Survey Plan and Area Calculation: A Cursory Look

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

A survey plan shows the shape and size of a property. It also helps to calculate the area of the land. Section 82 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, provides as under:

  • “82. Presumption as to maps or plans made by authority of Government: The Court shall presume that maps or plans purporting to be made by the authority of the Central Government or any State Government were so made, and are accurate; but maps or plans made for the purposes of any cause must be proved to be accurate.”

A proper survey commission report, supported by a correct and reliable survey plan, is indispensable for the effective adjudication of a large number of civil disputes. Courts and advocates should have a general idea and understanding of surveys and survey plans.

F-lines and G-lines

In survey plans, two types of lines are commonly seen—continuous lines and broken (or dashed) lines. Alongside the survey plan, we also see the field book (or ladder).

Continuous lines show the outer Field-lines (F-lines) of the plot.

Broken lines in a survey plan represent the Guidelines (or Baselines) called G-lines drawn from one bend or a corner of the plot to an opposite bend or corner.

  • The purpose of a G-line is to measure the perpendicular distances (offsets) from the G-line to the boundary bends on either side of the G-line. It is for dividing the land into imaginary right-angle triangles (triangles with one angle of 90 degrees) or trapeziums (four-sided quadrilaterals, two sides of which lie parallel), enabling the area to be calculated in a simple and systematic manner.
  • In surveying practice, these internal G-lines are fixed first, as an axis, and the measurement begins from the starting point of a G-line.

In the case of a large plot, there may be more than one G-line with a view to making the entire plot into triangles or trapeziums.

Offsets Fixed with the Cross-Staff

In surveying, the cross-staff is used to measure the offsets (perpendicular distances from the G-lines to the boundary bends). The cross staff is used to ensure a 90-degree angle for every offset.

Calculation of Area

Each triangle and trapezium, stated above, is shaped in the following manner:

  • Triangle: The required portion of the G-line will be its one side; the offset measurement will be the second side; and the outer field boundary (F-line) will be the third side.
  • Trapezium: Apart from the G-line portion and the outer boundary, two (parallel) offsets are taken into consideration for forming the four sides.

The area of a right-angle triangle is calculated using Heron’s formula. It is:

  • Area = ½ base × altitude.

The area of certain parts (triangles that are not right-angle triangles) may have to be calculated with the side measurements of the triangles. The formula applied in such a case, with side measurements a, b and c, is the following:

  • A = √[s(s-a)(s-b)(s-c)]
  • ‘s’ is the semi-perimeter of the triangle given by s = ½ of (a + b + c).

In certain cases, a portion of the area between two G-lines may need to be calculated by drawing (and measuring) a diagonal (check line) to form two triangles.

Trapeziums are formed between two G-lines or between two offsets. The area of a trapezium is calculated using the following formula:

  • A = ½ of (a + b) × h, where a and b are the lengths of the parallel sides and h is the perpendicular distance between them (required length of the G-line).

Surveying Steps Taken by the Surveyor

The surveyor follows these steps:

  • A rough sketch (draft) of the plot is prepared.
  • One or more G-lines are fixed and drawn in the sketch. The beginning and end points of each G-line are shown with letters (A–B; if there are multiple G-lines, they are placed as C–D, E–F, and so on).
  • To fix and measure the offset length — from the G-line to the boundary-bend (which are marked L, M, N, O, P, etc.) — the cross-staff is used. Flags will be placed at the starting and end points of the G-line, and also at the bend. The surveyor aligns the cross-staff along the G-line by sighting (i) the beginning and end points of the G-line through the slit of the cross-staff and (ii) the required outer bend through the opposite cross-slit.
  • After fixing the cross staff as stated above, the distance (i) from the beginning point of the G-line to the position of the cross staff, (ii) the distance from the outer bend to the G-line (position of the cross staff), and (iii) the outer boundary forming the third side of the triangle, or the fourth side of the trapezium are measured, and the measurements are duly entered in the diagram.
  • In this manner, all offsets—namely, the distances measured from the bends to the G-lines —and the lengths of the outer field boundaries, are taken and recorded in the sketch.

Field Book or Ladder

The field book is usually recorded in the following pattern:

D (75.0)
69.02.0T
68.027.0S
43.07.0R
38.015.0Q
23.02.0P
16.07.0O
10.05.0N
5.05.0M
C
B
(192.0)
L11.0190.0
M14.0188.0
N15.0157.08.0Z
O13.0132.028.0Y
P13.0124.020.0X
Q10.0115.028.0W
R12.0100.0 26.0 V
 S1 3.088.032.0U
 T1 3.076.024.0D
U110.049.0 
V110.027.0  
  4.06.0C
2.03.0L
  A  

It is prepared in the following manner:

  • AB and CD are G-lines.
  • At the bottom, the starting point (alphabet A) of the G-line (AD) is entered.
  • Above it, the distance from the point A to the first offset point on the G-line (2.0 metres) is written.
  • Since the first offset (first bend) is towards the right, the offset distance (3.0 metres) is entered in the right-hand column, and the corresponding boundary bend (L) is stated in the further right column.
  • The second offset (second bend) is also towards the right, the offset distance (6.0 metres) is entered in the right-hand column, and the corresponding boundary bend (C) is stated in the further right column.
  • The third offset being 27 meters away from the point A, and the length of the offset is 10 meters, these matters are also entered.
  • In this manner, entire boundary points (letters L to Z1) and the offset points and measurements are entered.
    • Note: If a and b are the sides of the 90-degree angle of a rectangle triangle, the length of the opposite side (hypotenuse) will be √[a2 + b2]. It is represented by: c2 = a2 + b2.
    • The measurements of all the trapeziums can be checked, applying the formula: c2 = a2 + b2 (after measuring/ drawing the diagonals, or check-lines, in these trapeziums).

Read also:

Area Calculation

  • Areas of all the triangles and trapeziums are calculated using the required formula.
  • Finally, the areas (all triangles and trapeziums) are added together to get the total extent of the property.

End Notes:

Accuracy Presumed on Govt. Maps and Plans u/s 82 BSA (83, IEA)

In Dnyaneshwar Balu Patole v State of Maharashtra, 2011 AllMR(Cri) 1889; 2011-4 MhLJ(Cri) 208, it is held as under:

  • “From the language of section 83 (IEA), it is clear that Court shall presume that the maps or plans purporting to be made by the authority of the Central Government or any State Government were so made and are accurate but maps or plans made for the purposes of any cause must be proved to be accurate. It shows that when plans of town or area or certain roads, forests, rivers, nalas, etc. are prepared for public record and general information there is presumption of its accuracy. However, when a map is prepared for particular cause or purpose, there is no presumption of accuracy and that map has to be proved by leading necessary evidence. If a map is prepared by the investigating agency to prove scene of offence ,that map is prepared for the particular purpose, i.e., to establish scene of offence and certain facts, which the prosecution wants to establish, there can not be any presumption of accuracy to such map. Such map will have to be proved like any other fact by leading necessary evidence.”

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Admissibility and Proof of (i) Photographs and (ii) Copies of Videos, Invoking “Silent Witness” Theory

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Key Points at a Glance

  • The only statutorily recognised mode of proof of a Computer Output (copy) is the production of a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA .
  • This certificate is accepted unless its correctness is specifically challenged.
  • A photograph or a copy of video stands on a distinct footing (in contradistinction to a statement-of-account) by reason of the statutory presumptions that the court can invoke.
  • The court is entitled to infer that a photograph or video correctly represents the scene or object as it existed at the time of recording, under the silent witness’ theory – the document “speaks for itself”.
  • A photograph or a video, by its very nature, speaks for itself. Upon its due admission in evidence, the court can act upon it, on the basis of general evidence, such as the identity of the persons seen in the photograph, the place, the time, or the occasion in which the photo or video was taken, without insisting upon further formal or technical proof.
  • The presumption attached to a photograph or a video is a rebuttable one.

Presumptions on Photographs and Videos

Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (Section 114 of the Evidence Act) allows the Court to

  • ‘presume the existence of any fact ….. regard being had to the common course of natural events‘.

A photograph or a video, by its very nature, speaks for itself. The law does not require the proponent to disprove every possibility of manipulation. Therefore, the courts in India can commence with a presumption as to the correctness of the photograph or video, placing the onus on the opposite party to rebut that presumption by placing material on record sufficient to dislodge or shift the same.

Invoking this general presumption, as regards the video properly admitted in evidence, the courts in India have consistently held –

  • ‘a mere bald denial of the contents of a video recording is insufficient‘; but, ‘there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed (See: Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1; State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129.)

Photographs – In many cases, a Corroborative Piece; It Can be the Best Evidence also

A photograph, being a document, ordinarily requires proof through a proper witness to establish its authenticity and relevance. However, it need not invariably be proved by examining the photographer, and may be proved through any competent witness capable of speaking to the facts depicted or the circumstances of its production. Once duly admitted, a photograph may constitute primary or substantive evidence, though in many cases it is used to corroborate other evidence.

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it is held that CCTV footage can be a ‘Best Evidence‘. The court said it as under:

  • “Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, prosecution in possession of the best evidence– CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced.”

In short, a photograph or video, once duly admitted and properly proved, constitutes substantive evidence. Though in many cases it is relied upon as corroborative evidence, in an appropriate case it may, by itself, establish the fact in issue, independently and without the aid of other evidence.

The probative value of a document is a matter for the court

Though in many cases a photograph or video is relied upon only as a corroborative piece of evidence, it can be substantive and independent evidence. It may also be a ‘best evidence‘, as shown above.

It is also important – the determination of the probative value of a document is a matter for the court. In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684, it is observed:

  • “Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”

Silent Witnesses Theory – Photograph /Video Speaks for Itself

In State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, the Madras High Court explained the “silent witness” theory, stating as under:

  • “115. We may also incidentally notice the developments in the law on video and photographic evidence in the West where the “silent witness” theory is deployed to admit video and photographic evidence. The theory proceeds on the footing that photographic and video evidence are “silent witnesses” which speak for themselves. They are substantive evidence of what they portray.”

The following two foreign decisions were specifically dealt with by the High Court:

  • (a) State of Nevada v. Archanian, [145 P 3d 1008 (2006)]: The Supreme Court of Nevada admitted the video evidence under the silent witness theory and held as under:
    • “There is no evidence suggesting that the composite videotape was inaccurate, that any relevant or exculpatory information had been deleted from it, or that the modifications made to it adversely affected or obscured the content.”
  • (b) Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, [2017 ONCJ 790,]: The Ontario Court of Justice in Canada opined to the following effect:
    • The party seeking to tender a video in evidence must show two things to meet the threshold test of admissibility: (i) The video is relevant, showing the crime scene or other evidence linked to the issues at trial; and (ii) the video is authentic — that it accurately represents the events depicted.

Bald Denials are Insufficient to Discredit the Authenticity of Video Footage

The Madras High Court, in this decision (State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi), also observed as under:

  • “113. It is true that the cameraman can zoom or minimize an image. It is also true that trick photography is possible. In Suo Motu taken up (PIL) WP Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others (WP 3335 etc. of 2009) decided on 29.10.2009, a Division Bench of this Court (F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla and R. Banumathi, JJ) held that bald denials are insufficient to discredit the authenticity of video footage. In her lead judgment, Banumathi, J (as she then was) has opined as under:
    • ‘349. That a bald denial of the contents of a videotape is not adequate to doubt its authenticity; there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed’.
  • The Division Bench proceeded to look into the video tape as a corroborative piece of evidence and held as under:
    • ‘350. The respondents have not disputed that the video clippings filed by the petitioners relate to the occurrence. Even though video clippings filed by the petitioners do not have the running time, we have watched the videos and looked into the photos as corroborative piece of evidence’.”

In Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1, the conclusion of the Speaker on CDs received from TV News channels, that ‘there is no room for doubting the authenticity and accuracy of the electronic evidence produced by the petitioner’, was accepted by the Apex Court holding as under:

  • “The petitioners despite grant of opportunity had declined to watch the recorded interview. It is one thing to watch the interview, point out in what manner the recording was not genuine but instead of availing of that opportunity, the petitioners preferred to adopt the course of vague denial.”

In Umesh v. State of Karnataka, 2023-2 KarLJ 397, while dealing with a ‘trap case’, after laying down the importance of digital evidence, it is cautioned as under:

  • “Qualified and trained expert should test the samples. The report should contain the procedure adopted for testing the samples. The equipments used should be duly calibrated and updated periodically. The electronic device should be tested for editing and tampering in order to establish its genuineness and authenticity.
  • Digital evidence form be created for every memory card/chip used in the trap case containing the unique identification features of the memory chip/card used. The defence should be provided with a cloned copy or a mirror image of the electronic device.”

Distinct Evidentiary Position of a Section 63(4) Certificate

Once the Section 63(4) certificate accompanies the computer output (copy), the computer output becomes admissible in evidence, and it is not mandatory to examine the CCTV operator, or the person who snapped the photograph, for the purpose of its admission.

  • See: Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473,
  • Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1.

The Person Who Signed Section 63/65B Certificate Need Not Be Examined: Having regard to the special features of the photographs and videos (that is, visual depictions of facts), even if the Section 63(4) certificate is not that given either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, but by another, the photograph or video can be marked in evidence through the plaintiff or the defendant.

