M. Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das –Pragmatic Verdict on Ayodhya Dispute

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Ayodhya dispute: All parties submit final notes, Hindus don't want land to  be divided

PART I

Introduction

Lord Rama is one of the widely worshipped Hindu deities. Rama has been venerated as personification of all goodness in life. Rama, the ideal man and ideal king, is believed to be born in Ayodhya in the ‘Treta yuga’.  (It is believed that ‘Treta yuga’ is the 2nd of the four yugas (Krita, Treta, Dwapara, and Kali). It lasted for 12,96,000 years.  Dwapara yuga lasted for 864,000 years. Present yuga, Kali, began in 3,102 BC and will last 4,32,000 years.)

Babri Masjid (Babur’s Mosque) is assumed to be constructed in 1528 by Mir Baqi, one of the generals of Babur. Babur was the first Mughal emperor and the founder of the Mughal empire in India.

Brief History of Disputes

Emergence of Ayodhya Disputes: During 1857, both the Hindus and Muslims worshipped in the same compound where the mosque stood. Muslims worshipped inside the mosque and Hindus outside. The compound was having the area of 2.77 acres. Hindus raised disputes on the belief that the Janamsthan (birthplace) of Rama is where the mosque stood. There being clashes, in 1857, a British administrator erected a railing within the area of 2.77 acres to separate the two groups. 

Mosque Was ‘Desecrated’ By a Group: The ‘controversy entered a new phase’ on the night intervening 22 and 23 December 1949, when the mosque was ‘desecrated by a group of about fifty or sixty people’ who broke open its locks and placed idols of Lord Ram under the central dome.

Allahabad High Court Judgement: The civil disputes triggered in 1950 took a long journey before its culmination in the Supreme Court decision in 2019 under the caption M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1). By the time, on December 6, 1992, the Babri Masjid, had been destroyed.

Three judges of the Allahabad High Court had decreed the suits, in 2010, directing to divide the 2.77 acre disputed land equally between the three parties – Ram Lalla Virajman, Nirmohi Akharaand Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Waqf Board.

Core-Crux of the Argument in Supreme Court

  • 1. Was the disputed land considered as the birth-place of Rama?
  • 2. Was there a temple in the disputed site before constructing Babri Masjid?
  • 3. Is there ‘presumed dedication’ in favour of Musjid and ‘waqf by user; alternatively, did Muslims perfect right of adverse-possession over the disputed property?

The Judgment

The afore-stated questions were answered (Ranjan Gogoi, S A Bobde, Dr D Y Chandrachud, Ashok Bhushan, S Abdul Nazeer,JJ) as under-

  • 1. Faith and belief of Hindus has always been that Janamasthan of Lord Ram is the place where Babri Mosque has been constructed.
  • 2. No evidence is available – whether the pre-existing structure was demolished for the construction of the mosque.
  • 3. No ‘presumed dedication’ and ‘waqf by user; and also no adverse possession, as claimed.

PART II

Suits Considered in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das

  • Suit No. 1 considered in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) was the suit instituted on 13 January 1950 by Gopal Singh Visharad, a resident of Ayodhya in his capacity as a follower of Sanatan Dharmseeking for:
    • (i) A declaration of his entitlement to worship and seek the darshan of Lord Rama, according to religion and custom at the Janambhumi temple without hindrance; and
    • (ii) A permanent and perpetual injunction restraining defendant nos. 1 to 10 from removing the idols of the deity and other idols from the place where they were installed; from closing the way leading to the idols; or interfering in worship and darshan. This suit was filed for a right in common with and for the benefit of the other Hindu devotees.
  • Suit No. 2 was filed on 5 December 1950 by Paramhans Ramchandra Das before the Civil Judge, Faizabad seeking reliefs similar to those in Suit 1. Suit 2 was subsequently withdrawn on 18 September 1990.
  • Suit No. 3 was instituted on 17 December 1959 by Nirmohi Akhara,claiming shebaitship rights, through Mahant Jagat Das seeking a decree for the removal of the receiver from the management and charge of the Janmabhumi temple and for delivering it to the plaintiff.
  • Suit No. 4 was instituted on 18 December 1961 by the Sunni Central Waqf Board and nine Muslim residents of Ayodhya. It has been averred that the suit has been instituted on behalf of the entire Muslim community together with an application under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC. As amended, the following reliefs have been sought in the plaint:
    • (a) A declaration to the effect that the property indicated by letters ABCD in the sketch map attached to the plaint is public mosque commonly known as ‘Babari Masjid’ and that the land adjoining the mosque shown in the sketch map by letters EFGH is a public Muslim graveyard as specified in para 2 of the plaint may be decreed. 
    • (b) That in case in the opinion of the Court delivery of possession is deemed to be the proper remedy, a decree for delivery of possession of the mosque and graveyard in suit by removal of the idols and other articles which the Hindus may have placed in the mosque as objects of their worship be passed in plaintiff‘s favour, against the defendants.
    • (bb) That the statutory Receiver be commanded to hand over the property in dispute described in ScheduleAof the Plaint by removing the unauthorized structures erected thereon.
  • Suit No. 5 was instituted on 1 July 1989 in the name of Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman at Sri Ram Janmabhumi, Ayodhya also called Bhagwan Sri Ram Lalla Virajman as the first plaintiff. The second plaintiff is described as Asthan Sri Rama Janambhumi, Ayodhya. Both the plaintiffs were represented by Sri Deoki Nandan Agrawala, a former judge of the Allahabad High Court as next friend. The next friend is impleaded as the third plaintiff. The defendants to the suit include: (i) Nirmohi Akhara which is the Plaintiff in Suit 3; (ii) Sunni Central Waqf Board, the Plaintiff in Suit 4; (iii) Hindu and Muslim residents of Ayodhya; and (iv) The State of Uttar Pradesh, the Collector and Senior Superintendent of Police. Several other Hindu entities including the All India Hindu Mahasabha and a Trust described as the Sri Ram Janmabhumi Trust, are parties to the Suit as is the Shia Central Board of Waqfs. Following reliefs were claimed in this suit:
    • (A) A declaration that the entire premises of Sri Rama Janma Bhumi at Ayodhya, as described and delineated in Annexure I, II and III belongs to the plaintiff Deities.
    •  (B) A perpetual injunction against the Defendants prohibiting them from interfering with, or raising any objection to, or placing any obstruction in the construction of the new Temple building at Sri Rama Janma Bhumi, Ayodhya, after demolishing and removing the existing buildings and structures etc., situate thereat, in so far as it may be necessary or expedient to do so for the said purpose.

The Judgment

Appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the verdict of the Allahabad High Court. The five-judge bench of the Apex Court heard the title-dispute cases, and passed the Judgment (M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das).

  • (Who authored the Judgment was not specified in the Judgment. In Committee of Management Anjuman Intezamia Masajid, Varanasi v. Rakhi Singh, 2024-3 SCC 336, authored by Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, this case (Ayodhya case) was called as ‘Ram Janmabhumi Temple Case’)

The Judgment in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das  (2020-1 SCC 1) was delivered on November 9, 2019. The Constitution Bench comprising the Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Justices SA Bobde, DY Chandrachud, Ashok Bhusan and Abdul Nazeer were unanimous in their verdict. And, the judgment was per curiam also, i.e., a collective one without specifying the author or authors.

There was an ‘addenda’ authored by one of the judges (undisclosed) recording his reasons on the issue of ‘whether the disputed structure was the birth place of Lord Ram, as per the faith and belief of the Hindus’.

Rights of ‘Next Friend’ to File Suits for Protection of Trust Properties

The possession and management of the property of a temple or Idol, with the right to sue, are vested in the Shebait. But, where the Shebait is negligent or where the Shebait himself is the guilty party against whom the deity needs relief, it is open to the worshippers or other persons interested in the religious endowment, to file suits for the protection of the trust properties.

A suit by worshippers in their personal capacity cannot however canvas the range of threats the idol may face at the hands of a negligent shebait and it may be necessary for the court to permit the next friend to sue on behalf of the idol itself to adequately protect the interests of the idol.

Under Sec. 92, CPC, in the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the Court, may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree.

Therefore, where a shebait acts adverse to the interests of the deity, a worshipper can, as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the deity itself, provided that if the next friend’s bona fides are contested, the court must scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend to adequately represent the deity.

Locus standi of worshipper to question affairs of a temple

In this case, with respect to the locus standi, our Apex Court considered the following questions:

  • Can a worshipper institute a suit?
  • If so, in what circumstance?
  • Can it be in his personal capacity?
  • What are the reliefs entitled to by the worshipper?
  • Should idol be a necessary party in such a suit?
  • Should Shebait be a necessary party in such a suit?
  • Should there be a court-appointment as ‘next friend’ of deity?

The legal position handed-down by the Supreme Court can be summarised as under:

  • (i) A worshipper can file a suit for enforcing individual rights (like access to the idol or worship) in a personal capacity. Such an ordinary suit can be filed in his own name without being obliged to bring a suit in the name of the idol. The relief may be against the Shebait. The deity is not bound by the suit of the worshippers unless the remedy provided is in rem in nature.
  • (ii) If the suit for enforcing individual rights is actually to protect the deity’s interests, such a suit can be filed by a worshipper only ‘on behalf of the deity’.
  • (iii) When a Shebait is negligent in its duties or takes actions that are hostile to the deity or improperly alienated trust property or refuses to act for the benefit of the idol or where the Shebait’s actions are prejudicial to the interest of the idol, it becomes necessary to confer on a next friend the right to bring an action in law against the Shebait; and a worshipper has an ad hoc power of representation to protect the interest of the idol.
  • (iv) No decree for recovery of possession can be made in such a suit unless the worshipper has the ‘present right to the possession’. But a mere declaratory decree that the alienation is not binding on the deity can be granted.
  • (v) The worshippers, out of their own independent action, cannot exercise the deity’s power of suing to protect its own interests, like taking action against a Shebait who acts adverse to the interests of the deity, or for recovery of possession of the property improperly alienated by the Shebait.
  • (vi) In such situations, a worshipper must be permitted to sue as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the idol itself – directly exercising the deity’s right to sue.
  • (vii) The next friend being so allowed, steps into the shoes of the Shebait for the limited purpose of the litigation. Or, the next friend, the worshipper, directly exercises the deity’s right to sue.
  • (viii) In a suit for the recovery of property on behalf of the idol, the court cannot deliver possession of the property to the next friend. The next friend is merely a temporary representative of the idol.
  • (ix) The court can craft any number of reliefs, including the framing of a scheme. The question of relief is fundamentally contextual and must be framed by the court in light of the parties before it and the circumstances of each case.
  • (x) To protect against the threat of a wayward ‘next friend’, the court has to satisfy, in some manner, that the next friend is bona fide and that he can satisfactorily represent the deity.
  • (xi) If the next friend’s bona fides are contested, the court must scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend to adequately represent the deity. In the absence of any objection, and where a court sees no deficiencies in the actions of the next friend, there is no reason why a worshipper should not have the right to sue on behalf of the deity where a Shebait abandons his sacred and legal duties.
  • (xii) In an appropriate case, the court can scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend, of its own accord. 

An Appointment of Next Friend Under Order XXXII, CPC Not Necessary

It was made clear in the judgment that ‘the worshipper must be permitted to sue as next friend’. It is not specifically stated that the permission must have been obtained as provided under Order XXXII, CPC (Suits by or against Minors). But, it appears that a ‘scrutiny’ is warranted only ‘if the next friend’s bona fides are contested’. It is held as under:

  • “Therefore, where a shebait acts adverse to the interests of the deity, a worshipper can, as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the deity itself, provided that if the next friend’s bona fides are contested, the court must scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend to adequately represent the deity. The court may do so of its own accord, ex debito justitae.”

PART III

Findings: Limitation

  • The Suit No.1, was maintainable since it was filed by a devotee (Gopal Singh Visharad) not for the assertion of any private right, but for a right in common with and for the benefit of the other Hindu devotees.
  • The Suit No. 3, filed by Nirmohi Akhara claiming shebaitship rights, was found to be not maintainable. The cause of action for Suit No. 3had been arisen in January 1950, when the receiver took custody of the disputed structure. But, the suit was filed only in December 1959, more than 9 years after the cause of action had arisen. Akhara claimed that it was within the limitation as it was a suit for possession and the limitation period thereof was 12 years. Court rejected Akhara’s argument observing that the suit was filed against the order of the Magistrate passed under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It was a suit for restoration of management and charge, and not one for possession. The applicable limitation period for the suit was 6 years (residuary provision) and not 12 years as claimed by the Akhara.
  • The Court also rejected Akhara’s argument that the action of the Magistrate amounted to a ‘continuous wrong’ and therefore the limitation period continued to reset. It noted that it was ‘inherently fallacious’ to argue that the order of a Magistrate would give rise to a wrong, let alone a continuous wrong.
  • The Suit No.4, filed by the Sunni Waqf Board, the Apex Court found that it was one for possession falling under Article 142 with a limitation period of 12 years; and thus the suit was held to be within limitation period.  
  • Suit No. 5 was filed by Plaintiff No. 3 as the ‘next friend’ of the Plaintiff No.1, the deity. Although it was only filed in 1989, the Court held it to be within the limitation period for: (i) the deity was not impleaded in any of the earlier suits, and (ii) the interests of the Plaintiff No.1 were not being protected by Nirmohi Akhara which was pursuing its own personal interest in suit 3.

Nirmohi Akhara did not enjoy Shebaitship

Court observed that Nirmohi Akhara, who filed Suit No. 3 claiming to be the de facto shebait, had no locus standi to file the suit. Akhara did not demonstrate continuous management of the idols in the outer courtyard. The Akhara lacked de facto shebaitship, even though the next friend in suit 5 never had historically disputed the Akhara’s shebaitship. Relying on Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar  [AIR 1954 SC 5]), it was held that the ‘next friend’ in suit 5 did not have to demonstrate that the Nirmohi Akhara was guilty of “misconduct”.

Nirmohi Akhara did not always act in the interests of the deity. It failed to prove de facto shebaitship. There was no deed to entrust it with management of the deity. Therefore, ‘next friend’ in suit 5 could sue on behalf of the deity. The Court reliedon Sankaranarayanan Iyer: AIR 1949 Mad 721.

Findings on Title and Possession

The Apex Court found that the disputed land (Ram Janmabhoomi) is not a ‘juristic person’. Thereon it proceeded to consider the contentions of both sides on title and possession of the disputed land. The Supreme Court determined title with the deity, Shri Ram Virajman. The Court rejected the claim of Sunni Waqf Board on ‘presumed dedication’ and ‘waqf by user; and also the alternative contention on adverse possession. Injunction was issued against the other parties from interfering in the construction of a new temple at the site.

Legal Personality of the Deity, Lord Rama

The Court proceeded, inter alia, on the following findings: The Nirmohis (Hindus) claimed that they were, at all material times, in charge and management of the structure at the disputed site which according to them was a temple until 29 December 1949, on which date legal steps were ordered under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

Two important questions were formulated in this case: First, what are the exact contours of the legal personality ascribed to a Hindu Idol. Second, can property of a corporeal nature (in this case land) be ascribed a distinct legal personality.

The nuances of juristic personality of ‘Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman’, the deity Lord Rama, was one of the main points discussed in this case.

Collection of Persons or Inanimate Object (Ship) Can Be a Legal Person

Juristic persons hold rights, entitlements, liabilities and duties. The artificial legal persons may be a collection of natural persons (e.g. corporation) or an inanimate object (e.g. a ship). A ship has a juridical personality, having both rights and liabilities (sometimes distinct from those of the owner) which may be enforced by process, and that the decree against the vessel is binding upon all interested in her. It is irrespective of the nationality of the ship or that of its owners, or the place of business or domicile or residence of its owners or the place where the cause of action arose wholly or in part.

Courts Recognises Legal Personality to Give Effect to the Dedication

The Supreme Court observed that courts recognised the legal personality of the Hindu Idol to give effect to the dedication of the founder of the endowment. The ‘recognition of juristic personality was…devised by the courts to give legal effect to the Hindu practice of dedicating property for a religious or ‘pious’ purpose’. When the founder was not alive and the shebait was not the owner of the lands, the courts (and through them the State) give effect to the original dedication conferring the legal personality to the idol. The legal personality of the idol, and the rights of the idol over the property endowed and the offerings of devotees, are guarded by the law to (a) protect the endowment against mal-administration by the human agencies entrusted with the day to day management of the idol,and (b) protect the interests of devotees. It was also found that legal rights entitled to by the idol was not dependent on the existence of an express trust.

Juristic Personality of ‘Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman’

Before exploring whether the disputed site, ‘Ram Janmabhoomi’ itself is a juristic person, the Court enquired into the legal status of the idol (First plaintiff in suit 5 – Shri Ram Virajman). Relying on statements of witnesses and travelogues of historical importance, it was found by the Apex Court that Hindu devotees believed that the resident deity of Ram Janmabhoomi was the embodiment of Lord Ram.

Conferral of Legal Personality Is Recognition of Pious Purpose

While delving into the jurisdictional foundation as to juristic personality of Idols, the Apex Court observed as under:

  • “116. … The idol constitutes the embodiment or expression of the pious purpose upon which legal personality is conferred. The destruction of the idol does not result in the termination of the pious purpose and consequently the endowment. Even where the idol is destroyed, or the presence of the idol itself is intermittent or entirely absent, the legal personality created by the endowment continues to subsist. In our country, idols are routinely submerged in water as a matter of religious practice. It cannot be said that the pious purpose is also extinguished due to such submersion. The establishment of the image of the idol is the manner in which the pious purpose is fulfilled. A conferral of legal personality on the idol is, in effect, a recognition of the pious purpose itself and not the method through which that pious purpose is usually personified. The pious purpose may also be fulfilled where the presence of the idol is intermittent or there exists a temple absent an idol depending on the deed of dedication. In all such cases the pious purpose on which legal personality is conferred continues to subsist.”

Legal Fictions Are to Protect Properties Dedicated to Pious Purpose

The Supreme Court concluded the rationale of conferring legal personality to Idol as under:

  • “123. The recognition of the Hindu Idol as a legal or ‘juristic’ person is therefore based on two premises employed by courts. The first is to recognise the pious purpose of the testator as a legal entity capable of holding property in an ideal sense (absent the creation of a trust-sic). The second is the merging of the pious purpose itself and the Idol which embodies the pious purpose to ensure the fulfillment of the pious purpose. So conceived, the Hindu Idol is a legal person. The property endowed to the pious purpose is owned by the Idol as a legal person in an ideal sense. The reason why the court created such legal fictions was to provide a comprehensible legal framework to protect the properties dedicated to the pious purpose from external threats as well as internal maladministration. Where the pious purpose necessitated a public trust for the benefit of all devotees, conferring legal personality allowed courts to protect the pious purpose for the benefit of the devotees.”

Destruction of Idol Does Not Affect Legal Personality

Our Apex Court, explained further as under:  

  • “127. … In the case of Hindu idols, legal personality is not conferred on the idol simpliciter but on the underlying pious purpose of the continued worship of the deity as incarnated in the idol. Where the legal personality is conferred on the purpose of a deity’s continued worship, moving or destroying the idol does not affect its legal personality. The legal personality vests in the purpose of continued worship of the idol as recognised by the court. It is for the protection of the continued worship that the law recognises this purpose and seeks to protect it by the conferral of juristic personality.”

Legal Personality of Idol Is Not Dependent On Its Continued Existence

The Court pointed out that the legal personality of the deity is not dependent on the continued existence of the idol. It reads as under:

  • “129. In the present case, the first plaintiff has been the object of worship for several hundred years and the underlying purpose of continued worship is apparent even absent any express dedication or trust. The existence of the idol is merely a question of form, or corpus, and the legal personality of the first plaintiff is not dependent on the continued existence of the idol. At the heart of the present dispute are questions pertaining to the rightful manager of the deity and the access of the devotees of Lord Ram to the idols.”

Beneficiaries of Endowments Are Not Idols but Worshippers

The Supreme Court quoted the following from Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar (1957): AIR 1957 SC 133:  

  • “6. …The true purpose of a gift of properties to the idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship. In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v Ram Lal Maitra (1910) it was held on a consideration of these and other texts that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a ‘sentient being‘, and that the dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment of the owner of his dominion over them for the purpose of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J at p. 138 that “the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected” and that “the dedication to a deity” may be “a compendious expression of the pious purpose for which the dedication is designed”.
  • 7. When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof.”

Idol as Representing Spiritual Purpose of Donor Is the Juristic Person

The Supreme Court quoted the following from Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1969): AIR 1969 SC 1089:

  • “6. …It should however be remembered that the juristic person in the idol is not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that the image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated and vivified by the Pran Pratishta ceremony. It is not also correct that the Supreme Being of which the idol is a symbol or image is the recipient and owner of the dedicated property.
  • …The correct legal position is that the idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests. As observed by Mr. Justice B.K. Mukherjea: “With regard to the debutter… It is not only a compendious expression but a material embodiment of the pious purpose and though there is difficulty in holding that property can reside in the aim or purpose itself, it would be quite consistent with sound principles of Jurisprudence to say that a material object which represents or symbolises a particular purpose can be given the status of a legal person, and regarded as owner of the property which is dedicated to it. … The legal position is comparable in many respects to the development in Roman Law.”

Doctrine on ‘Merger’ – ‘Entity of the Idol’ Is Linked With ‘Pious Purpose’

As established in earlier decisions, neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law; and it is not correct that the idol or image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated. Juristic personality of an Idol stands connected to the ‘pious purpose’ of the founder. Therefore, to give a logical proposition as to the ‘juristic personality’ of idol, the ‘entity of the idol’ has to be linked with the ‘pious purpose’.  It is vividly explained in this decision.

While explaining the legal personality of an Idol the Court held as under:

  • “123. … The first is to recognise the pious purpose of the testator as a legal entity capable of holding property in an ideal sense. The second is the merging of the pious purpose itself and the Idol which embodies the pious purpose to ensure the fulfillment of the pious purpose”

It is obvious that the Court brings-forth the doctrine of “merger” based on the following well accepted jurisprudential notions:

  1. Legal entity of an idol is conceived only in an ideal sense.
  2. The idol is chosen as the centre for legal relations.
  3. Idol is the embodiment of the pious purpose of its founder.
  4. A material object that represents a ‘purpose’ can be a legal person.

It Is the Idol that is the Embodiment of Pious Purpose

Relying mainly upon one of the oldest decisions in this subject, Manohar Ganesh Tambekar  Vs.  Lakhmiram (1887), ILR (1888) 12 Bom 247, our Apex Court held that juristic personality could not be conferred upon Ram Janmabhumi.  It is held as under:

  • “138. …The decision (Manohar Ganesh Tambekar  Vs.  Lakhmiram) clarifies that an Idol as a juridical person is the ‘ideal embodiment’ of a pious or benevolent idea. The status of a juristic person was conferred on the Idol as an entity which encompasses the purpose itself in which capacity the properties and offerings vest. The observations in this case affirm the position that juridical personality was conferred on the pious purpose and the property endowed or accumulated did not itself become a juristic entity. It is not the property endowed which is a juridical person – it is the Idol which as an embodiment of a pious purpose which is recognised as a juristic person, in whom the property stands vested.”

Hindu devotees were in settled possession in the outer courtyard

  • Until 1877, there was only one entry through which access could be gained to the inner courtyard which was the door on the eastern side called Hanumat Dwar.
  • The construction of the railing by the colonial administration was not an attempt to settle proprietary rights. It was an expedient measure to ensure law and order.
  • The decision of the colonial administration to allow the opening of an additional door to the outer courtyard in 1877 was to facilitate the entry of Hindu devotees against which objections were raised and rejected.
  • The need for an additional point of entry for Hindu devotees was an indicator of the extensive nature of their use to offer worship.
  • On gaining entry, the Hindu devotees offered worship at several structures such as the Ramchabutra and Sita Rasoi. The Bhandar was also under their control in the outer courtyard.
  • This indicated that insofar as the outer courtyard was concerned, the Hindu devotees were in settled possession and actively practicing their faith.

Continuing Dispute.

  • This possession of the Hindu devotees over the outer courtyard was open and to the knowledge of the Muslims.
  • The extensive nature of worship by the Hindus was indicated by the existence of specific places of worship and the permission by the administration for the opening of an additional point of entry in 1877 due to a large rush of devotees.
  • Disputes between 1858 and 1883 indicated that the attempt to exclude the Hindus from the inner courtyard by raising a railing was a matter of continuing dispute.
  • Significantly, the activities of the Hindu devotees in the outer courtyard continued.

PART IV

Claim and Argument on Ram Janmabhumi

The plaintiffs in Suit No. 5 in the batch of suits considered by the Supreme Court, were the deity of Lord Ram and the Janmasthan (both of whom were asserted to be juridical persons) through a next friend impleaded as a third plaintiff. The suit was for a declaration that the entire premises comprised of annexures 1, 2 and 3 to the plaint constituted Ram Janmabhumi and for an injunction against interference in the construction of a new temple after the demolition of the existing building.

Placing reliance on the decision of the Madras High Court in TRK Ramaswami Servai Vs. The Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, 1950 ILR(Mad) 799 it was contend that the presence of an idol is not an indispensable requirement with respect to religious worship and that the faith and belief of the worshippers along with the performance of the parikrama around the disputed land is sufficient for a court to confer on the disputed site legal personality.

Significant reliance was placed on the existence of certain temples which do not possess idols, in particular the Chidambaram temple in Tamil Nadu, to advance two legal propositions: First, that a Hindu deity possessing juristic personality could exist even absent an idol, and second that unadorned land, absent any distinguishing features, could constitute a Swayambhu deity and consequently a juristic person.

The Muslim parties (defendant Nos. 6 to 8) in their written statement took the plea that in the Suit of 1885, which was instituted by Mahant Raghubar Das, the relief was confined to the Chabutra outside the mosque and no objection was taken in respect of the mosque which was depicted in the site plan.

Ram Janmabhumi: Conception on Legal Personality

One of the main points came for consideration was whether the Ram Janmabhumi, or the birth-place of Lord Ram, was an object of worship and whether the land itself was a Deity, and therefore it was a legal person. It was argued that the construction of the mosque on the land by Emperor Babur in 1528 did not take away its character as a Deity. It was also contended that the disputed land being a legal person, it was res nullius (vest in nobody) and res extra commercium (not alienable); and therefore, not a property that could be subjected to adverse possession. The land itself had legal personality and that therefore it was not subject to the possessory claims of other parties. On behalf of the plaintiffs in suit No. 5, it had also been argued that a juristic entity cannot be owned, nor is it divisible.

Conferment of Legal Personality on ‘Immoveable Property’ – Not Law

This argument was opposed by the Sunni Waqf Board pointing out that the conferment of legal personality on immoveable property was not supported by the existing law. It was also asserted that the law of adverse possession and limitation would apply to claims involving property owned by the Idol.

The Court held that the Ram Jamnabhoomi itself could not be conferred with legal rights. First, it emphasised that land, were it given legal rights, would be an entirely different type of juristic entity than a Hindu idol. The question became not whether the land could be vested in the idol, but rather whether the land itself had legal rights. The Bench held that were it to confer the land with legal rights, it would in effect be extinguishing competing claims for the title purely on the basis of the faith and belief of Hindu devotees. After all, a legal personality is not subject to title claims. The Bench observed that to resolve the dispute in this manner would be against the secular nature of the Constitution.

Conferment of Legal Personality – will alter characteristics of property

Referring to The Mosque, Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar (AIR 1940 PC 116) the Court observed that recognision of immovable property as a juristic entity, would alter the essential characteristic of immovable property. Unlike a juristic entity, immovable property is subject to ownership and division. The Bench reiterated that the purpose of conferring an inanimate object with legal rights in the context of Hindu endowments, is to legally protect endowed property.It is observed that ‘the conferral of legal personality in the context of endowments was to ensure the legal protection of the endowed property, not   to confer upon the property legal impregnability by placing it outside the reach of the law. The elevation of land to the status of a juristic person fundamentally alters its characteristics as immoveable property, a severe consequence against which a court must guard. Nor is it a valid safeguard to postulate that the court will decide on a case to case basis where a particular immoveable property should have a juristic status.’  .

Whether a temple pre-existed

Though it had been asserted that the disputed structure was constructed over a Hindu temple, there was no specific finding in the report of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) that the underlying structure was a Lord Ram temple. The ASI has also not opined whether a structure was demolished for the purpose of building the disputed structure, though it clearly demonstrated the presence of successive structural activity underneath the disputed structure.

 Report of the ASI, not sufficient to claim title

With respect to the Report of Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) the Supreme Court held as follows:

  • “648. No argument other than a bare reliance on the ASI report was put forth. No evidence was led by the plaintiffs in Suit 5 to support the contention that even if the underlying structure was believed to be a temple, the rights that flow from it were recognised by subsequent sovereigns. The mere existence of a structure underneath the disputed property cannot lead to a legally enforceable claim to title today. Subsequent to the construction of the ancient structure in the twelfth century, there exists an intervening period of four hundred years prior to the construction of the mosque. No evidence has been led with respect to the continued existence of the legal regime or any change in legal regime. It is admitted by all parties that at some point during the reign of the Mughal empire, a mosque was constructed at the disputed site. Even if this Court was to assume that the underlying structure was in fact a Hindu temple which vested title to the disputed site in the plaintiff deities, no evidence has been led by the plaintiffs in Suit 5 to establish that upon the change in legal regime to the Mughal sovereign, such rights were recognised.”

PART V

Mosque Was Constructed Upon a (Hindu) Structure of Twelfth Century

Marshaling together the evidence on the claim of title in Suit 4 and Suit 5 to pave the way for the ultimate determination of the relief to be granted, the Court held in para 788 as under:

I. The report of the ASI indicates the following position:

  1. Archaeological findings in the area of excavation reveal significant traces of successive civilisations, commencing with the age of the North Black Polished Ware traceable to the second century B.C.;
  2.  The excavation by the ASI has revealed the existence of a preexisting underlying structure dating back to the twelfth century. The structure has large dimensions, evident from the fact that there were 85 pillar bases comprised in 17 rows each of five pillar bases;
  3. On a preponderance of probabilities, the archaeological findings on the nature of the underlying structure indicate it to be of Hindu religious origin, dating to twelfth century A.D.;
  4. The mosque in dispute was constructed upon the foundation of the pre-existing structure. The construction of the mosque has taken place in such a manner as to obviate an independent foundation by utilising the walls of the pre-existing structure; and
  5. The layered excavation at the site of excavation has also revealed the existence of a circular shrine together with a makarapranala indicative of Hindu worship dating back to the eighth to tenth century.

A reasonable inference can be drawn on the basis of the standard of proof which governs civil trials that:

  1. The foundation of the mosque is based on the walls of a large pre-existing structure;
  2. The pre-existing structure dates back to the twelfth century; and
  3. The underlying structure which provided the foundations of the mosque together with its architectural features and recoveries are suggestive of a Hindu religious origin comparable to temple excavations in the region and pertaining to the era.

No Evidence What Transpired In Four Centuries

II.  The conclusion in the ASI report about the remains of an underlying structure of a Hindu religious origin symbolic of temple architecture of the 12th century A.D. must however be read contextually with the following caveats:

  • (i) While the ASI report has found the existence of ruins of a preexisting structure, the report does not provide:
    • (a) The reason for the destruction of the pre-existing structure; and
    • (b) Whether the earlier structure was demolished for the purpose of the construction of the mosque.
  • (ii) Since the ASI report dates the underlying structure to the twelfth century, there is a time gap of about four centuries between the date of the underlying structure and the construction of the mosque.
    • No evidence is available to explain what transpired in the course of the intervening period of nearly four centuries;
  • (iii) The ASI report does not conclude that the remnants of the preexisting structure were used for the purpose of constructing the mosque (apart, that is, from the construction of the mosque on the foundation of the erstwhile structure); and
  • (iv) The pillars that were used in the construction of the mosque were black Kasauti stone pillars. ASI has found no evidence to show that these Kasauti pillars are relatable to the underlying pillar bases found during the course of excavation in the structure below the mosque.

Finding of Title Cannot Be Based on Archaeological Findings

III. A finding of title cannot be based in law on the archaeological findings which have been arrived at by ASI.

Between the twelfth century to which the underlying structure is dated and the construction of the mosque in the sixteenth century, there is an intervening period of four centuries. No evidence has been placed on the record in relation to the course of human history between the twelfth and sixteen centuries. No evidence is available in a case of this antiquity on

  • (i)    the cause of destruction of the underlying structure; and
  • (ii) whether the pre-existing structure was demolished for the construction of the mosque. Title to the land must be decided on settled legal principles and applying evidentiary standards which govern a civil trial.”

Case on ‘Dedication of Waqf’ and ‘Waqf by User’

The plaintiffs in Suit No. 4, the Sunni Waqf Board, claimed that the entire disputed site was dedicated by Babur for the purpose of public worship and a waqf was creared. Alternatively it was claimed that the disputed site had become a ‘waqf by user’.

The Court placed the case of the Sunni Waqf Board as under:

  •  “728. The documentary evidence relied upon by the plaintiffs in Suit 4 to demonstrate that the mosque stood on dedicated land originates after the colonial annexation of Oudh and after the year 1856. This was fairly admitted by Dr Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing in behalf of the plaintiffs in Suit 4. The plaintiffs in Suit 4 were unable to establish a specific grant of the land as a foundation of legal title prior to the annexation of Oudh or upon the transfer of power to the colonial administration after 1857.
  • 729. An attempt was made at an advanced stage of the hearing to contend that the disputed site marked out by the letters ABCD is waqf property, not by virtue of a specific dedication, but because of the long usage of the property as a site of religious worship by the Muslim community. Dr Dhavan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs in Suit 4 contended that the concept of a waqf has a broad connotation in Islamic Law. Hence, it was urged that even in the absence of an express dedication, the long use of the disputed site for public worship as a mosque elevates the property in question to a ‘waqf by user’. To support this proposition, Dr Dhavan contended that since the construction of the mosque by Emperor Babur in 1528 till its desecration on 22/23 December 1949, namaz has been offered in the mosque. Hence, the disputed property has been the site of religious worship. Further, he urges that the Muslims have been in settled possession of the disputed property and had used the mosque for the performance of public religious worship. Thus, despite the absence of a deed of dedication, the disputed site has been used for public religious worship for over four centuries, resultingly constituting its character as waqf property by long use.”

Court Rejected the Arguments on ‘Doctrine of Waqf by User’

The Court rejected the arguments on ‘doctrine of waqf by user’ observing the following:

  • “743. The contention of the plaintiffs in Suit 4 is that the entire property of the mosque, including both the inner and outer courtyards is waqf property. Once a property is recognised as waqf, the property is permanently and irrevocably vested in the Almighty, Allah from the date the waqf is deemed to be in existence. The land is rendered inalienable and falls within the regulatory framework of waqf legislation and Islamic law. The doctrine of waqf by user is well established in our law. However, as noted by the precedents detailed above, it is a doctrine of necessity to deal with cases where a property has been the site of long and consistent religious use by members of the Islamic faith but the original dedication is lost to the sands of time. Given the radical alterations to the characteristics of ownership of the property consequent upon a recognition of a waqf by user, the evidentiary burden to prove a waqf by useris high. The pleadings in the plaint in Suit 4 are deficient. No particulars of the extent or nature of the use have been set out. A stray sentence in paragraph 2 of the plaint cannot sustain a case of waqf by user. Moreover, the contention that the entire property was a single composite waqf cannot be assessed in a vacuum. The Court cannot ignore the evidence of established religious worship by Hindu devotees within the premises of the disputed site. If the contention urged by the plaintiffs in Suit 4 that the entire disputed property is a waqf by user is accepted, it would amount to extinguishing all rights claimed by the Hindus in the disputed property as a site of religious worship.
  • 744. In the decisions adverted to above in which claims of a waqf by user have been recognised, the claims were not made in the context of another religious community also utilising the property for the conduct of religious worship. It flows that the consequence of recognition of a waqf by user in the facts of these cases did not lead to the extinguishing of competing and legally tenable rights of another religious community.”

No Abandonment of the Mosque or Cessation of Namaz

The court observed in para 721 that there was no abandonment of the structure of the mosque or cessation of namaz within, as under:

  • “721. In so far as the inner courtyard is concerned, it appears that the setting up of the railing was a measure to ensure that peace prevailed by allowing the worship of the Muslims in the mosque and the continuation of Hindu worship outside the railing. In so far as the worship by the Muslims in the inner courtyard is concerned, the documentary material would indicate that though obstructions were caused from time to time, there was no abandonment of the structure of the mosque or cessation of namaz within.”

PART VI

Why Awarded the Title to the Entire Site to the Deity, in a Nutshell

The Court found –

  • (i) “no conclusion can be drawn that prior to 1857, the disputed site was used for worship by the resident Muslim community”,
  • (ii) “there is a lack of adequate evidence to establish that there was exclusive or unimpeded use of the inner courtyard after 1858” (para 742),
  • (iii) the Hindus had an “exclusive and unimpeded possession of the outer courtyard”,
  • (iv) Hindus Never Accepted the Division (para 773),
  • (v) Hindus made “offerings to the ‘Garbh Grih’ while standing at the railing” in furtherance of their belief that “the birth-place of Lord Ram was within the precincts of and under the central dome of the mosque”
  • (vi) the “possession over the inner courtyard was a matter of serious contestation” and “it cannot be said that the Muslims have been able to establish their possessory title to the disputed site as a composite whole” (para 781).

Cannot Conclude – Prior To 1857 Muslims worshipped at Disputed Site

In Para 741 the court observed as under:

  • “741. Dr Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs in Suit 4, admitted that there is no evidence of possession, use or offering of worship in the mosque prior to 1856-7. No evidence has been produced to establish worship at the mosque or possessory control over the disputed property marked by the letters A B C D over the period of 325 years between the alleged date of construction in 1528 until the erection of railing by the colonial government in 1857. Hence in the absence of evidence on record, no conclusion can be drawn that prior to 1857, the disputed site was used for worship by the resident Muslim community. Following the events in 1856-57, the colonial government erected the railing to bifurcate the areas of worship into the inner courtyard and the outer courtyard. Shortly thereafter, the Ramchabutra was constructed in the outer courtyard. Worship at the Ramchabutra and at the pre-existing Sita Rasoi led to the worship of the Hindus being institutionalised within the property marked by the letters A B C D.”

Claim of Unimpeded Possessory Title Raised by the Muslims Rejected

Pointing out that a claim to possessory title has to be based on exclusive and unimpeded possession which has to be established by evidence, the Court held as under:

  • “772. In assessing the title of the Muslims, the physical structure of the mosque is one fact to be taken into consideration. But a claim to possessory title has to be based on exclusive and unimpeded possession which has to be established by evidence. As shown above, the disputed premises are characterised by distinct architectural characteristics of Hindu and Islamic cultures. The claim to title will have to be judged from the perspective of long and continued possession. It becomes relevant to note the extent to which the Muslims have asserted their claim to the entirety of the property, which forms a composite whole, comprised of the inner and outer courtyards in comparison with the contesting claims of the Hindus. In relation to the outer courtyard, both Hindu and Muslim witnesses have admitted the presence of the Ramchabutra and other places of religious significance which were being continuously worshipped by the Hindus. The access of Hindus to and their possession of the outer courtyard was unimpeded.”

Hindus Never Accepted the Division

  • “773. Despite the setting up of the grill-brick wall in 1857, the Hindus never accepted the division of the inner and the outer courtyard. For the Hindus, the entire complex as a whole was of religious significance. A demarcation by the British for the purposes of maintaining law and order did not obliterate their belief in the relevance of the ‘Garbh-Grih‘ being the birth-place of Lord Ram. This is evident from the witness testimonies which indicate that pilgrims offered prayer standing at the railing by looking towards the sanctum sanctorum. Another relevant piece of evidence is the admission of the Moazzin of the Babri Mosque in his complaint dated 30 November 1858 against Nihang Singh. The Moazzin admitted that previously the symbol of Janamsthan had been there for hundreds of years and Hindus did puja inside the three domed structure. Absent any division of the site, the Hindus had multiple points and forms of worship within the disputed premises which included the Ramchabutra and Sita Rasoi and the parikrama of the disputed premises. Even after the railing was set up, Hindu worship at Ramchabutra, Sita Rasoi and of the idols placed below the fig and neem tree clearly indicated their exclusive and unimpeded possession of the outer courtyard. All the evidence indicates that a reasonable inference based on a preponderance of probabilities can be made that there was continuum of faith and belief of the Hindus that the ‘Garbh-Grih‘ was the place of birth of Lord Ram both prior to and after the construction of the wall. The use of the area within the railing by the Muslims was contentious and their access to the inner courtyard was landlocked; the only access being through the two gates to the outer portion and the area which were in the control of the Hindus.”

Evidence: Made Offerings to Birth-Place under the Central Dome

  • “781. From the documentary evidence, it emerges that: (i) Prior to 1856-7 there was no exclusion of the Hindus from worshipping within the precincts of the inner courtyard; (ii) The conflagration of 1856-7 led to the setting up of the railing to provide a bifurcation of the places of worship between the two communities; (iii) The immediate consequence of the setting up of the railing was the continued assertion of the right to worship by the Hindus who set up the Chabutra in the immediate proximity of the railing; (iv) Despite the existence of the railing, the exclusion of the Hindus from the inner courtyard was a matter of contestation and at the very least was not absolute; (v) As regards the outer courtyard it became the focal point of Hindu worship both on the Ramchabutra as well as other religious structures within the outer courtyard including Sita Rasoi. Though, the Hindus continued to worship at the Ramchabutra which was in the outer courtyard, by the consistent pattern of their worship including the making of offerings to the ‘Garbh Grih’ while standing at the railing, there can be no manner of doubt that this was in furtherance of their belief that the birth-place of Lord Ram was within the precincts of and under the central dome of the mosque; and (vi) The riots of 1934 and the events which led up to 22/23 December 1949 indicate that possession over the inner courtyard was a matter of serious contestation often leading to violence by both parties and the Muslims did not have exclusive possession over the inner courtyard. From the above documentary evidence, it cannot be said that the Muslims have been able to establish their possessory title to the disputed site as a composite whole.”

Possessory Rights Historical records of Travellers

In Clauses IV to VII of the para 788 which ‘marshal together the evidence on the claim of title in Suit 4 and Suit 5’ the Apex Court discussed the Historical records of travellers.

  • “Para 788 IV. Historical records of travellers (chiefly Tieffenthaler and the account of Montgomery Martin in the eighteenth century) indicate:
  •  (i) The existence of the faith and belief of the Hindus that the disputed site was the birth-place of Lord Ram;
  • (ii) Identifiable places of offering worship by the Hindus including Sita Rasoi, Swargdwar and the Bedi (cradle) symbolising the birth of Lord Ram in and around the disputed site;
  • (iii) Prevalence of the practice of worship by pilgrims at the disputed site including by parikrama (circumambulation) and the presence of large congregations of devotees on the occasion of religious festivals; and
  • (iv) The historical presence of worshippers and the existence of worship at the disputed site even prior to the annexation of Oudh by the British and the construction of a brick-grill wall in 1857.

Beyond the above observations, the accounts of the travellers must be read with circumspection. Their personal observations must carefully be sifted from hearsay – matters of legend and lore. Consulting their accounts on matters of public history is distinct from evidence on a matter of title. An adjudication of title has to be deduced on the basis of evidence sustainable in a court of law, which has withstood the searching scrutiny of cross-examination. Similarly, the contents of gazetteers can at best provide corroborative material to evidence which emerges from the record. The court must be circumspect in drawing negative inferences from what a traveller may not have seen or observed. Title cannot be established on the basis of faith and belief above. Faith and belief are indicators towards patterns of worship at the site on the basis of which claims of possession are asserted. The court has evaluated the rival claims to possessory title in a situation in which the state has expressly stated in its written statement that it claims no interest in the land.

Despite Mosque, Hindus worshiped as birth-place of Lord Ram

Para 788 V. The evidence indicates that despite the existence of a mosque at the site, Hindu worship at the place believed to be the birth-place of Lord Ram was not restricted. The existence of an Islamic structure at a place considered sacrosanct by the Hindus did not stop them from continuing their worship at the disputed site and within the precincts of the structure prior to the incidents of 1856-7. The physical structure of an Islamic mosque did not shake the faith and belief of Hindus that Lord Ram was born at the disputed site. On the other hand, learned counsel fairly stated that the evidence relied on by the Sunni Central Waqf Board to establish the offering of namaz by the Muslim residents commences from around 1856-7;

Disputed Site: a Composite Property despite Grill-Brick Wall

Para 788 VI. The setting up of a railing in 1857 by the British around the disputed structure of the mosque took place in the backdrop of a contestation and disputes over the claim of the Hindus to worship inside the precincts of the mosque. This furnished the context for the riots which took place between Hindus and Muslims in 1856-7. The construction of a grill-brick wall by the colonial administration was intended to ensure peace between the two communities with respect to a contested place of worship. The grill-brick wall did not constitute either a subdivision of the disputed site which was one composite property, nor did it amount to a determination of title by the colonial administration;

Ramchabutra – An Assertion of the Hindu Right to Worship

Para 788 VII. Proximate in time after the setting up of the railing, the Ramchabutra was set up in or about 1857. Ramchabutra was set up in close physical proximity to the railing. Essentially, the setting up of Ramchabutra within a hundred feet or thereabouts of the inner dome must be seen in the historical context as an expression or assertion of the Hindu right to worship at the birth-place of Lord Ram. Even after the construction of the dividing wall by the British, the Hindus continued to assert their right to pray below the central dome. This emerges from the evidentiary record indicating acts of individuals in trying to set up idols and perform puja both within and outside the precincts of the inner courtyard. Even after the setting up of the Ramchabutra, pilgrims used to pay obeisance and make offerings to what they believed to be the ‘Garbh Grih‘ located inside the three domed structure while standing at the iron railing which divided the inner and outer courtyards. There is no evidence to the contrary by the Muslims to indicate that their possession of the disputed structure of the mosque was exclusive and that the offering of namaz was exclusionary of the Hindus;

Hindus Asserted Right to Pray Inside Domes

Para 788 VIII. Hindu worship at Ramchabutra, SitaRasoi and at other religious places including the setting up of a Bhandar clearly indicated their open, exclusive and unimpeded possession of the outer courtyard. The Muslims have not been in possession of the outer courtyard. Despite the construction of the wall in 1858 by the British and the setting up of the Ramchabutra in close-proximity of the inner dome, Hindus continued to assert their right to pray inside the three-domed structure;

Opening Additional Door Indicates Presence of Large Hindu Devotees

Para 788 IX. In or about 1877, at the behest of the Hindus, another door to the outer courtyard was allowed to be opened by the administration on the northern side (Sing Dwar), in addition to the existing door on the east (Hanumat Dwar). The Deputy Commissioner declined to entertain a complaint against the opening made in the wall. The Commissioner while dismissing the appeal held that the opening up of the door was in public interest. The opening of an additional door with the permission of the British administration indicates recognition of the presence of a large congregation of Hindu devotees necessitating additional access to the site in the interest of public peace and safety;

Large Congregations of Hindu Devotees Visited

Para 788 X. Testimonies of both Hindu and Muslim witnesses indicate that on religious occasions and festivals such as Ram Navami, Sawan Jhoola, Kartik Poornima, Parikrama Mela and Ram Vivah, large congregations of Hindu devotees visited the disputed premises for darshan. The oral testimony of the Hindu devotees establishes the pattern of worship and prayer at Sita Rasoi, Ramchabutra and towards the ‘Garb Grih’, while standing at the railing of the structure of the brick wall;

Hindu Religious Symbols Inside and Outside Mosque

Para 788 XI. Hindu witnesses have indicated that Hindus used to offer prayer to the Kasauti stone pillars placed inside the mosque. Muslim witnesses have acknowledged the presence of symbols of Hindu religious significance both inside and outside the mosque. Among them, is the depiction of Varah, Jai-Vijay and Garud outside the three domed structure. They are suggestive not merely of the existence of the faith and belief but of actual worship down the centuries;

Contestation between the Two Communities over Worship

Para 788 XII. There can no denying the existence of the structure of the mosque since its construction in the sixteenth century with the inscription of ‘Allah’ on the structure. The genesis of the communal incident of 1856-7 lies in the contestation between the two communities over worship. The setting up of the railing in 1856-7 was an attempt by the administration to provide a measure of bifurcation to observe religious worship – namaz by the Muslims inside the railing within the domed structure of the mosque and worship by the Hindus outside the railing. Attempts by the Sikhs or faqirs to enter into the mosque and set up religious symbols for puja were resisted by the Muslims, resulting in the administration evicting the occupier;

Exclusive Possession of Hindus in the Outer Courtyard

 Para 788 XIII. After the construction of the grill-brick wall in 1857, there is evidence on record to show the exclusive and unimpeded possession of the Hindus and the offering of worship in the outer courtyard. Entry into the three domed structure was possible only by seeking access through either of the two doors on the eastern and northern sides of the outer courtyard which were under the control of the Hindu devotees;

Preponderance of Probabilities – Muslims did not Abandon Mosque

Para 788 XIV. On a preponderance of probabilities, there is no evidence to establish that the Muslims abandoned the mosque or ceased to perform namaz in spite of the contestation over their possession of the inner courtyard after 1858. Oral evidence indicates the continuation of namaz;

Mosque continued to Exist & Muslims Asserted Their Right to Pray

Para 788 XV. The contestation over the possession of the inner courtyard became the centre of the communal conflict of 1934 during the course of which the domes of the mosque sustained damage as did the structure. The repair and renovation of the mosque following the riots of 1934 at the expense of the British administration through the agency of a Muslim contractor is indicative of the fact the despite the disputes between the two communities, the structure of the mosque continued to exist as did the assertion of the Muslims of their right to pray. Namaz appears to have been offered within the mosque after 1934 though, by the time of incident of 22/23 December 1949, only Friday namaz was being offered. The reports of the Waqf Inspector of December 1949 indicate that the Sadhus and Bairagis who worshipped and resided in the outer courtyard obstructed Muslims from passing through the courtyard, which was under their control, for namaz within the mosque. Hence the Waqf Inspector noted that worship within the mosque was possible on Fridays with the assistance of the police;

Ouster of Muslims: Otherwise Than By Due Process of Law

Para 788 XVI. The events preceding 22/23 December 1949 indicate the build-up of a large presence of Bairagis in the outer courtyard and the expression of his apprehension by the Superintendent of Police that the Hindus would seek forcible entry into the precincts of the mosque to install idols. In spite of written intimations to him, the Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate (K K Nayyar) paid no heed and rejected the apprehension of the Superintendent of Police to the safety of the mosque as baseless. The apprehension was borne out by the incident which took place on the night between 22/23 December 1949, when a group of fifty to sixty persons installed idols on the pulpit of the mosque below the central dome. This led to the desecration of the mosque and the ouster of the Muslims otherwise than by the due process of law. The inner courtyard was thereafter attached in proceedings under Section 145 CrPC 1898 on 29 December 1949 and the receiver took possession;

Obliteration of Mosque – Egregious Violation of Rule of Law

Para 788 XVII. On 6 December 1992, the structure of the mosque was brought down and the mosque was destroyed. The destruction of the mosque took place in breach of the order of status quo and an assurance given to this Court. The destruction of the mosque and the obliteration of the Islamic structure was an egregious violation of the rule of law

Marshaling together the evidence on the claim of title in Suit 4 and Suit 5, the Court held in para 788 as under:

The Disputed Site is One Composite Whole; Mosque Destruction – a Serious Violation of the Rule of Law

  • “Para 788 XVII: (i) The disputed site is one composite whole. The railing set up in 1856-7 did not either bring about a sub-division of the land or any determination of title;
  • (ii) The Sunni Central Waqf Board has not established its case of a dedication by user;
  • (iii) The alternate plea of adverse possession has not been established by the Sunni Central Waqf Board as it failed to meet the requirements of adverse possession;
  • (iv) The Hindus have been in exclusive and unimpeded possession of the outer courtyard where they have continued worship;
  • (v) The inner courtyard has been a contested site with conflicting claims of the Hindus and Muslims;
  • (vi) The existence of the structure of the mosque until 6 December 1992 does not admit any contestation. The submission that the mosque did not accord with Islamic tenets stands rejected. The evidence indicates that there was no abandonment of the mosque by Muslims. Namaz was observed on Fridays towards December 1949, the last namaz being on 16 December 1949;
  • (vii) The damage to the mosque in 1934, its desecration in 1949 leading to the ouster of the Muslims and the eventual destruction on 6, December 1992 constituted a serious violation of the rule of law; and
  • (viii) Consistent with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, both Suits 4 and 5 will have to be decreed and the relief moulded in a manner which preserves the constitutional values of justice, fraternity, human dignity and the equality of religious belief.”

