Bar Under Section 116, Evidence Act: Does it Extend to Challenge – Landlord Lost Title After ‘Commencement of the Tenancy’  

Taken from: Recovery of Possession Based on Title and on Earlier Possession

Jojy George Koduvath.

Introduction

Section 116 of the Evidence Act

Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under:

  • Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession. No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be heard to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property.”

In Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, AIR 1976 SC 2335: 1976 4 SCC 838, it is held as under:

  • “The tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under section 116 of the Evidence Act. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, in a suit between landlord and tenant, the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant”.

The principle behind the proposition, which asserts that the owner/landlord has the right to recover the property based on his title if the defendant-tenant raises claim of title, is founded upon the notion that a tenant is precluded from disputing the title of the landlord or owner, as laid down in Section 116 of the Evidence Act.

Bar u/S. 116: Not Extend To Challenge – Landlord Lost Title After ‘Commencement Of The Tenancy’  

D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish (A.P. Sen, B.C. Ray, JJ.), AIR 1987 SC2192, 1987 (4) SCC 424, is a leading decision on this matter.

  • (However, ‘D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish’ is said to be an exception to the general rule. See: Masonic Club v. Jamna Lodge, 2014-207 DLT 62; 2014-140 DRJ 396; L. Rs.  of Arjun Lal v. L. Rs.  of Kundan Lal, 2013 AIR(CC) 2193; 201260 RCR(Civ) 769 (Raj); M. L.  Dawar v. M. L.  Seth, 2011-125 DRJ 564 (Del); Manoharlal v. Baijnath Jalan, 2005-4 Jhk CR 58; 2005-3 Jhk LJR 474.)

The following are the facts (of D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish) in a nutshell.

The owner had leased the demised premises to a tenant. The (original) tenant sub-leased it to the respondent. The head-lessor (owner) served a notice of eviction on the sub-tenant, alleging that there was unlawful subletting by the lessee.  The sub-tenant atoned in favour of the original lessor and started paying monthly rent directly to the superior landlord (owner).

In this decision, it is held that the estoppel or bar under Sec. 116 of the Evidence Act operates only –

  • (i)  during the continuance of the tenancy,
  • (ii) to the challenge of the title of the landlord at the beginning of the tenancy.

In this decision, it is held as under:

  • “3. …Section 116 of the Evidence Act provides that no tenant of immovable property shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. Possession and permission being established, estoppel would bind the tenant during the continuance of the tenancy and until he surrenders his possession. The words ‘during the continuance of the tenancy’ have been interpreted to mean during the continuance of the possession that was received under the tenancy in question, and the Courts have repeatedly laid down that estoppel operates even after the termination of the tenancy so that a tenant who had been let into possession, however, defective it may be, so long as he has not openly surrendered possession, cannot dispute the title of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy…”
  • “4. The rule of estoppel embodied under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is that, a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord’s title, however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord…”

It was further held that since (or, after) the date of tenancy, the title of landlord came to an end; for, the head-lessor (owner) served a notice of eviction on the sub-tenant, alleging that there was unlawful subletting by the lessee, and the sub-tenant atoned in favour of the original lessor. It was pointed out –

  • A tenant is not estopped from contending that the title of the lessor has “since come to an end” (or the landlord lost title after the commencement of the tenancy).

The Apex Court (in D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish) quoted from Mangat Ram & Anr. v. Sardar Meharban Singh, AIR 1987 SC 1656,  (1987) 4 SCC 319, (A.P. Sen, V. Balakrishnan Eradi, JJ.) saying:

  • “Quite recently, this Court in Mangat Ram v. Sardar Meharban Singh, [1987] 1 Scale 964, to which one of us was a party, observed:
  • “The estoppel contemplated by s. 116 is restricted to the denial of title at the commencement of the tenancy and by implication it follows that a tenant is not estopped from contending that the title of the lessor has since come to an end.”
  • See also: Fida Hussain v. Fazal Hussain & Ors., AIR (1963) MP 232,
  • K.S.M. Guruswamy Nadar v. N.G. Ranganathan, AIR (1954) Mad. 402, 
  • S.A.A. Annamalai Chettiar v. Molaiyan & Ors., AIR (1970) Mad. 396 and
  • Chidambara Vinayagar Devasthanam v. Duraiswamy, ILR (1967) 1 Mad. 624.”

D. Satyanarayanana v. P. Jagdish Distinguished

In E. Parashuraman v.  V. Doraiswamy,  AIR 2006 SC 376; 2006-1 SCC 658, it is stated as under:

  • “18. We have carefully examined the decisions of this Court in D. Satyanarayanana vs. P. Jagdish (supra) and A.V.G.P. Chettiar and Sons and others vs. T. Palanisamy Gounder : (2002) 5 SCC 337 and we are of the view that the principles laid down therein are not applicable to the facts of this case. The exception to the rule of estoppel embodied under Section 116 of the Evidence Act arises if it is shown that since the date of the tenancy of title of the landlord came to an end, or that he was evicted by a paramount title holder, or that even though there was no actual eviction or dispossession from the property, under a threat of eviction, the tenant had attorned to the paramount title holder and a new jural relationship of landlord and tenant had come into existence between them. Such a situation has not arisen in the instant case. In this case there is no finding that the title of the landlord has come to an end. The Corporation has not established its title in any proceeding in accordance with law. In these circumstances the exception to the rule of estoppel embodied in Section 116 of the Evidence Act cannot be pleaded by the appellants.”

Sec. 116 ceases to have applicability once the tenant has been evicted

In Vashu Deo v. Balkishan, 2002-1 SCR 171, it is held that Sec. 116 ceases to have applicability once the tenant has been evicted. (It stands incongruent to the view in D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish where it was held – estoppel operates even after the termination.) It is said as under:

  • “6. …Section 116 of the Evidence Act, which codifies the common law rule of estoppel between landlord and tenant, provides that no tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. The rule of estoppel so enacted has three main features :
    • .(i) the tenant is estopped from disputing the title of his landlord over the tenancy premises at the beginning of the tenancy;
    • (ii) such estoppel continues to operate so long as the tenancy continues and unless the tenant has surrendered possession to the landlord; and
    • (iii) Section 116 of the Evidence Act is not the whole law of estoppel between the landlord and tenant.
  • The principles emerging from Section 116 can be extended in their application and also suitably adapted to suit the requirement of an individual case… the rule of estoppel ceases to have applicability once the tenant has been evicted. His obligation to restore possession to his landlord is fulfilled either by actually fulfilling the obligation or by proving his landlord’s title having been extinguished by a paramount titleholder…”

Forfeiture of tenancy under Clause (g) of Section 111 of the TP Act

In Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash (Ruma Pal, R.C. Lahoti, JJ.), AIR 2002 SC 1264; 2002-3 SCC 375, it is held as under:

  • “In our opinion, the denial or disclaimer to be relevant for the purpose of Section 12(1)(c) should take colour from Section 116 of the Evidence Act and Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 116 of the Evidence Act embodies therein a rule of estoppel. No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. This estoppel, so long as it binds the tenant, excludes the tenant from raising a plea disputing the title of his landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. It flows as a corollary therefrom that the proof of landlord-tenant relationship tantamounts during the continuance of tenancy to proof of ownership of landlord over the tenancy premises at the beginning of the tenancy so far as the tenant is concerned. It is significant to note that on the phraseology of Section 116 of the Evidence Act the rule of estoppel applies so long as the tenancy is not terminated and the rule estops the tenant from laying challenge to the ownership of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. But the rule of estoppel as incorporated in Section 116 is not exhaustive and it may be extended or suitably modified in its application to other situations as well, retaining the basic feature of the rule.
  • “Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, insofar as relevant for our purpose, provides that a lease of immovable property determines by forfeiture in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. This provision contemplates two fact – situations which entail the lessee having renounced his character as such and they are: (i) when the lessee sets up a title in a third person, or (ii) when he claims title in himself.
  • “In either case, the tenant has disputed and denied the title of his landlord because a title in third person or title in himself cannot co-exist with the title in the landlord.
  • 13. The law as to tenancy being determined by forfeiture by denial of the lessor s title or disclaimer of the tenancy has been adopted in India from the Law of England where it originated as a principle in consonance with Justice, equity and good conscience. On enactment of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the same was incorporated into clause (g) of Section 111. So just is the rule that it has been held applicable even in the areas where the Transfer of Property Act does not apply (See – Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan vs. Municipal Board of Sitapur and Anr. – AIR 1965 SC 1923). The principle of determination of tenancy by forfeiture consequent upon denial of the lessor s title may not be applicable where rent control legislation intervenes and such legislation while extending protection to tenants from eviction does not recognize such denial or disclaimer as a ground for termination of tenancy and eviction of tenant. However, in various rent control legislations such a ground is recognized and incorporated as a ground for eviction of tenant either expressly or impliedly by bringing it within the net of an act injurious to the interest of the landlord on account of its mischievous content to prejudice adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord.
  • “14. Denial of landlord’s title or disclaimer of tenancy, is it an act injurious to interest of landlord? How does this rule operate and what makes it offensive Evans & Smith state in the Law of Landlord and Tenant (Fourth Edition, 1993, at p.89) that it is an implied condition of every lease, fixed-term or periodic and formal or informal, that the tenant is not expressly or deny the landlord s title or prejudice it by any acts which are inconsistent with the existence of a tenancy. Disclaimer of the landlord’s title is analogous to repudiation of a contract. The rule is of feudal origin; the courts are not anxious to extend it, and so any breach of this condition must be clear and unambiguous. Hill & Redman in Law of Landlord and Tenant (Seventeenth Edition, para 382, at page 445-446) dealing with “Acts which prejudice lessor s title” state that there is implied in every lease a condition that the lessee shall not do anything that may prejudice the title of the lessor; and that if this is done the lessor may re-enter for breach of this implied condition. Thus, it is a cause of forfeiture if the lessee denies the title of the lessor by alleging that the title of the landlord is in himself or another; or if he assists a stranger to set up an adverse title or delivers the premises to him in order to enable him to set up a title. It is a question of fact, however, what intention underlies the words or the actions of a tenant, whether in fact he is definitely asserting a title adverse to the landlord or, as the case may be, intending to enable someone else to set up such a title. Thus, it is not sufficient that the lessee does not at once acknowledge the title of the landlord and a general traverse in the defence to an action for possession does no more than put the landlord to proof and does not assert that the title is in another. The essential characteristic of disclaimer by tenant as stated in Foa s General Law of Landlord and Tenant (Eight Edition, para 934, at p.589) is that it must amount to a renunciation by the tenant of his character of tenant, either by setting up a title in another, or by claiming title in himself. A mere renunciation of tenancy without more, though it may operate as a surrender, cannot amount to a disclaimer. The denial, though it need not be express and can be implied, must nevertheless be a clear denial and it must be clearly proved.”

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Does Filing a Suit Amount to Notice of Termination of Contract

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

Filing a suit may amount to notice of termination of a contract if:

  • The contract or governing law does not mandate notice.
  • The pleadings clearly declare that the contract is terminated.
  • And, it will be an added circumstance — if the defendant acts upon or acknowledges that intention, for example, by stopping performance, ceasing payment (such as rent or invoices), sending an email confirming cessation of services, or making admissions in pleadings.

In such cases, the filing of the suit may be treated as constructive notice of termination. If the defendant accepts and acts upon the termination, they may be estopped from later denying its validity.

In M/s Nopany Investiments (P) Ltd. Santokh Singh (HUF), AIR 2008 S C 673, 2008 (2) SCC 728, has laid down as under:-

  • “In any view of the matter, it is well settled that filing of an eviction suit under the general law itself is a notice to quit on the tenant. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that no notice to quit was necessary under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in order to enable the respondent to get a decree of eviction against the appellant. This view has also been expressed in the decision of this Court in V. Dhanappal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, 1979(2) RCR (Rent) 352; [AIR 1979 SC 1745]”

See also:

  • Brompton Lifestyle Brands Pvt. Ltd. v. Riveria Commercial Developers Ltd. , 2023-4 AD(Del) 591,
  • International Institute of Neuro Sciences & Oncology Ltd. , Chandigarh v. Sahibjit Singh Sandhu, 2017-3 PLR 51; 2017-3 RCR(Civ) 554 (P&H),
  • Neelam v. . Sanjay Pahwa, 2016(1) R.C.R (Rent) 696,
  • Bhagirath Verma v. Dada Dev Mandir Prabandhak Sabha (Barah Gaon) Palam, 2016-234 DLT 3
  • Hazari Vs. Vinod Kumar. 2015(4) R.C.R (Civil) 688,
  • Chanda v. Rajesh Saxena, 2015-224 DLT 480,
  • Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. Vs. Jasbir Singh Chadha (HUF) & Anr. 2011 (183) DLT 712
  • Harikesh Vs. Smt. Narain Devi, 2010 (1) R.C.R(Rent) 99
  • M/s Mandap International Pvt. Ltd. v.. M/s Ahuja Kashyap Pvt. Ltd., 2014(5) R.C.R (Civil) 797.

