Contents of a Document are to be Proved in Court by Producing Original or Secondary Evidence

Jojy George Koduvath

Also Read: Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant

Abstract.

1. The contents of a document cannot be proved by oral evidence. The document itself must be produced. (Sections 61 and 62 of the Evidence Act).

2. Secondary evidence can be given if permitted under Sections 65 of the Evidence Act, read with Section 63.

3. Section 91 expressly bars oral evidence to prove the terms of a contract, disposition of property, etc., by oral evidence if they are reduced to writing.

4. If the original document is not produced, right to adduce Secondary Evidence is not automatic. Loss, non-availability, etc., are to be proved under Sec. 65; and no oral statement about its contents is inadmissible. Secondary evidence of a document’s contents cannot be admitted unless the non-production of the original is first accounted for.

5. Withholding the best evidence attracts adverse inference. When a party relies on a document but does not produce it, the Court must presume it would have gone against that party. A party in possession of the best evidence must produce it; otherwise, the court is entitled to drawadverse inference’.

6. No amount of oral evidence can substitute documentary evidence, where the law requires the document itself to be produced.

7. A document which is not proved (even if produced) in accordance with law cannot be relied upon by the court for deciding the rights of the parties.

8. Documents which are not proved (even if produced) in accordance with the law cannot be taken into consideration.

PRODUCTION, ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

A document to be used in court has to pass through three steps. They are:

  1. Production of documents in court
  2. Admittance and exhibition
  3. Proof (formal proof and truth of contents).

Modes of Proof of Documents

Modes of Proof of Documents (as to, both, ‘formal proof’ and ‘truth of the contents’) include the following:

  • Admission of the person who wrote or signed the document (Sec. 17, 21, 58, 67, 70).
  • Evidence of a person in whose presence the document was signed or written – ocular evidence (Sec. 59).
  • An attesting witness (Sec. 59).
  • Opinion of a person who is acquainted with the writing of the person who signed or wrote (Sec. 47).
  • Admission made by the person who signed or wrote the document made in judicial proceedings (Sec. 32, 33).
  • Evidence of a handwriting expert-opinion evidence/scientific evidence (Sec.45).
  • Evidence of a person who in routine has been receiving the document; or a document signed by such a person in the ordinary course of his business or official duty, though he may have never seen the author signing the document (Sec. 32, 34, 35 or 114).
  • Invoking (specific) presumptions under Sec. 79 to 90A.
  • Presumptions (general) under Sec. 114.
  • Circumstantial evidence: on probability or inferences (Sec. 114).
  • Court-comparison (Sec. 73).
  • Facts judicially noticeable (Sec. 56 and 57).
  • A fact of common-knowledge. (It does not require proof. See: Union Of India Vs. Virendra Bharti: 2011-2 ACC 886, 2010  ACJ 2353; Rakhal Chakraborty Vs. Sanjib Kumar Roy: 1998-1 GauLR 253, 1997-2 GauLT 705)
  • Internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document; a link in a chain of correspondence; recipient of the document. (Mobarik Ali Ahmed Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857)

Rule of Best Evidence

These Sections of the Evidence Act project the rule of best evidence and it directs that the contents of the document are to be proved by the original document itself, unless secondary evidence is provided under Sec. 65. (See: Bimla Rohal v. Usha, 2002-2 HLJ 745; 2002-2 Shim LC 341)

Documentary Evidence becomes meaningless if oral evidence Allowed

In Bhima Tima Dhotre v. The Pioneer Chemical Co. (1968) 70 Bom LR 683,  it is observed as under:

  • Documentary evidence becomes meaningless if the writer has to be called in every case to give oral evidence of its contents. If that were the position, it would mean that, in the ultimate analysis, all evidence must be oral and that oral evidence would virtually be the only kind of evidence recognised by law. That, however, is not the position under the Evidence Act. … Section 59 of the said Act enacts that all facts, except the “contents” of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. This provision would clearly indicate that to prove the contents of adocument by means of oral evidence would be a violation of that section.”

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The contents of a document are to be proved by producing it

To prove the contents of a document, it must have been produced before the court.

  • Sections 61 & 62 of the Evidence Act require proof of the contents of a document by the production of the document itself (or its secondary evidence).

If the document is not produced, its contents are legally non-existent for the Court. Following are the well-accepted principles in this regard:

  • Oral evidence cannot substitute documentary proof.
  • Court cannot decide rights on “assumed” contents

Principles of Law – in a Nutshell

The Principles of Law in this regard can be discerned from the following decisions of our Apex Court:

1. It is held in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595, that Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act bar amendment, variation, etc. of a document; oral variations—whether by the party or the opposite side—are barred. The Court laid down as under:

  • “Wherever written instruments are appointed, either by the requirement of law, or by the contract of the parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter them.”(Quoted in: Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., 2024-4 SCC 1; V. Anantha Raju v. T. M. Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)
  • “The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence are (i) to admit inferior evidence when law requires superior would amount to nullifying the law, (ii) when parties have deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory.” (Quoted in Placido Francisco Pinto v. Jose Francisco Pinto, 2021-10 SCR 676; V Anantha Raju v. T M Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)

2. In Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413, para 5, it is held that in a case where one party withholds a document, the court takes an adverse inference under Section 114(g). The Court said as under:

  • Even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue..”

3. The Constitution Bench of our Apex Court laid down in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 330; 2023-4 SCC 731, as under:

  • 47. Section 61 deals with proof of contents of documents which is by either primary or by secondary evidence.
  • When a document is produced as primary evidence, it will have to be proved in the manner laid down in Sections 67 to 73 of the Evidence Act.
  • Mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence. On the other hand, when a document is produced and admitted by the opposite party and is marked as an exhibit by the court, …  (sic – no objection can be raised at any later stage with regard to proof of its contents).
  • The contents of the document must be proved either by the production of the original document i.e., primary evidence or by copies of the same as per Section 65 as secondary evidence.
  • So long as an original document is in existence and is available, its contents must be proved by primary evidence.
  • It is only when the primary evidence is lost, in the interest of justice, the secondary evidence must be allowed.
  • Primary evidence is the best evidence and it affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.
  • Thus, when a particular fact is to be established by production of documentary evidence, there is no scope for leading oral evidence.
  • What is to be produced is the primary evidence i.e., document itself. It is only when the absence of the primary source has been satisfactorily explained that secondary evidence is permissible to prove the contents of documents.
  • Secondary evidence, therefore, should not be accepted without a sufficient reason being given for non-production of the original.”
  • 48. ……. Once a document is admitted, the contents of that document are also admitted in evidence, though those contents may not be conclusive evidence.
  • Moreover, once certain evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence.
  • There is a prohibition for any other evidence to be led which may detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence and the court has no option to hold the existence of the fact otherwise when such evidence is made conclusive.”

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Fraudulent or Void Transaction: Is ‘Declaration’ Required? The Supreme Court Says No (in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105).

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

A Seeming Conflict Between Two Decisions

  • 1. Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)
  • 2. Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)

In the earlier decision in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.), it was clearly opined, as regards an assailed instrument, as under:

  • “In a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, a declaration must have been sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff.”

However, in the subsequent decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105 (per Pardiwala and Mahadevan JJ.), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier position by holding that where the very character of a sale deed is assailed as fraudulent or bogus, the requirement of seeking a declaration stands implicitly satisfied. The Court said as under:

  • In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”

As a result –

  • a void document need not be challenged by claiming a declaration (that the said instrument is not binding), as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.

It is also made clear –

  • A plaintiff who was not a party to the instrument need not seek its cancellation; and
  • Relevant article in the Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 65 (12-year period) and not Article 59 (3-year period).

Subsequent Decision (Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi) Vividly Explained the Legal Position

In Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September 2025, made it clear – when a deed is fraudulent or a sham and bogus one, ‘it is not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that a document is void‘. It is held as under:

  • “25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. ….”
  • “28. In State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, reported in 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522, this Court held that as far as void and non-est documents are concerned, it would be enough for the plaintiff to file a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. …… Subsequently, the decision of this Court in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 186 … opined as follows:
    • .i. First, the contention of the State that it is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that would apply, was rejected. It was held that the suit is primarily one for possession of property based upon title. It was observed that owing to the decision in Bhim Singhji (supra), the order dated 26.05.1976 along with the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 became void ab intio and without jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that they are void. The plea about their invalidity could be raised in the course of any proceedings. Therefore, it is Article 65, which deals with a suit for possession based on title, that would apply from the date on the which the possession of the defendant State became adverse to the plaintiff.
    • ii. Secondly, though the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order dated 26.05.1976 and the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 were void, yet it was held that the same would be of no consequence insofar as the question of limitation is concerned.
  • The fact would still remain that the possession of the property was taken by the defendants via void documents. Therefore, such documents could be ignored and a suit for possession simpliciter, for which the period of limitation prescribed under Article 65, i.e., 12 years, could be filed. In the course of such proceedings, it could be contended by the plaintiff that the documents are a nullity.
  • …”
  • “29. This Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353, discussed the position of law as to when Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and opined as follows:
    • .i. First, that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only encompass within its fold fraudulent transactions which are ‘voidable’ transactions and not those that are ‘void’. In other words, Article 59 would apply only where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to those instruments which are presumptively invalid.
    • ii. Secondly, that when the document in question is void ab initio/or void, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary since such a transaction would be non-est in the eyes of law, owing to it being a nullity.
    • iii. Thirdly, a fine distinction was drawn between fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ and fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘contents of a document’. It is only in the former situation that the instrument would be void and, in the latter, it would remain voidable. To put it simply, Article 59 would not govern the period of limitation in respect of a void transaction.
    • iv. Lastly, that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was thereby void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder, i.e., he could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority.
    • ….”
  • “30. In the decision of this Court in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, where one of us, J.B. Pardiwala J., was a member of the Bench, it was reiterated that a person who is not a party to an instrument would not be obliged in law to seek its cancellation. The reason being that such an instrument would neither be likely to affect his title nor be binding on him. However, such a plaintiff must at least seek a declaration that the said instrument is not binding on him or that is invalid insofar as he is concerned. ………
  • 31. As per the dictum in Prem Singh (supra), this Court, in order to ascertain whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed. Both the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed therein. Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio. Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation. The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale deed. Consequently, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would find no application to the case in hand.
  • 32. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury (supra), it was clearly opined that a plaintiff who is not a party to the instrument in question need not seek its cancellation. We are not oblivious to the fact that in a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrumentthe said decision laid down a requirement that a declaration must be sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff. Howeverthe said decision clarified that whether the plaintiff has sought such a declaration or not could be culled out from a holistic reading of the plaint along with the relief(s) sought. In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”
  • …..
  • “34. We may look at the matter from one another angle. Apart from the aspect of fraud, the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 18 SCC 489, while looking into whether the defendants had paid any sale consideration to the plaintiff while purchasing the plaintiff’s share in the property, held as follows:
    • .i. First, that the sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future. If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
    • ii. Secondly, that, in the said case, the defendants could not rebut the allegation of the plaintiff that no sale consideration was paid as no evidence was adduced to indicate – (a) the actual payment of the price mentioned in the sale deeds and, (b) that the defendants had any earning capacity at the time of the transaction such that the sale consideration could have been paid. As such the sale deed being void for want of valid consideration, could not be said to have affected the one-half share of the plaintiff in the suit properties nor have conferred any right of title on the defendants. In fact, it was held that the sale deeds were a sham and must be ignored.
    • iii. Lastly, it was reiterated that a document that is void need not be challenged by seeking a declaration as the said pleas can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.”
  • “The relevant observations are thus:
    • “……
    • Thus, the sale deeds of 10-4-1981 will not confer any right, title and interest on Sudarshan Kumar’s wife and children, as the sale deeds will have to be ignored, being void. It was not necessary for the appellant to specifically claim a declaration as regards the sale deeds by way of amendment to the plaint. The reason being that there were specific pleadings in the plaints as originally filed that the sale deeds were void. A document which is void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
    • …..”

End Notes I

A suit for (i) declaration of Title and (ii) Recovery – Art. 65 Governs; Not, Art. 58.

Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September, 2025,  (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)  1. Crux of the issue: whether Article 65 or Article 59 
2. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460 – void and non-est documents – a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 would apply
3. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 186 – Claim of title void ab initio and without jurisdiction – suit for possession based upon title – not necessary to claim any separate declaration that they are void. -invalidity could be raised in any proceedings. – Article 65 deals with.
N. Thajudeen v. TN Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641  declaration of title and recovery of possession – relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one
K. Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)If the document ex facie reveals that the conveyer had no title, no specific declaration is needed.  
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183Suit for possession, as a consequence of the declaration, Article 58 will have no application
Prem Singh v. Birbal  (2006) 5 SCC 3531. Article 59 fraudulent transactions – ‘voidable’ not ‘void’. 2. Article 59 applies where an instrument is prima facie valid and not presumptively invalid. 3. Article 65 applies when the document is void ab initio or void 4. A decree for setting aside the document void ab initio or void would not be necessary since non-est. 5. Fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ would be void, not ‘contents’.  Article 59 would not govern a void transaction.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460The sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of the plaintiff having sought such a remedy to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply, and the limitation to file the suit will be 12 years.
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549Once the title is established,  the defendant has to prove adverse possession (Followed in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021)
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808Declaration with a further relief – Article governing such a suit will be that for such further relief.
Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 Declaration with possession – Article 65 would come into play, giving a 12-year period, not Article 58.
S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought, the consequential relief sought for is to be treated as the main relief governing the period of limitation. A declaration is unnecessary in such a case, and even if made, it needs only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition.
Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek cancellation of such a document.
K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.)1. suit for recovery based on title,  limitation arise only when adverse possession. 2.  Recovery of possession on title – declaration is only subservient to the main prayer, possession. 3. Article 58 will apply only to a suit for declaration simpliciter.

End Notes II

Declaration of Title & Recovery: Article 65 of the Limitation Act Governs; Not, 58

58To obtain any other declarationThree years.When the right to sue first accrues.
59To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract.Three years.When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
65  For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.Twelve years.When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

End Notes III

Earlier Supreme Court Decisions

1. Kizhakkevattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024-4 SCR 383; 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)

  • “If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence.”

2. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641

  • “In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

3. C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183

  • “If the plaintiff is to be granted a relief of recovery of possession, the suit could be filed within a period of 12 years. It is one thing to say that whether such a relief can be granted or not after the evidences are led by the parties but it is another thing to say that the plaint is to be rejected on the ground that the same is barred by any law. If the suit has been filed for possession, as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiffs title, Article 58 will have no application.”

4. Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, AIR 2002 SC 215; (2002) 1 SCC 178.

  • “Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding.”

5. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460, held as under:

  • “6. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji’s case (Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 166), Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj & Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi2 this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.”

6. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 808

  • In a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief.

The Kerala High Court, in Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

  • “When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

  • “39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
  • 40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

In Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 it is held as under:

  • “Article 58 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in a suit for declaration, but it has no application when the relief sought in the plaint is not for a mere declaration,but coupled with other reliefs like injunction, partition, possession etc. and Article 65 of the Limitation Act would come into play giving 12 year period. In the instant case, the relevant Article which can be applied is not Article 58, but Article 65 as the suit was filed not merely for a relief of declaration, but for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of immovable property.”

In S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840, it is held that Article 58 is not applicable for declaration that is sought only as an ancillary relief. It is held as under:

  • “When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought for that is which would not govern the period of limitation for the suit. The consequential relief sought for is to be treated as main relief governing the period of limitation for the suit. (See Mrs. Indira Bhalchandran Gokhale v. Union of India & Another-AIR 1990 Bombay 98). Therefore declaration prayed for in this case as relief Nos. 1 and 2 were unnecessary, and even if made, need only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition of immovable properties and the claim that appellant is entitled to get family pension.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Did the Supreme Court Depart From its Earlier Position in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, in its Subsequent Decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

A Seeming Conflict Between Two Decisions

In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.), it was clearly opined, as regards an assailed instrument, as under:

  • “In a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, a declaration must have been sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff.”

However, in the subsequent decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105 (per Pardiwala and Mahadevan JJ.), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier position by holding that where the very character of a sale deed is assailed as fraudulent or bogus, the requirement of seeking a declaration stands implicitly satisfied. The Court said as under:

  • In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”

As a consequence –

  • a void document need not be challenged by claiming a declaration (that the said instrument is not binding), as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.

It is also made clear –

  • A plaintiff who was not a party to the instrument need not seek its cancellation; and
  • Relevant article in the Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 65 (12-year period) and not Article 59 (3-year period)

Subsequent Decision (Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi) Vividly Explained the Legal Position

In Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September 2025, made it clear – when a deed is fraudulent or a sham and bogus one,it is not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that a document is void‘. It is held as under:

  • “25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. ….”
  • “28. In State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, reported in 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522, this Court held that as far as void and non-est documents are concerned, it would be enough for the plaintiff to file a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. …… Subsequently, the decision of this Court in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 186 … opined as follows:
    • .i. First, the contention of the State that it is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that would apply, was rejected. It was held that the suit is primarily one for possession of property based upon title. It was observed that owing to the decision in Bhim Singhji (supra), the order dated 26.05.1976 along with the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 became void ab intio and without jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that they are void. The plea about their invalidity could be raised in the course of any proceedings. Therefore, it is Article 65, which deals with a suit for possession based on title, that would apply from the date on the which the possession of the defendant State became adverse to the plaintiff.
    • ii. Secondly, though the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order dated 26.05.1976 and the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 were void, yet it was held that the same would be of no consequence insofar as the question of limitation is concerned.
  • The fact would still remain that the possession of the property was taken by the defendants via void documents. Therefore, such documents could be ignored and a suit for possession simpliciter, for which the period of limitation prescribed under Article 65, i.e., 12 years, could be filed. In the course of such proceedings, it could be contended by the plaintiff that the documents are a nullity.
  • …”
  • “29. This Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353, discussed the position of law as to when Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and opined as follows:
    • .i. First, that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only encompass within its fold fraudulent transactions which are ‘voidable’ transactions and not those that are ‘void’. In other words, Article 59 would apply only where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to those instruments which are presumptively invalid.
    • ii. Secondly, that when the document in question is void ab initio/or void, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary since such a transaction would be non-est in the eyes of law, owing to it being a nullity.
    • iii. Thirdly, a fine distinction was drawn between fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ and fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘contents of a document’. It is only in the former situation that the instrument would be void and, in the latter, it would remain voidable. To put it simply, Article 59 would not govern the period of limitation in respect of a void transaction.
    • iv. Lastly, that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was thereby void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder, i.e., he could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority.
    • ….”
  • “30. In the decision of this Court in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, where one of us, J.B. Pardiwala J., was a member of the Bench, it was reiterated that a person who is not a party to an instrument would not be obliged in law to seek its cancellation. The reason being that such an instrument would neither be likely to affect his title nor be binding on him. However, such a plaintiff must at least seek a declaration that the said instrument is not binding on him or that is invalid insofar as he is concerned. ………
  • 31. As per the dictum in Prem Singh (supra), this Court, in order to ascertain whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed. Both the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed therein. Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio. Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation. The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale deed. Consequently, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would find no application to the case in hand.
  • 32. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury (supra), it was clearly opined that a plaintiff who is not a party to the instrument in question need not seek its cancellation. We are not oblivious to the fact that in a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrumentthe said decision laid down a requirement that a declaration must be sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff. Howeverthe said decision clarified that whether the plaintiff has sought such a declaration or not could be culled out from a holistic reading of the plaint along with the relief(s) sought. In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”
  • “34. We may look at the matter from one another angle. Apart from the aspect of fraud, the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 18 SCC 489, while looking into whether the defendants had paid any sale consideration to the plaintiff while purchasing the plaintiff’s share in the property, held as follows:
    • .i. First, that the sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future. If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
    • ii. Secondly, that, in the said case, the defendants could not rebut the allegation of the plaintiff that no sale consideration was paid as no evidence was adduced to indicate – (a) the actual payment of the price mentioned in the sale deeds and, (b) that the defendants had any earning capacity at the time of the transaction such that the sale consideration could have been paid. As such the sale deed being void for want of valid consideration, could not be said to have affected the one-half share of the plaintiff in the suit properties nor have conferred any right of title on the defendants. In fact, it was held that the sale deeds were a sham and must be ignored.
    • iii. Lastly, it was reiterated that a document that is void need not be challenged by seeking a declaration as the said pleas can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.”
  • “The relevant observations are thus:
    • “……
    • Thus, the sale deeds of 10-4-1981 will not confer any right, title and interest on Sudarshan Kumar’s wife and children, as the sale deeds will have to be ignored, being void. It was not necessary for the appellant to specifically claim a declaration as regards the sale deeds by way of amendment to the plaint. The reason being that there were specific pleadings in the plaints as originally filed that the sale deeds were void. A document which is void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
    • …..”

End Notes I

A suit for (i) declaration of Title and (ii) Recovery – Art. 65 Governs; Not, Art. 58.

Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September, 2025,  (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)  1. Crux of the issue whether Article 65 or Article 59 
2. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460 – void and non-est documents – a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 would apply
3. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 186 – Claim of title void ab initio and without jurisdiction – suit for possession based upon title – not necessary to claim any separate declaration that they are void. -invalidity could be raised in any proceedings. – Article 65 deals with.
N. Thajudeen v. TN Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641  declaration of title and recovery of possession – relief of declaration would only be an ancillaryone
K. Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)  If Document ex-facie reveals- conveyer hadno title – No Specific declaration needed.  
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183  Suit for possession, as a consequence of declaration – Article 58 will have no application
Prem Singh v. Birbal  (2006) 5 SCC 3531. Article 59 fraudulent transactions – ‘voidable’ not ‘void’. 2. Article 59 apply where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to presumptively invalid. 3. Article 65 apply when document is void ab initio or void 4. A decree for setting aside the document void ab initio or void would not be necessary since – non-est. 5. Fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ would be void, not ‘contents’.  Article 59 would not govern a void transaction.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460The sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply, and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years.
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549Once the title is established,  the defendant to prove adverse possession (Followed in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021)
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808  declaration with a further reliefArticle governing -that for such further relief
Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 Declaration with possession – Article 65 would come into play giving 12 year period – not Article 58.
S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840Article 58 is not applicable for declaration sought only as an ancillary relief.
Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47Document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47) referred.
K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.)1. suit for recovery based on title,  limitation arise only when adverse possession 2.  recovery of possession on title – declaration is only subservient to the main prayer, possession 3. Article 58 will apply only to a suit for declaration simplicitor.

End Notes II

Declaration of Title & Recovery: Article 65 of the Limitation Act Governs; Not, 58

58To obtain any other declarationThree years.When the right to sue first accrues.
59To cancel or set aside an instrumentor decree or for the rescission of a contract.Three years.When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
65  For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.Twelve years.When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

End Notes III

Earlier Supreme Court Decisions

1. Kizhakkevattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024-4 SCR 383; 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)

  • “If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence.”

2. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641

  • “In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

3. C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183

  • “If the plaintiff is to be granted a relief of recovery of possession, the suit could be filed within a period of 12 years. It is one thing to say that whether such a relief can be granted or not after the evidences are led by the parties but it is another thing to say that the plaint is to be rejected on the ground that the same is barred by any law. If the suit has been filed for possession, as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiffs title, Article 58 will have no application.”

4. Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, AIR 2002 SC 215; (2002) 1 SCC 178.

  • “Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding.”

5. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460, held as under:

  • “6. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji’s case (Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 166), Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj & Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi2 this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.”

6. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 808

  • In a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief.

The Kerala High Court, in Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

  • “When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

  • “39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
  • 40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

In Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 it is held as under:

  • “Article 58 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in a suit for declaration, but it has no application when the relief sought in the plaint is not for a mere declaration,but coupled with other reliefs like injunction, partition, possession etc. and Article 65 of the Limitation Act would come into play giving 12 year period. In the instant case, the relevant Article which can be applied is not Article 58, but Article 65 as the suit was filed not merely for a relief of declaration, but for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of immovable property.”

In S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840, it is held that Article 58 is not applicable for declaration that is sought only as an ancillary relief. It is held as under:

  • “When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought for that is which would not govern the period of limitation for the suit. The consequential relief sought for is to be treated as main relief governing the period of limitation for the suit. (See Mrs. Indira Bhalchandran Gokhale v. Union of India & Another-AIR 1990 Bombay 98). Therefore declaration prayed for in this case as relief Nos. 1 and 2 were unnecessary, and even if made, need only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition of immovable prop

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Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic)

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Pleadings are to be Considered as a Whole. When Lack of Pleadings Amounts to a Material Flaw?

Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract: Why ‘Particulars’ are Insisted in Pleadings

  • 1. To give Notice to the other side.  
  • 2. To narrow down the controversy.
  • 3. To give definiteness to the stance of parties in court.
  • 4. Pleadings must be pregnant enough to produce an issue.
  • 5. It is Court that draws inference as to ‘abstract’ propositions.
  • 6. Pleadings constitute the skeleton that give shape to the case.
  • 7. In the Absence of Pleading, Evidence cannot be Considered.

Classic Rulings on this Subject

  • Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067
  • Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260
  • Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Asstt. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137
  • Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555
  • Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, 1978 KHC 500: AIR 1978 SC 484
  • Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735

Fundamental Rules of Pleadings

The Supreme Court of India pointed out, in Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067, the fundamental rules of pleadings, as under:

  • The pleadings must be read as a whole,
  • The purport of proper pleadings is – caused no prejudice to the other side.
  • When a question arises as to a flaw in the pleadings, it must be considered in the light of the evidence.
  • Impropriety (or otherwise) of a lack of pleading is tested on the touchstone – whether it caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants (or not).

The Apex Court (Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067) explained the position vividly as under:

  • “17. A comprehensive look at the pleadings taken by the appellant along with the site-plan attached to the petition makes it evident that the appellant gave out a detailed description of the extent of accommodation available in the suit property as also the accommodation presently in her occupation and the nature and extent of her requirement. In the pleadings, it was indeed specified that the appellant was residing on the property bearing No. “C-586/587”. The pleadings taken by the appellant in paragraph 18(a)(ii) of her petition, of course, begin with the expression “as stated above” and there had not been any earlier mention of property bearing No. “C-586/587” but, there had been detailed description in the preceding paragraphs and the site plan was also attached to the petition. The appellant further made the position clear in her cross-examination that the building in question was constructed on Plot Nos.586 and 587 jointly and she and her sister-in-law were residing in the same building as one family.
  • 18. Taking the pleadings as a whole and reading the same with the evidence, it is clear that there had not been any such mis-description of the property which would amount to a material flaw in the case of the appellant or which could have caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants.”

Object and Purpose of Pleadings

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, it was held as under:

  • “The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise.”

Order VI, rule 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 lay down the basics of pleading. They read as under:

  • Rule 1: Pleading: “Pleading” shall mean plaint or written statement.
  • Rule 2: Pleading to state material facts and not evidence:
  • (1) Every pleading shall contain, and contain only a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.
  • (2) Every pleading shall, when necessary, be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively, each allegation being, so far as is convenient, contained in a separate paragraph.
  • (3) Dates, sums and numbers shall be expressed in a pleading in figures as well as in words.

Pleadings should Receive a Liberal Construction

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, it was held as under:

  • “The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law, in such a case it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial.

Deficiency in Pleadings Doesn’t Matter if the Parties Knew the Case

In Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, 1966-2 SCR 286, the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court observed as under :

  • “If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is : did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another.”

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, relying on Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, 1966-2 SCR 286, it was held as under:

  • “Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.”

No Pedantic Approach and Hair Splitting Technicalities Permitted

In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Asstt. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137, it was held as under:

  • “15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair­splitting technicalities.”(Quoted in: Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR 2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260)

In Augustine @ Mervin Alexander v. Josmy @ Geetha, 2022-5 KerHC(SN) 13; 2022-4 KerLT 966, it is held that it is well settled that pleadings should receive a liberal construction. The High Court continued as under:

  • “No pedantic approach is to be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Pleadings has to be construed reasonably. The contention of the parties has to be culled out from the pleadings by reading the same as a whole. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with the strict interpretation of the law. In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised, the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings. The court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues, upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of the deficiency in the pleadings, parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on the issues by producing evidence, it would not be open to a party to raise the question of lack of pleadings [See: Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College AIR 1987 SC 1242].”