Janmasthan’ of Lord Rama

Finally, on the contentious point ‘whether disputed structure is the holy birth place of Lord Ram as per the faith, belief and trust of the Hindus’, the Apex Court (one among the learned Judges) ‘concluded on the conclusion that faith and belief of Hindus since prior to construction of Mosque and subsequent thereto has always been that Janamasthan of Lord Ram is the place where Babri Mosque has been constructed which faith and belief is proved by documentary and oral evidence’.

PART VII

Reliefs Granted

The Apex Court moulded the reliefs (M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das: 2020-1 SCC 1), directing the handing over of the entire disputed land to a trust to build a Hindu temple. It also directed the government to provide an alternative five-acre plot of land to the Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Waqf Board for the construction of the mosque.

Further, the Court directed the Central Government to formulate a scheme, within three months, for the setting up of a trust with the powers to build a temple at the disputed site. The Supreme Court also directed to give appropriate representation, in the proposed trust to Nirmohi Akhara (plaintiff in Suit No. 3, which claimed Shebait/management rights over the site).

Ayodhya Case – Proceeded on the principle: ‘The court is the protector of all charities’.

It is held in M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case) as under:

  • When a Shebait is negligent in its duties or takes actions that are hostile to the deity or improperly alienated trust property or refuses to act for the benefit of the idol or where the Shebait’s actions are prejudicial to the interest of the idol, it becomes necessary to confer on a next friend the right to bring an action in law against the Shebait; and a worshipper has an ad hoc power of representation to protect the interest of the idol.
  • The court can craft any number of reliefs, including the framing of a scheme. The question of relief is fundamentally contextual and must be framed by the court in light of the parties before it and the circumstances of each case.

It is clear that the our Apex Court has rendered the above edicts adopting the view that ‘the court is the protector of all charities’.

Conclusion‘Hard-Headedness of the Subject Matter’ is the Answer to all Difficulties.

  • It is a fact – the reliefs granted in this case were not that were asked for by the parties to these suits.
  • Doubts are raised – as to whether the legal riddles that were thrashed out in the Judgment are precisely translated into the reliefs granted.
  • Numerous suggestions could be proffered – as to formulating the decree in the frame of the conclusions in the Judgment [including the one to keep ‘open’ the disputed land without any structure, for various obvious reasons].
    • But, it is definite that the decree handed down settled the disputes.
  • The ‘hard-headedness of the subject matter’ is the answer to the qualms; and, ‘expediency’ justifies this unanimous decision.


Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Introduction

Property of a society or a club is the ‘joint property’ held by its members. Usually, unlike a club, the property of a society is meant to be maintained for the benefit of its future members also. Therefore, the property of a society is encumbered with obligations as in a ‘trust’. Hence, such property cannot be dealt with by the members and administrators disregarding the objectives of its foundation.

Property of an Unincorporated Club Vests in Members.

A club is a compendium of its members. Property of an unincorporated club vests in its members. Or, in other words, the members thereof are the owners of its property. But, it is subject to its bye laws and the principles of its foundation.

Salmond on Jurisprudence[1] reads:

  • “The Club property is the joint property of the members, though in fact, it is often held by trustees on behalf of the members.”

Halsbury’s Laws of England[2] says:

  • “Unincorporated members’ clubs. – An unincorporated members’ club is a society of persons each of whom contributes to the funds out of which the expenses of conducting the society are paid. ……. Subject to any rule to the contrary, the property and funds of the club belong to the members of the time being jointly in equal shares.”

Enjoyment and Appropriation of Property of an Unincorporated Club

Property of a club is held by its members as ‘joint tenants’ (i.e., without a right to partition). If the bye laws of a club allow, it can distribute its property among its members, on dissolution.

Joint ownership of property is an incidence of membership when one joins the club, though the motivation of joining the club is not acquisition of wealth or sharing of profits as in the case of a partnership. It is also an incidence of membership that the property of the club will be distributed among the members,[3] on dissolution.

Members of a club are entitled to enjoy or use the club premises in accordance with the rules, so long as they duly pay the subscription and continue to be members. In an unincorporated Members’ club, the members for the time being are jointly entitled to all the property and funds; and it is only on a valid dissolution the individual interest of the members becomes capable of realisation.[4]

If the intention of the founders of an unincorporated club or an unregistered society, as expressed in the bye laws or otherwise, is to use the property obtained to it for the benefit of the present and future members, then the members of a particular time, even if sui juris or of one mind, are not entitled to put an end to the same and to appropriate the property by themselves. If no such intention is laid down by the founders, and the members are sui juris, they may be entitled to put an end and to appropriate the property by themselves. But, it is not open for the majority of an association to alter the fundamental principles upon which it is founded.[5]

Because members were joint owners of all the club property including the excisable liquor, the Gujarat High Court held in Sports Club of Gujarat Vs Commissioner of Sales Tax[6]that the supply of liquor to a member at a fixed price by the club could not be regarded as ‘sale’. The court referred various decisions of English courts[7] and Supreme Court.[8]

But a contrary view is taken by the  Bombay High Court in Gondwana Club, Nagpur Vs. Sales Tax Officer[9] when it considered the question whether the provisions supplied by the Club to its members were the joint property belonging to all the members; and observed that, although the Club consists of members, the Club had an entity distinct from the entities of the members and that once the money was paid by the members and once the money passed into the coffers of the Club, the said money could not be said to belong to the members, and in these circumstances, it was difficult to accept the proposition that the property which was purchased by the Club was the property of the members of the Club.This decision is followed in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Gujarat, Ahmedabad Vs. Anil Co-Operative Credit Society[10] pointing out that the court had relied on the inclusive clause in the definition of “dealer” in the concerned Sales Tax Act.

Vesting of Property in a Registered Society

Sec. 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 speaks as to vesting of property, for administration, in registered societies. It reads as under:

"5. Property of society how vested:  The property, movable and immovable belonging to a society registered under this Act, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body of such society, and in all proceedings civil and criminal, may be described as the property of the governing body of such society for their proper title."

‘If Not Vested in Trustees’: Connotations

Management and Vesting of Property may be Separate

Though the administrative affairs of the societies are carried on by its governing body, the properties of the same may be vested with (separate) trustees (like ecclesiastical authorities, in case of religious associations). It is obvious that this system of vesting of property in trustees and administration of affairs by governing body is primarily viewed in the So. Regn. Act of 1860 when it refers, ‘if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body’. It is definite that our law accepts the ‘wider’ or ‘general’ expression as to ‘trust’, used by the progressive jurists like Salmond and Halsbury; and the same principle is adopted in the So. Regn. Act. The progressive jurists preferred investing principles of trust in the matters of various fiduciary relationships under which one holds property on behalf of, or for the benefit of, others.[11]

Halsbury’s Laws of England defines ‘trust’ as a confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power, to the intent, that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object. Salmond brings-in principles of trust in the affairs of associations.

Salmond on Jurisprudence reads as under:[12]

  • “Thirdly, it is expedient that property in which large numbers of persons are interested in common should be vested in trustees.” 

It is held by the Supreme Court in RV Sankara  KurupVs. Leelavathy  Nambiar[13] that the property in the hands of the agent was for the principal; and the agent stood in the fiduciary capacity,as a trustee,for the beneficial interest he had in the property. The petitioner had acted as an agent as a cestui que trust was a trustee and he held the property in trust for the respondent in his fiduciary capacity as an agent or trustee and he had a duty and responsibility to make over the unauthorised profits or benefits he derived while acting as an agent or a trustee and properly account for the same to the principal. Therefore, the High Court was right in its holding that the petitioner was an agent and trustee acted in the fiduciary capacity on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff as General power-of-attorney.

A society can be formed for the administration of a trust.[14]

If a trust is created for the benefit of a religious society, such trust shall continue to exist and it would not cease to exist by the resolution of the society. Such ‘creation of trust’ is considered by our Apex Court in Vinodkumar M. Malavia  Vs. Maganlal  Mangaldas  Gameti[15] and held:

  • The High Court has rightly observed that: ‘… the trust which has been created as public trust for a specific object and the charitable or the religious nature or for the bonafide of the Society or any such institution managed by such trusts for charitable and religious purpose shall continue to exist in perpetuity and it would not cease to exist by any such process of thinking or deliberation or the Resolution, which does not have any force of law’.”

In Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai  Ratanjibhai[16] it is held that in terms of Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, the property would vest in the trustees, and that only in the absence of vesting of such properties in the trustees, the same would be deemed to have been vested for the time being in the governing body of such society.[17]

In Pamulapati  Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu  Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[18] it is observed:

  • “If what is vested in the College Committee or its governing body is a right of management simpliciter, there is no question of the members of the society or the members of the governing body being beneficially interested in its property. It necessarily follows that by the fact of appointment of a treasurer, there can be no deprivation of the society of its rights in property. The consequence, which would flow on the appointment of a treasurer by the Government under the provisions of the Charitable Endowments Act, would be that he will take charge of the management of the properties held by the society. There is no divesting of the rights of the society in its properties. As already stated, what all the society is deprived of would be right of management which cannot be equated to any right in the property.”[19]

See Blog: Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies

Members do not have any Beneficial Interest

Members have no interest other than that of bare trustees

During the subsistence of a registered society, or on dissolution, the members do not have any proprietary or beneficial enjoyment/interest[20] in the property the society holds.[21] It is held in Pamulapati  Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu  Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[22] as under:

“The Societies Registration Act, therefore, does not create in the members of the registered society any interest other than that of bare trustees. What all the members are entitled to, is the right of management[23] of the properties of the society subject to certain conditions.”

Underhill, in his treatise, ‘Law of Trusts and Trustees’, explained:

  • “However, the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the Association for the time being. The members for the time being cannot under the Association rules appropriate trust property for themselves for there would then be no property held on trust as intended by the testator for those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the Association for the time being.”[24]

Read blog: Doctrine of Substantial Representation in Suits

Is Society a ‘Living Person’ under S. 5 of the TP Act 

Can transfer of property be made to or by Associations

Sec. 5 of the TP Act reads as under:

  • 5. “Transfer of property” defined:  In the following sections “transfer of property” means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such act.
  • In this section “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals.

Existing Laws as to Transfer of Property, will Remain in Force

Two points are emphasised in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 5 –

  • First, all unregistered associations, whether incorporated or not, are ‘living persons’, so that transfer of property can be made.
  • Second, the qualifying second limb – ‘nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals‘ – makes it clear:
    • if any law regulates transfer of property to (or by) companies, associations or bodies of individuals, it will remain in force.

The accepted and authoritative view is that company, incorporated club,[25] statutory body etc. alone can be considered as legal persons.

See: Usha Rani Kundu  Vs. Agradut  Sangha[26]

Body of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act

It may also be pointed out that, “body of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act (transfer to – “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals) is wide in meaning; and it stands independent. It is broad enough to take-in Beneficiaries/Trustees of a Trust.

  • Note: Order 31 rule 1 CPC spells out – a trust is not a legal person. It enables to file a suit by (or be sued) a trustee concerning ‘property vested in trustees’.

Can ‘Law for the Time Being in Force’ Include ‘Common Law’

Our courts have unhesitatingly held: ‘law for the time being in force’ in Sec. 5, TP Act includes “common law”;[27] and sumptuously exhibit and refer to the deeds executed by or in favour of such entities as valid and binding documents;[28] and the registration/revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

 It is a reality: the common law of our country accepts as valid the ‘transfer of property’ made to or effected by well known institutions, organisations,[29]and associations attached to well reputed trusts,[30] institutions[31] etc., though they are not juristic persons in its strict sense. Our courts sumptuously refer to such deeds as documents executed by or in favour of such entities, when they are referred to as exhibits. For example:

  • Settlement deed by Ashramam–Swayam  Prakash  Ashramam Vs. G Anandavally  Amma : AIR  2010 SC 622;
  • Settlement to trust – S N Mathur  Vs. Board of Revenue: 2009-13  SCC 301;
  • Sale deed by unregistered society – Suresh s/o. Bhagwanrao  Puri Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2016-3 AIR Bom R (Cri.) 603;
  • Gift to unregistered Association – Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna Satram: 1984-2 ALT 157;
  • Sale deed to an association – K. Kala Vs. Dist Registrar, Madurai: 2016 3 MLJ 50, 
  • Sale deed to an association – State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 P&H 218.
  • Sale deed to an association – Asst. Commr. Vs. Shivalingawwa: ILR 2003 Kar 2855;
  • Lease deed by trust to school – TNP Mothoo  Natarajan Vs. PV Ravi: 2015-2 MLJ (Cri.) 656;
  • Lease deed by a firm -2014-3 ALT 46;
  • Settlement deed to private trust –Kolli  Venkata Raja Vs. Govt. of AP: 2014-1 ALT 155;
  • Lease deed to a public trust –Nadigar  Sangham Charitable Trust, rep. by its managing Trustee, R. Sarathkumar Vs. S. Murugan:2013-1 MLJ 433;
  • Sale deed to Board of Trustees – Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chemists and Druggists Association Building Trust: 1995-215 ITR(Mad) 741;
  • Mortgage deed by a College – Sonar Bangla Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College:  AIR 1960 Cal 450.

Similarly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

Dedication can be made in favour of a Tank

It was held by our Apex Court in Kamaraju  Venkata Krishna Rao Vs. Sub Collector,  Ongole, AIR 1969 SC 563, that, under Hindu Law, a tank can be an object of charity and when a dedication was made in favour of a tank, the same was considered as a charitable institution. Without deciding whether that institution can also be considered as a juristic person, it was held that the same had to be registered in its name (ie., in the name of the tank) in the Inam register though it had continue to be managed by its Manager.

It is also noteworthy that Salmond on Jurisprudence reads: “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases.”

It is also noteworthy that Salmond on Jurisprudence[32] reads:

  • “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases.”

How Can a Society or a Club Acquire Property and Enter into a Contract?

Companies Act and various Cooperative Societies Acts[33] confer juristic personality to the Companies and Cooperative societies. Such entities can enter into contracts in their own names and through its officers.

In view of the edict that even the societies registered under the So. Regn. Act are not legal persons capable of holding properties, as laid down in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi,[34] Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society[35]  and Tata Vs. Tata,[36] the correct position emerges is that both registered and unregistered societies are not capable of contracting ‘in its own name’.[37]

The AP High Court has observed in N. Tyagaraju Vs. Narayanaswamy[38] that an unregistered entity was not a ‘living person’ under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act. Nevertheless it was held in this decision that the president of an unregistered club was entitled to enter into an agreement of sale for purchase of a property as the agreement would be one executed not in favour of an unregistered body, but it would be one in favour of its president who was an identifiable and a living person. It was further observed that the acquisition of property in the name of its president would also be valid.

In short, the proper way to execute contracts with respect to both registered and unregistered societies and unincorporated clubs is to enter into the agreements by the competent office bearer of the society or club, in his name for and on behalf of the society or club, as done by a trustee for and on behalf of a trust. It must also be according to the bye laws, or as approved by the general body or governing body. That is, it should be legal[39] and intra-vires;[40]and it should not be ab-initio void. And, in an appropriate case, the act of an office bearer can be ratified[41] by the general body or governing body, as the case may be.

Can the Members of a Society Convert the Society into a ‘Trust’?

Society and trust are two different concepts in the eye of law. The former is association of persons and the latter is a legal conception. But, in cases where the association, and the ‘trust’ expressly attached to the same, are inseparably related, the term ‘trust’ is used as synonym to the association. A society can be formed for the administration of a trust.[42]

Societies Registration Act (Section 14) provides special procedure for dissolution of societies. The left-behind-property of a Society, on dissolution, goes to another Society as determined by the members of the Society or by the court.

As shown above, the members of a registered society are trustees[43] for the future members who have to continue the aim and objects of the Society as envisaged by the founders or as manifested in the Rules or Bylaws;and the property of a society cannot absolutely vest in its members. Either during the subsistence of a society or at the time of its dissolution the members do not have beneficial enjoyment of its property.[44] Such property ‘shall continue to exist in perpetuity and it would not cease to exist by a resolution’ of the society;[45] and it cannot transfer its property to any other entity, or transform or vary its nature, disregarding the fundamental principles upon which the society is founded.

Vesting of Ownership of Trust/Association Property

The following propositions can be presented as to the vesting of ownership of the trust-property, and the property held by an association.

  1. The terms of dedication (as revealed from the deed, if any, or other evidence) determine the person or body of persons in whom/which such property ultimately vest in.
  2. If the ownership of the property of a trust vests in a legal person, such vesting is permanent (thereby it cannot be put to an end) and as representing or subject to the purpose envisaged by the founder.
  3. If the property is that of an association and the members thereof are ascertainable (as in the case of a society or a mutt) the actual ownership of the property will be presumed to be vested with those members (from time-to-time), as joint owners (contra-distinct to ownership under tenants-in-common).
  4. If the property is one dedicated to public so as to form a public trust and beneficiaries are unascertainable (as in the case of a political party or a church) the property ultimately vests with the entire members (of such Association or Church), from time to time, permanently(Thereby it cannot be put to an end.), subject to the trust and its objectives.
  5. If the property is one dedicated to public at large by a known or unknown person and administered and maintained by persons volunteering themselves as trustees (as in the case of a waiting shed or a public well) the property permanently and ultimately vests with the entire general public or the State, subject to the trust and its objectives. 
  6. If the property is one acquired by a branch of a larger body or a parish of a church with various parishes, for the benefit of all persons/members of the larger body, the entire members of the larger body, from time to time, will be presumed to be the owners, subject to the trust impressed upon the property. 

Vesting of Ownership of Property in Registered Societies

Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not state whether the vesting referred to therein pertains to ‘vesting of ownership’ or ‘vesting for administration’. If it refers to ‘vesting for administration’ a question will arise – in whom the ownership actually vests.  If it is assumed that the word ‘vested’ is used to denote ownership, the same question may arise – beyond the deemed vesting in the governing body, in whom the property actually vests.

‘Property Belonging to a Society’ & Property of a Company

The Society continues to exist and to function as such until its dissolution under the provisions of Act. The properties of the society continue to be vested in the trustees or in the Governing Body irrespective of the fact that the members of the society for the time being are not the same as they before; nor will be the same thereafter.

By reason of the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, once the society is registered the Registrar, by the filing of the memorandum and certified copy of the rules and regulations the Registrar has certified that the society is registered under the Act, it enjoys the status of a entity apart from the members constituting the same and is capable of suing or being sued. But the fact to be noted is that what different a society registered under the Act of 1860 a company incorporated under the Companies Act is that in the latter case the share -holders of company hold the properties of the company as their own whereas in the case of a society registered under the Act of 1860, the members of the society or the members of the governing body do not have any proprietary or beneficial interest; to the property the society holds.

Having regard to the fact that the members of the general body or the members of the governing body of the society do not have any proprietary or beneficial interest in the property of the society, it follows that upon its dissolution, they cannot claim any interest in the property of the dissolved society. The Societies Registration Act, therefore, does not create in the members of the registered society any interest other than that of bare trustees. What all the members are entitled to, is the right of management of the properties of the society subject to certain conditions.

As I have already stated, the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, provided that the conditions specified therein are satisfied, makes provision for the appointment of a treasurer, in whom certain powers are vested. Sub -section (4) of S. 4 contains a clear enunciation of the nature of that vesting. The said provision makes it clear that an order, vesting property in a treasurer shall not require or be deemed to require him to administer the property, or impose or be deemed to impose upon him the duty of a trustee with respect to the administration thereof.

Section 10 of the Charitable Endowments, Act contains a specific limitation of the functions and powers of a treasurer. It says that a Treasurer of Charitable Endowments shall always be a sole trustee, and shall not, as such treasurer, take or hold any property otherwise than under the provisions of the Act, or, subject to those provisions, transfer any property vested in him except in obedience to a decree divesting him of the property, or in compliance with a direction in that behalf issuing from the authority by whose order the property became vested in him.

Having regard to the specific limitation of the functions and powers of treasurer under S. 10 the treasurer shall not take or hold any property. He cannot dispose of property. He is a bare trustee as S. 8 of the Act makes it clear.

‘Property Belonging to a Society’: Comparable to Definition in Partnership Act

In Unani Tibia College case[46] the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that the expression ‘property belonging to a society’ does not give the society a corporate status and it ‘merely describes the property which vests in trustees or governing body’ and that the provisions of the Societies Registration Act did not give a ‘corporate status’ to a society ‘for the purpose of holding and acquiring property’.  In this decision it is further held:

  • “….. Those provisions undoubtedly give certain privileges to a society registered under that Act and the privileges are of considerable importance and some of those privileges are analogous to the privileges enjoyed by a corporation, but there is really no incorporation in the sense in which that word is legally understood.”
  • “…..  Thus something in the nature of perpetual succession is conceded by the provision that the society’s property is to vest in the trustees for the time being of the society for the use and benefit of the society and its members and of all persons claiming through the members according to the society’s rules, and further (and this is the most noteworthy provision) that the property shall pass to succeeding trustees without assignment or transfer.”

It can be seen that the expression ‘property belonging to a society’ is comparable to the definition of property of partnership in Section 14 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Referring to the definition in Sec. 14, Addanki Narayanappa  Vs. Bhaskara  Krishnappa[47]our Apex Court held as under:

  • “From a perusal of these provisions it would be abundantly clear that whatever may be the character of the property which is brought in by the partners when the partnership is formed or which may be acquired in the course of the business of the partnership it becomes the property of the firm and what a partner is entitled to is his share of profits, if any, accruing to the partnership from the realisation of this property, and upon dissolution of the partnership to a share in the money representing the value of the property. No doubt, since a firm has no legal existence, the partnership property will vest in all the partners and in that sense every partner has an interest in the property of the partnership. During the subsistence of the partnership, however, no partner can deal with any portion of the property as his own. Nor can he assign his interest in a specific item of the partnership property to anyone. His right is to obtain such profits, if any, as fall to his share from time to time and upon the dissolution of the firm to a share in the assets of the firm which remain after satisfying the liabilities set out in Clause (a) and sub-Cls. (i), (ii) and (iii) of Clause (b) of Section 48. ..”

Propositions as to Vesting of Ownership in Registered Societies

Five propositions are possible.

  1. In members, jointly. 
  2. In society itself.
  3. In governing body.
  4. Legal title in the trustees or governing body and equitable title in the society.
  5. In the members subject to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act and the basic principles upon which the society is founded.

I.   Can Ownership of Property Vest in Members, Absolutely?

No.

Property of a Society being maintained for benefit of future members also, as held in Pamulapati  Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu  Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[48], it cannot be dealt with by the members disregarding the objectives of foundation of the societies.

The property of a registered society cannot vest in its members in view of the various provisions of the Societies Registration Act. As per Sec. 13 and 14 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, on dissolution, the members of a society, even if sui juris, are not entitled to appropriate, by themselves, the property of a registered society.In Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State of Delhi[49] the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held as to beneficial enjoyment of property of a registered society as under:

  • “During the subsistence of a society, the right of the members is to ensure that the property will be utilised for the charitable objects set out in the memorandum and these did not include any beneficial enjoyment.  Nor did the members of the society acquire any beneficial interest[50] on the dissolution of the society.”[51]

It is pointed out in Unani Tibia College case[52] that the vesting of legal ownership of the property of a society in the governing body is merely a method or mechanism permitted by the law.

II  Can Ownership of Property Vest in Society itself?[53]

No.

Registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status.[54] It is unequivocally determined in Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society[55] that even a registered society is not a juristic person.[56]  It is held:

  • i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20);
  • ii) A Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  (Para 21); and
  • iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name (Para 22). Vesting of (ownership of) property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf (Para 26).

For the society is not a juristic person, Section 6 of the Act lays down that  the society may sue or be sued in the name of President, Secretary, etc.  It (impliedly) bars filing a suit in the name of society, without reference to the President, Secretary, etc.

The view that Sec. 6 is an enabling provision and it does not affect the right of a society to sue or be sued in its own name[57]is not a good law in view of Unani Tibia College case[58] and Illachi Devi case.[59]

Read Blogs: Doctrine of Substantial Representation in a Suit by or against an Association

III.  Can Ownership of Property Vest in Governing Body.

No.

The governing body is only a small group which represents a larger body; and therefore, the ownership of the property cannot vest in the governing body, unconditionally or absolutely.

Sec. 5 So. Regn. Act directs only deemed vesting of property in the governing body.  

 It is noteworthy that the vesting of property in the governing body is read along with the vesting of property in trustees. Under common law, actual title (other than legal title) does not vest in the trustees, and the trustees always hold the property for others.  It is pointed out by our Apex Court, in Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai  Ratanjibhai,[60] that, in terms of Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, only in the absence of vesting of such property in the trustees the same would be deemed to be vested for the time being in the governing body of a society.

IV. Can Legal Title Vest in Gov. Body, & Equitable Title in Society.

No.

The theory as to vesting of ‘equitable title’ in society (and ‘legal title’ in the trustees or governing body)[61] is, in-substance, endorses the view of vesting property in members of the society. Since the property cannot unconditionally vest in members of a society for their absolute enjoyment, as shown above, it is not proper to say that equitable title vests in society.

V. Can Ownership of Property Vest in Members, Conditionally.

Had it been so accepted by our system, the ownership of property of a society could have been vested in the society itself; but it is not so accepted.[62] In this eventuality, for propounding a theoretical proposition as to actual vesting of property of a regd. society we have to give effect to the following edicts of law:

1) Property of Unregistered Society Vests in Members

  • Property of an unregistered society is the joint property of the members of the society subject to the trust and obligations imposed by the founders or by the bye laws of the society.

2) Present members are Trustees.

  • The members of a society are trustees for the future members who have to continue the objects of the society as envisaged by the founders and as manifested in the Rules or Bye laws.[63]

3) Ultimate Administrative Authority is General Body.

  • Subject to the bye laws of the society, the ultimate authority with respect to the administration of a society is vested with the general body of the members; and the general body elects the trustees or governing body.  This principle is affirmed in the provisions of the Societies Registration Act.

4) Management alone in Governing Body.

  • As per the Common law and also as per the definition of governing body in Sec. 16, and under Sec. 4, of the Societies Registration Act, governing body is entrusted with the management of the society alone.[64]

5) Governing Body administers for attaining the ‘aim and objects’.

  • The trustees or the governing body administer the property ‘of the society’ as per its bye laws so as to fulfill or attain the ‘aim and objects’ the founders viewed.  They acquire and hold the property for and on behalf of the members of the society subject to the trust and obligations imposed by law and the bye laws or the fundamental principles[65] or trust[66] upon which it is founded.

6) A Registered Society is also an Association of Persons.

  • The registration will not make a society distinct from ‘association of persons’[67] and it is not a juristic person. It cannot own property also[68] though it has certain characteristics of a legal person.

7) ‘Property of the society’, “merely describes, property vests in Governing Body”

  • Expressions in the Societies Registration Act, ‘property belonging to a society[69] and ‘property of the society’,[70] do not give the society a corporate status; and it “merely describes the property which vests in trustees or Governing Body”.[71]

8) Regn. Brings in Permanency; on Dissolution, Property Goes to Another Society

  • As per the Societies Registration Act, on dissolution, the left-behind-property of a society goes to another society as determined by the members of the society or by the court (S. 14) for being managed by some other charitable organisation and to be utilised for like purposes. Either during the subsistence of a society or at the time of its dissolution the members of a society do not have beneficial enjoyment of its property.[72]

9) Right of Dissolution Vested with Members.

  • A society is dissolved on determination of the members of the society with required majority, if so provided in the bye laws. If the rules of a registered Society do not lay down the rules for disposal and settlement of the property on dissolution, the governing body is authorized to do the same as it ‘finds expedient’ (S. 13).

VI. Conclusion: Property vests in the members subject to the contract and the fundamental principles upon which it is founded.

From the above, it can be legitimately concluded that the ownership of the ‘property of a society’ does not absolutely vest either in its members or in the governing body; but it vests in the members of the society[73] subject to the bye laws or contract, and the fundamental-principles or trust[74] upon which it is founded.[75] We can take cue (i) from the observations of our Apex Court in Addanki Narayanappa  Vs. Bhaskara  Krishnappa[76] that the property which is brought in by the partners when the partnership is formed or which may be acquired in the course of the business of the partnership becomes the property of the firm, and the partnership property will vest in all the partners since a firm has no legal existence;[77] and (ii) from the following erudite assertion of Dr. BK Mukherjea, J., on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts:[78]

  • “The idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests.”[79]

In case of Registered Societies, the vesting of ownership of the ‘property of a society’ is further subject to the provisions of the Act under which it is registered.

Vesting of Property in Various Kinds of Associations and Trusts

Club, Society and Company

  No.  Nature of Association.Right of Manage-ment or Vesting of Legal Ownership.Vesting  of actual/ultimate ownershipWhether permanent or not (so as to put an end to)
  1  ClubTrustees or Gov. Body, as per  ByelawsMembers, subject to the byelaws and objectives of foundation.Presumed to be not permanent.[80]
2Unregistered Society/ Association  -do-  -do-Presumed to be permanent.
3Registered Society-do--do-SR Act governs dissolution.
4FirmPartnersPartnersContract governs
4Trading CompanyBoard of DirectorsCompanyComp. Act governs winding up.
  5Charitable or Non-trading company  -do-  -do-  -do-

Trusts / Religious-Endowments:

  6Public Trust– English Law[81]  TrusteesLegal ownership in Trustees; beneficial ownership – though not absolute – in Beneficiaries.  Permanent
  7  Public Trust-Indian (common) Law  -do-In trust/institution/ endowment itself.  If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person –in public or section of public who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as revealed from the facts or from the deed of foundation or bye laws, if any.        Permanent
  8 Public School, Public Library, etc.Manager, Headmaster, Librarians, Gov. Body, etc.  -do-  Permanent.
  9Private religious or charitable trusts  Trustees  -do-  Presumed to be permanent.
  10  Mosque, Church, Gurudwara, etc.  Trustees (by different names)In trust/institution/ Church[82]/ endowment itself.  If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person – in section of public who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as revealed from the facts or from the deed of foundation or bye laws, if any.  Permanent
11Temple (Public)Shebaits/ Darmkarta/Ooralen  Idol/deity  -do-
12 Temple (private)-do--do--do-
13 MattMadathipathiMutt-do-
14Private Trust (Coming under the Trusts Act  Trustees  Terms/ Deed of Trust govern.  Trusts Act governs Extinction and Revocation.[83]

Government School, University, etc.

15University, Govt. Hospital, Govt. College, etc.  Administrators as provided in the statute concerned  In the institution itself, if not expressly stated to be in the Government.Presumed to be permanent. (Permanent until decided to close by the Government.)

[1]      12th Edition, Page 326

[2]      IV Edition, Vol. 6, Para 205

[3]      Orient Club Vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax: 1982-10 TAXMAN 57 (Bom): 1982-29 CTR 117: 1982-136 ITR 697: Quoted in Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Mulam Club: 1991-191 ITR 370: 1991-1 Ker LT 762: 1991-58 TAXMAN 63

[4]      Orient Club Vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax: 1982-10 TAXMAN 57 (Bom): 1982-29 CTR 117: 1982-136 ITR 697: Quoted in Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Mulam Club: 1991-191 ITR 370: 1991-1 Ker LT 762: 1991-58 TAXMAN 63

[5]      Prasanna  Venkitesa  Rao Vs. Srinivasa  Rao: AIR 1931 Mad. 12: Relied on: Milligan Vs. Mitchel: 40 ER 852; Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun: (1904) AC 515.

[6]    1975-36 STC 511: This decision is distinguished in: Bangalore Golf Club Vs. Assistant Commr. of Luxury Taxes: 1999-115 STC 338 (Kar); Government Medical Store Depot Vs. State of Haryana. 1977-39 STC 114 (P&H) .

[7]     Hotel and Catering Industry Vs. Automobile Proprietary: ([1969] 1 WLR 697; Inland Revenue Commissioners Vs. Eccentric Club Ltd.: [1924] 1 KB 390.

[8]     Safdar Jung Hospital Vs. KS Sethi: AIR 1970 SC 1407;  Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Vs. Enfield India: [1968] 21 STC 317 (SC). Joint Commercial Tax Officer Vs. Young Men’s Indian Association: 1970SC1212

[9]     1958-9 STC 450

[10]   1969 24 STC 180 (Guj)

[11]    See: Balram  Chunnilal  Vs. Durgalal  Shivnarain: AIR1968 MP 81.

[12]    Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th  Edition, page 257.

[13]   AIR 1994 SC 2694

[14]    Tata Memorial Hospital Workers Union Vs. Tata Memorial Centre: AIR 2010 SC 2943

[15]    2013 AIR (SCW) 5782: AIR 2013 SC (CIV) 2849; (2013) 15 SCC 394

[16]    AIR 2005 SC 2544: 2005 (10) SCC 760.

[17]    Quoted in Vinodkumar M.  Malavia  Vs.  Maganlal  Mangaldas  Gameti: 2013 AIR (SCW) 5782: AIR 2013  SC (CIV) 2849; (2013) 15  SCC 394.

[18]    AIR 1958 AP 773

[19]    Quoted in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. H Narasimhaiah: AIR 1991 Kar 392.

[20]    That is, ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner.

[21]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College Vs.  The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; DharamDutt Vs. Union of India: AIR 2004 SC 1295; Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu  Vs. Govt. of AP: AIR 1958 AP 773.

[22]    AIR 1958 AP 773. See also: Raj Kumar Gaba Vs. State of UP: 2012-49 VST 252; Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Merchant Navy Club: 1974-96 ITR 261; Gurdwara  Prabandhak Committee Vs. Jagmonan Singh: ILR  1971-2 Del 515.

[23]    In companies, the share-holders hold the property as their own.

[24]    Quoted in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001- Para 69.

[25]    Under the Companies Act.

[26]    (2006) 3 Cal LT 139; 2006 (3) CHN 77.

[27]   See:Kelans Son Kodakkat  Kannan Vs. Tharakandi  Kadissa: AIR 1971 Ker 61; Shantilal Ambalal Mehta Vs. M.A. Rangaswamy: 1977-79 BLR 633; Union of India Vs. Official Assignee of Bombay: 1971-73 BLR 623; Tan Bug Taim Vs. Collector of Bombay: AIR  1946  Bom 216.

[28]    Settlement deed by Ashramam–Swayam  Prakash  Ashramam Vs. G Anandavally  Amma : AIR  2010 SC 622; Settlement to trust – S N Mathur  Vs. Board of Revenue: 2009-13  SCC 301; Sale deed by unregistered society – Suresh s/o. BhagwanraoPuri Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2016-3 AIR Bom R (Cri.) 603; Gift to unregistered Association – Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna Satram: 1984-2 ALT 157; Sale deed to an association – K. Kala Vs. Dist Registrar, Madurai: 2016 3 MLJ 50,  Sale deed to an association – State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 P&H 218. Sale deed to an association – Asst. Commr. Vs. Shivalingawwa: ILR 2003 Kar 2855; Lease deed by trust to school – TNP MothooNatarajan Vs. PV Ravi: 2015-2 MLJ (Cri.) 656; Lease deed by a firm -2014-3 ALT 46; Settlement deed to private trust –Kolli  Venkata Raja Vs. Govt. of AP: 2014-1 ALT 155; Lease deed to a public trust –Nadigar  Sangham Charitable Trust, rep. by its managing Trustee, R. Sarathkumar Vs. S. Murugan:2013-1 MLJ 433; Sale deed to Board of Trustees – Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chemists and Druggists Association Building Trust: 1995-215 ITR(Mad) 741; Mortgage deed by a College – Sonar Bangla Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College:  AIR 1960 Cal 450.

[29]    Such as well-known political parties, trade-unions, etc.

[30]    Such as temple-related trusts, Wakfs, church-related trusts, etc.

[31]    Such as libraries, universities, etc. See: Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna: 1984-2 ALT 157

[32]    12thEdn., Page 305.

[33]   Ramji  Mandir  Narsinhji Vs. Narsinh  Nagar:  AIR  1979Guj.  134

[34]    AIR 1962 SC 458

[35]    AIR 2003 SC 3397

[36]    AIR 2010 SC 2943

[37]   Mahamayatala Housing Co-Operative Society Vs. Charu Chandra Banerjee:1999-1 CalLJ 259; 1999-1 CalLT 450; 1999 CTJ 743

[38]   2013  LAP  149; 2014-1 ALD 108;  2014-2 ALT 540

[39]    T S Thinnappa  Chettiar Vs. Grajagopalan: AIR  1944 Mad 536

[40]    Weavers Mills Vs. Balkis  Ammal: AIR 1969 Mad 462. Murari  Ganguly Vs. Kanailal  Garal:   AIR  2003 Cal 105; ValiPattabhiramaRao Vs. Ramanuja: AIR  1984 AP 176.

[41]    Contract Act: Sec. 196.

[42]    Tata Memorial Hospital Workers Union Vs. Tata Memorial Centre: AIR 2010 SC 2943

[43]    It is held in Pamulapati  Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu  Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh: AIR 1958 AP 773.  See also: Raj Kumar Gaba Vs. State of UP: 2012-49 VST 252;         Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Merchant Navy Club: 1974-96 ITR 261;   Gurdwara  Prabandhak Committee Vs. Jagmonan Singh: ILR  1971-2 Del 515.

[44]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi:  AIR 1962 SC 458– Para 23.

[45]    Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai  Ratanjibhai: AIR 2005 SC 2544. Followed in Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal Mangaldas  Gameti: (2013) 15  SCC 394.

[46]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458.

[47]   AIR 1966 SC 1300: Referred to in: Mohd. Laiquiddin Vs. Kamala Dev Mishra: 2010-2 SCC 407; Jagatram  Ahuja  Vs. Comner. of Gift Tax Hyderabad: AIR 2000 SC 3195; Sunil Siddharthbhai Sarabhai Vs. Comner. of Income Tax: AIR1986 SC 368; Malabar Fisheries Co Vs. Comner. of Income Tax Kerala: AIR1980 SC 176.

[48]    Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu  Vs. Govt. of AP: AIR 1958 AP 773.

[49]    AIR 1962 SC 458

[50]    That is, ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner.

[51]    In companies, the share-holders hold the property as their own.

[52]    AIR 1962 SC 458

[53]    See Chapter: Is Registered Society A Juristic Person

[54]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458.

[55]    AIR 2003 SC 3397 – Para 22

[56]    Company is a juristic person. Property belongs to it. Bacha F Guzdar Bombay Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay:  AIR 1955 SC 74; Rustom  Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1970 SC 564; Electronics Corporation Vs. Secretary Revenue Department AP: AIR1999 SC  1734.

[57]    Shanti Sarup Vs. Radhaswami  Satsang  Sabha, Dayalbagh Agra: AIR 1969 All. 248; K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook, AIR 1970 Pat 163; Khiri Ram Gupta and Another versus Nana Lal:  AIR 1964 Pat. 114; State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 (P&H) 218. Satyavart  Sidhantalankar  Vs.  Arya  Samaj, Bombay: AIR 1946 Bom. 516

[58]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458. 

[59]    Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society: AIR 2003 SC 3397. See also Tata Vs. Tata:  AIR 2010 SC 2943

[60]    AIR 2005 SC 2544: 2005 (10) SCC 760. Relied on in Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal  Mangaldas  Gameti: 2013 AIR (SCW) 5782; (2013) 15  SCC 394.

[61]    KC Thomas Vs. RL Gadeock: AIR 1970 Pat 163 (DB)

[62]    See Notes above, under the heading: Can Ownership of Property Vest in Society itself. 

[63]    Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu  Vs. Govt. of AP: AIR 1958 AP 773. See also: Raj Kumar Gaba Vs. State of UP: 2012-49 VST 252; Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Merchant Navy Club: 1974-96 ITR 261; Gurdwara  Prabandhak Committee Vs. Jagmonan Singh: ILR  1971-2 Del 515.

[64]    Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu  Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1958 AP 773

[65]    Prasanna  Venkitesa  Rao Vs. Srinivasa  Rao: AIR 1931 Mad. 12:         Relied on: Milligan Vs. Mitchel: 40 ER 852; Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun: (1904) AC 515.         See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547.

[66]    Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai  Ratanjibhai: AIR 2005 SC 2544; Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal  Mangaldas  Gameti: (2013) 15  SCC 394.

[67]    Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society: AIR 2003 SC 3397- Para 20; Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458 – Para 38, 42

[68]    Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society: AIR 2003 SC 3397- Para 22.

[69]    Societies Registration Act: Sec. 5

[70]    Societies Registration Act: Sec. 8 and 10

[71]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458 -Para 11.

[72]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458 – Para 23

[73]   As in a partnership: See notes above under the head: ‘Property Belonging to a Society: Comparable to Definition in Partnership Act’

[74]    Prasanna  Venkitesa  Rao Vs. Srinivasa  Rao: AIR 1931 Mad. 12:         Relied on: Milligan Vs. Mitchel: 40 ER 852; Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun: (1904) AC 515.         See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh (2007-4 Raj LW 3547).

[75]    Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai  Ratanjibhai: AIR 2005 SC 2544:         Relied on in Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal  Mangaldas  Gameti: (2013) 15  SCC 394

[76]   AIR 1966 SC 1300: Referred to in: MohdLaiquiddin Vs. Kamala Dev Mishra: 2010-2 SCC 407; Jagatram  Ahuja  Vs. Comner. of Gift Tax Hyderabad: AIR 2000 SC 3195; Sunil Siddharthbhai Sarabhai Vs. Comner. of Income Tax: AIR1986 SC 368; Malabar Fisheries Co Vs. Comner. of Income Tax Kerala: AIR1980 SC 176.

[77]   See notes: ‘Property Belonging to a Society’: Comparable to Definition in Partnership Act

[78]   At page 45.

[79]    Quoted in Yogendra  Nath  Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax: AIR 1969 SC 1089; Idol of Shri Radhaji Vs. State of MP: AIR  1979 MP 129; Commissioner of Income Tax  Vs. Jogendra Nath Naskar: AIR 1965 Cal 570.

[80]    Agreement (Bylaws) governs. If the objectives of foundation envisage benefit to future members also, the present members and administrators are trustees for future members.

[81]    Preferred name: Charities

[82]   The properties of the (parish) churches are also vested in the Church (larger sense). See: Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[83]    It is settled that in the matter of (secular) private trusts, English principles are followed in India which lay down that if the beneficiaries are sui juris and of one mind, the trust can be put to an end or use the trust fund for any purpose (they wish): Profulla  Chorone  Requitte Vs. Satya  Chorone  Requitte: AIR 1979 SC 1682.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

Juristic Personality of Societies and Clubs

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

1. Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:

5. Property of society how vested
The property, movable and immovable belonging to a society registered under this Act, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body of such society, and in all proceedings civil and criminal, may be described as the property of the governing body of such society for their proper title.
6. Suits by and against societies
Every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the president, chairman, or principal secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society, and, in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion.
     Provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society, to sue the president or chairman, or principal secretary or the trustees thereof, if on application to the governing body some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant.

2. Introduction

Salmond reads:

  • “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases”.[1]

‘Persons’ are of two kinds: human beings and legal persons.

  • The second class is the institutions and associations of persons upon which the law incorporates or attributes legal personality. They are formed either on registration under a statute like Companies Act, or under a particular enactment such as English East India Company, Municipal Corporations, Life Insurance Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, etc. Apart from companies, corporations etc. our system accept idols in temples also as legal persons.  Though the legal personality of an unregistered association may not be a matter in dispute, the legal status of registered associations under Societies Registration Act remained as a potential question for quite long time. 

The enquiry as to the legal personality of an association of persons is essentially the enquiry whether it has the right of perpetuity in its own name, apart from its members.The basic tests to be applied for determining the same are the following:

  • (i)   Whether it can sue or be sued in its own name.
  • (ii)  Whether its property vests in itself.

Applying these tests authoritative decisions have definitively held that even the registered societies are also not juridical persons in law.

3. Registered Society is not a Juristic Person:

Unani Tibia College Case: The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had unequivocally held in the celebrated Unani Tibia College Case[2] that a registered society was not a corporation and that the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 gave only certain privileges to a society registered under that Act. It is held that (i) the society, being unincorporated, is unable to sue or be sued in its own name and (ii) the phrase ‘property belonging to a society’in Sec. 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 did not give the society a corporate status as this phrase merely described the property which had been vested in trustees or governing body.It had been held by several High Courts earlier, giving undue importance to the expression ‘property belonging to a society’ in Sec. 5, that the registered societies possess juristic personality or status.[3] It was held in Unani Tibia College Case as under:

  • “We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the provisions aforesaid do not establish the main essential characteristic of a corporation aggregate, namely, that of an intention to incorporate the society. We may further observe that the scheme and provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 are very similar to those of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 (59 and 60 Vict. C. 25), as amended in certain respects by subsequent enactments. It is appropriate to quote here what Dennis Lloyd has said in his ‘Law relating to Unincorporated Associations’ (1938 Edn. at page 59) in respect of the provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 as modified by subsequent enactments. He has said:
    • ‘The modern legislation still maintains the policy of the older Acts in withholding corporate status from friendly societies. Registration does not result in incorporation, but merely entitles the society so registered to enjoy the privileges conferred by the Act. These privileges are of considerable importance and certain of them go a long way towards giving registered societies…. a status in many respects analogous to a corporation strictly so-called, but without being technically incorporated. Thus something in the nature of perpetual succession is conceded by the provision that the society’s property is to vest in the trustees for the time being of the society for the use and benefit of the society and its members and of all persons claiming through the members according to the society’s rules, and further (and this is the most noteworthy provision) that the property shall pass to succeeding trustees without assignment or transfer. In the same way, though the society, being unincorporated, is unable to sue and be sued in its own name, it is given the statutory privilege of suing and being sued in the name of its trustees.’
  • We think that these observations made with regard to similar provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, correctly and succinctly summarise the legal position in respect of the several provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Those provisions undoubtedly give certain privileges to a society registered under that Act and the privileges are of considerable importance and some of those privileges are analogous to the privileges enjoyed by a corporation, but there is really no incorporation in the sense in which that word is legally understood.”
  • “…… Section 5, however, states that the property belonging to the society, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested in the governing body of the society and in all proceedings, civil and criminal, the property will be described as the property of the governing body. The section talks of property belonging to the society; but the property is vested in the trustees or in the governing body for the time being. The expression “property belonging to the society” does not give the society a corporate status in the matter of holding or acquiring property, it merely describes the property which vests in the trustees or governing body for the time being……..”

Century Club Vs. State of Mysore: It is held by the Karnataka High Court (KS Hegde, J.) in Century Club Vs. State of Mysore[4]that the Societies Registration Act did not say that the society could sue in its own name which would have been the position in the case of an incorporated society or in the case of a juridical person. Following questions were considered in this case:

  • (i) Do the registered clubs (registered under the So. Regn. Act) have legal personality of their own apart from their members,
  • (ii) do the registered clubs stand in the same position as the unregistered clubs as regards holding properties
  • (iii) can registered clubs sue or be sued and do they have competence to enter into agreement not only with outsiders but even with their own members and
  • (iv) are the clubs the legal owners of their properties and transfer the properties even to their members.

Referring to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, which (i) permits a registered society to sue or be sued in the name of the persons mentioned therein;(ii) provides for continuation of suits and proceedings despite the person suing or sued on behalf of the society, dying, or ceasing to hold the office, which he held at the time of the institution of the suit; (iii) prescribes that judgements passed in suits instituted have to be enforced only against the property of the society and not against the property of the person suing or sued; (iv) enables to sue its members in respect of the specified transactions;and (v) places the members in the same position as strangers as regards the offences mentioned therein, it was observed in this case as under: 

  • “If a registered society is a complete legal entity or a juridical person, these provisions are wholly superfluous. … The very fact that the Legislature thought it necessary to enact these provisions shows, that registered clubs are not juridical persons or complete legal entities but they have been merely conferred with certain attributes of legal entities. … The weight of judicial authority, English and Indian, is against the view contended for by the learned Advocate-General.”[5] 

Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society: The law on this point is further expounded by our Apex Court in Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society[6] as under:

  • i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
  • ii) A Society registered under the Societies Regn. Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  (Para 21)
  • iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22)
  • iv) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)

4. Legal Personality of Firms & Trusts

Under the general law, a firm is not a distinct legal entity or a juridical person like a body corporate; but a compendious name for all its partners;[7] but, firms are regarded as a quasi-independent entity,[8] or as legal personae for limited purposes.[9]By virtue of Order XXX, CPC a firm is enabled to sue and defend suits in the manner provided. Every partner of the firm is capable of representing the entire firm. He acts for all and is an agent as such.[10] If a partner dies, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the suit.[11]

Going by the definitions of trust, including that in the Indian Trusts Act,[12] 1882, it is clear that ‘trust’ is neither an institution nor an association of persons; but, it is an ‘obligation’ annexed to the ownership of property. Though, in the eye of law, trust is a concept and it cannot be a juristic person,[13] generally, while dealing with tax matters, such institutions administered by trustees are considered as juristic persons.[14]

Societies, both registered and unregistered, are also dealt with in the same manner.In Swami Satchitanand Vs. The 2nd Addl. IncomeTax Officer, Kozhikode[15]the Kerala High Court observed that, despite the fact that a Society is styled as an ‘association of persons’, tax imposed on a registered society is that on the society itself and not on its members.

