Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2026:KER:19290): Transfer of Registry can be Claimed only on Proper Application, with Supporting Documents

 Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam,

Abstract

  • Entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person.
  • Entries in revenue records have only ‘fiscal purpose’, i.e., for payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries.
  • Mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes the title of the property nor has it any presumptive value on title.
  • The mere fact that any of the disputing parties had paid basic tax for any particular period cannot be taken as a fact conferring a right upon such party for continued payment of basic tax.
  • The petitioner who seeks a writ of mandamus to effect the Transfer of Registry in favour of the petitioner has to produce documents of title to show that he is the ‘registered holder’.

Introduction

The High Court of Kerala, in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. v. State of Kerala and Others (Anil K. Narendran  &  S. Muralee Krishna, JJ.) held, on 5th March 2026 (2026:KER:19290), inter alia, the following with respect to the payment of Land Tax by the petitioner, Harrisons Malayalam Ltd.:

  • 1. The petitioner has no legal right to seek a writ of mandamus to effect the Transfer of Registry, since, inter alia, it has not chosen to submit a proper application, with supporting documents, before the competent authority.
  • 2. The condition imposed in the Government order to the extent it stipulates that the land tax received from the petitioner, i.e., Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. and its assignees, shall be subject to the final decision in the civil suit proposed to be filed by the State, is not sustainable in law.

However, the State will have the right to seek appropriate interim reliefs in the original suits filed against the petitioner, in respect of the lands in question.

Contention of the State

  • Land tax can be accepted only from the registered holder, as provided under the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961 and Rules made thereunder.
  • The land is the absolute property of the Government.
  • The Government has taken steps to file civil suit against the petitioner.

Contention of Harrisons Malayalam Limited

  • Malayalam Plantations Ltd. has been shown as the holder of the Estate in the revenue records.
  • Unless and until the Government establishes its title in a competent civil court, the Government is not entitled to decline acceptance of land tax from the petitioner.
  • Right to property is a right guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
  • It includes the right to enjoy the property without being subjected to any restrictions other than any restrictions imposed by law.
  • Being the registered holder of the land, the petitioner is entitled to remit land tax
  • Harrisons Malayalam Ltd., is successor in title from Malayalam Plantations Ltd., is the land holder as per the provisions under the Kerala Land Tax Act.
  • Harrisons Malayalam Ltd., is successor in title from predecessor in title, i.e., Malayalam Plantations Ltd., is the land holder as per the provisions under the Kerala Land Tax Act

Provisions of Law

Section 3(3) of the  Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, defines ‘landholder’. It reads as under:

  • 3. Definitions  – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- (1) ….. (2) …..
  • (3) ‘landholder‘ means,-
    • (a) in relation to any land held by a cultivating tenant as defined in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (1 of 1964), such cultivating tenant;
    • (b) in relation to any land in the possession of a kanam tenant as defined in the Kanam Tenancy Act, 1955 (XXIV of 1955), such kanam tenant;
    • (c) in relation to any land which has not been surveyed and it not held by a cultivating tenant referred to in sub-clause (a), the proprietor of such land;
    • (d) in relation to any other land, the registered holder for the time being of such land, and includes his legal representatives and assigned and any person who under any law for the time being in force is liable for the payment of public revenue due in respect of the land held by him.”
  •  Section 5(2) of of the Kerala Land Tax Act directs – basic tax charged on any land shall be paid by the ‘land holder’. It reads as under:
  • 5. Charge of land tax
    • (1) ….
    • (2) The basic tax charged on any land shall be paid by the land holder of that land before such date as may be prescribed:
      • Provided that where- (i) the landholder in respect of any land is a person referred to in sub-clause (c) or subclause (d) of clause (3) of Section 3;
      • (ii) such land is in the possession of a tenant or other person not being the landholder; and
      • (iii) the income obtained by the land-holder from that land is less than the basic tax payable thereon, the excess of the basic tax over such income shall be paid by the tenant or other persons in possession.

Points of Law Considered

  • 1. Does the petitioner have a legal right to seek a writ of mandamus to effect the Transfer of Registry in favour of the petitioner, for the land tax of lands is being paid in the name of its predecessor, Malayalam Plantations Ltd., despite –
    • its failure to produce documents of title before the High Court to show that it is the ‘registered holder’ and
    • it has not chosen to submit a proper application, with supporting documents, before the competent authority.
  • 2. Can the Government, by a Government Order, impose a condition that the land tax paid by Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. shall be received subject to the final decision in the civil suit proposed to be filed by the State against the petitioner?”

Read also:

Findings

  • 1. The petitioner has no legal right to seek a writ of mandamus to effect the Transfer of Registry in favour of the petitioner, since –
    • it failed to produce documents of title before the High Court to show that it is the ‘registered holder’ and
    • it has not chosen to submit a proper application, with supporting documents, before the competent authority
  • In Ponnanthodiyil Sreedevi Amma v. District Collector, Malappuram [2009 (2) KHC 833] enumerated persons who come within the definition of land holder under sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (3) of Section 3 of the said Act.
  • In Vijayarajan M.D. v. Tahsildar [2013 (2) KLT SN 119], a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the payment of land tax is to be made by the holder of the land and that is in tune with the relevant provisions of the Kerala Land Tax Act.
  • In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 111], the Apex Court held that when a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all.
  • 2. Of course, the question regarding title, which if ultimately decided by the competent civil court may have a bearing on the question as to who is the registered holder the land. Still, the condition imposed in the Government order, to the extent it stipulates that the land tax received from the petitioner, i.e., Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. and its assignees shall be subject to the final decision in the civil suit proposed to be filed by the State, is not sustainable in law. It is set aside for the following reasons:
    • Entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person.
    • Entries in revenue records have only ‘fiscal purpose’, i.e., for payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries.
    • Mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes the title of the property nor has it any presumptive value on title.
    • The mere fact that any of the disputing parties had paid basic tax for any particular period cannot be taken as a fact conferring a right upon such party for continued payment of basic tax.
  • However, the State will have the right to seek appropriate interim reliefs in the original suits filed against the petitioner, in respect of the lands in question.

End Notes

No findings on the title in the previous decision – [2018 (2) KLT 369]

The High Court also held in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. v. State of Kerala and Others (2026:KER:19290) as under:

  • “14. On the aforesaid contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, we notice the specific contention raised by the learned Advocate General, after referring to paragraphs 27, 98 and 141 of the decision of the Division Bench in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. [2018 (2) KLT 369], that no such findings on title of the subject properties are there in the said decision. Relevant portion of paragraphs 27, 98 and 141 of the said decision are extracted hereunder;
    • “27. ……….. The essential contention urged is on jurisdiction, or the absolute lack of it under the KLC Act to proceed against the properties which cannot be said to be either “Government land” or “puramboke land” as defined under the KLC Act. HML asserts their title and possession on the various properties as described in the Schedules. The Special Officer appointed under the KLC Act has absolutely no jurisdiction to proceedagainst lands owned by anyone other than the Government. The title is traced without interruption to about 100 years prior and has been obtained by the petitioner, a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (for brevity “Companies Act”), by way of an indenture of 08.03.1923 bearing Deed No.1006 of 1923. The original of the said deed has been deposited before this Court and a copy has been produced as Ext.P22(b). The submissions revolve on this indenture; the efficacy of which is seriously put to test by the State and the party respondents. HML and its assignees having raised the ground of title, as had been accepted by the Government too, evident from the revenue records; the proceedings are ill motivated, for reason of it having originated on mere paper reports. Further the question of valid title having been raised, the Special Officer appointed under the KLC Act is divested of jurisdiction to further proceed.
    • xxx xxx
    • 98. ……….. We, however, make it clear that we are not called upon to examine the title of the lands, as asserted by HML. We would hence not be required to examine all of the title deeds or the purchase certificates, tax receipts, inter-parte decisions, etc. We remind ourselves that we are only looking at the question of jurisdiction under the KLC Act. If, prima facie, a bona fide dispute is discernible on title, then necessarily the parties would have to be relegated to the Civil Court; without ourselves venturing on an enquiry, which we find ourselves incompetent to embark upon, in a proceeding under Article 226.
    • xxx xxx
    • 141. …………Title cannot be adjudicated under the KLC Act intended only at eviction of unauthorized occupation. Title to establish it or to controvert it, has to be adjudicated before a civil court. Title we reiterate, in this contest, we have not found on the petitioners, which we are incompetent to do in the present proceedings. Title has to be found after adducing evidence in a properly initiated civil proceedings, if the State ventures so, to institute. There is no cause of action for the petitioners to approach the civil court to establish title under Section 20 of the KLC Act, the proceedings under the Act having been set aside by us.”
  1. A reading of paragraph 141 of the decision would make it explicitly clear that the
    Division Bench did not decide the question of the title of the petitioner, since the High Court is incompetent to decide such an issue in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we find no force in the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the facts relating to the ownership and possession of the plantations, including the estates which are subject matter of these writ petitions, were concluded by the Division Bench, in favour of the petitioner, in the decision in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. [2018 (2) KLT 369] and the 1st respondent State has issued the Government order dated 06.06.2019 to overreach the said decision of the Division Bench.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Adverse Possession: A Concise Overview

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Ingredients of Adverse Possession

  • (a) hostile animus,
  • (b) denial of title of true owner – admitting the title of the true owner,
  • (c) wrongful dispossession of true owner,
  • (d) placing the date of starting of wrongful dispossession,
  • (e) some overt act,
  • (f) hostile (or notorious) acts must be peaceful, open and hostile to the true owner.
    • It is expressed in the classical formulation of adverse possession in the Latin maxim: “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario
    • That is –
      • not by force: nec vi,
      • not in secrecy: nec clam
      • not by permission: nec precario.

Note:

  • (i) For perfecting adverse possession, the statutory requirement of ’12 years’ in the Limitation Act, 1963 (particularly Article 65) must also be satisfied.
  • (ii) It starts only – “when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff” (Art. 65).
Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779;
T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570;
PT Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, AIR 2007 SC 1753

Drastic Change on Adverse Possession

Drastic change has been made, on the law on Adverse Possession, by 1963 Limitation Act. It introduced the words – “when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff“.

  • Under the (previous) Limitation Act, 1908 (Arts. 142 and 144), the true owner had to file the suit within 12 years of losing possession (otherwise, there would have been adverse possession).
  • Under the 1963 Limitation Act, it is no longer necessary for the true owner to prove that he was in possession within 12 years of filing the suit (as required, earlier, by Arts. 142 and 144 of the Limit. Act, 1908).
  • The burden lies solely on the claimant of adverse possession to establish hostile animus, denial of the title of the true owner, wrongful dispossession, and other overt acts constituting adverse possession.
  • Bar of limitation arises, in a title suit (by the true owner), if only the defendants have a sustainable claim of adverse possession, after the 1963 Limitation Act.

Effects of the Drastic Change

  • The limitation starts ‘when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff‘ (Art. 65, Limitation Act).
  • Mere possession, however long, will not be adverse.
  • Even if Plaintiff has knowledge of defendants’ possession (however long) – no relevance.
  • Adverse possession and title claim will not go together.
  • The claimant must (first) admit the ownership of the true owner.
  • An issue as to ‘adverse possession’ necessary.
  • Proper animus (pleading and proof) needed.
  • The ‘mindset/attitude’ of the true-owner is immaterial.
  • Defendants must have relinquished the title claim, if raised, to prop up adverse possession.
Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander, 1984-2 SCC 286,
Thakur Kishan Singh v. ArvindKumar, 1994-6 SCC 591,
Ramiah v. M. Narayana Reddy,  AIR 2004 SC 4261,
T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, 2006-7 SCC 570,
P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59,
Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, 2010-14 SCC 316,
Ram NaginaRai v. DeoKumarRai, 2019-13 SCC 324,
Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, 2019-15 SCC 756, 
Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263,
Govt of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988.

Suit on Title – No Limitation Unless Defendant has Claim of Adverse Possession

  • No question of limitation arises unless the defendant substantiates his plea of adverse possession. This is because, after the significant change brought about by the Limitation Act, 1963, mere possession—however long—does not, by itself, become ‘adverse’.
Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta, AIR 2024 SC 5374
Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021; 2024 KLT(Online) 3051,
K.J. Abraham v. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98;
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; 2007-14 SCC 183
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549,
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808.

Acquiescence, Inaction, etc.

  • The same is the position even if – acquiescence, inaction, etc. on the part of true owner.
  • Even if the plaintiff admits that the defendant has been a trespasser for a hundred years, there will be no bar of limitation to a recovery suit based on title, if the defendant does not claim adverse possession.

No Adverse Possession, Unless Claimant ‘Admits Title of the True Owner

  • There can be no adverse possession where the claimant does not admit the title of the true owner.
Dagadabai v. Abbas @ GulabRustumPinjari, 2017-13 SCC 705,
Raghavan, v. Devayani, 2024-2 KHC 417,
M. Radheyshyamlal v. V Sandhya, 2024 INSC 214, pointed out M.Siddiq v. Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1 (Ram Janmabhumi Temple case – 5 Judge Bench).
  • If the defendant (effectively) pleads adverse possession, admitting the plaintiff’s title, the plaintiff need not prove title.
  • Similarly, if the plaintiff (effectively) pleads adverse possession, the defendant, true owner, need not prove title.

Burden is on the Claimant

  • The burden to prove adverse possession is on the claimant (of adverse possession).
Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021; 2024 KLT(Online) 3051,
Janata Dal Party v. Indian National Congress, 2014-16 SCC 731,
C. Natrajan v. AshimBai, AIR 2008 SC 363; 2007-14 SCC 183,
Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan, 2009-16 SCC 517,
Mohammad Ali v. Jagdish Kalita, 2004-1 SCC 271,
Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1996) 1 SCC 639.

Adverse Possession – Irrational, Illogical Claim

In Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan, 2009-16 SCC 517, it was pointed out that the claim of adverse possession must be read in the context of human rights. The law which ousts an owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is found in this case to be irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Ten Square Miles Concession and Kanan Devan Hills Concession – State Grants of Travancore Governments

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • As regards Kanan Devan Hills Concession, Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v.  The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, is the direct authority to see that the land therein is Government land.
  • As regards the Ten Square Miles Concession, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, in M. A. Majeed v. State of Kerala, 2005-3 KLJ 762; 2006-1 KLT 19, proceeded on the basis that the lands therein were owned by the Government.

Introduction

Kanan Devan Hills Concession

On July 11, 1877, under the first Pooniat Concession, John Danial Munro obtained a large extent of land, on a rental basis, for coffee cultivation,  from Punjar Valiya Raja. Poonjar Raja surrendered the land to the State of Travancore. Now it vests with the State of Kerala.

It is held in Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v.  The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301 (relying on  the Travancore Land Revenue Manual) as under:

  • It thus appears that the State grants like
    • Kanan Devan Hills Concession and
    • Ten Square Miles Concession, and
    • Munro Lands,
  • were treated under the heading Pandaravaka Lands; i.e. lands belonging to the sircar.

Ten Square Miles Concession

In 1834, a tract of ten square miles was taken up and cultivated by one William Huxam under permission granted by the Sirkar in Pathanapuram and Shencotta. An agreement was entered into between the Dewan of Travancore and Huxam in 1849.

In 1852 Huxam transferred the land to the firm of Binny and Co., Madras. In the same year, an agreement was entered into between the Travancore Sirkar and Binny & Co., with respect to the land whereby the Sirkar granted the Company a lease for 30 years with a condition to renew it. The Travancore Government, subsequently, by Order dated 28th March 1906, stated that it was prepared to convert the leasehold into freehold on conditions.

Kanan Devan Hills Concession

Poonjar Raja was Original Janmi Poonjar Raja was a Janmi (landlord or proprietary interest holder) of the lands involved in Kanan Devan Hills Concession.  John Danial Munro obtained large extent of land, on rental basis, for coffee cultivation,  from Punjar Valiya Raja, on July 11, 1877, under the first Pooniat Concession. It was stipulated in the Concession that –

  • “you shall clear and remove the jungles, and reclaim the waste lands within the said boundaries, and cultivate them with coffee up to the year 1058 and from the year 1059, pay our rent collector a yearly rent at the rate of 3,000 British Rupees” (Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218).

The Maharaja of Travancore executed a deed of ratification, dated November 28, 1878, by which the he ratified the First Pooniat Concession dated July 11, 1877. The lands of Poonjar Raja over which he exercised the right as a Janmi had been transferred to the Government of Travancore.  

On 2.8.1886, the agreement called the Second Pooniat Concession was entered into modifying the previous deed. By this time a company called the North Travancore Land Planting and Agricultural Society Ltd. had acquired the rights in the said land.

Surrender of Rights to Travancore Sircar 

Poonjar Chief or Raja had subjugated himself to Travancore Sircar or Maharaja, and an agreement dated 18.09.1899 was entered into between Rohini Thirunal Kerala Varma Raja (the then Chief of Poonjar Koyikkal) and the Travancore Government, under which the ownership of the lands, including that described in the Poonjat Concessions, had been transferred to the Government of Travancore. (See: Kottayam District Koottu Krishi Karshakasangam v. Stateof Kerala, 2015).

It was declared that the tract known as Anjanad and Kannan Devan Hills was an integral portion of our territory of the Travancore and the inhabitants were not to make any payment to the Poonjar Chief.