No Termination – If Contract Mandates Written Notice

However, where the contract or applicable statute requires a written notice in a particular form, merely filing a suit is not sufficient to constitute valid termination. In such cases, compliance with the prescribed notice process is mandatory.

No Notice, Damages Alone

The Supreme Court clarified this in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service, (1991) 1 SCC 533, where it held:

  • The agreement being revocable by either party in accordance with clause 28 by giving thirty days’ notice, the only relief which could be granted was the award of compensation for the period of notice, that is, 30 days.

Issuance of notice may amount to sub-judice

Issuance of notice, when a suit is pending, even if it does not amount to sub-judice (Latin: “under judgment”), may be unnecessary, redundant, or even improper, as the issue is already seized by the court.

In such a situation the court can proceed – as if the suit or contention amounts to sufficient notice if-

  • The plaint itself discloses the grounds of termination or claim, and
  • The defendant suffers no prejudice, and
  • The suit is not premature.

Opponent’s Conduct Matters
If the opposite party acts based on the termination (e.g., ceases performance, accepts return of goods, or initiates exit procedures), that conduct may confirm mutual understanding of termination, which courts can take notice of.


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Hash Value Certificate – Mandatory or Directory

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

A Postscript at the Beginning
Hash Value Certification is Not Arbitrary or Unreasonable
Surya Kant, CJI, Joymalya Bagchi, Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ. ordered in Pune Bar Association v. Union of India on 22 May, 2026 as under:
“4. To achieve such objective, Section 63(4) of BSA improved upon the certificate envisaged under the old law by mandating the issuance of a standard-form certificate prescribed in the Schedule which inter alia requires the disclosure of hash value of the electronic/digital record along with a further certification by an expert. Hash value of an electronic data is synonymous with an electronic fingerprint and provides a sure way of identifying and verifying digital data. The necessity of incorporating the hash value of the electronic record in the certificate is thus to ensure its authenticity and integrity, and cannot be said to lack a rational nexus with the object of the Act. Similarly, certification by an expert in Part B provides an additional layer of authenticity to the secondary electronic evidence. For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the new provision has a clear and rational nexus with the object of the law and cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable so as to suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness.”

Introduction

This article examines whether the inclusion of a Hash Value Certificate in the Schedule to Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, is mandatory or merely directory.

Section 63(4)(c), BSA

Section 63(4)(c), BSA reads as under:

  • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.

A question may arise –

  • Because the term “hash value” is not explicitly used the main body of Section 63(4)(c) BSA, can it be argued – Hash Value Certificate is not mandatory but directory (or merely illustrative of the best practices)?

An argument is possible (“hash value” certificate is not mandatory) for two matters –

  • 1. The particulars in the Certificate stated in Section 63(4)(c) are specifically and categorically laid down in the sub-section (2) of Sec. 63. The “Part A” Certificate in the schedule contains all things in sub-section (2) of Sec. 63. So the “Part B” Hash Value Certificate is not mandatory as per the “Section”.
  • 2. The words “sufficient for a matter to be in the sub-section (4)(c) make it clear – the ‘verbatim adherence’ to the certificate format is not mandatory;*.* no doubt, the substance or contents thereof (particularly, the phraseology – “best of the knowledge and belief”) must have been placed in some (other) form. The particulars in the Certificate being the matters enumerated in the sub-section (2) of Sec 63 (and nothing is stated as regards Hash Value), the ‘Part B’ Hash Value Certificate cannot be a mandatory one.
    • *.*Note:
    • 1. See the difference between (i) reading Sec. 63(4)(c) without the words – sufficient for a matter to be and (ii) reading with these words. Relevant portion of Sec. 63(4)(c) is given below:
      • “(c) ….. for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be  sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.”
    • 2. The beginning portion of Sec. 63(4)(c) emphasises that it pertains to the matters enumerated in sub-section(2) alone, and not to hash-value. Sec. 63(4)(c) begins as under:
      • “(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate…”
    • 3. It appears that the hash value(s) of the original record are expected to be stated, rather than those of the copy (or “computer output”) actually produced before the court. This raises several questions, including: how is the court to verify the authenticity of the copy, if only the original’s HASH is referenced?

Possible Counter Arguments (This author does not subscribe)

  • First: The “form A” itself requires Hash Value Certificate.
  • Second:  Section 63(4)(c) says, “…. and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate… “
  • Third:  Section 63(4)(c) says, “a certificate specified in the Schedule”. The phrase “specified in the Schedule” explicitly ties the main section to the Schedule and makes it mandatory.
  • Fourth:  The Schedule provides a single, Certificate, divided into two parts – “Part A and “Part B”. It is not presented as two separate certificates, one mandatory and one optional.
  • Fifth: Legislative Intent (i.e., for ensuring the digital integrity of electronic records) reflects the mandatory nature.

Conclusion

The ‘Hash Value Certificate’ in the BSA is shrouded in several potential ambiguities. To dispel these uncertainties, a legislative amendment or a definitive ruling by an authoritative court that takes into account all pertinent arguments in this matter is imperative.

It is a fact that Section 65 of the old Act and Section 63 of the new Act were introduced as enabling provisions, designed to simplify the admissibility of electronic records.

  • However, due to poor and rigid drafting, they have paradoxically had the opposite effect.

In practice, it may be more feasible for many litigants to physically produce the original device—such as a computer, laptop, or mobile phone—before the court, rather than to obtain a certified hash value through a forensic expert.

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End Notes:

Section 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam

(Changes introduced in the New Adhiniyam – from the Evidence Act – are emphasised.)

  • 63. Admissibility of electronic records –
    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
    (2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:—
    (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer or communication device during the period over which the computer was used regularly to create, store or process information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer or communication device;
    (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
    (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer or communication device was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
    (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
    (3) Where over any period, the function of creating, storing or processing information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by means of one or more computers or communication device, whether—
    (a) in standalone mode; or
    (b) on a computer system; or
    (c) on a computer network; or
    (d) on a computer resource enabling information-creation or providing information—processing and storage; or
    (e) through an intermediary
    all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
    (4) In any proceeding where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things shall be submitted along with the electronic record at each instance where it is being submitted for admission, namely:—
    (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication device referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3);
     (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.
     (5) For the purposes of this section,—
    (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer or communication device if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
    (b) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer or communication device whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment or by other electronic means as referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3).

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Adverse Possession

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Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

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Sakshya Adhiniyam Mandates Hashing the Original; Established Jurisprudence Requires Hashing the Copy Also.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

A Postscript at the Beginning
Hash Value Certification is Not Arbitrary or Unreasonable
Surya Kant, CJI, Joymalya Bagchi, Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ. ordered in Pune Bar Association v. Union of India on 22 May, 2026 as under:
“4. To achieve such objective, Section 63(4) of BSA improved upon the certificate envisaged under the old law by mandating the issuance of a standard-form certificate prescribed in the Schedule which inter alia requires the disclosure of hash value of the electronic/digital record along with a further certification by an expert. Hash value of an electronic data is synonymous with an electronic fingerprint and provides a sure way of identifying and verifying digital data. The necessity of incorporating the hash value of the electronic record in the certificate is thus to ensure its authenticity and integrity, and cannot be said to lack a rational nexus with the object of the Act. Similarly, certification by an expert in Part B provides an additional layer of authenticity to the secondary electronic evidence. For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the new provision has a clear and rational nexus with the object of the law and cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable so as to suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness.”

Abstract

  • 1. Sec. 63 of the BSA mandates the hash certificate for the original electronic record alone.
    • However, to fulfill the intended purpose, the HASH value certificate for the copy (computer output) must also be provided.
  • 2. Sec. 63(4)(c) of the BSA does not specifically mandate that hashing must be done at the time of copying.
    • But the judicial precedents require recording the hash values at the time of ‘copying’.

Part I

Established Jurisprudence Varies from the Enacted Law

HASH Certificate Under Sec. 63 (BSA)

The (earlier) Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sec.  65B mandated only a simple certificate, as provided under Sec. 65B(4), when ‘computer output’ (copy) was produced before a court. But, the new Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam,  2023, requires, in Sec.  63(4), the HASH value certificate, also.

Also Read: Sec. 65B (Electronic Records) and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

Section 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam

Section 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Act speaks as to copy (computer output)  as under:

  • 63. Admissibility of electronic records– (1) “… any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper….  or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied …..”

Section 63(4)(c) of the Act reads as under:

  • “(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate,
  • and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.

HASH Value Certificate

The Certificate required in Sec. 63(4)(c) of the Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) must be “in the form specified in the Schedule”. It is laid down in the schedule (not expressly stated in the body of the section-text) that this certificate (HASH value certificate) is needed in addition to the Certificate that is required in sub-section (4) as regards the matters enumerated in sub-section (4).

HASH Value Certificate: Form in the Schedule

The Form in the Schedule directs to state the following:

  • “I state that the HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s is …… ……… …… , obtained through the following algorithm –
  • SHA1:
  • SHA256:
  • MD5:
  • Other …….. …….. …….. (Legally acceptable standard)
  • (Hash report to be enclosed with the certificate)”

What is (Literally) required is the Certificate concerning the Original

From the above form, it is evident that what is required is a certificate as regards the original ‘electronic/digital record(s)’, not any copy thereof.

Besides clause (c) of sub-section (4), clauses (a) and (b) also refer to the ‘original’ and not to a ‘copy’. Clauses (a) and (b) read as under:

  • “(a) identifying the containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication device referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3).”

The expression “identifying the electronic record containing the statement” in clause (a) of sub-section (4) further emphasises that the “statement” should pertain to that found in the ‘computer,’ indicating the statement within the physical device itself.

This interpretation aligns with the evidentiary logic that authentication must relate or refer to the source.

Moreover, the words “where it is desired to give a statement in evidence” in Sec. 63(4) can be understood to refer to the “statement” as it exists in the electronic form in the (original) computer or in its digital storage (rather than the ‘copy’ or reproduction of that statement introduced later in court).

Relevant words in Sec. 63(4) reads as under:

  • “Where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate… shall accompany the electronic record…”

The term “electronic record,” as used in this context, appears incongruent because the statute seems to treat the original electronic source and the document produced from it (such as a printout or soft copy) under the same terminology. This conflation could lead to multiple confusions, including what exactly is being certified, the original data in the system, or the document derived from it.

Further Discordant Notes

1. The law compulsorily requires the HASH certificate. But, the requirement for the HASH certificate is unnecessary, especially in situations where there is no dispute regarding the computer output (copy or print-out).

2. It is not made clear in Sec. 63, BSA –

  • (i) What is the precise purpose of ascertaining the hash value of the (original) ‘electronic or digital record’ and not a copy (computer output) that is actually produced before the court?
  • (ii) This raises also another question: how is the court to verify the authenticity of the copy, if only the original’s hash is referenced?
  • (iii) Why does the requirement of including HASH value appear only in the Schedule (certificate format) and not in the main body of Sec. 63 itself?
  • (iv) The lack of explicit mention in the section text also creates uncertainty about whether hash values are mandatory or directory (merely illustrative of best practices).

Established Jurisprudence

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020)3 SCC 216 (although it was delivered before the introduction new Adhiniyam of 2023), is regarded as the most authoritative decision on this matter.

Read: Certificate is Required Only for ‘Computer Output’; Not for ‘Electronic Records’: Arjun Panditrao Explored.

The enacted law (Sec. 63, BSA) requires the HASH value ‘certificate’ as regards the original ‘electronic or digital record(s)’, the prevailing consensus among the courts in India is the following –

  • The primary objective of the certificate being verification of the authenticity of the copy (CD, pen drive, etc.), the certificate must refer to the copy (computer output), as well as to the original (electronic record) from which the copy was derived.

As regards the HASH value in Sec. 63(4), BSA, the following matters requires consideration –

  • The main text of Section 63(4) does not use the term “hash value”.
  • The ‘HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s‘ is required to be given under the ‘Form’ scheduled.
  • Even though it is not specifically stated, the ‘HASH values’ of both the original and the copy of the record must be provided (otherwise, the intended purpose will not be served).

Part II

The Law Does Not Mandate Hashing at the Time of Copying

As shown above, the Court decisions refer to the HASH value of the copy (computer output) produced in court, and not the original (electronic or digital record).

It is also worth noting that the Section does not clarify when hashing must be done—whether during copying from the original or at the time of presentation before the court.

It is true that the hash value of the copy of the CCTV footage (or any other digital evidence) should ideally be generated at the time the copy is made, and not merely at the time when the pen drive or other storage device is produced in court.

Hash Value Is Insisted at Four Stages even under Evidence Act

Madras High Court, in Yuvaraj v. State, 2023-4 Mad LJ (Cri) 238, observed as under:

  • “206. To ensure that what is collected as an evidence in the source is exactly reflected or produced at the time of marking the electronic evidence before the Court, particularly when it comes to CCTV footages, a standard operating procedure must be followed. Such a practice will guarantee that nothing gets altered/deleted/added by the time the evidence is tendered before the Court. Hence, the concept of hash value is insisted at four stages and this value must be the same on all those four stages to ensure authenticity. When the CCTV footage gets stored in the hard disk, that is the first stage where the hash value must be noted down when it is received by the analyst from the Court on requisition made by the prosecution. Thereafter, the analyst creates a copy/mirror image of what is contained in the hard disk and this must also have the same hash value. As the next step, the forensic examination starts and ultimately, it is concluded and a report is given by the forensic analyst. In all those four stages, the hash value must be the same.”
  • 207. For convenience, after the examination is completed by the forensic analyst, the footage can be downloaded to a DVD/CD and the same hash value will be reflected without any change. Since the extraction from the hard disk to the DVD/CD makes such DVD/CD as a secondary evidence, it goes without saying that such a DVD/CD must be accompanied with Section 65-B certificate. Copies taken and given to the accused persons under Section 207 of CrPC. regarding the CCTV footages should also be accompanied with Section 65-B certificate.”