In the Absence of Pleading, Evidence cannot be Considered

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, it was also pointed out as under:

  • “6. … It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it.”

Plea of Adverse Possession

In M. Siddiq (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1, on the question of Adverse Possession it is pointed out that the plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat rights of true owner and law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence and that the ingredients must be set up in pleadings and proved in evidence. There can be no proof sans pleadings and pleadings without evidence will not establish a case in law. (Paras 748, 751, 752, 754 and 755)

Pleadings and Future Damages

In Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735; 1966-2 SCR 286, it was held as under:

  • “Once it is held that the plaintiff is entitled to eject the defendant, it follows that from the date of the decree granting the relief of ejectment to the plaintiff, the defendant who remains in possession of the property despite the decree, must pay mesne profits or damages for use and occupation of the said property until it is delivered to the plaintiff. A decree for ejectment in such a case must be accompanied by a direction for payment of the future mesne profits or damages. Then as to the rate at which future mesne profits can be awarded to the plaintiff, we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the trial Court that the reasonable amount in the present case would be Rs. 300/- per month.”

Rejection of Plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and Pleading

In Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706, it is observed as under: ­

  • “10 … It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial.
  • This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557, in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under: (SCC p. 560, para 9)
    • “9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.”
  • It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. vs. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184 and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. vs. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100.
  • It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, wherein while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in considering such application, this Court has reminded the trial Judges with the following observation: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
    • “5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10, C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.”
  • It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer J., in the above referred decision, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code.”(Quoted in: Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260).

In Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174, the legal position is analysed as under: ­

  • “7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.” (Quoted in: Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260.)

Why should crucial documents be produced along with the Plaint or WS?

  • 1. To prevent surprise to the opposite side.
  • 2. To substantiate and assure pleadings, and ensure fair play.
  • 3. To enable the court and the opposite side to understand the case fully.
  • 4. The CPC mandates it (Order VII Rule 14 & Order VIII Rule 1A).

CPC also mandates the production of all remaining documents before framing of issues (so that the court can frame proper issues).

Documents Are Not Pleadings; But, They Support Pleadings

  • Pleadings mean Plaint or Written Statement.  They are statements of fact alone (Order VI Rule 1 CPC).
  • The documents cannot be used to supplement missing facts, and will not cure the defect of ‘not pleading’ a fact merely because the document is produced with the pleadings that contain the relevant fact.
  • The documents, even if produced along with the Pleadings, will not automatically become evidence.
  • The documents cannot be used as materials to introduce new facts (without making an amendment of the pleadings).

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Foundational or Crucial Documents Be Produced Along With the Plaint or WS. Why?

Order VII Rule 14(3) and Order VIII Rule 1A C.P.C Confer Power to Receive Documents if ‘Good Cause‘ is shown for the Late Production of the Documents

Jojy George Koduvath

PART I

Why should foundational or crucial documents be produced along with the plaint or WS?

  • 1. To prevent surprise to the opposite side.
  • 2. To substantiate and assure pleadings, and ensure fair play.
  • 3. To enable the court and the opposite side to understand the case fully.
  • 4. The CPC mandates it (Order VII Rule 14 & Order VIII Rule 1A).

CPC also mandates the production of all remaining documents before framing of issues (so that the court can frame proper issues).

Documents Are Not Pleadings; They only Support Pleadings

  • Pleadings mean Plaint or Written Statement.  They are statements of fact alone (Order VI Rule 1 CPC).
  • The documents cannot be used to supplement missing facts, and will not cure the defect of ‘not pleading’ a fact merely because the document is produced with the pleadings that contain the relevant fact.
  • The documents, even if produced along with the Pleadings, will not automatically become evidence.
  • The documents cannot be used as materials to introduce new facts (without making an amendment of the pleadings).

Relevant Provisions in the CPC

Order VII Rule 14 CPC:

“Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies:

  • (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
    • (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
    • (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
    • (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiffs witnesses, or handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”

Order VIII Rule 1A CPC:

“Duty of defendant to produce documents upon which relief is claimed or relied upon by him

  • .(1) Where the defendant bases his defence upon a document or relies upon any document in his possession or power, in support of his defence or claim for set-off or counter-claim, he shall enter such document in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the written statement is presented by him and shall, at the same time, deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the written statement.
  • (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the defendant, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
  • (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the defendant under this rule, but, is not so produced shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
  • (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to documents— (a) produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”

Order 13 Rule 1.

“Original documents to be produced at or before the settlement of issues

  • .(1) The parties or their pleader shall produce on or before the settlement of issues, all the documentary evidence in original where the copies thereof have been filed along with plaint or written statement.
  • (2) The court shall receive the documents so produced:
  • Provided that they are accompanied by an accurate list thereof prepared in such form as the High Court directs.
  • (3) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to documents
  • (a) produced for the cross-examination of the witnesses of the other party; or
  • (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”

Rule 4 of Order 18.

“Recording of evidence

  • .(1) In every case, the examination-in-chief of a witness shall be on affidavit and copies thereof shall be supplied to the opposite party by the party who calls him for evidence:
  • Provided that where documents are filed and the parties rely upon the documents, the proof and admissibility of such documents which are filed along with affidavit shall be subject to the orders of the court.
  • xxx”

Rule 27 of Order 41.

“Production of additional evidence in appellate court

  • “(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court. But if—
  • (a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted; or
  • (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed; or
  • (b) the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined.
  • (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate court, the court shall record the reason for its admission….”

Documents Filed With the Pleadings Do Not Automatically Become Evidence

  • Though documents filed with the plaint or WS form part of the record, they do not automatically become evidence (that is, done at the evidentiary stage).

Requirement Of Production Of Documents Along With Plaint / WS

  • When deciding an application under Order VII, Rule 11 (i.e., for rejection of plaint). See: Gurmeet Singh Sachdeva v. Skyways Air Services (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3017,

Fundamental Rules of Pleadings

The Supreme Court of India pointed out, in Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067, the fundamental rules of pleadings, as under:

  • The pleadings must be read as a whole,
  • The purport of proper pleadings is – caused no prejudice to the other side.
  • When a question arises as to a flaw in the pleadings, it must be considered in the light of the evidence.
  • Impropriety (or otherwise) of a lack of pleading is tested on the touchstone – whether it caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants (or not).

When Documents Produced with the Plaint are Considered as Part of Pleadings

They are considered when an ambiguity arises as to pleadings. In Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067, our Apex Court explained the position as under:

  • “17. A comprehensive look at the pleadings taken by the appellant along with the site-plan attached to the petition makes it evident that the appellant gave out a detailed description of the extent of accommodation available in the suit property as also the accommodation presently in her occupation and the nature and extent of her requirement. In the pleadings, it was indeed specified that the appellant was residing on the property bearing No. “C-586/587”. The pleadings taken by the appellant in paragraph 18(a)(ii) of her petition, of course, begin with the expression “as stated above” and there had not been any earlier mention of property bearing No. “C-586/587” but, there had been detailed description in the preceding paragraphs and the site plan was also attached to the petition. The appellant further made the position clear in her cross-examination that the building in question was constructed on Plot Nos.586 and 587 jointly and she and her sister-in-law were residing in the same building as one family.
  • 18. Taking the pleadings as a whole and reading the same with the evidence, it is clear that there had not been any such mis-description of the property which would amount to a material flaw in the case of the appellant or which could have caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants.”

When Documents Produced With the Plaint are Treated As “Part Of The Plaint

  • When deciding an application under Order VII, Rule 11 (i.e., for rejection of the plaint).

The Supreme Court observed in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajrat), (2020) 7 SCC 366, as under:

  • “23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.”(Followed in: Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 INSC 1025; 2024 KLT Online 3058).

PART II

Leave of the Court Necessary

The Supreme Court, in Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar, AIR 2020 SC 5486; 2020-10 SCC 706, held as under:

  • “Sub-rule (3), as quoted above, provides a second opportunity to the defendant to produce the documents which ought to have been produced in the court along with the written statement, with the leave of the court. The discretion conferred upon the court to grant such leave is to be exercised judiciously. While there is no straight-jacket formula, this leave can be granted by the court on a good cause being shown by the defendant.”

Court Should Take a Lenient View

Our Apex Court, in Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar, AIR 2020 SC 5486; 2020-10 SCC 706, further held as under:

  • “It is often said that procedure is the handmaid of justice. Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of the court while doing substantial justice. If the procedural violation does not seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party, courts must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violation. We should not forget the fact that litigation is nothing but a journey towards truth which is the foundation of justice and the court is required to take appropriate steps to thrash out the underlying truth in every dispute. Therefore, the court should take a lenient view when an application is made for production of the documents under Sub-rule (3).”

In Dewanti Devi v. Radheshyam Tiwary, 2019 SCC Online Pat 28, it is held as follows:

  • “6. Order 8 Rule 1A(3) of the CPC provides that the documents, which have not been produced along with the written statement, cannot be produced to the court later on without the leave of the court. Thus, if a document is to be produced by a defendant, the same is to be produced with the written statement. Subsequent production of document can be done only if the court is satisfied with the grounds explained for non-production of the documents at the time of filing of the written statement.”

Late Production & “Good Cause”

In S. Rathinaswamy v. S. Bhanumathi, AIR 2006 Mad 221; 2006-3 MLJ 593, R. Banumathi, J. found as under:

  • “18. The main object of Or. 7 R. 14(3) C.P.C conferring the power upon the Court to receive the documents in genuine cases is to receive the documents if good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for the non-production of the documents at the earlier stage. The Courts are expected to receive the documents and give an opportunity to the parties.”

Law on Sufficient Cause

In Kasthuri v. C. Mohan, 2007-1 (Mad) LW 560 (V. Ramasubramaniam, J.), pointed out the difference between the language in the provisions of Order VII Rule 14 Sub Rule 3, after the amendment by Act 46 of 1999 and the provisions of Order XIII Rule 1 and 2 (1), as under:

  • “13. But it is not so. The Amendment Act 22 of 2002 has introduced a new Sub-rule (3) to Rule 14 of Order VII, in the place of the Sub-rule (3) substituted by Amendment Act 49 of 1999. The new Sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 of Order VII, after the Amendment of 2002 reads as follows:
  • Substituted by Act 22 of 2002 w.e.f. 1.7.2002 – (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
  • Thus the deletion of the provision, enabling to production of documents “at any subsequent stage of the proceedings” under Order XIII Rule 2 as it stood before amendment, has been compensated by the introduction of Sub-rule (3) under Rule 14 of Order VII under Amendment Act of 2002. Therefore, the right of a party to file a document at the time of hearing of the suit, if he has not already filed such document along with the plaint, is retained by the Amendment of 2002. All that is required under such circumstances, is that the plaintiff should take “the leave of the Court“. Even the words “good cause” that appeared under Order XIII Rule 2(1) before the amendment are absent in the newly introduced Sub Rule 3 of Rule 14 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a matter of fact, even in the judgment cited by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Madanlal v. Shyamlal, 2002 (1) SC 535, the Apex Court observed that the power under Order XIII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure(before amendment) should be exercised liberally and that “good cause” requires lesser decree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. Therefore, in view of the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 14 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act 22 of 2002, the respondents were entitled to file the documents in question, with the leave of the Court, which is what they have done in this case. The power of the Court to grant leave for a plaintiff to file additional documents under Order VII Rule 14 (3) is not even circumscribed by words such as “good cause” that were found in Order XIII Rule 2 before Amendment.”

In Hindustan Unilever Limited, Chennai v. Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd., 22 Mar 2018(Mad), after referring to Kasthuri v. C. Mohan, 2007 (1) LW 560 (Mad), it was observed as under:

  • “8. The sum and substance of the conclusions of the learned Judge is that on a comparative reading of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, regarding the receipt of documents as they stood prior to the amendment in 1999 and after the amendment would show that the power of the Court to receive documents is much more wider and liberal than what it was prior to the amendment of the Code.
  • In S. Rathinaswamy v. S. Bhanumathi, reported in 2006 (2) CTC 491, this Court had considered the scope of Order VII Rule 14(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, again after referring to the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, introduced in the year 1999 and 2002, it was held that the main object of Order VII Rule 14(3), conferring the power of the Court to receive the documents in genuine cases is to receive the documents if good cause, is shown to the satisfaction of the Court, for the non-production of the documents at an earlier stage. It was also pointed out that after all the procedure is only a handmaid of justice and Courts should always attempt to do complete justice between the parties, based on the evidence that is produced and not shut out the evidence.”

Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Usha Kiran Saxena v. Amit Maheshwari, Jan 8, 2025 (Ramesh Phadke, J.) stated as follows:

  • “11. Whenever documents are sought to be adduced as a corroborative evidence in support of the claim made in the plaint rigor of the rules can be said to be relaxed. Order 7 Rule 14 (3) C.P.C. enables the Court to receive the documents which are not filed along with the plaint in genuine cases and obviously the reason behind this is to avoid delay and when the documents are necessary for adjudication of the matter in dispute then the application can be allowed even if it is belatedly filed.”

The  Madhya Pradesh High Court relied on the Apex Court decision in the case of Rani Kusum v. Kanchan Devi Rani, AIR 2005 SC 3304; 2005-6 SCC 705, which laid down as under:-

  • “No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending, and if, by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. (See Blyth v. Blyth (1966 (1) All E.R. 524 (HL). A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. (See Shreenath and Anr. v.Rajesh and Ors. (AIR 1998 SC 1827) Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.”

Madhya Pradesh High Court, in a subsequent decision, Usha Kiran Saxena v. Amit Maheshwari (Anand Pathak, J.), July 27, 2023, held as under:

  • “7. …. Although documents were filed but not accompanied with the application under Order VII Rule 14(3) of CPC. Objection was raised by the petitioner but once the trial Court allowed the application preferred by respondent No.1 under Order VII Rule 14(3) of CPC then objections of petitioner were impliedly considered and rejected. Even otherwise, it is bi-parte order, therefore, all the parties were given opportunity to advance arguments.
  • 8. Procedures are handmaid to Justice and not Master of it and taking such hyper technical approach does not lead to justice.”