Royal Proclamation of 1899

On 24.9.1899, a Royal Proclamation (of 1899) was made. It reads as under:

  • “Whereas we deem it expedient to clearly declare the position of this State in respect of the tract known as Anjanad and Kannan Devan Hills, we are pleased to declare as follows; (1) The tract known as Anjanad and Kannan Devan Hills is an integral portion of our territory and all rights over it belong to and vest in us.
  • (2) The inhabitants of the said tract and all others whom it may concern are hereby informed and warned that they are not to pay any taxes, rents or dues, or make any other payment to the Poonjar Chief or his representatives or to any person other than an officer of our Government authorised in this behalf, in respect of anything in, upon or connected with the said tract, with the exception, however, of a payment of rupee three thousand per annum from the successors in interests of the late Mr. J.D. Munro of London and Peermade now being paid to the said Chief in virtue of a Lease deed executed by the said Chief in favour of the said late Mr.J.D. Munro on the 11th July, 1877, and which we are pleased to permit the said Chief to continue to receive.
  • (3) The lands within the said tract will be dealt with by our Government in the same manner as lands in other parts of our  territory with such modifications as the circumstances and conditions of the said tract may require and all taxes, rents and dues hitherto paid, and that may hereafter be imposed by our Government shall, with the exception of the sum of rupees three thousand aforesaid, be paid by the, occupants of lands within the said tract whose occupation has been or may be recognized or confirmed by our Government, and of such portions of the said tract as may from time to time hereafter, with the permission of our Government, be occupied, to the officers of our Government who may be authorised in this behalf.” (Quoted in: Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218; Kottayam District Koottu Krishi Karshakasangam v. Stateof Kerala, 2015)

Ten Square Miles Concession

The Travancore States Manuel, Volume IV, Page 487-490, reads as under:

  • “PATHANAPURAM CONCESSION.
  • A tract of land in Pathanapuram and Shencotta comprising an area of ten square miles was originally taken up and cultivated by one Mr. Huxam under permission granted by the Sirkar in 1834 (1009 ME) [Vide Land Revenue Manual — Vol. Ill- Revised Edition Part I, pp. 9-11: It refers to the proceedings of the Chief Secretary – G. 0. No. 5020 R. 1994, dated 28th March 1906]
  • An agreement was entered into between the Dewan of Travancore and Mr. William Huxam on 9th July 1849 (27th Mithunam 1024).
  • In 1852 Mr. Huxam transferred the land to the firm of Messrs. Binny and Co., Madras, with the sanction of the Sirkar.
  • An agreement was entered into between the Sirkar and Messrs. Binny & Co., in 1852 (1027 M.E.) whereby the Sirkar granted the Company a lease of the land for 30 years with a condition that the lease shall be renewable at the option of the then holder for the period of 30 years on the same terms and conditions, and again for a further period of 30 years at the option of the holders, thus extending the term to 90 years. A condition was also inserted in the agreement that, if the lease were not renewed at the expiration of either the first or the second term, the whole of the land with all the trees and plants thereon shall revert to the possession of the Sircar. Messers Binni and Co. transferred the land to Mr GM McLauchlan in 1876 with the permission of the Sirkar. Subsequently, Mr McLauchlan, with two partners (Mr P. W. Keir and Mr George Anderson), formed the ‘Travancore Plantation Company’, applied for and obtained a renewal of the lease Company. This agreement was executed on 17th April 1877 (6th Madam 1052). This deed granted a lease of the land to the Company for 35 years from 13th January 1877, with a condition that the lease shall be renewable for a further period of 30 years upon the same terms and conditions, viz., an annual rent of Rs. 100 for every English square mile of land cultivated, exemption from payment of rent for 3 years from the date of clearing and obligation to obtain the sanction of the Government for any alienation of the land or the rights thereof. It was also stipulated that, at the expiration of the period of sixty-five years provided for in the agreement, or if the lease were not renewed at the expiration of the first term, the whole of the land with all the trees and plants thereon shall revert to the possession of the Sirkar, In 1905, Messrs. Keir and McLauchlan requested the Government either to give them the assurance that the lease would be renewed on the expiry of the existing term or convert the lease-hold into free-hold at the expiry of the lease, for which they were prepared to pay 3 annas instead of 2 1/2 annas per acre for the land brought under cultivation. They made these proposals as they wanted to open the lands remaining uncultivated for rubber. The matter was discussed between the Dewan and the applicants and others who had acquired portions of the land from the lessees, and as the result of these discussions, the Government issued G. 0. No. 5020 R. 1994, dated 28th March 1906, in which it was stated that Government were prepared to convert the leasehold into freehold on the following conditions:
    • .(i) Payment of acreage value of Re. 1 per acre on the 10 sq. miles.
    • (ii) Assessment for lands under coffee, tea and other products, at the rates which may prevail at the time.
    • (iii) Assessment for lands which may not have been cleared and which may remain as jungle at 8 as. per acre.
    • (iv) Assessment for lands brought under rubber cultivation at Rs. 2 per acre.
  • It was also laid down in the G.O. that all transfers should be reported to the Government and that the other terms of the grant shall be the same as those that apply to waste lands granted under the coffee land rules, dated 7th July 1898. When the tax on lands granted for coffee and tea cultivation was raised from 12 annas to one British rupee per acre, with effect from 17th August 1910, by Royal Proclamation dated 12-8-09, that fact was communicated to the holders of this grant, with the intimation that when the lease-hold was converted into freehold under the above G.O the grantees and their alienees should pay assessment at the increased rate of Bh, Re. 1 per acre on the whole area cultivated, from 12th January 1912.
  • The area covered by this special grant consists of the following 10 estates situated in the taluks of Paithanapuram and Shenkotta:
    • Name: ………… ….. …………. Area: …………….Taluk
    • Venture …. …….. ……. ……. 407.25 acres: Shencotta
    • A and (B) Block:…. …….. 711.01 acres: Shencotta
    • Ridgeband: …… …….. ……. 127.80 acres: Shencotta
    • New Swarnagiri:…. . …… 208.87 acres: Shencotta
    • Upper Florence II Bit: … 39.29 acres: Shencotta
    • Koravanthavalam: …… 1230.20 acres: Pathanapuram
    • Midlothian: …… ……… …. 437.24 acres: Pathanapuram
    • Nagamala: ……. ….. …….. 1376.53: acres: Pathanapuram
    • Isfield: …… ….. ………………. 567.78 acres: Pathanapuram
    • New Arundal: … …… ….. 1310.13 acres: Pathanapuram”

Subsequent Grant Deeds

The land history of Ten Square Miles shows the following:

  • 1. After the G. 0. No. 5020 R. 1994, dated 28th March 1906, when the holders of the land sought the Travancore Government to issue ‘title or grant deeds‘, it was specified in the deeds (executed in 1913 and 1916) –
    • that those deeds were ‘grant deeds’ subject to the terms, covenants, conditions and provisions.
    • Note: 1. The words used in the GO are – “…. prepared to convert the leasehold into freehold on the following conditions“.
    • 2. The 1906 GO further reads – “when the lease-hold was converted into freehold under the above G.O the grantees and their alienees should pay assessment at the increased rate of Bh, Re. 1 per acre“. That is, no (binding) ‘declaration’ as to conversion to ‘freehold’ was made.
    • 3. GO does not have the same force as a statute (Act) or a statutory rule, unless it is issued under a specific statutory power.
    • 4. The grant deeds executed in 1913 and 1916, as stated above, show that the government had also “agreed to” issue ‘title or grant deeds‘; and the Company sought to issue ‘title or grant deeds(and the Government executed only “grant deeds”).
    • 5. When Grant deeds were executed (in pursuance of the GO) what is to be taken into consideration is the Grant Deed, and not GO..
  • 2. The terms, covenants, conditions and provisions in those deeds were substantially similar to the ‘grant deeds’ prevailing at the relevant time, which came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, and State of Kerala v. Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272 (mentioned below).

High Court Rejected the Contention – Ten Sq. Mile Land, a ‘Freehold Property

The contention of the petitioner in M.A. Majeed v. State of Kerala, 2005-3 KLJ 762; 2006-1 KLT 19, was that the Ambanad Estate (a part of New Arundal Estate etc. in Ten Sq. Miles Concession) land was a freehold property. The contention was not accepted by the Full Bench, on the appraisal that the Government was the owner of the property. It is held as under:

  • “Except the liability to pay seigniorage, nothing remains to be resolved in this Writ Petition. Necessarily, the aforesaid finding shall result in dismissal of the Writ Petition.”

Key Decisions on Grant

In the following cases the effect of “grant” by the Erstwhile Governments was considered.

1. Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v.  The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301

The Supreme Court, in Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301 (Sikri (CJ), Shelat, A.N. Ray, I.D. Dua, H.R. Khanna, JJ.) held that Kenan Devan Hills Concession (on grant deeds) fall within the expression “Janmam right” vested with Sircar. The State of Kerala made an Act – the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971, to “vest” the possession of the land that remained in the possession of the Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd.

According to the petitioner Company, ‘it has at all times been holding, cultivating, enjoying and dealing with the Concession Land as the absolute owner thereof’.

According to the State, this land is dealt with under this heading – Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar. and that it was only “granted” to the company for ‘coffee cultivation’. The State asserted in this case –

  • that the petitioner Company was not an absolute owner, but only a lessee under the Government, especially since the 1899 Proclamation issued by H.H. the Maharaja declaring that Kannan Devan Hills was ‘an integral part’ of the ‘territory’.
  • that the petitioner’s predecessor-in-title was John Danial Munro, who obtained the first Pooniat Concession from Punjar Valiya Raja, on July 11, 1877. This Concession recited that an application was made for the grant of the above property to the Raja for coffee cultivation.
  • It was further stipulated in the Concession that
    •  “you shall clear and remove the jungles, and reclaim the waste lands within the said boundaries, and cultivate them with coffee up to the year 1058 and from the year 1059, pay our rent collector a yearly rent at the rate of 3,000 British Rupees.”
  • H.H. the Maharaja executed a deed of ratification, dated November 28, 1878, by which the Government ratified the First Pooniat Concession dated July 11, 1877.
  • This deed of ratification laid down that  the Government permitted the grantee to hold the land. (It was similar to the ‘Grant/Title’ deeds executed by the State in all other ‘Grants’ – under the ‘Grant Rules’).
  • Clause 5 of the Deed of Ratification, is important. It provides, inter alia, that
    • “The grantee can appropriate to his own use within the limits of the grant all timber except the following and such as may hereafter be reserved namely, Teak, Cole Teak, Blackwood, Ebony, Karoonthaly, Sandalwood; should he carry any timber without the limits of the grant it will be subject to the payment of Kooteekanom, or Customs Duty……….
  • The eleventh clause reads –
    • “The land granted shall be held in perpetuity as heritable or transferable property, but every case of transfer of the grant by the grantee shall be immediately made known to the Sircar, who shall have the right of apportioning the tax, if a portion of the holding is transferred.”
  • The twelfth clause stipulates –
    • “The discovery of useful mines and treasures within the limits of the grant shall be communicated to the Sircar, and the grantee shall in respect to such mines and treasures, abide by the decision of the Sircar.”
  • The sixteenth clause provides –
    • “The grantee shall be bound to preserve the forest trees growing on the banks of the principal streams running through the tract to the extent of fifty yards in breadth on each side of the stream, the Underwood only being permitted to be cleared and coffee planted instead. Similarly he shall also be bound to preserve the, trees about the crest of the hill to the extent of a quarter of a mile on each side.”
  • Royal Proclamation was made on September 24, 1899 provided that ‘Anjanad and Kannan Devan Hills is an integral portion of our territory and that the inhabitants of the said tract are ‘hereby informed and warned that they are not to pay any taxes, rents or dues, or make any other payment to the Poonjar Chief.

Points came for consideration in this decision

  • Whether the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 was protected from challenge under Art. 31A of the Constitution. That is, whether these lands fall within expression ‘Janmam right’ or “estate”  in art. 31A of the Constitution.
  • If the lands acquired were an “estate”, or with ‘Janmam right’ owned by the Company, the land reform enactment did not have stood valid. (Note: Kesavananda Bharathi Case came in 1973.)

The Apex Court found the following:

  • Even if janmaom rights remained with the Poonjar Chief earlier, H.H. the Maharaja became the janmi by the Royal proclamation of 1899.
  • The nature of ‘janmam right’ has been examined by this Court previously in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887 Subba Rao, J., observed that janmaom right in Kerala is an “estate and it is the freehold interest.
  • The Sircar itself is one of these janmis and it was the largest Janmi. It came to possess janmam lands by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation and other ways
  • If any person wants land in Travancore, he must obtain it from, some one of the body of Janmis, i.e. from the Sircar, which is the Chief Janmi, or from some other Janmi.

The Apex Court observed as under:

  • “… On the material placed before us it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the lands in dispute fall within the expression “Janmam right”.
  • If, as stated in Travancore Land Revenue Manual Volume IV, there are no lands that do not belong to a Janmi and the Sircar becomes a janmi by gift, escheat, confiscation or otherwise, the effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1899 must be that the Sircar became the Janmi.”

The Apex Court further found –

  • The Registered Lands included inter alia, (a) Pandaravaka lands and (b) Janmam lands.
  • Regarding Pandaravaka lands it is stated : “Pandaravaka or Sircar lands are, lands of which the State is the landlord or the Jenmi and whatever rights which vest in the ryots are derived from the Sircar.”
  • Kenan Devan Hills Concession is dealt with under this heading, i.e. Pandaravaka Lands.
  • “It thus appears that the State grantlike
    • Kanan Devan Hills Concession and
    • Ten Square Miles Concession, and
    • Munro Lands.
  • were treated under the heading ‘Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar” (that is, such Grant-lands were not ‘owned’ by the holders thereof).

On these findings The Apex Court upheld the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 and dismissed the challenge of the Company.

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2. State of Kerala v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272

With respect to the same property  it was held in State of Kerala v. Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272as under:

  • “The Trial Court in a detailed and well-reasoned judgment dismissed the suit of the company. The trial court on the interpretation of First Concession (Exhibit P- 1), Second Concession (Exhibit P-2), deed of ratification (Exhibit P-62) and the Government agreement with the Society dated August 2, 1866 (Exhibit P-64) came to the conclusion that the company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession Area or the trees and timber in the said area. It was held that the Poonjar Chief had only conveyed heritable and transferable possessory rights over the Concession area to the grantee. It was also held that absolute rights over the trees and timber in the Concession Area did not pass to the grantee and it had only the right to use and remove timber subject to the restrictions imposed in the deeds of conveyance/ratification.”

It is observed:

  • “An identical clause in another grant entered into by the Travancore Government came for consideration before a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in George A Leslie v. State of Kerala, 1969 K. L.T. 378, K. K. Mathew, J. (as the learned Judge then was) interpreted the clause as under:
    •  We think that if title to the reserved trees passed to the grantees, a provision of this nature would have been quite unnecessary. There was no purpose in stating that the grantees will be free to appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant, if title to the trees passed to the grantees; the provision is a clear indication that the grantees were allowed to cut and appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant as a matter of concession.”
  • “We agree with the interpretation given to the clause by Mathew, J. and hold that the respondent- company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession Area or the trees and the timber therein.”

It is observed further:

  • “It was further held by Mathew, J. (in George A. Leslie v. State of Kerala, 1969 KLT 378) that kuttikanam being the governments share of the value of the trees owned by the government it has the power to fix the value of the trees. We agree with the reasoning and conclusions reached by Mathew, J.”

The Apex Court upheld and approved “the judgment and findings” of the Trial Court.

3. George A. Leslie v. State of Kerala – AIR 1970 Ker 21(K. K. Mathew, J.)

Travancore Regulation II of 1040 (1865) and Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills dated 24th April 1865 considered.

It is observed:

  • “Ext. P-l is a grant made under the Travancore Regulation II of 1040 and the Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills dated 24th April 1865. It conferred a heritable and transferable interest in the grantees of the land comprised in it. Clause 5 in Ext. P-l, which is identical with Section 5 in Form A of the Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills, is the relevant provision for deciding this question. It provides:
    • “Grantees can appropriate to their own use within the limits of the grant all timber except the following and such as may hereinafter be reserved, namely, Teak, Gole Teak, Blackwood, Ebony, Karcomthaly, Sandalwood; should they carry any timber without the limits of the grant, it will be subject to the payment of kuttikanom or customs duty or both, as the case may be, in the same way as timber ordinarily felled”.
  • 10. We think that if title to the reserved trees passed to the grantees, a provision of this nature would have been quite unnecessary. There was no purpose in stating that the grantees will be free to appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant, if title to the trees passed to the grantees; the provision is a clear indication that the grantees were allowed to cut and appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant as a matter of concession.”

It was pointed out –

  • Travancore Pattom Proclamation of 1040 (1865), which conferred full rights on tenants of pandarapattom land. They have no application to the land or trees comprised in grants for cultivation of coffee or tea (under Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills dated 24th April 1865).

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Doctrines of ‘Legislation by Reference’ and ‘Legislation by Incorporation’

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

The ‘Doctrine of incorporation’ and the ‘Doctrine of reference’ arise when a provision in a statute is referred to in another statute. The extent to which the earlier provision applies to the later statute is determined by these doctrines. They can be summarised as under:

  • 1. Doctrine of incorporation (only a restrictive and strict application) – subsequent change (amendment or repeal) of the referred provision does not affect the incorporating provision.  That is, the incorporated original provision alone applies, verbatim.
  • 2. Doctrine of reference or a citation (wider application) – future changes in the referred provision will also apply to the referring provision. The statute referred to is taken as it exists from time to time. Therefore, subsequent amendments to the referred statute will apply.

The effect of ‘repealing and re-enactment’ of an Act is set out in Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. That is: the re-enacted provision governs the field, and it is to be looked into.  Section 8(1) reads as under:

  • “8. Construction of references to repealed enactments: (1) Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears: be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted.”

The Decisive Factor is whether the Reference is ‘Specific or General

In Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu, BR Gavai, Sandeep Mehta, JJ., AIR 2024 SC 2835; 2024-4 SCC 508, held that the decisive factor to determine whether a case is of ‘legislation by incorporation’ or ‘legislation by reference’ is whether “the reference is specific or general”.

In this case (Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India), the reference considered was Section 236(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which reads as under:

  • “Offences under this Code shall be tried by the Special Court established under Chapter XXVIII of the Companies Act, 2013”.

At the time the Code was enacted, the Special Court referred to in Section 236 of the Companies Act consisted of a person who was qualified to be a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge. Subsequent amendments to Section 236 of the Companies Act, however, made it possible to contend that offences under the Code could be tried only by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class.

The Apex Court found that the reference was ‘not general but specific’.  Therefore, it is held that the case is a case of ‘legislation by incorporation’ (i.e., subsequent change does not affect), and not a case of ‘legislation by reference’.

The Court also pointed out that the Code has also suffered two subsequent amendments, in 2015 and 2018; and if the legislative intent was to give effect to the subsequent amendments in the Companies Act to Section 236(1) of the Code, nothing prevented the legislature from amending Section 236(1) of the Code. The legislature having not done so, the provision regarding the reference in Section 236(1) of the Code to the Special Court, as mentioned in Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013, stood frozen as on the date of enactment of the Code.

The Apex Court referred following decisions:

  • Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer, 2024 SCC Online SC 4,
  • Ebix Singapore Private Limited v. Committee of Creditors, (2022) 2 SCC 401,
  • Embassy Property Developments P Ltd v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 13 SCC 308,
  • Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 3 SCC 1,
  • Ujagar Prints v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488 ,
  • Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 529,
  • Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1974) 2 SCC 777,
  • New Central Jute Mills Co. v. Asst Collector, (1970) 2 SCC 820,
  • Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, AIR 1962 SC 316 : (1962) 3 SCR 786,

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Mistake in Boundary or Survey Number will not Invalidate a Document; Insignificant Errors in Plaint will not Disentitle a Decree

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Abstract

1. If the property is clearly identifiable, insignificant errors in its description in pleadings are not fatal. The court can act upon such correct identification without requiring a formal amendment to the pleadings or the decree.