Hash Value Must Be Recorded – Guidelines of Govt. in Tax Matters

In the “Digital Evidence Investigation Manual, 2014, Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), Department of Revenue Ministry of Finance Government of India, reads, in Para 6.8, as under:

  • “6.8 Forensic Imaging/Cloning: If on previewing, important data is found either in deleted or in active form, the storage medium is required to be cloned for evidence purpose. Otherwise a normal data backup can be taken. The following steps should be taken at the time of cloning:
  • • Preparation-
  • ….. In cases where very high capacity disks/ servers (Over 200 GB) are found at the search premises, separate Hardware imaging devices, which are up to ten times faster, would be needed. These hardware devices have in-built authentication engines. On completion of the imaging process, the device displays the hash value of the cloned hard disk. The image/clone has to have the same hash value as that of the target hard disk. The Hash value should be recorded in the Panchnama and the assessee can be given the option of seeking a copy of the imaged/cloned hard disk by paying the copying charges.”

Para 6.8 also requires the following under the heading ‘Report’:

  • • Report: Take printout of report generated by the imaging tool which contains the details of imaging attributes, details of Hard Disk Drives imaged, date and time and the most important thing the hash value of the Hard Disk Drive. Attach the report along with panchnama as an annexure to it.

In M/S. Saravana Selvarathnam Retails v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, 2024-463 ITR 523: 298 Taxman 319: 339 CTR 10 (Mad)(HC), the main grievance of the petitioner was that the digital data evidences were collected by the respondents from unknown locations without any valid search warrant and without following the guidelines issued by the CBDT vide Digital Evidence Investigation Manual. The Madras High Court addressed the contention in detail and held as under:

  • “The Digital Evidence Investigation Manual has been issued by the CBDT by virtue of powers available under Section 119 of the IT Act and hence, the Income Tax Authorities and all the other persons employed in the execution of this Act are bound to observe and follow such orders, instructions and directions issued by CBDT. ….. Hence, it is mandatory for  W.P. Nos. 9753, 9757, 9761 & 11176 of 2023 respondents to follow the Digital Evidence Investigation Manual issued by CBDT while conducting search and seizure and it is not optional.”

Directives of Maharashtra and Kerala Govts.

In Umesh v. State of Karnataka, 2023-2 KarLJ 397, it is pointed out –

  • “In fact, the Government of Maharashtra has already implemented the practice of collecting hash value of electronic evidences and collecting the memory component of the device it is recorded on at the first instance since 2016. A reference can also be made to the Standard Operating Procedures issued by the Government of Kerala for collection of digital evidence related to crimes against women and children, since 2021. In fact, guidelines on extraction of hash value are also given in Digital Evidence Investigation Manual Central Board of Direct Taxes Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.”

Hash Values of the Original and Copy at the Time of Copying, Required

Though Sec. 63(4)(c) of the BSA does not specifically mandate

  • (i) that hashing must be done at the time of copying, and (ii) that the hash value must pertain to the copy (computer output), also,

established jurisprudence, through long-standing legal precedents, requires recording the hash values of both the original and the copy at the time of copying, to demonstrate that the data is protected against tampering.

Part III

Section 63(4)(c), BSA

Section 63(4)(c), BSA reads as under:

  • “(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate,
  • and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.

A question may arise –

  • Because the term “hash value” is not explicitly used the main body of Section 63(4)(c) BSA, can it be argued – Hash Value Certificate is not mandatory but directory (or merely illustrative of the best practices)?

An argument is possible (“hash value” certificate is not mandatory) for two matters –

  • 1. The particulars in the Certificate stated in Section 63(4)(c) are specifically and categorically laid down in the sub-section (2) of Sec. 63. The “Part A” Certificate in the schedule contains all things in sub-section (2) of Sec. 63. So the “Part B” Hash Value Certificate is not mandatory as per the “Section”.
  • 2. The words “sufficient for a matter to be in the sub-section (4)(c) make it clear – the ‘verbatim adherence’ to the certificate format is not mandatory;*.* no doubt, the substance or contents thereof (particularly, the phraseology – “best of the knowledge and belief”) must have been placed in some (other) form. The particulars in the Certificate being the matters enumerated in the sub-section (2) of Sec 63 (and nothing is stated as regards Hash Value), the ‘Part B’ Hash Value Certificate cannot be a mandatory one.
    • *.*Note:
    • 1. See the difference between (i) reading Sec. 63(4)(c) without the words – sufficient for a matter to be and (ii) reading with these words. Relevant portion of Sec. 63(4)(c) is given below:
      • “(c) ….. for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.”
    • 2. The beginning portion of Sec. 63(4)(c) emphasises that it pertains to the matters enumerated in sub-section(2) alone, and not to hash-value. Sec. 63(4)(c) begins as under:
      • “(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate…”
    • 3. It appears that the hash value(s) of the original record are expected to be stated, rather than those of the copy (or “computer output”) actually produced before the court. This raises several questions, including: how is the court to verify the authenticity of the copy, if only the original’s HASH is referenced?

Possible Counter Arguments

  • First: The “form A” itself requires Hash Value Certificate.
  • Second:  Section 63(4)(c) says, “…. and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate… “
  • Third:  Section 63(4)(c) says, “a certificate specified in the Schedule”. The phrase “specified in the Schedule” explicitly ties the main section to the Schedule and makes it mandatory.
  • Fourth:  The Schedule provides a single, Certificate, divided into two parts – “Part A and “Part B”. It is not presented as two separate certificates, one mandatory and one optional.
  • Fifth: Legislative Intent (i.e., for ensuring the digital integrity of electronic records) reflects the mandatory nature.

Conclusion

The ‘Hash Value Certificate’ in the BSA is shrouded in several potential ambiguities. To dispel these uncertainties, a legislative amendment or a definitive ruling by an authoritative court that takes into account all pertinent arguments in this matter is imperative.

It is a fact that Section 65 of the old Act and Section 63 of the new Act were introduced as enabling provisions, designed to simplify the admissibility of electronic records.

  • However, due to poor and rigid drafting, they have paradoxically had the opposite effect.

In practice, it may be more feasible for many litigants to physically produce the original device—such as a computer, laptop, or mobile phone—before the court, rather than to obtain a certified hash value through a forensic expert.

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End Notes:

Section 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam

(Changes introduced in the New Adhiniyam – from the Evidence Act – are emphasised.)

  • 63. Admissibility of electronic records –
    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
    (2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:—
    (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer or communication device during the period over which the computer was used regularly to create, store or process information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer or communication device;
    (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
    (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer or communication device was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
    (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
    (3) Where over any period, the function of creating, storing or processing information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by means of one or more computers or communication device, whether—
    (a) in standalone mode; or
    (b) on a computer system; or
    (c) on a computer network; or
    (d) on a computer resource enabling information-creation or providing information—processing and storage; or
    (e) through an intermediary
    all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
    (4) In any proceeding where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things shall be submitted along with the electronic record at each instance where it is being submitted for admission, namely:—
    (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication device referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3);
     (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.
     (5) For the purposes of this section,—
    (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer or communication device if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
    (b) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer or communication device whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment or by other electronic means as referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3).

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Implied Grant: A Valid Mode of Creation of Easement under Indian Law

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • Easement by ‘Implied Grant’ is a Well-Recognised Category of Easement.
  • Implied Grant is an Independent Right (Alternative Way will Not Defeat it).
  • Implied Grant can be Inferred from the Circumstances.
  • No Express Consideration is Required for the Creation of an Easement by Grant and Implied Grant.
  • Grant alone pleaded; Not, Implied Grant – The Supreme Court recognized and allowed the doctrine of Implied Grant (in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622).

Grant in Easements – Three Distinct Legal Connotations under Indian Law

  • 1. Theoretical Basis of Every Easementary Right is Grant. The foundation of all easementary rights under Indian law is the concept of grant by the servient owner. Such a grant may be express, as provided in Sections 8 to 12 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882; implied, based on the circumstances of transfer by severance, as contemplated in Section 13; or presumed, from long and continuous use, as recognised under Section 15.
  • 2. Implied Grant is a Judicially Recognized Easement. The common law in India recognizes implied grant—distinct from an easement of necessity—as a valid mode of acquiring an easement, even though it is not expressly codified under the Indian Easements Act. Such easements are inferred from the conduct of the parties or from the surrounding circumstances that indicate the intention to grant such a right. Indian courts have upheld this principle in several decisions, including Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, and L. Govindarajulu Chettiar v. V. N. Srinivasalu Naidu, AIR 1972 Mad 307.
  • 3. Grant is inferred from Usage and Custom in Customary Easements: The Indian Easements Act also recognises customary easements, which are expressly discerned in Sec. 18 of the Act. In such cases, the right is not assumed to be founded on an express or implied grant in the conventional sense, but it is presumed as imbeded in the long and continuous reasonable use by a particular class of people within a specific locality. That is, the underlying presumption is that a reasonable grant must have once taken place, which now gives way to a valid and acceptable custom. An example would be a village pathway used by local inhabitants over a long time to form a custom. This principle has been upheld in several decisions, including Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89; Harendra Nath Chakraborti v. Asim Sindhu Chakraborty, AIR 1981 Cal 325; and Yohannan v. Mathai, 1991 (1) Ker LJ 605, 1991 KHC 571.

Easement by Implied Grant is a Well-Recognised Category of Easement

A grant may be either express or implied. The latter arises from the circumstances or conduct of the parties involved. Indian common law recognizes implied grant as a legitimate and acceptable mode for the acquisition of easements.

Sree Swayam Prakash Case: Supreme Court only Reaffirmed Previous Legal Position

In Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, the Supreme Court used the term implied-grant to refer to an easement of grant ‘arising by implication’. It is seen that the Supreme Court has only reaffirmed the legal position previously upheld by several High Courts.

  • R. Sivanandan v. Rajammal, (1975) 1 Mad LJ 251,
  • L. Govindarajulu Chettiar v. V. N. Srinivasalu Naidu, AIR 1972 Mad 307,
  • Ratanchand Chordia v. Kasim Khaleel, AIR 1964 Mad 209,
  • Annapurna v. Santosh Kumar, AIR 1937 Cal. 661 (referred to in the decision),
  • Kuppakkal v. Mathan Chettiar, AIR 1924 Mad 834.

It was held in R. Sivanandan v. Rajammal, (1975) 1 Mad LJ 251, that the plaintiff could found his case on an implied grant of easement even if there was no express grant; and that the argument that the absence of an express grant would negative an implied grant was quite untenable.

In L. Govindarajulu Chettiar v. V. N. Srinivasalu Naidu, AIR 1972 Mad 307, the existence of a right of way was inferred from the words of the relevant documents. It was observed as under:

  • “8. From all these documents Thiru D. Ramaswami Iyengar stated, it is clear that there is an implied grant of easement over the 30-ft. road. He cited Ratanchand Chordia v. Kasim Khaleel, AIR 1964 Mad 209, wherein a Bench of this Court has laid down the principles on which an implied grant can be inferred. The question whether a grant can be implied or not would only arise in a case where there is no express grant. To say the least, the contention that the absence of an express grant would negative an implied grant is quite untenable. It is from attendant circumstances and other documentary evidence that an implied grant has to be inferred. It is pity that the lower appellate Court has not bestowed its attention before it disposed of the appeal, on the aspect of spelling out an implied grant, which is recognised by law.
  • 9. Annapurna v. Santosh Kumar, AIR 1937 Cal 661 also makes it clear that in law implied grant has to be inferred and lays down that grant can be presumed from the description of boundaries in the conveyance which mentions the same to be a common passage.”

In L. Govindarajulu Chettiar v. V. N. Srinivasalu Naidu, AIR  1972 Mad 307, the High Court also referred Kuppakkal v. Mathato n Chettiar, AIR 1924 Mad 834, where ‘a grant of an easement of way’ had been inferred from the words of a lease deed. 

Implied Grant‘ exists Independent of Sec. 13, Easement Act

R. Sivanandan v. Rajammal, (1975) 1 Mad LJ 251, addressed the issue with clarity holding as under:

  • “Merely because the juristic basis of the easement of necessity (Section 13) is said to be an implied grant, the converse will not follow. In other words, where an easement is acquired by grant, either expressly or by necessary implication, it will not amount to an easement of necessity.”

K.S. Venkataraman, J., in this decision followed Peacock on Easements which reads as under:

  • “An implied grant, in the sense here used, is a grant which arises by implication from the language of the particular instrument construable according to the ordinary rules of construction, one of which is that the circumstances existing at the date of the grant may be looked at in order to ascertain the intention of the parties.”

