What is Munambam Wakf Land Issue? If No Permanent Dedication, there will be No Wakf.

PV Salim, Advocate, Kottayam

Introduction

About 400 acres of land at Munambam coast inhabited by hundreds of families of fishing communities, for generations, is claimed to be wakf property. This area is situated in Ernakulam district.  It is a part of Vypin Island. It comes within the boundary of erstwhile Travancore.  The majority of people there belongs to Latin Christian. Good number of Hindu families is also there.

History of the Dispute, in Nutshell

During 1902, Travancore Government leased out 404 acres of land, to Abdul Sathar Haji Moosa Sait. In 1948, Mohammed Siddiq Sait got the land assigned in his name from the legal hairs of Sathar Sait. Siddiq Sait had given the land to the Farook College, Kozhikode executing a ‘dakf’ (not wakf) deed on November 1, 1950.

Earlier Injunction suit

Farook College managing committee had filed a civil suit in 1962 before the Addl. District Court, Parur (OS No. 35/1962: Subsequently numbed as OS No. 53/1967 of Sub Court, Parur) for restraining the defendants (27 in number) from ‘trespassing’ on the suit property (404 acres). It ended in a High Court (AS No. 600/1971) decision in 1975. The defendants 1 to 14 were kudukidappukars. The injunction sought for by the college was granted (excepting the kudukidappukars and two others) . But there was no title enquiry, it being proceeded only on ‘possession’. (Actually there was no contention at all on the basis that it was a wakf property.)

It was definitely pointed out by the High Court, on the basis of survey commission report, that the extent of land available was 135.11 acre alone; the rest being lost by sea erosion.

Abdul Sathar Haji Moosa Sait Obtained Property in 1902

In the Judgment of the Sub Court dated 12. 07. 1971, the case of the plaintiff/college is laid down as under:

  • “Abdul Sathar Haji Moosa Sait obtained registry of 34 acres 92 cents on the eastern side of the canal and 404 acres 76 cents on the western side, in 1902 ME ….. On the death of the registry holder who was enjoying the property effecting improvements, his legal representatives sold the property to one Mohammed Siddiq Sait by document No. 875/1123″.

Dispute arose in 1960s were Settled

Though the people have been residing in that land for generations, they had no ownership deeds.  The legal steps initiated by the college authorities against the occupants were settled by a compromise whereunder the land was sold to its occupants at market rate.

Present Controversies

The Kerala State Wakf Board placed claim over the land – on the ground that there is wakf on the basis of the 1950 wakf deed.

What is a wakf?

Wakf is permanent dedication of property for charitable or religious purposes.

Is there a Permanent Dedication in Munambam matter?

It is the most important issue. The answer thereof is depended upon the interpretation of the 1950 deed. The following clause in the 1950 deed is brought forward by those who stand for propping up the rights of wakf and to argue that the dedication is permanent.

  • “There will be no right (for the college) to use the property, and the income therefrom, for any purpose other than the educational purpose of the college.”

The following emphatic provision in the 1950 deed is pressed ahead by those who stand for propping up the rights of the residents there, to say that there was no permanent dedication.

  • If the college comes to a standstill, and the property herein remains, the executant of the deed and his successors will have the right to recover the scheduled property.”

Nissar Commission

In 2008, an inquiry commission (Nissar, District Judge) was appointed as regards this property. The commission found (said to be without notice to the residents) that it was a wakf property. It observed that sale of properties, made by the college authorities, were illegal.

Wakf Board Required Revenue not to Accept Land Tax

In 2019, the Wakf Board required the Revenue Authorities not to accept land tax from the occupants. The state government did not approve it. Wakf Board filed petitions before the Kerala High Court. The High Court granted a temporary stay.

THE MUSSALMAN WAKF ACT, 1923

It is the Act that governed the matter during the time the dakf deed was made. This Act had been made ‘whereas it is expedient to make provision for the better management of wakf property and for ensuring the keeping and publication of wakf property accounts in respect of such properties’. It defined wakf as under:

  • “(e) “Wakf” means the permanent dedication by a person professing the Mussalman faith of any property for any purpose recognised by the Mussalman law as religious, pious or charitable, but does not include any wakf, such as is described in section 3 of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913, under which any benefit is for the time 6 being claimable for himself by the person by whom the wakf was created or by any of his family or descendants.”

THE WAKF ACT, 1954

The 1923 Act was overrode by The Wakf Act, 1954. This Act defined wakf as under:

  • (l) “wakf” means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes—
  • (i) a wakf by user;
  • (ii) grants (including mashrut-ul-khidmat) for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and
  • (iii) a wakf-alal-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable;

THE WAKF ACT, 1995

1995 Act was promulgated, repealing the 1954 Act . The 1995 Act is made for ‘the better administration of Wakfs and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto’. It defined wakf as under:

  • “(r) “wakf” means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes –
  • (i) a wakf by user but such wakf shall not cease to be a wakf by reason only of the user having ceased irrespective of the period of such cesser;
  • (ii) “grants“, including mashrut-ul-khidmat for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and
  • (iii) a wakf-alal-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable …”

Supreme Court Decisions

In Trustees of Sahebzadi Oalia Kulsum Trust v. Controller of Estate Duty, A. P. , Hyderabad, (AIR 1998 SC 2986; 1998-6 SCC 267) it is laid down as under:

  • “The mention of the poor is required by Mohammad (not by Abu Yusuf with whom is the Fatwa) not to give validity to the wakf, but to ensure perpetuity; and as human beings are liable to become extinct and as a wakf must be a permanent dedication, Mohammad required that the poor should be expressly named or implied by the use of the word “sadakah”. Abu Yusuf, on the other hand, held that whether the poor were named or not, or whether the word “sadakah” was used or not, the word “wakf” implied perpetuity, and, therefore, unless some other object was named, on failure of the wakif’s posterity, the income would be applied for the poor. There is no question about the validity of the wakf; the mention of the poor does not make the wakf per se more or less valid; it only ensures perpetuity insisted upon in the law.
  • The position in Islamic Law is summed up by Fyzee at page 303 by quoting the words of Ameer Ali:
  • From the promulgation of Islam up to the present day there has been an absolute consensus of opinion regarding the validity of wakfs on one’s children, kindred and neighbours. Practical lawyers, experienced judges, high officers of every sect and school under Mussulman sovereigns are all in unison on this point. There are minor differences, viz. Whether a wakf can be created for one’s self, whether the unfailing object should be designated, whether the property should be partitioned or not, whether consignment is necessary or not; but so far as the validity of a wakf constituting one’s family or children the benefaction, in whole or in part, is concerned, there is absolutely no difference. A wakf is a permanent benefaction for the good of God’s creatures: …”

In Aligarh Muslim University (The) v. Syed Mohammad Sayeed Chishty (2008 2 RLR 59; 2007 3 RLW(Raj) 2394; 2007 3 WLC 298) it is observed as under:

  • “(38). Thus, the Act of 1913 brought the law in conformity with the lslamic Jurisprudence on wakf. In the case of Trustees of Sahebzadi Oalia Kulsum Trust v. Controller of Estate Duty, A.P. (1998) 6 SCC 267), the Honble Supreme Court expressly overruled the case of  Abul Fata Mohammad Ishak v. Rasamaya Dhur Chowdhary (1894-22 Indian Appeals 76).
  • (39). Thus, “wakf is an unconditional, irrevocable, perpetual dedication of property, vested in God, the ownership of the founder, called `wakif is extinguished, the usufruct or profits of the property are used for the benefit of mankind, except for purposes forbidden by lslam. The essential of a valid wakf according to the Hanafi Law are threefold:
  • (1) The dedicator (wakif) should be a person professing the Musalman faith and of sound mind and not a minor or a lunatic, and
  • (2) The dedication should be for a purpose recognized by the Musalman law as religious, pious or charitable. (Mulla. 621).
  • (3) However, according to the Act of 1913, the wakf can be created for the benefit of the wakifs children, kindred or descendants as long as the ultimate purpose is the benefit of the poor or any religious, pious or charitable work in accordance with Muslim law.”

What is Dedication in Indian Law

An ‘endowment’ is founded by dedication of property for the purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment. In the ‘law of trusts’, dedication involves the extinguishment of the rights of the original owner of the lands (Gulam Mohideen Khan v. Abdul Majid Khan: AIR  1957 AP 941).

  • By ‘dedication’, the owner divests all his rights, title and interest in the property which becomes the property of the deity (SM Manorama Dasi Vs. Dhirendra Nath Busu: AIR  1931 Cal 329) or other endowment.

Read Blog: Dedication of Property in Public Trusts

Dedication involves complete (Kidangoor Devaswom v. Krishnan Namboothiri, 2016-1 KerLT 778) extinguishment of the rights, or cessation of ownership (Kuldip Chand v.  Advocate General to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685, Amolak Nath Vs. Keshav Ji Gaudia Math Trust: 2013-1 ADJ 363; 2012-94 All LR 573) of the original owner of the lands (Gulam Mohideen Khan v. Abdul Majid Khan: AIR 1957 AP 941).

The essential formalities (See: Shri Ram Kishan Mission v. Dogar Singh AIR 1984 All 72) for the creation of a religious or charitable endowment are:

  • the property in respect of which the endowment is made must be designated with precision;
  • the object or purpose of dedication should be clearly indicated;
  • the founder must have effectively divested (State of Madras v. S. S. M. Paripelena Sangam: AIR 1962 Mad 48; See also: Idol Murli Manoharji v. Gopilal Garg: AIR 1971 Raj 177) himself of all beneficial interest (right of enjoyment as owner or beneficial ownership (See: M. R. GodaRao Sahib v.  State of Madras: AIR 1966 SC 653; Sree Siddhi Budhi Vinayakagar v. S V Marimuthu: AIR 1963 Mad 369) in the endowed properly.

Claim of Title in ‘Dakf’ Deed

In the dakaf deed ‘absolute title’ is claimed. It is said to be derived from the sale deed executed by his predecessor in interest, under deed No. 775 of 1123 of SRO, Edappally.

Mere Assertion will not Confer Title

It is definite, and admitted by all concerned, that the property had been obtained to the predecessor in interest of the transferor under a Government lease, in 1902. If that be so, he had not obtained title. Mere assertion, without pre-existing title will not confer title; (Neelakantan Damodaran Namboori v. Velayudhan Pillai, AIR 1958 SC 832; Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki 2024-2 KLT 789) Nemo dat qod applies (P. Kishore kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar, 2024 (1) CTC 547).

GOVT. CAN RECOVER THIS PROPERTY

Since the Travancore government had given the property under a pattom/lease (in 1902) and the lessee had claimed title, the State, as landlord, can recover the property “on that ground” alone.

In Bishwanath Agarwala v. Sabitri Bera -2009(15) SCC 693 (Deepak Varma & SB Sinha, JJ) it is held as under:

  • “The landlord in a given case though may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the event, he proves his general title, may obtain a decree on the basis thereof.”

The Apex Court referred to Champalal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra, 1990 (1) DJLR 298, where SB Sihna, J. himself held:

  • “It is also well settled that one such relationship is admitted or established tenant would be estopped and precluded from challenging the title of the landlord; and if he does so, under the general rule, make himself liable for eviction on that ground”.

Read Blog: Pandaravakapattom and Travancore Royal Proclamations of 1040 (1865) and 1061 (1886)

Conclusion

The disputes in Munambam issue, in its ultimate analysis, centers around the point – whether there is ‘permanent dedication’ or not. It is depended upon the interpretation of the ‘dakf’ deed of 1950.


How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Even the Rightful Owner is NOT entitled to Eject a Trespasser, by Force

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

It goes without saying that the the rightful owner is not legally entitled to eject the interloper or trespasser by force, otherwise than by due process of law; especially when the trespasser is in settled possession.

In Karthiyayani Amma v. Govindan, AIR 1980 Ker 224, the High Court considered the question whether the rightful owner can eject a trespasser in possession with force; and whether a person in illegal possession could sustain a suit for injunction against the true owner, from forcibly dispossessing him from the property.  It was held as under:

  • “The ultimate position, therefore, reduces itself to this:
  • Can a person in possession without title sustain a suit for injunction against the rightful owner if he proves possession?
  • Yes.
  • In this case, plaintiff is found to in be possession. On the finding, he should be granted the injunction prayed for. A person in possession can be evicted only in due process of law. Even the rightful owner cannot eject him with force. If he cannot be evicted with force, he continues to be in possession and he can resist invasion of his possession by everyone including the rightful owner. If the rightful owner threatens his peaceful possession, he can approach Courts of Law and pray for the equitable relief of injunction to protect his possession”. (Followed in Aiysumma Vs. Mariyamma, 1994-2 CIVCC 52, 1994-1 KerLT 570. )

It is pointed out in Suresh v. Ashok Girdharilal Chandak, 2016-1 MHLJ 171 that ‘bearing in mind the basic principle of law in civil jurisprudence that even a trespasser cannot be evicted without following due process of law and no one can be allowed to take law into his own hands to recover possession of the property without following due process of law and without proving title to the immovable property in possession of a person holding actual physical possession thereof’.

Person in possession can use Reasonable Force to keep out a Trespasser

In Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769, our Apex Court Court, observed as under:­ 

  • “8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser.
  • A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force.
  • If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. 
  • The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force.
  • In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.” (quoted in: Subramanya Swamy Temple, Ratnagiri v. V. Kanna Gounder, 2009-3 SCC 306)

What is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner was made clear in Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769. It reads as under:

  • “9. …The “settled possession” must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase “settled possession” does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a straitjacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession.” (quoted in Samarpan Varishtha Jan Parisar vs Rajendra Prasad Agarwal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 564)

No decree for recovery unless ‘present right to the possession’

While considering the question whether a worshipper can file a suit for recovery, it is held by our Apex Court, in M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case) 2019-1 SCC 1, that no decree for recovery of possession can be made in such a suit unless the worshipper has the ‘present right to the possession’. But it is pointed out that in such situations, a worshipper must be permitted to sue as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the idol itself – directly exercising the deity’s right to sue.

Person in possession can use Reasonable Force to keep out a Trespasser

In Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769, our Apex Court Court, observed as under:­ 

  • “8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.”

Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal – HC and SC Approached in different Perspectives

Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal, 2022-10 SCC 217, arose from a suit seeking declaration of ownership and permanent injunction. The findings of the High Court were the following:

  • the plea of ownership claimed by the plaintiff based on a sale deed and the plea of adverse possession were contrary to each other;
  • the plaintiffs could not have been permitted to take both the pleas at the same time;
  • but, in view of the fact that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land since the execution of the said sale deed, the plaintiff was entitled for injunction on the basis of his possession.

Setting aside the High Court judgment the Apex Court held as under:

  • “The possession/alleged possession of the plaintiffs could not have been protected by passing a decree of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiffs”.

Should the Defendant-Rightful-Owner Approach the Court Again For Recovery?

No.

Before Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal, our Apex Court held in Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji v. Maniben Jagmalbhai, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 258 (M.R. Shah, B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.) to the following effect (:

  • The plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction and/or protect his possession against the rightful owner, more particularly, when he fails to get the declaratory relief with respect to the title.
  • In a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession, the only thing the plaintiff will have to establish is that as on the date of the suit, he was in lawful possession of the suit property and the defendant has tried to interfere or disturb his possession
  • the plaintiff, who has failed to get any declaratory relief on title cannot be said to be in “lawful possession”. Only when the person seeking the relief is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the property, he is legally entitled to be in possession, and not to disposes him, except in due process of law.
  • The contention of the plaintiff that even if the plaintiff failed to get the declaratory relief and the suit is dismissed, once the plaintiff is found to be in possession, her possession cannot be disturbed except in due process of law and the only remedy available to the defendant would be “to file a substantive suit to get back the possession is noticed only to be rejected outright”.
  • In Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes Vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370, it was held that the ‘due process’ or ‘due course’ condition was satisfied the moment the rights of the parties were adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it did not matter who brought the action to court.
  • In Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes Vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, the Court has approved the following findings of the High Court of Delhi in Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. Vs. Hotel Imperial (2006) 88 DRJ 545:
    • “In this context, when a party approaches a court seeking a protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails in setting up a good case, can it then say that the other party must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing his rights i.e. for taking back something from the first party who holds it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the injunction action must grant an injunction anyway? I would think not.”
  • Once the rights of the parties are adjudicated and the defendant is held to be the true owner, it can be said that due process of law has been followed and thereafter the plaintiff is not entitled to any permanent injunction against the true owner.
    • Note: It is not specifically stated in this decision, Prahladji Chenaji v. Maniben Jagmalbhai, that one can resume possession using force.

‘Possession is Good Against All But the True Owner’

The principle ‘Possession is Good against all but the True Owner’ is declared in Parry v. Clissold, (1907) AC 73. In this decision it was also pointed out that if the rightful owner did not come forward and assert his title within the period of limitation, his right would be extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.

The Supreme Court of India while accepting this principle in Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, pointed out that the law in India allows a plaintiff to maintain a possessory suit under Sec. 9 (preset Sec. 6) of the Specific Relief Act. Such a suit can be filed against a title holder, if he had dispossessed the plaintiff ‘otherwise than in due course of law’.

Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act reads as under:

  • 6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.
  • (1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit.
  • (2) No suit under this section shall be brought
    • (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or
    • (b) against the Government.
  • (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.
  • (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.

In Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, it is observed as under:

  • “17. … To express our meaning we may begin by reading 1907 AC 73 (Perry V. Clissold), to discover if the principle that possession is good against all but the true owner has in any way been departed from.
  • 1907 AC 73 reaffirmed the principle by stating quite clearly:
    • “It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.”
  • Therefore, the plaintiff who was peaceably in possession was entitled to remain in possession and only the State could evict him. The action of the Society was a violent invasion of his possession and in the law as it stands in India the plaintiff could maintain a possessory suit under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act in which title would be immaterial or a suit for possession within 12 years in which the question of title could be raised. As this was a suit of latter kind title could be examined. But whose title? Admittedly neither side could establish title. The plaintiff at least pleaded the statute of Limitation and asserted that he had perfected his title by adverse possession. But as he did not join the State in his suit to get a declaration, he may be said to have not rested his case on an acquired title. His suit was thus limited to recovering possession from one who had trespassed against him. The enquiry, thus narrows to this:
    • did the Society have any title in itself,
    • was it acting under authority express or implied of the true owner or
    • was it just pleading a title in a third party ?
  • To the first two questions we find no difficulty in furnishing an answer. It is clearly in the negative. So the only question is whether the defendant could plead that the title was in the State?
  • Since in every such case between trespassers the title must be outstanding in a third party a defendant will be placed in a position of dominance. He has only to evict the prior trespasser and sit pretty pleading that the title is in someone else. As Erle, J. put it in Burling v. Read [(1848)11 Q.B. 904]
    • ‘parties might imagine that they acquired some right by merely intruding upon land in the night, running up a hut and occupying it before morning’.
  • This will be subversive of the fundamental doctrine which was accepted always and was reaffirmed in Perry V. Clissold (1907 AC 73). The law does not, therefore, countenance the doctrine of ‘findings keepings’.

Possession is a Good Title or Right Against any one who cannot Show a Better

In Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813, our Apex Court explained the principle ‘possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better’ as under:

  • “9. The law in India, as it has developed, accords with jurisprudential thought as propounded by luminaries like Salmond. Salmond on Jurisprudence states:­
    • “These two concepts of ownership and possession, therefore, may be used to distinguish between the de facto possessor of an object and its de jure owner, between the man who actually has it and the man who ought to have it. They serve also to contract the position of one whose rights are ultimate, permanent and residual with that of one whose rights are only of a temporary nature.
    • x x x x x
    • In English law possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who takes his own, may be forced in this way to  restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law.
    • Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit).”
  • 10. As far back as 1924, in the case of Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144, the learned Judge observed that in India, persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a court. Later, in the case of Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, this Court ruled that when the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. It was further held that if Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (corresponding to the present Section6) is employed, the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. When, however, the period of six months has passed, questions of title can be raised by the defendant, and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words, such a right is only restricted to possession in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (corresponding to the present Section 6) but does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years from the date of dispossession, and title need not be proved unless the defendant can provide one.
  • 11. It was also observed by this Court in Nair Service Society Ltd (supra) that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against the entire world except the rightful owner. In such a case, the defendant must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title and probably a possession prior to the plaintiff’s, and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time.”

Settled Possession and Established Possession

In A. Subramanian v. R. Pannerselvam, AIR 2021 SC 821, the Supreme Court held that even a trespasser, who is in established possession of the property could obtain injunction. But, it was cautioned that the matter would be different, if the plaintiff himself elaborated in the plaint about title dispute and fails to make a prayer for declaration of title along with injunction relief.

In Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813, it was pointed out in a case where there was no document to prove settled possession that ‘merely on doubtful material and cursory evidence, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was ever in possession of the property, and that too in settled possession’. It held further as under:

  • “13. The crux of the matter is that a person who asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. Settled possession means such possession over the property which has existed for a sufficiently long period of time, and has been acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. Settled possession must be (i) effective,(ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. There cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine settled possession. Occupation of a property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual legal possession. The possession should contain an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser is to be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

Nature of Property and Claim of Occupant Whether Bona Fide were Determinative Factors

In Government of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao, (1982) 2 SCC 134,  the question considered was whether summary remedy for evicting a person provided for by section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905, could be resorted to. It was pointed out

  • the duration of encroachment, short or long, was not the determinative matter
  • what was relevant for the decision was more the nature of the property and
  • whether the claim of the occupant was bona fide.

It was also found that if there was bona fide dispute, on title between the Government and the occupant, it must be adjudicated upon by the Ordinary courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily. Duration of occupation would be relevant requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law, if the person –

  • occupied openly for an appreciable length of time and
  • could be taken, prima facie, to have a bonafide claim to the property

Injunction is a Possessory Remedy.

Courts protect settled possession (Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, 2004-1 SCC 769). Injunction is a possessory remedy. (See: Ladies Corner, Bangalore vs State of Karnataka, ILR 1987 KAR 1710, 1987 (1) KarLJ 402. Patil Exhibitors (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Corporation of The City (M Venikatachaliah, J.) : AIR 1986 Kant 194, ILR 1985 KAR 3700, 1985 (2) KarLJ 533. Referred to in Chetak Constructions Vs. Om Prakash, AIR 2003 MP 145. )

Courts grant injunction without seeking declaration when title is clear, simple and straight-forward; and when no serious denial or cloud on title (not any apparent defect):   Anathula Sudhakar v. Buchi Reddi: AIR 2008 SC 2033.

But, an injunction cannot be issued against a true owner or title holder and in favour of a trespasser or a person in unlawful possession. See: Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji vs Maniben Jagmalbhai: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 258.

Temporary Mandatory Injunction – To preserve or restore the status quo ante

Two Landmark Decisions

  • (1) Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR  1990 SC 867
  • (2) Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1975, (2004) 4 SCC 697

(1) Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR  1990 SC 867 : (1990) 2 SCC 117, is the laudable decision on interim mandatory injunction. It is laid down that interlocutory mandatory injunctions are granted to:

  • (i) preserve or restore the status quo ante, of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy, or
  • (ii) to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done, or
  • (iii) the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining.

It is also pointed out that the court would consider the prospect of granting of a mandatory injunction finally, after trial; and delineated that a fresh state of affairs cannot be allowed to be created by the grant of such an injunction.

(2) Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1975, (2004) 4 SCC 697, is the decision in the matter of elections in a Co-operative Society where the Apex Court moved forward and stated that Interim Mandatory Injunction can be granted if the court is satisfied that refusal of injunction would tantamount to dismissal of the main petition itself and there would be nothing left to be allowed when the final pronouncement  comes.

Possession Follows Title’ and ‘Title Follows Possession’

The legal principles, ‘Possession Follows Title’ and ‘Title Follows Possession’, are Rules of Evidence. They are applied in cases where there are no sufficient and independent evidence to prove possession or title, as the case may be.

Under S. 110 Evidence Act, ownership is presumed on the proof of possession. It ‘follows from well settled principle of law that normally, unless contrary is established, title always follows possession’ (Chuharmal v.  Commissioner of Income Tax, M P, AIR  1988 SC 1384; 1988 3 SCC 588).

S. 114 Evidence Act, expressly permits the court to ‘presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case’. Therefore, by virtue of Sec. 114,

  • (i) possession can be presumed on the basis of title (possession follows title), and
  • (ii) title/ownership can be presumed on the basis of possession (title follows possession).

S. 110 Evidence Act & the Principle, ‘Title Follows Possession’

Section 110 of the Evidence Act, 1872, reads as under:

  • “110. Burden of proof as to ownership.—When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner.”

This section deals with the burden of proof as to ownership – when a question arises as to whether a person in possession of anything is the owner of such thing. There, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who avers that he is not the owner.

In State of A.P. v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319, the Apex Court held that the object of Section 110 is based on public policy. The object is to prevent persons from committing a breach of peace by taking the law into their own hands however good their title may be over the land in question. This object underlies provisions such as Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963, Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and Sections 154 and 158 of the Indian Penal Code 1860.

Sec. 114 Evidence Act– Title Follows Possession Possession Follows Title

In M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1, the Apex Court quoted the following from State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 where Justice B.S. Chauhan explained as under:

  • ‘21…..The said presumption is read under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and applies only in a case where there is either no proof, or very little proof of ownership on either side. The maxim – possession follows title – is applicable in cases where proof of actual possession cannot reasonably be expected, for instance, in the case of wastelands, or where nothing is known about possession one way or another.
  • Presumption of title as a result of possession, can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests in any party. Possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful, and title of the plaintiff is not proved. It certainly does not mean that because a man has title over some land, he is necessarily in possession of it. It in fact means, that if at any time a man with title was in possession of the said property, the law allows the presumption that such possession was in continuation of the title vested in him.
  • A person must establish that he has continued possession of the suit property, while the other side claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/ encroachment, etc.
  • Where the apparent title is with the plaintiffs, it is incumbent upon the defendant, that in order to displace this claim of apparent title and to establish beneficial title in himself, he must establish by way of satisfactory evidence, circumstances that favour his version.
  • Even, a revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession.
  • Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, both forward and backward, can also be raised under Section 110 of the Evidence Act.’ ”

In Anathula Sudhakar  v. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2033, Apex Court held as under:

  • “But what if the property is a vacant site, which is not physically possessed, used or enjoyed? In such cases the principle is that possession follows title. If two persons claim to be in possession of a vacant site, one who is able to establish title thereto will be considered to be in possession, as against the person who is not able to establish title. This means that even though a suit relating to a vacant site is for a mere injunction and the issue is one of possession, it will be necessary to examine and determine the title as a prelude for deciding the de jure possession.”

In Arumaraj Devadhas v. K. Sundaram Nadar, 2009-17 SCC 467, also it was held that the principle possession follows title applies in vacant land. This principle is applied in ‘open space‘ in Praprai N Kothari Vs. John Braganza, AIR 1999 SC 1666 and in Rajendar Singh Vs. Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537. InNaval Shankar Ishwarlal Dave v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1994 SC 1496,  the Apex Court observed that it was ‘settled law that in respect of open land, title follows possession’.

Possession Follows Title and Adverse Possession

It is held in MS Jagadambal v. Southern Indian Education Trust, 1988 (Supp) SCC 144 that the possession continues with the title holder unless and until the defendant acquires title by adverse possession (possession follows title). In LN Aswathama v. P Prakash, 2009-13 SCC 229, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “In law, possession follows title. The plaintiffs having established title to the suit property, will be entitled to decree for possession, unless their right to the suit property was extinguished, by reason of defendant being in adverse possession for a period of twelve years prior to the suit.”

When the principles in Sec. 110 and 114 CANNOT be invoked

As we find in M.  Siddiq  v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case), 2020-1 SCC 1, Section 110 or the principle ‘title follows possession‘ applies when the facts disclose no title in either of the disputants in which case, possession alone decides (presumption cannot be invoked when the facts are known). But, with respect to the principle ‘possession follows title‘, as we find in Anathula Sudhakar  v. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2033, if only title is proved by one party, then only the principle ‘possession follows title’ comes in.

It is equally important that both these principles on presumption, ‘possession follows title’ and ‘title follows possession’, cannot be invoked in cases where:

  • (i) the defendants do not claim title/possession to the suit property (Devasia @ Kutty v. Jose, 2014-4 KLJ 41; 2014-3 KLT(SN) 50).
  • (ii) the facts (on title/possession) are known (M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1), or
  • there is evidence of independent possession/title (Bhavnagar Municipality Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 717).

Read Connected Blogs:


How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 

Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Pandaravakapattom and Travancore Royal Proclamations of 1040 (1865) and 1061 (1886)

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Can the Government ‘Lease-out’ Lands after 1061 (1886) Travancore Pattom Proclamation?

  • Answer: Yes; It is a Civil Right of every Owner of Properties.

Will the lease-character, of the Govt. leases after 1061, be lost (because of the 1040 and 1061 Proclamations) at the moment it is made, for it is “Pandaravaka-pattom”.

  • Answer: No;Proprietary rights as “Pandaravaka-pattom” are conferred only to Govt. leases prior to 1865 (1040 ME ).
  • (Note: Same is the situation in Cochin also. The crucial year is 1905)

Introduction

During the second half of 18th century major portion of the lands, in both (erstwhile) Travancore and Cochin kingdoms (of Kerala State), were brought under the respective Government administration and these lands were called Sircar or Pandaravaka lands.

Verumpattom in Cochin &Pandarapattom‘ in Travancore are ‘Estate’ under Article 31A

  • In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court held that in the erstwhile Cochin State, Pandaravaka Verumpattom were proprietors of the lands and hold the lands subject to the liability to pay the assessment to the State, and therefore Pandaravaka verumpattom could be regarded as local equivalent of an ‘estate’* under clause (2) of Article 31A of the Constitution.
    • * (Note: Estate denotes, generally, property ownership)
  • Five-Judge-Bench in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1: AIR 1971 Ker 168, held that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the Kerala State satisfies even the orthodox definition   of ownership by Austin, and was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution.

Travancore – Padmanabha Swamy Temple and ‘Bhandara Vaka’ Lands

The powerful King, Marthandavarma who ruled Travancore from 1729 to 1758, was successful in bringing all people and properties of Travancore (Southern Kingdom at present Kerala) under his administration; and collected tax from all lands except those that were expressly exempted.

The King of Travancore placed himself (trippadi-danam) as the servant of the deity. The entire assets of Travancore were regarded as the property that belonged to the Treasury or Offertory (Bhandaram in Malayalam; Pandaram in Tamil) of the Principal deity – Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple at Thiruvanamthapuram.

Connected Blogs:

Royal Pattom Proclamation of 1040 ME (1865 AD) – Magna Carta in Land Reforms

During the second half of the 19th century several Royal Proclamations were promulgated with a view to confer rights in the land to the tenants who were the real cultivators. Majority of the people were engaged in agriculture; but the lands belonged to Jenmies (Sircar, Brahmins or Devaswoms). The cultivators held the land under lease arrangement known as Pattom, Otti, Inam and Viruthi etc. One of the important Regulations came in the line of agrarian reforms was the Royal Proclamation of 1040 ME (1865 AD). It pertained to Pattom (lease) tenements created (by Sircar) on Sirkar lands known as Pandaravaka lands. It is exalted as the Magna Carta of peasants of Travancore it being led to conferring land to tillers, step by step.

The Proclamation of 1040 reads thus:

“PROCLAMATION

By His Highness the Maha Rajah of Travancore, issued under date the 2nd June 1865, corresponding to the 21st Edavam 1040.

Whereas we earnestly desire that the possession of landed as well as other property in Our territory should be as secure as possible; and whereas We are of opinion that, with this view, Sirkar Pattom lands can be placed on a much better footing than at present so as to enhance their value; We are pleased to notify to Our ryots

  • Istly- that the Sirkar hereby and for ever surrenders, for the benefit of the people all optional power over the following classes of lands, whether wet, garden or dry, and whether included in the Ayacut accounts or registered since:
  • Ven Pattom, Vettolivoo Pattom, Maraya Pattom, Olavoo Pattom, Mara Pattom, and all such Durkast Pattom the tax of which is understood to be fixed till the next Survey and Assessment;
  • 2ndly. that the ryots holding these lands may regard them fully as private, heri-table, saleable, and otherwise transferable, property;
  • 3rdly. accordingly, the sales, mortgages, & e., of these lands will hence-forward be valid; may be effected on stamped cadjans and will be duly registered; the lands may be sold for arrears of tax, in execution of decrees of Courts and such other legitimate purposes, and may also be accepted as security by the Sirkar as well as by private individuals;
  • 4thly. that the holders of the lands in question may rest assured that they may enjoy them undisturbed so long as the appointed assessment is paid;
  • 5thly. that the said holders are hence-forth at full liberty to lay out labour and capital on their lands of the aforesaid description to any extent they please, being sure of continued and secure possession;
  • 6thly. that the aforesaid description of lands will be resumable by the Sirkar like Jenmom and other private lands only for purely public purposes, as for instance, for making roads, canals, public buildings, & e., and when resumed for such purposes compensation will be paid by the Sirkar not for improvements only as here to fore, but equal, to the full market value of such lands;
  • 7thly. that the foregoing concessions are not however to be understood to affect in any way the rights of the Sirkar to regulate the land tax, to resume escheats, to confiscate the property of criminals, and generally such rights as have heretofore been exercised upon all property in general;
  • 8thly. that it is to be understood that when Pattom land being a portion of a holding, is transferred to a pauper, with the view of defrauding the Sirkar of the tax due to it, the Sirkar will have the right of apportioning the tax so as to prevent loss of revenue; and,
  • 9thly. (Repealed by Proclamation dated the 5th Karkadakam 1059). (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 : Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez Vs Albert Fernandez, AIR 1971 Ker 168; 1971 Ker LT 1.)