  • Chandrakumar v. Narayana Bahuleyan, ILR 2011-2 Ker 897; 2011-2 KHC 884; 2011-3 KLT 185 (the plaintiffs may not be non-suited, for no explanation as to a larger extent).
  • Niyamat Ali Molla v. Sonargon Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. , AIR 2008 SC 225; 2007-13 SCC 421 (in the Schedule of the Property, certain blank spaces have been left for the insertion of the plot numbers maintained in the Village records).
  • Mohammed Munvar v. N.C. Nesan, 21 Mar 2024, 2024 Supreme(Mad) 613 (east and west boundaries interchanged).
  • Guda Sanjeeva Reddy v. Kodathala Sujatamma, 2006-4 ALT 636; 2006-4 CivCC 452; 2007-5 RCR(Civ) 271 (name of the Village was wrongly described in the plaint).

2. An insignificant error in the plaint, even repeated in the decree, can be corrected by the court, invoking section 152 CPC.

  • Rahulghani v. Uma Shenkar, A.I.R. 1944 Oudh 5, (clerical error: ‘west’ for ‘east’)
  • Satyanarayana v. Purnayya, 1931 Mad 260 (wrong survey number)
  • J. Sarojini Alias Nesamma v. Narayani Sarojini, 2008-1 ILR(Ker) 153; 2008-1 KHC 897; 2008-1 KLT 516 (mistake in survey number).
  • Deo Kumar Sah v. Mahesh Pd. Rai, 2004-3 BBCJ 175; 2004-3 PLJR 354 (mistake in plot number and area).
  • Mohinder Singh v. Teja Singh, AIR 1979 P & H 47, (incorrect plot number and area)
  • Pratibha Singh v. Shanti Devi Prasad, (2003)2 SCC 330 (mistake in survey number)
  • Easwari Amma Prsannakumari v. Radhakrishna Pillai, 2015 (5) KerHC 922 (a survey number was omitted, and the length of the way was incorrect).

3. A mere mistake occurred in the compromise petition Can Be Corrected In Decree

  • M. K. Soumini v. M. K. Sreedharen, 10 Jan 2017, 2017 Supreme(Ker) 173,

4. Mistakes in decree arose from the erroneous plaint Can also Be Corrected In Decree

  • J. Sarojini Alias Nesamma v. Narayani Sarojini, 2008-1 ILR(Ker) 153; 2008-1 KHC 897; 2008-1 KLT 516 (mistake in survey number),
  • Subramanian Iyer v. Joseph George, 1959 K.L.T. 165 (boundaries of the schedule wrongly described; decree corrected).

5. Even Incidental Errors Anterior To Decree (Original Document), Can Be Corrected In Decree

  • Abdhu v. Assainar (1993 [2] KLT 711)
  • Raman Nadar Velayudhan Nadar v. Janaki Karthi (2011 [2] KLT 149)

6. Court Orders – Technical Defects will not defeat Substantive Rights

  • Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480.
  • Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India, (1984) 3 SCC 46).
  • State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719.
  • Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar (1975) 1 SCC 774,
  • Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425,

7. Non-mentioning of survey number is not a ground to reject the application of Petrol Pump.

  • Rajesh Parmar v. Under Secretary, Petroleum Corporation, MANU/MP/0121/2019)
  • Indian Oil Corporation Limited v.  Gosala Raju, AIR 2022 AP (NOC) 260.

8. “Falsa Demonstratio Non Nocet”  (Adequate and sufficient description with convenient certainty of what was meant to pass): an erroneous addition to the description will not vitiate it.

  • Umrao Bapu v. Ramakrishna Bapu, AIR1938 Nag. 93,
  • Durga Prased Singh v. Rajendra Narain Bagchi (1910) 37 Cal. 293,
  • Savarimuthu Nadar Chellayan Nadar v. Kanakku Kali Pillai Padmanabha Pillai, 1957 KHC 184

9. General principle – boundary descriptions shall prevail

  • Subhaga v. Shoba, 2006-5 SCC 466
  • T. Venkata Vijaya Lakshmi v. Kodali Rayana Rao, 2023-4 ALT 272; 2023-3 CivCC 746
  • Vishnu Anant Dessai v. Govind Vithal Sawant, 2020-5 All MR 496 (Bom);
  • Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959

10.Boundary descriptions – Vague and Uncertain Description Rejected & Definite and Certain Preferred.

  • Chandrakumar v. Narayana Bahuleyan, ILR 2011-2 Ker 897; 2011-2 KHC 884; 2011-3 KLT 185
  • Sivaraman Nair v. Shamsuddin, 1990 (1) KerLT 187: 1990 KHC 295
  • Savithri Ammal v. Padmavathy, 1990 KHC 295,

11. No Stamp Duty for Rectification Deed

  • P. Sasikumar v. State Of Kerala, 2024-4 KLT 864,
  • Jihas P.A. v. District Registrar, 2012 (3) KHC 146)
  • Rajesh Kumar K.T. v. State of Kerala, 2024 (3) KHC 425

12. Error will not necessarily invalidate a document – Not Applied

  • Kamalamma v. Shibu, 2024-3 KerHC 547.
  • Savarimuthu Nadar Chellayan Nadar v. Kanakku Kali Pillai Padmanabha Pillai, 1957 KHC 184,

13. Execution of ‘Rectification Deed’

  • Rajesh Kumar KT  v. State of Kerala, 2024-3 KHC 425,
  • Vannathi Valatpil Mahmood v. State of Kerala, 2019 (2) KHC 736 (change in the description of the property)
  • Jihas v. District Registrar, 2012 (3) KLT 194 (mistake in mentioning flat number in the sale deed).

14. Wrong description in Will. Legal heirs can execute a rectification

  • Baburaj P.K v. State of Kerala, 2019 (2) KHC 628.

15. Clerical or Arithmetical Errors in the plaint and Final Decrees can be Rectified

  • Kalkonda Pandu Rangaiah v. Kalkonda Krishnaiah, AIR 1974 AP 201,

16, When instrument may be rectified

  • Section 26 of Sp. Relief Act

17. Suit for Rectification of Deed – When Needed?

  • Aliyar v. Raju V. Vayalat, 2016-1 KHC 763; 2016-2 KLT 656.

18. Intention of the Parties to prevail when conflict between area and boundaries

  • Krishnamoorthi Iyer v. Janaki Amma, 1957 KHC 202 : 1957 KLT 886,
  • Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959)
  • The Church of South India Trust Association v. Raja Ambrose, 1978- 2 MLJ 620.

19. No “suppression”, if the facts are (i) Not Material and  (ii) “Known” to the opposite side.

  • Avtar Singh v. Union of India, 2016-8 SCC 471, (in a case of information given to the employer by a candidate).

Part I: Insignificant Mistakes in Proceedings in Suits

Order VII Rule 3 of C.P.C, hereunder:

  • “3. Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property—Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers.”

Insignificant mistakes in pleadings (plaint or written statement) do not necessarily require formal amendment before judgment or decree, especially when they do not prejudice the other side. That is, the amendment may not be insisted upon by the court before Judgment or Decree.

If Property Identifiable, Plaintiff Not to be Non-suited on Disparity in Extent

In Chandrakumar v. Narayana Bahuleyan, ILR 2011-2 Ker 897; 2011-2 KHC 884; 2011-3 KLT 185, it is held as under:

  • “17. …. The description of boundaries are certain, identifiable and capable of fixing the boundary without any dispute. In such circumstances, the extent as such may not be so important. That there is difference in the extent as shown in the title deed and as found in the resurvey is not very material in fixing the boundary between the property of the plaintiffs and the property of the defendant.
  • 18. …. The southern boundary could be easily identified and it was so done by the Commissioner. Simply because the plaintiffs did not explain as to how they came into possession of a larger extent than that shown in the title deed, I do not think they must be non suited.”

If parties went to trial, identifying property – Mistake can be Ignored

In Guda Sanjeeva Reddy v. Kodathala Sujatamma, 2006-4 ALT 636; 2006-4 CivCC 452; 2007-5 RCR(Civ) 271, it is held as under:

  • “5. As stated above, since the parties went to trial knowing that the property is situated at Buchireddypalem Village and Mandai and since the suit is decreed, respondent is entitled to recover the plaint schedule property. So merely on the ground that the name of the Village was wrongly described in the plaint in the initial stage, revision petitioner cannot be heard to say that the decree is un-executable.”

If Property Identifiable, Small Mistake will not Disentitle Decree

In Beohar Rajendra Sinha v. State of M.P., AIR 1969 SC 1256, 1969(3) SCR 955, our Supreme Court held as under:

  • “Any unimportant error or defect (two persons had given notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, only one person filed the suit) cannot be permitted to be treated as an excuse for defeating a just claim. 

Read: Similar Articles

Ss. 99, 152 and 153 CPC: Unimportant Error – Not be Stretched Too Far

The Civil Procedure Code makes it clear that an error or irregularity that does not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court is not material so as to warrant dismissal. It embodies the settled policy of our law that mistakes in any proceedings in the suit, which cause no prejudice, should not defeat substantive justice.

  • 99. No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction. No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.
    • Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party.”
  • 152Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders.: Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties.”
  • 153General power to amend. The Court may at any time, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit, amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit; and all necessary amendments shall be made for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on such proceeding.
  • Order VI Rule 17, CPC
  • Amendment of pleadings.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties:
    Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.”

Mistake in deed carried forward in plaint, repeated in decree: Can be Cured u/S. 152

In Subramania Iyer v. Joseph George, 1959 KLT 165, it was held (following Abdhu v. Assainar, 1993 -2 KLT 711) that a decree could be corrected, by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 152 of the CPC, even in a case where the error or mistake occurred even anterior to the suit, namely in the instrument or the document based on which the suit has been filed, and which has been carried forward into the plaint and repeated in the decree. In the said decision the Court has taken note of the views expressed in

  • Satyanarayana v. Purnayya (1931 Mad 260,
  • Ramakrishnan v. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1948 Madras 13),
  • Katamaraju v. Paripurnannadam (AIR 1949 Mad. 282) and
  • Krishna Poduval v. Lekshmi Nathiar (AIR 1950 Madras 751).

Any error, defect or irregularity” in Sec. 99 CPC

In Kailash Singh v. Hiralal Dey, AIR 1994 Gau. 12, it was held that the expression “any error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding in the suit” in Sec. 99 includes the signing and verification of the plaint. (also: Ramesh B. Nyamagowdar v. Hosamani Major, AIR 2021 Kar 47; P.J. Joseph v. Suhara Beevi Hussain AIR 2000 Ker 60; Vippanapally Radha v. Brindavan Educational Society, 2012 2 AndhLD 487; K. Santhanam v. S. Kavitha, 2011-1 CTC 286; 2011-1 LW 66; 2011-3 MLJ 34).

In Gold Medal v. Ameena Begum, 2004 (5) AndLT 542, it is held that the defect of the institution of the suit through a power of attorney is only a curable irregularity in view of Section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure and definitely does not touch the jurisdiction of the Court.

It is held by the Himachal Pradesh High Court (AIR 1957 HP 16) that irregularity in signing Vakalathnama is only a formal defect. (See also AIR 1924 Patna 114)

The omission to explain the non-production of a document before tendering secondary evidence is only a mere irregularity. (59 IC 461).

Section 151, CPC can also be Invoked for correcting a Decree

In Raman Nadar Velayudhan Nadar v. Janaki Karthi, 2011-2 KLT 149, it was held that a decree could be corrected not only under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but even the inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC could be invoked in an appropriate case.

In Niyamat Ali Molla v. Sonargon Housing Co-operative Society Ltd., AIR 2008 SC 225; 2007-13 SCC 421, an application under Section 151 of CPC was filed to insert certain plot numbers in the plaint and the extent of property.  Following Pratibha Singh v. Shanti Devi Prasad, AIR 2003 SC 643: (2003)2 SCC 330, it is held as under:

  • “It is not a case where the defendants could be said to have been misled. It is now well settled that the pleadings of the parties are to be read in their entirety. They are to be construed liberally and not in a pedantic manner. …. The statements contained in the body of the plaint have sufficiently described the suit lands. Only because some blanks in the schedule of the property have been left, the same, by itself, may not be a ground to deprive the respondents from the fruit of the decree. …. We, therefore, are of the opinion that only because the JL numbers (‘jurisdiction list’ numbers in the Village) in the schedule was missing, the same by itself would not be a ground to interfere with the impugned order.”

Procedural defects and irregularities – Curable

Our Apex Court held in Uday Shanker Triyar Vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, 2006-1 SCC 75, that filing an appeal without a vakalatnama or other authority was a curable defect. It is observed in Para 16 and 17 as under:

  •  “16. An analogous provision is to be found in Order VI, Rule 14, CPC, which requires that every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader, if any. Here again, it has always been recognised that if a plaint is not signed by the plaintiff or his duly authorised agent due to any bona fide error, the defect can be permitted to be rectified either by the Trial Court at any time before judgment, or even by the Appellate Court by permitting appropriate amendment, when such defect comes to its notice during hearing.      
    17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well recognised exceptions to this principle are:
           (i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of noncompliance;
           (ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
           (iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
           (iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the Court;
           (v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.”

Quoting the afore-stated passage from Uday Shanker Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, the Madras High Court observed in K.  Santhanam v. S. Kavitha: 2011-1 CTC 286; 2011-1 LW 66; 2011-3 MLJ 34, that non-compliance with the Civil Rules of Practice (Rule 22 and 23) is a curable defect and an error of procedure is merely an irregularity; that it cannot result in rejection of the suit; and that even without a power of attorney, a party to the suit is entitled to have the pleading signed through another if that another person had been duly authorised. This view is taken in the following decisions also:

  • Bilasraika Sponge Iron Pvt. v.  Devi Trading Company: 2011-5 ALD 327; 2011-4 ALT 297  – (Agent under Special power of Attorney did not seek leave of the Court under the Civil Rules of Practice)
  • Nethra Chits (P) Ltd., v. B. Ramachandra Reddy, 2006 (4) ALT 190, (Foreman of the Company did not obtain permission of the Court.)
  • M/s. Gold Medal v. Smt. Ameena Begum 2004-5 ALT 542 (Suit instituted on a defective power of attorney; and corrected subsequently)
  • Kamal Silk Mills v. Kuncham Mohana Rao: 2002 (1) ALD 722 (DB), (Contentions under Rule 32 cannot be raised at the stage of execution)
  • Abu Taher v. Abdul Majeed: 1995 (1) ALT 57 (Did not obtain prior permission of the Court under the Civil Rules of Practice for filing the petition as the GPA holder.)

Signing of Plaint is only a Procedural Matter

In P.J. Joseph v. Suhara Beevi Hussain: AIR 2000 Ker 60, there was a power of attorney in favour of the husband of the plaintiff.  Husband filed suit on that basis. The defendant contended that the husband was not specifically authorized by the power of attorney to institute the suit. The plaintiff applied to the trial Court for permission to sign the plaint.  The High Court observed that even if there was any defect, the plaintiff could sign the plaint, as signing of the plaint was only a procedural matter. (Sections 99 and 99A of the CPC referred to)

Non-mentioning of Survey Number

Madhya Pradesh High Court  in Rajesh Parmar v. Under Secretary, Petroleum Corporation, MANU/MP/0121/2019, found that non-mentioning of survey number is not a ground to reject the application of Petrol Pump. It is stated as under:

  • “… However, inadvertence or clerical error occurred in the description of land in the application could not have been stretched too far to conclude that the land offered is at variance with the survey number mentioned in the application to declare the applicant not eligible for allotment of petrol pump. ….”

Mistake arose from Plaint – Court can Correct Decree under S. 152

In Easwari Amma Prsannakumari v. Radhakrishna Pillai, 2015 (5) KerHC 922, it was found that even where the mistakes in the decree occurred on account of the mistaken description of the suit property in the plaint (a survey number was omitted and length og the way was mistaken), the power under Section 152 of the Code would be available to the court to correct the decree. It is held as under:

  • “Since what was intended by the Court by virtue of its decision in the suit could not be achieved on account of the mistake in the description of the suit property in the schedule to the decree, although the said mistake had occurred on account of the mistake in the description of the suit property in the schedule to the plaint, as held above, the said mistake is one liable to be corrected invoking the power of the Court under Section 152 of the Code, as otherwise, the decision of the Trial Court as confirmed by the Appellate Court and this Court would become meaningless.”

Mistake arose from Plaint – Court can Correct Decree under S. 152

Relying on Rajesh Parmar v. Under Secretary (supra)  it is held in Indian Oil Corporation Limited v.  Gosala Raju, AIR 2022 AP (NOC) 260, as under:

  • “10. In any view of the matter, as per the settled law, when there is a mistake in survey number, extent and boundaries will prevail.”

In Vishnu Anant Dessai v. Govind Vithal Sawant, 2020-5 All MR 496 (Bom), it is found as under:

  • “… On this score, the common law principles compel us to conclude that the boundaries prevail over extent  and even survey numbers.”

The same principle can be seen in Ramaiya Asari v. Ramakrishna Naicker, 2000 (3) MLJ 327.   

In Kannu Reddiar v. T. Palanirajan, 1995 (2) LW 769, it is emphasised as under:

  • “It is well established general principles of law that the boundary descriptions shall prevail over survey number, extent, etc., where there is conflict.”

In PKAB Coop. Society v. Govt. of Palestine, AIR 1948 PC 207,laid down as under:

  • “In construing a grant of land a description by fixed boundaries is to be preferred to a conflicting description by area. The statement as to area is to be rejected as falsa demonstratio.” (Quoted in: K. P. Parameswaran Pillai v. Parvathy Amma Gourikutty Amma, 1985  KerLJ 54).

In Ibrahim Koyakutty v. Varghese, 1951 KLT 117, it is observed as under:

  • “3. … .. But in the absence of circumstances indicating that application of the boundaries in determining the extent of the land that passed under the conveyance will lead to an error, usually in cases conflict between the area, survey number and the boundaries mentioned in the document the boundaries predominate and the rest is considered only as false or erroneous description. In this case there are no such circumstances and therefore we are clearly of the view that the disputed property is included in the documents mentioned above. … ……..” (quoted in: Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959.)

