coordinate or higher jurisdiction or in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of law. A ruling making specific reference to an earlier binding precedent may. Or may not be correct, but cannot be said to be per incuriam”.
• Hence, it is now indubitable that the decision rendered by the Apex Court later in point of time will prevail over the earlier one.”

Raman Gopi v. Kunju Raman Uthaman [2011 (4) KLT 458 (FB)] is also Referred to in:

• Saiby v. Mary, 2025-5 KHC 482: 2025-4 KLT 933 (Easwaran S., J.);
• M/s Asm Traxim Pvt Ltd v. Union Of India, 2025-11 ADJ 500 ; 2025-5 AllLJ 100
• Munni Lal v. Mohd. Rafik Kidwai, 2023-7 ADJ 74 ; 2023-AHC 124434 ; 2023-160 AllLR 658 ; 2023-2 ARC 432 ; 2023-4 AWC 3629
• XXXXXXXXXX – v. State of Kerala, 2022-5 KLT 636 (Kauser Edapagath, J.)

• Daisy M.P. v. State of Kerala, 2020-3 KHC 115 ; 2020-2 KLT 639 (Sunil Thomas, J.)
• Smitha v. V. Krishnan, 2017 AIR(Ker) 87; 2017-1 KHC 81; 2017-1 KLT 892 (K.T. Sankaran, P.D. Rajan and P. Ubaid, JJ.)
• Narayanan Radhakrishna Menon v. Narayanan Sukumara Menon,  2018-1 KHC 412 ; 2018-2 KLT 553)
• Papaiah Alias S.R. Papi Reddy v. P. Nagaraja Reddy, 2019 3 AIR(Kar)(R) 274
• Rosamma Joseph v. State of Kerala,2014 1 KLT(SN) 70 ; 2014 KHC 154 (K. Ramakrishnan, J.)
• St. Joseph’s Hospital Trust v. The Kerala University of Health Sciences, 2012-3 KHC(SN) 26 ; 2012-4 KLT 444 (K.M. Joseph & K. Harilal, JJ.)
• Saramma Paulose v. Lilly, Decided On: 03-10-2011 (Thomas P. Joseph. J)

In Kumari Alias Mary Francis, v. Baby,  2022-6 KHC 270 ; 2022-5 KLT 614 (P. Somarajam, J.) referred Raman Gopi v. Kunju Raman Uthaman [2011 (4) KLT 458 (FB)], laid down the history of this decision as under:

•  “2. Ext. B1 is a registered Will dated 2/11/1971 jointly executed by Paul and Sara. The suit was filed after the lapse of more than 30 years. ……The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff relied on the decision in Bharpur Singh & Ors. v. Shamsher Singh, 2009 (3) SCC 687, in support of his argument that there cannot be any application of Section 90 of the Evidence Act pertaining to a Will or testament irrespective of whether it is registered or not. But it is against the rationale (ratio) applied by the Apex Court in several decisions including the decision rendered by a Constitution Bench. Hence, it is necessary to ascertain the principle of binding precedent especially when contrary views were taken by a Full Bench and a Division Bench of this Court.
• 3. The issue came up before the Privy Council as early as in the year 1947 in Munnalal v. Mt. Kashibai, AIR 1947 PC 15, wherein it was held that the execution and attestation of a Will of more than 30 years old, when produced from proper custody, can be presumed. Later on, a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court had affirmed the legal position in Kalidindi Venkata Subbaraju & Ors. v. Chintalapati Subbaraju & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 947. It was followed by this Court in Narayanan Radhakrishna Menon v. Narayanan Sukumara Menon, 2018 (2) KLT 553. Subsequently, it was settled by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Another v. and State of Maharashtra and Another, AIR 2005 SC 752, that a decision delivered by a larger Bench is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength. It is further laid down that a Bench of lesser strength cannot doubt the correctness of the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger strength and summed up as follows:-
  • “The law laid down by Supreme Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength. A Bench of lessor quorum cannot doubt the correctness of the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of co-equal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of co-equal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.”
•  4. It has been further reiterated by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2016 SC 86, by holding that the judgment delivered earlier in point of time shall prevail over the judgment rendered by a co-equal Bench on a later point of time.
•  5. The abovesaid principle is subject to the exception that when in a subsequent pronouncement, after taking into consideration the previous judgment, re-defines or explains the width of principles laid down in the previous judgment, the subsequent pronouncement has to be followed (M. Natarajan v. State (2008) 8 SCC 413). It must be understood that there is no scope to re-write or reconsider the legal position earlier laid down by a larger Bench or a co-equal Bench, except for the purpose of explaining the width and length of the principle laid down in the previous judgment. Very recently, another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Dr. Shah Faesal and Ors. v. Union of India and Another [(2020) 4 SCC 1] had reiterated the legal position by explaining the rule of per incuriam, relevancy and binding precedent of ratio decidendi laid down in an earlier judgment of co-equal Bench or a larger Bench. There will not be any binding precedent regarding obiter dicta. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court had considered in this context, the doctrine of binding precedent with its utmost importance in the administration of judicial system by referring yet another five Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P., (2002) 4 SCC 234, and also the law laid down in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680: (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205. The view that the subsequent decision shall be declared per incuriam only if there exists a conflict in the ratio decidendi of the earlier judgments has got approval by a five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Punjab Land Development & Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682.”

Is the Full Bench Decision “Per Incuriam”?Does it apply to ‘Co-equal Benches’?

Kumari Alias Mary Francis, v. Baby,  2022-6 KHC 270 ; 2022-5 KLT 614 (P. Somarajam, J.) distinguished (?) Raman Gopi v. Kunju Raman Uthaman [2011 (4) KLT 458 (FB)] observing as under:

• “6. But, without noticing the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community’s case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court in Sampath S. Pawar v. Ibrahim, 2013 (3) KLT 722, had laid down the law that when conflicting views are taken by Benches of co-equal strength, the decision later in point of time will prevail over the earlier one by referring to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Raman Gopi v. Kunju Raman Uthaman, 2011 (4) KLT 458 (FB).”
• In fact, the abovesaid contrary view was taken by the Full Bench of this Court after referring the legal position laid down by the Constitution Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community’s case (supra). But the reference was only for the purpose of binding precedents of the larger Benches over the Benches of lesser strength. It was not referred in relation to “ratio decidendi” settled with respect to conflicting decision rendered by co-equal Benches. A mere citing of a decision or a legal position settled in an earlier judgment, not for the purpose either to follow or dissent, cannot be said to have referred so as to exclude the same from the mischief of “per incuriam decis”. In order to avoid the mischief, the “ratio decidendi” settled on a particular legal issue by the earlier larger or co-equal Bench must be referred in relation to that particular “ratio decidendi”. Hence, the legal position laid down by the Full Bench without referring to the law laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community’s case (supra) in relation to conflicting decision and the binding precedents of co-equal Benches would stand “per incuriam decis”. The decision rendered by the Division Bench in Sampath’s case (supra) by following the Full Bench decision in Raman Gopi’s case (supra) without noticing the decision of the Constitution Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community’s case (supra) also would stand per incuriam decis. So also, the decision rendered by a Single Bench of this Court in Hameed v. State of Kerala, 2008 (1) KLT 534, by taking a contrary view, though referred the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community’s case (supra) cannot be held good law.
• 7. The observation made by the Apex Court in Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others [(2008) 10 SCC 1] assumes importance at this juncture. The relevant portion is extracted below for reference:
  • “There have been several instances of different Benches of the High Court not following the judgments/orders of coordinate and even larger Benches. In some cases, the High Courts have gone to the extent of ignoring the law laid down by this Court without any tangible reason. Likewise, there have been instances in which smaller Benches of this Court have either ignored or bypassed the ratio of the judgments of the larger Benches including the Constitution Benches. These cases are illustrative of non-adherence to the rule of judicial discipline which is sine qua non for sustaining the system.”
•  8. Further, in view of the legal position settled by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community’s case (supra) and Dr. Shah Faesal’s case (supra), the earlier decision rendered by a Full Bench of this Court in Joseph v. Special Tahsildar (2001 (1) KLT 958 (FB)) holding that when two decisions of co-equal Benches of the Apex Court are conflicting, the decision later in time to be binding, cannot be held good law. The decision rendered by the Apex Court in Bharpur Singh’s case (supra) without noticing the earlier legal position settled by a larger Bench (three Judge Bench) of the Apex Court in Kalindindi Venkata Subbaraju’s case (supra), hence cannot be held to have binding precedent.”

The View: in Co-Equal Bench, Latest Judgment should Prevail – Fallacious?

It is held in Bindu v. State of Kerala, 2014 4 KHC 772 ; 2015 1 KLT(SN) 5 (Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.) that the school of thought — in case of conflict between co-equal benches, the latest judgment should prevail — is fallacious. Still, if the latter bench refers to the earlier one and distinguishes it, to that extent of distinction, the latter one binds. The court referred to the following decisions:

• Andhra Pradesh S.K. Mahaboob Ali, Ex-CRPF Constable, Nandyal v. Director General of Police, Central Reserve Police Force, New Delhi and others, 2005 (1) ALT 412 (DB)
• Jabalpur Bus Operators Association and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, AIR 2003 MP 81

CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF CO-ORDINATE 2 Judge BENCHES – REFER THE MATTER TO A BENCH OF THREE HON’BLE JUDGES. Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab 2009 AIR(SC) 483 ; 2009-16 SCC 785 (C.K. Thakker and D.K. Jain, JJ.)