Royal Proclamation of 1061 (1886) Brings in Further Radical Changes

Paragraph 9 of the Proclamation of 1061 says, with reference to Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, as regards Pandarapattam lands, as under:

  • These lands were originally the absolute property of Government, and the tenants were mere tenants-at-will; but, by the Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, Government generously waived all right to these lands, and declared them to be the private, hereitable, saleable property of the holders.”

Section 22 of the Settlement Proclamation of 1061 (1886) made radical changes in land tenure.

Those changes were:

  • (1)   no debt shall be recognised as due to the holder;
  • (2) no interest shall be deducted from the Pattom on such debt;  
  • (3) no reduction of debt or a corresponding enhancement of the Sirkar demand shall be made when such properties were transferred by sale.
  • The properties held on the tenures in question shall be recognised as so many favourably assessed lands or Inams and confirmed to the holders as such.

Clause 7 of Section 24 of the Proclamation provided as under:

  • “There shall be no further interference on the part of the Government with these free holds, except such as might be necessary for the punctual realization of the quit rent payable”.(Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.)

Proclamation of 1040 (1865) – No Proprietary Rights; But, Permanency to Cultivators

Till 1040 ME (1865 AD), the agriculturists, who held the Pandaravaka (Govt.) lands under Pattom arrangement, were liable to be treated as mere tenants-at-will; the land being resumable (by the Government) at any time, as they were in the nature of temporary leases just like tenements created by private jenmis.

The Pattom Proclamation of 1040 (1865) converted the pattom arrangement on pandaravaka lands into permanent leases and conferred on the holders thereof permanent rights of occupancy, heritable and alienable. Though the Proclamation of 1040 ME did not expressly confer full proprietary rights on tenants, it gave the tenants permanency in the Pandaravaka soil; and it recorded the fist gigantic step towards the land reforms in Travancore.

Royal Proclamation of 1061 (1886) Brings in Further Radical Changes

Paragraph 9 of the Proclamation of 1061 says, with reference to Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, as regards Pandarapattam lands, as under:

  • these lands were originally the absolute property of Government, and the tenants were mere tenants-at-will; but, by the Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, Government generously waived all right to these lands, and declared them to be the private, hereitable, saleable property of the holders.”

Section 22 of the Settlement Proclamation of 1061 (1886) made radical changes in land tenure.

Those changes were:

  • (1)   no debt shall be recognised as due to the holder;
  • (2) no interest shall be deducted from the Pattom on such debt;  
  • (3) no reduction of debt or a corresponding enhancement of the Sirkar demand shall be made when such properties were transferred by sale.
  • The properties held on the tenures in question shall be recognised as so many favourably assessed lands or Inams and confirmed to the holders as such.

Clause 7 of Section 24 of the Proclamation provided as under:

  • “There shall be no further interference on the part of the Government with these free holds, except such as might be necessary for the punctual realization of the quit rent payable”. (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.)

Sale of Janmam Properties were Recorded as “Thettoms” in Settlement Register

In 1910 Travancore Settlement Register (and in the sale deeds), lands sold by Janmam holders were recorded as “Thettoms” (Devaswom Thettom/Namboori Thettom etc.).

  • Note: In the 1910 Settlement Register Janmam properties (with Brahmins and Devaswoms) were recorded as “Thanathu”.
  • As shown above, when lands were classified under various heads, in Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, 1962 Ker LT 913 :  AIR 1963 Ker 86, ‘Janmam’ lands were denoted as ‘Tanathu’.

Cochin Settlement Proclamation of 1080 (1905)

As shown above, the Sirkar or Pandaravaka tenure holders of the Kingdom of Cochin were conferred with fixity of tenure by the Settlement Proclamation of 1080 (1905).

The Settlement Proclamation of 1905 covered all lands in the State, including lands held under concessional tenures or as tax-free. The Rules made under the Act contained the procedure for the issue of title deeds in respect of lands held under such grants. As stated above, Clause 13 of the Settlement Proclamation provided that the holders of Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands would acquire ‘full rights to the soil of the lands’ they held. Settlement Proclamation of Cochin of 1080 (1905) Clause 13 provided as under:

  • “At present holders of Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands do not possess any property in the soil. As we are convinced that proprietorship in soil will induce a cultivator to improve his land and thereby add to agricultural prosperity of the country, we hereby declare that our Verumpattom holders of lands shall, after the new settlement has been introduced, acquire full rights to the soil of the lands they hold and that their rights shall remain undisturbed so long as they regularly pay the State revenue, provided that the rights to metals and minerals, possessed by the State in all lands under whatever tenures they are held, are reserved to the State”.

The Settlement Proclamation of 1905 was expressly repealed by the Land Tax Act of 1955 of the united State of Travancore-Cochin; but this Act, as a whole, was struck down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 552. In Kesavan Vadhyan Namboodri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1968 Ker 279, it was pointed out that this Proclamation of 1080 (1905) stood repealed by implication by the Land Tax Act of 1961.

Section 4 of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, 1118, reads as under:

  • “Notwithstanding any law, custom or contract to the contrary, every verumpattomdar shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding and shall not be evicted therefrom except as provided in Section 8 of this act.”

Section 4 concerned with the fixity of tenure, that is, fixity of the period of holding, possession or enjoyment of the land. The effect of such a mere conferment of fixity of tenure was not to continue the lease beyond the period specified therein, but to give to the person who continues to remain in possession of the land after the lease has come to an end the status of a statutory tenant. (Ittiravi Namboodiri Vs. Krishnankutty Menon AIR 1964 Ker 298. Dr. K. A. Dhairyawan V. J. R. Thakur, AIR 1958 SC 789, referred to.)

Pattom Proclamations and Constitution of India 

Article 31A(2) of the Constitution of India reads thus:

  • “In this article-
  • (a) the expression ‘estate ‘ shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant, and in the States of Madras and Kerala any janmam right;
  • (b) the expression ‘rights’, in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue.”

1. Jenmam – Proprietary Right in the Soil

In K. K. Kochunni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080, the Supreme Court, while dealing with Article 31A of the Constitution, said:

  • “Under the definition, any jenmom right in Kerala is an ‘estate’. A jenmom right is the freehold interest in a property situated in Kerala. Moor in his “Malabar Law and Custom” describes it as a hereditary proprietorship. A jenmom interest may, therefore be described as ‘proprietary interest of a landlord in lands‘.”

In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “It seems to us that the basic concept of the word ‘estate’ is that the person holding the estate should be proprietor of the soil and should be in direct relationship with the State paying land revenue to it except where it is remitted in whole or in part”.

In Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, 1962 Ker LT 913 :  AIR 1963 Ker 86, it was observed that

  • ‘Thanathu,
  • Thettom,
  • Manavaka,
  • Brahmaswom Vaka,
  • Devaswom Vaka,
  • Kudijenmom,
  • Kanom,
  • Kanom Kudijenmom and
  • Venpattom’

“created by Jenmis” must be held to be covered by the word ‘Estate’ in Art. 31A of the Constitution. It held further as under:

  • “20. It cannot be disputed that these Jenmis and Devaswoms had full proprietary right in the soil and that the lands in which they have ‘Jenmom rights’ are ‘Estates’ within the definition of the word in Article 31-A.”
  • “21. … As regards ‘jnam lands’ it was conceded that the holders had full proprietary rights in the soil. These consist of
    • Pandaravaka Adima,
    • Anubhogam,
    • Thiruvulam,
    • Danom,
    • Pandaravaka Kudijenmom,
    • Erayeli,
    • Viruthi and
    • Karam Ozhivu.
  • Inam lands other than Erayeli and Viruthi (Service Inams) were dealt with under S. 24 of the Revenue Settlement Proclamation of 1061 M.E. (1886 AD). Clause 7 of S. 24 provided:
    • “There shall be no further interference on the part of the Government with these free holds, except such as might be necessary for the punctual realization of the quit rent payable”.
  • Note:
    • 1. It was held in Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 (analysing the 1040 ME (1865), Travancore Proclamation) that the provisions of the Proclamation did not confer on the tenants absolute proprietary rights in the soil.
    • 2. Overruling Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, it was held in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1; AIR 1971 Ker 168, that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the State was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31-A(2)(a).

Meaning of the Word ‘Thettom’

  • Generally meant – acquisition by Mortgage.
  • When ‘Thettom’ refers to a property dealing with a Jenmam holder, it can be any ‘subordinate tenure falling short of the full proprietary title‘.
  • When it refers to a property dealing with a Non-Jenmom holder, it may mean a sale’

As regards ‘Thettom’, Raman Menon, C.J., said, in Augusti v. The Dewan of Travancore, 8 Travancore LJ 438, as under:

  • “In S.A. 17 of 1074, this Court remarked:-‘In the Sirkar registry of 1011, the plaint property is entered as ‘Thettom’ in the name of defendants’ Tarwad.
  • That expression, according to its ordinary meaning, implies at least a mortgage lien, if not more, as held by this Court in A.S.166 of 1070 and A.S. 285 of 1071. It always implies something more than a simple lease’.
  • In S.A. 61 of 1075, the terms was taken to be generic and to include ‘all subordinate tenures falling short of the full proprietory title‘.
  • In S.A. 302 of 1075, it was observed that the word ‘Thettom’, as applied to Nambudiri Jenmies, had been held by this court to mean ordinarily a Kanom.
  • In S.A. 48 of 1076, Vencoba Chariar, C.J. and Mr. Justice Kunhiraman Nair construed the words thus:- ‘The chief ground of the plaintiff’s second appeal is that in arriving at this finding the lower courts have not given sufficient weight to the fact appearing from the Ext. B – an old Revenue account – in which the land in dispute is entered as ‘Thettam’ from plaintiff’s Illom; but the word ‘Thettom’ is a somewhat ambiguous one and though, as remarked in the case in 15 TLR 161 and in other cases, it is generally used in the Revenue accounts to signify the Kanom tenure under Jenmies, it is also sometimes used to denote other subordinate tenures‘.
  • In S.A. 343 of 1078, we find the following remarks:-‘Thettom ordinarily means a’Kanom’, and in any case, a derivative title when used in connection with Brahmaswam or Devaswom properties, as in the present case’.
  • Lastly, in A.S. Nos. 59 and 101 of 1083, Sadasiva Iyer, C.J., and Sankara Menon, J., observed thus:- ‘Mr. Kochukrishna Marar quotes 15 TLR 161 and says the word ‘Thettom’ means a Kanom or mortgage.
  • No doubt, in the case of Jenmies, it has been so held; but we doubt whether in the case of non jenmies, any meaning other than the ordinary meaning of the word can be given to the word ‘Thettom’. The plaintiffs are Nairs and the tenure claimed is not Jenmom. The ordinary meaning of the word is acquisition. We are inclined to hold that a word ‘Thettom’, in cases of this sort, means only sale’.”
  • (Quoted in: Travancore Devaswom Board v. Uzhithiraru Uzhithiraru, 1957 KLT 315)

In Damodaran v. Sankaranarayanan Namboothiripad, ILR 1963-2 Ker. 707; 1964 KLT 25, the High Court referred to thanathu thettom land (nilam); and observed – it conveys the idea of ‘acquisition’.

‘Janmom’

It was the properties owned by Janmies.  Such lands were exempted from tax.

  • Regulation of 1071 (1896) attracted these properties.  The tax under Rajabhogam had to be paid for this land.   But Devaswom and Brahmaswom thanathu lands, though came under the head ‘Janmam’, and were exempted from tax, only so long as they remained unalienated.  When alienated it was charged under Rajabhogam assessment.  Devaswom and Brehmaswom properties could have been subjected to outright sale.

Status in ‘Janmom’ cannot be Transferred

Theoretically, status in ‘Janmom’ cannot be transferred (it being an inherent right attached to land); though ‘rights in Janmam’ can be transferred.

Landmark Decisions on Pandarapattom lands (Cochin & Travancore)

(In the matter of compensation when acquire land by Govt – under Art. 31A, Constitution)

  • 1. Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694
  • Proprietary Rights to Pandarapattom Lands in Cochin, in view of 1905 Proclamation.
  • N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. (descending) referred 1040 Travancore Proclamation, and said that there was only withdrawal of the right by the State and no conferment.
  • 2. Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 (FB)
  • Pandarapattom Confered No Proprietary Rights in Travancore; only treated as holding on perpetual leases. (Overruled in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez)
  • 3. Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (5 Judge Bench)
  • Proclamation of 1040 (1865 AD), all Sircar-pattom-lands were converted into full proprietary-lands

Pandarapattom lands in Cochin & Travancore – Proprietary Right in the Soil

In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Supreme Court held (by majority, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta; and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, dissenting) that Pandarappattom properties come within ‘estate’ under Article 31A of the Constitution. The Apex Court considered the proclamation issued by his Highness Sir Rama Varma Raja of Cochin on March 10, 1905. Clause 13 that rendered ‘full rights to the soil of the lands they hold’.

The Supreme Court (majority) held, with respect to Cochin Regulation, 1905 as under:

  • “It would thus be seen that under clause 13 the person holding lands on the Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure is not a tenant. He is given the proprietary right in the soil itself, subject of course to the rights as to metals and minerals reserved in favour of the State, indeed, the whole scheme of the new Proclamation appears to be to change the character of the possession of the Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure-holder from that of a tenant into that of a proprietor-holder. It is true that he is made liable to pay half of the net produce and that may appear to be a little too high, but the measure of the levy will not convert what is intended to be a recovery of assessment Into a recovery of rent. The proprietor of the land held on Verumpattom tenure is nevertheless a proprietor of the land and he holds the land subject to his liability to pay the assessment to the State. It is not difficult to imagine that in a fairly large number of lands held by Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure-holders the holders in turn would let out the the lands to the cultivators and thus would come into existence a local equivalent of the class of intermediaries. Land revenue record is required to be prepared by the Proclamation and relevant entries showing the extent of the properties belonging to the respective holders and the details about their liability to pay the assessment are intended to be shown in the said record. In our opinion, it would not be reasonable to hold that the ‘lands held by the petitioner under the Pandaravaha Verumpattom tenure do not confer on him the proprietary right at all but make him a tenant of the State“.

But, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., while descending, observed as under:

  • “In this connection I might usefully refer to a proclamation of the ruler of Travancore of 1865 (1040 M. E.) regarding Sarkar-pattom lands, with the observation that subject to variations dependent on local usages, the system of land tenure and the concepts as regards the rights of property in land were substantially similar in Travancore and Cochin. Sarkar-pattom lands were what might be termed ‘Crown lands’ of which the ruler was deemed to be the Jenmi or the landlord. Previous to the proclamation the lands were legally capable of being resumed by the ruler, though this was seldom done and the cultivators were not legally entitled to transfer their rights and where this was done the Government had the right to ignore the transaction. The fact that the cultivator was conceived of as having no proprietary interest on the land also bore adversely on the State since the State was deprived of the means of realising any arrears of revenue by bringing the holding to sale. It was to remedy this situation that the proclamation was issued and the preamble and its terms carry the impress of the impact of the ryotwari system of Madras.”

After referring the 1040 (1865) Proclamation, Ayyangar, J. said as under:

  • “The language employed in the proclamation is of significance. It speaks of the relinquishment or withdrawal of the right of the State and not of the conferment of a right on the ryot so as to render the ryot a grantee from the State, just in line with the Hindu Law theory of the proprietorship of the soil vesting in the occupant-cultivator.”

In Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 (FB), in spite of the decision in Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694 (pertained to Cochin), it was held that Pandarapattom (Pandaravaka pattom, Pandaravakappattom, or Pandarappattom) lands in the Travancore area cannot have the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution. Analysing the 1040 ME Travancore Proclamation, it was held by the High Court as under:

  • “11. The provisions of the Proclamation do not, in our opinion, confer on the tenants absolute proprietary rights in the soil. There is no clause by which the Sirkar parted with all rights in favour of the tenants and in the absence of such a provision, the holders of such lands can only be treated as holding such lands on perpetual leases.”

Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez case – Pandarapattom Confers Proprietary Rights

Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86, was overruled by the larger Bench in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168, and it was held that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the State was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31-A(2)(a). (See: Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369).

It was found in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez case that by the Proclamation of 1040 (1865 AD), all Sircar-pattom-lands were converted into full proprietary-lands, and rights on tenants of Pandarapattom lands had thenceforth been conferred with proprietary-rights.

In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168, it was observed as under:

Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.:

  • “11. …. We have already shown how, in the face of the Proclamation of 1040, it is impossible to regard the holders of these lands as tenants in the strict sense of that term having only the right to enjoy the land and no interest in the land as such. We have also drawn attention to the fact that what they pay to the Government is, under the very terms of the Proclamation, assessment or land tax, in other words, land revenue, and not rent properly so-called. As stated in 1962 Ker LT 913 = (AIR 1963 Ker 86 FB). with reference to contemporary documents, the avowed purpose of the Proclamation of 1040 was to place pandarapattam lands on the same footing as ryotwari lands in the neighbouring province of Madras, and wo have no doubt that it succeeded in doing so. If the relations between the holder of a land and the Government are placed on the same footing as the relations between the holder of ryotwari land and the Government, it seems to us that it necessarily follows that the land is held under ryotwari settlement–it is the factual relationship and not the label that counts and no concept of legal rights is involved. ….

Per KK Mathew, J.

  • 17……. To my mind the terms of the Proclamation leave no doubt that full proprietary interest has been conferred upon the holders of pandarapattom lands. ….Clause (2) is the pivotal clause; and it provides that the ryots holding such lands may regard them fully private, saleable and otherwise heritable and transferable property. Clause (4) guarantees the continued undisturbed enjoyment of the land so long as the appointed assessment is paid. Clause (6) makes it clear that the lands will be resumable by the State like other jenmom or private land only for public purpose and when resumed for such purposes compensation will be paid by the Sirkar not only for the improvements but also for the full market value of the property. Clause (7) provided that the rights conferred by the Proclamation would not in any way affect the right of the Sirkar to regulate land tax or to resume escheats or to confiscate the property of criminals. Clauses (6) and (7) are very significant. What are reserved to the Sirkar by Clauses (6) and (7) are not anv proprietary rights in the land. The rights which inhere in every sovereign in respect of every property within his jurisdiction like eminent domain, the right to impose or regulate tax, to resume escheats, to confiscate property of criminals, are alone reserved by those clauses. They not only do not derogate from the grant of full proprietary interest made by Clauses (1), (2) and (4), but would highlight that no proprietary rights have been reserved to the State. If the sovereign was careful to reserve to himself in respect of these lands only those rights which appertain to sovereignty and not any right which relates to dominium, that is a clear indication that no right relating to dominium was intended to be retained by the Sirkar. Even if the clauses were absent, the Sirkar would have those rights as they appertain to sovereignty and not to dominium. In other words, if by way of abundant caution the clauses reserved to the Sirkar only rights which appertain to sovereignty, there was absolutely no reason why the rights, if any, relating to dominium or ownership were not reserved, if the sovereign intended to retain any right in respect of the lands.….. I think, a holder of pandarapattom land satisfies even the orthodox definition of ownership by Austin.   Austin defines the right of ownership as a–“right indefinite in point of user, unrestricted in point of disposition, and unlimited in point of duration, over a determinate thing.” (See ‘Jurisprudence’ by Austin, 3rd Edn., page 817.) 
  • 19. The basic concept of ‘estate’ is that the person holding the estate should be the proprietor of the soil and should be in direct relationship with the State by paying land revenue to it except where it is remitted in whole or in part. See AIR 1962 SC 694. As I have said the pattom Proclamation conferred full proprietary rights on tenants of pandarapattom lands, and they are also in direct relation with the State by paying land revenue. Since there is no definition of the word ‘estate’ in the existing local law relating to land tenure, pandarapattom land is the local equivalent of ‘estate,’ because its attributes conform to the basic concept of the term.”

Note: Another decision (with the same parties), Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 KLT 216, AIR 1973 Ker 55,  was overruled in Velayudhan Vivekanandan v. Ayyappan  Sadasivan, ILR 1975-1 Ker 166; 1975  KerLT 1.

Effect of Travancore Govt. Leases AFTER Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061

Now a question arises:

What is the impact of 1040 and 1061 (1886) Proclamations over the ‘Government Land Leases’ (Pandaravakappattoms) made after 1040 (1865)? Do such leased lands qualify as “estate” under Article 31A of the Constitution?

  • The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out (by the Government) after 1040 (1865) do not acquire the rights of ‘permanency of tenure’ or attain the ‘proprietary interest’ conferred by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061.
  • If such rights of permanency and ‘proprietary interest’ are axiomatically conferred as a matter of course, the result would be that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands (after the Proclamations), for, the lease character would be lost at the moment it is made.

n George A Leslie v. State of Kerala, 1969 KLT 378, it was observed as under:

  • ” 9. Ext. P 1 is a grant made under the Travancore Regulation II of 1040 and the Rules for the sale of Waste Land on the Travancore Hills dated 24th April 1865. …
  • 12. Reference was made by counsel for the petitioners to the Travancore Pattom Proclamation of 1040, which conferred full rights in the land on tenants of pandarapattom land, and the subsequent proclamations and notifications by which they acquired the full title to the trees in the land. They have no application to the land or trees comprised in Ext. P 1 grant.”

Therefore, there is a clear difference between leases made before and after the Proclamations; and the rights conferred by the Proclamations do not apply to leases made after the Proclamations.

The nature of Pandaravaka lands is explained in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual (Revised Edition), Volume Ill, Part I, page 6 as under:

  • “The proclamation of 1040 converted them into permanent leases and conferred on the holders thereof permanent rights of occupancy, heritable and alienable.” (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.)

There is no scope for arguing that the future “Pandarappattoms” (future tenancy by Government) was ‘made void’ by the proclamation; or in other words, that the 1040 Proclamation “binds” the future Government tenancies also.

1865 Travancore Proclamation and 1905 Cochin Proclamation

In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Supreme Court (Rajagopala Ayyankar, J. Minority) pointed out the requirement and purport of these Proclamations. It reads as under:

  • “The evils which the system gave rise to, the economic insecurity of the tenant and the consequent lack of incentive on his part to put his best exertion on the land and the resultant loss to the state in the shape of revenue as well as the rise of a contented peasantry were exactly parallel to the situation which faced the ruler of Travancore leading to the proclamation of 1865. It was in these circumstances that the ruler of Cochin issued a proclamation on March 10, 1905, which defined with precision the rights of the State and of the cultivator in regard to these lands …”

Ayyankar, J. (Minority) observed that there was “conferment of proprietary rights by the Cochin Proclamation of 1905″ and “relinquishment by the State under the Travancore Proclamation of 1865″.

Finally, the Majority held that by virtue of the Cochin Proclamation of 1905 the holders of the Pandaravaka-verumpattom lands in Cochin were holding the property as “estate” within the meaning of Article 31A of the Constitution, and that the challenge thereon (to the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961) was not sustainable.

Devaswom Proclamation, 1922 & 1948 and Formation of Dev. Board

The History of Governmental Administration of Devaswoms mark four phases. They are:

  • (i) Administration as the Land Revenue Department – started in 987 ME (1811-1812 AD) under the edicts of Col. Munro.
  • (ii) Administration as the Devaswom Department – from 1922 Devaswom Proclamation.
  • (iii) Direct Administration by Maharaja by the 1948 Proclamation assuming control of Devaswoms and Devaswom Department.
  • (iv) Administration under Devaswom Board – from 1950 in accordance with the enactment, Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950.

Administration ‘AS’ the Governemnt Departments

By virtue of ‘organising’ the Devaswoms “as” the Land Revenue Department (from 987 ME) and “as” the Devaswom Department (by Proclamation, 1922), Devaswoms mentioned in the schedule thereof were treated as the ‘property of the State’.

The history as to the formulation of the Devaswom Proclamation, 1922, is given in  M. Muraleedharan Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR1991 Ker 25. It was laid down:

  • The Hindu temples in the State of Travancore were mostly under private management called Ooralars or Karakars.
  • When those bodies were found mismanaging the institutions, Col. Munro decided in 987 ME (1811-1812 AD) that the State should assume control over them.
  • With a view to secure better management of the Devaswoms, the Government appointed a committee to report upon the assumptions of those Devaswoms, the feasibility of separating their administration from the Land Revenue Department and cost if a separate department be deemed desirable.
  • The Commitlee, recommended that the administration of the Devaswom should be separated from the Land Revenue Department and entrusted to a distinct agency.
  • The Government of Travancore after taking necessary legal opinion came to the conclusion that creation of a separate department exclusively to the administration of Devaswoms was necessary.
  • Considering that it is the solemn right and duty of the Government to maintain efficiently and in good condition the Hindu Religious Institutions the State the Travancore Government issued the Devaswom Proclamation on 12th April, 1922 corresponding to 30th Meenom, 1097.
  • Section 7 of the Proclamation is as under:
    • “7.(1) Our Government may for the better and more efficient management and more effective control of the Devaswoms mentioned in the schedule organised a Devaswom Department of the State consisting of such number of officers and other servants as they think fit.
    • (2) The expenditure in connection with the said Department shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 3 and 4, be not out of the general revenue of the State.”
  • Formation of the (independent) Devaswom Department, bifurcating it from Revenue Department) did not make any substantial change in the character of the Government-ownership/control over the temple and its properties.

Administration ‘UNDER’ the Travancore Devaswom Board

The history shows that a “material change” was brought forth by the formulation of the Travancore Devaswom Board. It is laid down in  M. Muraleedharan Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR 1991 Ker 25, as under:

  • The Maharaja did not want to leave the administration of the Devaswoms to the State Government in the new set up. Therefore on 10-8-1123 (23-3-1948), yet another proclamation was issued by which the Maharaja assumed control of Devaswoms and Devaswom Department of the Government.
  • A material change also made in respect of funds from which expenditure. It was also provided that expenditure to be made not from general revenue but only from Devuswom fund.
  • Thereafter when Travancore-Cochin States were integrated it was provided by Section 8(c) of the Covenant that the administration of the Devaswoms, Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments and their properties and funds would vest with effect from 1-8-1949 in a Board known as Travancore Devaswom Board.
  • The Hindu Religious Institutions Ordinance 10 of 1124 was promulgated which came into force on 1-8-1949. Before expiry of the period of Ordinance, Act 15 of 1950, namely the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 was enacted.
  • Section 3 of the Act provided (as regards the formation of the Travancore Devaswom Board) as under:
    • “The administration of Incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and of Hindu Religious Endowments and all their properties and funds as well as the fund constituted under the Devaswom Proclamation, 1097 M. E. and the Surplus Fund Constituted under the Devaswom (Amendment) Proclamation, 1122 M. E. which were under the management of the Ruler of Travancore prior to the first day of July 1949, except the Sree Padrnanabhaswamy Temple, Sree Pandaravaga properties and all other properties and funds of the said temple, and the management of all institutions which were under the Devaswom Department shall vest in the Travancore Devaswom Board.”
  • The power of nomination given to the Ruler of Travancore was taken away and was given to the Council of Ministers by Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions (Amendment) Act 70 of 1974. Thereafter, of the three Hindu members of the Board, two will have to be nominated by the Hindus among the Council of Minister. The power given to Rajpramukh was subsequently vested in the Governor.

Read Connected Blogs:

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 

Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

SUIT on TITLE: Landlord can Recover Property on (General) TITLE if Defendant Challenge Title of Landlord

If the tenant challenges title of the Landlord, a land owner can obtain a decree, in a suit for eviction (of tenant), on the basis of his (General) TITLE, without proving tenancy.

Jojy George Koduvath

Introspection

             •➧1. Suit on title (on payment of ad valorem Court Fee) by the landowner against the tenant, otherwise than terminating tenancy by the statutory notice (under Sec. 106 TP Act) Tenant denies tenancy. Is the suit barred for no notice?   •➧ Answer: No. For the tenant denies title of landlord (in Pleadings), the tenant cannot argue on the requirement of Sec. 106 TP Act notice. He is estopped under Sec. 116 Evid. Act.

             •➧2. Unless jurisdiction is excluded (e.g., Rent Control Acts), determination of the tenancy takes place by any of the modes referred to in Sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act; and the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain an eviction suit. (As per Sec. 111, notice in writing must have been issued to the tenant).

             •➧3. It is well settled that the tenant would be precluded from challenging the title of the landlord and if he does so, general law makes him liable for eviction on that ground.

             •➧4. A land owner can, on payment of ad valorem Court Fee, obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his (general) TITLE, without proving tenancy if the tenant raises title (or forfeiting the tenancy under Sec. 111 by renouncing his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself).

             •➧5. In a suit for ejectment, defendant claiming right to continue as a tenant is bound to show such right .

             •➧6. If the landlord is not the owner of the property (Eg. An agent who leased-out a property; or, a lessee who gave sub lease), he has no other option but to file the suit ‘on Forfeiture’ of tenancy, under Section 111 Clause (g) of the TP Act.
             •➧Note: ‘Agricultural leases’ are exempted from the provisions of Chap. V of the TP Act (that deals with ‘leases of immovable property’) as per Section 117 of the TP Act.
Nonetheless, it is established (Amrit Lal v. Mamleshwar, AIR 1973 Del. 75, Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai, AIR 1953 SC 228) that such landlords can recover such agricultural properties applying the ‘principles’ of forfeiture in Clause (g) of Section 111 of the TP Act; because the doctrine of forfeiture is a common law doctrine based on justice, equity, and good conscience.
             •➧ Landlord (claiming ownership) Fails to Prove His Title, But Proves to be the Landlord and the Grounds to Evict. Can the suit be decreed (on Rights of Landlord)?
             •➧ The answer is affirmative on two legal propositions – (i) the question of title to a suit premises is not germane in eviction suit (Apollo Zipper India Ltd. v. W. Newman and Co. Ltd., AIR 2018  SC 2847; 2018-6 SCC 744) and (ii) a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord’s title. (State of Andhra Pradesh v. D. Raghukul Pershad, (2012) 9 SCC 584; Apollo Zipper India Ltd. v. W. Newman and Co. Ltd., AIR 2018  SC 2847; 2018-6 SCC 744; Kamaljit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh, 2014 (3) All RC 210.)

Part I

If Tenant Challenges Title of Landlord, it Makes himself liable for Eviction under the General Rule

The Supreme Court of India, in Biswanath Agarwala v. Savitri Bera 2009-15 SCC 693, S.B. Sinha and Deepak Varma, JJ.), quoted with approval the following from  Champa Lal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra (S.B. Sinha, J.), (1990) 1 BLJR 268 –

  • “It is also well settled that one such relationship is admitted or established, tenant would be estopped and precluded from challenging the title of the landlord and if he does so, under the general rule, make himself liable for eviction on that ground. (Quoted in: Radha Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sinha, 1998-2 BLJR 1061 also.)

IN RECOVERY SUIT LANDOWNER CAN WIN IF S. 60(b) CLAIMANT FAILS

Where the defendant seeks to rely on Sec. 60(b) of the Easements Act in a recovery suit, the landowner can succeed by establishing ‘general title’. This is for two main reasons:

  • Under Sec. 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, the defendant—being a tenant or licensee—is estopped from disputing the title of the landowner.
  • The burden of proving the applicability of Sec. 60(b) of the Easements Act lies on the defendant.

Tenant challenges Title of Landlord: Landlord can win the TITLE SUIT if he Proves his GENERAL TITLE

S.B. Sinha, J. quoted further, in Biswanath Agarwala v. Savitri Bera 2009-15 SCC 693, the following with approval from Champa Lal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra (supra),  which reads as under:

  • “It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore** the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem Court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his general title. (Quoted in: Radha Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sinha, 1998-2 BLJR 1061; )
  • ** Tenant challenges title of landlord; and no special law (e.g., BRC Act) bars to give such a relief.

In Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani, AIR 1966 SC  1718, it was pointed out that unless jurisdiction was excluded the  civil court has jurisdiction entertain a suit based title.

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, it is held

  • “The landlord in a given case** although may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the event he proves his General TITLE, may obtain a decree on the basis thereof.”
  • **Tenant challenges title of landlord; and no special law (e.g., BRC Act) bars to give such a relief.
  • This decision is referred to in TribhuvanShankar v. Amrutlal (S.B. Sinha and Deepak Misra, JJ.), 2014-2 SCC 788.

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, the question was formulated by the Court as under:

  • “Whether a Civil Court can pass a decree on the ground that the defendant is a trespasser in a simple suit for eviction is the question involved in this appeal.”

The right of the plaintiff (landlord) to recover, on the basis of “GENERAL TITLE” is asserted by the Supreme Court (Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693) referring following decisions.

1. Radha Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sinha, 1998 (2) BLJR 1061. The Patna High Court accepted that a landlord is entitled to obtain a decree of eviction on the basis of his GENERAL TITLE, though he could not prove the relationship of landlord and tenant (when the tenant raised false claim of title).

