Survey Records under Survey Act – Raises a Presumption of Correctness on Boundary; though Not Confer Title

Taken from: Revenue Records (or ‘Mutation’) & Survey by Survey Authorities will not Confer Title; It merely Raises a Presumption on Possession

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

1. Survey Authorities Not to decide Title.

2. Survey Records – Conclusive proof that Boundaries were recorded correctly (when survey was made).

3. Logical inference from the above propositions is the following: If a party to the suit establishes title by producing his title deed, he can rely on the presumption: that survey records establish possession and boundary. See:

  • Elambilan Nani Amma v. Mulavana Antony (K. Babu, J,), 2023-7 KHC 418
  • Kannan v. Kannan, (1964 KLT 228), 
  • The Cheriyanad Grama Panchayath v. The State of Kerala,  (2019 (5) KHC 699),
  • Venugopalan Nair v. Saraswathy Amma, (2013 (4) KLT 717),
  • Karthyayani v. Balakrishnan, (2014 (2) KLT Suppl. 67 (Ker.),
  • Ibrahim v. Saythumuhammed, (2013 (4) KLT 435)
  • Achama Alexander v. Asst. Director, Survey and Land Records, 2022-3 KLT 198.
  • Thomas v. Philip,2022(4) KerHC 451;

PART – 1

Survey and Boundaries Act

“The Survey and Demarcation of lands by the State have a Purpose”

In Achuthan Unni v. Vally, 1962 KLT 1010, it is held as under:

  • “3. The survey and demarcation of lands by the State have a purpose; they are intended to identify the different pieces of land so as to regulate the rights of landholders. Bights in land will normally be presumed to be in terms of the survey divisions. When a person is admitted or found to be in possession of a survey division, the presumption is of such possession being extensive with the survey division concerned; and he is not to be constrained to prove his possession of every inch of it. It is then for the person who asserts the contrary to prove by positive evidence that a defined portion thereof is in his adverse possession and has been lost to the owner thereof. If the court finds the same, the Land Records will be corrected accordingly sub-dividing the original survey division so as to demarcate each holding with separate survey number.” (quoted in: Damodara Panicker v. Ayyappan Kutty, 1962 KLT 637; 1962 KHC 153; Kathirummal Chirammal Karthyayani v. Kunnool Balakrishnan, 2014-2 KHC 108; 2014-2 KLJ 289; 2014 Supp2 KLT 67).

In Damodara Panicker v. Ayyappan Kutty, 1962 KLT 637; 1962 KHC 153, it is held as under:

  • 5. Where the disputed land is a narrow strip, (in this case, it is of width ranging from two or three feet) at the verge of the plaintiff’s land adjoining the defendants’ property it would in most cases, be difficult to prove its actual possession as such. If the remaining portion of the plaintiff’s land is admitted or found to be in the plaintiff’s possession, the same must be held to extend to the border, unless there be clear evidence to the contrary. In other words, when a person is admitted or found to be in possession of his land identified by a Survey Number and the dispute by the adjoining landholder concerns only a narrow strip at the mutual boundary, the possession of the former will be presumed to be coextensive with the relative survey division and the burden will be on the party claiming the encroachment to prove his adverse possession thereof for over the statutory period (of 12 years). [See: Achuthan Unni v. Vally, 1962 KLJ 400].”
  • (Quoted in: Susi v. Sujathan, 2022-1 KHC 671, K Babu, J. and in Kathirummal Chirammal Karthyayani v. Kunnool Balakrishnan, 2014-2 KHC 108; 2014-2 KLJ 289; 2014 Supp2 KLT 67)

In Kathirummal Chirammal Karthyayani v. Kunnool Balakrishnan, 2014-2 KHC 108; 2014-2 KLJ 289; 2014 Supp2 KLT 67 (N.K. Balakrishnan, J.), the argument of the appellant in the Second Appeal was laid down by the court as under:

  • “5. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant who was examined as PW1 had a definite case that her property extends up to the ‘chal’ and the ridge on the eastern side of the property and so the findings entered by the appellate court that the boundary of the respondents’ property should be along the ‘EF’ line, cannot be accepted at all. Simply because resurvey was conducted and a plan was drawn by the Survey Authorities, it cannot be said that the appellant’s property does not extend up to the dotted line shown by the Commissioner, which is actually the natural boundary of the property, it is argued.”

Dismissing the second appeal, it is held as under:

  • “12. If it is a case where large extent of property lying in a different survey number is claimed by the plaintiff based on a survey record alone, when actually it is in the possession of the defendant, the plaintiff has to seek recovery of possession of that large extent of property which is in the possession of the defendant. So far as the case on hand is concerned, it is only a very narrow strip of land lying along the boundary line. Hence, the presumption should be that the person, who has got title to the property and whose boundary extends up to the line stated above is in possession of that narrow strip of land as well.”

Survey, Conclusive Proof – Boundaries determined & Recorded Correctly; It is More than a Presumption

In Elambilan Nani Amma v. Mulavana Antony (K. Babu, J,), 2023-7 KHC 418, it is observed as under:

  • “It is also trite that the decisions of the survey authorities under Chapter II of the Act (Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act) will not affect the right and title of the property acquired by a party as per a valid title deed. The right and title to property have to be determined not with reference to the survey demarcation but based on other cogent materials, the primary of which is the title deed. The record of the survey result shall be conclusive proof that the boundaries were determined and recorded therein correctly.
  • (Vide: Cheriyanad Grama Panchayath v. The State of Kerala and Ors. (2019 (5) KHC 699,
  • Venugopalan Nair v. Saraswathy Amma (2013 (4) KLT 717),
  • Karthyayani v. Balakrishnan [2014 (2) Suppl. 67 (Ker.)],
  • Ibrahim v. Saythumuhammed (2013 (4) KLT 435) and
  • Achama Alexander v. Assistant Director, Survey and Land Records (2022 (2) KHC 131).”

The record of the survey result shall be conclusive proof that the boundaries were determined and recorded therein correctly (when survey was made).

This view is fortified by the decisions of the Kerala High Court in: 

  • Kannan v. Kannan (1964 KLT 228), 
  • The Cheriyanad Grama Panchayath v. The State of Kerala  (2019 (5) KerHC 699),
  • Venugopalan Nair v. Saraswathy Amma (2013 (4) KLT 717);
  • Karthyayani v. Balakrishnan (2014 (2) KLT Suppl. 67 (Ker.);
  • Ibrahim v. Saythumuhammed (2013 (4) KLT 435);
  • Achama Alexander v. Asst. Director, Survey and Land Records (2022 (2) KerHC 131: 2022-3 KLT 198);
  • Thomas v. Philip,2022(4) KerHC 451;
  • Elambilan Nani Amma v. Mulavana Antony, 2023-7 KHC 418

Note: The decisions above, based on Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act, 1969, lay-down the law ‘more than on presumption’ on general presumption on official act (Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, AIR 1981 SC 707; 1981-2 SCC 103).

Determine Boundaries by Survey Authorities

Kerala High Court held in Thomas v. Philip, 2022(4) KerHC 451 (K. Babu, J.) to the following effect:

  • The Survey and Boundaries Act, 1961 empowers the survey authorities to determine the boundaries of different sub-divisions.
  • The Survey and Boundaries Act, 1961 empowers the survey authorities to determine the boundaries of different sub-divisions.
  • It is predominantly based on possession.
  • As per the Act, the survey officer has the power to determine and record any boundary as undisputed in respect of which no dispute is brought to his notice.
  • Where a boundary is disputed, the survey officer shall, after making such inquiries as he considers necessary, determine the boundary and record it in accordance with his decision with reasons in writing for arriving at that decision.

Presumption as to maps or plans made by authority of Government

Section 82 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, provides as under:

  • “82. Presumption as to maps or plans made by authority of Government: The Court shall presume that maps or plans purporting to be made by the authority of the Central Government or any State Government were so made, and are accurate; but maps or plans made for the purposes of any cause must be proved to be accurate.”

In title declaration Suits, Survey Plan & Revenue Records are Less significant.

In Laxkshmi B. v. Suku, 2024-1 KerHC 380, it is observed as under:  

  • “When a suit for recovery of possession has been filed on the strength of title or in a suit for title declaration, title would prevail over revenue records and resurvey numbers. To put it differently, tax receipts, survey plan, resurvey plan or revenue records do not confer title to anybody, when there is title deed in relation to the said property in favour of the title holder. Therefore, in suits involving title dispute, title would prevail over revenue records, if it is found on measurement that the property covered by the title deed is identified properly justifying the declaration of title and recovery of possession on the strength of title. The said reliefs never be denied merely on the ground that in the revenue records/resurvey records, the said portion of the property is not shown as the property of the plaintiffs.

Read also:

Survey Authorities Not to decide title

  • It is not for the survey authorities to decide the question of the title (based on resurvey records).
  • The decision of the survey authorities shall not affect the right and title of the properties acquired by a party as per a valid title deed.

Properties Identified on Title Deeds

  • The properties of the parties are to be identified based on the title deeds.
  • The changes in the extent of the property in the resurvey would not confer title.

Title and Possession decided by Civil Court

The title and possession are matters to be decided by a Civil Court.

Merely because a portion of the plaintiff’s property is shown in the resurvey records as with defendant’s survey number, it cannot lead to an inference that possession was with the defendant.

In Sundaresan Nair v. Mallan Nadar, the Kerala High Court (2012 – K. Vinod Chandran, J.) held as under:

  • “The questions of law regarding conclusiveness of the re-survey conducted under the Survey Act is held against the appellants and in favour of the 1st respondent/plaintiff. Necessarily, the resurvey conducted under Section 13 has to yield to the adjudication by the competent Civil Court with respect to the identity based on title.”

Power of Survey Officer to determine disputed boundary

In Cheriyanad Grama Panchayat v. State of Kerala, 2019 (4) KLT 916, it is laid down as under:

  • Section 10 of the Act authorizes the survey officer to re-define the boundary lines of a particular survey already settled by old survey records.
  • Section 6 and 7 of the Act do not empower survey officer to re-define any boundary line of a particular survey which was already settled and finalised in an earlier survey (except for the purpose of Section 5 of the Act which deals with the situation wherein certain area was taken away by sea erosion or action of river.)
  • Section 4 of the Act also permits a survey of the land, but its purpose should be understood in relation to the necessity to have a re-survey, certainly, not for altering the earlier survey recordsbut for recording the further divisions of property out of a large extent within a particular survey.

Sec. 10 of the Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act

Sec. 10 of the Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act reads as inder:

  • “10. Power of Survey Officer to determine and record a disputed boundary with reasons– (1) Where a boundary is disputed, the Survey Officer shall, after making such inquiries as he considers necessary, determine the boundary and record it in accordance with his decision with reasons in writing for arriving at that decision.
  • (2) Notice of every decision of the Survey Officer under sub-section (1) shall be given in the prescribed manner to the parties to the dispute and other registered holders of the lands, the boundaries of which may be affected by the decision.

In Achama Alexander v. Assistant Director, Survey and Land Records (K. Babu, J.), 2022-2 KHC 131; 2022-3 KLT 198, it is observed as under:

  • “24. A reading of Sec. 10 of the Act makes it candidly clear that the survey authority is only empowered to determine the disputes regarding the fixation of boundary between owners of land comprised in a particular survey division. The act of determination envisaged in Sec. 10 of the Act essentially draws a dividing line based on ownership within a particular survey or, in other words, Sec. 10 of the Act does not authorise the Survey Authority to redefine the boundary line of a particular survey already settled by old survey records. Section 10 of the Act does not empower the survey authority to change the ownership of a particular sub-division and make it part of another survey sub-division.”

Revenue record do Not confer Presumptive Value on Title

The argument as to ownership based upon entries in the revenue records had been negated in Prahlad Pradhan  v. Sonu Kumhar,(2019) 10 SCC 259. It was held that the revenue record would not confer title to the property nor do they have any presumptive value on the title.

  • “5. The contention raised by the appellants is that since Mangal Kumhar was the recorded tenant in the suit property as per the Survey Settlement of 1964, the suit property was his self-acquired property. The said contention is legally misconceived since entries in the revenue records do not confer title to a property, nor do they have any presumptive value on the title. They only enable the person in whose favour mutation is recorded, to pay the land revenue in respect of the land in question. As a consequence, merely because Mangal Kumhar’s name was recorded in the Survey Settlement of 1964 as a recorded tenant in the suit property, it would not make him the sole and exclusive owner of the suit property.” (Quoted in Prabhagiya Van Adhikari Awadh Van Prabhag v. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj (SC): 2021). See also: Narasamma & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2009) 5 SCC 591).

It is also held:

  • “Revenue records are not documents of title”. (P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2024-1 CTC 547; 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278).

PART II

PRESUMPTION under Sec. 114, Evid. Act read with Sec. 35.

Sec. 35 Evd. Act speaks on ‘an entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record’. Sec. 35 Evd. Act speaks as to presumption.

Besides direct evidence, or admission, the contents of a document can also be proved by circumstantial evidence or by invoking presumption. ‘Common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’ etc. under S. 114, can be used to prove the existence and genuineness/truth of a document.

Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • “35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty: An entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.

Illustration (e) of Sec. 114, Evd. Act, demonstrates that presumption as to ‘regularity’ can be invoked on Judicial and official acts, in proper cases, over and above ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’ etc. that are brought-forth under the body of S. 114.  ‘Regularity’ in Illustration (e) is not exactly the presumption as to ‘correctness or truth’. For such presumption, we have to resort the main section, Sec. 114 – that is, ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’, etc..

Presumption of Correctness on Entries in the Revenue Record

In Vishwa Vijay Bharathi v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642, it is held as under:

  • “It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry in to their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry is the revenue record states but the entry is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title.”

In Karewwa v. Hussensab Khansab Khansaheb Wajantri, AIR 2002 SC 504 : (2002) 10 SCC 315 , it is held as under:

  • “We do not dispute the legal position as stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, but the presumption of correctness of an entry in revenue record cannot be rebutted by a statement in the written statement. Mere statement of fact in the written statement is not a rebuttal of presumption of correctness of an entry in the revenue record. The respondent was recorded as a tenant in the revenue record in the year 1973 and under law the presumption is that the entry is correct. It was for the appellant to rebut the presumption by leading evidence. The appellant has not led any evidence to show that entry in the revenue record is incorrect. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention.”

Referring relevant provisions of Himachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Sec. 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is held by our Apex Court in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: AIR 2020 SC 1382, that Record-of-rights (Revenue document) carries the ‘presumption of correctness‘.

In Inder Singh v. S. Raghbir Singh, AIR 1978 P&H 98, it is observed as under:

  • “The principle is that an official record, kept by a person, upon whom there is a public duty to make entries in it only after satisfying himself of the truth of those entries, is presumed to be correct. Such a document itself is evidence of the truth of its contents unless and until its falsity can be demonstrated by any of the various methods by which the evidentiary value of any public book, register or document may be attacked.”

In Shiv Ram v. Shiv Charan Singh, AIR 1964 Raj 126, it is observed as under

  • “Where Sec. 35  properly comes into play, an entry made by a public servant in any public or official book in the discharge of his official duty becomes relevant by itself, and no other proof of such entry is required as a matter of law by our Evidence Act, but this, does not exclude the possibility that such an entry may become admissible otherwise if it is properly proved to have been made by a person ordinarily competent to make it.” (Quoted in Mayadhar Nayak vs Sub-Divisional Officer, Jajpur, AIR 1982 Ori 221).

In Durairaju v. Neela, 1976 CriLJ 1507, Ratnavel Pandian, J., it was held that it was the duty of the court, before making the order for maintenance, to find though in a summary manner, the paternity of the child. It was held that Ex. P. 1, the intimation received by the Municipality from the Government Hospital, and Ex. P. 2 a copy of the birth extract made on the basis of Ex, P. 1, were not sufficient to raise presumption of paternity for, the medical officer who made the entries in Ex. P. 1 had not been examined. The author of the information is not mentioned in Ex. P. 1. PW 2 herself had not stated that she mentioned to the doctor that the child was born to her through the petitioner. In the absence of such evidence, the document could not by itself prove the relevant entries made thereon. It was also observed that to prove a document under Section 35 it must be shown that the document was prepared by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law.

Record of rights and the record of Permanent Settlement

Our Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, as under:

  • “This brief review of evidence is sufficient to show that appellant has not been able by clear and conclusive evidence to rebut the presumption arising from the Record of rights and the record of Permanent Settlement and he has failed to establish his claim”.

In Vallikunnil Janaki Amma v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode, 2014 (1) KHC 57, Kerala High Court Court referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, held as under:  

  • “Even though Ext. A2 is only an extract of the Settlement Register/ Adangal extract which may not by itself prove or confer title to a party in whose name the property stood registered, it can be accepted as evidence of title when there is no contra evidence. Admittedly it is adjacent to Amruthamangalam temple. The temple compound and this suit property which is adjacent to the temple are shown to be of Amruthamangalam Devaswom as per revenue record. In these circumstances, the contention that this property did not and does not belong to the temple/Devaswom cannot be sustained at all.” (Referred to in: Kunhimangalam Devaswam v. State of Kerala, 6 April, 2022, Anil K. Narendran, J.)

Revenue Settlement Registers of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters

The Kerala High Court held in Mohandas v. Santhakumari Amma, 2018-3 KLT 606 as under:

  • “We notice that, a new survey and settlement was undertaken in the erstwhile Travancore State for the purpose of putting in place a sound Revenue administration. Accordingly, it appears that a complete survey and reassessment of the entire State ’embracing an accurate measurement, demarcation, mapping and valuation of properties of every description and a registration of titles, as the basis of a sound Revenue Administration’ was carried out. On the basis of such a statement a proclamation was issued by the Maharaja of Travancore on 14 th Kumbhom 1061 corresponding to 24th February 1886.”

If Settlement Register says Government Land, Petitioner to Establish Title

In Sahana Industries v. State of Kerala (2021 KHC OnLine 7110), Kerala High Court (Devan Ramachandran, J.) held (October 11, 2021) as under:

  • “… If the Settlement Register shows this land to be Government land, then certainly, the petitioner is obliged to establish their title over the property through competent documents”.

Petitioner to Prove claim (Lease); cannot rely Inconsistencies of Respondents

In OT Alexander v. State of Kerala, LAWS (KER) 2021-5. 23, High Court of Kerala (N. Nagaresh, J.) did not accept the argument of the petitioner in the Writ Petition, against the Government Order for resumption of the land, for the absence of materials to establish the lease of 1933 claimed by the Petitioner.  The prime contention of the petitioner was that the land was originally granted to the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner, under Ground Rent Patta by erstwhile Collector of South Malabar District during the British regime in 1933; and that Land assigned under Ground Rent Patta could not be resumed by the Government.

The petitioner claimed that the transferees of the original leasee sold their right to a bank. The Bank (State Bank of Travancore) sold the property to a Company in 1995. The petitioner purchased the property from the Company as per the Sale Deed of the year 2004. The petitioner has been paying property tax to the Cochin Corporation. The action for resumption of land by the District Collector was on the ground that the sale deed between SBT and the Company was illegal. Pointing out that the petitioner cannot base his claim on inconsistencies of the respondents, the High Court did not accept the arguments against the resumption of land by the Collector.

It is Settled – Revenue Records will not confer title

  • Sawarni v. Inder Kaur, (1996) 6 SCC 223
  • Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137
  • Suman Verma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58; 
  • Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, AIR 2008 SC 901
  • State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319
  • Faqruddin v. Tajuddin, (2008) 8 SCC 12;
  • Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368; 
  • Narasamma v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 5 SCC 591
  • Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689; 
  • T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342;
  • Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; 
  • Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259;
  • Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70.
  • Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import and Export Co. (2019) 3 SCC 191
  • Jitendra Singh v.  The State of Madhya Pradesh (2021 SCC OnLine SC 802) [M.R. Shah,  Aniruddha Bose, JJ.]
  • P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2024-1 CTC 547; 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278
  • Laxkshmi B. v. Suku, 2024-1 KerHC 380

Revenue Records Prove Possession

  • Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, AIR 2008 SC 901 (Revenue record merely raises a presumption in regard to possession)
  • State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 (Revenue records merely show possession of a person)
  • Krishnamurthy S.  Setlur v.  O.V.  Narasimha Setty, 2019-9 SCC 488 (Revenue records prove possession)

Revenue Records are Not Documents of Title.

P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K Patkar (2023 SCC Online SC 1483; 2024-1 CTC 547; 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278) is a latest decision (Dipankar Datta, Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.) in this matter which held as under:

  • 12. 11. It is trite law that revenue records are not documents of title.
  • 13. This Court in Sawarni v. Inder Kaur(1996) 6 SCC 223 held that mutation in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title, nor does it have any presumptive value on title. All it does is entitle the person in whose favour mutation is done to pay the land revenue in question.
  • 14. This was further affirmed in Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (Dead) by LRs(1997) 7 SCC 137 wherein this Court held that mere mutation of records would not divest the owners of a land of their right, title and interest in the land.
  • 15. In Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh2021 SCC OnLine SC 802, this Court after considering a catena of judgments, reiterated the principle of law as follows:
    • “6. …… mutation entry does not confer any right, title or interest in favour of the person and the mutation entry in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose.”
  • 16. We may also profitably refer to the decision of this Court in Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil (Dead) by LRs.(1977) 2 SCC 49 wherein it was held that there exists no universal principle that whatever will appear in the record of rights will be presumed to be correct, when there exists evidence to the contrary.
  • 17. In the present case, the Commissioner’s order (Special Deputy Commissioner of Inams) distinctly denying the rights of occupancy to the plaintiff’s vendor is evidence that renders these revenue entries unworthy of acceptance.
  • 18. An examination of the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff, also tilts the balance against him. The deed simply states that the plaintiff’s vendor traces her title not to a grant in her favour by the government, but through a sale deed executed in her favour. Further, there is a categorical recital in the deed that the property is neither Inam land nor tenanted land, and that there is no legal impediment to the sale of such property. Some element of mischief being present is clear inasmuch as a relevant fact was concealed, i.e., the plaintiff’s vendor had indeed applied for occupancy rights under the Act but had failed to secure them. Such an application would never have been necessary, had the property not been Inam or tenanted land, thus laying bare the deficiency in the plaintiff’s title. The High Court, while observing that there existed a lawfully registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, failed to identify this inherent defect in the title claimed by the plaintiff.”

It is a settled proposition of law (i) that the mutation entry in revenue documents will not confer any right, title or interest in favour of any person and (ii) that the mutation in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose. After pointing out these legal propositions it is observed in Jitendra Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802as under:

  • “6. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the case of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 137 , this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is observed and held that mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive value on title. Such entries are relevant only for the purpose of collecting land revenue. Similar view has been expressed in the series of decisions thereafter.
  • 6.1 In the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186 , it is observed and held by this Court that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose”, i.e., payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. It is further observed that so far as the title of the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court. Similar view has been expressed in the cases of Suman Verma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58; Faqruddin v. Tajuddin (2008) 8 SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368; Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689; T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342; Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259; and Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70.”

Revenue Documents do not Confer ‘Title’It Raises Presumption on Possession

Our Apex Court, in Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, AIR 2008 SC 901 (SB Sinha. J.), has held that a revenue record is not a document of title; and that it merely raises a presumption in regard to possession.

In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund (supra) , held as under:

  • “A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession.” (Quoted in: State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319).

It is pointed out in this case that in proper cases (for revenue record is not a document of title) declaration is required .

It is also laid down in this decision as under:

  • “Presumption of possession and/ or continuity thereof both forward and backward can also be raised under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Courts below, were, therefore, required to appreciate the evidence keeping in view the correct legal principles in mind.” (Quoted in: State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319).

It is observed by the Apex Court, in State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 (following Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, AIR 2008 SC 901),

  • “13. …. Even, a revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession.” (Quoted in M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1).
  • “16. The courts below erred in holding, that revenue records confer title, for the reason that they merely show possession of a person.”

Revenue record Proves Possession; Presumption of truth Attached

It is held in Krishnamurthy S.  Setlur v.  O.V.  Narasimha Setty, 2019-9 SCC 488, that revenue record proves possession. it is said as under:

  • “14. In our considered view, the High Court has not given any cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion that KS was not in possession of the property. His name figured in the revenue record from 1963 to 1981 as the owner in possession. Presumption of truth is attached to revenue record which has not been rebutted.”

Record of rights and the record of Permanent Settlement

Our Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, as under:

  • “This brief review of evidence is sufficient to show that appellant has not been able by clear and conclusive evidence to rebut the presumption arising from the Record of rights and the record of Permanent Settlement and he has failed to establish his claim”.

In Vallikunnil Janaki Amma v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode, 2014 (1) KHC 57, Kerala High Court Court referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, held as under:  

  • “Even though Ext. A2 is only an extract of the Settlement Register/ Adangal extract which may not by itself prove or confer title to a party in whose name the property stood registered, it can be accepted as evidence of title when there is no contra evidence. Admittedly it is adjacent to Amruthamangalam temple. The temple compound and this suit property which is adjacent to the temple are shown to be of Amruthamangalam Devaswom as per revenue record. In these circumstances, the contention that this property did not and does not belong to the temple/Devaswom cannot be sustained at all.” (Referred to in: Kunhimangalam Devaswam v. State of Kerala, 6 April, 2022, Anil K. Narendran, J.)

Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet

In P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2024-1 CTC 547; 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278), after pointing out that the revenue records are not documents of title, it is held as under:

  • “18. It is settled law that a vendor cannot transfer a title to the vendee better than he himself possesses, the principle arising from the maxim nemo dat quod non habet, i.e., “no one can confer a better title than what he himself has”. In the present case, the plaintiff’s vendor having been denied the right of title in the land by the Commissioner’s order, could not have conveyed the same to her vendee.”
  • “22. Contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff that through the record of rights the plaintiff has established his title by a preponderance of probabilities is not sustainable. As noted above, the plaintiff failed to produce a single document of title in respect of the suit property. In a dispute with respect to determination of title, merely pointing out the lacunae in the defendant’s title would not suffice. Having instituted the suit for declaration, the burden of proof rested on the shoulders of the plaintiff to reasonably establish the probability of better title, which the plaintiff in the present case, has manifestly failed to do.”

Mutation’ Only for Fiscal Purposes; Legal Rights are subject to civil court decision

Following propositions can be culled out from the very rules of The Transfer of Registry Rules made applicable in the State of Kerala (Rule 15 and 16):

  1. It is the duty of the Tahsildar to determine the person in whose name the transfer of registry shall be made.
  2. It is the immediate concern of the Land Revenue Department to keep the thandaper accounts (Chitta) up to date.
  3. It is the immediate concern of the Land Revenue Department bring into the thandaper accounts (Chitta) the names of the real land-holders who shall be held liable for the payment of Government revenue due on the land.
  4. No case shall be rejected solely for the default of appearance of the parties.
  5. Only a summary enquiry is to be made by the Revenue authorities.
  6. The summary enquiry and the decision thereon is only an arrangement for fiscal purposes.
  7. The summary enquiry and the decision thereon do not affect the legal rights of any person in respect of the lands covered by the decisions in transfer of registry cases.
  8. The question of legal rights is always subject to adjudication by civil courts.
  9. And, pattas will be revised from time to time in accordance with judicial decisions.

In Sawarni vs. Inder Kaur and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 223, it was held that mutation in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title, nor does it have any presumptive value on title. (Referred to in: P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023 4 CurCC(SC) 278)

In Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137 it was held that mere mutation of records would not divest the owners of a land of their right, title and interest in the land. (Referred to in: P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023 4 CurCC(SC) 278)

In Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802, it was held as under:

  • “6. … mutation entry does not confer any right, title or interest in favour of the person and the mutation entry in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose.” (Quoted in: P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023 4 CurCC(SC) 278)

In Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil, (1977) 2 SCC 49, it was held that there exists no universal principle that whatever will appear in the record of rights will be presumed to be correct, when there exists evidence to the contrary. (Referred to in: P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023 4 CurCC(SC) 278)

Patta is not a document of title. It can be Mortgaged as Title-Deed u/s. 58, TP Act

In Angu Pillai v. M.S.M. Kasiviswanathan Chettiar, AIR 1974 Mad 16, it was noticed as under:

  • “15.In Indian law, deposit of patta has been held to constitute a valid equitable mortgage, though patta is not in itself a deed of titlebut is only an evidence of title. This Court has consistently taken the view that the main object of tender of patta is merely to give information of the land revenue payable and the details of the property and that the exact weight to be given to the patta would depend upon the circumstances of the case. In Dohganna v. Jammanna, AIR 1931 Mad 613 it is pointed out that in case of pattas in respect of a land in Zamindari, if the land be at the disposal of the landlord at the time of granting the patta, prima facie such patta would not be mere bill of rent but something more and that if it is not so it would not create any rights in the pattadar in derogation of the rights of a person who would be entitled to the land subject to the proper and regular payment of rent. The question directly arose before a Bench of this Court in Official Assignee v. Basudevadoss, AIR 1925 Mad 723, as to whether a deposit of patta is enough to constitute an equitable mortgage. The Bench answered the question in the affirmative. Srinivasa Aiyangar, J. who delivered the leading judgment in that case, has pointed out that the answer to the question as to whether the pattas in respect of a land is a document which would be sufficient, by being deposited, to evidence the intention required for an equitable mortgage would vary according to the conditions of the country and the consciousness on the part of the members of the community and that though a patta is not a document of title still a deposit of the same with intent to create an equitable mortgage would create an equitable mortgage.” (Quoted with approval in: Syndicate Bank v. Estate Officer,  AIR 2007 AIR SC 3169; 2007-8 SCC 361)

Not to Set Aside Patta; for, Patta was Prepared not after hearing

In Godavarma Valia Raja v. Bhoothi Swamiyar,  AIR 1952 TC/Ker 408, ir is observed as under:

  • Therefore, so far as the assessment is concerned it was not at all necessary to set aside the order of the Settlement Officer. It is only in case the Devaswom impeaches the order in so far as it refused to issue patta in favour of the Devaswom for some of the properties claimed by it that the Devaswom would be bound to set aside the order. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the plaintiff was bound to set aside the decision of the settlement Officer mentioned in the notice, Ex. VIII. The further question for consideration is whether the plaintiff was bound to set aside the patta, Ex. G. There is nothing to show that the patta was prepared after hearing the plaintiff or after giving him an opportunity to show cause why the assessment should not be fixed in the manner in which it was fixed in Ex. G. The preparation of the patta appears to have been a mere executive order of the Settlement Officer. It was not an order passed between two parties. Again, even if the declaration asked for in the plaint is allowed it will not have the effect of setting aside the patta. It will only have the effect of correcting the patta with respect to the assessment.”