5. Privileges on Registration

See Blog: Effect of Registration of Societies and Incorporation of Clubs

6. Is Unregistered Society a ‘living-person’ under S. 5 of the TP Act 

See Blog: Vesting of Property in Trusts

7. Can transfer of property be made to or by Unregistered Associations

See Blog: Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs

8. Regd. Societies – Not Corporate Body & No Common Seal 

A society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 is not a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal.[16] 

9. Co-operative Societies are Juristic Persons & ‘Liability Limited’

Co-operative Societies Acts provide for juristic personality to Co-operative societies. In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana[17] our Apex Court held that ‘a co-operative society is a corporation as commonly understood’ inasmuch as the same has the status of a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold property, enter into contracts, institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purposes for which it is constituted.[18]

Co-operative societies being creatures of the statute, once a Co-operative Society is formed and registered, the rights of the society and that of its members stand abridged by the provisions of the Act. The activities of the societies are controlled by the statute. Therefore, there cannot be any objection to statutory interference with their composition or functioning merely on the ground of contravention of individual’s right of freedom of association by statutory functionaries.[19]

Ninety Seventh Amendment of our Constitution provided constitutional status to the Co-operative Societies and it has brought out radical changes in the concept of Co-operative Societies. Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a Co-operative Society.

10. How Can a Society or a Club Acquire Property and Enter into a Contract?

See Blog: Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs

11. No Legal Impediment in Treating the Church as a Person

It is held by the High Court of Kerala in James Chinnamma Vs.  Joseph Abraham[20], when a question came whether a Catholic church can claim to be “an agriculturist” under a Debt Relief Act, that the church being capable of holding property (of course, acting through human agency) there was no legal impediment in treating the church as a person and it can claim to be “agriculturist”. The judge considered the postulation whether the church could be a voluntary association. It also referred to the theory that the church was under the authority of a corporation-sole, either Vicar or Bishop.

Are Churches and Dioceses Juridic persons it being so accepted in Canon Law

As shown by Salmond and explained by the Supreme Court in Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass, the law may, if it pleases, regard a church, a hospital, a university or a library as a legal person.

In Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan (2016  AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51) it is observed that the (parish) church is a legal person.

But, in M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case – 2020-1 SCC 1) our apex Court held that Mosque is not a legal person. The Apex Court rejected the the contention that mosque was held to be a juristic person by the Privy Council in Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 P C 116. In the light of the Supreme Court decision on Mosque, legally it is difficult to support the the view that churches are juristic persons.

Law may, if it pleases‘ being the basis for determining a body or entity as a legal person, it is definite that the dioceses can never be treated as a juridic persons even though the Canon declares so.

Even if a (parish) church can be taken as comparable to a temple or Gurudwara, as they are accepted by our law as juristic persons, a Diocese can never be taken as a juristic person; especially in the light of our Apex Court decision, Illachi Devi v. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397, which authoritatively held that even a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  Parish churches and trusts created for the benefit of a Church are public religious trusts.

Read Blog: Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques

Merely because Cannon law declares a church or a diocese as a legal person, it cannot be assumed that the courts that deal with the matters of those entities will be bound by the assertion. It is a jurisprudential issue reigned by the common law. In the light of the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School (AIR 1958 MP 362) it is illogical to go deep to search an authority to see whether the church or diocese is a legal person for it is so described in the Canon.


[1]      12th Edn., Page 305.

[2]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & UnaniTibia College Vs. TheState: AIR 1962 SC 458.

[3]      See: Benares Hindu University Vs. Gauri DuttJoshir AIR 1950 All 196. Also see: K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook: AIR 1970 Pat 163; Inder Chand Vs. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha: AIR 1977 Del 34.

[4]      AIR 1967 Kar 25.                

[5]      The court referred the following decisions: Queen’s Bench decision in Graff vs. Evans: (1882) 8 Q. B. D. 373; Metford Vs. Edwards ([1915] 1 K. B. 172 ); Trebanog Working men’s Club and Institute Ltd. Vs. Macdonald: [1940] 1 K. B. 576; [1940] 1 All E. R. 454; National Association of Local Government Officers Vs. Watkins: (1934) 18 Tax Cas. 499; Farrar’s case: (1888)40 Ch. D. 395. Indian Cases: Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Vs. Cosmopolitan Club: AIR1954 Mad 1144 , Young Men’s Indian Association Vs. Joint Commercial Tax Officer: AIR 1964 Mad 63; Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Club, Rajnandgaon Vs. Sales Tax Officer: [1957] 8 S. T. C. 781;  Board of Trustees Vs. State of Delhi , AIR1962 SC 458; BoppanaRukminamma Vs. Maganti Venkata Ramadas: AIR 1940 Mad. 949;  Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay: AIR 1946 Bom 516; Krishnan Vs. Sundaram: AIR 1941 Bom. 312: Rukminamma Vs. Venkata Ramadas: AIR 1940 Mad 949; NA Nannier Vs. Official Assignee, Madras: AIR 1951 Mad 875.

[6]      Illachi  Devi  Vs. Jain Society:  AIR 2003 SC 3397;         See also Tata Vs. Tata: AIR 2010 SC 2943.

[7]      V Subramaniam Vs. Rajesh Raghuvandra Rao: AIR  2009 SC 1858, Murarilal Mahabir Prasad Vs. B R Vad: AIR 1976 SC 313, State Bank of India Vs. Simko Engineering Works: AIR 2005 P&H 63, Lieya Vs. Kaliappa Chettiar: AIR1996 Ker 218, Firm Narain Das Mangal Sen Vs. Anand Behari Mishra: AIR 1958MP 408.

[8]    Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation Vs. AVK Traders:2012-115 AIC 677: 2012-2 CivCC 755; 2012-2 KerLJ 534: 2012-2 KerLT 332.

[9]    Dena Bank Vs. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co: AIR 2000 SC 3654; Suwalal Anandilal Jain Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar: AIR 1997 SC 1279.

[10]   G.P.C. Co-op. Union Vs. Krishna Rao: AIR 1974 Bom 52

[11]    Sohan Lal Vs. Amin Chand: : AIR 1973 SC 2572; Upper India Cable Co. Vs. BalKishan, 1984-3 SCC 462; Anokhe Lal Vs. Radhamohan Bansal: 1996-6 SCC 730.

[12]    Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882

[13]    See: Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas 1967 Raj LW 273; It is referred to in Sagar Sharma Vs. AddlComr: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-336  ITR 611. Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Trilok Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del  145; Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs.  CIT: [1963] 50 ITR 798  (Mad); Kishorelal Asera Vs. Haji Essa: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367, Thanthi Trust Vs. Wealth Tax Officer: (1989)78 CTR 54: (1989) 45 TAXMAN 121: (1989) 178  ITR 28.

[14]    Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 defines “charitable purpose”.

[15]    AIR 1964 Ker 118

[16]    Captain Jagdish Chandra Varshney Vs. Smt. Muni Varshney : AIR 2006 All 347

[17]    AIR 1985 SC 973

[18]    Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana AIR 1985 SC 973, See also:  R Jaivel Vs. State of Tamil Nadu: AIR  2006 Mad 215. State of Punjab Vs. Kesari Chand: AIR 1987 P&H 216; Sonepat Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd Vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court:   AIR  1986 P&H 386; Mulshanker Kunverji Gor Vs.Juvansinhji ShivubhaJadeja: AIR 1980 Guj 62.

[19]    AP Dairy Develpmt. Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[20]    1962 Ker LT 240.


Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India


Read in this Cluster:

Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Principles and Procedure

Land Laws

Evidence Act – General

Contract Act

Easement

Stamp Act

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Societies and Branches

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

1. Introduction

The nexus between the branches and its central organisation has to be settled by the bye laws. Usually the upper body holds supervisory jurisdiction over the affairs of the branches; and, if the bye laws so provide, the property acquired by the branches may remain as the property of the whole/central organisation. When the parental body exercises its supervisory jurisdiction, in matters other than the formal administrative governance, it has to obey principles applicable to a quasi-judicial authority (ie., observing principles of natural justice, etc.).

The extent of autonomy or independence in administration of a branch is determined by the bye laws. Normally, so long the branches function within its jurisdiction, in conformity with the provisions of the bye laws, they can claim freedom from interference. When they violate the provisions of the bye laws and act in an arbitrary manner, their actions will be subject to the supervisory control of the central organisation.

Branches Contemplated In The Companies Act Are Not Separate Entities

In S.N.D.P. Yogam v. G. Krishnamoorthy,  2022-4 Ker HC 168, it is pointed out as under:

  • “The branches contemplated and provided for under the Companies Act, 1882 and its successor enactments are not independent or separate entities and in terms of the aforesaid statutes, company and its branches would constitute one single entity.”

Referring English Electric Co. of India Ltd v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, (1976) 4 SCC 460, it is observed in S.N.D.P. Yogam v. G. Krishnamoorthy,  2022-4 Ker HC 168, that a registered company can have Branches under the Companies Act and they are not independent or separate entities, and that the company and its branches constitute one single entity.

2. Does a Branch Regd. with a Regd. Society Get the Status as a Regd. Society?

An (unregistered) association which is registered with a registered-society will not get the status of a registered society.[1] Same will be the position as to a branch of a registered society.  Section 4 of the Societies Registration Act provides for filing Annual List of Managing Body once in every year with the Registrar. Societies Registration Act does not envisage societies-with-branches.

In Kerala Vyapari Vyavasayi Vs. Kerala Vyapari Vyavasayi Ekopana Samithi[2] after considering the definition and character of the ‘Governing Body’ in the So. Regn. Act, so also the scheme of the Act, it is held that the committee of officers at the district level or unit level is not the ‘Governing Body’ under the Societies Registration Act.

3. Can a Branch Sue?

The Supreme Court, in  P. Nazeer Vs. Salafi Trust, AIR 2022 SC 1580, held:

  • (i) A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is entitled to sue and be sued, only in terms of its bye­laws.
  • (ii) The bye­laws may authorise the President or Secretary or any other office bearer to institute or defend a suit for and on behalf of the society,
    • since section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, provides that ‘every society registered under the Act may sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society and,
    • in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion’.
  • (iii) Unless the plaintiff, which claims to be a society, demonstrates that it is a registered entity and that the person who signed and verified the pleadings was authorised by the bye­laws to do so, the suit cannot be entertained
    • The fact that the plaintiff in a suit happens to be a local unit or a Sakha unit affiliated to a registered society is of no consequence, unless the bye­laws support the institution of such a suit.

4. Fundamental Principles and Decision of a Branch to Sever

It being not open for the majority of the members of a society to alter the fundamental principles upon which it is founded, even the unanimous decision[3] of a branch (unless such a power is specifically reserved under the bye laws)[4] cannot sever the relation with the central body.  This principle was expounded in Milligan Vs. Mitchel,[5] Atttorney General Vs. Anderson.[6] In Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun,[7] House of Lords (by a majority of 5-2) found that the minority, which adhered to the ‘principles of establishment’, was entitled to the assets of the Free Church. It was observed that when men subscribe money for a particular object, and leave it behind them for the promotion of that object, their successors have no right to change the object endowed. It was held that, by adopting new standards of doctrine (and particularly by abandoning its commitment to ‘the establishment principle’, which was held to be fundamental to the Free Church), the majority had violated the conditions on which the property of the Free Church.[8]

5. Can a Branch Dissociate?

A branch of a (central) organisation created under the provisions of bye laws, cannot (unless the Rules provide otherwise) lawfully sever its connections with its central body, as observed in John Vs. Rees [9], inasmuch as the act of severance will amount to violation of the rules or bye laws.

6. Merger of an Association with Another Association

If a voluntary association came into existence independently, and subsequently subjected itself as a branch of another association, such a ‘branch’ may have the right[10] to dissociate or disaffiliate from such association or ‘central body’; because, the ‘branch’, when came into existence, had all characteristics of an independent voluntary association with its own basic principles of foundation.  The same will be the position of a voluntary association which merged or amalgamated[11] with another association. 

If the conduct of the members of the merged association shows that their act amounted to unanimous or undisputed surrendering or abandonment of the identity of the former voluntary association, or they became an integral-whole with the association in which they merged, principles of acquiescence and estoppel will be a bar for dissociation.

7. Parallel Administration within a Church Not Allowable

In Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church [12] it is pointed out by our Apex Court that ‘running parallel governance’ at the cost of Church by creating factionalism within the constituent parish churches is not permissible. It is settled proposition of law that when a mode is prescribed for doing a thing, it can be done only in that manner and not otherwise.

8. Incidents of trust in Clubs and societies

See blog: Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies.

 


[1]      Kalyani Mitra Vs. Hindu Milan Mandir: ILR 1986 MP 657

[2]      2004-1 Ker LT 756, 2004 KHC 122

[3]    Long Vs. The Bishop of Cape Town: (1863) 1 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 411; Merriman Vs. Williams: (1882) L.R.7 A.C.484

[4]      Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao: AIR 1931 Mad. 12; See also: Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Chorone Requitte: AIR 1979 SC 1682; Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547.

[5]      40 ER 852

[6]      (1888) 57 LJ Ch 543

[7]      (1904) AC 515

[8]      All these English decisions were referred to in Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao: AIR 1931 Mad. 12. See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547.

[9]      John Vs. Rees: [1970] 1 Ch 345: [19692 All ER 275.

[10]    Unless principles of estoppel and acquiescence work against.

[11]    Sec. 14A of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 provides powers to the Registrar to order amalgamation of societies. See: H Puttappa Vs. State of Karnataka: AIR  1978 Kar 148.

[12]   Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

Read in this cluster:

  1. Can Courts Award Interest on Equitable Grounds?
  2. Public & Private Trusts in India
  3. Presumptions on Registered Documents & Collateral Purpose
  4. EFFECT OF MARKING DOCUMENTS WITHOUT OBJECTION
  5. PRODUCTION, ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
  6. Modes of Proof of Documents
  7. Expert Evidence and Appreciation of Evidence
  8. Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting Witnesses
  9. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
  10. OBJECTIONS TO ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
  11. Order II, Rule 2 CPC – Not to Vex Defendants Twice for the Same Cause of Action
  12. Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney is Sufficient for Registration of a Deed
  13. Sec. 91 CPC and Suits Against Wrongful Acts
  14. Vesting of Property in Trusts
  15. Clubs and Societies, Bye Laws Fundamental
  16. The Law and Principles of Mandatory Injunction
  17. Natural Justice – Not an Unruly Horse, Cannot be Placed in a Straight-Jacket & Not a Judicial Cure-all.
  18. Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
  19. Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
  20. How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
  21. Rules on Burden of Proof & Adverse Inference
  22. Presumptions on Documents and Truth of its Contents
  23. Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
  24. Extent of Easement (Width of Way) in Easement of Necessity, Quasi Easement and Implied Grant
  25. Village Pathways and Right to Bury are not Easements.
  26. Sec. 65B,  Evidence Act: Certificate for Computer Output
  27. Legal Personality of Trustees and Office Bearers of Societies
  28. Interrogatories: When Court Allows, When Rejects?
  29. Can a Party to Suit Examine Opposite Party, as of Right?
  30. ‘Additional Burden Loses Lateral Support’ – Incorrect Proposition
  31. Production of Documents in Court: Order 11, Rule 14 CPC is not independent from Rule 12
  32. Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies.
  33. Management of Societies and Clubs, And Powers of General Body and Governing Body
  34. How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies
  35. Is Permission of Court Mandatory when a Power of Attorney Holder Files Suit
  36. Notary-Attested Documents: Presumption, Rebuttable
  37. Judicial & Legislative Activism in India: Principles and Instances
  38. Maratha Backward Community Reservation Case: Supreme Court Fixed Upper Limit at 50%.
  39. Separation Of Powers: Who Wins the Race – Legislature, Executive or Judiciary ?
  40. Custom & Customary Easements in Indian Law
  41. What is Easement? Does Right of Easement Allow to ‘Enjoy’ After Making a Construction?
  42. Constructive Res Judicata and Ineffectual Res Judicata
  43. Is Decree in a Representative Suit (OI R8 CPC) Enforceable Against Persons Not Eo-Nomine Parties?
  44. Admissibility of Visual and Audio Evidence (Including Photographs, Cassettes, Tape-recordings, Films, CCTV Footage, CDs, e-mails, Chips, Hard-discs, Pen-drives)
  45. Court Interference in Election Process
  46. Significance of Scientific Evidence in Judicial Process
  47. ‘Is Ban on Muslim Women to Enter Mosques, Unconstitutional’ Stands Tagged-on with Sabarimala Revision-Reference Matter
  48. Is Excommunication of Parsi Women for Marrying Outside, Unconstitutional
  49. Article 370: Is There Little Chance for Supreme Court Interference
  50. Certificate is Required Only for ‘Computer Output’; Not for ‘Electronic Records’: Arjun Panditrao Explored.
  51. M. Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das –Pragmatic Verdict on Ayodhya Disputes
  52. Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs
  53. Juristic Personality of Societies and Clubs
  54. Societies and Branches
  55. Effect of Registration of Societies and Incorporation of Clubs
  56. Clubs and Societies: General Features
  57. Indian Law of Trusts Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership
  58. Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
  59. What is Trust in Indian Law?
  60. Kesavananda Bharati Case: Effect and Outcome – Never Ending Controversy
  61. CAA Challenge: Divergent Views
  62. Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
  63. Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
  64. Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
  65. Declaration and Injunction
  66. Can Legislature Overpower Court Decisions by an Enactment?

Effect of Registration of Societies and Incorporation of Clubs

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

1. Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:

  • 3. Registration and fees: Upon such memorandum and certified copy being filed, the Registrar shall certify under his hand that the society is registered under this Act. There shall be paid to the Registrar for every such registration a fee of fifty rupees, or such smaller fees as [the State Government] may from time to time, direct; and all fees so paid shall be accounted for to [the State Government].
  • 4. Annual list of managing body to be filed:- Once in every year, on or before the fourteenth day succeeding the day on which, according to the rules of the society, the annual general meeting of the society is held, or, if the rules do not provide for an annual general meeting, in the month of January, a list shall be filed with the Registrar of joint-stock Companies, of the names, addresses and occupations of the governors, council, directors, committee or other governing body then entrusted with the management of the affairs of the society.
  • 20. To what societies Act applies: The following societies may be registered under this Act:–  Charitable societies, the military orphan funds or societies established at the several presidencies of India, societies established for the promotion of science, literature, or the fine arts for instruction, the diffusion of useful knowledge, [the diffusion of political education], the foundation or maintenance of libraries or reading-rooms for general use among the members or open to the public or public museums and galleries of paintings and other works of art, collections of natural history, mechanical and philosophical inventions, instruments, or designs.
  • Section 8 (2) Companies Act, 2013 reads: The company registered under this section shall enjoy all the privileges and be subject to all the obligations of limited companies.

2. Introduction

India has a long history of collective community life. Ancient history of India manifested in oldest scriptures of Hinduism – Vedas – refers to then existed strong civil society. Voluntary organisations were originated for promotion of  health, education and cultural activities. Religious organizations promoted charitable trusts with a philanthropic view. The Government recognised these voluntary organizations and trusts by various enactments. The oldest enactments in this regard include:

  • The Societies Registration Act, 1860,
  • The Religious Endowments Act, 1863,
  • The Indian Trusts Act, 1882,
  • The Charitable Endowments Act, 1890,
  • The Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920 and
  • The Trade Unions Act, 1926.

It is noteworthy that these enactments did not impose strong governmental control over various activities of the associations and the institutions. 

3. So. Regn. Act does not Require Compulsory Registration

Because Article 19(1)(c) of our Constitution guarantees freedom to form associations.

Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not require compulsory registration of Societies. This position continues. No doubt, it is because Article 19(1)(c) of our Constitution guarantees freedom to form associations and unions. But, Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 directs compulsory registration of certain societies.

Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 Sec. 4 reads:

  • 4. Compulsory Registration of Certain Societies
  • (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (3) and (4), every society formed on or after the date of the commencement of this Act, which has for its object any object mentioned in, or prescribed Under Section 3, and
    • (a) which consists of not less than twenty members, or
    • (b) whose annual gross income or expenditure in any financial year after the date of the commencement of this Act, is not less than ten thousand rupees, shall be registered under this Act within such period as may be prescribed.
  • (2) …..
  • (3) Nothing in this section shall apply to any society which has for its object the promotion of religion, athletics or sports (including indoor games).
  • (4) Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to require the registration under this Act of any society formed, established, registered or incorporated under any other law.

4. General Principles of Company Law Apply to Regd. Society.

The general principles governing rights of a member in a registered society, and the right of suit of a member, would be similar to that of an individual share holder’s rights in a company. The general principles as to the rights and responsibilities of the directors of a company also apply to the governing body members of a society.

Following are recognised as individual membership rights in a company.[1]

  • (i)   Right to vote,
  • (ii)  right to stand as a candidate for election as a director and
  • (iii) set-right illegal acts.

The general principles as to the rights and responsibilities of the directors of a company also apply to the governing body members of a society.

5. Registration of Societies Brings-in Certain Privileges

In Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi[2] the legal position is expounded by our Apex Court pointing out that by registration of a Society, perpetual succession is conceded inasmuch as the society’s property vest in the trustees for the time being of the society for the use and benefit of the society and its members and of all persons claiming through the members according to the society’s rules, and further (and this is the most noteworthy provision) that the property shall pass to succeeding trustees without assignment or transfer. In this decision it is observed as under:

  • “… The most important point to be noticed in this connection is that in the various provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, there are no sufficient words to indicate on intention to incorporate; on the contrary, the provisions show that there was an absence of such intention. ….. Section 5, however, states that the property belonging to the society, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested in the governing body of the society and in all proceedings, civil and criminal, the property will be described as the property of the governing body. The section talks of property belonging to the society; but the property is vested in the trustees or in the governing body for the time being. The expression “property belonging to the society” does not give the society a corporate status in the matter of holding or acquiring property, it merely describes the property which vests in the trustees or governing body for the time being……..”
  • “… Those provisions undoubtedly give certain privileges to a society registered under that Act and the privileges are of considerable importance and some of those privileges are analogous to the privileges enjoyed by a corporation, but there is really no incorporation in the sense in which that word is legally understood.”

In Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of AP[3] it was observed that if an association was not registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act it could not sue or be sued except in the name of all the members of the association. The registration of the Society confers on it certain advantages. The members as well as the Governing Body the Society are not always the same. Even though the members of the Society or the Government Body fluctuate from time to time, the identity of the society is sought to be made continuous by reason of the provisions of the Societies Registration Act.

Registering An Old Society Did Not Mean Forming A New Society,

In Noel Frederick Barwell v. John Jackson, AIR 1948 All. 146, the Court referred M’ Kenny v. Mayor and Corporation of Barnsley, (1894) 10 T.L.R. 533, and said as under:

  • “There the question was whether an unregistered society should be registered under the Friendly Societies Act, 1855, and dealing with the question whether the Society should or should not be registered, the Master of the Rolls observed:
  • “And in the absence of any special rule to the contrary, it seemed to be a general rule arising from the nature of things that, where a number of people joined together for some purpose and must for the carrying out of that purpose govern themselves, the only way in which they, could do so was by the will of the majority.”

The Allehabad High Court continued as under:

  • “68. His Lordship went on to hold that registering an old society did not mean forming a new society, nor did it alter it in any way. The observations must, therefore, be confined to the facts of that case that the natural law of the rule of the majority would govern only for the purpose of carrying out the object for which they had come together and formed the association, tout that does not justify the assertion that on all questions the majority have a right to impose their will on the minority.  It cannot be said here that the resolution of 3rd September was for the carrying out of the purpose for which the club was founded. In the absence of that basic requirement the case cannot help the defendants.”

The Allehabad High Court thereafter referred another English decision, Oldhamour Lady’s Sick and burial Society v. Taylor, and said as under:

  • “69. The case in Oldhamour Lady’s Sick and burial Society v. Taylor, (1887) 3 TLR 472 has, to my mind, no relevance. That was-a case where after the registration of an unregistered society, which was registered by a vote of the majority the minority then having decided to secede, the question was whether the registered society could claim the money due to the unregistered society and it was held that it was the same society and there was a continuity of existence.”

Person who Signs Pleadings must be Authorised by the Bye­laws

The Supreme Court, in  P. Nazeer Vs. Salafi Trust, AIR 2022 SC 1580, held:

  • (i) A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is entitled to sue and be sued, only in terms of its bye­laws.
  • (ii) The bye­laws may authorise the President or Secretary or any other office bearer to institute or defend a suit for and on behalf of the society,
    • since section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, provides that ‘every society registered under the Act may sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society and,
    • in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion’.
  • (iii) Unless the plaintiff, which claims to be a society, demonstrates that it is a registered entity and that the person who signed and verified the pleadings was authorised by the bye­laws to do so, the suit cannot be entertained
    • The fact that the plaintiff in a suit happens to be a local unit or a Sakha unit affiliated to a registered society is of no consequence, unless the bye­laws support the institution of such a suit.

6. Registration Brings-in Certain Changes to the Character of its Property

A society or a club is a compendium of its members. Its property is the ‘joint property’ held by the members as ‘joint tenants’ (as differentiated to ‘tenants in common’, till a decision is taken for dissolution). If such property is maintained for the benefit of its future members also (and therefore encumbered with obligations as in a ‘trust’), it cannot be dealt with by the members disregarding the objectives of its foundation.

With respect to the property of a society which can be distributed among the members on its dissolution, by registration under the Societies Registration Act a sea-change occurs whereby the disposal of property is governed by the provisions of the Societies Registration Act; and a perpetual succession is conceded thereto.[4]

Benefits Brought About by Registration of Societies. 

  1. Legal recognition and Benefits of Entry in Public Document. The Societies Registration Act provides for registering its bye laws and filing annual list of managing body and accounts. It is subject to scrutiny of Registrar. The registration and renewal of the registration of the society is for the benefit of all the members and office bearers of the society[5]so also the persons who deal with the society. A registered society can open bank accounts and obtain registration under Income Tax Act.
  2. Perpetual Succession. By registration of a Society, perpetual succession is conceded inasmuch as the society’s property vest in the trustees or its governing body, for the use and benefit of the society;or in its members and of all persons claiming through the members according to the society’s rules.[6]
  3. And further (and this is the most noteworthy provision) that the property shall pass to succeeding trustees or its governing body without assignment or transfer.[7]
  4. Enabling Provisions for Filing Suits. Suits with respect to registered societies can be filed without invoking the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 CPC;[8] and can be sued also in that way.
  5. Fixity. During the subsistence of a registered society, or on dissolution, the members do not have any proprietary or beneficial enjoyment/interest in the property the society holds.[9] The Societies Registration Act, therefore, does not create in the members of the registered society any interest other than that of bare trustees. What all the members are entitled to, is the right of management of the properties of the society subject to certain conditions.[10]
  6. Left-behind-property goes to another society: As per the Societies Registration Act, on dissolution, the left-behind-property of a registered society goes to another society as determined by the members of the society or by the court[11] for being managed by some other charitable organisation and to be utilised for like purposes.
  7. Tax Exemptions. Registration of Societies permits certain tax benefits and exemptions as provided in various Tax Laws.

So. Regn. Act: Holding Annual General Meeting is Statutory; Election Not

Sec. 4 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 postulates holding of Annual General Meeting. These provisions (also the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the society) as to holding Annual General Meetings, are mandatory; and not directory (Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts & Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585). As per Sec. 2 of the Societies Registration Act the management of the affairs of a society is entrusted with the governing body.  The rules of the society have to direct the details of such entrustment.

It is pertinent to note that the Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not specifically direct ‘election’ of the governing body. But various States’ amendments (and State-Acts) provide for the same. The mode and modalities of formation of the governing body is determinedly left, under Sec. 16, to the ‘Rules and Regulations of the society’.

Sec. 16 reads:

  • Governing body defined: The governing body of the society shall be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees, or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted.

See Blog: Election & Challenge in Societies and Clubs

7. Religious Societies & Charitable Purposes

A Religious-Society Can be Registered If it Carries on Secular Activities Also

Society formed for religious purposes can also be registered under the Societies Registration Act, as the society formed for religious purposes would also ordinarily be a Society for charitable purposes.[12] Though the expression charitable purpose generally takes-in religious purpose also, it is held by the Patna High Court in Md. Yunus Vs. The Inspector General of Registration[13] that the So. Regn. Act does not embrace purposes which are religious or predominantly religious.

9. How Can a Society or a Club Acquire Property and Enter into a Contract?

See Blog: Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs

10. Associations Regd. under S. 8(1) of the Companies Act, 2013

Incorporation of Clubs brings in Legal Personality

Section 8 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013, lays down that an association of persons with charitable objects can be registered under this Act. It should have ‘in its objects the promotion of commerce, art, science, sports, education, research, social welfare, religion, charity, protection of environment or any such other object’ and it should be one which ‘intends to apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects’.

Clubs incorporated under the Companies Act enjoy all the privileges of limited companies; and they are subject to all the obligations thereunder also.  Section 8 (2) Companies Act, 2013 reads:

  • “(2) The company registered under this section shall enjoy all the privileges and be subject to all the obligations of limited companies.”

Privileges

  • exempted from requirement regarding minimum share capital.
  • exempted from requirement to mention its name and address as required in case of all other companies 
  • free to determine the date, place and time of its Annual General Meeting according to their convenience and feasibility.
  • can call an Annual General Meeting at a short notice
  • can maintain books of accounts for a shorter period.
  • send the required documents at least fourteen days before the date of meeting instead of 21 days.
  • free to increase the number of its directors without seeking approval of central Government.
  • exempted from the applicability of Companies Auditor’s Report Order, 2003 (CARO).

Obligations

  • ensure that its profits and all other incomes are utilized only for the purpose of promoting its objects and not for any other purpose
  • ensure that its profits are not distributed as dividend among its members
  • cannot alter its objects clause in its Memorandum without seeking the written approval of central government
  • bound by such conditions and regulations imposed by Central Government
  • ensure that its objects are confined to those mentioned in section Section 8 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Halsbury’s Laws of England[14] describe Incorporated Members’ Club as under:

  • “206. Incorporated Members’ Club. – A members’ club incorporated under the Companies Act, 1948, or earlier Companies Acts, enjoys the advantages incidental to incorporation as a company, especially that of suing and being sued as a legal entity. The company may be limited by shares or by guarantee, and in either case the liability may be merely nominal in amount. The most convenient method, when a members’ club is incorporated, is to register it as a company limited by guarantee, the members of the club for the time being constituting the company. If a members’ club is incorporated as a company limited by shares, the articles of association to some extent take the place of club rules, and may be supplemented by bye laws. If it is registered as an association limited by guarantee, the rules governing the relations of the members inter se are generally appended to the memorandum of association, and they together form the regulations of the company. In either case the objects of the club are set forth in the memorandum of association. The company is quite distinct from the club, the company merely being the proprietor; the relations of the members of the club inter se are governed by club rules or bye laws, as in the case of an unincorporated members’ club, and the rights and liabilities of the share-holders in the company depend upon the memorandum and articles of association, as in the case of an ordinary trading company.”

11. Registered Society is not a Juristic Person

See Blog: Is Registered Society a Juristic Person.

12. Regd. Societies – Not Corporate Body & No Common Seal 

A society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 is not a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal.[15] But, a Co-operative Society, created by or under a statute,[16] is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to hold property; and it can enter into contracts.[17]

13. Societies  Considered as Legal Persons While Deal Tax Matters

Generally, public institutions established with a philanthropic view and administered by trustees are described as ‘trusts’, especially while dealing with tax matters, though, in the strict legal sense, trust is a concept and it cannot be an organisation or a  Juristic Person.[18]

In Swami Satchitanand Vs. The 2nd Addl. Income-tax Officer, Kozhikode[19] the Kerala High Court observed that a society registered under Societies Registration Act is a legal entity; and it is held that tax imposed on a Society, though it has been styled as an ‘Association of persons’ is still a tax on the society and not on its members, and that it is not possible, therefore, to say that the tax imposed on a Society is a tax imposed on the members of the Society.

14. Does a Society or Branch Registered with Another Registered Society Get the Status as a Registered Society?

See Blog: Societies and Branches

15. Registrar Acts on Prima Facie Materials

If a dispute arises as to whom among the two sets were the lawful members of the Governing Committee, the Registrar has the power to decide upon such a dispute under the Societies Registration Act as an incidental or consequential power in itself. The Registrar has to prima facie satisfy from the materials and evidences. There may not be an elaborate enquiry. However, such an enquiry made by the Registrar and the decision taken from it does not become final and the aggrieved party can take up the matter before a competent court for a decision as to who are the members of the governing body.[20]

16. Jurisdiction of State and Registrar: Limited

The District Registrar has no power to interfere with the selection in the election process. The scope of exercising power under the Societies Registration Act is only to limited extent. The enquiry is not directed against election or selection but to find out the genuineness of the list.

The disputes are to be resolved by the Civil Court

Sec. 4 of the So. Regn. Act casts a duty on the persons concerned to file before the registrar an annual return containing the names, addresses and occupation of the members of the Executive Committee. But the law does not provide for the suspension or dissolution of the society because of failure to comply with Sec. 4.  The Act does not vest any control or supervisory or disciplinary power or jurisdiction in the registrar to take action against a society. The disputes are to be resolved by the Civil Court.[21]

Once a list is furnished in accordance with the election, the scope of enquiry would come to an end, even if the selection is bad. The extent of enquiry is only to find out whether the list being furnished is not by way of any bogus claim or by fraudulent claim.[22]

17. Co-op. Registrar’s Powers Regulatory or Supervisory in Nature

A Co-operative society is an autonomous body and it has got a freedom of its own and such freedom can be interfered only when they violate the provisions of the bye-laws and act in an arbitrary manner. When they violate the provisions of the bye-laws and the Act in an arbitrary manner, or resort to activities prejudicial to the interest of the society, their actions will be subject to the supervisory control of the authorities under the Act.[23] Except supervisory role, the State has no administrative control over the day-to-day affairs of a Co-operative society.[24] It will not amount to dominating or interfering with the management or affairs of the Co-operative society so as to be controlled.The supervisory powers are given to the Co-operative Registrar and the executive powers are given to the Secretary with ‘a single object in view, namely, the better working of the Co-operative societies’[25]

AK Ganguly, J. in The Dakshinee Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Nayan Ranjan Das[26] has observed that democratic norms or democratic principles always presuppose regulatory measures since democracy cannot exist without moderation and that such provisions in the Act strengthen the larger interest of the co-operative movement in general.

Our Apex Court, in Thalappalam Ser. Co-op. Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala,[27] it is pointed out that the final authority of a society vests in the general body of its members and every society is managed by the managing committee constituted in terms of the bye-laws, and unequivocally held that the powers of Registrar of Co-operative Societies are only ‘regulatory or supervisory’ in nature and it ‘will not amount to dominating or interfering with the management or affairs of the society so as to be controlled’.

18. States’ Amendments/Acts Empower Registrar

Though the Central Act does not specifically empower the Registrar to enquire into the affairs of the society, various States’ Amendments/Acts provide for the same.

Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act

Considering Section 36(1) of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, it is held in CMS Evangelical Suvi David Vs. District Registrar[28] that the power of the Registrar to enquire into the affairs of the society was only to hold a summary inquiry for his own satisfaction. The said power cannot be construed as the power of appeal. Under Section 36, the Registrar has not been empowered to adjudicate upon the conflicting claims to represent the society based upon question of fact. A plain reading of Section 36 shows that the Registrar could look only the provisions of the Act and the Rules and prima facie materials to arrive at a conclusion either to believe or not to believe.

The power of the Registrar to call for information and explanation under Section 34 does not contemplate any power to examine witnesses or to allow opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses. The power is incidental and it is only for the purpose of maintaining correct records. As the power to conduct inquiry is only limited – in order to find out whether constitution of members are valid – the inquiry is limited only for the purpose of making entries in the register. However, the exercise of power must not be arbitrary as the orders passed or directions issued by the Registrar are amenable to challenge in the Writ Jurisdiction.[29]

19. Super-session of Governing Body by Government – M.P. Act

A few States, in their Societies Registration Acts, give power, to the Government to supersede societies. Section 32 of the MP Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, Registrar is authorised to hold an enquiry into the constitution and working and financial conditions of the society. Section 33 of the Act speaks of supersession[30] of the Governing Body by the State Government by removing the governing body and appointing a person or persons to manage the affairs of the society for a specified period not exceeding two years in the first instance.

Sec. 33 of the MP Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973 reads:

  • “33. Super-session of Governing Body.— (1) If, in the opinion of the Government, governing body of any State aided society—
  •         (a) persistently makes default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under this Act, regulations or bye-laws of the society or by any lawful order passed by the State Government or Registrar, or is unwilling to perform such duties, or
  •         (b) commits acts which are prejudicial to the interest of society or its members, or
  •         (c) is otherwise not functioning properly, the State Government may, by order in writing, remove the governing body and appoint a person or persons to manage the affairs of the society for a specified period not exceeding two years in the first instance.
  •         Provided that where it is proposed to remove the governing body of the society exclusively on the ground that election to the governing body were not held in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the regulations or bye-taws made thereunder, no action shall be taken under this sub-section unless the Registrar or an officer authorised by him in this behalf has convened a meeting of the General body for conducting the election thereto in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or the Regulations or bye-laws made thereunder but has failed to get the new governing body elected.
  •         Provided further that the Registrar or the Officer authorised by him shall, for the purpose of conducting election, have all the necessary powers under the Act or the Regulations or bye-laws made thereunder.
  •         (2) No order under Sub-section (1) shall be made unless the governing body has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed order and representation, if any, made by it, is considered.
  •         (3) …. (4) ….. (5) …. (6) …. (7) …. (8) …..”

It is held in Suresh Vs. State of MP[31] that the power of supersession was not an administrative power but was a quasi-judicial in nature. In Indian National Congress Vs. Institute of Social Welfare[32] it is observed by the Supreme Court, when it considered as to what constitutes exercise of quasi judicial power, as under:

  • “24. The legal principles laying down when an act of a statutory authority would be a quasi-judicial act, which emerge from the aforestated decisions are these: Where
    •  (a) a statutory authority empowered under a statute to do \any act
    •  (b) which would prejudicially affect the subject
    •  (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and subject and
    •  (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi-judicial.”

20. Power to Grant Interim Orders by Registrar – Karnataka Act

Section 25 of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act provides for an enquiry into the constitution and working of the registered society by the Registrar on his own motion or on the application of the majority of the members or on the complaint given by 1/3rd members of the society. The Act further gives power to the Registrar to issue notice for general body meeting of the society and require the governing body of the society to call a general meeting and to determine such matters as may be directed by him. The Registrar has the ancillary powers to summon any person and examine him.

It is held in Advocates Association Vs. District Registrar and Registrar of Societies[33] that if certain material irregularities were brought to the notice of the registrar and if he was of the opinion that granting of an interim order pending disposal of the enquiry was in furtherance of final order to be passed, the power can be traced under Section 25 itself regarding enquiry. It was observed that the authority which was supposed to hold an enquiry would have the power to grant an interim order, in aid of the final relief, even though it may not be traced to any of the provisions of the Act.

21. Powers of Registrar to Direct Election – Karnataka Act

Following Kodava Samaj, Bangalore Vs. District Registrar of Registration of Societies, Bangalore[34] it is held in Advocates Association Vs. District Registrar and Registrar of Societies[35] that under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act the Registrar has power to direct the society to hold an election, because an enquiry into the constitution and working of the registered society would include the enquiry into the propriety of continuation by a Working Committee and the need to elect a new committee if the existing working committee functions contrary to the bye-laws of the society. Section 25 (2) (c) should be read so as to include a power in the Registrar to direct the holding of the election to the general body if the occasion demands.

Registrar under the Manipur Societies Registration Act has locus standi to file a Writ Petition challenging election of Managing Committee on behalf of a society though the Regulation of the society empowers secretary to file suit on behalf of the society.[36]

22. Powers of Registrar Do Not Bar Civil Court Jurisdiction

The regulatory powers as to registration of a Society vested with the Registrar do not confer any authority on the Registrar to interfere with the affairs, including the election process, of the Society. The scope of exercising power under Section 4 of the Societies Registration Act is only to the limited extent of examining whether the list furnished is false or bogus. The above referred limited purpose is fulfilled the moment the list is furnished pursuant to an election. If the parties have any grievance against selection, they are free to approach the civil court.[37] When more than one return is filed, the Registrar has got the power to find out as to which one he should accept. There may not be an elaborate enquiry. Prima facie he has to satisfy as to which return is to be accepted. Such an enquiry made by the Registrar and the decision taken from it does not become final. The dispute can be taken up before a competent court as to who are the members of the governing body.[38]

23. Powers of Registrar: Only Enabling Provision

Several State-Societies-Registration-Acts and Amendments to the Societies Registration Act provide for enquiry by Registrar into the constitution, working and financial conditions of the society. In D Dhanapal Vs. D David Livingstone[39] it is held that the suit filed for declaration that the plaintiff continues to be the Secretary of the Society is maintainable. Section 36 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act does not reveal any express bar to the Civil Courts. Section 36 is merely an enabling provision. If the aggrieved party approaches the Registrar or the Registrar acts on his own motion, then, it shall be lawful for the Registrar to conduct an enquiry and communicate the report of the enquiry. It does not mean to deem it as a bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. There must be at least some implication to show that the Civil Court cannot entertain such suits.

24. Powers of Registrar on Defunct Society: May Cancel Registration

Certain state enactments and state amendments to So. Regn. Act empower the Registrars of Societies to cancel[40]  the registration of societies for violation of the provisions under Sec. 4 of the So. Regn. Act.

It is held in CMS Evangelical Suvi David Vs. District Registrar[41] that the intention of the Legislature was not to confer a power of supersession of the Committee on the Registrar as, such power was vested only in the Government;[42] and even when the Registrar was satisfied after enquiry[43] that the society which had contravened any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder, or the society was insolvent or the business of any such registered society was conducted fraudulently or not in accordance with the bye-laws or the objects specified in the memorandum filed with the Registrar, he may only cancel the registration.

From the object and scheme of the Societies Registration Acts it is legitimate to state that even if the registration of a society can be cancelled by the Registrar for it becomes defunct[44] the same would not set free the society, once registered, from the provisions as to dissolution in the Societies Registration Act. As per the Societies Registration Act, on dissolution, the left-behind-property of a society goes to another society as determined by the members of the society or by the court (S. 14) for being managed by some other charitable organization and to be utilised for like purposes.[45]

25. No power to Registrar to Direct Fresh Election

It is with Civil Court

Registrar has no jurisdiction to meddle with election disputes.[46] It is also held in CMS Evangelical Suvi David Vs. District Registrar[47] that the power under Sub-Section (9) of Section 36 cannot be stretched to a power on the Registrar to direct the registered society to hold fresh election. A direction to hold fresh election would amount to indirectly setting aside the earlier election and such power is not conferred on the Registrar under any of the provisions of the Act. So long as the election is not declared invalid in the manner known to law, no direction for fresh election could be ordered. Validity of the election could very well be decided only by the competent Civil Court as the parties are entitled to let in their evidence to sustain their respective claims. In the event the Registrar satisfies himself as to the particulars furnished in Form VII as correct, he should enter the names in the register maintained for that purpose. In the event if he does not satisfy as to the particulars and thereby does not accept Form VII, he has to issue a direction relegating the parties to approach the Civil Court for appropriate orders.

26. Effect of Failure to File Documents u/s 4 or of Becoming Defunct

Non-renewal does not infer, society is defunct.

Non-renewal of the registration of a society may be a bar to avail the benefits offered to registered societies, but the same by itself will not lead the inference that the society is not in existence.[48] Burden will be with those who wish to rebut the presumption; and, in any case, such a society can no more be regarded as a registered society.[49]Several State-amendments[50] to the So. Regn. Act, 1860 and State-Societies-Registration-Acts[51] also made specific provisions for imposing fine on the societies (or its office bearers) which make default in complying with the requirements of Sec. 4.

In Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate[52] it is held by Our Apex Court that in the event of becoming a society defunct, or failure to file documents under Sec. 4 of the So. Regn. Act, there is no bar to revive its activities and to conduct the election of the office bearers. It is held in this decision as under:

  • “A society need not necessarily be held to have become defunct only because certain statutory provisions have not been complied with by it.”

It was further observed that the courts cannot set aside such elections on the sole ground that certain statutory provisions have not been complied with by it. Right to contest an election of an office-bearer of the society is a statutory right of the member thereof. Such a right also exists under the bye-laws of the society. If a society fails to file with the Registrar the documents required under Sec. 4, a presumption may arise that it is defunct.

But, it was held by our Apex Court in Nand Deo Pandey Vs. Committees of Management[53] that properly constituted committee of management was required to continue the proceedings of inquiry against the Principal of a Vidyalaya. The Managing Committee was held to have ceased to be valid due to non-renewal of the registration of the society and non-holding of periodical elections under the provisions of the Societies’  Registration (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960. In Parshvanath Jain Temple Vs. LRs. of Prem Dass[54] it was observed by the Rajasthan High Court that irregularity, if any, on account of non-registration of the Trust under the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act at the time of institution of the suit could be cured with the registration of the Trust. It was held that the bar under Section 29 of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act was only against the hearing and final decision of the suit and not against the institution of the suit itself.

27. States Usually Insist Registration for Its Assistances

Usually, for extending State’s assistances, especially financial, registration of societies under a proper Act is insisted, for it ensures supervision of officials.


[1]      NagappaChettiar Vs. Madras Race Club AIR 1951 Mad 831.

Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj: AIR 1946 Bom 516; 

Shridhar Misra Vs. Jaihandra: AIR 1959 All 598;

CL Joseph Vs. Jos: AIR 1965 Ker 68;

Star Tiles Works Vs. N. Govindan AIR 1959 Ker  254.

[2]      AIR 1962 SC 458                 

[3] AIR 1958 AP 773

[4]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458.  [Dennis Lloyd, ‘Law relating to Unincorporated Associations’ (1938 Edn. at page 59) is quoted.]

[5]      Committee of Management Sri JantaAudyogik Vidyalaya Sherpur Gurha Kanpur Vs. Deputy Registrar Firms Societies and Chits Kanpur: ILR 1998 All 38.

[6]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458.  [Dennis Lloyd, ‘Law relating to Unincorporated Associations’ (1938 Edn. at page 59) is quoted.]

[7]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458.  [Dennis Lloyd, ‘Law relating to Unincorporated Associations’ (1938 Edn. at page 59) is quoted.]

[8]      Sec. 6 Societies Registration Act, 1860

[9]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458. Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India: AIR 2004 SC 1295;

Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of AP: AIR 1958 AP 773.

[10]    Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of AP: AIR 1958 AP 773: Raj Kumar Gaba Vs. State of UP: 2012-49 VST 252;

Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Merchant Navy Club: 1974-96 ITR 261;

Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee Vs. Jagmonan Singh: ILR  1971-2 Del 515.

[11]    Sec. 14               

[12]    Hindu Public Vs. Rajdhani Puja Samithee: AIR 1999 SC 964

[13]    AIR 1980 Pat 138. Referred: Fazlul Rabbi Pradhan Vs. State of West Bengal: AIR 1965 SC 1722.

[14]    IV Edn. Vol. 6.

[15]    Captain Jagdish Chandra Varshney Vs. Smt. Muni Varshney : AIR 2006 All 347

[16]    Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College Vs. Lakshmi Narain: AIR 1976 SC 888.

[17]    Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 973.

R Jaivel Vs. State of Tamil Nadu: AIR  2006 Mad 215.

State of Punjab Vs. Kesari Chand: AIR 1987 P&H 216;

Sonepat Co Op Sugar Mills Ltd Vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court:   AIR  1986 P&H 386;

Mulshanker KunverjiGor Vs. Juvansinhji ShivubhaJadeja:   AIR  1980Guj 62.

[18]    Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas 1967 Raj LW 273;

Sagar Sharma Vs. Additional Commissioner of IT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-336  ITR 611; 

Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Trilok Chand Charitable Trust: AIR1984 Del  145

Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs.  CIT: [1963] 50 ITR 798  (Mad); 

Kishorelal Asera Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endts: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367

Thanthi Trust Vs. Wealth Tax Officer: (1989)78 CTR 54: (1989) 178  ITR 28].

[19]    AIR 1964 Ker 118

[20]    AP Aboobaker MusaliarVs. Dist. Registrar (G), Kozhikode: (2004) 11 SCC 247.

CMZ Musliar Vs.Aboobacker: ILR 1998-2 Ker 76.

[21]    Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. The Registrar of Societies: WP (C) No. 3260/2010 (Delhi High Court), decided on 12.04.2012

[22]    Narayanan Vs. District Registrar: ILR 2016-1 Ker 472

[23]    Kurian Vs. Joint Registrar: 1990(1) Ker LT 618;

Dipakbhai Prahladbhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat: 2016 2 GLR 1293.

[24]    Umarani Vs. Registrar, Co-operative Societies:  (2004) 7 SCC 112.

[25]    Virendra Pal Singh Vs. District Assistant Registrar, Co-op Societies: 1980-4 SCC 109.

[26]    2006-2 Cal. LT 17; 2006-4 CHN 321.

[27]    Thalappalam Ser. Co-op. Bank Ltd Vs. State of Kerala: 2013 -16 SCC 82; 2013 Sup AIR (SC) 437; 2013 AIR(SC) (CIV) 2758, 2013 AIR(SCW)  5683; 2013 Sup AIR (SC) 437.  

[28]    2005-2 Mad LJ 335

[29]    M S Evangelical Suvi David Vs. District Registrar: 2005-2 Mad LJ 335

[30]    A few States give power, in the So. Reg.  Act, to the Government to supersede societies.