The Delhi High Court in Pradeep Bailey v. Gilma Daniel (18 June, 2025, Ravinder Dudeja, J.) after quoting Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, said as under:

  • “11. A plain reading of Order 7 Rule 14 CPC makes it clear that plaintiff has to present the relevant documents with the plaint. Subsequently, such documents cannot be presented without the leave of the court. The provision thus creates a bar on production of additional documents if the same have not been mentioned in the list of documents annexed to the plaint and produced at the time of filing the same, unless the leave of the court is sought. This principle was reiterated by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Polyflor Limited Vs. Sh. A. Goenka & Ors. in OA No. 84/2016 CS (OS) 504/2016.
  • 12. The Coordinate Bench of the this Court in Haldiram (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held that it is a discretionary power of the court to allow belated filing of a document. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:
  • “21. In any event, both under the old Order 7 Rule 18 sub-rule (1) and new Order 7 Rule 14 sub-rule (3) CPC a new document can certainly be produced on behalf of plaintiff at the final hearing of suit, but the same has to be done with leave of the Court. It is not that the plaintiff has a legal vested right to file a document at a belated stage i.e. at the final hearing of the suit. The said provision gives a discretionary power to the Court, which needless to say has to be exercised in a reasonable and legal manner. In fact, this power has to be exercised sparingly and for some overpowering reason and not as a matter of routine. If petitioners‟ interpretation of Sub Rule 3 is accepted, it would make it impossible for the trial court to conclude the hearing of any suit.”
  • 13. It is no more res-integra that the rules of procedure are handmaid of justice and should not come in the way of delivering substantial justice. In the case of Sugandhi (dead) by Lrs. & Anr. Vs. P. Rajkumar, represented by his power agent Imam Oli(2020) 10 SCC 706, the Apex Court discussed the factors which must be considered while granting permission to produce additional documents under Section 8 Rule 1-A CPC. It was observed that procedure is handmaid of justice. If the procedural violation does not cause prejudice to the adversary party, procedural and technical hurdles should not come in the way of the courts while doing substantial justice. Thus, the courts should take a lenient view while deciding an application under Order 8 Rule 1-A CPC.
  • 14. In Mrs. Nalini Lal Vs State of NCT of Delhi & Others, TEST.CAS.22/2009, a Coordinate Bench of this Court while allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 14 of CPC, held that the said provision allows for the submission of additional documents if the Court grants leave and if such documents are necessary for resolving the real issues between the parties. It was again emphasized that procedural rules should not hinder substantive justice.
  • 15. In the case of Mohanraj Vs. Kewalchand Hastimal Jain &Ors. AIR 2007 Bom. 69, the Bombay High Court discussed the object of Order 7 Rule 14 CPC and observed that the provision is enacted to assist the parties and the courts in the manner of production of documentary evidence while adjudicating the disputes, to arrive at an appropriate decision on the matter. In this regard, the provision is to be construed liberally and a pedantic approach should not be taken while enforcing the provision of law. A documentary evidence which is relevant and material for the just and appropriate decision should be allowed to be produced and merely because the party failed to enter the same in the list annexed to the plaint, it should not be ignored unless the plaintiff can show that there would be real prejudice caused if such permission is granted.

Finally the High Court held as under:

  • “21. The documents referred to in the application under Order 7 Rule 14 CPC are for the purpose of showing that petitioner was not sitting idle and was indulging in work and was earning income, as also for showing that he has been making the payment of house tax of the property since after its purchase and was making payment of electricity and water bills and was also looking after his mother. The trial court failed to appreciate that additional documents sought to be placed were relevant to counter the averments of the respondent, as mentioned in the written statement. Undisputedly, the documents are relevant. Some of the documents are, in fact public documents. The authenticity and genuineness of the documents can be considered after granting an opportunity to the petitioner to prove the same. The contention of the petitioner that Wills dated 19.09.2000 & 24.08.2000 were not in his possession and he received them from his sister in law at a later stage, and therefore, being filed belatedly, cannot be disbelieved at this stage. The learned trial court disbelieved the argument of the petitioner that documents could not be filed due to negligence of the previous counsel of the petitioner. Be that as it may, even if it was a mistake on the part of the petitioner, as per the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Nishant Hannan (supra), the parties do make the mistakes in the conduct of their cases and therefore such mistakes should be allowed to be corrected unless there is a great prejudice to the other side. The trial is still at an initial stage. The parties are yet to lead evidence, and therefore, no great prejudice shall be caused to the respondent in case the documents are allowed to be taken on record.
  • 22. The procedural rules under the CPC are intended to ensure substantive justice and exclusion of the documents in the present case would amount to elevating procedural technicalities over substantive justice, thereby, defeating the very purpose of fair adjudication.
  • 23. In view of the above, I find that the impugned order suffers from gross illegality and perversity in disallowing the petitioner/plaintiff from filing the additional documents by dismissing the application of the petitioner/plaintiff.”

Pleading and Evidence

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242, 1987-2 SCC 555, it was held as under:

  • “6. … It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. To have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should settle the essential material facts so that the other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words that may not expressly make out a case in accordance with a strict interpretation of the law. In such a case the court must ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead, the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings; instead, the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings, parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal….” (Quoted in: Mohammed Abdul Wahid v. Nilofer, 2023 INSC 1075,  (2024) 2 SCC 144); Mohan Hirachand Shah v. Geeta Kumarchand Shah,19-03-2024)

It is also pointed out in this decision:

  • “Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead; the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.
  • In Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, [1956] 1 SCR 286 a Constitution Bench of this Court considering this question observed:
  • “If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is: did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to reply upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another.”

Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal (2008) 17 SCC 491:

  • “10(i). No amount of evidence can be looked into, upon a plea which was never put forward in the pleadings. A question which did arise from the pleadings and which was not the subject matter of an issue, cannot be decided by the court.” ….” (Quoted in: Mohan Hirachand Shah v. Geeta Kumarchand Shah,19-03-2024)

Biraji @ Brijraji v. Surya Pratap (2020) 10 SCC 729:

  • “8. …It is fairly well settled that in absence of pleading, any amount of evidence will not help the party….” (Quoted in: Mohan Hirachand Shah v. Geeta Kumarchand Shah,19-03-2024)

Delhi High Court, in Brij Praksh Gupta v. Ashwini Kumar, on 6 February, 2020, Prathiba M. Singh, J., observed as under:

  •  “A party to the suit cannot be permitted to travel beyond his pleadings. If any evidence is tried to be adduced which has no foundation in the pleadings, the Court always has a power to discard such evidence while finally deciding the suit or proceeding.”

Sikkim HC held in Surja Narayan Pradhan v. Jumden Lepcha (May 11, 2022) 03 SIK CK 0021, as under:

  • “It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered and no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings.” 

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

The Doctrine of ‘Prima Facie Case’ in Criminal Cases

Jojy George Koduvath.

Preface

The term prima facie has been authoritatively explained by the Supreme Court in Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2023 SC 5551, wherein the Court laid down the meaning and scope of the words as under:

  • “The Latin expression prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first view”, or “based on first impression”. According, to Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”.
  • In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, or if an opposing party introduces contradictory evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties.”

Introduction:

The doctrine of prima facie Case’ arises for consideration in various stages of criminal proceedings, as under:

  1. For Ordering Investigation under [Section 156(3), CrPC ] and Taking Cognizance & Issuing Process [Sections 190 & 204 CrPC]:
    What is required is the Prima Facie existence of sufficient ground to proceed. At this stage, the Magistrate needs only to be satisfied that the complaint discloses a cognizable offence warranting investigation.
  2. For Quashing of FIR [Section 482, CrPC ] :
    The test is whether the allegations in the FIR Prima Facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or Article 226 of the Constitution, is not required to assess the merits of the allegations or examine the probability of conviction.
  3. For Framing of Charge / Discharge [Sections 227 to 239 CrPC]:
    The Court must examine whether the materials in the charge sheet and accompanying documents Prima Facie disclose sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. At this stage, the standard of proof required for conviction is not applicable—what is required is only a Prima Facie, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
  4. Grant or Refusal of Bail:
    While deciding bail applications, courts examine whether a Prima Facie case exists against the accused.

1. S. 156(3) – Prima Facie ‘EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT GROUND TO PROCEED’

It is held in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka as under:

  • “38. In the background of the factual position, the JMFC’s Order dated 18.01.2018 cannot be faulted. Enough material is available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police. The JMFC, to our mind, had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a prima facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC.
  • xxx
  • 40. The … JMFC had referred the matter to police under Section 156(3) of the Code, and the usage of ‘further’ was not in the context of Section 173(8) of the Code, which fine distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over. The case(s) at hand, in our considered view, demonstrate material showing the commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of itwhich would merit police investigation. Therefore, interdiction of the Impugned Orders is necessitated.”

Read also:

In Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2024 SC 4531, it is held as under:

  • “If at the stage of pre-cognizance, the Magistrate is expected to be careful or to put it in other words, the Magistrate is obliged to look into the complaint threadbare so as to reach to a prima facie conclusion whether the offence is disclosed or not, then he is expected to be more careful when he is actually taking cognizance upon a private complaint and ordering issue of process.”

In Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2019 SC 5233; 2019-17 SCC 1 (R.F. Nariman, Surya Kant, V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.) it is held as under:

  • “42. … To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases midway through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out.”

In Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage, (2016) 6 SCC 277, it is observed as under:

  • “2. This Court has held in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., that if a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or having been registered, proper investigation is not being done, then the remedy of the aggrieved person is not to go to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but to approach the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3) CrPC. If such an application under Section 156(3) CrPC is made and the Magistrate is, prima facie, satisfied, he can direct the FIR to be registered, or if it has already been registered, he can direct proper investigation to be done which includes in his discretion, if he deems it necessary, recommending change of the investigating officer, so that a proper investigation is done in the matter. We have said this in Sakiri Vasu case because what we have found in this country is that the High Courts have been flooded with writ petitions praying for registration of the first information report or praying for a proper investigation.
  • We are of the opinion that if the High Courts entertain such writ petitions, then they will be flooded with such writ petitions and will not be able to do any other work except dealing with such writ petitions. Hence, we have held that the complainant must avail of his alternate remedy to approach the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3) CrPC and if he does so, the Magistrate will ensure, if prima facie he is satisfied, registration of the first information report and also ensure a proper investigation in the matter, and he can also monitor the investigation.”

In Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda, (2015) 12 SCC 420, it is said as under:

  • “22… The satisfaction on the ground for proceeding would mean that the facts alleged in the complaint would constitute an offence, and when considered along with the statements recorded, would, prima facie, make the accused answerable before the court…In other words, the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of each and every complaint filed before him and issue process as a matter of course. There must be sufficient indication in the order passed by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that the allegations in the complaint constitute an offence and when considered along with the statements recorded and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under Section 202 of CrPC, if any, the accused is answerable before the criminal court, there is ground for proceeding against the accused under Section 204 of CrPC, by issuing process for appearance. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction…To be called to appear before criminal court as an accused is serious matter affecting one’s dignity, self respect and image in society. Hence, the process of criminal court shall not be made a weapon of harassment.” (Quoted in: Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2024 SC 4531)

In Sunil Bharti Mittal v. C.B.I., (2015) 4 SCC 609, it is held as under:

  • “53. However, the words “sufficient ground for proceeding” appearing in Section 204 are of immense importance. It is these words which amply suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie, case against the accused, though the order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect.” (Quoted in: Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2024 SC 4531)

2. Quashing FIR – Prima Facie ‘DISCLOSE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENCE’ Matters

It is pointed out by the three-judge bench in  Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra (Dr. DY. Chandrachud, M.R. Shah,  Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.), (2021) 19 SCC 401, that the court has to exercise the powers for quashing the FIR in a very sparing manner. It is observed as under:

  • “33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.’

The Apex Court, while discussing the powers to quash the first information report under Section 482 Cr. P.C or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 (K.T. Thomas & M.B. Shah, JJ.), it was observed and held as under:

  • “14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. [State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283] It is also settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370, 395 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 180]”
  • (Quoted in  Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401)

3. Framing Charges – Only a Prima Facie Case for PROCEEDING be Satisfied

In Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, AIR 2020 SC 554, 2020-2  SCC 217 (Hrishikesh Roy, A.S. Bopanna, R. Banumathi, JJ.), it is observed as under:

  • “12. Though the circumstances alleged in the charge sheet are to be established during the trial by adducing the evidence, the allegations in the charge sheet show a prima facie case against the accused-respondent Nos.1 and 2. The circumstances alleged by the prosecution indicate that there are  against the accused. At the time of framing the charges, only prima facie case is to be seen; whether case is beyond reasonable doubt, is not to be seen at this stage. At the stage of framing the charge, the court has to see if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. While evaluating the materials, strict standard of proof is not required; only prima facie case against the accused is to be seen.”

See also:

  • State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294
  • Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217
  • Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148
  • State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, AIR 2017 SC 796,
  • Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460
  • Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135
  • State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338
  • State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659
  • Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.
  • Union of India  v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4.

4. Grant or Refusal of Bail:
While deciding bail applications, courts examine whether a Prima Facie case exists against the accused.

In Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “19. Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence are required to be satisfied and further while granting such relief, the court must record the reasons therefor. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has falsely been enroped in the crime and would not misuse his liberty. (See D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran (2007) 4 SCC 434, State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain (2008) 1 SCC 213 and Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal (2008) 13 SCC 305.)”
  • (Quoted in: P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2019 SC  4198; (2019) 9 SCC 24.)