Unless the authenticity or correctness of the certificate issued under Section 63(4) is specifically disputed, oral evidence has no role to play in proving (for the purpose of marking) that the computer output is the exact copy of the (original) electronic record. Therefore, the photographer who issued the certificate under Section 63(4) need not be examined if the correctness of the certificate is not specifically disputed.

In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, our Apex Court further affirmed as under:

  • “50. … However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such certificate be given by such person/persons.”

Definition of Document Includes Photographs and Videos

Section 2(1)(d) of the Bharat Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), defines ‘document’ as under:

  • “ (d) ‘document’ means any matter expressed or described or otherwise recorded upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or any other means or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter and includes electronic and digital records.”

By virtue of Section 63 of the BSA, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (computer output) shall be ‘deemed to be also a document’.

Section 3(18), General Clauses Act, 1897, defines document as under:

  • Document shall include any matter written, expressed, or described upon any substances by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means which is intended to be used, or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter.”

Section 2(8) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, defines ‘document’ as any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, and includes electronic and digital record, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.

Going by the definitions, ‘document‘ includes not only all materials or substances upon which thoughts of a man are represented by writing or any other species of conventional mark or symbol, but also records of information of some sort (Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State, 2014 KerHC 31).

Electronic Record is Documentary Evidence

It is well established — under Section 3 of the Evidence Act (Sec. 2(1)(d) of the BSA), the electronic record produced for the inspection of the Court is documentary evidence (Anwar PV v. PK Basheer, 2014-10 SCC 473).

In P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1, it is observed that the following were “documents” under Section 3 of the Evidence Act-

  • (i) tape records of speeches (See also: Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, 2010-4 SCC 329; Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra(1976) 2 SCC 17 ) and
  • (ii) audio/video cassettes (See: Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, 1976-2 SCC 17) including compact disc (See also: Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016-15 SCC 485).

Presumption on Computer Output (copy) Admitted under Sec. 63

A computer output (copy) of a CCTV footage or video, or of a photograph captured on a mobile phone, can be admitted in evidence in place of the original — if it is produced with a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA.

  • Note: Section 63(1), BSA says about admissibility of copy — “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.”

Proof by Certificate under Section 63(4)

In view of the non-obstante clause (“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam”) in Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the only Mode of Proof of a computer output (copy) is the evidence through a certificate under Section 63(4).

  • Therefore, even in cases where formal proof of the digital photos or videos is dispensed with (for the opposite party admits it), a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA is necessary.

Admission and Proof of Computer Output (copy): Independent Matters

(i) Admitting a copy of a computer output (such as copy of a statement of accounts) in evidence (with a certificate under Section 63), and (ii) the formal proof thereof at the time of trial, are two distinct and independent matters.

  • The questions as to substantive proof — whether the computer output or copy is relevant, and how it should be proved — are not determined by Section 63 of the BSA. They are to be established independently, as in the case of any other class of documents.

The burden of Impeaching the Certificate is upon the Party who Disputes it

The presumption arising under Section 63—by which a computer output is deemed to be a document—is rebuttable and does not render the contents of the electronic record conclusive.

If such a challenge on the certificate is overruled by the court, it can draw a presumption as to the genuineness and authenticity of the photographs or videos contained in the computer output (copies).

S. 63 deals with Admissibility of computer output or copy, and not Proof

The questions as to substantive proof — whether the computer output or copy is relevant, and how it should be proved — are not determined by Section 63 of the BSA. They are to be established independently, as in the case of any other class of documents.

  • However, the court can draw presumptions as to the genuineness and authenticity of such photographs or videos, as stated earlier.

Once Copy Admitted by S. 63 Certificate, Oral Evidence has No Place in Marking

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, is an authority on the following matters –

  • (i) The certificate under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to admissibility of the computer output (copy);
  • (ii) The certificate is meant to replace the oral evidence of the device-handler or operator.
  • (iii) Once the certificate is produced, oral evidence has no place (for the purpose of marking it).

However, the person who issued the certificate (operator) has to be examined if:

  • the authenticity or correctness of the certificate is specifically disputed;
  • allegations of fabrication, manipulation, or false certification are raised;
  • the issuer’s control over the device/system is seriously questioned; or
  • the court needs clarification to assess probative value, not admissibility.

Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witness Theory

  • Pictorial Testimony Theory — Photograph Need Not Be Proved.
  • Silent Witness Theory — Photograph Must Be Proved.

Pictorial testimony theory

  • It is applied when a photograph is used merely as an aid to a witness in explaining or illustrating his testimony—for example,
    • a doctor explaining injuries with reference to a photographs,
    • witness identifying a scene/person with a photograph,
    • identification of a deceased through a photograph,  
    • accident site photos to explain the incident by a witness.
  • In these cases, the primary evidence is the oral testimony of the witness and not the contents of the photograph itself. The photograph is admitted merely as an aid to enable the witness to explain or illustrate what he personally perceived (and the photograph itself is not relied upon as substantive evidence). Consequently, it is not necessary to examine the photographer, provided the witness could affirm that the photograph fairly and accurately represents what he saw. In such cases, the photograph does not constitute substantive evidence, and therefore, no certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA (Section 65B of the IEA) is required.

Silent witness theory or Communication theory

  • It is invoked when the photograph itself constitutes substantive and probative evidence of what it depicts, speaking for itself without supporting oral testimony—for instance,
    • an X-ray film showing a fracture,
    • a photograph depicting the accused in a crowd holding a weapon (though the photographer did not notice him),
    • a photograph of the scene of occurrence of a crime.
    • CCTV footage.
    • speed camera photographs.
  • In these cases, the reliability and authenticity of the photographs or video must be proved, for the court relies upon what is depicted by the camera, CCTV, etc., in the mechanical/ electronic process, and not what the human witness who operated the process perceived.

In Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State (2014 Ker HC 31), these two theories, governing the proof and authenticity of photographs, were explained.

Examination of the Photographer may not be insisted (In silent witness theory)

As stated above, in silent witness theory cases, photographs or videos are required to be proved. However, such proof need not necessarily be by way of formal proof through the examination of the photographer or the person who captured the image.

Court to Draw a Prima Facie Presumption of Correctness

The law does not proceed on any presumption that electronic or visual evidence is to be viewed with constant suspicion.

The party producing a photograph or video is required only to establish foundational facts sufficient for its admissibility and relevance. Once this burden is discharged and the document is duly admitted, the Court can draw a prima facie presumption of correctness under Section 119 of the BSA (Section 114 of the IEA).

If S. 63/65B Requirement is fulfilled, CD is admissible, Like a Bocument

In Kailas v. The State of Maharashtra: 2025 INSC 1117, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “19. … However, strangely, the High Court opined that the video would become relevant only if it is played during deposition of each witness so that the witness could explain its contents in his own words resulting in a transcript of the video. In our view, this is a strange and unacceptable reasoning for the simple reason that the CD is an electronic record and once the requirement of Section 65B is fulfilled it becomes an admissible piece of evidence, like a document, and the video recorded therein is akin to contents of a document which can be seen and heard to enable the Court to draw appropriate inference(s). No doubt, there may be an occasion where to appreciate contents of a video an explanatory statement may be needed, but that would depend on the facts of a case. However, it is not the requirement of law that the contents of the video would become admissible only if it is reduced to a transcript in the words of a witness who created the video or is noticed in the video. Besides that, in the instant case, the search and seizure operation was sought to be proved by oral evidence of witnesses. The video, therefore, was perhaps to corroborate the oral testimony. …”

General Evidence on Factual Features through a ‘Proper’ Witness Sufficient

Besides admission of the other side as regards the authenticity, the photographs or videos may instead be proved through a ‘proper’ witness who is competent to depose by way of general evidence regarding the factual features depicted therein, such as the identity of the persons in the photograph, the place, the time, or the surrounding circumstances.

The following legal principles are relevant in this matter:

  • 1. Formal proof of a photograph or copy of a video and the requirement of the certificate under Section 63(4) are two distinct and independent matters.
  • 2. Even in cases where formal proof of the photographs or copies of videos is dispensed with, the certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA (Section 65B of the IEA) is necessary, when a computer output (copy) of a photograph or video is produced — in view of the non-obstante clause in Section 63 of the BSA.
  • 3. A photograph or a copy of video, admitted in evidence on the strength of a certificate under Section 63(4), stands on a distinct footing (in contradistinction to a statement-of-account) by reason of the statutory (general) presumptions that the court can invoke (under Section 119 BSA), it being direct visual depictions of facts.
  • 4. The certificate under Section 63(4) is accepted unless its correctness is specifically challenged. The oral evidence of the person who issued the certificate becomes relevant (for the purpose of admitting the document) only where the certificate itself is specifically and successfully challenged by the party who disputes its authenticity or correctness.
  • 5. Therefore, the court is entitled to infer that a photograph or video, once duly admitted in evidence, correctly represents the scene or object as it existed at the time of recording. It is doctrinally recognised as the ‘silent witness’ theory – the document “speaks for itself”.
  • 6. Accordingly, once a photograph or copy of a video is duly admitted in evidence, the court can act upon it (usually as a corroborative piece of evidence), on the basis of general evidence relating to the identity of the persons depicted, the place, the time, and the surrounding circumstances, without insisting upon any further primary or direct proof of the facts.
  • 7. The presumption attached to a photograph or a video admitted in evidence being one rebuttable, the opposite party can rebut it by placing appropriate evidence to show that the photograph or video does not correctly represent the scene, object, or occurrence as it existed at the relevant point of time, or that the factual position had materially changed.

Photo Identification falls under the Pictorial Testimony Theory

Photo identification falls under the Pictorial testimony theory. Because the court has nothing to perceive from the photograph by itself; it only serves as an aid to the witness. The material and substantive evidence is the personal knowledge of the witness, and not what is depicted in the photograph.

The Kerala High Court (KT Thomas, J.), in Ponnappan v. State of Kerala, ILR 1994(3) Ker 370, confirmed the conviction, holding that Chacko was the person who was killed. It was on a photo identification. The Court held as under:

  • “PW I identified the person in M.O. 9 photo as the person who was killed. There is no doubt that M.O. 9 is the photograph of Chacko, the film representative. It was contended that since P. W. 1 himself admitted that he had not observed the features or facial peculiarities of the person when he was inside the car, the identification made by him with the help of the photo is not of any use. We are of the view that even without noticing any translatable mark or feature of a person, it would be possible to identify him later.”

Read also:

Pictorial Testimony Theory: No Enacted Law; Only Judicial Exposition

The pictorial testimony theory rests on judicial exposition rather than statutory codification. It finds only indirect support, in principle, from Section 162 (Refreshing Memory), BSA. Section 162 is to be understood as one not exhaustive in its operation.

Section 162 of the BSA reads as under:

  • Refreshing memory: (1) A witness may, while under examination, refresh his memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or so soon afterwards that the Court considers it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in his memory:
    • Provided that the witness may also refer to any such writing made by any other person, and read by the witness within the time aforesaid, if when he read it, he knew it to be correct.
  • (2) Whenever a witness may refresh his memory by reference to any document, he may, with the permission of the Court, refer to a copy of such document:
    • Provided that the Court be satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the non-production of the original:
    • Provided further that an expert may refresh his memory by reference to professional treatises.”

R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157

In R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157, the Apex Court summarised the earlier decision, Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720, (which considered the evidentiary value of tape recording, compared to that of a photograph) as under:

  • “In Nagri’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720) the appellant offered bribe to Sheikh a Municipal Clerk. Sheikh informed the Police. The Police laid a trap. Sheikh called Nagree at the residence. The Police kept a tape recorder concealed in another room. The tape was kept in the custody of the police inspector  Sheikh gave evidence of the talk. The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae. It is also comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident. The tape recorded conversation is therefore a relevant fact and is admissible under section 7 of the Evidence Act.” (Referred to in: K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275)

After summarising Nagri’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720), the Supreme Court continued as under:

  • “The Court will take care in two directions in admitting such evidence. First, the Court will find out that it is genuine and free from tampering or mutilation. Secondly, the Court may also secures scrupulous conduct and behaviour on behalf of the Police. The reason is that the Police Officer is more likely to behave properly if improperly obtained evidence is liable to be viewed with care and caution by the Judge. In every case the position of the accused, the nature of the investigation and the gravity of the offence must be judged in the light of the material facts and the surrounding circumstances.”

Conclusion

  • The only Mode of Proof of a computer output (copy) is the certificate under Section 63(4).
  • Where formal evidence is required to establish the relevance or authenticity of a photograph or video, it is sufficient for the party concerned (under the silent witness theory) to adduce general evidence relating to the factual aspects depicted therein—such as the identity of the persons depicted, the place, the time, or the circumstances depicted.
  • As pointed out in State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, a bald denial of the contents of the videotape is not adequate to doubt its authenticity; there should be material to show that they are doctored or morphed.
  • The photograph or video constitutes substantive evidence. Though in many cases it is relied upon as corroborative evidence, in an appropriate case it may, by itself, establish the fact in issue, independently and without the aid of other evidence. It may also be from the ‘best evidence‘ in certain cases (Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178). In any case, the probative value of a document is a matter for the court.
  • The photograph admitted merely as a non-probative aid to enable a witness to explain or illustrate what he personally perceived need not be proved by a ‘proper’ witness; and, no certificate is required for such photographs under Section 63(4) of the BSA.