[31]    AIR 1970 MP 154 

[32]    AIR 2002 SC 2158

[33]    2006-4 AIR Kar R 218: 2006-4 Kant LJ 526    

[34]    ILR1993 Kar 2715

[35]    2006-4 AIR Kar R 218: 2006-4 Kant LJ 526    

[36]    Christian Revival Church Vs. State of Manipur: AIR 2018 (NOC) (Manipur)

[37]    Christ Church Mcconaghy School Society, Lucknow Vs. Registrar Firms, Societies And Chits, Lucknow: 2015-5 ADJ 472

[38]    C M Z Musliar Vs. Aboobacker: 1998-1 Ker LT–136: ILR 1998-2 Ker 76;

Approved in AP  Aboobaker Musaliyar Vs. District Registrar: (2004) 11 SCC 247

[39]    2003-3 Mad LJ 668.

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs.Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao: AIR 2000 SC 2220;

PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma:  AIR 1995 SC 2001 relied on.

[40]    Section 93 of the Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002;

        Section 18A of the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958;

        Section 12-D of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as amended by State of UP;

Section 27 of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960.

[41]    2005-2 Mad LJ 335

[42]    By insertion of Tamil Nadu Act 16 of 1994.

[43]    Under Section 36 of the Tamil Nadu Act

[44]    Sub-section (2) of Section  of M.P. Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973 deals with the power of Registrar to dissolve the society if a society has become defunct or has been persistently making default in the observance of the provisions of the Act, or the regulations or byelaws made thereunder.        

[45]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458: Para 23.

        Dadar Ashram Trust Society Vs. Mahathma Gandhi KakshiVidyapeeth: AIR 2017 All. 60

[46]    All. Muslim Welfare Society Vs. Asst. Registrar: AIR 1992 All. 43;

        All India Council Vs. Asst. Registrar: AIR 1988 All. 236 .

[47]    2005-2 Mad LJ 335

[48]    Committee of Management Vs. Commissioner, Kanpur Region: 2008 -1 AWC 695; 2008 -1 ADJ 706; 2008-70 All LR 368.

[49]    In Mrigan Maity Vs. Daridra Bandhab Bhandar: 2011-4 Cal LT 226 it is observed that though only a few members of the society  have shown any interest in matters pertaining to the society for 36 years or so, it might  still not be presumed that the society was defunct that would warrant dissolution under the So. Rgn. Act.

[50]    Assam, Orissa, Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Nagaland, Pondicherry, etc. Maharashtra Amendment to Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Sub Sec. 5 of Sec.  3A) lays down that a society which fails to get its certificate of registration renewed in accordance with this section with one year from the expiration of the period for which the certificate was operative shall become an unregistered society.

[51]    Karnataka, MP, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Travancore-Cochin, etc.

[52]    AIR 2007 SC 1337. Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Netaji Cricket Club [(2005) 4 SCC 741: AIR 2005 SC 592] referred to in this decision.

[53]    AIR 1991 SC 413

[54]    2009-3-RCR(CIVIL) 133



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

Clubs and Societies: General Features

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

1.Introduction

Clubs and Societies are voluntary associations of persons. Article 19(1)(c) of our Constitution guarantees freedom to form associations and unions.  It includes in itself the right of effective functioning so as to achieve its lawful objectives.[1]

The Clubs and Societies, as understood in our legal system, are identified in English Common Law as ‘Members’ Clubs’ and ‘Friendly Societies’.

2. Differentiating Features Between Clubs and Societies

It is difficult to pinpoint the differentiating features. Nomenclature of an Association, as Club or Society, by itself, may not be a decisive factor. For distinguishing Clubs from Societies, following characteristics, seen generally attached to Clubs, can be relied on.

  • (i)  Recreation, or social interaction for mutual benefit of the members, is prime object.
  • (ii) Funded by equal contribution of members, as membership-fee and subscriptions.
  • (iii) Property is joint property of the members, and not encumbered with obligations of ‘trust’ so as to benefit outsiders; and, therefore, they are freely dealt with by the members as they wish (subject to the bye laws).
  • (iv) Interaction between members being higher, compared to Societies, new membership is given on a serious scrutiny. The membership fee and rate of subscriptions are comparatively high.
  • (v) Usually registered under the Companies Act, for getting legal identity.

General features of Societies can be summarised, for the purpose of distinguishing them from Clubs, as under:

  • (i )  Societies are formed for accomplishing social, charitable or benevolent objectives.
  • (ii)  They are funded, mainly, on voluntary donations from members or outsiders.
  • (iii) Property of a Society (though theoretically joint property of the members) is maintained for benefit of persons other than the members also (and therefore encumbered with obligations pertaining to ‘trust’).
  • (iv) Acquisition of membership in Societies will be easier and membership fee and rate of subscriptions thereof will be comparatively low.
  • (v) Societies are registered under the Central or State Societies Registration Act, for acquiring legal identity and recognition.

3. Club: Definitions

Halsbury’s Laws of England: ‘Club’ is defined in the Halsbury’s Laws of England[2] as under:

  • “A club, except a proprietary club or an investment club, may be defined as a society of persons associated together, not for the purposes of trade, but for social reasons, the promotion of politics, sport, art, science or literature, or for any other lawful purpose; but trading activities will not destroy the nature of a club if they are merely incidental to the club’s purposes.”

Black’s Law Dictionary

  • In the Black’s Law Dictionary club is expounded as ‘a voluntary, incorporated or unincorporated association of persons for purposes of a social, literary, or political nature, or the like.’[3]

Daly’s Club Law

  • Daly’s Club Law[4] describes a club as ‘essentially an association of individuals in a way that involves to some degree the factors of free choice (which connotes a power of exclusion), permanence, corporate identity and the pursuit as a common aim of some joint interest other than the acquisition of gains.’

4. Members’ Club and Proprietary Club

Clubs are categorised into two main classes: ‘Members’ Club’ and ‘Propriety Club’.

  • Members’ Club: A ‘Members’ Club’ is a voluntary association of persons joining together in accordance with the rules and bye-laws of the club fundamentally for enjoying certain facilities or for availing specified mutually beneficial objectives and purposes.
    • Halsbury’s Laws of England[5] describes Members’ Club as a society of persons each of whom contributes to the funds out of which the expenses of conducting the society are paid. The contribution is generally made by means of membership fees or subscriptions, or both. 
    • In Members’ Club, subject to any rule to the contrary, members of the time being are joint owners, in equal shares, of all the properties of the Club. The relationship between the Club and the members is governed by the doctrine of mutuality; every member is a shareholder and every shareholder is a member.[6]
    • On the dissolution of a Members’ Club the property and assets are sold and realised, and after the discharge of the debts and liability of the club the surplus is divisible equally amongst the members for the time being, other than the honorary members, subject to any provision in the rules to the contrary.[7]
  • Proprietary Club: Propriety Club is controlled and administered by proprietor. The members are customers of proprietor; and they are not the owners of or interested in the property of the club.[8] The proprietor utilizes surplus income as profit and appropriates the same for his own benefit. There are wide variation in the nature and activity of propriety club and many of them are purely commercial undertakings. In India, Proprietary Clubs are usually seen established by Companies.

5. Unincorporated and Incorporated Clubs

Clubs can be incorporated under the Companies Act;[9] and on that basis, there are two classes: Unincorporated Clubs and Incorporated Clubs.

An incorporated company has a separate existence and the law recognises it as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. This new personality emerges from the moment of its incorporation and its rights and obligations are different from those of its shareholders. The company is holding its property and carrying on its business is not agent of its shareholders.[10]

Sec. 8 of the Companies Act, 2013 deals with companies with charitable objects, etc. It reads:

  • 8. Formation of companies with charitable objects, etc
  • (1) Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Central Government that a person or an association of persons proposed to be registered under this Act as a limited company—
    • (a) has in its objects the promotion of commerce, art, science, sports, education, research, social welfare, religion, charity, protection of environment or any such other object;
    • (b) intends to apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects; and
    • (c) intends to prohibit the payment of any dividend to its members, the Central Government may, by licence issued in such manner as may be prescribed, and on such conditions as it deems fit, allow that person or association of persons to be registered as a limited company under this section without the addition to its name of the word “Limited”, or as the case may be, the words “Private Limited” and thereupon the Registrar shall, on application, in the prescribed form, register such person or association of persons as a company under this section.

6. Societies Registered under Societies Registration Act

Societies predicated in the Societies Registration Act, 1860 are the ‘associations of persons for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose’; and no recreation club can be registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Acts.

A society formed for religious purposes can also be registered under the Societies Registration Act as the society formed for religious purposes would also ordinarily be a Society for charitable purposes.[11] But, it is held by the Patna High Court in Md. Yunus Vs. The Inspector General of Registration[12] that the Societies Registration Act does not embrace purposes which are religious or predominantly religious. It is explained in Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate by our Apex Court that when the Church, indisputably, carries on secular activities also, keeping in view the interest of the general public, there is no reason as to why in a case of mismanagement of such (registered) charitable organisations, although run by minorities, the Court cannot oversee its functions.[13]

Sec. 1 and 20 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 deal with registration of societies, etc. It reads:

  • 1. Societies formed by memorandum of association and registration
    •      Any seven or more persons associated for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose, or for any such purpose as is described in section 20 of this Act, may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association, and filing the same with Registrar of Joint-stock Companies form themselves into a society under this Act.
  • 20. To what societies Act applies
    •      The following societies may be registered under this Act: Charitable societies, the military orphan funds or societies established at the several presidencies of India, societies established for the promotion of science, literature or the fine arts, for instruction, the diffusion of useful knowledge (the diffusion for political education), the foundation or maintenance of libraries or reading-rooms for general use among the members or open to the public museums and galleries of paintings and other works or art, collections of natural history,

See Blog (Click): Effect of Registration of Societies and Incorporation of Clubs

7. Can a Literary/Charitable Club be Registered under So. Regn Act

Sec. 14 of the So. Regn. Act provides the provisions for dissolution. It lays down that upon the dissolution of a society registered under this Act, the property of that society shall not be distributed among the members, but shall be given to some other society, as directed in this Section. In the proviso to this Section, it is stated:

  • “Clause not to apply to Joint-stock Companies: Provided, however, that this clause shall not apply to any society which has been founded or established by the contributions of share-holders in the nature of a Joint-stock Company.”

It is clear from the Proviso to Sec. 14 of the So. Regn. Act that Associations ‘in the nature of a Joint-stock Company’ can also be registered under the So. Regn. Act. Therefore, it is legitimate to state that an Association in the nature of a club – not for recreation but, ‘for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose’ (and not encumbered with obligations of ‘trust’ so as to benefit outsiders) too can be registered under the Societies Registration Act. Property of such an Association/society is the joint property of the members; and, therefore, they are entitled to freely deal with the same as they wish (subject to the bye laws).

8. Unincorporated Clubs and Unregistered Societies

General principles as to the individual membership rights (so also the rights and responsibilities of the governing body members) of unincorporated clubs and unregistered societies are similar. Halsbury’s Laws of England describe Unincorporated members’ club as under:

  • “205. Unincorporated Members’ Clubs. – An unincorporated members’ club is a society of persons each of whom contributes to the funds out of which the expenses of conducting the society are paid. The contribution is generally made by means of entrance fees or subscriptions, or both. The society is not a partnership, because the members are not associated with a view to profit, nor, for the same reason, is it an association requiring registration as a company. It is not recognised as having any legal existence apart from the members of which it is composed. Subject to any rule to the contrary, the property and funds of the club belong to the members of the time being jointly in equal shares; and if provisions are supplied to a member, at a given price, this does not constitute a sale, but is in effect a release by the other members of their interest in the goods supplied. The transaction is not of a commercial nature and, consequently, is not controlled by the provisions of the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968. The peculiar nature of the transaction is of particular significance in relation to the supply of intoxicating liquor.”

9. Guarantees of Freedom to Form Associations, not Absolute

Right to form associations or unions is guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. But, it is  subjected to the restrictions in clause (4) of Article 19.[14]

Article 19 lays down:

  • Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. – 
  • (1) All citizens shall have the right- 
    • (a)….  (b) …. 
    • (c) to form associations or unions, co-operative societies; 
    • (d) … (e) … (f) … (g) . … 
  • (2) …. (3) … 
  • (4) Nothing in Sub -clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause. 
  • (5) …  (6) ….”

10. Enactments Governing Trusts, Societies and Clubs in India

‘Trust and Trustees’ and ‘Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions’ are subjects of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, under Entry No.10  and  28, respectively; thereby both the Centre and the States are competent to legislate on these subjects. A non-profit association can be formed under Section 8 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013.

The legal form of a charitable institution is identified by the nature  of business it undertakes. Charitable organisations in India are registered, mainly, under three laws:

  1. Societies Registration Act
  2. (State) Public Trusts Act
  3. Companies Act, 2003.

The Societies Registration Act, 1860 and various State-Societies-Registration-Acts (Rajasthan, Karnataka, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Jammu – Kashmir) do not require compulsory registration of Societies.Nevertheless, Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 requires compulsory registration of certain societies.

All public charitable trusts in the state of Maharashtra are governed by the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. States like Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh etc. also have Public Trusts Act. Several other states in India have no Trust Act at all. Wakf Acts and Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Acts also govern various religious public organisations.

11. Associations Attracted S. 8(1) of the Companies Act, 2013

Section 8 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013, lays down that an association of persons with charitable objects can be registered under this Act. It should have ‘in its objects the promotion of commerce, art, science, sports, education, research, social welfare, religion, charity, protection of environment or any such other object’ and it should be one which ‘intends to apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects’.

12. Unlike a Company, a Registered Society is not a Juristic Person[15]

 ‘Persons’ are of two kinds: human beings and legal persons. The second class is the institutions and associations of persons upon which the law incorporates or attributes legal personality. They are formed either on registration under a statute like Companies Act, or under a particular enactment such as English East India Company, Municipal Corporations, Life Insurance Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, etc. Apart from companies, corporations etc. our system accept idols in temples also as legal persons. 

A Company is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold property.  It is held by our Apex Court in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi[16]  that the vesting of legal ownership of the property of a society in the governing body is merely a method or mechanism permitted by the law; and, it was pointed out that the very resort to the machinery of trustees or the governing body for the time being acquiring and holding the properly showed that there was no intention to incorporate the society or union so as to give it a corporate capacity for the purpose of holding and acquiring property and that they confer certain privileges on a registered Society, which would be wholly unnecessary if the registered society were a corporation.

See Blog: Juristic Personality of Societies and Clubs

Bye Laws Bind as Contract

The members of a club or society, both registered and unregistered, are bound by the memorandum of association and its rules and regulations. The bye laws bind its members as a contract. Even the formation of a society itself is based on a contract. When a person becomes a member of the society, he would have no independent rights, and lose his individuality qua the society except those that are given to him by the statutes concerned and bye laws; and the rights of members merge in the rights of the society. In State of UP Vs. CD Chheoki Employees Co-operative Society, AIR 1997  SC  1413, our Apex Court explicated it with the analogy that the stream cannot rise higher than the source. It reads:

  •  “Thus, it is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) to become a member of a Cooperative Society. His right is governed by the provisions of the statute. So, the right to become or to continue being a member of the society is a statutory right. On fulfillment of the qualifications prescribed to become a member and for being a member of the society and on admission, he becomes a member. His being a member of the society is subject to the operation of the Act, Rules and bye-laws applicable from time to time. A member of the society has no independent right qua the society and it is the society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, Rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, Rules and the bye-laws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot rise higher than the source.”
  • (Quoted in Zoroastrian Co-op. H. Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar: AIR 2005  SC  2306; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774; Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. Devinder Singh: AIR 2007 SC 1723.)

See Blog: Bye Laws Fundamental

Acts Reasonably Ancillary or Conducive to the Objects

An act beyond the powers conferred by law, or an act violative of the objects envisaged in the foundational document or memorandum of a company, an association or a trust, is termed ‘ultra vires’ act.  But, if the act done by a company, association or trust is fairly incidental or reasonably ancillary to its main business or conducive to the statement of the objects of the company, association or trust, unless such an act is expressly prohibited, cannot be held to be ultra vires.

No Alteration of Fundamental Principles of Foundation and Trust

It is not open for the majority of the members of an association to alter the fundamental principles upon which it is founded, unless such a power is specifically reserved. This principle explained in Prasanna Venkiaesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao. (AIR 1931 Mad. 12; Relied on: Milligan Vs. Mitchel: 40 ER 852; Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun: (1904) AC 515. See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh (2007-4 Raj LW 3547).

In Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun, House of Lords (by a majority of 5-2) found that the minority was entitled to the assets of the Free Church. It was observed that when men subscribe money for a particular object, and leave it behind them for the promotion of that objecttheir successors have no right to change the object endowed. It was held that, by adopting new standards of doctrine (and particularly by abandoning its commitment to ‘the establishment principle’, which was held to be fundamental to the Free Church), the majority had violated the conditions on which the property of the Free Church was held.

Ultra Vires Acts are Void

Though the configuration of a society differs from that of a company, general principles as to various administrative affairs of a registered society are similar to that of a company.

A company is a juristic person. The actions and functioning of a company differ from that of a natural person who is free to act on his whims and fancies. The actions and functioning of a company are limited by the Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of Company. A corporation or a company has no inherent common law rights. Any act of a company (save a case of indoor management) ultra vires its Memorandum and Articles of Association, even if backed by the Resolution of the Board of Directors, is void and not enforceable. A contract made by the Directors of a company upon a matter not included in the Memorandum of Association is ultra vires and is not binding on the company. Such a contract does not become binding on the company even though afterwards expressly assented to at a General Meeting of shareholders, being void in its inception. A company is competent to carry out its objects specified in the Memorandum of Association and cannot travel beyond the objects. An ultra vires contract by a company is analogous to and stands on the same footing as a contract by an infant or a minor and in which case there is total incapacity. Just like a consent decree founded on the incompetency of an infant or minor is void and a nullity, a contract founded on the incompetency of the company is void and a nullity. These principles are recapped in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. Vs. Riche.

The principles in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. Vs. Riche  have been followed in A. Lakshmana-swami Mudaliar Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India,  In Re – Steel Equipment and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. etc.

See blog: Management – Powers of General Body and Governing Body

13. Co-Operative Societies, Creatures of the Statute

Co-operative Societies Acts provide for juristic personality to Co-operative societies. In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana[18] our Apex Court held ‘a co-operative society is a corporation as commonly understood’ inasmuch as the same has the status of a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold property, enter into contracts, institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purposes for which it is constituted.[19]

Co-operative societies being creatures of the statute, once a Co-operative Society is formed and registered, the rights of the society and that of its members stand abridged by the provisions of the Act. The activities of the societies are controlled by the statute. Therefore, there cannot be any objection to statutory interference with their composition or functioning merely on the ground of contravention of individual’s right of freedom of association by statutory functionaries.[20]

But, when the association has an option/choice to get it registered under a particular (Co-operative Societies’) statute,[21] if there are more than one statute operating in the field, the State cannot force the society to get itself registered under a statute for which the society has not applied. If the State does so, it will ‘violate Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India’.Ninety Seventh Amendment of our Constitution provided constitutional status to the Co-operative Societies and it has brought out radical changes in the concept of Co-operative Societies. Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a Co-operative Society.

Vesting of property

In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India,[17] reiterating the earlier view, it is held by our Apex Court that a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate,and that the mere fact of registration of a Society under the Societies Registration Act will not make the said Society distinct from association of persons.In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. A society, whether registered or unregistered, is not capable of owning any property or of suing or being sued in its own name.

See Blog: Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs

14. Regd. Society:  Members do not have any Beneficial Interest

Members have no interest other than that of bare trustees

During the subsistence of a registered society, or on its dissolution, the members do not have any proprietary or beneficial enjoyment/interest (that is, ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner) in the property the society holds.[22]  But, in companies, the share-holders hold the property as their own.

In Pamulapati  Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu  Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[23] it is held as under:

  • “The Societies Registration Act, therefore, does not create in the members of the registered society any interest other than that of bare trustees. What all the members are entitled to, is the right of management of the properties of the society subject to certain conditions.”

Underhill, in his treatise, ‘Law of Trusts and Trustees’, explained:

  • “However, the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the Association for the time being. The members for the time being cannot under the Association rules appropriate trust property for themselves for there would then be no property held on trust as intended by the testator for those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the Association for the time being.” [24]

See Blog: Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies

15. Formation of Associations and Running Business

A fundamental right to form the association cannot be coupled with the fundamental right to carry on any trade or business.[25] The right of the citizens to form the association is different from running the business by that association. Therefore, right of individuals to form a society has to be understood in a completely different context.

Expulsion of a Member from Society or Club

The associations have the right to manage their affairs by themselves. They have the right to enforce the internal discipline even by expelling an erring member. Since expulsion of a member from society or club visits him with harsh adversities, it will always be an exceptional decision and it has to be taken only in exceptional circumstances. It has to be done cautiously and after due considerations. And, it should also be strictly in accordance with law.

See blog: Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers

‘Suit By or Against a Regd. So.’ is Virtually Suit By or Against Entire Members

A society or a club, both registered and unregistered, is the compendium of its members. When it sues or is sued all its members should be made parties. Registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status. The common expression, ‘suit by or against a society’, legally and virtually denotes suit by or against its entire members.

From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act, that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ “as” President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees.

See Blogs: Suits By or Against Societies, Clubs and Companies

Civil Courts’ Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs of a Society or Club

Unless by express mode or by necessary implication barred, civil courts’ jurisdiction permeates into every civil matter including that of the private associations and even clubs. When the affairs of such institutions, associations etc. are governed by statutes, the courts test the validity of their actions on the touch stone of such statutes. If such bodies are not directly governed by any statute but being administered under their own rules, bye laws etc., their impugned actions are tested in the light of those rules or bye laws. The courts enquire whether their acts were in conformity with those rules and bye laws, and following the principles of natural justice.
See Blog: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs

How to Sue Societies, Clubs

An unregistered society or a club is not a legal person; and therefore, it has to sue or be sued only in the name of all its members. It can be done invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC which enables one or more of ‘numerous’ persons having common interest to sue or be sued in a representative character.

When a suit is filed by a member seeking reliefs concerning the society or a club, relating to a matter common to all members, he has to file it (also) as representing other members of the society other than the defendants (usually office-bearers of the society or club); and if it is a personal matter of the plaintiff, seeking relief against all other members, the plaintiff has to sue against one or two members (usually office-bearers) as representatives of others.

Suit Against Regd. Societies shall be in the Personal Name of President, Chairman, etc.

Suing entire members of the society, either in person or invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC, is the normal rule. But, Sec. 6 enables to sue or be sued every registered society in the name of its president, secretary, etc., as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society (or through such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion).

From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ as President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees.
See Blog: How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies

16. General Principles in Company Law Apply to Regd. Society.

The principal difference between a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and a company corporate is that a company is a juristic person by virtue of it being a body corporate, whereas the society, even when it is registered, is not possessed of these characteristics.[26]

The general principles governing rights of a member in a registered society, and the right of suit of a member, would be similar to that of an individual share holder’s rights in a company. Following are recognised by Courts as individual membership rights in a company:   (i) Right to vote,  (ii) right to stand as a candidate for election as a director and (iii) set-right illegal acts.[27] The general principles as to the rights and responsibilities of the directors of a company also apply to the governing body members of a society.

17. Role of Societies in society

After laying down the legal status of the Societies, our Apex Court observed in Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India[28] that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act play an important role in society. They discharge various functions which are beneficial to the society. They run educational and other institutions. They sometimes work in public interest and act in aid of State functions. They have their own accountability. They sometimes incur liabilities. Public interest litigations filed by Societies are galore.


[1]      AP Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298;

DharamDuttVs. Union of India: AIR 2004 SC 1295.

[2]      Fourth Edition, Vol. 6, Para 201, Page 56: 

Quoted in H R Club Vs. State: AIR 1986 Pat 182.

[3]      Quoted in Delhi Gymkhana Club Limited Vs. Union of India: ILR 2009-5 Del 625.

[4]      Page 1

[5]      IV Edition, Vol. 6, Para 205, 206, and 208

[6]      Harbour Division II, Madras Vs. Young Men’s Indian Association, Madras: AIR 1970 SC 1212

[7]      Halsbury’s Laws of England: IV Edition, Vol. 6, Paras 209,217, 220, 232, 247, 256 and 261

[8]      Harbour Division II, Madras Vs. Young Men’s Indian Association, Madras: AIR 1970 SC 1212.

[9]      Under Section 8 (1) Companies Act, 2013.     

[10]    Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC 3397.

[11]    Hindu Public Vs. Rajdhani Puja Samithee: AIR 1999 SC 964.

[12]    AIR 1980 Pat 138.

Referred to in: Fazul Rabbi Pradhan Vs. State of WB: AIR 1965 SC 1722.

[13]    AIR 2007 SC 1337.

[14]    Board of Control for Cricket Vs. Cricket Association of Bihar: AIR 2015 SC 3194; 

AP Dairy Development Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298;

Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India AIR 2004 SC 1295;

M/s. Raghubar Dayal Jai Prakash Vs.The Union of India   AIR 1962 SC 263.

[15]    See Chapter: ‘Juristic Personality of  Societies and Clubs’

[16]    AIR 1962 SC 458 

[17]    AIR 2003 SC 3397

[18]    AIR 1985 SC 973

[19]    R Jaivel Vs. State of Tamil Nadu: AIR  2006 Mad 215.

State of Punjab Vs. Kesari Chand: AIR 1987 P&H 216;

Sonepat Co Op Sugar Mills Ltd Vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court:   AIR  1986 P&H 386;

Mulshanker  Kunverji  Gor Vs. Juvansinhji  Shivubha  Jadeja:   AIR  1980Guj 62.

[20]    A P Dairy Develpmt.  Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[21]    A P Dairy Develpmt. Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[22]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic  &  Unani Tibia College Vs.  The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Dharam  Dutt Vs. Union of India: AIR 2004 SC 1295;

Pamulapati  Buchi Naidu College Committee, Vs. Govt. of A P: AIR 1958 AP 773.

[23]    AIR 1958 AP 773. See also: Raj Kumar Gaba Vs. State of UP: 2012-49 VST 252;

Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Merchant Navy Club: 1974-96 ITR 261;

Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee Vs. Jagmonan Singh: ILR  1971-2 Del 515.

[24]    Quoted in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001- Para 69.

[25]    Tata Engineering and Locomotives Vs. The State of Bihar:  AIR 1965 SC 40; 

A P Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[26]    Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans: AIR 2003 SC 3397

[27]    Nagappa Chettiar Vs. Madras Race Club: AIR 1951 Mad 831;

Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516; 

ShridharMisra Vs. Jaihandra, AIR 1959 All 598;

CL Joseph Vs. Jos AIR 1965 Ker 68;

Star Tiles Works Vs. N. Govindan: AIR 1959 Ker  254.

[28]    AIR 2003 SC 3397.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Indian Law of Trusts Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

1. Introduction

Under English law of trusts, there is ‘duel ownership’ over the trust property.

  • First is the ‘legal ownership’. It is vested with trustees.
  • The other is the ‘equitable or beneficial ownership’. It is vested with the beneficiaries.

Indian law on trusts differs from English-Trust-Law on the doctrine of ‘duel ownership’. Because, under Indian law:

  1. Trustee is the ‘sole’ (legal) owner of the trust property.
  2. Beneficiaries do not have ‘beneficial ownership’; they have only ‘beneficial interest’.
  3. Trustees only ‘hold’ the trust property, and it is for mere administration.
  4. Trustees hold the trust property for the ‘benefit of the beneficiaries’; not ‘on their behalf‘.
  5. Since the trustees only ‘hold’ the properties for the beneficiaries, no legal ‘title’ vests with the trustees, though they have legal ‘ownership’.

2. Salmond Propounds doctrine of ‘Duel Ownership’

Under English law, when the author of the trust creates a trust, by the dedication of the endowed property, he transfers the ‘legal ownership’ on the trust-property to the trustees and ‘beneficial ownership’ to the beneficiaries. Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th  Edition, page 256) refers these propositions as under:

  • “A trustee is the legal owner of the property, the actual owner thereof having lost title thereto by the creation of a trust. The equitable ownership in the trust property vests in the beneficiaries. The trust is thus an incident of dual ownership in which the creator of the trust no longer figures.”

3. Doctrine of ‘Duel Ownership’ has no Universal Acceptance.

Doctrine of duel-ownership on trust property is peculiar to English law. It has no universal acceptance.

In The I Congresso Del Partido [(1977) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 536 ] the Queen’s Bench Division (Admiralty Court) pointed out that the trust-concept ‘involving a dichotomy between legal and equitable ownership is unknown to some, and perhaps most, other jurisdictions’. [Referred to in Owners and Parties Interested in the Vessel M.V. “Dong Do” v. Ramesh Kumar, (2000) 1 Cal LT 367 ].

Definition of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882

Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 defines trust as under:

  • Trust: A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner:

From the definition it is clear that ‘Trust’, in law, holds the following conceptions:

  • Trust is ‘an obligation’ upon the trustee.
  • It is to administer the endowed property.
  • The administration must be done by the trustee as if he is the owner.
  • It must be done by him accepting the desire of the author.
  • And, the same must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.

4. ‘Trustee’ is the Sole ‘Owner’ According to    the Definition of ‘Trust’

From the definition of ‘trust’ in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 it is clear that the Act does not recognise ‘beneficial ownership’ in the beneficiaries. It recognises ‘ownership in trustee’ alone.

The definition of trust in Sec. 3 can be analysed as under:

(i) A ‘trust’ is an obligation-

  • annexed to the ownership of property (to administer), and
  • (i) arising out of a confidence reposed in (trustee, by the author) and accepted by the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner), or (ii) declared and accepted by him(that is, trustee),#
    • for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner).
  • # the obligation that is declared and accepted by the same person. This situation comes-up when the the author himself declares to act as trustee. See notes below under the head: ‘Obligation … Declared And Accepted By Him’.

(ii) Confidence is ‘Reposed’ by the Author

Trust is defined to be an obligation arising out of a confidence ‘reposed in’ (the owner/trustee). When the ‘author of the trust’ is defined, it is stated:

  • “The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’.”

Therefore, it is definite that the words, confidence reposed in the owner’, denote the confidence that is ‘reposed’ by the author ‘in the owner’. (Allahabad Bank Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.)

(iii) The ‘Owner’ in whom  the Confidence is ‘Reposed’, is Trustee

As stated above, it is the author who ‘reposes’ the confidence; and the confidence is ‘reposed in’ the ‘owner‘. Then, who is the ‘owner’?

  • It is trustee. (Khairul Bashar Vs. ThannuLal: AIR1957 All 553; Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co Vs. CIT: 1966-61 ITR 572 (Bom); Christopher Karkada VS Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569;       Rajah SagiJanaki Vs. Appururu Bhukta: 1976-2 AndWR 117, 1976-1 APLJ 312;       Special Secy. Govt of WB Vs. State Bank of India: AIR  1989 Cal 40; CIT Vs. K Shyamaraju: 1991-1 KantLJ 233; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.)

The nexus between owner and trustee is clear from the definitions of ‘trust’ and ‘trustee’.

  • When ‘trust’ is defined, it is stated:
    • the confidence is ‘accepted by the owner’;
  • When ‘trustee’ is defined, it is stated:
    • the confidence is ‘accepted by the trustee’.

According to the definition of trust, the ‘obligation’ stands ‘annexed to the ownership’ of the trust-property. Sec. 6 of the Trusts Act makes it clear that ‘a trust is created when the author of the trust transfers the trust property to the trustee’. Therefore, the ‘obligation’ upon the trustee casts a duty upon him to administer the trust-property as (if) he is its ‘owner’.

(iv) The definition of Trust can be explained as under:

A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property,Trust is an obligation (upon trustee to administer the trust-property as its (legal) owner. (Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act casts duty on the trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling ‘the purpose of the trust’, and obeying ‘the directions of the author of the trust’.) (Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; State Bank of India Vs. Spl. Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529)
and arising out of a confidenceDuty of a Trustee is fiduciary in nature. (R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Edl Trust: 1982-21 DLT 46: ILR  1982-1Del 801; Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid: AIR1944  Cal 163) (Paru Vs. Chiruthai: 1985 KerLJ 480, 1985  KerLT 563: Referred: UN Mitra’s Law of Limitation and Prescription, 9th Edn., Vol. II, at page 1574, Para 66; Bhavna Nalinkant  Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529; CBSE Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay: AIR 2011 SCW  4888:  2011-8 SCC 497; Reserve Bank of India Vs. Jayantilal N.  Mistry: AIR 2016 SC 1.)
It is moral as well as legal. (Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.)
reposed inConfidence is reposed in Trustee (by the Author). (Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Canara Bank Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1982 Ker 1: ILR 1981-2 Ker 649; R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1 Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.)
and accepted by the owner,Trustee the (legal) owner, must have accepted the confidence (reposed in by the author).(Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; DinshawRusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557. Trustee is the owner:       Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram   Shah:  AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887; Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553; Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW (Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Benafasilal Rajgorhia Vs. Central Bank of India: 1971-76 Cal WN 807; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993 BCR 301; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.)
or declared and accepted by himTrustee (when author himself is the truste) (Heeralal  Vs. Firm RatanlalMahavir Prasad:1964 RajLW  33) can ‘declare and accept’ the ‘confidence’.
for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner.Author creates trust for the benefit of others. Trustee can be one among the beneficiaries.

5. Indian Law Recognises ‘Legal Ownershipon Trustees; Not ‘Title

The Privy Council, in Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram (AIR 1931 PC 196) held as under:

  • “The Indian Law does not recognise legal and equitable estates. By that law, therefore, there can be but one owner; and where the property is vested in a trustee, the owner must, their Lordship think, be the trustee. This is the view embodied in the Indian Trusts Act: See Sec. 3, 55, 56, etc. … ” (Quoted in Special Secy. Govt of W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar. 72; Raja Sir Muthiah Chettiar Vs. Commissioner of IT: 1984-38 CTR 76: 1984-17 TAXMAN 142: 1984-148 ITR532: Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Ganga Properties Ltd: 1970-77 ITR 637; Sardarilal Vs. Shrimati Shakuntla Devi: AIR 1961 P&H 378.)

Inasmuch as Indian Law does not recognise legal and equitable estates (‘ownership’) (Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196.) and trustee alone has ownership (legal ownership), this ‘ownership’ of trustees is not the ‘legal (or trust) ownership’ that is understood in English law.

In English law, when ‘legal ownership’ is referred to, it denotes ‘legal estate’. It is one component the duel-ownership. It confers a ‘title’ upon the trustee. But, in Indian Law, the trust properties ‘vest’ in the trustees for the limited purpose of administration or management; and the trustees only ‘hold’ the properties. (Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs. Comner. IT, Madras: AIR 1964   Mad 483).

6. Indian Law Does Not Recognise Equitable Ownership (Estate) of Beneficiaries

Similarly, the Indian Trusts Act does not refer to ‘beneficial ownership’; it refers merely to ‘interest’ or ‘beneficial interest’ of the beneficiary. (See: Ram Bharose Sharma Vs. Mahant Ram Swaroop: 2001 AIR- SCW  4062:  Mitar Sain Vs. Data Ram: AIR 1926 All 7; Urshottam Vs. Kanhaiyalal: AIR 1966 Raj 70.) It is clear from the following affirmations in the definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882:

  • (i) “A ‘trust’ is an obligation … arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner… for the benefit of another….”
  • (ii) “(T)he ‘beneficial interest’…  is his (beneficiary’s) right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.”

In English law, when ‘beneficial interest’ is referred to, it denotes – ‘beneficial ownership’ or ‘beneficial estate’, the second component among the duel ownership.

The courts in India have followed the principles in Trusts Act, as to legal ownership of trustees and beneficial interest of the beneficiaries, in Common Law of Trust; and disfavoured doctrine of ‘duel ownership’ (Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram Shah:  AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887; Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Kripashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463, Bai Dosabai Vs. Mathuradas: AIR 1980 SC 1334; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-301; Hem Chandra Vs. Suradham Debya: AIR 1940 P.C. 134;       Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106. Deoki Nandan  Vs.  Murlidhar:  AIR 1957 SC 133; Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73).

Thus, under the Law of Trust in India, trustee holds the trust property as its sole (legal) owner, subject to the obligation to use this ownership for the benefit of the beneficiaries (Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin Vs. Trustees,  Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184).

The legal entitlement of beneficiaries in a trust (that is, beneficial interest) is legibly stated in The Province of Bihar v. FR Hayes,  1946-14 ITR 326 (Patna), by Fazl Ali, CJ (as he then was) while interpreting Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1938, referring the definition of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, as under:

  • “The framers of the Act must be assumed to have known the accepted legal meaning of the expression and also known that the term ‘beneficiary’ in law is not generally used with reference to a full legal owner but with reference to a person who has ‘beneficial interest’ in some property which is usually in the possession and control of another person. The distinction between beneficial interest and legal ownership is one of the most notable features of a trust and in my judgment ‘beneficiaries’ referred to in Section 11 are those persons who have merely beneficial interest in a property while the legal ownership of the property vests in a person or persons who hold the property for their benefit.”

7. Trustee Holds ‘For the Benefit Of’; Not ‘On Behalf Of’ the Beneficiaries

The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 repeatedly lays down – trustees are ‘holding’ trust property (Sec. 10, 29 and Chap. IX: Sec. 80 onwards).  It is subject to the obligation to use his ownership ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.

Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 10. Who may be trustee.—Every person capable of holding property may be a trustee; but, where the trust involves the exercise of discretion, he cannot execute it unless he is competent to contract.

Sec. 29 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 29. Liability of trustee where beneficiary’s interest is forfeited to Government.—When the beneficiary’s interest is forfeited or awarded by legal adjudication to the Government, the trustee is bound to hold the trust property to the extent of such interest for the benefit of such person in such manner as the State Government  may direct in this behalf.

In WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106) it is laid down by our Apex Court as under:

  • “23. Whatever be the position in English Law, the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882) is clear and categoric on this point. … These definitions emphasise that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary only has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property. The trustee is thus, the legal owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such. He, no doubt, holds the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries but he does not hold it on their behalf. The expressions ‘for the benefit of’ and ‘on behalf of’ are not synonymous with each other. They convey different meanings.”

Our Apex Court observed in Comm. Wealth Tax Vs. Kirpashanker Dayashankar, AIR 1971 SC 2463, that the trustee holds the trust property ‘on his own right’ and not ‘on behalf of’ someone else though he holds it ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.Obligations are casted upon trustees, only to manage the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries. It is beyond doubt that the trustee has no ‘proprietary interest’ inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’(Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Special Secy. Govt. of W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40) in the property itself. (It is not a mere ‘right’ similar to ‘right of easement’ for the dominant owner; but, it is an ‘interest’.) In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property (Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Kumar Jain Vs. Parasnath Digambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199).

8. View of Salmond Adopted  in Societies Registration Act

While dealing with the chief classes of persons on whose behalf the protection of trusteeship is extended, Salmond on Jurisprudence lays down (12th  Edition, page 257) as under:

  • “Thirdly, it is expedient that property in which large numbers of persons are interested in common should be vested in trustees.”

This ‘wider’ or ‘general’ principle is accepted in the Societies Registration Act when it refers to ‘trustees’ in Sec. 5. It reads as under:

  • “5. Property of society how vested – The property, movable and immovable, belonging to a society registered under this Act, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body of such society, and in all proceedings, civil and criminal, may be described as the property of the governing body of such society for their proper title.”


Read in this Cluster  (Click on the topic):

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Principles and Procedure

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Contract Act

Easement

Stamp Act

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam. 

Abstract

Important modern propositions as to adverse possession (in India)

  • 1. Party claims Adverse Possession must KNOW the Actual Owner
  • 2. To Attract ‘Adverse-Possession’, Possession for Mere 12 Years Insufficient
  • 3. Onus on the trespasser to prove ‘adverse’ possession
  • 4. Mere possn. for Howsoever Long – will not result in adverse possession.
  • 5. Permissive Possession Cannot Be Basis For Adverse Possession
  • 6. What is in the mind of the claimant is decisive.
  • 7. Mere Animus Possidendi, Not Sufficient; There must be Intention to Dispossess.
  • 8. Owner “did not take care to know notorious facts”  and hostile colour of title, required.
  • 9. If it is not sure who the true owner is, there will be no Adverse Possession
  • 10. Claim of Adv. Possn. – There will be Implied admission of title of other Party.
  • 11. No Adverse Possession if Title of True Owner is Not Accepted
  • 12. No Alternate plea on Adverse Possession be Sustained.
  • 13. No requisite animus, if one takes divergent claims.
  • 13. Title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent; the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced

How to Plead Adverse Possession

It is really a troublesome matter for the advocates. Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt of India – (2004) 10 SCC 779; T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa – [(2006) 7 SCC 570]; and PT Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma – AIR 2007 SC 1753, guide us in this field. It may be necessary to plead the following modules.

  • The claimant has been in ‘hostile and open, continuous uninterrupted as of right‘ possession of the land,
  • in denial of the title of the rightful owner,
  • adversely to the interest of the owner of the land,
  • started with wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner
    • (Note: Article 65, Limitation Act says – period 12 years from dispossession),
  • exercising absolute rights of ownership in respect of the land,
  •  on and from .. . .. (Specify date).

And, it is appropriate to plead ‘hostile and open’ possession as under:

  • Claimant’s acts were hostile enough to make the true owner aware of the adverse possession;
  • or, the claimant made the true owner knew as to his hostile acts or adverse possession (from the inception).

No Equities in favour of a Person Pleading Adverse Possession

Claim of adverse possession is one to defeat the rights of the true owner.  Therefore, there is no equity in his favour. It must be properly pleaded and proved. In M. Radheshyamlal v. V. Sandhya (Abhay S. Oka & Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.), AIR 2024 SC 1595, as under:

  • “It is a settled law that by pleading adverse possession, a party seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner, and therefore, there is no equity in his favour. After all, the plea is based on continuous wrongful possession for a period of more than 12 years. Therefore, the facts constituting the ingredients of adverse possession must be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff.”

In Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, (2010) 14 SCC 316, it is observed as under:

  • “A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour as he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner and, hence, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. The courts always take unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights. The plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law.”

Party claims Adverse Possession must know the Actual Owner

In M. Radheshyamlal v. V. Sandhya (Abhay S. Oka & Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.), AIR 2024 SC 1595, as under:

  • 12. Therefore, to prove the plea of adverse possession:-
    • (a) The plaintiff must plead and prove that he was claiming possession adverse to the true owner;
    • (b) The plaintiff must plead and establish that the factum of his long and continuous possession was known to the true owner;
    • (c) The plaintiff must also plead and establish when he came into possession; and
    • (d) The plaintiff must establish that his possession was open and undisturbed.
  • It is a settled law that by pleading adverse possession, a party seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner, and therefore, there is no equity in his favour. After all, the plea is based on continuous wrongful possession for a period of more than 12 years. Therefore, the facts constituting the ingredients of adverse possession must be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff.
  • 13. … When a party claims adverse possession, he must know who the actual owner of the property is. Secondly, he must plead that he was in open and uninterrupted possession for more than 12 years to the original owner’s knowledge….”

In T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, 2006-7 SCC 570, it is held as under:.

  • … If the defendants are not sure who is the true owner the question of their being in hostile possession and the question of denying title of the true owner do not raise…… Therefore, the defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the property knowing fully well that the property belonged to the plaintiff’s father and the plaintiff’s vendor also did not take any action to evict them…” (Followed in: Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 46.)

Adverse Possession according to the Limitation Act of 1963

  • The ‘adverse’ possession of a property by one person (trespasser), for 12 years, bars the right to ‘recovery’ by the person in (earlier) lawful possession (or, the true owner);
    • because, Article 65 of the Limitation Act lays down 12 years as the period for (recovery of) possession of immovable property (or any interest therein based on title), from a person in ‘adverse’ possession (trespasser).
  • Continuance of ‘Adverse Possession’ for 12 years confers ‘Title’ under Sec. 27, Limit. Act.
  • But, rights under ‘adverse’ possession will be inchoate (started; but, not full-blown) until such title is declared or upheld by a competent court.

To attract ‘adverse-possession’, possession for mere 12 years insufficient

  • Under the (present) Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 65),  adverse possession arises, only ‘by the positive and hostile acts’ of the trespasser; and, the true owner will lose title only if the trespasser proves ‘adverse‘ possession for 12 years. Therefore, mere 12 years’ possession by trespasser is insufficient to bring home adverse possession.
  • The true owner, therefore, can bring the suit based on title even after 12 years (of losing possession), for recovery, and he will lose property only if the trespasser proves ‘adverse‘ possession.
    • Article 142 of the (repealed) Limitation Act, 1908, which dealt with Adverse Possession, did not put down the term ‘adverse’. Therefore, the true owners lost title, under this Act, if they failed to prove possession for 12 years; and they had the burden to show possession within 12 years.
    • Under the old Act of 1908, a true owner was bound to file suit for recovery (from a trespasser) within 12 years of losing possession (to continue the property).

1963 Limitation Act casts onus on the trespasser to prove ‘Adverse’ possession

  • The present Act of 1963 casts onus on the trespasser to prove claims of title by ‘adverse’ possession (knowing the true owner and bringing his attention to the ‘trespass’).

Mere possn. Howsoever Long – will not result in adverse possession.

In a suit for recovery on title, previous possession of plaintiff (within 12 years or so) need not be proved by the plaintiff.

Under Article 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act, previous possession of plaintiff (within 12 years or so) need not be proved by the plaintiff.  Possession of plaintiff whatever period back is immaterial. (Jagannath Garnaik v. Sankar Samal, AIR 1990 Ori 124; State of Orissa v Jhtnjhuntallo, 1986 CLT 55).  Period of possession (or its lose) of 12 years has significance only if the defendant pleads “adverse” possession.

 U.N. Mitra, in the “Law of Limitation and Prescription” (Tagore Law Lectures – 12th Edition, Vol. 2, Page 1430) stated as under:

  • “A squatter is one who settles on land without title or with a view to acquiring title. He is a person who settles or locate on land enclosed or unenclosed with no bona fide claim or colour of title and without consent of the owner. He is merely an intruder and no matter how long he may continue there, no right in law vests in him. A squatter who does not set up a claim of right cannot plead adverse possession. No length of squatting possession would operate as a good or valid defence in a suit for possession by the true owner. A mere squatter or intruder who does not deny the title of the true owner or set up any right in himself cannot claim to be in adverse possession. …” (Quoted in: K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98)

If no adverse possession, mere possession, of trespasser, howsoever long, will not lose the right of the true owner to recover property on the basis of his title. See:

  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988 (Mere possession over a property for a long period of time does not grant the right of adverse possession on its own);
  • Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara, 2024 INSC 1021,
  • Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461,
  • Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) 8 SCC 729 (three-Judge Bench) (Trespasser’s long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession.)
  • Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai, 2019-13 SCC 324 (The defendants will not acquire adverse possession by simply remaining in permissive possession for howsoever long it may be.),
  • Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, 2019-15 SCC 756 (it is a settled principle of law that mere continuous possession howsoever long it may have been qua its true owner is not enough to sustain the plea of adverse possession unless it is further proved that such possession was open, hostile, exclusive and with the assertion of ownership right over the property to the knowledge of its true owner.),  
  • Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba  Rao, 2010-14 SCC 316 (Mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner.);
  • T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, 2006-7 SCC 570 (It is well recognized proposition in law that mere possession however long does not necessarily means that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner),
  • Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779 (Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won’t affect his title.)
  • Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, 1994-6 SCC 591 (Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession.)
  • Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander, 1984-2 SCC 286 (Mere continuance of unauthorised possession even for a period of more than 12 years is not enough.)

Important modern propositions as to adverse possession (in India)

No Requisite “Animus” IF Divergent Claims

Requisite animus is very important in the claim of adverse possession. If one takes divergent claims, such as title and adverse possession, it is beyond doubt that he has no ‘required animus’.

In Saroop Singh v. Banto, (2005) 8 SCC 330, it is held as under:

  • “30. ‘Animus possidendi’ is one of the ingredients of adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the land has the requisite animus the period for prescription does not commence. As in the instant case, the Appellant categorically states that his possession is not adverse as that of true owner, the logical corollary is that he did not have the requisite animus. (See Mohd. Mohd. Ali v. Jagadish Kalita, (2004) 1 SCC 271, SCC para 21.)”

What is in the mind of the Claimant of the Adverse Possession is decisive

What is in the mind of the claimant of the Adverse Possession is decisive; in other words, knowledge of actual situation by the true owner is not a point at all (in a claim before a court, for the burden of proof is upon the claimant).

  • 1.  Mere ‘animus possidendi’, not enough; there must have animus to dispossess.
    • Article 65, Limitation Act says – period 12 years, from dispossession‘.
    • Note: ‘Wilful neglect element’ (that is, the owner has abandoned the property) is not given a go bye. Thus, there is a two-pronged enquiry – (i) animus to dispossess by the trespasser (ii) wilful neglect element by the true owner.
  • 2. Trespasser must know who the true owner is.
  • 3. Burden to plead and prove adverse possession is upon the defendant (trespasser).

Hemaji Waghaji : (2009) 16 SCC 51: AIR 2009 SC 103 held that there is no equities – high time to abolish or at least change the law. But, the subsequent authoritative decisions including Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur,  AIR 2019 SC 3827 (three judge bench) affirmed the punch of adverse possession.

The 22nd Law Commission (Report No. 280 of the year 2023) did not pursue the observations in Hemaji Waghaji; on the contrary, upholding the law on adverse possession, it emphasised that the present law ensures that ‘there is always an owner or claimant to the contentious land, and that it is precisely the reason why the law validates the claim of adverse possession made by the squatter’.

Mere Animus Possidendi, Not Sufficient

Adverse Possession is a common law doctrine. The true title holder loses his title by adverse possession; and it is acquired by the ‘trespasser’. Period of limitation, for acquiring adverse possession, under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, is 12 years. It starts, ‘when the possession of defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff’.

Therefore, the trespasser should have ‘dispossessed’ the true owner by an overt act or by inviting the true owner’s specific attention to attract ‘adverse possession’ (as it was said to be needed in acquiring ‘adverse possession’ against a co-owner, in early times). In other words, intention to dispossess true owner is necessary; or intention to possess property of true owner (mere animus possidendi), not sufficient. The pivotal point that constitutes adverse possession is

  • (i) the positive and hostile acts of the trespasser; and, 
  • (ii) not the inaction or acquiescence of the true land owner.

Adv. Possn. and Ownership – Both are mutually Inconsistent

One does not begin until the other is renounced.

It is observed in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt of India (2004) 10 SCC 779 as under:

  • “The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced.” Quoted in Munichikkanna Reddi v. Revamma: AIR 2007 SC 1753.