In P. Chidambaram v. Central Bureau Of Investigation, AIR 2019 SC 5272; 2020-13 SCC 337, it is observed as under:

  • “Expression of prima facie reasons for granting or refusing to grant bail is a requirement of law, especially where such bail orders are appealable so as to indicate application of mind to the matter under consideration and the reasons for conclusion. Recording of reasons is necessary since the accused/prosecution/victim has every right to know the reasons for grant or refusal to grant bail. This will also help the appellate court to appreciate and consider the reasonings for grant or refusal to grant bail. But giving reasons for exercise of discretion in granting or refusing to grant bail is different from discussing the merits or demerits of the case. At the stage of granting bail, an elaborate examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching upon the merit of the case, which may prejudice the accused, should be avoided. Observing that “at the stage of granting bail, detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case should be avoided”, in Niranjan Singh, it was held as under:-
    • “3. ……Detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits should be avoided while passing orders on bail applications. No party should have the impression that his case has been prejudiced. To be satisfied about a prima facie case is needed but it is not the same as an exhaustive exploration of the merits in the order itself.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka: Supreme Court held – Prima Facie Case as to Commission of Cognizable Offence, Merit Police Investigation

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

  • For Ordering Investigation under S. 156(3): Prima Facie ‘EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT GROUND TO PROCEED’ is enough.
  • For quashing the FIR: What is to be looked into is whether the allegations in the FIR Prima Facie Discloses The Commission Of A Cognizable Offence or not. The Court is not required to consider the merits while considering quashing the first information report under Section 482 Cr. P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

These were the matters discussed by the Supreme Court of India, in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka, 4 November 2025 (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Pankaj Mithal, JJ.).

Also Read: The Doctrine of ‘Prima Facie Case’ in Criminal Cases

Facts of the case

A Rent Agreement produced by the accused, on an E-Stamp Paper, was fake. Even the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of Stamps stated that Prima Facie the E- Stamp used was a fake E-Stamp. It was contended – since there was Prima Facie material that substantiates the appellant’s claim that the E- Stamp Paper is a forged document, the possibility of a conspiracy hatched by the accused cannot be ruled out.

The prime question for consideration

The prime question for consideration was the following:

  • Whether the direction for investigation to the police issued by the JMFC under  Section 156(3) of the Code, which was quashed by the Impugned Orders, is justified based on the facts and circumstances of the cases.

The Apex Court relied on the following decisions:

  • 1. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401,
  • 2. Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615,
  • 3. Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439.

The Apex Court, while exercising the powers to quash the first information report under Section 482 Cr. P.C or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is pointed out in a three-judge bench decision (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, M.R. Shah,  Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.) in  Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, that the court has to exercise the powers in a very sparing manner. It is observed as under:

  • ‘16. In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of process of law by converting a civil dispute into a criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurise the accused. Similarly, in a given case the complaint itself on the face of it can be said to be barred by law. The allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such cases and in exceptional cases with circumspection, the High Court may stay the further investigation. However, at the same time, there may be genuine complaints/FIRs and the police/investigating agency has a statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand and those innocent persons against whom the criminal proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case abuse of process of law and the process. However, if the facts are hazy and the investigation has just begun, the High Court would be circumspect in exercising such powers and the High Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed further with the investigation in exercise of its statutory duty under the provisions of the Code. Even in such a case the High Court has to give/assign brief reasons why at this stage the further investigation is required to be stayed. The High Court must appreciate that speedy investigation is the requirement in the criminal administration of justice.’
  • xxx
  •  ‘33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.’ (emphasis supplied)

In Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615 (P. Sathasivam, Jagdish Singh Khehar, JJ.), it was held as under:

  • “18. When a Magistrate receives a complaint he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The Magistrate has discretion in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint, he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence itself. As said earlier, in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). However, if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to revert back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3).”
  • “This position of law was recently reiterated in Lavanya C v Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 499, where one of us (P. Mithal, J.) was part of the coram.”

In Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439, three learned Judges (T.S. Thakur, Adarsh Kumar Goel, R. Banumathi) opined after noticing Cardinal Mar George Alencherry v. State of Kerala, (2023) 18 SCC 730, as under:

  • “13. We may first deal with the question as to whether the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3) or was justified in proceeding under Section 202(1) and what are the parameters for exercise of power under the two provisions.
  • xxx
  • 22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that:
  • 22.1. The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone the issuance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued.
  • 22.2. The cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine
    • existence of sufficient ground to proceed”.
  • Category of cases falling under para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] may fall under Section 202. Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case.
  • xxx
  • 38. In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy [(1976) 3 SCC 252: 1976 SCC (Cri) 380], National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz [(2013) 2 SCC 488: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 731], Madhao v. State of Maharashtra [(2013) 5 SCC 615: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 141], Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 4 SCC 185: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 801], the scheme of Sections 156(3) and 202 has been discussed. It was observed that power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before taking cognizance and was in the nature of pre-emptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its plenary power of investigation beginning with Section 156 and ending with report or charge-sheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 applies at post-cognizance stage and the direction for investigation was for the purpose of deciding whether there was sufficient ground to proceed.”

Finding of the Apex Court

It is held in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka as under:

  • “38. In the background of the factual position, the JMFC’s Order dated 18.01.2018 cannot be faulted. Enough material is available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police. The JMFC, to our mind, had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a Prima Facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC.
  • xxx
  • 40. The … JMFC had referred the matter to police under Section 156(3) of the Code, and the usage of ‘further’ was not in the context of Section 173(8) of the Code, which fine distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over. The case(s) at hand, in our considered view, demonstrate material showing the commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of itwhich would merit police investigation. Therefore, interdiction of the Impugned Orders is necessitated.”

Conclusion

In the background of the factual position, the Apex Court held that the JMFC’s Order cannot be faulted, and that enough material was available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police, and that the JMFC had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a Prima Facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC.

End Note:

Framing the Charges – Only a Prima Facie Case is to be Satisfied

In Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, AIR 2020 SC 554, 2020-2  SCC 217 (Hrishikesh Roy, A.S. Bopanna, R. Banumathi, JJ.), it is observed as under:

  • “12. Though the circumstances alleged in the charge sheet are to be established during the trial by adducing the evidence, the allegations in the charge sheet show a prima facie case against the accused-respondent Nos.1 and 2. The circumstances alleged by the prosecution indicate that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. At the time of framing the charges, only prima facie case is to be seen; whether case is beyond reasonable doubt, is not to be seen at this stage. At the stage of framing the charge, the court has to see if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. While evaluating the materials, strict standard of proof is not required; only prima facie case against the accused is to be seen.”

See also:

  • State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294
  • Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217
  • Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148
  • State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, AIR 2017 SC 796,
  • Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460
  • Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135
  • State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338
  • State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659
  • Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.
  • Union of India  v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Trusts and Trust Deeds

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

A trust is what its authors or founders intended, as revealed from the deed of dedication, if any, or on other substantial evidence.  In CIT v. Kamala Town Trust, AIR 1996 SC 620, 1996-7 SCC 349, it is pointed out as under:

  • “A Trust Deed is a document which sets out the terms of an understanding between the author of the trust and the trustees. Though in form, the trustees are not signatories to the instrument as drawn up, they are parties to the instrument in a real sense, for it is on the terms of the instrument that they accept office and proceed to administer the trust. The law obliges them to act upon the terms of the Trust Deed, and they cannot commit a breach thereof.”

The trustee is bound to fulfil the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation (Sec. 11 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882). Usually, there will be trust deeds which direct the administration of the trusts, which include how the trustees are appointed, and how new trustees are selected.

As per the Indian Trust Act. 1882, the trustee holds the trust-property for ‘management’ or ‘administration’.  The legal ownership vests in the trustee for the purposes of the trust, and its administration should be in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust (Ramabai Govind  v. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106).

In Abdul Kayum Vs. Alibhai, AIR 1963 SC 309, our Apex Court expounded the following legal incidents of trusteeship:

  • (i) Trustees cannot transfer their duties, functions & powers to some other body of men and create them trustees in their own place unless this is clearly permitted by the trust deed, or agreed to by the entire body of beneficiaries (Sec. 48);
  • (ii) A trustee is not bound to accept the trust; but having once entered upon the trust he cannot renounce the duties and liabilities except with the permission of the Court or with the consent of the beneficiaries or by the authority of the trust deed itself (Sec. 46).
  • (iii) A trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his functions except in some specified cases (Sec. 47).

Trustee is Obliged to Manage for Benefit of the Beneficiaries

As pointed out by our Apex Court, in WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,[AIR1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.]  the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 declares vesting legal ownership with trustees. The vesting of ownership of trust property with the trustee is under an obligation to manage it for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin  Vs. Trustees Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184. See also: RamabaiGovind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj)]  Though, in a trust, the trust property must have been transferred to the trustees, and the trust property vests in the trustee as owner thereof, it does not absolutely belong to any individual.

Trustee has no ‘Proprietor Interest’

It is observed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Special Secretary Land and Land Revenue [1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30] that the trustee would become the owner of the trust property for the purpose of effectively executing or administering the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries and for due administration thereof, and not for any other purpose. Merely because the property is vested in the trustee as the legal owner, he has no ‘proprietor interest’, inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’ in the property itself. 

Trustee Deals with the Property According to the Deed of Trust

The property is vested in trustees subject to the obligations upon which the trustees accepted the trust.[Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj)] The trustee deals with the property in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust.[Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106]  In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Vs. Parasnath Digambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199]The legal ownership which vests in the trustee is for the purposes of the trust and to administer [Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529] the same.

Basic Principle of Foundation of a Trust Cannot be Changed

The trustees are bound to administer the affairs of the trust to attain the objects (Commr of IT Vs. Rajmitra Bhailal: 1964-54 ITR 241) envisioned by the founder and in accordance with his directions laid down in the trust deed; and the acts and actions of trustees ultra vires such objects or directions are void.  If a trustee fails to administer in accordance with the terms of the trust, it amounts to breach of trust (RP Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Educational Trust:1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801).

The basic principle of foundation of a trust cannot be changed.  Tudor on Charities [6th Edn.  At p. 131], explained it as under:

  • “When a charity has been founded and trusts have been declared, the founder has no power to revoke, vary or add to the trusts. This is so irrespective of whether the trusts have been declared by an individual, or by a body of subscribers, or by the trustees.” (Agasthyar Trust Vs. Commr IT Madras ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;1998-5 SCC 588)

No Change to Basic Principles, Even By Majority, Unless Specific Power

Fundamental principles upon which an association is founded (as revealed from the deed of dedication, if any, or on other substantial evidence) are also not open to alteration, even for the majority of its members, unless such a power is specifically reserved. This principle is laid down in

  • Milligan Vs.  Mitchell, (1837) 3 My. & Cr. 72 : 40 ER 852,
  • Attorney General Vs. Anderson, (1888) 57 LJ Ch 543, and
  • Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun, (1904) AC 515

These decisions are referred to in –

  • Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao, AIR 1931 Mad. 12.

See also:

  • Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547;
  • Allahabad High School Society Vs. State of UP: 2010-5 ADJ 734, 2010-82 All LR 83;
  • P. Jayader  Vs. Thiruneelakanta Nadar Chinnaneela Nadar: ILR  1966-2 Mad 92.

Ultra Vires Acts, Void; It Constitutes ‘Breach of Trust’.

A company is a juristic person. The actions and functioning of a company differ from that of a natural person who is free to act on his whims and fancies. The actions and functioning of a company are limited by its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association.

Deed of Endowment/Dedication

A declaration by a registered deed or vesting/transferring property to a trustee is the usual mode of dedication of immovable property for the creation of a public trust; though no document is necessary for creating an endowment.

If the founders’ intention is clear from the document of foundation or other direct evidence, oral or documentary, no difficulty arises. In cases where express dedication cannot be proved, it will be a matter for legal inference from the proved facts and circumstances of each case. In Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Reli. Endts, it is held:

  • “Where, however, a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and the recitals of the document show that the control and management of the temple is retained with the founder or his descendants, and that extensive properties are dedicated for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple belonging to the founder himself, this will be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature.”[AIR 1981 SC 798; (quoted in Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685).]

In S. Shanmugam Pillai . Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai .[AIR 1972 SC 2069] it is held:

  • “Whether or not a dedication is complete would naturally be a question of fact to be determined in each case on the terms of the relevant document if the dedication in question was made under a document. … “[Quoted in Sitaram Agarwal Vs. Subarata Chandra: AIR 2008 SC 952; Controller of Estate Duty West Bengal Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312]

In Hemanta Kumari Debi Vs. Gauri Shankar Tewari [AIR 1941 PC 38; Quoted in Kuldip Chand Vs. AG to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685.  Terms of the document, important:1951 SCR 1122;  Sri. Govindlalji Vs. State of Rajasthan: AIR 1963  SC  1638; R Venugopala Reddiar Vs. Krishnaswamy: AIR 1971 Mad  262; Kuldip Chand Vs. A G to Govt of H P: AIR 2003  SC  1685. Importance of document: Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Endts.: AIR 1981 SC 798; Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts: Page 188] it is held, while dealing with a bathing ghat on the banks of the River Ganges, that complete relinquishment of title was not the only form of dedication under Hindu Law.

It further observed as under:

  • “In the absence of a formal and express endowment evidenced by deed or declaration, the character of the dedication can only be determined on the basis of the history of the institution and the conduct of the founder and his heirs.”

Our Apex Court observed the following, interpreting a deed, in Idol of Sri Renganatha-swamy Vs. PK Thoppulan Chettiar [(2020) 5 Mad LJ 331(SC)] as under:

  • “The Deed of Settlement must be examined as a whole to determine the true intention of the settlor. Where the settlor seeks to divest himself of the property entirely for a religious purpose, a public religious charity is created. In the present case, the Deed of Settlement creates an absolute prohibition on the subsequent sale or mortgage of the suit property. The Deed of Settlement provides that, the settler purchased the punja land mentioned in the schedule of property… for the performance of charity work in reference to Sri Renganathan-swamy sanctum. The property outlined in the schedule of the Deedof Settlement is described as, property allotted for charity work. With respect to the legal heirs, the Deed of Settlement creates an obligation on the settlors legal heirs to continue the charitable activities at the suit property out of their business incomes. The settlor had a clear intent to divest himself and his legal heirs of the property and endow it for the continuation of the charitable activities at the suit property. The purpose of the endowment was to carry on charitable work. The Deed of Settlement obligates the legal heirs to continue the charitable activities at the suit property.”