Transfer of Registry Rules, 1966

Rule 15 and 16 of the Transfer of Registry Rules, 1966, of the Kerala State read as under:

  • Rule 15 : “With the help of the details furnished in the statement in Form ‘A’ prepared by the Village Officers and such further information as the Tahsildar may receive from parties and village officials at the time of enquiry regarding the fact of possession and enjoyment, payment of tax and other particulars, the Tahsildar shall determine the person in whose name the transfer of registry shall be made. No case shall be rejected solely for the default of appearance of the parties as it is the immediate concern of the Land Revenue Department to keep the thandaper accounts (Chitta) upto date and bring into it the names of the real land-holders who shall be held liable for the payment of Government revenue due on the land.”
  • Rule 16 : “The summary enquiry and the decision thereon is only an arrangement for fiscal purposes and does not affect the legal rights of any person in respect of the lands covered by the decisions in transfer of registry cases. The question of legal rights is always subject to adjudication by civil courts and pattas will be revised from time to time in accordance with judicial decisions.”

The Kerala High Court held in Thulasibhai CC v. State of Kerala, 2010 (4) KLT 215, that the revenue recovery proceedings would not stand as a bar either in the Revenue Recovery Act or in the Transfer of Registry Rules to effect mutation. In Sudan K.K.   v. State of Kerala, 2013 (4) KLT 563, it was held that the pendency of a civil suit also can never be a bar with regard to the acceptance of land tax unless specifically restrained by any order passed by the Court.

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What is GRANT in Easement

Jojy George Koduvath.

“Basis of Every Right of Easement is Grant”

The Indian Easements Act, 1882 refers to the different methods by which easements are acquired. They are pointed out (Ramkanya Bai v. Jagdish, AIR 2011 SC 3258) to be the following:

  1. easements by grant: express grant by the owner of the servient heritage
  2. easements of necessity: based on implied grants or reservations made by the owner of a servient heritage at the time of transfers or partitions
  3. easements by prescription: it is presumed that it is acquired by peaceable and open enjoyment, without interruption for twenty years and
  4. customary easements: it is inferred that it is acquired by virtue of a local custom.

For easement by prescription, it is not necessary that the user should be exclusive, but the claimant should exercise it under some claim existing in his own favour independently of all others.

The origin of all easements is, theoretically, grant by the servient owner. It may be express or implied. It may also be presumed from long user. It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

  • “Theoretically all easements have their origin in some sort of grant by the servient owner. The grant may be express or it may be implied from the surrounding attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties or it may even be presumed from long user. In the case of an express grant of easement the limit thereof depends on the words used.”

In Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89, it is held as under:

  • “The basis of every right of easement by whatsoever method it may have been acquired, is theoretically a grant from the servient-owner.
    • It may be expressed, as is mentioned in Sections 8 to 12 of the Act, or
    • it may be implied from the circumstances as in Section 13 of the Act. or
    • it may be presumed from long and continued user for a certain period as in Section 15 of the Act, or
    • it may be inferred from a long and continued practice of user by a certain class of the public in certain locality.” 

Easement is a Right

Easement is a right possessed by the owner of a land (dominant land),

  • to use the land of another (servient land),
  • for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant land.

Easement Does Not Confer Ownership or Possession

By virtue of easement –

  • No Ownership is bestowed in the (servient) land (AIR 2004 All 359; AIR 1925 Bom 335).
  • No Possession is obtained in the (servient) land. (2011 (2) KLT 605; AIR 1925 Bom 335).  
  • No Substantive Interest is created in the (servient) land. (2003 (1) KLT 320; AIR 1954 All 393).

Easement (सुखाधिकार) is Well Recognised, And Circumscribed by Law

  • Easement is a limited right to ‘use’or ‘enjoy‘ another’s land.
  • It is to do, or to prevent to do, some specific thing.
  • It is to be exercised in a way least onerous to ‘another’s land’.
  • It is not a right to build and enjoy.
  • The right gained cannot be enlarged.
    • That is, an easement of way to a particular (dominant) property cannot be extended to another property by the dominant owner; an easement for residential purpose cannot be enlarged for an industrial purpose. (Sec. 28, 29, 43 etc.)
  • Servient owner can use his land in any manner (without disturbing enjoyment of the easement).

According to ‘Katiyar on Easements’:                                                                   

  • Easement is not a right to land or exclude owner.
  • It is not a right to permanent occupation. 
  • It does not confer exclusive right of user/enjoyment.
  • And, it is not a corporeal interest in land.

Easement – Definition under the Indian Easements Act

SECTION 4 of the Indian Easements Act defines Easements as under:

  • “An easement is a right
  • which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses,
    • as such,
  • for the beneficial enjoyment of that land 
  • to do and continue to do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done,
  • in or upon, or in respect of, certain other land not his own.”

Salient Limitations of Easement under the Indian Easements Act

  • The owner of a land only ‘uses’or ‘enjoys‘ land of another (Sec. 31)
  • It is only ‘enjoyment’ of soil or things ‘subsisting’ (Explanation in Sec. 4).
  • It allows limited enjoyment of land, and advantages from its situation: S. 7
  • Right be exercised in a way least onerous to ‘another’s land’: Sec. 22
  • Servient owner can secure full enjoyment; but, he should cause as little inconvenience: Sec. 24: 2017-2 KLT 63

It is Not a right to:                                            

  • tend to total destruction of servient tenement: S. 17 (2003 (1) KLT320)
  • make additional burden: S. 23
  • make constructions in, or cultivate upon: (2003 (1) KLT 320).
  • prevent servient owner to use: S. 27 : 2003 (1) KLT 320
  • enlarge purpose of, or accustomed user: S. 28
  • substantially increase an easement: S. 29
  • prevent servient owner from obstructing excessive  ‘user’ of servient land – as ‘enjoyment of easement’: S. 31
  • increase burden by making permanent change in do. tent: S. 43
  • capable of forming grant – No easement, if Not capable of forming grant (without document or registration): Mohammed vs. Doomunhi Achari, 1987 (2) KLT 1037.

No easement if:

  • right claimed is incidents of ownership.
  • servient property belongs to him. Easement is a right with conscious knowledge that the servient property does not belong to him. AIR 1966 Raj 265. It must also be with proper animus as to easement: AIR 1973 Mad 173.

Easement is acquired; Not arise out of ‘Express Permission’

Sec. 12, Easements Act states that an easement is acquired (under grant, partition or prescription) by the owner of an immovable property. Section 12, Indian Easements Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 12. Who may acquire easements-An easement may be acquired by the owner of the immovable property for the beneficial enjoyment of which the right is created, or on his behalf, by any person in possession of the same.
  • One of two or more co-owners of immovable property may, as such, with or without the consent of the other or others, acquire an easement for the beneficial enjoyment of such property.
  • No lessee of immovable property can acquire, for the beneficial enjoyment of other immovable property of his own, an easement in or over the property comprised in his lease.

It is observed by the Apex Court in Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal, AIR 2009 SC 1103, that the claimant of easement (prescription) should plead and prove that the right claimed was enjoyed independent of any agreement with the owner of the property over which the right is claimed, as any user with the express permission of the owner will be a licence and not an easement. 

It is seen that the easement of grant is not acquired. Because, as observed in Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, easement of grant is a matter of contract. It reads as under: “But easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties.”

In Mathai v. Jordi Poulose, ILR 2011-2 Ker 484; 2011-2 KHC 591; 2011-2 KLT 605, it is pointed out: “An easement can be acquired by an express grant or even by implied grant.

Sec. 28 of the Easement Act reads as under:

  • 28 Extent of easements -With respect to the extent of easements and the mode of their enjoyment, the following provisions shall take effect:-
  • Easement of necessity -An easement of necessity is co-extensive with the necessity as it existed when the easement was imposed.
  • Other easements -The extent of any other easement and the mode of its enjoyment must be fixed with reference to the probable intention of the parties, and the purpose for which the right was imposed or acquired. In the absence of evidence as to such intention and purpose-
    • .(a) Right of way -A right of way of any one kind does not include a right of way of any other kind;
    • (b) Right to light or air acquired by grant -The extent of a right to the passage of light or air to a certain window, door on other opening, imposed by a testamentary or non-testamentary instrument, is the quantity of light or air that entered the opening at the time the testator died or the non-testamentary instrument was made;
    • (c) Prescriptive right to light or air -The extent of a prescriptive right to the passage of light or air to a certain window, door or other opening is that quantity of light or air which has been accustomed to enter that opening during the whole of the prescriptive period irrespectively of the purposes for which it has been used;
    • (d) Prescriptive right to pollute air or water-The extent of a prescriptive right to pollute air or water is the extent of the pollution at the commencement of the period of user on completion of which the right arose; and
    • (e) Other prescriptive rights -The extent of every other prescriptive right and the mode of its enjoyment must be determined by the accustomed user of the right.

Sec. 29 of the Easement Act reads as under:

  • 29. Increase of easement -The dominant owner cannot, by merely altering or adding to the dominant heritage, substantially increase an easement. Where an easement has been granted or bequeathed so that its extent shall be proportionate to the extent of the dominant heritage, if the dominant heritage is increased by allution, the easement is proportionately increased, and if the dominant heritage is diminished by dilution, the easement is proportionately diminished. Save as aforesaid, no easement is effected by any change in the extent of the dominant or the servient heritage.

Who has the Burden to show Alternate Way

In Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, it is held that the plaintiff claiming easement of necessity or grant has only a primary burden to prove the absence of any alternate pathway.

  • “In a case where the original plaintiff was claiming easement right either as grant or as of necessity the plaintiff has only a primary burden to prove the absence of any alternate pathway. As the defendants have not proved the existence of any pathway for access to Plaint `A’ schedule property the version of the plaintiff that there is no alternate pathway shall be accepted. … The defendants have not entered the witness box to disprove the evidence led by the plaintiff.”

Implied grant and Quasi Easement in a ‘Formed’ Way

There could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent. But, in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, our Apex Court found quasi easement under Section 13(b) of the Indian Easements Act over a way in the following circumstances –

  • Though there could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent, if there is a ‘formed road’ existing over one part of the tenement for the apparent use of another portion or there is ‘some permanence in the adaptation of the tenement’ from which continuity may be inferred, an exception can be inferred (Annapurna Dutta vs. Santosh Kumar Sett, AIR 1937 Cal.661, B.K. Mukherjee, referred to).
  • There was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to dominant property and there was no objection also to the use of disputed way by the plaintiff.
  • An easement may arise by implication, if the intention to grant can properly be inferred either from the terms of the grant or the circumstances.
  • A trace of the pathway could be presumed to be in existence from the time when the plaintiff acquired the properties by separation of tenements.
  • Only access to the property was through disputed pathway.
  • It was required for the reasonable and convenient use of the plaintiff’s property and that on severance of the tenements, plaintiff can be presumed to have got a right over disputed pathway by an implied grant and also an easement of necessity.
  • The user was not obstructed for very long time.
  • There was no reason to disbelieve the plaintiff’s version that disputed way was given as grant for his use as he was a close relative of the former.
  • There was an apparent and continuous use which was necessary for the enjoyment of the `A’ schedule property within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the Indian Easements Act.
  • The defendants have not entered the witness box to disprove the evidence led by the plaintiff.
  • Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to easement right in respect of the pathway.

Pleaded ‘grant’; Not, Implied Grant – Apex Court, allowed Implied Grant

Though the plaintiff pleaded only ‘grant’, and not, Implied grant,  our Apex Court, in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, allowed Implied Grant observing as under:

  • “It is true that the defendant/appellant alleged that no implied grant was pleaded in the plaint. The Trial Court, in our view, was justified in holding that such pleadings were not necessary when it did not make a difference to the finding arrived at with respect to the easement by way of grant. Accordingly, there is no substance in the argument raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellants.”

Easement and Grant

The term ‘Grant’ is used in law to denote-

  • A generic term to mean ‘transfer’ of immovable property (e.g., sale, lease, gift etc.). In Black s Law Dictionary, the word “grant” is shown to have the meanings (i) to bestow; to confer upon someone other than the person or entity which makes the grant; (ii) to give or present as a right or privilege. (Fifth Edn., page 629: Quoted in Hajee S. V. M. Mohamed Jamaludeen Brothers And Company v. Government of T. N., AIR 1997 SC 1368; 1997-3 SCC 466))
  • But, it will not be a ‘transfer’ of property; and remain as a concession, permission, settlement, grant of easement etc., if it is used in place of ‘transfer’, purposefully, to denote a lesser right.
  • Present, aid, help etc., and the act of a settlor of trust, or of donor of a charity.
  • A technical term to denote conditional-transfer of lands by sovereign especially when it is purposefully used to differentiate from ‘transfer’ of property.
  • More than a licence (which does not create an estate or interest) and less than an outright and unconditional ‘transfer’ of property.

Characteristics of ‘grant

  • Usually it denotes a grant by deed.
  • It can be with or without consideration.
  • Unless specifically specified, it is creation of an ‘interest’ in property (in case of easement, no interest is created; but only a right of enjoyment: Ananthakini Padmanabha Kini v. Kamalavathy Animal, 1990 AIR Ker 136.)
  • As long as the conditions are fulfilled, grant is usually irrevocable.
  • Conditions can also be fixed to limit the period of grant.
  • Inferior interest, out of an interest retained by the grant or, e.g. the grant of a lease of land by the person holding the freehold. (Collins Dictionary of Law).

Read Blog: Extent of Easement (Width of Way) in Easement of Necessity, Quasi Easement and Implied Grant

Grant’ is an Agreement – Salmond on Jurisprudence

What is grant is stated in Salmond’s Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, at pages 338-339, under the heading ‘The Classes of Agreements’. According to Salmond  a grant

  • ” is an agreement“,
  • “creates a right
  • is NOT “a right in Personam between the parties to it”,
  • examples – “grants of leases, easements, charges, patents, franchises, licences and so forth“.

Salmond distinguishes ‘grant’ from other legal concepts as under.

  • “…. A contract is an agreement which creates an obligation or a right in personam between the parties to it.
  • grant is an agreement which creates a right of any other description; examples being grants of leases, easements, charges, patents, franchises, licences and so forth.
  • An agreement which transfers a right may be termed generically an assignmentOn which extinguishes a right is a release, discharge, or surrender.” (Quoted in H. Anraj v. Government of Tamil Nadu  (& Shri Dipak Dhar v. The State of West Bengal), AIR 1986 SC 63: (1986) 1 SCC 414.)

Agreement to Grant (a way) and Grant in Presenti

In Venkatachalapathi Aiyar v. China Muna Chakrapani Aiyar, 1922-15 LW 279; 1922-42 MLJ 258, it is held that it is a fundamental thing that for a valid dedication it should be a completed dedication; and “a mere intention to dedicate in future is insufficient as it has no legal effect”.

It is definite that the same principle applies to ‘grant’ (of way) also. (Section 4, Easements Act defines an easement as a right possessed by the dominant owner.) Grant, being a matter of agreement, a contract for a future grant can be enforced in a court by a suit for specific performance, but it cannot be enforced as an easement.

Nallin Ghosh v. Ananta Pada Modak, 1964-69 CalWN 503, said – “Permission, apart from grant, on the contrary, usually negatives the case of easement”, it is definite that the grant must be a permanent one (as stated in this decision itself).

But, it must be noted that a present grant with future enjoyment is valid; it need not be presently exercisable, but it must presently exist. A mere intention to grant a right of way in future does not create a legal easement.

Grant of Right of Way must be Liberally Construed

Katiyar on Easements repeatedly said in his treatise that a ‘grant of right of way must be liberally construed’ to ensure the dominant owner’s beneficial enjoyment of his land. Gale on Easements (leading English treatise) and “Law of Easements and Licenses” by P.S. Narayana also emphasised this principle.

In Mathai v. Jordi Poulose,  ILR 2011-2 Ker 484; 2011-2 KHC 591; 2011-2 KLT 605, it was found that the suit agreement, made it clear that the right given thereunder was not a personal right but a right for the beneficial enjoyment for the property, and it could only be a right of easement and not a licence. The High Court  referring Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242, said further as under:

  • “18. True, the plaint did not specifically show that appellant has claimed a right of easement by grant. But as rightly argued by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, a pleading must be liberally construed and placing undue emphasis on the form is not in the interest of justice. The Honourable Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College (AIR 1987 SC 1242) held:
  • “It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law, in such a case it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.”

Taken from: What is Easement? Does Right of Easement Allow to ‘Enjoy’ After Making a Construction?

Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545

The Supreme Court has observed, in Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 as under:

  • “25. In the case at hand the High Court found that the approach of the trial court and the first appellate court was erroneous inasmuch as they proceeded on the basis as if it is a case of easement of necessity. Had the trial court and the first appellate court considered the evidence in the light of the respective stands of the parties and then concluded one way or the other, the position would have been different. When the approach was fundamentally wrong the High Court cannot be faulted for having gone into the question as to what was the proved intention of the party as culled out from the partition deed. The relevant (translated) portion reads as follows:
  • “Aravamutha Chettiar commonly enjoy the well situate on the portion allotted to Purushothaman Chettiar, likewise Purushothaman Chettiar commonly enjoy the lane situate on the portion allotted to Aravamutha Chettiar. Well is the exclusive property of Purushothaman Chettiar and lane is the exclusive property of Aravamutha Chettiar.”
  • 26. Though an attempt was made by learned counsel for the appellant to contend that the quoted portion was only the preamble and not the intention of the parties, the same is clearly untenable. Earlier to the quoted portion it has been noted as follows:
  • “As per the above arrangement we decided to enter into the partition deed and hence we are writing this partition deed. We should take possession of our respective shares and enjoy the same uninterruptedly forever.”
  • 27. Therefore, there is no manner of doubt that the intention was clear that it was a grant and not an easement of necessity which could be extinguished.
  • 28. The question whether an easement is one acquired by grant (as contrasted from an easement of necessity) does not depend upon absolute necessity of it. It is the nature of the acquisition that is relevant. Many easements acquired by grant may be absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant tenement in the sense that it cannot be enjoyed at all without it. That may be the reason for the grant also. But easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties. In the matter of grant the parties are governed by the terms of the grant and not by anything else. Easement of necessity and quasieasement are dealt with in Section 13 of the Act. The grant may be express or even by necessary implication. In either case it will not amount to an easement of necessity under Section 13 of the Act even though it may also be an absolute necessity for the person in whose favour the grant is made. Limit of the easement acquired by grant is controlled only by the terms of the contract. If the terms of the grant restrict its user subject to any condition the parties will be governed by those conditions. Anyhow the scope of the grant could be determined by the terms of the grant between the parties alone. When there is nothing in the term of the grant in this case that it was to continue only until such time as the necessity was absolute; in fact even at the time it was granted, it was not one of necessity. If it is a permanent arrangement uncontrolled by any condition, that permanency in user must be recognised and the servient tenement will be recognised and the servient tenement will be permanently burdened with that disability. Such a right does not arise under the legal implication of Section 13 nor is it extinguished by the statutory provision under Section 41 of the Act which is applicable only to easement of necessity arising under Section 13.
  • 29. An easement by grant does not get extinguished under Section 41 of the Act which relates to an easement of necessity. An easement of necessity is one which is not merely necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the dominant tenement, but one where dominant tenement cannot be used at all without the easement. The burden of the servient owner in such a case is not on the basis of any concession or grant made by him for consideration or otherwise, but it is by way of a legal obligation enabling the dominant owner to use his land. It is limited to the barest necessity however inconvenient it is irrespective of the question whether a better access could be given by the servient owner or not. When an alternate access becomes available, the legal necessity of burdening the servient owner ceases and the easement of necessity by implication of law is legally withdrawn or extinguished as statutorily recognised in Section 41. Such an easement will last only as long as the absolute necessity exists. Such a legal extinction cannot apply to an acquisition by grant and Section 41 is not applicable in such case.”

Mathai v. Jordi Poulose

In Mathai v. Jordi Poulose, ILR 2011-2 Ker 484; 2011-2 KHC 591; 2011-2 KLT 605, it is held as under:

  • “An easement can be acquired by an express grant or even by implied grant. The express grant could be oral and need not even be written and no form is prescribed. It will be sufficient if the words stated or written convey the idea of grant of a right of easement unequivocally.”

The High court quoted the following from In B.B.Katiyar Law of Easements and Licences Thirteenth Edn. at page 12 which reads as under:

  • “an easement may be acquired by express grant. It may be oral and need not be in writing or registered.”

The High Court continued as under:

  • “12. Justice Madhavan Nair in Musunoori Satyanarayana Murti v. Chekka Lakshmayya and others  RSA 1267 & 1270 of 2005 24 (AIR 1929 Madras 79)quoting Peacock in his Tagore Lectures on the Easement Act by Mitchell that “by the law of India, wherever the Transfer of Property Act applies, the grant of easement by way of sale must be made by a registered instrument, an easement being an intangible thing, and if made by way of gift must also be by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the grant or and witnessed by at least two witnesses” held:-
  • “If I may say so with respect , very carefully and elaborately considered in Bhagwan Sahai v. Narasingh Sahai(1909 31 All.612) and I cannot do better than refer to the exposition of the law on this point contained in that judgment in answer to the appellant’s argument. In that case “the owner of a house undertook by an “argument” to permit the  owner of an adjoining house when he built a second storey which was in contemplation, to discharge rain water and also water used for daily household purposes into the premises of the former.”

Sec. 92 of the Evidence Act

But, it is noteworthy that Sec. 92 of the Evidence Act enacts that when the terms of a grant or other disposition of property are reduced into writing, whether or not such contract or grant is compulsorily required to be reduced into writing and registered, no oral evidence shall be admitted to contradict, vary, add to or substract from its terms.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Can the Ownership of (Exempted) Plantation (Above Ceiling Limit) be Changed? Can Plantation be Fragmented?

Taken from: Exempted Plantation Land – In whom Ownership Vests

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Key Takeaways

Can Plantation be fragmented?
No.
Section 81 is a special provision to prevent fragmentation of plantation and to improve the economy of the state. Change the character of the plantation could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act. (One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985)
Can Ownership of (Exempted) Plantation (Above Ceiling Limit) be Changed?
Yes; but, subject to the condition – use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted.
Exemption granted under S.81(1)(a) is for the land and would continue to operate irrespective of change of ownership of the exempted land and the transferee would have to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted (R. V.  Devassia v. Sub Registrar, Idukki, 2015-1 ILR(Ker) 1047; 2015-1 KHC 805; 2015-2 KLJ 17).

Does the Plantation Exemption confer Unconditional Rights over the ‘LAND’?

No.

Is the Vesting in Govt. “Fictional” (and it is only for transferring land to the Tenant)?

  • Yes; as regards lands within the ceiling limit.
  • No; as regards lands above ceiling limit.

It is for the following reason –

  • Exemption is only a ‘Legal Advantage conferred by Statute’. It continues (only) as long as Plantation exists.
  • Because,
    • Under Sec. 2, clause (44), Plantation means any land used by a person principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon.
    • Section 87, Explanation II states that if a plantation for which exemption is given on recognition of a specific ‘plantation-crop’ is converted into any other ‘plantation-crop’ or the plantation activity is not continued, the exemption will be lost; and the land will be taken for considering the ceiling limit.

Sec. 87 reads as under:

  • “S. 87. Excess land obtained by gift, etc. to be surrendered – (1) Where any person acquires any land dafter the date notified under Section 83 by gift, purchase, mortgage with possession, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, such excess shall be surrendered to such authority as may be prescribed.
  • Explanation 1 – Where any land is exempted by or under Section 81 and such exemption is in force on the date notified under Section 83, such land shall, with effect from the date on which it ceases to be exempted, be deemed to be land acquired after the date notified under Section 83.
  • Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted intoany other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.”
  • Note:
  • 1. The (main) section refers to lands in general (and not confined to Plantation). The Explanations refer to Plantation Lands.
  • 2. The expression “ceases to be exempted” in first Explanation denotes the following –
    • A Plantation land can be “ceases to be exempted” either ono “conversion” given in Explanation II or on legislation.
    • Therefore, if there is conversion as stated in Explanation II, it will be taken as land “exceeds the ceiling area“, and
    • “such excess” stands liable to be “surrendered” (automatically – without intervention of any authority).
  • 3. In case of conversion by a transfer/sale, the expression “persondenote the transferee. It is clear from the beginning words of this section – “Where any person acquires any land … by gift, purchase, … or any other kind of transfer …”
  • 4. The expression “shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date” in the last limb of Explanation II (also) shows the nexus between the Explanations I and II. The result is that “such excess” stands liable to be “surrendered” (automatically – without intervention of any authority)

Read Blog: Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?

Fragmentation of Plantation will be against the Provisions of the Act

Section 81 is a special provision to prevent fragmentation of plantation and to improve the economy of the state. Change the character of the plantation could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act. (One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985).

No Total Prohibition in using Exempted Land for a Different Purpose

Explanation II does not make a total bar. It only causes to lose benefit of the exemption to a certain extent. That is, if a person converts any portion of his exempted land to any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit; and the Taluk Land Board can proceed upon that (excess) land. In short, the exemption will be lost for that portion. In this premises, in Wayanad Granites v. District Collector, 2023-4 KLT 874, it is held that ‘fragmentation is per se not illegal’. similarly, in District Collector v. Sajith Lal, 2023-4 KLJ 851, it is held that ‘there is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non-exempted purposes as well’.

In Mathew K.T. v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024, in the light of earlier decisions, observed that there is no total prohibition in using an exempted land for a different purpose under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The impediment or restriction is (only) the following –

  • If a portion of the exempted land is utilised for any other purpose, that would fall within his ceiling area and the authorities may be able to initiate ceiling proceedings.

The Full Bench decision, Mathew K. Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority [AIR 2019 Ker. 67, affirmed by the Supreme Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob, 2020-14 SCC 126] held as under:

  • “We however add that any class of land earlier exempted in the ceiling case can be converted into any class of land not liable to be exempted under Explanation II to Section 87 of the Act. The consequence is that the benefit of the exemption would be lost and the extent added to the account of the assessee or the declarant in determination of his ceiling area. That is a matter to be dealt with by the Taluk Land Board with the assessee or the declarant and other interested parties on the party array and we desist from elaborating further.”

In District Collector v. Sajith Lal (2023-4 KLJ 851; 2023 KLT OnLine 1225) it is held as under:

  • “5. There is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non- exempted purposes as well. If the land is used for non-exempted purposes, the holder of the land will lose the qualification for exemption, thus giving authority to the Land Board to initiate ceiling proceedings.” (Quoted in: Mathew K.T v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024)

No Embargo to Transfer (Exempted) Plantation Land (Above Ceiling Limit)

In R. V.  Devassia v. Sub Registrar, Idukki, 2015-1 ILR(Ker) 1047; 2015-1 KHC 805; 2015-2 KLJ 17, it is held as under:

  • “9. On promulgation of the KLR Act in the State, the entire landed property in the State is subjected to State control as envisaged under the provisions of the KLR Act. No piece of the land escapes the clutches of the KLR Act including exempted land for ceiling purposes. The ceiling proceedings is a continuing proceedings and can be reopened in any of the circumstances, if so warranted, as contemplated under Section 87 of the KLR Act. Exemption granted from ceiling is the qualification to use the land in a particular manner, which means a burden is imposed on the land. The moment the qualification for exemption is vanished by conversion of the land, the protection from ceiling will also be extinguished to bring the land within the fold of the ceiling area. The exemption is in the nature of a burden on the land to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted. The eminent domain power of the State can be exercised for acquiring land without consent and also to regulate the use of land in public interest. The eminent domain is power inherent in any Sovereign State. This burden would bind the holder of the land as on 01/01/1970 and the successor-in-interest. The Division Bench of this Court in the State Human Rights Protection Centre, Thrissur and another v. State of Kerala and others [2009 (3) ILR 695] held that exemption granted under S.81(1)(a) is for the land and would continue to operate irrespective of change of ownership of the exempted land and the transferee would have to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted.”

In Everest Stone Crusher and Granites v. District Collector, Kannur, 2020-6 KHC 289, it is observed as under:

  • “16. In Devassia R.V. this Court noticed that, the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act do not place any embargo on transfer. The transfer of registry is for fiscal purposes. The power of the competent authority to reopen the ceiling proceedings to include the land exempted for the purpose of ceiling is not lost on account of effecting mutation. Therefore, the Revenue Officials cannot refuse to effect mutation of the property purchased by the transferee.”

Tenant/Owner cannot ‘Sell’ Plantation Land (above ceiling limit) as his absolute property

  • An owner, or a tenant who got ‘fixity’ over such land, cannot ‘sell’ this land as his absolute (ownership) property.

Effect of Fragmentation for Non-exempted Category

The decision in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985, arose from the Writ Petition filed for a declaration that the fragmentation and sale of a Rubber Plantation for non-plantation purposes was illegal as it defeated the purpose of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. When the matter was placed before the Taluk Land Board under Sec 87, KLR Act, it found that there was no change in classification of the land and therefore dropped the proceedings. The Court held as under:

  • “34. Section 81 of the KLR Act is in pith and substance a special provision, with its main objective of giving exemption to certain lands including the lands maintained as plantations is to prevent fragmentation of the land and to keep it as plantation itself to improve the economy of the state for welfare of people as a whole while the Act creates a regime, the State is under an obligation to safeguard, the intended purpose of the provisions of the Act in its spirit. ….. …… It could be gathered from the records that the proposal to transfer 1.03 acres of land to each workers in discharge of their service or retrenchment benefits will definitely divide the plantation into separate slots and that would definitely change the character/nature of the plantation, which could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act.”

Can a Tenant of Plantation Transfer his Rights, Fragmenting the Plantation

Possession is a heritable and transferable right. [See: Nallammal Vs. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864; Phirayalal Kapur Vs. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186].

Therefore, a tenant of plantation having rights of fixity (Sec. 13) may have the right to transfer it to another. In any case, the change of character or nature of the plantation by fragmentation being amount to ‘conversion’ that will be against the provisions of the Act, as pointed out in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985.

Sec. 120A, KLR Act is Relevant

Fragmentation of plantation land amounts to ‘conversion’. It will be against the provisions of the Act. Section 120A, KLR Act is relevant in this regard. It reads as under:

  • 120A.  Registering officer not to register in certain cases. – Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act 16 of 1908), where the District Collector or any other officer authorised by the Government in this behalf informs the registering officer in writing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any document relating to transfer of land which may be presented before him for registration is intended to defeat the provisions of this Act, such registering officer shall not register such document until the District Collector or the officer so authorised, as the case may be, informs the registering officer that the transfer is not intended to defeat the provisions of this Act. [Inserted by Act 17 of 1972.]