Section 152 can be invoked to cure the defect because of the incorrect plaint

In Subramania Iyer v. Joseph George, AIR 1959 Ker 386, the particular question considered was whether Section 152 can be invoked to cure the defect in the decree which was prepared based on the incorrect plaint. The court said as under:

  • “Thus when there is an error in the description of mortgaged property owing to the accidental use of the word ‘west’ for ‘east’ (Rahulghani v. Uma Shenkar, AIR 1944 Oudh 5) or the insertion of wrong survey number (Satyanarayana v. Purnayya, AIR 1931 Mad. 260) and the error is repeated in the plaint and the decree, the court has been held to have ample powers to rectify the error. As Pandalai, J. observed in the Madras case just cited:
  • “There is nothing which limits the power of the court under S.152 to correcting errors, mistakes and omissions, which arise in the suit. Nothing prevents the court from doing justice in an appropriate case where such mistakes arose by reason of copying an erroneous document into the plaint. A suit for rectification of the instrument and decree is not the only remedy; an application for review may be appropriate, but that is no obstacle under S. 152 to an application.”
  • It is no doubt true that this case came in for dissent in the later case of Ramakrishnan v. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1948 Mad. 13, but the application there was made to correct the mortgage deed along with the judgment, preliminary decree and final decree passed upon it. And Gentle, C. J. delivering the judgment of the Court said:
    • “I am unable to see how S. 152 gives to a court jurisdiction and authority to modify documents, particularly documents upon which a suit is instituted. There is a remedy by way of suit and I find nothing in the provision of S. 152 which confers upon it similar powers as are conferred by S. 31, Specific Relief Act. In my view, S. 152 is for the purpose of correcting errors directly involved in the proceedings themselves and not for correcting errors which are anterior to the proceedings, particularly in documents upon which proceedings are brought.”
  • And the learned judges preferred to follow Mand Khan v. Govind Behari AIR 1934 All. 100.
  • In the later case before the Madras High Court Krishna Poduval v. Lekshmi Nathiar, AIR 1950 Mad. 751, the prayer was for amendment of the survey number of an item of property in the plaint schedule and the decree schedule when there was no dispute as regards the identity of the property or boundaries to it and the amendment was allowed under S.152. Discussing the matter the learned judge held:
    • “I do not think therefore that the amendment asked for goes to the root of the claim or an amendment is sought for in respect of any matter which has been a subject of controversy between the parties to the suit. It is only an amendment for correction of certain errors that have crept into the decree and in the plaint schedule which errors happen to be also in Ext. B-1 (Original document). The fact that Ext. B-1 also has the same errors as in the plaint schedule and in the schedule to the decree cannot disentitle the plaintiff’s to have the errors set right if they arc entitled to it under the provisions of the Code.” (Paragraph 5, page 752)
  • The learned judge distinguished AIR 1948 Madras 13 above referred to on the ground that the application there sought to amend the schedule to the document and following Katamaraju v. Paripurnanadam, AIR 1949 Mad. 282 which had favoured amendment in like circumstances.
  • I therefore hold that the court under S. 152 has undoubted jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the plaintiff assuming of course he can sustain it on the facts.”

In Vallabhaneni Vimalamba v. Ghanta Ratnamma, AIR 1966 AP 26; 1965-1 AndhWR 266, also the the question considered was whether Section 152 can be invoked to cure the defect in the decree which was prepared based on the incorrect plaint. The court said as under:

  • “It is now well settled that the power under Section 152 C. P. C. is not confined only to correct the mistakes in the drafting of the decree. It has been held to apply even to correct the mistakes or errors committed in the plaint, and even in a document on the foot of which the suit was filed. If authority is needed, reference may be made to T. V. Ranga Rao Naidu v. Balaksonlal Janaki Prasad, AIR 1941 Mad 940 and Satyanarayana Rao v. Purnayya, AIR 1931 Mad 260. The view held by the Allahabad and other High Courts that Section 152 does not deal with mistake of parties has not been subscribed for by the Madras High Court and this Court.
  • In Venkayya v. Satyanarayana, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 360 at p. 364 a Bench of this Court had ruled that a mistake committed by the plaintiffs in entering the acreage or the survey numbers due to inadvertence could be corrected under Section 152. The learned Judges held that as a mistake in that behalf crept into the plaint schedule, the same mistake necessarily entered into the judgment and decree, and that it is an accidental slip and a clerical mistake capable of being rectified under Section 152, and there is nothing which limits the power of the Court under Section 152 to correct such errors and mistakes which arise in the suit.”

Section 152 CPC: Court has Wider Powers

The Madras High Court, in C.K. Philips v. T.A. Shanmugam, (2003)2 MLJ 722, allowing a petition under Section 152 CPC held as under:

  • “The finding of the Court below that Section 152 C.P.C. cannot be invoked to correct the survey number of the property and that Section 152 can be invoked only to correct clerical errors or arithmetical errors in the judgments and decrees, in my opinion, is erroneous. Likewise the other reasoning given by the Court below that any kind of correction can be carried out only before the decree is passed is also not correct”.

Clerical or Arithmetical Errors in the plaint and Final Decrees can be Rectified

In Kalkonda Pandu Rangaiah v. Kalkonda Krishnaiah, AIR 1974 AP 201, it is laid down as under:

  • “Where clerical or arithmetical mistakes occur in copying the plaint schedules from the documents anterior to the suit the proceedings in the suit can always be corrected under Section 152, CPC. In such cases even the documents on the basis of which the suit was filed may be amended either in a suit under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act or in a proper case even by an application under Section 152 CPC provided it in a case of misdescription and not one of disputed identity. In such cases if Section 152 is invoked it would obviate a suit which have ultimately bring the same result. In all cases where clerical or arithmetical errors creep-in in the plaint and as a consequence in the decrees as well, they can be rectified at any time even after a final decree. A case of such an amendment petition under Section 152 CPC filed in a pending suit even after a preliminary decree is passed therein is an a fortiori case.”

Execution Court can Proceed Without Correcting (the Accidental Slip in) the Decree

The Apex court in Pratibha Singh v. Shanti Devi Prasad, AIR 2003 SC 643: (2003)2 SCC 330, observed as under:

  • “When the suit as to immovable property has been decreed and the property is not definitely identified the defect in the Court record caused by overlooking of provisions contained in O.7, R.3 and O.20, R.3 of the C.P.C. is capable of being cured. After all a successful plaintiff should not be deprived of the fruits of decree. Resort can be had to S.152 or S.47 of the C.P.C. depending on the facts and circumstances of each case which of the two provisions would be more appropriate, just and convenient to invoke. Being an inadvertent error, not affecting the merits of the case, it may be corrected under S.152 of the C.P.C. by the Court which passed the decree by supplying the omission. Alternatively, the exact description of decretal property may be ascertained by the Executing Court as a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree within the meaning of S.47, C.P.C. A decree of a competent Court should not, as far as practicable, be allowed to be defeated on account of an accidental slip or omission.”

Following Pratibha Singh v. Shanti Devi Prasad (supra) it is held in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.  v. Ajay Bhatia, AIR 2022 SC 4739, as under:  

  • “50.… The Court which passed the decree could supply the omission. Alternatively, exact description of the decretal property might be ascertained by the Executing Court, as a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree within the meaning of Section 47.
  • 51. There could be no doubt that a decree should not to the extent practicable be allowed to be defeated. At the same time, a decree can only be executed in respect of the suit property if the suit property is easily identifiable. The extent of the suit property would have to be determined by the Executing Court, as a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.”

In Themma v. Infant Jesus Church, 2016-5 KHC 407; 2016-4 KLT 388, following Pratibha Singh v. Shanti Devi Prasad (supra), it is held as under:

  • “14. All the parties agree that the western boundary of the property covered by the agreement for sale belongs to the defendant and is not a road as described in the plaint schedule. This mistake can be corrected during the finalisation of the draft sale deed by the court below after considering the objections to the report of the Advocate Commissioner. The power is abundant in the court below to execute a ‘proper conveyance’ as is discernible from Section 28(3) of the Act where under minor discrepancies if any can be very well be corrected.”

When an instrument may be Rectified

Section 26 of Sp. Relief Act reads as follows:

  • “26. When instrument may be rectified –
  • (1) When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties a contract or other instrument in writing (not being the articles of association of a company to which the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) applies) does not express their real intention, then-
  • either party or his representative-in- interest may institute a suit to have the instrument rectified; or
  • the plaintiff may, in any suit in which any right arising under the instrument is in issue, claim in his pleading that the instrument be rectified; or
  • a defendant in any such suit, as is referred to in Cl.(b), may, in addition to any other defence open to him, ask for rectification of the instrument.
  • (2) If, in any suit in which a contract or other instrument is sought to be rectified under sub-section (1), the Court finds that the instrument, through fraud or mistake, does not express the real intention of the parties, the Court may in its discretion direct rectification of the instrument so as to express that intention, so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good faith and for value.
  • (3) A contract in writing may first be rectified, and then if the party claiming rectification has so prayed in his pleading and the Court thinks fit, may be specifically enforced.
  • (4) No relief for the rectification of an instrument shall be granted to any party under this section, unless it has been specifically claimed:
  • Provided that, where a party has not claimed any such relief in his pleading, the Court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the pleading on such terms as may be just for including such claim.”

Suit for Rectification of Deed – When Needed?

In Aliyar v. Raju V. Vayalat, 2016-1 KHC 763; 2016-2 KLT 656, it is found as under:

  • “Admittedly, in Ext. A1 there are mistakes in the extent, survey number, boundaries and the details of the anterior title deeds. In these situations, it is clear that institution of a suit merely for the injunction reliefs will not serve the purpose of the respondent/plaintiff. Likewise, a suit for declaration that the plaint schedule property is the property that is included in Ext. A1 will also not help the respondent to get an effective and executable decree. It is, therefore, very clear that the patent mistakes in Ext. A1 will have to be rectified, otherwise the actual features available on the ground will be totally different from the descriptions shown in the respondent’s title deed. That apart, a declaratory relief can only be claimed in respect of a specific immovable property capable of being identified correctly. Indisputably, the descriptions in the schedule to Ext.A1 and the recital in the document do not reflect the actual state of affairs. Therefore, the declaratory relief can be effectively granted only after rectifying the mistakes in Ext. A1. Viewing from this angle, we are of the view that the most important and primary relief claimable under such a situation is the rectification of Ext. A1.”

Small Mistake will not Disentitle Decree

In Mohammed Munvar v. N. C. Nesan, 21 Mar 2024, 2024: Supreme(Mad) 613, the eastern and western boundaries have been interchanged in the schedule to the plaint. But it did not create any confusion or lead to the wrong identification of the property. After quoting Order VII Rule 3 of C.P.C, observed as under:

  • “38. As such, if the suit is in respect of an immovable property, the plaint shall contain the description, sufficient to identify and if could be identified by boundaries or numbers and in such case, the plaintiff shall specify such boundaries or numbers. ….. The description given in the plaint schedule by the plaintiff, satisfies the provisions of Order VII Rule 3 of C.P.C., as the property is identifiable. Therefore, the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the decree cannot be granted as proper description of the suit property is not given, cannot be sustained. Even though the eastern and western boundaries have been interchanged in the schedule to the plaint, it does not create any confusion or lead to wrong identification of the property. Further, the Advocate Commissioner’s reports filed and evidence of C.W. 2/Deputy Inspector of Surveyor have fortified the fact that ‘C’ schedule suit property belongs to the plaintiff and the defendant has trespassed and also he is in possession of the ‘C’ schedule suit property.”

In Satyanarayana v. Purnayya (1931 Mad 260) error in boundaries (‘west’ for ‘east’) occurred while copying an erroneous document to the plaint. It was held that in appropriate cases, such mistakes did not prevent the court from doing justice. It was held as under:

  • “There is nothing which limits the power of the Court under S. 152 to correcting errors, mistakes and omissions, which arise in the suit. Nothing prevents the Court from doing justice in an appropriate case where such mistakes arose by reason of copying an erroneous document into the Plaint. A Suit for rectification of the instrument and decree is not the only remedy; an Application for review may be appropriate, but that is no obstacle under Section 152 to an Application.”

In Chandran v. Amruthavally, 2016 (5) Ker HC 444, 2017 AIR (CC) 1405; 2016-4 KLT 753, there was a mistake in the survey number of the property recorded in the final decree in the partition suit. It was held that it was open to the court, in exercise of power under Section 152 of the CPC to correct such a mistake. Paragraph 10 of the said judgment reads as under:

  • “8. In Subramania Iyer v. Joseph George (1959 KLT 165) it was held that a decree could be corrected even in a case where the error or mistake occurred even anterior to the suit, namely in the instrument or the document based on which the suit has been filed, which has been carried forward into the plaint and repeated in the decree, by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 152 of the CPC. It was observed therein that, there is no reason to restrict the powers of the court under Section 152 of the CPC to errors made by the Courts alone. In the said decision the Court has taken note of the views expressed in
    • Satyanarayana v. Purnayya (1931 Mad 260,
    • Ramakrishnan v. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1948 Madras 13),
    • Katamaraju v. Paripurnannadam (AIR 1949 Mad. 282) and
    • Krishna Poduval v. Lekshmi Nathiar (AIR 1950 Madras 751).
  • This Court held that even the errors that occurred anterior to the decree and which were in existence even in the original document, which happened to be carried forward to the plaint and decree, could be corrected in the decree, by exercise of the powers under Section 152 of the CPC. The same view has been taken by this Court in
    • Abdhu v. Assainar (1993 [2] KLT 711)
  • wherein also this Court accepted the proposition that even the mistakes that had crept in anterior to the suit can be corrected by the court in the decree. That was a case where a mistake that had crept in the preliminary decree regarding the survey number of the property therein was corrected.
  • In Raman Nadar Velayudhan Nadar v. Janaki Karthi (2011-2 KLT 149)
  • this Court held that a decree can be corrected not only under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but even the inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC could be invoked in an appropriate case.”
  • 10. In the instant case, as pointed out earlier, there is no dispute between parties regarding the identity of the property sought to be partitioned. The respondents have no objection to the correction of the survey number of the property in the manner as sought for by the revision petitioner. If the correction is allowed that will not cause prejudice to any of the parties to the litigation. The only apprehension is whether as per the revenue records the property in the particular survey number sought to be incorporated namely Sy. No. 644/5, is shown to be in the possession of third parties, in which event, the rights of the said third parties would be affected by the inclusion of the said survey number in the present case. I make it clear that the right of third parties, if any, over the property described in the survey number sought to be incorporated, will not be affected by such inclusion. If there is any disputed right, the parties to the present suit will have to approach the appropriate Court or authorities, seeking necessary reliefs.”

In M. K. Soumini v. M. K. Sreedharen, 10 Jan 2017, 2017 Supreme(Ker) 173, it was found that the mistake occurred in the compromise petition, which led to the final decree could be corrected. It was pointed out that the documents produced before this Court showed that the correction of the mistakes in the final decree would not result in any change in the identity of the property.

In J. Sarojini Alias Nesamma v. Narayani Sarojini, 2008-1 ILR(Ker) 153; 2008-1 KHC 897; 2008-1 KLT 516, the plaint schedule property was delivered . They have no complaint that the delivered property is a different property. Plaintiffs’ only grievance is that the survey number of the property was mistakenly shown as 237/2 instead of 238/1-A. This mistake had happened in the plaint when it was typed. Mistake was noticed only after the delivery. It was held that nothing prevents the Court from doing justice in an appropriate case where such mistakes arise; and that a suit for rectification of the instrument and decree is not the only remedy, an application for review may also be appropriate, that also is not the only way and will not be an obstacle for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 152 of the C.P.C. The court held as under:

  • “In the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view that if really there is a grievance that in the plaint a mistake has been crept there should be some remedy for the revision petitioners. One remedy available to the revision petitioners is that they can file a review petition to reopen the execution proceedings, so that the pendency of the suit will continue so long as the execution proceedings are pending. Then the revision petitioners can move the court which passed the decree to make the corretion. Alternatively the revision petitioners can also sue for rectification of he mistakes crept in the survey number of the plaint schedule property. These remedies are open to them and they are at liberty to avail the above said remedies to redress their grievance. In the circumstances no interference is possible in the impugned order.”

In this decision (J. Sarojini Alias Nesamma v. Narayani Sarojini) the High Court referred to an earlier decision, Subramanian Iyer v. Joseph George( 1959 K.L.T. 165), where the boundaries of the schedule property alone had been wrongly described and the schedule was otherwise correct in so far as it elated to survey number, extent, village etc. The question of correcting the plaint and the decree arose in the case for consideration. It was found that the language of Section 152 of the Code which enables the court to correct the clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties.

Court Orders – Technical Defects will not defeat Substantive Rights

The suits will not fail merely because of an incorrect survey number. The principle to be invoked will be –

  • Technical defects or clerical mistakes in the description will not defeat substantive rights.
  • If property identity is clear from the record, relief should not be denied on technical grounds. Minor errors do not invalidate proceedings if identity is clear.
  • Procedural law is meant to facilitate justice. Technicalities should not defeat substantive rights.
  • “Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.” (Krishna Iyer, J.: State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719.
  • The Courts should give preference to the cause of substantive justice over the procedural technicalities.
  • Adjective law dealing with procedure alone be interpreted in such a manner as to sub-serve and advance the cause of justice. (Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India, (1984) 3 SCC 46).
  • Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar (1975) 1 SCC 774, said as under: “The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a Judge’s conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justiciae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence — processual, as much as substantive.”

See also:

  • Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425,
  • State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719,
  • Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480.

No “Suppression”, if Facts are (i) Not Material and  (ii) “Known

It is held in Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471, that there will be no “suppression”, if the facts are (i) Not Material and  (ii) “Known” to the opposite side.  This decision is referred to in:

  • Union of India v. Shishu Pal, AIR 2024  SC 3652
  • Ravindra Kumar v. State of U. P., 2024 5 SCC 264
  • State of West Bengal v. Mitul Kumar Jana, 2023-14 SCC 719
  • Ex-Const/Dvr Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union Of India, AIR 2023 SC 482
  • Satish Chandra Yadav v. Union Of India, 2023-7 SCC 536
  • Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, 2022 AIR SC 2829; 2023-12 SCC 317
  • State of Madhya Pradesh v. Abhijit Singh Pawar, 2018-18 SCC 733.