West and Buhler in Digest of Hindu Law [at page 248] reads further as under:

  • “Like the trustee in English law, a Shebait has to act gratuitously and he cannot charge the debutter estate for any remuneration on account of the time and labour he spends over his affairs. The position would certainly be different if there is a provision in the deed of dedication to that effect; or, in the absence of any deed of endowment, there is a usage sanctioning such remuneration to the Shebait. The law is well established that, in the absence of any provision in the deed of dedication or any usage to that effect, a Shebait has no right to take any portion of the income of the debutter estate nor even the surplus that remains after meeting the expenses of the deity. In this income would be included not merely the rents and profits of the debutter property but the offerings which are made to the deity by its devotees. “

Underhill in his treatise Law relating to Trusts and Trustees under the caption, Right to Reimbursement and Indemnity, it has been stated as under:

  • “Trustee is entitled to be reimbursed out of the trust property all expenses which he has properly incurred having regard to the circumstances of each particular case but without interest unless he has paid an interest bearing claim in which case he stands in the shoes of the creditor by subrogation.”

Description of Property as Debutter in a Deed, Not Conclusive

Execution of a deed by itself will not prove dedication.  Though it is a piece of evidence, it is not conclusive for determining the dedication.  In Paras Nath Thakur Vs. Mohani Dasi Deceased Ana [AIR 1959 SC 1204 ] it is held that when a document is solemnly executed and registered, burden is heavy on the person who plead it to be fictitious. [ILR 18 Cal. 10;  ILR 42 All. 295]

Appointment and Succession of Trustees

Method of appointment of trustees and the mode of their succession are the matters for the author of the trust. If sought for, court will give effect to the same. In the absence of an instrument of trust, custom and usage will hold the field. Under Sec. 92 CPC, when the trustees fail to take administration of the trust, the designated court is destined to interfere in the appointment of new trustees if the trust deed is silent as to the appointment of the new trustees.

Under Hindu Law, when there is no provision in the deed of endowment about the succession of office of Shebait, or the succession provided therein comes to an end, the management and control of the property follows the ordinary rule of inheritance from the founder and passes to his heirs. (Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228)

Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Trustees in a Nut Shell

Trustee has all rights as a legal-owner of the trust property. It includes possession of the trust property. Rights enumerated under Chapter IV (The Rights and Powers of Trustee) of the Indian Trusts Act, which includes the following:

  • Sec.31. Right to title-deed.

All Trustees Should Act Jointly

Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 48. Co-trustees cannot act singly.—When there are more trustees than one, all must join in the execution of the trust, except where the instrument of trust, otherwise provides.

The instrument of trust may provide that one or more trustees shall be managing trustees and where such provision is made, those who are empowered to act as managing trustees would be entitled to execute the duties of the office without the concurrence of the other co-trustees.

Lewin on Trusts reads as under [Sixteenth Edition, page 181]:

  • “In the case of co-trustees of a private trust, the office is a joint one. Where the administration of the trust is vested in co-trustees, they all form as it were but one collective trustee and therefore must execute the duties of the office in their joint capacity. Sometimes, one of several trustees is spoken of as the acting trustees, but the Court knows of no such distinction: all who accept the office are in the eyes of the law acting trustees. If anyone refuses or is incapable to join, it is not competent for the others to proceed without him, and, if for any reason they are unable to appoint a new trustee in his place under Section 36(1) of the Act, the administration of the trust must devolve upon the Court. However, the act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee may be regarded as the act of both, though such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.” [Quoted in: Atmaram Ranchhodbhai  Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin, AIR 1973 Guj 113]

No trustee can delegate his powers and duties to another trustee and any agreement to do so would be against the obligations he had undertaken, illegal and void [H.E.H. The Nizam’s Jewellery Trust (in re:): AIR 1980 SC 17]. But in the absence of such provision, all co-trustees must join in the execution of the duties of the office [Atmaram Ranchhodbhai  Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113]. This principle applies both to Public and private trusts[Atmaram Ranchhodbhai Vs. Gulamhuse in Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113. Also See: Man Mohan Das Vs. Janki Prasad, AIR 1945 PC 23].

In Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joodeo [AIR 1978 All 1] it has been held that the trustees would join to file an application to execute the decree obtained on behalf of the idol of a temple. However, it was also observed that it was a settled law that it was Shebait alone who can file a suit. But in exceptional circumstances, persons other than Shebait can institute a suit on behalf of the idol. Our Apex Court in M/s. Shanti Vijay and Co. Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzfa [AIR 1980 SC 17] held as under:

  • “The act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee may be regarded as the act of both. But such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.” [Quoted in: JP Srivastava and Sons Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co.AIR2005 SC 83].

Suit by One of its Trustees: Effect

The trustees altogether constitute one body in the eye of law and all must act together. A suit against a trust is not maintainable without impleading all its trustees. However, suits can be filed by any one (or more) of the trustees, when so authorised in that behalf by the rest.[Kishorelal  Asera Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endowments: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367] But such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.[ Shanti Vijay Co. Vs. Princess Fatima: AIR 1980 SC 17. Lewin’s Law of Trusts referred to. Vaidyaratnam P. S. Variers Arya Vaidyasla Vs. K. C. Vijaikumar: ILR 1990-1 Del 124.]  It is doubtful whether it can be by a resolution, otherwise than executing powers of attorney. Similarly, all co-trustees together should determine the tenancy by issuing notice;[ Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973  Guj 113; Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Trilok Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144] and all together should file the suit for eviction.[ Kansara Abdulrahman Vs. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj. 184; Uma Ray Vs. Smt. Meghamala: AIR 1989  NOC. 166 (Cal); Iswardas Vs. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal: AIR 1968 SC 1364; Baisnab Das Sen Vs. Bholanath Sen: AIR 1986 Cal 118; M. M. Nagalinga Nadar Vs. Sri. Lakshmi Family Trust: 2001- 3 MLJ 523]  In J.P. Srivastava and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. [(2005) 1 SCC 172] it is held by the Supreme Court as follows:

  • “Therefore, although as a rule, trustees must execute the duties of their office jointly, this general principle is subject to the following exceptions when one trustee may act for all
  • .(1) where the trust deed allows the trusts to be executed by one or more or by a majority of trustees;
  • (2) where there is express sanction or approval of the act by co-trustees;
  • (3) where the delegation of power is necessary;
  • (4) where the beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation;
  • (5) where the delegation to a co-trustee is in the regular course of the business,
  • (6) where the co-trustee merely gives effect to a decision taken by the trustees jointly.”

Our Apex Court, in Kanakarathanammal Vs. Loganatha  Mudaliar [AIR 1965 SC 271]  has observed that where all the trustees were not joined as parties the omission was fatal and that in appropriate cases it was not impermissible for the Court, to permit the impleading of the other Trustees in exercise of its powers under Order I Rule 10 (2) of the CPC, 1908. The Apex Court cautioned that this should be done at the stage of trial and that too, without prejudice to the plea of the parties as to limitation.

But it is held otherwise by Bombay High Court in Namdeo Vs. Shahi Gupta Masjid Chandrapur,[2014-4 AIR Bom R 657]  pointing out that the trust represented by one of the co-trustees itself was the ‘landlord’ and that the ‘landlord’ was entitled to file a petition for eviction under the Rent Control Act and also referring the definition of ‘landlord’ mentioned in the Act.

Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts speaks in this regard as under:

  • “When there are more Shebaits than one, they constitute one body in the eyes of law, and all of them must act together. The management may be for practical purposes in the hands of one of the Shebaits who is called the managing Shebait or the Shebaits themselves may exercise their right of management by turns; but in neither case it is competent for one of the Shebaits to do anything in relation to the Debutter estate without the concurrence either express or implied of his co-Shebaits. This is of course, subject to any express direction given by the grantor.”[Quoted in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. LaxminathjiMaharaj: AIR 1985 All 228]

Managing Trustees Would be Entitled to Execute the Duties

The instrument of trust may provide that one or more trustees shall be managing trustees and where such provision is made, those who are empowered to act as managing trustees would be entitled to execute the duties of the office without the concurrence of the other co-trustees. But in the absence of such provision, all co-trustees must join in the execution of the duties of the office. [Atmaram Ranchhodbhai Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113; Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joo Deo: AIR 1978 All 1; Shanti Vijay and Co. Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzfa: AIR 1980 SC 17.]

In JP Srivastava and Sons Ltd. Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co [AIR 2005 SC 83] it is held by the Supreme Court as follows:

  • “Therefore, although as a rule, trustees must execute the duties of their office jointly, this general principle is subject to the following exceptions when one trustee may act for all:
  • (1) where the trust deed allows the trusts to be executed by one or more or by a majority of trustees;
  • (2) where there is express sanction or approval of the act by co-trustees;
  • (3) where the delegation of power is necessary;
  • (4) where the beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation;
  • (5) where the delegation to a co-trustee is in the regular course of the business,
  • (6) where the co-trustee merely gives effect to a decision taken by the trustees jointly.”

If the Trust Deed Permits One Trustee can Execute the Duties

The observation in J.P. Srivastava and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd., AIR 2005 SC 83; (2005) 1 SCC 172 – if the trust deed so permits, one trustee can execute the duties for other trustees also –  is referred to in the following decisions:

  • Charu Kishor Mehta v. Joint Charity Commissioner, 2015-8 SCC 207
  • Tapendro Mullick v. Kumar Mrigendro Mallick, 20193 CHN 640 (Cal)
  • Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Digvijaysingh Gangasingh, 2017-6 AllMR 346; 2018-1 MhLJ 259
  • Namdeo v. Shahi Gupta Masjid Chandrapur, 2014-3 AllMR 592; 2014-4 MhLJ 209
  • Shyamabai v. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha, 2014-1 AllMR 810; 2014-2 BomCR 436; 2014-2 MhLJ 547
  • Indian Youth Centres Trust v. Shishir Bajaj, 2012-193 DLT 584
  • Shyamabai v. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha, AIR 2010 Bom  88
  • Canbank Mutual Fund v. Nuclear Power Corporation, 2007-145 DLT 1; 2007-98 DRJ 464; ILR 2007-16 Dlh 1303.

A person/trustee is not bound to accept the trust; but having once accepted, he cannot renounce the duties and liabilities except with the permission of the Court or with the consent of the beneficiaries or under the authority of the trust deed itself.

Delegatus Non Potest Delegare (a delegate has no power to delegate, unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words by the terms of the deed or necessary implication (Director General, ESI Vs. T. Abdul Razak AIR 1996  SC 2292.Shanti Vijay And Co Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR1980 SC  17;Also see: Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309.) is a well-settled principle of law

‘Cy pres’ Doctrine

When it is found by the court that the particular mode of charity, indicated by the donor, cannot be carried on for impossibility or impracticability, the court will execute and accomplish the donor’s intention applying ‘cy pres’ doctrine.  It is applied where from lapse of time or change of circumstances it is no longer possible to apply the property left by the founder or donor in the precise way in which it was directed to be applied. [Balkrishna Vishvanath Vs. Vinayak Narayan: AIR 1932 Bom 191; AP Shah Vs. BM Institute of Mental Health: 1986  GLH 262.] It is based on the principle that the court is the protector of all charities; [C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia: AIR 1952 Kar14] and that the court will not allow to fail a validly created trust or objects of foundation. 

Invoking ‘cy pres’ doctrine the court will apply the property of the Trust to a charitable purpose ‘as nearly as possible’ [In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228]. Besides physical impossibility, becoming the trust valueless, owing to attendant circumstances, also invites application of cy pres doctrine [Hormusji Franji Warden, ILR 32  B. 214] resembling the original Trust.

The trustees are bound to carry out the directions of the author under Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act and the only way in which the directions of the testament may be varied is by applying ‘cy  pres’ doctrine.

Amendment of Objects in Trust Deed – If Only Original Trust-Deed Permitted

If only the original trust-deed permitted amendment to the objects of the trust, then only the object clauses could be amended. It is settled principle of trust law that once a trust is created and certain objects stipulated therein, even the settler has no power to delete any of the objects. [Association of University Teachers Tamilnadu, v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2012 3 MLJ 875]

CIT v. Kamala Town Trust,  AIR 1996 SC 620, 1996-7 SCC  349

The Apex Court considered the effect of amendment made to a trust deed – which had  earlier been rectified by a Civil Court – in CIT v. Kamala Town Trust,  AIR 1996 SC 620, 1996-7 SCC  349. It was held that whatever might be the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Civil Court under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to say that the trustees could administer the trust in accordance with the original deed and that the claim for exemption had to be dealt with on the basis of the original deed. It is held as under:

  • “In this connection it is profitable to have a look at the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Jagdamba Charity Trust v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi (Central) (1981) 128 I.T.R. 377. In that case Deed of Trust was got rectified by the parties from the Civil Court. These proceedings had to be initiated in the light of judgment of the High Court which had held that due to provisions in certain clauses of the Trust Deed the trust was non-charitable and the trust was not entitled to exemption under Income-tax Act and that since the decision had created some doubts regarding the validity of some clauses of the deed it was necessary that the deed should be rectified. The Civil Court granted a decree and directed that the Trust Deed be rectified. The question was whether such rectification order of the Civil Court was binding on the Income Tax Department when the assessee-trust armed with such rectification order claimed exemption from income tax under Section 11 of the 1961 Act. S. Ranganathan, J., as he then was, speaking for the Delhi High Court took the view that the word ‘instrument’ used in Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act has a very wide meaning and includes every document by which any right or liability is, or is purported to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. There is no reason to exclude a Trust Deed from its purview. A Trust Deed is a document which sets out the terms of an understanding between the author of the trust and the trustees. Though in form, the trustees are not signatories to the instrument as drawn up, they are parties to the instrument in a real sense for it is on the terms of the instrument that they accept office and proceed to administer the trust. The law obliges them to act upon the terms of the Trust Deed and they cannot commit a breach thereof. If a gift deed, sale deed or promissory note could be within the terms of the section, there is no reason why a Trust Deed cannot be rectified under Section 26. It was further held that since there was an order of Civil Court binding on the author and the trustees, they could administer the trust only in terms of the amendment directed by the Court. The trustees were and must be deemed, from the beginning, to have been under a legal obligation to hold the properties only for the object and with the powers set out in the Trust Deed as amended. Therefore, whatever might be the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Civil Court under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to say that the trustees could administer the trust in accordance with the original deed and that the claim for exemption had to be dealt with on the basis of the original deed. Nor was it open to the Income-tax Officer to say that in the relevant accounting year, the trustees held the property subject to the terms of the original and not the amended deed. In our view the aforesaid decision of the Delhi High Court lays down the correct legal position in connection with proceedings for rectification of instruments like trust deeds, initiated before competent civil courts under the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act.”