End Notes

Relevant provisions of KLR Act, in a Nutshell

Section Provisions in a Nutshell
Chap. II 
3(1)
Exemptions – (i) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to – (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
“Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.
7 EPersons acquired lands (before 2005 amendment in KLR Act) for consideration below 1 Hec. 61 Are 87 Sq.m. (4 acre) will be deemed to be tenants .
13Fixity: “Every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding.”
59Deposit of purchase price and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
72Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating tenants in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
72(1) says: Holdings upon which tenanat entilted fixity under sec. 13 vest in govt.
72(4) – says: Landowner entitled to resume land shall apply within the time fixed. Otherwise vest in govt.
Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 
72BCultivating-tenant “shall be entitled to assignment” of land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 –within ceiling area and get purchase certificate (through LT) (2 years from 1-1-1970). Effect of non-filing (See Balanoor Plantations case. 2018(3) KLT 283.)
72ESuch tenant is liable to pay rent to the Government.
72CProvides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit,)
72KLT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.
74Prohibition of future tenancies.
Chap. III 
81
Exemption from ceiling and excess for Govt. lands, private forests, plantations, industrial or commercial undertaking etc.
Proviso – There will be exemption (as plantation, land given to educational institution, trust etc.) on Government lands, given under grant, lease etc.
See: HMT (Machine Tools) Limited v. Taluk Land Board, 2009 (3) KLJ 110; MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28.
82Ceiling area – 5/10 standard acres.
83No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  It is a total bar. (Note:  plantations, industrial area etc. are exempted.)
Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB), Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137)
The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571.
84Certain transfers – void.
85(1)Surrender excess.
85(2)Owners and Tenants (in excess of the ceiling area) should furnish ceiling return to Land Board before March31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
Effect of non-filing: See – Balanoor Plantations case – 2018(3) KLT 283.State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009
85(3)Excess shall be surrendered.
85(5)Land Board shall determine – extend to be surrendered
85(7)Whereon a person fails to file statement under 85(2), LB shall intimate TLB  –  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered.
Effect of non-filing: See – Balanur Plantations case (With respect to Sec. 72B application) – 2018(3) KLT 283. Statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit to file statement:  State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
[TLB not to do, suo motu, without direction from LB. 1980 KLT 120, referred to in 2019(1) KLT 985.]
85AFile ceiling return within March  2, 1973 before Land Board..
86(1)On determination of the extent to be surrendered under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
86(3)Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession
86(4)Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
86(6)Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
87
Exp. II
If a person converts any portion of exempted land for any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit. That is, the exemption will be lost for the portion that exceeds the ceiling limit. (Mathew K Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Exempted Plantation Land – In whom Ownership Vests

(Does Plantation Exemption confer Unconditional Rights over the ‘LAND’?)

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Key Takeaways

Does the Plantation Exemption confer Unconditional Rights (to the Owner) over the ‘LAND’?
No.
Exemption is only a ‘Legal Advantage conferred by Statute’. It continues (only) as long as Plantation exists.

Who is the OWNER of Exempted (Private-Leasehold) Plantation Lands in Kerala?
It is the Government, though by virtue of Chapter II (Sec. 13), the tenant has ‘Fixity’ (within ceiling limit).

What is the Right of ‘tenants’ of Plantations, after vesting the land with Govt.?
It is a ‘Legal Right conferred by Statute’.

Can Plantation be fragmented?
No.
Section 81 is a special provision to prevent the fragmentation of plantations and to improve the economy of the state. Changing the character of the plantation could be termed as ‘conversion’, and that will be against the provisions of the Act. (One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985)

PART I

Contents in a Nutshell

  • 1. Ceiling Limit: The maximum extent of land assignable under a Purchase Certificate is circumscribed by the ceiling limit, under Section 72B(1)(a) and (b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.
  • 2. Plantation Exemption: Owners and tenants of plantations are permitted to retain plantation lands in excess of the ceiling limit by availing the ‘exemption’ provided under Section 81. However, the said exemption does not confer any absolute proprietary right over such land.
  • 3. Exempted-plantation-land Vest in Government: Title/ownership of unassignedexempted-plantation-land is vested with the Government, under Section 72(1).
  • 4. Prior Owners and Tenants will be Deemed as Tenants of the Govt. Such tenants have to pay ‘Rent’ to the Government (Section 72E) for the unassignedexempted-plantation-land.  The rent is fixed by the Land Tribunal [Section 72F(5)(h) ].
  • 5. On Acquisition, No Land Value to Previous Owners or Tenants: If the land vested in Government under Section 72 is acquired, land-value will not be paid to the former land-owner or the tenant (Section 112(5A).
  • 6. Exemption will be lost, if “Fragmented”:The exemption granted to a plantation will be lost if it is “fragmented” or the plantation-crop is abandoned (under Section 87).

Relevant Provisions of Law

  • 1. Section 72(1), Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963: All right, title and interest of the land-owners held by cultivating-tenants as on 1.1.1970 entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 shall vest in the Government.
  • 2. Section 72B: It deals with “cultivating tenants’ right to assignment” (of the land vested in Government under Section 72).  Sub Section 1(a) and (b) of this Section direct that the assignment should be within the ceiling limit (mentioned in Section 82).
  • 3. Section 72C: It deals with assignment of land, where the cultivating-tenant has not made application under Section 72B. All provisions of Section 72B, except sub section 3, are made applicable to Section 72C.  The opening words of Section 72C (“notwithstanding anything contained in sub Section 3 of Section 72B”), indicate the nexus between Section 72B and Section 72C.  Therefore, the purchase certificate can be issued, within ceiling limit alone, under Section 72C, as in the case of Section 72B.
  • 4. Section 72E: As stated above, tenancy-lands vest in the Government, under Section 72. The tenants (under Government) of unassigned-exempted-plantation-land, etc., are liable to pay rent to the Government for the unassigned (over and above the ceiling limit).
  • 5. Section 72F(5)(h): Land Tribunal fixes the rent for the said unassigned–exempted-land (under Section 81) .
  • 6. Section 87(1) and its Explanations I and II: Only a limited right to continue; and, fragmentation is prohibited.  The specified plantation-crop alone is permitted.  The exemption is given subject to the condition – not to “convert” the land for any other use.
    • In case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost, and the exemption may be withdrawn under Explanation II of Section 87(1).  
  • 7. Section 112 (5A)On acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Section 72.
  • 8. Section 112 (5A)(a):The compensation for any building or other improvements  belonging to the land-owner shall be awarded to the Government.
  • 9. Section 112 (5A)(b):The balance-compensation remaining after deducting the amount referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • 10. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India: The State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
    • The provisions of the KLR Act, in this regard, are legislated following this proviso in Article 31A(1). It goes without saying – if no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.

Legal Right Conferred by the Statute
From the above, it is clear:

  • The unassigned land allowed to be occupied by a tenant (over and above the ceiling limit for which the tenant is liable to pay rent to the Government under Section 72E) can be termed as a “Legal Right conferred by the Statute”. It is not an absolute right that is conferred to some, including the BIG plantation tenants.

The Policy of the KLR Act
Section 83, lays down the policy of the Act – No person “be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” (Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State of Kerala v. Puliyangattu Krishnan Master, 2008(1) KLJ 571).

Unjustifiable to Confer Undue Benefits to Plantation-Tenants
Under Section 72A and Section 88, meagre compensation is paid to the land owners on vesting landlords’ rights in the Government and on surrendering the surplus land.  It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits on the tenants or lessees (which is not given to the land owners) when their lease-hold-lands are acquired (the majority of such plantation-lessees are Companies).

Lands of the Maharaja of Travancore were taken

It is a matter of record that even the lands of the Maharaja of Travancore—191 acres situated within Thiruvananthapuram City,  far in excess of the statutory ceiling of 7.5 acres, were taken over pursuant to the orders of the Land Board, Thiruvananthapuram, vide Order No. LB(B)2-18919/70 dated 15-01-1972. Equally, it is an indisputable fact that thousands of middle-class landowners were subjected to the rigour of the Act, and their excess lands were taken by the force of law.

  • Therefore, it would be wholly unreasonable to contend that the Legislature intended to confer any special or undue benefit upon plantation-tenants (benefits which were not extended to middle-class landowners, to other categories of tenants governed by the Act and even to the Maharaja of Travancore).

Any interpretation that elevates plantation-tenants to a privileged class, beyond the plain limits imposed by the statute, would be contrary to the scheme, object, and egalitarian ethos of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.

Chapter III – Deals with Ceiling Limit and Exemptions

Chapter III (Sections 81 to 98A) of the KLR Act deals with ‘Restriction on Ownership and Possession of Land in Excess of Ceiling Area and Disposal of Excess Lands’.

  • Among other things, it procures provisions as to:
    • ceiling limit,
    • exemptions from ceiling limit,
    • filing ceiling return,
    • determining extent to be surrendered,
    • surrender,
    • taking possession by TLB,
    • effect of conversion of exempted land.

Exemption from Ceiling Limit

Sec. 81(1) says that the provisions of Chapter III shall not apply to –

  • lands owned or held by the Government,
  • private forests, 
  • plantations, etc.

PART II

Does the Plantation Exemption confer Unconditional Rights over the ‘LAND’?

No.

It is for the following reason –

  • Exemption is only a ‘Legal Advantage conferred by Statute’. It continues (only) as long as Plantation exists.
  • Because,
    • Under Sec. 2, clause (44), Plantation means any land used by a person principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon.
    • Section 87, Explanation II states that if a plantation for which exemption is given on recognition of a specific ‘plantation-crop’ is converted into any other ‘plantation-crop’ or the plantation activity is not continued, the exemption will be lost; and the land will be taken for considering the ceiling limit.

Sec. 87 reads as under:

  • “S.87. Excess land obtained by gift, etc. to be surrendered – (1) Where any person acquires any land dafter the date notified under Section 83 by gift, purchase, mortgage with possession, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, such excess shall be surrendered to such authority as may be prescribed.
  • Explanation 1 – Where any land is exempted by or under Section 81 and such exemption is in force on the date notified under Section 83, such land shall, with effect from the date on which it ceases to be exempted, be deemed to be land acquired after the date notified under Section 83.
  • Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.”
  • Note: 1. The (main) section refers to lands in general (and not confined to Plantation). The Explanations alone refer to Plantation Lands.
  • 2. The expression “ceases to be exempted” in first Explanation denotes the following –
    • A Plantation land can be “ceases to be exempted” either ono “conversion” given in Explanation II or on legislation.
    • That is, if there is conversion as stated in Explanation II, it will be taken as land “exceeds the ceiling area“, and
    • “such excess” stands liable to be “surrendered” (automatically – without intervention of any authority).
  • 3. In case of conversion by a transfer/sale, the expression “persondenote the transferee. It is clear from the beginning words of this section – “Where any person acquires any land … by gift, purchase, … or any other kind of transfer …”
  • 4. The expression “shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date” in the last limb of Explanation II (also) shows the nexus between the Explanations I and II. The result is that “such excess” stands liable to be “surrendered” (automatically – without intervention of any authority)

Fragmentation of Plantation will be against the Provisions of the Act

Section 81 is a special provision to prevent fragmentation of plantation and to improve the economy of the state. Change the character of the plantation could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act. (One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985). (See: Notes under the heading – Effect of Fragmentation for Non-exempted Category)

Sec. 120A, KLR Act is Relevant

Fragmentation of plantation land amounts to ‘conversion’. It will be against the provisions of the Act. Section 120A, KLR Act is relevant in this regard. It reads as under:

  • 120A.  Registering officer not to register in certain cases. – Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act 16 of 1908), where the District Collector or any other officer authorised by the Government in this behalf informs the registering officer in writing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any document relating to transfer of land which may be presented before him for registration is intended to defeat the provisions of this Act, such registering officer shall not register such document until the District Collector or the officer so authorised, as the case may be, informs the registering officer that the transfer is not intended to defeat the provisions of this Act. [Inserted by Act 17 of 1972.]

Chapter III – Excess, Ceiling ReturnSurrenderExemption, Etc.

PLANTATIONS – Analysis of S. 81, 82 and 83

CHAPTER III of the KLR Act deals with Ceiling Area and Excess Lands.

Sec. 81 provides for ‘Exemptions’. Sec. 81 reads as under:

  • Exemptions: (1) The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to –
    • (a) lands owned or held by the Government ….
    • …. …..
    • (e) plantations;
    • …………

Note: Exemption apply to lease-lands owned by the Government.

Sec. 81(1)(a) Proviso says –

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease“. (See notes under the heading: “Sec. 81 exemptions do not apply to Govt. lands; But, Exemption apply to lease-lands”)

Ceiling area 

S. 82 & 83 deal with ceiling area and bars holding land excess of ceiling fixed. Sec. 82 reads as under:

  • 82. Ceiling area. – [(1) The ceiling area of land shall be,
  • (a) in the case of an adult unmarried person or a family consisting of a sole surviving member, five standard acres, so however that the ceiling area shall riot be less than six and more than seven arid a half acre in extent;
  • (b) in the case of a family consisting of two or more, but not more than five members, ten standard acres, so however that the ceiling area shall not be less than twelve and more than fifteen acres in extent.
  • (c) in the case of a family consisting of more than five members, ten standard acres increased by one standard acre for each member M excess of five, so however that the ceiling area shall not he less than twelve and more than twenty acres in extent; and
  • (d) in the case of any other person, other than a joint family, ten standard acres, so however that the ceiling are shall not be less than twelve and more than fifteen acres in extent.]

Sec. 83 reads as under:

  • “83. No person to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. With effect from such dates as may be notified by the Government in the Gazette, no person shall be entitled to own or hold or to possess under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area.”

It is a total bar.

  • Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB),

The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.”

  • Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137) – quoted in 2008(1) KLJ 571 (State Vs. Puliyangattu). Followed in State vs Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16; Bhikoba S. Vs. ML Punchand Tathed, AIR 1982 (SC) 865.

Section 85(1) reads as under:

  • 85. Surrender of excess land. (1) Where a person owns or holds land excess of the ceiling area on the date notified under Section 83, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided: …. ….”

Section 2 (3) defines ceiling area as under:

  • “Ceiling area” means the extent of land specified in section 82 as the ceiling area”.

Relevant Provisions: Excess, Ceiling ReturnSurrenderExemption Etc.

  • Sec. 85 (1) provides for Surrender excess.
  • Sec. 85 (2) provides – Owners and Tenants of plantation (who owns or hold properties) should furnish statement (ceiling return) to Land Board before March 31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
  • Sec. 85 (3) provides – Excess shall be surrendered.
  • Sec. 85 (5) provides – LAND BOARD shall DETERMINE – extend to be surrendered
  • Sec. 85 (7) provides – Whereon a person fails to file statement (ceiling return) under 85(2), LAND BOARD shall intimate Taluk Land Board (TLB), TLB shall determine land to be surrendered.
    • “The statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit and if such a person fails to file the statement in accordance with law, the Board is enjoined to proceed against such person.” State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
    • [TLB not to do, suo motu, without direction from LB. State Of Kerala Vs Idiculla, 1980 KLT 120, referred to Shircy, J. in One Earth One Live Vs. State of Kerala, 2019(1) KLT 985.]
    • The effect of not filing ceiling return can be equated to ‘not applying for assignment’ of purchase certificate, See: Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283.
  • Sec. 85A provides – File ceiling return/statement within March  2, 1973 before Land Board.
  • Sec. 86(1) provides – On determination of the extent to be surrendered (by LB) under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
  • Sec. 86(3) provides – Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession.
  • Sec. 86(4) provides – Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
  • Sec. 86(6) provides – Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
  • Sec. 87 Exp. II  provides – If CONVERTED TO ANY OTHER CLASS and the person owns excess of ceiling area – the excess shall be deemed to be land acquired.
  • Sec. 87(1A) provides – Person referred to above (transferee) also should file statement (Return).

See note below: ‘No Total Prohibition in using Exempted Land for a Different Purpose‘

Sec. 81 exemptions do not apply to Govt. lands; But, Exemption apply to lease-lands

Government lands are exempted under Sec. 81(1)(a).

81(1)(a) Proviso says –

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease“.

This proviso is introduced in 1971. By virtue of this amendment (introducing Section 81(1)(a) Proviso) “Plantation-Exemption” takes effect on Government-lease-land (with tenants).

But it must be noted that a ‘valid lease’ must exist. That is, the person in possession of government land should be a “lessee”; he must not be trespasser or a person who forfeit the title of Government.

Section 81(1)(a) Proviso reads as under:

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease whether current or time expired or otherwise.”

The word “otherwise” must be understood as a permissive occupation

In MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28, it is held-

  • “Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 81 by which “Government lands held under a lease current or time expired or otherwise” can be understood only as referring to such lands which are held by persons in permissive possession. The word “otherwise” must be understood as a permissive occupation otherwise than under a lease. The word “otherwise” has no wider meaning in the context. So understood, the exemption to Clause (a) of that Section is perfectly legal and in that limited sense we uphold that provision as valid.”

Tenant is defined in Sec 2 (57) as under:

  • (57) tenant moans any person who has paid or has agreed to pay rent or other consideration
  • for his being allowed to possess and to enjoy any land by a person entitled to lease that land, and includes- …. ….. ….. “

Section 86 reads:

  • 86. Vesting of excess lands in Government. (1) On the determination of the extent and other particulars of the lands, the ownership or possession or both of which is or are to be surrendered under Section 85, the ownership or possession or both, as the case may be of the land shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances and the Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
  • (2) On receipt of [the order of the Taluk Land Board under Sub-section (1)] such person shall make the surrender demanded, in such manner as may he prescribed.
  • (3) Where any person fails to make the surrender demanded, the [Taluk Land Board] may authorise any officer to take possession or assume ownership of the land in such manner as may be prescribed.
  • [(4) Where the ownership of any land vests in the Government under Sub-section (1), the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of the land shall stand extinguished, and where possession of any land which was in the possession of a cultivating tenant vests in the Government under that Sub-section, the ownership of such land shall vest in the Government and the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of such land shall stand extinguished.]

Read Blog: Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?

PART III

Effect of Conversion of a Portion of Exempted Land into a Non-exempted Category

Section 87 is the relevant provision – quoted above.

From Sec. 87, following legal principles can be deduced (as stated above) –

  • 1. The (main) section refers to lands in general (and not confined to Plantation). The Explanations refer to Plantation Lands.
  • 2. The expression “ceases to be exempted” in first Explanation denotes the following –
    • A Plantation land can be “ceases to be exempted” either ono “conversion” given in Explanation II or on legislation.
    • Therefore, if there is conversion as stated in Explanation II, it will be taken as land “exceeds the ceiling area“, and
    • “such excess” stands liable to be “surrendered” (automatically – without intervention of any authority).
  • 3. In case of conversion by a transfer/sale, the expression “persondenote the transferee. It is clear from the beginning words of this section – “Where any person acquires any land … by gift, purchase, … or any other kind of transfer …”
  • 4. The expression “shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date” in the last limb of Explanation II (also) shows the nexus between the Explanations I and II. The result is that “such excess” stands liable to be “surrendered” (automatically – without intervention of any authority)

No Total Prohibition in using Exempted Land for a Different Purpose

Explanation II does not make a total bar. It only causes to lose benefit of the exemption to a certain extent. That is, if a person converts any portion of his exempted land to any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit; and the Taluk Land Board can proceed upon that (excess) land. In short, the exemption will be lost for that portion. In this premises, in Wayanad Granites v. District Collector, 2023-4 KLT 874, it is held that ‘fragmentation is per se not illegal’. similarly, in District Collector v. Sajith Lal, 2023-4 KLJ 851, it is held that ‘there is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non-exempted purposes as well’.

In Mathew K.T v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024, in the light of earlier decisions, observed that there is no total prohibition in using an exempted land for a different purpose under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The impediment or restriction is (only) the following –

  • If a portion of the exempted land is utilised for any other purpose, that would fall within his ceiling area and the authorities may be able to initiate ceiling proceedings.

The Full Bench decision, Mathew K. Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority [AIR 2019 Ker. 67, affirmed by the Supreme Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob, 2020-14 SCC 126] held as under:

  • “We however add that any class of land earlier exempted in the ceiling case can be converted into any class of land not liable to be exempted under Explanation II to Section 87 of the Act. The consequence is that the benefit of the exemption would be lost and the extent added to the account of the assessee or the declarant in determination of his ceiling area. That is a matter to be dealt with by the Taluk Land Board with the assessee or the declarant and other interested parties on the party array and we desist from elaborating further.”

In District Collector v. Sajith Lal (2023-4 KLJ 851; 2023 KLT OnLine 1225) it is held as under:

  • “5. There is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non- exempted purposes as well. If the land is used for non-exempted purposes, the holder of the land will lose the qualification for exemption, thus giving authority to the Land Board to initiate ceiling proceedings.” (Quoted in: Mathew K.T v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024)

No Embargo to Transfer Plantation Land

In R. V.  Devassia v. Sub Registrar, Idukki, 2015-1 ILR(Ker) 1047; 2015-1 KHC 805; 2015-2 KLJ 17, it is held as under:

  • “9. On promulgation of the KLR Act in the State, the entire landed property in the State is subjected to State control as envisaged under the provisions of the KLR Act. No piece of the land escapes the clutches of the KLR Act including exempted land for ceiling purposes. The ceiling proceedings is a continuing proceedings and can be reopened in any of the circumstances, if so warranted, as contemplated under Section 87 of the KLR Act. Exemption granted from ceiling is the qualification to use the land in a particular manner, which means a burden is imposed on the land. The moment the qualification for exemption is vanished by conversion of the land, the protection from ceiling will also be extinguished to bring the land within the fold of the ceiling area. The exemption is in the nature of a burden on the land to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted.. The eminent domain power of the State can be exercised for acquiring land without consent and also to regulate the use of land in public interest. The eminent domain is power inherent in any Sovereign State. This burden would bind the holder of the land as on 01/01/1970 and the successor-in-interest. The Division Bench of this Court in the State Human Rights Protection Centre, Thrissur and another v. State of Kerala and others [2009 (3) ILR 695] held that exemption granted under S.81(1)(a) is for the land and would continue to operate irrespective of change of ownership of the exempted land and the transferee would have to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted.”

In Everest Stone Crusher and Granites v. District Collector, Kannur, 2020-6 KHC 289, it is observed as under:

  • “16. In Devassia R.V. this Court noticed that, the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act do not place any embargo on transfer. The transfer of registry is for fiscal purposes. The power of the competent authority to reopen the ceiling proceedings to include the land exempted for the purpose of ceiling is not lost on account of effecting mutation. Therefore, the Revenue Officials cannot refuse to effect mutation of the property purchased by the transferee.”

Effect of Fragmentation for Non-exempted Category

The decision in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985, arose from the Writ Petition filed for a declaration that the fragmentation and sale of a Rubber Plantation for non-plantation purposes was illegal as it defeated the purpose of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. When the matter was placed before the Taluk Land Board under Sec 87, KLR Act, it found that there was no change in classification of the land and therefore dropped the proceedings. The Court held as under:

  • “34. Section 81 of the KLR Act is in pith and substance a special provision, with its main objective of giving exemption to certain lands including the lands maintained as plantations is to prevent fragmentation of the land and to keep it as plantation itself to improve the economy of the state for welfare of people as a whole while the Act creates a regime, the State is under an obligation to safeguard, the intended purpose of the provisions of the Act in its spirit. ….. …… It could be gathered from the records that the proposal to transfer 1.03 acres of land to each workers in discharge of their service or retrenchment benefits will definitely divide the plantation into separate slots and that would definitely change the character/nature of the plantation, which could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act.”

Can a Tenant of Plantation Transfer his Rights, Fragmenting the Plantation

Possession is a heritable and transferable right. [See: Nallammal Vs. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864; Phirayalal Kapur Vs. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186].

Therefore, a tenant of plantation having rights of fixity (Sec. 13) may have the right to transfer it to another. In any case, the change of character or nature of the plantation by fragmentation being amount to ‘conversion’ that will be against the provisions of the Act, as pointed out in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985.

PART – IV 

Plantation ExemptionFixity & Purchase Certificate for a Tenant below 30-acres-plantation

  • Under Chapter III, Sec. 81(1)(e), he can also avail benefits of exemption for plantation (without being affected by the ceiling limit – Sec. 82 & 83).
  • Note: For getting benefits under Sec. 81 exemption, the tenant should have filed ceiling return (under Sec. 85(2); 85A).
  • Purchase Certificate being provided within ceiling limit alone under Sec. 72B or 72C, it is legitimate to state that a tenant cannot get Purchase Certificate on the plantation land, under Sec. 72B or 72C. (Note: No rider to Sec. 72B and 72C, by way of proviso or otherwise, exempting plantation.)

Combined Impact of Sec. 3(1)(viii) and Sec. 81 on Plantation-Tenancy-land

Below 30 acres – Chapter II applies:

  1. By virtue of S. 3(1)(viii)Chapter II applies to all tenancies (both above and below 30 acres. It stands contradistinct to ‘leased-lands-upon-which-plantation-was-put-up’ by the tenant above 30 acres.
  2. Such tenants also get benefit of exemption under Sec. 81 and they can continue without being affected by the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 and 83.
  3. For getting benefits of Sec. 81 exemption ceiling return (Sec. 85(2); 85A). should have been filed.

Above 30 acres ‘Plantation-Tenancy’- KLR Act will not Apply:

  • S. 3(1)(viii) being exclude (from Chapter II) ‘Plantation-Tenancy’ (i.e. ‘leased-lands-upon-which-plantation-was-put-up’ by the landlord) above 30 acres, provisions of Chapter II do not apply to such plantations.
  1. Hence, No ‘fixity’ under Sec. 13, for the tenants of ‘Plantation-Tenancy’ above 30 acres.
  2. Contract applies to termination of tenancy, above 30 acre plantation–tenancy. But, until evicted lawfully, such tenants get benefit of exemption under Sec. 81 and they can continue without being affected by the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 and 83.
  3. Land lord is entitled Sec. 81 exemption over such plantation.
  4. For getting benefits of Sec. 81 exemption, ceiling return [Sec. 85(2); 85A] should have been filed.

If tenant raised plantation on bare land leased: S. 3(1)(viii)does not apply.

  1. S. 3(1)(viii) does not deal with plantations put up on bare land leased by the tenants. (Such property is not excluded from Chapter II, also.)
  2. That is, the protection or benefits given to tenants (fixity) can be availed by such tenants (who put up plantation on land leased).
  3. No purchase Certificate can be obtained, for, fragmentation of plantation will not be allowed (Sec. 87 Expl. II).
  4. Under Sec. 81, such tenants can avail exemption and they can also continue without being affected by the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 and 83.
  5. Such lands also vest in Government under Sec. 72.
  6. For getting benefits of Sec. 81 exemption ceiling return [Sec. 85(2); 85A]. should have been filed.

Assignment of Purchase certificate to Tenants 

  • Sec. 72B provides for cultivating tenant’s rights to get assignment  – purchase certificate (through LT) – within ceiling area. [Tenant is “obliged to apply” for it within 2 years from 1-1-1970. Effect of not applying for assignment, See: Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283. This decision also says that tenants having ‘no bona fide claim’ as to cultivating-tenancy has ‘no vested right to continue’.]
  • Sec. 72 C provides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit,)
  • The tenant who opts to avail benefits of plantation-exemption, under Sec. 81, cannot seek fragmentation (Sec. 87, Explanation II) of the plantation land so as to obtain purchase-certificate (under Sec. 72A, 72B or 72C) within ceiling limit. Still, he stands as a cultivating tenant, “entitled to assignment” of the right under Sec. 72B. As shown elsewhere, there is an option for the tenant – either to obtain purchase-certificate or to avail plantation-exemption.

Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 

  • Such lands vest in Govt. under Sec. 72 also.

PATR IV

VESTING OF LAND IN GOVT. & RIGHT OF GOVT. TO COLLECT RENT

According to the provisions of the KLR Act, lands held by individuals (or associations of persons) vest in Govt. under two provisions. They are-

  • First, Sec. 72 – Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government.
  • Second, 86. Vesting of excess lands in Government.
    • Note: Sec. 86 does not apply to Plantations, for (i) they being already vest in Govt. under Sec. 72, and (ii) if Govt. land, no question of vesting arises.

Section 72(1) reads:

  • “72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”

Section 86 reads:

  • 86. Vesting of excess lands in Government. (1) On the determination of the extent and other particulars of the lands, the ownership or possession or both of which is or are to be surrendered under Section 85, the ownership or possession or both, as the case may be of the land shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances and the Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
  • (2) On receipt of [the order of the Taluk Land Board under Sub-section (1)] such person shall make the surrender demanded, in such manner as may he prescribed.
  • (3) Where any person fails to make the surrender demanded, the [Taluk Land Board] may authorise any officer to take possession or assume ownership of the land in such manner as may be prescribed.
  • [(4) Where the ownership of any land vests in the Government under Sub-section (1), the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of the land shall stand extinguished, and where possession of any land which was in the possession of a cultivating tenant vests in the Government under that Sub-section, the ownership of such land shall vest in the Government and the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of such land shall stand extinguished.]
  • It is a total bar.
    • Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB),
    • The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137) – quoted in 2008(1) KLJ 571 (State Vs. Puliyangattu). Followed in State vs Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16; Bhikoba S. Vs. ML Punchand Tathed, AIR 1982 (SC) 865.

PART V

Who is the OWNER of Exempted (Private-Leasehold) Plantation Lands in Kerala?

It is Government, though by virtue of Chapter II (Sec. 13) the tenant has ‘Fixity’. 

1. Plantation (lease) Lands VEST in GOVT, automatically

  • Because,
  • Sec. 72 provides for
    • mandatory and involuntary vesting in Government–
    • of leasehold lands that is held by cultivating tenants entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13 (even if the extent exceeds ceiling limit).

2.  ‘Vesting’ in Govt. is ‘Vesting of Ownership

  • It is for the reasons –
    • Sec. 72(1) [Declared to be ‘vested’ in Government],
    • Sec. 72E [the cultivating tenant shall pay rent to the Government from 01.01.1970],    
    • Sec.72F(h) [Land Tribunal to fix the rent stated in Sec. 72E] and
    • Sec. 112(5A) [when a land is acquired, compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the land owner shall be awarded to the Government; and when compensation is given to the tenant, no ‘value of the land’ be given].

3. Article 31A(1), Proviso of the Constitution of India

  • Article 31A(1), Proviso lays down that the State need not pay compensation to the land-owners (when land is acquired) above the ceiling limit.  And, the aforestated provisions of the KLR Act are legislated following this constitutional provision. 
  • Article 31A(1), Proviso of the Constitution reads as under:
  • “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”

Read Blog: Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?

4. ‘Exemption’ in Chapter III Cannot be read into Sec. 72B(2)

  • Sec. 72B(2) specifies that the provisions of Section 82 (as to ceiling limit) shall apply for a limited purpose. It reads-
    • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1)
  • The exemption provision in Sec. 81 (Chapter III) cannot be brought-forth or read-into Sec. 72B (provision for assignment/purchase-certificate) in Chapter II.
  • Further:
    • Chapter II of the KLR Act (dealing with ‘Tenancy’) is exclusive and exhaustive as to ‘fixity’ and ‘vesting’ of land in Government.
    • Proviso to Sec. 72B(1) shows – Sec. 72B(1) is an an independent provision. (It says as to assignment to a cultivating tenant within the ceiling limits.)
    • It is not stated anywhere in the Act – the right and title of the (leased-plantation) land vested in Government under Sec. 72, will be divested in any manner (to the previous owner, or to the tenant or to anybody else), in any circumstance.
    • Sec. 72E provides for collection of ‘rent‘ from the holders of the plantation. It is for the reason that (ownership of) the land vests in Govt.
    • Proceedings initiated by Taluk Land Board under Chapter III (in respect of plantation) do not confer title.