Part II: Interpretation of Deeds

Vague and Uncertain Description Rejected & Definite and Certain Preferred

“Falsa Demonstratio Non Nocet”  (Adequate and sufficient description with convenient certainty of what was meant to pass, an erroneous addition to the description will not vitiate it) is referred to and applied in Umrao Bapu v. Ramakrishna Bapu, AIR1938 Nag. 93, and Durga Prased Singh v. Rajendra Narain Bagchi (1910) 37 Cal. 293, Savarimuthu Nadar Chellayan Nadar v. Kanakku Kali Pillai Padmanabha Pillai, 1957 KHC 184

In Sivaraman Nair v. Shamsuddin, 1990 (1) KerLT 187: 1990 KHC 295, it is found as under:

  • ‘9. In cases where there is a difference in the extent and the boundary covered by a document, one or the other which is clearer and more specific has to be preferred. In some cases it may be the boundary. In some other cases it may be the extent and in yet other cases it may be the side measurements. There is no invariable rule in this regard. None of the decisions on which the appellants rely has held positively that in all cases of such conflict the boundary alone shall prevail. On the other hand, in Krishnamurthy Iyer’s case (1957 KLT 886) Kumara Pillai, J. held that:
    • “The usual rule is that when there is a conflict between the area and the boundaries, the description of the boundaries should be accepted in preference to the area mentioned in the document for determining the extent of the land conveyed thereunder. This is not an inflexible rule. When from the proved circumstances it is clear that the intention of the parties was only to convey the extent mentioned in the document, even though the boundaries would take in a larger area, effect has to be given to their intention and the description of the boundaries cannot be allowed to prevail.” (quoted in: Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959)

Varadaraja Iyengar, J. in Krishnan v. Mathai, 1957 KerLT 42, held as under:

  • “The evidence supplied by boundaries, extent, survey numbers and lekhoms form the determining factors when the identity of the property is put in issue. If all these factors harmonise, there is little difficulty to identify the property in dispute. But when some of them are in conflict with the rest as when the extent and survey numbers do not agree with the boundaries usually the boundaries predominate and the rest is regarded as erroneous or inaccurate descriptions. This is not an inflexible rule and the guiding principle is to apply that test which is most unlikely to be vitiated by error.” (quoted in: Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959)

In Velu v. Padmavathy Amma (UL Bhat, J.), ILR 1984-1 Ker 30; 1983 KLN Case Notes p.38 Case No. 39, it is stated as follows:

  • “A golden thread runs through all the decisions referred to above. A piece of land may be described in the document or decree correctly or wrongly. Description may be given by reference to village, locality, survey number, lekhom number, extent, measurements or boundaries. At times, descriptions may tally pointing unerringly to a particular plot of land in which case there will be no difficulty in locating the plot. Sometimes the various descriptions given in a document or decree may be in conflict with each other. In such a case, the court is called upon to adjudicate on the identity of the exact plot intended to be dealt with in the document or decree. No doubt, the court will at first try to reconcile the various descriptions. If that be not possible, one or more of the descriptions may have to be rejected and the other decision rested only on the other description or descriptions.
  • When one of the descriptions is vague and uncertain and another description is definite and certain, the latter may be preferred. If none of the descriptions is vague or uncertain, that description which is more certain and stable and least likely to have been mistaken or inserted inadvertently must be preferred if it sufficiently identified the subject matter of the transaction, and the other descriptions must be rejected as erroneous or inaccurate.
  • This is not a rule of law and therefore is not inflexible in character it is a mere rule of construction which appears to be safe and almost an infallible guide.” (Quoted in: K. P. Parameswaran Pillai v. Parvathy Amma Gourikutty Amma, 1985  KerLJ 54; Chandrakumar v. Narayana Bahuleyan, ILR 2011-2 Ker 897; 2011-2 KHC 884; 2011-3 KLT 185)

The decisions referred to in Velu v. Padmavathy Amma are the following:

  • Zamindar of Pachipenta v. Maharajah of Jeypore, XXIII MLJ 97,
  • Subbayya Chakkiliyan v. Manjan Muthia Goundan, AIR 1924 Mad. 493,
  • Durga Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Narain Bagehi, ILR 37 Cal. 293,
  • Kumaran Krishnan v. Ulahanna Mathai, 1957 KLT 42,
  • Chacko Joseph v. Varghese Markose, 1957 KLT 485,
  • Savarimuthu Nadar v. Kanakku Kali Pillai, 1957 KLT 825 and
  • Krishnamurthi Iyer v. Janaki Amma, 1957 KLT 886.

In Savithri Ammal v. Padmavathi Amma, 1990-1 KLT 187, Bhat J. reaffirmed the proposition.

Kerala High Court, in Ouseph Poulose v. Kuttappan Chothi (K. Vinod Chandran, J., on 12 November, 2012) referring Savithri Ammal, observed as under:

  • “11. This Court has time and again considered the procedure by which properties which are covered by documents come up for identification and difficulties are caused due to the change in extent, boundaries, survey numbers and so on and so forth. Reference can be safely made to Krishnan v. Mathai (1957 KLT 42), wherein the dispute on identity of the property relying on a mistake in survey number shown in the decree was negatived and Krishnamurthy Iyer v. Janaki Amma (1957 KLT 886) where it was held that the usual rule of predominance given to boundaries in the effect of conflict between boundaries and area was “not an inflexible rule”.

See also –

  • Zamindar of Pachipenta v. Maharaja of Jeypore (XXIII MLJ. 97),
  • Subbayya Chakkiliyan v. Manjan Muthia Goundan (AIR 1924 Mad.493),
  • Durga Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Narain Bageni (ILT 37 Cal.293),
  • Savarimuthu Nadar v. Kanakku Kali Pillai (1951 KLT 825),
  • Kumaran Krishnan v. Ulahannan Mathai 1957 KerLT 42, 485,
  • Sheodhyan Singh v. Sanichara Kuer, AIR 1963 SC 1879,
  • KP Parameswaran Pillai v. Parvathy Amma, 1985  KerLJ 54,
  • Savithri Ammal v. Padmavathy, 1990 KHC 295,
  • Kamakshi Ammal v. R. Ranganathan, 82 LW 142.

Wrong description in Will. Legal heirs can execute a Rectification Deed

In Baburaj PK v. State of Kerala, 2019 (2) KHC 628, it was held that there was no impediment under the law to execute a rectification deed by the legal heirs, to rectify a wrong description in a registered Will, if there was unanimity among them as to the intention of the testator.

No  Stamp Duty for Rectification Deed

In P. Sasikumar v. State of Kerala, 2024-4 KLT 864, it is held that a rectification deed, which merely corrects descriptions without altering rights, does not attract stamp duty as a conveyance under the Kerala Stamp Act. It is pointed out as under:

  • “10. A Single Bench of this Court in Jihas P.A. (Jihas P.A. v. District Registrar and another, 2012 (3) KHC 146) held that when a mistake in a deed is sought to be corrected by executing a rectification deed, stamp duty is not payable. In Rajesh Kumar K.T. (Rajesh Kumar K.T. v. State of Kerala, 2024 (3) KHC 425), another Single Bench of this Court held that the rectification deed executed to correct a mistake in respect of the re-survey number of property, wherein the boundary, extent and old survey number remain unchanged cannot be treated as a fresh sale deed for the purpose of levying registration fee and stamp duty payable. Same view was taken in Vannathi Valappil Mahmood (Vannathi Valappil Mahmood v. State of Kerala and Others, 2019 (2) KHC 736).”

Error will not necessarily invalidate a document – Not Applied

The principle that ‘an error will not necessarily invalidate a document’ is found not applicable in the facts of Kamalamma v. Shibu, 2024-3 KerHC 547. The High Court observed as under:

  • “21. It is true that generally when there is a conflict between area and boundary, the boundary will prevail. However, as held in the decision in Savithri Ammal (supra) and Chandrakumar (supra), the above rule is not an inflexible one. In the present case, the properties of the defendants could be clearly identified using the boundaries given in Exts.A2 and A3, while it could not be identified using the area given in the document. In the above circumstances, it is to be held that in the present case, the principle that “when there is conflict between area and boundary, boundary will prevail” squarely applies.
  • 22. Relying upon the decision in Savarimuthu Nadar Chellayan Nadar v. Kanakku Kali Pillai Padmanabha Pillai, 1957 KHC 184, the RSA 710 of 2014, learned counsel for the plaintiffs would argue that the maxim “falsa demonstratio non nocet” is to be applied in this case, in support of his argument that if there be an adequate and sufficient description with convenient certainty of what was meant to pass, an erroneous addition to the description will not vitiate it. It is true that an error will not necessarily invalidate a document if it can be determined from the other facts in it. However, in this case the above maxim does not in any way help the plaintiff as the defects in his case are so fatal that it could not be set right by any other means.”

Execution of ‘Rectification Deed’

In Rajesh Kumar KT  v. State of Kerala, 2024-3 KHC 425, it is held that a ‘rectification deed’ is enough if the wrong description is only in ‘Re-Suvey Number’. It reads as under:

  • “On the basis of the same, the petitioner would submit that the boundaries, extent and original survey numbers remain the same but the only anomaly is regarding the resurvey number in the description of the property and that is what is sought to be corrected by way of Ext.P2 rectification deed.”

The Court relied on the following decisions:

  • Vannathi Valatpil Mahmood v. State of Kerala, 2019 (2) KHC 736 (change in the description of the property)
  • Jihas v. District Registrar, 2012 (3) KLT 194 (mistake in mentioning flat number in the sale deed).

Intention of the Parties

In Krishnamoorthi Iyer v. Janaki Amma, 1957 KHC 202 : 1957 KLT 886, it is said as under:

  • “2. ….. .. The usual rule, no doubt, is that when there is a conflict between the area and the boundaries mentioned in a document the description of the boundaries should be accepted in preference to the area mentioned in the document for determining the extent of the land conveyed thereunder. But, this is not an inflexible or infallible rule, and even in the cases in which this rule has been applied, it has been pointed out that when, from the proved circumstances it is clear that the intention of the parties was only to convey the extent mentioned in the document, even though the boundaries would take in a larger area, effect has to be given to their intention and the description of the boundaries cannot be allowed to prevail. .. .. …” (quoted in: Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959)

In The Church of South India Trust Association v. Raja Ambrose, 1978- 2 MLJ 620, it is observed as under.  

  • “6. The principle of construction grants made under instruments in writing seems to be now well-settled not only in this country, but in many other systems as well. The principle accords with common sense and might be stated, broadly, thus: The subject-matter of the grant would depend on the intention of the parties as expressed in the relative conveyance deed.”

Intention of the Court in Court sale

In Pradeep Kumar v. State Bank of Travancore,1999 1 CivCC 429; 1998 2 KLJ 862; 1998 2 KLT 927, the Kerala High Court held that the Intention of the court is the guiding factor, if a mistake in the description of property in a court sale. It referred to the following decisions:

  • Sobla and Anr. v. Jethmal – AIR 1961 Rajasthan 191. It is observed as under:
  • “It is a mistake made in giving the boundaries in the execution application which was repeated in the warrant of attachment, the sale proclamation and the sale certificate. I see no reason why this mistake cannot be corrected on an application under S.151 C.P.C. It is in the ends of justice that this injury should be remedied and needless expense and inconvenience to parties avoided.”
  • Aziz Ullah Khan v. Court of Wards – AIR 1932 Allahabad 587. The Court observed as follows:
  • “….the power of the Court to make corrections necessary for the ends of justice is not confined only to powers exercisable under S.152. Extensive powers may be exercised also under Ss.151 and 153. We consider that this is eminently a case in which the accidental slip should be corrected as the contention is necessary for the ends of justice”.
  •  Dwaraka Parshad v. Rang Behari Lai – AIR 1934 Lah 29. The Lahore High Court held as follows:
  • “It is clear that the sale certificate must be based on the sale proclamation and this is the basis of discovering what has been sold. Assuming that the identity of the property was not iii doubt the question still remains whether the misdescription of the items of property in the ‘sale proclamation did not materially affect the price realised and whether in the circumstances it is fair to set aside the sale leaving the decree holder to pursue his remedies under the amended decree, or whether the mis description made any material difference and therefore, the sale proclamation should also be amended. As it is a mere case of misdescription I think the sale proclamation can be amended in the sense that it is competent for the Court so to do. But the question whether the misdescription affected the sale price or not is question of fact and there has been no decision on this material point. The onus of the issue will there fore be on the parties and the Court when coming toils decision will bear in mind the above remarks. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the misdescription made no material difference in the sale price, it will amend the sale proclamation and the sale certificate as directed by the decree holder”.

Boundaries Preferred Over Survey Number, Extent

Our Apex Court, in Subhaga v. Shoba, 2006-5 SCC 466, observed as under:

  • “That a property can be identified either by boundary or by any other specific description is well established. Here the attempt had been to identify the suit property with reference to the boundaries and the Commissioner has identified that property with reference to such boundaries. Even if there was any discrepancy, normally, the boundaries should prevail.”

The Church of South India Trust Association v. Raja Ambrose, (1978) 2 MLJ 620, it is further laid down as under:

  • “Where the deed sets out the extent and measurements correctly, there can be no difficulty in determining the subject-matter of the grant. But where no measurements are given or the extent mentioned in the deed is either vague or is only a rough and ready approximation, one has to look to other indications in the deed in order to fix the identity of the property which is the subject of the grant. If the deed in question sets out the boundaries of the property conveyed, then these boundaries will have to be accepted as a clear reflection of the intention of the grantor and they will conclude not only the exact positioning of the property conveyed, but also its true extent. The boundaries given in the deed will also, in such cases, prevail over the measurements given in the deed, if these are given as approximations.”

 In T. Venkata Vijaya Lakshmi v. Kodali Rayana Rao, 2023-4 ALT 272; 2023-3 CivCC 746, it is held as under:

  • “It is settled law that boundaries prevail over extent and survey number as also measurements.”

Conclusion

The following can be epitomised from the above discussion:

  • Clerical mistakes in the plaint or written statements will not be fatal, because such mistakes in the decree, arising from the erroneous plaint, can also be corrected invoking Section 152 CPC, in the interest of justice.
  • Mutual mistakes and clerical mistakes in deeds are to be dealt with distinctly from unilateral and wilful mistakes.
  • Patent mistakes in a deed will have to be rectified by a correction deed or by a court decree.
  • Even a wrong description in a registered Will can be remedied by executing a rectification deed by the legal heirs.
  • Dispute on identity of the property, relying on a mistake in survey number, cannot be validly raised.
  • Usually, boundaries would be accepted in preference to other descriptions; but, it is not an inflexible rule.
  • Court will at first try to reconcile the various (divergent) descriptions; if not possible, descriptions that are definite and certain (or clearer and more specific) have to be preferred; and the rest are rejected as erroneous or inaccurate.
  • The intention of the executant (or parties) is paramount.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Survey Plan and Area Calculation: A Cursory Look

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

A survey plan shows the shape and size of a property. It also helps to calculate the area of the land. Section 82 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, provides as under:

  • “82. Presumption as to maps or plans made by authority of Government: The Court shall presume that maps or plans purporting to be made by the authority of the Central Government or any State Government were so made, and are accurate; but maps or plans made for the purposes of any cause must be proved to be accurate.”

A proper survey commission report, supported by a correct and reliable survey plan, is indispensable for the effective adjudication of a large number of civil disputes. Courts and advocates should have a general idea and understanding of surveys and survey plans.

F-lines and G-lines

In survey plans, two types of lines are commonly seen—continuous lines and broken (or dashed) lines. Alongside the survey plan, we also see the field book (or ladder).

Continuous lines show the outer Field-lines (F-lines) of the plot.

Broken lines in a survey plan represent the Guidelines (or Baselines) called G-lines drawn from one bend or a corner of the plot to an opposite bend or corner.

  • The purpose of a G-line is to measure the perpendicular distances (offsets) from the G-line to the boundary bends on either side of the G-line. It is for dividing the land into imaginary right-angle triangles (triangles with one angle of 90 degrees) or trapeziums (four-sided quadrilaterals, two sides of which lie parallel), enabling the area to be calculated in a simple and systematic manner.
  • In surveying practice, these internal G-lines are fixed first, as an axis, and the measurement begins from the starting point of a G-line.

In the case of a large plot, there may be more than one G-line with a view to making the entire plot into triangles or trapeziums.

Offsets Fixed with the Cross-Staff

In surveying, the cross-staff is used to measure the offsets (perpendicular distances from the G-lines to the boundary bends). The cross staff is used to ensure a 90-degree angle for every offset.

Calculation of Area

Each triangle and trapezium, stated above, is shaped in the following manner:

  • Triangle: The required portion of the G-line will be its one side; the offset measurement will be the second side; and the outer field boundary (F-line) will be the third side.
  • Trapezium: Apart from the G-line portion and the outer boundary, two (parallel) offsets are taken into consideration for forming the four sides.

The area of a right-angle triangle is calculated using Heron’s formula. It is:

  • Area = ½ base × altitude.

The area of certain parts (triangles that are not right-angle triangles) may have to be calculated with the side measurements of the triangles. The formula applied in such a case, with side measurements a, b and c, is the following:

  • A = √[s(s-a)(s-b)(s-c)]
  • ‘s’ is the semi-perimeter of the triangle given by s = ½ of (a + b + c).

In certain cases, a portion of the area between two G-lines may need to be calculated by drawing (and measuring) a diagonal (check line) to form two triangles.

Trapeziums are formed between two G-lines or between two offsets. The area of a trapezium is calculated using the following formula:

  • A = ½ of (a + b) × h, where a and b are the lengths of the parallel sides and h is the perpendicular distance between them (required length of the G-line).

Surveying Steps Taken by the Surveyor

The surveyor follows these steps:

  • A rough sketch (draft) of the plot is prepared.
  • One or more G-lines are fixed and drawn in the sketch. The beginning and end points of each G-line are shown with letters (A–B; if there are multiple G-lines, they are placed as C–D, E–F, and so on).
  • To fix and measure the offset length — from the G-line to the boundary-bend (which are marked L, M, N, O, P, etc.) — the cross-staff is used. Flags will be placed at the starting and end points of the G-line, and also at the bend. The surveyor aligns the cross-staff along the G-line by sighting (i) the beginning and end points of the G-line through the slit of the cross-staff and (ii) the required outer bend through the opposite cross-slit.
  • After fixing the cross staff as stated above, the distance (i) from the beginning point of the G-line to the position of the cross staff, (ii) the distance from the outer bend to the G-line (position of the cross staff), and (iii) the outer boundary forming the third side of the triangle, or the fourth side of the trapezium are measured, and the measurements are duly entered in the diagram.
  • In this manner, all offsets—namely, the distances measured from the bends to the G-lines —and the lengths of the outer field boundaries, are taken and recorded in the sketch.