CIT, Amritsar v. Rattan Trust, AIR 1997 SC 2831; 1997-11 SCC 56

In this decision it is held as under:

  • “10. The requirements of the proviso with which we are concerned are (1) Trust should have been created before April 1, 1962 and (2) the trustees apply the funds of the Trust in concern in which they themselves are interested if there was a mandatory provision in the Trust Deed for such a purpose. The question which squarely falls for consideration is if the second condition should have been there is the Trust Deed before April 1, 1962 when the I.T. Act came into force or if such a condition could be added subsequently in the Trust Deed after this date if the propounder of the Trust in the Trust-Deed so authorised the trustees to amend the Trust-Deed allowing the trustees to invest the funds of the Trust in a concern in which they might be interested. To us it appears the answer is quite obvious that such a mandate in the Trust-Deed should have existed before April, 1, 1962 and could not have been brought in by amending the Trust-Deed at a later stage after that crucial date even if the Trust-Deed so authorised the Trustees to amend the Trust-Deed to bring in the mandatory condition or requirement for them to invest funds of the Trust in a concern in which they might be interested. Any other interpretation would set at naught the proviso and would defeat the very purpose for which the proviso was added in Section 13. If we accept any other interpretation then the Trustees even today could amend the Trust-Deed and bring in their case to fall within the proviso.”

Is Trust  a ‘Living Person’ under S. 5 of the TP Act 

Can transfer of property be made to or by Trusts/Associations?

Sec. 5 of the TP Act reads as under:

  • 5. “Transfer of property” defined:  In the following sections “transfer of property” means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such act.
  • In this section “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals.

Existing Laws as to Transfer of Property will Remain in Force

Two points are emphasised in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 5 –

  • First, all unregistered associations, whether incorporated or not, are ‘living persons’, so that transfer of property can be made.
  • Second, the qualifying second limb – ‘nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals‘ – made it clear:
    • if any law regulates transfer of property to (or by) companies, associations or bodies of individuals, it will remain in force.

Bodies of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act

It may also be pointed out that, “bodies of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act is wide in meaning; and it stands independent. It is broad enough to take-in Beneficiaries/ Trustees of a Trust.

Accordingly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

  • Note: Order 31 rule 1 CPC spells out – a trust is not a legal person. It enables to file a suit by (or be sued) a trustee concerning ‘property vested in trustees’.

Can ‘Law for the Time Being in Force’ Include ‘Common Law’

‘Law for the time being in force’ in Sec. 5 TP Act includes “common law”.

It is a reality – the common law of our country accepts as valid the ‘transfer of property’ made to or effected by well-known institutions, organisations, and associations attached to reputed trusts, institutions etc., though they are not juristic-persons in its strict senseOur courts sumptuously refer to such deeds as documents executed by or in favour of such entities, when they are referred to as exhibits. For example:

  • Settlement deed by Ashramam–Swayam  Prakash  Ashramam Vs. G Anandavally  Amma : AIR  2010 SC 622;
  • Settlement to trust – S N Mathur  Vs. Board of Revenue: 2009-13  SCC 301;
  • Sale deed by unregistered society – Suresh s/o. Bhagwanrao  Puri Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2016-3 AIR Bom R (Cri.) 603;
  • Gift to unregistered Association – Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna Satram: 1984-2 ALT 157;
  • Sale deed to an association – K. Kala Vs. Dist Registrar, Madurai: 2016 3 MLJ 50, 
  • Sale deed to an association – State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 P&H 218.
  • Sale deed to an association – Asst. Commr. Vs. Shivalingawwa: ILR 2003 Kar 2855;
  • Lease deed by trust to school – TNP Mothoo  Natarajan Vs. PV Ravi: 2015-2 MLJ (Cri.) 656;
  • Lease deed by a firm -2014-3 ALT 46;
  • Settlement deed to private trust –Kolli  Venkata Raja Vs. Govt. of AP: 2014-1 ALT 155;
  • Lease deed to a public trust –Nadigar  Sangham Charitable Trust, rep. by its managing Trustee, R. Sarathkumar Vs. S. Murugan:2013-1 MLJ 433;
  • Sale deed to Board of Trustees – Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chemists and Druggists Association Building Trust: 1995-215 ITR(Mad) 741;
  • Mortgage deed by a College – Sonar Bangla Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College:  AIR 1960 Cal 450.

Similarly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

It was held by our Apex Court in Kamaraju  Venkata Krishna Rao Vs. Sub Collector,  Ongole, AIR 1969 SC 563, that, under Hindu Law, a tank can be an object of charity and when a dedication was made in favour of a tank, the same was considered as a charitable institution. Without deciding whether that institution can also be considered as a juristic person, it was held that the same had to be registered in its name (ie., in the name of the tank) in the Inam register though it had continue to be managed by its Manager.

It is also noteworthy that Salmond on Jurisprudence reads: “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases.”

Also read:

End Notes:

Vesting of Property in Various Kinds of Associations and Trusts

Club, Society, Firm and Company

Nature of Association.Vesting of Management and Legal Ownership.Vesting  of actual/ ultimate ownershipWhether perma-nent or can it be put an end to
  ClubTrustees or Gov. Body, as per  ByelawsMembers, subject to the byelaws and objectives of foundation.Presumed to be not permanent.
Unregistred. Society/ Association  -do-  -do-Presumed to be permanent.
Registered Society-do--do-Permanent.  SR Act governs dissolution.
FirmPartnersPartnersContract/partnership deed governs
Trading CompanyBoard of DirectorsCompanyPermanent. Co. Act governs winding up.
Charitable or Non-trading company  -do-  -do-  -do-

Trusts/Religious-Endowments:

Public Trust– English Law  TrusteesLegal ownership in Trustees; beneficial ownership in Beneficiaries.  Permanent
Public Trust-Indian (common) Law    Trustees  Beneficiaries have only beneficial interest; and, no beneficial ownership. Theoretically, properties vest in public or section who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as established by evidence or as revealed from the deed of founda-tion or byelaws, if any.        Permanent
Public School, Public Library, etc.  Trustees (called by different names).    -do-  Permanent.
Private religious or charitable trustsManagement on Trustees (called by different names). If the trust/ institution/ endowment is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership will be vested upon it.Properties vest in trust/ institution/endowment itself.  If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person – property vests in such persons as established by evidence or the deed of foundation or byelaws.  Beneficiaries have no beneficial ownership.        Presumed to be permanent.
Mosque, Church, Gurudwara, etc.  Management on Trustees (by different names).  If the trust/ institution/ endowment is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership will be vested upon it.In trust/institution or endowment itself.  If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person – section of public who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as established by evidence or as revealed from the deed of foundation or bylaws, if any.  Permanent
  Temple (Public)Management on Shebaits/ Darmkarta/ Ooralen. Since Idol/deity is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership vests upon it.  Idol/deitydo-
 Temple (private)-do--do--do-
   MuttManagement on Madathipathi. Since Mutt is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership vests upon it.  Mutt-do-
Private Trust (Coming under the Trusts Act  Trustees  Terms/ Deed of Trust govern.Trusts Act governs Extinction and Revocation.

Government School, University, etc.

University, Govt. Hospital, Govt. College, etc.  Administrators as provided in the statute concerned  In the institution itself, if not expressly stated to be in the Government.Presumed to be permanent. (Permanent until decided to close by the Government.)

.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

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PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

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Evidence Act – General

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Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal: Landmark Decision on Trust – A Trust Cannot Be Made as a Party to a Litigation

Jojy George Koduvath.

See Earlier Article in ‘indianlawlive‘:
Does a Cheque-Case under NI Act Lie Against a Trust? Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR 2023-4 Ker 252 – Whether Correctly Decided?

Preface

Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ), 2025 INSC 1210 (09-10-2025), is a landmark decision on trust.

It held:

  • A Trust Is Not a Legal Person.
  • A Trust Operates through its Trustees.
  • Trustees Can Maintain and Defend a Suit.
  • Trust is an Obligation and not a Legal Entity.
  • No Legal Requirement For A Trust To Be Made A Party.
  • Just as a Managing Director is responsible for the affairs of a company, a Chairman or Managing Trustee is responsible for the affairs and administration of a Trust, within the powers and duties conferred by the Trust Deed and law.

Question Considered

Two principal questions arose for consideration in this case. They are:

  • (i) Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is maintainable against the Chairman or a Trustee of a Trust when the cheque in question has been issued on behalf of the Trust, without the Trust itself being made an accused; and
  • (ii) Whether the complainant under Section 138 must make specific averments regarding the accused-trustee’s role and responsibility in the conduct of the day-to-day affairs of the Trust, even though the person is admittedly a Trustee.

It arose from the decision of the Meghalaya High Court (2023-1 GLT 344) which quashed the proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate, Shillong.

The Impugned High Court Judgment

The respondent issued a Cheque to the complainant under the signature of the respondent as authorised signatory of Orion, a trust. The Cheque was dishonoured. It led to the filing of a complaint under Sections 138 and 142 of the NI Act, as well as under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Respondent preferred a Criminal Petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, before the High Court seeking to quash the complaint, on the ground, inter alia, that Orion (Trust) is a juristic entity and a necessary party.

Part I

Apex Court Adjudicated –  Trust is NOT a Legal Person

Decisions relied on (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) to show – Trust is not a ‘legal entity’ capable of being sued – are:

  • 1. Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712.
  • 2. K P Shibu v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 7585, 2019 (3) KHC 1.

Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank

In Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712, it is held

  • A Trust is not a person.
  • It could not be a consumer.
  • A Trust cannot be a complainant.
  • It would not fall under the definition of ‘person’ as per Section 2(m) of the Consumer Protection Act.

The Apex Court, in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra, quoted the following from the Pratibha Pratisthan case-

  • “4. A reading of the definition of the words “complaint”, “complainant” and “consumer” makes it clear that a trust cannot invoke the provisions of the Act in respect of any allegation on the basis of which a complaint could be made. To put this beyond any doubt, the word “person” has also been defined in the Act and Section 2(1)(m) thereof defines a “person” as follows:
    • “2. (1)(m) “person” includes—
    • (i) a firm whether registered or not;
    • (ii) a Hindu undivided family;
    • (iii) a cooperative society;
    •  (iv) every other association of persons whether registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or not;”
  • 5. On a plain and simple reading of all the above provisions of the Act it is clear that a trust is not a person and therefore not a consumer. Consequently, it cannot be a complainant and cannot file a consumer dispute under the provisions of the Act.”

After quoting Sections 3 (definition of Trust) and 13 (Trustee to protect title to trust-property) of the Trust Act, the Apex Court observed in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal as under:

  • “23. To our mind, the above-extracted Sections of the Trusts Act would also favour the view we are taking, as the obligation to ‘maintain and defend’ suits is placed on the shoulders of a Trustee and not the Trust itself. It is clear that only a Trustee has the obligation to file, maintain and defend any suit on behalf of the Trust. Meaning thereby, that a Trust does not have a separate legal existence of its own, making it incapable of suing or being sued.”

KP Shibu v. State of Kerala

The Kerala High Court, in  KP Shibu v. State of Kerala (B. Sudheendra Kumar, J.), 2019 (3) KHC 1, held –

  • Trustees can maintain and defend a suit to protect the Trust property.
  • A Trust is not a juristic person or a legal entity, and has no legal existence of its own.
  • A Trust itself cannot sue or be sued in a court of law.
  • A Trust would not fall within the term ‘association of individuals’.

In Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal the Apex Court quoted the following from KP Shibu v. State of Kerala, 2019 (3) KHC 1-

  • “16. Thus, it is clear from the above provisions that all the trustees are the owners of the property, but they are obliged to use the same in a particular manner. If a number of trustees exist, they are the joint owners of the property. The trustees are bound to maintain and defend all suits, for the preservation of the trust-property and the assertion or protection of the title thereto. Thus, it appears that the “Trust” is not capable of suing and being sued in a court of law, even though the trustees can maintain and defend suits for the preservation and protection of the trust-property. Therefore, a “Trust” is not a juristic person or a legal entity, as the juristic person has a legal existence of its own and hence it is capable of suing and being sued in a court of law. Thus, it appears that a “Trust” is not like a body corporate, which has a legal existence of its own and therefore can appoint an agent. The above discussion would make it clear that a “Trust” is not a body corporate.”

Trust is an Obligation and not a Legal Entity

Trust, as defined under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 is an obligation and not a legal entity.

The Apex Court, while discussing this matter, referred (with approval) the following decisions placed by the Appellant:

  • KR Rajan v. Cherian K Cherian, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 4699 (Kerala High Court)
  • Duli Chand v. M/s MPTC Charitable Trust, 1983 SCC OnLine Del 270 (Delhi High Court)
  • V Chandrasekaran v. Venkatanaicker Trust, 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 33745 (Madras High Court)
  • Narayana Iyer v. Anandammal Adheena Trust, (2021) 3 CTC 776; (Madras High Court)
  • Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin v. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat Ahmedabad, AIR 1968 Guj 184 (Gujarat High Court)
  • Vijay Sports Club v State of Bengal, 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 2331 (Calcutta High Court).

A Trust operates through its Trustees

After referring the aforestated decisions, the Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) said as under:

  • “25. …. A Trust is also not like a corporation which has a legal existence of its own and therefore can appoint an agent. A Trust operates through its Trustees, who are legal entities. We may gainfully refer to the decision of the Kerala High Court in KR Rajan (supra), where the said Court has rightly held:
  • ‘7. The legal status of a trust, is thus well discernible. Trust not being a legal person, and the Code of Civil Procedure not providing any enabling provision for the Trust to sue or for being sued in its name, there is no merit in the contention that the Trust is to be arrayed as a co-nominee party. The arraying of the trust in its own name is otiose or redundant. It is the trustees who are to be impleaded to represent the trust. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner on the ground of non-joinder, also fails’.”