5. Government Need Not Pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, if Acquired

  • For the above (plantation land vest in Govt.), the Government Need Not Pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, to the tenant, or the former owner, if such Lands are Acquired. (See Notes below under head: Sec. 112 of the KLR Act)

6. Tenant/Owner cannot ‘Sell’ Plantation Land (above ceiling limit) as his absolute property

  • An owner, or a tenant who got ‘fixity’ over such land, cannot ‘sell’ this land as his absolute (ownership) property.

Vesting in  Government u/s. 72 is independent of issuance of Purchase Certificate

The rights of the landlord would vest in the Government, under Sec. 72 KLR Act. A tenant is free to apply for and obtain Purchase Certificate within the Ceiling Limit under Sect. 59(2) and 72B or 72C. from such property. Vesting of lease property in Government under Sec. 72 is independent of issuance of Purchase Certificate. In Perumal Smaraka Nidhi v. Harrisons Malayalam Limited (9 July, 2010, K.M.Joseph, J.) held-

  • The rights of the landlord would vest in the Government, under Sec. 72 KLR Act.
  •  Sec. 72 would appear to contemplate vesting when there is no certificate of purchase issued under Sec. 59 (2).
  • If no certificate of purchase has been issued under sub Sec. (2) of Sect. 59 (irrespective of whether the tenants have applied), under Section 72, there will be vesting, if other conditions are satisfied.
  • (Appeal Judgment: Perumal Smaraka Nidhi vs M/S Harrisons Malayalam Ltd., 31. 01. 2013.)

Rights of ‘tenants’ of Plantations, after vesting the land with Govt.?

Is the Vesting in Govt. “Fictional” (and it is only for transferring land to the Tenant)?

  • Yes; as regards lands within the ceiling limit.
  • No; as regards lands above ceiling limit.

It is a ‘Legal Right conferred by Statute’

  • It is not Tenancy – For no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt.
  • Not Grant or Licence/Permission – For Grant as well as Licence/Permission arise from a contract (express or implied).
  • Therefore, it can termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act.
  • What are the Stipulations attached to that “Legal Right”?
    • Subject to the condition – not to “convert” it for any other use, other than the specific plantation (Sec. 87).
  • When Such a land is Required for Govt., Should it be Acquired?
    • The ownership being vested in Govt. it need not be ‘strictly’ “acquired”.
    • But no provision In Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’, if and when Govt. needs it.
  • Sec. 112 of the KLR Act
    • But, Sec. 112 of the KLR Act says as to ‘Apportionment of land value in cases of acquisition’.
    • Because of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“ upon the former tenants of the plantation, they are entitled for certain compensation, when that land is required for the Govt..
    • In cases falling under Chapter II (pertaining to, tenants entitled for fixity, issuance of purchase certificate etc.) Section 72 deals with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants; and says -the land will be free from encumbrances created by the land-owners and intermediaries.
    • However, insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment (within ceiling limit) subject to the payment of purchase price – as stated in Section 72D. (See: Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439.)
    • No ‘authority’ is also named in any law to fix the compensation to be given to the former tenants, when the Govt. requires it.
  • Therefore, it is said – Apportionment of land value in cases of ‘acquisition’.
    • Note:  It makes no difference (SUBSTANTIALLY, IN DETERMINING COMPENSATION) whether such a plantation land is “acquired” or not. Because, even if the land is not ‘acquired’, Govt. has to pay compensation for improvements to the former tenants (who holds the land by virtue of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act).

Apportionment’s of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 of the KLR Act reads-

  • “112. Apportionment’s of land value in cases of acquisition – (1) Where any land is acquired under the law for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, the compensation awarded under such law in respect of the land acquired shall be apportioned among the landowner, intermediaries, cultivating tenant and the kudikidappukaran in the manner specified in this Section.
  • (2) The compensation for any building or other improvements shall be awarded to the person entitled to such building or other improvements.
  • (3) The kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to the value of the land occupied by his homestead or hut subject to a minimum of-
    • three cents in a city or major municipality; or
    • five cents in any other municipally; or
    • ten cents in a panchayat area or township.
  • (4) The difference between the value of three cents or five cents or ten cents, as the case may be, and the value of the extent of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, be borne by the Government or the local authority or the company or other person on whose behalf the land is acquired.
  • (5) The balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in Sub-section (2) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall he apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land acquired immediately before such acquisition.
    • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to (i) in the case of a landowner, the rent which he was entitled to get from the tenant holding immediately under him; (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord; and (iii) in the case of a cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent payable by him; and the rent payable by the cultivating tenant and the intermediary for the purposes of this Explanation shall be as calculated under the provisions of this Act.
  • (5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
    • the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to such landowner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government; and
    • the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to-
    • in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
    • in the case of the Government, such rent.
  • (7) In this Section, “homestead” includes a dwelling house occupied by a person who is deemed to be a kudikidappukaran under Explanation IIA to clause (25) of Section 2.”

Apportionment depends upon rights on the date of acquisition

  • Valia Raja v. Veeraraghava Iyer, 1961 Ker LT 103, it was held that the question of apportionment of compensation has to depend upon the rights of the parties on the date of the acquisition. Referrd to in: Varkey Thomas Vs. Annamma Abraham,  1969 Ker LT 903.

Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439

  • In Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439, the question as to ‘rival claims raised by the cultivating tenant and landlord for compensation on acquisition’ arose. The land was leased out by landlords. The lease-rights came in the cultivating tenants by transfer. The Government contended that the tenant was a cultivating tenant and the land vested upon the Govt. under Sec. 72 KLR Act. Hence tenant alone would be entitled to get compensation for the improvements to be determined under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, in view of Section 20(1) of the KLR Act.
  • The landlords argued that the land was a plantation (over 30 acres) when it was (originally) leased, and therefore, they are entitled to claim exemption and benefits in the light of the exemption under clause (viii)  of Section 3 (1) of the KLR Act. Since there would be no fixity of tenure, it being a plantation, there would not be vesting of rights of the land owner in the Government. Hence, there should be the apportionment of the compensation between the lessor and the lessee and it should be decided in the acquisition proceedings.
  • The single Judge dismissed the writ petition, ‘leaving open the liberty of the lessee as well as the landlords, to approach the civil court seeking relief against the Government, and also to resolve the inter se dispute by and between the tenant and the landlords’.
  • The Division Bench, in appeal held that ‘land acquisition’ proceedings are to be initiated. It is pointed out that (even if it is a land vested in Govt.) there is no provision in Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’ if and when Govt. need it. The court also observed as under –
    • “31. On an analysis of the provisions of Section 72(1) of the Act, 1963, it is clear that when the Government notified the said provision with effect from 01.01.1970, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under sub-Section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, vested in the Government.
    • 32. Therefore, it is clear from Section 72 that what is vested with the Government is the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants. It is nothing but a legal fiction by which the interest held by a cultivating tenant in a property of a landlord or intermediary is protected from 01.01.1970 .
    • 34. On a conjoint reading of Sections 72 and 72A, it can be seen that vesting of rights in the Government contained under Section 72 is the rights held by the landlord and the intermediary in respect of holdings held by the cultivating tenants. However, the same will not, in any manner, interfere with the rights enjoyed by a cultivating tenant in contemplation of the provisions of the Act, 1963.”
    • 42. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 72 of Act, 1963 would only deal with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants free from encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries. However, the legal provisions discussed above would make it clear that insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.
  • While considering the right of landlord, it is pointed out (basing on the principle, or scheme of the KLR Act**) that the landlord may have right for compensation under Section 72BB. The Division Bench said-
    • “36. So also, sub-Section (1) of Section 72BB dealing with ‘the right of landlord to apply for assignment and compensation’ specifies that any landowner or intermediary, whose right, title and interest in respect of any holding have vested in the Government, may apply to the Land Tribunal for the assignment of such right, title and interest to the cultivating tenant and for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A.”
  • **Note: 1. If plantation-lease-(leasing a land when plantation existed)-above-30-acre-
    • Sec. 72, 72 BB etc. will not apply (such land being excluded from Chapter II, under Sec. 3(1)(viii), KLR Act).
  • 2. In case of a plantation-lease-above-30-Acre-
    • on termination of the lease period, the land lord can resume the land, on the basis of his title; for, the tenant will not have fixity in such case, the land being exempted from the benefits of Chapter II (as per Sec. 3(1)(viii) of the KLR Act).
  • 3. The landlords of such plantation will get the benefits (under Sec. 81) and protection from ceiling limit that is stipulated under the provisions of Sec. 82, 83 etc. (that is, there will be no ceiling limit).
  • 4. In such a case, the right of landlord may be on a higher level or footing than the tenant (to get compensation).
  • 5. It cannot be compared with a plantation that is put up by the tenant. The tenants of such plantation will-
    • get fixity under Sec. 13 (though they will not get Purchase Certificate),
    • get the benefits and protection (under Sec. 81) from ceiling limit that is stipulated under the provisions of Sec. 82, 83 etc. (that is, there will be no ceiling limit).
    • In such a case, the right for compensation, if any, of the landlord will be nil or negligible.
      • The Division Bench, inter alia, on the above observations directed ‘the State and its officials to take proceedings for the acquisition of the land’.

Read Blog: Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?

The Govt. is Entitled Reasonable ‘Rent and Land Tax

The land being vest in Govt., it can collect reasonable ‘rent’. Sec. 72E reads as under:

  • 72E. Rent of holdings vested in Government but not assigned to cultivating tenants. – Where in respect of any holding or part thereof, the right, title and interest of the landowner and intermediaries have vested in the Government under Section 72 and the cultivating tenant is not entitled to the assignment of such right, title and interest by virtue of Sub-section (1) of Section 72, the cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay to the Government the rent payable under this Act from the date of vesting under Section 72.

With respect to payment of tax it is stated as under in Sec. 72S:

  • 72S. Liability for assessment alter the date of vesting under Section 72. (1)] Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract, where the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, in respect of a holding have vested in the Government under Section 72, the cultivating tenant of that holding shall be liable to pay the basic tax payable in respect of that holding under the said Act and other taxes and cesses due in respect of that holding.
  • (2) In the case of a holding or part of a holding in respect of which an application for resumption under the provisions of this Act is rejected, the cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay the basic tax and other taxes and cesses in respect of such holding or part of the holding, as the case may be, with effect on and from the date notified under Sub-section (1) of Section 72.

Can Purchase-Certificate be given to Plantation-Land, over & above Ceiling-Limit?

  • No.
  • Because, under Sec. 72B(2) a cultivating tenant is entitled to get assigned the area within the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 alone.

Sec. 72B reads as under:

  • “72B. Cultivating tenants right to assignment. – (1) The cultivating tenant of any holding or part of a holding, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Section 72, shall be entitled to assignment of such right, title and interest:
  • Provided that
  • (a) no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of any holding or part of a holding under this Section if he, or if he is a member of a family, such family, owns an extent of land not less than-the ceiling area.
  • (b) where the cultivating tenant or, if he is a member of a family, such family, does not own any land or owns an extent of land which is less than the ceiling area, he shall be entitled to the assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of only such extent of land as will, together with the land, if any, owned by him or his family, as the case may be, be equal to the ceiling area.
  • Explanation. – In calculating the extent of land owned by the cultivating tenant or, where he is a member of a family, by such family, for the purposes of clauses (a) and (b) of the foregoing proviso, the portion of the land owned by such cultivating tenant or by the family, which is liable to be assigned to the cultivating tenants holding under him or such family, shall not be taken into account.
  • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1);
  • Provided that if no date has been notified under Section 83, the date notified under Section 72 shall be deemed to be the date notified under Section 83.
  • (3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub-section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the dote of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.
  • (4) An application under Sub-section (3) shall contain the following particulars, namely:
  • (a) the village, survey number and extent of the holding or part to which the assignment relates.
  • (b) the name and address of the landowner and intermediaries and also of every other person interested in the land and the nature of their interest so far as they arc known to him;
  • (c) the particulars regarding the other lands owned or held by him or if he is a member of a family; by such family; and
  • (d) such other particulars as may be prescribed.
  • (5) Where a cultivating tenant is entitled to the assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of only a portion of the holding held by him, he may indicate in the application under Sub-section (3) his choice of the portion to which the assignment shall relate.”

Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy’; TLB to Fix Plantation Exemption.  

In Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it is pronounced that the tenants must have approached the Land  Trtibunal for getting plantation exemption.  It is basing on the Principle – Land Tribunal to fix tenancy’; TLB to fix excess land & resultantly to fix plantation exemption.  

Cultivating Tenant ‘Entitled to Assignment’, were Obliged to Apply LT

Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it was observed that a cultivating tenant, “entitled to assignment” of the right under Sec. 72B, if failed to apply the same, will not have ‘vested right to continue’, as a cultivating tenant and he will not be entitled to the benefit of fixity under Sec. 13 of the KLR Act.

Sec. 72B provides for cultivating tenant’s rights to get assignment by purchase certificate (through LT) – within ceiling area.

It is definite: the principle applied in the Balanoor case (that it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant to apply to the Land Tribunal) is the following –

  • It is for adjudicating the ‘tenancy right’.
  • The reason is that the Land Tribunal is the only authority that can decide on the “tenancy right.”
  • A Tenant is “obliged to apply” for it within 2 years from 1-1-1970. 
  • Under Sec. 72A, the Landlord is entitled to Compensation and under Sec. 72D, a tenant is bound to pay the Purchase Price. The Scheme of the KLR Act requires that there should be proceedings before the Land Tribunal under Sec. 72B or 72C.
  • It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government, for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.
    • Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period
  • Note: Plantation-lands usually involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land. The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be minuscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres). Therefore, the analogy that a tenant has a right to seek assignment is not apt at all.
  • Note: A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and avail benefits – the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.

Therefore, the cultivating tenants entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest were “obliged to apply” to the Land Tribunal within the time fixed for asserting the claim as cultivating tenants. This decision also says that tenants having ‘no bona fide claim’ as to cultivating-tenancy will not have the benefit of fixity under Sec. 13 of the KLR Act, and they will have ‘no vested right to continue’.

Sec. 73B(3) reads as under:

  • “(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

Effect of not applying for assignment

In Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it is stated that the tenants having ‘bona fide claim’ as to cultivating tenancy would have approached the LT. Those tenants who had not approached the LT would have ‘no vested right to continue’ as tenants (claiming plantation-tenancy-benefit).

A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and avail benefits – the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.

Also Read: Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board

End Notes

Relevant provisions of KLR Act, in a Nutshell

Section Provisions in a Nutshell
Chap. II 
3(1)
Exemptions – (i) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to – (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
“Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.
7 EPersons acquired lands (before 2005 amendment in KLR Act) for consideration below 1 Ha. 61 Are 87 Sq.m. (4 acre) will be deemed to be tenants .
13Fixity: “Every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding.”
22Landlord desiring to resume any land shall apply to the Land Tribunal.
31Fair rent determined by Land Tribunal.
51B. Landlord not to enter on land surrendered or abandoned by the tenant. 
Contravention is made punishable.
54(1)
55
57
57 (3)
57 (6)
61
54(1). A cultivating tenant (to purchase the right) has to apply Land Tribunal.
55. Purchase price is fixed by LT (on fair rent u/s. 31) to be paid u/s. 59
57. The LT after enquiries, pass orders determining purchase price.
(3). The Land Tribunal allows the purchase of the land it determines.
(6). The Land Tribunal forwards  orders to the Land Board.
61. Tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) pending proceedings.
59When Sec. 54 application is allowed (by the LT), the purchase price (determined u/s. 57 by the LT) shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal to the credit of the Land Board and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
72
72(1)
72(4)
Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating tenants in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
72(1) says: Holdings upon which tenanat entilted fixity under sec. 13 vest in govt.
72(4) – says: Landowner entitled to resume land shall apply within the time fixed. Otherwise vest in govt.
Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 
72BCultivating-tenant “shall be entitled to assignment” of land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 –within ceiling area and get purchase certificate (through LT) (2 years from 1-1-1970). Effect of non-filing (See Balanoor Plantations case. 2018(3) KLT 283.)
72D. The cultivating tenant has to pay the purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
72ESuch tenant is liable to pay rent to the Government.
72CProvides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit,)
72KLT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.
74Prohibition of future tenancies.
Chap. III 
81
Exemption from ceiling and excess for Govt. lands, private forests, plantations, industrial or commercial undertakings, etc.
Proviso – There will be an exemption (as plantation, land given to educational institution, trust, etc.) on Government lands, given under grant, lease, etc.
See: HMT (Machine Tools) Limited v. Taluk Land Board, 2009 (3) KLJ 110; MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28.
82Ceiling area – 5/10 standard acres.
83No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  It is a total bar. (Note:  plantations, industrial area etc. are exempted.)
Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB), Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137)
The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571.
84Certain transfers – void.
85(1)Surrender excess.
85(2)Owners and Tenants (having land in excess of the ceiling area) should furnish ceiling return to Land Board before March31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
Note: Effect of non-filing: See – Balanoor Plantations case – 2018(3) KLT 283.State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
 According to S. 3(1) (viii), “tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres” is exempted from Chapter II. Therefore, the landlord can recover such plantation lands after the period of tenancy. Such landlords also had to file a ceiling return within the time stipulated.
85(3)Excess shall be surrendered.
Note: Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant)
It is clear from the following provisions:
S. 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT(for the purchase of right, title and interest.)
S. 55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
S. 57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
S. 57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
S. 57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board.
S. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT)
S. 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
S. 72D. The cultivating tenant has to pay purchase price to the Government (fixed by the LT) on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.
Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.
It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case.
Note: (i) The sub-section (3) itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant, (ii) LT is the only authority to determine tenancy (Land Board cannot determine it), and (iii) it is clear that even if it is a plantation-exemption-land (beyond ceiling limit), the tenant has to file petition under Section 54 – for fixing Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT and for allotting the land under section 57(3) and for effecting the payments of ‘rent’ and ‘purchase price’(to the credit of the Land Board)  under sec. 61 and 59.
85(3A)The person bound to file a statement under sub-section (2) (that is, Owners and Tenants – having land in excess of the ceiling area)  shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.
85(5)On receipt of the statement under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3A), the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Board and such Taluk LandBoard shall determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered.
85(7)Whereon a person fails to file statement under 85(2) or (3A), LB shall intimate that fact to TLB  –  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered. It is obvious – The LB can intimate TLB as to non-filing, on the basis of the records it obtained under Sec. 57(6) and 59. That is, those tenants who are not entitled to get a purchase certificate also has to file an application under Sec. 54(1) and 85(2) or (3A). Effect of non-filing: See – Balanur Plantations case (With respect to Sec. 72B application) – 2018(3) KLT 283. Statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit to file statement:  State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
[TLB not to do, suo motu, without direction from LB. 1980 KLT 120, referred to in 2019(1) KLT 985.]
85AFile ceiling return within March  2, 1973 before Land Board..
86(1)On determination of the extent to be surrendered under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
86(3)Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession
86(4)Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
86(6)Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
87
Exp. II
If a person converts any portion of exempted land for any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit. That is, the exemption will be lost for the portion that exceeds the ceiling limit. (Mathew K Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913)

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Should the Plaintiff, Schedule Servient Heritage in a Suit Claiming Easement?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Should the plaintiff necessarily schedule servient heritage in a suit claiming prescriptive easement?

In P. V. Abdul Majeed Hajiv.  Shorabi, 2020-4 KHC 53; 2020-4 KLT 629, the Kerala High Court answered the question with reference to Order VII Rule 3 CPC.  It is held as under:

  • “4. … For claiming prescriptive right of easement, the servient heritage over which the claim is raised should be specifically and separately scheduled in the plaint so as to grant a decree in accordance with the mandate under Order VII Rule 3 CPC.”

It is difficult to single out ‘easement by prescription’ from other claims of easements (necessity, grant, etc.) in this regard.

In Kizhakke Neliyarambath Rafeek v. Thavararakkattil Choyikutty Master, 2021-5 KHC 592; 2021-5 KLT 574, it is held as under:

  • “12. On a reading of the common judgment of the first appellate court dated 18.6.2019, this Court is of the view that the court correctly analysed the points for consideration in the impugned judgment. The first appellate court mainly arrived at the following conclusions:-
  • …. The pathway claimed by the plaintiff therein alone is scheduled as schedule ‘B’. In a suit for easement right, the servient heritage and dominant heritage must be shown in the plaint as separate schedules.”

End Note:

Order VII Rule 3 CPC reads as under:

  • 3. Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property. Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers.

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Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

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Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

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Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta (AIR 2024 SC 5374) – Supreme Court Denied the Tenant’s Claim of Adverse Possession

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

The Supreme Court, in Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta (AIR 2024 SC 5374: C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.), upheld the decision of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur which held to the following effect –

  • Permissive possession of a defendant-tenant could not be converted as adverse possession except by proving his possession ‘adverse’ to the title of the plaintiff for a continuous period of 12 years or more; and
  • the starting point of limitation in terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act would commence from the date of defendant’s possession becoming ‘adverse‘ and not from the date when the right of ownership was acquired by the plaintiff.

The findings of the Apex Court (as regards the Adverse Possession) can be summarised as under:

  • “Animus possidendi” (under hostile colour of title) is one of the ingredients of adverse possession.
  • To attract adverse possession (in a case of permissive possession of a defendant-tenant) it must be established –
    • the time from which it was converted ‘adverse to the title of the plaintiff’, and
    • it should be open and continuous for the prescriptive period.

The Findings as regards the adverse Possession

The Supreme Court referred to the following previous decisions to highlight the legal point it addressed –

  • Saroop Singh v. Banto, (2005) 8 SCC 330,
  • M. Durai v. Muthu, (2007) 3 SCC 114,
  • Mohd. Mohd. Ali v. Jagadish Kalita, (2004) 1 SCC 271,
  • Brij Narayan Shukla v. Sudesh Kumar, (2024) 2 SCC 590,
  • Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729,
  • M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1 (Ram Janmabhumi Temple case).

The Apex Court mainly based its decision on Saroop Singh v. Banto, (2005) 8 SCC 330, to highlight the change in the legal position brought under Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court quoted the following from Saroop Singh v. Banto:

  • “28. The statutory provisions of the Limitation Act have undergone a change when compared to the terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1908, in terms whereof it was imperative upon the plaintiff not only to prove his title but also to prove his possession within twelve years, preceding the date of institution of the suit. However, a change in legal position has been effected in view of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the instant case, the plaintiff-respondents have proved their title and, thus, it was for the first defendant to prove acquisition of title by adverse possession. As noticed hereinbefore, the first defendant-appellant did not raise any plea of adverse possession. In that view of the matter the suit was not barred.

Change in law – once plaintiff proves title, Defendant to establish adverse possession

The Apex Court pointed out that the law laid down in Saroop Singh’s case is reiterated in M. Durai v. Muthu, (2007) 3 SCC 114, and cited the following from M. Durai v. Muthu –

  • “7. The change in the position in law as regards the burden of proof as was obtaining in the Limitation Act, 1908 vis-à-vis the Limitation Act, 1963 is evident. Whereas in terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act, the plaintiff was bound to prove his title as also possession within twelve years preceding the date of institution of the suit under the Limitation Act, 1963, once the plaintiff proves his title, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that he has perfected his title by adverse possession.”

It is further pointed out by the Supreme Court that Saroop Singh’s case was reiterated in Prasanna v. Mudegowda, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 511, and Vasantha v. Rajalakshmi, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 132, also. Referring Mohd. Mohd. Ali v. Jagadish Kalita, (2004) 1 SCC 271, it is pointed out in this decision – the claimant in permissive possession (tenant) categorically stated that his possession was not adverse to the true owner, and therefore the logical corollary is that he did not have the requisite animus. It is further held – Once the plaintiff proves his title over suit property it is for the defendant resisting the same claiming adverse possession (to prove) that he perfected title through adverse possession.

The Apex Court further emphasised, referring Saroop Singh v. Banto, (2005) 8 SCC 330, that the starting point of limitation, in terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, commences from the date the defendant’s possession becomes adverse. Relying Brij Narayan Shukla v. Sudesh Kumar, (2024) 2 SCC 590, the Court considered the question whether tenants of original owner could claim adverse possession against transferee of land lord. It was held that tenants or lessees could not claim adverse possession against their landlord/lessor, as the nature of their possession is permissive in nature.

The Apex Court then quoted the following from Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729 which illustrated the three classic requirements of adverse possession, namely, nec vi, nec clam and nec precario. It reads as under:

  • “60. The adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to co-exist at the same time, namely, nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e. adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner does not take care to know notorious facts, knowledge is attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would have known it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title which is not pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title is required.”

The Court finally referred M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1 (“Ram Janmabhumi Temple case”) quoting the following –

  • “1142. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed. Evidently, therefore, the plaintiffs in Suit 4 ought to be cognizant of the fact that any claim of adverse possession against the Hindus or the temple would amount to an acceptance of a title in the latter. Dr Dhavan has submitted that this plea is a subsidiary or alternate plea upon which it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to stand in the event that their main plea on title is held to be established on evidence. It becomes then necessary to assess as to whether the claim of adverse possession has been established.
  • 1143. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous possession which meets the requirement of being nec vi nec claim and nec precario. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence, it is well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

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Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

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Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

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Marking of Photocopy and Law on Marking Documents on Admission (Without Formal Proof)

Abridged From: Can the Court Refuse to Mark a (Relevant and Admissible) Document, for (i) there is No Formal Proof or (ii) it is a Photocopy?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introspection

Can the Court Refuse to Mark a (Relevant and Admissible) Document, for (i) there is Irregularity in Mode of (Formal) Proof or (ii) it is a Photocopy?

  • Answer: No, the Court Cannot.

It is for the following two main reasons –

  • FirstRight of undertaking: Sec. 136, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permits a party to furnish a fact before proving it formally, if “the party undertakes to give proof of such fact, and the Court is satisfied with such undertaking”.
  • Second, Right to Admit: Marking a document unopposed (by the opposite party), or the opposite party acquiesces irregularity of mode adopted for proving the document, amounts to waiver (of rights with the opposite side). It is based on the principles in Sec. 58, Evidence Act which directs that ‘facts admitted need not be proved’.

Proof of Document is, Normally, Proof of (both) Execution and Contents

  • When existence of a document is proved (either by admission or by proof), normally, Contents thereof are also taken as proved.
  • In most cases, ‘proof of execution’ may lead the court to presume ‘proof of truth’. But, it is not a rigid rule, for it falls under the caption, “appreciation of evidence”.
  • Evidence Act does not expressly proffer anything as to “TRUTH of contents” of documents. It is left to the discretion (Sec. 3) of the court. In proper cases court is expressly authorised to presume (Sec. 114) truth.

Therefore, by virtue of our procedure-laws (especially, Sec. 3 and 114 Evidence Act) and the law handed down by our Apex Court, the Courts are free to appraise that marking of a document –

  • 1. Contents and ‘Truth of its Contents’ stand proved, or
  • 2. Mere marking does not amount to proof of contents (even), or
  • (3) admission of contents; not truth of contents (especially when truth is in issue), or
  • (4) admission of contents and truth of contents; but, its probative value is small or nil.

PART I

Documents Marked Without Objection as to MODE OF PROOF – Effect, Waiver

The law prevails in India is the following –

  • If documents are marked without objection as to its mode of proof,  it is not open to the other side to object to their admissibility afterwards.

Following are the decisive authorities in this line.

P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumal,(1972) 1 SCC 9 (Three Judge Bench – A.N. Grover, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Ray, JJ.)Admissibility of police reports without examining the Head Constables who covered those meetings. Those reports were marked without any objection.  Hence it was not open to the respondent to object to their admissibility.Relied on: Bhagat Ram v. Khetu Ram, AIR 1929 PC 110.
R.V.E. Venkatachalla Gounder v. Arulmighu Viswesaraswamy and V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752 (R.C. Lahoti, Ashok Bhan, JJ.)Photo copies were admitted in evidence without leading foundationwithout objection. They cannot be held inadmissible for originals were not produced.Relied on: Padman v. Hanwanta, AIR 1915 PC 111 P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S.Perumal
Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082Objection to be taken    at     trial before document is marked as an ‘exhibit’.   Relied on: Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder
PC Thomas v. PM Ismail (R.M. Lodha, D.K. Jain, JJ.), AIR 2010 SC 905; 2009-10 SCC 239.Non-examination of Witness to Prove Truth-
If no objection on ‘mode of proof’ in trial court, it will be too late (in appeal) to raise objection on the ground of mode of proof – that is, “non production of John K as a witness
Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1986 ACJ 616; 1986 Guj LH 27; 1985-2 GujLR 1315No objection about the truth of contents of Ex. 32. The witness of the defendant accepted the contents. Therefore, too late in the day to canvass that contents of Ex. 32 were not proved
Sarkar on Evidence .If copies of the documents are admitted without objection in the trial Court, no objection can be taken in appealReferred to in:
Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082.

Who Should Object FIRST – Court or Opposite Side?

There is divergence of judicial opinion as to saying ‘NO’ by court to marking a document with formal defect, beforehand it is objected by the other side. Eg. Tendering copy of a document without furnishing the ‘foundational evidence’ to admit secondary evidence.

First view
Court is under an obligation to exclude inadmissible materials.
H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492 (Followed in: U. Sree  v.  U. Srinivas: AIR 2013 SC 415.)
Yeshoda v. Shoba Ram:  AIR 2007 SC 1721
Second view
The court cannot object first.
If no objection for other side, Court cannot refrain from marking a document on its own volition (on the ground of formal defect).
R.V.E. Venkatchalla Gounder v. Arulmighu Viswesaraswamy and V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752
Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082.

First View: Court is under an Obligation to Exclude

In H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492, it is held:

  • “Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. … The court has an obligation to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon.” (Followed in: U. Sree  v.  U. Srinivas: AIR 2013 SC 415.)

In Yeshoda v. Shoba Ram:  AIR 2007 SC 1721, it is held:

  • “In order to enable a party to produce secondary evidence it is necessary for the party to prove existence and execution of the original document. .. The conditions laid down in the said Section (Section 65) must be fulfilled before secondary evidence can be admitted. Secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without non-production of the original being first accounted for in such a manner as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the Section.

Second and Typically Followed View

  • 1. Failure to raise timely objectionas to the irregularity of mode adopted for proving the document “amounts to waiver“.
    • R.V.E. Venkatchalla Gounder v. Arulmighu Viswesaraswamy and V.P.Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752;
    • Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082.
  • 2. If the deficiency is pertaining to non-registration of a compulsory registrable document (as it falls under the head, inadmissible document) the court can desist the marking of the document.
  • 3. By virtue of the decision, G. M. Shahul Hameed v. Jayanthi R. Hegde, AIR 2024 SC 3339, unless the court has not applied its mind to the insufficiency of stamp, and unless there is a ‘judicial determination‘, the objection thereof can be raised at any time.

Failure to Raise Objection as to Irregularity of modeAmounts to Waiver

In RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003 SC 4548: 2003-8 SCC 752 it is held “failure to raise timely objection” as to the irregularity of mode adopted for proving a document “amounts to waiver“.