2. Champa Lal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra, S.B. Sinha, J., (1990) 1 BLJR 268. It was held:

  • “It is also well settled that one such relationship is admitted or established, tenant would be estopped and precluded from challenging the title of the landlord and if he does so, under the general rule, make himself liable for eviction on that ground.
  • It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem Court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his general TITLE.”

3. Hajee Golam Hossain Ostagar v. Sheik Abu Bakkar, AIR 1936 Cal. 351. It was held – in a suit for ejectment, if the defendant claims the right to remain on a land permanently, he was ‘bound to show‘ the right ‘wherefore the onus would be on him‘.

Payment of ad valorem court fee needed to obtain a decree on general title

In Anil Bansal v. Dinesh Kohli, ILR 2017-4  HP 524, it is held as under: 

  • “22. It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore, the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his general title.”

Tenant Denied Title of Landlord, No Requirement of S. 106 Notice

  • (But Notice under Sec. 111 needed.)

When the tenant denies the title of the landlord, notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not required for determination of the termination of the lease. See:

  • Madan Lal v. Ram Pal, AIR 2010 P & H 142
  • Phulan Devi v. Anand Saroop, 1995 AIHC 1590

In Jaswinder Singh v. Jagjiwan Singh, 2015-1 LawHerald 610; 2015-2 RCR(Civ) 480, it is observed as under:

  • “In Madan Lal v. Ram Pal, 2010(1) RCR 382 (P&H), it is held that the tenant of land claiming ownership by way of adverse possession forfeits his status as a tenant in a suit filed by owner for dispossession and no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is required to be given.

In Madan Lal v. Ram Pal, AIR 2010 P & H 142, it is observed as under:

  • “14, Admittedly, in their plaint, the appellants did not plead the termination of tenancy as a cause of action to file the suit, but pleaded that the cause of action arose to them in June, 2000 when the respondents denied their title and forfeited the right of tenancy. Therefore, the law laid down in Rambaran Paswans case, (AIR 1974 Pat 333) is not applicable to the facts of the instant case and rather, the observations made in Abdul Rahims case (Abdul Rahim v. Md. Azimuddin, AIR 1965 Pat 156) apply because of the fact that the eviction of the respondents had been sought on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy and, thus, the requirement of notice under Section 106 of the Act was not mandatory and the suit of the appellants was maintainable and ought, to have been answered in their favour.”

In Phulan Devi v. Anand Saroop, 1995 AIHC 1590, it is held as under:

  • “The Defendants have taken contradictory plea in their written statement. They have denied the ownership of the Plaintiffs over the suit land. They have further averred that in case the Plaintiff are found to be the owners of the suit land even then Defendants have acquired title by adverse possession to the knowledge of the Plaintiffs. …. In the written statement the Defendants denied the title of the Plaintiffs, that is sufficient to disentitle the occupants to a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is settled law that a tenant denying tenancy and setting up adverse title in himself cannot plead want of notice to quit.” (Quoted in: People Charity Fund v. Bajaj Electrical Limited , 2001-3 Kar CCR 1675)

In Payal Vision Ltd. v. Radhika Choudhary, 2012-11 SCC 405, it is held that if the lease deed is not registered, the tenant becomes month to month tenant and tenancy can be terminated by notice under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Also Read: Tenancy at Sufferance in Indian Law

It did not lie in his mouth to contest that there should be a notice

In Abdul Rahim v. Md. Azimuddin, AIR 1965 Pat 156, it was held as under:

  • If a defendant challenges a plaintiff’s title to the suit premises, he cannot at the same time plead that his tenancy has not been terminated according to law. A Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Palak Mahton v. Bilas Mahton, AIR 1952 Pat 69 held such two pleas as based on facts which were wholly incompatible with one another, and, therefore, it was not open to the defendant to assert in one breath that he was not a tenant of the plaintiff and in another to assert that he was a tenant and that his tenancy has not been properly determined. In that case, the suit was for ejectment of the defendant who challenged the plaintiff’s title and also pleaded that the notice to quit served on him was not valid.”

It was also pointed out in Abdul Rahim v. Md. Azimuddin (supra) that in Lalu Gagal v. Bai Motan Bibi, ILR 17 Bom 631 –

  • “Learned Judges of the Bombay High Court … held that as the plaintiff in his plaint and during trial of the suit denied his landlords’ title (defendants) as he had claimed to be the full owner, he could not be permitted afterwards to be restored to possession on the ground that he was an yearly tenant entitled to notice to quit which was not given’.

In S. A. Henry v. J.V.K.  Rao, AIR 1972 Mad 64,1971 2 MLJ 297, apprised the above decision as under:

  • “On the merits, the Bench (Abdul Rahim v. Md. Azimuddin) took the view that when the tenant denied the title of the landlord, it did not lie in his mouth to contest that there should be a notice determining the lease for that reason.”

Read also: Suit under Sec. 6, Specific Relief Act – Is it a ‘Summary Suit’ under Order XXXVII CPC?

Section 111 & 117, Transfer of Property Act

Section 111, Transfer of Property Act reads as under:

  • “111. Determination of lease – A lease of immoveable property determines—
  • (a) …  to … (f)
  • (g) by forfeiture; that is to say,
    • (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or
    • (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or
    • (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event;
  • and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease;
  • (h) ….”

Sec.117 of the Transfer of Proper Act provides as follows:

  • “117. Exemption of leases for agricultural purposes – None of the provisions of this Chapter apply to leases for agricultural purposes, except in so far as the State Government may by notification published in the Official Gazette declare all or any of such provisions to be so applicable in the case of all or any of such leases, together with, or subject to, those of the local law, if any, for the time being in force.
  • Such notification shall not take effect until the expiry of six months from the date of its publication.”

Right on Forfeiture is a Right Arose in Common Law

Section 111, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 says as to forfeiture as to lease. It being based on the common law principles as to justice, equity and good conscience, the principles can be applied to ‘grants’ also; for, (i) the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable, as such, to ‘grants’ and (ii) no provision of law (as regards grant) stands contrary these principles (Vasudeva Menon v. K.J. Plantation (KM Joseph, J.), 2012 (3) KerLT 730).

Principles of S. 111 TP Act Apply To Agricultural Leases

Agricultural leases are exempted from the whole Chapter (Chapter V of the TP Act that deals with ‘leases of immoveable property’) under Sec.117 of the Transfer of Proper Act. And, ‘Grants’ are not mentioned in Sec. 111. Does it mean–

  • 1. There will be no forfeiture of tenancy even if the agricultural tenant or Granteeforfeit’ tenancy or grant by claiming ownership or adverse possession?
  • 2. “Notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease” is essential under Sec. 111(g) (on his claiming title). Whether it is required to be issued to (i) agricultural tenants and (ii) Grantees on forfeiture of tenancy/grant (on his claiming title) – on principle of justice, equity and good conscience?

The right of forfeiture (for claiming title as owner, by tenant) being a right that arises in common law (that is, on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience (Maharaja of Jaipore  v. Rukmini Pattamahadevi, 46 Ind App 109; AIR 1919 PC 1; Ratan Lal v. Vardesh Chander AIR 1976 SC 588), it can be applied in “agricultural leases” also, if no express prohibition.

Analogy with Sec. 116 TP Act (‘Effect of Holding Over’)

Sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act speaks about effect of holding over. The principles thereof apply fully to agricultural leases also; despite the fact that agricultural leases are entirely exempted from the provisions of the Chapter V of the TP Act (that deals with ‘leases of immoveable property’), as laid down in Section 117 of the TP Act. The same analogy can be profitably extended to ‘forfeiture’ in Sec. 111.

Sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:

  • 116. Effect of holding over: If a lessee or under-lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or under-lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in section 106.

KM Joseph, J. held in  Vasudeva Menon v. K.J. Plantation, 2012 (3) KerLT 730, as under:

  • “Whether the principle of Sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply in regard to agricultural lease in view of Sec.117 Act ? …
  • … But there we may notice that the principle of Sec. 116 would apply even to agricultural leases on the basis of it embodying principles of equity, justice and good conscience. In this connection we may refer to a Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Amrit Lal v. Mamleshwar (AIR 1973 Del. 75).”

The relevant passage in Amrit Lal v. Mamleshwar (AIR 1973 Del. 75) reads as under:

  • “16. Shri Bindra placed reliance on Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act which exempts leases for agricultural purposes from the provisions of Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act. In Anantmal v. Lala, AIR 1964 Raj 88, it was held that the principle underlying Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is based upon considerations of equity, justice and good conscience and in the absence of anything to the contrary the provisions are applicable to cases not governed by the Transfer of Property Act. The principles of Section 116 are applicable to leases of agriculture lands. Similarly in Alphanso Pinto v. Thukru Hengsu, AIR 1955 Mad 206, it was held if there is no agreement fixing the terms of a new lease, the terms of the old lease must be deemed to be applicable. Where the tenant holds over after the expiration of the term, he holds subject to all the covenants in the lease which are applicable to the new situation. Therefore, clause 9 must be held to be one of the terms of the tenancy by holding over. The tenancy must be held to be one subject to the covenants in respect of Sardarkhti rights contained in the original lease deed. The rule that principles of equity, justice and good conscience apply to agricultural leases and that the principle contained in Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is a principle of equity, justice and good conscience has been enunciated in a number of rulings, for example in
    • Krishna Shetti v. Gilbert Pinto, 2nd 42 Mad 654 (AIR 1919 Mad 12),
    • Gangamma v. Phommakka, (1910) 33 Mad 253,
    • Mt. Kesarbai v. Rajabhau Sadasheo Rao, AIR 1944 Nag 94, 
    • Nanjappa Goundan v. Rangaswami Gounda, AIR 1940 Mad 410, 
    • Moore v. Makhan Singh, Air 1919 Pat 254,
    • Eayo George v. Kacki Muthaliyar, AIR 1953 Trav-Co 299, 
    • Bainani Properties Private Ltd. v. M. Gulamali Abdul Hossain and Co., and
    • Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai, AIR 1953 SC 228.)”

Forfeiture on Claim of Ownership By ‘Grantees’

As shown above, there is no specific provision for forfeiture of grant for claiming ‘title as owner’, by Grantee (similar to the forfeiture of tenancy for claiming ‘ownership’ by a tenant under Sec. 111(g) of the TP Act). Will claim of ownership (over the granted-property) by Grantee amount to forfeiture?

The answer is – Yes. Following are the reasons:

  • 1. Applying the Principles of ‘Forfeiture of Tenancy’ it being on principles on justice, equity and good conscience. The right of forfeiture (for claiming title as owner, by tenant, under Sec. 111(g), TP Act) is a right that arises in common law (that is, on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience (Maharaja of Jaipore  v. Rukmini Pattamahadevi, 46 Ind App 109; AIR 1919 PC 1; Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander AIR 1976 SC 588).
  • 2. Analogy to Holding-over in agricultural lease. The right of ‘holding over’ on termination of lease (if lessor accept rent even after termination of the lease period) is provided under Sec. 116 of the TP Act. Though Sec. 117 of the TP Act exempts ‘leases for agricultural purposes’ (from the whole Chapter), it is pointed out in a good number of decisions that the principles thereof (holding over) would apply to agricultural leases also, if no express prohibition, for it contains the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. (See: Amrit Lal v. Mamleshwar, AIR 1973 Del. 75.)
  • 3. Analogy to Forfeiture (itself) in agricultural lease. agricultural leases, being specifically exempted in Sec. 117 (it may be argued), the principles on justice, equity and good conscience may not apply to them as regards forfeiture (under Sec. 111).

But, the principles thereon (forfeiture) definitely apply to grants, for it is not governed by the TP Act (See: Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai, AIR 1953 SC 228).

S. 111  TP Act and Notice Provided under Clause (g)

Section 111 Clause (g) of the TP Act (which requires a notice in writing) applies to cases where the Owner of a property had to sue the defendant as a tenant. If the position of the defendant is that of a trespasser (or agricultural leasee or grantee), there would be no question of invoking Clause (g) of Section 111.

It is observed in Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, AIR 2002 SC 1264; 2002-3 SCC 375, as under:

  • “Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, insofar as relevant for our purpose, provides that a lease of immovable property determines by forfeiture in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. This provision contemplates two facts – situations which entail the lessee having renounced his character as such and they are: (i) when the lessee sets up a title in a third person, or (ii) when he claims title in himself. In either case, the tenant has disputed and denied the title of his landlord because a title in third person or title in himself cannot co-exist with the title in the landlord.”

Part II

Suit For Eviction On Jural Relationship of Landlord and Tenant

When Courts “convert” suit for eviction into one for recovery of possession on title

Whether the Courts can convert the suit for eviction of the tenant (based on the ground of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant) into one for recovery of possession (based on the title of the plaintiff) is considered in the following two decisions of the Supreme Court:

  • Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693
  • Tribhuvanshankar v. Amrutlal, (2014) 2 SCC 788.

The Apex Court remanded the first case, a civil suit, and allowed to amend the plaint so as to claim the plea of adverse possession, invoking Article 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to do complete justice to the parties. In the latter case the suit was dismissed for it was filed under a special enactment (Accommodation Control Act), and it could not have been permitted to seek ‘recovery’ by an amendment.

Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693

It was a Civil Suit for eviction of defendant after issuing notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiffs pleaded, in a nutshell, as under:

  • There was a rental arrangement with the defendant.
  • The defendant denied the jural relationship.
  • The trial Court had dismissed the suit though found
    • that the plaintiffs proved to be the owner; and
    • the defendant had failed to prove independent title.
  • The trial Court dismissed the suit on the finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish the jural relationship of landlord and tenant.
  • The Court of first appeal held that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for possession on the basis of their general title.
  • In the second appeal, it was found by the High Court that the defendant was a trespasser and as such upheld the decree of eviction.
  • The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the defendant on the following grounds:
    • no issue as to whether the defendant was a trespasser or not,
    • non-valuation of the relief of recovery of possession based on title (and non-payment of ad-valorem Court-fee)
    • lack of opportunity to the defendant to take a plausible plea of acquisition of indefeasible title by adverse possession.
  • However, it is held by the Apex Court, inter alia, as under:
  • “The plaintiffs may file an application for grant of leave to amend their plaint so as to enable them to pray for a decree for eviction of the defendant on the ground that he is a trespasser.”
  • “For the aforementioned purpose, he shall pay the requisite Court-fee in terms of the provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870.”
  • “The appellant-defendant would in such an event, be entitled to file his additional written statement” (to raise the plea of adverse possession).
  • “The learned Trial Judge shall frame an appropriate issue and the parties would be entitled to adduce any other or further evidence on such issue.”

The Apex Court pointed out –

  • The directions were given in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to do complete justice to the parties.
  • Note:
    • Article 142 had been invoked for there was (i) no issue as to whether the defendant was a trespasser or not, (ii) non-valuation of the relief of recovery of possession based on title and (iii) lack of opportunity to defendant to take a plausible plea adverse possession; and
    • it would not have been needed if the plaintiff had sought for relief of recovery(on title), alternatively.

Tribhuvanshankar v. Amrutlal, (2014) 2 SCC 788

It was a suit for eviction under the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act.

The plaintiffs pleaded, in a nutshell, as under:

  • The defendant was a tenant under the earlier owner.
  • The rents were not paid by him.
  • The tenancy was terminated.
  • The defendant disputed the landlord and tenant relationship
  • The original owner sold the property without obtaining any sale consideration.
  • It was with the sole intention of obtaining possession by colluding with the plaintiff.
  • The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that –
    • The sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was without any consideration
    • The relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was not established
    • The defendant had perfected title on adverse possession.
  • The first appellate Court held to the following effect –
    • The relationship of landlord and tenant was not established
    • The finding of the trial Court that the sale deed is not supported by consideration is neither justified nor correct
    • There was no clinching evidence to establish that the defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession.
  • In the second appeal, one of the substantial questions of law formulated was – whether a decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff though such plaintiff fails to establish relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • The High Court had allowed the appeal and restored the decree and judgment of the trial Court. It was held –
    • Once the plaintiff had failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant which is a sine qua non in a suit for eviction, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to fall back on his title to seek eviction.
  • The Supreme Court distinguished Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, pointing out that it was a Civil Suit and not one under Accommodation Control Act (or Rent Control Act). Dismissing the suit, the Apex Court held as under:
    • “On a seemly analysis of the principle stated in the aforesaid authorities,**it is quite vivid that there is a difference in exercise of jurisdiction when the civil court deals with a lis relating to eviction brought before it under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and under any special enactment pertaining to eviction on specified grounds.”
    • **LIC v. India Automobiles & Co., (1990) 4 SCC 286, Dr. Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal (1995) 6 SCC 580 and Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad (2002) 1 SCC 90.

Title-Suit for Rcovery (by Owner): Lease not Proved, Entitled Relief

In Bandaru Venugopala Rao v. Allure Anasuya, 2024-2 And LT 605, following Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, it is held that in a suit for recovery on title, failure to prove lease would not disentitle relief to the plaintiff.

Following are the facts in Bandaru Venugopala Rao v. Allure Anasuya (supra).

  • Plaintiff claimed to be the title holder.
  • Plaintiff sent a lawyer’s notice to defendant terminating the lease.
  • In the reply defendant alleged title for himself.
  • Hence,the plaintiff sued for declaration of title and possession.
  • Defendant claimed that an agreement for sale was entered into by him with the prior owner and claimed rights under Sec. 53A TP Act.
  • Plaintiff failed to prove lease.
  • Still the suit on title claiming possession was decreed.
  • It was held that the failure to prove the lease, by itself, did not disentitle the plaintiff.

It is held as under:

  • “Even if plaintiff alleged that the possession of defendant No.1 is only as lessee and even if plaintiff failed to prove it that by itself does not disentitle a title holder from claiming possession. In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India laid the law that in a case where the plaintiff sues for declaration of title and for recovery of possession alleging that the person in possession is a tenant, even if the plaintiff fails to prove such jural relationship of landlord and tenant he still is entitled for a decree for recovery of possession on proof of his GENERAL TITLE. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that on failure to prove the lease alleged by plaintiff, the suit ought to have been dismissed is a contention which lacks any legal basis. Therefore, point is answered against the appellant.”

Plaintiff in a suit against Tenant Failed to Prove Tenancy; Can he Win on Title

Plaintiff filed the suit, as landlord, for ejectment of a tenant. The plaintiff failed to establish the tenancy. Will he be entitled to a decree for possession on the basis of his title?

‘No’ was the argument for the defendant/appellant in Sri Venkateswara Oil Company, Tirupathi  v.  Guduru Jalaja Reddy, 2002-1 ALD 182; 2001-6 ALT 567. Following decisions were relied on.

  • Brahmanand v. Neki Puri, AIR 1965 SC 1506;
  • Bhagwari Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966  SC 735;
  • Sita Ram v. Radha Bai, AIR 1968  SC 534; and  
  • Bibt Rehana Khatun V. Iqtidar Uddin Hasan, AIR  1943 All. 184

The argument was not accepted by the Andhra High Court pointing out that the parties, had known that title to the suit land was in dispute, and they adduced evidence in that regard. Following decisions were relied on by the Court –

  • Ponnia Pillai v. Pannai, AIR 1947 Mad. 282 (relying on Bala Mukund V. Dalu, 25 All. 498 (FB) and 
  • Jagamohan Garnaik v. Sankar Samal,  AIR 1990 Ori. 124.

Court is Entitled to Consider the Title set up by the Defendants also 

In Ram Chandra Sakharam Mahajan Vs. Damodar Trimbak, AIR 2007 SC 2577, it is observed –

  • In a recovery on title suit, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish title.
  • Court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants
  • But, weakness of defence to establish title, would not enable plaintiff to a decree.

The Apex Court held:

  • “The suit is for recovery of possession on the strength of title. Obviously, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that title. No doubt in appreciating the case of title set up by the plaintiff, the Court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants. But the weakness of the defence or the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these propositions.”
  • “14. We find that the trial Court and the appellate Court were not justified in refusing the amendment of the plaint sought for by the plaintiff. No doubt there had been delay in seeking amendment but that delay could have been compensated by awarding costs to the contesting defendants 1 to 9. Therefore, we are satisfied that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff ought to have been allowed. We are inclined to allow the amendment sought for, since it would enable the Court to pin-pointedly consider the real dispute between the parties and would enable it to render a decision more satisfactorily to its conscience. We, therefore, allow the amendment as sought for by the plaintiff at a belated stage. The amendment will be carried out by the plaintiff in the trial Court within three months from this date as per the practice followed in the trial Court. Obviously defendants 1 to 9 would have an opportunity to file an additional written statement to the amended plaint. They will be entitled to file an additional written statement within a period of four months from the date of this judgment.”

Document ex-facie reveals no title – specific declaration as to invalidity not necessary

The Supreme Court held in Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki (Aniruddha Bose & Sudhanshu DhuliaJJ.), 2024 3 KerHC 169; 2024-2 KerLT 789; 2024-4 SCR 383, held as under:

  • “If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence. Chiruthey could not convey any property over which she did not have any right or title. Her right, if any, would stem from the second deed of lease (Exhibit A-1). We are conscious of the fact that no claim was made before any forum for invalidating the deed dated 14th July 1910 (Exhibit A-20).”

By proving a deed, title of the executing person is not automatically confirmed

The Supreme Court held in Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki (Aniruddha Bose & Sudhanshu DhuliaJJ.), 2024 3 KerHC 169; 2024-2 KerLT 789; 2024-4 SCR 383, also held as under:

  • “18. ….But it would be trite to repeat that even if subsistence of a deed is proved in evidence, the title of the executing person (in this case Chiruthey) does not automatically stand confirmed.. ….. … But in absence of proper title over the subject property, that lease deed even if she was its sole lessor would not have had been legally valid or enforceable. If right, title or interest in certain property is sought conveyed by a person by an instrument who herself does not possess any such form of entitlement on the subject being conveyed, even with a subsisting deed of conveyance on such property, the grantee on her successors-in-interest will not have legal right to enforce the right the latter may have derived from such an instrument.”

End Notes:

Following were the facts Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, 2009-15 SCC 693, S.B. Sinha and Deepak Varma, JJ.):

  • The defendant-tenant entered the suit shop in 1970.
  • Plaintiffs purchased the suit premises in 1980. in
  • The plaintiffs served a notice on the defendant under Sec. 106, TP Act.
  • Plaintiffs filed Suit for eviction claiming to be the owners and landlords.
  • Defendant denied that he had ever been a tenant.
  • He claimed independent title. He claimed to have an agreement for sale with the owner.

The trial judge dismissed the suit on the following findings, in a nutshell –

  • .i. The plaintiffs proved to be the owner.
  • ii. The defendant failed to prove his independent title.
  • iii. The plaintiffs failed to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant.  
  • iv. The plaintiffs having failed to prove the tenancy, not entitled to a decree.

Appellate Court, relying on AIR 1984 ROC 78 (All.), page 35, and AIR 1984 All. 66  allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.

The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal.

Hence the appeal before the Apex Court.

The Plaintiffs- respondents contended as under:

  • .i. Even in a suit for eviction, the plaintiffs would be entitled to obtain a decree for possession relying on or on the basis of his title.
  • ii. In a suit for eviction, it is for the defendant to show that he has a right to remain on the tenanted premises either as a permanent tenant or otherwise.

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, it is held 

  • “The landlord in a given case** although may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the event he proves his General TITLE, may obtain a decree on the basis thereof.”
  • **Tenant challenges title of landlord; and no special law (e.g., BRC Act) bars to give such a relief.
  • This decision is referred to in TribhuvanShankar v. Amrutlal (S.B. Sinha and Deepak Misra, JJ.), 2014-2 SCC 788.

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera , the question was formulated by the Court as under:

  • “Whether a Civil Court can pass a decree on the ground that the defendant is a trespasser in a simple suit for eviction is the question involved in this appeal.”

The right of the plaintiff (landlord) to recover, on the basis of “GENERAL TITLE” is asserted by the Supreme Court (Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera) referring following decisions.

1. Radha Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sinha, 1998 (2) BLJR 1061. The Patna High Court accepted that a landlord is entitled to obtain a decree of eviction on the basis of his GENERAL TITLE, though he could not prove the relationship of landlord and tenant (when the tenant raised false claim of title).

2. Champa Lal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra, SB Sinha,  J., (1990) 1 BLJR 268. It was held:

  • “It is also well settled that one such relationship is admitted or established, tenant would be estopped and precluded from challenging the title of the landlord and if he does so, under the general rule, make himself liable for eviction on that ground.
  • It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem Court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his general TITLE.”

3. Hajee Golam Hossain Ostagar v. Sheik Abu Bakkar, AIR 1936 Cal. 351. It was held – in a suit for ejectment, if the defendant claims the right to remain on a land permanently, he was ‘bound to show‘ the right ‘wherefore the onus would be on him‘.

Read Connected Blogs:


How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy; TLB to Fix Plantation-Exemption  

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Part I

Introduction

In Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it is pointed out – when a title claim is raised by the Government or the Devaswom, the persons who claim to be a cultivating tenant

  • will have to first prove their claim of being a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, under the provisions of the KLR Act through a proper process of law.

It is derived that the tenants who have not approached the Land  Tribunal and established rights as “cultivating tenant” are not entitled to avail benefits as “Fixity of Tenure”, under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

It is held in Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, as under:

  • “28. That apart, we notice that the specific claim of the petitioners is hinged solely on Exts. P1, P2 lease deeds in favour Sri. K. M. Cheriyan and on Exts. P3 and P4 letters of the Zamorin Raja, which as we have already said earlier is contended by the Zamorin Raja to be forged. However, nowhere do they say in their pleadings or in their submissions before us that the petitioners have even attempted, under the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, to claim right over the property as a cultivating tenant. This is pertinent because, under Section 72B(3) of the KLR Act, it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant, entitled to assignment of right, title and interest in respect of any property, to apply to the Land Tribunal, within whose jurisdiction that the property is situated, within two years from the date of vesting of such title and interest. Of course, the period of limitation shown therein can be extended by the Government for sufficient reasons. The imperative mandate of this Section is inescapable and we, therefore, deem it necessary to extract it as under to facilitate a complete reading of it:
  •        “72B(3): Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under sub-section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

It is further held as under:

  • “29. From the factual factors in this case, it is rather obvious that even though the petitioners claim possession and ownership over the property on the strength of Exts. P1 to P4, asserting that they are cultivating tenants, they have conspicuously chosen never to make an application before Land Tribunal for assignment of the right, title or interest over the property in their favour until now. Therefore, all that the petitioners have done is to merely make a claim, solely based on the documents aforementioned and Ext. P5, to assert that they are cultivating tenants with respect to the property in question, however, consciously choosing not to make any application under the afore extracted Section 72B (3) to establish such claim, even when they are statutorily obligated to do so.”
  • “44. We are, of course, cognizant that Sri. Joseph Kodianthara, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, refutes with grate force the above submissions of Sri. R. Lakshmi Narayan by predicating that the Devaswom cannot even be heard to be the owner of the property, since by the automatic operation of Section 72 of the KLR Act, the property would become vested with the Government. This submission, we must say, is certainly ingenious in its nature but we refrain ourselves from answering it one way or the other, for the simple reason that whether the property belongs to the Government or to the Devaswom Board, it would be of no consequence or relevance to the petitioners since, in either case, they will have to first prove their claim of being a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, under the provisions of the KLR Act through a proper process of law. Unless and until they are able to do so, the attempted distinction drawn by Sri. Joseph Kodianthara would be nothing more than academic in its nature. We are firm in our mind of this because it is only if they are able to prove that they are a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, can the first petitioner obtain the locus to challenge action under the KLC Act, invoked on the strength of Section 94A of the HR & CE Act, on the ground that property does not belong to the Devaswom. As long as they have not established their claim over the property, adjudication as to if the property is owned by the Government or the Devaswom would not be of any relevance to the petitioners at this point of time.”

It is, obviously, based upon the following principles of law:

  • A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and claim benefits under KLR Act.
  • Land Tribunal is the (sole) authority to determine if someone is a Cultivating Tenant or not.
  • The TLB (only) deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues, etc., and also determines the land to be surrendered.

Tenants Obligated to Approach the LT for Availing Plantation Exemption

Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it was laid down that only cultivating tenants, entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, would be “entitled to hold possession over the property and to resist action under the KLC Act”.

Sec. 72B provides for cultivating tenants’ rights to get assignment by purchase certificate (through LT) – within the ceiling area. A Tenant was “obligated to apply” for the purchase certificate within 2 years from 1-1-1970.

Sec. 73B(3) reads as under:

  • “(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

A Tenant Failed to Apply Assignment will not have a ‘Vested Right’

It is the Legal Basis of Balanoor Plantations case

The legal basis of the decision, Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, can be derived from Sec. Sec. 85(3) of the KLR Act.

Sec. 85(3) and (3A) of the KLR Act read as under:

  • (3). Where, after the final settlement of claims for resumption of lands held by a person as tenant, such person holds land in excess of the ceiling area, or where after the purchase of the right, title and interest of the landowner** and the intermediary by the cultivating tenant in respect of lands owned by a person, such person owns land in excess of the ceiling area, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided.
  • (3A). The person bound to file a statement under Sub-section (2) shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.] [Substituted by Act No. 35 of 1969.

**Why the Words “After The Purchase of the Right, Title And Interest of the Landowner” Included?

It is beyond doubt – the excess land in possession of a tenant, over which he has fixity of tenure under Section 13 (other than the lands exempted under Section 81), has to be surrendered. If the claimant of Plantation Exemption (under Section 81) is a tenant, he must have approached the Land Tribunal under subsection (3) of Section 85 – within the stipulated time (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations under different landlords), because:

  • (i) subsection (3) of Section 85 itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant under Section 72B (or for getting a Certificate to the effect that he is not eligible to purchase any more land, for he is already holding maximum within the limit prescribed under Section 82),
  • (ii) the Land Tribunal is the only authority to deal with tenancy in this regard (Land Board or Taluk Land Board – deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues, etc. – cannot adjudicate on tenancy rights), and
  • (iii) Title to the property is not adjudicated by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11). Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).  
  • In Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736; 1993 2 KLT 962, it is pointed out: “If there is dispute on any of these points necessarily the Land Tribunal has to go into the question of possession and the alleged tenancy”
  • (iv) the Land Board cannot accept the self-declaration that one is a tenant. 

Note: 1. The entire tenancy-land being vested with the Government by virtue of Section 72, the tenants of the exempted-plantation-land (above the ceiling limit), will be the tenants under the Government liable to pay rent under Section 72E.

2. Under Section 72F(5)(h), the Land Tribunal fixes the rent for the unassigned-exempted-land.

3. Explanation II to Sec. 87 bars fragmentation of the plantation land. Still, subsection (3) of Section 85(3) expressly allows the tenant to obtain purchase-certificate (under Sec. 72B).

A Tenant Failed to Apply Assignment will not have a ‘Vested Right’ to hold land beyond the ceiling limit

A cultivating tenant, “entitled to assignment” of the right under Sec. 72B, if failed to apply the same, will not have ‘vested right to continue’, as a cultivating tenant beyond the ceiling limit.

  • Note: As shown elsewhere, there is an option for the tenant – either to obtain purchase-certificate or to avail plantation-exemption.

Sec. 72B provides for cultivating tenant’s rights to get assignment by purchase certificate (through LT) – within the ceiling area. A tenant was “obliged to apply” for it within 2 years from 1-1-1970. Therefore, the cultivating tenants entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest were “obliged to apply” to the Land Tribunal within the time fixed for asserting the claim as cultivating tenants. This decision (Balanoor Plantations) also says that tenants having ‘no bona fide claim’ as to cultivating-tenancy will not have the benefit of fixity under Sec. 13 of the KLR Act, and they will have ‘no vested right to continue’.

Sec. 73B(3) reads as under:

  • “(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

The principle in Balanoor case (“Legally Obligatedto apply LT)

It is definite: the principle applied in the Balanoor case (that it is “legally obligated” on every cultivating tenant to apply to the Land Tribunal) is the following –

  • It is for adjudicating the ‘tenancy right’.
  • The reason is that the Land Tribunal is the only authority that can adjudicate on the “tenancy right.”
  • Under Sec. 72A, the Landlord is entitled to Compensation and under Sec. 72D, a tenant is bound to pay the Purchase Price. The Scheme of the KLR Act requires that there should be proceedings before the Land Tribunal under Sec. 72B or 72C.
  • It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government, for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.
    • Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.
  • Note: A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and avail benefits – the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal. (See: Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9); Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54); Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736; 1993 2 KLT 962.)

What is the Position if the Tenant holds Maximum Within the Ceiling

Before approaching the Land Board or the Taluk Land Board under Section 85(5) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act—particularly with respect to the area to be surrendered (in effect, to seek a declaration of ‘plantation exemption’)—the tenant is required, in terms of Section 85(3), to first ‘purchase the right, title, and interest of the landowner’.

However, a legal question arises when the tenant already holds land up to the maximum extent permitted under the ceiling limit. In such a case, where no further land can be purchased without violating the ceiling provisions, it becomes legally impermissible for the tenant to acquire additional land, even through the statutory purchase mechanism. This limitation could potentially bar the tenant from complying with the precondition under Section 85(3), thereby affecting their ability to claim plantation exemption through the Land Board proceedings.