Easement by Implied Grant

It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

  • “An easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties and it may have its own consideration. (B.B. Katiyar’s Commentaries on Easements and Licenses, p. 762).  It may be either express or even by necessary implication. Though easement of necessity will come to an end with the termination of necessity, easement acquired by grant cannot be extinguished on that ground as per section 13(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Therefore, even assuming that the plaintiff had an alternative pathway as contended by the defendants, it does not extinguish the right of easement of grant in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the Trial Court was justified in granting a relief of declaration of right of easement of grant over the `B’ schedule pathway. However, the declaration granted on the ground of easement of necessity was not justified.”

The aforesaid Supreme Court decision (Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622) arose from the Kerala High Court decision, Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. N. Gopala Pillai on 9 May 2006. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Kerala High Court held as under:

  • “Theoretically all easements have their origin in some sort of grant by the servient owner. The grant may be express or it may be implied from the surrounding attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties or it may even be presumed from long user. In the case of an express grant of easement the limit thereof depends on the words used.”

Upholding the view taken by the Kerala High Court, the Apex Court held as under:

  • “In our view, therefore, the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as pathway by the original plaintiff (since deceased) at least up to 1982, when alone the cause of action for the suit arose.”

Grant: No Express ‘Consideration’ Required; TP Act has no application

In B. Shyamkumar v. Francis George, 2009-4 CTC 750; 2009-7 MLJ 835, the Madras High Court held unequivocally as under:

  • “In case the easement was one acquired by grant, there was no question of consideration of the plea of easement of necessity.”

Gujarat High Court, in Hamir Ram v. Varisng Raimal, 1998 AIR Guj 165, has also held ‘grant’ can be gratuitous. It is said as under:

  • “Easement by grant may be created by oral agreement. It may be gratuitous. It may also be for consideration. If the grant was for consideration it hardly requires registration because mere creation of easement is not compulsorily registrable. …. Further, the …. parties never intended to transfer ownership in respect of the land which was set apart for the purpose of common passage. Hence, it cannot be held to be a sale deed of immovable property having value more than one hundred rupees. For this reason also the agreement does not require registration.”

The incorporeal right of Easement, by itself, cannot be a subject-matter of sale. Following two legal provisions are relevant in this matter –

  • 1. Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • 2. Sec. 8 of the Indian Easements Act.

Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act

Easement cannot exist independently of the dominant tenement; hence always remains appurtenant to land (that is, attached to, and passes with, the ownership of the dominant tenement). Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:

  • “6. What may be transferred– Property of any kind may be transferred, except as provided by this Act or by any other law for the time-being in force;
  • a.… b….
  • c. An easement cannot be transferred apart from the dominant heritage.”

In Musunoori Satyanarayana Murti v. Chekka Lakshmayya, AIR 1929 Mad 79, it was held – ‘the creation of a right of easement by grant is not such a transfer of ownership as is contemplated by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and therefore, provisions of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to the creation of easement. Section 6(c) of the Transfer of Property Act contemplates that an existing easement cannot be transferred apart from the dominant heritage. Therefore, prima facie, the deed of easement is a creation of easement and not a transfer of an existing easement. [See also: Saraswatibai Bishwambarlal Charity Trust v. Gopal Traders Pvt.  Ltd., 2023 BHC (AS) 34908 (Bom)]

Sec. 8 of the Indian Easements Act

Sec. 8 of the Indian Easements Act deals with express grant. It reads –

  • “8. Who may impose easements – An easement may be imposed by any one in the circumstances, and to the extent, in and to which he may transfer his interest in the heritage on which the liability is to be imposed.”

This section simply says that a person who has the legal right to transfer an interest (i.e. to sell, lease, or mortgage) in an immovable property (‘heritage’) is legally capable of creating (i.e., imposing or granting) an easement over that property.

It is also clear –

  • A life tenant (who has rights only for life) can grant an easement, but it ends with their interest.
  • A co-owner cannot impose an easement on the entire property without consent of the others.

Law does not bar ‘imposition’ of easement accepting consideration

Though the transfer of an easement is not recognized under the provisions of Sec. 54, TP Act, it is noteworthy – the law does not bar ‘imposition’ of easement accepting consideration as pointed out in Saraswatibai Bishwambarlal Charity Trust v. Gopal Traders Pvt.  Ltd., 2023 BHC (AS) 34908 (Bom).

It is also important – though the provisions of the Easements Act address the creation of easements by grant, it is without an explicit requirement for ‘consideration‘, though consideration is a necessary element of a valid agreement under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Sec. 13 further elaborates on easements of necessity and quasi-easements, indicating that such easements can arise from the transfer or bequest of immovable property, again without an express requirement for consideration.

In Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, the Supreme Court observed that an ‘easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties’ (and it may have its own consideration); and that ‘the grant may be either express or even by necessary implication’.

In State of Punjab v. Brig. Sukhjit Singh, 1993-3 SCR 944, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “Payment of licence fee is not an essential attribute for the subsistence of a licence.”

It is pointed out in Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha and Anr v. Smt. Manharbala Jeram Damodar, AIR 2013 SC 2959, 2013-15 SCC 358, as under:

  • “In Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, the word “license” means “a revocable permission to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful” and the word “licensee” means “one to whom a license is granted or one who has permission to enter or use another’s premises, but only for one’s own purposes and not for the occupier’s benefit.
  • Thus, it is seen that even in popular sense the word “license” is not understood to mean it should be on payment of license fee for subsistence of license. It also covers a “gratuitous licensee”, that is, a person who is permitted, although not invited, to enter another’s property and who provides no consideration in exchange for such permission.””

A Grant Deed with Consideration requires Stamp and Registration

In Subramanyam Chettiar v. Meyyammai Achi, AIR 1943 Mad 522, it was held that the consideration for the grant of the easement was a promise on the part of the grantee to do something of a like kind for the grantor; and the provisions of the Indian Registration Act were quite clear and it could not be doubted that such a deed required registration under Section 17 and so by virtue of Section 49 it could not be admitted as evidence of the creation of the easement.

Implied Grant is Independent Right ; Alternative Way will Not Defeat it

The existence of an alternative way will defeat easement of necessity and quasi-easement. But, it is pointed out in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Ammaalternative pathway ‘does not extinguish the right of easement of grant. It includes the claim of implied grant also. (See: John, S/o. Ulahannan v. P. Janaki, D/o. Late Vava, 2012, Kerala High Court.)

In Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “28. … Many easements acquired by grant may be absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant tenement in the sense that it cannot be enjoyed at all without it. That may be the reason for the grant also. But easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties. In the matter of grant the parties are governed by the terms of the grant and not by anything else. Easement of necessity and quasi-easement are dealt with in Section 13 of the Act. The grant may be express or even by necessary implication. In either case it will not amount to an easement of necessity under Section 13 of the Act even though it may also be an absolute necessity for the person in whose favour the grant is made.”

Easement by Implied grant and Quasi Easement can be pleaded Alternatively

Easement by (implied) grant and quasi easement can be pleaded alternatively, for they are not mutually destructive, and it is permissible to raise inconsistent pleas (but to confine either of the two at the time of evidence).

Implied Grant can be Inferred from the Circumstances

Grant alone Pleaded ; Not, Implied Grant – Apex Court, allowed Implied Grant

It is held in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, Easement of implied grant can be granted in a suit even though “Grant” alone was claimed (Alternatively to easement of necessity). Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are the following –

  • Plaintiff, owner of A-schedule property (dominant tenement), claimed “easement of necessity or of grant” in B-schedule property (servient tenement).
  • Implied grant” was not specifically pleaded (only ‘grant’ was pleaded).
  • Dominant tenement had been separated from the servient tenement.
  • Plaintiff has been using the way in B-schedule property for a long period (about 50 years).
  • The trial court observed that the plaintiff claiming easement by grant or easement of necessity has only a primary burden to prove the absence of any alternate pathway (these findings were accepted by the Apex Court).
  • Defendant alleged that two alternate pathways existed. But, No evidence of any other way to A-schedule property (dominant tenement).
  • The High Court found that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway.

The Supreme Court upheld the view of the High Court and the Trial Court and held as under:

  • “… the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that
    • (i) no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and
    • (ii) there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property …”

It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

  • “In Annapurna Dutta vs. Santosh Kumar Sett & Ors., AIR 1937 Cal.661, B.K. Mukherjee, as His Lordship then was observed:
    • “There could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent. Now a right of way is neither continuous nor always an apparent easement, and hence would not ordinarily come under the rule. Exception is no doubt made in certain cases, where there is a ‘formed road’ existing over one part of the tenement for the apparent use of another portion or there is ‘some permanence in the adaptation of the tenement’ from which continuity may be inferred, but barring these exceptions, an ordinary right of way would not pass on severance unless language is used by the grantor to create a fresh easement.”
  • 26. In our view, therefore, the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as pathway by the original plaintiff (since deceased) at least up to 1982, when alone the cause of action for the suit arose.”

In this decision our Apex Court has also quoted the following from Katiyar on Law of Easements and Licences –

  • “… It is the intention of the grantor whether he can be presumed to have been intended to convey to the grantee a right of easement for the reasonable and convenient enjoyment of the property which has to be ascertained in all the circumstances of the case to find out whether a grant can be implied. A description in a conveyance may connote an intention to create a right of easement. An easement may arise by implication, if the intention to grant can properly be inferred either from the terms of the grant or the circumstances“.

Implied Grant and Quasi Easement

The question of implied grant arises only if the easement is apparent and continuous (that is, there should be a ‘formed road’)

  • Easement of Necessity: even if – no visible sign (not apparent); and even if – never used before (not continuous). E.g., a foot path to a landlocked plot.
    • But, there should have strict necessity.
  • Quasi Easement – must be visible (apparent) and must be functioning without repeated human action (continuous). E.g., water flowing through a pipe or a drainage system.
    • It is based on prior use before land division.
    • It requires only reasonable necessity, not strict necessity.

Implied Grant and Quasi-Easement

  • The question of implied grant (or quasi-easement) arises only if the alleged easement is:
    • Apparent (i.e., visible upon reasonable inspection), and
    • Continuous (i.e., functions without repeated human intervention)
  • E.g., Water flowing through a pipe, A drainage trench, Overhead electric cables.

Conclusion

  • It is the fundamental principle of easement law that every easement is, in theory, rooted in a grant.
  • Indian law clearly permits the acquisition of easements by implied grant. That is, an easement may arise by implication, and the intention to grant can be inferred either from the terms of the grant or from the surrounding circumstances.
  • Though easement by grant is (generally) said to have arisen from a ‘contract’, the provisions of law that deals with the matter do not specifically require ‘consideration’ in the creation of easements by grant.

End Notes 1

Customary Easements under S. 18 of the Easement Act

Section 18 of the Easement Act reads as under:

  • “18. Customary easements. An easement may be acquired in virtue of a local custom. Such easements are called customary easements.”

Both custom and easement are involved in customary easement. In other words, when customary easement is claimed, elements of both custom and prescriptive easement (long user) are to be proved. [Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89.]

Customary easement includes the right to take water and earth from a tank, use water for cattle from a tank,  graze cattle [Illustration (a) to sec. 18], to take earth for building and repairing their houses etc.[Jugal Kishore v. Umrao Singh, AIR 1949 All 272. ] These are rights of people of a locality; and not a public right.