Note: Mutually destructive plea is impermissible: (2006) 12  SCC 233, AIR 2009 SC 2355.(Because, the foundations of both claims are different.)

  • Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly, 2008 (7) SCC 85
  • Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India – AIR 2006 SC 3229, 2006 (12) SCC 233,
  • Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (1996) 1 SCC 639 (Since claim is founded on Section 53-A, plea of adverse possession is not available)
  • Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Baldwin Babusaheb Patil, AIR 1995 SC 895
  • Firm Srinivas Ram v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177.

In Government of Kerala VS Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988, it is held as under:  

  • “21.9 Claim of independent title and adverse possession at the same time amount to contradictory pleas.”

Plea of Title and Adverse Possession Mutually Destructive

In Rattan Lal v. Ragunath, 18 Aug 2023, 2023 Supreme (Del) 3938, quoting Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 961it is held as under:

  • “11.2. Therefore, the plea of adverse possession raised by the Appellants as a new plea in first appeal is inconsistent with the case setup in the written statement and the trial. In law, the Appellants are precluded from taking the said plea in view of the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Bharat Bhushan Jain & Anr. v. UOI & Ors., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3577, wherein this Court has held that the plea of ownership by title and adverse ownership cannot be raised together being inconsistent and mutually destructive. The plea of adverse possession is a question of fact and cannot be raised in appeal only on the basis of prolonged possession of suit property in the absence of the proof of the other ingredients necessary for proving the said defence including the fact that the possession was hostile to the true owner of the property.”

In Rama Kanta Jain v. M.S. Jain, AIR 1999 (Del) 281, it was held as under:

  • “18. There is another aspect of the matter. The mere fact that the defendants have come forward with a plea of adverse possession, means that they admit the plaintiff to be the true owner. For a plea of ownership on the basis of adverse possession, the first and the foremost condition is, that the property must belong to someone else other than the person pleading his title on the basis of adverse possession, In the instant case the defendants have put forward defences which are irreconcilable’ and mutually destructive and inconsistent with one another.’” (Quoted in: Anu Gupta VS Vijay Gupta, 08 Aug 2022, 2022 Supreme(Del) 1198).

‘Mutually Destructive’ Pleas Cannot Co-exist

Easement of Necessity and Prescriptive Right are ‘mutually destructive’. Both cannot be maintained in one suit. The reason is that the origins of both are distinctive and divergent in law.  Easement of necessity continues as long as necessity exists. Its origin is the presumption of law. It will not give rise to a prescriptive right. In other words, Easement of necessity is based on an implied grant – based on some sort of ‘consent, approval or permission’; and Easement by Prescription is acquired by prescriptive or hostile acts.

The Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 3229, 2006-12 SCC 233, (S.B. Sinha, Dalveer Bhandari) held as under:

  • “To raise such a mutually destructive plea is impermissible in law. Such mutually destructive plea, in our opinion, should not be allowed to be raised even in an industrial adjudication. Common law principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are applicable in an industrial adjudication.”

In Damodhar Narayan Sawale v. Tejrao Bajirao Mhaske, AIR 2023 SC 3319;  it is pointed ourt as under:

  • “Contextually, it is apposite to state that though in a suit a defendant is entitled to raise alternative inconsistent plea he could not be permitted to raise pleas which are mutually destructive of each other and raising such pleas would only work out to his detriment.”

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, 2009-15 SCC 693 (Deepak Verma, S.B. Sinha JJ.), held as under:

  •  “A defendant as is well known may raise inconsistent pleas so long they are not mutually destructive.”

In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly, 2008-7 SCC 85 (V.S. Sirpurkar, S.B. Sinha, JJ.) it is held as under:

  • “22. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other.” (Quoted in: Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, 2009-15 SCC 693)

If one Refers to Lawful Title of Another, Cannot Discard it

In Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant, 1995-2 SCC 543, it is held that independent title and adverse possession will stand as contradictory pleas. It is held as under:

  • “15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another’s title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other’s title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all.” (Quoted in: Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988; Bangalore Development Authority v. N.  Jayamma, 2017-13 SCC 159)

Mutually Inconsistent Pleas (Title and Adv. Possn.): One has to be RENOUNCED

Our Apex Court took the view that the plea of title and Adverse Possession are Mutually Inconsistent Pleas (and not taken asmutually destructive” pleas). See:

  • Gopi @ Goverdhannath v. Ballabh Vyas, AIR 2022  SC 5248,
  • Narasamma v. A. Krishnappa, (2020) 15 SCC 218,
  • Prabhakar Gones Prabhu Navelkar v. Saradchandra Suria Prabhu Navelkar, 2020-20 SCC 465.
  • T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, 2017-7 SCC 342,
  • Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693,
  • L. N. Aswathama v. P. Prakash, (2009) 13 SCC 229,
  • P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, 2007 0 AIR(SC) 1753; 2007 6 SCC 59,
  • Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, AIR 2004 SC  2096; 2004-10 SCC 779,
  • P. Periasami v. P. Periathambi (1995) 6 SCC 523 (Title and Adv. Possn.) plea of adverse possession – inherent – someone else was the owner of the property),
  • Arundhati Mishra v. Sriram Charitra Pandey, 1994-2 SCC 29,
  • Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, 1996- 1 SCC 639.

In L. N. Aswathama v. P. Prakash, (2009) 13 SCC 229, Our Apex Court held that the plea of adverse possession is inconsistent with the plea of title. It is held as under:

  • “16. … According to them, the two pleas being mutually inconsistent, the latter plea could not even begin to operate until the former was renounced. (Quoted in Prabhakar Gones Prabhu Navelkar v. Saradchandra Suria Prabhu Navelkar, 2020-20 SCC 465).

In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, AIR 2004 SC  2096; 2004-10 SCC 779it is held as under:

  • “…..the pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced.…” (Quoted in: Narasamma v. A.Krishnappa ((2020) 15 SCC 218)

In Arundhati Mishra v. Sriram Charitra Pandey, 1994-2 SCC 29, it is held as under:

  • “The question in this case is whether the plea of adverse possession sought to be set up by the respondent could be permitted to be raised. The pleas based on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. It is his own case that he came into possession of the suit house in his own right and remained in possession as an owner. The appellant is only benamidar. Therefore, his plea is based on his own title. He never denounced his title nor admitted the title of the appellant. He never renounced his character as an owner asserting adverse possession openly to the knowledge of the appellant and the appellants acquiescence to it.”

Plea of Title or permissive Possession  And Adverse Possession Are Mutually Contradictory.

Adverse possession can be raised only against the property owned by another person. In Abdul Hameed Rawther v. Basheer, ILR 2024-2 Ker 527; 2024-3 KLT 812, it is held as under:

  • “25. The law is well settled that the plea of adverse possession can be raised only against the property owned by another person against whom he asserts possession adverse to the title of the other (Raghavan v. Devayani [2024 (2) KHC 417] and Shri Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461).”

In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988, it is held as under: 

  • “21.9 Claim of independent title and adverse possession at the same time amount to contradictory pleas. The case of Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant, (1995) 2 SCC 543 elaborated this principle as:
  • “15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another’s title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other’s title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all.”
  • This principle was upheld in the case of Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (AIR 1996 SC 910, 1996 1 SCC 639 –two Judge Bench) –
  • “4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, necprecario. Since the appellant’s claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.”
  • The Court in Sri Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, AIR 2020 SC 461, has reiterated this principle of adverse possession.”

Historical Background

On the subject “The Law on Adverse Possession”, the 22nd Law Commission, headed by former Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, Ritu Raj Awasthi (Chairperson), and comprising Full-Time Members, Justice (retired) K.T. Sankaran (Kerala High Court), Prof. (Dr.) Anand Paliwal, Prof. D.P. Verma, in Report No. 280 of the year 2023, observed that  the rudimentary form of adverse possession could be found as early as 2000 B.C. in the code of Hammurabi, of which Law 30 specifically dealt with the concept of adverse possession.

The Law Commission [referring Chilperic Edwards (ed.), The Hammurabi Code and the Sinaitic Legislation 32-33 (1904);  Also see: J.G. Sprankling, “An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession” 79 Corneil Law Review 816-884 (1994)] quoted Law 30 (of the Code) which reads as under:

  • “If a chieftain or a man leaves his house, garden, and field and hires it out, and someone else takes possession of his house, garden, and field and uses it for three years: if the first owner returns and claims his house, garden, and field, it shall not be given to him, but he who has taken possession of it and used it shall continue to use it.”

It is also pointed out by the Law Commission that the phrase “adverse possession” was apparently coined in a 1757 English decision in Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde; and that the Statute of Westminster, 1275 was the first statute that limited actions for the recovery of land.

Adverse Possession – Evolving’ Concept

Adverse possession being essentially a judge-made law, and not exhaustively defined in any statute, the concept of adverse possession has been ‘evolving’. It is interesting to note that there were divergent views even with respect to the very fundamentals of ‘adverse possession’.

Adv. Possession on termination of his LicenceMust have some ‘Overt Act

In Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander, (1984) 2 SCC 286 , it is observed as under:

  • “1… It is not merely unauthorised possession on termination of his licence that enables the licensee to claim title by adverse possession but there must be some overt act on the part of the licensee to show that he is claiming adverse title. It is possible that the licensor may not file an action for the purpose of recovering possession of the premises from the licensee after terminating his licence but that by itself cannot enable the licensee to claim title by adverse possession. There must be some overt act on the part of the licensee indicating assertion of hostile title. Mere continuance of unauthorised possession even for a period of more than 12 years is not enough.”

Earlier view – Inaction of true-owner matters (not overt-acts of trespasser) 

At one time it was considered that inaction/acquiescence of the true owner for 12 years brings-in adverse possession. Because,

  • Article 65, which speaks of as to limitation of suits (to be filed by the plaintiffs) does not specifically speak as to (i)  intention to dispossess title owner or (ii) knowledge on the part of trespasser as to who is the true owner.
  • “Nec vi, nec clam, nec precario” does not refer to (or speak as to) ‘hostile’ possession
  • “Animus possidendi” also does not say – hostile possession.
  • Inaction, acquiescence etc. of true owner are the material considerations – to become a ‘possession’ adverse to plaintiff.
  • Therefore, to attract adverse possession the trespasser need not know the true owner.

Philosophy of the earlier view can be seen from Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Behadur (Para 22 – AIR 2004 SC 3782)

  • “What is adverse possession? ………The process of acquisition of title by adverse possession springs into action essentially by default or inaction of the owner. ……… The law does not intend to confer any premium on the wrong doing of a person in wrongful possession; it pronounces the penalty of extinction of title on the person who though entitled to assert his right and remove the wrong doer and re-enter into possession, has defaulted and remained inactive for a period of 12 years, which the law considers reasonable for attracting the said penalty. ………..”

Present view – Give prominence to overt and adverse acts of trespasser.

Following are the important decisions to see the present view on adverse possession:

  1. Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779
  2. T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570]
  3. PT Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, AIR 2007 SC 1753
  4. Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, AIR 2019 SC 3827: (2019) 8 SCC 729
  5. Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988.

PT Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, AIR 2007 SC 1753, is an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court that discussed various views on adverse possession. It is observed in this decision as under:

  • “Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned# the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile.”
  • Thus, there must be intention to dispossess (Article 65, Limitation Act – period 12 years from dispossession). And it needs to be open and hostile enough to bring the same to the knowledge and plaintiff has an opportunity to object.

Thereafter it was emphasised as under:

  • “Therefore, to assess a claim of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry is required:
  • 1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially “willful neglect” element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner.
  • 2. Specific Positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property.”

In a nutshell, adverse possession arises from:

  1. acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts; and
  2. hostile acts of the trespasser.

“A right not exercised for a long time is non-existent

The doctrine that law assists those who are vigilant with their rights and not those that sleep thereupon is contained in the maxim “Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt”.

In Chairman, State Bank of India v. MJ James, (2022) 2 SCC 301, relating to disciplinary proceedings against an employee of the Bank, it is observed as under:

  • “A right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay.”
    • Note:
    • 1. It is doubtful whether mere delay, laches and acquiescence apply to ‘adverse possession’ matter – in view of the specific provisions in the Limitation Act with regard to adverse possession.
    • 2. See doctrines of abandonment (or deliberate relinquishment) and acquiescence amounting to estoppel may have more force on the matter of adverse possession, they being arise from the wilful conduct of the person concerned.

Owner “not take care to know notorious facts”  and hostile colour of title, required

In P Lakshmi Reddy v. L Lakshmi Reddy, 1957 SCR 195, it was observed as under:

  • “7…Consonant with this principle the commencement of adverse possession, in favour of a person implies that the person is in actual possession, at the time, with a notorious hostile claim of exclusive title, to repel which, the true owner would then be in a position to maintain an action. It would follow that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with the requisite animus.” (Quoted in: M Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1)

Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729, has held as under:

  • “60. The adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to co-exist at the same time, namely, nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e. adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner does not take care to know notorious facts, knowledge is attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would have known it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title which is not pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title is required. Trespasser’s long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession…”

Doctrine of Estoppel, delay, laches, acquiescence – applied to non-suit litigants

It is held, in Chairman, State Bank of India v. MJ James, (2022) 2 SCC 301, further as under:

  • 29. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between ‘acquiescence’ and ‘delay and laches’. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain (See Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department, (2015) 15 SCC 1. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das and Suyamal Das, AIR 1925 Cal 1107).  In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance (See M/S Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. Chief Commissioner Tax, (1992) 194 ITR 584),  which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention (See Krishan Dev v. Smt. Ram Piari AIR 1964 HP 34).  Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and inspite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance (See “Introduction”, UN Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures – Law of Limitation and Prescription, Volume I, 14th Edition, 2016). However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence.
  • 30. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person (See M/S Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. Chief Commissioner Tax (1992) 194 ITR 584). Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.“

22nd Law Commission Report

On the subject “The Law on Adverse Possession”, the 22nd Law Commission in its 280th Report (placed on 24th May, 2023), observed that  ‘there is no justification for introducing any change in the law relating to adverse possession’.

Crux of the Law Commission Report

The crux of the Report of the 22nd Law Commission is the answer to the following question:

  • Why the law validates the claim of adverse possession made by a squatter?

It is answered by the Law Commission as under:

  • “If no one has effective authority over a property, there arises a vacancy in the position of owner of that property. Such a vacancy results in destabilizing the other peoples’ relations with respect to that property. In such a circumstance, the law of adverse possession ensures that there is always someone in charge of that property in the eyes of the law, and hence no unsettling vacancies. This is precisely the reason why the law validates the claim of adverse possession made by the squatter only when the owner can be shown to have lost effective authority. This is also the rationale behind the owner being able to defeat the adverse possessor’s claims by showing that he continues to be in charge of the property. Ultimately, the concept of adverse possession addresses the law’s most pressing concern which is not who is owner but rather that the office of owner is filled instead of lying vacant.”

Notable Observations of the Law Commission on Adverse Possession

The Law Commission made the following important and notable observations on adverse possession –

  • “6.12. The Limitation Act applies to courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals. (See L.S. Synthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowlh Financial Semices Ltd., AIR 2005 SC 1209) (2004) 11 SCC 456; M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commission of Central Excise (2015) 7 SCC 582. Generally speaking, the Limitation Act only bars the remedy but doesn’t destroy the right to which the remedy relates to. The exception to the general rule is contained in Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • 6.13. Though the period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act precludes a plaintiff from bringing a suit which is barred by Limitation, there is no such limitation so far as any defence is concerned. The rationale behind the law of limitation is that it is founded on public policy. The concept of adverse possession is based on the legal maxim ‘vigilantibus non-dormientibus subvenit lex’ which means that the law favours only the vigilant and not the sleepy – only the active citizen and not those who are dormant or in other words those who are not concerned about their rights.”
  • 7 .ll. Mere continuance of unauthorised possession, for a period of more than twelve years is not enough.
  • “…. that mere termination of a licence of a licensee does not enable the licensee to claim adverse possession, unless and until he sets up a title hostile to that of the licensor after termination of his licence. It is not merely unauthorised possession on termination of his licence that enables the licensee to claim title by adverse possession but there must be some overt act on the part of the licensee to show that he is claiming adverse title. It is possible that the licensor may not file an action for the purpose of recovering possession of the premises from the licensee after terminating his licence but that by itself cannot enable the licensee to claim title by adverse possession. There must be some overt act on the part of the licensee indicating assertion of hostile title. Mere continuance of unauthorised possession even for a period of more than I2 years is not enough.” (Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander AIR 1984 SC 930: (1984)2 SCC 286)
  • “It is well recognised proposition in law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity  and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner’s title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The  possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former’s hostile action. “(See T. Anjanappa  v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570.)

Read Blog: 22nd Law Commission  Report on ‘Law on Adverse Possession’

Article 142 of the (Repealed) Limitation Act, 1908

Article 142 of the (repealed) Limitation Act, 1908, which dealt with Adverse Possession, did not put down the term ‘adverse’. 

Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 reads as under:

142. For possession of immovable property when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession12 yearsThe date of the dispossession or discontinuance

Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provided that the true owner would lose his right to recover the property from a trespasser if he failed to file a suit within the period of 12 years.

Art. 65 of Limtn. Act, 1963 Made Major Changes in Law of Adverse Possession

Articles 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 brought-in  complete change insofar as the onus of proof is concerned:

65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.12 yearsWhen the possession of Defendant becomes
adverse to the plaintiff.

When these provisions Attracted

  • Plaintiff must have been dispossessed by the defendant.
  • Both Acts deal with limitation for suits for recovery of possession.

Old Act of 1908 – Backdrop

  • Under the old Act of 1908, the true owner was bound to file suit for recovery (from a trespasser) within 12 years of losing possession (to continue the property).
  • In other words, under the old Act, the true owner would lose his right to recover the property if he failed to file a suit within the period of 12 years.
  • Under the 1908 Act, it was immaterial – whether the trespasser ‘acquired’ right of adverse possession against the true owner, knowing him and bringing his attention to the ‘trespass’ (as required in 1963 Act).
  • The requirement of ouster, for attracting Adverse Possession, needed only in case of permissive or joint possession, including that of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent

New 1963 Act – Backdrop

  • Under the new Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 65), the true owner will lose title only if the trespasser proves ‘adverse‘ possession for 12 years. Therefore the true owner has no burden to show possession within 12 years (as required under the old Act).
  • The new Act casts onus on the trespasser to prove claims of title by ‘adverse’ possession (knowing him and bringing his attention to the ‘trespass’).
  • Under the 1963 Act, adverse possession arises, only if dispossession (Article 65)of true owner and only by the positive and hostile acts of the trespasser; and, mere possession is not sufficient (but, it must be ‘adverse’ to the true owner).
  • If no adverse possession, mere possession, of trespasser, however long, will not lose the right of the true owner (on the ground of limitation) to recover property on the basis of his title. [See: Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988; Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander and Anr. (two-Judge Bench) (1984) 2 SCC 286, Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, (1994) 6 SCC 591;Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, (2019) 15 SCC 756].

Article 64 and 65 Analysed

Article 64 and 65 of Limitation Act read as under:

64. For possession of immovable property based on previous possession and not on title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed.12 yearsThe date of dispossession.
65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.12 yearsWhen the possession of Defendant becomes
adverse to the plaintiff.

General

  • Plaintiff must have been dispossessed by the defendant (to attract both Articles).
  • Both articles deal with limitation for suits for recovery of possession.
  • Both are independent and apply two different situations.
  • In both cases the defendant can rely on his title or “perfection” of title by ‘adverse possession’ (without a counter claim – Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur AIR 2019 SC 3827).

Article 64

  • Article 64 is based on previous possession of plaintiff (unlike Article 65 which speaks about Title).
  • Article 64 is not based on title of plaintiff (But, it can be possessory title).
  • Article 64 applies only if the plaintiff lost possession within 12 years (in other words, he must have been in possession of the property within twelve years prior to suit. (Tribeni v. Soaroop, AIR 1911 Raj 232)  
  • Under Article 64, it is unnecessary to inquire – whether the defendant’s possession was ‘adverse’. (Muhammad Amanullah v. Badan Singh (1889) ILR l7 Cal 137 (PC).
  • Under Article 64 the nature of the plaintiffs possession is not material. Article 65 specifically refers to “immovable property or any interest therein” whereas Article 64 mentions only “immovable property”. So the interest in immovable properly stands outside the scope of that article.

Article 65

  • Article 65 deals with recovery based on title.
  • Under Article 65 previous possession of plaintiff (within twelve years) need not be proved. It is immaterial. (Jagannath Garnaik v. Sankar Samal, AIR 1990 Ori 124; State of Orissa v Jhtnjhuntallo, 1986 CLT 55.)  
  • Under Article 65, if plaintiff could prove his title, it would fail only if the defendant proves adverse possession over twelve years. (Bhushan Lal v. Suresh Kumar, AIR 1987 All 25,  Manikyala Rao v. Narasimhaswrami, AIR 1996 SC 470.)
  • Under Article 65, if plaintiff could not prove his title, he will fail (and in such a case, whether the defendant proves title or adverse possession is immaterial). (Ranjit Kumar Bhowmik v.  Subodh Kumar Roy, (2004) I WBLR 228: (2004) 2 CHN 180)
  • Under Article 65, if only title of plaintiff is proved, then only adverse possession of defendant becomes a material point.

Burden of Proof – Complete change by Articles 64 and 65

In the recent decision, Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988, our Apex Court observed that burden of proof rests on the person claiming adverse possession. The Court followed P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59, which observed as under:

  • “34. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned : once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession….”

Suit-On-Title – Plaintiff Cannot Be Non-Suited, Unless Adverse Possession

If title is established in a suit-on-title (and for possession) – plaintiff cannot be non-suited unless the defendant proves adverse possession.

 In Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549, it is held as under:

  • “5. It is, therefore, obvious that when the suit is based on title for possession, once the title is established on the basis of relevant documents and other evidence unless the defendant proves adverse possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited. Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter was missed by the learned Judge and, therefore, the entire reasoning for disposing of the second appeal has got vitiated. Only on that short ground and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the question of law framed by the learned Judge for disposing of the second appeal, this appeal is allowed.”

Same principle is applied in the following decisions also:

  • Saroop Singh v. Banto, (2005) 8 SCC 330,
  • M. Durai v. Muthu, (2007) 3 SCC 114,
  • P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59
  • Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta ((2024) 2 SCR 326; 2024 INSC 769: C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.)
  • Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021.

Changes after Recommendations of 3rd Law Commission Report

The Changes were made after the recommendations of the 3rd Law Commission. The Report reads as under:

  • “lf the defendant want to defeat the right of the plaintiff he must establish the adverse possession for over twelve years which has the effect of extinguishing the title of the owner by operation of Section 28 of the Limitation Act (Section 27 of the 1963 Act), read with Art. 144. (Article 65 of the 1963 Act). If he fails to do so, there is no reason for non-suiting the plaintiff merely because he was not able to prove possession within twelve years….. In our opinion, Art. 142 must be restricted in its application only to suits based on possessory title. The plaintiff in such a suit seek protection of his previous possession which falls short of the statutory period of prescription, to recover possession from another trespasser. The plaintiff’s prior possession no doubt entitles him to protection against a trespasser though not against the true owner. The true owner’s entry would be a rightful entry and would interrupt adverse possession. But if the defendant trespasser is a person who wishes to oust the plaintiff who was himself a prior trespasser or a person who did not come into possession as a trespasser but continued to hold it as such, in order to enable the plaintiff to continue his wrongful possession without disturbance and to enable him to acquire a title by  adverse possession, the law must undoubtedly step in and give relief to the plaintiff. As against the true owner a person who is in possession for a length of time short of the statutory period is not entitled to any protection but the net result of the decisions under article 142 is that the true owner must prove that he has a subsisting title on the date of the suit. We, therefore, suggest that in order to avoid injustice and inequity to the true owner and to simplify the law, article 142 should be restricted to suits based on possessory title and the owner of the property should not lose his right to it unless the defendant in possession is able to establish adverse possession. Article 142, may, therefore, be amended as follows:
  • “For possession of immovable property based on possessory title when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed – l2 years from the date of dispossession. “ (Quoted in the 22nd Law Commission Report)

Adverse possession Declaration: Art. 65 & Not Art. 58 of Limit. Act Governs

See Blog: Declaration and Injunction

Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right

In T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570, it is observed that the possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former’s hostile action

The Supreme Court, in T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570, held as under:

  • “The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e., a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other’s rights but denies them. The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of the owner’s right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property.

‘Starting Point’ of “Adverse” Possession

In S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina Bibi Sakina, (1964) 6 SCR 780, a case (Civil Appeal No. 647 of 1962) before the implementation of Amended Limitation Act of 1963, it was found as under:

  • “Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for “several 12 years” or that the plaintiff had acquired “an absolute title” was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. The cited cases need hardly be considered, because each case must be determined upon the allegations in the plaint in that case.” 

In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59, Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, (2010) 14 SCC 316 etc., when dealt with the 1963 Act, it was pointed out –

  • (i) Animus possidendi is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the property adverse to the title of the true owner.
  • (ii) The date on which he came in possession, nature of possession, the factum of possession, knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed – must be established.

No adverse possession without admitting title of real owner

It is a basic factor in adverse possession- the claimant thereof must have accepted the title of the true owner. In The State of Haryana v. Amin Lal (SC), Nov. 19, 2024, 2024-4 CurCC(SC) 222, it is held as under:

  • “By asserting adverse possession, the appellants have impliedly admitted the plaintiffs’ title.”

In In Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao v. Galla Jani Kamma Alias Nacharamma, (2008) 15 SCC 150, it was pointed out – if according to the defendant, the plaintiff was not the true owner, his possession would not have been sufficient to term it ‘hostile’ to the plaintiff’s title; and that the defendant had to show, to attract adverse possession, that his possession was also hostile to the title and possession of the true owner.

In Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461, our Apex Court allowed the appeal, negating the claim of adverse possession raised by the defendant, inter alia, for not accepting the title of the plaintiff (true owner), by the defendant. It was observed  as under:

  • “16. In the present case, the defendants have not admitted the vesting of the suit property with the Managing Officer and the factum of its transfer in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants have denied the title not only of the Managing Officer but also of the plaintiff.”

In Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2020 SC 1884; (2020) 9 SCC 393, it was pointed out by the Apex Court :

  • “The question of adverse possession without admitting the title of the real owner is not tenable.”

Our Apex Court, in Ayodhya case Judgment, M Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1, it is held as under:

  • “747. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other.”

No Alternate plea on Adverse Possession can be Sustained

As shown above, referring Saroop Singh v. Banto, (2005) 8 SCC 330, requisite animus is very important in the claim of adverse possession. If one takes divergent claims, such as title and adverse possession, it is beyond doubt that he has no ‘required animus’.

In Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 0 INSC 1021; 2024 KLT (Online) 3051, it is observed as under:

  •  “49. Claim of independent title and adverse possession at the same time amount to contradictory pleas.”

In Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020-9 SCC 393) the defendants case on “alternate plea” of adverse possession was not accepted. The defendants case is placed by the Apex Court as under:

  • “The defendant contended that if the plaintiffs had any right in the land in possession of the defendant, then the defendant had become the owner of the land in question by adverse possession. It was pleaded as under:
    • 10. That the land in possession of defendant does not lie in the alleged khasra no. and is not covered by any alleged lease deed. Without prejudice to this plea in alternative it is submitted that the lease, if any, has already come to an end, about more than 22 years back, and defendant is owner in possession in his own rights.”

In T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha (Arun Misra, J.), 2017-7 SCC 342, held as under:

  • “The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced.”

In L. N. Aswathama and another v. P. Prakash, (2009) 13 SCC 229, it is held as under:

  • “17. … The pleas based on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Unless the person possessing the property has the requisite animus to possess the property hostile to the title of the true owner, the period for prescription will not commence.
  • (Vide P. Periasami v. P. Periathambi (1995) 6 SCC 523,
  • Md. Mohammad Ali v. Jagadish Kalita (2004) 1 SCC 271 and
  • P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (2007) 6 SCC 59.”

In Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1996) 1 SCC 639, it is observed as under:

  • “4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the Appellant’s claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the Appellant.” (Quoted in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 0 INSC 1021; 2024 KLT (Online) 3051; Govt. of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988,  M.  Venkatesh v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority, 2015 AIR (SCW) 6933)

KNOWLEDGE of True Owner sine qua non of ADVERSE POSSESSION

1. For a possession to be “ADVERSE”, it must be one obviously arose by Dispossessing true owner, admitting his Title (Knowing him).

It is trite law – after 1963 Limitation Act, under Article 65 – the defendants should have founded its case on “adverse” possession with the pleading –

  • Started with wrongful dispossession,
    • – obviously – knowing True Owner.
  • hostile or notorious enough
    • with a view to make True Owner aware
  • spec ifying date of starting
    • – obviously – knowing True Owner
  • admitting ‘real/true’ owner as ‘rightful’ owner,  
    • – obviously – knowing True Owner
  • with some overt act (Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chandar, 1984(2) SCC 286; Government of Kerala v. Joseph –AIR 2023 SC 3988).
    • – obviously – knowing True Owner”

See:

  • RadhesiamLal v. Sandhya – AIR 2024 SC 1595
  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph – AIR 2023 SC 3988
  • Ram NaginaRai v. DeoKumarRai – 2019-13 SCC 324.
  • Karnataka Board of Wakaf v. Govt of India – AIR 2004 SC 2096;
  • T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa – [(2006) 7 SCC 570]; and
  • PT Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma – AIR 2007 SC 1753;
  • Nand Ram v. Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393
  • Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. NirmalChandar 1984(2) SCC 286, P.N. Bhagwati, D.P. Madon
  • T. Lakshmi Reddi v. L. Lakshmi Reddi 1957 SCR 195).

2. If permissive holder, no adverse possession. See:

  • State of Haryana v. AminLal – 19 Nov. 2024 SC, 2024-4 CurCC(SC) 222
  • NeelamGupta v. Rajendrakumar – (2024) 2 SCR 326; 2024 INSC 769
  • Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai – 2019-13 SCC 324
  • Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, 1994-6 SCC 591
  • L.N. Aswathama v. P. Prakash  (2009) 13 SCC 229
  • R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203.

3. Permissive holder is Estopped from raising claim of Adverse Possession

  • Nand Ram v.Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393.

4. Mere possession, however long,  insufficient.  It must be adverse.  There is drastic change after 1963 Limitation Act.

  • Govt. of Kerala v. Joseph – AIR 2023 SC 3988
  • T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa – 2006(7) SCC 570.
  • Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chandar 1984(2) SCC 286.
  • Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India – (2004) 10 SCC 779.
  • Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara, 2024 INSC 1021.

A tenant having taken possession of the property cannot plead adverse possession. Nand Ram v. Jagdish Prasad, 2020-9 SCC 393

It not sure who the true owner is, there will be no Adverse Possession

Adverse possession is hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner. To attract adverse possession there must be animus possidendi to hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner (Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, 2010-14 SCC 316; M. Venkatesh v. BDA, 2015-17 SCC 1; Brijesh Kumar v. Shardabai, 2019-9 SCC 369) with the knowledge of the true owner. If the defendants are not sure who the true owner is, there will be no question of possessing the property hostile to the true owner.

In T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, 2006-7 SCC 570, it is held as under:.

  • …The High Court has erred in holding that even if the defendants claim adverse possession, they do not have to prove who is the true owner and even if they had believed that the Government was the true owner and not the plaintiffs, the same was inconsequential. Obviously, the requirements of proving adverse possession have not been established. If the defendants are not sure who is the true owner the question of their being in hostile possession and the question of denying title of the true owner do not raise…… Therefore, the defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the property knowing fully well that the property belonged to the plaintiff’s father and the plaintiff’s vendor also did not take any action to evict them and the plaintiff and his vendor were aware that the properties belonged to them and despite the same, the plaintiff’s vendor did not take any action to evict them. Hence, the appellants/defendants have also perfected title by adverse possession. Therefore, the 2nd substantial question of law of is answered in favour of the appellants/defendants.” (Followed in: Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 46.)

Possession is heritable and transferable

Possession is a heritable and transferable right. [See: Nallammal Vs. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864; Phirayalal Kapur Vs. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186]. A settled possession can be protected by court-injunction.

Injunction is a Possessory Remedy.

Courts protect settled possession (Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, 2004 1 SCC 769). Injunction is a possessory remedy. (See: Ladies Corner, Bangalore vs State of Karnataka, ILR 1987 KAR 1710, 1987 (1) KarLJ 402. Patil Exhibitors (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Corporation of The City (M Venikatachaliah, J.): AIR 1986 Kant 194, ILR 1985 KAR 3700, 1985 (2) KarLJ 533. Referred to in Chetak Constructions Vs. Om Prakash, AIR 2003 MP 145. )

But, an injunction cannot be issued against a true owner or title holder and in favour of a trespasser or a person in unlawful possession. See: Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji vs Maniben Jagmalbhai: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 258.

The legal principles, ‘Possession Follows Title’ and ‘Title Follows Possession’, are Rules of Evidence. They are applied in cases where there are no sufficient and independent evidence to prove possession or title, as the case may be.

Under S. 110 Evidence Act, ownership is presumed on the proof of possession. It ‘follows from well settled principle of law that normally, unless contrary is established, title always follows possession’ (Chuharmal v.  Commissioner of Income Tax, M P, AIR  1988 SC 1384; 1988 3 SCC 588).

S. 114 Evidence Act, expressly permits the court to ‘presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case’. Therefore, by virtue of Sec. 114,

  • (i) possession can be presumed on the basis of title (possession follows title), and
  • (ii) title/ownership can be presumed on the basis of possession (title follows possession).

Settled Possession

In A. Subramanian v. R. Pannerselvam, AIR 2021 SC 821, the Supreme Court held that even a trespasser, who is in established possession of the property could obtain injunction. But, it was cautioned that the matter would be different, if the plaintiff himself elaborated in the plaint about title dispute and fails to make a prayer for declaration of title along with injunction relief.

In Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813, it was pointed out in a case where there was no document to prove settled possession that ‘merely on doubtful material and cursory evidence, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was ever in possession of the property, and that too in settled possession’. It held further as under:

  • “13. The crux of the matter is that a person who asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. Settled possession means such possession over the property which has existed for a sufficiently long period of time, and has been acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. Settled possession must be (i) effective,(ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. There cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine settled possession. Occupation of a property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual legal possession. The possession should contain an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser is to be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

‘Possession is good against all but the True Owner’ & Sec. 6 of the Sp. Relief Act

The principle ‘Possession is Good against all but the True Owner’ is declared in Parry v. Clissold, (1907) AC 73. In this decision it was also pointed out that if the rightful owner did not come forward and assert his title within the period of limitation, his right would be extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.

The Supreme Court of India while accepting this principle in Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, pointed out that the law in India allows a plaintiff to maintain a possessory suit under Sec. 9 (preset Sec. 6) of the Specific Relief Act. Such a suit can be filed against a title holder, if he had dispossessed the plaintiff ‘otherwise than in due course of law’.

Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act reads as under:

  • 6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.
  • (1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit.
  • (2) No suit under this section shall be brought
    • (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or
    • (b) against the Government.
  • (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.
  • (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.

In Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, it is observed as under:

  • “17. … To express our meaning we may begin by reading 1907 AC 73 (Perry V. Clissold), to discover if the principle that possession is good against all but the true owner has in any way been departed from.
  • 1907 AC 73 reaffirmed the principle by stating quite clearly:
    • “It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.”
  • Therefore, the plaintiff who was peaceably in possession was entitled to remain in possession and only the State could evict him. The action of the Society was a violent invasion of his possession and in the law as it stands in India the plaintiff could maintain a possessory suit under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act in which title would be immaterial or a suit for possession within 12 years in which the question of title could be raised.”

Person in possession can use Reasonable Force to keep out a Trespasser

In Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769, our Apex Court Court, observed as under:­ 

  • “8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.”

Possession is a Good Title of right Against any one who cannot Show a Better

In Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813, our Apex Court explained the principle ‘possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better’ as under:

  • “9. The law in India, as it has developed, accords with jurisprudential thought as propounded by luminaries like Salmond. Salmond on Jurisprudence states:­
    • “These two concepts of ownership and possession, therefore, may be used to distinguish between the de facto possessor of an object and its de jure owner, between the man who actually has it and the man who ought to have it. They serve also to contract the position of one whose rights are ultimate, permanent and residual with that of one whose rights are only of a temporary nature.
    • x x x x x In English law possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who takes his own, may be forced in this way to  restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law.
    • Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit).”
  • 10. As far back as 1924, in the case of Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144, the learned Judge observed that in India, persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a court. Later, in the case of Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, this Court ruled that when the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. It was further held that if Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (corresponding to the present Section6) is employed, the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. When, however, the period of six months has passed, questions of title can be raised by the defendant, and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words, such a right is only restricted to possession in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (corresponding to the present Section 6) but does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years from the date of dispossession, and title need not be proved unless the defendant can provide one.
  • 11. It was also observed by this Court in Nair Service Society Ltd (supra) that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against the entire world except the rightful owner. In such a case, the defendant must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title and probably a possession prior to the plaintiff’s, and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time.”

Two views on Declaration & Recovery

Can be used as a Shield alone (earlier view):

  • Declaration cannot be sought for with respect to Adverse Possession was the view taken by certain Jurists and Courts. See:  Gurudwara Sahib v. Grama Panchayath [(2014) 1 SCC 669]. This view is followed in Mohini v. Thimmappa [2015(4) KLT 759].  It is held: Extinguishment of the right of real owner is depended on the ‘establishment’ of adv. possession; and the ‘establishment’ of adv. possession comes only when a title suit comes. Therefore, plea of adverse possession is only a shield; and not sword.

Can be used as a Sword (present  view) 

So held in Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, AIR 2019 SC 3827: (2019) 8 SCC 729. [See also: Sarangadeva Periyamadon v. Ramaswamy (AIR 1966 SC 1603) 3-Judge-Bench; and Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Behadur: AIR 2004 SC 3782]

The earlier view in  Gurudwara Sahib v. Grama Panchayath [(2014) 1 SCC 669] that declaration cannot be sought for with respect to Adverse possession is overruled by Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, AIR 2019 SC 3827: (2019) 8 SCC 729 (Arun Misra, J). The Three Judge Bench held in Ravinder Kaur Grewal that once 12 years’ period of adverse possession is over, even owner’s right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner.

In paragraph 62 of Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur  AIR 2019 SC 3827: (2019) 8 SCC 729 (Arun Misra, J) , following has been observed: 

  • “62. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years’ period of adverse possession is over, even owner’s right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner as the case may be against whom he has prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is that once the right, title or interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession. In case of dispossession by another person by taking law in his hand a possessory suit can be maintained under Article 64, even before the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. By perfection of title on extinguishment of the owner’s title, a person cannot be remediless. In case he has been dispossessed by the owner after having lost the right by adverse possession, he can be evicted by the plaintiff by taking the plea of adverse possession. Similarly, any other person who might have dispossessed the plaintiff having perfected title by way of adverse possession can also be evicted until and unless such other person has perfected title against such a plaintiff by adverse possession. Similarly, under other articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can sue and maintain a suit.”

It is pointed out that S. 27 Limitation Act is an exception to the general rule – limitation bars remedy, not title.

Appreciation of Evidence in Adverse Possession Case

Somnath Barman v. Dr. S. P. Raju AIR 1970 SC 846, 1969-3 SCC 129 (KS Hegde & JC Shah, JJ.), can be safely considered to see how evidence on adverse possession is appreciated by the Supreme Court of India. In this case the plaintiff claimed title on a document. The defendants pleaded adverse possession. According to them the second defendant had sold the property to the 1st defendant 3 years before the suit. Therefore, to establish the claim of title by adverse possession (for the period of 12 years), the fact that the second defendant was in possession of the suit property for a period of over nine years before he sold the same to the first defendant should have been proved. The Supreme Court found that the defendants failed to establish adverse possession observing the following:

  • “Though the second defendant filed a -written statement supporting the case of the 1st defendant and though he was present at the time of hearing several occasions, he was not examined as a witness in this case to support the plea of adverse possession put forward by the defendants. No explanation is forthcoming for his non-examination. This circumstance goes a long way to discredit the defendant’s plea of adverse possession. The 1st defendant’s evidence as regards adverse possession is of very little significance as his knowledge of the suit property prior to the date he purchased the same is very little. The only other evidence relied on in support of the plea of adverse possession is that of D.W.2, Shambhu Prashad who claims to have taken the suit property on lease from the second defendant. The lease deed said to have been executed by him is marked as Exh.D/ 1. It is not explained how the 1st defendant came into possession of Exh.D/l. Though the suit was filed as far back as 1949, Exh.D/1 was produced into court for the first time in the year 1960. No explanation has been given for this inordinate delay in producing Exh.D/1, (an unregistered document) in court. According to D.W.2, the 1st defendant knew about this document as far back as 1950. Under these circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in rejecting the testimony of D.W.2 and not relying on Exh.D/l.”

Sec. 27,  Limitation Act  –  Extinguishment of right to property

Sec. 27 of the Limitation Act speaks that at the determination of the period “hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property”, his right to such property shall be extinguished.

Adverse possession confers title under Sec. 27 (by necessary implication, because extinguished title of real owner comes to vest in wrongdoer – because, rights thereon had already been lost to the true owner, and passed over to the ‘possessory/adverse’ owner).

Therefore it is clear that Sec. 27 is a provision in the Limitation Act that gives a substantial right to a party. In view of Sec. 27 one can seek declaration of title by adverse possession and consequential injunction or recovery. That is why it is held in Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur,  AIR 2019 SC 3827: (2019) 8 SCC 729, that the person acquiring title by adverse possession can use it as a sword.

Prescriptive Rights – Inchoate until the title is upheld by a competent court

No doubt, it is true, one can acquire easement and adverse possession by prescription. But, prescriptive rights are said to be inchoate (started; but, not full-blown) until the such title is declared or upheld by a competent court.

It was observed in Sultan Ahmad v. Valiullah (1912) 10 ALJ 227, that the result of the Easements Act and the similar provisions of the Limitation Act was that a right of easement could not be said to be perfected until the right was declared by a decree of court.

  • Sultan Ahmad v. Valiullah (1912) 10 ALJ 227 is referred to in:
  • Nachiparayan v. Narayana Goundan, (1920): 60 Ind Cas 171, (1920) 39 MLJ 574;
  • Arjuna Udayar v. Manuswamy Naicker, 1999-1 CurCC 97.
  • See also: Tradesh and Miners, Ltd v. Dhirendra Nath Banerjee, AIR 1944 Pat 261.

In Siti Kantapal v. Radha Gobindaen, AIR 1929 Cal 542, it was held as under:

  • “It has been authoritatively held that a tie to easement is not complete merely upon the effluxion of the period mentioned in the Statute viz., 20 years and that however long the period of actual enjoyment may be, no absolute or indefeasible right can be acquired until the right is brought in question in some suit, and until it is so brought in question, the right is inchoate only and in order to establish it when brought in question, the enjoyment relied on, must be an enjoyment for 20 years up to within 2 years of the institution of the suit.” (Quoted in – D. Ramanatha Gupta vs S. Razaack, AIR 1982 Kant 314.)

In Ramanunni Vaidyar v. Govindankutty Nair, 1998(2) Ker LT 47, it is found that a person who has not acquired or perfected a right cannot maintain an action against the owner of the land over which the right is claimed. It is held as under:

  • In my view, on the basis of an inchoate right or a right which has not ripened into an easement by prescription, but is merely one of user, no relief can be granted to the user of them as against the owner of that land. In other words, a right, proprietary or otherwise, has to be shown for obtaining relief (Krishna Pillai v. Kunju Pillai 1990 (1) KLT 136, referred to).

Possession cannot be Adverse to one who has No Immediate Right to Possession

In U. N. Mitra’s Tagore Law Lectures on Limitation and Prescription (3rd Edition, page 161), it is observed that the principle that possession cannot be adverse to one who has no immediate right to possession and since a landlord does not have any such right in respect of the tenanted property during the subsistence of the tenancy, he does not acquire any right of action against the trespasser encroaching upon the tenanted property. (It is referred to in Biswanath v. Prafulla Kumar Khan, 1988 AIR Cal 275).

Claim of Adverse Possession by Tenant

In Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393, the claim of adverse possession by the tenant was negatived by the Apex Court on the following grounds:

  • The respondent-tenant had admitted the ownership of the landlord in earlier proceedings.
  • Such plea operates as estoppel. The subsequent claim of adverse possession of the tenant as owner is not sustainable.
  • The respondent was to prove his continuous, open and hostile possession to the knowledge of true owner for a continuous period of 12 years. The respondent has not led any evidence of hostile possession to the knowledge of true owner.
  • He has also not surrendered possession before asserting hostile, continuous and open title to the knowledge of the true owner. (In terms of Sec. 108(q) of the TP Act possession of tenant remains permissive till it has been actually restored to the landlord.)
  • See also: Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta ((2024) 2 SCR 326; 2024 INSC 769: C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.)

In Bishwanath Agarwala v. Sabitri Bera -2009(15) SCC 693 (Deepak Varma & SB Sinha, JJ) it is held as under:

  • “The landlord in a given case though may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the event, he proves his general title, may obtain a decree on the basis thereof.”

The Apex Court referred to Champalal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra, 1990 (1) DJLR 298, where SB Sihna, J. himself held:

  • “It is also well settled that one such relationship is admitted or established tenant would be estopped and precluded from challenging the title of the landlord; and if he does so, under the general rulemake himself liable for eviction on that ground”.

Title Declaration – Plaintiff to succeed on the strength of his own Title

It is trite law that in a declaratory suit the plaintiff has to win the case on his own pleading and proof, and he cannot hide shelter on the weakness of the opposite side. This proposition equally applies to a case where one seeks declaration on adverse possession.

In Jagdish Prasad Patel v. Shivnath, (2019) 6 SCC 82, our Apex Court explained the well accepted principle that in a suit for declaration of title and possession, ‘the plaintiffs will succeed on the strength of their own title irrespective of whether defendants proved their case or not’ in the following words:

  • “44. In the suit for declaration for title and possession, the Plaintiffs-Respondents could succeed only on the strength of their own title and not on the weakness of the case of the Defendants-Appellants. The burden is on the Plaintiffs-Respondents to establish their title to the suit properties to show that they are entitled for a decree for declaration. The Plaintiffs-Respondents have neither produced the title document i.e. patta-lease which the Plaintiffs-Respondents are relying upon nor proved their right by adducing any other evidence. As noted above, the revenue entries relied on by them are also held to be not genuine. In any event, revenue entries for few Khataunis are not proof of title; but are mere statements for revenue purpose. They cannot confer any right or title on the party relying on them for proving their title.
  • 45. Observing that in a suit for declaration of title, the Plaintiffs- Respondents are to succeed only on the strength of their own title irrespective of whether the Defendants-Appellants have proved their case or not, in Union of India v. Vasavi Coop. Housing Society Limited, (2014) 2 SCC 269, it was held as under SCC p.275, para 15) “15. It is trite law that, in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the Plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the Defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the Plaintiff.”” (referred to in A. Subramanian v. R. Pannerselvam, AIR 2021 SC 821.)

What is ouster?

“Black’s Law Dictionary” explains ‘ouster‘ as under:

  • “A putting out; dispossession; amotion of possession. A species of injuries to things real, by which the wrong-doer gains actual occupation of the land, and compels the rightful owner to seek his legal remedy in order to gain possession.
  • An “ouster” is a wrongful dispossession or exclusion of a party from real property and involves a question of intent.
  • Notorious and unequivocal act by which one cotenant deprives another of right to common and equal possession and enjoyment of property.” 

Webster’s New World Law Dictionary expounds ‘ouster’ as under:

  • Ouster: n. 1 The wrongful exclusion of a person from property or dispossession of same. 2 The removing from office of a public or corporate official.”

In P Ramanatha Aiyar’s “The Law Lexicon” with Legal Maxims, Latin Terms and Words & Phrases, Second Edition 1997) it is laid down-

  • “Dispossession” implies ouster, and the essence of ouster lies in that the person ousting is in actual possession.
  • Dispossession implies some active element in the mind of a person in ousting or dislodging or depriving a person against his will or counsel and there must be some sort of action on his part.” (Quoted in: U. P.  Gandhi Smarak Nidhi v. Aziz Mian, 2013-3 ADJ 321, 2013-4 All LJ 149)

In “Mitra’s Legal and Commercial Dictionary” 5th Edition (1990) by A.N. Saha, ‘Dispossession’ is explained as under:

  • “The term ‘dispossession’ applies when a person comes in and drives out others from possession. It imports ouster; a driving out of possession against the will of the person in actual possession.” (Quoted in: U. P.  Gandhi Smarak Nidhi v. Aziz Mian, 2013-3 ADJ 321, 2013-4 All LJ 149)

Permissive Possession Cannot Be the Basis For Adverse Possession

It is definitely held in State of Haryana v. Amin Lal, 19 Nov 2024, (SC), 2024-4 CurCC(SC) 222as under:

  • “Permissive possession cannot be the basis for a claim of adverse possession.”

See also:

  • Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta, (2024) 2 SCR 326; 2024 INSC 769
  • Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai, 2019-13 SCC 324
  • Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, 1994-6 SCC 591
  • L.N. Aswathama v. P. Prakash  (2009) 13 SCC 229
  • R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, (2010) 5 SCC 203

In Chandramathy C.S. v. Devakey Amma, 2010 (4) KerHC 383it is pointed out – ‘Permissive possession is not at all adverse and limitation does not commence until possession become adverse. The defendants have not stated as to when permissive possession became adverse to the real owner.’ (Referred to in: Abdul Hameed Rawtherv. Basheer, ILR 2024-2 Ker 527; 2024 3 KHC 216; 2024 3 KLT 812.

Permissive Possession will nobring-forth Adverse Possession

When the old Limitation Act of 1908 reigned, our Apex Court, in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314, following Debendra Lal Khan case, (1933-34) 61 IA 78 : AIR 1934 PC 23], observed as under :

  • “4. … But it is well-settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one coheir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits, of the properties. Ouster of the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the co-heirs. When one co-heir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other co-heir’s title. It is a settled rule of law that as between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. … the burden of making out ouster is on the person claiming to displace the lawful title of a co-heir by his adverse possession.” (Quoted in: Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikabhai Khengarbhai Harijan, (2009) 16 SCC 517).

Amimus and Adverse Possession

  • In L.N. Aswathama v. P. Prakash  (2009) 13 SCC 229 it is held – permissive possession or possession in the absence of Animus possidendi would not constitute the claim of adverse possession.
  • In Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591 it is held – possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession.