Read Similar Articles

End Notes — 1

Photograph-Evidence: In a Nutshell

Photographs are admissible in evidence as documents.  P.  Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1; 2020-9 SCC 161
While considering a case on dowry death, the prosecution argued that a photograph was not admissible in evidence as neither the person who took the photograph nor its negative was produced in evidence. But, the court accepted the photograph as ‘no dispute was raised by the prosecution witnesses’.Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2024 SC 4551
A large number of photographs were marked and considered in this case.
In para 525, it is stated – the witness “was confronted with photographs of the inscription”
There were three sets of albums containing photographs taken by the State Archaeological Department pursuant to an order dated 10 January 1990 (Para 533).
In para 538, the Court considered the evidence of a witness as to the “photographs placed within the structure in 1990”.
M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1 (Ayodhya case)
The factum of photo identification (of an accused) by PW 2, as witnessed by the officer concerned, is a relevant and admissible piece of evidence.Rabindra Kumar Pal v.  Republic of India, 2011-2 SCC 490
Nothing prevented the appellant-State Government from producing the relevant photographs of the purported pucca pond existing at some spots.State of Rajasthan v. Ultratech Cement Ltd. , 2022-12 Scale 606; 2022-13 SCR 1
A statement about the photograph made by any expert would not be admissible before examining the photographer.Dr. Pankaj Kumudchandra Phadnis v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 785
Photographs, tape-records of speeches [Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17] are documents.Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016 15 SCC 485;
Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2011-4 SCC 143
Photo identification of an accused during the investigation, who was seen by the witness at the relevant time.Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic  AIR 1999 SC  2562, 2000-1 SCC 138; Rabindra Kumar Pal v. Republic of India, AIR  2011 SC 1436; 2011 2 SCC 490
Inventory, photographs and the list of samples certified by the Magistrate are admissible as primary evidence. It is a substitute for the production of physical evidence of seized contraband samples.Nisar Ahmed Bhat, v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir 2024 0 Supreme(J&K) 187  
The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae.K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275;
R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157;
Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720

End Notes — 2

Decisions on Photo/Audio/Video

Audio/Video cassettesZiyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17
Tape records of speechesTukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329
Photo or videoMohammed Rafiq v. Madhan, 2018-1 Mad LJ(CRI) 641;
Moti Rabidas v. The State of Bihar, 2015-145 AIC 435;
Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan 2014-1 Raj Cri C 31;
State of MP v. Shankarlal, ILR 2010 MP 717;
P Rajagopal v. Inspector of police 2009-2 Mad LJ(Cri) 161;
Santhosh Baccharam Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 All MR (Cri)997, 2003 BCR (Cri) 120.
CD  Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, (2016) 15 SCC 485
Photographs including photographs of tombstones and houses Lyell v. Kennedy (No.3) (1884) 50 L.T. 730
Video recordings  State of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053
Audio and videoState of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053;
Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31;
Taylor v. Chief Constable Cheshire:1987(1) All.ER 225
CassettesTukaram S.Dighole v. Manik Rao Shivaji Kokate (2010)4 SCC 329
Moving cinematographSenior v. Holdsworth, Ex parte Independant Television New Ltd. (1976) Q.B. 23)
Film  Rex v. Daye ((1908)2 K.B. 333, 340)
Floppies, CCTV footages, CDs, DVDs, Chips, Hard discs, Pen drives North West Airlines v. Union of India 2007 (214) ELT 178 (Bom.)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

What is the Period of Limitation for a Suit on a Promissory Note?

Jojy George Koduvath

Does the Cause of Action Arise only on a ‘Demand’?

No is the answer.

The ‘Cause of Action’ and the ‘Limitation’ begin from the date of the promissory note itself, unless –

  • a promissory note is made payable on a specified contingency (must be express), or the payment is explicitly made conditional upon an express demand, or the governing contract or statute specifically requires a demand as a condition precedent.

Relevant Provision: Article 35, Limitation Act, 1963

The period of limitation for a suit on a promissory note payable on demand is governed by Article 35 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Article 35 reads as under:

Description of suitPeriod of limitationTime from which period begins to run
35. On a bill of exchange or promissory note payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue.Three years.  The date of the bill or note.

Thus, where a promissory note is payable on demand, and there is no clause postponing or restraining the right to sue, the money is payable immediately, and limitation begins to run from the date of the promissory note itself, not from the date of any subsequent demand.

Authoritative Judicial Pronouncements

The Supreme Court, in Syndicate Bank v. Channaveerappa Beleri, AIR 2006 SC 1874: (2006) 11 SCC 506, held to the following effect:

  • The words “on demand” do not have a uniform meaning in all contexts.
  • In the case of promissory notes or bills of exchange, this means the amount is always payable, i.e., payable forthwith.
  • A demand is not a condition precedent for the cause of action in such cases.

The Supreme Court clarified that a promissory note payable on demand stands on the same footing as Article 21, and not Article 22.

  • Article 21 (Money lent payable on demand): Limitation begins from the date of the loan, because the money is payable immediately.
  • Article 22 (Money deposited payable on demand): Limitation begins only when a demand is actually made, as demand is a condition precedent.

Our Apex Court, in Syndicate Bank v. Channaveerappa Beleri, held as under:

  • “12. We will examine the meaning of the words ‘on demand‘. As noticed above, the High Court was of the view that the words ‘on demand’ in law have a special meaning and when an agreement states that an amount is payable on demand, it implies that it is always payable, that is payable forthwith and a demand is not a condition precedent for the amount to become payable.
  • The meaning attached to the expression ‘on demand’ as ‘always payable‘ or ‘payable forthwith without demand’ is not one of universal application. The said meaning applies only in certain circumstances. The said meaning is normally applied to promissory notes or bills of exchange payable on demand.
  • We may refer to Articles 21 and 22 in this behalf. Article 21 provides that for money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, the period of limitation (3 years) begins to run when the loan is made. On the other hand, the very same words ‘payable on demand’ have a different meaning in Article 22 which provides that for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, the period of limitation (3 years) will begin to run when the demand is made.
  • Thus, the words ‘payable on demand’ have been given different meaning when applied with reference to ‘money lent’ and ‘money deposited’. In the context of Article 21, the meaning and effect of those words is ‘always payable’ or payable from the moment when the loan is made, whereas in the context of Article 22, the meaning is ‘payable when actually a demand for payment is made’.”

Legal Principles Evolved

The limitation begins from the date of the promissory note, and the suit must be filed within three years from that date. Apart from the express legal provision contained in the Limitation Act, it is logically sound for the following reasons:

  • 1. A promissory note that is ‘payable on demand’ is enforceable immediately upon its execution.
  • 2. No separate or subsequent demand is required to set the limitation in motion. That is, the cause of action arises immediately on the execution of the note.
  • 3. A creditor cannot postpone limitation indefinitely by delaying demand.

The law affirmed in Syndicate Bank v. Channaveerappa Beleri is followed in the following cases

  • Manjunath S. v. B. K. Subbarao, ILR 2020 Kar 227
  • K. V. G. Rajan v. Karnataka State Financial Corporation, 2017 (4) AIR (Kar) (R) 563
  • Subhash Chand v. State Bank of Patiala, AIR 2014 Del 82
  • Seelak Ram Balhara v. Bank of Baroda, 2014 (2) BC 46 (All)
  • Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Rajit Subodhbhai Shah, 2013 (5) GLR 4289 (Guj)

Earlier Contrary View (Now No Longer Good Law)

An earlier line of decisions had taken the view that a demand promissory note does not become payable until a demand is made, and therefore limitation would begin only from the date of demand. Illustrative cases include:

  • Gopalan v. Lakshminarasamma, AIR 1940 Mad 631
  • Braja Kishore Dikshit v. Purna Chandra Panda, AIR 1957 Ori 153
  • Ghania Lal v. Karam Chand, AIR 1929 Lah 240

‘On Demand’ Subjected to Different Connotations in the Limitation Act

In Seethamma v. Kamala, ILR 1980-2 Ker 339; 1980 KLT 755 (P. Subramonian Poti, P. Janaki Amma, JJ.) made it clear as under:

  • “8. The expression ‘on demand’ has been subjected to different treatment at the hands of the framers of the Limitation Act.
  • Under Art. 21 which deals with suits for money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, and
  • under Art. 35, which deals with suits on a bill of exchange or promissory note, payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue, limitation starts from the date of the loan or the document, as the case may be. On the other hand,
  • under Art. 22, in the case of a suit for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand limitation starts only when a demand is made.”

Conclusion

  • Period of limitation for a promissory note is three years from the date of the promissory note
  • Governing provision: Article 35, Limitation Act, 1963. (It lays down – time from which the limitation period begins to run is the date of the note.)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Rejection of Plaint is a Procedural Termination, and Dismissal of Suit on Preliminary Issue is a Summary Decision on Merits

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

The following provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be invoked by a defendant, to seek rejection or dismissal of a suit, at the threshold, without a trial:

  1. Order VII Rule 11, CPCRejection of plaint (on the specific grounds enumerated).
  2. Order XIV Rule 2(2), CPCDecision on preliminary issues, where the issue relates to –
    (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a statutory bar to the suit, and(c) such issues that can be decided as a pure question of law.
  3. Section 151, CPCInherent powers of the court  (exercised in exceptional cases where the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of the court or no specific provision in the CPC).

The following are the general provisions of law that may be invoked by a defendant for summary termination of a suit, without a full trial:

  • Section 9 CPC – Civil court jurisdiction expressly or impliedly barred
  • Section 11 CPC – Bar of Res judicata
  • Limitation Act, 1963 – Barred by limitation, apparent on the plaint
  • Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Bar under Sections 14, 41, etc.
  • Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 69 – Suit by unregistered firm, to enforce contractual rights
  • Public Premises Act/ Rent Control Acts/ Land Reforms Acts – Statutory exclusion of civil jurisdiction.

Part I

Order VII rule 11 of the CPC

Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC is the specific provision for the rejection of the plaint. It reads as under:

  • “11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:
  • (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
  • (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
  • (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
  • (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9″.

Rejection of Plaint under O. VII r. 11Following are the Basic Principles

  • Rejection is a procedural termination (and not a dismissal on the merits).
  • A plaint is rejected only in the specific situations enumerated in Order VII rule 11 CPC.
  • Only plaint averments are looked into for determining rejection of plaint.
  • Defence pleadings or disputed facts cannot be looked into.
  • Rejection can be ordered at any stage. (Usually it is a threshold determination.)
  • A fresh plaint can be presented after curing the defects (if not barred by limitation or under any provision of law).

Grounds for Rejection

Following are the grounds for Rejection of Plain in Order VII rule 11 CPC:

  • No Cause of Action Disclosed [Order VII Rule 11(a)]
  • Relief Undervalued [Order VII Rule 11(b)]
  • Insufficient Court Fee [Order VII Rule 11(c)]
  • Suit Barred by Law [Order VII Rule 11(d)] such as:
    • Limitation
    • Res judicata (when evident on the plaint)
    • Statutory bar (e.g., Section 69 of the Partnership Act for unregistered firms)
  • Duplicate Plaint Not Filed [Order VII Rule 11(e)]
  • Non-compliance with Rule 9 [Order VII Rule 11(f)]

Order VI rule 16

Order VI rule 16 provides for striking out pleadings at any stage. (It may not lead to dismissal of the entire plaint.) It reads as follows:

  • “16. Striking out pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading-
  • a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or
  • b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or
  • c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.”

Order 14 rule 2

Order 14 rule 2 CPC provides for the hearing of any preliminary issue, including the maintainability of the suit. It reads as follows:

  • “2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-
    • (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
    • (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in-force.
  • and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.”

Order 10 rule 1 CPC

Order 10 rule 1 CPC reads as under:

  • Examination of parties by the court: 1. Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied.—At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain from each party or his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The Court shall record such admissions and denials.”

Part II

Inherent Powers Cannot be used for Rejection’ of Plaints. But it can be used for “Dismissal” of Suits in Rare Cases.

  • PLAINT cannot be rejected invoking Section 151 CPC (Inherent Powers of courts).
  • But, the court can dismiss a SUIT, at the threshold, in exceptional cases, invoking inherent powers.
  • Inherent powers are not invoked for the Rejection of the plaintiff, for it is a Statutory-Affair, and specific provisions are laid down in Order VII Rule 11. (It cannot be supplemented, expanded, or substituted, invoking Section 151. In such cases, the inherent powers stand excluded.)

Inherent Powers Not Used if in Conflict with Express Provisions

In Padam Sen v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218, our Apex Court found: “the Additional Munsiff had DO inherent powers to pass the order appointing a Commissioner to seize the plaintiff’s account books”.

It had been observed in this decision, as under:

  • “It is submitted for the State, that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, can adopt any procedure not prohibited by the Code expressly or by necessary implication if the Court considers it necessary, for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Section 151 of the Code reads:
    • ” Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court “.
  • The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the puposes mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.”

In Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee, (1970) 1 SCC 732, the Apex Court cautioned as under:

  • “Under the inherent power of courts recognised by Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, a court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglected to avail himself of the same. Further the power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power.”

S. 151 is Not a Provision Conferring Power of Substantive Relief

It is held in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1, as under:

  • Section 151 is not a provision of law conferring power to grant any kind of substantive relief. It is a procedural provision saving the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It cannot be invoked with reference to a matter which is covered by a specific provision in the Code. It cannot be exercised in conflict with the general scheme and intent of the Code. It cannot be used either to create or recognise rights, or to create liabilities and obligations not contemplated by any law.”

Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss the Suit) in the Following Situations

T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, is an authority to argue that inherent powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss a Suit) in the Following Situations:

  • Abuse of process of court
  • Fraud on court
  • Sham, vexatious, or illusory litigation
  • Re-litigation amounting to judicial harassment.

Order VII Rue 11 is not Exhaustive; Court can invoke Inherent Power

In K. Akbar Ali v. K. Umar Khan, AIR 2021 SC 1114; 2021-14 SCC 51 it is held as under:

  • “Moreover, the provisions of Order VII Rue 11 are not exhaustive and the Court has the inherent power to see that frivolous or vexatious litigations are not allowed to consume the time of the Court.”

Se. 151, Inherent Power to Dismiss a Suit – if ‘Abuse of Process of the Court’

The Courts have inherent powers to dismiss a suit that is an ‘abuse of their process’. It can also be invoked for rejection or setting aside a suit if an absolutely groundless suit is filed.

Re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. If the Court finds that there is an abuse of the process of court, and is satisfied that there is no chance of succeeding, the Court may exercise its discretion with circumspection, though only in rare situations.

In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, AIR 1998 SC 1297: 1998 (3) SCC 573, it is observed as under:

  •  “32. Under Order 6 Rule 16, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding, order to be struck out, inter alia, any matter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Mulla in his treatise on the Code of Civil Procedure. (15th Edition, Volume II, page 1179 note 7) has stated that power under clause (c) of Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code is confined to cases where the abuse of the process of the Court is manifest from the pleadings; and that this power is unlike the power under Section 151 whereunder Courts have inherent power to strike out pleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings which are an abuse of their process.
  • In the present case the High Court has held the suit to be an abuse of the process of Court on the basis of what is stated in the plaint.”
  • (Quoted in: Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, AIR 2016 SC 1948; 2016 11 SCC 484;
  • Reddy Enterprises, Vijayawada v. Appellate Authority & Additional Commissioner (ST) Vijayawada, 2024-5 ALD 452;
  • Raahul Foundations Private Ltd. v. S. Chandrababu, 2019-2 LW 148; 2019-3 MLJ 321)

Where No express provision, Inherent Powers can be Invoked

In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 2554, while dealing with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, the Supreme Court held that where there is no express provision, inherent power can be invoked. The Court said as under:

  • “2. …It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code…..”

Part III

Manifestly Vexatious Suit –  ‘Nipped in the bud’, Searchingly u/Or. 10, CPC

Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer:  T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, held that on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint, if it is found that a manifestly vexatious suit is filed, it must be nipped in the bud searchingly under Order 10, CPC. The Court held as under:

  • “We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, be should exercise his power under Or. VII r. 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first bearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code (Ch. XI) is also resourceful enough to meet such men, and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too good.”

Fraud or Abuse of judicial process — May Invite Dismissal of Suit

It is trite law – Fraud vitiates all judicial acts (See: A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. (2007) 4 SCC 221. [Quoted in: Yashoda (Alias Sodhan) VS Sukhwinder Singh, AIR 2022 SC 4623; 2022-12 SCR 31; Smriti Madan Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra, AIR 2021 SC 5423].  Courts take suppression of material facts seriously, and if there is deliberate misuse of judicial process, courts may even dismiss the suit outright invoking inherent powers. (See: K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3SCC 573).

Fraud on Court and fraud on a party

In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550, referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court’s business”.

In Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 289; 2024-5 SCC 481, it is held as under:

  • It is trite that fraud vitiates everything. It is a settled proposition of law that fraud avoids all judicial acts. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (Dead) through LRs, (1994) 1 SCC 1 (“S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu”), it has been observed that “fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” Further, “no judgment of a court, no order of a minister would be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. fraud unravels everything” vide Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasley, (1956) 1 all ER 341 (“Lazarus Estates Ltd.”).
  • It is well-settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and that the discretion must be exercised equitably for promotion of good faith vide State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 (“Prabhu”). This Court has further emphasized that fraud and collusion vitiate the most solemn precedent in any civilized jurisprudence; and that fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). This maxim has never lost its lustre over the centuries. Thus, any litigant who is guilty of inhibition before the Court should not bear the fruit and benefit of the court’s orders. This Court has also held that fraud is an act of deliberation with a desire to secure something which is otherwise not due. fraud is practiced with an intention to secure undue advantage. Thus, an act of fraud on courts must be viewed seriously.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Can a Plaint be Rejected Invoking the Inherent Powers of the Court?

Yes, But Only in Exceptional Circumstances.

Jojy George Koduvath.

Introduction

The following provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be invoked by a defendant, to seek rejection or dismissal of a suit at the threshold, without a full-fledged trial:

  1. Order VII Rule 11, CPCRejection of plaint (on the specific grounds enumerated).
  2. Order XIV Rule 2(2), CPCDecision on preliminary issues, where the issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a statutory bar to the suit, and(c)such issues that can be decided as a pure question of law.
  3. Section 151, CPCInherent powers of the court  (exercised in exceptional cases where the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of the court or no specific provision in the CPC).

The following are the general provisions of law that may be invoked by a defendant for summary termination of a suit, without a full trial:

  • Section 9 CPC – Civil court jurisdiction expressly or impliedly barred
  • Section 11 CPCRes judicata
  • Limitation Act, 1963 – Time-bar apparent on plaint
  • Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Bar under Sections 14, 41, etc.
  • Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 69 – Suit by unregistered firm
  • Public Premises Act / Rent Control Acts / Land Reforms Acts – Statutory exclusion of civil jurisdiction.

Part I

Rejection of Plaint under O. VII r. 11: Following are the Basic Principles

  • Rejection is a procedural termination (and not a dismissal on the merits).
  • A plaint is rejected only in the specific situations enumerated in Order VII rule 11 CPC.
  • Only plaint averments are looked into for determining rejection of plaint.
  • Defence pleadings or disputed facts cannot be looked into.
  • Rejection can be ordered at any stage. (Usually it is a threshold determination.)
  • A fresh plaint can be presented after curing the defects (if not barred by limitation or under any provision of law).

Grounds for Rejection

Following are the grounds for Rejection of Plain in Order VII rule 11 CPC:

  • No Cause of Action Disclosed [Order VII Rule 11(a)]
  • Relief Undervalued [Order VII Rule 11(b)]
  • Insufficient Court Fee [Order VII Rule 11(c)]
  • Suit Barred by Law [Order VII Rule 11(d)] such as:
    • Limitation
    • Res judicata (when evident on the plaint)
    • Statutory bar (e.g., Section 69 of the Partnership Act for unregistered firms)
  • Duplicate Plaint Not Filed [Order VII Rule 11(e)]
  • Non-compliance with Rule 9 [Order VII Rule 11(f)]

Order VII rule 11 of the CPC

Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC is the specific provision for the rejection of the plaint. It reads as under:

  • “11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:
  • (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
  • (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
  • (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
  • (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9″.

Order VI rule 16

Order VI rule 16 provides for striking out pleadings at any stage. (It may not lead to dismissal of the entire plaint.) It reads as follows:

  • “16. Striking out pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading-
  • a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or
  • b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or
  • c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.”

Order 14 rule 2

Order 14 rule 2 CPC provides for the hearing of any preliminary issue, including the maintainability of the suit. It reads as follows:

  • “2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-
    • (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
    • (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in-force.
  • and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.”

Order 10 rule 1 CPC

Order 10 rule 1 CPC reads as under:

  • Examination of parties by the court: 1. Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied.—At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain from each party or his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The Court shall record such admissions and denials.”

Part II

Inherent Powers Cannot be used for “Rejection” of plaints. But it Can be used for “Dismissal” of Suits in Rare Cases.

  • A PLAINT cannot be rejected invoking Section 151 CPC (inherent powers of courts).
  • But, a court can dismiss a SUIT, at the threshold, in exceptional cases, invoking inherent powers.
  • Inherent powers are not invoked for the Rejection of the plaintiff, for it is a Statutory-Affair, and specific provisions are laid down in Order VII Rule 11. (It cannot be supplemented, expanded, or substituted, invoking Section 151. In such cases, the inherent powers stand excluded.)

Inherent Powers Not Used if in Conflict with Express Provisions

In Padam Sen v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218, our Apex Court found: “the Additional Munsiff had DO inherent power to pass the order appointing a Commissioner to seize the plaintiff’s account books”.

It had been observed in this decision, as under:

  • “It is submitted for the State, that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, can adopt any procedure not prohibited by the Code expressly or by necessary implication if the Court considers it necessary, for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Section 151 of the Code reads:
    • ” Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court “.
  • The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the puposes mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.”

In Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee, (1970) 1 SCC 732, the Apex Court cautioned as under:

  • “Under the inherent power of courts recognised by Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, a court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglected to avail himself of the same. Further the power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power.”

S. 151 is Not a Provision Conferring Power of Substantive Relief

It is held in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1, as under:

  • Section 151 is not a provision of law conferring power to grant any kind of substantive relief. It is a procedural provision saving the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It cannot be invoked with reference to a matter which is covered by a specific provision in the Code. It cannot be exercised in conflict with the general scheme and intent of the Code. It cannot be used either to create or recognise rights, or to create liabilities and obligations not contemplated by any law.”

Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss the Suit) in the Following Situations

T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, is an authority to argue that Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss a Suit) in the Following Situations:

  • Abuse of process of court
  • Fraud on court
  • Sham, vexatious, or illusory litigation
  • Re-litigation amounting to judicial harassment

Order VII Rue 11 is not Exhaustive; Court can invoke Inherent Power

In K. Akbar Ali v. K. Umar Khan, AIR 2021 SC 1114; 2021-14 SCC 51 it is held as under:

  • “Moreover, the provisions of Order VII Rue 11 are not exhaustive and the Court has the inherent power to see that frivolous or vexatious litigations are not allowed to consume the time of the Court.”

Se. 151, Inherent Power to Dismiss a Suit – if ‘Abuse of Process of the Court’

The Courts have inherent power to dismiss a suit that is an ‘abuse of their process’. It can also be invoked for rejection or setting aside a suit if an absolutely groundless suit is filed.

Re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. If the Court finds that there is an abuse of the process of court, and is satisfied that there is no chance of succeeding, the Court may exercise its discretion with circumspection, though only in rare situations.

In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, AIR 1998 SC 1297: 1998 (3) SCC 573, it is observed as under:

  •  “32. Under Order 6 Rule 16, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding, order to be struck out, inter alia, any matter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Mulla in his treatise on the Code of Civil Procedure. (15th Edition, Volume II, page 1179 note 7) has stated that power under clause (c) of Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code is confined to cases where the abuse of the process of the Court is manifest from the pleadings; and that this power is unlike the power under Section 151 whereunder Courts have inherent power to strike out pleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings which are an abuse of their process.
  • In the present case the High Court has held the suit to be an abuse of the process of Court on the basis of what is stated in the plaint.”
  • (Quoted in: Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, AIR 2016 SC 1948; 2016 11 SCC 484;
  • Reddy Enterprises, Vijayawada v. Appellate Authority & Additional Commissioner (ST) Vijayawada, 2024-5 ALD 452;
  • Raahul Foundations Private Ltd. v. S. Chandrababu, 2019-2 LW 148; 2019-3 MLJ 321)

Where no express provision, Inherent Power can be Invoked

In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 2554, while dealing with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, the Supreme Court held that where there is no express provision, inherent power can be invoked. The Court said as under:

  • “2. …It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code…..”

Part III

Manifestly Vexatious Suit –  ‘Nipped in the bud’, Searchingly u/Or. 10, CPC

Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer:  T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, held that on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint, if it is found that a manifestly vexatious suit is filed, it must be nipped in the bud searchingly under Order 10, CPC. The Court held as under:

  • “We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, be should exercise his power under Or. VII r. 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first bearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code (Ch. XI) is also resourceful enough to meet such men, and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too good.”

Fraud or Abuse of judicial process — May Invite Dismissal of Suit

It is trite law – Fraud vitiates all judicial acts (See: A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. (2007) 4 SCC 221. [Quoted in: Yashoda (Alias Sodhan) VS Sukhwinder Singh, AIR 2022 SC 4623; 2022-12 SCR 31; Smriti Madan Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra, AIR 2021 SC 5423].  Courts take suppression of material facts seriously, and if there is deliberate misuse of judicial process, courts may even dismiss the suit outright invoking inherent powers. (See: K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3SCC 573).

Fraud on Court and fraud on a party

In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550, referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court’s business”.

In Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 289; 2024-5 SCC 481, it is held as under:

  • It is trite that fraud vitiates everything. It is a settled proposition of law that fraud avoids all judicial acts. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (Dead) through LRs, (1994) 1 SCC 1 (“S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu”), it has been observed that “fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” Further, “no judgment of a court, no order of a minister would be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. fraud unravels everything” vide Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasley, (1956) 1 all ER 341 (“Lazarus Estates Ltd.”).
  • It is well-settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and that the discretion must be exercised equitably for promotion of good faith vide State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 (“Prabhu”). This Court has further emphasized that fraud and collusion vitiate the most solemn precedent in any civilized jurisprudence; and that fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). This maxim has never lost its lustre over the centuries. Thus, any litigant who is guilty of inhibition before the Court should not bear the fruit and benefit of the court’s orders. This Court has also held that fraud is an act of deliberation with a desire to secure something which is otherwise not due. fraud is practiced with an intention to secure undue advantage. Thus, an act of fraud on courts must be viewed seriously.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Do the Plantation-Tenants have a Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land, beyond the Ceiling Limit (under Purchase Certificates)?

Are Such Tenants Entitled for Full Compensation if the Land is Acquired?

‘No’ is the Answer.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Contents in a Nutshell

  • 1. Ceiling Limit: The maximum extent of land assignable under a Purchase Certificate is circumscribed by the ceiling limit, under Section 72B(1)(a) and (b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.
  • 2. Plantation Exemption: Owners and tenants of plantations are permitted to retain plantation lands in excess of the ceiling limit by availing the ‘exemption’ provided under Section 81. However, the said exemption does not confer any absolute proprietary right over such land.
  • 3. Exempted plantation (lease) land Vest in Government: Title/ownership of unassignedexempted-plantation-lease-land is vested with the Government, under Section 72(1).
  • 4. Tenant Cannot Claim Better Right than the Landowner: Section 72G provides for payment of compensation to the former landowner; consequently, the vesting of the land in the Government under Section 72 stands absolutely affirmed. In such a situation, the tenant cannot claim any right better than that which the landowner himself did not possess.
  • 5. Tenants will be Deemed as Tenants of the Govt. Such tenants have to pay ‘Rent’ to the Government (Section 72E) for the unassignedexempted-plantation-lease-land.  The rent is fixed by the Land Tribunal [Section 72F(5)(h) ].
  • 6 On Acquisition, No Land Value to Previous Owners or Tenants: If the land vested in Government under Section 72 is acquired, land-value will not be paid to the former land-owner or the tenant (Section 112(5A).
  • 7. Exemption will be lost, if “Fragmented”:The exemption granted to a plantation will be lost if it is “fragmented” or the plantation-crop is abandoned (under Section 87).
  • 8. It is stated in Sec. 72B: “The provisions of Sec. 82 shall so far as may be applied to the CALCULATION of the ceiling area for the purpose of the proviso to sub section (1)”. It is obvious –
    • The legislature incorporated Sec. 82 only for a limited or a “specific” purpose – to the calculation of the ceiling area.

Relevant Provisions of Law

  • Sec. 53 – Cultivating tenant’s right to purchase landlord’s rights.
  • Sec. 55 – Purchase price to land owner – It is 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees.
    • Sec. 59 – Deposit purchase price by cultivating tenant before Land Tribunal.  Purchase Certificate is conclusive proof.
    • Sec. 64– Payment of purchase price to land owner – full discharge (from the part of land owner)
  • Section 72(1), Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963: All right, title and interest of the land-owners held by cultivating-tenants as on 1. 1. 1970 entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 shall vest in the Government.
  • Sec. 72A – Compensation to land owner for vesting under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter.
    • Sec. 72D – Cultivating tenant to pay purchase price (for getting assignment).
    • Sec. 72D(1A)- No purchase price is land below One Hect.
    • Sec. 72D(2)  – Purchase price to Govt. – 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees) Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 55
  • 2. Section 72B: It deals with “cultivating tenants’ right to assignment” (of the land vested in Government under Section 72).  Sub Section 1(a) and (b) of this Section direct that the assignment should be within the ceiling limit (mentioned in Section 82). It is stipulated – “The provisions of Sec. 82 shall so far as may be applied to the CALCULATION of the ceiling area for the purpose of the proviso to sub section (1)”.
  • 3. Section 72C: It deals with assignment of land, where the cultivating-tenant has not made application under Section 72B. All provisions of Section 72B, except sub section 3, are made applicable to Section 72C.  The opening words of Section 72C (“notwithstanding anything contained in sub Section 3 of Section 72B”), indicate the nexus between Section 72B and Section 72C.  Therefore, the purchase certificate can be issued, within ceiling limit alone, under Section 72C, as in the case of Section 72B.
  • 4. Section 72E: As stated above, tenancy-lands vest in the Government, under Section 72. The tenants (under Government) of unassigned-exempted-plantation-land, etc., are liable to pay rent to the Government for the unassigned (over and above the ceiling limit).
  • 5. Section 72F(5)(h): Land Tribunal fixes the rent for the said unassigned–exempted-land (under Section 81) .
  • 6. Section 72G: For the land vested in the Government under Section 72, compensation is paid to the former landowner. Subsections (2) and (3) ensure the payment of substantial compensation. Consequently, the vesting effected under Section 72(1) stands duly justified and legally sustained.
  • 7. Section 87(1) and its Explanations I and II: Only a limited right to continue; and, fragmentation is prohibited.  The specified plantation-crop alone is permitted.  The exemption is given subject to the condition – not to “convert” the land for any other use.
    • In case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost, and the exemption may be withdrawn under Explanation II of Section 87(1).  
  • 8. Section 112 (5A)On acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Section 72.
  • 9. Section 112 (5A)(a):The compensation for any building or other improvements  belonging to the land-owner shall be awarded to the Government.
  • 10. Section 112 (5A)(b):The balance-compensation remaining after deducting the amount referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • 11. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India:The State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
    • The provisions of the KLR Act, in this regard, are legislated following this proviso in Article 31A(1). It goes without saying – if no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.

Legal Right Conferred by the Statute
From the above, it is clear:

  • The unassigned land allowed to be occupied by a tenant (over and above the ceiling limit for which the tenant is liable to pay rent to the Government under Section 72E) can be termed as a “Legal Right conferred by the Statute”. It is not an absolute right that is conferred to some, including the BIG plantation tenants.

Land Owners’s Right for Compensation

The right for the same arises in the following three instances.

  • On Assignment to CULTIVATING TENANT: Sec. 55
  • On VESTING under Sec. 72:  Sec. 72A
  • On Surrendering SURPLUS LAND: Sec. 88

Sec. 55 – Purchase price to land owner –

Sec. 53 lays down the cultivating tenant’s right to purchase landlord’s rights. Sec. 55 provides for the purchase price entitled to by the land owner. It is 16 times the fair rent for land, plus the value of the structures on the land, plus half the value of the timber trees. [Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 72D(2) ].

  • Sec. 59 – Deposit purchase price by cultivating tenant before Land Tribunal.  Purchase Certificate is conclusive proof.
  • Sec. 64– Payment of purchase price to land owner is a full discharge (from the part of land owner).

Sec. 72A – Compensation to land owner for vesting under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter.

It is 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees. [ Note: Same rate under Sec. 55 & 72D(2) ]

  • Sec. 72D – Cultivating tenant to pay purchase price (for getting assignment – below the ceiling limit alone).
  • Sec. 72D(1A)- No purchase price is land below One Hect.
  • Sec. 72D(2)  – Purchase price to Govt. – 16 times fair rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees) Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 55.
  • Land above the ceiling limit payment is only under Sec. 88 – on surrendering land. (It is paid by the Government, not by the tenant.)

The Policy of the KLR Act
Section 83, lays down the policy of the Act – No person “be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” (Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State of Kerala v. Puliyangattu Krishnan Master, 2008(1) KLJ 571).

S. 82 (in Chp. III) cannot be enlarged while referring it in S. 72B (in Chp. II)

Section 82 deals with ceiling area. Sec. 81 states about the exemption of various provisions of Chapter III. By virtue of Sec. 81 private forests, plantations, etc. are exempted. Therefore, the provisions of ‘ceiling area’ in Sec. 82 do not apply to plantations, private forests, etc.

Section 72B(1) in Chapter II limits the assignment of land (within the ceiling area) while a Purchase Certificate is given. Section 72B(2) says –

  • “The provisions of Sec. 82 shall so far as may be applied to the CALCULATION of the ceiling area for the purpose of the proviso to sub section (1)”.

From the above it is clear –

  • The provisions as to the exemption in Section 81 will not be attracted to sec. 72B.
  • The legislature incorporated the referred provision only for a limited or a “specific” purpose – to the calculation of the ceiling area.
    • It can be made clear on a reading of the relevant provision – without the words “the CALCULATION of “.
  • Calculation of the ceiling area‘ in Section 82 stands independent to Section 81.
  • Therefore, other controlling provisions of Section 82 (such as Section 81) do not automatically brought in.

Interpretation of Law in this regard

  • In Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 : (1963) 3 SCR 858, it is held as under:
    • “Where the provisions of an Act are incorporated by reference in a later Act the repeal of the earlier Act has, in general, no effect upon the construction or effect of the Act in which its provisions have been incorporated.”
  • In TVS Motor Company Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2018 SC 5624; 2019-13 SCC 403, it is held as under:
    • “It is, therefore, clear that the definition of ‘motor vehicle’ as existing prior to 1956 Amendment would alone be applicable as being incorporated in the Taxation Act.”
  • When a statute incorporates a provision in another statute, that particular provision alone is attracted, unless otherwise specifically mentioned. Doctrines of ‘legislation by reference’ and ‘legislation by incorporation’ are the creation of judicial pronouncements. See:
    • Bolani Ores v. State of Orissa : (1974)2 SCC 777
    • Mahindra v. Union of India: (1979)2 SCC 529
    • State of M.P. v. Narasimhan : (1975)2 SCC 377;
    • Bharat Co-operative Bank v. Employees’ Union : (2007)4 SCC 685
    • Girnar Tradeers v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 (3) SCC 1
    • Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., AIR 1931 PC 149.
    • Municipal Commissioner of Howrah v. Shalimar Wood Products, (1963) 1 SCR 47;
    • Ujagar Prints v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488;
    • U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam, (1998) 2 SCC 467;
    • Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasant Rao, (2002) 7 SCC 657 and
    • Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Maharashtra. (2003) 4 SCC 200.

When a statute refers to another provision, only the provision specifically referred to is attracted, and it shall not be construed as importing the entire body of law relating to that subject, or other connected or ancillary provisions – especially in the absence of express words and the intention is manifest.

It is reasonable to hold that the same position applies when a section incorporates a provision in another section, in the same Act. That is, that particular provision alone is attracted.

  • See: K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, AIR 2005 SC 688, 2005 (1) SCC 754.

Unjustifiable to Confer Undue Benefits to Plantation-Tenants Ignoring Ground Realities and Invoking Petty Grounds
Under Section 72A and Section 88, meagre compensation is paid to the land owners on vesting landlords’ rights in the Government and on surrendering the surplus land.  It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits on the tenants or lessees (which is not given to the land owners) when their lease-hold-lands are acquired (the majority of such plantation-lessees are Companies).

Lands of the Maharaja of Travancore were taken

It is a matter of record that even the lands of the Maharaja of Travancore—191 acres situated within Thiruvananthapuram City,  far in excess of the statutory ceiling of 7.5 acres, were taken over pursuant to the orders of the Land Board, Thiruvananthapuram, vide Order No. LB(B)2-18919/70 dated 15-01-1972. Equally, it is an indisputable fact that thousands of middle-class landowners were subjected to the rigour of the Act, and their excess lands were taken by the force of law.

  • Therefore, it would be wholly unreasonable to contend that the Legislature intended to confer any special or undue benefit upon plantation-tenants (benefits which were not extended to middle-class landowners, to other categories of tenants governed by the Act and even to the Maharaja of Travancore).

Any interpretation that elevates plantation-tenants to a privileged class, beyond the plain limits imposed by the statute, would be contrary to the scheme, object, and egalitarian ethos of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.

Section 72, KLR Act – ‘Vesting of Ownership’ in Government

Section 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act speaks about ‘vesting of landlord’s rights in Government’.  It pertains to –

  • All right, title and interest of the land-owners and intermediaries … and in respect of which  certificates of  purchase… have not been issued, shall …. vest in the government”.

As compensation is paid to the former landowner under Section 72G, the vesting of the land in the Government under Section 72 is absolute.

Fixity of Tenure and Assignment under Kraya Certificate

Section 13 of the KLR Act, which declares Fixity of Tenure to the cultivating tenants, is dealt with under Chapter II that governs tenancies; whereas the provisions of ceiling (Section 82 and Section 83) come under Chapter III that governs restriction on ownership, ceiling area, etc.  (Section 83 restricts holding land, excess of ceiling limits prescribed under Section 82.)