Co-Ordinate Bench Decisions also Should be Referred to a Larger Bench If Difference

In Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand, AIR 1965 SC 1767, it is held as under:

• “8. .. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety. ….” (Quoted in: U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Rajesh Kumar, AIR 2012 SC 2728 ; 2012-7 SCC 1.) 

In Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija v. The Collector, Thane, Maharashtra, AIR 1991 SC 1893, it is observed as under:

• “One must remember that pursuit of the law, however, glamorous it is, has its own limitation on the Bench. In a multi-Judge Court, the Judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority. The judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a learned single Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be referred to a larger Bench. It is a subversion of judicial process not to follow this procedure.” (Quoted in: U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Rajesh Kumar, AIR 2012 SC 2728 ; 2012-7 SCC 1.)

In State Through Central Bureau Of Investigation v. Hemendhra Reddy, 2023-16 SCC 779 (Surya Kant, J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.), it is said as under:

• 81. We would like to extend a word of caution over here. While it is open to a learned Judge to differ with a view of a Co-ordinate Bench the sequitur is to make a reference to a larger Bench on papers being placed before the learned Chief Justice. The learned Judge cannot simply say “with due respect, I do not agree to the ratio…” or “the decision is per incuriam as a binding judgment of the Supreme Court has not been considered….” and proceed to take a contrary view as done in the impugned order. Such an approach would result in conflicting opinions of Co-ordinate Benches, resulting in judicial chaos and is, thus, improper. This is something atrocious and unacceptable.”

The Apex court referred Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1

In Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of W.B. [AIR 1960 SC 936 : (1960) 3 SCR 578] our Apex Court pointed out as unser:

• “19. … If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if Judges of coordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another’s decisions.

CONTRARY TO THE LAW DECLARED BY THE APEX COURT; Pareed Pillai v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2019 AIR Ker 9 ; 2018 4 KLT 792 (Hrishikesh Roy, P.R.Ramachandra Menon, A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar, Anil K.Narendran, Devan Ramachandran, JJ.)

HAD NOT TAKEN NOTE OF A BINDING CONSTITUTION BENCH DECISION; BUT FOLLOWED A LATER DECISION. Kottukal Konam Hindu Nadar Mahajana Sanm v. P.Kunjukrishnan Nadar AS 615/2000 Decided On : 09-04-2010

EXCEPT IN COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES EARLIER BENCH CAN BE SAID TO BE PER INCURIAM

Except in compelling circumstances, such as where the order of the earlier bench can be said to be per incuriam, in that it is passed in ignorance of an earlier binding precedent/ statutory or constitutional provision, the subsequent bench would follow the earlier  oordinate bench.

SALMOND: Lower Court Can Pick And Choose:  Salmond on Jurisprudence a lower court can pick and choose between two conflicting decisions of the same court on the same question of law. P.A. Thomas v. Authority Under the Minimum Wages Act   2008 1 KHC 800;  2008 1 KLT 858 (S. Siri Jagan, J.). Read as under:

“10. Salmond on Jurisprudence deals with the question of choosing between conflicting decisions of the same court by a subordinate court as follows:

• “(4) Inconsistency with earlier decision of higher court. it is clear law that a precedent loses its binding force if the court that decided it overlooked an inconsistent decision of a higher court. If, for example, the Court of Appeal decides a case in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords which went the other way, the decision of the Court of Appeal is per incuriam, and is not binding either on itself or on lower courts; on the contrary, it is the decision of the House of Lords that is binding. The same rule applies to precedents in other courts, such as the Divisional Court.
• (5) Inconsistency between earlier decisions of the same rank. A court is not bound by its own previous decisions that are in conflict with one another. This rule has been laid down in the Court of Appeal, Court of Criminal Appeal and Divisional Court and it obviously applies also to the House of Lords. There may at first sight seem to be a difficulty here: how can a situation of conflict occur, if the court is bound by its own decisions? At least two answers may be given. First, the conflicting decisions may come from a time before the binding force of precedent was recognized. Secondly, and more commonly, the conflict may have arisen through inadvertence, because the earlier case was not cited in the later. Owing to the vast number of precedents, and the heterogeneous ways in which they are reported-or are not reported-it is only too easy for counsel to miss a relevant authority. Whenever a relevant prior decision is not cited before the court, or mentioned in the judgments, it must be assumed that the court acts in ignorance or forgetfulness of it. If the new decision is in conflict wit the old, it is given per incuriam and is not binding on a later court.
• Although the later court is not bound by the decision so given per incuriam, this does not mean that it is bound by the first case. Perhaps in strict logic the first case should be binding, since it should never have been departed from, and was only departed from per incuriam. However, this is not the rule. The rule is that where there are previous inconsistent decisions of it own, the court is free to follow either. It can follow the earlier, but equally, if it thinks fit, it can follow the later. This rule has been laid down for the Court of Appeal, and it is submitted that it applies also to other courts. It will be seen, therefore, that this exception to the binding force of precedent belongs both to the category of abrogation by subsequent facts and to the category of what is here called inherent vice. The earlier case can be disregarded because of the subsequent inconsistent decision on the same level of authority, and the later case can be disregarded because of its inherent vice of ignoring the earlier case.
• Where authorities of equal standing are irreconcilably in conflict, a lower court has the same freedom to pick and choose between them as the schizophrenic court itself. The lower court may refuse to follow the later decision on the ground that it was arrived at per incuriam, or it may follow such decision on the ground that it is the latest authority. Which of these two courses the court adopts depends, or should depend, upon its own view of what the law ought to be. However, it takes a somewhat bold judge to disregard a precedent handed down by a court of higher standing on the ground that the decision was per incuriam.”

Binding Precedent- In Nutshell

No Binding Precedent if relevant STATUTORY PROVISION was Not considered. [Union of India v. Maniklal Banerjee, AIR 2006 SC 2844]  Where no consideration was given to the question, the decision cannot be said to be binding; and precedents SUB SILENTIO – Without Arguments – are of NO MOMENT. [A-One Granites v. State of U.P., 2001-3 SCC 537]    A decision is available as a precedent only if it DECIDES a QUESTION OF LAW. [State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1593: 1992-1 SCC 489]. Not facts. [Prakash Chandra Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1960 SC 195]  RATIO DECIDENDI is Binding Precedent: Mere Casual Expressions – Not of Much Avail.[ Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555; State of Maharashtra v. Bhakti Vedanta Book Trust, AIR 2013 SC 1667; 2013-4 SCC 676; Shrirampur Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher, AIR 2013 SC 3757; 2013 5 SCC 627; Arun Kumar Aggarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 3056; 2014-13 SCC 707).  For Binding Precedent, finding  must be ‘RATIO DECIDENDI’ (necessary to the decision); and  Not obiter dicta. [Allen in ‘Law in the Making’; Quoted in: Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543; Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543)] Court’s order is binding on the parties under res judicata; the RATIO DECIDENDI is binding on other Courts as binding precedent. [The Modern English Legal System (4th Edition) by Smith, Bailey and Gunn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), pages 518-519]    What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. [State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647; Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, 1996-6 SCC 44; Secunderabad Club v. CIT, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004, 2023-457 ITR 263 (SC)  The doctrine of precedent mandates that an exposition of law must be followed and applied. [State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar Sharma, 2016-15 SCC 289].  Res judicata bars raising the same issue. Judicial precedent is not concerned with issues between parties. (Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley’s Commentary on the Doctrine of Res Judicata (Butterworths: London, Edinburgh, Dublin – 1996, pages 8 and 9) Res judicata pertains to the parties;  precedent refers to a binding declaration of law that applies to courts or authorities. [Indian Broadcasting and Digital Foundation v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, 01 Nov 2024, 2024 KER 80988].  A decision on the ‘construction of that document’ can operates as a judicial precedent against one though he was not a party to that litigation (Sahu Madho Dass v. Mukand Ram, 1955 AIR SC 481).