The answer is the following:

  • (i) It was incumbent on the tenant to apply (within the time limit) to the Land Tribunal –
    • to get the order of ‘purchase’ by the LT
    • to get the price fixed by the LT
    • to pay the purchase price to the landowner through LT
    • to pay rent to the land owner through LT
    • and to get forwarded the orders to the Land Board by the LT.
  • The following are the relevant provisions of the KLR Act.
    • 54(1). A cultivating tenant (to purchase the right) has to apply Land Tribunal.
    • 55. Purchase price is to be fixed by LT (on fair rent u/s. 31) to be paid u/s. 59
      57. The LT, after enquiries, has to pass orders determining the purchase price.
    • 57(3). The Land Tribunal has to allow the purchase of the land it determines.
    • 57(6). The Land Tribunal has to forward the orders to the Land Board. (On the basis of the Orders sent to the Land Board, the Land Board takes actions under S. 85(7) – whereon a person fails to file a statement under 85(2) or (3A), LB shall intimate that fact to TLB and thereon the  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered.)
    • 59. The purchase price (determined u/s. 57 by the LT) has to be deposited with the Land Tribunal to the credit of the Land Board and issue of certificate
    • 61. Tenant has to pay rent (under orders of LT) pending proceedings.
    • 72D. The cultivating tenant has to pay purchase price to the Government (fixed by the LT) on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
  • (ii) The Tenant has to obtain a Certificate from the Land Tribunal
    • A tenant can obtain title to land only up to the extent permissible under the ceiling limit prescribed by the KLR Act. (For determining the ceiling area, the total extent of land held by the person or family anywhere in the State or in India shall be taken into account.)
    • In such a situation, it is legitimate to say that the tenant has to obtain a Certificate from the Land Tribunal stating that (i) he is a cultivating tenant of the property under consideration and (ii) he has already complied with the provisions-
      • to get the order of ‘purchase’ by the LT
      • to get the purchase price fixed by the LT
      • to pay the purchase price to the landowner through LT
      • to pay rent to the land owner through LT
      • and to get forwarded the orders to the Land Board by the LT. .

Extent of Land for which a Purchase Certificate can be issued by LT

If a cultivating tenant (of a plantation land) possessed land at or above the ceiling limit, no purchase certificate can be issued to him, from the plantation property in question. 

If a tenant holds some land, he will receive a Purchase Certificate for the extent – equal to the Ceiling Limit minus the land he already possesses.

If such a tenant (already) holds land at or above the ceiling limit (and, for that reason,  no purchase certificate can be given with respect to the plantation property), proceedings are to be promulgated, or an order is to be issued, by the Land Tribunal  to that effect, if it finds that he is a cultivating tenant of that plantation.

  • The same will be the position as regards the plantation-lease-lands owned by the Government (for the reason that no purchase certificate can be issued for Government-lease-lands, by virtue of Sec. 3, KLR Act).

The aforesaid proceedings of the Land Tribunal also has to be presented (with the lease-agreement and other documents), before the Taluk Land Board, for getting the order of exemption.  

Tenant has to pay Rent to the Government

In any case, the tenants who are found to be cultivating tenants entitled to hold the plantation tenancy land, under exemption, have to pay rent to the Government as provided under Sec. 72E (and the Land Tribunal has to fix the rent under subsection (5)(h) of Sec. 72F).  If such land is acquired by the Government  compensation for improvements alone need be paid to the tenant [and no land-value be given, under Sec. 112(5A)]. 

Also Read: Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board.

Part II

Civil Court to Find Title; Land Tribunal to Fix Tenancy; Taluk Land Board to Determine Plantation Exemption

Abstract

  • Civil court alone to find disputes on title.
  • A tenant cannot declare himself to be tenant.
  • Land Tribunal is the sole authority to determine Tenancy.
  • The TLB alone deals with exemption and land to be surrendered.

Civil court alone to find disputes on title

It is observed in M/S Radha Krishan Industries v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 334, that where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition (Art. 226); and it is pointed out that this principle have been consistently upheld by the Apex Court in

  • Seth Chand Ratan v Pandit Durga Prasad, (2003) 5 SCC 399,
  • Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706 , and
  • Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 632, etc.

The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Harrisions Malayalam Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(2) KLT 369, held as under:

“141. ………Title, we reiterate, in this context, we have not found on the petitioners, which we are incompetent to do in the present (Writ) proceedings………”.

A Tenant Cannot Declare Himself to be a Tenant and Avail Benefits under KLR Act

  • The competent statutory authority to determine tenancy under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.
  • Land Board or Taluk Land Board deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues etc. It cannot adjudicate on tenancy right or title.

Title to the Property is not Ajudicated by the TLB.

  • Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).  

Land Tribunal to go into the question of tenancy

In Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736

  • “If there is dispute on any of these points necessarily the Land Tribunal has to go into the question of possession and the alleged tenancy”.

Balanoor Plantations Case – Based on the Principle LT to fix Tenancy’; TLB to Fix Plantation Exemption.  

In Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it is pronounced that the tenants who have not approached the Land  Tribunal and established rights as “cultivating tenant” are not entitled to avail benefits on “Fixity of Tenure”, under Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

It is pointed out – when a title claim is raised by the Government or the Devaswom, the person who claims to be a cultivating tenant –

  • will have to first prove their claim of being a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, under the provisions of the KLR Act through a proper process of law.

It is held as under:

  • “This is pertinent because, under Section 72B(3) of the KLR Act, it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant, entitled to assignment of right, title and interest in respect of any property, to apply to the Land Tribunal, within whose jurisdiction that the property is situated, within two years from the date of vesting of such title and interest.”

It is based upon the following principles of law:

  • It is for adjudicating the ‘tenancy right’, by the Land Tribunal – for, the Land Tribunal is the only authority that can decide on the “tenancy right.” (It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case.)
  • Note: A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and avail benefits – the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.
  • Land Board or Taluk Land Board (deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues etc.) cannot adjudicate on tenancy right.

Cultivating Tenants (‘Entitled to Assignment’) are Obligated to Apply LT

Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it was laid down that only cultivating tenants, entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, would be “entitled to hold possession over the property and to resist action under the KLC Act”.

Sec. 72B provides for cultivating tenant’s rights to get an assignment by purchase certificate (through LT) – within the ceiling area. A Tenant was “obligated to apply” for the purchase certificate within 2 years from 1-1-1970.

Sec. 73B(3) reads as under:

  • “(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

Referrence to the Land Tribunal, under Section 125(3)

On the basis of the Full Bench decision in Lissy v. Kuttan, 1976 KLT 571, it was argued in Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala that a person who claims to be a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 of the KLR Act, the Civil Courts are prohibited from considering such issues and the matter has to be referred to the Land Tribunal, under Section 125(3) of the KLR Act. It is pointed out in this decision that the judgment in Lissy v. Kuttan had been overruled by a Larger Bench in Kesava Bhat v. Subraya Bhat, 1979 KLT 766. It was held in Balanoor Plantations as under:

  • “11…. Unless the question actually “arises” for consideration, there is no obligation under S. 125 (3) to make a reference to the Land Tribunal. The mere incorporation of an unnecessary or irrelevant plea of tenancy into the written statement which has no relation whatever to the material averments and the reliefs sought in plaint, cannot attract the bar of S. 125 (1), or the provisions of S. 125 (3 ). …..  It is only if the question arises for consideration that the obligation to refer under S. 125 (3) also arises. …..”

Read Related Blogs:

End Notes

Relevant provisions of KLR Act, in a Nutshell

Section Provisions in a Nutshell
Chap. II 
3(1)
Exemptions – (i) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to – (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
“Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.
7 EPersons acquired lands (before 2005 amendment in KLR Act) for consideration below 1 Ha. 61 Are 87 Sq.m. (4 acre) will be deemed to be tenants .
13Fixity: “Every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding.”
22Landlord desiring to resume any land shall apply to the Land Tribunal.
31Fair rent determined by Land Tribunal.
51B. Landlord not to enter on land surrendered or abandoned by the tenant. 
Contravention is made punishable.
54(1)
55
57
57 (3)
57 (6)
61
54(1). A cultivating tenant (to purchase the right) has to apply Land Tribunal.
55. Purchase price is fixed by LT (on fair rent u/s. 31) to be paid u/s. 59
57. The LT after enquiries, pass orders determining purchase price.
(3). The Land Tribunal allows the purchase of the land it determines.
(6). The Land Tribunal forwards  orders to the Land Board.
61. Tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) pending proceedings.
59When Sec. 54 application is allowed (by the LT), the purchase price (determined u/s. 57 by the LT) shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal to the credit of the Land Board and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
72
Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating tenants in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
72(1) says: Holdings upon which tenants entitled fixity under sec. 13 vest in govt.
The land vested in the Government under Section 72, compensation shall be paid to the former landowner under Section 72G. Consequently, the vesting effected under Section 72(1) becomes absolute.
72BCultivating-tenant “shall be entitled to assignment” of land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 –within ceiling area and get purchase certificate (through LT) (2 years from 1-1-1970). Effect of non-filing (See Balanoor Plantations case. 2018(3) KLT 283.)
72DThe cultivating tenant has to pay the purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
72ESuch a tenant is liable to pay rent to the Govt. for the unassigned land – under Purchase Certificate (E.g., exempted-plantation-land). The Land Tribunal fixes the rent under Sec. 72F(5)(h).
72CProvides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit). Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 
72KLT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.
74Prohibition of future tenancies.
Chap. III 
81
Exemption from ceiling and excess for Govt. lands, private forests, plantations, industrial or commercial undertakings, etc.
Proviso – There will be an exemption (as plantation, land given to educational institution, trust, etc.) on Government lands, given under grant, lease, etc.
See: HMT (Machine Tools) Limited v. Taluk Land Board, 2009 (3) KLJ 110; MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28.
82Ceiling area – 5/10 standard acres.
83No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  It is a total bar. (Note:  plantations, industrial area etc. are exempted.)
Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB), Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137)
The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571.
84Certain transfers – void.
85(1)Surrender excess.
85(2)Owners and Tenants (having land in excess of the ceiling area) should furnish ceiling return to Land Board before March31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
Note: Effect of non-filing: See – Balanoor Plantations case – 2018(3) KLT 283.State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
 According to S. 3(1) (viii), “tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres” is exempted from Chapter II. Therefore, the landlord can recover such plantation lands after the period of tenancy. Such landlords also had to file a ceiling return within the time stipulated.
85(3)Excess shall be surrendered.
Note: Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant) It is clear from the following provisions: 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT(or the purchase of right, title and interest.)
55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.
Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.
It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case. Note: (i) The sub-section (3) itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant, (ii) LT is the only authority to determine tenancy (Land Board cannot determine it), and (iii) it is clear that even if it is a plantation-exemption-land (beyond ceiling limit), the tenant has to file petition under Section 54 – for fixing Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT and for allotting the land under section 57(3) and for effecting the payments of ‘rent’ and ‘purchase price’(to the credit of the Land Board)  under sec. 61 and 59.
85(3A)The person bound to file a statement under sub-section (2) (that is, Owners and Tenants – having land in excess of the ceiling area)  shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.
85(5)On receipt of the statement under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3A), the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Board and such Taluk LandBoard shall determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered.
85(7)Whereon a person fails to file statement under 85(2) or (3A), LB shall intimate that fact to TLB  –  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered. It is obvious – The LB can intimate TLB as to non-filing, on the basis of the records it obtained under Sec. 57(6) and 59. That is, those tenants who are not entitled to get a purchase certificate also has to file an application under Sec. 54(1) and 85(2) or (3A). Effect of non-filing: See – Balanur Plantations case (With respect to Sec. 72B application) – 2018(3) KLT 283. Statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit to file statement:  State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
[TLB not to do, suo motu, without direction from LB. 1980 KLT 120, referred to in 2019(1) KLT 985.]
85AFile ceiling return within March  2, 1973 before Land Board..
86(1)On determination of the extent to be surrendered under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
86(3)Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession
86(4)Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
86(6)Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
87
Exp. II
If a person converts any portion of exempted land for any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit. That is, the exemption will be lost for the portion that exceeds the ceiling limit. (Mathew K Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913)

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 

Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

What is Easement? Does Right of Easement Allow to ‘Enjoy’ Servient Land After Making Improvements Therein ?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

What is Easement?

  • Easement is a right possessed by the owner of a land (dominant land),
    • to use the land of another (servient land),
    • for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant land.

Easement (सुखाधिकार) Does Not Confer Ownership or Possession

By virtue of easement –

  • No Ownership is bestowed in the (servient) land (AIR 2004 All 359; AIR 1925 Bom 335).
  • No Possession is obtained in the (servient) land. (2011 (2) KLT 605; AIR 1925 Bom 335)  
  • No Substantive Interest is created in the (servient) land. (2003 (1) KLT 320; AIR 1954 All 393).

Easement: According to ‘Katiyar on Easements’                                                                   

  • Easement is not a right to land or exclude owner.
  • It is not a right to permanent occupation
  • It does not confer exclusive right of user/enjoyment.
  • And, it is not a corporeal interest in land.

Easement – Definition under the Indian Easements Act

SECTION 4 of the Indian Easements Act defines Easements as under:

  • “An easement is a right
  • which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses,
    • as such,
  • for the beneficial enjoyment of that land 
  • to do and continue to do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done,
  • in or upon, or in respect of, certain other land not his own.”

Easement is a mere ‘Privilege’ according to English Law.

  • But, Indian Law on Easement confers “limited interest” also in the land of another.  
  • It is clear from Explanation to Sec. 4 (Definition of Easement) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882.  The Explanation lays down that the expression “to do something” in the definition includes removal and appropriation of any part of the soil of the servient heritage, or anything growing or subsisting thereon (Profit-a-Prendre).
  • They are made definite by the Illustrations to various sections as shown under:
    • Illustn.-(d) of Sec. 4.
      • It speaks as to – Graze cattle,
      • take water and fish out from the tank, 
      • take timber from wood, 
      • take fallen leaves for manuring.
    • Illustn.- (b) of Sec. 22.
      • It states about cutting  thatching- grass. 
    • Illustn.- (a) of Sec. 24.
      • It refers to easement to lay pipes.

Easement is Well Recognised, and Circumscribed by Law

  • Easement is a limited right to ‘use’or ‘enjoy‘ another’s land.
  • It is to do, or to prevent to do, some specific thing.
  • It is to be exercised in a way least onerous to the ‘another’s land’.
  • It is not a right to build and enjoy.
  • The right gained cannot be enlarged.
    • That is, an easement of way to a particular (dominant) property cannot be extended to another property by the dominant owner; an easement for residential purpose cannot be enlarged for an industrial purpose.
  • Servient owner can use his land in any manner (without disturbing enjoyment of the easement).

Salient Limitations of Easement under the Indian Easements Act

  • The owner of a land only ‘uses’or ‘enjoys‘ land of another (Sec. 31)
  • It is only ‘enjoyment’ of soil or things ‘subsisting’ (Explanation in Sec. 4).
  • It allows limited enjoyment of land, and advantages from its situation: S. 7
  • right be exercised in a way least onerous to ‘another’s land’: Sec. 22
  • Servient owner can secure full enjoyment; but, he should cause as little inconvenience: Sec. 24: 2017-2 KLT 63

It is Not a right to:                                            

  • tend to total destruction of servient tenement: S. 17 (2003 (1) KLT320)
  • make additional burden: S. 23
  • make constructions in, or cultivate upon: (2003 (1) KLT 320).
  • prevent servient owner to use: S. 27 : 2003 (1) KLT 320
  • enlarge purpose of, or accustomed, user: S. 28
  • substantially increase an easement: S. 29
  • prevent servient owner from obstructing excessive  ‘user’ of servient land – as ‘enjoyment of easement’: S. 31
  • increase burden by making permanent change in do. tent: S. 43
  • capable of forming grant – No easement, if Not capable of forming grant (without document or registration): 1987 (2) KLT 1037.

No easement if:

  • right claimed is incidents of ownership.
  • servient property belongs to him. Easement is a right with conscious knowledge that the servient property does not belong to him. AIR 1966 Raj 265. It must also be with proper animus as to easement: AIR 1973 Mad 173.

“Which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses

Sec. 12 states that an easement is acquired by the owner of an immovable property. Sec. 21 lays down that an easement must not be used for any purpose not connected with enjoyment of the dominant heritage. It cannot be severed from dominant heritage.

‘Enjoyment’ of ‘Land’

Easements are limited to ‘enjoyment of’ Servient ‘land’ (and things ‘subsisting’, for land includes things permanently attached to earth).

For the beneficial enjoyment of that Land.

The most outstanding clause in the definition of easement is “Beneficial Enjoyment”.

Easements are primarily for the beneficial enjoyment of dominant heritage. Easement stands as part and parcel of dominant land. The definition says that an easement is a ‘right which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses, as such’. 

As Such

‘As such’ is used for emphasis to convey that easement is essentially connected to the dominant land, and it is inherently for the beneficial enjoyment of annexed/appertained (dominant) land; and not a right ‘in gross’ (for the benefit of individuals).

Profit-a-prendre (Right to Take): Indian Law Varies from English Law

Under English Law, an easement is a privilege alone, and profit-a-prendre (right to take) is not an easement. It does not allow “Removal and Appropriation” either. The Indian Easements Act purposefully used “to do something in or upon”, decisively avoiding, ‘to use’ or ‘to enjoy’; because Indian Law allows ‘profit-a-prendre‘ [fishing, pasturing, grass-cutting for thatching, etc.]. It is allowed in Indian situations, but without conferring substantial interest in the servient land. ‘Profit a prendre’ is not appurtenant to any dominant land; and it is a right ‘in gross’ (for the benefit of individuals).

Beneficial Enjoymentin Easement includes Removal and Appropriation

The Explanation to the definition of Easement (in Sec. 4) reads as under:

  • “Explanation – In the first and second clauses of this section, the expression “land” includes also things permanently attached to the earth;
  • the expression “beneficial enjoyment” includes also possible convenience, remote advantage, and even a mere amenity;
  • and the expression “to do something” includes removal and appropriation by the dominant owner, for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant heritage, of any part of the soil of the servient heritage, or anything growing or subsisting thereon.”

The word ‘Servient’ is derived from ‘Servant’

Literal meaning of the word ‘servient’ is – subordinate, subservient and subject to another. Etymologically it is derived from ‘servus’ (Latin) meaning – slave or servant.

  • “Dominant and Servient Heritages and OwnersThe land for the beneficial enjoyment of which the right exists is called the dominant heritage, and the owner or occupier thereof the dominant owner; the land on which the liability is imposed is called the servient heritage, and the owner or occupier thereof the servient owner.”

Thus, the land upon which the right is claimed is ‘servient’ land.

Easement is acquired; not arise out of ‘Express Permission’

Sec. 12, Easements Act states that an easement is acquired  (under grant, partition or prescription) by the owner of an immovable property. Section 12, Indian Easements Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 12. Who may acquire easements-An easement may be acquired by the owner of the immovable property for the beneficial enjoyment  of which the right is created, or on his behalf, by any person in possession of the same.
  • One of two or more co-owners of immovable property may, as such, with or without the consent of the other or others, acquire an easement for the beneficial enjoyment  of such property.
  • No lessee of immovable property can acquire, for the beneficial enjoyment of other immovable property of his own, an easement in or over the property comprised in his lease.

It is observed by the Apex Court in Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal, AIR 2009 SC 1103, that the claimant of easement (prescription) should plead and prove that the right claimed was enjoyed independent of any agreement with the owner of the property over which the right is claimed, as any user with the express permission of the owner will be a licence and not an easement. 

Easement and Licence – Distinction

Division Bench of this High Court in Chandu Lal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1978 Del 174, distinguished easement and licence as under:

  • “26… A mere licensee has only a right to use the property. Such a right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property but is only a personal privilege to the licensee. After the termination of the license, the licensor is entitled to deal with the property as he likes. This right he gets as an owner in possession of his property. He need not secure a decree of the Court to obtain the right. He is entitled to resist in defence of his property the attempts of a trespasser to come upon his property by exerting the necessary and reasonable force to expel a trespasser……..”

Methods of Acquisition of Easements

The Indian Easements Act, 1882 refers to the different methods by which easements are acquired. They are pointed out (Ramkanya Bai v. Jagdish, AIR 2011 SC 3258) to be the following:

  1. easements by grant: express grant by the owner of the servient heritage
  2. easements of necessity: based on implied grants or reservations made by the owner of a servient heritage at the time of transfers or partitions
  3. easements by prescription: it is presumed that it is acquired by peaceable and open enjoyment, without interruption for twenty years and
  4. customary easements: it is inferred that it is acquired by virtue of a local custom.

For easement by prescription, it is not necessary that the user should be exclusive, but the claimant should exercise it under some claim existing in his own favour independently of all others.

Basis of Every Right of Easement Is Theoretically a Grant

The origin of all easements is, theoretically, grant by the servient owner. It may be express or implied. It may also be presumed from long user. It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

  • “Theoretically all easements have their origin in some sort of grant by the servient owner. The grant may be express or it may be implied from the surrounding attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties or it may even be presumed from long user. In the case of an express grant of easement the limit thereof depends on the words used.”

In Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89, it is held as under:

The basis of every right of easement is theoretically a ‘grant’ from the servient-owner.

  • It may be expressed, as in Sections 8 to 12 of the Act; or
  • it may be implied from the circumstances as in Section 13 of the Act; or
  • it may be presumed from long and continued user for a certain period as in Section 15 of the Act; or
  • it may be inferred from a long and continued practice of user by a certain class of the public in certain locality.

For easement by prescription, it is not necessary that the user should be exclusive, but the claimant should exercise it under some claim existing in his own favour independently of all others.

Grant by a Co-owner

Grant effected by a co-owner with the consent of other co-owners, or validated by their approval or ratification, alone is valid. In proper cases such consent or ratification may be presumed.

Lost Grant

In Easements Act by Dr. Karandikar & Chitaley at Page 425, note 20 (Title by lost grant), it is observed as follows:

  • “(2) The evidence from which a lost grant may be inferred is not very different from the evidence on which a claim for a prescriptive easement may be established.
  • (3) (Drainage system of defendant’s building connected with sewer line of plaintiff’s building – Right claimed by defendant exercised secretly – Held, right was not proved.) The presumption of lost grant may be negatived by showing legal incompetence as regards owner of the servient tenement to grant an easement or a physical incapacity of being obstructed as regard the easement itself or an uncertainty or secrecy of enjoyment putting out of the category of all known easements.
  • (4) Where the plaintiff did make out a case of user from time immemorial in the plaint a decree could be granted on the basis of lost grant.
  • (5) Acquisition of easement by immemorial user based on doctrine of lost grant can be claimed when dominant and servient tenements are held under same landlord.
  • (6) Proof of the origin of right or by such proof of long & uninterrupted usage as in the absence of a documentary title will suffice to establish a prescriptive right.” (Quoted in Varghese v. Jose Mathew, 2014-3 Ker LT 1065).

In Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 16(2) at Page 42, paragraph 76, it is observed as follows:

  • “76. Prescription based on presumed grant. The doctrine of prescription generally is based upon the presumption of a grant, the common law doctrine being that all prescription presupposes a grant once made and validly subsisting, but since lost or destroyed. The other forms of prescription are merely modifications of this doctrine. The presumption in the former instance of such a grant arises under the doctrine of prescription from the fact of enjoyment of the right. It therefore follows that a right claimed by prescription must be such that it could have formed the subject matter of a grant. Nothing which cannot have had a lawful beginning can be claimed by prescription. Recourse can only be had to the doctrine of prescription in cases where a grant of the right is not forthcoming, for prescription has no place if a grant is proved and its terms are known“. (Quoted in Varghese v. Jose Mathew, 2014-3 Ker LT 1065).

Extent of Easement – If used for several purposes, inferred for all purposes

Under the provisions of the Easements Act, the dominant owner cannot –

  • enlarge purpose of, or accustomed, user (S. 28) and
  • substantially increase an easement (S. 29).

In Cowling v Higginson (1838) 4 M & W 245, it was held as under:

  • “If a way has been used for several purposes, there may be a ground for inferring that there is a right of way for all purposes.”

Extent of Easement

The courts in India took the stand that easement for one purpose can be changed to another, provided there is no additional burden (agricultural purposes might be used for the purpose of a factory provided no additional burden). See:

  • Jesang v. Whittle, (1899) ILR 23 Bom 595,
  • Manchersha Sorabji v. Virjivallabhdas, (1926) ILR 50 Bom 635,
  • Mahammad Beari v. Badava Beari, (1931) 61 Mad LJ 58.

Our Courts followed the principles laid down in the following English cases-

Williams v. James: [1867] LR 2 CP 577, held that ‘a right of way obtained by prescription for the purpose of carting hay to field ‘cannot be increased so as to affect the servient tenement by imposing upon it any additional burthen’.

  • This decision is followed in Jotindra Mohan Mitter v. Probodh Kumar Dutt, AIR 1932 Cal 249, and it was held –
  • “In ascertaining the extent of the right of user of a road when the condition of the adjoining property has been altered, the fact that there was plenty of room in the road had never been taken into consideration. The right must be measured according to the principle laid down by Wills, J., in Williams v. James [1867] 2 C.P. 577 as a reasonable use for the purpose of the land in the condition in which it was when the user took place, that is in the case of this mansion, in the state in which it was when the grant was made. The matter must however be looked at reasonably, and no small addition to the house would be improper. Here there had been a very large increase.

Wimbledon and Putney Commons Conservators v. Dixon: (1875) 1 Ch D 362, held that ‘if a right of way to a field be proved by evidence of user, however general, for whatever purpose qua field, the person who is the owner of that field cannot from that say, I have a right to turn that field into a manufactory, or into a town, and then use the way for the purpose of the manufactory or town so built.’

  • This decision is followed in Manchersha Sorabji Shet v. Virijvalavdas Jekisandas, (1926) 28 BomLR 1158, and it was held –
  • “In Wimbledon and Putney Commons Conservators v. Dixon (1875) 1 Ch D 362 it was held that the immemorial user of a right of way for all purposes for which a road was wanted in the then condition of the property, does not establish a right of way for all purposes in an altered condition of the property where that would impose a greater burden on the servient tenement. Where a road had been immemorially used to a farm not only for usual agricultural purposes, but in certain instances for carrying building materials to enlarge the farm-house and rebuild a cottage on the farm, and for carting away sand and gravel dug out of the farm, it was decided that those circumstances did not establish a right of way for carting the materials required for building a number of new houses on the land.”

Corporation of London v. Riggs (1880) 13 Ch. D. 798, held that a right of way of necessity is not a general right “for all purposes”; it is limited to the uses to which it had been put at the time when the action first arose or when the way of necessity was created.

  • This decision is followed in Manchersha Sorabji Shet v. Virijvalavdas Jekisandas, (1926) 28 BomLR 1158, and it was held –
  • “Again, in Corporation of London v. Riggs (1880) 13 Ch.D. 798 the head-note runs as follows :- Where the owner of a close surrounded by his own land grants the land and reserves the close, the implied right to a way of necessity to and from the close over the land operates by way of re-grant from the grantee of the land, and is limited by the necessity which created it.”

The converse had been pointed out in Cowling v. Higginson, (1838) 4 MEE & W 245-

  • “If a way has been used for several purposes, there may be a ground for inferring that there is a right of way for all purposes”. (See: Vasudeva Prabhu   Madhava Prabhu, AIR 1993 Ker 68.)

Easement: ‘Easement’ is the right in the land of another

‘Easement’ under Sec. 4 of the Easements Act is the right in a land ‘not of his own’. See:

  • Vasudeva Prabhu   Madhava Prabhu, AIR 1993 Ker 68 (no easement in co-ownership property)
  • Venkateswaraswamivari Devasthanam v. Velidandla Kanakalakshmi, AIR 1976 AP 250
  • Sumanlal Bhagwandas v. Naginlal Bhagwandas, AIR 1967 Guj 87,
  • Raychand Vanmali-das v. Maneklal Mansukhbhai, AIR 1946 Bom 266
  • Marghabhai Vallavbhai v. Motibhai Mithabhai, AIR 1932 Bom 513.

Will Easement of Necessity Ripen into a Prescriptive Easement?

In other words-

  • Can one claim ‘easement of necessity’ and ‘easement by prescription’ with respect to a (same) way?  
  • Does a way  that started with minimum width (say a foot-path) under the claim ‘easement of necessity’, and continued with a higher width (so that cars can be taken), in the course of time,  for more than 20 years, will yield or bring-in ‘easement by prescription’?

We find answer in negative form in Tanba Nusaji Mahajan v, Pandhari Mahajan, 2004 (6) BomCR 782, 2004 (4) MhLJ 109. It is held as under:

  • “10. However, a way of necessity is distinguished from the right of way acquired by prescription and cannot ripen into a prescriptive easement so long as the necessity continues. A way of necessity arises by virtue of conditions entirely different from easement of way created by prescription. The former arises by implication of law out of the necessities of the case and is based upon principle of law which negative the existence of a way by continuous adverse user. The acquisition of way by adverse user is based upon the theory of the hostility of the use to the title of the person over whose lands it is acquired, while a way of necessity is based upon an implication of an intended grant and the use of it is based entirely upon such implication or consent to its use.”

Existence of alternate way will End Easement of Necessity

Existence of alternate way, how ever inconvenient, will end Easement of Necessity.

  • See: Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622
  • Gouri Amma Krishnamma v. Seethalakshmi Amma, AIR 2004 Ker 75,
  • Thilakraj v. Sebastian, 2014-4 Ker LT 714, 2014 KHC 5042,
  • Rameshchandra Bhikhabhai Patel v. Sakriben,  AIR 1978 Guj 62.

In Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, AIR 2006 SC 2234, it is held that an easement by grant would not get extinguished under Section 41 of the Act which relates to an easement of necessity.

Apparent and Continuous Easements

Sec. 5 of the Easements Act defines apparent and continuous easements.

  • An apparent easement is defined as one the existence of which is shown by some permanent sign which, upon careful inspection by a competent person, would be visible to him; and
  • a continuous easement is one whose enjoyment is, or may be, continual without the act of man.

Easement of Necessity and Quasi Easement

  • Easement of Necessity: even if – no visible sign (not apparent); and even if – never used before (not continuous). E.g., a foot path to a landlocked plot.
    • But, there should have strict necessity.
  • Quasi Easement – must be visible (apparent) and must be functioning without repeated human action (continuous). E.g., water flowing through a pipe or a drainage system.
    • It is based on prior use before land division.
    • It requires only reasonable necessity, not strict necessity.

Implied Grant and Quasi-Easement

  • The question of implied grant (or quasi-easement) arises only if the alleged easement is:
    • Apparent (i.e., visible upon reasonable inspection), and
    • Continuous (i.e., functions without repeated human intervention)
  • E.g., Water flowing through a pipe, A drainage trench, Overhead electric cables.

Easement: Implied Grant and Quasi Easement in a ‘Formed’ Way

There could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent. But, in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, our Apex Court found quasi easement under Section 13(b) of the Indian Easements Act over a way in the following circumstances –

  • Though there could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent, if there is a ‘formed road’ existing over one part of the tenement for the apparent use of another portion or there is ‘some permanence in the adaptation of the tenement’ from which continuity may be inferred, an exception can be inferred (Annapurna Dutta vs. Santosh Kumar Sett, AIR 1937 Cal.661, B.K. Mukherjee, referred to).
  • There was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to dominant property and there was no objection also to the use of disputed way by the plaintiff.
  • An easement may arise by implication, if the intention to grant can properly be inferred either from the terms of the grant or the circumstances.
  • A trace of the pathway could be presumed to be in existence from the time when the plaintiff acquired the properties by separation of tenements.
  • Only access to the property was through disputed pathway.
  • It was required for the reasonable and convenient use of the plaintiff’s property and that on severance of the tenements, plaintiff can be presumed to have got a right over disputed pathway by an implied grant and also an easement of necessity.
  • The user was not obstructed for very long time.
  • There was no reason to disbelieve the plaintiff’s version that disputed way was given as grant for his use as he was a close relative of the former.
  • There was an apparent and continuous use which was necessary for the enjoyment of the `A’ schedule property within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the Indian Easements Act.
  • The defendants have not entered the witness box to disprove the evidence led by the plaintiff.
  • Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to easement right in respect of the pathway.

Easement of Necessity is limited to Barest Necessity, however inconvenient it is

In Hero Vinoth (Minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, AIR 2006 SC 2234, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “An easement of necessity is one which is not merely necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the dominant tenement, but one where dominant tenement cannot be used at all without the easement. The burden of the servient owner in such a case is not on the basis of any concession or grant made by him for consideration or otherwise, but it is by way of a legal obligation enabling the dominant owner to use his land. It is limited to the barest necessity however inconvenient it is irrespective of the question whether a better access could be given by the servient owner or not. When an alternate access becomes available, the legal necessity of burdening the servient owner ceases and the easement of necessity by implication of law is legally withdrawn or extinguished as statutorily recognized in Section 41. Such an easement will last only as long as the absolute necessity exists. Such a legal extinction cannot apply to an acquisition by grant and Section 41 is not applicable in such case.”

Who has the Burden to show Alternate Way

In Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, it is held that the plaintiff claiming easement of necessity or grant has only a primary burden to prove the absence of any alternate pathway.