  • Fixity of tenure is assured in Section 13(1) “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage of contract, etc.”
  • The Fixity of Tenure (laid down under Section 13, in Chapter II) is not controlled by the ceiling provisions  in Section 82 and 83 (in Chapter III).  That is, the provisions as to Fixity of Tenure will prevail, without being affected by the ceiling provisions in Chapter III.
  • Note: (1) Section 13 (Fixity of Tenure) is controlled by Section 72 (in Chapter II itself) as to vesting in Government.
  • (2) The stipulations as to ceiling-limit were specifically brought into Sec. 72B (Chapter II) for the reason that Chapter II stands independent of Chapter III .

Therefore, land cannot be assigned under Section 72B and 72C, by the Land Tribunal, by Purchase Certificates, over and above the ceiling limit.

  • In sum, though a plantation-tenant will definitely have the right of ‘fixity’, those tenants will not have the right of assignment (under Section 72B and 72C) over and above the ceiling limit.

Tenants Obligated to Approach the LT for Availing Plantation Exemption

It is beyond doubt – the excess land in possession of a tenant, over which he has fixity of tenure under Section 13 (other than the lands exempted under Section 81), has to be surrendered. If the claimant of Plantation Exemption (under Section 81) is a tenant, he must have approached the Land Tribunal under subsection (3) of Section 85 – within the stipulated time (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations under different landlords), because:

  • (i) subsection (3) of Section 85 itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant under Section 72B (or for getting a Certificate to the effect that he is not eligible to purchase any more land, for he is already holding maximum within the limit prescribed under Section 82),
  • (ii) the Land Tribunal is the only authority to deal with tenancy in this regard (the Land Board or Taluk Land Board – deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues, etc. – cannot adjudicate on tenancy-rights),
  • (iii) Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11). Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).  
  • In Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736; 1993 2 KLT 962, it is pointed out: “If there is dispute on any of these points necessarily the Land Tribunal has to go into the question of possession and the alleged tenancy”
  • (iv) the Land Board cannot accept the self-declaration that one is a tenant. 
  • (v) It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government, for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.
    • Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.

Note: 1. The entire tenancy-land being vested with the Government by virtue of Section 72, the tenants of the exempted-plantation-land (above the ceiling limit), will be the tenants under the Government liable to pay rent under Section 72E.

2. Under Section 72F(5)(h), the Land Tribunal fixes the rent for the unassigned-exempted-land.

3. These legal principles are adopted in Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, , 2018(3) KLT 283.

Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala, 2022 (4) KHC 97.

Following were the basic factual situation in Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala (supra)  –

  • The land was leased out by landlords.
  • The lease-rights came in the petitioners (cultivating tenants) by transfer.

The following were the rival contentions or claims raised by the parties.

Contention of the Government

  • The tenant was a cultivating tenant. The land (absolutely) vested in the Government under Section 72 KLR Act.
    • Hence, tenant would be entitled to get compensation for the improvements (alone) to be determined under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, in view of Section 20(1) of the KLR Act.

Contention of the Tenants

  • cultivating tenant has absolute right to seek assignment (subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D). Therefore, vesting of rights in the Government under Section 72 is a legal fiction.

Claims of Land-Owners

  • In view of Section 3(i)(viii), if the extent of the plantation is above 30 acres, and if the land was a plantation (put up by the land owner) when it was leased, the tenant will not be entitled for ‘fixity’; and the land will return to the land owner after the lease-period.  Therefore, the land owners (in one Writ Appeal) claimed that the land involved therein was such a land entitled to by them (after the lease period).
  • Land owners also claimed that Section 72BB(1) gives them a right (i) to apply for assignment to the tenant and (ii) for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A (as regards the property within ceiling limit).

The Division Bench Finding on Vesting Under Section 72

  • The contention of the Government that the land was (absolutely) vested in it was rejected and held –
    • 1. the vesting in Government ‘is a legal fiction‘.
    • 2. cultivating tenant ‘has an absolute right to seek assignment‘ subject to the payment of purchase price.

The Division Bench observed as under:

  • “41. On an indepth analysis of the aforesaid provision, we find that when Section 72 came into force on 01.01.1970, the cultivating tenant is entitled for the assignment of the land for possession, subject to the liabilities fixed under Section 72 of the Act, 1963 to pay the purchase price. As per Section 72C, if no application is filed by the cultivating tenant, the Land Tribunal shall subject to the Rules made by the Government ensure that the assignment is granted to the cultivating tenant, assigning such title and interest to the cultivating tenant entitled thereto, which rights, title and interest are vested with the Government by virtue of the legal fiction created under Section 72 of the Act, 1963.
  • 42. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 72 of Act, 1963 would only deal with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants free from encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries. However, the legal provisions discussed above would make it clear that insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.”

Tanya Alice Stephen v. Manager, Perumal Smaraka Nidhi, 2025:KER:97401

In this case, the High Court held, on 17.12.2025, to the following effect:

  • Under Ext. P3, the Land Tribunal “restricted the purchase certificate to an extent of 12 acres and has rejected the claim regarding the balance extent out of 94.54 acres”.
  • The HC directed the Government on 18.3.2024 to file an affidavit “by the person who authored Ext. P3 explaining and referring to the reasons as to why the earlier decision of the Land Tribunal affirmed in the judgment of the Sub Court, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court and the Apex Court was not followed….”
  • Though a counter affidavit was filed “the affidavit does not explain why the relief was restricted to 12 acres”
  • It is stated in the affidavit that “the attempt to obtain purchase certificate is an attempt to defeat the KLR Act and to alienate the land vested in the Government and not to pay rent under Section 72E”.
  • The High Court observed “no such contention is available to the respondents in view of the categoric finding of this court that the lessees … …. are entitled to fixity of tenure”; and that “there is no explanation as to why the finding of this Court affirmed by the Supreme Court have not been followed…..”.

The High Court erroneously interlinked two independent rights—fixity of tenure and the right to obtain a purchase certificate. It failed to advert to the following vital aspects:

  1. Fixity of tenure under Section 13 is conceptually and statutorily distinct from the issuance of a purchase certificate under Section 72B, and the two cannot be conflated.
  2. A purchase certificate can indeed be issued only in respect of land over which tenants have fixity of tenure.  However, that does not mean – the stipulation in Section 72B (that the maximum extent to be assigned must be within the ceiling limit) can be ignored.
  3. Sec. 72A directs compensation to the land owner for vesting land under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter. 
  4. For the land above the ceiling limit, payment is made under Sec. 88 – on surrendering land. It is paid by the Government; not by the tenant. (Under Sec. 72D, the cultivating tenant pays the purchase price for getting the assignment – below the ceiling limit – alone.)
  5. The previous judgment of the High Court with respect to the same land, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, regarding the fixity of tenure (over 94.54 acres), is wholly unrelated to and does not govern the statutory ceiling prescribed under Section 72B (7.5 or 15 acres) while issuing a purchase certificate.

The Line of Reasoning Put Forward in the above decisions is Inappropriate.  

The interpretative approach adopted by the High Court (an absolute right vests in the tenants to seek assignment—upon payment of the purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D—in respect of the entire land over which tenants have fixity of tenure) appears to be legally untenable.

  • It is mainly because such lands stand vested in the Government; and upon such vesting, the former tenants are deemed to be tenants under the Government and are statutorily obliged to pay rent to the Government by virtue of Section 72E.

Section 72B, falling under Chapter II of the Act, unequivocally mandates that a purchase certificate may be issued only in respect of land within the prescribed ceiling limit. The exemption provisions, on the other hand, form part of Chapter III and operate independently. It is precisely for this reason that the ceiling-related stipulations were expressly incorporated into Section 72B.

  • Further, in the event of acquisition of unassigned exempted plantation land vested in the Government, Section 112(5A) specifically provides that no land value shall be payable either to the former landowner or to the tenant.

It goes without saying that the plantation holdings typically extend to hundreds or thousands of acres, of which the assignable extent within the ceiling may be a negligible fraction (7.5 or 15 acres).

Therefore, extending the statutory right of assignment to the vast excess land will stand against the express provisions of the Statute. It will also annihilate the public interest well-visioned by the erudite legislatures considering the well-being of the generations to come, and the whole ecology of the nation.

The High Court failed to consider the Earlier Decisions

  • In K. Jayaprakashan v. State of Kerala, 2023-3 KLT 541, it is observed as under:
    • “Section 72 of the Act deals with vesting of landlord’s rights in Government. As per sub-section (1) of Section 72 ….  all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyiruppus and holders of karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 … shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon on the said date”.
  • In V.N. Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (P.T. Raman Nayar, T.C.Raghavan, K.K.Mathew, JJ.) , AIR 1971 Ker 98, it is held as under:
    • “By Section 72 the rights of landlords whose rights have not been purchased by cultivating tenants vest in the Government free of all encumbrances on a date to be notified by the Government in that behalf -the date has been notified as the 1st January, 1970”
  • In Lakshmi v. Rama Iyer, 1992-1 ILR-Ker 398; 1991-2 KLT 897it is pointed out: “Consequently the title and interest of the land-lord would vest in the Government on the appointed day that is, on 1-1-1970. Then as per S. 72Q the land owner would be entitled to recover rent accrued till 1-1-1970 only”.
  • In Aru v. Nakunni (Padmanabhan, J.), 1987-1 KLT 177, it is held as under:
    • “Under S.72 of the Act all the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of a holding held by a cultivating tenant entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 shall, subject to the various provisions of S.72, vest in the Government free of all encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries and subsisting on the date notified by the Government. ….. When once vesting has taken place there cannot be any further rights in any body. . …. By assignment all such rights vest in the tenant”.

Land Reform Wearied Middle Class Landlords and Tenants

When Land Reform Measures were implemented in the State of Kerala, it wearied small and moderate landlords and tenants, on the bedrock of “ceiling limit”.  But the Plantations were not “touched”, taking “the economy” into consideration.  Still, the well-visioned legislators were particular to see that the ownership of this large extent of plantations (otherwise thick forest of the Western Ghats) remained with the State.  It was based on the principles in Article 31A(1) of the Constitution, which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit’.

Conclusion

1. The exemption provisions confer only a limited and conditional right—namely, the right to continue the specified plantation crop alone. Upon conversion of the land or deviation from the permitted use, the exemption will be forfeited, and the land will become fully subject to the statutory regime.

2. It can be stated with legal certainty that:

  • (i) Where the landowner himself has no vested or proprietary right over land held beyond the ceiling limit, a tenant cannot claim any such right. To hold otherwise would be illogical, irrational, and contrary to settled principles of property law, as a tenant cannot acquire a higher or superior right than that of the landowner.
  • (ii) Statutory interpretation, particularly when constitutional principles are implicated, must advance the larger public interest, including the interests of the nation and future generations, and not operate to confer benefits on a select class.
  • (iii) It is wholly unjustifiable to confer disproportionate rights or benefits upon plantation tenants—many of whom are large corporate entities—when even the Maharaja of Travancore was denied retention of land beyond the ceiling limit. It is a sheer fact that thousands of middle-class landowners were divested of their lands under the rigorous operation of the Act.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

“Once a Mortgage Always a Mortgage”: Usufructuary Mortgage is ‘Always’ Redeemable; Limitation of 30 Years NOT Applicable.

Jojy George Koduvath

Legal Principles

  • 1. In a usufructuary mortgage, the usufruct (profits) of the land are being adjusted towards interest on the mortgage amount.
  • 2. Therefore, in a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagee continues to remain in possession of the mortgaged security, appropriating the usufruct of the mortgaged land towards the interest on the mortgaged debt till the mortgager makes the (re)payment of the mortgage money.
  • 3. Accordingly, the right to seek redemption (i.e., recover possession) of a usufructuary mortgage accrues only on payment of the mortgage money, and the limitation period of 30 years is not related to (any) date of the mortgage.
  • 4. For the above reason, the right of foreclosure (forcing sale through the court) will not accrue to the mortgagee till such time he remains in possession (appropriating the usufruct of the mortgaged land towards the interest).
  • 5. The limitation of 30 years under Article 61(a) begins to run “when the right to redeem or the possession accrues” (that is, on the payment of the mortgage money).
  • 6. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for a declaration that he had become an owner (merely) on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage.
  • 7. The right to seek foreclosure is co-extensive with the right to seek redemption.
  • 8. As shown above, the period of redemption will not start as long as the usufruct of the land is adjusted towards interest on the mortgage amount. In this situation, the principle is invoked: “once a mortgage, always a mortgage” and is “always redeemable”.

In Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, AIR 2014 SC 3447; 2014-9 SCC 185, the above propositions are laid down as under –

  • “15. We, thus, hold that special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act to recover possession commences in the manner specified therein, i.e., when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by mortgagor. Until then, limitation does not start for purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for declaration that he had become an owner merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage. We answer the question accordingly.
  • 16. On this conclusion, the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court will stand affirmed and contrary view taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Bhandaru Ram (D) Thr. L.R. Ratan Lal vs. Sukh Ram (supra) will stand overruled.”

This decision (Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, AIR 2014 SC 3447; 2014-9 SCC 185) is followed in –

  • Harminder Singhv. Surjit Kaur, 2022-3 CivCC 266; 2022-2 RCR(Civ) 859,
  • Bir Singh v. Ram Kanwar Singh, 2018- 5 RCR(Civ) 403; 2018-15 SCC 341,
  • Mohan Lal v. Mohan Lal, 2016-13 SCC 90.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Contents of a Document are to be Proved in Court by Producing Original or Secondary Evidence

Jojy George Koduvath

Also Read: Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant

Abstract.