Res Judicata Binds Parties; Ratio Decidendi (as binding precedent) Binds Courts

The Supreme Court, in Eminent Colonizers Private Limited v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 INSC 116, held with repect to the the distinction as to  Precedent and Res Judicata as under:

• “24. There is a clear conceptual distinction between precedent and res judicata. Salmond on Jurisprudence P.J. Fitzgerald (12th Edition) page 141 states
  • “a judicial precedent speaks in England with authority; it is not merely evidence of the law but a source of it, and the courts are bound to follow the law that is so established”.
•  A decision between two parties which sets out a principle of law will operate as a precedent for disputes between two other parties too. A precedent operates in rem. In contrast, a res judicata operates in personam between the same parties either in the later stage of the same litigation between them or in a different litigation between them. That is the essential distinction between the two.
• 25. This Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Nemi Chand Mahela and Others, (2019) 14 SCC 179  , held as under:
  • “11. The learned counsel for the petitioners had drawn our attention to para 22 of the decision in Manmohan Sharma case [Manmohan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 5 SCC 782 which refers to the case of one Danveer Singh whose writ petition had been allowed [Danveer Singh v. Rural Development & Panchyati Raj Deptt., WP (C) No. 2200 of 2000 sub nom Jayanti Sharma v. Rural Development & Panchyati Raj Deptt., WP (C) No. 1646 of 2000, order dated 26-2-2001 (Raj)] and the order had attained finality as it was not challenged before the Division Bench or before the Supreme Court. Termination of services in the case of Danveer Singh, it was accordingly held, was not justified and in accordance with law. The reasoning given in paras 22 and 23 in Manmohan Sharma case [Manmohan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 5 SCC 782 relating to the case of Danveer Singh would reflect the difference between the doctrine of res judicata and law of precedent. Res judicata operates in personam i.e. the matter in issue between the same parties in the former litigation, while law of precedent operates in rem i.e. the law once settled is binding on all under the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court. Res judicata binds the parties to the proceedings for the reason that there should be an end to the litigation and therefore, subsequent proceeding inter se parties to the litigation is barred. Therefore, law of res judicata concerns the same matter, while law of precedent concerns application of law in a similar issue. In res judicata, the correctness of the decision is normally immaterial and it does not matter whether the previous decision was right or wrong, unless the erroneous determination relates to the jurisdictional matter of that body. [See Makhija Construction & Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Indore Development Authority, (2005) 6 SCC 304] ]”

In The Modern English Legal System (4th Edition) by Smith, Bailey and Gunn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), pages 518-519, says as under:

• “…. Thus the Court’s order is binding on the parties under the res judicata doctrine; the ratio decidendi is binding on other Courts in accordance with the principles outlined above under the doctrine of binding precedent. A startling illustration of the distinction was provided by the following series of cases. A testator, John Arkle Waring, left annuities to Mr. Howard and Mrs. Louie Burton-Butler ‘free of income tax’. In 1942 the Court of Appeal in Re warning, Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Awdry : (1942) Ch. 426 on an appeal in which Howard was a party, held that income tax had to be deducted. Louie was not a party as she was in an enemy occupied country. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. Four years later the House of Lords in Berke¬ley v. Berkeley : (1946) A.C. 555 overruled the Awdry case. Subsequently, Jenkins J. held that the Awdry case was res judica¬ta so far as Howard was concerned notwithstanding that its ratio had been overruled in Berkeley v. Berkeley and that Louie’s annuity would be dealt with in accordance with the later case. (See Re Warning, Westminster Bank v. Burton-Butler : (1948) Ch. 221).”
• (Quoted in: Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India (AK Ganguly, CJ, then) 2007-104 CLT 737, Ori)

Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley’s Commentary on the Doctrine of Res Judicata (Butterworths: London, Edinburgh, Dublin – 1996, pages 8 and 9), explains the concept of res judicata as under:

• “There is an essential difference between res judicata estoppel and the doctrine of judicial precedent. Under the former a final decision in fact or law by any Court having jurisdiction precludes either party (except on appeal) from again raising the same issue against the other in any Court. The doctrine of judicial precedent, on the other hand, is not concerned with issues between parties. …
• The difference is illustrated by the cases of Re Waring decided in 1942 and 1948. In the first Farwell J held that Section 25 of the Finance Act 1941 was not applicable (1942) Ch. 309 to an annuity; but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision. (1942) Ch. 426. The effect was two-fold; it decided as res judicata between the parties that Section 25 applied, and it bound Courts up to the Court of Appeal in other cases. In Berkeley v. Bekeley (1946) AC 555, the House of Lords overruled Re Waring. In 1948 the trustees sought a decision as between themselves and the annuitant who had not been joined in the first proceedings. (1948) Ch. 221. The other annuitant remained bound by the earlier decision, but the result (see Duke of Bedford v. Elliz : (1901) AC 1 at 8), was otherwise governed by Berkeley v. Berkeley: Gisborne Sheepfarmers’ Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. IRC : (1962) NZLR 810 at 814.” (Quoted in: Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India (AK Ganguly, CJ, Ori) 2007-104 CLT 737)

In State of M.P. v. Mulam Chandi, AIR 1973 MP293, it has been held as under:

• “As between a decision which operates as res judicata and a decision which is binding as a precedent but not res judicata, the former must prevail.”

Res judicata Apply parties, Precedent is binding declaration of law; 

Not open to Ignore the Judgment (Ratio Decidendi) of the Supreme Court

Indian Broadcasting and Digital Foundation v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, 01 Nov 2024, 2024 KER 80988, it is held by the Kerala High Court as under:

• Typically, a statutory regulation can be challenged on two grounds: first, for violating fundamental rights, and second, for being inconsistent with the parent Act. Once the Supreme Court has dismissed a challenge to the regulation, any court bound by the declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution cannot revisit a binding judgment of the Supreme Court on different grounds. It is important to differentiate between precedent and res judicata. Res judicata pertains to the parties involved in a particular case, while precedent refers to a binding declaration of law that applies to courts or authorities and is independent of the rights and obligations of the parties involved.
• In other words, precedent falls within the category of case law in the hierarchical system of adjudication and serves as a source of law that binds inferior authorities to the legal declarations made by superior authorities. The binding nature of precedent brings in certainty of law to be followed by all courts and authorities. In contrast, res judicata pertains to procedural rules that bind litigating parties to previous judgments on the same issue.
• It is the ratio decidendi that determines the binding nature of a precedent, not the cause of action. …. The cause of action refers to the bundle of facts that give rise to a legal action, which is crucial in determining the applicability of the principles of res judicata but not necessarily on binding nature of precedent. Only the Supreme Court has the authority to revisit its own declared law; no other court can do so. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and Another v. State of Gujarat and Others [(2004) 12 SCC 645], where it stated in paragraph 62:
  • “62. It is well settled that the judgments of this Court are binding on all the authorities under Article (142*) 141 of the Constitution and it is not open to any authority to ignore a binding judgment of this Court on the ground that the full facts had not been placed before this Court and/or the judgment of this Court in the earlier proceedings had only collaterally or incidentally decided the issues raised in the show-cause notices. Such an attempt to belittle the judgments and the orders of this Court, to say the least, is plainly perverse and amounts to gross contempt of this Court. We are pained to say that the then Deputy Collector has scant respect for the orders passed by the Apex Court. (sic) ”

Interpretation of a Document can Be a Binding Judicial Precedent

In Sahu Madho Dass v. Mukand Ram, 1955 AIR SC 481, it was observed out as under:

• “Mukand Ram was not a party to that litigation and the decision does not bind him but it operates as a judicial precedent about the construction of that document, a precedent with which we respectfully agree.” (Referred to in: Syed Hafiz Mir v. Abdul Nayeemkhan, AIR 1960  MP 50; Potluri Saraswathi v. Vallabhaneni Veerabhadra Rao, 2004-7 ALT 120; Harabati v. Jasodhara Debi, AIR 1977  Ori  143; Ramachandra Bhat v. Srideviamma, AIR 1976 Kar 217; Katragadda China Anjaneyulu v. Kattragadda China Ramayya, 1965  AIR AP 177)

In R. V. Bhupal Prasad v. Saleha Begum, 2002 Supp2 ALD 735; 2001-5 ALT 770, it is pointed out that in Anjaneyulu v. Ramaiah, 1965-1 ALT 149, a Full Bench of the Andhra High Court held that interpretation of a material document in a prior proceeding between the same parties even if does not operate as res judicata would be a binding judicial precedent in a subsequent proceeding between the parties based on that document.

Even an erroneous decision operates as res judicata

In Bindeswari v. Bageshwari, AIR 1936 PC 46, it was held as under:

• “Where the decision of the Court in a previous suit determined that the section had never applied to a transaction, a Court in a new suit between the same parties with regard to the same transaction cannot try a new the issue as to its applicability in face of the express prohibition in Section 11 of the Code. “

In Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna, AIR 1953 SC 65 it was laid down  as under:

• “(23) There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as res judicata. A decision in the previous execution case between the parties that the matter was not within the competence of the executing court even though erroneous is binding on the parties; see Abhoy Kanta Gohain v. Gopinath Deb Goswami AIR 1943 Cal. 460.”

No Binding precedent if relevant statutory provision was Not considered

A Full Bench of the Allahabad  HighmCourt, in  Indian Ceramic House, Langra-Ki-Chowki, Agra v. Sales Tax Officer, II Sector, Agra : 1970 SCC OnLine All 193, observed as under:

• “A Judgment is authoritative only as to that part of it which is considered to have been necessary to the decision of the case, and not that part which was not necessary to its decision. The first is called ‘ratio decidendi’. Which is binding as a precedent. The other called ‘obiter dicta’ cannot be treated as a binding precedent though the opinion so expressed is entitled to respect.” (Quoted in Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543)

Allen in ‘Law in the Making’ said as under:

• “Any judgment of any Court is authoritative only as to that part of it, called the ‘ratio decidendi’, which is considered to have been necessary to the decision of the actual issue between the litigants. It is for the Court, of whatever degree, which is called upon to consider the precedent, to determine what the true ‘ratio decidendi’ was…………..Judicial opinions upon such matters, whether they be merely casual, or wholly gratuitous or (as is far more usual) of what may be called collateral relevance, are known as ‘obiter dicta or simply ‘dicta’, and it is extremely difficult to establish any standard of their relative weight.” (Quoted in : Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543). (Quoted in : Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543).