Field Book or Ladder

The field book is usually recorded in the following pattern:

D (75.0)
69.02.0T
68.027.0S
43.07.0R
38.015.0Q
23.02.0P
16.07.0O
10.05.0N
5.05.0M
C
B
(192.0)
L11.0190.0
M14.0188.0
N15.0157.08.0Z
O13.0132.028.0Y
P13.0124.020.0X
Q10.0115.028.0W
R12.0100.0 26.0 V
 S1 3.088.032.0U
 T1 3.076.024.0D
U110.049.0 
V110.027.0  
  4.06.0C
2.03.0L
  A  

It is prepared in the following manner:

  • AB and CD are G-lines.
  • At the bottom, the starting point (alphabet A) of the G-line (AD) is entered.
  • Above it, the distance from the point A to the first offset point on the G-line (2.0 metres) is written.
  • Since the first offset (first bend) is towards the right, the offset distance (3.0 metres) is entered in the right-hand column, and the corresponding boundary bend (L) is stated in the further right column.
  • The second offset (second bend) is also towards the right, the offset distance (6.0 metres) is entered in the right-hand column, and the corresponding boundary bend (C) is stated in the further right column.
  • The third offset being 27 meters away from the point A, and the length of the offset is 10 meters, these matters are also entered.
  • In this manner, entire boundary points (letters L to Z1) and the offset points and measurements are entered.
    • Note: If a and b are the sides of the 90-degree angle of a rectangle triangle, the length of the opposite side (hypotenuse) will be √[a2 + b2]. It is represented by: c2 = a2 + b2.
    • The measurements of all the trapeziums can be checked, applying the formula: c2 = a2 + b2 (after measuring/ drawing the diagonals, or check-lines, in these trapeziums).

Area Calculation

  • Areas of all the triangles and trapeziums are calculated using the required formula.
  • Finally, the areas (all triangles and trapeziums) are added together to get the total extent of the property.

Read also:

End Notes:

Accuracy Presumed on Govt. Maps and Plans u/s 82 BSA (83, IEA)

In Dnyaneshwar Balu Patole v State of Maharashtra, 2011 AllMR(Cri) 1889; 2011-4 MhLJ(Cri) 208, it is held as under:

  • “From the language of section 83 (IEA), it is clear that Court shall presume that the maps or plans purporting to be made by the authority of the Central Government or any State Government were so made and are accurate but maps or plans made for the purposes of any cause must be proved to be accurate. It shows that when plans of town or area or certain roads, forests, rivers, nalas, etc. are prepared for public record and general information there is presumption of its accuracy. However, when a map is prepared for particular cause or purpose, there is no presumption of accuracy and that map has to be proved by leading necessary evidence. If a map is prepared by the investigating agency to prove scene of offence ,that map is prepared for the particular purpose, i.e., to establish scene of offence and certain facts, which the prosecution wants to establish, there can not be any presumption of accuracy to such map. Such map will have to be proved like any other fact by leading necessary evidence.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Photographs and Videos: Admissibility, and Proof Invoking Presumptions and ‘Silent Witness’ Theory

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • 1. Once a photograph or a copy of a video is duly admitted in evidence—having been produced along with the certificate required under Section 63(4) of the BSA—
  • the court can rely upon it as a piece of evidence,
    • (i) based on the general (and reliable) evidence’ (such as the identity of the persons seen in the photograph/video, the place, time, etc.)
    • (ii) as substantive evidence,
    • (iii) invoking the discretionary presumption under Section 119, BSA,
    • (iv) without insisting on any further independent proof.
  • 2. The presumption under Section 119, BSA, is rebuttable.

Key Points at a Glance

  • The only statutorily recognised mode of proof of a Computer Output (copy) is the production of a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA .
  • This certificate is accepted unless its correctness is specifically challenged.
  • A photograph or a copy of video stands on a distinct footing (in contradistinction to a statement-of-account) by reason of the statutory presumptions that the court can invoke.
  • The court is entitled to infer that a photograph or video correctly represents the scene or object as it existed at the time of recording, under the silent witness’ theory – the document “speaks for itself”.
  • A photograph or a video, by its very nature, speaks for itself. Upon its due admission in evidence, the court can rely upon it, on the basis of general (and reliable) evidence’, such as the identity of the persons seen in the photograph/video, the place, the time, or the occasion in which the photo or video was taken, without insisting upon further formal or technical proof.
  • The person who refutes the correctness of the photograph or video has the duty to adduce proper and admissible evidence, to discredit the presumption as to its correctness (This presumption under Section 119, BSA is ‘rebuttable’ for the word “may” in that Section).

Presumptions on Photographs and Videos: Discretionary and Rebuttable

Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (Section 114 of the Evidence Act) allows the Court to

  • ‘presume the existence of any fact ….. regard being had to the common course of natural events‘.

A photograph or a video, by its very nature, speaks for itself. They are “silent witnesses. It may be the most effective evidence in the peculiar nature of a case. (For example, the photograph that represents the scene of an accident.) It is on the supposition – photographs do not lie (Rajesh Khaitan v. State of WB, 1983 CrLJ 877; Anurag Sharma v. Manushi Sharma, 2017 AIR(CC) 332; 2016-234 DLT 530).

Invoking the legal presumptions under Section 119 of the BSA, a court can begin with an assumption as to the correctness of a photograph or video, casting the onus on the opposite party to rebut that presumption by placing on record material sufficient to dislodge or shift it. The presumption under Section 119 is discretionary and rebuttable. Consequently, the law does not oblige the proponent of the photograph or video to negate every theoretical possibility of manipulation.

However, it must have been fairly and accurately depicted. Where the rebuttal evidence creates a reasonable doubt regarding the authenticity or integrity of the photograph or video—whether on the ground of tampering, manipulation, fabrication, or otherwise—or where the court considers that further clarification is necessary to assess its probative value, the court may insist on further proof.

  • Note: The court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove even documents admitted (by the opposite side). Besides Section 53, BSA (facts admitted need not be proved: S. 58, IEA) and the powers of the court under Section 168, BSA (S. 165, IEA), the scheme of the Procedural Acts (CPC and BNSS/CrPC) also shows it. See – 
    • Order VIII Rule 5, CPC
    • Order XII, Rule 2A(1) [Proviso], CPC and 
    • S. 330, BNSS (S. 294 of the CrPC).

Invoking the general presumption (Section 119 of the BSA), as regards the video properly admitted in evidence, the courts in India have consistently held –

  • ‘A mere bald denial of the contents of a video recording is insufficient‘; but, ‘there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed [State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129.]
    • See also: Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1 [The court proceeded, observing – ‘there is no room for doubting the authenticity and accuracy of the electronic evidence‘].

Photographs – In many cases, a Corroborative Piece; It Can be the Best Evidence also

A photograph, being a document, ordinarily requires proof through a proper witness to establish its authenticity and relevance. However, it need not invariably be proved by examining the photographer, and may be proved through any competent witness capable of speaking to the facts depicted or the circumstances of its production. Once duly admitted, a photograph may constitute primary or substantive evidence, though in many cases it is used to corroborate other evidence.

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it is held that CCTV footage can be a ‘Best Evidence‘. The court said it as under:

  • “Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, prosecution in possession of the best evidence– CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced.”

In short, a photograph or copy of a video, once duly admitted in evidence, may constitute substantive and even the best evidence. The court can rely upon it by invoking the statutory presumptions, without insisting on further independent proof.

International Criminal Proceedings: No strict Requirement – Photographs be Corroborated

According to Rule 63(4) of the  of the ‘International Criminal Proceedings (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, it is pointed out in Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842,14 March 2012, TC I-718, that there is no strict legal requirement that a photograph has to be corroborated by other evidence for the Court to be able to rely on it and establish a specific fact [See: End Notes ].

The probative value of a document is a matter for the Court

Though in many cases a photograph or video is relied upon only as a corroborative piece of evidence, it can be substantive and independent evidence. It may also be a ‘best evidence‘, as shown above.

It is also important – the determination of the probative value of a document is a matter for the court. In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684, it is observed:

  • “Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”

Silent Witnesses Theory – Photograph /Video Speaks for Itself

In State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, the Madras High Court explained the “silent witness” theory, stating as under:

  • “115. We may also incidentally notice the developments in the law on video and photographic evidence in the West where the “silent witness” theory is deployed to admit video and photographic evidence. The theory proceeds on the footing that photographic and video evidence are “silent witnesses” which speak for themselves. They are substantive evidence of what they portray.”

The following two foreign decisions were specifically dealt with by the High Court:

  • (a) State of Nevada v. Archanian, [145 P 3d 1008 (2006)]: The Supreme Court of Nevada admitted the video evidence under the silent witness theory and held as under:
    • “There is no evidence suggesting that the composite videotape was inaccurate, that any relevant or exculpatory information had been deleted from it, or that the modifications made to it adversely affected or obscured the content.”
  • (b) Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, [2017 ONCJ 790,]: The Ontario Court of Justice in Canada opined to the following effect:
    • The party seeking to tender a video in evidence must show two things to meet the threshold test of admissibility: (i) The video is relevant, showing the crime scene or other evidence linked to the issues at trial; and (ii) the video is authentic — that it accurately represents the events depicted.

Bald Denials are Insufficient to Discredit the Authenticity of Video Footage

The Madras High Court, in this decision (State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi), also observed as under:

  • “113. It is true that the cameraman can zoom or minimize an image. It is also true that trick photography is possible. In Suo Motu taken up (PIL) WP Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others (WP 3335 etc. of 2009) decided on 29.10.2009, a Division Bench of this Court (F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla and R. Banumathi, JJ) held that bald denials are insufficient to discredit the authenticity of video footage. In her lead judgment, Banumathi, J (as she then was) has opined as under:
    • ‘349. That a bald denial of the contents of a videotape is not adequate to doubt its authenticity; there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed.
  • The Division Bench proceeded to look into the video tape as a corroborative piece of evidence and held as under:
    • ‘350. The respondents have not disputed that the video clippings filed by the petitioners relate to the occurrence. Even though video clippings filed by the petitioners do not have the running time, we have watched the videos and looked into the photos as corroborative piece of evidence’.”

In Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1, the conclusion of the Speaker on CDs received from TV News Channels, that ‘there is no room for doubting the authenticity and accuracy of the electronic evidence produced by the petitioner’, was accepted by the Apex Court, holding as under:

  • “The petitioners despite grant of opportunity had declined to watch the recorded interview. It is one thing to watch the interview, point out in what manner the recording was not genuine but instead of availing of that opportunity, the petitioners preferred to adopt the course of vague denial.”

In Umesh v. State of Karnataka, 2023-2 KarLJ 397, while dealing with a ‘trap case’, after laying down the importance of digital evidence, it is cautioned as under:

  • “Qualified and trained expert should test the samples. The report should contain the procedure adopted for testing the samples. The equipments used should be duly calibrated and updated periodically. The electronic device should be tested for editing and tampering in order to establish its genuineness and authenticity.
  • Digital evidence form be created for every memory card/chip used in the trap case containing the unique identification features of the memory chip/card used. The defence should be provided with a cloned copy or a mirror image of the electronic device.”

Distinct Evidentiary Position of a Section 63(4) Certificate

Once the Section 63(4) certificate accompanies the computer output (copy), the computer output becomes admissible in evidence, and it is not mandatory to examine the CCTV operator, or the person who snapped the photograph, for the purpose of its admission.

  • See: Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473,
  • Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1.

The Person who Signed Section 63/65B Certificate Need Not be Examined: Having regard to the special features of the photographs and videos (that is, visual depictions of facts), even if the Section 63(4) certificate is not that given either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, but by another, the photograph or video can be marked in evidence through the plaintiff or the defendant.

Unless the authenticity or correctness of the certificate issued under Section 63(4) is specifically disputed, oral evidence has no role to play in proving (for the purpose of marking) that the computer output is the exact copy of the (original) electronic record. Therefore, the photographer who issued the certificate under Section 63(4) need not be examined if the correctness of the certificate is not specifically disputed.

In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, our Apex Court further affirmed as under:

  • “50. … However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such certificate be given by such person/persons.”

Definition of Document Includes Photographs and Videos

Section 2(1)(d) of the Bharat Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), defines ‘document’ as under:

  • “ (d) ‘document’ means any matter expressed or described or otherwise recorded upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or any other means or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter and includes electronic and digital records.”

By virtue of Section 63 of the BSA, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (computer output) shall be ‘deemed to be also a document’.

Section 3(18), General Clauses Act, 1897, defines document as under:

  • Document shall include any matter written, expressed, or described upon any substances by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means which is intended to be used, or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter.”

Section 2(8) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, defines ‘document’ as any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, and includes electronic and digital record, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.

Going by the definitions, ‘document‘ includes not only all materials or substances upon which thoughts of a man are represented by writing or any other species of conventional mark or symbol, but also records of information of some sort (Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State, 2014 KerHC 31).

Electronic Record is Documentary Evidence

It is well established — under Section 3 of the Evidence Act (Sec. 2(1)(d) of the BSA), the electronic record produced for the inspection of the Court is documentary evidence (Anwar PV v. PK Basheer, 2014-10 SCC 473).

In P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1, it is observed that the following were “documents” under Section 3 of the Evidence Act-

  • (i) tape records of speeches (See also: Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, 2010-4 SCC 329; Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra(1976) 2 SCC 17 ) and
  • (ii) audio/video cassettes (See: Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, 1976-2 SCC 17) including compact disc (See also: Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016-15 SCC 485).

Presumption on Computer Output (copy) Admitted under Sec. 63

A computer output (copy) of a CCTV footage or video, or of a photograph captured on a mobile phone, can be admitted in evidence in place of the original — if it is produced with a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA.

  • Note: Section 63(1), BSA says about admissibility of copy — “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.”

Proof by Certificate under Section 63(4)

In view of the non-obstante clause (“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam”) in Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the only Mode of Proof of a computer output (copy) is the evidence through a certificate under Section 63(4).

  • Therefore, even in cases where formal proof of the digital photos or videos is dispensed with (for the opposite party admits it), a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA is necessary.

Admission and Proof of Computer Output (copy): Independent Matters

(i) Admitting a copy of a computer output (such as copy of a statement of accounts) in evidence (with a certificate under Section 63), and (ii) the formal proof thereof at the time of trial, are two distinct and independent matters.

  • The questions as to substantive proof — whether the computer output or copy is relevant, and how it should be proved, etc. — are not determined by Section 63 of the BSA. They are to be established independently, as in the case of any other class of documents.

The burden of Impeaching the Certificate is upon the Party who Disputes it

The presumption arising under Section 63—by which a computer output is deemed to be a document—is rebuttable and does not render the contents of the electronic record conclusive.

If such a challenge on the certificate is overruled by the court, it can draw a presumption as to the genuineness and authenticity of the photographs or videos contained in the computer output (copies).

S. 63 deals with Admissibility of computer output or copy, and not Proof

The questions as to substantive proof — whether the computer output or copy is relevant, and how it should be proved — are not determined by Section 63 of the BSA. They are to be established independently, as in the case of any other class of documents.

  • However, the court can draw presumptions as to the genuineness and authenticity of such photographs or videos, as stated earlier.

Once Copy Admitted by S. 63 Certificate, Oral Evidence has No Place in Marking

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, is an authority on the following matters –

  • (i) The certificate under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to admissibility of the computer output (copy);
  • (ii) The certificate is meant to replace the oral evidence of the device-handler or operator.
  • (iii) Once the certificate is produced, oral evidence has no place (for the purpose of marking it).

However, the person who issued the certificate (operator) has to be examined if:

  • the authenticity or correctness of the certificate is specifically disputed;
  • allegations of fabrication, manipulation, or false certification are raised;
  • the issuer’s control over the device/system is seriously questioned; or
  • the court needs clarification to assess probative value, not admissibility.

Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witness Theory

  • Pictorial Testimony Theory — Photograph Need Not Be Proved.
  • Silent Witness Theory — Photograph Must Be Proved.

Pictorial testimony theory

  • It is applied when a photograph is used merely as an aid to a witness in explaining or illustrating his testimony—for example,
    • a doctor explaining injuries with reference to a photographs,
    • witness identifying a scene/person with a photograph,
    • identification of a deceased through a photograph,  
    • accident site photos to explain the incident by a witness.
  • In these cases, the primary evidence is the oral testimony of the witness and not the contents of the photograph itself. The photograph is admitted merely as an aid to enable the witness to explain or illustrate what he personally perceived (and the photograph itself is not relied upon as substantive evidence). Consequently, it is not necessary to examine the photographer, provided the witness could affirm that the photograph fairly and accurately represents what he saw. In such cases, the photograph does not constitute substantive evidence, and therefore, no certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA (Section 65B of the IEA) is required.

Silent witness theory or Communication theory

  • It is invoked when the photograph itself constitutes substantive and probative evidence of what it depicts, speaking for itself without supporting oral testimony—for instance,
    • an X-ray film showing a fracture,
    • a photograph depicting the accused in a crowd holding a weapon (though the photographer did not notice him),
    • a photograph of the scene of occurrence of a crime.
    • CCTV footage.
    • speed camera photographs.
  • In these cases, the reliability and authenticity of the photographs or video must be proved, for the court relies upon what is depicted by the camera, CCTV, etc., in the mechanical/ electronic process, and not what the human witness who operated the process perceived.

In Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State (2014 Ker HC 31), these two theories, governing the proof and authenticity of photographs, were explained.

Examination of the Photographer may not be insisted (In silent witness theory)

As stated above, in silent witness theory cases, photographs or videos are required to be proved. However, such proof need not necessarily be by way of formal proof through the examination of the photographer or the person who captured the image.

Court to Draw a Prima Facie Presumption of Correctness

The law does not proceed on any presumption that electronic or visual evidence is to be viewed with constant suspicion.

The party producing a photograph or video is required only to establish foundational facts sufficient for its admissibility and relevance. Once this burden is discharged and the document is duly admitted, the Court can draw a prima facie presumption of correctness under Section 119 of the BSA (Section 114 of the IEA).

If S. 63/65B Requirement is fulfilled, CD is admissible, Like a Bocument

In Kailas v. The State of Maharashtra: 2025 INSC 1117, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “19. … However, strangely, the High Court opined that the video would become relevant only if it is played during deposition of each witness so that the witness could explain its contents in his own words resulting in a transcript of the video. In our view, this is a strange and unacceptable reasoning for the simple reason that the CD is an electronic record and once the requirement of Section 65B is fulfilled it becomes an admissible piece of evidence, like a document, and the video recorded therein is akin to contents of a document which can be seen and heard to enable the Court to draw appropriate inference(s). No doubt, there may be an occasion where to appreciate contents of a video an explanatory statement may be needed, but that would depend on the facts of a case. However, it is not the requirement of law that the contents of the video would become admissible only if it is reduced to a transcript in the words of a witness who created the video or is noticed in the video. Besides that, in the instant case, the search and seizure operation was sought to be proved by oral evidence of witnesses. The video, therefore, was perhaps to corroborate the oral testimony. …”

General Evidence on Factual Features through a ‘Proper’ Witness Sufficient

Besides admission of the other side as regards the authenticity, the photographs or videos may instead be proved through a ‘proper’ witness capable to furnish general (and reliable) evidence’ (to invoke the ‘general presumption‘ under Section 119, BSA) regarding the factual features depicted therein, such as the identity of the persons in the photograph, the place, the time, or the surrounding circumstances.