  • (Therefore it is clear that ‘objection’ is a matter that primarily remains in the realm of the opposite party; rather than the court).

In RVE Venkatachala Gounder, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “Ordinarily an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes:
    • (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and
    • (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient.
  • In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as ‘an exhibit’, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken before the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The later proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the Court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the Court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the Court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the later case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in superior Court.”

Admission by the other side, Proves Contents – No Blindfold Application

Court has wide powers under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act to require evidence to prove a document marked on ‘admission’. Besides the powers under Sec. 165, the Procedural Acts show that the courts have jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove admitted-documents. It is evident from the Provisos of –

  • Sec. 58 of Evidence Act
  • O. XII, r. 2A, CPC and
  • Sec. 294 of the CrPC.

The Courts are free to refrain from acting upon any document, in the particular nature of a case, especially when the Court feels that injustice will be resulted by the blindfold application of this principle (admission of a document by the other side, proves its contents also), for it falls under the caption, “appreciation of evidence”. It is the reason why the courts refuse to apply this principle in certain cases, saying –

  • (i) Contents are ‘not proved’ (Though signature Proved)
  • (ii) Truth of contents are ‘not proved’ (Though contents Proved)
  • (iii) Probative value of the document is small or nil (Though contents and truth Proved).

Proof must be by one who can Vouchsafe for Truth Not Beseem in All Cases

The normal rule as to proof of execution is made clear in Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745, under the following words –

  • “Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue”.

Though it is the “normal principle” that proof must be by one who can vouchsafe for truth (Assistant Commissioner of Customs v. Edwin Andrew Minihan, ILR 2024-1 Ker 596; 2023-7 KHC 512; 2024-1 KLT 24), it may not be correct in all cases; because, (besides documents ‘admitted’ by the other side) there may be cases where proof as to ‘existence and contents’ of a document can be given by a witnesses who cannot vouchsafe truth – e.g., a letter or a deed obtained by a witness in ‘due/common course’. In such cases, if ‘truth’ as to the contents of the document is in dispute, it has to be proved by a competent person.

Relevant Provisions as to Appreciation of Evidence – Sec. 3 & 114, Evid. Act

The definition of “Proved” in Sec. 3 gives vast discretion to the court. It reads as under:

” ‘Proved‘ — A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court; either BELIEVES it to exist, or CONSIDERS its existence so PROBABLE that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.”

Sec. 114 reads as under:

“114. Court may presume existence of certain facts —The Court may PRESUME the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.”
  • Any fact” may include “truth” of contents of documents.

Relevancy of Evidence

Sec. 5 and 136 of the Evidence Act stipulate that evidence can be given only on ‘facts in issue’ or ‘relevant facts’. Relevant facts are enumerated in Sec. 6 onwards.

Sec. 5 Evidence Act, 1872 deals with Relevancy

Sec. 5 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as under:

“5. Evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts – Evidence may be given in any suit or proceedings of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant, and of no others.
Explanation – This section shall not enable any person to give evidence of a fact which he is disentitled to prove by any provision of the law for the time being in force relating to Civil Procedure

Sec. 136, Evidence Act – Permits Evidence on Undertaking of the Party

Sec. 136, Evidence Act permits to furnish a fact before proving it formally, if “the party undertakes to give proof of such fact, and the Court is satisfied with such undertaking”. It reads as under:

“S. 136. Judge to decide as to admissibility of evidence.
             When either party proposes to give evidence of any fact, the Judge may ask the party proposing to give the evidence in what manner the alleged fact, if proved, would be relevant; and the Judge shall admit the evidence if he thinks that the fact, if proved, would be relevant, and not otherwise.
             If the fact proposed to be proved is one of which evidence is admissible only upon proof of some other fact, such last-mentioned fact must be proved before evidence is given of the fact first mentioned, unless the party undertakes to give proof of such fact, and the Court is satisfied with such undertaking.
             If the relevancy of one alleged fact depends upon another alleged fact being first proved, the Judge may, in his discretion, either permit evidence of the first fact to be given before the second fact is proved, or require evidence to be given of the second fact before evidence is given of the first fact.”

Court can Reject ‘Irrelevant’ or ‘Inadmissible’ Document At Any Stage

Order 13 Rule 3 CPC reads as under:

Rejection of irrelevant or inadmissible documents – The Court may at any stage of the suit reject any document which it considers irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, recording the grounds of such rejection.

It is pertinent to note that Order 13 Rule 3 CPC speaks as to the rejection of irrelevant and inadmissible documents at any stage of the suit. It does not deal with the probative value of a document or marking/exhibiting the same in evidence. The courts can adjudicate the matters before them only on the basis of substantive evidence.

Court Cannot Discard Documents, Straight Away. It has to be marked ‘subject to proof’

When a ‘relevant’ and ‘admissible’ document is tendered in evidence, otherwise than through its executant (or a witness to the document) –

  • Can it be discarded outright by the Court, pointing out – no ‘formal proof’?
  • What will be the situation if the opposite side does not raise objection (or expressly say – they have no objection) to such marking?
  • Can a copy of a document be marked without ‘foundational evidence’, on admission?

It is definite –

  • The court cannot discard such documents, straight away.
  • It has to be marked ‘subject to proof’ or ‘subject to objection’, as it is the practice followed. The law also supports it.

Admission is a Mode of Proof; ‘Facts Admitted Need Not be Proved’

Usually, a document is proved through its author, or through a witness or a person acquainted with handwriting. Admission by the opposite side is an acceptable form of proving documents in evidence (under Sec. 17, 21, 58, 59 Evidence Act). Even ‘Truth of the contents’ of documents can also be established by concession or admission from the other side (“at the hearing”).

Sec. 58, Evidence Act reads as under:

“58. Facts admitted need not be proved: No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings:
             Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.”

Sec. 58 says that no fact need be proved in any proceeding in three circumstances:

  1. the parties or their agents agree to admit at the hearing
  2. before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands
  3. by any rule of pleading they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings.

HearingPartakes ‘recording evidence’

Legal implication of the term ‘hearing’ is clear from Rule 2 (1) of Order XVIII (Hearing of the suit and examination of witnesses) of the CPC – that is, hearing partakes ‘recording evidence’.

Admissions – by the Advocate at Hearing

Admissions (at ‘hearing’) – by the advocate – may be made at the evidence-stage (while the witnesses are examined) and at the time of ‘final hearing’. Admissions by advocate are to be deciphered from Judgment (Sarcar) or Order-sheet.

Admissions are Substantive Evidence By Themselves

In Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405: 1966-1 SCR 606, it was observed as under:

  • Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of ss. 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted.”

Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi is quoted/referred to in:

  • Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2019 SC  3363; 2019-16 SCC 547.
  • Union of India v. Moksh Builders And Financiers Ltd., 1977 AIR SC 409; 1977-1 SCC 60.
  •  Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad AIR 1974 SC 117, 1974-1  SCC 78,
  • Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil, (1977) 2 SCC 49,
  • Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1971 SC 1153; 1971-1 SCC 864.

In the case of Murlidhar Bapuji Valve v. Yallappa Lalu Chougule, AIR 1994 Bom 358, it was held that an “admission” made by a party in a sale deed was liable to be considered as substantive evidence, and there was no need to confront the witness with the statement.

Marking Documents “Subject to Objection or Proof”

In M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, (Ayodhya Case), 2020-1 SCC 1, the practice of marking documents “subject to objection and proof” was referred to as under:

  • “539. On 7 February 2002, counsel for the plaintiffs in Suit 5 filed a report dated 3 February 2002 before the High Court of Dr. KV Ramesh, pertaining to the “Ayodhya Vishnu Hari temple inscription”. The documents were taken on record “subject to objection and proof” as required by the provisions of the Evidence Act 1872. ….”

The practice of exhibiting documents ‘subject to proof and relevancy’ is also referred to in –

  • Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, 2022-10 SCC 451 (photocopy),
  • Uttaradi Mutt v. Raghavendra Swamy Mutt, 2018-10 SCC 484,
  • Ameer Minhaj v. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar, 2018-7 SCC 639,
  • Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics Pvt.  Ltd., 2015-9 SCC 755,
  • State of Bihar v. PP Sharma, AIR 1991 SC 1260: 1992 Supp1 SCC 222,
  • Nilavarnisa v. MM  Faizal, 2019-1 KHC 699; 2019-1 KLT 652.

PART II

Effect of Marking Documents without Objection

Following two things are different processes –

  • (i) admission or exhibiting of a document in evidence; and
  • (ii) proving the ‘truth of its contents‘ (or veracity of the same).

But, in certain cases, as comes out from Sec. 56, 57 and 58 of the Evidence Act, when a document is admitted, or marked without objection separate proof as to ‘truth of contents’ may not be warranted.

  • Similarly, separate proof need not be required when presumptions (Sec. 114, Evidence Act) can be invoked (e.g. document in ordinary course of business, a letter obtained in reply or a public document).

What is the effect of marking documents without objection; do contents stand proved; does it bar raising objection afterwards?

  • Divergent views are taken by the Courts depending on the facts of each case.
First view
(a) Proof (Contents and ‘Truth of its Contents’) stands established.  It cannot be questioned afterwards.

(b) Admission of contents – but, does not dispense with proof of truth of its contents.
(a) RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami: AIR 2003  SC  4548; Narbada Devi  v. Birendra Kumar: (2003) 8 SCC 745; Dayamati Bai v. K.M. Shaffi : AIR 2004 SC 4082; Oriental Insurance Co v. Premlata:  (2007) 8 SCC 575; Thimmappa Rai v. RamannaRai,(2007) 14 SCC 63; Iqbal Basith v. N Subbalakshmi, (2021) 2 SCC 718.
(b) Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865; Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796 .
Second View
Even if no objection,
it does not dispense with proof (as to, both, existence of the document and its truth).
In such a case the document will not be taken as proved.

(Note: It may not be legitimate to apply this principle literatim. A close analysis of each case is essential.)
LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen: 2010-4 SCC 491 (Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry);
H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240 (Copy of a power of attorney alone was shown to the respondent during cross-examination and he admitted his signature thereon only, and not its contents);
Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohith: 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 (date of birth).
Third view
If truth is in issue, mere proof of contents, or marking without objection, is not proof of truth.
See: Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745; Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085.
Fourth view
Admission of contents, and
dispenses with proof and truth;
but its probative value will be a matter for appreciation by court.
See: State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684 (Admission and probative value – different); Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri: 2015  AIR(SCW) 6271; Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758;  H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492;  Rasiklal Manikchand  v. MSS Food Products: 2012-2 SCC 196.
Fifth view
Admission of contents, and
dispenses with proof and truth;
but Court should require (in proper cases) the party producing the document to adduce proper evidence, and to cure formal defects, invoking –
              • Sec. 165 of Evidence Act
              • Sec. 58 of Evidence Act
              • O. XII, r. 2A Proviso, CPC and
              • Sec. 294 of the CrPC.
See: Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh, (2005) 13 SCC 511;
Umesh Challiyil v. K.P. Rajendra, (2008) 11 SCC 740;
KK Ramachandran Master v. MV Sreyamakumar, (2010) 7 SCC 428; AIR 2015 SC 3796.

1. (a) Once no Objection to Mode of Proof, Right to Objection Stands Waived

 It is trite law that once no-objection is raised to the mode of proof on account of lack of original, then the right of the opposite party to raise objection (on this score) stands waived. RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu, AIR 2003 SC 4548: (2003) 8 SCC 752, is often quoted to establish the proposition – 

It was the position of law accepted by our legal system. See:

  • Sk. Farid Hussinsab v. State of Maharashtra, 1983 CrLJ 487 (Quoted in Sonu @ Amar v. State of Haryana, AIR  2017  SC 3441; 2017-8 SCC 570)
  • Rafia Sultan Widow of Mirza Sultan Ali Baig v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1986 GujLH 27; 1985-2 GujLR 1315 (relied on:  P. C. Purushottamman v. S. Perumal AIR 1972 SC 608;
  • Pandappa v. Shivlingappa 47 BLR. 962; and
  • Gopaldas  v. ShriThakurli AIR 1943 PC 83).

See also:

  • Lachhmi Narain Singh v. Sarjug Singh, AIR 2021 SC 3873;
  • Sumita @ Lamta v. Devki, (Valmiki J. Mehta, J.), 25 Sep 2017 (indiakanoon);
  • Oriental Insurance Co v. Premlata:  (2007) 8 SCC 575,
  • Dayamathi Bai v. KM Shaffi, (2004) 7 SCC 107, AIR 2004 SC 4082;
  • R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752;
  • Narbada Devi  v. Birendra Kumar: (2003) 8 SCC 745
  • Thimmappa Rai v. Ramanna Rai,(2007) 14 SCC 63.

When a document is marked without objection, our courts take two (divergent) views:

  • First, both Contents and ‘Truth of its Contents’ stand proved.
  • Second, contents alone stand proved; and, not ‘Truth’ of its Contents.

Effect of marking document without objection is laid down in the following two recent decisions of the Supreme Court. In both these cases, it is seen, the Apex Court has taken the view that the ‘truth’ is also stood proved.

The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 330; 2023 4 SCC 731, held as under:

  • “44. Section 64 of the Evidence Act states that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in certain cases mentioned above. ….. Thus, once a document has been properly admitted, the contents of the documents would stand admitted in evidence, and if no objection has been raised with regard to its mode of proof at the stage of tendering in evidence of such a document, no such objection could be allowed to be raised at any later stage of the case or in appeal vide Amarjit Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1995 Cr LJ 1623 (Del) (“Amarjit Singh”). But the documents can be impeached in any other manner, though the admissibility cannot be challenged subsequently when the document is bound in evidence.”

In PC Thomas v. PM Ismail, AIR 2010 SC 905; 2009-10 SCC 239, it is observed  as under:

  • “No objection on pleas of “inadmissibility” or “mode of proof” was raised at the time of their exhibition or any time later during trial, when most of the witnesses, produced by the parties were confronted with these, as duly exhibited, bearing stamp marking with particulars, prescribed under Order XIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and duly signed as such.
  • In our opinion, it is too late in the day now to object to their exhibition on the ground of “prescribed procedure” i.e. mode of proof.
  • Moreover, we also find that it was nobody’s case that the said documents were got printed by John K or distributed amongst voters by him. Absence of proof of acknowledgment by him because of non production of John K as a witness, in the circumstances, in our view, is inconsequential.
  • Admittedly, John K was a well known leader of high stature, recognized as such by Christian/Catholic voters including those mentioned in Para 17 (supra) and, therefore, there is no question of drawing an adverse inference against the election petitioner for not examining him, as strenuously urged on behalf of the appellant, particularly when the printing and circulation of offending material (Exts.P1 and P2) has been proved by the election petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.”

Objection as to Truth of Contents, First Time In Appeal – Effect

In Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1986 ACJ 616; 1986 Guj LH 27; 1985-2 GujLR 1315 it is observed as under:

  • “It was never the case of the Commission that report which was submitted in a sealed cover was not the genuine and true report of the committee appointed by the Commission itself. Thus in short no objection about the truth of contents of Ex. 24/1 i. e. Ex. 32 was ever put forward before the trial Court and rightly so as that was the report of its own committee of experts appointed by the Commission for enlightening itself about the causes of the accident and about the future safety steps which were required to be taken to avoid such accidents. … Not only that but the witness of the defendant accepted the contents of the said document Ex. 32. Nothing was suggested by him or even whispered to the effect that the contents of the said report were in any way untrue. …. In fact both the sides have relied upon different parts of Ex. 32 in support of their rival contentions on the aspect of negligence and contributory negligence. It is therefore too late in the day for Miss Shah for the Commission to canvass for the first time before us in appeal that contents of Ex. 32 were not proved in accordance with law and hence the document was required to be taken off the record. It is now well settled that objection about mode of proof can be waived by a party and that such objection is raised by the party at the earliest opportunity in the trial Court such objection will be deemed to have been waived and cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in appeal (vide P. C. Purushottamman v. S. Perumal AIR 1972 SC 608; Pandappa v. Shivlingappa 47 BLR. 962; and Gopaldas and another v. Shri Thakurli, AIR 1943 PC 83 at page 87 ). In view of this settled legal position the objection raised by Miss Shah against admissibility of Ex. 32 viz. that its contents were not proved in accordance with law has to be repelled.”

(b) Document marked without objection – Contents (‘TRUTH also) proved

When a document is marked without objection, no doubt, the presumption in Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act is wide enough to presume that (i) the “contents” of the document and (ii) its ‘truth’ stand ‘proved’. Therefore, it is the duty of the other side to express its disapproval – that it does not accept the ‘contents’ and/or ‘truth’ (if it is so).

The dissent thereof can be placed by the opposite side by-

  • Raising ‘objection’ at the time of its marking, or
  • Placing the protest by way of ‘suggestion’ to the witness or by proper questions, in cross examination.

(c) TRUTH is left to Discretion (Sec. 3) & Presumption (Sec. 114) of Court

Sec. 67, Evidence Act lays down the fundamental principles as to the proof of documents. Sec. 67 reads as under:

“67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced—If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person’s handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting.”

Sec. 67 says as to ‘proof of signature and handwriting’ alone. Neither Sec. 67 nor any other section of the Evidence Act says about ‘proof as to truth‘ of contents of documents.

Inferences as to “TRUTH of contents

  • Evidence Act does not expressly proffer anything as to “TRUTH of contents” of documents.
  • It is left to the discretion (Sec. 3) of the court. In proper cases court can presume (Sec. 114) truth.
  • In most cases, ‘proof of execution’ leads the court to presume ‘proof of truth’.
  • It is more so, when a document is admitted (by the other side) without objection.
  • But, when proof as to ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute, the party in whom the burden thereof rests has to discharge it.

(d) Legal Position on ‘Waiver’ of Mode of Proof, Reprised

It appears that the legal position can be summed-up as under –

  • If a document is marked without objection, the right of objection (vested with the other side) stands waived And the entire contents of the document would be admissible in evidence.
  • However, if (i) there is any intrinsic infirmity to the document, or (ii) specific proof as to truth is required in the nature of the case of the parties, or it is marked through a witness who is incompetent to prove it (and the opposite party does not expressly or impliedly accepted it), the court can say – it is not ready to act upon it, for truth or correctness of contents is not established.

In Dibakar Behera v. Padmabati Behera, AIR 2008 Ori  92, it is pointed out that (in such a situation) there must be some evidence to support the contents of such document.

It is apposite to note – in RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arumlmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003  SC  4548, the question as to ‘truth’ of contents did not specifically come for consideration. It is dealt with as under:

  • “Since documents A30 and A34 were admitted in evidence without any objection, the High Court erred in holding that these documents were inadmissible being photo copies, the originals of which were not produced.”

Photocopy of 30 Years Old OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS – Marked WITHOUT OBJECTION– REGULARITY can be Presumed

Quoting Lakhi Baruah v. Padma Kanta, it is elucidated in Iqbal Basith v. N Subbalakshmi, (2021) 2 SCC 718, as regards official/public document, marked without objection, presumption under Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act (there shall be a that all official acts have been regularly performed) can be invoked, over and above the presumption under Ser. 90. It is held as under:

  • “The appellants produced photocopies of all other resolutions, government orders and sale deed in favour of their vendor OA Majid Khan by the Municipality. The failure to produce the originals or certified copies of other documents was properly explained as being untraceable after the death of the brother of P.W.1 who looked after property matters. The attempt to procure certified copies from the municipality was also unsuccessful as they were informed that the original files were not traceable. The photocopies were marked as exhibits without objection. The respondents never questioned the genuineness of the same. Despite the aforesaid, and the fact that these documents were more than 30 years oldwere produced from the proper custody of the appellants along with an explanation for non­production of the originals, they were rejected without any valid reason holding that there could be no presumption that documents executed by a public authority had been issued in proper exercise of statutory powers. This finding in our opinion is clearly perverse in view of Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, which provides that there shall be a presumption that all official acts have been regularly performed. The onus lies on the person who disputes the same to prove otherwise.”

2. MERE MARKING, DOES NOT PROVE THE CONTENTS –  NOT AN UNQUALIFIED PROPOSITION 

This Proposition is Not to be Applied “Literatim”

It is disgraceful that several courts in India apply this proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) ineptly.  

This proposition is not attracted–

  • when a document is marked on ‘admission’ by the opposite side.

This proposition is attracted–

  • when it is evident that the document is marked only for ‘identification, or
  • when the objection raised by the other side is sustained and the document is marked ‘subject to proof/objection’.
  • when the document is marked through an incompetent witness and not proved through a competent witness (in spite of the objection in this regard), afterwards;
  • when it has come out in cross examination of the witness through whom it is marked (by other evidence) that it is not proved ‘in accordance with law.

Each Case under this Head Requires Distinct Consideration

As this proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) is not to be applied “literatim”, each case (which referred to this proposition) requires distinct consideration. (Some of these decisions mentioned this proposition, merely to show that such an argument was placed before it; but those decisions were quoted (subsequently) by some Courts as if those earlier decisions laid down a ‘ratio decidendi’.)

Read blog: Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent; Not the Final Order or Conclusion

Following are the often-cited cases on this subject.

(a) Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was neither attracted nor applied in this case, for – the rent receipts were taken as proved, for, it was not disputed by the other side.]

It is held in Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745 as under:

  • “Reliance is heavily placed on behalf of the appellant on Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085. The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof  of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue”.

Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal (supra) continued as under:

  • “The plaintiff did not dispute his signatures on the back of them. There was, therefore, no further burden of proof on the defendant to lead additional evidence in proof of the writing on the rent receipts and its due execution by the deceased landlady.”

Note:

  • In this case the rent receipts were taken as proved, for, it was ‘not disputed’. [Hence the ‘legal position’ stated in Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import (that mere production and marking of a document cannot be held to be a due proofwas not attracted in this case.]

(b) Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh2013-10 SCC 758

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contentswas neither attracted nor applied in this case, for – the secondary evidence of dying declaration produced in this case (with foundational evidence) was accepted by the Court]

In this case the Courts upheld the acceptance of the secondary evidence (of the dying declaration). Our Apex Court held as under-

  • “In the instant case, the Trial Court had granted permission to lead secondary evidence and the same had been adduced strictly in accordance with law and accepted by the courts below.”

It is only pointed out in this decision as under:

  • “However, the secondary evidence of an ordinary document is admissible only and only when the party desirous of admitting it has proved before the court that it was not in his possession or control of it and further, that he has done what could be done to procure the production of it. Thus, the party has to account for the non-production in one of the ways indicated in the section. The party further has to lay down the factual foundation to establish the right to give secondary evidence where the original document cannot be produced. When the party gives in evidence a certified copy/secondary evidence without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, the opposite party must raise an objection at the time of admission. In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.Further, mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with the proof , which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law.
    • (Vide: The Roman Catholic Mission v. The State, AIR 1966 SC 1457;
    • Marwari Khumhar v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri, AIR 2000 SC 2629;
    • RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu, AIR 2003 SC 4548;
    • Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082; and
    • LIC of India  v. Rampal Singh Bisen,2010-4 SCC 491).”

(c) Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contentswas neither attracted nor applied in this case, for – Truth of the facts in the document was in issue”]

It is held as under:

  • “Obviously, in these circumstances the Privy Council observed that the fact that a letter and two telegrams were sent by itself would not prove the truth of the contents of the letter and, therefore, the contents of the letter bearing on the question of lack of testamentary capacity would not be substantive evidence. Undoubtedly, mere proof of the handwriting of a document would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the facts stated in the document. If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouch safe for the truth of the facts in issue.”
  • Note: The aforequoted portion itself will show that the proposition – mere proof of the handwriting would not tantamount to proof of contents – is not absolute. It is attracted to this case, because the truth of the facts was “in issue“.

(d) M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, 2010-9 SCC 712

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was applied in this case, for – the Validity and Genuineness of the Photocopy (of the Caste Certificate) was very much in question]

In this decision it was held:

  • “The High Court while considering this issue has noticed that the appellant failed to produce the original certificate issued by Arya Samaj, Madurai and further has not examined Santnakumar, who was supposed to have received and retained the original certificate issued by the Arya Samaj and the original records have not been summoned from Arya Samaj and no steps have been taken to summon the responsible person from Arya Samaj to prove that the appellant underwent conversion. Therefore, the claim made by her about her reconversion cannot be accepted. We do not agree with the reasoning of the High Court. It is true that a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of a document must adduce primary evidence of the contents, and only in the exceptional cases will secondary evidence be admissible. However, if secondary evidence is admissible, it may be adduced in any form in which it may be available, whether by production of a copy, duplicate copy of a copy, by oral evidence of the contents or in another form. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original.”
  • Note: It was an appeal from an Election petition and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The validity and genuineness of the Certificate was very much in question. Therefore, the principles in RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu, AIR 2003 SC 4548 (where the secondary evidence was marked without objection), was not attracted to this case (and it was not referred to also).
  • Principle of law laid down in M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu is followed in Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri, 2016 -16 SCC 483.

(e) H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was applied in this case, for – the Photocopy was shown to the witness during cross-examination alone, and signature alone was admitted by the witness.]

It was held that the power of attorney was not proved in accordance with the terms of Sec. 65 of the Evidence Act, for the following –

  • The power of attorney had not been proved.
  • Original had never been filed before the Trial Court.
  • Only a photocopy of the same was shown to the respondent during cross-examination.
  • The respondent has only admitted his signature thereon.
  • He had never admitted its contents or genuineness.

It is held in H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, 2011-4 SCC 240, as under:

  • “In our humble opinion, the Trial Court could not proceed in such an unwarranted manner for the reason that the respondent had merely admitted his signature on the photocopy of the power of attorney and did not admit the contents thereof.”

It is added:

  • More so, the court should have borne in mind that admissibility of a document or contents thereof may not necessary lead to drawing any inference unless the contents thereof have some probative value.”

(f) Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865.

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was applied in this case, for – the accounts of the Plaintiff would not be proved by itself.]

It is held that the documents do not prove themselves. It is also observed in this decision as under:

  • “15. The plaintiffs wanted to rely on Exs. A-12 and A-13, the day book and the ledger respectively. The plaintiffs did not prove these books. There is no reference to these books in the judgments. The mere marking of an exhibit does not dispense with the proof of documents. It is common place to say that the negative cannot be proved. The proof of the plaintiffs’ books of account became important because the plaintiffs’ accounts were impeached and falsified by the defendants’ case of larger payments than those admitted by the plaintiffs. The irresistible inference arises that the plaintiffs’ books would not have supported the plaintiffs.” (Quoted in: Vinod Jaswantray Vyas v. State of Gujarat, 2024-7 SCR 365.)

Other Important Decisions –

  • 1. LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen: 2010-4 SCC 491 (Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry); 
  • 2. Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohith: 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 (document on date of birth).
  • 3.  Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796 (It is observed that mere marking as exhibit and identification of executant’s signature by one of witnesses does not prove contents of a document).
  • 4. Vinod Jaswantray Vyas v. State of Gujarat, 2024-7 SCR 365 (mere marking of exhibit – letter – without the expert deposing about the opinion given therein would not  dispense with the proof of contents).

3. IF ‘TRUTH’ IS IN ISSUE – Mere Marking Not Amount to ‘Waiver’

The fundamental principles as to proof of execution a document is that the execution has to be proved by proper evidence, that is by the ‘evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue’ (Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745). 

  • Note: In the facts and circumstances of each case, the court is at liberty to invoke its wisdom and fill certain gaps in evidence by applying ‘presumption’ (as shown elsewhere in this article). But it is subject to the discretion of the court – to take presumption and evaluate probative value.

If ‘TRUTH’ is in issue, or in dispute, marking a document without objection, or mere proof of handwriting or execution, by itself, need not absolve the duty to prove the truth as to the contents of the documents. Court has a duty to see that the statement of a witness gets independent corroboration, direct or circumstantial, in proper cases (Ahalya Bariha v. Chhelia Padhan, 1992 Cri.LJ 493).

In Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, it was held as under:

  • “If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”

See also:

  • State of Bihar v. Radhaa Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684,
  • Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, AIR 2004 SC 175,
  • Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Premlata Shukla, 2007-13 SCC 476,
  • Dharmarajan v. Valliammal, AIR 2008 SC 850,
  • Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant, AIR 2010 SC 2933,
  • Joseph John Peter Sandy v. Veronica Thomas Rajkumar, AIR 2013 SC 2028
  • Achuthan Pillai v. Marikar (Motors) Ltd., AIR 1983 Ker 81;
  • Suresh v. Tobin, 2013-1 KerLT 293.

4. Admission of Contents – May Dispense with ProofBut PROBATIVE VALUE may be Less or Nil

The discretion vested with the court to take presumption; and to evaluate probative value.

It is well settled that when a party leads secondary evidence, the Court is obliged to examine the probative value of the document and its contents, and to decide the question of admissibility of the same [Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri: 2015  AIR(SCW) 6271; Kaliya v. State of MP, 2013-10 SCC 758 ].

Even when a document is technically admitted in court, the probative value thereof will always be a matter for the court to determine. That is, it is depended upon the nature of each case.

The probative value of Scene-Mahazar, Postmortem Report, Photocopy of a Registered Deed etc. without supporting legal evidence may be lesser. In such cases the court can refrain from acting upon such documents until regular evidence is tendered.

In Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh2013-10 SCC 758, after holding – ‘Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof’ – it is further held as under:

  • “The court is obliged to examine the probative value of documents produced in court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence.”
  • [Note: Further held: “In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.”]

In Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758 our Apex Court also referred to  H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, AIR 2011 SC 1492, and Rasiklal Manikchand  v. MSS Food Products: 2012-2 SCC 196.

In Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri, 2015 AIR (SCW) 6271, as regards mere admittance of secondary evidence, it is held:

  • Mere admission of secondary evidence, does not amount to its proof. The genuineness, correctness and existence of the document shall have to be established during the trial and the trial court shall record the reasons before relying on those secondary evidences.”

In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [2010-4 SCC 491], it is observed as under:

  • “26. We are of the firm opinion that mere admission of document in evidence does amount to its proof. In other words, mere marking of exhibit on a document does dispense with its proof, which is required to be done in accordance with law. …..
  • 27. It was the duty of the appellants to have proved documents Exh.-A-1 to Exh. A-10 in accordance with law. Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry would partake the character of admissible evidence in Court of law. That documentary evidence was also required to be proved by the appellants in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, which they have failed to do.”

The Calcutta High Court [quoting Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, 2010-4 SCC 491] it is observed in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company v. Smt. Santa (2019-2 ACC 36) that ‘even if the document had been marked as Exhibit-A without objection, without a formal proof thereof in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, such document lost its credibility and is of no probative value’.

Best Evidence Rule and ‘Evidence of High Probative Value

Though various kinds of secondary evidences are provided under Sec. 63, the ‘probative value’ of one kind (say, a photograph/photostat of an original document, as stated in Illustration (a) of Sec. 63) will definitely be higher when compared with another (say, oral account). The best evidence rule insists for evidence bearing high ‘probative value’.