The Supreme Court in Jayant Verma v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 743, quoted the dissenting judgement of A.P. Sen, J. in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCC 745, with approval :

• “54. This question is answered by referring to authoritative works and judgments of this Court. In Precedent in English Law by Cross and Harris (4th edn.), ‘ratio decidendi’ is described as follows: “The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him, or a necessary part of his direction to the jury.”

In Union of India v. Maniklal Banerjee, AIR 2006 SC 2844, the Apex Court has held as under:

• “It is now well-settled that if a decision has been rendered without taking into account the statutory provision, the same cannot be considered to be a binding precedent. This Court, in Pritam Singh, while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, might have refused to interfere with the decision. The same, therefore, did not constitute any binding precedent.” (Referred to in: Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain (Arun Misra, J.), ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472)

Arun Misra, J., referred to the House of Lords’ decision in Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain, ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472, and said as under:

• “(35) Another decision relied upon is rendered by the House of Lords in Watt vs. Ahsan (2007) UKHL 51. In the aforesaid case, question arose on Section 12 of the Race Relations Act, 1976. The submission was made that they were party and that All vs. Mcdonagh (2002) ICR 1026 was wrongly decided. In any case, the interpretation given to Section 12 by the EAT in Sawyer v. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 is res judicata between him and the Labour Party, not only for the purposes of his first complaint but for the other two as well. It was opined that the EAT was wrong in Sawyer vs. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 to hold that the Labour Party was a qualifying body, but there was no appeal against the decision of EAT; it was held that decision was binding upon the parties, though wrong in law. When the Tribunal was-having the jurisdiction to decide the question, it is binding upon the parties though erroneous.
• There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition, but here we are concerned with the fresh cause of action on which suit is based and previously relevant statutory provision of Section 111 (d) of TP Act was not taken into consideration, question of determination of tenancy was also not decided.”

Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent; Not the Final Order or Conclusion.

Ratio decidendi literally means “reason for deciding”.

In B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1480, it was observed that a decision is binding not because of its (final) conclusion but with regard to its ratio and the principle laid down therein.  (Referred to in: Secunderabad Club v. CIT, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004, 2023-457 ITR 263 (SC).

A Case is only an Authority for what it Actually Decides

In State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647, wherein after relying on British authorities it was held:

• “13….A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein, nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic, this is what Earl of Halsbury L.C. said in Quinn v. Leathem [[1901] AC 495]:
• “Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, [1898] AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it.”

Questions which are Essentially Questions of Fact, Cannot be Cited as Precedents

In State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1593: 1992-1 SCC 489, it is laid down as under:

• “A decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law.”

In Prakash Chandra Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1960 SC 195, it is held as under:

• “Learned counsel for the appellant cited before us a number of reported decisions of this Court bearing on the appreciation of circumstantial evidence. We need not refer to those authorities. It is enough to say that decisions even of the highest court on questions which are essentially questions of fact, cannot be cited as precedents governing the decision of other cases which must rest in the ultimate analysis upon their own particular facts.” 

The Supreme Court (B.V. Nagarathna, J.)observed in Secunderabad Club v. CIT, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004, 2023-457 ITR 263 (SC), as under:

• “22. Further, the precedential value of an order of the Supreme Court which is not preceded by a detailed judgment would be lacking inasmuch as an issue would not have been categorically dealt with. What is of essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein, nor what logically follows from the various observations made therein.”

A case is only an authority for what it decides, and not from what logically follows from it (Ram Krishan Ram Nath v. Janpad Sabha, AIR 1967 SC 1073)

Ratio Decidendi – Basis of Reasons and Principles Underlying a Decision

It is the discernable ratio decidendi which forms a precedent and not the final order in the judgment (Sanjay Singh v. Uttar Pradesh PSC, Allahabad, 2007-3 SCC 720).

The Supreme Court, in Krishena Kumar v. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 207, said as under::

• “19. The doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain “propositions wider than the case itself required”. This was what Lord Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker’s Trustees [(1882) 7 App Cas 259 : 46 LT 826 (HL)] and Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495, 502 : 17 TLR 749 (HL)]. Sir Frederick Pollock has also said :
• “Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision.”

Decision Applicable Only to Facts Cannot be a Binding Precedent

The basis of reasons and principles underlying a decision is ratio decidendi. It is distinct from the ultimate relief granted in a given case. Therefore, the decision applicable only to the facts of the case cannot be treated as a binding precedent.

Ratio Decidendi Is Binding Precedent: Casual Words, Not of Much Avail

In Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555, it is pointed out as under:

• “Hence, in light of the aforementioned judicial pronouncements, which have well settled the proposition that only the ratio decidendi can act as the binding or authoritative precedent, it is clear that the reliance placed on mere general observations or casual expressions of the Court, is not of much avail to the respondents.”
• (Quoted in: State of Maharashtra v. Bhakti Vedanta Book Trust, AIR 2013 SC 1667; 2013-4 SCC 676;
• Shrirampur Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher, AIR 2013 SC 3757; 2013 5 SCC 627;
• Arun Kumar Aggarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 3056; 2014-13 SCC 707)

A deliberate decision after hearing on a question constitute a precedent

A three Judge Bench of our Apex Court, in Union of India v. Dhanawanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44. held as under:

• “9. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates –
• (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts;
• (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and
• (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above.
• A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi.

• 10. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents……” (Quoted in: Vishal N.  Kalsaria v. Bank of India, 2016-3 SCC 762)

Law laid down by SC – if only there is a Speaking Order;  Not by Dismissal In Limine

It was added, in Secundrabad Club v. CIT – V, 17-08- 2023; 2023-457 ITR 263 (SC), as under:

• “23. Another important principle to be borne in mind is that declaration of the law by the Supreme Court can be said to have been made only when it is contained in a speaking order, either expressly or by necessary implication and not by dismissal in limine.”

Law ‘Declared’, and ‘found or made’

While speaking about judicial precedents, in DTC v. DTC Mazdoor Congress Union, AIR 1991 SC 101, Mukherji, CJ., laid down that the expression ‘declared’ is wider than the words ‘found or made’. The latter expression involves the process, while the former expresses the result. (Referred to in: Secunderabad Club v. CIT, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004, 2023-457 ITR 263 (SC).

Ratio Decidendi alone is Binding Precedent; It is statements of principles of law

The Supreme Court observed further in Secundrabad Club v. CIT, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004, 2023-457 ITR 263 (SC), as under

• “13. It is a settled position of law that only the ratio decidendi of a judgment is binding as a precedent.”

B.V. Nagarathna, J. held (in Secundrabad Club v. CIT, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004, 2023-457 ITR 263 (SC) as under:

• “According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic ingredients:
• .(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of fact is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts;
• (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and
• (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and (ii) above.
• For the purposes of the parties themselves and their privies, ingredient (iii) is the material element in the decision, for, it determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation to the subject-matter of the action. It is the judgment that estops the parties from reopening the dispute. However, for the purpose of the doctrine of precedent, ingredient (ii) is the vital element in the decision. This is the ratio decidendi. It is not everything said by a judge when giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi.”

A “collateral or incidental” finding would not ordinarily be res judicata.

If only finding is “Necessary”, then only it is “Directly and Substantially” in issue

In Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350 the Supreme Court held that to attract res judicata on an earlier finding, the matter must have been directly and substantially in issue and that the finding on an issue came “collaterally or incidentally” would not ordinarily be res judicata. It was pointed out that if only the issue was “necessary” to be decided for adjudicating on the principal issue and had actually been decided, then only it would have to be treated as “directly and substantially” in issue; and that it is also necessary that the judgment was in fact based upon that decision.

For Res Judicata – Adjudication of the Issue Material and Essential

In Sajjadanashin it is pointed out as under:

• “Where title to property is the basis of the right of possession, a decision on the question of possession is res judicata on the question of title to the extent that adjudication of title was essential to the judgment; but where the question of the right to possession was the only issue actually or necessary involved, the judgment is not conclusive on the question of ownership or title.”

Referring to Sajjadanashin Sayed, it is observed in Nand Ram v. Jagdish Prasad: AIR  2020 SC 1884 that a material test to be applied is whether the court considered the adjudication of the issue material and essential for its decision.

• (Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350, is quoted and followed in: M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 273.)

Referring to Sajjadanashin Sayed it is observed in Union of India Vs. Vijay Krishna Uniyal, 2017-12 SCALE 704, that one has to examine the plaint, the written statement, the issues and the judgment to find out if the matter was directly and substantially in issue.

In Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, AIR 2000 SC 1238, observed as under:

• “Point No. 1:
• 11. The words “collaterally” or “incidentally in issue” have come up for interpretation in several common law jurisdictions in the context of the principle of res judicata. While the principle has been accepted that matters collaterally or incidentally in issue are not ordinarily res judicata, it has however been accepted that there are exceptions to this rule. The English, American, Australian and Indian Courts and Jurists have therefore proceeded to lay down certain tests to find out if even an earlier finding on such an issue can be res judicata in a later proceedings. There appears to be a common thread in the tests laid down in all these countries. We shall therefore refer to these developments.
• 12. Matters Collaterally or incidentally in issue:
• It will be noticed that the words used in Section 11 CPC are “directly and substantially in issue.” If the matter was in issue directly and substantially in a prior litigation and decided against a party then the decision would be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. Judicial decisions have however held that if a matter was only `collaterally or incidentally in issue and decided in an earlier proceeding, the finding therein would not ordinarily be res judicata in a latter proceeding where the matter is directly and substantially in issue.
• 13. As pointed out in Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. 16, Para 1538) (4th Ed.), the fundamental rule is that a judgment is not conclusive if any matter came collaterally in question [R. vs. Knaptoft Inhabitants, Heptulla Bros vs. Thakore; or if any matter was incidentally cognizable Sanders (otherwise Saunders) vs. Sanders (otherwise Saunders)].
• 14. A collateral or incidental issue is one that is ancillary to a direct and substantive issue; the former is an auxiliary issue and the latter the principal issue. The expression collaterally or incidentally in issue implies that there is another matter which is directly and substantially in issue (Mulla, CPC 15th Ed. p. 104).
• 15. Difficulty in distinguishing whether a matter was directly in issue or collaterally or incidentally in issue and tests laid down in various Courts:
• Difficulty in this area of law has been felt in various jurisdictions and therefore some tests have been evolved. Halsbury says (Vol. 16, Para 1538) (4th Ed.) that while the general principle is clear “difficulty arises in the application of the rule in determining in each case what was the point decided and what was the matter incidentally cognizable, and the opinion of Judges seems to have undergone some fluctuations.”
• 16. Spencer Bower and Turner on The Doctrine of Res Judicata (2nd Ed, 1969) (p. 181) refer to the English and Australian experience and quota Dixon, J. of the Australian High Court in Blair v. Curran to say: “The difficulty in the actual application of these conceptions is to distinguish the matters fundamental or cardinal to the prior decision on judgment, or necessarily involved in it as its legal justification or foundation, from matters which, even though actually raised and decided as being in the circumstances of the case the determining considerations, yet are not in point of law the essential foundation of a groundwork of the judgment.” The authors say that in order to understand with essential distinction, one has always to inquire with unrelenting severity – is the determination upon which it is sought to find an estoppel so fundamental to the substantive decision that the latter cannot stand without the former. Nothing less than this will do. It is suggested by Dixon, J that even where this inquiry is answered satisfactorily, there is still another test to pass: viz. whether the determination is the immediate foundation” of the decision as opposed to merely “a proposition collateral or subsidiary only, i.e. not more than part of the reasoning supporting the conclusion.” It is well settled, say the above authors “that a mere step in reasoning is insufficient. What is required is no less than the determination of law, or fact or both, fundamental to the substantive decision.”

A Deliberate Judicial Decision Alone is Judicial Precedent

As regards binding precedent it is observed in Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44, as under:

• “9…..It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates-
  • (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts;
  • (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and
  • (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides.
• What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. “

Res Judicata: The Issue Should Have Been “Necessary to be Decided”

In PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, it is held as under:

• “57. It is fairly settled that the finding on an issue in the earlier suit to operate as res judicate should not have been only directly and substantially in issue but it should have been necessary to be decided as well.”

A Compromise Decree is not a decision by the Court; No Res Judicata

In Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao, AIR 1967 SC 591, the Supreme Court has laid down as under :

• “A compromise decree is not a decision by the Court, it is the acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties had agreed. It has been said that a compromise decree merely sets the seal of the Court on the agreement of the parties. The Court did not decide, anything. Nor can it be said that the decision of the Court was implicit in it.”
• See also: Daryao v. State of UP, 1962- I SCR 574;
• Vidya Sagar v. Sudesh Kumari, 1976-1 SCC 115;
• Jamia Masjid v. K. V.  Rudrappa, AIR 2021 SC 4523; 2022-9 SCC 225.

In Baldevdas Shivlal and another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 406, it is held as under:

• “A consent decree according to the decisions of this Court does not operate as res-judicata because a consent decree is merely the record of contract between the parties to a suit, to which is superadded the seal of the Court. A matter in contest in a suit may operate as res-judicata only if there is an adjudication by the Court; the terms of section 11 of the Code leave no scope for a contrary view.”

Cardinal feature of Common Law – Stand by Precedent

In State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar Sharma, 2016-15 SCC 289, it is held as under:

• 10. Time and again this Court has emphatically restated the essentials and principles of ‘precedent’ and of Stare Decisis which are a cardinal feature of the hierarchical character of all Common Law judicial systems. The doctrine of precedent mandates that an exposition of law must be followed and applied even by coordinate or co-equal Benches and certainly by all smaller Benches and subordinate courts. That is to say that a smaller and a later Bench has no freedom other than to apply the law laid down by the earlier and larger Bench; that is the law which is said to hold the field. Apart from Article 141, it is a policy of the courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb a settled point. The purpose of precedents is to bestow predictability on judicial decisions and it is beyond cavil that certainty in law is an essential ingredient of rule of law. A departure may only be made when a coordinate or co-equal Bench finds the previous decision to be of doubtful logic or efficacy and consequentially, its judicial conscience is so perturbed and aroused that it finds it impossible to follow the existing ratio. The Bench must then comply with the discipline of requesting the Hon’ble Chief Justice to constitute a larger Bench.”

Modern English Practice

In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, it is pointed out as under:

• “47. Though English Courts in the past accepted the Blackstonian theory and though the House of Lords strictly adhered to the doctrine of ‘precedent’ in the earlier years, both the doctrines were practically given up by the “Practice Statement (Judicial precedent)” issued by the House of Lords, recorded in (1966) 1 WLR 1234. Lord Gardiner L.C., speaking for the House of Lords made the following observations;
• “Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so.”

Article 141 in Constitution of India 141

Article 141 mandates the courts in India to follow the law declared by the Apex Court. It reads as under:

• “Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts: The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.”

The enacted laws do not speak about binding judicial precedents. But, the common law expounds the principles thereon, following the principles adopted by English Courts. By virtue of this convention, the principle of law applied in an earlier case is followed in subsequent cases, and the decision of a larger bench is honoured by the smaller bench.

Article 141 declares that the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India will be a ‘Source of Law’.

Larger Bench Decision is binding on Bench of lesser strength

It is observed in Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, AIR 2024 (SC) 714; 2024-3 SCC 224 (Vikram Nath, Rajesh Bindal, JJ.) as under:

• “1. The rule of ‘Judicial Discipline and Propriety’ and the Doctrine of precedents has a merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to individuals as to the consequences of their actions. The Constitution benches of this court have time and again reiterated the rules emerging from judicial Discipline. Accordingly, when a decision of a coordinate Bench of same High court is brought to the notice of the bench, it is to be respected and is binding subject to right of the bench of such co-equal quorum to take a different view and refer the question to a larger bench. It is the only course of action open to a bench of co-equal strength, when faced with the previous decision taken by a bench with same strength.”

The Apex Court referred the following decisions –

• Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359
• Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673
• State of Punjab , v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 26

In Sita Soren v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 1701; 2024-5 SCC 629, it is pointed out as under:

• “24. A decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. A Bench of lesser strength cannot disagree with or dissent from the view of the law taken by the bench of larger strength. However, a bench of the same strength can question the correctness of a decision rendered by a co-ordinate bench. In such situations, the case is placed before a bench of larger strength. [Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community vs. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673, Para 12]”

Minority Decision may a binding precedent (when no disagreement by majority)

In Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 INSC 835; 2024 KLT(Online) 2648; 2024 8 Supreme 387; 2024 0 Supreme(SC) 990, it is pointed out (in the Majority View: DY Chandrachud, CJI, Hrishikesh Roy, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma, Augustine George Masih, JJ.- Minority, B.V. Nagarathna, Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ.) as under:

• “102. It must be noted, however, that there is a difference between whether an observation is a binding precedent and whether it is a position of law that may have persuasive value on subsequent benches. In the absence of disagreement by a majority of judges (either express or implied), nothing precludes subsequent benches of this Court from relying on observations made in a concurring opinion (on behalf of the minority of judges) which are not discussed by the other judges at all. It is assumed in such cases, that all judges on the bench have read the opinions of one another, and did not deem it necessary to either state their express disagreement with the opinion or lay down a different understanding of the proposition of law (implied disagreement).”

Are the Trial Courts bound by its Previous Decisions

No.

• A Munsiff or a Subordinate Judge is not bound to follow his previous decision as a judicial precedent. Such rulings are at best persuasive, not obligatory.

Certainty demands Consistency

Certainty and consistency in judicial decisions are necessary for providing assurance to individuals as to the consequences of their actions. Applying this principle, a Munsiff or Sub-judge is bound to follow the principles he (or his predecessor in office) had adopted in a previous decision. But it is not a constitutional mandate. No common-aw doctrines also direct so. Still, when such a precedent (judgment or order) is placed either by producing the same in evidence or by pointing out the same in the argument of the case, judicial courtesy and comity require the Munsiff or the judge to explain reasons if he deviates from the earlier stance.

In Land Acquisition cases it is common that earlier decisions are cited for showing the reasonable compensation.