  • “In a case where the original plaintiff was claiming easement right either as grant or as of necessity the plaintiff has only a primary burden to prove the absence of any alternate pathway. As the defendants have not proved the existence of any pathway for access to Plaint `A’ schedule property the version of the plaintiff that there is no alternate pathway shall be accepted. … The defendants have not entered the witness box to disprove the evidence led by the plaintiff.”

Who has the Onus to show Alternate Way Could Not be Used ‘As of Right’

When the existence of alternate way is shown by the alleged servient owner of easement of necessity, the onus to prove that the way cannot be used “as of right” is upon the dominant owner. In Antony @ Anthappan v. George,  LAWS(KER) 2012-11-179 it is held by t6he Kerala High Court as under:

  • “11. When the existence of an alternate way is shown, the appellants ought to have shown that they could not use it as of right. That is because that is a matter within the knowledge of the appellants. The appellants did not adduce evidence in that line.”

The High Court then remanded the case giving the dominant owners an opportunity to adduce evidence to show that the alternate way was not one which they were entitled to use as of right.

Pleaded ‘Grant’; Not, Implied Grant – Apex Court, allowed Implied Grant

Though the plaintiff pleaded only ‘Grant’, and not, Implied Grant,  our Apex Court, in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, allowed Implied Grant observing as under:

  • “It is true that the defendant/appellant alleged that no implied grant was pleaded in the plaint. The Trial Court, in our view, was justified in holding that such pleadings were not necessary when it did not make a difference to the finding arrived at with respect to the easement by way of grant. Accordingly, there is no substance in the argument raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellants.”

Prescriptive Rights are Inchoate until upheld by a Competent Court

No doubt, it is true, one can ‘acquire’ easement by prescription. But, prescriptive rights are said to be inchoate (started; but, not full-blown) until the such title is upheld by a competent court.

It was observed in Sultan Ahmad v. Valiullah (1912) 10 ALJ 227, that the result of the Easements Act and the similar provisions of the Limitation Act was that a right of easement could not be said to be perfected until the right was declared by a decree of court. See also:

  • Sultan Ahmad v. Valiullah (1912) 10 ALJ 227 is referred to in: Nachiparayan v. Narayana Goundan, (1920): 60 Ind Cas 171, (1920) 39 MLJ 574; Arjuna Udayar v. Manuswamy Naicker, 1999-1 CurCC 97;
  • D. Ramanatha Gupta vs S. Razaack, AIR 1982 Kant 314..
  • See also: Tradesh and Miners, Ltd v. Dhirendra Nath Banerjee, AIR 1944 Pat 261.

Prescriptive easement is created by adverse user, by the Hostile use

It is held in Kantaben Parsottamdas v. Ganshyambhai Ramkrishan Purohit, AIR 2022  Guj  146, as under:

  • “15. It is pertinent to note that the prescriptive easement is created by adverse user, by the hostile use to the title of servient owner, whereas easement of necessity is based upon the grant either express or implied.”

Easement by Prescription – ‘Acquires’ by “Hostile or Notorious Act

Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Danad vs Purushotram, 1971 AIR 1878, it was pointed out as under:

  • “In Ravachand v. Maniklal (ILR 1946 Bom. 184), it was held that an easement by prescription under ss. 12 and 15 of the Act is in fact an assertion of a hostile claim of certain rights over another man’s property and in order to acquire the easement the person who asserts the hostile claim must prove that he had the consciousness to exercise that hostile claim on a property which is not his own and where no such consciousness is proved he cannot establish a prescriptive acquisition of the fight.”

In Raychand Vanmalidas vs Maneklal Mansukhbhai, (1946) 48 BomLR 25, it was held as under:

  • “In any case it must be shown that the right was enjoyed as an easement, that is, as an assertion of a hostile claim of certain limited rights over somebody else’s property. Such an assertion cannot be held proved without satisfactory proof of the requisite consciousness. Prescriptive easement, as opposed to easement by grant, is always hostile. It is in fact an assertion of a hostile claim of certain rights over another man’s property and as such it resembles in some respects the claim to ownership by adverse possession of property; both are of hostile origin and are, therefore, prescriptive rights obtained by adverse enjoyment for a certain period, the difference being that while in the case of adverse possession the possessor must assert his own ownership, in the case of easement he must assert limited rights of user on a property and acknowledge its ownership in some one else. It must, therefore, follow, in my opinion, that a person who asserts such a hostile claim must prove that he had the consciousness of exercising that hostile claim on a property which is not his own, and where no such consciousness is proved, he cannot prove the prescriptive acquisition of the right”.

Easement by prescription is ‘acquired’ by ‘prescriptive’ user. It should not have been by permission or agreement. In case of easement, law requires pleading and proof – that the right claimed was enjoyed independent of any express permission (Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal, AIR 2009 SC 1103).

It is held in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 62, that the acquisition of easement by prescription may be classified under the head of implied grant; for, all prescription presupposes a grant.

Easement-by-Prescription – ‘Grant’or Acquisition by “Hostile or Notorious Act”

The basis of every right of easement is theoretically a grant from the servient-owner. Grant is presumed in easement by prescription, from long and continued user. Is there incongruity (in easement by prescription) between ‘grant’ (on one part) and ‘acquisition’ of easement by “prescription” which suggests ‘adverse’ and ‘hostile or notorious’ user (on the other part)?

  • The answer would be that the ‘grant’ herein is only a “presumption in law; and virtually, easement by prescription has to be acquired by hostile and/or notorious acts.

Tanba Nusaji Mahajan v. Pandhari Mahajan, 2004 (6) BomCR 782, 2004 (4) MhLJ 109 lays down the legal position accepted by Indian law, clearly, as under:

  • “The acquisition of way by adverse user is based upon the theory of the hostility of the use to the title of the person over whose lands it is acquired, while a way of necessity is based upon an implication of an intended grant and the use of it is based entirely upon such implication or consent to its use.”

Read: Easement by Prescription – Grant or ‘Acquiring’ by “Hostile Act”

Plea of Title and Adverse Possession – Whether Mutually Contradictory?

In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988, it is held as under: 

  • “21.9 Claim of independent title and adverse possession at the same time amount to contradictory pleas. The case of Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant, (1995) 2 SCC 543 elaborated this principle as:
  • “15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another’s title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other’s title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all.”
  • This principle was upheld in the case of Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (AIR 1996 SC 910, 1996 1 SCC 639 – two Judge Bench) –
  • “4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant’s claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.”
  • The Court in Uttam Chand (Sri Uttam Chand v.  Nathu Ram AIR 2020 SC 461) has reiterated this principle of adverse possession.”

(Note: Mutually destructive plea is impermissible: (2006) 12  SCC 233, AIR 2009 SC 2355).

Profit-a-prendre – Indian Law Varies from English Law

Explanation to Sec. 4 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • “Explanation – In the first and second clauses of this section, the expression “land” includes also things permanently attached to the earth; the expression beneficial enjoyment includes also possible convenience, remote advantage, and even a mere amenity; and the expression “to do something” includes removal and appropriation by the dominant owner, for the beneficial enjoyment  of the dominant heritage, of any part of the soil of the servient heritage, or anything growing or subsisting thereon.”

From the above Explanation it is clear that easement includes appropriation of certain tangible material things or natural resources (Profit-a-Prendre). They are further made clear by the Illustrations to various sections as shown under:

  • Illustn.-(d) of S.4. It speaks as to Graze cattle, take water and fish out from the tank, take timber from wood, take fallen leaves for manuring.
  • Illustn.- (b) of S. 22. It states about cutting  thatching- grass
  • Illustn.- (a) of S. 24. It refers to easement to lay pipes.

Hence, it is clear: Easement is not a mere ‘Privilege’; but, it includes:

  • limited (legally-recognised) enjoyment /user/interest in serviant heritage, and
  • a right for (expressly-recognised) profit.

Though Profit-a-prendre is allowed by Indian law considering the peculiarities of Indian situations, it is not a corporeal right.  And, it does not allow maintaining a substantial interest over the servient land.  No profit-a-prendre in gross also, i.e., for the benefit of individuals. On a close look, it can be seen that it is substantially related to ‘user’ of servient land.

“To do do something & ‘Removal and Appropriation

In State of Bihar v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1968 SC 281, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “By the Explanation to Sec. 4 the expression “to do something” includes removal and appropriation by the dominant owner, for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant heritage, of any part of the soil of the servient heritage, or anything growing or subsisting thereon. A profit-a- prendre is therefore included in the definition of “easement” in Sec. 4 of the Indian Easements Act. But an easement being a right which is super-added to the ordinary common law incidents of the ownership of a dominant tenement, and which connotes a corresponding burden on a servient tenement, can only be created by grant, or by statute.”

“In or upon, or in respect of, certain other land not his own”

Easement is a right to do something in or upon land of another. Even if the easement involves ‘construction’, it should be of another; because, Sec. 4: Explanation reads: “land” includes also things permanently attached to earth.

If the subsisting-construction is made by, or it belongs to, dominant owner, no doubt, there will be no easement. [1987 (2) Ker LT 1037 (Bund); AIR 1915 PC 131 (Jetty); AIR 1971 SC 1878].

Easement Not Allows to ‘Enjoy’ After Making a Construction or Cultivation .

Easement is a Right for ‘enjoyment’ of things ‘subsisting’.  It is a Right for limited enjoyment, and advantages arising from its situation; and it does not allow to build-and-enjoy. It is clear from Sec. 7 which indicates that easement is only a right for limited enjoyment of (a) land and (b) advantages arising from its situation. It is also clear from the Scheme of the Act as shown under:

  • S. 4 An easement is a ‘right which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses’ “as such”
  • S.4: Illustn. (d):  Graze cattle, take water and fish out from the tank, take timber from wood, take fallen leaves for manuring .
  • S. 7: Only a right for limited enjoyment of (a) land & (b) advantages arising from its situation. (It is stated:  Easements are restrictions of (a) Exclusive right (of owner) to enjoy immovable property, (b) Rights to advantages arising from its situation)
  • S. 12 An easement is acquired by owner an immovable property.
  • S. 17: Not a right – to tend to total destruction of the servient tenement. (2003 (1) KLT 320)
  • S. 21 An easement must not be used for any purpose not connected with enjoyment of the dominant heritage.
  • S. 22: Exercise easement – least onerous to servient tenement (Illustn.- b: can cut thatching- grass, not to destroy plants)
  • S. 23: Not to make additional burden (Illus.- b: not to advance eaves; Illus.- d: not another pollution)
  • S. 24: Secure full enjoyment, but cause as little inconvenience.  Illus. (a) easement to lay pipes
  • S. 27: Servient owner is entitled to use – consistent with  easement
  • S. 28: Easements of  necessity, Right of way, Other prescriptive rights not to enlarge purpose, accustomed user etc.
  • S. 29: Dominant owner Cannot substantially increase an easement
  • S. 31: If excessive user – servient owner may obstruct the user.
  • S. 43: Permanent change in the dominant heritage and the burden increased – easement is extinguished

Customary Easements

Section 18 of the Easement Act reads as under:

  • “18. Customary easements. An easement may be acquired in virtue of a local custom. Such easements are called customary easements.”

Both custom and easement are involved in customary easement. In other words, when customary easement is claimed, elements of both custom and prescriptive easement are to be proved (Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89). In customary easements there need not be any ‘dominant tenement’. It is a right ‘in gross’ (to many). Customary easements also does not allow to ‘construct and use’.

Acquiring Customary Easement by One Person or a Fluctuating Body

Illustration (a) to sec. 18 runs as follows:

  • “By the custom of a certain village every cultivator of village land is entitled, as such, to grass his cattle on the common pasture. A having become the tenant of a plot of uncultivated land in the village, breaks up and cultivates that plot. He thereby acquires an easement to graze his cattle in accordance with the customs.”

A customary easement can be claimed by a family or an individual, and such claim need not be by a large community alone (R. Venkateswara Raju v. State of AP, 2020 Supreme (AP) 206). To constitute a customary easement the right claimed must be an easement and it must be in virtue of a local custom. A customary right of uninterrupted user is quite different from setting up a local custom.

It is also pointed out that different persons may have a right of pasture over a land, but the plaintiff can nonetheless claim a right independent of others, provided the necessary conditions are satisfied. A customary easement, as is obvious, embraces the needs of variable persons belonging to a class or locality, while a right by prescription is always personal. Therefore, customary easement is unappurtenant to any dominant tenement, or it has no relation to the beneficial enjoyment  of a dominant tenement as required in easement. A fluctuating body like the inhabitants of the locality cannot claim an easement as can be done in customary easement. Easements are private rights belonging to particular persons while customary rights are public rights annexed to the place in general (Brahma Nand v. Teju Ram, 2019-195 AIC 584).

Easement and Grant

The term ‘Grant’ is used to denote-

  • A generic term to mean ‘transfer’ of immovable property (e.g., sale, lease, gift etc.).
  • But, in judicial parlance, it will not be an absolute ‘transfer’ of property; and remain as a concession, permission, settlement, grant of easement etc., if it is used in place of ‘transfer’ of property.
  • Present, aid, help etc., and the act of a settlor of trust, or of donor of a charity.
  • A technical term to denote conditional-transfer of lands by sovereign especially when it is purposefully used to differentiate from ‘transfer’ of property.
  • More than a licence (which does not create an estate or interest) and less than an outright and unconditional ‘transfer’ of property (similar to sale, gift etc.).

Characteristics of ‘Grant’

  • Usually it denotes a grant by deed.
  • It can be with or without consideration.
  • Unless specifically specified, it is creation of an ‘interest’ in property (in case of easement, no interest is created; but only a right of enjoyment). 
  • As long as the conditions are fulfilled, grant is usually irrevocable.
  • Conditions can also be fixed to limit the period of grant.
  • Inferior interest, out of an interest retained by the grantor, e.g. the grant of a lease of land by the person holding the freehold. (Collins Dictionary of Law).

‘Grant’ – Salmond on Jurisprudence

What is ‘grant’ is stated in Salmond’s Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, at pages 338-339, under the heading ‘The Classes of Agreements’. According to Salmond  a grant

  • ” is an agreement“,
  • “creates a right
  • is NOT “a right in Personam between the parties to it”,
  • examples – “grants of leases, easements, charges, patents, franchises, licences and so forth“.

Salmond distinguishes ‘grant’ from other legal concepts as under.

  • “…. A contract is an agreement which creates an obligation or a right in personam between the parties to it.
  • grant is an agreement which creates a right of any other description; examples being grants of leases, easements, charges, patents, franchises, licences and so forth.
  • An agreement which transfers a right may be termed generically an assignment. On which extinguishes a right is a release, discharge, or surrender.” (Quoted in H. Anraj v. Government of Tamil Nadu  (& Shri Dipak Dhar v. The State of West Bengal), AIR 1986 SC 63: (1986) 1 SCC 414.)

A  Planter under a Grant from Government is not a Jenmi

  • Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86
  • Kannan Devan Hills Produce v.  The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301
  • State of Kerala v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272
  • State of Kerala v. The Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co.,  AIR 1998 Ker 267

Grant may be Express or “Implied

The origin of all easements is, theoretically, grant by the servient owner. It may be express or implied. It may also be presumed from long user.

  • Note: Traditionally, the term ‘implied easement’ was used by the conventional authorities only to denote ‘easement of necessity‘. However, in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, the Supreme Court used the same to refer to an easement of grant ‘arising by implication‘.

It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

  • “13. On the question of easement by grant, the Appellate Court was of the opinion that the plaintiff’s claim in that respect stood proved. The plaintiff had acquaintance and association with the Ashramam and Yogini Amma from his childhood days as revealed from the oral and documentary evidence. Considering the location and nature of `B’ schedule pathway, the location of two pillars at its inception and the gate from which it started, it could be seen that it had been in use by the plaintiff as a pathway. The plaintiff had been residing in the house on `A’ schedule property even prior to the deed of settlement. Therefore, the Appellate Authority arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff had obtained right of easement of grant from Yogini Amma over the `B’ schedule pathway.
  • An easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties and it may have its own consideration. (B.B. Katiyar’s Commentaries on Easements and Licenses, p. 762).  It may be either express or even by necessary implication. Though easement of necessity will come to an end with the termination of necessity, easement acquired by grant cannot be extinguished on that ground as per section 13(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Therefore, even assuming that the plaintiff had an alternative pathway as contended by the defendants, it does not extinguish the right of easement of grant in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the Trial Court was justified in granting a relief of declaration of right of easement of grant over the `B’ schedule pathway. However, the declaration granted on the ground of easement of necessity was not justified.”

The aforesaid Supreme Court decision (Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622) arose from the Kerala High Court decision, Sree Swyam Prakash Ashramam v. N. Gopala Pillai on 9 May, 2006. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Kerala High Court held as under:

  • “Theoretically all easements have their origin in some sort of grant by the servient owner. The grant may be express or it may be implied from the surrounding attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties or it may even be presumed from long user. In the case of an express grant of easement the limit thereof depends on the words used.”

Upholding the view of the Kerala High Court the Apex Court held as under:

  • “In our view, therefore, the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as pathway by the original plaintiff (since deceased) at least up to 1982, when alone the cause of action for the suit arose.”

Also read: Implied Grant: A Valid Mode of Creation of Easement under Indian Law

No Explicit ‘Consideration’ Required for Easement by Grant

Neither the provisions of the enacted law (Easements Act, 1882) nor judicial decisions specifically address the requirement of ‘consideration’ in the creation of easements by grant. This omission is understandable, as Indian law clearly permits the acquisition of easements by grant – both express and implied. Since an easement may arise by implication, and the intention to grant can be inferred from the terms of the grant or the surrounding circumstances, the fundamental principle of easement law – that every easement is, in theory, rooted in a grant – supports the conclusion that no express consideration is required for the creation of an easement by grant.

Sec. 8 of the Indian Easements Act reads:

  • “An easement may be acquired by the owner of the immovable property for the beneficial enjoyment of which the right is created, or, on his behalf, by any person in possession of the same.”

Sec. 13 further elaborates on easements of necessity and quasi-easements, indicating that such easements can arise from the transfer or bequest of immovable property, again without a requirement for consideration.

In Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, the Supreme Court held:

  • “Theoretically all easements have their origin in some sort of grant by the servient owner. The grant may be express or it may be implied from the surrounding attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties or it may even be presumed from long user.”

Way Widened; Request to confine to Two Feet –  Sheer Impracticability

It is held by the Kerala High Court in Mahalinga Bhat v. Dooja Souza, 1994-1 KLJ 160; 1994-1 KLT 197, as under:

  • “3. In view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below that there existed a pathway having width of two feet through plaint A schedule and that it was widened by the people of the locality, the question that arises for consideration is whether plaintiff is entitled to seek injunction restraining the defendants from taking vehicles through the road. As the evidence in the case discloses the fact that there existed a public pathway through plaint A schedule, even if the plaintiff had to surrender portion of his property for converting the pathway into a road it cannot be retained as his private properly. Plaintiff’s contention that the foot path with two feet width as it existed before widening of the same alone can be used by the defendants and that they cannot use the remaining portion of the road cannot be accepted due to its sheer impracticability. Plaintiffs claim that he alone can use vehicles through the road as the existing foot path was widened by surrendering portion of his property and that defendant do not have that right deserves to be rejected as the widening of the road ensures to the benefit of the general public.”

Read Blogs:

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 

Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Public Records under Sec. 35 Evidence Act: Presumption of Truth and Probative Value

Jojy George Koduvath

Introspection

Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act speaks as to ‘relevancy’ of entry in public record, or an electronic record, made in performance of an official duty.
Can ‘truth of its contents’ be presumed under Sec. 114?

Answer: Yes.

But, Note: ‘Regularity’ in Illustration (e) is not exactly the presumption as to ‘correctness or truth’. For such presumption (correctness or truth), we have to resort the main section, Sec. 114 – that is, ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’, etc.
‘Regularity’ in Illustration (e) can also be taken as an aid in such an evaluation.

Presumption in Evidence Act under S. 114

Besides direct evidence and admission, the contents of a document can also be proved by circumstantial evidence or by invoking presumption. ‘Common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’, etc. under S. 114, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, can be used to prove the existence and genuineness/truth of a document.  Sec. 114 Evd. Act reads as under”

  • S. 114. Court may presume existence of certain facts The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.”

Under Sec. 114 the court can  presume existence of truth or correctness (a fact) which ‘it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business’.

Illustration (e) of Sec. 114, Evd. Act

Illustration (e) of Sec. 114, Evd. Act, demonstrates that presumption as to ‘regularity’ can be invoked on Judicial and official acts, in proper cases. 

‘Regularity’ in Illustration (e) is not exactly the presumption as to ‘correctness or truth’. For such presumption, we have to resort the main section, Sec. 114 – that is, ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’, etc.

General (Sec. 114) and Specific (Sec. 79 to 90A) Presumptions in Evidence Act

Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act allows the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.

Sec. 79 to 90A of the Evidence Act speaks as to specific instances of invoking presumptions.

Relevancy, Admissibility and Presumptions on Truth under Sec. 16, 34, 35

Sec. 16, 34, 35, etc. of the Evidence Act speaks only on ‘relevancy’ of documents. It directs towards the ‘admissibility’. The ‘truth or otherwise’ attached to its contents can be ‘presumed’ under Sec. 114.

Documents in the Course of Business – Relevant Fact under Sec. 16 

Sec. 16 of the Indian Evidence Act: Sec. 16 reads as under:

  • 16. Existence of course of business when relevant: When there is a question whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course of business, according to which it naturally would have been done, is a.

Illustrations to Sec. 16 make it clear that (a) when a question arises whether a particular letter was dispatched, the facts that it was the ordinary course of business for all letters put in a certain place to be carried to the post, and that particular letter was put in that place, are relevant; and that (b) when a question arises whether a particular letter reached A, the fact that it was posted in due course, and was not returned through the Dead Letter Office, are relevant.

In Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkat Ramanaa, AIR 1976 SC 869, the Apex Court found that a letter sent by registered post, with the endorsement “refused” on the cover, could be presumed to have been duly served upon the addressee without examining the postman who had tried to effect service and it was observed that there was presumption under Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act that, in the ordinary course of business, it was received by the addressee and actually refused by him.

Illustration (f) of Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act speaks that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. Under this Illustration, it can be presumed the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. A registered postal receipt along with a copy of the letter containing the court notice and bearing correct address raises presumption that it was duly received by the addressee, in spite of the absence of a return of acknowledgement (Anil Kumar vs. Nanak Chandra: AIR 1990 SC 1215). but, the addressee can rebut it (Radha Kishan vs. State: AIR 1963 SC 822).

Sec. 34 – Entries in Books of Account, in the Course Of Business, Relevant

Section 34 enjoins that entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant. But, they by themselves, cannot create any liability.

In Dharam Chand Joshi v. Satya Narayan Bazaz, AIR 1993 Gau 35, it was pointed out that unbound sheets of paper are not books of account.

In Ishwar Dass v. Sohan Lal, AIR 2000 SC 426, it is pointed out that Books of account, by themselves, being cannot create any liability, it can only be a corroborative evidence, and must be supported by other evidence (See also: Dharam Chand Joshi v. Satya Narayan Bazaz, AIR 1993 Gau 35).

Sec. 32: ‘Presumption Of Truth’ on Documents Falls Relevant Under Sec. 32

Sec. 32 Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant. –– Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:  
  • (1) When it relates to cause of death …. …..
  • (2) Or is made in course of business. –– When the statement was made by such person in the ordinary course of business, and in particular when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in books kept in the ordinary course of business, or in the discharge of professional duty; or of an acknowledgement written or signed by him of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property of any kind; or of a document used in commerce written or signed by him; or of the date of a letter or other document usually dated, written or signed by him
  • (3) …..”

Presumption on Truth on Documents Prepared under Sec. 35

Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • “35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty: An entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.

The entries made in the statutory registers are admissible in evidence in terms of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (CIDCO v. Vashudha Gorakhnath Mandevleka, 2009 (7) SCC 283).

In The State of Haryana v. Amin Lal (SC), 2024-4 CurCC(SC) 222, it is held as under:

  • Revenue records are public documents maintained by government officials in the regular course of duties and carry a presumption of correctness under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. While it is true that revenue entries do not by themselves confer title, they are admissible as evidence of possession and can support a claim of ownership when corroborated by other evidence.”

In Inder Singh v. S. Raghbir Singh, AIR 1978 P&H 98, it is observed as under:

  • “The principle is that an official record, kept by a person, upon whom there is a public duty to make entries in it only after satisfying himself of the truth of those entries, is presumed to be correct. Such a document itself is evidence of the truth of its contents unless and until its falsity can be demonstrated by any of the various methods by which the evidentiary value of any public book, register or document may be attacked.”

Our Apex Court, in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: AIR 2020 SC 1382, referring relevant provisions of Himachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act, held that Record-of-rights (Revenue document) carries the ‘presumption of correctness‘.

In Shiv Ram v. Shiv Charan Singh, AIR 1964 Raj 126, it is observed as under

  • “Where Sec. 35 properly comes into play, an entry made by a public servant in any public or official book in the discharge of his official duty becomes relevant by itself, and no other proof of such entry is required as a matter of law by our Evidence Act, but this, does not exclude the possibility that such an entry may become admissible otherwise if it is properly proved to have been made by a person ordinarily competent to make it.” (Quoted in Mayadhar Nayak vs Sub-Divisional Officer, Jajpur, AIR 1982 Ori 221).

In Durairaju v. Neela, 1976 CriLJ 1507, Ratnavel Pandian, J., it was held that it was the duty of the court, before making the order for maintenance, to find though in a summary manner, the paternity of the child. It was held that Ex. P. 1, the intimation received by the Municipality from the Government Hospital, and Ex. P. 2 a copy of the birth extract made on the basis of Ex, P. 1, were not sufficient to raise presumption of paternity for, the medical officer who made the entries in Ex. P. 1 had not been examined. The author of the information is not mentioned in Ex. P. 1. PW 2 herself had not stated that she mentioned to the doctor that the child was born to her through the petitioner. In the absence of such evidence, the document could not by itself prove the relevant entries made thereon. It was also observed that to prove a document under Section 35 it must be shown that the document was prepared by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law.

Public Register is Public Document; A Certificate, Not

In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Poonam Kesarwani , (2010) ACJ 1992, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court considered whether the letter/certificate issued by Regional Transport Officer coluld be considered to be a public document as defined in Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act  which required no proof.  It is pointed out –

  • ‘A public document is a document that is made for the purpose of public making use of it. When a public officer is under a duty to make some entries in the official book or register, the entries made therein are admissible in evidence to prove the truth of the facts entered in the official book or register. The entries are evidence of the particular facts which was the duty of the officer to record. The law reposes confidence in the public officer entrusted with public duties and the law presumes that public officers will discharge their duties with responsibility. A driving licence is issued under Chapter II of the Act. Section 26 of the Act makes it mandatory for the State Government to maintain a register known as State Register of Driving Licences. The entries with regard to issuance or renewal of driving licence by the licensing authorities which contains particulars of the licence and the licence holder are entered by the Regional Transport Officer/the licensing authority in discharge of their official duty enjoined by law. The State Register of Driving Licences is record of the acts of public officers. The State Register of Driving Licences is a public record. It can be inspected by any person. We are of the considered opinion that the State Register of Driving Licences is a public document as defined by Section 74 of the Evidence Act.
  • 10. Section 76 of the Evidence Act gives the right to obtain a certified copy of a public document which any person has a right to inspect on payment of fee. A certified copy of the entries made in the public record is required to be issued on payment of fee in Form 54 as laid down by rule 150 (2). Form 54 being a certified copy of a public document, namely, the State Register of Driving Licences need not be proved by examining a witness. Once a certified copy of the entries made in the register maintained under Section 26 (1) read with rule 23 is issued in Form 54 it is admissible in evidence under Section 77 of the Evidence Act, and no further proof of Form 54 by oral evidence by examining witnesses is required.
  • 12. The aforesaid information is in the form of a letter written to the investigator appointed by the insurance company. It cannot be deemed to be a certificate or certified copy in Form 54 of the Rules. Deposit of fee would not convert the letter into a certificate under rule 150. Therefore, the aforesaid letter issued by the Regional Transport Officer, Raipur (Chhattisgarh) was required to be proved by the insurance company before the Tribunal by oral evidence by examining witnesses. Insurance company had failed to lead any evidence to prove the aforesaid letter by examining witnesses before the Tribunal. The Tribunal rightly refused to place reliance on the letter dated 20.4.2005.”

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Poonam Kesarwani , (2010) ACJ 1992 is quoted and followed in New India Assurance Company Ltd.  v. Indu Bala, ILR 2016-3 HP 1829 (Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.).

Wajibul-Arz – Part of Settlement Record Presumption of Correctness Attached

The Privy Council has held in Fatea Chand v. Knshan, 10 ALJ 335, that wajibul-arz is a cogent evidence of rights as they existed when it was made.

The value of wazibul-aiz has been accepted to be very high in Anant Prasad v. Raja Ram, 1984 Supp AWC 194 and Yash Pat Singh v. Jagannath, 1946 ALJ 132.

In Avadh Kishore Das v. Ram Gopal, AIR 1979 SC 861, (1979) 4 SCC 790, it is observed as under:

  • “Wajibularz is village administration paper prepared with due care and after due enquiry by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. It is a part of the settlement record and a statutory presumption of correctness attaches to it. Properly construed, this Wajibularz shows that the entire revenue estate of village Bahawalpura vests in the Temple or the Math as a juristic person.”

Proof on Date of Birth

In Harpal Singh v. State of H. P. , AIR 1981 SC 361; 1981-1 SCC 560, it was held as under:

  • A certified copy of the relevant entry in the birth register which shows that Saroj Kumari, who according to her evidence was known as Ramesh during her childhood, was born to Lajwanti wife of Daulot Ram on 11-11-1957. Mr, Hardy submitted that in the absence of the examination of the officer/chowkidar concerned who recorded the entry, it was inadmissible in evidence. We cannot agree with him for the simple reason that the entry was made by the concerned official in the discharge of his official duties, that it is therefore clearly admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine its author.”

In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U. P. , AIR 2006 SC 2157; 2006 5 SCC 584,  it was observed that there was nothing on record to show that the said date of birth was recorded in a register maintained by the school in terms of the requirements of law as contained in Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, and thereafter it was held as under:

  • “22. Section 35 of the Evidence Act would be attracted both in civil and criminal proceedings. The Evidence Act does not make any distinction between a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding. Unless specifically provided for, in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, the register maintained in ordinary course of business by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which, inter alia, such register is kept would be a relevant fact. Section 35, thus, requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document is held to be admissible thereunder :
  • (i) it should be in the nature of the entry in any public or official register;
  • (ii) it must state a fact in issue or relevant fact;
  • (iii) entry must be made either by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country; and
  • (iv) all persons concerned indisputably must have an access thereto.”

In Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 673, it is held that transfer certificate issued by a Primary School does not satisfy the requirement of Section 35 of Indian Evidence Act. Para 32 and 33 of the judgment read as under:

  • “32. Under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a register maintained in terms of a statute or by statutory authority in regular course of business would be relevant fact. Had such a vital evidence been produced, it would have clinched the issue. The respondent did not choose to do so.
  • 33. In the aforementioned backdrop the evidence brought on record are required to be considered. The Admission Register or a Transfer Certificate issued by a Primary School do not satisfy the requirements of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is no reliable evidence on record to show that the date of birth was recorded in the school register on the basis of the statement of any responsible person.”

In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 584, the proof of copy of a school leaving certificate was considered under Section 35 of the Evidence Act was considered, and it is held as under:

  • “17. “The school leaving certificate was said to have been issued in the year 1998. A bare perusal of the said certificate would show that the appellant was said to have been admitted on 01.08.1967 and his name was struck off from the roll of the institution on 06.05.1972. The said school leaving certificate was not issued in ordinary course of business of the school There is nothing on record to show that the said date of birth was recorded in a register maintained by the school in terms of the requirements of law as contained in Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. No statement has further been made by the said Head Master that either of the parents of the appellant who accompanied him to the school at the time of his admission therein made any statement or submitted any proof in regard thereto. The entries made in the school leaving certificate, evidently had been prepared for the purpose of the case. All the necessary columns were filled up including the character of the appellant. It was not the case of the said Head Master that before he had made entries in the register, age was verified. If any register in regular course of business was maintained in the school; there was no reason as to why the same had not been produced.
  • 19. The school leaving certificate was not an original one. It was merely a second copy. Although it was said to have been issued in July 1972, the date of issuance of the said certificate has not been mentioned. The copy was said to have been signed by the Head Master on 30.04.1998. It was accepted before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr on 27.01.1999. The Head Master has also not that the copy given by him was a true copy of the original certificate. He did not produce the admission register.
  • 23. Section 35 of the Evidence Act would be attracted both in civil and criminal proceedings. The Evidence Act does not make any distinction between a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding. Unless specifically provided for, in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, the register maintained in ordinary course of business by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which, inter alia, such register is kept would be a relevant fact. Section 35, thus, requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document is held to be admissible thereunder : (i) it should be in the nature of the entry in any public or official register;; (ii) it must state a fact in issue or relevant fact; (iii) entry must be made either by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country; and (iv) all persons concerned indisputably must have an access thereto.
  • 35. We have not been shown as to whether any register was required to be maintained under any statute. We have further not been shown as to whether any register was maintained in the school at all. The original register has not been produced. The authenticity of the said register, if produced, could have been looked into. No person had been examined to prove as to who had made entries in the register. The school leaving certificate which was not issued by a person who was in the school at the time when the appellant was admitted therein, cannot be relied upon.”