In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh (AIR 1983 SC 684) it is observed as under:

  • “Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”

Secondary Evidence would be Admissible only in Exceptional Cases

In Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti, AIR 1990 SC 396, it had been observed as under:

  • A certified copy of a registered sale deed may be produced as secondary evidence in the absence of the original. But in the present case Ex. 3 is not certified copy. It is just an ordinary copy. There is also no evidence regarding content of the original sale deed. Ex.3 cannot therefore, be considered as secondary evidence. The appellate Court has a right and duty to exclude such evidence.”

5. Court should allow to adduce proper evidence to prove documents

Besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove that document. It is evident from –

              • Sec. 58 of Evidence Act,
              • O. XII, r. 2A Proviso, CPC and
              • Sec. 294 of the CrPC.

Inasmuch as –

  • (a) mere marking of a document on admission will not amount to proof, or evidence of the contents of the document or its truth;
  • (b) the probative value of a document ‘marked without objection’ may be low or nil, for want of proper proof; and
  • (c) there may be a formal defect to the document for it is a secondary evidence and it is produced without adducing ‘foundational evidence’, 

it is legitimate to say that before taking an adverse stance as to proof in these counts, the court should give an opportunity to the party who relies on the document to cure the deficiency.

Duty of the Court to Aid Fair Trial

As shown above, the Privy Council, in Padman v. Hanwanta, 1915 (17) BomLR 609: AIR 1915 PC 111, held, as regards objection as to the admissibility of a certified copy of a will without any objection, as under:

  • “11. … Had such objection been made at the time, the District Judge, who tried the case in the first instance, would probably have seen that the deficiency was supplied. Their Lordships think that there is no substance in the present contention.”

Defect for not producing a proper power of attorney being curable, in Haryana State Coop.  Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd. v. Jayam Textiles, 2014 AIR SC 1926 (a case under Section 138 Negotiable instruments Act), the Apex Court gave opportunity to the petitioner to produce the authorization of Board of Directors. It is observed that the in Raj Narian v. Indira Nehru Gandhi, (1972) 3 SCC 850 it was held that the rules of pleadings are intended as aids for a fair trial and for reaching a just decision. 

This principle is iterated in following cases also:

  • F.A. Sapa v. Singora, (1991) 3 SCC 375;
  • H.D. Revanna v. G. Puttaswamy Gowda, (1999) 2 SCC 217;
  • V.S. Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis, (1999) 3 SCC 737;
  • Mahendra Pal v. Ram Dass Malanger, (2000) 1 SCC 261;
  • Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh, (2007) 3 SCC 617; (observed that facta probanda (material facts) are to be set out in the pleadings and facta probantia (particulars or evidence) need not be set out in the pleadings);
  • Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar v. Sukh Darshan Singh, (2004) 11 SCC 196
  • (held that defective verification or affidavit is curable);
  • Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh, (2005) 13 SCC 511;
  • Umesh Challiyil v. K.P. Rajendra, (2008) 11 SCC 740;
  • KK Ramachandran Master v. MV Sreyamakumar, (2010) 7 SCC 428
  • T.C. Lakshamanan v. Vanaja, ILR 2011-3 (Ker) 228; 2011-3 KLT 347.

End Notes

1. Proof is of Two Types:

  • First, Formal Proof, or Proof as to existence of the document. The modes of proof of documents are governed under Sec. 64 to 73A of the Evd. Act.
  • Second, Substantive Proof or Proof as to truth. Besides the formal proof, in most cases (excepting a few cases where signature, hand-writing etc. alone are considered), the court acts upon a document, only when ‘truth’ of the contents of the document is established.  

2.Modes of Proof of Documents

Documents can be proved (both, ‘formal proof’ and ‘truth of the contents’) in the following ways:

  • Admission of the person who wrote or signed the document (Sec. 17, 21, 58, 67, 70).
  • Evidence of a person in whose presence the document was signed or written – ocular evidence (Sec. 59).
  • An attesting witness (Sec. 59).
  • Opinion of a person who is acquainted with the writing of the person who signed or wrote (Sec. 47).
  • Admission made by the person who signed or wrote the document made in judicial proceedings (Sec. 32, 33).
  • Evidence of a handwriting expert-opinion evidence/scientific evidence (Sec.45).
  • Evidence of a person who in routine has been receiving the document; or a document signed by such a person in the ordinary course of his business or official duty, though he may have never seen the author signing the document (Sec. 32, 34, 35 or 114).
  • Public documents – Sec. 74 – 77.
  • Invoking (specific) presumptions under Sec. 79 to 90A.
  • Presumptions (general) under Sec. 114.
  • Circumstantial evidence: on probability or inferences (Sec. 114).
  • Court-comparison (Sec. 73).
  • Facts judicially noticeable (Sec. 56 and 57).
  • A fact of common-knowledge. (It does not require proof. See: Union Of India Vs. Virendra Bharti: 2011-2 ACC 886, 2010  ACJ 2353; Rakhal Chakraborty Vs. Sanjib Kumar Roy: 1998-1 GauLR 253, 1997-2 GauLT 705)
  • Internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document; a link in a chain of correspondence; recipient of the document. (Mobarik Ali Ahmed Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857)

3. Proof as to truth is to be established-

  • (i) by oral evidence of one who can vouchsafe the same or
  • (ii) by circumstantial evidence or
  • (iii) by invoking ‘presumption’ or
  • (iv) by express admission by the other side.

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Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introspection.

            •➧ Governments’ rights and powers based on the doctrine, ‘Eminent Domain‘ (arises from:  dominium eminens or ‘supreme ownership’ – Wikipedia) are accepted by all democratic jurisdictions, including the UK, US, and India.  
            •➧ In a dispute between the State and a private individual over property ownership, the burden rests upon the private individual to affirmatively establish his title supported by valid and legally admissible documentary evidence. The State enjoys a presumption of ownership. It becomes even stronger when certain factors are present—such as the land’s proximity to forest areas, coastal zones, or other ecologically sensitive locations—and when foundational revenue documents, including the General Land Register and Settlement Register, indicate a strong likelihood that the property belongs to the Government.
            •➧ In such a dispute, if the private person fails to establish a valid title, it is not open to him to contend that the State has also failed to prove its title or discharge any burden. This is because the law recognises certain presumptions in favour of the State, particularly in cases involving land situated near forests, coastal areas, etc.
            •➧ Disputes may arise when a piece of land is recorded as Government property in revenue or other official records, while a private individual asserts ownership based on a title deed in his possession. In such cases, courts place significant reliance on foundational documents, such as the General Land Register and the Settlement Register, as well as the prior deeds of the claimant. And, it will consider whether the doctrine nemo dat quod non habet—one cannot give what one does not have—is to be applied.

Key Decisions

  • Usha Kapoor v. Govt.  of India, 2014-16 SCC 481: (The General Land Register maintained by the Cantonment Board under the Cantonment Act and the Rules framed thereunder is a public document and the entries therein are conclusive evidence of title and of the fact that the land is covered by an old grant. Followed: Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, 2012-8 SCC 148; Union of India v. Kamla Verma, 2010-13 SCC 511; Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil, AIR 1999 SC 2294.)
  • Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, 2012(8) SCC 148: (It is a settled legal position that the entries made in the General Land Register maintained under Cantonment Land Administration Rules are conclusive evidence of title. …… The appellate courts examined the title of Government instead of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. The title of Government cannot be disputed. ….. The issue had been as to whether the plaintiff was the owner of the suit-land. Relied on in: Union of India v. Robert Zomawia Street, AIR 2014 SC 2721; 2014-6 SCC 707)
  • R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Govt of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203: (Presumption available in favour of the government – all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government.)
  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988 (When the land subject to proceedings wherein adverse possession has been claimed, belongs to the Government, the court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property.)
  • Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil, AIR 1999 SC 2294; 1999-3 SCC 555: (Had there been any conveyance or lease, it should have come from their custody. The Regulations, as well as the General Land Register maintained under the Cantonment Land Administration Rules of 1925, which are old documents, clearly indicate that the land is held on an old grant.)
  • Ameer Hussain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 204, 1977 AWC 1: (It would be deemed that the disputed land vested in the State, and if the other side fails, in law,  it would be taken that the land was vested in the State. Quoted in Mohd.  Shafiq v. Asstt.  Director Of Consolidation, Lucknow, 2011- 9 ADJ 24.)
  • Pierce Lessley & Company Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlong Waoshare, AIR 1969 SC 843: (Ultimate ownership by the State of all property within the jurisdiction of the State.)
  • Chotte Khan v. Muhammed Obedulla Khan, AIR 1953 Nag. 361: (The State is the ultimate owner of all property.)
  • Sahana Industries v. State of Kerala,, 2021 KHC OnLine 7110, Kerala High Court, Devan Ramachandran, J.: (If the Settlement Register shows this land to be Government land, then certainly, the petitioner is obliged to establish their title over the property through competent documents. (Followed in: Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, WP(C) No. 25830/2010, 24.01. 2025, Harisankar V. Menon, J.)
  • The Secretary of State for India v. Chimanlal Jamnadas, (1942)44 BomLR 295, AIR 1942 Bom 161: “Even assuming that the lease be not held as proved, the plaintiffs had no title to the land as rightly held by the lower Court and as nobody else was its owner at the time when it was occupied by the plaintiffs’ ancestor, the presumption under Section 37 of the Land Revenue Code which was also applicable before its enactment was that Government were its owner at that date. If the plaintiffs claim to remain in possession merely on the strength of their long possession in the past, though without any rightful title in them, Government had the right to assert their ownership which had not been divested by the act of the plaintiffs’ ancestor, and they had a right of resumption so long as the plaintiffs had not proved any acquisition of right in them by adverse possession against the Government.”
  • Union of India v. Laxman Yadneshwar Sathe, 2018-4 AllMR 157: “As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court therefore in the case of R. Hanumaiah and Another v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department and Others (supra), the west lands are presumed to be the Government lands. Rights, entitlement and presumptions of title lie in favour of the Government, distinguished from those of private parties. As held by this Court also, way back in the year 1941, in the case of The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Chimanlal, Jamnadas and Others (1942) Indian Law Reports 358), the Government is presumed to be the owner in case of lands which are not proved to be of a private party.”
  • Satpal Nahar v. Union of India (Sanjay Karol, Tarlok Singh Chauhan, JJ.), 2017 Supp HimLR 2994; ILR 2017-4 (HP) 196: “Even otherwise, it is settled that all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the Government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the Government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the Government is not available to any person or individual.”

The UK/England Decisions

  • Field Common Ltd v Elmbridge Borough Council (2008): When a local authority encroached the land of the claimant for the construction of a road, and the claimant sued for trespass, it was held that the claimant (private landowner) had to show that the council encroached. Since the defendant council asserted right of way by prescription over that land, it was held that the burden was on the council to prove the elements required for prescription.
  • Delaware Mansions Limited & Others v Lord Mayor and Citizens of the City of Westminster [2001]: In the case of encroachment by tree roots from property owned by Westminster City Council into property of the claimant, it was found that the claimant had to prove that roots had encroached, the existence of damage caused by those roots (for example, damage to drains/walls etc.). The technical distinction between trees being “self‑sown” versus planted, was rejected.
  • Entick v Carrington [1765]: Government agents entered private property under warrant, seized documents. It was held that the claimant had to show that the defendants entered without lawful authority/beyond their legal power. It was also found that the defendants would have to show lawful authority (warrant, statutory power etc.) they had the burden  to show they were acting under law.

The US Decisions

  • United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980): The US Supreme Court, while considering the burden of proof, made it clear that in ‘inverse condemnation’ the landowner must bring the claim, and that the landowner has the burden to demonstrate that a ‘taking’ in fact occurred. It is pointed out: “To accomplish a taking by seizure, on the other hand, a condemning authority need only occupy the land in question. Such a taking thus shifts to the landowner the burden to discover the encroachment and to take affirmative action to recover just compensation.”
  • Vaughn v. City of Muskogee, Oklahoma Civ. App., 2015: The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that in an ‘inverse condemnation’ proceeding, the landowner has the burden of proving that a taking has occurred, whether or not the government files an objection.
  • Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992 v. City of Boulder (Colorado, 2001): The Colorado Supreme Court held that in an inverse condemnation action, the landowner has the burden to prove both (i) a ‘taking’ has occurred and (ii) the amount of compensation.

Will ‘Long Possession’ Invite Civil Suit by the State?

In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081, 1982 (2) SCC 134 (Y.V. Chandrachud,A. Varadarajan, Amarendra Nath Sen, JJ.), the Supreme Court found that the respondents and their predecessors had long possession and therefore, a Civil Court enquiry on title was required on two matters:

  • 1. whether the title was vested in the Government
  • 2. whether the title by adverse possession was perfected (by the private person) against the Government of Andhra Pradesh.

The Apex Court said it as under:

  • “The conspectus of facts in the instant case justifies the view that the question as to the title to the three plots cannot appropriately be decided in a summary inquiry contemplated by sections 6 and 7 of the Act. The long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in- title of these plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title, remembering especially that the property, admittedly, belonged originally to the family of Nawab Habibuddio from whom the respondents claim to have purchased it. The question as to whether the title to the property came to be vested in the Government as a result of acquisition and the further question whether the Nawab encroached upon that property thereafter and perfected his title by adverse possession must be decided in a properly constituted suit. May be that the Government may succeed in establishing its title to the property but until that is done, the respondents cannot be evicted summarily.”

Govt. of AP v. Thummala Krishna RaoCritical Appreciation

As pointed out in V. Laxminarasamma VS A. Yadaiah (S.B. Sinha, A.K. Ganguly & R.M. Lodha, JJ.), 2009-5 SCC 478, the ‘long possession’ and ‘adverse possession’ were considered in Thummala Krishna Rao case for the following:

  • (i) A suit for possession filed by Osmania University was dismissed earlier on the premise that Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession.
  • Thereafter Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to take steps for summary eviction

It is clear that the Government of AP need not have gone for a civil suit, if it was definite –

  • (i) the title of the disputed property vested with the Government and
  • (ii) there was no scope for an argument by the private person as regards adverse possession.

In V. Laxminarasamma v. A. Yadaiah (S.B. Sinha, A.K. Ganguly & R.M. Lodha, JJ.), 2009-5 SCC 478, in a Reference for determination of a question of adverse possession — whether it would come within the purview of the jurisdiction of Special Tribunal and/or Special Court constituted under the AP Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, noticing purported conflict in the decisions of two Division Benches — held as under:

  • 45. … We are not oblivious of a decision of this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and Anr. [(1982) 2 SCC 134] wherein it was held that a question of title could not properly be decided in a summary enquiry contemplated by Sections 6 and 7 of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905. In that case, the principal question, which arose for consideration, was as to whether the property in question was in possession of the family of one Habibuddin for a long time and, thus, the same had not vested in the Government by reason of a land acquisition proceeding initiated for acquisition of the land for Osmania University. In that case, Osmania University filed a suit for possession which was dismissed on the premise that Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession. Thereafter Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to take steps for summary eviction of the persons who are not in authorized occupation of the said plots. The observations made therein must be held to have been made in the aforementioned factual matrix.”
  • See also: Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah, AIR 2010 SC 744; 2010-2 SCC 461.

It is further clear from State of Rajasthan v. Padmavatidevi, 1995 Suppl(2) SCC 290, which observed as under:

  • “6. As noticed earlier, Section 91 of the Act prescribes a summary procedure for eviction of a person who is found to be in unauthorised occupation of Government land. The said provisions cannot be invoked in a case where the person in occupation raises bona fide dispute about his right to remain in occupation over the land. Dealing with similar provisions contained in Section 6of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1945, this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao (1982) 2 SCC 134 : (1982) 3 SCR 500 has laid down that the summary remedy for eviction provided by Section 6 of the said Act could be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of the Government and if the person in occupation has a bona fide claim to litigate he could not be ejected save by the due process of law and that the summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 was not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. For the same reasons, it can be said that summary remedy available under Section 91 of the Act is not the legal process which is suited for adjudication of complicated questions of title where the person sought to be evicted as an unauthorised occupant makes a bona fide claim regarding his right to be in possession. In such a case the proper course is to have the matter adjudicated by the ordinary courts of law.
  • 7. In the present case, Respondent 1 has put forward a bona fide claim about her right to remain in occupation over the land. The said claim raises questions involving applicability and interpretation of various laws and documents as well as investigation into disputed questions of fact involving recording of evidence. These matters could not be satisfactorily adjudicated in summary proceedings under Section 91 of the Act and can be more properly considered in regular proceedings in the appropriate forum.
  • 8. In view of the fact that these proceedings have been pending for the past 25 years, we were not disinclined to consider the claim of Respondent 1 that she is entitled to remain in occupation of the land.”
  • (Quoted in: Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji v. Union of India, AIR 2019 SC 1692; 2019 20 SCC 705)

The axioms, in the Government of AP v. Thummala Krishna Rao, on ‘long possession‘ and the scope of adjudication on ‘title by adverse possession‘ were not seen followed in subsequent pronouncements. Later decisions have clarified and reinforced certain key legal principles, including:

  • 1. Presumption available in favour of the government – all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government (R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Govt of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203).
  • 2. The court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property (Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988).

Part I

State is the Ultimate Owner: Escheat and Bona Vecantia – Incidents of Sovereignty

Our Apex Court, in Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlong Waoshare,, AIR 1969 SC 843, appraised the principles of escheat in the Constitutional context (particularly, Article 296 of the Constitution) and held as under:

  • “In this country escheat is not based on artificial Rules of Common Law and is not an incident of feudal tenure. It is an incident of sovereignty and rests on the principle of ultimate ownership by the State of all property within its jurisdiction.”

Also read:

Article 296 of the Constitution

Article 296 of the Constitution of India, provides as under:

“Subject as hereinafter provided, any property in the territory of India which, if this Constitution had not come into operation, would have accrued to His Majesty or, as the case may be, to the Ruler of an Indian State by escheat or lapse, or as bona vacantia for want of a rightful owner, shall if it is property situate in a State, vest in such State, and shall, in any other case, vest in the Union.”

State is the Ultimate Owner of the Property – Recognised Long Back

In Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlong Waoshare (supra) the Supreme Court relied on the Privy Council decision in 1860 in Collector of Massulipatnam v. Cavali Venata Narrainapeli, (1859-61) 8 MIR 500, where it was declared that the doctrine of bona vacantia or escheat was a part of the law in India. In Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavary Vancata Narrainappah it was observed as under:

  • “There can be, legally speaking, no unowned property, the law of escheat intervenes and prevails, and is adopted generally in all Courts of the Country alike. Private ownership not existing, the State must be owner as ultimate Lord.”

The same principle is iterated by Sinha, CJ, in in Chhote Khan v. Mohammad Obedulla Khan, AIR 1953 Nag 361, as under:

  • “The State Government is not in the position of the assignee interest of the proprietor, nor is it his successor in title, The State does not claim the proprietary interest, either through or under the outgoing proprietor. The State, as the ultimate owner of all property situate within its boundaries, naturally becomes, the owner of all property in villages, except those interests which have been recognized by the State as still vesting in or held by individuals in their rights as cultivators (‘malik-makbuza’ or otherwise) or as house-holders by virtue of being inhabitants of the village, or as having acquired by purchase or otherwise house-sites or buildings on house-sites.”

General Law of Universal Application

In Amir Hussain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 204, it had been noted as under:

  • “All important systems of Law provide for escheat to the Crown or Government of the property of a deceased person in the absence or failure of heirs.”

It is pointed out in Biswanath v. Prafulla Kumar Khan, AIR 1988 Cal 275, also that it is a General Law of universal application that ‘private ownership not existing, the State must be the owner as the ultimate Lord’.

Private Person to Prove his TitleState need not Prove Title

  • From Article 296 of the Constitution of India, it is clear that where a property:
    • is abandoned by all,
    • that has no rightful owner,
    • over which all claims raised are invalid, and
    • over which none can raise a valid claim
  • it vests with State.

Therefore, when a dispute comes as to the ownership of property between State and a ‘private person’, and the private person fails to prove his title, it is not Constitutional for him to argue that ‘the State also failed to prove its title and failed in discharging its burden’.

In Amir Hussain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 204, 1977 AWC 1, it observed as under:

  • “But, in a case where in proceedings under Section 9, the consolidator authorities reached at the conclusion that both the claimants had failed to prove their title, the necessary consequence of the finding was that the land had to be recognised as having vested in the State and in the Gaon Sabha. … To require a Gaon Sabha to file a claim at the commencement of the consolidation proceedings would be placing an impossible burden upon the Gaon Sabhabecause at that stage the Gaon Sabha could not possibly be in a position to know that the claim of the contending parties would be negatived and the land would be deemed to have vested in the State. In our opinion, the proper course in these cases is that if the authorities find that both the parties have failed to prove their title, and that in law the land has vested in the State under the Rule of escheat, they, in order to give effect to their findings, should direct the land to be recorded in the name of the Gaon Sabha.”
  • (Quoted in Mohd.  Shafiq v. Asstt.  Director Of Consolidation, Lucknow, 2011- 9 ADJ 24.)

In Vishwa Vijai Bharti v. Fakhrul Hasan, AIR 1976 SC 1485, it is held as to the presumption of correctness on revenue-records as under:

  • “It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry in to their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry is the revenue record states but the entry is open to the attack that it was Made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title.”

Revenue Settlement Registers of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters

The Kerala High Court held in Mohandas v. Santhakumari Amma, 2018-3 KLT 606 as under:

  • “We notice that, a new survey and settlement was undertaken in the erstwhile Travancore State for the purpose of putting in place a sound Revenue administration. Accordingly, it appears that a complete survey and reassessment of the entire State ’embracing an accurate measurement, demarcation, mapping and valuation of properties of every description and a registration of titles, as the basis of a sound Revenue Administration’ was carried out. On the basis of such a statement a proclamation was issued by the Maharaja of Travancore on 14th Kumbhom 1061 corresponding to 24th February 1886.”

If Settlement Register says Government Land, Petitioner to Establish Title

In Vallikunnil Janaki Amma v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode, 2014 (1) KHC 57, Kerala High Court, referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, observed as under:  

  • “Even though Ext. A2 is only an extract of the Settlement Register/ Adangal extract which may not by itself prove or confer title to a party in whose name the property stood registered, it can be accepted as evidence of title when there is no contra evidence. Admittedly it is adjacent to Amruthamangalam temple. The temple compound and this suit property which is adjacent to the temple are shown to be of Amruthamangalam Devaswom as per revenue record. In these circumstances, the contention that this property did not and does not belong to the temple/Devaswom cannot be sustained at all.” (Referred to in: Kunhimangalam Devaswam v. State of Kerala (2022 KHC OnLine 7354), 6 April, 2022, Anil K. Narendran, J. and Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, WP(C) No, 25830/2010,24.01. 2025, Harisankar V. Menon, J.)

In Sahana Industries v. State of Kerala, in WP(C) 20520/2021 (2021 KHC OnLine 7110), Kerala High Court (Devan Ramachandran, J.) held (October 11, 2021) as under:

  • “… If the Settlement Register shows this land to be Government land, then certainly, the petitioner is obliged to establish their title over the property through competent documents”. (Referred to in: Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, WP(C) No. 25830/2010, 24.01. 2025, Harisankar V. Menon, J.)

In Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, WP(C) No. 25830/2010 (2025:KER:5422) 24.01. 2025 (Harisankar V. Menon, J.) it is pointed out as under:

  • “7. …. In the settlement register at Ext. R1(a), there is no dispute that the entire properties under old Survey No. 2211 having an extent in excess of 107 Acres are shown as “puramboke….
  • 8…. As regards the petitioner in WP(C) No. 25830 of 2010 also, the title is traceable to some documents of the Attingal Sub Registry of the yeas 1959, 1957 and 1061. But, it is categorically found that even in these documents, there is no mention as to the receipt of pattayam with respect to the property in question.
  • 11. …. As already noticed, the settlement register describes the property as “Puramboke”. … In view of the discussions made above, I am of the opinion that the contentions raised by the learned Senior Government Pleader with respect to the malpractices committed, cannot be brushed aside.
  • 13….. However, I notice that WP(C) No.25830 of 2010 the entry with respect to the Settlement Register is to be considered at first, which admittedly is against the petitioner. The case of the State is that some foul play is carried out subsequently at the instance of those interested and therefore, the subsequent entries cannot be acted upon.
  • 14. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader relied on Vallikunnil Janaki Amma and Ors. v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode and Anr. [2014 (1) KHC 57], which laid down the principle with respect to the acceptability/relevance of the Settlement Register. As already noticed, I have found that the Settlement Register describes the property under old Survey No. 2211 as “Puramboke”. To the same effect is the judgment of a learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 20520 of 2021 dated 11.10.2021. This Court further notices the judgment of the Apex Court in Suraj Bhan and Ors. v. Financial Commissioner and Ors. [(2007) 6 SCC 186] which held that mere entry in the revenue records does not confer title on a person. As already noticed, in view of the entries in the Settlement Register, the requirement of an appropriate assignment cannot be lost sight of.

In Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair M.N.,  (2013) 3 KLT 132, (T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J ; A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J), it is observed as under:

  • “18. …. The land register as well as the settlement register will establish the plea of the Board that the property having an extent of 2.26 acres is Temple property. Thus, Section 27 of Act of 1950 is clearly attracted and the property is clearly Devaswom property.”
  • “51. As far as the property herein is concerned, the land register and the settlement register produced herein are relevant. The property having the entire extent of 2.26 acres is described as ”kavu” (holy grove) in the settlement register. In the land register also it is described as ”kshethram irippu sthalam” (property where the temple is situated). No other document or other evidence is there to prove the contrary. Therefore, these documents will definitely show that the item of property will fit in with the requirement of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.”
  • “75. … Apart from that, in the light of Section 27 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act and in the light of the settlement register and land register, the property is described as Temple puramboke and not Government puramboke. Further Government lands are covered by the exemption u/s 3(1)(x) of the Land Reforms Act and therefore he cannot claim any fixity of tenure. There is no claim by the Government here to the property.”

Part II

Presumptions in Favour of Govt. Lands

(a) There is a presumption in favour of Government – all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the Government.

(b) In order to defeat the title of the Government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the Government.

(c) In Pierce Lessley & Company Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlong Waoshare, AIR 1969 SC 843, it was held as under –

  • “In this country escheat is not based on artificial rules of common law; and is not an incident of feudal tenure.  It is incident sovereignty and rests on principle of ultimate ownership by the State of all property within the jurisdiction.”

(d) In Chotte Khan v. Muhammed Obedulla Khan, AIR 1953 Nag. 361, held

  • “the State is the ultimate owner of all property situate within its boundaries”.

(e) In Ameer Hussain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 204, 1977 AWC 1, it is held that it would be deemed that the disputed land vested in State and if the other side fails, in law,  it would be taken that the land was vested in State. (Followed in: Mohd. Shafiq v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, 2011-9 ADJ 24)

(f) In R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, (2010) 5 SCC 203, it was held as under:

  • “15. Suits for declaration of title against the government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects.
  • The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the government, is not available to any person or individual. …”

(g) The law as to title of property is laid down in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, 2012(8) SCC 148 as under –

  • “The appellate courts examined the title of Government instead the plaintiff/respondent No. 1.  Such a course was not warranted.  The title of Government cannot be disputed.  In any event, possession of Government for decades is not disputed.  The plaintiff shifted the case from time to time; but failed to prove his title……….   The said courts did not realize that this was not the issue to be determined, rather the issue had been as to whether the plaintiff was the owner of the suit-land.”

(h) In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988 – It was pointed out –

  • “When the land subject to proceedings wherein adverse possession has been claimed, belongs to Government, the court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property.”

(i) In State of Kerala v. Pathrose Mathai, 1970 Ker LJ 517; 1969 KerLT 507, it was held as under:

  • “There is also no presumption that a person who enters Government land, improves the same & keeps possession, is exercising acts hostile to the title of the State. This is because it is not uncommon for persons to enter upon Government land & reclain and improve such land in the hope of ultimately getting registry or lease of such land.”

(j) In Union of India v. Robert Zomawia Street, AIR 2014 SC 2721; 2014-6 SCC 707, the High Court allowed the second appeal preferred by the plaintiff and decreed the plaintiff’s suit.  The Supreme Court reversed the decree. The Apex Court quoted para 19 of the High Court Judgment.  The following can be deduced from paragraph 19:

  • No evidence to prove the old grant by the State.
  • There can be no presumption of ownership in favour of the State.
  • The plaintiff had created a high degree of probability that he was the owner.
  • The onus to prove ownership had been shifted to the State.
  • Apart from admissionsno document to indicate the old grant.
  • The state miserably failed to discharge such onus.
  • The plaintiff was able to prove his title to the suit land.
  • The courts below put the onus of proving title wrongly upon the plaintiff.
  • The concurrent findings of the courts below were consequently perverse.
  • It could not have been sustained in law and are liable to be interfered with in the second appeal.

The Apex Court, while reversing the findings of the High Court, laid down the following –

  • 1. The entries made in the GLR maintained under the Cantonment Land Administration Rules are conclusive evidence of title.
  • 2. Relied on the following findings in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148) –
    • The General Land Register and other documents maintained by the Cantonment Board under the Cantonment Act, 1924 and the Rules made thereunder were public documents.
    • The certified copies of the same are admissible in evidence in view of the provisions of Section 65 read with Section 74 of the Evidence Act.
    • It is a settled legal position that the entries made in the General Land Register maintained under the Cantonment Land Administration Rules are conclusive evidence of title.
  • 3. Also relied on Union of India v. Kamla Verma (2010) 13 SCC 511, to emphasise that the documents under the GLR were conclusive evidence of title.
    • The land in question was originally permitted to be used by a civilian on an “old grant” basis.
    • This fact is reflected in the lease deed executed by the late Shri Roop Krishan Seth.
    • Even in the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent, it has been stated that the vendor was an “occupancy-holder of the land and trees of the aforesaid premises and owner of superstructure of the bungalow…”.
    • Even in the land register, the Government of India has been shown as a “landlord” and Shri Mohan Krishan Seth has been shown to have occupancy right, and his nature of right was shown to be of “old grant”.
  • 4. Also relied on Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil, (1999) 3 SCC 555
  • 5. The argument that the word “held” meant “to own with legal title” was rejected. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot be a tenant was not accepted.
  • 6. The GLR showed that the Government was the Landlord.
  • 7. The GLR provided for the ‘table’ of rent and the details of the property.
  • 8. It was not possible to accept the contentions – since the State failed to produce the actual grant documents and there was no explanation, (1) adverse inference had to be drawn against the State, and (2) the grant not being proved, the plaintiff’s suit deserved to be decreed.
  • 9. The GLR supported the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff held the land on an old grant basis.
  • 10. The plaintiff, on the other hand, has not produced any document to show the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Nemo dat quid non habet is the maxim, which means no one gives what he does not possess, aptly applied in the case.
  • 11. The classification of the land as B3 land also points towards the same conclusion.