Also Read

•➧ Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent; Not the Final Order or Conclusion.              •➧ Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases: Does a Civil Court Judgment Bind a Criminal Court?              •➧ Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon (SC), April 2, 2024 – An Odd Decision on ‘Civil Court Judgment Does Not Bind Criminal Court’.              •➧ Cheating and Breach of Contract: Distinction lies in Fraudulent Intention ‘at the time of Promise’.  No Criminal Case endures on a Dispute Essentially Civil in Nature.              •➧ Res Judicata and Judicial Precedent              •➧ No Res judicata on Finding on Title in an Injunction Suit              •➧ What are “Relevant Under Some Other Provisions of this Act” in Sec. 43?           •➧ Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata             •➧ Alternative Pleadings on Title and Adverse Possession: Mutually Inconsistent or Mutually Destructive?              •➧Res Judicata: ‘Same issue’ must have been ‘Adjudicated’ in the former suit

End Notes:

Sec. 11 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, reads as under:

• Res Judicata -No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
• Explanation I– The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
• Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court.
• Explanation III.- The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.
• Explanation IV.- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
• Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.
• Explanation VI– Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
• Explanation VII.- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to proceedings for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.
• Explanation VIII.-An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in as subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.

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Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

• Order IX Rule 9 CPC: Earlier Suit for Injunction; Subsequent Suit for Recovery & Injunction – No Bar
• H. Anjanappa v. A. Prabhakar: An ‘Aggrieved’ Stranger or a ‘Prejudicially Affected’ Third-Party (also) Can File Appeal with the ‘Leave of the Court’.
• Replication, Rejoinder and Amendment of Pleadings
• Can a Suit be Withdrawn in Appeal, on the Ground that Appeal is Continuation of the Suit?
• Does Registration of a Document give Notice to the Whole World?
• Suit under Sec. 6, Specific Relief Act – Is it a ‘Summary Suit’ under Order XXXVII CPC?
• Is it Mandatory to Lift the Attachment on Dismissal of the Suit? Will the Attachment Orders Get Revived on Restoration of Suit?
• Will Interlocutory Orders and Applications Get Revived on Restoration of Suit?
• Can an ‘Ex-parte’ Defendant Cross Examine Plaintiff’s Witness?
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Civil Rights and Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
• Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
• Res Judicata and Judicial Precedent
• Order II, Rule 2 CPC – Not to Vex Defendants Twice
• A Land Mark Decision on Order II rule 2, CPC – Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd., Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 73
• Order I rule 8, CPC (Representative Suit) When and How? Whether Order I rule 8 Decree is Enforceable in Execution?
• Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
• Pleadings in Defamation Suits
• Previous Owner is Not a Necessary Party in a Recovery Suit
• UNDUE INFLUENCE and PLEADINGS thereof in Indian Law
• PLEADINGS IN ELECTION MATTERS
• Declaration and Injunction
• Law on Summons to Defendants and Witnesses
• Notice to Produce Documents in Civil Cases
• Production of Documents: Order 11, Rule 14 & Rule 12
• Sec. 91 CPC and Suits Against Wrongful Acts
• Remedies Under Sec. 92 CPC
• Mandatory Injunction – Law and Principles
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• Interrogatories: When Court Allows, When Rejects?
• Decree in OI R8 CPC-Suit & Eo-Nomine Parties
• Pecuniary & Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Doctrine of Substantial Representation in a Suit by or against an Association
• Who are Necessary Parties, Proper Parties and Pro Forma Parties in Suits
• What is Partnership, in Law? How to Sue a Firm?
• ‘Legal Representatives’, Not ‘Legal Heirs’ to be Impleaded on Death of Plaintiff/Defendant
• Powers and Duties of Commissioners to Make Local Investigations, Under CPC
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Burden on Plaintiff to Prove Title; Weakness of Defence Will Not Entitle a Decree
• Is it Mandatory to Set Aside the Commission Report – Where a Second Commissioner is Appointed?
• Can a Commission be Appointed to Find Out the Physical Possession of a Property?
• Withholding Evidence and Adverse Inference
• Pendente Lite Transferee Cannot Resist or Obstruct Execution of a Decree
• Family Settlement or Family Arrangement in Law
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Will Findings of a Civil Court Outweigh Findings of a Criminal Court?
• Relevancy of Civil Case Judgments in Criminal Cases
• Waiver and Promissory Estoppel
• Can a Christian Adopt? Will an adopted child get share in the property of adoptive parents?
• Principles of Equity in Indian Law
• Thangam v.  Navamani Ammal: Did the Supreme Court lay down – Written Statements which deal with each allegation specifically, but not “para-wise”, are vitiated?
• No Criminal Case on a Dispute Essentially Civil in Nature.
• Doctrine of Substantial Representation in Suits
• Order I rule 8, CPC (Representative Suit) When and How? Whether Order I rule 8 Decree is Enforceable in Execution?
• Appointment of Guardian for Persons Suffering from Disability or Illness: Inadequacy of Law – Shame to Law Making Institutions
• Can Documents be Marked In Cross Examination, If Witness Admits Them?

Principles and Procedure

• Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases: Does a Civil Court Judgment Bind a Criminal Court?
• When can (i) a ‘Victim’ File an Appeal in a Criminal Case and  (ii) an ‘Aggrieved Person’ File an Appeal in a Civil Case?
• Asian Paints Limited v. Ram Babu, 2025 INSC 828 – ‘Victim’ Can File an Appeal in a Criminal Case
• BURDEN of PROOF: Initial Burden and Shifting the Onus in Indian and English Law
• H. Anjanappa v. A. Prabhakar: An ‘Aggrieved’ Stranger or a ‘Prejudicially Affected’ Third-Party (also) Can File Appeal with the ‘Leave of the Court’.
• Our Courts Apply Different ‘STANDADARDS of Proof’
• Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent, Not a Final Order
• BNSS – Major Changes from CrPC
• Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Important Changes from the Indian Penal Code
• Substantive Rights and Mistakes & Procedural Defects in Judicial Proceedings
• Can Documents be Marked In Cross Examination, If Witness Admits Them?
• Will Boundaries of Properties (Always) Preferred Over Survey Number, Extent, Side Measurements, etc.?
• All Illegal Agreements are Void; but All Void Agreements are Not Illegal
• Doctrines on Ultra Vires, Rule of Law, Judicial Review, Nullification of Mandamus, and Removing the BASIS of the Judgment
• Can an ‘Ex-parte’ Defendant Cross Examine Plaintiff’s Witness?
• Will – Probate and Letters of Administration
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence
• Effect of Not Cross-Examining a Witness & Effect of Not Facing Complete Cross-Examination by the Witness
• Suggestions & Admissions by Counsel, in Cross Examination to Witnesses
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
• Declaration and Injunction
• Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
• Does Alternate Remedy Bar Civil Suits and Writ Petitions?
• Void, Voidable, Ab Initio Void, and Sham Transactions
• Can Courts Award Interest on Equitable Grounds?
• Natural Justice – Not an Unruly Horse
• Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State Of M.P, 29 January, 2025 – Law on Natural Justice Revisited
• ‘Sound-mind’ and ‘Unsound-Mind’
• Prescriptive Rights – Inchoate until the Title thereof is Upheld by a Competent Court
• ‘Title’ and ‘Ownership’ in Indian Law
• Can a Party to Suit Examine Opposite Party, as of Right?
• Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
• Doctrine of ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Indian Law
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Cheating and Breach of Contract: Distinction – Fraudulent Intention at the time of Promise.
• Declaration of Title & Recovery of Possession: Art. 65, not Art. 58, Limitation Act Governs
• What is COGNIZANCE and Application of Mind by a Magistrate?
• Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle: Rejection of Plaint on ‘Bar of Limitation’ on Plea of Fraud.
• Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. The State of Gujarat: The Police have No Discretion to conduct a Preliminary Inquiry Before Registering an FIR in Cognizable Offences

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

• ‘Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet’
• Section 27, Limitation Act Gives-Rise to a Substantive Right so as to Seek Declaration and Recovery
• Sale Deeds Without Consideration – Void
• Tenancy at Sufferance in Indian Law
• Revenue Settlement Registers of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters
• Recovery of Possession: 
• Recovery of Possession Based on Title and on Earlier Possession
• Declaration of Title & Recovery of Possession: Art. 65, not Art. 58, Limitation Act Governs
• Title and Ownership and Possessory Title in Indian Law
• Does Registration of a Document give Notice to the Whole World?
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• POSSESSION is a Substantive Right in Indian Law
• 22nd Law Commission  Report on ‘Law on Adverse Possession’
• Adverse Possession Against Government
• Government of Kerala v. Joseph – Law on Adverse Possession Against Government
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?
• Ultimate Ownership of All Property Vests in State; It is an Incident of Sovereignty.
• ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’
• Preemption is a Very Weak Right; For, Property Right is a Constitutional & Human Right
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Family Settlement or Family Arrangement in Law
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal – Does Something Remain Untold?
• Grant in Law
• Termination of Tenancy (& Grant) by Forfeiture (for Claiming Title)
• Survey under Survey Act – Raises a Presumption on Boundary; though Not Confer Title
• SUIT on TITLE: Landlord can Recover Property on GENERAL TITLE (though Tenancy Not Proved) if Defendant Falsely Claimed Independent Title
• Even the Rightful Owner is NOT entitled to Eject a Trespasser, by Force

Adverse Possession

• What is Adverse Possession in Indian Law?
• Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta (October 14, 2024) – Supreme Court Denied the Tenant’s Claim of Adverse Possession
• Adverse Possession: How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• Adverse Possession Against Government
• Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?
• Government of Kerala v. Joseph – Law on Adverse Possession Against Government
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• Ouster and Dispossession in Adverse Possession
• Declaration of Title & Recovery of Possession: Art. 65, not Art. 58, Limitation Act Governs
• Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021, Composite Suit (Cancellation & Recovery) – Substantive Relief Determines Limitation  