End Notes 2

It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

  • “17. The High Court limited itself to the issue whether the decree of the first appellate court granting the original plaintiff (since deceased) right of easement over ‘B’ schedule property by way of grant concurring with the findings of the trial court was sustainable.
  • 18. Before the High Court, the defendants pleaded that there had been no appeal or cross objection filed by the original plaintiff (since deceased) against the order of the Appellate Court which disallowed the claim of easement of necessity and, therefore, the finding that there existed no easement of necessity in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased) over the ‘B’ schedule property stood confirmed. Further they contended that the alternative pathway on the western side of the ‘A’ schedule property was rendered inconvenient by the very act of the original plaintiff (since deceased) who sold that portion of the property to a third party who began digging that pathway resulting in the difference in level. The High Court, on consideration of these contentions, held that though the claim of right of easement by way of necessity over ‘B’ Schedule property may be affected by the subsequent sale of the said plot by the plaintiff in 1983, the claim of right of easement by way of grant over ‘B’ schedule property stood unaffected by the said conduct.
  • 21. The High Court relied on a number of observations in Katiyar’s Law of Easement and Licences (12th Edition) on law with respect to “implication of grant of an easement.” It may arise upon severance of a tenement by its owner into parts. The acquisition of easement by prescription may be classified under the head of implied grant for all prescription presupposes a grant. All that is necessary to create the easement is a manifestation or an unequivocal intention on the part of the servient owner to that effect.
  • 23. Applying these observations to the facts of the case, the High Court held that though the original grant was by Yogini Amma that grant could not perfect as an easement for the reason that Yogini Amma herself was the owner of both ‘A’ schedule and ‘B’ schedule properties and consequently there was no question of ‘B’ schedule property becoming the servient tenement and ‘A’ schedule property becoming the dominant tenement. However, it was the desire of Yogini Amma that was implemented by her disciples by virtue of the settlement deed. Therefore, the right of the plaintiff to have ‘B’ schedule property as a pathway could not have been taken away by the very same deed. In fact, there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway as can be inferred from the circumstances, namely,
    • i) no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property in the settlement deed and
    • ii) there was no objection to the use of ‘B’ schedule as pathway.
  • 25. We have heard Mr. T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Mr. Subramanium Prasad, learned senior counsel for the respondents. We have carefully examined the impugned judgment of the courts below and also the pleadings, evidence and the materials already on record. It is not in dispute that the trial court as well as the First Appellate Court concurrently found on a proper appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case that the ‘B’ Schedule Property of the plaint was being used by the original plaintiff (since deceased) and thereafter, by the respondents even after construction of the building in 1940 in ‘A’ Schedule property of the plaint. The appellants also did not dispute the case of the original plaintiff (since deceased) that he was in continuous occupation of the building even after its construction in the year 1940. It is also not in dispute that the appellants were not able to establish that the original plaintiff (since deceased) was using any other pathway for access to ‘A’ Schedule Property of the plaint and the building therein, which was in the occupation of the original plaintiff (since deceased). The case of the appellants that since there was no mention in the deed of settlement enabling the use of ‘B’ schedule pathway for access to ‘A’ schedule property and the building therein, cannot be the reason to hold that there was no grant as the grant could be by implication as well. It is not in dispute that the fact of the use of the ‘B’ schedule property as pathway even after execution of Exhibit A1, the settlement deed in the year 1982 by the original plaintiff (since deceased) would amply show that there was an implied grant in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased) relating to ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint for its use as pathway to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint in residential occupation of the original plaintiff (since deceased). In the absence of any evidence being adduced by the appellants to substantiate their contention that the original plaintiff (since deceased) had an alternative pathway for access to the ‘A’ schedule property, it is difficult to negative the contention of the respondent that since the original plaintiff (since deceased) has been continuously using the said pathway at least from the year 1940 the original plaintiff (since deceased) had acquired an easement right by way of an implied grant in respect of the ‘B’ Schedule property of the plaint. It is an admitted position that both ‘A’ schedule and ‘B’ schedule properties of the plaint belonged to Yogini Amma and her disciples and it was the desire of Yogini Amma that was really implemented by the disciples under the settlement deed executed in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased). Therefore, the High Court was perfectly justified in holding that when it was the desire of Yogini Amma to Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam & Anr vs G.Anandavally Amma & Ors grant easement right to the original plaintiff (since deceased) by way of an implied grant, the right of the original plaintiff (since deceased) to have ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as a pathway could not have been taken away.
  • In Annapurna Dutta vs. Santosh Kumar Sett & Ors. [AIR 1937 Cal.661], B.K. Mukherjee, as His Lordship then was observed:
    • “There could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent. Now a right of way is neither continuous nor always an apparent easement, and hence would not ordinarily come under the rule. Exception is no doubt made in certain cases, where there is a ‘formed road’ existing over one part of the tenement for the apparent use of another portion or there is ‘some permanence in the adaptation of the tenement’ from which continuity may be inferred, but barring these exceptions, an ordinary right of way would not pass on severance unless language is used by the grantor to create a fresh easement.”
  • 26. In our view, therefore, the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as pathway by the original plaintiff (since deceased) at least up to 1982, when alone the cause of action for the suit arose.”

In this decision our Apex Court has also quoted the following from Katiyar on Law of Easements and Licences –

  • “There are numerous cases in which an agreement to grant easement or some other rights has been inferred or more correctly has been imputed to the person who is in a position to make the grant, on account of some action or inaction on his part. These cases rest on the equitable doctrine of acquiescence, but they may be referred to, for the purpose of classification, as imputed or constructive grants. The party acquiescing is subsequently estopped from denying the existence of easement. It is as if such person had made an actual grant of the easement… … It is the intention of the grantor whether he can be presumed to have been intended to convey to the grantee a right of easement for the reasonable and convenient enjoyment of the property which has to be ascertained in all the circumstances of the case to find out whether a grant can be implied. A description in a conveyance may connote an intention to create a right of easement. An easement may arise by implication, if the intention to grant can properly be inferred either from the terms of the grant or the circumstances“.

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Can a Power of Attorney Holder file a Civil Suit? Is there any bar by virtue of Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024-6 SCC 130?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

In Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024-6 SCC 130 (Pankaj Mithal,  Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.) held –

  • it is settled in law that Power of Attorney holder can only depose about the facts within his personal knowledge.

It is observed in this case –

  1. The law as understood earlier was that
    • a General Power of Attorney holder can appear, plead and act on behalf of a party he represents; but
    • he cannot become a witness on behalf of the party represented by him as no one can delegate his power to appear in the witness box to another party.
  2. In A.C Narayan v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC 790  upheld the principle of law laid down in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (2005-2 SCC 217) and clarified that Power of Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the court but he must have witnessed the transaction as an agent and must have due knowledge about it.  

The Supreme Court said in Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024-6 SCC 130 as under:

  • “28. The law as understood earlier was that a General Power of Attorney holder though can appear, plead and act on behalf of a party he represents but he cannot become a witness on behalf of the party represented by him as no one can delegate his power to appear in the witness box to another party. However, subsequently in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani vs. IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217, this Court held that the Power of Attorney holder can maintain a plaint on behalf of the person he represents provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question. It was opined that the Power of Attorney holder or the legal representative should have knowledge about the transaction in question so as to bring on record the truth in relation to the grievance or the offence. However, to resolve the controversy with regard to the powers of the General Power of Attorney holder to depose on behalf of the person he represents, this Court upon consideration of all previous relevant decisions on the aspect including that of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra) in A.C Narayan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC 790  concluded by upholding the principle of law laid down in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra) and clarified that Power of Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the court but he must have witnessed the transaction as an agent and must have due knowledge about it. The Power of Attorney holder who has no knowledge regarding the transaction cannot be examined as a witness. The functions of the General Power of Attorney holder cannot be delegated to any other person without there being a specific clause permitting such delegation in the Power of Attorney; meaning thereby ordinarily there cannot be any sub-delegation.
  • 29. It is, therefore, settled in law that Power of Attorney holder can only depose about the facts within his personal knowledge and not about those facts which are not within his knowledge or are within the personal knowledge of the person who he represents or about the facts that may have transpired much before he entered the scene. The aforesaid Power of Attorney holder PW-1 had clearly deposed that he is giving evidence on behalf of plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4 i.e. the Gala’s. He was not having any authority to act as the Power of Attorney of the Gala’s at the time his statement was recorded. He was granted Power of Attorney subsequently as submitted and accepted by the parties. Therefore, his evidence is completely meaningless to establish that Gala’s have acquired or perfected any easementary right over the disputed rasta in 1994 when the suit was instituted.”
  • In Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217, it was held that the Power of Attorney holder can maintain a plaintprovided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question.

It is observed (obvious, clerical-mistake) in Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024-6 SCC 130, as regards maintaining a plaint, as under:

  • “However, subsequently in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani vs. IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217, this Court held that the Power of Attorney holder can maintain a plaint on behalf of the person he represents provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question.”

But, it is seen that Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217, did not observe anything as to  ‘maintaining a plaint (as observed in Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani). Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd. referred to “complaint only“. It is said in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd. as under:

  • “Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, empowers the holder of power of attorney to “act” on behalf of the principal. In our view the word “acts” employed in Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, confines only in respect of “acts” done by the power of attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term “acts” would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power of attorney holder has rendered some “acts” in pursuance to power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined.
  • On the question of power of attorney, the High Courts have divergent views. In the case of Shambhu Dutt Shastri Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1986 2WLL 713 it was held that a general power of attorney holder can appear, plead and act on behalf of the party but he cannot become a witness on behalf of the party. He can only appear in his own capacity. No one can delegate the power to appear in witness box on behalf of himself. To appear in a witness box is altogether a different act. A general power of attorney holder cannot be allowed to appear as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff in the capacity of the plaintiff.
  • The aforesaid judgment was quoted with the approval in the case of Ram Prasad Vs. Hari Narain & Ors. AIR 1998 Raj. 185. It was held that the word “acts” used in Rule 2 of Order III of the CPC does not include the act of power of attorney holder to appear as a witness on behalf of a party. Power of attorney holder of a party can appear only as a witness in his personal capacity and whatever knowledge he has about the case he can state on oath but be cannot appear as a witness on behalf of the party in the capacity of that party. If the plaintiff is unable to appear in the court, a commission for recording his evidence may be issued under the relevant provisions of the CPC.
  • In the case of Dr. Pradeep Mohanbay Vs. Minguel Carlos Dias reported in 2000 Vol.102 (1) Bom.L.R.908, the Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court held that a power of attorney can file a complaint under Section 138 but cannot depose on behalf of the complainant. He can only appear as a witness.
  • However, in the case of Humberto Luis & Anr. Vs. Floriano Armando Luis & Anr. reported in 2002 (2) Bom.C.R.754 on which the reliance has been placed by the Tribunal in the present case, the High Court took a dissenting view and held that the provisions contained in Order III Rule 2 of CPC cannot be construed to disentitle the power of attorney holder to depose on behalf of his principal. The High Court further held that the word “act” appearing in order III Rule 2 of CPC takes within its sweep “depose”. We are unable to agree with this view taken by the Bombay High Court in Floriano Armando (supra).
  • We hold that the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Shambhu Dutt Shastri (supra) followed and reiterated in the case of Ram Prasad (supra) is the correct view. The view taken in the case of Floriano Armando Luis (supra) cannot be said to have laid down a correct law and is accordingly overruled.”

A.C Narayan v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC 790  

In view of difference of opinion amongst various High Courts as also the decisions of this Court in M.M.T.C.v. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd., 2002 (1) SCC 234, and in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd., 2005 (2) SCC 217, the following question (main) question was referred to the three judge bench:

  • “If the Power of Attorney holder fails to assert explicitly his knowledge in the complaint then can the Power of Attorney holder verify the complaint on oath on such presumption of knowledge?”

In the light of Sec. 142 of the NI Act the three Judge Bench answered the reference in negative. Sec. 142 reads as under:

  • “142. Cognizance of offences. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) –
  • no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;…”

The Bench answered the question as under:

  • “23) In the light of the discussion, we are of the view that the power of attorney holder may be allowed to file, appear and depose for the purpose of issue of process for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. An exception to the above is when the power of attorney holder of the complainant does not have a personal knowledge about the transactions then he cannot be examined. However, where the attorney holder of the complainant is in charge of the business of the complainant-payee and the attorney holder alone is personally aware of the transactions, there is no reason why the attorney holder cannot depose as a witness. Nevertheless, an explicit assertion as to the knowledge of the Power of Attorney holder about the transaction in question must be specified in the complaint.”

From the above, it is clear –

  • A civil suit can be filed by the plaintiff through a power of attorney;
  • but, he can furnish evidence on the ‘transaction’ (if so necessitated) if only he has direct knowledge.
  • Power of Attorney holder can maintain a complaint under Sec. 138 NI Act on behalf of the person he represents provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question.

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Judicial Admissions in Pleadings: Admissible Proprio Vigore Against the Maker

Saji Koduvath Advocate, Kottayam.

Taken from the Blog: Modes of Proof of Documents

Judicial Admissions, Stand on a Higher Footing

Admissions in pleadings (in the same, not earlier, proceedings) are judicial admissions. They stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions.

  • They may give rise to ‘Foundation of Rights’.
  • They are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proofs.
  • Evidentiary admissions  (including that in the previous pleadings or separate proceedings) are not conclusive by themselves and they can be shown to be wrong.

Judicial Admission Must Be in the very Same Litigation

In Umesh Agarwal v. Mahesh Agarwal (Sikkim), 06 Aug 2013, Indian Kanoon, Pius Kuriakose, CJ., held as under:

  • “42. A survey of the various decisions cited before me at the Bar, particularly, the judgment of the Supreme Court in 
    • Karan Kapahi v. Lalchand Public Charitable Trust, AIR 2010 SC 2077, 
    • Basant Singh v. Janki Singh, AIR 1967 SC 341, 
    • Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, (1974) 1 SCC 242,
  • shows that the law contemplates two kinds of admissions – judicial admissions and evidentiary admissions. It is judicial admissions which are contemplated under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act. In order to that an admission is a judicial admission, the same has to be an admission through his pleadings or by other materials in writing produced in the very same litigation. All other admissions are evidentiary admissions. Judicial admissions stand on a higher pedestal than evidentiary admissions. Evidentiary admissions will have to be proved against the makers like any other relevant fact.” 

Admission Contained in Pleadings and that in Evidentiary Admissions

An admission made by a party to a suit in an earlier proceeding is admissible against him.