Entry on Caste in school admission registers- Relevant and Admissible

Desh Raj v. Bodh Raj, AIR 2008 SC 632; 2008-2 SCC 186, it is held as under:

  • “Having regard to the provisions of Section 35, entries in school admission registers in regard to age, caste etc., have always been considered as relevant and admissible. [See : Umesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan, 1982 (2) SCC 202 and State of Punjab vs. Mohinder Singh, – 2005 (3) SCC 702]. In Kumari Madhuri Patil vs. Addl. Commissioner, [1994 (6) SCC 241], this Court observed that caste is reflected in relevant entries in the public records or school or college admission register at the relevant time and certificates are issued on its basis.”

In Dalchand Mulchand v. Hasanbi AIR 1938 Nag 152 (Vivian Bose and Puranik JJ.) held as under:

  • “The initial burden of proving execution of a document when it is denied is upon the person alleging execution. But if nothing else is known the mere fact that a document is admitted to bear a certain signature and that it comes from proper custody ought to be enough to raise an inference that it was signed with the intention of execution. This inference arises in India directly from Sec. 114, Evidence Act. Persons do not ordinarily sign documents without intending to execute them: that is not the common course of human conduct, nor yet the common course their public or private business. Consequently if any person wants to rely on an exceptional circumstance, if he wants to show that in some particular instance the ordinary rule was abrogated surely he must prove it and thus the burden shifts on him”.

Revenue record Presumption of Truth Attached

It is held in Krishnamurthy S.  Setlur v.  O.V.  Narasimha Setty, 2019-9 SCC 488, that revenue record proves possession. It is said as under:

  • “14. In our considered view, the High Court has not given any cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion that KS was not in possession of the property. His name figured in the revenue record from 1963 to 1981 as the owner in possession. Presumption of truth is attached to revenue record which has not been rebutted.”

Referring relevant provisions of Himachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Sec. 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is held in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: AIR 2020 SC 1382, that Record-of-rights (Revenue document) carries the ‘presumption of correctness‘.

Presumption of Correctness to Revenue Record Entries

In Vishwa Vijay Bharathi v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642, it is held as under:

  • “It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry in to their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry is the revenue record states but the entry is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title.”

In Karewwa v. Hussensab Khansab Khansaheb Wajantri, AIR 2002 SC 504 : (2002) 10 SCC 315 , it is held as under:

  • “We do not dispute the legal position as stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, but the presumption of correctness of an entry in revenue record cannot be rebutted by a statement in the written statement. Mere statement of fact in the written statement is not a rebuttal of presumption of correctness of an entry in the revenue record. The respondent was recorded as a tenant in the revenue record in the year 1973 and under law the presumption is that the entry is correct. It was for the appellant to rebut the presumption by leading evidence. The appellant has not led any evidence to show that entry in the revenue record is incorrect. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention.”

Public Document Admissible per se without Formal Proof

Certified copies of the public documents can be proved without formal proof. See:

  • Jaswant Singh v. Gurdev Singh, 2012-1 SCC 425 ,
  • Shyam Lal @ Kuldeep v. Sanjeev Kumar, AIR 2009 SC  3115; 2009-12 SCC 454
  • Harpal Singh and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361
  • Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633
  • Rajasthan State Road Trans. Corp. v. Nand Kishore, 2002 ACJ 1564 (Raj)
  • Md. Akbar v. State of A.P., 2002 CrLJ 3167 (And)
  • Collector (L. A. ), South Andaman v. Himangshu Mondal, 2015-2 CalLT 1
  • Arti Meena v. Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, 2020-1 SCT 1 (Raj).

In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa (Gajendragadkar , J.), AIR1963 SC1633; 1964-2 SCR 673, it is held as under:

  • “9. … The document in question being a Certified copy of a public document need not have been proved by calling a witness.”(Referred to in Rangaraju v. Kannayal, 10 Jan 2012, (Mad).

In Harpal Singh and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361, it is held as under:

  • “3.…  We cannot agree with him for the simple reason that the entry was made by the concerned official in the discharge of his official duties, that it is therefore clearly admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine its author ” (Quoted in: Manikanta v. State of Karnataka, 2024 Kar HC 21233)

In Shyam Lal @ Kuldeep v. Sanjeev Kumar, AIR 2009 SC  3115; 2009-12 SCC 454, it was observed as under:

  • “25. The findings of the learned District Judge holding Ex. P. 2 to be a public documentand admitting the same without formal proof cannot be questioned by the defendants in the present appeal sinceno objection was raised by them when such document was tendered and received in evidence.
  • It has been held in Dasondha Singh and Others v. Zalam Singh and Others [1997(1) P.L.R. 735] that an objection as to the admissibility and mode of proof of a document must be taken at the trialbefore it is received in evidence and marked as an exhibit.
  • Even otherwise such a document falls within the ambit of Section 74, Evidence Act, and is admissible per se without formal proof“.

In Jaswant Singh v. Gurdev Singh, 2012-1 SCC 425, it is held that certified copy of a public document prepared under Section 76 of the Act, in terms of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is admissible in evidence under Section 77 of the said Act, without being proved by calling witness. It is said as under:

  • “9. … To put it clear, the compromise had become a part of the decree which was passed by the court of Sub-Judge Ist Class, Hoshiarpur. Hence, it is a public document in terms of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short ‘the Act’) and certified copy of the public document prepared under Section 76 of the Act is admissible in evidence under Section 77 of the said Act. A certified copy of a public document is admissible in evidence without being proved by calling witness.

See also the following cases where documents were accepted in evidence and acted upon on the basis of Section 35 Evidence Act:

  • Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1982 SC 1057 (admission forms as also the School’s register)
  • Harpal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361 (certified copy of the birth register).

REVENUE SETTLEMENT REGISTERS of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters

The Kerala High Court held in Mohandas v. Santhakumari Amma, 2018-3 KLT 606 as under:

  • “We notice that, a new survey and settlement was undertaken in the erstwhile Travancore State for the purpose of putting in place a sound Revenue administration. Accordingly, it appears that a complete survey and reassessment of the entire State ’embracing an accurate measurement, demarcation, mapping and valuation of properties of every description and a registration of titles, as the basis of a sound Revenue Administration’ was carried out. On the basis of such a statement a proclamation was issued by the Maharaja of Travancore on 14 th Kumbhom 1061 corresponding to 24th February 1886.”

Read Blogs:

If Settlement Register says Government Land, Petitioner to Establish Title

In Sahana Industries v. State of Kerala (2021 KHC OnLine 7110), Kerala High Court (Devan Ramachandran, J.) held (October 11, 2021) as under:

  • “… If the Settlement Register shows this land to be Government land, then certainly, the petitioner is obliged to establish their title over the property through competent documents”.

In Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair M.N.,  (2013) 3 KLT 132, (T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J ; A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J), it is observed as under:

  • “52. As far as the property herein is concerned, the land register and the settlement register produced herein are relevant. The property having the entire extent of 2.26 acres is described as ‘kavu’ (holy grove) in the settlement register. In the land register also it is described as ‘kshethram irippu sthalam’ (property where the temple is situated). No other document or other evidence is there to prove the contrary. Therefore, these documents will definitely show that the item of property will fit in with the requirement of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.”

SEC. 35 REGISTRATION ACT: There is Presumption –  “It is VALIDLY EXECUTED

  • Sec. 35 in the Registration Act, 1908 says that the Registrar allows registration of a document (i) if only he is satisfied as to the identity of the person who executes the document, and (ii) if the executant admits the execution of the document.
  • Presumptions can be invoked in view of the Sec. 58 and 59 Sec. 60 (certificate) of the Registration Act. The presumption of regularity of official acts in Illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence is also attached to a registered deed.
  • The certificate endorsed on a registered deed by the registering officer is a relevant piece of evidence for proving its execution – Piara v. Fatnu, AIR 1929 Lah 711.
  • There is a presumption – registered document is validly executed –
    • Prem Singh v. Birbal, AIR 2006 SC 3608;
    • Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Zabar, AIR 2010 SC 211
    • Jamila Begum v. Shami Mohd., AIR 2019 SC 72;
    • Manik Majumder v. Dipak Kumar Saha, AIR  2023 SC 506.
  • A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was executed in accordance with law – Bellachi v. Pakeeran, AIR 2009 SC 3293.

Genuineness can also be drawn onRegistered Deeds, Invoking Presumption

  • Besides the presumption on a registered document that it is validly executed, there is also a presumption that the “transaction is a genuine one” (Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant Eknath Jajoo, 2009- 5 SCC 713.)
  • The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who questions the same.

Presumption of Correctness Attached to a Registered Deed

In the split-verdict in Majumder v. Dipak Kumar Saha, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 37, BV Nagaratna, J., held as under:

  • “18. … The presumption of correctness attached to endorsement made by the Sub-Registrar is in view of the provisions of Sections 58, 59 and 60 of the Registration Act. This presumption can be rebutted only by strong evidence to the contrary.”

BV Nagaratna, J. referred the following decisions-

  • Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, (2000) 1 SCC 434 (a registered document is presumed to be valid).
  • Chottey Lal v. The Collector of Moradabad,  AIR 1922 PC 279 (presumption of validity of a power of attorney which formed the basis of a registered deed; the sub-registrar being accepted the document for registration, it is prima-facie evidence that the conditions have been satisfied).
  • Jugraj Singh v. Jaswant Singh, 1970 (2) SCC 386 (presumption of regularity of official acts of sub-registrar).
  • Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Gill, AIR 2021 SC 899 (presumption of validity of a general power of attorney and consequently of the sale deed executed – especially of a 30-year old document).
  • Prem Singh v. Birbal , (2006) 5 SCC 353 (when such a presumption arises, the onus would be on a person who challenges such presumption, to successfully rebut it).

Where Truth Disputed,  Truth of Public Document must be Established

In Om Prakash Berlia v. Unit Trust of India, AIR 1983 Bom 1, it is held that even when the contents of a document is proved, the truth of what the document states must be separately established. It was a case where truth of contents disputed. It is clear from this decision that the proposition as to proving truth is more apposite when a contention was raised regarding the correctness of truth of the documents. It was further held in this case that annual return under the provisions of Section 164 of the Companies Act was prima facie evidence of any matters directed or authorised to be inserted therein by the Companies Act. The said extract prima facie establishes the truth of the contents of its original.

It is made clear in Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, as under:

  • If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”

INSTANCES WHERE PRESUMPTION WAS NOT INVOKED

Age of a Person in a School Register – Not Much Evidentiary Value

In Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit ,1988 Supp. SCC 604, it was held as under:

  • “To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded

No evidence – On What Material Entry in Voters List Made

In Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2009 SC  314; 2008-13 SCC 133, it is held as under

  • “23. Therefore, on facts at hand, in the absence of evidence to show on what material the entry in the Voters List in the name of the accused was made, a mere production of a copy of the Voters List, though a public document, in terms of Section 35, was not sufficient to prove the age of the accused. Similarly, though a reference to the report of the Medical Board, showing the age of the accused as 17-18 years, has been made but there is no indication in the order whether the Board had summoned any of the members of the Medical Board and recorded their statement. It also appears that the physical appearance of the accused, has weighed with the Board in coming to the afore-noted conclusion, which again may not be a decisive factor to determine the age of a delinquent. Insofar as the High Court is concerned, there is no indication in its order as to in what manner Rule 22(5)(iv) has been ignored by the Board. The learned Judge seems also to have accepted the opinion of the Medical Board in terms of the said Rule as conclusive. Therefore, the afore-stated ground on which the High Court has set aside the opinion of the Board and holding the accused to be a juvenile, cannot be sustained.”

Hath Chitha – Not Proved, Entry in Discharge of Official Duties

In Ram Prasad Sharma v. State Of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 326; 1969-2 SCC 359, it is held as under:

  • “In this case it has not been proved that the entry in question was made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. As observed by this Court in 1965-3 SCR 861 (Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha) at p. 864
  • “the reason why an entry made by a public servant in a public or other official book, register, or record stating a fact in issue or a relevant fact has been made relevant is that when a public servant makes it himself in the discharge of his official duty, the probability of its being truly and correctly recorded is high.”
  • No proof has been led in this case as to who made the entry and whether the entry was made in the discharge of any official duty. In the result we must hold that Ex. D, the hath chitha, was rightly held by the High Court to be inadmissible.”

Illiterate Public Servant, Somebody Else Made Entry – Does Not Come Within Sec. 35

Constitution Bench of in Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha,  AIR 1965 SC 282, observed as under:

  • “The reason why an entry made by a public servant in a public or other official book, register, or record stating a fact in issue or a relevant fact has been made relevant is that when a public servant makes it himself in the discharge of his official duty, the probability of its being truly and correctly recorded is high. That probability is reduced to a minimum when the public servant himself is illiterate and has to depend on somebody else to make the entry. We have therefore come to the conclusion that the High Court is right in holding that the entry made in an official record maintained by the illiterate Chowkidar, by somebody else at his request does not come within Section 35 of the Evidence Act.”

Document Admissible Under Sec. 35 May (still) Require Corroboration

In Satpal Singh v. the State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 714, it is held as under:

  • “22. Therefore, a document may be admissible, but as to whether the entry contained therein has any probative value may still be required to be examined in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The aforesaid legal proposition stands fortified by the judgments of this Court in
  • Ram Prasad Sharma Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 326;
  • Ram Murti Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1970 SC 1029;
  • Dayaram & Ors. Vs. Dawalatshah, AIR 1971 SC 681;
  • Harpal Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361;
  • Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 584;
  • Babloo Pasi Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2008) 13 SCC 133;
  • Desh Raj Vs. Bodh Raj, AIR 2008 SC 632; and
  • Ram Suresh Singh Vs. Prabhat Singh @Chhotu Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 681.
  • In these cases, it has been held that even if the entry was made in an official record by the official concerned in the discharge of his official duty, it may have weight but still may require corroboration by the person on whose information the entry has been made and as to whether the entry so made has been exhibited and proved. The standard of proof required herein is the same as in other civil and criminal cases. Such entries may be in any public document; i.e. school register, voters list or family register prepared under the rules and regulations, etc, in force, and may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act as held in Mohd, Ikram Hussian v. State of U.P. and Santenu Mitra v. State of W.B.”

Judge’s power to put Questions or Order Production

  • Sec. 165 of Evidence Act reads as under:
  • 165 – Judge’s power to put questions or order production The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question:
  • Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved:
  • Provided also that this section shall not authorize any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question, or to produce any document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under sections 121 to 131, both inclusive, if the question were asked or the document were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person to ask under section 148 or 149; nor shall he dispense with primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.

Similar Articles:

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 

Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Is TRUTH OF CONTENTS (also) Established when a Document is MARKED WITHOUT OBJECTION?

Taken From: Can the Court Refuse to Mark a (Relevant and Admissible) Document, for (i) there is No Formal Proof or (ii) it is a Photocopy?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Documents Marked Without Objection – Effect

The law prevails in India is the following –

  • If a document is marked without objection as to its mode of proof,  it is not open to the other side to object to its admissibility afterwards.

Following leading decisions predicate the law in this matter as under:

P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumal,(1972) 1 SCC 9 (Three Judge Bench – A.N. Grover, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Ray, JJ.)Police reports were marked, without examining the Head Constables who covered those meetings, without any objection.  Hence it was not open to the respondent to object to their admissibility.Relied on: Bhagat Ram v. Khetu Ram, AIR 1929 PC 110.
R.V.E. Venkatchalla Gounder v. Arulmighu Viswesaraswamy and V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752 (R.C. Lahoti,  Ashok Bhan, JJ.)Photo copies were admitted in evidence ‘without foundation‘; but, without objection. They cannot be held inadmissible for originals were not produced. Failure to raise a timely objection amounts to waiver.Relied on: Padman v. Hanwanta, AIR 1915 PC 111 P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumal
Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082Copy of sale deed was marked without examining the executant or the donor; but, without objection. It was argued that mode of proof was insufficient. Held: Objection as to the mode of proof falls within procedural law. It could be waived.Relied on: Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder; Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji, AIR 1943 PC 83;
Sarkar on Evidence, 15th Edition, page 1084.
PC Thomas v. PM Ismail, AIR 2010 SC 905; 2009-10 SCC 239 (R.M. Lodha, D.K. Jain,JJ.).Non-examination of the author and absence of “proof of acknowledgment” by him
If no objection on mode of proofin trial court, it will be too late (in appeal) to raise objection on the ground of mode of proof.
Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi), 2023 4 SCC 731 (B. V. Nagarathna, V. Ramasubramanian, A. S. Bopanna, B. R. Gavai, S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.)If no objection as to mode of proof (secondary evidence) when marked, no such objection could be allowed to be raised at any later stage.
Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1986 ACJ 616; 1986 Guj LH 27; 1985-2 GujLR 1315No objection as regards the truth of contents of Ex. 32. The witness of the defendant accepted the contents. Therefore, too late in the day to canvass that contents of Ex. 32 were not proved.

Failure to Raise Timely Objection, “Amounts to Waiver

In RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003 SC 4548: 2003-8 SCC 752 it is laid down that “failure to raise timely objection” as to the irregularity of mode adopted for proving the document “amounts to waiver“.

  • Therefore it is clear that ‘objection’ is a matter that primarily remains in the realm of the opposite party; rather than the court.

It is typically followed in India, after R.V.E. Venkatchalla Gounder v. Arulmighu Viswesaraswamy and V.P. Temple (supra).

  • Note: 1. If the deficiency is pertaining to non-registration of a compulsory registrable document (as it falls under the head, inadmissible document) the court can desist the marking of the document.
  • 2. By virtue of the decision, G. M. Shahul Hameed v. Jayanthi R. Hegde, AIR 2024 SC 3339, unless the court has not applied its mind to the insufficiency of stamp, and unless there is a ‘judicial determination‘, the objection thereof can be raised at any time.

In RVE Venkatachala Gounder (supra), our Apex Court held as under:

  • “Ordinarily an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes:
    • (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and
    • (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient.
  • In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as ‘an exhibit’, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. …. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the later casefailure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in superior Court.”

Proof of Document is, normally, Proof of (both) Execution and Contents

When existence of a document is proved (either by admission or by proof), normally, contents thereof are also taken as proved.

  • In most cases, ‘proof of execution’ may lead the court to presume ‘proof of truth’. But, it is not a rigid rule, for it falls under the caption, “appreciation of evidence”.
  • Evidence Act does not expressly proffer anything as to “TRUTH of contents” of documents. It is left to the discretion (Sec. 3) of the court. In proper cases court is expressly authorised to presume (Sec. 114) truth.

For the above, by virtue of our procedure-laws (especially, Sec. 3 and 114 Evidence Act) and the law handed down by our Apex Court, the Courts are free to appraise a “marked” document as under:

  • 1. Mere marking does not amount to proof of contents (even), or
  • 2. Contents and ‘Truth of its Contents’, stand proved, or
  • 3. Admission of contents; not truth of contents (especially when truth is in issue), or
  • 4. Admission of contents and truth of contents; but, its probative value is small or nil.

Admission by the other side, Proves Contents – No Blindfold Application

Court has wide powers under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act to require, evidence to prove a document marked on ‘admission’. Besides the powers under Sec. 165, the Procedural Acts show that the courts have jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove admitted-documents. It is evident from the ‘Provisos’ of –

  • Sec. 58 of Evidence Act
  • O. XII, r. 2A Proviso, CPC and
  • Sec. 294 of the CrPC.

The Courts are free to refrain from acting upon any document, in the particular nature of a case, especially when the Court feels that injustice will be resulted by the blindfold application of this principle (admission of a document by the other side, proves its contents also), for it falls under the sphere, “appreciation of evidence”. It is the reason why the courts deviate from the general principles in certain cases, in the peculiar circumstances of those cases, saying –

  • (i) Contents are ‘not proved’ (Though signature Proved)
  • (ii) Truth of contents are ‘not proved’ (Though contents Proved)
  • (iii) Probative value is small or nil (Though contents and truth Proved).

Proof must be by one who can Vouchsafe for Truth – Not Beseem in All Cases

The normal rule as to proof of execution is made clear in Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745, under the following words –

  • “Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue”.
  • See: Assistant Commissioner of Customs v. Edwin Andrew Minihan, ILR 2024-1 Ker 596; 2023-7 KHC 512; 2024-1 KLT 24.

This “normal principle” (that proof must be by one who can vouchsafe for truth), is not invariably followed – e.g., a letter or a deed obtained by a witness in ‘due/common course’. In such cases, if only ‘truth’ as to the contents of the documents is in dispute, this rule is insisted.

Admission is a Mode of Proof; ‘Facts Admitted Need Not be Proved’

Usually, a document is proved through its author, or through a witness to its execution or a person acquainted with handwriting. Concession or admission by the opposite side is an acceptable form of proving documents in evidence (under Sec. 17, 21, 58, 59 Evidence Act).

Sec. 58, Evidence Act reads as under:

“58. Facts admitted need not be proved: No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings:
Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.”

Sec. 58 says that no fact need be proved in any proceeding in three circumstances:

  1. the parties or their agents agree to admit at the hearing
  2. before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands
  3. by any rule of pleading they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings.

Hearing” Partakes ‘recording evidence’

Legal implication of the term ‘hearing’ is clear from Rule 2 (1) of Order XVIII (Hearing of the suit and examination of witnesses) of the CPC – that is, hearing partakes ‘recording evidence’. Rule 2 (1) reads as under:

“2. Statement and production of evidence – (1) On the day fixed for the hearing of the suit or on any other day to which the hearing is adjourned, the party having the right to begin shall state his case and produce his evidence in support of the issues which he is bound to prove.”

Admissions at hearing

Admissions at ‘hearing’ (by the advocate) may be made at the evidence-stage (while the witnesses are examined) and at the time of ‘final hearing’. Admissions of advocate are to be deciphered from Order-sheet or Judgment.

Once no Objection to Mode of Proof, Right to Objection Stands Waived

From the above it is clear that it would not be legitimate for the court to refrain from exhibiting a relevant document which could be received in evidence on the (express or implied) concession or admission of the opposite side (as regards mode of proof), in the scheme of Evidence Act.

Our Procedure Codes (CPC, CrPC) also declare this principle.

Copy Marked, Without Objection, Right to Objection Stands Waived

“Admission”is a mode of proof, inasmuch as ‘facts admitted need not be proved’ (Sec. 58, Evidence Act). Once a document is marked as no objection to the mode of proof on account of lack of original, then the right to raise objection (on this score) stands waived. See:

  • Lachhmi Narain Singh v. Sarjug Singh, AIR 2021 SC 3873;
  • Sumita @ Lamta v. Devki, (Valmiki J. Mehta, J.), 25 Sep 2017 (indiakanoon);
  • Sonu @ Amar v. State of Haryana, AIR  2017  SC 3441; 2017-8 SCC 570
  • Dayamathi Bai v. KM Shaffi, (2004) 7 SCC 107;
  • R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 752;
  • Rafia Sultan Widow of Mirza Sultan Ali Baig v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1986 GujLH 27; 1985-2 GujLR 1315
  • Sk. Farid Hussinsab v. State of Maharashtra, 1983 CrLJ 487.

Admissions are Substantive Evidence By Themselves

In Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405: [1966] 1 SCR 606, it was observed as under:

  • Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of ss. 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of opinion that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appeared as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. The purpose of contradicting the witness under s. 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence.”

Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi is Quoted/referred to in:

  • Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2019 SC  3363; 2019-16 SCC 547.
  • Union of India v. Moksh Builders And Financiers Ltd., 1977 AIR SC 409; 1977-1 SCC 60.
  •  Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad AIR 1974 SC 117, 1974-1  SCC 78,
  • Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil, (1977) 2 SCC 49,
  • Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1971 SC 1153; 1971-1 SCC 864.

In Murlidhar Bapuji Valve v Yallappa Lalu Chougule, AIR 1994 Bom 358 (an often quoted decision), it was held that it was well settled law that an “admission” of a party (in a sale deed) was liable to be considered as substantive evidence even if the party made the admission was not confronted with the statement.

Judicial Admissions and Admissions in Pleadings

In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam, AIR 1974 SC 471, it was held by the Supreme Court as under:

  • “26. Admissions if true and clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admission. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the rival as evidence are by themselves not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.” (Quoted in: Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad: AIR 2005 SC 809, 2005 (11) SCC 314.)

See also:

  • Biswanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1974 SC 117,
  • Steel Authority of India Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 3229, 2006 (12) SCC 233,
  • Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, (2005) 12 SCC 1.

Evidence in Old Transaction – Vigor in RECENT TRANSACTIONS could Not be EXPECTED

In Muthialpet Benefit Fund Ltd.  v. V.  Devarajulu Chetty, AIR 1955 Mad 455, it is held as under:

  • “7. To my mind, neither of the first two points is convincing because the first is based on the rather over-optimistic and facile profession of faith made in every minors suit that he the minor is going to win and to which the statistics of our Courts do not unfortunately lend any support and especially so in this case and in the circumstances set out above, which make out prima facie that the mortgagee public institution made proper and bona fide enquiry as to the existence of necessity and did all that was reasonable to satisfy itself as to the existence of such necessity. In such a case even if there was no necessity in fact or even if the money borrowed was not applied to meet the necessity, the alienation will be upheld. The recitals of necessity in the deed are admissible in evidence as admissions of the Manager or father and also amount to representation of necessity though in the case of RECENT TRANSACTIONS evidence aliunde** would be NORMALLY EXPECTED. These elementary propositions require no buttressing by citations (See Mulla, Hindu Law, Edn.10, p.285; Raghavachari: Hindu Law, Edn.3, p.335 and following; Mayne: Hindu Law, Edn.11, Re-print pp.474-475). Secondly, it is in the best interest of the mortgagors themselves to prevent the deterioration of the value of the corpus and market it into cash and keep the sale proceeds in Court pending and abiding the result of the suit.”
  • (** from other sources)

Read Blogs: Modes of Proof of Documents

Effect of Marking Documents without Objection

Following two things are different processes –

  • (i) admission or exhibiting of a document in evidence; and
  • (ii) proving the ‘truth of its contents‘ (or veracity of the same).

But, in certain cases, as comes out from Sec. 56, 57 and 58 of the Evidence Act, when a document is admitted, or marked without objection separate proof as to ‘truth of contents’ may not be warranted.

  • Similarly, separate proof need not be required when presumptions (Sec. 114, Evidence Act) can be invoked (e.g. document in ordinary course of business, a letter obtained in reply or a public document).

What is the effect of marking documents without objection; do contents stand proved; does it bar raising objection afterwards?

  • Divergent views are taken by the Courts depending on the facts of each case.
First view
Proof (Contents) stands established.  It cannot be questioned afterwards.

Truth also: See: Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1985-2 GujLR 1315, 1986 ACJ 616; 1985-2 GujLR 1315.
RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami: AIR 2003  SC  4548.
Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of Delhi) [2023] 4 SCC 731 [If no objection as to mode of proof (secondary evidence) when marked, no such objection could be allowed to be raised at any later stage.]
Second View
Even if no objection, it does not dispense with proof (as to, both, existence of the document and its truth).

In such a case the document will not be taken as proved.

(Note: It may not be legitimate to apply this principle literatim)
LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen: 2010-4 SCC 491 (Domestic enquiry report);
H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240 (Copy of a power of attorney alone was shown to the respondent during cross-examination and he admitted his signature thereon only, and not its contents);
Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohith: 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 (date of birth).
Third view
If truth is in issue, mere proof of contents, or marking without objection, is not proof of truth.
See: Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745; Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085.
Fourth view
Admission of contents, and dispenses with proof and truth; but its probative value will be a matter for appreciation by court.
See: State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684 (Admission and probative value – different); Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri: 2015  AIR(SCW) 6271; Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758;  H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492;  Rasiklal Manikchand  v. MSS Food Products: 2012-2 SCC 196.
Fifth view
Admission of contents, and dispenses with proof and truth; but Court should require (in proper cases) the party producing the document to adduce proper evidence, and to cure formal defects, invoking –
              • Sec. 165 of Evidence Act
              • Sec. 58 of Evidence Act
              • O. XII, r. 2A Proviso, CPC and
              • Sec. 294 of the CrPC.
See: Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh, (2005) 13 SCC 511; Umesh Challiyil v. K.P. Rajendra, (2008) 11 SCC 740; KK Ramachandran Master v. MV Sreyamakumar, (2010) 7 SCC 428; AIR 2015 SC 3796.

1. (a) Once no Objection to Mode of Proof, Right to Objection Stands Waived

It is trite law that once no-objection is raised to the mode of proof , then the right of the opposite party to raise objection (on this score) stands waived. RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu, AIR 2003 SC 4548: (2003) 8 SCC 752, is often quoted to establish this proposition. 

It was the position of law accepted by our legal system. See:

  • Rafia Sultan Widow of Mirza Sultan Ali Baig v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1986 GujLH 27; 1985-2 GujLR 1315 (relied on:  P. C. Purushottamman v. S. Perumal AIR 1972 SC 608;
  • Sk. Farid Hussinsab v. State of Maharashtra, 1983 CrLJ 487 (Quoted in Sonu @ Amar v. State of Haryana, AIR  2017  SC 3441; 2017-8 SCC 570)
  • Pandappa v. Shivlingappa, 47 BLR. 962; and
  • Gopaldas  v. ShriThakurli, AIR 1943 PC 83).

See also:

  • Lachhmi Narain Singh v. Sarjug Singh, AIR 2021 SC 3873;
  • Sumita @ Lamta v. Devki, (Valmiki J. Mehta, J.), 25 Sep 2017 (indiakanoon);
  • Oriental Insurance Co v. Premlata:  (2007) 8 SCC 575,
  • Thimmappa Rai v. Ramanna Rai,(2007) 14 SCC 63.
  • Dayamathi Bai v. KM Shaffi, (2004) 7 SCC 107, AIR 2004 SC 4082;
  • R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752;
  • Narbada Devi  v. Birendra Kumar: (2003) 8 SCC 745

When a document is marked without objection, our courts take two (divergent) views:

  • First, both Contents and ‘Truth of its Contents’ stand proved.
  • Second, contents alone stand proved; and, not ‘Truth’ of its Contents.

Effect of marking document without objection is laid down in the following two recent decisions of the Supreme Court. In both these cases, it is seen, the Apex Court has taken the view that the ‘truth’ is also stood proved.

Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi), 2023 4 SCC 731

The Constitution Bench (B. V. Nagarathna, V. Ramasubramanian, A. S. Bopanna, B. R. Gavai, S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.) of our Apex Court laid down in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 330; 2023 4 SCC 731, as under:

  • Section 61 deals with proof of contents of documents which is by either primary or by secondary evidence.
  • When a document is produced as primary evidence, it will have to be proved in the manner laid down in Sections 67 to 73 of the Evidence Act.
  • Mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence. On the other hand, when a document is produced and admitted by the opposite party and is marked as an exhibit by the court, …  (sic – no objection can be raised at any later stage with regard to proof of its contents).
  • The contents of the document must be proved either by the production of the original document i.e., primary evidence or by copies of the same as per Section 65 as secondary evidence.
  • So long as an original document is in existence and is available, its contents must be proved by primary evidence.
  • It is only when the primary evidence is lost, in the interest of justice, the secondary evidence must be allowed.
  • Primary evidence is the best evidence and it affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.
  • Thus, when a particular fact is to be established by production of documentary evidence, there is no scope for leading oral evidence.
  • What is to be produced is the primary evidence i.e., document itself. It is only when the absence of the primary source has been satisfactorily explained that secondary evidence is permissible to prove the contents of documents.
  • Secondary evidence, therefore, should not be accepted without a sufficient reason being given for non-production of the original.
  • Once a document is admitted, the contents of that document are also admitted in evidence, though those contents may not be conclusive evidence.
  • Moreover, once certain evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence.
  • There is a prohibition for any other evidence to be led which may detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence and the court has no option to hold the existence of the fact otherwise when such evidence is made conclusive.

It is held further as under:

  • “44. Section 64 of the Evidence Act states that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in certain cases mentioned above. ….. Thus, once a document has been properly admitted, the contents of the documents would stand admitted in evidence, and if no objection has been raised with regard to its mode of proof at the stage of tendering in evidence of such a document, no such objection could be allowed to be raised at any later stage of the case or in appeal vide Amarjit Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1995 Cr LJ 1623 (Del) (“Amarjit Singh”). But the documents can be impeached in any other manner, though the admissibility cannot be challenged subsequently when the document is bound in evidence.”

Objection as to non examination of the author is too late in the day 

In PC Thomas v. PM Ismail (R.M. Lodha, D.K. Jain, JJ.), AIR 2010 SC 905; 2009-10 SCC 239, it is observed that the objection as to non examination of the author is too late in the day . It is held as under:

  • “No objection on pleas of “inadmissibility” or “mode of proof” was raised at the time of their exhibition or any time later during trial, when most of the witnesses, produced by the parties were confronted with these, as duly exhibited, bearing stamp marking with particulars, prescribed under Order XIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and duly signed as such.
  • In our opinion, it is too late in the day now to object to their exhibition on the ground of “prescribed procedure” i.e. mode of proof.
  • Moreover, we also find that it was nobody’s case that the said documents were got printed by John K or distributed amongst voters by him. Absence of proof of acknowledgment by him because of non production of John K as a witness, in the circumstances, in our view, is inconsequential.
  • Admittedly, John K was a well known leader of high stature, recognized as such by Christian/Catholic voters including those mentioned in Para 17 (supra) and, therefore, there is no question of drawing an adverse inference against the election petitioner for not examining him, as strenuously urged on behalf of the appellant, particularly when the printing and circulation of offending material (Exts.P1 and P2) has been proved by the election petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.”

