Section 202 CrPC Enquiry

Taken from: What is COGNIZANCE and Application of Mind by a Magistrate

Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract

               •➧ The CrPC empowers the Magistrate to order/direct investigation (by police) under the following provisions-
                             • 1. S. 155(2) – non-cognizable cases,
                             • 2. S. 156(3) – cognizable cases, 
                            •3. S. 202(1) – for deciding whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding. [Note: S. 173(8) allows (only) the police to make further investigation.]

               •➧ The CrPC does not give powers to the Magistrate to “monitor” the investigation. (If it was really intended, or the scheme of the CrPC was, to convey such a ‘wide power’ to the Magistrate, it would have been stated in the Code itself.)

               •➧ Once a Final Report is filed by the police, ‘further investigation’ can be ordered by the Magistrate, only u/S. 202 CrPC. It cannot be made under Sec. 156(3) or Sec. 173(8). Because, Sec. 156(3) deals with the power of Magistrate to direct (only once) investigation of cognizable offences by police; and, Sec. 173(8)  authorises (only) the police to make further investigation.

               •➧ Once a Final Report is filed, the Magistrate has to apply his mind – to decide whether to do with it (that is, to issue summons/warrant under Sec. 204) or not. At this stage, if the Magistrate finds it proper to take further evidence or conduct further investigation, he has to invoke Sec. 202 (and, he cannot go back to Sec. 156).
It is for the following –
*(i) after getting the police report, the magistrate has to take cognizance of offences, under Sec. 190, if he decides to proceed against the accused.
*(ii) after taking cognizance on a police report, if the Magistrate finds it proper to take further evidence or conduct further investigation (to decide whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against accused), only enabling provision in the CrPC is Sec. 202.
*(iii) after taking cognizance, the Magistrate cannot go back to the pre-cognisance stage, Sec. 156(3).
*(iv) Sec. 202 expressly provides for taking further evidence or conducting further investigation by the Magistrate, after taking cognizance on a police report also.
[Note: It is not confined to “Complaint”. The term used is not mere “complaint”. It can also be a ‘complaint of an offence’ in a Charge also. It is clear from the words in Sec. 202 – “on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance the Magistrate can ‘either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer'” ]

               •➧ S. 202 says – ‘Complaint of an offence’, includes one that is made over to the Magistrate under S. 192. It takes-in Police Report. Therefore, it is further clear – “complaint of an offence” is used [in S. 202] in a wider sense; and not confined to “Complaint”..

               •➧ Power of Magistrate under S. 156(3) is limited, for he cannot travel into the arena of merit of the case (it is to be done in trial).  Similarly, the scope of S. 202 is also limited for it is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed – that is, if there is a ‘prima facie’ ground, then the Magistrate can (or has to) proceed under Sec. 204.
               
               •➧ From the aforesaid propositions it is definite that the Magistrate cannot ‘Return’ a Final Report, to police, for ‘reinvestigation’ or ‘further investigation’, invoking Sec. 156(3).

               •➧ The Code does not allow or require the Magistrate to “give directions” or to “monitor” the investigation (while it is done by the police).

               •➧ But, Contra View in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., 2008-2 SCC 409. It is held that the Magistrate has very wide powers to ensure a proper investigation and for this purpose he can monitor the investigation. This decision is followed in subsequent decisions – Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat (RF Nariman, J.), AIR 2019 SC  5233, Union Public Service Commission v. S. Papaiah,  1997-7 SCC 614, etc., to observe that Magistrate could, under Section 173(8) CrPC, direct ‘further investigation’.

Section 202 CrPC Enquiry

The Sec. 202 enquiry can be by –

  • the Magistrate himself – who takes cognisance of an offence
    • (upon a complaint or
    • police report or
    • upon his own knowledge)
  • or any Magistrate subordinate to him,
  • or by a police officer,
  • or by such other person as he thinks fit.

Purpose of Sec. 202 enquiry

  • The purpose is – “deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.”

In Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan, 2006-1 SCC (Cri.) 460 laid down the relevant principles under Sec. 202 as under:

  • “9. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A reading of Section 202(1) of the Code makes the position clear that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Section 202(1) i.e. “or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.”
  • 10. This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him.”

In Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah, AIR 1964 SC 1541, it is observed as under:

  • “.. . when on a petition of complaint being filed before him a Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under the various provisions of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he must be held to have taken cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint. When however he applies his mind not for such purpose but for purposes of ordering investigation under s. 156(3) or issues a search warrant for the purpose of investigation he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. It was so held by this Court in R.R. Chari v. State of U. P. and again in Gopal Das v. State of, Assam. In the case before us the Magistrate after receipt of Bhadai Sah’s complaint proceeded to examine him under s. 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section itself states that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint shall at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath. This examination by the Magistrate under s. 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure puts it beyond doubt that the Magistrate did take cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint. After completing such examination and recording the substance of it to writing as required by s. 200 the Magistrate could have issued process at once under s. 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or could have dismissed the complaint under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was also open to him, before taking either of these courses, to take action under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Scope of 202 Enquiry -“Ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint”

In Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah, AIR 1964 SC 1541, it is observed further as under:

  • “That section (s. 202) empowers the Magistrate to “postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of persons complained against, and either enquire into the case himself or if he is a Magistrate other than a Magistrate of the third class, direct an enquiry or investigation to be made by any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by a police officer, or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint.”

In Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar, AIR 1960 SC 1113, also it was observed that the purpose of Section 202 of CrPC was to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint for ascertaining whether there was a sufficient evidence available in support of issuance of the summoning order.

Not Proper to Order to “Institute a Case” under Sec. 202 (Only Investigation)

In Anand Kumar Pandey v. State of U. P. , 2020-1 All.CR 899, it is found as under:

  • If and when such investigation or inquiry is ordered the result of the investigation or inquiry has to be taken into consideration before the Magistrate takes any action under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • We find that in the case before us the Magistrate after completing the examination under s. 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and recording the substance of it made the order in these words :–
    • “Examined the complaint on s.a. The offence is cognizable one. To S.I. Bakunthpur for instituting a case and report by 12.12.56.”
  • If the learned Magistrate had used the words “for investigation” instead of the words “for instituting a case” the order would clearly be under s. 202(1) the Code of Criminal Procedure. We do not think that the fact that he used the words “for instituting a case” makes any difference. It has to be noticed that the Magistrate was not bound to take cognizance of the offences on receipt of the complaint. He could have, without taking cognizance, directed an investigation of the case by the police under s. 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Once however he took cognizance he could order investigation by the police only under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not under s. 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As it is clear here from the very fact that he took action under s. 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that he had taken cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint, it was open to him to order investigation only under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not under s. 156(3) of the Code. It would be proper in these circumstances to hold that though the Magistrate used the words “for instituting a case” in this order of November 22, 1956 he was actually taking action under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that being the only section under which he was in law entitled to act.”

Police Investigation u/Sec. 156(3) & 202(1) – Two Operate in Distinct Spheres;

Section 202 is Not to initiate a Fresh Case on Police Report – Only to see “Sufficient Ground to proceed”

In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, (1976) 3 SCC 252, it is pointed out as under:

  • “17. Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption: “Information to the Police and their powers to investigate”; while Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading: “Of complaints to Magistrates”.
  • The power to order police investigation under Section 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by Section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the precognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made under sub- section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or charge-sheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section an investigation “for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding”. Thus the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him.” This judgment was then followed in Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh (1977) 4 SCC 459 at paragraphs 11 and 15.” (Quoted in Anand Kumar Pandey v. State Of U. P. , 2020-1 All.CR 899)