‘Ouster’ of Co-owners

It is considered in Vidya Devi @ Vidya Vati v. Prem Prakash, AIR 1995 SC 1789, 1995-4 SCC 496. It is held as under:

  • ” ‘Ouster’ does not mean actual driving out of the co- sharer from the property. It will, however, not be complete unless it is coupled with all other ingredients required to constitute adverse possession. Broadly speaking, three elements are necessary for establishing the plea of ouster in the case of co-owner. They are –
    • (i) declaration of hostile animus
    • (ii) long and uninterrupted possession of the person pleading ouster and
    • (iii) exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of other co-owner.
  • Thus, a co-owner, can under law, claim title by adverse possession against another co-owner who can, of course, file appropriate suit including suit for joint possession within time prescribed by law.”

Plea and proof of ouster is necessary when one plead adverse possession against a co-owner. Express, positive and specific overt acts ousting co-owner from possession are necessary; mere hostile acts of the adverse possession are not enough (See: Velliyottummel Sooppi v. Nadukandy Moossa, AIR 1969 Ker 222).

Privy Council in Coera v. Appuhamy,AIR 1914 PC 243 held as under:

  • “Entering into possession and having a lawful title to enter, he could not divest himself of that title by pretending that he had no title as all. His title must have ensured for the benefit of his co-proprietors. The principle recognised by Wood, V.C. in Thomas Vs. Thomas (1856) 25 LJ Ch 159 (161): 110 RR 107 holds good: `Possession is never considered adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title’….. His possession was, in law, the possession of his co-owners. It was not possible for him to put an end to that possession by any secret intention in his mind. Nothing short of ouster or something equivalent to ouster could bring about that result.” (Quoted in: Vidya Devi @ Vidya Vati v. Prem Prakash, AIR 1995 SC 1789, 1995-4 SCC   496).

Dispossession’ implies ouster itself.

From the above decisions it is clear that ‘dispossession’ implies ouster itself. However, the quality of evidence expected as to ‘dispossession’ in cases of adverse possession against a co-owner or in case of a permissive-possession is ‘higher’; and this ‘dispossession’ is termed as ouster.

Read Blog: Ouster and Dispossession in Adverse Possession

Adverse Possession Against Government – Govt. of Kerala v. Joseph

In Govt. of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988, our Apex Court has emphasised (August 9, 2023), that the Courts have to consider the question of adverse possession “more seriously” when it is claimed on a land that belongs to the Government.

In this case, the judgment of the first appellate court which ‘observed that the title of the Government on land cannot be lost by placing reliance on “casual advertence” or on the basis of “scanty material” ’ was restored by the Apex Court. The Apex Court held –

  • “When the land subject of proceedings wherein adverse possession has been claimed, belongs to the Government, the Court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property.”

The Apex Court also alluded to the following often repeated the basic ingredients to attract the adverse possession, with reference to various previous earlier decisions including the Privy Council –

  • i. the possession must be open, clear, continuous and hostile to the claim or possession of the other party;
  • ii. all three classic requirements must coexist – nec vi (i.e., adequate in continuity); nec clam (i.e., adequate in publicity); and nec precario (i.e., adverse to a competitor), in denial of title and knowledge.

The decisions referred in this case (Govt. of Kerala v. Joseph) include the following –

  • 1.  Privy Council in Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna, ILR 27 Cal. 944; (1900) 27 Ind App 136 (PC); 1900 SCC OnLine PC 4 – The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity, and in extent.
  • 2.  Privy Council in Perry v. Clissold, [1907] A.C. 73 – peaceably possessed land; rightful owner did not come forward and assert his title within the period of Limitation.
  • 3. Privy Council in Secy. of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Khan, (1933) 61 IA 78 : 1934 All LJ 153 (PC) – the possession must be overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the person against whom time is running, ought if he exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening and if the rights of the Crown have been openly usurped it cannot be heard to plead that the fact was not brought to its notice.
  • 4. Privy Council in Council Maharaja Sri Chandra Nandi v. Baijnath Jugal Kishore, AIR 1935 PC 36 – possession should be overt and without any attempt at concealment, so that the person against whom time is running ought, if he exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening.
  • 5. P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314, adverse possession should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario — that is the possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. It must be with the required animus also.
  • 6. Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander (1984) 2 SCC 286 – on termination of licence there must be some overt act on the part of the licensee indicating assertion of hostile title. Mere continuance of unauthorised possession even for a period of more than 12 years is not enough. (also Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591; Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah (2019) 15 SCC 756).
  • 7 .Parsinni v. Sukhi (1993) 4 SCC 375 – possession must be ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec precario’ i.e. peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate, in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner.
  • 8. Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591 – possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession.
  • 9. Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant, (1995) 2 SCC 543 : AIR 1995 SC 895 – “15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another’s title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other’s title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all.”
  • 10. Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1996) 1 SCC 639  – “4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant’s claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.”
  • 11. State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh  (2000) 5 SCC 652 –  “12. So far as the question of perfection of title by adverse possession and that too in respect of public property is concerned, the question requires to be considered more seriously and effectively for the reason that it ultimately involves destruction of right/title of the State to immovable property and conferring upon a third-party encroacher title where he had none.”  “When the property was a vacant land before the alleged construction was put up, to show open and hostile possession which could alone in law constitute adverse to the State, in this case, some concrete details of the nature of occupation with proper proof thereof would be absolutely necessary and mere vague assertions cannot by themselves be a substitute for such concrete proof required of open and hostile possession.”
  • 12.  Balkrishna v. Satyaprakash (2001) 2 SCC 498  – Mere passing of an order of ejectment neither causes his dispossession nor discontinuation of his possession.
  • 13. V. Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava, (2004) 1 SCC 551 – “…A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or in issues at the stage of the trial, would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of appeal…” 
  • 14.  Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India,  (2004) 10 SCC 779  – there must be exclusive possession and the animus possidendi;  possession must be  “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario”, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. It must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. (This case was relied on in M. Venkatesh v. Bangalore Development Authority (2015) 17 SCC 1 ;  Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) 8 SCC 729 .
  • 15.  Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam  (2007) 14 SCC 308 – Possessor must have animus possidendi at the commencement of the possession and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner and  continued for 12 years. Mere possession would not ripen into possessory title.
  • 16. P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59   – initially the burden lied on the landowner to prove his title; thereafter it shifts on the other party to prove title by adverse possession.
  • 17. Des Raj and Others v. Bhagat Ram (2007) 9 SCC 641 (two- Judge Bench) this Court observed – possession must be in hostile declaration of his title vis-à-vis his co-owners and they were in know thereof.
  • 18.  L.N. Aswathama v. P. Prakash  (2009) 13 SCC 229 – permissive possession or possession in the absence of Animus possidendi would not constitute the claim of adverse possession.
  • 19.  Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, (2010) 14 SCC 316 – Animus possidendi is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the property adverse to the title of the true owner. The date on which he came in possession, nature of possession, the factum of possession, knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed – must be established. (Referred to in: Brijesh Kumar v. Shardabai, (2019) 9 SCC 369).
  • 20. Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah  (2010) 2 SCC 461 – “…It is our considered view that where an encroacher, illegal occupant or land grabber of public property raises a plea that he has perfected title by adverse possession, the court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, care and circumspection. Any laxity in this regard may result in destruction of right/title of the State to immovable property and give an upper hand to the encroachers, unauthorised occupants or land grabbers.”
  • 21. State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 – The State cannot claim the land of its citizens by way of adverse possession.
  • 22.  Janata Dal Party v. Indian National Congress, (2014) 16 SCC 731 – “…the entire burden of proving that the possession is adverse to that of the plaintiffs, is on the defendant…”
  • 23.  State of Uttrakhand v. Mandir Sri Laxman Sidh Maharaj  (2017) 9 SCC 579 – “…The courts below also should have seen that courts can grant only that relief which is claimed by the plaintiff in the plaint and such relief can be granted only on the pleadings but not beyond it. In other words, courts cannot travel beyond the pleadings for granting any relief…” (Relied on in Dharampal (Dead) v. Punjab Wakf Board, (2018) 11 SCC 449)
  • 24.  M Siddiq (D) through LRs v. Mahant Suresh Das   (2020) 1 SCC 1 – possession must be peaceful, open and continuous; it must meet the requirement of being ‘nec vi nec claim and nec precario’. possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. There must be adequate pleadings and sufficient evidence.
  • 25. Narasamma v. A. Krishnappa, (2020) 15 SCC 21 (three-Judge Bench) – plea of adverse possession can be used not only as a shield by the defendant, but it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff. (Followed Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729).

Adverse Possession Against Government

  • There is presumption available in favour of the government – that is, all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government.
  • All unoccupied lands are the property of the government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land.

In R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, (2010) 5 SCC 203, it was observed that that the Suits for declaration of title against the government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects. The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government.

The Apex Court held as under:

  • “15. Suits for declaration of title against the government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects.
  • The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the government, is not available to any person or individual.
  • The second difference is in regard to the period for which title and/or possession have to be established by a person suing for declaration of title. Establishing title/possession for a period exceeding twelve years may be adequate to establish title in a declaratory suit against any individual. On the other hand, title/possession for a period exceeding thirty years will have to be established to succeed in a declaratory suit for title against government. This follows from Article 112 of Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a longer period of thirty years as limitation in regard to suits by government as against the period of 12 years for suits by private individuals. The reason is obvious. Government properties are spread over the entire state and it is not always possible for the government to protect or safeguard its properties from encroachments. Many a time, its own officers who are expected to protect its properties and maintain proper records, either due to negligence or collusion, create entries in records to help private parties, to lay claim of ownership or possession against the government.
  • Any loss of government property is ultimately the loss to the community. Courts owe a duty to be vigilant to ensure that public property is not converted into private property by unscrupulous elements.
  • 16. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration of title and injunction against government, in a casual manner, ignoring or overlooking the special features relating to government properties. Instances of such suits against government being routinely decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries are common. Whether the government contests the suit or not, before a suit for declaration of title against a government is decreed, the plaintiff should establish, either his title by producing the title deeds which satisfactorily trace title for a minimum period of thirty years prior to the date of the suit (except where title is claimed with reference to a grant or transfer by the government or a statutory development authority), or by establishing adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years.
  • In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring the presumptions available in favour of the government, grant declaratory or injunctive decrees against the government by relying upon one of the principles underlying pleadings that plaint averments which are not denied or traversed are deemed to have been accepted or admitted.
  • A court should necessarily seek an answer to the following question, before it grants a decree declaring title against the government :
    • whether the plaintiff has produced title deeds tracing the title for a period of more than thirty years; or
    • whether the plaintiff has established his adverse possession to the knowledge of the government for a period of more than thirty years, so as to convert his possession into title.
    • Incidental to that question, the court should also find out whether the plaintiff is recorded to be the owner or holder or occupant of the property in the revenue records or municipal records, for more than thirty years, and
    • what is the nature of possession claimed by the plaintiff, if he is in possession – authorized or unauthorized; permissive; casual and occasional; furtive and clandestine; open, continuous and hostile; deemed or implied (following a title).
  • 17. Mere temporary use or occupation without the animus to claim ownership or mere use at sufferance will not be sufficient to create any right adverse to the Government. In order to oust or defeat the title of the government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the government or establish perfection of title by adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years with the knowledge of the government.
  • To claim adverse possession, the possession of the claimant must be actual, open and visible, hostile to the owner (and therefore necessarily with the knowledge of the owner) and continued during the entire period necessary to create a bar under the law of limitation. In short, it should be adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent. Mere vague or doubtful assertions that the claimant has been in adverse possession will not be sufficient. Unexplained stray or sporadic entries for a year or for a few years will not be sufficient and should be ignored.
  • As noticed above, many a time it is possible for a private citizen to get his name entered as the occupant of government land, with the help of collusive government servants. Only entries based on appropriate documents like grants, title deeds etc. or based upon actual verification of physical possession by an authority authorized to recognize such possession and make appropriate entries can be used against the government. By its very nature, a claim based on adverse possession requires clear and categorical pleadings and evidence, much more so, if it is against the government. Be that as it may.” (Quoted in: Bhagi Ram v. State of H P (2023 April 10), Nathu Ram v. D D A (2022 February 1.)

Notes (Questions arose in various classes and answers given by the author):

(i) Plea of title and adverse possession – whether mutually inconsistent?

Yes. But, The Supreme Court has not taken it as “mutually destructive”

Both can be claimed in one suit; but, must confine to one at trial.

(See Notes Earlier: Adv. Possn. and Ownership – Both cannot be Claimed Together)

(ii) Is Adverse PossessionIllogical, disproportionate and draconian law as viewed in some decisions referred to in Munichikkanna Reddi v. Revamma : AIR 2007 SC 1753.

It appears that the argument in favour of adverse possession are, mainly, the following:

  1. It is on a public policy.
  2. This law exists all-around the world.
  3. In Indian situations (landless poor are large in number; and Government records cannot be relied on – on account of various matters), this law is essential.

The argument against adverse possession are, mainly, the following:

  1. European Court of Human Rights has taken an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession. Para 19,  Munichikkanna Reddi v. Revamma : AIR 2007 SC 1753.
  2. Now-a-days Government records are reliable enough; we need not nurse illogical and draconian law.
  3. Several Nations, relying on Governmental records, do not go after law of adverse possession.
  4. A large number of people go abroad for employment or for other purpose. Thy should not be punished.

(iii) What is the present position in India on Adverse Possession – Is it Not a bad law: Hemaji Waghaji : (2009) 16 SCC 51: AIR 2009 SC 103 held that there is no equities – high time to abolish or at least change the law. But, the subsequent authoritative decisions including Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur,  AIR 2019 SC 3827 (three judge bench) affirmed the punch of adverse possession.

22nd Law Commission Report: But, the 22nd Law Commission did not pursue the observations in Hemaji Waghaji; on the contrary, upholding the law on adverse possession, it emphasised that the present law ensures that ‘there is always an owner or claimant to the contentious land, and that it is precisely the reason why the law validates the claim of adverse possession made by the squatter’.  

Read Blog: 22nd Law Commission  Report on ‘Law on Adverse Possession’

(iv) Can Government assert adverse possession?

No.

It is held in State of Haryana v. Amin Lal, 19 Nov 2024, (SC), 2024-4 CurCC(SC) 222 as under:

  • “It is a fundamental principle that the State cannot claim adverse possession over the property of its own citizens.”

Following decisions were referred to:

  • State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404,
  • Vidya Devi v. State of H.P, (2020) 2 SCC 569,
  • Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353′
  • The State of Haryana v. Amin Lal (SC), Nov. 19, 2024, 2024-4 CurCC(SC) 222.

(v) What is the limitation period for acquiring adverse possession against Government?

30 years. See Article 112 of the Limitation Act.

(vi) Is declaration necessary in suits claiming Adverse Possession?

Yes. Declaration is needed in the following circumstances:

  1. As Introductory/preliminary to grant (1) Injunction or (2) Recovery (Unnikrishnan v. Ponnu Ammal: AIR 1999 Ker 405
  2. When serious denial or cloud on title (or right): Anathula Sudahakar v. Buchi Reddi: AIR 2008 SC 2033
  3. Asserted title or civil right is not clear, simple and straight-forward; or, not well-established (lawful possession). (Eg. inchoate rights – started; but, not full-blown, until the such title is upheld by a competent court; like title on adverse possession.)
  4. Complicated or complex questions of fact and law to be ‘adjudicated’ (Anathula: 2008 SC 2033)
  5. Insurmountable obstacle – Md. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa : (1996) 7 SCC 767
  6. Make clear what is doubtful – as to legal character and title. ILR 1970-2 (Del) 433: Eg. Suit by trespasser claiming adverse possession: Darshan Kumari v. Kaushalya Devi: 1990 JKLR 208; 1991 Kash LJ 1 (R.P. Sethi, J) for dispelling cloud: AIR 1953 (Gau) 162.

(vii) Can a defendant plead Adverse Possession as a shield (without a counter claim)?

Yes. See the quoted portion, above, from Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur,  AIR 2019 SC 3827.

(viii) Should the person who claims adverse possession necessarily know the true owner?

There is difference of opinion.

It can be said – “The person who claims adverse possession must necessarily know the true owner, (for) then only it becomes ‘adverse’ as stated in Art. 65 of the Limitation Act.

In Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant, (1995) 2 SCC 543: AIR 1995 SC 895  (two-Judge Bench) our Apex Court held as under:

  • “A person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i.e possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed.”

But, in the Report of the 22nd Law Commission it is stated as under:

  • “7.5. Possession must be open and without any attempt at concealment. It is, however, not necessary that possession must be so effective as to bring it to the specific knowledge of the owner (except ouster).”

The Consultation Paper-cum-Questionnaire prepared by the 19th Law Commission is attached to the Report of the 22nd Law Commission, as “Annexure – 1”. Para 2.6 of the same reads as under:

  • “2.6 It was clarified by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Kshithish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, AIR 1981 SC 707,  
    • “All that the law requires is that the possession must be open and without any attempt at concealment. It is not necessary that the possession must be so effective so as to bring it to the specific knowledge of the owner. Such a requirement may be insisted on where an ouster of title is pleaded, but that is not the case here. “
  • “It was also clarified in a series of decisions that while possession shall be open and exclusive and in assertion of one’s own right, the fact that the possessor did not know who the real owner was, will not make his possession any the less adverse. There are certain passing observations in some judgments of the Supreme Court rendered by two learned Judges that the plea of adverse possession is not available if the adverse possessor does not know who the true owner is; but, the law declared by the larger Bench decisions of the Supreme Court obviously prevails.

It appears that the Law Commission inappropriately relied on the Three Judge Bench decision. On a careful reading of this decision, Kshithish Chandra Bose, it can be seen that this decision arose from a matter that emerged prior to 1963 Limitation Act, and when the 1908 Limitation Act reigned the field.

Under the 1908 Act, the true owner was bound to file suit for recovery within 12 years of losing possession. Therefore, it was immaterial – whether the trespasser ‘acquired’ right of adversepossession against the true owner; knowing him and bringing his attention to the ‘trespass’, or not (as required in 1963 Act). (See also Notes above, under Heading – Art. 65 of Limtn. Act, 1963 Made Major Changes in Law of Adverse Possession)

While narrating the facts, it is observed in Kshithish Chandra Bose, as under:

  • “In the suit the plaintiff based his claim in respect of plot No. 1735, Ward No. I of Ranchi Municipality on the ground that he had acquired title to the land by virtue of a Hukumnama granted to him by the landlord as far back as 17th April, 1912 which is Exhibit 18. Apart from the question of title, the plaintiff further pleaded that even if the land belonged to the defendant municipality, he had acquired title by prescription by being in possession of the land to the knowledge of the municipality for more than 30 years, that is to say, from 1912 to 1957.

From the above, it comes out that the person who claims adverse possession must necessarily know the true owner; and that Kshithish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, AIR 1981 SC 707, cannot be used to support  the plea that adverse possession is available even if the adverse possessor does not know who the true owner is.

(ix) Did the the Kerala High Court went wrong in K.T. Kurungottukandi Rarichakutty v. Aranda Rarichan, 2018-5 KHC 599

Yes. Kerala High Court went wrong.

Kerala High Court also (see Notes just above) inappropriately relied on the Three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court which held in Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, AIR 1981 SC 707, that the person who claims adverse possession adverse possession need not know the true owner.

(x) Once, right was perfected by 12 years’ user. Thereafter obstruction for a few years. Can a suit be filed on the basis of (earlier) perfected by 12 years’ user?

Yes.

See: RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL Vs. MANJIT KAUR: AIR 2019 SC 3827: “Once right is extinguished another person acquires prescriptive right which cannot be defeated by re­entry by the owner”.

Also note: Stipulation in Para 5 of Section 15 of the Indian Easements Act is not applicable to Adverse possession. Para 5 of Section 15 reads:

“Each of the said periods of twenty years shall be taken to be a period ending within two years next before the institution of the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates is contested.”

Permissive possession will not be Adverse

1. In Chandramathy C.S. v. Devakey Amma [2010 (4) KHC 383]. The defendants canvassed permissive possession on the basis of an oral agreement of sale. In the above context, the Court held that permissive possession is not at all adverse and limitation does not commence until possession become adverse. The defendants have not stated as to when permissive possession became adverse to the real owner. It was in the above context, the court held that the plea based on title and adverse possession are inconsistent with each other. (Referred to in: Abdul Hameed Rawther, ILR 2024 2 Ker 527; 2024-3 KLT 812)

2. If permissive holder, no adverse possession. (Here, the 1947 deeds show the property in Sy. No. 357 and 368 – lion-share in this case – are Pandaravakapattom; means, permissive possession.) 

  • NeelamGupta v. Rajendrakumar – (2024) 2 SCR 326; 2024 INSC 769
  • Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai – 2019-13 SCC 324
  • Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, 1994-6 SCC 591
  • L.N. Aswathama v. P. Prakash  (2009) 13 SCC 229
  • R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203.

3. Permissive holder is Estopped from raising claim of Adverse Possession

  • Nand Ram v. Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393.

‘Adverse’ Possession: Burden – Complete Change by Articles 64 and 65:

Under the (new) Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 65), the true owner will lose title only if the trespasser proves ‘adverse’ possession for 12 years. Therefore the true ownerhas no burden to show possession within 12 years (as required under the old Act of 1908, under which it was provided that a true owner would lose title if he did not file suit within 12 years of losing title).In other words, the new Act casts onus on the trespasser to prove claims of title by ‘adverse’possession against the true owner (knowing him and bringing his attention to the ‘trespass’).

In short, the plea of adverse possession does not arise for consideration in this I.A. for it is a matter of pleading by the defendant.

 There is drastic change by the 1963 Limitation Act which cast burden on the defendant to plead and prove adverse possession in a recovery suit based on title.   Once the title is established by the plaintiff (here, the admitted grant-deeds in this case prove title with the plaintiff), unless the defendant proves adverse possession, there would not be any question of limitation.

  • Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549
  • C. Natrajan v. AshimBai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi, JJ.)
  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988
  • P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59
  • K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98.

In the recent decision, Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988, our Apex Court observed that burden of proof rests on the person claiming adverse possession. The Court followed P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59, which observed as under:

  • “34. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent  complete change insofar as the onus is concerned : once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse Possession….”

Adverse Possession Against Government –

Any loss of Government Property is ultimately the loss to the community

In R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, (2010) 5 SCC 203, it was held as under:

  • “………… In order to oust or defeat the title of the government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the government or establish perfection of title by adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years with the knowledge of the government.

In R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, it was also held as under:

  • “As noticed above, many a time it is possible for a private citizen to get his name entered as the occupant of government land, with the help of collusive government servants. Only entries based on appropriate documents like grants, title deeds etc. or based upon actual verification of physical possession by an authority authorized to recognize such possession and make appropriate entries can be used against the government. By its very nature, a claim based on adverse possession requires clear and categorical pleadings and evidence, much more so, if it is against the government. Be that as it may.”

In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988– It was pointed out –

  • “When the land subject to proceedings wherein adverse possession has been claimed, belongs to Government, the court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property.”

There is a presumption in favour of Govt.

All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the Government.

In order to defeat the title of the Government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the Government.  In R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, (2010) 5 SCC 203, it was held as under:

  • “15. Suits for declaration of title against the government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects.
  • The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the government, is not available to any person or individual.
  • The second difference is in regard to the period for which title and/or possession have to be established by a person suing for declaration of title. Establishing title/possession for a period exceeding twelve years may be adequate to establish title in a declaratory suit against any individual. On the other hand, title/possession for a period exceeding thirty years will have to be established to succeed in a declaratory suit for title against government. This follows from Article 112 of Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a longer period of thirty years as limitation in regard to suits by government as against the period of 12 years for suits by private individuals. The reason is obvious. Government properties are spread over the entire state and it is not always possible for the government to protect or safeguard its properties from encroachments. Many a time, its own officers who are expected to protect its properties and maintain proper records, either due to negligence or collusion, create entries in records to help private parties, to lay claim of ownership or possession against the government.
  • Any loss of government property is ultimately the loss to the community. Courts owe a duty to be vigilant to ensure that public property is not converted into private property by unscrupulous elements.
  • 16. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration of title and injunction against government, in a casual manner, ignoring or overlooking the special features relating to government properties. Instances of such suits against government being routinely decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries are common. Whether the government contests the suit or not, before a suit for declaration of title against a government is decreed, the plaintiff should establish, either his title by producing the title deeds which satisfactorily trace title for a minimum period of thirty years prior to the date of the suit (except where title is claimed with reference to a grant or transfer by the government or a statutory development authority), or by establishing adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years.
  • In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring the presumptions available in favour of the government, grant declaratory or injunctive decrees against the government by relying upon one of the principles underlying pleadings that plaint averments which are not denied or traversed are deemed to have been accepted or admitted.
    • A court should necessarily seek an answer to the following question, before it grants a decree declaring title against the government :whether the plaintiff has produced title deeds tracing the title for a period of more than thirty years; or whether the plaintiff has established his adverse possession  to the knowledge of the government for a period of more than thirty years, so as to convert his possession into title.
    • Incidental to that question, the court should also find out whether the plaintiff is recorded to be the owner or holder or occupant of the property in the revenue records or municipal records, for more than thirty years, and what is the nature of possession claimed by the plaintiff, if he is in possession – authorized or unauthorized; permissive; casual and occasional; furtive and clandestine; open, continuous and hostile; deemed or implied (following a title).
  • 17. Mere temporary use or occupation without the animus to claim ownership or mere use at sufferance will not be sufficient to create any right adverse to the Government. In order to oust or defeat the title of the government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the government or establish perfection of title by adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years with the knowledge of the government.
  • To claim adverse possession, the possession of the claimant must be actual, open and visible, hostile to the owner (and therefore necessarily with the knowledge of the owner) and continued during the entire period necessary to create a bar under the law of limitation. In short, it should be adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent. Mere vague or doubtful assertions that the claimant has been in adverse possession will not be sufficient. Unexplained stray or sporadic entries for a year or for a few years will not be sufficient and should be ignored.
  • As noticed above, many a time it is possible for a private citizen to get his name entered as the occupant of government land, with the help of collusive government servants. Only entries based on appropriate documents like grants, title deeds etc. or based upon actual verification of physical possession by an authority authorized to recognize such possession and make appropriate entries can be used against the government. By its very nature, a claim based on adverse possession requires clear and categorical pleadings and evidence, much more so, if it is against the government. Be that as it may.” (Quoted in: Bhagi Ram v. State of H P (2023 April 10), Nathu Ram v. D D A (2022 February 1.)

When possession of a tenant could be converted as adverse possession

The Supreme Court, in Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta (2024) 2 SCR 326: C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.), upheld the decision of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur which held to the following effect –

  • Permissive possession of a defendant-tenant could not be converted as adverse possession except by proving his possession ‘adverse’ to the title of the plaintiff for a continuous period of 12 years or more; and

the starting point of limitation in terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act would commence from the date of defendant’s possession becoming ‘adverse‘ and not from the date when the right of ownership was acquired by the plaintiff

Will Abandonment Create a Right

See BlogDoes ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?


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Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

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What is Trust in Law?

‘Trust’, in Law, Simplified.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

TRUST: Word Meaning

  • Primary:
    • Faith, hope, confidence, entrustment, obligation, conviction, expectation, belief, assurance, care etc.
  • Derivative:
    • Reposition of confidence in trustee, by the founder;
    • Obligation of trustee to administer the trust property;
    • Unconditional responsibility undertaken by the trustee.
    • Association involved in the affairs of the trust.
    • Endowment or property held in trust;
    • Institution managed under the trust;

TRUST – In Law

  • Trust is anobligation’-
    • that arises from the reposition of confidence by the author
    • upon the trustee
    • to deal with or administer the trust-property
    • for the benefit the beneficiaries.
  • Trustee is the person who is-
    • entrusted by the founder
    • to deal with or administer the trust property
    • for the benefit the beneficiaries..
  • Trust-property is the property –
    • that is endowed by the founder
    • with a particular object that would benefit
    • the specified beneficiaries.

Thus, the constituents for a valid trust are the following:

  • Founder, Property,
  • Object, Trustee,
  • Obligation
  • Reposition of confidence, and
  • Beneficiary.

Definitions Given by Jurists

Underhill in ‘Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees’ defines trust as under:

  • “A trust is an equitable obligation binding a person (who is called a trustee) to deal with property over which he has control (which is called the trust property) for the benefit of persons (who are called the beneficiaries) of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom may enforce the obligation.”[1]

Halsbury’s Laws of England describes ‘trust’ as a confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power, to the intent, that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object.[2]

Salmond on Jurisprudence[3] refers to trust as under:

  • “A trust is a very important and curious instance of duplicate ownership. Trust property is that which is owned by two persons at the same time, the relation between the two owners being such that one of them is under an obligation to use his ownership for the benefit of the other. The former is called the trustee, and his ownership is trust ownership: the latter is called the beneficiary, and his is beneficial ownership. As between trustees and beneficiary, the law recognises the truth of the matter: as between these two, the property belongs to the latter and not to the former. But as between the trustee and third persons, the fiction prevails. The trustee is clothed with the rights of his beneficiary, and is so enabled to personate or represent him in dealings with the world at large.”[4]

TRUST: Definition in Indian Trusts Act

Definition of ‘trust’ in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 contains the quintessence and spirit of the definitions given by Underhill, Halsbury and Salmond. Sec. 3 of the Trusts Act defines trust as under:

  • Trust:
    • A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner:
  • ‘Author of the trust’: ‘trustee’;beneficiary’; ‘trust property’; ‘beneficial interest’; ‘instrument of trust’: –
    • The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’;
    • the person who accepts the confidence is called the ‘trustee’;
    • the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the ‘beneficiary’;
    • the subject-matter of the trust is called ‘trust property’ or ‘trust money’;
    • the ‘beneficial interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property; and
    • the instrument, if any, by which the trust is declared is called the ‘instrument of trust’.”

Definition of ‘Trust’: Simplified

The definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 can be simplified as under:

  • 1. A ‘trust’ is an obligation upon the trustees.
  • 2. It arises from the reposition of confidence, upon the trustees, by the author.
  • 3. It is to deal with or administer the trust property, as if he (trustee) himself is the owner, for the benefit the beneficiaries.

Definition of ‘Trust’: Analysed

Sec. 3 presents the definition in a ‘noncompound’ expression; that is, ‘trust is an obligation’. It is only qualified further, as shown under:

  • A ‘trust’ is an obligation-
    • (i) annexed to the ownership of property (to administer), and
    • (ii)(a) arising out of a confidence reposed in (trustee, by the author) and accepted by the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner), or
    • (ii)(b) declared and accepted by him (that is, trustee),#
    • (iii) for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner).
      • # The words “by him” denote that the obligation is “declared and accepted” by the same person. This situation comes-up only when the author himself declares to act as trustee. See notes below under the head: ‘Obligation … Declared And Accepted By Him’.

In simple terms, trust is the legal obligation of the Trustees to deal with (Arjan Singh v Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; Arjan Singh Vs Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; P.  Elumalai v Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board, 2017-8 MLJ 529) or administer (Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173) the trust property and to give effect to the objects of the Trust.

A Drill Required to Appreciate the Definition – Taking Aid from other Provisions

The definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act is complicated. Not only certain courts but some learned authors of treatises also went completely wrong while explaining the definition.

An exercise is necessary to understand the purport and implication of the definition. For that effort we have to take aid from other sections of the Act; though, usually, definitions are tools for explaining the substantive provisions of a statute, and not vice-versa.

(i) ‘A  Trust is An Obligation’

According to the Indian ‘Trusts Act’, ‘a trust is an obligation’ (arises from the reposition of confidence by the author).

It casts a responsibility upon the trustees to deal with or administer the trust property (as he himself is the owner). The word ‘trust’ is used in law as an ‘abstract[5]-countable[6] noun’, similar to ‘a business’, ‘an idea’ or ‘a duty’.[7]

(ii)  ‘Obligation Annexed to the Ownership’ refers ‘Administration

As per the definition, trust is an obligation ‘annexed to the ownership’ of the trust-property. By the very nature of ‘Trust’, the obligation ‘annexed’ to the trust-property is for administration.[8] It is made clear in Sec. 11 of the Indian Trust Act.

Sec. 11 casts duty on trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling ‘the purpose of the trust’, and obeying ‘the directions of the author of the trust’.[9] Sec. 34, 35 and 60 also refer to ‘administration’ or ‘management’ by trustee.

  • Sec. 11 Says – The trustee is bound to fulfil the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author
  • Sec. 34 says – Right to apply to Court for opinion in management of trust-property
  • Sec. 60 says – Right to proper trustees.—The beneficiary has a right  that the trust-property shall be properly protected and held and administered by proper persons …

(iii) Confidence is ‘Reposed’ by the Author ‘in the Owner’ – Owner is Trustee

Trust is defined to be an obligation arising out of a confidence ‘reposed in’ and ‘accepted by’ the owner. When the ‘author of the trust’ is defined, it is stated:

  • “The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’.”

Therefore, it is definite that the words, confidence reposed in the owner’, denote the confidence that is ‘reposed’ by the author[10] ‘in the owner’.

(iv) The ‘Owner’ who  ‘Accepts’ the Confidence is Trustee.

As we have seen, it is the author who ‘reposes’ the confidence; and the confidence is ‘reposed in’, and ‘accepted by’, the owner.  Who is the ‘owner’?

It is trustee.[11] The observations in some decisions[12] that the word ‘owner’ refers to the ‘author’ is absolutely incorrect.

The nexus between owner and trustee is clear from the definitions of ‘trust’ and ‘trustee’ – when ‘trust’ is defined, it is stated: the confidence is ‘accepted by the owner’; when ‘trustee’ is defined, it is stated: the confidence is ‘accepted by the trustee’.

According to the definition of trust, the ‘obligation’ stands ‘annexed to the ownership’ of the trust-property. Sec. 6 of the  Trusts Act makes it clear that ‘a trust is created when the author of the trust transfers the trust property to the trustee’.  Therefore, the ‘obligation’ upon the trustee casts a duty upon him to deal with or administer the trust-property as if he is its ‘owner’.

From Sec. 6 of the  Trusts Act, it is further clear that a trust cannot be said to have been constituted, unless the trustee is constituted as the ‘owner’ of the endowed property.[13]  For due administration,[14] such transfer[15] and vesting[16] of property in the trustee, as its (legal) owner,[17]is  inevitable. 

To find the answer, who is the ‘owner’ referred to in the definition of trust,we can also refer to the definition of ‘beneficial interest or interest’, in Sec. 3. The definition reads: 

  • “The ‘beneficial interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.”

The endowed property of a trust stands vested in trustee as its (sole) ‘owner’.[18] In RP Kapur  Vs. Kaushalya Educational Trust[19]  it is held by Delhi High Court that  ‘obligation’ in trust refers to a ‘tie of equity’ (viniculum-juris), whereby the trustee accepts the confidence reposed in him by the author to hold or apply the trust property for the purposes of the trust.

(v) ‘Obligation … Declared And Accepted By Him’

Going by the definition, the pronoun ‘him’ stands for ‘owner’. The definition reads:

  • “A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him …..”

As we have found in the notes just above, the confidence is ‘reposed and declared’ by the author;[20] and the confidence is ‘reposed in’, and ‘accepted by’, the trustee[21] (trustee is referred to in the definition as ‘owner’ – since trustee is the ‘legal owner’).

The expression, ‘obligation … declared and accepted by him’, is applied only when the declaration and the acceptance  are  made by the same person – it is Trustee. Rajasthan High Court observed in Heeralal  Vs. Firm Ratanlal Mahavir Prasad[22] as under:

  • “If only the trustee himself is the author, then only the trustee can make a declaration of trust.”

Therefore it is clear that this expression is attracted when the author declares ‘himself to be the trustee’.[23] (In such cases, the requirement of a formal ‘reposition of confidence upon the trustee’ does not arise.)

Section 6 of the Trusts Act expressly states that an author can be a founder-trustee. Clause (e) of Sec. 6 indicates that the formal ‘transfer of the trust-property to the trustee’ is not required where the author ‘indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts’ that he himself would be the trustee.

Our Apex Court held in Tulsidas Kilachand Vs. CIT Bombay City[24]  as under:

  • “No doubt, under Ss. 5 and 6 of the Indian Trusts Act if the declarer of the trust is himself the trustee also, there is no need that he must transfer the property to himself as trustee; but the law implies that such a transfer has been made by him, and no overt act except a declaration of trust is necessary. The capacity of the declarer of trust and his capacity as trustee are different, and after the declaration of trust, he holds the assets as a trustee. Under the Transfer of Property Act, there can be a transfer by a person to himself or to himself and another person or persons. In our opinion, there was, in this case, a transfer by Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand to himself as a trustee, though there was no formal transfer.”

(vi) ‘Confidence (Reposed in and) Accepted by the Owner’

We have seen, on analysis of the definition, that:

  • the confidence is ‘reposed in’ and ‘declared by’ by the author; and
  • the confidence is ‘accepted’ by the trustee.

From the definition, it is clear that the clause, ‘Confidence Reposed in and Accepted by the Owner’ manifest that (i) the ‘Obligation‘ on trustee is that enjoined by the author, and (ii) the Obligation must have been accepted by the trustee, on his own.

“Accepted by the Owner” denotes Unconditional Obligation undertaken by the Trustee

The words, “accepted by the owner (trustee)” is used in the definition with the deliberate object of denoting the unconditional obligation undertaken by the trustee, ‘on his own’; if not, the words “and accepted by” stand superfluous; inasmuch as a trust will not endure without a trustee.

The definition of Trust can be explained, in a nutshell, as under:

A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, andTrust is an obligation (upon trustee[25]). It is to deal with or administer[26] the trust-property as its (legal) owner.
arising out of a confidenceDuty of a Trustee is fiduciary[27] in nature.[28]  It is moral as well as legal.[29] (It must have been arisen from the confidence reposed in by the author.)
reposed inConfidence is reposed in Trustee (by the Author[30]).
and accepted by the owner, orTrustee,[31]the (legal) owner,[32] must have (unconditionally) accepted the confidence (reposed in by the author).
declared and accepted by himThe obligation is ‘declared and accepted‘ by the trustee.
(Only when the author himself is the trustee
,[33] the obligation can be ‘declared and accepted’ by one person.)
for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner.Author creates trust for the benefit of others. Trustee can be one among the beneficiaries.

Essential Requirements for a Valid Trust

Sec. 4 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 speaks as to creation of trust for ‘lawful purpose’. It reads as under:

  • 4. Lawful purpose. A trust may be created for any lawful purpose. The purpose of a trust is lawful unless it is
    • (a) forbidden by law, or
    • (b) is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law, or
    • (c) is fraudulent, or
    • (d) involves or implies injury to the person or property of another, or
    • (e) the Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy.
  • Every trust of which the purpose is unlawful is void. And where a trust is created for two purposes, of which one is lawful and the other unlawful, and the two purposes cannot be separated, the whole trust is void.
  • Explanation. In this section, the expression “law” includes, where the trust property is immovable and situate in a foreign country, the law of such country.

The essential elements for creation of a trust, enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act, reads as under:

  • 6. Creation of trust: Subject to the provisions of section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts
    • (a) an intention on his part to create thereby a trust,
    • (b) the purpose of the trust,
    • (c) the beneficiary, and
    • (d) the trust-property, and
    • (e) (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust-property to the trustee.  

Trust and Endowment

For a valid trust there should be certainty[34] as to:

  • Intention to create trust,[35]
  • Purpose,[36]
  • Beneficiary,[37]  and
  • Property.[38]

These are the ingredients of an endowment also. Appointment of a trustee[39] and transfer[40] of property to trustee for administration make Trust different from an Endowment.

The word ‘endow’[41] expresses the idea of giving, bequeathing or dedicating something for some purpose.[42] An ‘endowment’ is founded by dedication of property for the purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[43]  There may be dedication (granting) of property for subjecting it to an ‘easement’. But, in ‘law of trusts’, dedication involves the extinguishment of the rights of the original owner of the lands.[44] By ‘dedication’, the owner divests all his rights, title and interest in the property which becomes the property of the deity[45] or other endowment.

An ‘endowment’ can be public or private.[46] It is a corporeal reality to which social concepts are adhered to; whereas, a trust is primarily a legal concept attached to the administration of the endowed property.[47]

See Blog: Dedication of Property in Public Trusts

Property Vests in Trustee, by Transfer; But no Proprietary Interest

According to the definition of ‘Trust’, in the Indian Trusts Act, ‘a   trust is an obligation (a) annexed to the ownership of property, and (b) arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner/trustee. To establish a valid trust, the author must have completely parted with all his interest in the trust-property, and the property must have been transferred[48] to the trustee. But, the trustee acquires only ‘legal ownership’ over the trust-property, under the law in India. And, the beneficiaries have no proprietary-interest, or ‘beneficial interest’ pertaining to owners, as they have no ownership in the trust property.

In WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1957),[49] referring to the definition of trust, it is laid down by our Apex Court that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such.  It is held in this decision as under:

  • “22. Whatever be the position in English Law, the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (II of 1882) is clear and categoric on this point. Sec. 3 of that Act defines a Trust as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another or of another and the owner : the person who accepts the confidence is called the ‘trustee’ : the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the ‘beneficiary’ : ‘the beneficial Interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property; the subject-matter of the trust is called ‘trust property’ or ‘trust money’.”

Following WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,[50] it is observed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Special Secretary Land and Land Revenue[51] that Sec. 3 of the Trusts Act emphasises the fact that the beneficiary has a right to obtain his beneficial interest or interest against the trustee as owner of the trust property and that the trustee would become trust property’s owner for the purpose of effectively executing or administering the trust. 

It is observed by the Calcutta High Court in Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jew Vs. Commr. of IT[52] as under:

  • “Three parties are necessary to the constitution of a trust, namely, the settlor, the trustee and the beneficiary. A trust is not completely constituted until the trust property is vested in trustees for the benefit of the cestui que trust.”

In Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal (1957)[53] the Allahabad High Court had held as under:

  • “A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property (vide Sections 3 and 5 of the Trusts Act). It is an essential condition of trust that property must vest in the trustee. Unless, therefore, the trustee is constituted as the owner of the property entrusted to him, a trust cannot be said to have been constituted. Reference in this connection might be made to cases reported in Hussain Ali v. Baqir Ali, AIR 1946 Mad 116 (A); Shri Mahadeoji v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1941 Nag 181 (B) and Khemchand Ramdas v. Girdharidas Radhakishaindas, AIR 1947 Sind 187 (C); Ma Thein May v. U Po Kin, AIR 1925 Rang 289 (D) and Secretary of State for India v. Guru Proshad Dhur, ILR 20 Cal 51 (FB) (E). … The mere fact that a person is holding the property on behalf of another, will not constitute him a trustee, unless the ownership of the property is also vested in him.”

The definitions of ‘trust’, ‘trustee’ and ‘beneficiary’ lay down that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.

The obligation upon the trustee, to administer,[54] being ‘annexed to the ownership of property’, the property has to be administered by the trustee as if he is the ‘owner’ of the same;[55]  and, for such administration, the property must have been vested upon him as its (legal) owner.

Under Sec. 6 of the Trusts Act, a trust is created when the author of the trust transfers[56] the trust-property to the trustee.[57] Holding that the trustee is the legal owner of the trust property, it is observed in Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs.   Badrun Nisa Bibi (1940)[58] as under:

  • “In short, it is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and before there can be a trust the trustee must be the owner. The matter is made abundantly clear in Section 6, Trusts Act, 1882, which is in these terms:

‘Subject to the provisions of Section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts an intention on his part to create thereby a trust, the purpose of the trust, the beneficiary, and the trust property, and (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust property to the trustee.’

In short, there must be a transfer of the property to the trustee before a trust is created.”

Orissa High Court held in Narasingh Charan Mohapatra Vs. Radhakanta Mohapatra[59] as under:

  • “A trust in the accepted sense of the word is the creation of an obligation by the owner to the intent that he may hold the property for the benefit of some other person or object. As soon as the trust is declared according to the requirements of the law, the legal ownership passes to the trustee and he is bound to apply the income arising out of the property to the use and benefit of ‘cestuique trust’. As a general rule, it may be laid down that in order to make a voluntary declaration of trust binding upon the author of the trust he must have completely parted with all his interest in the property to the trustee or declared himself to be a trustee of the property for the benefit of the ‘cestuique trust’ –See: Agnew’s Trusts, p. 53.”

Sec. 10 and 75 of the Indian Trusts Act implies ‘vesting of property in trustees’.

Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 10. ….. Disclaimer of trust—Instead of accepting a trust, the intended trustee may, within a reasonable period, disclaim it, and such disclaimer shall prevent the trust property from vesting in him. A disclaimer by one of two or more co-trustees vests the trust property in the other or others and makes him or them sole trustee or trustees from the date of the creation of the trust.

Sec. 75 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 75. Vesting of trust property in new trustees.—Whenever any new trustee is appointed under section 73 or section 74, all the trust property for the time being vested in the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, or in the legal representative of any trustee, shall become vested in such new trustee, either solely or jointly with the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, as the case may require.

A Compny can be a Trustee of a Public Trust

It was held in See M.Gomathinarayagam Pillai v. Sri.Manthramurthi High School Committee, Tirunelveli, AIR 1963 Mad 387, as under:

  • “For the application of that section (Section 92 CPC)  it makes no difference whether the trustees is an individual or a company, nor is there any distinction between a company in whom the office of trustee vests and one which is specially formed for the purpose of executing the trust.” (Referred to in: S.N.D.P.  Yogum v. G.  Krishnamoorthy, ILR 2022-3 Ker 494; 2022-4 KHC 168; 2022-4 KLT 36)

Duel Ownership, as comprehended by Salmond is Not accepted in Indian Law

Trustee is full and Sole Owner, under Indian law.

Under English law, there is ‘duel ownership’ on trust property. First is the ‘legal ownership’ which is vested with trustee; and the second, the ‘equitable or beneficial ownership’ vested with the beneficiary. Salmond on Jurisprudence[60]  refers it as under:

  • “A trustee is the legal owner of the property, the actual owner thereof having lost title thereto by the creation of a trust. The equitable ownership in the trust property vests in the beneficiaries. The trust is thus an incident of dual ownership in which the creator of the trust no longer figures.”[61]

The Law of Trust in India does not follow the ‘doctrine of dual ownership’; because, it does not recognise legal and equitable estates. The trustee ‘holds’ and administers the trust property as its (sole[62]) ‘legal owner’[63] or the ‘full (legal) owner’. The Privy Council, in Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram (1931),[64] held as under:

  • “The Indian Law does not recognise legal and equitable estates. By that law, therefore, there can be but one owner; and where the property is vested in a trustee, the owner must, their Lordship think, be the trustee. This is the view embodied in the Indian Trusts Act: See Sec. 3, 55, 56, etc. … “[65]

If more than one trustee, the trustees altogether are (joint) owners of the trust property.[66]

Out Apex Court, referring, Mount Royal/Walsh Inc. v. Jensen Star, the Ship, (1990) 1 FC 199, of Federal Court of Appeal in Canada, observed in Ahmed Abdulla Ahmed Al Ghurair Vs. Star Health and Allied Insurance Co. Ltd.[67] as under:

  • “49. The term ‘Beneficial interest’ is defined under Section 3 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 which is reproduced hereunder:
  • ‘Beneficial interest’ or ‘interest of the beneficiary’ is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.’
  • 50. As it can be discerned from the definition of ‘Beneficial interest’ provided in Section 3 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882, there are two parties involved in an issue governing beneficial interest. One is a beneficiary named as ‘beneficial owner’ and the other is the owner named as ‘registered owner’ being the trustee of the property or the asset in question. Thus, one can deduce the underlining principle that the ownership is nonetheless legal over the trust property, which vests on him but he also acts as a trustee of the beneficiary. A beneficial owner may include a person who stands behind the registered owner when he acts like a trustee, legal representative or an agent.”

It is beyond doubt that the Canadian law that follows the English principles is not applicable in India, in these aspects.

‘Beneficiaries’ have Merely Beneficial Interest; ‘Legal Ownershipwith Trustees

In The Province of Bihar v. FR Hayes,  1946-14 ITR 326 (Patna), Fazl Ali, CJ (as he then was) while interpreting Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1938, referring the definition of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, held as under:

  • “The framers of the Act must be assumed to have known the accepted legal meaning of the expression and also known that the term ‘beneficiary’ in law is not generally used with reference to a full legal owner but with reference to a person who has ‘beneficial interest’ in some property which is usually in the possession and control of another person. The distinction between beneficial interest and legal ownership is one of the most notable features of a trust and in my judgment ‘beneficiaries’ referred to in Section 11 are those persons who have merely beneficial interest in a property while the legal ownership of the property vests in a person or persons who hold the property for their benefit.”

Read Blog: Indian Law Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership

Trustee Holds ‘On His Own Right’; Not ‘On Behalf Of’ the Beneficiaries

In WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh[68]  it is laid down by our Apex Court as under:

  • “23. These definitions emphasise that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary only has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property. The trustee is thus, the legal owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such. He, no doubt, holds the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries but he does not hold it on their behalf. The expressions ‘for the benefit of’ and ‘on behalf of’ are not synonymous with each other. They convey different meanings.”

Our Apex Court observed in Comm. Wealth Tax Vs. Kirpashanker Dayashankar[69] that the trustee holds the trust property ‘on his own right’ and not ‘on behalf of’ someone else though he holds it ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.

Indian Trusts Act, 1882 does not accept the doctrine of ‘duel ownership’.  ‘Legal ownership’ of the trust property is ‘vested’ with the trustee. Indian Trusts Act expounds that the trustee ‘holds’ the trust property as its (sole[70]) owner.  These obligations are casted upon trustees only to manage the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[71] It is beyond doubt that the trustee has no ‘proprietary interest’ inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’[72] in the property itself.  In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[73]The Act refers only to ‘beneficial interest’ entitled to by the beneficiaries; and, not ‘beneficial ownership’.

It is clear from the following statements in the definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882:

  • (i) “A ‘trust’ is an obligation … arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner… for the benefit of another….”
  • (ii) “(T)he ‘beneficial interest’…  is his (beneficiary’s) right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.”

The Common Law of Trust predicated by the courts in India,[74] in the matters of public trusts, has disfavoured the doctrine of ‘duel ownership’;[75] and followed the Trusts Act.

The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 repeatedly lays down – trustees are ‘holding’ trust property(Sec. 10, 29 and Chap. IX: Sec. 80 onwards).  It is subject to the obligation to use his ownership ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.

Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 10. Who may be trustee.—Every person capable of holding property may be a trustee; but, where the trust involves the exercise of discretion, he cannot execute it unless he is competent to contract.

Sec. 29 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 29. Liability of trustee where beneficiary’s interest is forfeited to Government.—When the beneficiary’s interest is forfeited or awarded by legal adjudication to the Government, the trustee is bound to hold the trust property to the extent of such interest for the benefit of such person in such manner as the State Government may direct in this behalf.

‘Obligation’ in Trustee: Moral & Legal Duty

A trust being an ‘obligation’ (i) for administration and (ii) arising out of a ‘confidence’ reposed in the trustee, the trustee has to discharge the ‘obligation’  and ‘confidence’ faithfully.[76]It must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries. He has to fulfill the object and the purpose of the trust and obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation.[77]It is his moral as well as legal duty.[78]

As pointed out by our Apex Court, in WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,[79]  the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 declares vesting legal ownership with trustees. The vesting of ownership of trust property with the trustee is under an obligation to manage it for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[80]  Though, in a trust, the trust property must have been transferred to the trustees, and the trust property vests in the trustee as owner thereof, it does not absolutely belong to any individual. The property is vested in trustees subject to the obligations upon which the trustees accepted the trust.[81] The trustee deals with the property in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust.[82]  In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[83]The legal ownership which vests in the trustee is for the purposes of the trust and to administer[84] the same.

It is observed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Special Secretary Land and Land Revenue[85] that the trustee would become the owner of the trust property for the purpose of effectively executing or administering the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries and for due administration thereof, and not for any other purpose. Merely because the property is vested in the trustee as the legal owner, he has no ‘proprietor interest’, inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’ in the property itself.  The trustee is not the full owner of the property in the real sense of the term.

Trustee has to perform these duties gratuitously.[86] No remuneration can be claimed from the trust property or income unless the terms of the trust do not specifically allow it.  But, the trustee is entitled to get reimbursement out of the trust property for all expenses properly incurred in relation to the execution of the trust and for preservation of the trust property.[87]

See Blog: Trustees and Administration of Public Trusts

Distinguishing Particularities of Trust from Other Legal-Relations

Trust imposes obligation upon trustees.[88]The whole edifice of trust rests upon the acceptance of ‘confidence’ by the trustee, reposed in by the author.[89] It is for administration[90] as desired by the author.  As soon as the trust is validly declared by the author and duly accepted by the trustee, the legal ownership passes to the trustee[91]and the property vests[92] in him. The trustee holds the endowed property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[93] The distinguishing particularities of trust from other legal-relations lie in ‘obligation’, ‘confidence’ and ‘entrustment of ownership in trustee’. 

Entrustment with Banker

The trustee administers the property as its (legal) owner (Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan:  AIR 1919 Mad 555; In Re Sabnis, Goregaonkar Senjit  Vs.  Shivramdas:  AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan:   AIR   1938 Cal818; Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Life Insurance Corp.  of India Vs.   Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1) with exclusive rights. (Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma: 2010-85 AIC 762; 2009-6 ALT 197, 2009-6 ALD 269).  In N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh (13.12.2021) the Supreme Court held as under:

“The money that a customer deposits in a bank is not held by the latter on trust for him. It becomes a part of the banker’s funds who is under a contractual obligation to pay the sum deposited by a customer to him on demand with the agreed rate of interest. Such a relationship between the customer and the Bank is one of a creditor and a debtor. The Bank is liable to pay money back to the customers when called upon, but until it’s called upon to pay it, the Bank is entitled to utilize the money in any manner for earning profit.”

‘Once a (Public) Trust Always a Trust’

A public trust is perpetual. Rule against perpetuities does not apply to it. It can never be put to an end though its nature may be changed.[94] Once a public endowment is made, even the former owners or founders cannot revoke it.[95]Subsequent conduct of the founder or his descendants contrary to such dedication would amount to a breach of trust.[96]  Tudor on Charities,[97]  while dealing with creation of charitable trusts, explains it as under:

  •  “When a charity has been founded and trusts have been declared, the founder has no power to revoke, vary or add to the trusts. This is so irrespective of whether the trusts have been declared by an individual, or by a body of subscribers, or by the trustees. “[98]

In Halsbury’s Laws of England,[99]it is stated as under:

  • “Charitable trusts have sometimes been declared subject to express powers of revocation, but there has apparently been no decision on the validity of such a power except as regards the rule against perpetuities.”[100]

Underhill in ‘Law relating to Trusts and Trustees’ has explained it,with respect to associations, thus:

  • “However, the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the Association for the time being. The members for the time being cannot under the Association rules Appropriate Trust property for themselves for there would then be no property held on trust as intended by the testator for those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the Association for the time being.”[101]

Revocable Trust

When the author/settlor creates or establishes the trust reserving his power to terminate the trust, or change the beneficiaries and trustees, or the terms of the trust, as he likes, such trust at the will and pleasure of the author is called revocable trust (See: Jyotendrasinhji v. SI Tripathi, AIR 1993 SC 1991).

Such trusts are possible only in private trusts. In case of revocable trusts, there will not be complete dedication of trust property.

  • 77. Trust how extinguished.—A trust is extinguished
  • (a) ….(b) …..(c) ….. or
  • (d) when the trust, being revocable, is expressly revoked.

Read Blog: Extinction, Discharge, Revocation, etc. of Public Trusts

A Trust or An Endowment Shall Not Fail for Want of Trustees.

It is a principle of equity that no trust shall fail for want of trustees.[102]  It applies  in three occasions: First, though a trust was clearly intended, the settler did not or could not appoint trustees owing to a mere omission or the trustee who was named either refused or was unable to act.[103]  Secondly, when a vacancy of trustee occurs.  Thirdly, in dedication to a juristic person like temple, or to a well identified institution or purpose though it is not regarded as juristic person.

Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act shows that, generally, a trust is created by transfer of trust-property to a trustee; and that a trust can also be created otherwise than ‘by any words or acts’ as to appointment of trustee when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts that he himself would be the trustee.

Dedication of property is like a rocket fired.  As long as it is in private realm it retains the character of a private property.[104] Once dedication is complete, it cannot be revoked.[105] It is a trite law that ‘once a trust always a trust’.[106]  In Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Som Nath Dass[107] the Supreme Court has described ‘Endowment’ as under:

  • “Endowment is when donor parts with his property for it being used for a public purpose and its entrustment is to a person or group of person in trust for carrying out the objective of such entrustment. Once endowment is made, it is final and it is irrevocable. It is the onerous duty of the persons entrusted with such endowment, to carry out the objectives of this entrustment. They may appoint a manager in the absence of any indication in the trust or get it appointed through Court.”

Sec. 92, CPC, applicable to public trusts, expressly authorizes court to appoint a new trustee.[108] Section 59 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, applicable to public trusts, deals[109] with the principle ‘A Trust shall not fail for want of a trustee’.  It reads:

  • 59. Right to sue for execution of trust.—Where no trustees are appointed or all the trustees die, disclaim or are discharged, or where for any other reason the execution of a trust by the trustee is or becomes impracticable, the beneficiary may institute a suit for the execution of the trust, and the trust shall, so far as may be possible, be executed by the Court until the appointment of a trustee or new trustee.

Public Trusts &  Indian Trusts Act

The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 is enacted primarily to govern private trusts; and ‘public or private charitable or religious endowments’ are expressly excluded from its ambit. 

In Sec. 1, under the head, ‘Savings’, it is stated:

  • But nothing herein contained affects the rules of Mohammedan law as to waqf, or the mutual relations of the members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law, or applies to public or private religious or charitable endowments, or to trusts to distribute prizes taken in war among the captors; and nothing in the Second Chapter of this Act applies to trusts created before the said day.

Though the Indian Trusts Act does not apply, in terms, to the public trusts, the common legal principles,[110] which cover matters of both public and private trusts, especially the Sections that speak as to the Duties and Liabilities of Trustees (Chapter III), Disabilities of Trustees (Chapter V), and Chapter IX pertaining to implied trusts, apply to public trusts also.[111]They ‘cannot become untouchable’[112] merely because they find a place in the Trusts Act.

Our courts apply the general law of trusts, and the universal rules of equity and good conscience upheld by the English judges in this subject, in appropriate cases.

Registration of Public Trusts

Various State Public Trusts Acts require registration of all public trusts with the authorities appointed under the said Acts. In New Noble Educational Society v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax-1, 2023-6 SCC 649, it is held with reference to Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, as under:

  • “67. In the event of failure to comply with Section 43(1), or failure to intimate changes in the trust, or for supplying false information, the trustee or other person in charge, can be penalized by Section 43 (11). Section 44 empowers the Commissioner to direct charitable organizations and trusts to comply and register under the Act.
  • 68.The assessees had argued that since they were registered under the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 or were trusts duly registered, they could not be compelled to comply with state laws as a condition for consideration of their application as charitable institutions, under Section 10 (23C).
  • 69. This court is of the opinion that the findings in the impugned judgment on this aspect are sound. The requirement of registration of every charitable institution is not optional. Aside from the fact that the consequences of non-registration are penal, which indicates the mandatory nature of the provisions of the A.P. Charities Act, such local laws provide the regulatory framework by which annual accounts, manner of choosing the governing body (in terms of the founding instrument: trust, society, etc.), acquisition and disposal of properties, etc. are constantly monitored. Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution reads as follows:
    • “32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, and universities; unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations; cooperative societies.”
  • By Entry 28, List III of the Seventh Schedule, the states have undoubted power to enact on the subject of charities:
    • “28. Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions.”

Private Religious Trusts

So far as private religious trusts are concerned, there are no specific statutory enactments to regulate their affairs. Such trusts are governed by the foundational principles upon which they are established, as evidenced by documents, if any; customs and usages;general law of contract and transfer of property, etc; apart from the Common Law of the Land applicable to such trusts.

See Blog (click): Public & Private Trusts in India.

In Hindu Endowments, Managers are Trustees in a General Sense

Three parties are necessary to constitute a trust; namely, the settlor, the trustee and the beneficiary, as laid down in Sree SreeIswar Gopal Jew Vs. CIT[113]. Trustee holds the property for the benefit of the beneficiaries or cesti que trust. In Hindu religious endowments, the trustees hold the endowed properties for the institution. It is laid down in Ram Parkash Dass Vs. Anant Das (1916)[114] as under:

  • “He (Mahanth) sits upon the gadi, he initiates candidates into the mysteries of the cult; he superintends the worship of the idol and the accustomed spiritual rites; he manages the property of the institution; he administers its affairs; and the whole assets are vested in him as the owner thereof in trust for the institution itself.”

This decision was noticed by the Board in Vidya Varuthi Vs. Baluswami[115] (1922) and it was observed:

  • “They thus concur with the first court that there was no “specific trust” which was the foundation of the plaintiff’s case. But after examining some of the judgments of their own court, they apparently felt constrained to hold that the decision of his Board in Ram Parkash Das Vs. Anand Das had crystallised the law on the subject, and definitely declared the Mahant to be a trustee. It is to be observed that in that case the decision related to the office of Mahant, but in the course of their judgment their Lordships conceived it desirable to indicate inter alia what, upon the evidence of the usages and customs applicable to the institution with which they were dealing, and similar institutions, were the duties and obligations attached to the office of superior: and they used the term trustee in a general sense, as in previous decisions of the Board, by way of a compendious expression to convey a general conception of those obligations. They did not attempt to define the term or to hold that the word in its specific sense is applicable to the laws and

In Pratap Singhji   Vs. Charity Commissioner[116] our Apex Court held as under:

  • “ ‘Endowment’ is dedication of property for purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment. It is to be remembered that a trust in the sense in which the expression is used in English law is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple. Hindu piety found expression in gifts to idols and images consecrated and installed in temples, to religious institutions of every kind and for all purposes considered meritorious in the Hindu social and religious system. Under the Hindu law the image of a deity of the Hindu pantheon is, as has been aptly called, a ‘juristic entity’, vested with the capacity of receiving gifts and holding property. The Hindu law recognises dedications for the establishment of the image of a deity and for maintenance and worship thereof. The property so dedicated to a pious purpose is placed extra-commercium and is entitled to special protection at the hands of the Sovereign whose duty it is to intervene to prevent fraud and waste in dealing with religious endowments. Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. It would be a legitimate inference to draw that the founder of the temple had dedicated it to the public if it is found that he had held out the temple to be a public one: Pujari Lakshmana Goundan Vs. Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44.”

The same is the position with respect to Wakf property held by Sajadahnashin who controls and manages the same.[117]

Roman Law and Hindu Law

In Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakhmiram,[118] it was held that ‘the Hindu Law like the Roman law and those derived from it recognizes not only corporate bodies with rights or property-vested in the corporation’ apart from its individual members, but also juridical persons and subjects called foundations.’ The religious institutions like mutts and other establishments obviously answer to the description of foundations in Roman law. The idea is the same, namely, when property is dedicated for a particular purpose, the property itself upon which the purpose is impressed, is raised to the category of a juristic person so that the property which is dedicated would vest in the person so created.

Trustee Represents Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries do not have right of ownership over the trust property.  But, Order XXXI, Rule 1 CPC lays down that the Trustee shall represent the persons interested in the trust in suits concerning property vested in the Trustee. Apart from providing an enabling stipulation, it indicates the significance of obligation casted on the trustees. And, it also asserts the paramount importance of the beneficiaries in a trust. 

Vesting of Ownership of Trust Property

While establishing a trust the author completely parts with all his interest in the trust-property, and the property has to be transferred[119] to the trustee. But, the trustee acquires only ‘legal ownership’ over the trust-property, under the law in India. And, the beneficiaries have mere ‘beneficial interest’, as they have no proprietary-interest or ownership. Then, an interesting question arises: In whom the actual ownership vests?

The following propositions can be presented as to the vesting of ownership of the trust-property.

  1. In most cases of public trusts, the ‘ultimate vesting’ may not be a matter of practical importance; because, the endowment will be permanent and indivisible; and court takes cognizance, when practical difficulties are faced while carrying out the object of the trust, by applying cy pres doctrine, or by invoking its inherent jurisdiction.
  2. The terms of dedication (as revealed from the deed of dedication, if any, or on other substantial evidence) determine the person or body of persons in whom/which such property ultimately vest in.
  3. If the ownership of the property of a trust vests in a legal person, such vesting is permanent (thereby it cannot be put to an end), and such vesting is subject to the object and purpose envisaged by the founder.
  4. If the subject matter of the trust is dedicated to public at large or a section of public, the title of such subject matter stands separated from the owner and vests in public or the section of public who are the beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation.
  5. If the property is that of an unregistered association and the members thereof are ascertainable (as in the case of an unregistered society) the actual ownership of the property will be presumed to be vested with those members (from time-to-time), only as joint owners (contra-distinct to ownership under tenants-in-common).
  6. If the property is one stands dedicated to a Political Party, unregistered Association or a Church, and the beneficiaries thereof are unascertainable, the property vests with the entire members (of such Party, Association or Church), from time to time, subject to its objectives Such vesting is permanent, whereby it cannot be put to an end even by a majority decision of the members of a particular time.
  7. In case such unregistered association or church becomes defunctive and it is impossible to carry on the affairs of the trust as intended by the founders, the court will apply the trust-property to a charitable purpose, ‘as nearly as possible’[120]to the objects of the original Trust, invoking ‘cy pres’ doctrine.  
  8. If the subject matter of a trust is one partially dedicated to public at large or a section of public (as in the case of a waiting shed or a public well) by a known person and administered and maintained by himself or through another person, the property will remain vested with the owner, when the purpose of dedication is extinguished.

Two (Kinds of) “Trusts” over the Parish or Branch Property

One Property, Several Trusts Possible

Trust is a general term used in wider sense in law. Therefore –

  1. If a property is acquired by a branch of a larger body, or a parish of a Church, the entire members of the larger body, from time to time, will be presumed to be the owners, subject to (i) the byelaws of the (entire) association or trust and (ii) the purposes or objectives ‘aimed to achieve’ by that particular property. 
  2. If the bylaws (expressly or by necessary implication) provides for special beneficial enjoyment by the members of the branch or parish, over the branch/parish properties, definitely there will be two (kinds of) “trusts” over the same property – one, trust for the beneficial enjoyment of whole body; and the other, for the members of the branch/parish.

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

Read Blog: Vesting of Property in Trusts

Trust is a Legal Concept ; Not a Juristic Person

‘A Trust’ is ‘an obligation’ according to the definition in the Trusts Act. In common law also it does not convey the idea that it is a tangible or a corporeal property. Grammatically speaking, as pointed out earlier, it is an ‘abstract[121]-countable[122] noun’. Therefore, it can neither be a juristic person[123] nor an association of persons.[124]

‘Trust’ is essentially a legal concept attached to the endowed property. It arises by the appointment of a trustee. For creation of a trust, the trust-property must have been transferred to the trustee.[125]The Delhi High Court held in Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Sham Lal[126] as under:

  • “A trust is primarily a legal concept, a mode of transfer of property and of holding property. On the other hand, an institution is primarily a social concept. It is not a legal concept at all. For, there is established legal method by which an institution may come into being. It may be established by way of an organisation which may assume any or no legal form. It may be a trust or a company or a statutory corporation or a mere unincorporated association or a society registered or otherwise. It is its work and place in the society that is the hall-mark of an institution. As observed by Lord Macnaghten in Mayor, etc. of Manchester V. Mcadam,3 Tax Cases 491 at 497, ‘it is the body (so to speak) called into existence to translate the purpose as conceived in the mind of the founders into a living and active principle.’ In the present case, the founders of the trust may have transferred their property to a charitable purpose and thus created a public trust. But the body to translate the trust into a living and active principle has not yet come into existence. It is that body which will be entitled to be called an institution. It is not a mere legal arrangement like a trust but an active working body with a social impact which can be called an institution.”

Read Blog: Trust is ‘An Obligation’; Not a Legal Entity

‘Trust’ is Used as Synonym to Endowment/Association

Inasmuch as the ‘trust’ has no existence without its trust property, and it is an ‘obligation’ ‘annexed to’ the trust property, the endowment or institution, upon which the obligation of ‘trust’ is pervaded, is personified as a ‘trust’. Certain public institutions established or dedicated with philanthropic view are also generally described as ‘trusts’.

In the inclusive definition of ‘trust’ in the Public Trusts Acts enacted by various States and in several Tax-Laws, Trust ‘means and includes’ a temple, a math, wakf, a dharmada or any other religious or charitable endowment, and even a society.  It is interesting to note that the word ‘trust’ is used as an ‘entity’ even in Illustration (b) of Sec. 15 of the Trusts Act –it is the only one place in this Act where the term ‘trust’ is used in this manner.

The Illustration (b) of Sec. 15 reads: 

  • “(b) A, trustee of lease-hold property, directs the tenant to pay the rents on account of the trust to a banker, B, ….”

See Blog: Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies

Life is Bestowed  upon Endowment When Trustee is Appointed

An ‘endowment’ is arisen by the dedication of a specified property for purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[127]

The differentiating particularity of a trust from an endowment is, the ‘transfer[128] of the trust-property to the trustee’.[129]The other ingredients for creation of trust as stated in the clauses (a) to (d) of Section 6 of the Act (Intention to create trust,  Purpose,  Beneficiary,  and Property) are the requisites for endowments also.

The author endows the property with a definite purpose, beneficial to the beneficiaries. Trust arises when a trustee is appointed for administration of the endowment.[130]  For the formation of a trust, the trust-property must have been vested in trustees.[131]The administration by the trustee must be to accomplish the purpose intended by the founder. The ‘obligation’ upon trustee arises only when the trustee accepts the confidence reposed-in by the author. The duty accepted by the trustee is ‘fiduciary’ in character. The administration by the trustee must be carried on with prudence,[132] and as a reasonable man.[133]

The Trustee of a Charitable Trust is enjoined with the duty to preserve and protect the property of the Trust as if the Manager of an infant, but such power of the Trustees cannot be read as that of a pleasure doctrine or a sweet will of the Trustees to dispose of the property. The degree of obligation is coupled with their fiduciary capacity to preserve and protect the property for the larger interest of the Trust and to be made available to the beneficiaries of the Trust to the maximum possible extent.[134]

Therefore, a legal identity is renowned, or life is bestowed, upon the endowment when a trustee is appointed. An endowment, sans trustee, remains static.

Trust Property must be one “Transferable to the Beneficiary”: Import

It must not be merely beneficial interest.

Section 8 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads:

  • 8. Subject of Trust. The subject-matter of a trust must be property transferable to the beneficiary. It must not be merely beneficial interest under a subsisting trust.

Subject matter[135] of an endowment and a trust will, normally, be a corporeal property. Sections 5 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 speaks as to ‘trust of’ movable and immovable properties. Under Section 8 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, the subject-matter of a (private) trust must be property transferable(note:- not, ‘be transferred’, ultimately)to the beneficiary, and it must not be merely beneficial interest under a subsisting trust. It conveys us two ideas:

  • (i) those who created the trust must be owners of the trust property and must be capable of transferring their interest in the trust properties[136] and
  • (ii) a Trust cannot be created only for a beneficial interest, (Note: Not the ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner; it is the interest pertaining to beneficiaries.) or there is no trust upon a trust.  In Pestonji Jalbhoy Chichgar Vs. Jalbhoy Jehangir Chichgar[137] it is observed by the Privy Council: “What the S. 8 forbids is a trust upon a trust– a trust of a mere right of the beneficiary to proceed against the trustee, and if the Will of Gulbai amounts to a declaration of a trust of her beneficial interest, that is, of her right to go against the trustees of Kaka’s will, then the trust offends against S.8.”

(Note: Section 8 does not postulate that the property should be transferred to the beneficiaries, ultimately.)

Salmond’s Jurisprudence (while describing “property”) refers to corporeal property  as, ‘the right of ownership in a material object, or that object itself’.[138]A founder can also be a beneficiary of a trust after its dedication. (But, he cannot claim any special right on that score, unless he reserved the same positively.)

Progressive Jurists Accept Trust in a ‘General Sense’

Indian law of trusts follows the progressive view of jurists like Halsbury.  They preferred investing principles of trust, in a ‘wider’ or ‘general’ form.  They see principles of trust in all matters of fiduciary relationships under which one holds property on behalf of, or for the benefit of, others.  Halsbury’s Laws of England defines ‘trust’ as a confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power, to the intent, that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object. Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 substantially follow this definition.

Our Common Law imports still wider meaning to ‘trust’ in the matters of religious trusts.

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

It is trite law that dedicated property of a temple will be vested with the idol as the legal owner thereof, though such vesting is qualified to be in an ‘ideal or secondary sense’;[139] and the possession and management thereof will be with some human being identified as Shebait or Manager, though in the strict legal sense, they cannot be accepted as trustees.

In Wali Mohammed v. Rahmat Bee, (1999- 3 SCC 145), to the question whether the Mutawalli of a Wakf would be a trustee, our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “35. It will be seen that the main part of Sec. 10 (Limitation Act) states that no period of limitation applies for recovery of property from a trustee in whom the property is vested for a specific purpose, unless such a person is an assignee for valuable consideration. The Explanation further states that it shall be deemed that a person managing the property of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is to be deemed to be a trustee in whom such property has vested for a specific purpose. We shall explain these provisions in some detail.
  • 36. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] the Privy Council held that property comprised in a Hindu or Mohammedan religious or charitable endowment was not property vested in trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of the said words in the main section. The reason was that according to the customary law, where property was dedicated to a Hindu idol or mutt or to a Mohammedan wakf, the property vested in the idol or the institution or God, as the case may be, directly and that the shebait, mahant, mutawalli or other person who was in charge of the institution was simply a manager on behalf of the institution. As Sec. 10 did not apply unless these persons were trustees this judgment made recovery of properties of the above trusts from donees, from these managers, rather difficult.
  • 37. The legislature therefore intervened and amended Sec. 10 for the purpose of getting over the effect of the above judgment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill of 1929 makes this clear. It says: “The (Civil Justice) Committee’s recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] and Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das Aurora [(1922) 50 IA 84] which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutawalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Mohammedan religious endowment is vested, are not trustees within the meaning of the words as used in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in them. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person, not being an assignee for valuable consideration, endowments of this nature are not protected. The Committee’s recommendation is that Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Mohammedan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee.” (Quoted in: Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482).

In Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482, the Apex Court held that the Mutawalli is not a trustee in its true sense. The Supreme Court formulated a crucial question and answered it as under:

  • “127. Thus, the Mutawalli is treated as a trustee. But would the amendment made to Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make a Mutawalli a trustee generally?

Our answer is an emphatic No. This is for the reason that the change in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act was effected to overcome the judgment of the Privy Council, when it held that a Mutawalli would not be a trustee and when in view of the requirement in Sec. 10 that the suit must be one against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose and as a Mutawalli would not be a trustee in law per se, the legislature brought in the explanation. But what is striking are two features. Firstly, the change is brought by way of an Explanation. More importantly, the explanation begins with words “For the purpose of this section  and proceeds to declare that “any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be properly vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”

Both Express and Constructive Trusts Differ from Contract

Trust differs from contract. Trust is a concept derived by law to give effect to a pious or philanthropic wish of a generous man, and to ensure the benefits thereof to the beneficiaries intended by its founder. But, contract is the result of positive acts of two persons. There is no intermediary in contract, as trustees in a trust. A contract without consideration is void. In ‘trust’, trustee undertakes an obligation; and there is no question of consideration.

In express trust there must be a deliberate intention on the part of the author to create a trust.[140] Constructive trust emerges without regard to the intention of the parties to create a trust.  It is an equitable remedy exercises by court of law. In both cases, there no direct involvement of beneficiaries. In a contract, the claims of one party against the other are personal in nature;[141] whereas, trust is governed by obligation and fiduciary relation. Fiduciary relationship for trustees and beneficial interest for beneficiaries in the trust property are the characteristics of trust; they are absent in contract.[142] Trustee deals with the property in a discretionary manner applying his prudence.[143]The beneficiaries of a trust have the right to get the trust enforced. Beneficiary of a contract has merely a personal claim against the promisor.

Breach of trust by itself is punishable under law; whereas breach of a contract, without fraud or cheating, raises civil liability alone. Every breach of contract is not breach of trust or cheating. A breach of contract is different from the offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust under IPC. In the absence of illegal motives or intention at the very inception, no offence of cheating would be made out in a contract.[144]

The service of a person agreeing to collect rent for another[145] with the undertaking to render accounts thereof does not create a trust even  constructively or impliedly.[146]  A mortgagee in possession is also not a trustee in the strict sense, and a constructive or implied trust  is legally recognised, as in cases governed by S. 90 and 95 of the Trusts Act, for he holds a fiduciary character in certain respects.[147]

Court is the Ultimate Protector of Charities[148]

Courts have jurisdiction and duty[149] to administer and enforce public trusts.[150]  As in the case of English Law, Indian Law also accepts court as the ultimate protector of all charities.[151] It is the guardian of the public charitable trusts or institutions[152] and its property.[153] In legal theory the Court is the guardian of charity, as it is of an infant.[154]In P. Elumalai Vs. Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board[155] the Madras High Court while passing an order exercising the ‘Parens Patriae’ jurisdiction over the trust held that, as ‘Parens Patriae’, the Courts were empowered to protect the sanctity of public trust in case of breach of trust on account of irregularities committed in trust. In this decision it was held that the Court could not remain a mute spectator when illegality had been committed against a public Trust in front of its own eyes.[156]

Public Trust Doctrine

Who is the owner of the sea, sky, air, rivers, sea shore etc.? Roman Law thought about it first. They found the answer and declared: either owned by no one (res nullius) or by everyone in common (res communious).  The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life.

The Public Trust Doctrine rests on the principle that the resources made available by the nature are of immense importance to the people as a whole and that it will stand wholly unjustified if made them an object of private ownership.

This doctrine envisages that the natural resources such as lakes, ponds (water bodies)etc. are held by the State as a ‘trustee’ of the public. The State is the trustee of all natural resources. The public trust doctrine[157]enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes.[158]It requires the State to protect, conserve and augment the gift of nature including the traditional water retaining structures.

The Government cannot ignore the fiduciary duty of care and responsibility casted upon it. If a water body has been fallen into disuse or forest is burnt up, that by itself, would not be a good ground for the Government to regularise the encroachments therein; as it amounts to breach of the public trust.

Any act or attempt made by the Government, or even the legislature, that derogate the object for which such land air or water exists, has to be held illegal by the higher authority, if any, which is equipped to scrutinise the illegality of such acts.

MC Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath

The Doctrine of Public Trust, by that name, is introduced to our legal system by our Apex Court in MC Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath.[159]  It was a public interest litigation. It arose from a news item appeared in the Indian Express.  It was stated that a private company, Span Motels, had built a motel at the bank of River Beas in Kullu Valley, by encroaching forest land. The major shares of the company were with the relatives of one Kamal Nath. The encroachment was later regularized by the government; and the land was leased out to the company, when Kamal Nath was the Minister for Environment and Forests.

The Motel used earth-movers and bulldozers to turn the course of river Beas. It was found to be illegal and constituted ‘callous interference with the natural flow of river Beas’; and that it resulted in the degradation of the environment. In this case the Supreme Court found that the Motel was liable to pay compensation by way of cost for the restitution of the environment and ecology of the area  and  issued various directions to restore the original position.

The  Apex  Court observed that the public had a right to expect certain lands and natural areas to retain their natural characteristics.  It  was  declared in the judgment that the public trust doctrine, ‘as discussed by in this judgment is a part of the law of the land’.

In this   trailblazing landmark decision, the Apex Court quoted Joseph L. Sax, Professor of Law, University of Michigan – proponent of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine -from his  erudite article ‘Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention’, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, Part 1 p. 473, which gave the historical background of the Public Trust Doctrine,[160] as under :

  • “The source of modern public trust law is found in a concept that received much attention in Roman and English law – the nature of property rights in rivers, the sea, and the seashore. That history has been given considerable attention in the legal literature, need not be repeated in detail here. But two points should be emphasized. First, certain interests, such as navigation and fishing, were sought to be preserved for the benefit of the public; accordingly, property used for those purposes was distinguished from general public property which the sovereign could routinely grant to private owners. Second, while it was understood that in certain common properties – such as the seashore, highways, and running water – ‘perpetual use was dedicated to the public’, it has never been clear whether the public had an enforceable right to prevent infringement of those interests. Although the State apparently did protect public uses, no evidence is available that public rights could be legally asserted against a recalcitrant government.”
  • “Three types of restriction on governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the public trust; first the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purposes but it must be held available for use by the general public; second, the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third the property must be maintained for particular types of uses:”

The Supreme Court held further as under:

  • “Our legal system – based on English common law – includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership.”[161]

In Tehseen Poonawalla  Vs. Union of India[162] it is pointed out that the principles such as the ‘polluter pays’ and the public trust doctrine have evolved during the adjudication of public interest petitions. (Also See: In Re: T. N.  Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, AIR 2024  SC 1955.)

Expansion of the Concept

In Fomento Resorts & Hotels Vs. Minguel Martins[163] our Apex Court held that the heart of the public trust doctrine is that it imposes limits and obligations upon government agencies and their administrators on behalf of all the people; especially future generations. It is pointed out in Noida Entrepreneurs Association Vs. Noida[164]that the doctrine has been developed from Article 21 of the Constitution. (Referred to in Bikramchatterji Vs. Union Of India: 2019 5 Supreme 3; 2019 0 Supreme(SC) 768).

It is held by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Kerala (2014  AIR SC 2407, Referred to in  In Re: The Punjab Termination of Agreement Act, 2004: AIR 2016  SC 5145) that the judicial function is also a very important sovereign function of the State and the foundation of the rule of law, and that the legislature cannot indirectly control the action of the courts and directly or indirectly set aside the authoritative and binding finding of fact by the court, by invoking ‘public trust doctrine’ or ‘precautionary principle’.

Our Apex Court held in Tata Housing Development Company  Vs.  Aalok Jagga (2020) 15 SCC 784; 2019 0 Supreme(SC) 1228) that the housing project,  setting up of high-rise buildings up to 92 meters, fell within the catchment area of Sukhna Lake and 123 meters away from the boundary of Sukhna Wildlife Sanctuary, could not be allowed to come up. 95 MLAs were to be the recipients of the flats in the buildings. The State of Punjab was required to act on the basis of Doctrine of Public Trust.

In Bikram Chatterji Vs. Union of India (2019 (8) SCC 527; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 901.) our Apex Court pointed out that the Public Trust Doctrine imposes on the State and its functionaries a mandate to take affirmative action for effective management, and the citizens are empowered to question its ineffectiveness. When the land of the farmers had been acquired for the purpose of housing and infrastructure needs by the State Government and handed over to the concerned authorities for construction, they were bound to ensure that builders acted in accordance with the objective behind the acquisition of land and the conditions on which allotment had been made. The concerned officials were not only enjoined to ensure protection of the rights of the home buyers, but also the interests of the authorities and bankers. The public authorities are duty-bound to observe that the leased property is not frittered away along with the money of the home buyers.

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[1]     Quoted in: Shanmughan  Vs. Vishnu Bharatheeyan:  AIR  2004 Ker 143.

[2]     Quoted in: Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar. 72

[3]     Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th  Edition, page 256.

[4]     Quoted in: Assn. of University Teachers Vs. AICTE: AIR 1999 Mad 164.

[5]     Contra-distinct to ‘concrete noun’ like God, earth, man, president etc.

[6]     Contra-distinct to ‘uncountable noun’ like poverty, wealth, kindness, innocence etc.

[7]    Grammatically, ‘a trust is attached to a property’, as ‘a business is done by a man’.

[8]     State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106. 

[9] Sec. 11  reads: “11. Trustee to execute trust.—The trustee is bound to fulfil the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation ….”

[10]   Allahabad    Bank  Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.

[11]   Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553; Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co Vs. CIT: 1966-61 ITR 572 (Bom); Christopher Karkada VS Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569;       Rajah SagiJanaki Vs. Appururu Bhukta: 1976-2 AndWR 117, 1976-1 APLJ 312;       Special Secy Govt of WB Vs. State Bank of India: AIR  1989 Cal 40; CIT Vs. K Shyamaraju: 1991-1 KantLJ 233; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[12]   C. Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma Association: 2010-85 AIC 762, 2009-6 ALD 269, B Vasudeva Rao Vs. K Laxminarayana : AIR 1985 Kar 129,

[13]   Khairul Bashar Vs. ThannuLal: AIR1957 All 553; Christopher Karkada  Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725;.

[14]   State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30.

[15]   Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revn. Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass Ahluwalia: AIR 1972 Del 128; Pankumari Kochar Smt Vs. Controller Of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.

[16]   Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460

[17]   Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan:  AIR 1919 Mad 555; Chhatra  Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram:  AIR 1931 PC 196; In Re Sabnis, Goregaonkar Senjit  Vs.  Shivramdas:  AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan:   AIR   1938 Cal818; Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of UP: AIR1957 SC 887, Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569; Comm. Wealth Tax Vs. Kirpashanker Dayashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463; Controller of Estate Duty Lucknow Vs. Aloke Mitra: AIR 1981SC 102; Life Insurance Corp.  of India Vs.   Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1. Special Secy. Govtof W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; Christopher Karkada  Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; PrabhakarGonesPrabhu  Vs. Saradchandra Suria Prabhu: 2019-11SCALE 381.

[18]   Chhatra Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of UP: AIR1957 SC 887; Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569.

[19]   1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801

[20]   Definition of Author: “The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’.”

[21]   Definition of Trustee: “The person who accepts the confidence is called the ‘trustee’.

[22]   Heeralal  Vs. Firm Ratanlal Mahavir Prasad:1964 Raj LW  33

[23]   As stated in Sec. 6.

[24]   AIR 1961SC  1023

[25]   Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act casts duty on the trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling ‘the purpose of the trust’, and obeying ‘the directions of the author of the trust’.

[26]   Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; State Bank of India Vs. Spl. Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529; Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173.

[27]   R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Edl Trust: 1982-21 DLT 46: ILR  1982-1Del 801, Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid: AIR1944  Cal 163.

[28]   Paru Vs. Chiruthai: 1985 KerLJ 480, 1985  KerLT 563: Referred: UN Mitra’s Law of Limitation and Prescription, 9th Edn., Vol. II, at page 1574, Para 66; Bhavna Nalinkant  Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529, CBSE Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay: AIR 2011 SCW  4888:  2011-8 SCC 497; Reserve Bank of India Vs. Jayantilal N.  Mistry: AIR 2016 SC 1.

[29]   Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557

[30]   Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Canara Bank Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1982 Ker 1: ILR 1981-2 Ker 649; R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[31]   Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.

[32]   Trustee is the owner.

      Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram   Shah:  AIR 1931 PC 196;       WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887; Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553; Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW (Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Benafasilal Rajgorhia Vs. Central Bank of India: 1971-76 CalWN 807; BomiMunchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993 BCR 301; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[33]   Heeralal  Vs. Firm Ratanlal Mahavir Prasad: 1964 Raj LW  33

[34]   Life Insurance Corp.  of India VS Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1; Patel Chhotabhai Vs. Gian Chandra Basak: AIR 1935 PC 97; Chambers Vs. Chambers: AIR 1944 PC 78.

[35]   Chambers Vs. Chambers, AIR 1944 PC 78, Benafasilal Rajgorhia Vs. Central Bank of India: 1971-76 CalWN 807; Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Badri: 1966 2 DLT 294. Khub Narain Missir Vs. Ramchandra Narain Dass: AIR 1951  Pat 340; Patel Chhotabhai Vs.Jnan Chandra Bank: AIR 1935 PC 97.

[36]   Laxman Balwant Bhopatkar Vs. Charity Commr, Bombay: AIR 1962  SC 1589, Banwarilal  Vs. Edwin Bhagirathi:  AIR 1981 MP 116.

[37]   Allahabad Bank Ltd.  Vs. CIT: 1952 21 ITR 169

[38]   Cambay Municipality Vs. Ratilal Ambalal Reshamwala: 1995 Supp2 SCC 591. Mahabir Prasad Mishra Vs. Shyama Dev : 2013 9 ADJ 46; 2013 101 AllLR 402; Hardinge Memorial Fund Trust Vs. St. of Bihar: 2008 1 BLJR 28; 2007 3 PLJR 553, LIC of India Vs. Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1.

[39]Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[40]Sec. 6 Clause (e) of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[41]   Vidarbha and Marathwada, Nagpur Vs. Mangala: 1982 MhLJ 686; Maria Antonica Rodrigues Vs. DR Baliga: AIR 1967 Bom 465.

[42]   Idol of Sri Renganathaswamy Vs. PK Thoppulan: (2020) 5 Mad LJ 331(SC); MJ  Thulasiraman Vs. Comr, HR & CE: AIR 2019 SC 4050.

[43]   Pratap Singhji Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064

[44]Gulam Mohideen Khan Vs. Abdul Majid Khan: AIR  1957 AP 941.

[45] SM Manorama Dasi Vs. Dhirendra Nath Busu: AIR  1931 Cal 329,

[46]   Deoki Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar:  AIR 1957 SC 133, Quoted in: M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1, Pratap Singhji  Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064

[47]Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Sham Lal: ILR 1973-1 Del  144,

[48]   Sec. 6(e) of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[49]   AIR1957 SC 887; Referred to in: Commr W. Tax Vs. Kirpashanker  : AIR 1971 SC 2463; Shyam Sunder Kejriwal Vs. Usha: 2011-97 AIC 910: 2010-4 CalHN 782; Shyam Sunder Kayal Vs. Mist Valley: 2008-1 CalHN 900: 2007-3 CalLT 560. The Nizams Jewellery Trust Vs. Asst Commr: 1997-1 ALD 4: 1996-4 ALT 852, CIT Vs. A N Chowdhury: AIR  1970 Cal 124, See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[50]   AIR1957 SC 887.

[51]   1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30;  Followed in: Shyam Sunder Kayal Vs. Mist Valley Binimoy: CalHN 2008 1 900,CalLT 2007 3 560.

[52]   AIR 1951  Cal 309

[53]   Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553.

[54]   Arjan Singh Vs Deputy Mal Jain, 1982-22 DLT 14; 1981-1 DMC 248; ILR 1982-1 Del. 11; P.  Elumalai v Pachaiyappa’s Trust Board, 2017-8 MLJ 529; Khasgi Trust Indore v. Vipin Dhanaitkar, 2022 SCC Online SC 900; 2022-11 SCALE 1; 2022-17 SCR 173; State Bank of India v. Special Secretary Land, [1995] Suppl 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529; Mathura Bai Vs. Regional Provident Fund: 1992 WLN 206(Raj); Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106

[55]   Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.

[56]   Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass Ahluwalia: AIR  1972 Del  128; Pankumari KocharSmt Vs. Controller Of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.

[57]   Alagappa Vs. Lakshmanan:  AIR 1919 Mad 555, Goregaonkar Senjit  Vs.  Shivramdas:  AIR 1937 Bom 374; Himansu Kumar Vs. Hasem Ali Khan:   AIR   1938 Cal818; Rajah Sagi Janaki Vs.Appururu Bhukta: 1976-2 And WR 117, 1976-1 APLJ 312; Life Insurance Corp.  of India VS Iqbal Kaur: AIR 1984 J&K 1.

[58]   AIR 1940 Pat 90

[59]   AIR 1951 Ori  132

[60]   Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th  Edition, page 256

[61]   See: Baba Badri Dass  Vs. Dharma: ILR 1982(1) P&H 491;       Govordhanhari Devasthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: 1982 Mh.L.J 390.

[62]   Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Himansu Kumar Roy Chowdhury Vs. Moulvi Hasem: AIR1938 Cal 818, Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid Ostagar: AIR1944 Cal163, Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329.

[63]   Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569, Birendra Kumar Datta Vs. Commr IT: AIR 1960 Cal 323: 1961-42 ITR 661, Shantiniketan Co Op Hsg. Society Vs. Dist.  Regr Co Op So: AIR 2002  Guj 428; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329; Mohammed Basheer Vs. Ahmed Kutty: 2011 (3) Ker LJ 767.

[64]   AIR 1931 PC 196. Referred to in: A S Krishna Murthy Vs. C N Revanna: AIR 2009KarRep 2692 , Raja Baldeodas Birla Santatikosh Vs. C I T: 1991-190ITR 578; Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid Ostagar: AIR1944 Cal 163, Himansu Kumar Roy Chowdhury Vs. MoulviHasem Ali Khan: AIR 1938 Cal 818.

[65]   Quoted in Special Secy. Govt of W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar. 72; Raja Sir Muthiah Chettiar Vs. CIT: 1984-38 CTR 76: 1984-148 ITR532: Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Ganga Properties Ltd: 1970-77 ITR 637; Sardarilal Vs. Shrimati Shakuntla Devi: AIR 1961 P&H 378.

[66]   Rakesh Arora Vs. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories: 2019-261 DLT 307; Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 145.

[67] AIR 2019 SC 413

[68]   AIR1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[69]   AIR 1971 SC 2463.

[70]   Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-329 , Uma Roy VS Mehamala Dey: 1988 2 Cal HN 128.

[71]   Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin Vs. Trustees Maniar: AIR 1968 Guj 184

[72]   Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Special SecyGovtof W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40.

[73]   Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Kumar Jain Vs. ParasnathDigambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199

[74]   Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram Shah:  AIR 1931 PC 196;       WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887 ,       Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Kripashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463,       Bai Dosabai Vs. Mathuradas: AIR 1980 SC 1334;        Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2BCR301;       Hem Chandra Vs. Suradham Debya: AIR 1940 PC 134;      Ramabai Govind Vs. RaghunathVasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.        Deoki Nandan  Vs.  Murlidhar:  AIR 1957 SC 133;      Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73.

[75]   Smith Vs. Anderson, (1880) 15 Ch. D. 247;Quoted in: Bengal Luxmi Cotton Mills  Vs. State: 1964-69 CalWN 137; 1965-35 CC 187

[76]   Allahabad    Bank  Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476.

[77]Sec. 11.

[78]   Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557

[79]   AIR1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.

[80]   Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin  Vs. Trustees Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184. See also: RamabaiGovind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj).

[81]   Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj)

[82]   Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106

[83]   Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Vs. Parasnath Digambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199

[84]   Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529.

[85]   1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30.

[86]   Scott on Trusts Vol. II Sec. 170. The leading case on the subject is Kench  Vs. Gandford (1726) (White and Tudor Leading Cases in Equity page 693) , Referred to in: Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

[87]   Kishore Joo Vs. Guman BehariJoo Deo: AIR  1978 All 1; Bapalal Godadbhai Kothari Vs. Charity Commissioner Gujarat: 1966  GLR 825

[88]   Allahabad    Bank  Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476.

[89]   S Pandit Rao Vs. Vishwakarma Association: 2009-6 ALD 269; 2009-6 ALT 197

[90]   State Bank of India Vs. Spl Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30.

[91] Narasingh Charan Mohapatra Vs. Radhakanta Mohapatra: AIR1951 Ori  132

[92]   Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460

[93]WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh:AIR 1957 SC887 .

[94]   In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228

[95]   Ramkishorelal vs. Kamalnarayan, AIR 1963 SC 890;  Agasthyar Trust Vs. CIT ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;(1998) 5 SCC 588). Krishnaswamy Pillai Vs. Kothandarama Naicken: AIR 1915 Mad 380; Dasami Sahu Vs. Param Shameshwar, AIR 1929 All 315

[96]   Agasthyar Trust Madras Vs. CIT ; 1998 AIR (SCW) 3945 ; (1998) 5 SCC 588).     

[97]   (6th edn. ). at p. 131

[98]   Quoted in: Agasthyar Trust Vs. CIT ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;(1998) 5 SCC 588). Sri Gasthyar Trust vs. CIT: [1999] 236 ITR 23:103 Taxman 363

[99]   4th Edn., Vol. 5, para. 624

[100]  See also: Radhika Mohan Nandy Vs. Amrita LalNandy, AIR 1947 Cal 301

[101]  Quoted in: Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar: AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[102]  Silvy George Vs. Anna Joseph: 2014-2 KerLJ 462;       Commr. of Wealth Tax Vs. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali:1983-139 ITR 517;      Vadivelu Mudaliar Vs. CN  Kuppuswami Mudaliar: ILR1971-3 Mad142;      Mahadulal Vs. Chironji Lal: AIR 1963 MP 51;      Chidambaranatha Thambiran Vs. Psnallasiva Mudaliar: AIR 1918 Mad 464.

[103]  Shanti Devi Vs. State : AIR1982Del453

[104]  See: MAppala Ramanujacharyulu Vs. M Venkatanarasimha: 1974 AP 316; Siva Kanta Barua Vs. RajaniramNath:AIR 1950 Ass. 154: ILR 51 All. 626.

[105]   Radhika Mohan Nandy v. Amrita LalNandy: AIR1947 Cal  301, Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17;       M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; T C Chacko Vs. Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107. Virbala K. Kewalram Vs. Ramchand Lalchand: AIR 1997 Bom 46

[106]   See: Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17; M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; TC ChackoVs. Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107. KS Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333

[107]AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[108]  Deelipkumar And Co.  Vs. Mulla Gulamali: 1998-1 Mad LJ 773; Ramdas Bhagat vs. Krishna Prasad: AIR 1940Pat425.

[109]  Thangachi Nachial Vs. Ahmed Hussain Malumiar: AIR 1957 Mad 194;      AS Krishna Murthy Vs. CN Revanna: AIR 2009 Kar 2692

[110]  Thayarammal Vs. Kanakammal: AIR 2005 SC 1588; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309.

[111]  Bai Dosabai  Vs. Mathurdas Govinddas: AIR 1980 SC 1334.

[112]  State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Bansi Dhar:  AIR 1974 SC 1084.

[113]  AIR 1951  Cal 309

[114]  AIR 1916 PC 256

[115]  AIR 1922 PC 123

[116]  AIR 1987 SC 2064

[117]  Mir Ghulam Hassan Shah Geelani Vs. Mir Maqbool: AIR 1975 J&K 57

[118]  ILR 12 Bombay 247.

[119]  Sec. 6(e) of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[120]  In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228

[121]  Contradistinct to ‘concrete noun’.

[122]  Contradistinct to ‘uncountable noun’ like poverty, wealth, kindness, innocence etc.

[123]  Govt. of the Province of Bombay Vs. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia:  AIR 1949 PC 143; Thiagesar Dharma Vs.  CIT: AIR 1964 Mad 483: [1963] 50 ITR 798  (Mad);  Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas 1967 Raj LW 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144; Thanthi Trust Vs. W. Tax Officer: (1989) 45 TAXMAN 121: (1989) 178  ITR 28; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Kishorelal AseraVs. Haji Essa Abba: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367; Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. Commner. of IT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-336  ITR 611; Sambandam Died Vs. NatarajaChettiar: 2012-1 Mad LW 530.

[124]  Canara Bank Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1982 Ker 1: ILR 1981-2 Ker 649.

[125]  Maulavi Kamiruddin Khan Vs. Badrun Nisa Bibi: AIR 1940 Pat 90; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Banarsi Dass: AIR  1972 Del  128; Pankumari Kochar Smt Vs. Controller of Estate Duty: 1969-73 ITR 373.

[126]ILR 1973-1 Del  144,

[127]  Pratap Singh ji Vs. Charity Commissioner: 1987 AIR SC 2064.

[128]  CIT Vs. P. Bhandari 1984 -47 ITR 500 (Mad); L Gouthamchand  Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1989-176 442(Mad).

[129]  Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, reads as under:  “6. Creation of trust: Subject to the provisions of section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts: … … … (e) (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust-property to the trustee.”

[130]  Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553.

[131]  Padmavathi Vs. Raghu Tippanna Ruge: 1968(1) MysLJ 583; Relied on: Shivramdas Vs. Nerukar: 39 Bom LR 633; Sree SreeIswar Gopal Jew Vs. Commr of IT: AIR 1951  Cal 309; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. Mgr. St. Bnk Mysore: AIR1988 Kar 1

[132]  Shanti Vijay and Company Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR 1980  SC 17; P Parthasarathy   Vs. Kee Pee Yes: 2016-1 MLJ 267; Neelam  Tirupatirayudu  Vs. Vinjamuri: 1912-17 Ind Cas 597; 1912-23 MLJ 599.

[133]  Shanti Vijay And Company VS Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR1980  SC 17.

[134]Ramdev Developers Vs. Jt. Chrity Commissioner: 2009-1Guj LR 337,

[135]  See Sec. 8 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

[136]  A D Vehvalwala Vs. M C H Rustomji: 1970 Cal LJ 312;1970-1 Cal LT 292.