(b) Document marked without objection – Contents (‘TRUTH also) proved

Objection as to Truth of Contents, First Time In Appeal – Effect – Too late in the day

In Rafia Sultan v. Oil And Natural Gas Commission (I.C. Bhatt, S.B. Majmudar, JJ.), 1986 ACJ 616; 1986 Guj LH 27; 1985-2 GujLR 1315 it is observed as under:

  • “It was never the case of the Commission that report which was submitted in a sealed cover was not the genuine and true report of the committee appointed by the Commission itself. Thus in short no objection about the truth of contents of Ex. 24/1 i. e. Ex. 32 was ever put forward before the trial Court and rightly so as that was the report of its own committee of experts appointed by the Commission for enlightening itself about the causes of the accident and about the future safety steps which were required to be taken to avoid such accidents. … Not only that but the witness of the defendant accepted the contents of the said document Ex. 32. Nothing was suggested by him or even whispered to the effect that the contents of the said report were in any way untrue. …. In fact both the sides have relied upon different parts of Ex. 32 in support of their rival contentions on the aspect of negligence and contributory negligence. It is therefore too late in the day for Miss Shah for the Commission to canvass for the first time before us in appeal that contents of Ex. 32 were not proved in accordance with law and hence the document was required to be taken off the record. It is now well settled that objection about mode of proof can be waived by a party and that such objection is raised by the party at the earliest opportunity in the trial Court such objection will be deemed to have been waived and cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in appeal (vide P. C. Purushottamman v. S. Perumal AIR 1972 SC 608; Pandappa v. Shivlingappa 47 BLR. 962; and Gopaldas and another v. Shri Thakurli, AIR 1943 PC 83 at page 87 ). In view of this settled legal position the objection raised by Miss Shah against admissibility of Ex. 32 viz. that its contents were not proved in accordance with law has to be repelled.”

When a document is marked without objection, no doubt, the presumption in Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act is wide enough to presume that (i) the “contents” of the document and (ii) its ‘truth’ stand ‘proved’. Therefore, it is the duty of the other side to express its disapproval – that it does not accept the ‘contents’ and/or ‘truth’ (if it is so).

The dissent thereof can be placed by the opposite side by-

  • Raising ‘objection’ at the time of its marking, or
  • Placing the protest by way of ‘suggestion’ to the witness or by proper questions.

 (c) TRUTH is left to Discretion (Sec. 3) & Presumption (Sec. 114) of Court

Sec. 67, Evidence Act lays down the fundamental principles as to the proof of documents. Sec. 67 reads as under:

“67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced—If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person’s handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting.”

Sec. 67 says as to ‘proof of signature and handwriting’ alone. Neither Sec. 67 nor any other section of the Evidence Act says about ‘proof as to truth‘ of contents of documents.

Inferences as to “TRUTH” of contents

  • Evidence Act does not expressly proffer anything as to “TRUTH of contents” of documents.
  • It is left to the discretion (Sec. 3) of the court. In proper cases court can presume (Sec. 114) truth.
  • In most cases, ‘proof of execution’ leads the court to presume ‘proof of truth’.
  • It is more so, when a document is admitted (by the other side) without objection.
  • But, when proof as to ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute, the party in whom the burden thereof rests has to discharge it.

(d) Legal Position on ‘Waiver’ of Mode of Proof, Reprised

It appears that the legal position can be reprised as under –

  • If a document is marked without objection, the right of objection (vest with the other side) stands waived And the entire contents of the document would be admissible in evidence.
  • However, if (i) there is any intrinsic infirmity to the document, or (ii) specific proof as to truth is required in the nature of the case of the parties, or it is marked through a witness who is incompetent to prove it (and the opposite party does not expressly or impliedly accepted it), the court can say – it is not ready to act upon it, for truth or correctness of contents is not established.

In Dibakar Behera v. Padmabati Behera, AIR 2008 Ori  92, it is pointed out that (in such a situation) there must be “some evidence” to support the contents of such document.

The following decisions also lay down the proposition that ‘mere marking of a document’ as an ‘exhibit’ may amount to proof of contents, but not its ‘truth’.

  • Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri, 2015 AIR(SCW) 6271.
  • Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2013-10 SCC 758;
  • Sait Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865;
  • Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796 (“Mere identifying the signature of Mr. Pathak (by a witness) does not prove the contents of the said letter which is being relied upon by the appellant.”)

It is apposite to note – in RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arumlmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003  SC  4548, the question as to ‘truth’ of contents did not specifically come for consideration. It is dealt with as under:

  • “Since documents A30 and A34 were admitted in evidence without any objection, the High Court erred in holding that these documents were inadmissible being photo copies, the originals of which were not produced.”

Standard of Proof in Civil Cases – Preponderance of  Probability

It is noteworthy that the standard of proof required in civil cases is different from that of criminal cases; since, civil court proceeds on a preponderance of probability, whereas criminal court insists ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’. In Miller v. Minister of Pensions, (1947)2 All ER 372, Lord Denning, described preponderance of probability as “more probable than not”. It is said in picturesque as ‘likelihood of 51%’.

2. MERE MARKING, DOES NOT PROVE THE CONTENTS –  NOT AN UNQUALIFIED PROPOSITION 

This Proposition is Not to be Applied “Literatim”

It is disgraceful that several courts in India apply this proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) ineptly.

This proposition is not attracted–

  • when a document is marked on ‘admission’ by the opposite side.

This proposition is attracted–

  • when it is evident that the document is marked only for ‘identification, or
  • when the objection raised by the other side is sustained and the document is marked ‘subject to proof/objection’.
  • when the document is marked through an incompetent witness and not proved through a competent witness (in spite of the objection in this regard), afterwards;
  • when it has come out in cross examination of the witness through whom it is marked (by other evidence) that it is not proved ‘in accordance with law.

Each Case under this Head Requires Distinct Consideration

As this proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) is not to be applied “literatim”, each case (which referred to this proposition) requires distinct consideration. (Some of these decisions mentioned this proposition, merely to show that such an argument was placed before it; but those decisions were quoted (subsequently) by some Courts as if those earlier decisions laid down a ‘ratio decidendi’.)

Read blog: Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent; Not the Final Order or Conclusion

Following are the often-cited cases on this subject.

The Proposition -Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents  – was NOT applied in the following decisions. 

  DecisionDid the Documents Mark without Proper Proof  was accepted in evidence?Reason for NOT Appling the Proposition Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents
Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745Yes.
The rent receipts were received in evidence. (without formal proof)
The rent receipts were ‘not disputed’ by the other side.
Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh2013-10 SCC 758Yes.
The secondary evidence of dying declaration produced in this case was accepted by the Court.
Secondary evidence was adduced with foundational evidence (for producing copy; not original)

The Proposition -Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents  – was  applied in the following decisions; but, not unreservedly.

  DecisionDid the proposition – Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents – unreservedly apply? Reason for NOT applying the Proposition Mere Marking Does Not Prove  Contents, unreservedly
Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085No.
Truth of contents of a letter and two telegrams were not taken. (though marked)
Truth of the facts in the document was “in issue
M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, 2010-9 SCC 712  No.
Validity and Genuineness of the Photocopy (of the Caste Certificate) was not accepted (though marked)
Validity and Genuineness of the Caste Certificate was very much in question
H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240  No.
Contents of the Photocopy was not received as proof (though marked)
Photocopy was shown to the witness during cross-examination alone, and Signature alone was admitted by the witness.
Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865No.
Accounts of the Plaintiff was not received as proof (though marked)
The accounts of the Plaintiff would not be proved by itself

(a) Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was neither attracted nor applied in this case, for – the rent receipts were taken as proved, for, it was ‘not disputed’ by the other side.]

It is held in Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745 as under:

  • “Reliance is heavily placed on behalf of the appellant on Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085. The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof  of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue”.

Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal (supra) continued as under:

  • “The plaintiff did not dispute his signatures on the back of them. There was, therefore, no further burden of proof on the defendant to lead additional evidence in proof of the writing on the rent receipts and its due execution by the deceased landlady.”

Note:

  • In this case the rent receipts were taken as proved, for, it was ‘not disputed’. [Hence the ‘legal position’ stated in Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import (that mere production and marking of a document cannot be held to be a due proofwas not attracted in this case.]

(b) Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh2013-10 SCC 758

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) neither attracted nor applied in this case, for – the secondary evidence of dying declaration produced in this case (with foundational evidence) was accepted by the Court]

In this case the Courts upheld the acceptance of the secondary evidence (of the dying declaration). Our Apex Court held as under-

  • “In the instant case, the Trial Court had granted permission to lead secondary evidence and the same had been adduced strictly in accordance with law and accepted by the courts below.”

It is only pointed out in this decision as under:

  • “However, the secondary evidence of an ordinary document is admissible only and only when the party desirous of admitting it has proved before the court that it was not in his possession or control of it and further, that he has done what could be done to procure the production of it. Thus, the party has to account for the non-production in one of the ways indicated in the section. The party further has to lay down the factual foundation to establish the right to give secondary evidence where the original document cannot be produced. When the party gives in evidence a certified copy/secondary evidence without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, the opposite party must raise an objection at the time of admission. In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.Further,mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with the proof , which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law.
    • (Vide: The Roman Catholic Mission v. The State, AIR 1966 SC 1457;
    • Marwari Khumhar v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri, AIR 2000 SC 2629;
    • RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu, AIR 2003 SC 4548;
    • Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082; and
    • LIC of India  v. Rampal Singh Bisen,2010-4 SCC 491).”

(c) Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was applied in this case, for – Truth of the facts in the document was “in issue“]

It is held as under:

  • “Obviously, in these circumstances the Privy Council observed that the fact that a letter and two telegrams were sent by itself would not prove the truth of the contents of the letter and, therefore, the contents of the letter bearing on the question of lack of testamentary capacity would not be substantive evidence. Undoubtedly, mere proof of the handwriting of a document would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the facts stated in the document. If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouch safe for the truth of the facts in issue.”
  • Note: The aforequoted portion itself will show that the proposition – mere proof of the handwriting would not tantamount to proof of contents – is not absolute. It is attracted to this case, because the truth of the facts was “in issue“.

(d)M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, 2010-9 SCC 712

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was attracted in this case, for – the Validity and Genuineness of the Photocopy (of the Caste Certificate) was very much in question]

In this decision it was held:

  • “The High Court while considering this issue has noticed that the appellant failed to produce the original certificate issued by Arya Samaj, Madurai and further has not examined Santnakumar, who was supposed to have received and retained the original certificate issued by the Arya Samaj and the original records have not been summoned from Arya Samaj and no steps have been taken to summon the responsible person from Arya Samaj to prove that the appellant underwent conversion. Therefore, the claim made by her about her reconversion cannot be accepted. We do not agree with the reasoning of the High Court. It is true that a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of a document must adduce primary evidence of the contents, and only in the exceptional cases will secondary evidence be admissible. However, if secondary evidence is admissible, it may be adduced in any form in which it may be available, whether by production of a copy, duplicate copy of a copy, by oral evidence of the contents or in another form. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original.”
  • Note: It was an appeal from an Election petition and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The validity and genuineness of the Certificate was very much in question. Therefore, the principles in RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu, AIR 2003 SC 4548 (where the secondary evidence was marked without objection), was not attracted to this case (and it was not referred to also).
  • Principle of law laid down in M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu is followed in Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri, 2016 -16 SCC 483.

(e) H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was applied in this case, for – the Photocopy was shown to the witness during cross-examination alone, and Signature alone was admitted by the witness.]

It was held that the power of attorney was not proved in accordance with the terms of Sec. 65 of the Evidence Act, for the following –

  • The power of attorney had not been proved.
  • Original had never been filed before the Trial Court.
  • Only a photocopy of the same was shown to the respondent during cross-examination.
  • The respondent has only admitted his signature thereon.
  • He had never admitted its contents or genuineness.

It is held in H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, 2011-4 SCC 240, as under:

  • “In our humble opinion, the Trial Court could not proceed in such an unwarranted manner for the reason that the respondent had merely admitted his signature on the photocopy of the power of attorney and did not admit the contents thereof.”

It is added:

  • More so, the court should have borne in mind that admissibility of a document or contents thereof may not necessary lead to drawing any inference unless the contents thereof have some probative value.”

(f) Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865.

[The proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was applied in this case, for – the accounts of the Plaintiff would not be proved by itself]

It is held that the documents do not prove themselves. It is also observed in this decision as under:

  • “15. The plaintiffs wanted to rely on Exs. A-12 and A-13, the day book and the ledger respectively. The plaintiffs did not prove these books. There is no reference to these books in the judgments. The mere marking of an exhibit does not dispense with the proof of documents. It is common place to say that the negative cannot be proved. The proof of the plaintiffs’ books of account became important because the plaintiffs’ accounts were impeached and falsified by the defendants’ case of larger payments than those admitted by the plaintiffs. The irresistible inference arises that the plaintiffs’ books would not have supported the plaintiffs.” (Quoted in: Vinod Jaswantray Vyas v. State of Gujarat, 2024-7 SCR 365.)

Other Important Decisions –

  • 1. LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen: 2010-4 SCC 491 (Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry); 
  • 2. Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohith: 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 (document on date of birth).
  • 3.  Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796 (It is observed that mere marking as exhibit and identification of executant’s signature by one of witnesses does not prove contents of a document).
  • 4. Vinod Jaswantray Vyas v. State of Gujarat, 2024-7 SCR 365 (mere marking of exhibit – letter – without the expert deposing about the opinion given therein would not  dispense with the proof of contents).

3. IF ‘TRUTH’ IS IN ISSUE – Mere Marking Not Amount to ‘Waiver’

The fundamental principles as to proof of execution a document is that the execution has to be proved by proper evidence, that is by the ‘evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue’ (Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745). But, in the facts and circumstances of each case, the court is at liberty to invoke its wisdom and fill certain gaps in evidence by applying ‘presumption’.

It is legitimate to say that this requirement as to proof of ‘truth’ is independent from inviting ‘proof of signature and handwriting’ in Sec. 67 to 71 of the Evidence Act. This proposition is clear from Sec. 67, which lays down the fundamental principles as to the proof of documents. Sec. 67 reads as under:

  • “67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced—If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person’s handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting.”

Though proof of execution (dealt with in Sec. 67 to 71) is independent from proof as to ‘truth’ of contents of a document, proof as to ‘truth’ can be presumed by the court, in most cases, on ‘proof of execution’. It is more so, when a document is admitted without objection. Proof as to ‘truth’ is essential if ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute.

If ‘TRUTH’ is in issue, or in dispute, marking a document without objection, or mere proof of handwriting or execution,by itself, need not absolve the duty to prove the truth as to the contents of the documents. (Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import, AIR 1981 SC 2085; Achuthan Pillai v. Marikar (Motors) Ltd., AIR 1983 Ker 81; Suresh v. Tobin, 2013-1 KerLT 293). Court has a duty to see that the statement of a witness gets independent corroboration, direct or circumstantial, in proper cases (Ahalya Bariha v. Chhelia Padhan, 1992 Cri.LJ 493).

In Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, it us held as under:

  • “If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”

4. Admission of Contents – May Dispense with ProofBut Probative Value may be Less or Nil

The discretion vested with the court to take presumption; and to evaluate probative value.

It is well settled that when a party leads secondary evidence, the Court is obliged to examine the probative value of the document and its contents, and to decide the question of admissibility of the same [Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri: 2015  AIR(SCW) 6271; Kaliya v. State of MP, 2013-10 SCC 758 ].

Even when a document is technically admitted in court, the probative value thereof will always be a matter for the court to determine. That is, it is depended upon the nature of each case.

The probative value of Scene-Mahazar, Postmortem Report, Photocopy of a Registered Deed etc. without supporting legal evidence may be lesser. In such cases the court can refrain from acting upon such documents until regular evidence is tendered.

In Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh2013-10 SCC 758, it is held as under:

  • “The court is obliged to examine the probative value of documents produced in court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence.”
  • [Note: Further held: “In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.”]

In Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758 our Apex Court also referred to  H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, AIR 2011 SC 1492, and Rasiklal Manikchand  v. MSS Food Products: 2012-2 SCC 196.

In Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri, 2015 AIR (SCW) 6271, as regards mere admittance of secondary evidence, it is held:

  • Mere admission of secondary evidence, does not amount to its proof. The genuineness, correctness and existence of the document shall have to be established during the trial and the trial court shall record the reasons before relying on those secondary evidences.”

In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [2010-4 SCC 491], it is observed as under:

  • “26. We are of the firm opinion that mere admission of document in evidence does amount to its proof. In other words, mere marking of exhibit on a document does dispense with its proof, which is required to be done in accordance with law. …..
  • 27. It was the duty of the appellants to have proved documents Exh.-A-1 to Exh. A-10 in accordance with law. Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry would partake the character of admissible evidence in Court of law. That documentary evidence was also required to be proved by the appellants in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, which they have failed to do.”

The Calcutta High Court quoting Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [2010-4 SCC 491] it is observed in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company v.Smt. Santa (2019-2 ACC 36) that ‘even if the document had been marked as Exhibit-A without objection, without a formal proof thereof in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, such document lost its credibility and is of no probative value’.

5. Court should allow to adduce proper evidence to prove documents

Besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove that document. It is evident from –

              • Sec. 58 of Evidence Act
              • O. XII, r. 2A Proviso, CPC and
              • Sec. 294 of the CrPC

Inasmuch as –

  • (a) mere marking of a document on admission will not amount to proof, or evidence of the contents of the document or its truth;
  • (b) the probative value of a document ‘marked without objection’ may be low or nil, for want of proper proof; and
  • (c) there may be a formal defect to the document for it is a secondary evidence and it is produced without adducing ‘foundational evidence’, 

it is legitimate to say that before taking an adverse stance as to proof in these counts, the court should give an opportunity to the party who relies on the document to cure the deficiency.

Read connected Blogs:

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 

Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Survey Records under Survey Act – Raises a Presumption of Correctness on Boundary; though Not Confer Title

Taken from: Revenue Records (or ‘Mutation’) & Survey by Survey Authorities will not Confer Title; It merely Raises a Presumption on Possession

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

1. Survey Authorities Not to decide Title.

2. Survey Records – Conclusive proof that Boundaries were recorded correctly (when survey was made).

3. Logical inference from the above propositions is the following: If a party to the suit establishes title by producing his title deed, he can rely on the presumption: that survey records establish possession and boundary. See:

  • Elambilan Nani Amma v. Mulavana Antony (K. Babu, J,), 2023-7 KHC 418
  • Kannan v. Kannan, (1964 KLT 228), 
  • The Cheriyanad Grama Panchayath v. The State of Kerala,  (2019 (5) KHC 699),
  • Venugopalan Nair v. Saraswathy Amma, (2013 (4) KLT 717),
  • Karthyayani v. Balakrishnan, (2014 (2) KLT Suppl. 67 (Ker.),
  • Ibrahim v. Saythumuhammed, (2013 (4) KLT 435)
  • Achama Alexander v. Asst. Director, Survey and Land Records, 2022-3 KLT 198.
  • Thomas v. Philip,2022(4) KerHC 451;

PART – 1

Survey and Boundaries Act

“The Survey and Demarcation of lands by the State have a Purpose”

In Achuthan Unni v. Vally, 1962 KLT 1010, it is held as under:

  • “3. The survey and demarcation of lands by the State have a purpose; they are intended to identify the different pieces of land so as to regulate the rights of landholders. Bights in land will normally be presumed to be in terms of the survey divisions. When a person is admitted or found to be in possession of a survey division, the presumption is of such possession being extensive with the survey division concerned; and he is not to be constrained to prove his possession of every inch of it. It is then for the person who asserts the contrary to prove by positive evidence that a defined portion thereof is in his adverse possession and has been lost to the owner thereof. If the court finds the same, the Land Records will be corrected accordingly sub-dividing the original survey division so as to demarcate each holding with separate survey number.” (quoted in: Damodara Panicker v. Ayyappan Kutty, 1962 KLT 637; 1962 KHC 153; Kathirummal Chirammal Karthyayani v. Kunnool Balakrishnan, 2014-2 KHC 108; 2014-2 KLJ 289; 2014 Supp2 KLT 67).

In Damodara Panicker v. Ayyappan Kutty, 1962 KLT 637; 1962 KHC 153, it is held as under:

  • 5. Where the disputed land is a narrow strip, (in this case, it is of width ranging from two or three feet) at the verge of the plaintiff’s land adjoining the defendants’ property it would in most cases, be difficult to prove its actual possession as such. If the remaining portion of the plaintiff’s land is admitted or found to be in the plaintiff’s possession, the same must be held to extend to the border, unless there be clear evidence to the contrary. In other words, when a person is admitted or found to be in possession of his land identified by a Survey Number and the dispute by the adjoining landholder concerns only a narrow strip at the mutual boundary, the possession of the former will be presumed to be coextensive with the relative survey division and the burden will be on the party claiming the encroachment to prove his adverse possession thereof for over the statutory period (of 12 years). [See: Achuthan Unni v. Vally, 1962 KLJ 400].”
  • (Quoted in: Susi v. Sujathan, 2022-1 KHC 671, K Babu, J. and in Kathirummal Chirammal Karthyayani v. Kunnool Balakrishnan, 2014-2 KHC 108; 2014-2 KLJ 289; 2014 Supp2 KLT 67)

In Kathirummal Chirammal Karthyayani v. Kunnool Balakrishnan, 2014-2 KHC 108; 2014-2 KLJ 289; 2014 Supp2 KLT 67 (N.K. Balakrishnan, J.), the argument of the appellant in the Second Appeal was laid down by the court as under:

  • “5. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant who was examined as PW1 had a definite case that her property extends up to the ‘chal’ and the ridge on the eastern side of the property and so the findings entered by the appellate court that the boundary of the respondents’ property should be along the ‘EF’ line, cannot be accepted at all. Simply because resurvey was conducted and a plan was drawn by the Survey Authorities, it cannot be said that the appellant’s property does not extend up to the dotted line shown by the Commissioner, which is actually the natural boundary of the property, it is argued.”

Dismissing the second appeal, it is held as under:

  • “12. If it is a case where large extent of property lying in a different survey number is claimed by the plaintiff based on a survey record alone, when actually it is in the possession of the defendant, the plaintiff has to seek recovery of possession of that large extent of property which is in the possession of the defendant. So far as the case on hand is concerned, it is only a very narrow strip of land lying along the boundary line. Hence, the presumption should be that the person, who has got title to the property and whose boundary extends up to the line stated above is in possession of that narrow strip of land as well.”

Survey, Conclusive Proof – Boundaries determined & Recorded Correctly; It is More than a Presumption

In Elambilan Nani Amma v. Mulavana Antony (K. Babu, J,), 2023-7 KHC 418, it is observed as under:

  • “It is also trite that the decisions of the survey authorities under Chapter II of the Act (Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act) will not affect the right and title of the property acquired by a party as per a valid title deed. The right and title to property have to be determined not with reference to the survey demarcation but based on other cogent materials, the primary of which is the title deed. The record of the survey result shall be conclusive proof that the boundaries were determined and recorded therein correctly.
  • (Vide: Cheriyanad Grama Panchayath v. The State of Kerala and Ors. (2019 (5) KHC 699,
  • Venugopalan Nair v. Saraswathy Amma (2013 (4) KLT 717),
  • Karthyayani v. Balakrishnan [2014 (2) Suppl. 67 (Ker.)],
  • Ibrahim v. Saythumuhammed (2013 (4) KLT 435) and
  • Achama Alexander v. Assistant Director, Survey and Land Records (2022 (2) KHC 131).”

The record of the survey result shall be conclusive proof that the boundaries were determined and recorded therein correctly (when survey was made).

This view is fortified by the decisions of the Kerala High Court in: 

  • Kannan v. Kannan (1964 KLT 228), 
  • The Cheriyanad Grama Panchayath v. The State of Kerala  (2019 (5) KerHC 699),
  • Venugopalan Nair v. Saraswathy Amma (2013 (4) KLT 717);
  • Karthyayani v. Balakrishnan (2014 (2) KLT Suppl. 67 (Ker.);
  • Ibrahim v. Saythumuhammed (2013 (4) KLT 435);
  • Achama Alexander v. Asst. Director, Survey and Land Records (2022 (2) KerHC 131: 2022-3 KLT 198);
  • Thomas v. Philip,2022(4) KerHC 451;
  • Elambilan Nani Amma v. Mulavana Antony, 2023-7 KHC 418

Note: The decisions above, based on Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act, 1969, lay-down the law ‘more than on presumption’ on general presumption on official act (Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, AIR 1981 SC 707; 1981-2 SCC 103).

Determine Boundaries by Survey Authorities

Kerala High Court held in Thomas v. Philip, 2022(4) KerHC 451 (K. Babu, J.) to the following effect:

  • The Survey and Boundaries Act, 1961 empowers the survey authorities to determine the boundaries of different sub-divisions.
  • The Survey and Boundaries Act, 1961 empowers the survey authorities to determine the boundaries of different sub-divisions.
  • It is predominantly based on possession.
  • As per the Act, the survey officer has the power to determine and record any boundary as undisputed in respect of which no dispute is brought to his notice.
  • Where a boundary is disputed, the survey officer shall, after making such inquiries as he considers necessary, determine the boundary and record it in accordance with his decision with reasons in writing for arriving at that decision.

Survey Plan or Revenue Records Do Not Confer Title

In Laxkshmi B. v. Suku, 2024-@1 KerHC 380, it is observed as under:  

  • “When a suit for recovery of possession has been filed on the strength of title or in a suit for title declaration, title would prevail over revenue records and resurvey numbers. To put it differently, tax receipts, survey plan, resurvey plan or revenue records do not confer title to anybody, when there is title deed in relation to the said property in favour of the title holder. Therefore, in suits involving title dispute, title would prevail over revenue records, if it is found on measurement that the property covered by the title deed is identified properly justifying the declaration of title and recovery of possession on the strength of title. The said reliefs never be denied merely on the ground that in the revenue records/resurvey records, the said portion of the property is not shown as the property of the plaintiffs.

Survey Authorities Not to decide title

  • It is not for the survey authorities to decide the question of the title (based on resurvey records).
  • The decision of the survey authorities shall not affect the right and title of the properties acquired by a party as per a valid title deed.

Properties Identified on Title Deeds

  • The properties of the parties are to be identified based on the title deeds.
  • The changes in the extent of the property in the resurvey would not confer title.

Title and Possession decided by Civil Court

The title and possession are matters to be decided by a Civil Court.

Merely because a portion of the plaintiff’s property is shown in the resurvey records as with defendant’s survey number, it cannot lead to an inference that possession was with the defendant.

In Sundaresan Nair v. Mallan Nadar, the Kerala High Court (2012 – K. Vinod Chandran, J.) held as under:

  • “The questions of law regarding conclusiveness of the re-survey conducted under the Survey Act is held against the appellants and in favour of the 1st respondent/plaintiff. Necessarily, the resurvey conducted under Section 13 has to yield to the adjudication by the competent Civil Court with respect to the identity based on title.”

Power of Survey Officer to determine disputed boundary

In Cheriyanad Grama Panchayat v. State of Kerala, 2019 (4) KLT 916, it is laid down as under:

  • Section 10 of the Act authorizes the survey officer to re-define the boundary lines of a particular survey already settled by old survey records.
  • Section 6 and 7 of the Act do not empower survey officer to re-define any boundary line of a particular survey which was already settled and finalised in an earlier survey (except for the purpose of Section 5 of the Act which deals with the situation wherein certain area was taken away by sea erosion or action of river.)
  • Section 4 of the Act also permits a survey of the land, but its purpose should be understood in relation to the necessity to have a re-survey, certainly, not for altering the earlier survey recordsbut for recording the further divisions of property out of a large extent within a particular survey.

Sec. 10 of the Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act

Sec. 10 of the Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act reads as inder:

  • “10. Power of Survey Officer to determine and record a disputed boundary with reasons– (1) Where a boundary is disputed, the Survey Officer shall, after making such inquiries as he considers necessary, determine the boundary and record it in accordance with his decision with reasons in writing for arriving at that decision.
  • (2) Notice of every decision of the Survey Officer under sub-section (1) shall be given in the prescribed manner to the parties to the dispute and other registered holders of the lands, the boundaries of which may be affected by the decision.

In Achama Alexander v. Assistant Director, Survey and Land Records (K. Babu, J.), 2022-2 KHC 131; 2022-3 KLT 198, it is observed as under:

  • “24. A reading of Sec. 10 of the Act makes it candidly clear that the survey authority is only empowered to determine the disputes regarding the fixation of boundary between owners of land comprised in a particular survey division. The act of determination envisaged in Sec. 10 of the Act essentially draws a dividing line based on ownership within a particular survey or, in other words, Sec. 10 of the Act does not authorise the Survey Authority to redefine the boundary line of a particular survey already settled by old survey records. Section 10 of the Act does not empower the survey authority to change the ownership of a particular sub-division and make it part of another survey sub-division.”

Revenue record do Not confer Presumptive Value on Title

The argument as to ownership based upon entries in the revenue records had been negated in Prahlad Pradhan  v. Sonu Kumhar,(2019) 10 SCC 259. It was held that the revenue record would not confer title to the property nor do they have any presumptive value on the title.

  • “5. The contention raised by the appellants is that since Mangal Kumhar was the recorded tenant in the suit property as per the Survey Settlement of 1964, the suit property was his self-acquired property. The said contention is legally misconceived since entries in the revenue records do not confer title to a property, nor do they have any presumptive value on the title. They only enable the person in whose favour mutation is recorded, to pay the land revenue in respect of the land in question. As a consequence, merely because Mangal Kumhar’s name was recorded in the Survey Settlement of 1964 as a recorded tenant in the suit property, it would not make him the sole and exclusive owner of the suit property.” (Quoted in Prabhagiya Van Adhikari Awadh Van Prabhag v. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj (SC): 2021). See also: Narasamma & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2009) 5 SCC 591).

It is also held:

  • “Revenue records are not documents of title”. (P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2024-1 CTC 547; 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278).

PART II

PRESUMPTION under Sec. 114, Evid. Act read with Sec. 35.

Sec. 35 Evd. Act speaks on ‘an entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record’. Sec. 35 Evd. Act speaks as to presumption.

Besides direct evidence, or admission, the contents of a document can also be proved by circumstantial evidence or by invoking presumption. ‘Common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’ etc. under S. 114, can be used to prove the existence and genuineness/truth of a document.

Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • “35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty: An entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.

Illustration (e) of Sec. 114, Evd. Act, demonstrates that presumption as to ‘regularity’ can be invoked on Judicial and official acts, in proper cases, over and above ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’ etc. that are brought-forth under the body of S. 114.  ‘Regularity’ in Illustration (e) is not exactly the presumption as to ‘correctness or truth’. For such presumption, we have to resort the main section, Sec. 114 – that is, ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’, etc..

Presumption of Correctness on Entries in the Revenue Record

In Vishwa Vijay Bharathi v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642, it is held as under:

  • “It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry in to their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry is the revenue record states but the entry is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title.”

In Karewwa v. Hussensab Khansab Khansaheb Wajantri, AIR 2002 SC 504 : (2002) 10 SCC 315 , it is held as under:

  • “We do not dispute the legal position as stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, but the presumption of correctness of an entry in revenue record cannot be rebutted by a statement in the written statement. Mere statement of fact in the written statement is not a rebuttal of presumption of correctness of an entry in the revenue record. The respondent was recorded as a tenant in the revenue record in the year 1973 and under law the presumption is that the entry is correct. It was for the appellant to rebut the presumption by leading evidence. The appellant has not led any evidence to show that entry in the revenue record is incorrect. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention.”

Referring relevant provisions of Himachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Sec. 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is held by our Apex Court in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: AIR 2020 SC 1382, that Record-of-rights (Revenue document) carries the ‘presumption of correctness‘.

In Inder Singh v. S. Raghbir Singh, AIR 1978 P&H 98, it is observed as under:

  • “The principle is that an official record, kept by a person, upon whom there is a public duty to make entries in it only after satisfying himself of the truth of those entries, is presumed to be correct. Such a document itself is evidence of the truth of its contents unless and until its falsity can be demonstrated by any of the various methods by which the evidentiary value of any public book, register or document may be attacked.”

In Shiv Ram v. Shiv Charan Singh, AIR 1964 Raj 126, it is observed as under

  • “Where Sec. 35  properly comes into play, an entry made by a public servant in any public or official book in the discharge of his official duty becomes relevant by itself, and no other proof of such entry is required as a matter of law by our Evidence Act, but this, does not exclude the possibility that such an entry may become admissible otherwise if it is properly proved to have been made by a person ordinarily competent to make it.” (Quoted in Mayadhar Nayak vs Sub-Divisional Officer, Jajpur, AIR 1982 Ori 221).