Final Report under Sec. 173 and Cognizance by the Magistrate

  • On getting the 156(3) Order, the police will register an FIR and investigate the matter.
  • Finally, the police submits a report under Section 173(2).
  • On receiving the police report the Magistrate –
    • (a) takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(c) and issue process to the accused – even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out. [Note: Magistrate takes cognizance, not because he is bound by the Sec. 173 Police Report; but, because – on ‘application of judicial mind‘ on the Report, the Magistrate finds it proper “to proceed” under 204.]
    • (b) proceeds to act under Section 200, by taking cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint originally submitted to him, and proceed to record the statement upon oath of the complaint and the witnesses present and thereafter decide whether the complaint should be dismissed or process should be issued.
    • (c) takes further evidence or conduct further investigation, under Sec. 202 (he cannot go back to 156(3) – pre cognisance stage) to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed.
    • (d) drops the proceedings if it is satisfied (on applying his judicial mind – without regard to the opinion on the police officer as to grounds to ‘proceed’ against the accused) that there is no sufficient material to take cognizance of the offence.

In India Carat Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka, 1989 (2) SCC 132, it is observed as under:

  • “13. From the provisions referred to above, it may be seen that on receipt of a complaint a Magistrate has several courses open to him…..  …… … …Yet another course open to the Magistrate is that instead of taking cognizance of the offence and following the procedure laid down under Section 200 or Section 202, he may order an investigation to be made by the police under Section 156(3). When such an order is made, the police will have to investigate the matter and submit a report under Section 173(2). On receiving the police report the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(c) and issue process straightaway to the accused. The Magistrate may exercise his powers in this behalf irrespective of the view expressed by the police in their report whether an offence has been made out or not. This is because the police report under Section 173(2) will contain the facts discovered or unearthed by the police as well as the conclusion drawn by the police therefrom. If the Magistrate is satisfied that upon the facts discovered or unearthed by the police there is sufficient material for him to take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the Magistrate may do so without reference to the conclusion drawn by the Investigating Officer because the Magistrate is not bound by the opinion of the police officer as to whether an offence has been made out or not. Alternately the Magistrate, on receiving the police report, may without issuing process or dropping the proceeding proceed to act under Section 200 by taking cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint originally submitted to him and proceed to record the statement upon oath of the complaint and the witnesses present and thereafter decide whether the complaint should be dismissed or process should be issued.”

Magistrate has to independently apply his mind on a final report

A Magistrate can, independently apply his mind to a police report. He is not bound to follow the procedure under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance. (It is, however, open to the Magistrate to do so: Vishnu Kumar Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2019 SC 3482; 2019-8 SCC 27). It is held in Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 7 SCC 768as under:

  • “6. There is no provision in the Code to file a protest petition by the informant who lodged the first information report. But this has been the practice. Absence of a provision in the Code relating to filing of a protest petition has been considered. This Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267 : AIR 1985 SC 1285] stressed on the desirability of intimation being given to the informant when a report made under Section 173(2) is under consideration. The Court held as follows: (SCC p. 542, para 4)
  • “There can, therefore, be no doubt that when, on a consideration of the report made by the officer in charge of a police station under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173, the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process. We are accordingly of the view that in a case where the Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the first information report, the Magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report.” (Quoted in: Vishnu Kumar Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2019 SC 3482; 2019-8 SCC 27)

Enquiry under Section 202 is extremely limited

The Supreme Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra,  2013-14 SCC 44, observed as under:

  • “At the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to “Prima Facie satisfy” whether there are “sufficient grounds to proceed” against the accused and it is not the province of the Magistrate to enquire into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely limitedin the sense that the Magistrate, at this stage, is expected to examine prima facie the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint.”

In Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P., 2001(2) S.C.C. 628, the Supreme Court observed as under:

  • “Section 156, falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of the Police Officers to investigate cognizable offences. Section 202 which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to “direct an investigation by a Police Officer”. But the investigation envisaged in section 202 is different from the investigation contemplated in section 156 of the Code. The significant point to be noticed is that when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence. A Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A reading of section 202(1) Cri.P.C. would convince that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a Police Officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further.”