In Ammini Tharakan v. Lilly Jacob, Thottathil B.Radhakrishnan & SS Satheesachandran, JJ. (7 Oct 2013) the Kerala High Court held that admission contained in a plaint or written statement or in an affidavit or sworn deposition by a party in a previous litigation would be regarded as an admission in a subsequent action. It can be explained by the maker thereof, unless thereis no estoppel (Sec. 31, Evi. Act). Such an admission is a relevant fact. The courts can arrive at a decision on the basis of the admissions. See:

  • Thimmappa Rai v. Ramanna Rai, (2007) 14 SCC 63 .
  • Deb Prosanna v. Hari Kison, AIR 1937 Cal. 515 ,
  • Chendikamba v. Viswanathamayya, AIR 1939 Mad 446 ,
  • Lal Singh v. Guru Granth Sahib, AIR(38) 1951 Pep 101,  and
  • Mst. Ulfat v. Zubaida Khatoon, AIR 1955 All. 361.

In Ammini Tharakan v. Lilly Jacob (7 Oct 2013) it is observed that Section 17 of the Evidence Act says that a document or a statement which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, is an admission. It was pointed out in this decisions as under:

  • Admissions in pleadings are governed under Section 58 Evidence Act.
  • Section 31 of the Evidence Act, says as to evidentiary admissions.
  • There is distinction between the two.
  • The evidentiary admissions are merely relevant and not conclusive unless they operate as estoppel.
  • An admission by a party in a previous suit is admissible in evidence in a subsequent suit.The burden is upon the party making it to show that it was wrong on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so, though the party making the admission may give evidence to rebut this presumption.
  • Unless and until that is satisfactorily done, the fact admitted must be taken to be established.
  • This is true notwithstanding the fact that the statement which amounts to an admission was not put to the party making it, when that person came into the witness box.

The High Court further held as under in Ammini Tharakan v. Lilly Jacob (7 Oct 2013) –

  • “Here, the plaintiff, who was a defendant in Lucy’s suit, had filed Ext.B10 written statement through her power of attorney holder and mother Martha. That written statement contained the clear stand that neither Lucy nor the plaintiff herein had any share in any of the assets forming the estate of late David Tharakan. This statement which amounts to an admission as to a particular state of affairs, has not been explained by the plaintiff either in the plaint or at any point of time in any manner worthy of being accepted as a rebuttal. While it is the law that admission does not confer title, what we treat as admissions here is demonstrative of the plaintiff’s animus in re inheritance to her father’s estate. We proceed to discuss that aspect further in the succeeding paragraph.”

Categorical Admission cannot be Resiled but, may be Explained or Clarified

In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly, 2008-7 SCC 85, it is held, after considering various decisions including Panchdeo Narain Srivastava (1984-Supp. SCC 594) and Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co. (AIR 1977 SC 680; 1976-4 SCC 320), as under:

  • “28. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other.” (Quoted in: Ram Niranjan Kajaria v. Sheo Prakash Kajaria, 2015-10 SCC 203; S. R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma, 2010-5 SCC 274, )

Admissions in the pleadings are Admissible Proprio Vigore

Admissions in the pleadings are admissible proprio vigore against the maker thereof.

  • See: Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India, AIR 2022 SC 5058;
  • National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rattani, (2009) 2 SCC 75
  • Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, 2009-5 SCC 713.
  • Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2009 SC 120; 2008-14 SCC 589.
  • Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash, 2008 15 SCC 673
  • State of Haryana v. M. P. Mohla (SB Sinha, J.), 2007-1 SCC 457
  • Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India, 2006 (12) SCC 233,

Admissions – Best Evidence. Evidentiary Admissions – Not Conclusive

In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi (M. Hidayatullah, S.K. Das), AIR 1960 SC 100, it was held as under:

  • “In view of all these admissions and the revenue records, it was necessary for the appellant to prove that the admissions were erroneous, and did not bind him. An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous.”

In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Icharam, AIR 1974 SC 471, 1974-1 SCC 242, held:

  • “Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted.
  • Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under s. 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case,
    • stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions.
  • The former class of admissions are
    • fully binding on the party that makes them and
    • constitute a waiver of proof.
  • They by themselves
    • can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties.
  • On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”

The propositions in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalptram Iccharam, 1974-1 SCC 242 (admissions in pleadings stand on higher footing and are admissible as per Section 58 of the Evidence Act) is referred to in the following decisions:

  • Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar, 2022-10 SCC 496,
  • Alagu Pharmacy v. N. Magudeswari, AIR 2018 SC 3821; 2018-8 SCC 311,
  • Ram Niranjan Kajaria v. Sheo Prakash Kajaria, 2015-10 SCC 203,
  • D. N. Jeevaraju v. D. Sudhakar, AIR 2011 SC 1158; 2010-14 SCC 69,
  • S. R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma, 2010-5 SCC 274,
  • Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (SB Sinha, J.), AIR 2005 SC 809; 2005-11 SCC 314,
  • Epoch Enterrepots v. M. V. Won Fu, AIR 2003 SC 24; 2003-1 SCC 305,
  • Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas, AIR 1993 SC 1449;
  • Arjun Khiamal Makhijani: Prithdayal Chetandas v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani, 1989-4 SCC 612,
  • Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, AIR 1987 SC 1986; 1987-4 SCC 1.

Inconsistent  Pleadings Not Possible by Addl. or Subsequent Pleadings

In Mohammed Ali v. Khutejatul Kubra, ILR 2001 Kar 4580, 2002(1) KarLJ 596, the Karnataka High Court has held as under:

  • “6. A perusal of the aforesaid order makes it clear that if a party wants to plead a new ground of claim or a statement containing allegation of fact inconsistent with the previous pleadings of the party pleading the same shall be raised by way of amendment only. There is a total prohibition for pleading new claims and inconsistent statements by any other mode except by way of amendment to the existing pleadings. Though subsequent pleadings is permitted under Order 8, Rule 9 of CPC the same cannot be made use for raising pleas which are altogether new and inconsistent with the original pleadings in the written statement. Order 6, Rule 7 of the CPC deals with departure from the previous pleadings, Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC deals with the amendment of pleadings and Order 8, Rule 9 of the CPC deals with subsequent pleadings. When they are read together distinction becomes apparent. Then it is clear by way of subsequent pleadings under Order 8, Rule 9 of the CPC new claims and inconsistent pleas cannot be raised and for raising such pleas one has to resort to Order 6, Rule 18 of the CPC only”.

Amendment of Written Statement to Prejudice Plaintiff – Not Allowed

The Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court held in Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co., (1977) 1 SCR 728: AIR 1977 SC 680: 1976-4 SCC 320 – cannot be allowed to withdraw an amendment if such withdrawal would amount to totally displacing the case of the plaintiff and which would cause him irretrievable prejudice. In Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal,1998 (1) SCC 278, the Supreme Court followed the decision, Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co., observing as under:

  • “Even that apart the said decision of two learned judges of this Court Akshaya Restaurant v. P. Anjanappa, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 303), runs counter to a decision of a Bench of three learned judges of this court in the case of Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. Ladha Ram & Co., (1977) 1 SCR 728. In that case Ray, CJ., Speaking for the Bench had to consider the question whether the defendant can be allowed to amend his written statement by taking an inconsistent plea as compared to the earlier plea which contained an admission in favour of the plaintiff. It was held that such an inconsistent plea which would displace the plaintiff complete from the admissions made by the defendants in the written statements cannot be allowed. If such amendments are allowed in the written statement plaintiff will be irretrievably prejudiced by being denied the opportunity of extracting the admission from the defendants. In that case a suit was filed by the plaintiff for claiming a decree for Rs. 1,30,000/- against the defendants. The defendants in their written statement admitted that by virtue of an agreement date 07th April 1967 the plaintiff worked as their stockist-cum-distributor. After three years the defendants by application under order VI Rule 17 sought amendment of written statement by substituting paragraphs 25 and 26 with a new paragraph in which they took the fresh plea that plaintiff was mercantile agent cum-purchaser, meaning thereby they sought to go behind their earlier admission that plaintiff was stockist- cum-distributor. Such amendment was rejected by the Trial Court and the said rejection was affirmed by the High Court in Revision. The said decision of the High Court was upheld by this Court by observing as aforesaid. This decision of a Bench of three learned judges of this the written statement contains an admission in favour of the plaintiff, by amendment such admission of the defendants cannot be allowed to be withdrawn if such withdrawal would amount to totally displacing the case of the plaintiff and which would cause him irretrievable prejudice. Unfortunately the aforesaid decision of three member Bench of this Court was not brought to the notice of the Bench of two learned judges that decided the case in Akshaya Restaurant (supra). In the latter case it was observed by the Bench of two learned judges that it was settled law that even the admission can be explained and even inconsistent pleas could be taken in the pleadings. The aforesaid observations in the decision in Akshaya Restaurant (supra) proceed on an assumption tat it was the settled law that even the admission can be explained and even inconsistent pleas could be taken in the pleadings. However the aforesaid decision of the three member Bench of this Court in Modi Spinning (supra) is to the effect that while granting such amendments to written statement no inconsistent or alternative plea can be allowed which would displace the plaintiff’s case the cause him irretrievable prejudice.
  • … We were then taken to another decision of this Court in the case of Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahay and another [ 1984 (Supp.) SCC 594]. In that case the plaintiff was held entitled to amend his plaint by submitting that though earlier he stated that the defendant was uterine brother, the plaintiff by amendment in his plaint could submit that the defendant was his brother and the word ‘uterine’ could be dropped. Even in that case the main case put forward by the plaintiff did not get changed as the plaintiff wanted submit that the defendant was his brother. whether the was uterine brother or real brother was a question of decree and depended on the nature of evidence that may be led before the Court. Therefore, the deletion of word ‘uterine’ was not found to be displacing the earlier case of the plaintiff. On the facts of the present case also, therefore, the aid decision cannot be of any assistance to the learned counsel for respondents.
  • In our view, therefore, on the facts of this case and as discussed earlier, no case was made out by the respondents, contesting defendants, for amending the written statement and thus attempting to go behind their admission regarding 5 out of 7 remaining items out of 10 listed properties in Schedule-A of the plaint. However, so far as Schedule-B properties are concerned from the very inception the defendants’ case qua those properties was that plaintiff had no interest therein. By proposed amendment they wanted to introduce an event with reference to those very properties by submitting that they had been in possession of trespassers. Such amendment could not be said to have in any way adversely or prejudicially affected the case of the plaintiff or displaced any admission on their part qua Schedule-B properties which might have resulted into any legal right in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, so far as Schedule-B properties were concerned, the amendment could not be found fault with. Hence exercising the powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India we would not be inclined to interfere with that part of the decision of the High Court allowing the amendment in the written statement, even though strictly speaking High Court could not have interfered with even this part of the order under Section 115, CPC.

Erroneous Admissions & Earlier Findings -Effect

In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi, AIR 1960 SC 100, it was held further as under:

  • “In view of these admissions, the question of burden of proof, as we have already pointed out, is really academic, and if any burden lay upon any party, it was upon the appellant to displace by cogent and convincing evidence that these admissions were erroneous and need not be accepted in proof.”

S, 17, Evidence Act: No distinction – Admission in a pleading and other Admissions

In Basant Singh v. Janki Singh, AIR 1967 SC 341, 1967-1 SCR 1, it is observed as under:

  • “In Phipson on Evidence, 10th Edn, Art. 741, the English law is thus summarised:
    • “Pleadings, although admissible in other actions, to show the institution of the suit and the nature of the case put forward, are regarded merely as the suggestion of counsel, and are not receivable against a party as admissions, unless sworn, signed, or otherwise adopted by the party himself.”
  • Thus, even under the English law, a statement in a pleading sworn, signed or otherwise adopted by a party is admissible against him in other actions. In Marianski v. Cairns (1 Macq. 212 (H.L.).), the House of Lords decided that an admission in a pleading signed by a party was evidence against him in another suit not only with regard to a different subject-matter but also against a different opponent. Moreover, we are not concerned with the technicalities of the English law. Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes no distinction between an admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions. Under the Indian law, an admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits. In other suits, this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive, and it is open to the party to show that it is not true.”

Admission is Not Conclusive as to the Truth of the matter

In Kishori Lal v. Mr. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504, it was held that admissions were not conclusive and that the maker of the admissions is at liberty to prove that the admissions were made mistakenly or that the admissions were untrue, unless such admissions otherwise operate as estoppel. The Supreme Court also noticed in that case that admissions are mere pieces of evidence and that if the truth relating to the matter admitted is known to the parties, the admissions would not be considered as admissions in the true sense. In Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “An admission is not conclusive as to the truth of the matter stated therein. It is only a piece of evidence, the weight to be attached to which must depend on the circumstances under which it is made. It can be shown to be erroneous or untrue, so long as the person to whom it was made has not acted upon it to his detriment, when it might become conclusive by way of estoppel.”

Court’s Jurisdiction to Require to Prove an Admitted Document

In any case, besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts (Evidence Act, CPC and CrPC) shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove that document. We can see it in Sec. 58 of Evidence Act, Order XII, Rule 2A Proviso of the CPC and Sec. 294 of the CrPC .

Section 294 of Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

  • “294. No formal proof of certain documents. (1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document.
  • (2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government.
  • (3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed:
  • Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved.”

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Document Exhibited in the Writ Petition as ‘True Copy’ – Can it be Used as ‘Admission’, in a Civil Suit?

Saji Koduvath Advocate, Kottayam.