Trust Is An Obligation Imposed On The Ostensible Owner – Trustee

The Apex Court held further as under (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal):

  • “26. Ergo, it is clear that though a Trust may act or even be treated as an entity for certain legal purposes and not all legal purposes, a Trust is an obligation imposed on the ostensible owner of the property to use the same for a particular object – for the benefit of a named beneficiary or charity, and it is the Trustee(s) who are bound to maintain and defend all suits and to take such other steps with regard to the nature, land or the value of the Trust property, that may be reasonably required for the preservation of the Trust property, and the assertion of protection of title thereto, subject to the provisions of the instructions of Trust to take such other steps.”

No Legal Requirement For A Trust To Be Made A Party

The Apex Court held further as under (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal):

  • “27. There exists no ambiguity about there being no legal requirement for a Trust to be made a party in a proceeding before a Court of Law since it is only a/the Trustee(s) who are liable and answerable for acts done or alleged to have been done for and on behalf of the said Trust. From a perusal of Orion’s Deed of Trust, of which the Respondent is the Chairman/Authorized Signatory, it emerges clearly that the relevant clauses deal with the Trustee insofar as administering and holding the funds and properties of the Trust are concerned. Which is to say that the Trust (i.e., Orion) operates only through the Trustee(s) and that the objects thereof were for charitable purposes. The Deed of Trust also provides for permitting one or more Trustees to operate a bank account. It becomes all the more apparent that it is the Trustees alone, through whom the Trust funds/property(ies) are managed and dealt with. The Trust itself is without any independent legal status.”

Apex Court Disapproved Prana Educational Trust Case

The Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) disapproved Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala, 2023 (6) KHC 175, holding as under:

  • “32. We do not approve of the manner in which the learned Single Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust  (supra) decided to ignore binding precedent in K P Shibu (supra), which was a judgment rendered by another learned Single Judge of the same Court, earlier in point of time, merely by noting ‘it is discernible that the said decision is not so elaborative and the interpretation of the term “association of individuals” not done by applying the ratio of ejusdem generis.’ It was not open to the learned Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) to prefer the view expressed by other High Courts in preference to the view of a Bench of the own High Court of equal strength expressed previously. At the most, recording his disagreement with the view in K P Shibu (supra), the learned Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) ought to have referred the matter to the learned Chief Justice of the High Court seeking constitution of a larger Bench. The only other way Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) could have gotten over K P Shibu (supra) despite being a co-equal Bench would have been by undertaking an analysis via the principles of per incuriam and/or sub-silentio, as undertaken by a 3-Judge Bench recently in A Raja v D Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1033. We say this illustratively. Not as a matter of routine can a later Bench of equal strength refuse to follow an earlier decision of a Bench of equal strength. The law hereon was stated in National Insurance Company Limited v Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 and Union Territory of Ladakh v Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140. Therefore, while not disturbing Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) inter- parties, we declare the statement of law therein incorrect to the extent it rules on the issue before us, on account of failure to adhere to binding precedent.”

Read Also:

Part II

Requirement of Averments – Role of Trustee-Accused in Affairs of Trust

The position of a Managing Director in a company carries responsibility for its affairs. A similar principle applies to Trusts — the Trustees (authorised signatory or Managing Trustee, where designated) are responsible for the administration and conduct of the Trust’s affairs, subject to the powers and duties defined by the Trust Deed and applicable law.

The Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) relied upon the decision SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89 [3-Judge Bench], wherein it was held that a position of a Managing Director would suggest responsibility of the person holding the said position, in the day-to-day affairs of the Company.

The following portion from SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) is quoted by the Apex Court.

  • “…. The answer to the question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. …
  • …. the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141.”

The Apex Court also sought support from KK Ahuja v. VK Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48, which held as under:

  • “27. The position under Section 141 of the Act can be summarised thus:
  • .(i) If the accused is the Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he is in charge of, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. It is sufficient if an averment is made that the accused was the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director at the relevant time. This is because the prefix “Managing” to the word “Director” makes it clear that they were in charge of and are responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company.”

The Apex Court also relied on Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, (2022) 10 SCC 152, where it was observed:

  • “36. The High Court also rightly held that the Managing Director or Joint ManagingDirector would admittedly be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business by virtue of the office they hold as Managing Director or Joint Managing Director. These persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, and they get covered under Section 141 of the NI Act.”

End Notes

Trustees Can Maintain and Defend a Suit

Sections 3 and 13 of the Trusts Act read thus:

  • “3. Interpretation-clause:
  • Trust”—A “trust” is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner;
  • the person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the “author of the trust”; the person who accepts the confidence is called the “trustee”;
  • the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the “beneficiary”; the subject-matter of the trust is called “trust-property” or “trust money”;
  • the “beneficial interest” or “interest” of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust-property; and the instrument, if any, by which the trust is declared is called the “instrument of trust”;
  • a breach of any duty imposed on a trustee, as such, by any law for the time being in force, is called a “breach of trust”; and in this Act, unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context, “registered” means registered under the law for the registration of documents for the time being in force;
  • a person is said to have “notice” of a fact either when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from inquiry or gross negligence, he would have known it, or when information of the fact is given to or obtained by his agent, under the circumstances mentioned in the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Section 229;
  • and all expressions used herein and defined in the Indian Contract Act, 1872, shall be deemed to have the meanings respectively attributed to them by that Act.
  • xxx
  • 13. Trustee to protect title to trust-property—A trustee is bound to maintain and defend all such suits, and (subject to the provisions of the instrument of trust) to take such other steps as, regard being had to the nature and amount or value of the trust-property, may be reasonably requisite for the preservation of the trust-property and the assertion or protection of the title thereto.”

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Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

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Right of a Co-Accused or Co-Defendant to Cross-Examine another Accused’s/Defendant’s Witness is Limited – It is Possible Only When the Statement of the Witness Becomes “Adverse”

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

Article 21 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty: The Supreme Court has consistently held that Article 21 includes the right to a fair trial, which necessarily includes the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.

In Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “In the Indian Criminal jurisprudence, the accused is placed on a somewhat advantageous position than under different jurisprudence of some of the countries in the world. The criminal justice administration system in India places human rights and dignity for human life at a much higher pedestal. In our jurisprudence an accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty, the alleged accused is entitled to fairness and true investigation and fair trial and the prosecution is expected to play balanced role in the trial of a crime. The investigation should be judicious, fair, transparent and expeditious to ensure compliance to the basic rule of law. These are the fundamental canons of our criminal jurisprudence and they are quite in conformity with the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India.” (Quoted in: Rattiram v. State of M.P., AIR 2012 SC 1485; (2012) 4 SCC 516)

INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 (Indian Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2025)

Section 138, Indian Evidence Act  

  • Order of Examinations “Witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined.”
  • Any adverse party has the right to cross-examine.
  • If a co-accused’s interests are adverse to the witness or to the party calling the witness, the co-accused becomes an “adverse party” for that limited purpose and may cross-examine.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 (CrPC) Indian Nagarik Suraksha Sanhitha, 2025

Evidence for Prosecution

Section 231 CrPC:

  • The prosecution shall be called upon to lead evidence, and the accused shall have the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.

Section 233, CrPC

  • Evidence for Defence: The accused may enter on his defence and produce his own witnesses.

Court Decisions

(a) In Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, AIR 1949 PC 257

  • The Privy Council (Sir John Beaumont) observed – “A confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of ‘evidence’ contained in S. 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination.” (Quoted in: Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184; Adambhai Sulemanbhai Ajmeri v. State of Gujarat, 2014-7 SCC 716; Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh VS Republic of India, AIR 2011 SC 1436; 2011-2 SCC 490; Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253.)

 (b) In P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 2012 SC 2242

  • Our Supreme Court examined the scope of the provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and held as under:
  • “Grant of fairest opportunity to the accused to prove his innocence was the object of every fair trial, observed this Court in Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector of Customs, Amritsar, (2000) 10 SCC 430. The following passage is in this regard apposite:
  • ‘In such circumstances, if the new Counsel thought to have the material witnesses further examined, the Court could adopt latitude and a liberal view in the interest of justice, particularly when the Court has unbridled powers in the matter as enshrined in Section 311 of the Code. After all the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts should afford the opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible.’
  • ‘We are conscious of the fact that recall of the witnesses is being directed nearly four years after they were examined in chief about an incident that is nearly seven years old….. we are of the opinion that on a parity of reasoning and looking to the consequences of denial of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, we would prefer to err in favour of the appellant getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against a possible prejudice at his cost. Fairness of the trial is a virtue that is sacrosanct in our judicial system and no price is too heavy to protect that virtue. A possible prejudice to prosecution is not even a price, leave alone one that would justify denial of a fair opportunity to the accused to defend himself.” (Quoted in: Natasha Singh v. CBI, 2013 5 SCC 741)

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 (CPC)

CPC does not expressly mention “cross-examination” though its procedural framework implies it through:

  • Order XVIII Rule 4 & 5: Evidence of witnesses to be taken orally in open court (subject to cross-examination by the adverse party).
    • Order XVIII Rule 2(2): Parties have the right to “state their case and produce their evidence.”
    • Order XVIII Rule 15: Continuation of hearing by successor judge includes evidence and cross-examination already done.

When several defendants are present, and their defences are mutually adverse, each defendant has the right to cross-examine the witness of the other.

Principle in Civil Trials

  • If the defenses of co-defendants are joint or identical, one defendant cannot cross-examine the other’s witness as an “adverse party.”
    • But if their defenses are hostile or conflicting, each becomes an adverse party and gains the right to cross-examine.

Treatises

Sarkar on Evidence, eight edition p.1141, it is said as under:

  • No special provision is made in the Evidence Act for the cross-examination of the co-accused’s or co-defendant’s witnesses. But the procedure to be adopted may be regulated by the well-known rule that no evidence should be received against one who had no opportunity of testing it by cross-examination; as it would be unjust and unsafe not to allow a co-accused or co- defendant to cross-examine witness called by one whose case was adverse to his, or who has given evidence against. If there is no clash of interest or if nothing has been said against the other party, there cannot be any right of cross-examination.

Quoted in:

  • Ennen Castings Private Ltd. v. Sundaresh, AIR 2003 Kar 293
  • Chinnaiah v. Valliammal, 2023-3 LW 356; 2023-4 MLJ 544
  • Akhilesh Singh v. Krishan Bahadur Singh, 2020-4 CivCC 779; 2020-1 JLJ 452; 2020-1 MPLJ 457
  • Shiv Pratap Singh Tomar v. Seema Tomar, 2018(1) MPWN 118; 2018 (4) MPLJ 74
  • Bhajinder Singh v. Hardev Singh, 2017-3 CivCC 260; 2017-238 DLT 422; 2017-3 LJR 7
  • Mohamed Ziaulla v. Sorgra Begum, 1997 ILR Kar 1378; 1997-5 KarLJ 709
  • Sohan Lal VS Gulab Chand, AIR 1966 Raj 229

In ‘Principles and Digest of the Law of Evidence’ by M. Monir, third edition, p.1114 , it is said as under:

  • “A defendant may cross-examine a co-defendant or any other witness who has given evidence against him, and reply on such evidence, though there is no issue joined between them.”

Phipson on Evidence, tenth edition, para.1538 reads as under:

  • “A defendant may cross-examine a co-defendant or any other witness who has given evidence against him, and reply on such evidence though there is no issue joined between them.”

Court Decisions

1. In Ennen Castings Private Ltd. v. Sundaresh, AIR 2003 Kar 293, it is said as under:

  • “9. AS a general rule, evidence is not legally admissible against a party, who at the time it was given had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness or of rebutting their testimony by other evidence. When two or more persons are tried on the same indictment and are separately defended any witness called by one of them may be cross-examined on behalf of the others, if he gives any testimony to criminate them. A defendant may cross-examine his co-defendant who gives evidence or any of his co-defendant’s witnesses, if his co-defendant’s interest is hostile to his own.
  • 10.  THOUGH there is no specific provision in the Indian Evidence Act providing for such an opportunity for a defendant-respondent to cross-examine a co-defendant/co-respondent, however, having regard to the object and scope of cross-examination, it is settled law that when allegations are made against the party to the proceedings before that evidence could be acted upon, that party should have an ample opportunity to cross-examine the person who had given the evidence against him. It is only after such an opportunity is given, and witness is cross-examined that evidence becomes admissible.”

2. In Shiv Pratap Singh Tomar v. Seema Tomar, 2018(1) MPWN 118; 2018 (4) MPLJ 74, after quoting the above treatise it was observed as under:

  • “8. Though there is no specific provision in the Indian Evidence Act providing for such an opportunity for a defendant-respondent to cross-examine a co-defendant/ co-respondent, however, having regard to the object and scope of cross-examination, it is settled law that when allegations are made against the party to the proceedings, before that evidence could be acted upon, that party should have an ample opportunity to cross-examine the person who had given the evidence against him. It is only after such an opportunity is given, and the witness is cross-examined that evidence becomes admissible. (Quoted in:)

3. In Akhilesh Singh v. Krishan Bahadur Singh, 2020-4 CivCC 779; 2020-1 JLJ 452; 2020-1 MPLJ 457, (after quoting the said passages in Shiv Pratap Singh Tomar v. Seema Tomar, 2018(1) MPWN 118; 2018 (4) MPLJ 74) it was held as under:,

  • “9. Therefore, it is very clear from the aforesaid passages that it is settled law that no evidence should be received against one who had no opportunity of testing it by cross-examination; as it would be unjust and unsafe not to allow a co-accused or co-defendant to cross-examine a witness called by one whose case was adverse to him, or who has given evidence against. If there is no conflict of interest, such an opportunity need not to given. Therefore, the condition precedent for giving an opportunity to a defendant/respondent to cross-examine a co-respondent or a defendant is either from the pleadings of the parties or in the evidence, there should exist conflict of the interest between them. Once it is demonstrated that their interests is not common and there is a conflict of interest and evidence has been adduced, affecting the interest of the co-defendant/ co-respondents, then before the Court could act on that evidence, the person against whom the evidence is given should have an opportunity to cross-examine the said witness, so that ultimately truth emerges on the basis of which the Court can act.”

Conclusion

The right to cross-examine is both a statutory and constitutionally guaranteed right.

  • On the criminal side, a co-accused may cross-examine another’s witness only when the testimony adversely affects him.
  • On the civil side, a co-defendant may do so only when their defences are conflicting or adverse.

This doctrine ensures the principle of natural justice — audi alteram partem.

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