1. The contents of a document cannot be proved by oral evidence. The document itself must be produced. (Sections 61 and 62 of the Evidence Act).

2. Secondary evidence can be given if permitted under Sections 65 of the Evidence Act, read with Section 63.

3. Section 91 expressly bars oral evidence to prove the terms of a contract, disposition of property, etc., by oral evidence if they are reduced to writing.

4. Sec. 22 and 144 of the Evidence Act postulate that the oral admissions or assertions as to contents of documents are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under Sec. 65, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

5. If the original document is not produced, right to adduce Secondary Evidence is not automatic. Loss, non-availability, etc., are to be proved under Sec. 65; and no oral statement about its contents is inadmissible. Secondary evidence of a document’s contents cannot be admitted unless the non-production of the original is first accounted for.

6. Withholding the best evidence attracts adverse inference. When a party relies on a document but does not produce it, the Court must presume it would have gone against that party. A party in possession of the best evidence must produce it; otherwise, the court is entitled to drawadverse inference’.

7. No amount of oral evidence can substitute documentary evidence, where the law requires the document itself to be produced.

8. A document which is not proved (even if produced) in accordance with law cannot be relied upon by the court for deciding the rights of the parties.

9. Documents which are not proved (even if produced) in accordance with the law cannot be taken into consideration.

PRODUCTION, ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

A document to be used in court has to pass through three steps. They are:

  1. Production of documents in court
  2. Admittance and exhibition
  3. Proof (formal proof and truth of contents).

Modes of Proof of Documents

Modes of Proof of Documents (as to, both, ‘formal proof’ and ‘truth of the contents’) include the following:

  • Admission of the person who wrote or signed the document (Sec. 17, 21, 58, 67, 70).
  • Evidence of a person in whose presence the document was signed or written – ocular evidence (Sec. 59).
  • An attesting witness (Sec. 59).
  • Opinion of a person who is acquainted with the writing of the person who signed or wrote (Sec. 47).
  • Admission made by the person who signed or wrote the document made in judicial proceedings (Sec. 32, 33).
  • Evidence of a handwriting expert-opinion evidence/scientific evidence (Sec.45).
  • Evidence of a person who in routine has been receiving the document; or a document signed by such a person in the ordinary course of his business or official duty, though he may have never seen the author signing the document (Sec. 32, 34, 35 or 114).
  • Invoking (specific) presumptions under Sec. 79 to 90A.
  • Presumptions (general) under Sec. 114.
  • Circumstantial evidence: on probability or inferences (Sec. 114).
  • Court-comparison (Sec. 73).
  • Facts judicially noticeable (Sec. 56 and 57).
  • A fact of common-knowledge. (It does not require proof. See: Union Of India Vs. Virendra Bharti: 2011-2 ACC 886, 2010  ACJ 2353; Rakhal Chakraborty Vs. Sanjib Kumar Roy: 1998-1 GauLR 253, 1997-2 GauLT 705)
  • Internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document; a link in a chain of correspondence; recipient of the document. (Mobarik Ali Ahmed Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857)

Rule of Best Evidence

The Evidence Act project the rule of best evidence and it directs that the contents of the document are to be proved by the original document itself, unless secondary evidence is provided under Sec. 65. (See: Bimla Rohal v. Usha, 2002-2 HLJ 745; 2002-2 Shim LC 341)

Oral Evidence on Contents of Documents

No Use, Unless Secondary Evidence Permitted

Sec. 22 and 144 of the Evidence Act postulate that the oral admissions or assertions as to contents of documents are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under Sec. 65, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22 emphasises that oral evidence as to contents of documents , even if adduced, will be of no use, as it will be ‘irrelevant’. By virtue of Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act, the adverse party may object to giving oral evidence as to contents of the same until such document itself is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.

Sec. 22 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 22. When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant.—Oral admissions as to the contents of a document are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under the rules hereinafter contained, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22A says as to oral admissions as to contents of electronic records as under:

  • 22A. When oral admissions as to contents of electronic records are relevant
  • Oral admissions as to the contents of electronic records are not relevant, unless the genuineness of the electronic record produced is in question.”

Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 144. Evidence as to matters in writing.—Any witness may be asked, whilst under examination, whether any contract, grant or other disposition of property, as to which he is giving evidence, was not contained in a document, and if he says that it was, or if he is about to make any statement as to the contents of any document, which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to be produced, the adverse party may object to such evidence being given until such document is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.
  • Explanation.—A witness may give oral evidence of statements made by other persons about the contents of documents if such statements are in themselves relevant facts.
  • Illustration. The question is, whether A assaulted B. C deposes that he heard A say to D—”B wrote a letter accusing me of theft, and I will be revenged on him”. This statement is relevant as showing A’s motive for the assault, and evidence may be given of it, though no other evidence is given about the letter.

Documentary Evidence becomes meaningless if oral evidence Allowed

In Bhima Tima Dhotre v. The Pioneer Chemical Co. (1968) 70 Bom LR 683,  it is observed as under:

  • Documentary evidence becomes meaningless if the writer has to be called in every case to give oral evidence of its contents. If that were the position, it would mean that, in the ultimate analysis, all evidence must be oral and that oral evidence would virtually be the only kind of evidence recognised by law. That, however, is not the position under the Evidence Act. … Section 59 of the said Act enacts that all facts, except the “contents” of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. This provision would clearly indicate that to prove the contents of adocument by means of oral evidence would be a violation of that section.”

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The contents of a document are to be proved by producing it

To prove the contents of a document, it must have been produced before the court.

  • Sections 61 & 62 of the Evidence Act require proof of the contents of a document by the production of the document itself (or its secondary evidence).

If the document is not produced, its contents are legally non-existent for the Court. Following are the well-accepted principles in this regard:

  • Oral evidence cannot substitute documentary proof.
  • Court cannot decide rights on “assumed” contents

Principles of Law – in a Nutshell

The Principles of Law in this regard can be discerned from the following decisions of our Apex Court:

1. It is held in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595, that Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act bar amendment, variation, etc. of a document; oral variations—whether by the party or the opposite side—are barred. The Court laid down as under:

  • “Wherever written instruments are appointed, either by the requirement of law, or by the contract of the parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter them.”(Quoted in: Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., 2024-4 SCC 1; V. Anantha Raju v. T. M. Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)
  • “The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence are (i) to admit inferior evidence when law requires superior would amount to nullifying the law, (ii) when parties have deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory.” (Quoted in Placido Francisco Pinto v. Jose Francisco Pinto, 2021-10 SCR 676; V Anantha Raju v. T M Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)

2. In Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413, para 5, it is held that in a case where one party withholds a document, the court takes an adverse inference under Section 114(g). The Court said as under:

  • Even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue..”

3. The Constitution Bench of our Apex Court laid down in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 330; 2023-4 SCC 731, as under:

  • 47. Section 61 deals with proof of contents of documents which is by either primary or by secondary evidence.
  • When a document is produced as primary evidence, it will have to be proved in the manner laid down in Sections 67 to 73 of the Evidence Act.
  • Mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence. On the other hand, when a document is produced and admitted by the opposite party and is marked as an exhibit by the court, …  (sic – no objection can be raised at any later stage with regard to proof of its contents).
  • The contents of the document must be proved either by the production of the original document i.e., primary evidence or by copies of the same as per Section 65 as secondary evidence.
  • So long as an original document is in existence and is available, its contents must be proved by primary evidence.
  • It is only when the primary evidence is lost, in the interest of justice, the secondary evidence must be allowed.
  • Primary evidence is the best evidence and it affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.
  • Thus, when a particular fact is to be established by production of documentary evidence, there is no scope for leading oral evidence.
  • What is to be produced is the primary evidence i.e., document itself. It is only when the absence of the primary source has been satisfactorily explained that secondary evidence is permissible to prove the contents of documents.
  • Secondary evidence, therefore, should not be accepted without a sufficient reason being given for non-production of the original.”
  • 48. ……. Once a document is admitted, the contents of that document are also admitted in evidence, though those contents may not be conclusive evidence.
  • Moreover, once certain evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence.
  • There is a prohibition for any other evidence to be led which may detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence and the court has no option to hold the existence of the fact otherwise when such evidence is made conclusive.”

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Fraudulent or Void Transaction: Is ‘Declaration’ Required? The Supreme Court Says No (in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105).

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

A Seeming Conflict Between Two Decisions

  • 1. Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)
  • 2. Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)

In the earlier decision in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.), it was clearly opined, as regards an assailed instrument, as under:

  • “In a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, a declaration must have been sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff.”

However, in the subsequent decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105 (per Pardiwala and Mahadevan JJ.), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier position by holding that where the very character of a sale deed is assailed as fraudulent or bogus, the requirement of seeking a declaration stands implicitly satisfied. The Court said as under:

  • In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”

As a result –

  • a void document need not be challenged by claiming a declaration (that the said instrument is not binding), as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.

It is also made clear –

  • A plaintiff who was not a party to the instrument need not seek its cancellation; and
  • Relevant article in the Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 65 (12-year period) and not Article 59 (3-year period).

Subsequent Decision (Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi) Vividly Explained the Legal Position

In Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September 2025, made it clear – when a deed is fraudulent or a sham and bogus one, ‘it is not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that a document is void‘. It is held as under:

  • “25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. ….”
  • “28. In State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, reported in 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522, this Court held that as far as void and non-est documents are concerned, it would be enough for the plaintiff to file a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. …… Subsequently, the decision of this Court in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 186 … opined as follows:
    • .i. First, the contention of the State that it is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that would apply, was rejected. It was held that the suit is primarily one for possession of property based upon title. It was observed that owing to the decision in Bhim Singhji (supra), the order dated 26.05.1976 along with the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 became void ab intio and without jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that they are void. The plea about their invalidity could be raised in the course of any proceedings. Therefore, it is Article 65, which deals with a suit for possession based on title, that would apply from the date on the which the possession of the defendant State became adverse to the plaintiff.
    • ii. Secondly, though the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order dated 26.05.1976 and the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 were void, yet it was held that the same would be of no consequence insofar as the question of limitation is concerned.
  • The fact would still remain that the possession of the property was taken by the defendants via void documents. Therefore, such documents could be ignored and a suit for possession simpliciter, for which the period of limitation prescribed under Article 65, i.e., 12 years, could be filed. In the course of such proceedings, it could be contended by the plaintiff that the documents are a nullity.
  • …”
  • “29. This Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353, discussed the position of law as to when Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and opined as follows:
    • .i. First, that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only encompass within its fold fraudulent transactions which are ‘voidable’ transactions and not those that are ‘void’. In other words, Article 59 would apply only where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to those instruments which are presumptively invalid.
    • ii. Secondly, that when the document in question is void ab initio/or void, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary since such a transaction would be non-est in the eyes of law, owing to it being a nullity.
    • iii. Thirdly, a fine distinction was drawn between fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ and fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘contents of a document’. It is only in the former situation that the instrument would be void and, in the latter, it would remain voidable. To put it simply, Article 59 would not govern the period of limitation in respect of a void transaction.
    • iv. Lastly, that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was thereby void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder, i.e., he could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority.
    • ….”
  • “30. In the decision of this Court in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, where one of us, J.B. Pardiwala J., was a member of the Bench, it was reiterated that a person who is not a party to an instrument would not be obliged in law to seek its cancellation. The reason being that such an instrument would neither be likely to affect his title nor be binding on him. However, such a plaintiff must at least seek a declaration that the said instrument is not binding on him or that is invalid insofar as he is concerned. ………
  • 31. As per the dictum in Prem Singh (supra), this Court, in order to ascertain whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed. Both the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed therein. Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio. Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation. The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale deed. Consequently, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would find no application to the case in hand.
  • 32. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury (supra), it was clearly opined that a plaintiff who is not a party to the instrument in question need not seek its cancellation. We are not oblivious to the fact that in a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrumentthe said decision laid down a requirement that a declaration must be sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff. Howeverthe said decision clarified that whether the plaintiff has sought such a declaration or not could be culled out from a holistic reading of the plaint along with the relief(s) sought. In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”
  • …..
  • “34. We may look at the matter from one another angle. Apart from the aspect of fraud, the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 18 SCC 489, while looking into whether the defendants had paid any sale consideration to the plaintiff while purchasing the plaintiff’s share in the property, held as follows:
    • .i. First, that the sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future. If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
    • ii. Secondly, that, in the said case, the defendants could not rebut the allegation of the plaintiff that no sale consideration was paid as no evidence was adduced to indicate – (a) the actual payment of the price mentioned in the sale deeds and, (b) that the defendants had any earning capacity at the time of the transaction such that the sale consideration could have been paid. As such the sale deed being void for want of valid consideration, could not be said to have affected the one-half share of the plaintiff in the suit properties nor have conferred any right of title on the defendants. In fact, it was held that the sale deeds were a sham and must be ignored.
    • iii. Lastly, it was reiterated that a document that is void need not be challenged by seeking a declaration as the said pleas can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.”
  • “The relevant observations are thus:
    • “……
    • Thus, the sale deeds of 10-4-1981 will not confer any right, title and interest on Sudarshan Kumar’s wife and children, as the sale deeds will have to be ignored, being void. It was not necessary for the appellant to specifically claim a declaration as regards the sale deeds by way of amendment to the plaint. The reason being that there were specific pleadings in the plaints as originally filed that the sale deeds were void. A document which is void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
    • …..”