[137]AIR 1934 Bom 64

[138]Quoted in: Maharashtra St. Co Op Bank Vs. Asst. Provt. Fund Commr: AIR  2010 SC 868; Santhoshkumar Vs. Shaji: AIR  2013 Ker 184; Ans Gopal heo Narain Vs. PK Banerji: AIR  1949 All 433.

[139]  Bhupathi Nath Vs. Ramlal Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128

[140]  Cambay Municipality Vs. Ratilal Ambalal: 1995 Supp2 SCC 591.

[141]  LT Overseas, North America Vs. Sachdeva : 2018 252 DLT 270

[142]  The Travancore Bank Ltd.  Vs. Abraham: AIR 1955  TC 131; Rama Rao Vs. V Chandra Gopal: 1969-82 LW 738: 1969-2 MLJ 460

[143]  Shanti Vijay and Company Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR 1980  SC 17; P Parthasarathy Vs. Kee Pee Yes: 2016 1 MLJ 267; Neelam Tirupatirayudu Vs. Vinjamuri: 1912-17 Ind Cas 597; 1912-23 MLJ 599.

[144]  Uma Shanker Gopalika Vs. State of Bihar (2006)2 SCC (Crl.) 49, Referred to in: Ranbaxy Vs. State of Telangana: 2016 2 ALT(Cri) 165.

[145]  Mussamat Basso Kuar Vs. Lala Dhum Singh: 1887-15 Law Rep. Ind.App. 211

[146]  BL Rai Vs. Bhaiyalal: AIR 1920 PC 8; Mahabir Prasad Mishra Vs. Shyama Devi: 2013-9 ADJ 46; 2013-101 AllLR 402

[147]  Jagannath Vs. Sripathi Babu: AIR 1945 Mad. 297.      Relied on in Narayani Amma Vs. Eyo Poulose: AIR 1982 Ker 198.

[148]  See Chapter: State & Court – Protectors of All Charities

[149]  AG Vs. Pearson: (1817) 3 Mer 353; Ram Dularey Vs. Ram Lal: AIR 1946 PC 34. Quoted in KS  Varghese Vs. St. Peters and St. Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333. Rajendra Gupta VS Corporation of Chennai, rep. by its Commissioner: 011 4 LW 633, Rajagopal v. Balachandran: 2002 (2) CTC 527, See also: Narasimhiah Vs. Y H Venkataramanappa: AIR 1976 Kar 43.

[150]  C.K. Rajan Vs. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee: .AIR 1994 Ker 179. [Appeal Judgment: Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee Vs. C.K. Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546]; Fakhuruddin Vs. Mohammad Rafiq: AIR  1916 All 115 (PC);  Sridhar Vs. ShriJagan Nath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner Of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089. Ch Hoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265;  I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. MullaAlibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309. See also: Mulla’s Hindu Law (11th Ed. Page 489) and Dr. B.K. Mukherjea: Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Fifth Ed, Page 407 and 412).

[151]  C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296: Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia:  AIR 1952 Kar 14; Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915; Subramonia Pillai Chellam Pillai Vs. Subramonia Pillai Chathan Pillai: AIR 1953 TC 198;  M.G. Narayanaswami Naidu Vs. M. Balasundaram Naidu: AIR 1953 Mad 750.

[152]  ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh Laws(Dlh)-2009-4-105 ILR (Dlh)- 2009-19-265], See also Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate  AIR 2007 SC 1337. 

[153]Sujan Mohinder Charitable Trust  Vs. Mohinder Kaur: 2019 0 Supreme(Del) 281, AM Shamsudeen Vs AM Mohamed Salihu: 2004 2 LW 487; 2003 2 MLJ 526.

[154]In-Re, Man Singh AIR 1974 Del. 228

[155]2017-8 MadLJ 529

[156] Referred to in: Thatha Sampath Kumar Vs. Vupputur Alwar: 2019-3MadLW 705

[157]  Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Union of India: (1996) 5 SCC 281; T.K. Shanmugam Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu: AIR 2016 Mad 25.

[158]  Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. Vs. Minguel Martins (2009) 3 SCC 571. Quoted in  Association for Environment Protection Vs. State of Kerala: AIR  2013 SC 2500; Navi Mumbai Environt. Preservation Society Vs. Ministry of Environment: 2019-1 BCR 39.

[159]  1997-1 SCC 388; Referred to in T. N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India , AIR 1997 SC 1228; In re T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2022) 4 SCC 289.

[160] Rajeev Suri Vs. Delhi Development Authority: 2021 SCC Online 7

[161]Jayant Etc Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh: AIR 2021 SC 496.

[162]  AIR 2018 SC 5538

[163]  (2009) 3 SCC 571

[164]  (2011) 6 SCC 508.



Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Kesavananda Bharati Case: Effect and Outcome – Never Ending Controversy

Saji Koduvath, Advocate

Introduction

Kesavananda Bharati case[1] is one of the most important cases taken up by the Supreme Court of India. Largest ever bench of the Supreme Court (13 judges) considered it.  Kesavananda credits the longest ever hearing in the history of the Supreme Court; it took 66 days, spread over to 5 months.

  • Kesavananda Bharati (1973) overruled Golak Nath (1967).
  • Golak Nath had overruled
    • (i) Sankari Prasad Vs. Union of India (1951) and
    • (ii) Sajjan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (1965)

I.    Points considered

The 13 judge bench was constituted to consider whether Golak Nath[2] was correctly decided. It had been held in Golak Nath, by an 11 judge bench, that the Parliament could not amend fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution[3] and that the amendments that took away or abridged fundamental rights were invalid. Therefore Kesavananda was eyed as a fight for supremacy between Parliament and Supreme Court.

II.  Background of Kesavananda Bharati

  • (i) Sankari Prasad and (ii) Sajjan Singh had upheld Parliament’s unlimited power.
  • Golak Nath had overruled these two decisions and held that Parliament cannot limit the vigour of the fundamental rights.

Sankari Prasad Vs. Union of India (1951): [4] 

A five-judge-bench of the Supreme Court considered power of the Parliament to amend fundamental rights. Zamindari Abolition Acts (Agrarian Reforms Laws) were enacted in Bihar, UP, MP. and several other States. These were based on the mandate in Art. 37 of the Constitution(read with Art. 39) which stipulated that it was the duty of the State to apply the ‘principles’ (Directive Principles) in Part IV of the Constitution,[5] in making Laws.

Zamindars questioned these Acts in court on the ground that it took away fundamental rights; mainly, Article 19(1)(f) – Right to Property.[6] Patna High Court held the Bihar Act to be unconstitutional. Therefore 1st Constitution Amendment (of 1951), inter alia, inserted Article 31A & 31B.[7]

This Constitution Amendment Bill had been moved by Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, PM, himself in the Provincial Parliament which consisted of the same members of the Constituent Assembly. Pt. Nehru said while moving the Bill:

  • “….. the whole purpose behind the Constitution, which was meant to be a dynamic Constitution leading to a certain goal, step by step, is somewhat hampered and hindered by the static element (Fundamental Rights) being emphasised a little more than the dynamic element (Directive Principles) and we have to find out some way of solving it”.[8]

Zamindars filed petition under Article 32 in the Supreme Court. The argument of the petitioners was that under Art.13(2)[9] no ‘law’ shall be made taking away or abdicating fundamental rights.

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Sankari Prasad Vs. Union of India, unanimously upheld the validity of the 1st Constitutional amendment holding that amendment of Constitution under Art. 368 was independent from, and not controlled by, Art. 13(2).

Sajjan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (1965): [10] 

Another 5-judge-bench considered the power of Parliament to amend fundamental rights. 17th Constitution Amendment Act (1965) which included certain Agrarian Reform Laws in the 9th schedule was questioned filing petitions under Article 32, before Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld validity of the Amendment Act, 1965. 

It is noteworthy that Mudholkar, J. raised a question: 

  • “Above all, it formulated a solemn and dignified Preamble which appears to be an epitome of the basic features of the Constitution. Can it not be said that these are indicia of the intention of the Constituent Assembly to give a permanency to the basic features of the Constitution?”  

Requirement of Constitution First Amendment of 1951 (on Property)

The requirement and effect of Constitution First Amendment of 1951 is recounted in Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694 [P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta (N. Rajagopala Ayyangar – dissented)], as under:

  • “The Constitution First Amendment of 1951 was made in order to validate the acquisition of zamindari estates and the abolition of permanent settlement. In other words the effect of the First Amendment was to provide that any law which affected the right of any proprietor or intermediate holder in any estate shall not be void on the ground that its provisions were inconsistent with any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by part III of the Constitution. The acquisition of zamindnri rights and the abolition of permanent settlement, however, was only the first step in the matter of agrarian reform which the Constitution-makers had in mind. When the first zamindari abolition laws were passed in pursuance of the programme of social welfare legislation their validity was impugned on the ground that they contravened the provisions of Arts. 14, 19 and 31. In order to save the impugned legislation from any such challenge Arts. 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule were enacted by the Constitution First Amendment Act; and it is in that context that Art. 31A (2)(a) and (b) were also enacted. After the zamindari abolition legislation was thus saved the Constitution-makers thought of enabling the State Legislatures to take the next step in the matter of agrarian reform. As subsequent legislation passed by several States shows the next step which was intended to be taken in the matter of agrarian reform was to put a ceiling on the extent of individual holding of agricultural land. The inevitable consequence of putting a ceiling on individual occupation or ownership of such agricultural land was to provide for the acquisition of the land held in excess of the prescribed maximum for distribution amongst the tillers of the soil. …”

III. Impugned Constitution-Amendments came up in Kesavananda

1. 24th ConstitutionAmendment, 1971

It was passed to get over Golak Nath. This Amendment expressly empowered the Parliament to amend any provision including fundamental rights and it made Article 13 inapplicable to Article 368. An interesting thing is that if Golak Nath held the field this Amendment itself was bad. 

2. 25th Amendment, 1971

The 4th amendment of the Constitution (1955) pertained to Article 31. After this amendment, property acquisition could not have been challenged in Court on the ground of adequacy of compensation.  But, in Bank Nationalisation case (1970), the Supreme Court struck down this clause.  To surmount this difficulty 25th Amendment was made (1971).  Following are the changes introduced by 25th Amendment:

  1. Section 2(a) of the Amendment Act: In 1955, by 4th amendment, it was inserted in Article 31:  “No such law (Acquisition law) shall be questioned in court on the ground that the ‘compensation’ was not adequate …”.  By 25th amendment in the place of ‘compensation’ the word ‘amount’ was inserted.  The purport was to convey the idea that full compensation should be paid.
  2. Section 2(b)  of the Amendment Act: It was inserted – Article 19(1)(f) – fundamental right to property – should not be used against Article 31.
  3. Section 3 of the Amendment Act: New Article 31C was inserted.  It provided: [first part] – the laws which give effect to Directive Principles will not be void on the allegation that it is inconsistent with certain fundamental rights; and [second part] – such laws (which contain a declaration to that effect) shall not be questioned in court.

3. 26th Amendment (1971)

It pertains to abolition of privy purses.

4. 29th amendment (1972)

29th Amendment of the Constitution put Kerala Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1969 and Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971, in IXth schedule. 

IV   Pre-determined and divided court heard Kesavananda: 

It was alleged: Most of the Judges to Kesavananda were committed to one-side or other.

Sikri CJ. and Shelat J. were parties to majority judgment in Golak Nath. In Bank Nationalisation case[11]and in Privy Purse Case[12] — both these decisions were followed Golak Nath — Sikri, Shelat, Hegde and Grover JJ. were parties to majority judgment.  

A.N. Ray J. was the single descending judge in Bank Nationalisation case.  He was among minority-descending-judges in Privy Purse Case also. 26th Constitution amendment (came up for consideration in Kesavananda) had been considered in Privy Purse Case also. ‘Fundamental right to property’ was in issue in all these cases.

Government appointed favourable judges to ‘pack the court’ M.H. Beg J. was alleged to be a nominee of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and Dwivedi J. was related to then Minister H.N. Bahuguna. It is reported – Dwivedi, J. had told to an audience of lawyers, before his elevation to Supreme Court that he was going to Supreme Court to overrule Golak Nath. The Judges expressed their ‘divided’ views in open court. The Advocates appeared also showed partisan approach towards Judges.

Palkhivala, Advocate for petitioner answered all questions of Chief Justice, Shelat, Hegde and Grover, JJ, and expressed reluctance to the questions of Ray, Mathew, Palekar and Khanna, JJ. It is observed that ‘on several occasions’ he simply ignored or evaded the questions from Dwivedi and Beg, JJ. In the course of argument, Attorney General read out part of a speech of Hegde, J., in Parliament (he was an M.P. earlier):  The laws were two generations behind the times and the judges were three generations behind their times.[13]

V   Rival contentions:

Nani A Palkhivala led arguments for the petitioners. He emphasized:

  1. Article 368 does not override Article 13(2). The power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is derived from Articles 245, 246 and 248 of the Constitution and not from Article 368 which only deals with procedure.[14] 
  2. The word ‘amendment’ has ‘limited’ meaning (something can be modified but without change of core) and there are ‘inherent and implied limitations’  to abrogate or repeal the Constitution (though not express; inherent in Constitution itself) for altering the essential features or basic structure of Constitution. It was explained by Palkhivala as under: “The principle of inherent and implied limitations means: deducing that is left unsaid from what is said, and perceiving what is implicit in the express provision and scheme of the instrument”. 
  3.  Palkhivala argued against unlimited amending power elucidating the essential features of our constitution, which included sovereignty, the republican form of government, the federal structure and the fundamental rights (as a whole). They were unchangeable.  Founding fathers of the Constitution considered fundamental rights as ‘fundamental’.  
  4. The Constitution is supreme. The Parliament is a creature of Constitution. Therefore, the Parliament cannot increase the power conferred to it or destroy essential/basic feature or basic structure of the Constitution. That is, there is implied limitation for the Parliament. 
  5. The Preamble [15] of the Constitution limits ‘unlimited power of the Parliament. 
  6. If Parliament has unlimited power, it can make judiciary and executive completely subordinate or take over their powers. 
  7. Ultimate power is vested with ‘We, the people’
  8. The Constitution gives the Indian citizen freedoms which are to subsist for ever. If Article 31C is valid, Parliament and State Legislatures, and not the Constitution, will determine how much freedom is good for the citizens.

H.M. Seervai (for State of Kerala) and Niren De (Attorney General) stood for unlimited amending power.  They stressed the following:

  1. Unless there are no express words, or compelling implication from the existing provisions, for limiting extent of amendment, then there will be no implied limitation.
  2. Government is duty bound to give effect to Directive principles (Part IV of the Constitution) and to enact ‘Laws’ to achieve those objectives.
  3. The acceptance of concepts like ‘implied limitation’, which have no definite contours, would introduce uncertainty and vagueness. 
  4. No test can be applied to essential or non-essential feature.  
  5.  The constituent assembly made no distinction between essential and non-essential features. 
  6. None in the constituent assembly said – fundamental rights could not be amended. 
  7. The expression ‘an amendment of this Constitution’ in Article 368 meant amendment of each and every provisions of Constitution. Article 368 not only prescribes the procedure but also gives the power of amendment   
  8.  If Constitution-makers intended that the fundamental rights should override Article 368, it is reasonable to assume that they would have made an express provision to that effect.  The Preamble cannot control the unambiguous language of the articles of the Constitution. The Constitution of India is one of the lengthiest Constitutions, if not the lengthiest of the world. 
  9. The expression ‘fundamental’ does not lift the fundamental rights above Constitution itself.
  10. There is distinction between Constituent power and legislative power.  Article 13(2) pertains to legislative power alone. 
  11.  The Constitution did not envisage a constituent assembly, in future, to abridge or change fundamental rights.

Palkhivala contended that wide power to amend the Constitution would result  ‘in liquidation of Constitution’. Attorney General (Niren De) retorted that ‘unambiguous meaning of amendment’ should not be destroyed ‘to nurse the theory of implied limitation’.

VII   What is the final outcome of Kesavananda Bharati

It is a never ending controversy.

13 Judges delivered 11 judgments. (There were two ‘common judgments’.) In the paper titled “View by the Majority” signed by Chief Justice (S.M.Sikri) and other 8 Judges (9 only) contained six points. It stated:

  • (1) Golak Nath case is overruled. 
  • (2) Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or frame work of the Constitution. 
  • (3) The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid.
    • (Note: It was passed to get over Golek Nath.) 
  • (4) Section 2(a) and 2(b) of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid.
    • (Note: It pertained to ‘right to property’. Art. 31 & 19(1)(f) and Added Art. 31C.) 
  • (5) The first part of Section 3 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid. The second part, namely, “and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy” is invalid. 
    • (Note: 1. New Article 31C provided: [first part] the laws which give effect to Directive Principles will not be void on the allegation that it is inconsistent with certain fundamental rights.
    • 2. The second part is held invalid, applying the doctrine of ‘basic structure‘ for the first time.)
  • (6) The Constitution (29th Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid.
    • (Note: It put Kerala Acts in the 9th Schedule.)
  • The Constitution bench will determine the validity of the Constitution (Twenty-sixth amendment) Act, 1971 in accordance with law.
    • (Note: It relates to the abolition of privy purses and privileges of princes.)

(1)  Judgment at a glance

Unanimous decision

  • Article 368 is independent from, and  not controlled by, Article 13(2).
  • Golak Nath is overruled.
  • 24th Constitutional Amendment Act is valid.

Judges accepted argument of Palkhiwala

Following Judges accepted the argument of Palkhiwala and held: (entire) fundamental rights (as such) were essential features of the Constitution and therefore there was implied limitation to abrogate or repeal them (though they could be abridged).  

  1. S.M. Sikri, CJ  
  2. J.M. Shelat  
  3. A.M. Grover  
  4. K.S. Hegde  
  5. A.K. Mukherjea
  6. P. Jaganmohan Reddi

Judges accepted argument of Government

Following Judges accepted argument of Government in this regard. That is, there was unlimited power of amendment – even furndamental rights also could be repealed.

  1. A.N. Ray
  2. D.G. Palekar
  3. K.K. Mathew
  4. M.H. Beg
  5. S.N. Dwivedi
  6. Y.V. Chandrachud

Khanna, J. took ‘Midway’ [as qualified by Palkhivala in (1974) 4 SCC Journal 57]

Khanna, J. rejected argument on ‘essential features’ and ‘implied limitation’ & proceeded on ‘basic structure doctrine’ alone. He held: power of amendment extends to all Articles including fundamental rights; and only restriction is that the basic structure of the Constitution should not be changed.

(2) No essential featuresNo implied limitation;

  • All Sikri (CJ) – led 6 Judges held: Fundamental rights could not be abrogated, (though they could be abridged, by amendment).
  • CJ, Sikri led judges (except Jaganmohan, J) accepted argument of Adv. Palkhivala that the fundamental rights are essential features of the Constitution and that there was implied limitation to change or amend the fundamental rights. 
  • J. Ray led 6 judges were of the definite opinion that there was no limitation at all to amend the Constitution and therefore fundamental rights also could be ‘amended’ – it could be abrogated or repealed.
  • Khanna J discarded both ‘essential features’ theory  and ‘implied limitation’ theory; and held: fundamental rights also could be ‘added, altered or repealed’.
  • Therefore, majority (J. Ray led judges + Khanna, J.) decision emerged was that: There was “no implied limitation” to amend the Constitution; that is, even the fundamental rights could be ‘repealed

 (3)   Khanna J. ‘Tipped the scales’

Kesavananda Bharati is fundamental right’s case.

The crux was whether fundamental rights could be ‘amended’.

CJ. Sikri-led six judges stood for limited power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution. They held – fundamental rights could not be abrogated or repealed. 

Broadly speaking, J. Khanna joined with them for he held: Parliament has no unlimited power to amend the Constitution.

 J. Khanna also joined six J. Ray-led judges when he held – fundamental rights also could be repealed.  Therefore the majority decision turned out was that fundamental rights are also subject to ‘amendment power’ of the Parliament.

Finally the ‘mid-way’ stance of J. Khanna ‘tipped the scales’ in favour of CJ. Sikri-led-judges which paved way to emerge basic structure doctrine as the ‘essential feature’ of Kesavananda.

(4) Final outcome – ‘Basic Structure Doctrine’: But, No Common Ratio?

  • Khanna, J. asserted: Art. 368 cannot be “so construed as to embody the death-wish of the Constitution or provide sanction for what may perhaps be called lawful hara-kiri”. 
  • It is clear that Khanna, J. propounded ‘basic structure’ doctrine not in the way that was upheld by Sikri (CJ.) led  judges. It was not in the way exactly argued by Palkhivala also. For discarding the ‘implied limitation’ theory and ‘essential features’ theory (these theories were accepted by Sikri-led judges), Khanna, J. accepted the arguments of Seervai and Attorney General in this regard. But, finally, by the ‘View by the Majority’ signed by nine judges, the view  (minority?)  of Khanna, J. (ie. basic structure doctrine) was emerged as the ‘ratio’ of the case.
  • Seervai in his treatise ‘Constitutional Law of India’ stated as under, on page 1626:  “If the ‘fundamental rights case’ is stood by itself, it was possible to argue that the judgment of 7 Judges [Sikri (CJ) led judges + Khanna, J.] as to the basic structure disclosed no common ratio”.

(5) Even CJ. Sikri-led-judges ‘diluted’ fundamental rights

CJ. Sikri led (6) judges (six only) held definitely that fundamental rights were not liable to be abrogated by amendment; and it is very important to note that even these 6 judges held that the fundamental rights were subject to reasonable abridgement, in the public interest; and the power of ‘amendment’ reached every part and every article of the Constitution, provided the basic foundation or structure remained the same. All these judges (also) varied from Golak Nath which unconditionally held – fundamental rights cannot be varied/ amended.

(6) Did Khanna J. hold every ‘fundamental right’ was part of basic structure?

Justice Khanna held the following in his Judgment:  “Subject to the retention of the basic structure or frame work of the Constitution, I have no doubt (i) that the power of amendment is plenary and (ii) would include within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles including those relating to fundamental rights  as well as which may be said to relate to essential features”.

Divergent views as to Judgment of Khanna, J.:

  1. Khanna, J. did not hold – fundamental rights were part of basic structure.  Seervai stated as under in ‘Constitutional Law of India’ (Page 1625) – “His (Khanna, J.) Judgment was capable of being read to mean that according to him fundamental rights (as such) were not a part of the basic structure of our Constitution and it was so read by Chandrachud, J. in the Election case (Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Raj Narayan)”[16]. (The idea conveyed is that, by ‘basic structure’ it brought-in broad aspects like ‘democracy, sovereignty, federalism’ etc. and it is not confined to any specific Part or Article.)
  2. Khanna J. held – fundamental rights might be part of basic structure. Bhagawati, J., in Minerva Mills case[17](mentioned below), pointed out that Khanna, J. did not hold that fundamental rights (as such) were not a part of the basic structure. Bhagawati, J. observed: “The very fact that Khanna, J. proceeded to consider this question (whether right to property, appertained to basic structure) shows beyond doubt that he did not hold that fundamental rights (as such) were not part of the basic structure; but so far as other fundamental rights were concerned, he left the question open”.
  3. Khanna J. held – fundamental rights were part of basic structure. Khanna, J. himself, also, had ‘explained’ in Election Case (Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Raj Narayanan) as under:
    • “It is difficult to read anything in my judgment to justify the conclusion that fundamental rights (as such) were not part of the basic structure”. 

(7)  Who won the battle for supremacy?

In Minerva Mills case (AIR 1980 SC 1789), CJ (majority) held:

Whether or not the summary (signed by nine judges) is legitimate part of Judgment, or is per-incurium for the scholarly reasons cited by authors, it is undeniable that it correctly reflects the majority view”.

The basic structure theory is stated in ‘View by the Majority’ (summary) as under:

  • Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or frame work of the Constitution”.

The upshot of this view by majority was that the Parliament lost the battle between Parliament and court.

It is interesting to consider: Could have the basic structure doctrine been more happily worded in ‘View by Majority’? Propositions are numerous. It is suggested that it would have been better and apt if it was begun in positive form as:

  • Article 368 enables the parliament to amend any provision of the Constitution provided the amendment does not destroy the basic structure of the Constitution” (See: (2016)5 SCC 1, 808 (J. Chelameswar).

Both the renditions were not relished by the Government.  Why? Because, in either case the court has the ultimate power to decide upon the validity of the enactments of Parliament (that is judicial review) on the touch stone of ‘basic structure’ doctrine.

(8)  What was the dictum on ‘right to property’?

The following two majority findings in Kesavananda are important:

  1.   The right of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is limited.  There are certain essential features  or basic structure which cannot be discarded. (Sikri (CJ) led judges + Khanna J)
  2.   Fundamental rights are also open to ‘amendment’. (J. Ray led judges + Khanna J)

In the light of the aforesaid two majority findings the following decision of Khanna, J. (single Judge) emerges as a declaration/ dictum (having force of law under Art. 141 of the Constitution) of Kesavananda[18]on the right to property:  “Right to property in Art. 19(1)(f) does not form part of the basic structure”(so that it cannot be amended).

(9) Is there a majority finding in Kesavananda on fundamental rights to property or what was the fate of Kerala Act. 

Sikri (CJ) – led (6) judges held that the matter whether the Kerala Land Reforms Act violated the fundamental rights to property was a matter to be gone into by the (regular) Constitution Bench. As stated above, they held that the fundamental rights were subject to reasonable abridgement, in the public interest, provided the basic foundation or structure remained the same. Therefore they directed to place the Kerala Land Reforms Act (29th Amendment) to a Constitution Bench. J. Ray-led (6) judges stood for unlimited power of Parliament. Therefore they had no occasion to probe into this matter. 

Khanna, J. alone probed – was ‘right to property’ formed part of basic structure of the Constitution.  He held: “Right to property did not form part of basic structure of Constitution”. He, inter alia, stated that (i) if it was felt necessary to abridge the fundamental right to property, for changing the economic structure (by narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor), and (ii) to obtain the objectives contained in the Directive Principles, the Preamble did not stand in the way of amending/limiting right to property.

Khanna J. unambiguously found that right to property did not form part of the basic structure of Constitution; and therefore any constitutional amendment could  be made on property (Land) related matters. Therefore, Khanna, J. held (along with six other Judges led by A N Ray, J) that the 29th amendment of the Constitution was unconditionally valid.  In view of Majority (J. Khanna + J. Ray led judges) the Kerala Act was not sent for consideration of a regular Constitution Bench.  

(10)   Did Khanna J ‘Misapplied’ ‘the law laid down’ by himself?

In Minerva Mills case Bhagavathi, J. doubted the decision of Khanna, J. as to the finding on the unconditional validity of the Kerala Acts for the following reason: Khanna, J. held that the fundamental rights, as a whole, are not part of basic structure.  Otherwise he should have referred the Kerala Acts to the regular Constitution Bench (as done by CJ. Sikri -led Judges), to see whether the inclusion of the Kerala Acts in the 9th Schedule was violative of the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. But Khanna J “wrongly held the Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1972 to be unconditionally valid”.

Bhagavathi J held: 

  • “It is not customary to quote from the writing of a living author, but departing from that practice which, I believe, is no longer strictly adhered to or followed, I may point out that what I have said above finds support from the comment made by Mr. Seervai in the 2nd Volume of his book on Constitutional Law, where the learned Author says: ‘The conflict between Khanna, J.’s views on the amending power and on the unconditional validity of the Twenty-ninth Amendment is resolved by saying that he laid down the scope of amending power correctly, but misapplied that law in holding Article 31-B and Schedule 9 unconditionally valid’. I entirely agree with this perceptive remark of the learned Author”.

(11) Did Apex Court Incorrectly held – Constitution (24th Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid?

As shown above, in Kesavananda Bharati there was unanimous decision on the following:

  • Article 368 is independent from, and not controlled by, Article 13(2).
  • Golak Nath is overruled.
  • The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid.

The 24th Constitutional Amendment Act had been passed to get over IC Golak Nath Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1967 SC 1643. (In Golak Nath, it was held by an 11 judge bench that the Parliament could not amend fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution and that the amendments that took away or abridged fundamental rights were invalid.) The Golak Nath decision was on the basis of Article 13 – which laid down that the ‘Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights’ are void. But, the Twenty-fourth Amendment Act, mainly, legislated:

  • “(4) Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article”. 

(i) The law declared by the Apex Court being the law of land, under Article 141 of the Constitution (See also: Bharvagi Constructions Vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy: AIR 2017 SC 4428) and (ii) it being not open to the legislature to simply brush aside findings of a court of law by an Amendment Act, under the Constitutional principles; instead of upholding Twenty-fourth Amendment Act (after overruling Golak Nath) the Supreme Court should have either annulled the Amendment, or observed that this amendment was redundant in view of the overruling. It is legitimate to say that the course open to the Government was to approach the Supreme Court, again (Note: AN Ray, CJ constituted a 13 judge bench to reconsider Kesavananda on the presumed premises that the Governments sought for a ‘reconsideration’, as shown below).

VI. Attempt of Government and the Chief Justice, A.N.Ray, to overcome Kesavananda

The Judges (Khanna, Mathew and Chandrachud, JJ.) applied the ‘basic structure doctrine’ when they considered the Election case of Indira Gandhi.  The importance is that it could have been ‘argued’: there was ‘no common ratio’, as observed by H.M. Seervai.  (But, even the two pro-government judges in Kesavananda also applied this doctrine)

  1. On April 25, 1973 Sikri, CJ retired. The Government appointed A.N. Ray as Chief Justice overlooking seniority of Shelat, Hegde and Grover, JJ.,  whereby these Judges resigned.
  2. On September 1, 1974, the Attorney General, Niren De, made an oral application to Chief justice for early hearing of certain petitions wherein violation of basic structure of the Constitution was alleged. 
  3. On June 25, 1975, Emergency was declared after Smt. Indira Gandhi lost the election case at Allahabad High Court. 
  4. On October 20, 1975, Chief Justice issued an order that a Bench of 13 Judges was constituted to hear the arguments, on basic structure doctrine and the validity of decision in Bank Nationalization case, from November 10, 1975.
  5. On November 7, 1975 the election appeal of Indira Gandhi was allowed by the Supreme Court. 
  6. On November 10, 1975, the review matter of Kesavananda was taken up.  Niren De, Attorney General submitted that Kesavananda impeded the Government’s committal to bring about large measures for socio-economic uplift of the people.

Palkhivala argued for 2 days on preliminary objection. [One of the main points placed by Palkhivala, and pondered by the judges (including pro-government judges in Kesavananda), was whether any legislation was ‘impeded’ by the declaration of the ‘basic-structure’ doctrine in Kesavananda. The Attorney General could not point out – any legislation was impeded.] (See ‘Neither Roses Nor Thornes’ by  Khanna Page: 74, Seervai: Page 2657 and ‘The Kesavananda Bharati Case’ by Anthiarujina, Page 99).  

The Chief Justice dissolved the Bench, abruptly, after two-days-hearing. Thus, the dissolution of specially constituted bench by Ray, CJ resulted in changing the ‘weak & wooden-framed’ basic structure doctrine into a ‘steel’ one, indirectly.

VII.    Reasons for abrupt dissolution of Special Bench

It is obvious that the fellow Judges of Ray, CJ in the specially constituted 13-judge-bench (including those who were in minority in Kesavananda) did not favour reconsideration or review of Kesavananda. 

It appears that it was for the following reason: That these judges were of the opinion that there would not have been any impediment to enact any so-called ‘progressive or socio-economic-oriented legislations’, such as Kerala Land Reforms Act, in future (on the allegation that such legislations violated fundamental rights),  since:

  1. Golak Nath was overruled;
  2. The theory of ‘essential feature’ (whereby no fundamental right could be amended) propounded by Palkhivala was discarded;
  3. ‘Basic structure doctrine’ (alone) became ‘view of the majority’ in Kesavananda;
  4. Even Sikri (CJ) – led 6 judges held that the fundamental rights were subject to  ‘reasonable abridgement’ in public interest; and
  5. Khanna, J. probed into the merits of argument – whether property right was not part of basic structure ; and his ‘findings’ were widely acclaimed. 

Seervai stated (on Page 1628) – “This sequence of events would suggest that Ray, CJ realised, before 10th November 1975, that his brother-judges in the Election case were not likely to depart from the theory of basic structure; and it would also suggest that the hearing before the bench of 13 judges satisfied him that the doctrine of the basic structure would not be reconsidered by the bench”. 

VIII.  Minerva Mills Case: Government-attempt to Supersede Kesavananda Led to this Case

During emergency the 42nd Constitution Amendment Act, 1976 was passed.  Major changes were the following: Article 31C was modified whereby the amendment deprived the fundamental rights of their supremacy and made them subordinate to directive principles of State policy.  In other words, the primacy was given to directive principles over fundamental rights in case of conflict between them.

Art. 368 was amended agaiin – Clause 4 & 5 were added: (a) Clause 4 –No amendment, before or after 42nd Amendment, “shall be called in question in any court on any ground”. (b) Clause 5 –“There shall be no limitation whatever” on Parliament’s amending power. 

All these amendments were challenged before the Supreme Court, in Minerva Mills Vs. Union of India (AIR 1980 SC 1789).  Palkhivala resigned the office as Ambassador to United States and came down to argue this case. The amendment to Art. 31C was struck down by the majority (Chandrachud (CJ), A.C. Gupta, N.L. Untwalia and P.S. Kailasam, JJ) as the same was found to be destructive to the basic structure of the Constitution.

Bhagawati, J. (minority) upheld Art. 31C which, according to him, did not destroy the basic structure of Constitution. Bhagawati, J. stated: 

  • “Lastly I must consider the argument of Mr. Palkhivala that almost any and every law would be within the protection of the amended Article 31C, because it would be referable to some Directive Principles or the other.  I think this is an argument of despair.  Obviously, the objection set out in these directive principles being specific and limited, ……… it is only a limited number of laws which would have real and substantive connection with one or the other of the specific objectives contained in these directive principles ……… I cannot therefore subscribe to the proposition that if the amendment in Article 31C were held valid, it would have the effect of protecting every possible legislation under the sun; and that would, in effect and substance, wipe out Article 14 and 19 from the Constitution ……

Chandrachud, CJ observed (for majority) as under:

  • “……… Art.31C has removed two sides of that golden triangle (Article 14, 19 and 21) which affords to the people of this country an assurance that the promise held forth by the Preamble (….to secure justice, liberty, equality & fraternity) will be performed ……, without emasculation of the rights to liberty and equality which alone can preserve the dignity of the individual.”

It is interesting to remember: Chandrachud, J. was a ‘pro-government judge’ in Kesavananda.

Clause 4 & 5 of Article 368 were unanimously struck down by the Supreme Court it being found invalid and ultravires for the following (main) reasons (as stated by Palkhivala in ‘We, the People’):

  1. Donee of a limited power cannot, by the exercise of that very power, convert the limited power into an unlimited one.  It amounts to overthrow the supremacy of the Constitution.
  2. The limited amending power is itself a basic feature of the Constitution.
  3. Ouster of the court’s jurisdiction destroys a basic feature.  It destroys balance of power between the legislature and judiciary.

IX.   How the Conflicts on ‘Right to Property’ laid to ‘Rest in Peace’:

The right to property – Article 19(1)(f) and 31 – was deleted by 44th Constitution Amendment Act, 1978 and Article 300A was inserted. It stated:

  • No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law”.

Palkhivala stated in ‘We, the people’ Page 201 – 

  • “I am wholly in favour of removing the small remnant of the right to property from the chapter on Fundamental Rights so as to put an end to the perpetual and deliberate distortion of the issue of the basic human freedoms by snide references to the right to property”.

X.   I.R. Coelho Vs. State of TN:  AIR 2007 SC 861

Despite Kesavananda Bharati decision following questions remained as potential:

  • Whether 9th Schedule was valid. Could laws be put in 9th schedule.
  • Did a law stand immunised from judicial review for it was put in 9th schedule.
  • Could the Parliament itself declare a law as valid  by inserting it in the 9th Schedule.

The nature and character of protection given by the 9th Schedule & Art. 31B had been considered by the Supreme Court in various cases subsequent to Kesavananda Bharati, including Waman Rao Vs. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 271). 

A 9-Judge Bench was constituted in I.R. Coelho – for re-considering Waman Rao to reconcile the ‘apparent inconsistencies’ in that decision, and to determine – (i) whether an Act once found by a Constitutional court to be violative of Ar. 14, 19 or 31 could be protected by including the same in the 9th Schedule; and (ii) whether the Constitution amendment (of putting an Act in  the 9th schedule) itself destroys the basic structure of the Constitution could be struck down.

I.R. Coelho found:

  • 9th Schedule is valid. Laws can be put in 9th schedule.
  • But, no law is not immunised – for it is put in 9th schedule – from judicial review.
  • Parliament itself cannot declare a law valid  by inserting such laws in the 9th Schedule.
  • Laws that that are incorporated in the Ninth Schedule after 24th April, 1973 (that is, after Kesavananda Bharati decision), shall be open to challenge on the ground that it destroys or damages the basic structure of the Constitution.

The reference to the 9-Judge Bench was finally answered by a ‘twin test’.

Twin Test [19]

First, whether there is violation of Fundamental Rights; then (second) whether ‘in effect and substance, destroys the basic structure’.

The first test (whether violation of Fundamental Rights) takes in following points:

  1. All fundamental rights do not constitute the basic structure.  It includes only ‘some of the fundamental rights.’[20]
  2. If only the ‘essence of any fundamental right or any other part of the basic structure is infringed’, [21] then only an Act  put in the 9th schedule will be rendered unconstitutional as violative of basic structure of the Constitution.
  3. Inquiry on essential features of the Constitution as reflected in Ar. 21, r/w 14, 19 is necessary[22] to render an Act unconstitutional.

 Infirmities pointed out by those who criticise this Judgment:

  1. The aforesaid 3 points are not harmonizing (but apparently conflicting) each other.
  2. The twin test in para 147 is also ambiguous. It turned more confusing when it reflected in the decreetal para, 150 (iii), as it was not made clear –  what was the ‘basic or essential features of the Constitution as reflected in Ar. 21 r/w Ar. 14 and Ar. 19 and the principles underlining them’. It is not clear, whether it widened the scope of Basic Structure Doctrine or narrowed it (from earlier decisions).
  3. It is not clear: which are the fundamental rights that are accepted as basic structure.
  4. It is also not made clear: whether the aforesaid fundamental rights as such, or the ‘essence’ of the fundamental rights, formed ‘basic structure’.

Significance of this Judgment according to those who support it.

  1. This Judgment expressly declared: Certain Fundamental Rights (as such) are part of basic structure.[23]
  2. It clarified and enlarged the scope of ‘basic structure’: for it canvassed ‘basic or essential features of the Constitution as reflected in[24] Ar. 21 r/w Ar. 14, Ar. 19 and the principles underlining them’. It left open a window so as to bring-in (future) social-reform-laws in the 9th schedule if and when it becomes the ‘need of the hour’.
  3. The twin test[25] (First, whether violation of Fundamental Rights; then (second) whether ‘in effect and substance, destroys the basic structure’) resolved the ambiguity/disputes in saving an Act putting in the 9th schedule after a finding by a Court that it is unconstitutional.

X. Dietrich Conrad on ‘Implied Limitations of the Amending Power’

German lawyer, Dietrich Conrad delivered a speech at the Law Faculty of the Banaras Hindu University in 1965 on ‘Implied Limitations of the Amending Power’. In the speech he said as under:

  • “Perhaps the position of the Supreme Court is influenced by the fact that it has not so far been confronted with any extreme type of constitutional amendments. It is the duty of the jurist, though, to anticipate extreme cases of conflict, and sometimes only extreme tests reveal the true nature of a legal concept.” 

Thereafter he wrote an article in the Indian Yearbook of International Affairs, in 1970, after the decision in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, ‘Limitations of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power’. This article was referred to in this judgement. 

(It is pointed out that the amendment made to save the election case of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was an ‘extreme amendment’ stated by Conrad.)

XI. ‘Majority cannot alter Fundamental Principles of Foundation’

The fundamental principles upon which a trust is founded cannot be varied. It is also not open for the majority of the members of an association to alter the fundamental principles upon which it is founded, unless such a power is specifically reserved. These principles are found in Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao, AIR 1931 Mad. 12 [Relying on: Milligan Vs.  Mitchel, 40 ER 852, Attorney General Vs. Anderson and Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun, (1904) AC 515].

XII  Conclusion:

F.S. Nariman stated (‘Before Memory Fades …’- Page 126): “It (basic structure theory) was evolved from great silences in our Constitution”. No doubt, these silences make the Constitution dynamic, vibrant and grow as an organic giant. But, what about ‘silences’ and ‘misapplications’ in judgments …?

XI. Amendments and Cases: in a nutshell

  Year  Article  Amendment  Case, Year and Decision
195131A   31BAcquisition law: not void for abridging F/r 9th Schedule – notwithstanding Judgmt, Law continue in force.Sankari Prasad (1952). Upheld amendment.
Sajjan Singh (1965) Upheld amendment.
Golakh Nath (1967) Struck down amendments (overruled Sankari Prd & Sajjan Singh).
  1971  31C   13 (4) & 368Laws give effect to D/p. Not be void for inconsistent with F/r. Such laws shall not be questioned in court. Amended to overcome Golek NathKesav. Bharati (1973). Upheld the 1st part (Laws give effect to D/p. Not be void for inconsistent with F/r) and Struck down 2nd part (Such laws shall not be questioned in court). Upheld Amended to overcome Golek Nath.
  1975  329A (4),(5)Prime Minister, Speaker not amenable to Election Law.Indira Gandhi (1975). Struck down Amendment.
  197631C   368 (4)       (5)Primacy given to D/p when conflict. Shall not be questioned in court. No limitationM. Mills (1980).
(i) Struck down by majority – Primacy given to D/p when conflict.
(ii) Struck down unanimously – Shall not be questioned in court & No limitation.
  31A,                              B,      C         ….Bhim Singhji & Waman Rao (1980). Urban Land Ceiling Act. S.27(1) struck down. Held that 9th Schedule would not hold full protection after 1973 April.
-do-       …I.R. Coelho (2007). Twin test.  
(1) Whether violation of F/r  
(2) Whether destroys B/s

Foot Note:

Argument of Dr. BR Ambedkar on  “Spirit of the Constitution” and Implied Prohibition

State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952  SC 252, Dr. Ambedkar argued for some of the zamindars in the Uttar Pradesh. He placed following propositions:

  • i. A constitutional prohibition could be deduced from the “spirit of the Constitution“.
  • ii. There can be implied prohibition in the Constitution.

Patanjali Sastri, C. J. dealt with the argument of Dr. Ambedkar as under:

  • “7. Dr. Ambedkar, who appeared for some of the zamindars in the Uttar Pradesh batch of cases, advanced a different line of argument. He placed no reliance upon Entry 36 of List 2 or Entry 42 of List 3. He appeared to concede what Mr. Das so strenuously contested, that those entries, concerned as they were with the grant of power to the State Legislature to legislate with respect to matters specified therein, could not be taken, as a matter of construction, to import an obligation to pay compensation. But he maintained that a constitutional prohibition against compulsory acquisition of property without public necessity and payment of compensation was deducible from what he called the “spirit of the Constitution“, which, according to him was a valid test for judging the constitutionality of a statute. The Constitution, being avowedly one for establishing liberty, justice and equality and a government of a free people with only limited powers, must be held to contain an implied prohibition against taking private property without just compensation and in the absence of a public purpose. He relied on certain American decisions and text-books as supporting the view that a constitutional prohibition can be derived by implication from the spirit of the Constitution where no express prohibition has been enacted in that behalf. Articles 31-A and 31-B barred only objections based on alleged infringements of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III, but if, from the other provisions thereof, it could be inferred that there must be a public purpose and payment of compensation before private property could be compulsorily acquired by the State, there was nothing in the two articles aforesaid to preclude objection on the ground that the impugned Acts do not satisfy these requirements and are, therefore, unconstitutional.”

Mahajan J. dealt with this argument of Dr. Ambedkar as under:

  • “201. Having negatived the contentions of Mr. Das, I cannot for the same reasons accept the contentions of Mr. Dar as sound. It is convenient now to examine the point made by Dr. Ambedkar that the obligation to pay compensation is implicit in the spirit of the Constitution. It is well settled that recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution when its provisions are explicit in respect of a certain right or matter. When the fundamental law has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the general powers conferred on the legislature, it is not possible to deduce a limitation from something supposed to be inherent in the spirit of the Constitution. This elusive spirit is no guide in this matter. The spirit of the Constitution cannot prevail as against its letter. Dr. Ambedkar relied on the observation of Nelson J. in ‘PEOPLE v. MORRIS’, 13 Wend 325, quoted in the foot-note at p. 357 of Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations. The foot-note states:
    • “It is now considered an universal and fundamental proposition in every well regulated and properly administered government, whether embodied in a constitutional form of not, that private property cannot be taken for strictly private purposes at all, nor for public uses without a just compensation; and that the obligation of contracts cannot be abrogated or essentially impaired. These and other vested rights of the citizen are held sacred and inviolable, even against the plenitude of power of the legislative department.”
  • Those observations of the learned Judge, however, do not lend support to the contention urged; on the other hand, it seems to me that the proposition stated by Dr. Cooley at page 351 (Vol. I) that the Courts are not at liberty to declare an Act void, because in their opinion it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution but not expressed in words, has an apposite application here. It is difficult upon any general principle to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial interposition except so far as the express words of a written constitution give that authority.
  • 202. The argument of Dr. Ambedkar cannot be accepted for the further reason that it is based on an unwarranted assumption that qua the estates of the zamindars, Part III of the Constitution stands repealed and is ‘non est.’ The truth is that Part III of the Constitution is an important and integral part of it and has not been repealed or abrogated by anything contained in Art. 31-A of the Constitution; on the other hand Art. 31-A, while providing that no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III, clearly provides that where such law is made by the legislature of a State, the provisions of this article ‘shall not apply thereto’ unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent. This proviso in express terms keeps alive the alternative provisions of Part III of the Constitution in Art. 31(3) for judging whether the State law has or has not complied with the provisions of Art. 31 (2). The provisions of Art. 31(2). therefore, do not stand repealed by Art. 31-A. On the other hand they are kept alive. The difference is that persons whose properties fall within the definition of the expression “estate” in Art. 31-A are deprived of their remedy under Art. 32 of the Constitution and the President has been constituted the sole judge of deciding whether a State law acquiring estates under compulsory power has or has not complied with the provisions of Art. 31 (2). The validity of the law in those cases depends on the subjective opinion of the President and is not justiciable. Once the assent is given, the law is taken to have complied with the provisions of Art. 31 (2).”

[1] His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1973 SC 1461. This case is known is as ‘Fundamental Rights Case’.

[2] IC Golak Nath Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1967 SC 1643

[3] F.S. Nariman stated in ‘Before Memory Fades ….’ page 124, as under: “Subba Rao, CJ managed to forge (with his qualities of judicial statesmanship) a narrow majority (6:5) for the view that none of the fundamental rights were amenable to the amending power (Article 368) in the Constitution …” (F.S. Nariman assisted N.A. Palkhivala who argued for petitioner in Golak  Nath)

[4] AIR 1951 SC 458

[5] Part IV contains Directive Principles of State Policy

[6] It was repealed and a new Article was inserted – Art. 300A

[7] Article 31A stipulated that no acquisition law should be void for it takes away or abridges fundamental rights. Article 31B introduced 9th schedule and stated that the Acts specified in that schedule should not be void for it took away or abridged fundamental rights.

[8] Provincial Parliament Debates: May 16, 1951

[9] Article 13(2) lays down: State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by fundamental rights and any law made in contravention of this clause is void. (Art. 12: State includes Parliament.)     Note: Article 13(2) refers to ‘laws’ and not Constitutional amendments

[10] AIR 1965 SC 845; Golak Nath has held that the 1st Amendment was invalid.  It (prospectively) overruled both Sankari Prasad & Sajjan Singh.

[11] Rustom Cawasji Cooper Vs. Union of India – AIR 1970 SC 564

[12] Madhava Rao Sindhya Vs. Union of India – AIR 1971 SC 530

[13] Kesavananda Bharathi Case: TR Andhiarujina: Page 16.

[14] Sankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh held that Article 368 was independent from Article 13(2).  But Golak Nath held: “Law in Article 13(2) would cover Constitutional amendments in Article 368 also.

[15] The Preamble to the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, proclaims:

 “WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens:

       JUSTICE, social, economic and political;

       LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;

       EQUALITY of status and of opportunity;

and to promote among them all

       FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation;

In our Constituent Assembly this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this constitution.”

[16] AIR 1975 SC 2299

[17] AIR 1980 SC 1789

[18] (Art. 141: Law declared by SC binds on all courts)

Palkhivala, in the written propositions placed before the 13-judge-review-bench (detailed below), begun as under: “At the outset it is important to note what are the true effects of Kesavananda’s case.  In that case it has been expressly held that the right to property is not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and therefore any amendment can be made to the Constitution in total disregard of the right to property”. (We, the people – Page 183)

[19] Para 147

[20] Para 114 (1st part): Since the basic structure of the Constitution includes some of the fundamental rights, any law granted 9th schedule protection deserves to be tested against these principles.

Para 150 (iii) (2nd part): Even though an act is put in the 9th schedule by a constitutional amendment its provisions would be open to attack, on the ground that they destroy or damage the basic structure, if the fundamental right or rights taken away or abrogated pertains or pertain to the basic structure.

[21] Para 114 (2nd part): If the law infringes the essence of any of the fundamental rights or any other aspect of basic structure then it will be struck down.

[22] Para 150(iii): All amendments ……….. shall have to be tested on the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the Constitution as reflected in Ar. 21 r/w Ar. 14 and Ar. 19 and the principles underlining them. (1st part)

[23] The other views are: (i) not a ‘mere violation’ of a fundamental right, but a ‘shocking, unconscionable or unscrupulous’ violation invites challenge on the doctrine of basic structure (See Judgment of  Krishna Iyer, J.  in Waman Rao); (ii)  violation should affect the ‘core’ of the fundamental right; and (iii) basic structure doctrine pertains to ‘concept’ and not the ‘language’ in Part III of the Constitution.

[24] In Waman Rao v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 271), considering the earlier decision in Keshavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala (AIR 1973 SC 1461), it is held:  “2. In Keshavananda Bharati, decided on April 24, 1973 it was held by the majority that Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to damage and destroy its basic or essential features or its Basic Structure. ….. (I)f any Act or Regulation included in the 9th Schedule by a constitutional amendment made after April 24. 1973 is saved by Article 31C as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the 9th Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its Basic Structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose. “

[25] Para 147



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