Taken from the Blog: Modes of Proof of Documents

Inquisition

Can a document exhibited in a writ petition as ‘true copy’ be marked in a civil court as ‘admission’ – producing the certified copy of the writ petition; for example:
(i) a letter written by the Petitioner (True Copy produced in the Writ Petition)
(ii) a letter or a private document obtained by him (apparently the original of the same is with the Petitioner)
(iii) a copy of a Public Document.

The Answer is:

  • Yes, it can be ‘marked’ as ‘admission’.
  • The existence of the contents of the first and third documents (letter written by the Petitioner and copy of a Public Document) can be ‘presumed’ by the court, against the petitioner, in a subsequent civil suit, under Sec. 114, Evidence Act (which lays down a rebuttable presumption).
    • Note:
    • 1. Sec. 58, Evidence Act says – Admitted facts need not be proved.
    • 2. Certified copy of a public document need not be proved by a witness – Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633.
    • 3. Even in a case where a document exhibited in the Certified Copy of the Writ Petition is marked in the civil court, if it falls under Sec. 65 (e) or (f) of the Evidence Act, it has to be ‘proved’ by producing a certified copy of the same, in view of the stringent directives in Sec. 65 (“In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible”.)
  • Though the existence of the second class of documents (a letter or a private document obtained to him – original of which are apparently with the Writ-Petitioner) can be presumed, if truth of contents of those documents is in question or denied the adverse party, it has to be proved independently .
    • Note: Proviso to Sec. 58 Evidence Act reads as under:
    • “Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.”
    • Also Note: Normally the documents relied of in the Writ petition will not be denied by the petitioner therein.

Certified copy of a public document need not be proved by a witness

In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa (P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta), AIR 1963 SC 1633, it is held as under:

  • “The document in question being a certified copy of a public document need not have been proved by calling a witness.”

See also:

  • State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, (1983) 3 SCC 118.

This proposition in Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633, is referred to in the following decisions:

  • Sarojini Amma v. Palace Administration Board, 2024 Ker 75727; 2024 KLT(Online) 2545; 2024-6 KLT(SN) 36,
  • Shail v. Nasib Khan, 2018-3 CGLJ 450 (Chh)
  • State of Gujarat v. Ashokkumar Lavjiram Joshi (J.B. Pardiwala, J), 2018-2 Glh 166 (Guj)
  • Raj Moti Dal Mills v. Sales Tax Officer (B. S. Chauhan and D. P. Gupta, JJ.), 2004-136 STC 576 (All)
  • United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hamu Ram, 2004 5 WLC 513 (Raj).

Admissions in the pleadings are Admissible Proprio Vigore

Admissions in the pleadings are admissible proprio vigore against the maker thereof.

  • See: Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India, AIR 2022 SC 5058;
  • National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rattani, (2009) 2 SCC 75
  • Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, 2009-5 SCC 713.
  • Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2009 SC 120; 2008-14 SCC 589.
  • Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash, 2008 15 SCC 673
  • State of Haryana v. M. P. Mohla (SB Sinha, J.), 2007-1 SCC 457
  • Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India, 2006 (12) SCC 233,

Judicial Admissions, Stand on a Higher Footing

Admissions in pleadings (in the same proceedings) are judicial admissions. They stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions.

  • They may give rise to ‘Foundation of Rights’.
  • They are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proofs.
  • Evidentiary admissions  (including that in the previous pleadings in the earlier proceedings) are not conclusive by themselves and they can be shown to be wrong.

In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Icharam, AIR 1974 SC 471, 1974-1 SCC 242, held that admissions in pleadings are judicial admissions under Section 58 of the Evidence Act. They are made by parties or their agents at or before the hearing of a case and stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. Former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proofs. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of parties. On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence are by themselves not conclusive and they can be shown to be wrong.

The propositions in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalptram Iccharam, 1974-1 SCC 242 (admissions in pleadings stand on higher footing and are admissible as per Section 58 of the Evidence Act) is referred to in the following decisions:

  • Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar, 2022-10 SCC 496,
  • Alagu Pharmacy v. N. Magudeswari, AIR 2018 SC 3821; 2018-8 SCC 311,
  • Ram Niranjan Kajaria v. Sheo Prakash Kajaria, 2015-10 SCC 203,
  • D. N. Jeevaraju v. D. Sudhakar, AIR 2011 SC 1158; 2010-14 SCC 69,
  • S. R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma, 2010-5 SCC 274,
  • Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (SB Sinha, J.), AIR 2005 SC 809; 2005-11 SCC 314,
  • Epoch Enterrepots v. M. V. Won Fu, AIR 2003 SC 24; 2003-1 SCC 305,
  • Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas, AIR 1993 SC 1449;
  • Arjun Khiamal Makhijani: Prithdayal Chetandas v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani, 1989-4 SCC 612,
  • Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, AIR 1987 SC 1986; 1987-4 SCC 1.

In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly, 2008-7 SCC 85, it is held, after considering various decisions including Panchdeo Narain Srivastava (1984-Supp. SCC 594.) and Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co. (AIR 1977 SC 680; 1976-4 SCC 320), as under:

  • “28. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other.” (Quoted in: Ram Niranjan Kajaria v. Sheo Prakash Kajaria, 2015-10 SCC 203; S. R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma, 2010-5 SCC 274, )

Judicial Admission must be in the very Same Litigation

In Umesh Agarwal v. Mahesh Agarwal (Sikkim), 06 Aug 2013, Indian Kanoon, Pius Kuriakose, CJ., held as under:

  • “42. A survey of the various decisions cited before me at the Bar, particularly, the judgment of the Supreme Court in
    • Karan Kapahi v. Lalchand Public Charitable Trust, AIR 2010 SC 2077, 
    • Basant Singh v. Janki Singh, AIR 1967 SC 341, 
    • Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, (1974) 1 SCC 242,
  • shows that the law contemplates two kinds of admissions – judicial admissions and evidentiary admissions. It is judicial admissions which are contemplated under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act. In order to that an admission is a judicial admission, the same has to be an admission through his pleadings or by other materials in writing produced in the very same litigationAll other admissions are evidentiary admissions. Judicial admissions stand on a higher pedestal than evidentiary admissions. Evidentiary admissions will have to be proved against the makers like any other relevant fact.” 

Court’s Jurisdiction to Require to Prove an Admitted Document

In any case, besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts (Evidence Act, CPC and CrPC) shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove that document. We can see it in Sec. 58 of Evidence Act, Order XII, Rule 2A Proviso of the CPC and Sec. 294 of the CrPC .

Section 294 of Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

  • “294. No formal proof of certain documents. (1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document.
  • (2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government.
  • (3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed:
  • Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

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Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

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Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

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Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

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“Title Thereto” in the Definition of ‘Prescriptive Easement’ in Sec. 15 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Sec. 15 Easement Act

Sec. 15 Easement Act reads as under:

  • “15. Acquisition by prescription: Where …… a right of way or any other easement has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming title thereto, as an easement and as of right, without interruption, and for twenty years, the right to such access and use of light or air, support, or other easement, shall be absolute.”

What does “claiming title thereto” refer to?

  • Answer: It is claiming of ‘title to (the legal right of) easement’.

Following decisions refer this proposition –

  • Ramlal v. Tulsi Ram, 2014-3 CGLJ 369 (Chh),
  • Deo Kumar v. Kailash Chand, 2007-4 MPHT 151; 2008-1 MPLJ 123,
  • Patel Karshanbhai Bababhai v. Patel Bhaichandbhai Khushalbhai, 21 Jun 2001 (Guj),
  • Unnikrishnan v. Ponnu Ammal, AIR 1999 Ker 405,
  • Ibrahimkutty Koyakutty v. Abdul Rahumankunju Ibrahimkutty (K.S. Paripoornan, J.), AIR 1993 Ker 91, 1992 (1) Ker LT 775,
  • D. Ramanatha Gupta v. S. Razaack, AIR 1982 Kar  314,
  • Surendrasingh v. Phirosahah, (Sinha C.J. & Hidayatullah, J.), AIR 1953 Nag. 205,
  • Siti Kantapal v. Radha Gobinda Sen, AIR 1929 Cal. 542,
  • Sultan Ahamed v. Waliullah, (1912) 17 Indian Cases 22.

Peacock in his treatise, “Law Relating to Easements in British India”, Third Edn., at page 608 said as under:

  • “As an easement is not one of the ordinary rights of ownership, it is necessary that either party claiming or relying on an easement should plead the nature of his title thereto so as clearly to show the origin of the right, whether it arises by statutory prescription, or express or implied grant, or the old common law method of a lost grant“.

Quoting Peacock, in Surendrasingh v. Phirosahah, (Sinha C.J. and Hidayatullah, J.), AIR 1953 Nag. 205, it is held as under:

  • “No doubt, the words ‘title thereto‘ refers tile of ‘easement’ claimed; and the word ‘title’ was not used in the general sense now used (that is, absolute ownership) in the Indian Easements Act, 1882.” (Quoted in: Ibrahimkutty Koyakutty v. Abdul Rahumankunju Ibrahimkutty (K.S. Paripoornan, J.), AIR 1993 Ker 91, 1992 (1) Ker LT 775.)

In Maharani Rajroop Koer v. Syed Abul Hossein, 1879-7 Ind. App. 240, the Privy Council, referring Sec. 27 of the Limitation Act, No. IX. of 1871, (similar to Sec. 15, Easements Act 1882) observed as under:

  • “The object of the statute was to make more easy the establishment of rights of this description, by allowing an enjoyment of twenty years, if exercised under the conditions prescribed by the Act, to give, without more, a title to easements.”

Gale on Easements (15th Edn.),Pages 415, reads as under:

  • “Under the present system of pleading, it is conceived that, whether the section be brought against the servient owner or a stranger, a party cannot safely allege his right to an easement generally, but should state specifically the manner in which he claims title to the easement, whether by grant (actual or lost), prescription at common law, or under the Prescription Act, and in many cases it is advisable to plead, alternatively, a title by all three methods.” (Quoted in: Ibrahimkutty Koyakutty v. Abdul Rahumankunju Ibrahimkutty (K.S. Paripoornan, J.), AIR 1993 Ker 91, 1992 (1) Ker LT 775.)

MullaCode of Civil Procedure (14th Edn.) Volume II, at page 986, states the law thus :

  • “Easement — A party claiming or relying on an easement should plead the nature of the title thereto, so as to clearly show the origin of the right, whether it arises by statutory prescription or express or implied grant, or the old common law method of a lost grant.”

Rent Control Acts

Rent Control Acts enacted by various States say – where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court.

It is definite that this provision does not speak about the “ownership”; but only ‘title as the landlord‘.

Conclusion

Though the word ‘title’ is now generally used to denote absolute ownership, in the Indian Easements Act, 1882, the phrase title thereto refers – the title to an easement.

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Can Documents be Marked In Cross Examination, if Witness Admits Them?

Jojy George Koduvath

The Answer is, YES.

Documents can be used in two ways in cross-examination. They are:

  • 1. For marking it, to use it as a substantive evidence.
    • Note: It must be a document that is produced in the regular way, invoking provisions of Orders VII, VIII or XIII, CPC.
  • 2. For the cross examination, invoking Sec. 145 of the Evidence Act.
    • Note: It can be done – even without producing the document in court. But, it must be a document written by the witness.

Relevant Provisions in the Civil Procedure Code for the Production of Documents

Order VII

  • Rule 14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.— (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
  • (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
  • (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
  • (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiffs witnesses, or handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.

Order VIII

  • Rule 1-A. Duty of defendant to produce documents upon which relief is claimed or relied upon by him.—(1) Where the defendant bases his defence upon a document or relies upon any document in his possession or power, in support of his defence or claim for set-off or counter-claim, he shall enter such document in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the written statement is presented by him and shall, at  the same time, deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the written statement.
  • (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the defendant, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
  •  (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the defendant under this rule, but, is not so produced shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
  • (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to documents —
    • (a) produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or
    • (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.

Order XIII

  • Rule 1. Original documents to be produced at or before the settlement of issues.—(1) The parties or their pleader shall produce on or before the settlement of issues, all the documentary evidence in original where the copies thereof have been filed along with plaint or written statement.
  • (2) The Court shall receive the documents so produced:
  • Provided that they are accompanied by an accurate list thereof prepared in such form as the High Court directs.
  • (3) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to documents—
    • (a) produced for the cross-examination of the witnesses of the other party; or
    • (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.

Inherent power u/s. 151 CPC  to be invoked if failure to produce documents before the Settlement of Issues

Documents liable to be produced along with Plaint (Order VII Rule 14) or Written Statement (Order VIII Rule 1-A(4) can be produced subsequently with the leave of the Court” as provided under these rules itself.

  • No such provision in Order XIII.
  • Therefore, inherent power u/s. 151 CPC has to be invoked.

Documents Produced for the Cross-Examination and used to Refresh his Memory

Relevant provisions of the Evidence Act are the following:

  • Cross examination – Sec. 145, Evid. Act
  • Refresh memory – Sec. 159, Evid. Act

Note: In both these cases, the statements in the document must be that of the witness.

If Witness Admits Document In Cross Examination, it can be Marked

Relevant provisions as to admission are Sec. 21 and 58 Evidence Act.