End Notes I

A suit for (i) declaration of Title and (ii) Recovery – Art. 65 Governs; Not, Art. 58.

Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September, 2025,  (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)  1. Crux of the issue: whether Article 65 or Article 59 
2. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460 – void and non-est documents – a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 would apply
3. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 186 – Claim of title void ab initio and without jurisdiction – suit for possession based upon title – not necessary to claim any separate declaration that they are void. -invalidity could be raised in any proceedings. – Article 65 deals with.
N. Thajudeen v. TN Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641  declaration of title and recovery of possession – relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one
K. Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)If the document ex facie reveals that the conveyer had no title, no specific declaration is needed.  
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183Suit for possession, as a consequence of the declaration, Article 58 will have no application
Prem Singh v. Birbal  (2006) 5 SCC 3531. Article 59 fraudulent transactions – ‘voidable’ not ‘void’. 2. Article 59 applies where an instrument is prima facie valid and not presumptively invalid. 3. Article 65 applies when the document is void ab initio or void 4. A decree for setting aside the document void ab initio or void would not be necessary since non-est. 5. Fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ would be void, not ‘contents’.  Article 59 would not govern a void transaction.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460The sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of the plaintiff having sought such a remedy to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply, and the limitation to file the suit will be 12 years.
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549Once the title is established,  the defendant has to prove adverse possession (Followed in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021)
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808Declaration with a further relief – Article governing such a suit will be that for such further relief.
Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 Declaration with possession – Article 65 would come into play, giving a 12-year period, not Article 58.
S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought, the consequential relief sought for is to be treated as the main relief governing the period of limitation. A declaration is unnecessary in such a case, and even if made, it needs only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition.
Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek cancellation of such a document.
K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.)1. suit for recovery based on title,  limitation arise only when adverse possession. 2.  Recovery of possession on title – declaration is only subservient to the main prayer, possession. 3. Article 58 will apply only to a suit for declaration simpliciter.

End Notes II

Declaration of Title & Recovery: Article 65 of the Limitation Act Governs; Not, 58

58To obtain any other declarationThree years.When the right to sue first accrues.
59To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract.Three years.When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
65  For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.Twelve years.When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

End Notes III

Earlier Supreme Court Decisions

1. Kizhakkevattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024-4 SCR 383; 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)

  • “If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence.”

2. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641

  • “In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

3. C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183

  • “If the plaintiff is to be granted a relief of recovery of possession, the suit could be filed within a period of 12 years. It is one thing to say that whether such a relief can be granted or not after the evidences are led by the parties but it is another thing to say that the plaint is to be rejected on the ground that the same is barred by any law. If the suit has been filed for possession, as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiffs title, Article 58 will have no application.”

4. Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, AIR 2002 SC 215; (2002) 1 SCC 178.

  • “Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding.”

5. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460, held as under:

  • “6. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji’s case (Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 166), Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj & Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi2 this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.”

6. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 808

  • In a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief.

The Kerala High Court, in Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

  • “When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

  • “39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
  • 40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

In Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 it is held as under:

  • “Article 58 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in a suit for declaration, but it has no application when the relief sought in the plaint is not for a mere declaration,but coupled with other reliefs like injunction, partition, possession etc. and Article 65 of the Limitation Act would come into play giving 12 year period. In the instant case, the relevant Article which can be applied is not Article 58, but Article 65 as the suit was filed not merely for a relief of declaration, but for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of immovable property.”

In S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840, it is held that Article 58 is not applicable for declaration that is sought only as an ancillary relief. It is held as under:

  • “When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought for that is which would not govern the period of limitation for the suit. The consequential relief sought for is to be treated as main relief governing the period of limitation for the suit. (See Mrs. Indira Bhalchandran Gokhale v. Union of India & Another-AIR 1990 Bombay 98). Therefore declaration prayed for in this case as relief Nos. 1 and 2 were unnecessary, and even if made, need only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition of immovable properties and the claim that appellant is entitled to get family pension.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Did the Supreme Court Depart From its Earlier Position in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, in its Subsequent Decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

A Seeming Conflict Between Two Decisions

In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.), it was clearly opined, as regards an assailed instrument, as under:

  • “In a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, a declaration must have been sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff.”

However, in the subsequent decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105 (per Pardiwala and Mahadevan JJ.), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier position by holding that where the very character of a sale deed is assailed as fraudulent or bogus, the requirement of seeking a declaration stands implicitly satisfied. The Court said as under:

  • In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”

As a consequence –

  • a void document need not be challenged by claiming a declaration (that the said instrument is not binding), as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.

It is also made clear –

  • A plaintiff who was not a party to the instrument need not seek its cancellation; and
  • Relevant article in the Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 65 (12-year period) and not Article 59 (3-year period)

Subsequent Decision (Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi) Vividly Explained the Legal Position

In Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September 2025, made it clear – when a deed is fraudulent or a sham and bogus one,it is not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that a document is void‘. It is held as under:

  • “25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. ….”
  • “28. In State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, reported in 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522, this Court held that as far as void and non-est documents are concerned, it would be enough for the plaintiff to file a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. …… Subsequently, the decision of this Court in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 186 … opined as follows:
    • .i. First, the contention of the State that it is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that would apply, was rejected. It was held that the suit is primarily one for possession of property based upon title. It was observed that owing to the decision in Bhim Singhji (supra), the order dated 26.05.1976 along with the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 became void ab intio and without jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that they are void. The plea about their invalidity could be raised in the course of any proceedings. Therefore, it is Article 65, which deals with a suit for possession based on title, that would apply from the date on the which the possession of the defendant State became adverse to the plaintiff.
    • ii. Secondly, though the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order dated 26.05.1976 and the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 were void, yet it was held that the same would be of no consequence insofar as the question of limitation is concerned.
  • The fact would still remain that the possession of the property was taken by the defendants via void documents. Therefore, such documents could be ignored and a suit for possession simpliciter, for which the period of limitation prescribed under Article 65, i.e., 12 years, could be filed. In the course of such proceedings, it could be contended by the plaintiff that the documents are a nullity.
  • …”
  • “29. This Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353, discussed the position of law as to when Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and opined as follows:
    • .i. First, that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only encompass within its fold fraudulent transactions which are ‘voidable’ transactions and not those that are ‘void’. In other words, Article 59 would apply only where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to those instruments which are presumptively invalid.
    • ii. Secondly, that when the document in question is void ab initio/or void, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary since such a transaction would be non-est in the eyes of law, owing to it being a nullity.
    • iii. Thirdly, a fine distinction was drawn between fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ and fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘contents of a document’. It is only in the former situation that the instrument would be void and, in the latter, it would remain voidable. To put it simply, Article 59 would not govern the period of limitation in respect of a void transaction.
    • iv. Lastly, that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was thereby void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder, i.e., he could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority.
    • ….”
  • “30. In the decision of this Court in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, where one of us, J.B. Pardiwala J., was a member of the Bench, it was reiterated that a person who is not a party to an instrument would not be obliged in law to seek its cancellation. The reason being that such an instrument would neither be likely to affect his title nor be binding on him. However, such a plaintiff must at least seek a declaration that the said instrument is not binding on him or that is invalid insofar as he is concerned. ………
  • 31. As per the dictum in Prem Singh (supra), this Court, in order to ascertain whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed. Both the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed therein. Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio. Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation. The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale deed. Consequently, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would find no application to the case in hand.
  • 32. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury (supra), it was clearly opined that a plaintiff who is not a party to the instrument in question need not seek its cancellation. We are not oblivious to the fact that in a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrumentthe said decision laid down a requirement that a declaration must be sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff. Howeverthe said decision clarified that whether the plaintiff has sought such a declaration or not could be culled out from a holistic reading of the plaint along with the relief(s) sought. In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”
  • “34. We may look at the matter from one another angle. Apart from the aspect of fraud, the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 18 SCC 489, while looking into whether the defendants had paid any sale consideration to the plaintiff while purchasing the plaintiff’s share in the property, held as follows:
    • .i. First, that the sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future. If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
    • ii. Secondly, that, in the said case, the defendants could not rebut the allegation of the plaintiff that no sale consideration was paid as no evidence was adduced to indicate – (a) the actual payment of the price mentioned in the sale deeds and, (b) that the defendants had any earning capacity at the time of the transaction such that the sale consideration could have been paid. As such the sale deed being void for want of valid consideration, could not be said to have affected the one-half share of the plaintiff in the suit properties nor have conferred any right of title on the defendants. In fact, it was held that the sale deeds were a sham and must be ignored.
    • iii. Lastly, it was reiterated that a document that is void need not be challenged by seeking a declaration as the said pleas can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.”
  • “The relevant observations are thus:
    • “……
    • Thus, the sale deeds of 10-4-1981 will not confer any right, title and interest on Sudarshan Kumar’s wife and children, as the sale deeds will have to be ignored, being void. It was not necessary for the appellant to specifically claim a declaration as regards the sale deeds by way of amendment to the plaint. The reason being that there were specific pleadings in the plaints as originally filed that the sale deeds were void. A document which is void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
    • …..”

End Notes I

A suit for (i) declaration of Title and (ii) Recovery – Art. 65 Governs; Not, Art. 58.

Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September, 2025,  (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)  1. Crux of the issue whether Article 65 or Article 59 
2. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460 – void and non-est documents – a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 would apply
3. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 186 – Claim of title void ab initio and without jurisdiction – suit for possession based upon title – not necessary to claim any separate declaration that they are void. -invalidity could be raised in any proceedings. – Article 65 deals with.
N. Thajudeen v. TN Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641  declaration of title and recovery of possession – relief of declaration would only be an ancillaryone
K. Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)  If Document ex-facie reveals- conveyer hadno title – No Specific declaration needed.  
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183  Suit for possession, as a consequence of declaration – Article 58 will have no application
Prem Singh v. Birbal  (2006) 5 SCC 3531. Article 59 fraudulent transactions – ‘voidable’ not ‘void’. 2. Article 59 apply where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to presumptively invalid. 3. Article 65 apply when document is void ab initio or void 4. A decree for setting aside the document void ab initio or void would not be necessary since – non-est. 5. Fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ would be void, not ‘contents’.  Article 59 would not govern a void transaction.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460The sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply, and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years.
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549Once the title is established,  the defendant to prove adverse possession (Followed in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021)
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808  declaration with a further reliefArticle governing -that for such further relief
Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 Declaration with possession – Article 65 would come into play giving 12 year period – not Article 58.
S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840Article 58 is not applicable for declaration sought only as an ancillary relief.
Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47Document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47) referred.
K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.)1. suit for recovery based on title,  limitation arise only when adverse possession 2.  recovery of possession on title – declaration is only subservient to the main prayer, possession 3. Article 58 will apply only to a suit for declaration simplicitor.

End Notes II

Declaration of Title & Recovery: Article 65 of the Limitation Act Governs; Not, 58

58To obtain any other declarationThree years.When the right to sue first accrues.
59To cancel or set aside an instrumentor decree or for the rescission of a contract.Three years.When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
65  For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.Twelve years.When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

End Notes III

Earlier Supreme Court Decisions

1. Kizhakkevattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024-4 SCR 383; 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)

  • “If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence.”

2. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641

  • “In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

3. C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183

  • “If the plaintiff is to be granted a relief of recovery of possession, the suit could be filed within a period of 12 years. It is one thing to say that whether such a relief can be granted or not after the evidences are led by the parties but it is another thing to say that the plaint is to be rejected on the ground that the same is barred by any law. If the suit has been filed for possession, as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiffs title, Article 58 will have no application.”

4. Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, AIR 2002 SC 215; (2002) 1 SCC 178.

  • “Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding.”

5. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460, held as under:

  • “6. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji’s case (Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 166), Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj & Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi2 this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.”

6. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 808

  • In a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief.

The Kerala High Court, in Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

  • “When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

  • “39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
  • 40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

In Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 it is held as under:

  • “Article 58 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in a suit for declaration, but it has no application when the relief sought in the plaint is not for a mere declaration,but coupled with other reliefs like injunction, partition, possession etc. and Article 65 of the Limitation Act would come into play giving 12 year period. In the instant case, the relevant Article which can be applied is not Article 58, but Article 65 as the suit was filed not merely for a relief of declaration, but for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of immovable property.”

In S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840, it is held that Article 58 is not applicable for declaration that is sought only as an ancillary relief. It is held as under:

  • “When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought for that is which would not govern the period of limitation for the suit. The consequential relief sought for is to be treated as main relief governing the period of limitation for the suit. (See Mrs. Indira Bhalchandran Gokhale v. Union of India & Another-AIR 1990 Bombay 98). Therefore declaration prayed for in this case as relief Nos. 1 and 2 were unnecessary, and even if made, need only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition of immovable prop

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