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

• Travancore Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 (1865 AD) and 1061 (1886 AD), And 1922 Devaswom Proclamation
• Revenue Settlement Registers of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters
• Tenancy at Sufferance in Indian Law
• Freehold Property in Law
• What is Patta or Pattayam?
• Does ‘Pandaravaka Pattom’ in Kerala Denote Full-Ownership?
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Previous Owner is Not a Necessary Party in a Recovery Suit
• Recovery of Possession Based on Title and on Earlier Possession
• Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder
• Vested interest and Contingent Interest
• Ultimate Ownership of All Property Vests in State; It is an Incident of Sovereignty.
• Land Acquired Cannot be Returned – Even if it is Not Used for the Purpose Acquired
• ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’
• FERA, 1973 And Transfer of Immovable Property by a Foreigner
• Marumakkathayam – A System of Law and Way of Life Prevailed in Kerala
• Land Tenures, and History of Land Derivation, in Kerala
• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
• Sale Deeds Without Consideration – Void
• Law on SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE and LEGAL HEIRSHIP CERTIFICATE
• Sec. 7 Easements Act – Natural Advantages Arising from the Situation of Land & Natural Flow of Water
• Grant in Law
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• Survey under Survey Act – Raises a Presumption on Boundary; though Not Confer Title

Land Reform Laws

• Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land Owners?
• Relevant provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act in a Nutshell
• Land Tenures, and History of Land Derivation, in Kerala
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• ‘Janmam’ Right is FREEHOLD Interest and ‘Estate’ in Constitution – By Royal Proclamation of 1899, The Travancore Sircar became Janmi of Poonjar Raja’s Land
• Government is the OWNER of (Leasehold) Plantation Lands in Kerala.
• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
• Law on Acquisition of Private Plantation Land in Kerala
• Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell
• Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy
• Grant in Law
• Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy’; TLB to Fix Plantation Exemption.  
• 1910 Settlement Register of Travancore – Basic Record of Land Matters

Power of attorney

• M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula: Mere Word ‘Irrevocable’ Does Not Make a POWER OF ATTORNEY Irrevocable
• Can a Power of Attorney file a Civil Suit? Is there any bar by virtue of Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024-6 SCC 130?
• No Adjudication If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney Sufficient for Registration
• Notary-Attested Documents and Presumptions
• Permission when a Power of Attorney Holder Files Suit
• If Power of Attorney himself Executes the Document, S. 33 Registration Act will NOT be attracted
• Should a Power of Attorney for Sale must have been Registered –
• Is Registered Power of Attorney Necessary for Registration of a Deed? No.

Evidence Act – General

• Newspaper Reports are ‘Hearsay Secondary Evidence’
• Major Changes in the Evidence Act by Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Sec. 27 Recovery/Discovery in Evidence Act and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Evidence in Court – General Principles
• Expert Evidence and Appreciation of Evidence
• How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
• Withholding Evidence and Adverse Inference
• Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
• What is Collateral Purpose?
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence
• Effect of Not Cross-Examining a Witness & Effect of Not Facing Complete Cross Examination by the Witness
• Suggestions & Admissions by Counsel, in Cross Examination to Witnesses
• Proof of Documents – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Public Documents: Proof and Presumption
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• Significance of Scientific Evidence in Judicial Process
• Polygraphy, Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping Tests
• What is Section 27 Evidence Act – Recovery or Discovery?
• How ‘Discovery’ under Section 27, Evidence Act, Proved?
• Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witnesses Theory
• Sec. 35 Evidence Act: Presumption of Truth and Probative Value
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act

Sec. 65B

• Hash Value Certificate – Mandatory or Directory
• Sakshya Adhiniyam (Literally) Mandates Hashing the Original. But the Established Jurisprudence Requires Hashing the Copy.
• Sec. 27 Recovery/Discovery in Evidence Act and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Sec. 65B (Electronic Records) and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Sec. 65B, Evidence Act: Arjun Paditrao Criticised.
• Sec. 65B Evidence Act Simplified
• ‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be proved by ‘CERTIFICATE’ u/s. 65B
• Sec. 65B,  Evidence Act: Certificate forms
• Certificate is Required Only for ‘Computer Output’; Not for ‘Electronic Records’: Arjun Panditrao Explored.
• How to Prove ‘Whatsap Messages’, ‘Facebook’ and ‘Website’ in Courts?

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

• ‘Admission’ in Indian Law
• Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• Judicial Admissions in Pleadings: Admissible Proprio Vigore Against the Maker
• Document Exhibited in the Writ Petition as ‘True Copy’ – Can it be Used in a Civil Suit as ‘Admission’?
• Modes of Proof of Documents
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Should Objection to Marking Documents be Raised When it is Admitted; Is it Enough to Challenge them in Cross-Examination?
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Burden on Plaintiff to Prove Title; Weakness of Defence Will Not Entitle a Decree
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence
• Production, Admissibility & Proof Of Documents
• Proof of Documents – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Can Documents be Marked In Cross Examination, If Witness Admits Them?
• Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting 
• Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Relevancy of Civil Case Judgments in Criminal Cases
• Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon (SC), April 2, 2024 – An Odd Decision on ‘Civil Court Judgment does not Bind Criminal Court’

Law on Documents

• Public Documents: Proof and Presumption
• Public Documents Admissible Without Formal Proof
• Admitted Documents – Can the Court Refrain from Marking, for no Formal Proof?
• Does Registration of a Document give Notice to the Whole World?
• Production, Admissibility & Proof Of Documents
• Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Effect of Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Stand Proved?
• Time Limit for Registration of Documents
• Registration of Documents Executed out of India
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• Are RTI Documents Admissible in Evidence as ‘Public Documents’?
• Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Notary-Attested Documents and Presumptions
• What is Collateral Purpose?
• No Application Needed for Filing or Admitting Copy
• Presumptions on Documents and Truth of Contents
• Presumptions on Registered Documents & Truth of Contents
• Notice to Produce Documents in Civil Cases
• Production of Documents: Order 11, Rule 14 & Rule 12
• Modes of Proof of Documents
• Secondary Evidence of Documents & Objections to Admissibility – How & When?
• Should Objection to Marking Documents be Raised When it is Admitted; Is it Enough to Challenge them in Cross-Examination?
• 30 Years Old Documents and Presumption of Truth of Contents, under Sec. 90 Evidence Act
• Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
• Adjudication as to Proper Stamp under Stamp Act
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Settlement Deeds & Powers of Sub-Registrar in cancelling Deeds
• Cancellation, Avoidance or Declaration of a Void or Voidable Deed
• Can the True Owner Seek Cancellation of a Deed, Executed by a Stranger to the Property
• Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting 
• How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
• Visual and Audio Evidence (Including Photographs, Cassettes, Tape-recordings, Films, CCTV Footage, CDs, e-mails, Chips, Hard-discs, Pen-drives)
• Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witnesses Theory
• No Adjudication Needed If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance
• Impounding of Documents – When Produced; Cannot Wait Till it is Exhibited
• Sec. 35 Evidence Act: Presumption of Truth and Probative Value
• How to Prove Resolutions of a Company; Are Minutes Necessary?

Documents – Proof and Presumption

• Public Documents: Proof and Presumption
• Can the Court Refuse to Mark a (Relevant and Admissible) Document, for (i) there is No Formal Proof or (ii) it is a Photocopy?
• Marking of Photocopy and Law on Marking Documents on Admission (Without Formal Proof)
• Proof of Documents – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Modes of Proof of Documents
• ‘Admission’ in Indian Law
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Admitted Documents – Can the Court Refrain from Marking, for no Formal Proof?
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Effect of Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Stand Proved?
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Should Objection to Marking Documents be Raised When it is Admitted; Is it Enough to Challenge them in Cross-Examination?
• Presumptions on Documents and Truth of Contents
• Presumptions on Registered Documents & Truth of Contents
• Secondary Evidence of Documents & Objections to Admissibility – How & When?
• 30 Years Old Documents and Presumption of Truth of Contents, under Sec. 90 Evidence Act

Interpretation

• Interpretation of Documents – Literal Rule, Mischief Rule and Golden Rule
• Golden Rule of Interpretation is Not the Application of Plain Meaning of the Words
• Interpretation of Wills
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence

Contract Act

• Can Filing a Suit Amount to Notice of Termination of Contract
• Godrej Projects Development Limited v. Anil Karlekar, 2025 INSC 143 – Supreme Court Missed to State Something
• ‘Sound-mind’ and ‘Unsound-Mind’ in Indian Civil Laws
• Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
• Who has to fix Damages in Tort and Contract?
• UNDUE INFLUENCE and PLEADINGS thereof in Indian Law
• All Illegal Agreements are Void; but All Void Agreements are Not Illegal
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance
• Cheating and Breach of Contract: Distinction – Fraudulent Intention at the time of Promise.