The principles in Sec. 110 and 114 CANNOT be invoked –

It is held in the following decisions that the Principle ‘Possession Follows Title’ does not apply in the following situations-

  • The facts (on title/possession) are known (M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1)
  • There is evidence of independent possession/title (Bhavnagar Municipality v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 717).

As we find in M.  Siddiq  v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case), 2020-1 SCC 1, Section 110 or the principle title follows possession‘ applies when the facts disclose no title in either of the disputants in which case, possession alone decides (presumption cannot be invoked when the facts are known). But, with respect to the principle ‘possession follows title‘, as we find in Anathula Sudhakar  v. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2033, if only title is proved by one party, then only the principle ‘possession follows title’ comes in.

It is equally important that both these principles on presumption, ‘possession follows title’ and ‘title follows possession’, cannot be invoked in cases where:

  • (i) the defendants do not claim title/possession to the suit property (Devasia @ Kutty v. Jose, 2014-4 KLJ 41; 2014-3 KLT(SN) 50).
  • (ii) the facts (on title/possession) are known (M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1), or
  • (iii) there is evidence of independent possession/title (Bhavnagar Municipality v.. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 717).

Mutation will not confer ‘Title’ (only Presumption on Possession)

It is a settled proposition of law (i) that the mutation entry in revenue documents will not confer any right, title or interest in favour of any person and (ii) that the mutation in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose. Mutation is made mainly based on possession. After pointing out these legal propositions, it is observed in Jitendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802, as under:

  • “6. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the case of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 137 , this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is observed and held that mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive value on title. Such entries are relevant only for the purpose of collecting land revenue. Similar view has been expressed in the series of decisions thereafter.
  • 6.1 In the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186 , it is observed and held by this Court that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose”, i.e., payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. It is further observed that so far as the title of the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court. Similar view has been expressed in the cases of Suman Verma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58; Faqruddin v. Tajuddin (2008) 8 SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368; Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689; T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342; Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259; and Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70.”

Revenue Records Not Confer Presumptive Value on Title

The Supreme Court in  Smt. Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import and Export Company (2019) and Commissioner, Bruhath Bangalore Mahanagra Palike v. Faraulla Khan (2021)observed that mutation in revenue records will not confer or lose title (Relied on Sawarni (Smt.) v. Inder Kaur (1996) 6 SCC 223, Balwant Singh & Anr. v. Daulat Singh (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. (1997) 7 SCC 137,  Narasamma & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2009) 5 SCC 591).

As pointed out above, it is observed by the Apex Court in State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 that revenue record is not a document of title; it merely raises a presumption in regard to possession (Quoted in M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1). The argument as to ownership based upon entries in the revenue records had been negated in Prahlad Pradhan  v. Sonu Kumhar,(2019) 10 SCC 259. It was held that the revenue record does not confer title to the property nor do they have any presumptive value on the title. (Quoted in Prabhagiya Van Adhikari Awadh Van Prabhag v. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj (SC): 2021)

Effect of Travancore Govt. Leases after Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061

Now a question arises: What is the impact of 1040 and 1061 (1886) Proclamations over the ‘Government Land Leases’ made after 1061 (1886)? Do such leased lands qualify as “estate” under Article 31A of the Constitution?

The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out (by the Government) after 1061 (1886) do not acquire the rights of ‘permanency of tenure’ or attain the ‘proprietary interest’ conferred by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061. If such rights are axiomatically conferred as a matter of course, the result would be that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands (after the Proclamations), for, the lease character would be lost at the moment it is made.

In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (five Judge Bench), 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.), concluded that the land covered by the Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 were “estates” falling under Art. 31A of the Constitution. It was on the finding that the Proclamation “secured permanency of tenure”, and “proprietary interest” in the soil. It was observed as under:

  • “7. It is impossible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that,even after the Proclamation of 1040, the holders of these lands had no proprietary interest whatsoever in the soil and remained tenants in the strict sense of that term, with only the right of enjoyment, the only difference being that they secured permanency of tenure, the Government still remaining the full and absolute proprietor of the soil.”

Therefore, there is a clear difference between leases made before and after the Proclamations, and the rights conferred by the Proclamations do not apply to leases made after them.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

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PROPERTY LAW

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Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Who is the OWNER of Leasehold (Exempted) Plantation Lands in Kerala?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

1. Introspection

It is held in Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-4 Ker LT 121 –
            •➧The “vesting” in Government under Sec. 72, KLR Act, is a “legal fiction”.
            •➧The cultivating tenant has an “absolute right” to seek assignment. 
The Division Bench failed to consider
            •➧1. The right, title and interest of the land (above ceiling limit) ‘vest’ with the Government under Sec. 72. It is absolute. It is not a ‘fiction; but, it is real and actual.
            •➧2. The nature of this statutory ‘vesting in Govt’ (under Sec. 72) is further clear from – Sec. 72E (tenant has to pay rent) and Sec. 112(5A) (land-value need not be given to the land-owner or the tenant, in case of acquisition).
            •➧3. Sec. 72B(2) KLR Act spells-out that a cultivating tenant will get Purchase Certificate for the extent below the ‘ceiling limit’ alone. That is, the tenant has no “absolute rights” above the ceiling limit. (It is limited to the improvements made, in case of acquisition.)
            •➧4. Plantation-lands, usually, involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land. The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be miniscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres). Therefore, the analogy drawn by the Bench (tenant has a right seek assignment) is not apt at all.
            •➧5. The provisions of the KLR Act (in this regard) are legislated following Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.

2. Who is the OWNER of Leasehold (Exempted) Plantation Lands in Kerala?

It is the Government

Reasons:

  • (i). Plantation (lease) lands Statutorily VEST in GOVT, under S. 72.
    • Sec. 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964, provides for absolute vesting (of lease-land) in Government.
    • Tenants of leasehold-exempted-plantation lands (above ceiling-limit) are entitled only to ‘fixity of tenure‘ by virtue of Chapter II, Sec. 13 (and they are not entitled for Purchase Certificate, over and above ‘ceiling limit’).
    • Note: ‘Tenure’ is derived from the Latin term, “tenere“;  means “to hold” or “to keep”.
  • (ii). Vesting’ in Govt. is ‘Vesting of Ownership
    • Sec. 72 speaks about ‘Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government’.
    • It pertains to –
      • all right, title and interest” of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants”.
  • (iii). Tenant has no “absolute rights”
    • Sec. 72B(2) KLR Act spells-out that a cultivating tenant will get Purchase Certificate for the extent below the ‘ceiling limit’ alone. That is, the tenant has no “absolute rights” above the ceiling limit. (It is limited to the improvements made, in case of acquisition, under Sec. 112(5A), as stated below.)
    • Plantation-lands, usually, involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land (above ceiling limit). The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be miniscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres).
    • Tenant to Pay Rent to the Govt.: Sec. 72E directs – such a cultivating tenant is liable to pay ‘Rent’ to the Government (obviously over and above ‘ceiling limit’). Sec. 72F(5) authorises Land Tribunal to fix the rent.
  • (iv). Government Need Not Pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, if Acquired
    • Sec. 112(5A) provides that the Government need not pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, to the tenant, or the former land owner, if such Lands (above ceiling limit) are Acquired. (It is for the reason that ownership of such plantation-land vest in Govt., absolutely.)
  • (v). Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India
    • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
Proviso to Article 31A(1) reads as under:
“Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivationit shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”

3. Tenant cannot ‘Sell’ Plantation Land as his Absolute Property

  • A tenant who got ‘fixity’ over such land cannot ‘sell’ this land as his absolute (ownership) property.

4. ‘Exemption’ in Chapter III Cannot be Read Into Sec. 72B(2)

  • The provision of law for giving Purchase-Certificate under Sec. 72B specifies that the provisions of Sec. 82 (as to ceiling limit) shall apply for the calculation of the ceiling area (alone).
  • Sec. 72B(2) reads-
    • “(2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may beapply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1)”
  • The exemption provision in Sec. 81 (Chapter III), which excludes plantation lands from the ceiling limit, cannot be brought-forth or read-into Sec. 72B (provision for assignment of purchase-certificate) in Chapter II.
    • In other words, purchase-certificates cannot be given for land above ceiling-limit, rigging the exemption provisions (for plantations etc.).
  • Because,
    • Sec. 72B(1), in Chapter II shows – Sec. 72B(1) is an independent provision (though the Proviso says –  no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest … (more than) … the ceiling area, mentioned in Sec. 82 in Chapter III)
    • When a provision in a latter Chapter of an Act (here, Sec. 82 that deals with extent of ceiling limit, in Chapter III) is referred to in an independent provision in an earlier Chapter (here, Sec. 72B, as regards issuing purchase certificate, in Chapter II), for a specific purpose (here, to state the limit in area alone), it cannot be said – the attributed colour or smell of the provision in the latter chapter (by virtue of other provisions, i.e., entire characteristics or attributions added to Sec. 82 by virtue of other provisions in Chapter III), would stand reflected on the earlier provision (here, Sec. 72B).
  • Further:
    • Chapter II of the KLR Act (dealing with ‘Tenancy’) is exclusive and exhaustive as to ‘fixity’, and ‘vesting’ of land in Government.
    • It is not stated anywhere in the Act – the right and title of the (leased-plantation) land legitimately vested in Government under Sec. 72, will be divested in any manner (in favour of the previous owner, or of the tenant or anybody else), in any circumstance.
    • Sec. 72E provides for collection of ‘rent‘ from the holders of the plantation and Sec. 72F(5) authorises the Land Tribunal to fix the rent. (It goes without saying saying that it is for the reason that the ownership of the land vests in Govt.)
    • Note: Proceedings initiated by Taluk Land Board under Chapter III (in respect of plantation) do not confer title.

5. What is the legal right attached to former ‘tenants’, after vesting the land with Govt. under Sec. 72?

  • It is not Tenancy – For no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt.
  • Not Grant or Licence/Permission – for Grant as well as Licence/Permission arise from a contract (express or implied).
  • Therefore, it can termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, that is, the KLR Act.

6. What are the Stipulations attached to that “Legal Right conferred by Statute” to tenants (of Plantation land) having fixity?

  • 1. Liable to pay ‘Rent’ (under Sec. 72E).
  • 2. Subject to the condition – not to “convert” it for any other use, other than the specific plantation (Sec. 87).
  • 3. From Sec. 112(5A)(b) it is clear that the tenant will be entitled (on acquisition of the land) for the compensation for his homestead or hut, if any, and the value of his improvements (alone).

7. When Such a land (Vested In Govt. under S. 72) is Required for Govt. (Public Purpose), Should it be ‘Acquired’? Is the landowner Entitled for any Compensation? What is the Compensation Entitled to by the Tenant?

  • When Such a land (Vested In Govt. under S. 72) is Required for Govt. (Public Purpose), Should it be Acquired?
    • The ownership being vested in Govt. it need not be ‘strictly’ “acquired”. But no specific provision in Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’, if and when Govt. needs it. 
    • Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act uses the term ‘acquisition’ itself (for the possessory rights remain with the tenant).
  • Is the landowner Entitled for any Compensation?
    • Sec. 112(5A) deals with the land acquired that has been vested in the Government under Section 72. From the sub section (5A) it is clear that the entire rights of the (former) landowner is vested with the Govt. and he cannot claim any right over the land (when it is acquired).
  • What is the Compensation Entitled to by the Tenant?
    • Sec. 112(5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonged to such land owner and intermediaries shall be awarded (?) to the Government ; and
    • from Sec. 112(5A)(b) it is clear that the tenant will be entitled for the compensation for his homestead or hut, if any, and the value of his improvements (alone).

8. Apportionment of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 of the KLR Act reads –

“112. Apportionment of land value in cases of acquisition  – (1) Where any land is acquired under the law for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, the compensation awarded under such law in respect of the land acquired shall be apportioned among the landowner, intermediaries, cultivating tenant and the kudikidappukaran in the manner specified in this Section.
(2) The compensation for any building or other improvements shall be awarded to the person entitled to such building or other improvements.
(3) The kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to the value of the land occupied by his homestead or hut subject to a minimum of-
               three cents in a city or major municipality; or
               five cents in any other municipally; or
               ten cents in a panchayat area or township.
(4) The difference between the value of three cents or five cents or ten cents, as the case may be, and the value of the extent of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, be borne by the Government or the local authority or the company or other person on whose behalf the land is acquired.
(5) The balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in Sub-section (2) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall he apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land acquired immediately before such acquisition .
Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to (i) in the case of a landowner, the rent which he was entitled to get from the tenant holding immediately under him; (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord; and (iii) in the case of a cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent payable by him; and the rent payable by the cultivating tenant and the intermediary for the purposes of this Explanation shall be as calculated under the provisions of this Act.
(5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
               (a) the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to such land owner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government ; and
               (b) the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to- in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
in the case of the Government, such rent.
(7) In this Section, “homestead” includes a dwelling house occupied by a person who is deemed to be a kudikidappukaran under Explanation IIA to clause (25) of Section 2.”

9.Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala2022-4 Ker LT 121 – Not Correctly decided

Following were the basic factual situation in Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala (supra)  –

  • The land was leased out by landlords.
  • The lease-rights came in the cultivating tenants by transfer.

Following were the rival claims raised by (i) the Govt. (ii) tenant and (iii) the landlord.

Contention of the Govt.

  • The Government contended that the tenant was a cultivating tenant and the land (absolutely) vested in the Govt. under Sec. 72 KLR Act.
    • Hence, tenant would be entitled to get compensation for the improvements (alone) to be determined under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, in view of Section 20(1) of the KLR Act.

Contention of the Tenants

  • cultivating tenant has absolute right to seek assignment (subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Sec. 72D). Therefore, vesting of rights in the Government under Sec. 72 is a legal fiction.

Claim of Land Owners

  • In view of Sec. 3(i)(viii), if the extent of the plantation is above 30 acres, and if the land was a plantation (put up by the land owner) when it was leased, the tenant will not be entitled for ‘fixity’; and the land will return to the land owner after the lease-period. Therefore, the land owners in one Writ Appeal claimed that the land involved therein was such a land entitled to by them (after the lease period).
  • Land owners also claimed that Sec. 72BB(1) gives them a right (i) to apply for assignment to the tenant and (ii) for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A (as regards the property within ceiling limit).

10. The Division Bench Finding on Vesting Under Sec. 72

  • The contention of the Govt. that the land was (absolutely) vested upon it was rejected and held –
    • 1. the vesting in Govt. ‘is a legal fiction‘.
    • 2. cultivating tenant ‘has an absolute right to seek assignment‘ subject to the payment of purchase price.

11. The Division Bench observed as under –

  • “31. On an analysis of the provisions of Section 72(1) of the Act, 1963, it is clear that when the Government notified the said provision with effect from 01.01.1970, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under sub-Section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, vested in the Government.
  • 32. Therefore, it is clear from Section 72 that what is vested with the Government is the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants. It is nothing but a legal fiction by which the interest held by a cultivating tenant in a property of a landlord or intermediary is protected from 01.01.1970.”
  • “34. On a conjoint reading of Sections 72 and 72A, it can be seen that vesting of rights in the Government contained under Section 72 is the rights held by the landlord and the intermediary in respect of holdings held by the cultivating tenants. However, the same will not, in any manner, interfere with the rights enjoyed by a cultivating tenant in contemplation of the provisions of the Act, 1963.”
  • “41. On an indepth analysis of the aforesaid provision, we find that when Section 72 came into force on 01.01.1970, the cultivating tenant is entitled for the assignment of the land for possession, subject to the liabilities fixed under Section 72 of the Act, 1963 to pay the purchase price. As per Section 72C, if no application is filed by the cultivating tenant, the Land Tribunal shall subject to the Rules made by the Government ensure that the assignment is granted to the cultivating tenant, assigning such title and interest to the cultivating tenant entitled thereto, which rights, title and interest are vested with the Government by virtue of the legal fiction created under Section 72 of the Act, 1963.
  • 42. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 72 of Act, 1963 would only deal with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants free from encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries. However, the legal provisions discussed above would make it clear that insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.”

12. The following logic put forwarded by the Bench is inappropriate.  

  • “… insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963″.

Because–

  • Sec. 72B spells out that the Purchase-Certificate can be given within the ceiling limit alone.
  • Note: Plantation-lands, usually, involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land. The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be miniscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres). Therefore, the analogy drawn by the Bench (tenant has a right seek assignment) is not apt at all.

13. The Division Bench failed to consider the following as regards Vesting Under S. 72

  • 1. The vesting in Govt’ under Sec. 72 is absolute. It is further clear from Sec. 72E (tenant has to pay rent) and Sec. 112(5A) (land-value need not be given to the land-owner or the tenant, in case of acquisition).
    • The Division Bench went wrong in observing that it is “a legal fiction by which the interest held by a cultivating tenant in a property of a landlord or intermediary is protected from 01.01.1970“.
  • 2. Sec. 72B(2) KLR Act provides that a cultivating tenant will get Purchase Certificate for the extent below the ‘ceiling limit’ alone. That is, the tenant has no “absolute rights” above the ceiling limit.
    • Plantation-lands, usually, involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land (land above ceiling limit). The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be miniscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres).
    • Tenant has to Pay Rent to the Govt.: Sec. 72E directs – such a cultivating tenant is liable to pay ‘Rent’ to the Government (obviously over and above ‘ceiling limit’). Sec. 72F(5) authorises Land Tribunal to fix the rent.
  • 3. The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated following Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
    • When a landowner has no vested right over and above the ceiling limit, it is illogical and irrational to say that the tenant will have it.

14. The DB Avoided Consideration of Factual Matters u/S. 3(i)(viii) & 72BB

While considering the claims of landlord (basing on Sec. 3(i)(viii) and Sec. 72BB), the Bench avoided consideration of these matters (as they were absolutely factual in nature) observing as under:

  • “36. So also, sub-Section (1) of Section 72BB dealing with ‘the right of landlord to apply for assignment and compensation’ specifies that any landowner or intermediary, whose right, title and interest in respect of any holding have vested in the Government, may apply to the Land Tribunal for the assignment of such right, title and interest to the cultivating tenant and for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A.”
  • “55. However, the landlords, who are the appellants in W.A. No. 500 of 2016, in their appeal have raised a claim against the cultivating tenant basically contending that the tenancy is exempted in view of Section 3(i)(viii) of Chapter II of the Act, 1963 and therefore, the lessee is not entitled to fixity of tenure. Other contentions are also raised. But, in our considered opinion, the dispute with regard to the apportionment of the claim for compensation by rival claimants is a matter for consideration by the competent authority, and also in contemplation of the provisions of Section 64 of the Act, 2013, and therefore, the said dispute, which are absolutely factual in nature depending on evidence, has to be decided by the statutory authority in accordance with law.”
  • The landlords argued that the land was a plantation (over 30 acres) when it was (originally) leased, and therefore, they are entitled to claim exemption and benefits in the light of the exemption under clause (viii)  of Section 3 (1) of the KLR Act. Since there would be no fixity of tenure, it being a plantation, there would not be vesting of rights of the land owner in the Government. Hence, there should be the apportionment of the compensation between the lessor and the lessee and it should be decided in the acquisition proceedings.
  • The single Judge dismissed the writ petition, ‘leaving open the liberty of the lessee as well as the landlords, to approach the civil court seeking relief against the Government, and also to resolve the inter se dispute by and between the tenant and the landlords’.

Epitome

When Land Reform Measures were implemented in the State of Kerala, it jaded and wearied small and moderate landlords and tenants, on the bedrock of “ceiling limit”. But, the Plantations were not “touched” taking “economy” into consideration. Still, the well-visioned legislators were particular to see that the ownership of this large extent of plantations (otherwise thick forest of the Western Ghats) was remained with the State. It was based on the principles in Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit’.

Therefore, it can say definitely –

  • For (even) the landowner has no vested right on land beyond the ceiling limit, a tenant can never claim such a right; and, it is too illogical and irrational for the tenant to have such a right.
  • Interpretation of law, especially when Constitutional principles are involved, should subserve the interests of the nation and future generations, and not that of a few ones.

Conclusion

In short, the juridical status of the ‘plantation land’ (beyond the ceiling limit), vested in Govt. under Sec. 72, can be placed as under –

  • 1. Title and ownership of the same is vested with the Govt.
  • 2. Because of the Exemption (Sec. 81) and Fixity (Sec. 13) the tenant can continue the plantation activity therein.
  • 3. But the tenant has to pay the ‘Rent’ to the Govt. (Sec. 72E) fixed by the Land Tribunal (Sec. 72F).
  • 4. Because of the restrictions in Sec. 72B and 72C, a tenant cannot obtain Purchase Certificate (and become the land-owner) for more extent than the ceiling limit.

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Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Part I

Contents in a Nutshell

The point placed for consideration in Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022 (4) KHC 97, was the following –

  • Whether the tenant of a plantation-tenancy-land is entitled to compensation for the entire ‘plantation-tenancy-land’ (including the land over and above the ceiling limit – vested in Government under Section 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963).

The Division Bench pronounced to the following effect –

  • (i) The ‘vesting’ of land in the Government under Section 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is only a ‘legal fiction’;
  • (ii) the cultivating tenant has an ‘absolute right’ to seek assignment of the entire plantation-tenancy-land (irrespective of the ceiling limit); and
  • (iii) the cultivating tenant is entitled to get ‘compensation for the entire plantation-tenancy-land’.

Para 42 of the decision reads as under:

  • “42. … Insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.”

The Division Bench Totally Ignored Relevant Provisions of Law

The Division Bench erred in holding that a cultivating tenant has the absolute right to seek ‘assignment’ of the entire plantation-tenancy-land (disregarding the ceiling limit). It failed to consider the following relevant statutory provisions.

  • 1. Sec. 72, Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963: All right, title and interest of the land-owners held by cultivating-tenants as on 1.1.1970 entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 shall vest in the Government.
  • 2. Sec. 72A directs compensation to the land owner for vesting land under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter. 
    • For the land above the ceiling limit, payment to land owner is made under Sec. 88 – on surrendering land. It is paid by the Government; not by the tenant. (Under Sec. 72D, the cultivating tenant pays the purchase price for getting the assignment – below the ceiling limit – alone.)
  • 3. Sec. 72B: It deals with “cultivating tenants’ right to assignment” (of the land vested in Government under Section 72).  Sub Section 1(a) and (b) of this Section direct that the assignment should be within the ceiling limit (mentioned in Section 82).
    • It is stated in Sec. 72B: “The provisions of Sec. 82 shall so far as may be applied to the CALCULATION of the ceiling area for the purpose of the proviso to sub section (1)”. It is obvious –
    • The legislature incorporated Sec. 82 only for a limited or a “specific” purpose – to the calculation of the ceiling area.
  • 4. Sec. 72C: It deals with assignment of land, where the cultivating-tenant has not made application under Section 72B. All provisions of Section 72B, except sub section 3, are made applicable to Section 72C.  The opening words of Section 72C (“notwithstanding anything contained in sub Section 3 of Section 72B”), indicate the nexus between Section 72B and Section 72C.  Therefore, the purchase certificate can be issued, within ceiling limit alone, under Section 72C, as in the case of Section 72B.
  • 5. Sec. 72E: It says that a tenant (under Government) is liable to pay rent to the Government for the unassigned land (i.e., unassignedexempted-plantation-land, over and above the ceiling limit).
  • 6. Sec. 72F(5)(h): Land Tribunal fixes the rent for the said unassignedexempted-plantation-land land.
  • 7. Sec. 87(1) and its Explanations I and II: Only a limited right to continue; and, fragmentation is prohibited.  The specified plantation-crop alone is permitted.  The exemption is given subject to the condition – not to “convert” the land for any other use.
    • In case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost, and the exemption may be withdrawn.
  • 8. Sec. 112 (5A): It says: on acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Sec. 72.
  • 9. Sec. 112 (5A)(a), which says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the landowner shall be awarded to the Government.
  • 10. Sec. 112 (5A)(b): Itsays that the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • 11. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India: It says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the‘ceiling limit‘.
    • The provisions of the KLR Act, in this regard, are legislated following this proviso in Article 31A(1). It goes without saying – if no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.

Legal Right Conferred by the Statute
From the above, it is clear:

  • The land allowed to be held by a tenant (over and above the ceiling limit for which the tenant is liable to pay rent to the Government under Sec. 72E) can be termed as a “Legal Right conferred by the Statute“. It is not an absolute right that is conferred to some, including the BIG tenants.

The policy of the Act
Sec. 83, lays down the policy of the Act – No person “be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” (Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571).

Unjustifiable to Confer Undue Benefits to BIG Tenants
Under Sec. 72A and Sec. 88, meagre compensation is paid to the land owners on vesting landlords’ rights in the Govt. and on surrendering land. It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits on the plantation-tenants (and not to the land owners) when their lease-lands are acquired  (the majority of such lessees are BIG Companies)

Lands of the Maharaja of Travancore were taken

It is a matter of record that even the lands of the Maharaja of Travancore—191 acres situated within Thiruvananthapuram City, far in excess of the statutory ceiling of 7.5 acres—were taken over pursuant to the orders of the Land Board, Thiruvananthapuram, vide Order No. LB(B)2-18919/70 dated 15-01-1972. Equally, it is an indisputable fact that thousands of middle-class landowners were subjected to the rigour of the Act, and their excess lands were taken by the force of law.

  • Therefore, it would be wholly unreasonable to contend that the Legislature intended to confer any special or undue benefit upon plantation tenants—benefits which were not extended even to the Maharaja of Travancore, to middle-class landowners, and to other categories of tenants governed by the Act.

Any interpretation that elevates plantation-tenants to a privileged class, beyond the plain limits imposed by the statute, would be contrary to the scheme, object, and egalitarian ethos of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.

  • The legislature never intended to give undue benefit to the plantation-tenants, which were not given to the Maharaja and the middle-class property owners; so also the other tenants (other than the plantation-tenants).

Sec. 72, KLR Act – ‘Vesting of Ownership’ in Government

Sec. 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act speaks about ‘vesting of landlord’s rights in Government’. It pertains to –

  • All right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries … and in respect of which certificates of purchase have not been issued, shall …. vest in the government”.

Section 72(1) reads:

“72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”

Part II

Is Vesting in Government ‘Fictional’ and such Land to be Transferred to Tenants?

No. The vesting in the Government is real, as regards lands above the ceiling limit; and such lands are not liable to be transferred to tenants.

Reasons:

  • (i). Lease lands Statutorily VEST in GOVT, under S. 72.
    • Sec. 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, provides for absolute vesting (of lease-land) in Government.
    • It is vesting of all right, title and interest. Sec. 72 reads: “… the right, title and interest of the landowner and all other persons… shall cease, and the land shall vest in the Government, free from all encumbrances…”
    • There cannot be any further right or interest in anybody (Aru v. Nakkunni, 1987 -1 KLT 177).
  • (ii). Tenant has no “absolute rights”
  • (a) Sec. 72B(2) KLR Act spells-out that a cultivating tenant will get Purchase Certificate for the extent below the ‘ceiling limit’ alone. That is, the tenant has no “absolute rights” above the ceiling limit.
    • Tenants of leasehold-exempted-plantation lands (above ceiling-limit) are entitled only to ‘fixity of tenure’ (that is, right to continue as tenant) by virtue of Sec. 13, Chapter II (and they are not entitled for Purchase Certificate, over and above ‘ceiling limit’).
    • Plantation-lands, usually, involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land (above ceiling limit). The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be miniscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres).
    • Note: 1. ‘Tenure’ is derived from the Latin term, “tenere“; means “to hold” or “to keep”.
    • 2. The holding of plantation land on the basis of ‘exemption’ provision under Sec. 81, is only a “right” conferred by the law just like the ‘right’ of easement – which does not bestow any ‘interest’ in the land.
  • (b) Tenant to Pay Rent to the Govt.: Sec. 72E directs – such a cultivating tenant is liable to pay ‘Rent’ to the Government (obviously over and above ‘ceiling limit’, if purchase certificate has been obtained for the same).
  • (c) Sec. 72F(5)(h) authorises the Land Tribunal to fix the rent.
  • (d) Government Need Not Pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, if Acquired
    • Sec. 112(5A) provides that the Government need not pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, to the tenant, or the former land owner, if such Lands (above ceiling limit) are Acquired. (It is for the reason that ownership of such plantation-land vest in Govt., absolutely.)
  • (e) Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India
    • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’, ‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
    • It goes without saying – If no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.
Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India reads as under:
“Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”

(iii) Tenant or Former Owner cannot ‘Sell’ Plantation Land (above ceiling limit) as his Absolute Property

  • An owner, or a tenant who got ‘fixity’ over such land, cannot ‘sell’ this land as his absolute (ownership) property.

(iv) ‘Exemption’ in Chapter III Cannot be Read Into Sec. 72B(2)

  • The provision of law for giving Purchase-Certificate under Sec. 72B specifies that the provisions of Sec. 82 (as to ceiling limit) shall apply for the calculation of the ceiling area (alone).
    • Note: That is why it is specifically stated in Sec. 72B and in all places wherever Purchase Certificate is mentioned in Chapter II that the extent of land in Purchase Certificate should be limited to the ‘ceiling area’.
  • Sec. 72B(2) reads-
    • “(2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may beapply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1)”
  • The exemption provision in Sec. 81 (Chapter III), which excludes plantation lands from the ceiling limit, cannot be brought-forth or read-into Sec. 72B (provision for assignment of purchase-certificate) in Chapter II.
  • Because,
    • Sec. 72B(1), in Chapter II denotes – Sec. 72B(1) is an independent provision (that is why the Proviso says –  no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest … (exceeding) … the ceiling limit, mentioned in Sec. 82 in Chapter III).
    • When a provision in a latter Chapter of an Act (here, Sec. 82 that deals with extent of ceiling limit, in Chapter III) is referred to in an independent provision in an earlier Chapter (here, Sec. 72B, as regards issuing purchase certificate, in Chapter II), for a specific purpose (here, to state the limit in area alone), it cannot be said – the attributed colour or smell of the provision in the latter chapter would stand reflected on the earlier provision (here, Sec. 72B).
  • Further:
    • Chapter II of the KLR Act (dealing with ‘Tenancy’) is exclusive and exhaustive as to ‘fixity’, and ‘vesting’ of land in Government.
    • It is not stated anywhere in the Act – the right, title and interest of the (leased-plantation) land legitimately vested in Government under Sec. 72, will be divested in any manner (in favour of the previous owner, or of the tenant or anybody else), in any circumstance.
    • Sec. 72E provides for collection of ‘rent‘ from the holders of the plantation (for the unassignedexempted-plantation-land vested in Government under Sec. 72); and Sec. 72F(5) authorises the Land Tribunal to fix the rent. (It goes without saying saying that it is for the reason that the ownership of the land vests in Govt.)
    • Section 81(4)permits use of the land not exceeding 5% of the extent of such holding for floriculture, dairy farms, hotels, restaurants, etc.
    • Note: Proceedings initiated by Taluk Land Board under Chapter III (in respect of plantation) do not divest title vested in Govt.