The following legal principles are relevant in this matter:

  • 1. The relevance of the photograph or video can be established by general evidence’ regarding the identity of the persons seen in the photograph, the place, etc.
  • 2. The admissibility of a photograph or copy of a video (under the Section 63(4) certificate) and its formal proof are two distinct and independent matters.
  • 2. Even in cases where formal proof of the photographs or copies of videos is dispensed with, the certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA (Section 65B of the IEA) is necessary — in view of the non-obstante clause in Section 63 of the BSA.
  • 3. A photograph or a copy of video, admitted in evidence on the strength of a certificate under Section 63(4), stands on a distinct footing (in contradistinction to a statement-of-account) by reason of the statutory (general) presumptions that the court can invoke (under Section 119 BSA), it being direct visual depictions of facts.
  • 4. The certificate under Section 63(4) is accepted unless its correctness is specifically challenged. The oral evidence of the person who issued the certificate becomes relevant (for the purpose of admitting the document) only where the certificate itself is specifically and successfully challenged by the party who disputes its authenticity or correctness.
  • 5. Therefore, the court is entitled to infer that a photograph or video, once duly admitted in evidence, correctly represents the scene or object as it existed at the time of recording. It is doctrinally recognised as the ‘silent witness’ theory – the document “speaks for itself”.
  • 6. Once a photograph or a copy of a video is duly admitted in evidence, the court cannot discard it, equating it to hearsay or corroborative evidence. The court cannot, as an invariable rule, insist upon further direct proof of the facts depicted in the photo or video. That is, the court has to accept it as a piece of (substantive) evidence.
  • 7. The presumption attached to a photograph or a video admitted in evidence being one rebuttable, the opposite party can rebut it by placing appropriate evidence to show that the photograph or video does not correctly represent the scene, object, or occurrence as it existed at the relevant point of time, or that the factual position had materially changed.

Photo Identification falls under the Pictorial Testimony Theory

Photo identification falls under the Pictorial testimony theory. Because the court has nothing to perceive from the photograph by itself; it only serves as an aid to the witness. The material and substantive evidence is the personal knowledge of the witness, and not what is depicted in the photograph.

The Kerala High Court (KT Thomas, J.), in Ponnappan v. State of Kerala, ILR 1994(3) Ker 370, confirmed the conviction, holding that Chacko was the person who was killed. It was on a photo identification. The Court held as under:

  • “PW I identified the person in M.O. 9 photo as the person who was killed. There is no doubt that M.O. 9 is the photograph of Chacko, the film representative. It was contended that since P. W. 1 himself admitted that he had not observed the features or facial peculiarities of the person when he was inside the car, the identification made by him with the help of the photo is not of any use. We are of the view that even without noticing any translatable mark or feature of a person, it would be possible to identify him later.”

Read also:

Pictorial Testimony Theory: No Enacted Law; Only Judicial Exposition

The pictorial testimony theory rests on judicial exposition rather than statutory codification. It finds only indirect support, in principle, from Section 162 (Refreshing Memory), BSA. Section 162 is to be understood as one not exhaustive in its operation.

Section 162 of the BSA reads as under:

  • Refreshing memory: (1) A witness may, while under examination, refresh his memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or so soon afterwards that the Court considers it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in his memory:
    • Provided that the witness may also refer to any such writing made by any other person, and read by the witness within the time aforesaid, if when he read it, he knew it to be correct.
  • (2) Whenever a witness may refresh his memory by reference to any document, he may, with the permission of the Court, refer to a copy of such document:
    • Provided that the Court be satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the non-production of the original:
    • Provided further that an expert may refresh his memory by reference to professional treatises.”

R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157

In R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157, the Apex Court summarised the earlier decision, Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720, (which considered the evidentiary value of tape recording, compared to that of a photograph) as under:

  • “In Nagri’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720) the appellant offered bribe to Sheikh a Municipal Clerk. Sheikh informed the Police. The Police laid a trap. Sheikh called Nagree at the residence. The Police kept a tape recorder concealed in another room. The tape was kept in the custody of the police inspector  Sheikh gave evidence of the talk. The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae. It is also comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident. The tape recorded conversation is therefore a relevant fact and is admissible under section 7 of the Evidence Act.” (Referred to in: K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275)

After summarising Nagri’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720), the Supreme Court continued as under:

  • “The Court will take care in two directions in admitting such evidence. First, the Court will find out that it is genuine and free from tampering or mutilation. Secondly, the Court may also secures scrupulous conduct and behaviour on behalf of the Police. The reason is that the Police Officer is more likely to behave properly if improperly obtained evidence is liable to be viewed with care and caution by the Judge. In every case the position of the accused, the nature of the investigation and the gravity of the offence must be judged in the light of the material facts and the surrounding circumstances.”

Conclusion

  • The only Mode of Proof of a computer output (copy) is the certificate under Section 63(4).
  • Where formal evidence is required to establish the relevance or authenticity of a photograph or video, it is sufficient for the party concerned (under the silent witness theory) to adduce general evidence’ relating to the factual aspects depicted therein—such as the identity of the persons depicted, the place, the time, or the circumstances depicted.
  • As pointed out in State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, a bald denial of the contents of the videotape is not adequate to doubt its authenticity; there should be material to show that they are doctored or morphed.
  • The photograph or video constitutes substantive evidence. Though in many cases it is relied upon as corroborative evidence, in an appropriate case it may, by itself, establish the fact in issue, independently and without the aid of other evidence. It may also be from the ‘best evidence‘ in certain cases (Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178). In any case, the probative value of a document is a matter for the court.
  • The photograph admitted merely as a non-probative aid to enable a witness to explain or illustrate what he personally perceived need not be proved by a ‘proper’ witness; and, no certificate is required for such photographs under Section 63(4) of the BSA.

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End Notes — 1

International Criminal Proceedings: No strict Requirement – Photographs be Corroborated

Rules 63 and 64 of the ‘International Criminal Proceedings (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ say about the discretion of a Chamber to assess freely all evidence submitted in order to determine its relevance or admissibility. From the above, it is clear that there should be reliable information as to

  • the date,
  • location and
  • events depicted   

for determining the

  • relevance,
  • probative value and
  • admissibility of the photograph-evidence.

Rules 63 and 64 of the ‘International Criminal Proceedings (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ read as under:

“Rule 63: General provisions relating to evidence

  • .1. The rules of evidence set forth in this chapter, together with article 69, shall apply in proceedings before all Chambers.
  • 2. A Chamber shall have the authority, in accordance with the discretion described in article 64, paragraph 9, to assess freely all evidence submitted in order to determine its relevance or admissibility in accordance with article 69.
  • 3. A Chamber shall rule on an application of a party or on its own motion, made under article 64, subparagraph 9 (a), concerning admissibility when it is based on the grounds set out in article 69, paragraph 7.
  • 4. Without prejudice to article 66, paragraph 3, a Chamber shall not impose a legal requirement that corroboration is required in order to prove any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, in particular, crimes of sexual violence.
  • 5. The Chambers shall not apply national laws governing evidence, other than in accordance with article 21.”

“Rule 64: Procedure relating to the relevance or admissibility of evidence

  • .1. An issue relating to relevance or admissibility must be raised at the time when the evidence is submitted to a Chamber. Exceptionally, when those issues were not known at the time when the evidence was submitted, it may be raised immediately after the issue has become known. The Chamber may request that the issue be raised in writing. The written motion shall be communicated by the Court to all those who participate in the proceedings, unless otherwise decided by the Court.
  • 2. A Chamber shall give reasons for any rulings it makes on evidentiary matters. These reasons shall be placed in the record of the proceedings if they have not already been incorporated into the record during the course of the proceedings in accordance with article 64, paragraph 10, and rule 137, sub-rule 1.
  • 3. Evidence ruled irrelevant or inadmissible shall not be considered by the Chamber.”

According to Rule 63(4) of the  International Criminal Courts (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence, it is pointed out that there is no strict legal requirement that a photograph has to be corroborated by other evidence for the Court to be able to rely on it and establish a specific fact [Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842,14 March 2012, TC I-718 ].

In Prosecutor v Lubanga it is observed as under:

  • “644. The prosecution relies on a number of video excerpts to establish that some of the UPC/FPLC recruits were “visibly” under the age of 15. The defence argues that it is impossible to distinguish reliably between a 12 or 13 year-old and a 15- or 16-year-old on the basis of a photograph or video extract alone. The Chamber accepts that for many of the young soldiers shown in the video excerpts, it is often very difficult to determine whether they are above or below the age of 15. Instead, the Chamber has relied on video evidence in this context only to the extent that they depict children who are clearly under the age of 15.”

(See: Prosecutor v. Ntaganda: Decision on Prosecution’s request for admission of documentary evidence,  ICC-01/04-02/06-1838 (28 March 2017) (TC VI) [68]. Prosecutor v Oussama Achraf Akhlafa, ECLI: EN: RBDHA: 2019: 7430, the Dutch District Court in Hague noted that “determining the date on which a particular image was taken is potentially an interesting element in the context of a criminal investigation”.)

Specific Presumptions on Elc. Record in S. 81 & 93, BSA

Specific presumptions relating to electronic records are contained in Sections 81, 85, 86, 87, 90 and 93 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. Two of them are very important. They are given below.

S. 81 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 reads as under:

  • 81. Presumption as to Gazettes in electronic or digital record: The Court shall presume the genuineness of every electronic or digital record purporting to be the Official Gazette, or purporting to be electronic or digital record directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such electronic or digital record is kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody.
  • Explanation.—For the purposes of this section and section 93 electronic records are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and looked after by the person with whom such document is required to be kept; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render that origin probable.

Section 93 BSA reads as under:

  • “93. Presumption as to electronic records five years old: Where any electronic record, purporting or proved to be five years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the electronic signature which purports to be the electronic signature of any particular person was so affixed by him or any person authorised by him in this behalf.
  • Explanation.—The Explanation to section 81 shall also apply to this section.”

End Notes — 2

Photograph-Evidence: In a Nutshell

Photographs are admissible in evidence as documents.  P.  Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1; 2020-9 SCC 161
While considering a case on dowry death, the prosecution argued that a photograph was not admissible in evidence as neither the person who took the photograph nor its negative was produced in evidence. But, the court accepted the photograph as ‘no dispute was raised by the prosecution witnesses’.Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2024 SC 4551
A large number of photographs were marked and considered in this case.
In para 525, it is stated – the witness “was confronted with photographs of the inscription”
There were three sets of albums containing photographs taken by the State Archaeological Department pursuant to an order dated 10 January 1990 (Para 533).
In para 538, the Court considered the evidence of a witness as to the “photographs placed within the structure in 1990”.
M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1 (Ayodhya case)
The factum of photo identification (of an accused) by PW 2, as witnessed by the officer concerned, is a relevant and admissible piece of evidence.Rabindra Kumar Pal v.  Republic of India, 2011-2 SCC 490
Nothing prevented the appellant-State Government from producing the relevant photographs of the purported pucca pond existing at some spots.State of Rajasthan v. Ultratech Cement Ltd. , 2022-12 Scale 606; 2022-13 SCR 1
A statement about the photograph made by any expert would not be admissible before examining the photographer.Dr. Pankaj Kumudchandra Phadnis v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 785
Photographs, tape-records of speeches [Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17] are documents.Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016 15 SCC 485;
Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2011-4 SCC 143
Photo identification of an accused during the investigation, who was seen by the witness at the relevant time.Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic  AIR 1999 SC  2562, 2000-1 SCC 138; Rabindra Kumar Pal v. Republic of India, AIR  2011 SC 1436; 2011 2 SCC 490
Inventory, photographs and the list of samples certified by the Magistrate are admissible as primary evidence. It is a substitute for the production of physical evidence of seized contraband samples.Nisar Ahmed Bhat, v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir 2024 0 Supreme(J&K) 187  
The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae.K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275;
R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157;
Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720

End Notes — 3

Decisions on Electronic Records

  • CCTV footage in the following landmark cases:
    • State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,
    • Tomaso Bruno Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015-7 SCC 178)
  • CDs/VCDs in respect of video recording by the Election Commission
    • Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216
  • CDs containing election speeches and songs in:
    • Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473).
  • Conclusion of the Speaker on CDs received from TV News Channels:
    • Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1
  • Call Detail Records – CDR – of mobile phonesin:
    • Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570)
  • Tape recorded conversation on the landline phone
    • Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518
  • Propriety of videography of the scene of crime or scene of recovery during investigation, in:
    • Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 )

End Notes — 4

Decisions on Photo/Audio/Video

Audio/Video cassettesZiyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17
Tape records of speechesTukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329
Photo or videoMohammed Rafiq v. Madhan, 2018-1 Mad LJ(CRI) 641;
Moti Rabidas v. The State of Bihar, 2015-145 AIC 435;
Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan 2014-1 Raj Cri C 31;
State of MP v. Shankarlal, ILR 2010 MP 717;
P Rajagopal v. Inspector of police 2009-2 Mad LJ(Cri) 161;
Santhosh Baccharam Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 All MR (Cri)997, 2003 BCR (Cri) 120.
CD  Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, (2016) 15 SCC 485
Photographs including photographs of tombstones and houses Lyell v. Kennedy (No.3) (1884) 50 L.T. 730
Video recordings  State of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053
Audio and videoState of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053;
Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31;
Taylor v. Chief Constable Cheshire:1987(1) All.ER 225
CassettesTukaram S.Dighole v. Manik Rao Shivaji Kokate (2010)4 SCC 329
Moving cinematographSenior v. Holdsworth, Ex parte Independant Television New Ltd. (1976) Q.B. 23)
Film  Rex v. Daye ((1908)2 K.B. 333, 340)
Floppies, CCTV footages, CDs, DVDs, Chips, Hard discs, Pen drives North West Airlines v. Union of India 2007 (214) ELT 178 (Bom.)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

What is the Period of Limitation for a Suit on a Promissory Note?

Jojy George Koduvath

Does the Cause of Action Arise only on a ‘Demand’?

No is the answer.

The ‘Cause of Action’ and the ‘Limitation’ begin from the date of the promissory note itself, unless –

  • a promissory note is made payable on a specified contingency (must be express), or the payment is explicitly made conditional upon an express demand, or the governing contract or statute specifically requires a demand as a condition precedent.

Relevant Provision: Article 35, Limitation Act, 1963

The period of limitation for a suit on a promissory note payable on demand is governed by Article 35 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Article 35 reads as under:

Description of suitPeriod of limitationTime from which period begins to run
35. On a bill of exchange or promissory note payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue.Three years.  The date of the bill or note.

Thus, where a promissory note is payable on demand, and there is no clause postponing or restraining the right to sue, the money is payable immediately, and limitation begins to run from the date of the promissory note itself, not from the date of any subsequent demand.

Authoritative Judicial Pronouncements

The Supreme Court, in Syndicate Bank v. Channaveerappa Beleri, AIR 2006 SC 1874: (2006) 11 SCC 506, held to the following effect:

  • The words “on demand” do not have a uniform meaning in all contexts.
  • In the case of promissory notes or bills of exchange, this means the amount is always payable, i.e., payable forthwith.
  • A demand is not a condition precedent for the cause of action in such cases.

The Supreme Court clarified that a promissory note payable on demand stands on the same footing as Article 21, and not Article 22.

  • Article 21 (Money lent payable on demand): Limitation begins from the date of the loan, because the money is payable immediately.
  • Article 22 (Money deposited payable on demand): Limitation begins only when a demand is actually made, as demand is a condition precedent.

Our Apex Court, in Syndicate Bank v. Channaveerappa Beleri, held as under:

  • “12. We will examine the meaning of the words ‘on demand‘. As noticed above, the High Court was of the view that the words ‘on demand’ in law have a special meaning and when an agreement states that an amount is payable on demand, it implies that it is always payable, that is payable forthwith and a demand is not a condition precedent for the amount to become payable.
  • The meaning attached to the expression ‘on demand’ as ‘always payable‘ or ‘payable forthwith without demand’ is not one of universal application. The said meaning applies only in certain circumstances. The said meaning is normally applied to promissory notes or bills of exchange payable on demand.
  • We may refer to Articles 21 and 22 in this behalf. Article 21 provides that for money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, the period of limitation (3 years) begins to run when the loan is made. On the other hand, the very same words ‘payable on demand’ have a different meaning in Article 22 which provides that for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, the period of limitation (3 years) will begin to run when the demand is made.
  • Thus, the words ‘payable on demand’ have been given different meaning when applied with reference to ‘money lent’ and ‘money deposited’. In the context of Article 21, the meaning and effect of those words is ‘always payable’ or payable from the moment when the loan is made, whereas in the context of Article 22, the meaning is ‘payable when actually a demand for payment is made’.”

Legal Principles Evolved

The limitation begins from the date of the promissory note, and the suit must be filed within three years from that date. Apart from the express legal provision contained in the Limitation Act, it is logically sound for the following reasons:

  • 1. A promissory note that is ‘payable on demand’ is enforceable immediately upon its execution.
  • 2. No separate or subsequent demand is required to set the limitation in motion. That is, the cause of action arises immediately on the execution of the note.
  • 3. A creditor cannot postpone limitation indefinitely by delaying demand.

The law affirmed in Syndicate Bank v. Channaveerappa Beleri is followed in the following cases

  • Manjunath S. v. B. K. Subbarao, ILR 2020 Kar 227
  • K. V. G. Rajan v. Karnataka State Financial Corporation, 2017 (4) AIR (Kar) (R) 563
  • Subhash Chand v. State Bank of Patiala, AIR 2014 Del 82
  • Seelak Ram Balhara v. Bank of Baroda, 2014 (2) BC 46 (All)
  • Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Rajit Subodhbhai Shah, 2013 (5) GLR 4289 (Guj)

Earlier Contrary View (Now No Longer Good Law)

An earlier line of decisions had taken the view that a demand promissory note does not become payable until a demand is made, and therefore limitation would begin only from the date of demand. Illustrative cases include:

  • Gopalan v. Lakshminarasamma, AIR 1940 Mad 631
  • Braja Kishore Dikshit v. Purna Chandra Panda, AIR 1957 Ori 153
  • Ghania Lal v. Karam Chand, AIR 1929 Lah 240

‘On Demand’ Subjected to Different Connotations in the Limitation Act

In Seethamma v. Kamala, ILR 1980-2 Ker 339; 1980 KLT 755 (P. Subramonian Poti, P. Janaki Amma, JJ.) made it clear as under:

  • “8. The expression ‘on demand’ has been subjected to different treatment at the hands of the framers of the Limitation Act.
  • Under Art. 21 which deals with suits for money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, and
  • under Art. 35, which deals with suits on a bill of exchange or promissory note, payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue, limitation starts from the date of the loan or the document, as the case may be. On the other hand,
  • under Art. 22, in the case of a suit for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand limitation starts only when a demand is made.”