In Durairaju v. Neela, 1976 CriLJ 1507, Ratnavel Pandian, J., it was held that it was the duty of the court, before making the order for maintenance, to find though in a summary manner, the paternity of the child. It was held that Ex. P. 1, the intimation received by the Municipality from the Government Hospital, and Ex. P. 2 a copy of the birth extract made on the basis of Ex, P. 1, were not sufficient to raise presumption of paternity for, the medical officer who made the entries in Ex. P. 1 had not been examined. The author of the information is not mentioned in Ex. P. 1. PW 2 herself had not stated that she mentioned to the doctor that the child was born to her through the petitioner. In the absence of such evidence, the document could not by itself prove the relevant entries made thereon. It was also observed that to prove a document under Section 35 it must be shown that the document was prepared by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law.

Record of rights and the record of Permanent Settlement

Our Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, as under:

  • “This brief review of evidence is sufficient to show that appellant has not been able by clear and conclusive evidence to rebut the presumption arising from the Record of rights and the record of Permanent Settlement and he has failed to establish his claim”.

In Vallikunnil Janaki Amma v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode, 2014 (1) KHC 57, Kerala High Court Court referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, held as under:  

  • “Even though Ext. A2 is only an extract of the Settlement Register/ Adangal extract which may not by itself prove or confer title to a party in whose name the property stood registered, it can be accepted as evidence of title when there is no contra evidence. Admittedly it is adjacent to Amruthamangalam temple. The temple compound and this suit property which is adjacent to the temple are shown to be of Amruthamangalam Devaswom as per revenue record. In these circumstances, the contention that this property did not and does not belong to the temple/Devaswom cannot be sustained at all.” (Referred to in: Kunhimangalam Devaswam v. State of Kerala, 6 April, 2022, Anil K. Narendran, J.)

Revenue Settlement Registers of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters

The Kerala High Court held in Mohandas v. Santhakumari Amma, 2018-3 KLT 606 as under:

  • “We notice that, a new survey and settlement was undertaken in the erstwhile Travancore State for the purpose of putting in place a sound Revenue administration. Accordingly, it appears that a complete survey and reassessment of the entire State ’embracing an accurate measurement, demarcation, mapping and valuation of properties of every description and a registration of titles, as the basis of a sound Revenue Administration’ was carried out. On the basis of such a statement a proclamation was issued by the Maharaja of Travancore on 14 th Kumbhom 1061 corresponding to 24th February 1886.”

If Settlement Register says Government Land, Petitioner to Establish Title

In Sahana Industries v. State of Kerala (2021 KHC OnLine 7110), Kerala High Court (Devan Ramachandran, J.) held (October 11, 2021) as under:

  • “… If the Settlement Register shows this land to be Government land, then certainly, the petitioner is obliged to establish their title over the property through competent documents”.

Petitioner to Prove claim (Lease); cannot rely Inconsistencies of Respondents

In OT Alexander v. State of Kerala, LAWS (KER) 2021-5. 23, High Court of Kerala (N. Nagaresh, J.) did not accept the argument of the petitioner in the Writ Petition, against the Government Order for resumption of the land, for the absence of materials to establish the lease of 1933 claimed by the Petitioner.  The prime contention of the petitioner was that the land was originally granted to the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner, under Ground Rent Patta by erstwhile Collector of South Malabar District during the British regime in 1933; and that Land assigned under Ground Rent Patta could not be resumed by the Government.

The petitioner claimed that the transferees of the original leasee sold their right to a bank. The Bank (State Bank of Travancore) sold the property to a Company in 1995. The petitioner purchased the property from the Company as per the Sale Deed of the year 2004. The petitioner has been paying property tax to the Cochin Corporation. The action for resumption of land by the District Collector was on the ground that the sale deed between SBT and the Company was illegal. Pointing out that the petitioner cannot base his claim on inconsistencies of the respondents, the High Court did not accept the arguments against the resumption of land by the Collector.

It is Settled – Revenue Records will not confer title

  • Sawarni v. Inder Kaur, (1996) 6 SCC 223
  • Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137
  • Suman Verma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58; 
  • Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, AIR 2008 SC 901
  • State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319
  • Faqruddin v. Tajuddin, (2008) 8 SCC 12;
  • Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368; 
  • Narasamma v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 5 SCC 591
  • Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689; 
  • T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342;
  • Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; 
  • Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259;
  • Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70.
  • Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import and Export Co. (2019) 3 SCC 191
  • Jitendra Singh v.  The State of Madhya Pradesh (2021 SCC OnLine SC 802) [M.R. Shah,  Aniruddha Bose, JJ.]
  • P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2024-1 CTC 547; 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278
  • Laxkshmi B. v. Suku, 2024-1 KerHC 380

Revenue Records Prove Possession

  • Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, AIR 2008 SC 901 (Revenue record merely raises a presumption in regard to possession)
  • State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 (Revenue records merely show possession of a person)
  • Krishnamurthy S.  Setlur v.  O.V.  Narasimha Setty, 2019-9 SCC 488 (Revenue records prove possession)

Revenue Records are Not Documents of Title.

P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K Patkar (2023 SCC Online SC 1483; 2024-1 CTC 547; 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278) is a latest decision (Dipankar Datta, Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.) in this matter which held as under:

  • “11. It is trite law that revenue records are not documents of title.”

It is a settled proposition of law (i) that the mutation entry in revenue documents will not confer any right, title or interest in favour of any person and (ii) that the mutation in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose. After pointing out these legal propositions it is observed in Jitendra Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802as under:

  • “6. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the case of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 137 , this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is observed and held that mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive value on title. Such entries are relevant only for the purpose of collecting land revenue. Similar view has been expressed in the series of decisions thereafter.
  • 6.1 In the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186 , it is observed and held by this Court that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose”, i.e., payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. It is further observed that so far as the title of the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court. Similar view has been expressed in the cases of Suman Verma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58; Faqruddin v. Tajuddin (2008) 8 SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368; Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689; T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342; Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259; and Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70.”

Revenue Documents do not Confer ‘Title’It Raises Presumption on Possession

Our Apex Court, in Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, AIR 2008 SC 901 (SB Sinha. J.), has held that a revenue record is not a document of title; and that it merely raises a presumption in regard to possession.

In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund (supra) , held as under:

  • “A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession.” (Quoted in: State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319).

It is pointed out in this case that in proper cases (for revenue record is not a document of title) declaration is required .

It is also laid down in this decision as under:

  • “Presumption of possession and/ or continuity thereof both forward and backward can also be raised under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Courts below, were, therefore, required to appreciate the evidence keeping in view the correct legal principles in mind.” (Quoted in: State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319).

It is observed by the Apex Court, in State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 (following Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, AIR 2008 SC 901),

  • “13. …. Even, a revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession.” (Quoted in M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1).
  • “16. The courts below erred in holding, that revenue records confer title, for the reason that they merely show possession of a person.”

Revenue record Proves Possession; Presumption of truth Attached

It is held in Krishnamurthy S.  Setlur v.  O.V.  Narasimha Setty, 2019-9 SCC 488, that revenue record proves possession. it is said as under:

  • “14. In our considered view, the High Court has not given any cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion that KS was not in possession of the property. His name figured in the revenue record from 1963 to 1981 as the owner in possession. Presumption of truth is attached to revenue record which has not been rebutted.”

Record of rights and the record of Permanent Settlement

Our Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, as under:

  • “This brief review of evidence is sufficient to show that appellant has not been able by clear and conclusive evidence to rebut the presumption arising from the Record of rights and the record of Permanent Settlement and he has failed to establish his claim”.

In Vallikunnil Janaki Amma v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode, 2014 (1) KHC 57, Kerala High Court Court referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, held as under:  

  • “Even though Ext. A2 is only an extract of the Settlement Register/ Adangal extract which may not by itself prove or confer title to a party in whose name the property stood registered, it can be accepted as evidence of title when there is no contra evidence. Admittedly it is adjacent to Amruthamangalam temple. The temple compound and this suit property which is adjacent to the temple are shown to be of Amruthamangalam Devaswom as per revenue record. In these circumstances, the contention that this property did not and does not belong to the temple/Devaswom cannot be sustained at all.” (Referred to in: Kunhimangalam Devaswam v. State of Kerala, 6 April, 2022, Anil K. Narendran, J.)

Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet

In P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2024-1 CTC 547; 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278), after pointing out that the revenue records are not documents of title, it is held as under:

  • “18. It is settled law that a vendor cannot transfer a title to the vendee better than he himself possesses, the principle arising from the maxim nemo dat quod non habet, i.e., “no one can confer a better title than what he himself has”. In the present case, the plaintiff’s vendor having been denied the right of title in the land by the Commissioner’s order, could not have conveyed the same to her vendee.”
  • “22. Contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff that through the record of rights the plaintiff has established his title by a preponderance of probabilities is not sustainable. As noted above, the plaintiff failed to produce a single document of title in respect of the suit property. In a dispute with respect to determination of title, merely pointing out the lacunae in the defendant’s title would not suffice. Having instituted the suit for declaration, the burden of proof rested on the shoulders of the plaintiff to reasonably establish the probability of better title, which the plaintiff in the present case, has manifestly failed to do.”

Mutation’ Only for Fiscal Purposes; Legal Rights are subject to civil court decision

Following propositions can be culled out from the very rules of The Transfer of Registry Rules made applicable in the State of Kerala (Rule 15 and 16):

  1. It is the duty of the Tahsildar to determine the person in whose name the transfer of registry shall be made.
  2. It is the immediate concern of the Land Revenue Department to keep the thandaper accounts (Chitta) up to date.
  3. It is the immediate concern of the Land Revenue Department bring into the thandaper accounts (Chitta) the names of the real land-holders who shall be held liable for the payment of Government revenue due on the land.
  4. No case shall be rejected solely for the default of appearance of the parties.
  5. Only a summary enquiry is to be made by the Revenue authorities.
  6. The summary enquiry and the decision thereon is only an arrangement for fiscal purposes.
  7. The summary enquiry and the decision thereon do not affect the legal rights of any person in respect of the lands covered by the decisions in transfer of registry cases.
  8. The question of legal rights is always subject to adjudication by civil courts.
  9. And, pattas will be revised from time to time in accordance with judicial decisions.

In Sawarni vs. Inder Kaur and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 223, it was held that mutation in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title, nor does it have any presumptive value on title. (Referred to in: P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023 4 CurCC(SC) 278)

In Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137 it was held that mere mutation of records would not divest the owners of a land of their right, title and interest in the land. (Referred to in: P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023 4 CurCC(SC) 278)

In Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802, it was held as under:

  • “6. … mutation entry does not confer any right, title or interest in favour of the person and the mutation entry in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose.” (Quoted in: P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023 4 CurCC(SC) 278)

In Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil, (1977) 2 SCC 49, it was held that there exists no universal principle that whatever will appear in the record of rights will be presumed to be correct, when there exists evidence to the contrary. (Referred to in: P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2023 4 CurCC(SC) 278)

Patta is not a document of title. It can be Mortgaged as Title-Deed u/s. 58, TP Act

In Angu Pillai v. M.S.M. Kasiviswanathan Chettiar, AIR 1974 Mad 16, it was noticed as under:

  • “15.In Indian law, deposit of patta has been held to constitute a valid equitable mortgage, though patta is not in itself a deed of titlebut is only an evidence of title. This Court has consistently taken the view that the main object of tender of patta is merely to give information of the land revenue payable and the details of the property and that the exact weight to be given to the patta would depend upon the circumstances of the case. In Dohganna v. Jammanna, AIR 1931 Mad 613 it is pointed out that in case of pattas in respect of a land in Zamindari, if the land be at the disposal of the landlord at the time of granting the patta, prima facie such patta would not be mere bill of rent but something more and that if it is not so it would not create any rights in the pattadar in derogation of the rights of a person who would be entitled to the land subject to the proper and regular payment of rent. The question directly arose before a Bench of this Court in Official Assignee v. Basudevadoss, AIR 1925 Mad 723, as to whether a deposit of patta is enough to constitute an equitable mortgage. The Bench answered the question in the affirmative. Srinivasa Aiyangar, J. who delivered the leading judgment in that case, has pointed out that the answer to the question as to whether the pattas in respect of a land is a document which would be sufficient, by being deposited, to evidence the intention required for an equitable mortgage would vary according to the conditions of the country and the consciousness on the part of the members of the community and that though a patta is not a document of title still a deposit of the same with intent to create an equitable mortgage would create an equitable mortgage.” (Quoted with approval in: Syndicate Bank v. Estate Officer,  AIR 2007 AIR SC 3169; 2007-8 SCC 361)

Not to Set Aside Patta; for, Patta was Prepared not after hearing

In Godavarma Valia Raja v. Bhoothi Swamiyar,  AIR 1952 TC/Ker 408, ir is observed as under:

  • Therefore, so far as the assessment is concerned it was not at all necessary to set aside the order of the Settlement Officer. It is only in case the Devaswom impeaches the order in so far as it refused to issue patta in favour of the Devaswom for some of the properties claimed by it that the Devaswom would be bound to set aside the order. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the plaintiff was bound to set aside the decision of the settlement Officer mentioned in the notice, Ex. VIII. The further question for consideration is whether the plaintiff was bound to set aside the patta, Ex. G. There is nothing to show that the patta was prepared after hearing the plaintiff or after giving him an opportunity to show cause why the assessment should not be fixed in the manner in which it was fixed in Ex. G. The preparation of the patta appears to have been a mere executive order of the Settlement Officer. It was not an order passed between two parties. Again, even if the declaration asked for in the plaint is allowed it will not have the effect of setting aside the patta. It will only have the effect of correcting the patta with respect to the assessment.”

Transfer of Registry Rules, 1966

Rule 15 and 16 of the Transfer of Registry Rules, 1966, of the Kerala State read as under:

  • Rule 15 : “With the help of the details furnished in the statement in Form ‘A’ prepared by the Village Officers and such further information as the Tahsildar may receive from parties and village officials at the time of enquiry regarding the fact of possession and enjoyment, payment of tax and other particulars, the Tahsildar shall determine the person in whose name the transfer of registry shall be made. No case shall be rejected solely for the default of appearance of the parties as it is the immediate concern of the Land Revenue Department to keep the thandaper accounts (Chitta) upto date and bring into it the names of the real land-holders who shall be held liable for the payment of Government revenue due on the land.”
  • Rule 16 : “The summary enquiry and the decision thereon is only an arrangement for fiscal purposes and does not affect the legal rights of any person in respect of the lands covered by the decisions in transfer of registry cases. The question of legal rights is always subject to adjudication by civil courts and pattas will be revised from time to time in accordance with judicial decisions.”

The Kerala High Court held in Thulasibhai CC v. State of Kerala, 2010 (4) KLT 215, that the revenue recovery proceedings would not stand as a bar either in the Revenue Recovery Act or in the Transfer of Registry Rules to effect mutation. In Sudan K.K.   v. State of Kerala, 2013 (4) KLT 563, it was held that the pendency of a civil suit also can never be a bar with regard to the acceptance of land tax unless specifically restrained by any order passed by the Court.

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – “How to Subscribe free “


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

What is GRANT in Easement

Jojy George Koduvath.

“Basis of Every Right of Easement is Grant”

The Indian Easements Act, 1882 refers to the different methods by which easements are acquired. They are pointed out (Ramkanya Bai v. Jagdish, AIR 2011 SC 3258) to be the following:

  1. easements by grant: express grant by the owner of the servient heritage
  2. easements of necessity: based on implied grants or reservations made by the owner of a servient heritage at the time of transfers or partitions
  3. easements by prescription: it is presumed that it is acquired by peaceable and open enjoyment, without interruption for twenty years and
  4. customary easements: it is inferred that it is acquired by virtue of a local custom.

For easement by prescription, it is not necessary that the user should be exclusive, but the claimant should exercise it under some claim existing in his own favour independently of all others.

The origin of all easements is, theoretically, grant by the servient owner. It may be express or implied. It may also be presumed from long user. It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

  • “Theoretically all easements have their origin in some sort of grant by the servient owner. The grant may be express or it may be implied from the surrounding attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties or it may even be presumed from long user. In the case of an express grant of easement the limit thereof depends on the words used.”

In Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89, it is held as under:

  • “The basis of every right of easement by whatsoever method it may have been acquired, is theoretically a grant from the servient-owner.
    • It may be expressed, as is mentioned in Sections 8 to 12 of the Act, or
    • it may be implied from the circumstances as in Section 13 of the Act. or
    • it may be presumed from long and continued user for a certain period as in Section 15 of the Act, or
    • it may be inferred from a long and continued practice of user by a certain class of the public in certain locality.” 

Easement is a Right

Easement is a right possessed by the owner of a land (dominant land),

  • to use the land of another (servient land),
  • for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant land.

Easement Does Not Confer Ownership or Possession

By virtue of easement –

  • No Ownership is bestowed in the (servient) land (AIR 2004 All 359; AIR 1925 Bom 335).
  • No Possession is obtained in the (servient) land. (2011 (2) KLT 605; AIR 1925 Bom 335).  
  • No Substantive Interest is created in the (servient) land. (2003 (1) KLT 320; AIR 1954 All 393).

Easement (सुखाधिकार) is Well Recognised, And Circumscribed by Law

  • Easement is a limited right to ‘use’or ‘enjoy‘ another’s land.
  • It is to do, or to prevent to do, some specific thing.
  • It is to be exercised in a way least onerous to ‘another’s land’.
  • It is not a right to build and enjoy.
  • The right gained cannot be enlarged.
    • That is, an easement of way to a particular (dominant) property cannot be extended to another property by the dominant owner; an easement for residential purpose cannot be enlarged for an industrial purpose. (Sec. 28, 29, 43 etc.)
  • Servient owner can use his land in any manner (without disturbing enjoyment of the easement).

According to ‘Katiyar on Easements’:                                                                   

  • Easement is not a right to land or exclude owner.
  • It is not a right to permanent occupation. 
  • It does not confer exclusive right of user/enjoyment.
  • And, it is not a corporeal interest in land.

Easement – Definition under the Indian Easements Act

SECTION 4 of the Indian Easements Act defines Easements as under:

  • “An easement is a right
  • which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses,
    • as such,
  • for the beneficial enjoyment of that land 
  • to do and continue to do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done,
  • in or upon, or in respect of, certain other land not his own.”

Salient Limitations of Easement under the Indian Easements Act

  • The owner of a land only ‘uses’or ‘enjoys‘ land of another (Sec. 31)
  • It is only ‘enjoyment’ of soil or things ‘subsisting’ (Explanation in Sec. 4).
  • It allows limited enjoyment of land, and advantages from its situation: S. 7
  • Right be exercised in a way least onerous to ‘another’s land’: Sec. 22
  • Servient owner can secure full enjoyment; but, he should cause as little inconvenience: Sec. 24: 2017-2 KLT 63

It is Not a right to:                                            

  • tend to total destruction of servient tenement: S. 17 (2003 (1) KLT320)
  • make additional burden: S. 23
  • make constructions in, or cultivate upon: (2003 (1) KLT 320).
  • prevent servient owner to use: S. 27 : 2003 (1) KLT 320
  • enlarge purpose of, or accustomed user: S. 28
  • substantially increase an easement: S. 29
  • prevent servient owner from obstructing excessive  ‘user’ of servient land – as ‘enjoyment of easement’: S. 31
  • increase burden by making permanent change in do. tent: S. 43
  • capable of forming grant – No easement, if Not capable of forming grant (without document or registration): Mohammed vs. Doomunhi Achari, 1987 (2) KLT 1037.

No easement if:

  • right claimed is incidents of ownership.
  • servient property belongs to him. Easement is a right with conscious knowledge that the servient property does not belong to him. AIR 1966 Raj 265. It must also be with proper animus as to easement: AIR 1973 Mad 173.

Easement is acquired; Not arise out of ‘Express Permission’

Sec. 12, Easements Act states that an easement is acquired (under grant, partition or prescription) by the owner of an immovable property. Section 12, Indian Easements Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 12. Who may acquire easements-An easement may be acquired by the owner of the immovable property for the beneficial enjoyment of which the right is created, or on his behalf, by any person in possession of the same.
  • One of two or more co-owners of immovable property may, as such, with or without the consent of the other or others, acquire an easement for the beneficial enjoyment of such property.
  • No lessee of immovable property can acquire, for the beneficial enjoyment of other immovable property of his own, an easement in or over the property comprised in his lease.

It is observed by the Apex Court in Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal, AIR 2009 SC 1103, that the claimant of easement (prescription) should plead and prove that the right claimed was enjoyed independent of any agreement with the owner of the property over which the right is claimed, as any user with the express permission of the owner will be a licence and not an easement. 

Sec. 28 of the Easement Act reads as under:

  • 28 Extent of easements -With respect to the extent of easements and the mode of their enjoyment, the following provisions shall take effect:-
  • Easement of necessity -An easement of necessity is co-extensive with the necessity as it existed when the easement was imposed.
  • Other easements -The extent of any other easement and the mode of its enjoyment must be fixed with reference to the probable intention of the parties, and the purpose for which the right was imposed or acquired. In the absence of evidence as to such intention and purpose-
    • .(a) Right of way -A right of way of any one kind does not include a right of way of any other kind;
    • (b) Right to light or air acquired by grant -The extent of a right to the passage of light or air to a certain window, door on other opening, imposed by a testamentary or non-testamentary instrument, is the quantity of light or air that entered the opening at the time the testator died or the non-testamentary instrument was made;
    • (c) Prescriptive right to light or air -The extent of a prescriptive right to the passage of light or air to a certain window, door or other opening is that quantity of light or air which has been accustomed to enter that opening during the whole of the prescriptive period irrespectively of the purposes for which it has been used;
    • (d) Prescriptive right to pollute air or water-The extent of a prescriptive right to pollute air or water is the extent of the pollution at the commencement of the period of user on completion of which the right arose; and
    • (e) Other prescriptive rights -The extent of every other prescriptive right and the mode of its enjoyment must be determined by the accustomed user of the right.

Sec. 29 of the Easement Act reads as under:

  • 29. Increase of easement -The dominant owner cannot, by merely altering or adding to the dominant heritage, substantially increase an easement. Where an easement has been granted or bequeathed so that its extent shall be proportionate to the extent of the dominant heritage, if the dominant heritage is increased by allution, the easement is proportionately increased, and if the dominant heritage is diminished by dilution, the easement is proportionately diminished. Save as aforesaid, no easement is effected by any change in the extent of the dominant or the servient heritage.

Who has the Burden to show Alternate Way

In Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, it is held that the plaintiff claiming easement of necessity or grant has only a primary burden to prove the absence of any alternate pathway.

  • “In a case where the original plaintiff was claiming easement right either as grant or as of necessity the plaintiff has only a primary burden to prove the absence of any alternate pathway. As the defendants have not proved the existence of any pathway for access to Plaint `A’ schedule property the version of the plaintiff that there is no alternate pathway shall be accepted. … The defendants have not entered the witness box to disprove the evidence led by the plaintiff.”

Implied grant and Quasi Easement in a ‘Formed’ Way

There could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent. But, in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, our Apex Court found quasi easement under Section 13(b) of the Indian Easements Act over a way in the following circumstances –

  • Though there could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent, if there is a ‘formed road’ existing over one part of the tenement for the apparent use of another portion or there is ‘some permanence in the adaptation of the tenement’ from which continuity may be inferred, an exception can be inferred (Annapurna Dutta vs. Santosh Kumar Sett, AIR 1937 Cal.661, B.K. Mukherjee, referred to).
  • There was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to dominant property and there was no objection also to the use of disputed way by the plaintiff.
  • An easement may arise by implication, if the intention to grant can properly be inferred either from the terms of the grant or the circumstances.
  • A trace of the pathway could be presumed to be in existence from the time when the plaintiff acquired the properties by separation of tenements.
  • Only access to the property was through disputed pathway.
  • It was required for the reasonable and convenient use of the plaintiff’s property and that on severance of the tenements, plaintiff can be presumed to have got a right over disputed pathway by an implied grant and also an easement of necessity.
  • The user was not obstructed for very long time.
  • There was no reason to disbelieve the plaintiff’s version that disputed way was given as grant for his use as he was a close relative of the former.
  • There was an apparent and continuous use which was necessary for the enjoyment of the `A’ schedule property within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the Indian Easements Act.
  • The defendants have not entered the witness box to disprove the evidence led by the plaintiff.
  • Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to easement right in respect of the pathway.

Pleaded ‘grant’; Not, Implied Grant – Apex Court, allowed Implied Grant

Though the plaintiff pleaded only ‘grant’, and not, Implied grant,  our Apex Court, in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, allowed Implied Grant observing as under:

  • “It is true that the defendant/appellant alleged that no implied grant was pleaded in the plaint. The Trial Court, in our view, was justified in holding that such pleadings were not necessary when it did not make a difference to the finding arrived at with respect to the easement by way of grant. Accordingly, there is no substance in the argument raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellants.”

Easement and Grant

The term ‘Grant’ is used in law to denote-

  • A generic term to mean ‘transfer’ of immovable property (e.g., sale, lease, gift etc.).
  • But, it will not be a ‘transfer’ of property; and remain as a concession, permission, settlement, grant of easement etc., if it is used in place of ‘transfer’, purposefully, to denote a lesser right.
  • Present, aid, help etc., and the act of a settlor of trust, or of donor of a charity.
  • A technical term to denote conditional-transfer of lands by sovereign especially when it is purposefully used to differentiate from ‘transfer’ of property.
  • More than a licence (which does not create an estate or interest) and less than an outright and unconditional ‘transfer’ of property.

Characteristics of ‘grant

  • Usually it denotes a grant by deed.
  • It can be with or without consideration.
  • Unless specifically specified, it is creation of an ‘interest’ in property (in case of easement, no interest is created; but only a right of enjoyment). 
  • As long as the conditions are fulfilled, grant is usually irrevocable.
  • Conditions can also be fixed to limit the period of grant.
  • Inferior interest, out of an interest retained by the grant or, e.g. the grant of a lease of land by the person holding the freehold. (Collins Dictionary of Law).

Read Blog: Extent of Easement (Width of Way) in Easement of Necessity, Quasi Easement and Implied Grant

Grant’ – Salmond on Jurisprudence

What is grant is stated in Salmond’s Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, at pages 338-339, under the heading ‘The Classes of Agreements’. According to Salmond  a grant

  • ” is an agreement“,
  • “creates a right
  • is NOT “a right in Personam between the parties to it”,
  • examples – “grants of leases, easements, charges, patents, franchises, licences and so forth“.

Salmond distinguishes ‘grant’ from other legal concepts as under.

  • “…. A contract is an agreement which creates an obligation or a right in personam between the parties to it.
  • grant is an agreement which creates a right of any other description; examples being grants of leases, easements, charges, patents, franchises, licences and so forth.
  • An agreement which transfers a right may be termed generically an assignmentOn which extinguishes a right is a release, discharge, or surrender.” (Quoted in H. Anraj v. Government of Tamil Nadu  (& Shri Dipak Dhar v. The State of West Bengal), AIR 1986 SC 63: (1986) 1 SCC 414.)

Grant of Right of Way must be Liberally Construed

Katiyar on Easements repeatedly said in his treatise that a ‘grant of right of way must be liberally construed’ to ensure the dominant owner’s beneficial enjoyment of his land. Gale on Easements (leading English treatise) and “Law of Easements and Licenses” by P.S. Narayana also emphasised this principle.

In Mathai v. Jordi Poulose,  ILR 2011-2 Ker 484; 2011-2 KHC 591; 2011-2 KLT 605, it was found that the suit agreement, made it clear that the right given thereunder was not a personal right but a right for the beneficial enjoyment for the property, and it could only be a right of easement and not a licence. The High Court  referring Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242, said further as under:

  • “18. True, the plaint did not specifically show that appellant has claimed a right of easement by grant. But as rightly argued by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, a pleading must be liberally construed and placing undue emphasis on the form is not in the interest of justice. The Honourable Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College (AIR 1987 SC 1242) held:
  • “It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law, in such a case it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.”

Taken from: What is Easement? Does Right of Easement Allow to ‘Enjoy’ After Making a Construction?

Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545

The Supreme Court has observed, in Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 as under:

  • “25. In the case at hand the High Court found that the approach of the trial court and the first appellate court was erroneous inasmuch as they proceeded on the basis as if it is a case of easement of necessity. Had the trial court and the first appellate court considered the evidence in the light of the respective stands of the parties and then concluded one way or the other, the position would have been different. When the approach was fundamentally wrong the High Court cannot be faulted for having gone into the question as to what was the proved intention of the party as culled out from the partition deed. The relevant (translated) portion reads as follows:
  • “Aravamutha Chettiar commonly enjoy the well situate on the portion allotted to Purushothaman Chettiar, likewise Purushothaman Chettiar commonly enjoy the lane situate on the portion allotted to Aravamutha Chettiar. Well is the exclusive property of Purushothaman Chettiar and lane is the exclusive property of Aravamutha Chettiar.”
  • 26. Though an attempt was made by learned counsel for the appellant to contend that the quoted portion was only the preamble and not the intention of the parties, the same is clearly untenable. Earlier to the quoted portion it has been noted as follows:
  • “As per the above arrangement we decided to enter into the partition deed and hence we are writing this partition deed. We should take possession of our respective shares and enjoy the same uninterruptedly forever.”
  • 27. Therefore, there is no manner of doubt that the intention was clear that it was a grant and not an easement of necessity which could be extinguished.
  • 28. The question whether an easement is one acquired by grant (as contrasted from an easement of necessity) does not depend upon absolute necessity of it. It is the nature of the acquisition that is relevant. Many easements acquired by grant may be absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant tenement in the sense that it cannot be enjoyed at all without it. That may be the reason for the grant also. But easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties. In the matter of grant the parties are governed by the terms of the grant and not by anything else. Easement of necessity and quasieasement are dealt with in Section 13 of the Act. The grant may be express or even by necessary implication. In either case it will not amount to an easement of necessity under Section 13 of the Act even though it may also be an absolute necessity for the person in whose favour the grant is made. Limit of the easement acquired by grant is controlled only by the terms of the contract. If the terms of the grant restrict its user subject to any condition the parties will be governed by those conditions. Anyhow the scope of the grant could be determined by the terms of the grant between the parties alone. When there is nothing in the term of the grant in this case that it was to continue only until such time as the necessity was absolute; in fact even at the time it was granted, it was not one of necessity. If it is a permanent arrangement uncontrolled by any condition, that permanency in user must be recognised and the servient tenement will be recognised and the servient tenement will be permanently burdened with that disability. Such a right does not arise under the legal implication of Section 13 nor is it extinguished by the statutory provision under Section 41 of the Act which is applicable only to easement of necessity arising under Section 13.
  • 29. An easement by grant does not get extinguished under Section 41 of the Act which relates to an easement of necessity. An easement of necessity is one which is not merely necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the dominant tenement, but one where dominant tenement cannot be used at all without the easement. The burden of the servient owner in such a case is not on the basis of any concession or grant made by him for consideration or otherwise, but it is by way of a legal obligation enabling the dominant owner to use his land. It is limited to the barest necessity however inconvenient it is irrespective of the question whether a better access could be given by the servient owner or not. When an alternate access becomes available, the legal necessity of burdening the servient owner ceases and the easement of necessity by implication of law is legally withdrawn or extinguished as statutorily recognised in Section 41. Such an easement will last only as long as the absolute necessity exists. Such a legal extinction cannot apply to an acquisition by grant and Section 41 is not applicable in such case.”

Mathai v. Jordi Poulose

In Mathai v. Jordi Poulose, ILR 2011-2 Ker 484; 2011-2 KHC 591; 2011-2 KLT 605, it is held as under:

  • “An easement can be acquired by an express grant or even by implied grant. The express grant could be oral and need not even be written and no form is prescribed. It will be sufficient if the words stated or written convey the idea of grant of a right of easement unequivocally.”

The High court quoted the following from In B.B.Katiyar Law of Easements and Licences Thirteenth Edn. at page 12 which reads as under:

  • “an easement may be acquired by express grant. It may be oral and need not be in writing or registered.”

The High Court continued as under:

  • “12. Justice Madhavan Nair in Musunoori Satyanarayana Murti v. Chekka Lakshmayya and others  RSA 1267 & 1270 of 2005 24 (AIR 1929 Madras 79)quoting Peacock in his Tagore Lectures on the Easement Act by Mitchell that “by the law of India, wherever the Transfer of Property Act applies, the grant of easement by way of sale must be made by a registered instrument, an easement being an intangible thing, and if made by way of gift must also be by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the grant or and witnessed by at least two witnesses” held:-
  • “If I may say so with respect , very carefully and elaborately considered in Bhagwan Sahai v. Narasingh Sahai(1909 31 All.612) and I cannot do better than refer to the exposition of the law on this point contained in that judgment in answer to the appellant’s argument. In that case “the owner of a house undertook by an “argument” to permit the  owner of an adjoining house when he built a second storey which was in contemplation, to discharge rain water and also water used for daily household purposes into the premises of the former.”

Sec. 92 of the Evidence Act

But, it is noteworthy that Sec. 92 of the Evidence Act enacts that when the terms of a grant or other disposition of property are reduced into writing, whether or not such contract or grant is compulsorily required to be reduced into writing and registered, no oral evidence shall be admitted to contradict, vary, add to or substract from its terms.

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – “How to Subscribe free “


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India