Law on Damages

• Law on Damages
• Who has to fix Damages in Tort and Contract?
• Law on Damages in Defamation Cases
• Pleadings in Defamation Suits
• Godrej Projects Development Limited v. Anil Karlekar, 2025 INSC 143 – Supreme Court Missed to State Something

Easement

• Easement Simplified
• What is Easement? Does Right of Easement Allow to ‘Enjoy’ Servient Land After Making Improvements Therein ?
• “Implied Grant” in Law of Easements
• Implied Grant: A Valid Mode of Creation of Easement under Indian Law
• “Title Thereto” in the Definition of ‘Prescriptive Easement’ in Sec. 15 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882
• Prescriptive Rights – Inchoate until the Title thereof is Upheld by a Competent Court
• Will Easement of Necessity Ripen into a Prescriptive Easement?
• What is “period ending within two years next before the institution of the suit” in Easement by Prescription?
• Is the Basis of Every Easement, Theoretically, a Grant
• Extent of Easement (Width of Way) in Easement of Necessity, Quasi Easement and Implied Grant
• Easement of Necessity and Prescriptive Easement are Mutually Destructive; But, Easement of Necessity and Implied Grant Can be Claimed Alternatively
• Can Easement of Necessity and of Grant be Claimed in a Suit (Alternatively)?
• Can an Easement-Way be Altered by the Owner of the Land?
• Village Pathways and Right to Bury are not Easements.
• Custom & Customary Easements in Indian Law
• ‘Additional Burden Loses Lateral Support’ – Incorrect Proposition
• Grant in Law
• Right of Private Way Beyond (Other Than) Easement
• Easement – Should Date of Beginning of 20 Years be pleaded?
• What is Easement, in law? Right of Easement Simplified
• One Year Interruption or Obstruction will not affect Prescriptive Easement
• Should the Plaintiff Schedule Servient Heritage in a Suit Claiming Perspective Easement?
• Necessary Parties in Suits on Easement
• Easement by Prescription – Grant or ‘Acquiring’ by “Hostile Act”
• Sec. 7 Easements Act – Natural Advantages Arising from the Situation of Land & Natural Flow of Water

Stamp Act & Registration

• Sub-Registrar has no Authority to Ascertain whether the Vendor has Title
• Title Enquiry by the Sub Registrar is Illegal
• Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Settlement Deeds & Powers of Sub-Registrar in Cancelling Deeds
• Time-Limit For Adjudication of Unstamped Documents, before Collector
• Time Limit for Registration of Documents
• Presumptions on Registered Documents & Truth of Contents
• Registration of Documents Executed out of India
• LAW ON INSUFFICIENTLY STAMPED DOCUMENTS 
• Adjudication as to Proper Stamp under Stamp Act
• Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance
• Impounding of Documents, When Produced; Cannot Wait Till it is Exhibited
• No Adjudication Needed If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney Sufficient for Registration

Divorce/Marriage

• Presumption of Valid Marriage – If lived together for Long Spell
• Validity of Foreign Divorce Decrees in India
• Is ‘Irretrievable Brake-down of Marriage’, a Valid Ground for Divorce in India?
• Foreign Divorce Judgment against Christians having Indian Domicile

Negotiable Instruments Act

• Does Cheque-Case under Sec. 138, NI Act Lie Against a Trust?
• Sec. 138 NI Act (Cheque) Cases: Presumption of Consideration u/s. 118
• Even if ‘Signed-Blank-Cheque’, No Burden on Complainant to Prove Consideration; Rebuttal can be by a Probable Defence
• “Otherwise Through an Account” in Section 142, NI Act
• Where to file Cheque Bounce Cases (Jurisdiction of Court – to file NI Act Complaint)?
• Cheque Dishonour Case against a Company, Firm or Society
• What is ‘Cognizance’ in Law
• What is COGNIZANCE and Application of Mind by a Magistrate?

Criminal

• Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. The State of Gujarat: The police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR in cognizable offences

Arbitration

• Seesaw of Supreme Court in NN Global Mercantile v. Indo Unique Flame
• N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. and Ground Realities of Indian Situation
• What are Non-Arbitrable Disputes? When a Dispute is Not Referred to Arbitration in spite of Arbitration Clause
• Termination or Nullity of Contract Will Not Cease Efficacy of the Arbitration Clause
• No Valid Arbitration Agreement ‘Exists’ – Can Arbitration Clause be Invoked?

Will

• Witnesses to the Will Need Not See the Execution of the Will
• Interpretation of Wills
• Interpretation of Inconsistent Clauses in a Will
• Will – Probate and Letters of Administration
• Executors of Will – Duties & their Removal
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• How to Write a Will? Requirements of a Valid Will
• When Execution of a Will is ‘Admitted’ by the Opposite Side, Should it be ‘Proved’?
• A Witness to Hindu-Will will not Lose Benefit

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

• Judicial & Legislative Activism in India: Principles and Instances
• Can Legislature Overpower Court Decisions by an Enactment?
• Separation of Powers: Who Wins the Race – Legislature or Judiciary?
• Kesavananda Bharati Case: Never Ending Controversy
• Mullaperiyar Dam: Disputes and Adjudication of Legal Issues
• Article 370: Is There Little Chance for Supreme Court Interference
• Maratha Backward Community Reservation: SC Fixed Limit at 50%.
• Polygraphy, Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping Tests
• CAA Challenge: Divergent Views
• FERA, 1973 And Transfer of Immovable Property by a Foreigner
• Doctrine of ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Indian Law
• Doctrines on Ultra Vires and Removing the BASIS of the Judgment, in ED Director’s Tenure Extension Case (Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India)
• Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India – Mandamus (Given in a Case) Cannot be Annulled by Changing the Law
• Art. 370 – Turns the Constitution on Its Head

Religious issues

• Secularism and Art. 25 & 26 of the Indian Constitution
• Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
• ‘Ban on Muslim Women to Enter Mosques, Unconstitutional’
• No Reservation to Muslim and Christian SCs/STs (Dalits) Why?
• Parsi Women – Excommunication for Marrying Outside
• Knanaya Endogamy & Constitution of India
• Sabarimala Review Petitions & Reference to 9-Judge Bench
• SABARIMALA REVIEW and Conflict in Findings between Shirur Mutt Case & Durgah Committee Case
• Ayodhya Disputes: M. Siddiq case –Pragmatic Verdict

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

• General
  • General Features
  • Bye Laws Fundamental
  • Effect of Registration of Societies and Incorporation of Clubs
  • Societies and Branches
• Property & Trust
  • Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs
  • Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies
  • Juristic Personality of Societies and Clubs
  • Legal Personality of Trustees and Office Bearers
• Suits
  • Suits and Criminal Complaints By and Against a Company
  • Suits By or Against Societies, Clubs
  • Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs
  • How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies
  • Members of a Charitable Society which Runs a College are Tractable to Prevention of Corruption Act
• Amendment and Dissolution
  • Amendment of Bye laws of Societies and Clubs
  • Dissolution of Societies and Clubs
• Rights and Management
  • Rights & Liabilities of Members of Clubs and Societies
  • Individual Membership Rights in Societies & Clubs
  • Management – Powers of General Body and Governing Body
  • Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers
  • Law on Meetings: An Overview
  • How to Prove Resolutions of a Company; Are Minutes Necessary?
• Election
  • Election & Challenge in Societies and Clubs
  • Court Interference in Election Process
• State Actions
  • State-Interference in Affairs of Societies & Clubs

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

• General Principles
  • What is Trust in Law?
  • Classification of Trusts
  • Public & Private Trusts in India.
  • Trust is ‘An Obligation’; Not a Legal Entity
  • Indian Law Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership
  • Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab, 2024-2 SCR 847
• Dedication and Vesting
  • Dedication of Property in Public Trusts
  • Vesting of Property in Trusts
  • Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies
  • What is Munambam Wakf Land Issue? If there is No Permanent Dedication, there will be No Wakf.
• Trustees and Management
  • Trustees and Administration of Public Trusts
  • Alienation of Public Trust Property
  • Extinction, Discharge, Revocation, etc. of Public Trusts
  • Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920: Provisions as regards opinion, advice or direction of the Court.
• Breach of Trust
  • Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees
• Suits by or against Trusts
  • Suits By or Against Trusts and Trustees
  • Remedies Under Sec. 92 CPC
  • Does Cheque-Case under Sec. 138, NI Act Lie Against a Trust?
• Law on Hindu Religious Endowments
  • Philosophy of Idol Worship
  • Is an Idol a Perpetual Minor?
  • Hindu Temples & Law of Trusts
  • Law of Mutts and Other Hindu Endowments
  • Shebaits & Mahants and Law of Trustees
• Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques – General
  • Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques
• Constitutional Principles
  • Secularism and Art. 25 & 26 of the Indian Constitution
  • Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
  • ‘Muslim Women: Ban to Enter Mosques, Is it Unconstitutional
  • Parsi Women Excommunication, Unconstitutional.
  • Knanaya Endogamy & Constitution of India
  • State & Court – Protectors of All Charities
• Ayodhya and Sabarimala Disputes
  • Ayodhya Disputes: M. Siddiq case – Pragmatic Verdict
  • Sabarimala Review Petitions & Reference to 9-Judge Bench
  • SABARIMALA REVIEW and Conflict in Findings between Shirur Mutt Case & Durgah Committee Case
• General
  • Public Trusts and (State) Endowments/Trusts Acts
  • Public Trusts and Indian Trusts Act – An Overview
  • Business by Charitable Trusts & Institutions