Conclusion

  • Period of limitation for a promissory note is three years from the date of the promissory note
  • Governing provision: Article 35, Limitation Act, 1963. (It lays down – time from which the limitation period begins to run is the date of the note.)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Rejection of Plaint is a Procedural Termination, and Dismissal of Suit on Preliminary Issue is a Summary Decision on Merits

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

The following provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be invoked by a defendant, to seek rejection or dismissal of a suit, at the threshold, without a trial:

  1. Order VII Rule 11, CPCRejection of plaint (on the specific grounds enumerated).
  2. Order XIV Rule 2(2), CPCDecision on preliminary issues, where the issue relates to –
    (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a statutory bar to the suit, and(c) such issues that can be decided as a pure question of law.
  3. Section 151, CPCInherent powers of the court  (exercised in exceptional cases where the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of the court or no specific provision in the CPC).

The following are the general provisions of law that may be invoked by a defendant for summary termination of a suit, without a full trial:

  • Section 9 CPC – Civil court jurisdiction expressly or impliedly barred
  • Section 11 CPC – Bar of Res judicata
  • Limitation Act, 1963 – Barred by limitation, apparent on the plaint
  • Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Bar under Sections 14, 41, etc.
  • Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 69 – Suit by unregistered firm, to enforce contractual rights
  • Public Premises Act/ Rent Control Acts/ Land Reforms Acts – Statutory exclusion of civil jurisdiction.

Part I

Order VII rule 11 of the CPC

Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC is the specific provision for the rejection of the plaint. It reads as under:

  • “11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:
  • (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
  • (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
  • (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
  • (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9″.

Rejection of Plaint under O. VII r. 11Following are the Basic Principles

  • Rejection is a procedural termination (and not a dismissal on the merits).
  • A plaint is rejected only in the specific situations enumerated in Order VII rule 11 CPC.
  • Only plaint averments are looked into for determining rejection of plaint.
  • Defence pleadings or disputed facts cannot be looked into.
  • Rejection can be ordered at any stage. (Usually it is a threshold determination.)
  • A fresh plaint can be presented after curing the defects (if not barred by limitation or under any provision of law).

Grounds for Rejection

Following are the grounds for Rejection of Plain in Order VII rule 11 CPC:

  • No Cause of Action Disclosed [Order VII Rule 11(a)]
  • Relief Undervalued [Order VII Rule 11(b)]
  • Insufficient Court Fee [Order VII Rule 11(c)]
  • Suit Barred by Law [Order VII Rule 11(d)] such as:
    • Limitation
    • Res judicata (when evident on the plaint)
    • Statutory bar (e.g., Section 69 of the Partnership Act for unregistered firms)
  • Duplicate Plaint Not Filed [Order VII Rule 11(e)]
  • Non-compliance with Rule 9 [Order VII Rule 11(f)]

Order VI rule 16

Order VI rule 16 provides for striking out pleadings at any stage. (It may not lead to dismissal of the entire plaint.) It reads as follows:

  • “16. Striking out pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading-
  • a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or
  • b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or
  • c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.”

Order 14 rule 2

Order 14 rule 2 CPC provides for the hearing of any preliminary issue, including the maintainability of the suit. It reads as follows:

  • “2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-
    • (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
    • (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in-force.
  • and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.”

Order 10 rule 1 CPC

Order 10 rule 1 CPC reads as under:

  • Examination of parties by the court: 1. Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied.—At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain from each party or his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The Court shall record such admissions and denials.”

Part II

Inherent Powers Cannot be used for Rejection’ of Plaints. But it can be used for “Dismissal” of Suits in Rare Cases.

  • PLAINT cannot be rejected invoking Section 151 CPC (Inherent Powers of courts).
  • But, the court can dismiss a SUIT, at the threshold, in exceptional cases, invoking inherent powers.
  • Inherent powers are not invoked for the Rejection of the plaintiff, for it is a Statutory-Affair, and specific provisions are laid down in Order VII Rule 11. (It cannot be supplemented, expanded, or substituted, invoking Section 151. In such cases, the inherent powers stand excluded.)

Inherent Powers Not Used if in Conflict with Express Provisions

In Padam Sen v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218, our Apex Court found: “the Additional Munsiff had DO inherent powers to pass the order appointing a Commissioner to seize the plaintiff’s account books”.

It had been observed in this decision, as under:

  • “It is submitted for the State, that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, can adopt any procedure not prohibited by the Code expressly or by necessary implication if the Court considers it necessary, for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Section 151 of the Code reads:
    • ” Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court “.
  • The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the puposes mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.”

In Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee, (1970) 1 SCC 732, the Apex Court cautioned as under:

  • “Under the inherent power of courts recognised by Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, a court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglected to avail himself of the same. Further the power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power.”

S. 151 is Not a Provision Conferring Power of Substantive Relief

It is held in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1, as under:

  • Section 151 is not a provision of law conferring power to grant any kind of substantive relief. It is a procedural provision saving the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It cannot be invoked with reference to a matter which is covered by a specific provision in the Code. It cannot be exercised in conflict with the general scheme and intent of the Code. It cannot be used either to create or recognise rights, or to create liabilities and obligations not contemplated by any law.”

Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss the Suit) in the Following Situations

T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, is an authority to argue that inherent powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss a Suit) in the Following Situations:

  • Abuse of process of court
  • Fraud on court
  • Sham, vexatious, or illusory litigation
  • Re-litigation amounting to judicial harassment.

Order VII Rue 11 is not Exhaustive; Court can invoke Inherent Power

In K. Akbar Ali v. K. Umar Khan, AIR 2021 SC 1114; 2021-14 SCC 51 it is held as under:

  • “Moreover, the provisions of Order VII Rue 11 are not exhaustive and the Court has the inherent power to see that frivolous or vexatious litigations are not allowed to consume the time of the Court.”

Se. 151, Inherent Power to Dismiss a Suit – if ‘Abuse of Process of the Court’

The Courts have inherent powers to dismiss a suit that is an ‘abuse of their process’. It can also be invoked for rejection or setting aside a suit if an absolutely groundless suit is filed.

Re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. If the Court finds that there is an abuse of the process of court, and is satisfied that there is no chance of succeeding, the Court may exercise its discretion with circumspection, though only in rare situations.

In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, AIR 1998 SC 1297: 1998 (3) SCC 573, it is observed as under:

  •  “32. Under Order 6 Rule 16, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding, order to be struck out, inter alia, any matter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Mulla in his treatise on the Code of Civil Procedure. (15th Edition, Volume II, page 1179 note 7) has stated that power under clause (c) of Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code is confined to cases where the abuse of the process of the Court is manifest from the pleadings; and that this power is unlike the power under Section 151 whereunder Courts have inherent power to strike out pleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings which are an abuse of their process.
  • In the present case the High Court has held the suit to be an abuse of the process of Court on the basis of what is stated in the plaint.”
  • (Quoted in: Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, AIR 2016 SC 1948; 2016 11 SCC 484;
  • Reddy Enterprises, Vijayawada v. Appellate Authority & Additional Commissioner (ST) Vijayawada, 2024-5 ALD 452;
  • Raahul Foundations Private Ltd. v. S. Chandrababu, 2019-2 LW 148; 2019-3 MLJ 321)

Where No express provision, Inherent Powers can be Invoked

In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 2554, while dealing with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, the Supreme Court held that where there is no express provision, inherent power can be invoked. The Court said as under:

  • “2. …It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code…..”

Part III

Manifestly Vexatious Suit –  ‘Nipped in the bud’, Searchingly u/Or. 10, CPC

Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer:  T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, held that on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint, if it is found that a manifestly vexatious suit is filed, it must be nipped in the bud searchingly under Order 10, CPC. The Court held as under:

  • “We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, be should exercise his power under Or. VII r. 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first bearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code (Ch. XI) is also resourceful enough to meet such men, and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too good.”

Fraud or Abuse of judicial process — May Invite Dismissal of Suit

It is trite law – Fraud vitiates all judicial acts (See: A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. (2007) 4 SCC 221. [Quoted in: Yashoda (Alias Sodhan) VS Sukhwinder Singh, AIR 2022 SC 4623; 2022-12 SCR 31; Smriti Madan Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra, AIR 2021 SC 5423].  Courts take suppression of material facts seriously, and if there is deliberate misuse of judicial process, courts may even dismiss the suit outright invoking inherent powers. (See: K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3SCC 573).

Fraud on Court and fraud on a party

In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550, referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court’s business”.

In Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 289; 2024-5 SCC 481, it is held as under:

  • It is trite that fraud vitiates everything. It is a settled proposition of law that fraud avoids all judicial acts. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (Dead) through LRs, (1994) 1 SCC 1 (“S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu”), it has been observed that “fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” Further, “no judgment of a court, no order of a minister would be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. fraud unravels everything” vide Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasley, (1956) 1 all ER 341 (“Lazarus Estates Ltd.”).
  • It is well-settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and that the discretion must be exercised equitably for promotion of good faith vide State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 (“Prabhu”). This Court has further emphasized that fraud and collusion vitiate the most solemn precedent in any civilized jurisprudence; and that fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). This maxim has never lost its lustre over the centuries. Thus, any litigant who is guilty of inhibition before the Court should not bear the fruit and benefit of the court’s orders. This Court has also held that fraud is an act of deliberation with a desire to secure something which is otherwise not due. fraud is practiced with an intention to secure undue advantage. Thus, an act of fraud on courts must be viewed seriously.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Can a Plaint be Rejected Invoking the Inherent Powers of the Court?

Yes, But Only in Exceptional Circumstances.

Jojy George Koduvath.

Introduction

The following provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be invoked by a defendant, to seek rejection or dismissal of a suit at the threshold, without a full-fledged trial:

  1. Order VII Rule 11, CPCRejection of plaint (on the specific grounds enumerated).
  2. Order XIV Rule 2(2), CPCDecision on preliminary issues, where the issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a statutory bar to the suit, and(c)such issues that can be decided as a pure question of law.
  3. Section 151, CPCInherent powers of the court  (exercised in exceptional cases where the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of the court or no specific provision in the CPC).

The following are the general provisions of law that may be invoked by a defendant for summary termination of a suit, without a full trial:

  • Section 9 CPC – Civil court jurisdiction expressly or impliedly barred
  • Section 11 CPCRes judicata
  • Limitation Act, 1963 – Time-bar apparent on plaint
  • Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Bar under Sections 14, 41, etc.
  • Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 69 – Suit by unregistered firm
  • Public Premises Act / Rent Control Acts / Land Reforms Acts – Statutory exclusion of civil jurisdiction.

Part I

Rejection of Plaint under O. VII r. 11: Following are the Basic Principles

  • Rejection is a procedural termination (and not a dismissal on the merits).
  • A plaint is rejected only in the specific situations enumerated in Order VII rule 11 CPC.
  • Only plaint averments are looked into for determining rejection of plaint.
  • Defence pleadings or disputed facts cannot be looked into.
  • Rejection can be ordered at any stage. (Usually it is a threshold determination.)
  • A fresh plaint can be presented after curing the defects (if not barred by limitation or under any provision of law).

Grounds for Rejection

Following are the grounds for Rejection of Plain in Order VII rule 11 CPC:

  • No Cause of Action Disclosed [Order VII Rule 11(a)]
  • Relief Undervalued [Order VII Rule 11(b)]
  • Insufficient Court Fee [Order VII Rule 11(c)]
  • Suit Barred by Law [Order VII Rule 11(d)] such as:
    • Limitation
    • Res judicata (when evident on the plaint)
    • Statutory bar (e.g., Section 69 of the Partnership Act for unregistered firms)
  • Duplicate Plaint Not Filed [Order VII Rule 11(e)]
  • Non-compliance with Rule 9 [Order VII Rule 11(f)]

Order VII rule 11 of the CPC

Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC is the specific provision for the rejection of the plaint. It reads as under:

  • “11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:
  • (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
  • (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
  • (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
  • (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9″.

Order VI rule 16

Order VI rule 16 provides for striking out pleadings at any stage. (It may not lead to dismissal of the entire plaint.) It reads as follows:

  • “16. Striking out pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading-
  • a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or
  • b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or
  • c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.”

Order 14 rule 2

Order 14 rule 2 CPC provides for the hearing of any preliminary issue, including the maintainability of the suit. It reads as follows:

  • “2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-
    • (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
    • (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in-force.
  • and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.”

Order 10 rule 1 CPC

Order 10 rule 1 CPC reads as under:

  • Examination of parties by the court: 1. Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied.—At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain from each party or his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The Court shall record such admissions and denials.”

Part II

Inherent Powers Cannot be used for “Rejection” of plaints. But it Can be used for “Dismissal” of Suits in Rare Cases.

  • A PLAINT cannot be rejected invoking Section 151 CPC (inherent powers of courts).
  • But, a court can dismiss a SUIT, at the threshold, in exceptional cases, invoking inherent powers.
  • Inherent powers are not invoked for the Rejection of the plaintiff, for it is a Statutory-Affair, and specific provisions are laid down in Order VII Rule 11. (It cannot be supplemented, expanded, or substituted, invoking Section 151. In such cases, the inherent powers stand excluded.)

Inherent Powers Not Used if in Conflict with Express Provisions

In Padam Sen v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218, our Apex Court found: “the Additional Munsiff had DO inherent power to pass the order appointing a Commissioner to seize the plaintiff’s account books”.

It had been observed in this decision, as under:

  • “It is submitted for the State, that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, can adopt any procedure not prohibited by the Code expressly or by necessary implication if the Court considers it necessary, for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Section 151 of the Code reads:
    • ” Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court “.
  • The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the puposes mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.”

In Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee, (1970) 1 SCC 732, the Apex Court cautioned as under:

  • “Under the inherent power of courts recognised by Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, a court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglected to avail himself of the same. Further the power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power.”

S. 151 is Not a Provision Conferring Power of Substantive Relief

It is held in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1, as under:

  • Section 151 is not a provision of law conferring power to grant any kind of substantive relief. It is a procedural provision saving the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It cannot be invoked with reference to a matter which is covered by a specific provision in the Code. It cannot be exercised in conflict with the general scheme and intent of the Code. It cannot be used either to create or recognise rights, or to create liabilities and obligations not contemplated by any law.”

Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss the Suit) in the Following Situations

T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, is an authority to argue that Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss a Suit) in the Following Situations:

  • Abuse of process of court
  • Fraud on court
  • Sham, vexatious, or illusory litigation
  • Re-litigation amounting to judicial harassment

Order VII Rue 11 is not Exhaustive; Court can invoke Inherent Power

In K. Akbar Ali v. K. Umar Khan, AIR 2021 SC 1114; 2021-14 SCC 51 it is held as under:

  • “Moreover, the provisions of Order VII Rue 11 are not exhaustive and the Court has the inherent power to see that frivolous or vexatious litigations are not allowed to consume the time of the Court.”

Se. 151, Inherent Power to Dismiss a Suit – if ‘Abuse of Process of the Court’

The Courts have inherent power to dismiss a suit that is an ‘abuse of their process’. It can also be invoked for rejection or setting aside a suit if an absolutely groundless suit is filed.

Re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. If the Court finds that there is an abuse of the process of court, and is satisfied that there is no chance of succeeding, the Court may exercise its discretion with circumspection, though only in rare situations.

In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, AIR 1998 SC 1297: 1998 (3) SCC 573, it is observed as under:

  •  “32. Under Order 6 Rule 16, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding, order to be struck out, inter alia, any matter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Mulla in his treatise on the Code of Civil Procedure. (15th Edition, Volume II, page 1179 note 7) has stated that power under clause (c) of Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code is confined to cases where the abuse of the process of the Court is manifest from the pleadings; and that this power is unlike the power under Section 151 whereunder Courts have inherent power to strike out pleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings which are an abuse of their process.
  • In the present case the High Court has held the suit to be an abuse of the process of Court on the basis of what is stated in the plaint.”
  • (Quoted in: Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, AIR 2016 SC 1948; 2016 11 SCC 484;
  • Reddy Enterprises, Vijayawada v. Appellate Authority & Additional Commissioner (ST) Vijayawada, 2024-5 ALD 452;
  • Raahul Foundations Private Ltd. v. S. Chandrababu, 2019-2 LW 148; 2019-3 MLJ 321)

Where no express provision, Inherent Power can be Invoked

In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 2554, while dealing with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, the Supreme Court held that where there is no express provision, inherent power can be invoked. The Court said as under:

  • “2. …It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code…..”

Part III

Manifestly Vexatious Suit –  ‘Nipped in the bud’, Searchingly u/Or. 10, CPC

Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer:  T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, held that on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint, if it is found that a manifestly vexatious suit is filed, it must be nipped in the bud searchingly under Order 10, CPC. The Court held as under:

  • “We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, be should exercise his power under Or. VII r. 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first bearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code (Ch. XI) is also resourceful enough to meet such men, and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too good.”

Fraud or Abuse of judicial process — May Invite Dismissal of Suit

It is trite law – Fraud vitiates all judicial acts (See: A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. (2007) 4 SCC 221. [Quoted in: Yashoda (Alias Sodhan) VS Sukhwinder Singh, AIR 2022 SC 4623; 2022-12 SCR 31; Smriti Madan Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra, AIR 2021 SC 5423].  Courts take suppression of material facts seriously, and if there is deliberate misuse of judicial process, courts may even dismiss the suit outright invoking inherent powers. (See: K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3SCC 573).

Fraud on Court and fraud on a party

In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550, referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court’s business”.

In Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 289; 2024-5 SCC 481, it is held as under:

  • It is trite that fraud vitiates everything. It is a settled proposition of law that fraud avoids all judicial acts. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (Dead) through LRs, (1994) 1 SCC 1 (“S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu”), it has been observed that “fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” Further, “no judgment of a court, no order of a minister would be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. fraud unravels everything” vide Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasley, (1956) 1 all ER 341 (“Lazarus Estates Ltd.”).
  • It is well-settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and that the discretion must be exercised equitably for promotion of good faith vide State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 (“Prabhu”). This Court has further emphasized that fraud and collusion vitiate the most solemn precedent in any civilized jurisprudence; and that fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). This maxim has never lost its lustre over the centuries. Thus, any litigant who is guilty of inhibition before the Court should not bear the fruit and benefit of the court’s orders. This Court has also held that fraud is an act of deliberation with a desire to secure something which is otherwise not due. fraud is practiced with an intention to secure undue advantage. Thus, an act of fraud on courts must be viewed seriously.

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – “How to Subscribe free 

Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic)

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India