(v) In State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk, AIR 1973 SC 2734, while considering similar [Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act 26 of 1971] “vesting”, similar to that in the KLR Act, it was observed as under:

  • “Section 3 of the impugned Act vests the ownership and possession of all private forests in the State.”
  • “As to its constitutionality we have shown that the Act purports to vest the janmam rights to the forests in the Government as a step in the implementation of agrarian reform.”
    • Note: Section 3 Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 reads as under:
    • “3. Private forests to vest in Government
    • (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract or other document, but subject to the provisions of sub- sections (2) and (3), with effect on and from the appointed day, the ownership and possession of all private forests in the State of Kerala shall, by virtue of this Act, stand transferred to and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances, and the right, title and interest of the owner or any other person in any, private forest shall stand extinguished. …”

(vi) Section 82 KLR Act – Bar on Civil Courts & Finality of Vesting

  • Section 82 of the KLR Act bars civil courts from questioning orders made under Chapter III.

This includes the finality of orders determining excess land and vesting.

S. 82 (in Chp. III) cannot be enlarged while referring it in S. 72B (in Chp. II)

Section 82 deals with ceiling area. Sec. 81 states about the exemption of various provisions of Chapter III. By virtue of Sec. 81 private forests, plantations, etc. are exempted. Therefore, the provisions of ‘ceiling area’ in Sec. 82 do not apply to plantations, private forests, etc.

Section 72B(1) in Chapter II limits the assignment of land (within the ceiling area) while a Purchase Certificate is given. Section 72B(2) says –

  • “The provisions of Sec. 82 shall so far as may be applied to the CALCULATION of the ceiling area for the purpose of the proviso to sub section (1)”.

From the above it is clear –

  • The provisions as to the exemption in Section 81 will not be attracted to sec. 72B.
  • The legislature incorporated the referred provision only for a limited or a “specific” purpose – to the calculation of the ceiling area.
    • It can be made clear on a reading of the relevant provision – without the words “the CALCULATION of “.
  • Calculation of the ceiling area‘ in Section 82 stands independent to Section 81.
  • Therefore, other controlling provisions of Section 82 (such as Section 81) do not automatically brought in.

Interpretation of Law in this regard

  • In Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 : (1963) 3 SCR 858, it is held as under:
    • “Where the provisions of an Act are incorporated by reference in a later Act the repeal of the earlier Act has, in general, no effect upon the construction or effect of the Act in which its provisions have been incorporated.”
  • In TVS Motor Company Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2018 SC 5624; 2019-13 SCC 403, it is held as under:
    • “It is, therefore, clear that the definition of ‘motor vehicle’ as existing prior to 1956 Amendment would alone be applicable as being incorporated in the Taxation Act.”

‘Doctrine of Incorporation’ and the ‘Doctrine of Reference’

The ‘principles’ of doctrine of incorporation (only a restrictive and strict application) is to be applied in this matter – whether Section 72B(1) in Chapter II limits the assignment of land (within the ceiling area) while a Purchase Certificate is given. The decisive factor to determine whether a case is of ‘legislation by incorporation’ or ‘legislation by reference’ is whether “the reference is specific or general”.

  • Doctrine of incorporation (only a restrictive and strict application) – subsequent change (amendment or repeal) of the referred provision does not affect the incorporating provision.  That is, the incorporated original provision alone applies, verbatim.
  • Doctrine of reference or a citation (wider application) – future changes in the referred provision will also apply to the referring provision. The statute referred to is taken as it exists from time to time. Therefore, subsequent amendments to the referred statute will apply.
  • Doctrines of ‘legislation by reference’ and ‘legislation by incorporation’ are the creation of judicial pronouncements. See:
    • Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu, BR Gavai, Sandeep Mehta, JJ., AIR 2024 SC 2835; 2024-4 SCC 508
    • Bolani Ores v. State of Orissa : (1974)2 SCC 777
    • Mahindra v. Union of India: (1979)2 SCC 529
    • State of M.P. v. Narasimhan : (1975)2 SCC 377;
    • Bharat Co-operative Bank v. Employees’ Union : (2007)4 SCC 685
    • Girnar Tradeers v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 (3) SCC 1
    • Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., AIR 1931 PC 149.
    • Municipal Commissioner of Howrah v. Shalimar Wood Products, (1963) 1 SCR 47;
    • Ujagar Prints v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488;
    • U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam, (1998) 2 SCC 467;
    • Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasant Rao, (2002) 7 SCC 657 and
    • Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Maharashtra. (2003) 4 SCC 200.

When a statute refers to another provision, only the provision specifically referred to is attracted, and it shall not be construed as importing the entire body of law relating to that subject, or other connected or ancillary provisions – especially in the absence of express words and the intention is manifest.

It is reasonable to hold that the same position applies when a section incorporates a provision in another section, in the same Act. That is, that particular provision alone is attracted.

  • See: K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, AIR 2005 SC 688, 2005 (1) SCC 754.

Part III

What is the legal right attached to former ‘plantation-tenants’, after vesting the land with Govt. under Sec. 72?

  • It is not Tenancy  – For no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt.
  • Not Grant or Licence/Permission – for Grant as well as Licence/Permission arise from a contract (express or implied).
  • Therefore, it can termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, that is, the KLR Act.

What are the Conditions attached to that “Legal Right conferred by Statute” to tenants (of Plantation land) having fixity?

  • 1. Liable to pay ‘Rent’ (under Sec. 72E) for the unassignedexempted-plantation-land vested in Government under Sec. 72.
  • 2. Subject to the condition – not to “convert” it for any other use, other than the specific plantation (Sec. 87).
  • 3. If no purchase certificate is given to the tenant, from Sec. 112(5A)(b) it is clear that the tenant will be entitled (on acquisition of the land) for the compensation for the actual area where his homestead or hut, if any, is situated (whatever may be the area of land outside it).

Purport of Sec. 87 and the Explanations in S.87(1)

Section 87 reflects the legislative intention in protecting plantations. The protection is on economic grounds. That is, certain crops and cultivations that made the land of Kerala renowned from ancient times were to be protected. Section 87 and the Explanations are to be read and interpreted in the light of their intentions. The Kerala High Court aptly appreciated these provisions in this background in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985.

In State Human Rights Protection Centre, Thrissur v. State of Kerala, 2009(3)KLJ 110, it is held as under:

  • “19.There is no restriction on alienation of lands exempted under Section 81 (1)(a) of the Land Reforms Act ,since such lands are exempted from the operation of Chapter III of the Kerala Land Reforms Act dealing with ceiling on holding. It is not the excess land that is alienated but the exempted land………”

It was further held in para 21-  

  • ”……Any exemption from ceiling provision under the Kerala Land Reforms Act has a purpose and the purpose in the present case is public interest and that public interest is the use of land for industrial purpose. Since under the Kerala Land Reforms Act there is no restriction on alienation of the exempted category of lands and since the transferee is subjected to the acid test of eligibility and entitlement for exemption in terms of use of the land, the transfer made by the HMT will also be subjected to the same test, namely use of the transferred land for industrial purpose. In other words, HMT is legally entitled to transfer 100 acres of land notified under Ext.R1(i) notification, but the transferee will have to use that land for industrial purpose and that purpose only. Therefore, the transfer is not vitiated in any way; but the transferee will have to use the land only for industrial purpose. That is a covenant on the land.” (Quoted in: One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985)

In Everest Stone Crusher and Granites v. District Collector, District Collectorate, Kannur, 2020-6 KHC 289, it is held as under:

  • “Therefore, Ext.P13 prohibitory order issued by the 1st respondent District Collector, during the pendency of suo motu proceedings under Section 87 of the Act, cannot be said to be one issued without reasonable grounds to believe that any document relating to transfer of land of the land owned by the petitioner, which may be presented before the 3rd respondent registering officer, is intended to defeat the provisions of the said Act. The said order warrants no interference in this writ petition, invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

Acquisition of land Vested In Govt. under S. 72

  • When Such a land (Vested In Govt. under S. 72) is Required for Govt. (Public Purpose), it need not be Acquired?
    • The ownership being vested in Govt. it need not be ‘strictly’ “acquired”. But no specific provision in Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’, if and when Govt. needs it. 
    • Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act uses the term ‘acquisition’ itself (obviously for the possessory rights remain with the tenant).
  • No Compensation to the landowner
    • Sec. 112(5A) deals with the land acquired that has been vested in the Government under Section 72. If no purchase certificate is given to the tenant, from the sub section (5A) it is clear that the entire rights of the (former) landowner is vested with the Govt. and he cannot claim any right over any fixed portion of land (when it is acquired).
  • What is the Compensation Entitled to by the Tenant?
    • Sec. 112(5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonged to such land owner and intermediaries shall be awarded (?) to the Government ; and
    • If no purchase certificate is given to the tenant, from Sec. 112(5A)(b) it is clear that the tenant will be entitled for the compensation for the land where his homestead or hut, if any, is situated (whatever may be the area of land outside it).

Apportionment of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 of the KLR Act reads –

“112. Apportionment of land value in cases of acquisition  – (1) Where any land is acquired under the law for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, the compensation awarded under such law in respect of the land acquired shall be apportioned among the landowner, intermediaries, cultivating tenant and the kudikidappukaran in the manner specified in this Section.
(2) The compensation for any building or other improvements shall be awarded to the person entitled to such building or other improvements.
(3) The kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to the value of the land occupied by his homestead or hut subject to a minimum of-
               three cents in a city or major municipality; or
               five cents in any other municipally; or
               ten cents in a panchayat area or township.
(4) The difference between the value of three cents or five cents or ten cents, as the case may be, and the value of the extent of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, be borne by the Government or the local authority or the company or other person on whose behalf the land is acquired.
(5) The balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in Sub-section (2) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall he apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land acquired immediately before such acquisition.
Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to (i) in the case of a landowner, the rent which he was entitled to get from the tenant holding immediately under him; (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord; and (iii) in the case of a cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent payable by him; and the rent payable by the cultivating tenant and the intermediary for the purposes of this Explanation shall be as calculated under the provisions of this Act.
(5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
               (a) the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to such land owner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government ; and
               (b) the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut,*fn* if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to- in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
in the case of the Government, such rent.
(7) In this Section, “homestead” includes a dwelling house occupied by a person who is deemed to be a kudikidappukaran under Explanation IIA to clause (25) of Section 2.”
  • *fn* 1. “Value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” says as to the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
  • 2. This provision is applied to lease-lands vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 and no purchase certificate is given (to the tenant).

Sec. 72A – Compensation to land owner; No right remains with him thereafter.

  • It is 16 times fare rent for land plus (+) value of structures of land owner plus (+) half value of timber trees. Note: Same rate under Sec. 55 & 72D(2) Land above ceiling limit payment is only under Sec. 88 – on surrendering land. (It is paid by Govt.)
  • Sec. 72D – Cultivating tenant to pay purchase price (for getting assignment – below ceiling limit).
  • Sec. 72D(1A) – No purchase price to be paid if extent of land is land below One Hectare.
  • Sec. 72D(2)  – Purchase price to Govt. by Cultivating Tenant – 16 times fare rent for land plus (+) value of structures of land owner plus (+) half value of timber trees) Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 55

Surrendering SURPLUS LAND: Land Owners’s Right for Compensation

Relevant provisions are Sec. 82, 83, 85 & 88 of the KLR Act.

  • Sec. 82 – Ceiling area is fixed (for an adult unmarried person – 5 standard acres; family of 2 or more persons – 10 standard acres; more than 5 persons – 10 standard acres increased by one standard acre for each member).
    Sec. 83 – No person to own or hold land in excess of ceiling area.
    Sec. 85(1): Surrender excess lands. 
    Sec. 85 (2) File a Statement before the Land Board including lands exempted under Sec. 81 indicating the land proposed to be surrendered.
    Sec. 85 (3) Special duty on tenant – Final settlement of claims under Sec. 72(4). (Right, title and interest of the land owner vest in Govt.  But claims for resumption can be filed within six months.)   After purchasing the land under Sec. 72B or 72C (by the cultivating tenant), excess with the tenant shall be surrendered. 

Sec. 88 – Persons surrendering land entitled compensation

No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter.

  • Compensation is calculated at the rates specified in Schedule IV. Note: Maximum compensation is Rs. 2 Lakh.

Implied Declaration as “Excess Land” When Land Board Fixes Exempted Plantation-Land

  • When Land Board fixes land as exempted plantation-land, there is an implied declaration as regards “excess land”; and implied “liability to surrender” (by land holder to Govt.) if plantation is not continued or there is fragmentation.
    Similarly, if it is a lease-land there is implied finding on “vesting” under Sec. 72.

No Land value to be given for the “excess” land (Beyond Ceiling Limit)

As stated above, under Sec. 112(5A) the claimants will not be entitled (on acquisition of the land) for the compensation for the entire area he possessed. It is limited to the following –

  • building or other improvements
  • land occupied by the homestead or hut”
  • any building or other improvements“.

Only Statutory Permission or Right

It is true, “exemption” is given to plantation, to hold land over and above ceiling limit. It is only a statutory permission to continue, subject to conditions. It will be lost when it is “fragmented” or the crop is abandoned. As stated elsewhere, it is also most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation owners or tenants (majority are BIG Companies) which had not been given to thousands of middleclass property owners whose property had been harshly sized or expropriated under the provisions of the KLR Act.

Vesting in  Government u/s. 72 is independent of issuance of Purchase Certificate

The rights of the landlord would vest in the Government, under Sec. 72 KLR Act. A tenant is free to apply for and obtain Purchase Certificate within the Ceiling Limit under Sect. 59(2) and 72B or 72C from such property. Vesting of lease property in Government under Sec. 72 is independent of issuance of Purchase Certificate.

In Perumal Smaraka Nidhi v. Harrisons Malayalam Limited (RFA No. 336/2011; dt. 31 Jan, 2010, K.M. Joseph, J.) held-

  • The rights of the landlord would vest in the Government, under Sec. 72 KLR Act.
  •  Sec. 72 would appear to contemplate vesting when there is no certificate of purchase issued under Sec. 59 (2).
  • If no certificate of purchase has been issued under sub Sec. (2) of Sect. 59 (irrespective of whether the tenants have applied), under Section 72, there will be vesting, if other conditions are satisfied.

Part IV

Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-4 Ker LT 121 – Not Correctly decided

Following were the basic factual situation in Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala (supra)  –

  • The land was leased out by landlords.
  • The lease-rights came in the cultivating tenants by transfer.

Following were the rival claims raised by the parties.

1. Contention of the Govt.

  • The tenant was a cultivating tenant. The land (absolutely) vested in the Govt. under Sec. 72 KLR Act.
    • Hence, tenant would be entitled to get compensation for the improvements (alone) to be determined under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, in view of Section 20(1) of the KLR Act.

2. Contention of the Tenants

  • A cultivating tenant has absolute right to seek assignment (subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Sec. 72D). Therefore, vesting of rights in the Government under Sec. 72 is a legal fiction.

3. Claim of Land Owners

  • In view of Sec. 3(i)(viii), if the extent of the plantation is above 30 acres, and if the land was a plantation (put up by the land owner) when it was leased, the tenant will not be entitled for ‘fixity’; and the land will return to the land owner after the lease-period. Therefore, the land owners in one Writ Appeal claimed that the land involved therein was such a land entitled to by them (after the lease period).
  • Land owners also claimed that Sec. 72BB(1) gives them a right (i) to apply for assignment to the tenant and (ii) for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A (as regards the property within ceiling limit).

4. The Division Bench Finding on Vesting Under Sec. 72

  • The contention of the Govt. that the land was (absolutely) vested upon it was rejected and held –
    • 1. the vesting in Govt. ‘is a legal fiction‘.
    • 2. cultivating tenant ‘has an absolute right to seek assignment‘ subject to the payment of purchase price.

5. The Division Bench observed as under –

  • “31. On an analysis of the provisions of Section 72(1) of the Act, 1963, it is clear that when the Government notified the said provision with effect from 01.01.1970, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under sub-Section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, vested in the Government.
  • 32. Therefore, it is clear from Section 72 that what is vested with the Government is the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants. It is nothing but a legal fiction by which the interest held by a cultivating tenant in a property of a landlord or intermediary is protected from 01.01.1970.”
  • “34. On a conjoint reading of Sections 72 and 72A, it can be seen that vesting of rights in the Government contained under Section 72 is the rights held by the landlord and the intermediary in respect of holdings held by the cultivating tenants. However, the same will not, in any manner, interfere with the rights enjoyed by a cultivating tenant in contemplation of the provisions of the Act, 1963.”
  • “41. On an indepth analysis of the aforesaid provision, we find that when Section 72 came into force on 01.01.1970, the cultivating tenant is entitled for the assignment of the land for possession, subject to the liabilities fixed under Section 72 of the Act, 1963 to pay the purchase price. As per Section 72C, if no application is filed by the cultivating tenant, the Land Tribunal shall subject to the Rules made by the Government ensure that the assignment is granted to the cultivating tenant, assigning such title and interest to the cultivating tenant entitled thereto, which rights, title and interest are vested with the Government by virtue of the legal fiction created under Section 72 of the Act, 1963.
  • 42. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 72 of Act, 1963 would only deal with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants free from encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries. However, the legal provisions discussed above would make it clear that insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.”

The Line of Reasoning Put Forward by the Bench is Inappropriate.  

The interpretative approach adopted by the Bench (“an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D”) appears to be inappropriate; because–

  • Section 72B spells out that the Purchase-Certificate can be given within the ceiling limit alone.

Plantation holdings typically extend to hundreds or thousands of acres, of which the assignable extent within the ceiling may be a negligible fraction (7.5 or 15 acres). The statutory right of assignment, therefore, cannot be extended to the vast excess land.

Also Read: Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy’; TLB to Fix Plantation Exemption.  

The Division Bench failed to consider the following as regards Vesting Under S. 72

  • All right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries … and in respect of which certificates of purchase have not been issued ‘vest’ with the Government under Sec. 72. It is absolute. It is not a ‘fiction’; but, it is real and actual.
  • In K. Jayaprakashan v. State of Kerala, 2023-3 KLT 541, it is observed as under:
    • “Section 72 of the Act deals with vesting of landlord’s rights in Government. As per sub-section (1) of Section 72 ….  all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyiruppus and holders of karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 … shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon on the said date”.
  • In V.N. Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (P.T. Raman Nayar, T.C.Raghavan, K.K.Mathew, JJ.) , AIR 1971 Ker 98, it is held as under:
    • “By Section 72 the rights of landlords whose rights have not been purchased by cultivating tenants vest in the Government free of all encumbrances on a date to be notified by the Government in that behalf -the date has been notified as the 1st January, 1970”
  • The absolute nature of vesting is further clear from Sec. 72E and Sec. 112(5A).
  •  The nature of this statutory ‘vesting in Govt’ (under Sec. 72) is further clear from – Sec. 72E (tenant has to pay rent for the unassignedexempted-plantation-land vested in Government under Sec. 72). Such payments are required in two occasions – (i) after vesting in Government (for there is cultivating tenant and fixity of tenure) the tenant has not got his rights purchased under ‘Purchase Certificate’ and (ii) holding exempted-plantation land excess of ceiling limit.
  • In Lakshmi v. Rama Iyer, 1992-1 ILR-Ker 398; 1991-2 KLT 897it is pointed out: “Consequently the title and interest of the land-lord would vest in the Government on the appointed day that is, on 1-1-1970. Then as per S. 72Q the land owner would be entitled to recover rent accrued till 1-1-1970 only”.
  • In Aru v. Nakunni (Padmanabhan, J.), 1987-1 KLT 177, it is held as under:
    • “Under S.72 of the Act all the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of a holding held by a cultivating tenant entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 shall, subject to the various provisions of S.72, vest in the Government free of all encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries and subsisting on the date notified by the Government. ….. When once vesting has taken place there cannot be any further rights in any body. …. By assignment all such rights vest in the tenant”.
  •  Sec. 72A directs compensation to the land owner for vesting land under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter. 
  • For the land above the ceiling limit, payment is made under Sec. 88 – on surrendering land. It is paid by the Government, not by the tenant. (Under Sec. 72D, the cultivating tenant pays the purchase price for getting the assignment – below the ceiling limit – alone.)
  • Sec. 112(5A) deals with unassigned land (that is, no purchase certificate is given). Under this sub section land-value need not be given (even to) to the land-owner or the tenant(tenant has no right above that of land owner in this regard) over and above the “value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” – that is, the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
  • This provision is applied to lease-lands vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 and no purchase certificate is given (to the tenant)., in case of acquisition).
  • Sec. 72B(2) KLR Act spells-out that a cultivating tenant will get Purchase Certificate for the extent below the ‘ceiling limit’ alone. That is, the tenant has no “absolute rights” above the ceiling limit.
    • Note: Plantation-lands usually involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land. The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be minuscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres). Therefore, the analogy that a tenant has a right to seek assignment is not apt at all.
  • When land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 is acquired, in the light of Sec. 112(5A) land-value need not be given to the land-owner or the tenant, over and above the “value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” – that is, the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
  • The aforesaid provision of law in the KLR Act is legislated following Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
  • The rights of ‘tenants’ of Plantations, to continue in the land till the plantation exists, after vesting the land with Govt., is a ‘Legal Right conferred by Statute’. It is not Tenancy – for no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt. It is not a Grant or Licence/Permission – for such rights arise from a contract (express or implied). Therefore, it can be termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act.
  • It goes without saying – If no compensation is payable (as per the Constitution) to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.
  • Under Sec. 72A and Sec. 88, meagre compensation is paid to land owner on vesting landlords’ rights in Govt. and on surrendering land. It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation-tenants when their lease-lands are acquired  (majority are BIG Companies). It is apposite to remember that the lands of Maharaja of Travancore (191 acres of lands in Thiruvananthapuram – above the ceiling limit, 15 acres – in the City) were ‘mercilessly’ taken under the Orders of the Land Board Trivandrum under No. LB(B)2-18919/70, dated 15.01.1972. It is a sheer fact that lands of thousands of middleclass property owners was also harshly taken by under the provisions of the Act.
  • (Note: Only limited right to continue the specified plantation-crop alone is given by the ‘exemption’; and, according to law, in case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost.)

Land Reform wearied Middle Class landlords and tenants

When Land Reform Measures were implemented in the State of Kerala, it wearied small and moderate landlords and tenants, on the bedrock of “ceiling limit”. But the Plantations were not “touched”, taking “the economy” into consideration. Still, the well-visioned legislators were particular to see that the ownership of this large extent of plantations (otherwise thick forest of the Western Ghats) remained with the State. It was based on the principles in Article 31A(1) of the Constitution, which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit’.

Therefore, it can be stated with certainty –

  • Where the landowner has no vested right on land beyond the ceiling limit, a tenant cannot claim such a right; and, it is too illogical and irrational for the tenant to have such a right.
  • Interpretation of law, especially when Constitutional principles are involved, should subserve the interests of the nation and future generations, and not that of a few (BIG) ones.
  • It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation-tenants (majority are BIG Companies), which had not been given to the Maharaja of Travancore.  It is a sheer fact that lands of thousands of middle-class property owners were also harshly taken under the provisions of the Act.
    • (Note: Only a limited right to continue the specified plantation-crop alone is given by the ‘exemption’; and, according to law, in case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost.)

Conclusion

In short, the juridical status of the ‘plantation land’ (beyond the ceiling limit), vested in Govt. under Sec. 72, can be placed as under –

  • 1. Ceiling Limit: The maximum extent of land assignable under a Purchase Certificate is circumscribed by the ceiling limit, under Section 72B(1)(a) and (b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.
  • 2. Plantation Exemption: Owners and tenants of plantations are permitted to retain plantation lands in excess of the ceiling limit by availing the ‘exemption’ provided under Section 81. However, the said exemption does not confer any absolute proprietary right over such land.
  • 3. Exempted-plantation-land Vest in Government: Title/ownership of unassignedexempted-plantation-land is vested with the Government, under Section 72(1).
  • 4. Prior Owners and Tenants will be Deemed as Tenants of the Govt. Such tenants have to pay ‘Rent’ to the Government (Section 72E) for the unassignedexempted-plantation-land.  The rent is fixed by the Land Tribunal [Section 72F(5)(h) ].
  • 5. On Acquisition, No Land Value to Previous Owners or Tenants: If the land vested in Government under Section 72 is acquired, land-value will not be paid to the former land-owner or the tenant (Section 112(5A).
  • 6. Exemption will be lost, if “Fragmented”:The exemption granted to a plantation will be lost if it is “fragmented” or the plantation-crop is abandoned (under Section 87).

Also Read: Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board.

Do the Plantation-Tenants have the Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land (under Purchase Certificates)?

End Notes:

Effect of Travancore Govt. Leases after Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061

What is the impact of 1040 and 1061 (1886) Proclamations over the ‘Government Land Leases’ made after 1061 (1886)? Do such leased lands qualify as “estate” under Article 31A of the Constitution?

The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out (by the Government) after 1061 (1886) do not acquire the rights of ‘permanency of tenure’ or attain the ‘proprietary interest’ conferred by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061. If such rights are axiomatically conferred as a matter of course, the result would be that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands (after the Proclamations), for, the lease character would be lost at the moment it is made.

In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (five Judge Bench), 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.), concluded that the land covered by the Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 were “estates” falling under Art. 31A of the Constitution. It was on the finding that the Proclamation “secured permanency of tenure”, and “proprietary interest” in the soil. It was observed as under:

  • “7. It is impossible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that,even after the Proclamation of 1040, the holders of these lands had no proprietary interest whatsoever in the soil and remained tenants in the strict sense of that term, with only the right of enjoyment, the only difference being that they secured permanency of tenure, the Government still remaining the full and absolute proprietor of the soil.”

Therefore, there is a clear difference between leases made before and after the Proclamations, and the rights conferred by the Proclamations do not apply to leases made after them.

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End Notes

Relevant provisions of KLR Act, in a Nutshell

Section Provisions in a Nutshell
Chap. II 
3(1)
Exemptions – (i) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to – (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
“Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.
7 EPersons acquired lands (before 2005 amendment in KLR Act) for consideration below 1 Ha. 61 Are 87 Sq.m. (4 acre) will be deemed to be tenants .
13Fixity: “Every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding.”
22Landlord desiring to resume any land shall apply to the Land Tribunal.
31Fair rent determined by Land Tribunal.
51B. Landlord not to enter on land surrendered or abandoned by the tenant. 
Contravention is made punishable.
54(1)
55
57
57 (3)
57 (6)
61
54(1). A cultivating tenant (to purchase the right) has to apply Land Tribunal.
55. Purchase price is fixed by LT (on fair rent u/s. 31) to be paid u/s. 59
57. The LT after enquiries, pass orders determining purchase price.
(3). The Land Tribunal allows the purchase of the land it determines.
(6). The Land Tribunal forwards  orders to the Land Board.
61. Tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) pending proceedings.
59When Sec. 54 application is allowed (by the LT), the purchase price (determined u/s. 57 by the LT) shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal to the credit of the Land Board and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
72
Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating tenants in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
72(1) says: Holdings upon which tenanat entilted fixity under sec. 13 vest in govt.
72BCultivating-tenant “shall be entitled to assignment” of land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 –within ceiling area and get purchase certificate (through LT) (2 years from 1-1-1970). Effect of non-filing (See Balanoor Plantations case. 2018(3) KLT 283.)
72DThe cultivating tenant has to pay the purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
72ESuch a tenant is liable to pay rent to the Govt. for the unassigned land – under Purchase Certificate (e.g., unassignedexempted-plantation-land). The Land Tribunal fixes the rent under Sec. 72F(5)(h).
72CProvides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit)
Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 
72KLT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.
74Prohibition of future tenancies.
Chap. III 
81
Exemption from ceiling and excess for Govt. lands, private forests, plantations, industrial or commercial undertakings, etc.
Proviso – There will be an exemption (as plantation, land given to educational institution, trust, etc.) on Government lands, given under grant, lease, etc.
See: HMT (Machine Tools) Limited v. Taluk Land Board, 2009 (3) KLJ 110; MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28.
82Ceiling area – 5/10 standard acres.
83No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  It is a total bar. (Note:  plantations, industrial area etc. are exempted.)
Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB), Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137)
The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571.
84Certain transfers – void.
85(1)Surrender excess.
85(2)Owners and Tenants (having land in excess of the ceiling area) should furnish ceiling return to Land Board before March31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
Note: Effect of non-filing: See – Balanoor Plantations case – 2018(3) KLT 283.State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
 According to S. 3(1) (viii), “tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres” is exempted from Chapter II. Therefore, the landlord can recover such plantation lands after the period of tenancy. Such landlords also had to file a ceiling return within the time stipulated.
85(3)Excess shall be surrendered.
Note: Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant)
It is clear from the following provisions:
(Before 1. 1. 1970)
S. 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT(for the purchase of right, title and interest.)
S. 55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
S. 57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
S. 57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
S. 57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board.
S. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT)
S. 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
(After 1. 1. 1970)
S. 72B – cultivating tenant to apply to the LT, for Purchase Certificate.
S. 72D. The cultivating tenant has to pay purchase price to the Government [fixed by the LT] on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
S. 72F(5) – Land Tribunal shall issue notice to consider the claims and objections from the land owner or intermediaries, and pass an order specifying, inter alia, the rent [under S. 72F(5)(h) ] payable by the cultivating tenant to the Government.
S. 72F(6) & (7) – LT shall pass Orders on encumbrance or charge for maintenance or alimony and compensation payable to the landowner or that intermediary.
It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case. Note: (i) The sub-section (3) itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant, (ii) LT is the only authority to determine tenancy (Land Board cannot determine it), and (iii) it is clear that even if it is a plantation-exemption-land (beyond ceiling limit), the tenant has to file petition under Section 54 – for fixing Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT and for allotting the land under section 57(3) and for effecting the payments of ‘rent’ and ‘purchase price’(to the credit of the Land Board)  under sec. 61 and 59.
85(3A)The person bound to file a statement under sub-section (2) (that is, Owners and Tenants – having land in excess of the ceiling area)  shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.
85(5)On receipt of the statement under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3A), the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Board and such Taluk LandBoard shall determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered.
85(7)Whereon a person fails to file statement under 85(2) or (3A), LB shall intimate that fact to TLB  –  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered. It is obvious – The LB can intimate TLB as to non-filing, on the basis of the records it obtained under Sec. 57(6) and 59. That is, those tenants who are not entitled to get a purchase certificate also has to file an application under Sec. 54(1) and 85(2) or (3A). Effect of non-filing: See – Balanur Plantations case (With respect to Sec. 72B application) – 2018(3) KLT 283. Statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit to file statement:  State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
[TLB not to do, suo motu, without direction from LB. 1980 KLT 120, referred to in 2019(1) KLT 985.]
85AFile ceiling return within March  2, 1973 before Land Board..
86(1)On determination of the extent to be surrendered under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
86(3)Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession
86(4)Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
86(6)Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
87
Exp. II
If a person converts any portion of exempted land for any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit. That is, the exemption will be lost for the portion that exceeds the ceiling limit. (Mathew K Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913)

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