  • Section 21: Admission is relevant and may be proved.
  • Section 58: Facts admitted need not be proved.

A document properly produced invoking Order VII Rule 14 or Order VIII Rule 1-A(4) CPC or Order XIII Rule 1 CPC (or invoking inherent power u/s. 151 CPC) can be marked as an exhibit under Sec. 21 or 58 Evidence Act.

Following Decisions Say as to Valid Marking of Documents in Cross Examination

  • Trimurti Charitable Public Trust v. Muni Kumar Razdan, 2024-1 RN 25 (MP)
  • Bhag Singh Gambhir v. Rama Arora, on 8 July, 2022
  • S.  Raj v. S.  Gopalakrishnan 2022 Supreme(Mad) 831
  • Tamun Impex Company Private Limited v. Ozone Projects Private Limited, 2019-5 CTC 432; 2019 1 LW 29
  • Prabhakara Alias Suresh v. State of Karnataka, 2018-5 KarLJ 661
  • A.  Sennimalai Gounder v. E. S. Selambanan, 22 Aug 2017, 2017 Supreme (Mad) 1592;
  • Narayan Singh v. Ram Chandra Mandal, 2016-3 BLJ 248
  • Kannusamy Naicker v. Nataraja Naicker, 2012 Supreme(Mad) 3664
  • Bommanayaka v. Bommanayaka, 2013-3 AIR(Kar)(R) 299; ILR 2012 (Kar) 3391; 2013-2 KarLJ 114
  • Bharath Electronics Contract Labour Union v. Bharat Electronics Ltd, Bangalore, 2012-3 AIR(Kar)(R) 150; ILR 2012 (Kar) 1653; 2012-6 KarLJ 61.

In Prehlad Krishan v. Smt.  Mohini Devi, 1999-2 Raj CJ 282; 1999-1 RLR 518 (Raj), it was contended that no rent note was executed by the tenant in favour of the plaintiff though the plaintiff has got signature of defendant on a blank rent note. The High Court held that the argument, in its considered view, ‘is contrary to his own admission regarding execution of the rent note, which is a duly exhibited document on record of the trial Court during cross-examination of the tenant and, therefore, it is not open to the appellant to raise such a plea in second appeal before this Court’.

In Bhima Jewellery and Diamonds (P) Ltd.  v. O. Sandeep Kumar (Devan Ramachandran, J.), AIR 2021 Ker  8; 2020-3 ILR (Ker) 1028; 2020-5 KLT 40, it is held as under:

  • “28. In such confines, the production of a document under Order VII Rule 14(4), Order VIII Rule 1A (4) and Order XIII Rule 1(3)(a) of the CPC, axiomatically, will have to be construed to happen when it is physically put to the witness during cross examination and when the Court then receives it on record. Hence no Court can refuse a document being put to a witness during cross examination merely for the reason that it had not been produced earlier or not produced as per the manner in which it ought to have been normally produced.
  • 29.  Therefore so concluded, an adjunct question arises as to how the Trial Court should deal with a document produced at the cross examination of a witness. The answer to this is fairly easy when the witness admits the document – the Court then will mark it and admit it in evidence, subject to its relevance and probative value.”

In Chalil Kalliani v. Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan, 18 Jan 2008 (KT Sankaran, J.), 2008 Supreme (Ker) 43, it is held as under:

  • “It is relevant to note that Ext. B1 dated 7.5.1900 relied on by the defendants is also a registration copy of the original document. It was marked in evidence during the cross examination of PW1.”

Also Read:

End Notes 1

1. Document Marked Collectively in Cross Exam. – Contents are to be Specifically Proved

The substantial question of law raised in Mahalaxmi Shikshan Samiti v. Manikrao Kishnarao Dessai, 2021-5 AllMR 50; 2022-1 MhLJ 262, is the following:

  • “Whether the reliance by the First Appellate Court on the document marked at Exhibit 76 is erroneous when the contents of such document were not proved and such document was exhibited in the cross examination of PW 1 which is not permissible in law in the facts of the case?”

It is answered in the affirmative by holding, inter alia, that ‘the reliance by the Appellate Court on the documents marked as Exhibit 76-C collectively’ was erroneous, ‘since the contents of the documents are not proved’.

The Court pointed out –

  • Chapter V of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relate to documentary evidence.
  • Section 61, says that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence.
  • In terms of Section 62, primary evidence means the document itself being produced for inspection of the Court.
  • As per Section 63, secondary evidence means and includes, (1) Certified copies, (2) Copies made from the original by mechanical processes, and copies compared with such copies, and (3) Copies made from or compared with the original, (4) Counterparts of documents, and (5) Oral accounts of the contents of a document.
  • Section 64 mandates that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in cases fall under Sec. 65.
  • Section 65 stipulates the conditions in which the secondary evidence may be given. It requires that the ‘foundation’ is to be laid before production of secondary evidence.

The Bombay High Court further pointed out –

  • Mere production of the document is no proof of its contents as the legal position is that mere production and marking of the document as exhibit by the Court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents.
  • Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, by the evidence of those persons, who can vouch or state the truth of the facts in issue.
  • A document can be proved primarily by examining the person, who has executed or created the document by writing and signing the same, but when such examination is not possible, execution of a document can be proved by examining a person, who saw the document being written and signed.
  • In absence of direct evidence relating to writing and signature on the document, its execution may be proved by examining a person, who is (i) qualified and competent to express his opinion as to the handwriting and signature , (ii) by acquaintance of otherwise and (iii) by comparison of the handwriting as envisaged under Section 73 of the Evidence Act (S. Gopal Reddy V. State of A.P. 1996-4 SCC 596, referred to)

The High Court pointed out the following in Kaliya v. State of M.P. 2013-10 SCC 758, observing that it ‘highlighted the parameters regarding permissibility of secondary evidence’-

  • “Section 65(c) of the Act 1872 provides that secondary evidence can be adduced relating to a document when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason, not arising from his own default, or neglect, produce it in reasonable time. The court is obliged to examine the probative value of documents produced in court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence. (Vide: H. Siddiqui (dead) by Lrs. v. A. Ramalingam, AIR 2011 SC 1492; and Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal and Anr. v. M.S.S. Food Products, (2012) 2 SCC 196).
  • However, the secondary evidence of an ordinary document is admissible only and only when the party desirous of admitting it has proved before the court that it was not in his possession or control of it and further, that he has done what could be done to procure the production of it. Thus, the party has to account for the non-production in one of the ways indicated in the section. The party further has to lay down the factual foundation to establish the right to give secondary evidence where the original document cannot be produced. When the party gives in evidence a certified copy/secondary evidence without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, the opposite party must raise an objection at the time of admission. In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage. Further, mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. (Vide: The Roman Catholic Mission v. The State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1457; Marwari Khumhar and Ors. v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri and Anr., AIR 2000 SC 2629; R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple and Anr., AIR 2003 SC 4548; Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaff, AIR 2004 SC 4082; and Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr. v. Rampal Singh Bisen, (2010) 4 SCC 491).”

The High court relied on M.Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, 2010-9 SCC 712 which held as under:

  • “We do not agree with the reasoning of the High Court. It is true that a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of a document must adduce primary evidence of the contents, and only in the exceptional cases will secondary evidence be admissible. However, if secondary evidence is admissible, it may be adduced in any form in which it may be available, whether by production of a copy, duplicate copy of a copy, by oral evidence of the contents or in another form. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. It should be emphasized that the exceptions to the rule requiring primary evidence are designed to provide relief in a case where a party is genuinely unable to produce the original through no fault of that party.”

The Bombay High Court, in Mahalaxmi Shikshan Samiti v. Manikrao Kishnarao Dessai, 2021-5 AllMR 50; 2022-1 MhLJ 262, appraised the legal position authoritatively laying down as under:

  • “27. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. When a document is merely exhibited, while exhibiting the same, it does not finally decide the right of the party or form any opinion or express any opinion on the document. The document will have to be proved qua its contents in terms of Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act as the said provision contemplate proof of contents of the documents, either by primary or secondary evidence.”

End Notes 2

Can Photocopies of documents be used in cross examination?

Yes.

Document Marked Without Objection: Courts in India consistently follow RVE Venkatachala Gounder

RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu (R.C. Lahoti & Ashok Bhan, JJ.), AIR 2003 SC 4548: (2003) 8 SCC 752,considered the effect of marking a secondary evidence (photocopy of rent-note) without any objection. It is the well-established decisive leading decision in the following propositions of law.

  • Objection as to the irregularity of mode adopted for proving the document should be taken when the evidence is tendered;
  • Once the document has been marked as an exhibit, the objection cannot be allowed to be raised at any subsequent stage.
  • Failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of that right.
  • The objection enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility.
  • It is a rule of fair play for it would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect by giving formal proof of a document.

Following earlier decisions were relied on in RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu (supra) :

  • The Roman Catholic Mission v. The State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1457;
  • Padman and Others v. Hanwanta, AIR 1915 PC 111;
  • P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S.Perumal, 1972 (2) SCR 646.

RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu (supra) held as under:

  • “17. The other document is the rent note executed by Defendant 2 in favour of the plaintiff. Here also the photocopy of the rent note was produced. Defendant 2 when in the witness box was confronted with this document and he admitted to have executed this document in favour of the plaintiff and also admitted the existence of his signature on the document. It is nobody’s case that the original rent note was not admissible in evidence. However, secondary evidence was allowed to be adduced without any objection and even in the absence of a foundation for admitting secondary evidence having been laid by the plaintiff.
  • 18. …
  • 19. ….
  • 20. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has relied on Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1457] in support of his submission that a document not admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the abovesaid case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as “an exhibit”, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly,  in the event of finding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiverof the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior court.
  • 23. Since documents Exts. A-30 and A-34 were admitted in evidence without any objection, the High Court erred in holding that these documents were inadmissible being photocopies, the originals of which were not produced.”

RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu, AIR 2003 SC 4548: (2003) 8 SCC 752, is referred to and quoted with approval in the following decisions:

Lachhmi Narain Singh v. Sarjug Singh, AIR 2021 SC 3873;
Sonu @ Amar Vs State Of Haryana, 2017 AIR SC 3441; 2017-8 SCC 570;
Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta v. New Era Fabrics Pvt.  Ltd., 2015-9 SCC 755;
Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd.  v. Surendra Oil & Dal Mills, 2010-8 SCC 423;
Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Sukumar Mukherjee, 2009-9 SCC 221;
Directorate of Revenue v. Mohammed Nisar Holia, 2008 2 SCC 370;
Dayamathi Bai v. K. M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082; 2004-7 SCC 107.

See: Anil Madan vs R.K.Madan & Ors. on 21 August, 2009 (Indian Kanoon). In this decision the plaintiff was confronted with a photocopy of an affidavit jointly executed by the plaintiff, defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 which had been exhibited.

Read Blogs:

Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents – Not applied

1. Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745

  • This proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was neither attracted nor applied in Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2003-8 SCC 745, for – the rent receipts were taken as proved, for, it was not disputed’ by the other side.

2. Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh2013-10 SCC 758

  • In Kaliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh2013-10 SCC 758, also the proposition was neither attracted nor applied, for – the secondary evidence of dying declaration produced in this case (with foundational evidence) was accepted by the Court.

3. Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085

  • In Ramji Dayawala v. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, also the proposition was neither attracted nor applied  for the  truth of the facts in the document was in issue.

Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents – Applied

1. M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, 2010-9 SCC 712

  • But in M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, 2010-9 SCC 712, the proposition (Mere Marking Does Not Prove the Contents) was applied for – the Validity and Genuineness of the photocopy (of the Caste Certificate) was very much in question.

2. H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240

  • In H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240, also the proposition was applied , for – the photocopy was shown to the witness during cross-examination alone, and signature alone was admitted by the witness. 

3. Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865

  • Similarly in Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865, also the proposition was applied , for – the accounts of the Plaintiff would not be proved by itself.

End Notes 3

Exhibiting of a document is an administrative act.

In Bama Kathari Patil v. Rohidas Arjun Madhavi, 2004-2 AllMR 290; 2004-3 BomCR 509; 2004-3 CivCC 14; 2004-2 MhLJ 572, it is observed as under:

  • “3. By an application dated 20th October, 2003, the petitioner (original defendant No. 1) made a prayer for recalling the plaintiff for further cross-examination on the ground that the agreement dated 14th August, 1986 was exhibited after the cross-examination of the plaintiff was concluded. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that as the document was not exhibited at the time of cross-examination, the defendant No. 1 did not cross examine the plaintiff on that document. Since the document has been exhibited after the cross-examination of the plaintiff was over, he should be given an opportunity of cross-examining the plaintiff regarding the said document. Exhibiting of an document is an administrative act. It is true that a document which is produced in Court is ordinarily exhibited only after its proof. But, exhibiting a document does not mean that the document is proved and non-exhibiting a document does not mean that the document is not proved. A document is required to be proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. Merely for administrative convenience of locating or identifying a document, it is given an Exhibit number in courts. Exhibiting a document has nothing to do with the proof though, as a matter of convenience, only the proved documents are exhibited.”

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Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India