Magistrate can take cognizance even if police report is – no case made out

In Jitender Mehta v. Shivani Mehta, (M.K. Hanjura, J.), AIR OnLine 2018 J & K 546;  2018 Kash LJ 918, it is held as under:

  • “23. The position is, thus, clear that when a Magistrate receives police report under Section 173(2), he is entitled to take cognizance of an offence even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. The Magistrate can take into account the statements of the witnesses examined by the police during the investigation and other material collected during investigation and form his own opinion independently without being bound by the conclusions arrived at by the investigating agency and take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code and direct the issue of process to the accused.”

Magistrate cannot use any material other than Police investigation recordsMagistrate to follow the Procedure under Sec. 200 and 202

In Jitender Mehta v. Shivani Mehta, AIR OnLine 2018 J & K 546;  2018 Kash LJ 918, it is also held as under:

  • “However, the Magistrate cannot make use of any material or evidence other than the investigation records while acting under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code. If he chooses to make use of any materials other than the investigation records, he will have to follow the procedure laid down in relation to complaint cases, on the basis of original complaint or application moved under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. which otherwise tantamount to complaint or the Protest petition filed against acceptance of final report treating the same as complaint.
  • This proposition would be in consonance with the provision of Section 207 which inter-alia provides for supply of copy of statements recorded under Sub-section (3) of Section 161 of all persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses and any other document or relevant extract thereof forwarded to the Magistrate with the police report under Sub-section (5) of Section 173.”

Standard of Proof of Evidence at Sec. 202-Stage

  • The complaint filed by a private party can be dismissed by the learned Magistrate under Section 203 Cr.P.C., if he thinks that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. While exercising his discretionary powers, the Magistrate should not allow himself to evaluate and appreciate the sworn statements recorded by him under Section 202 Cr.P.C. All that he could do would be, to consider as to whether there is a Prima Facie case for a criminal offence, which, in his judgment, would be sufficient to call upon the alleged offender to answer. At the stage of Section 202 Cr.P.C. enquiry, the standard of proof which is required finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise should not be applied at the initial stage. [Ponnal @ Kalaiyarasi v. Rajamanickam, 1998 Cri LJ 4333; 1998 (4) Crimes 543 (Mad)]

Accused has no right of hearing until Issueance of Process

In Manharibhai Mujlibhai Kakadia v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel, 2012-10 SCC 517, it is observed as under:

  • “46. The legal position is fairly well-settled that in the proceedings Under Section 202 of the Code the accused/suspect is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not. As a matter of law, upto the stage of issuance of process, the accused cannot claim any right of hearing. Section 202 contemplates postponement of issue of process where the Magistrate is of an opinion that further inquiry into the complaint either by himself is required and he proceeds with the further inquiry or directs an investigation to be made by a Police Officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. If the Magistrate finds that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint and dismisses the complaint under Section 203 of the Code, the question is whether a person accused of crime in the complaint can claim right of hearing in a revision application preferred by the complainant against the order of the dismissal of the complaint. The Parliament being alive to the legal position that the accused/suspects are not entitled to be heard at any stage of the proceedings until issuance of process Under Section 204, yet in Section 401(2) of the Code provided that no order in exercise of the power of the revision shall be made by the Sessions Judge or the High Court, as the case may be, to the prejudice of the accused or the other person unless he had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence.”
  • See contra view below.

Contra View – Once a Final Report (favourable to Accused), Accused be heard before rejecting it

Though accused has no right of hearing until Issue of Process, as shown above, in Jitender Mehta v. Shivani Mehta, AIR OnLine 2018 J & K 546;  2018 Kash LJ 918, it is held as under:

  • “25. The learned counsel for the petitioner has energetically argued that the impugned order dated 25th November 2006 was passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. His submission is that once there is a Final Report, then, before the Magistrate rejects the same, he must hear the accused. In this connection it may be mentioned that the Supreme Court in Bhagwant v. Commissioner, AIR. 1985 SC 1285, has held that prior to accepting the Final Report, a notice must be given to the first informant or a person aggrieved and such a person must be heard. The ratio of the said decision will be applicable to a contrary case as well, like the present one. In the present case, the petitioner is an accused in a case in which a Final Report has been submitted. His grievance, and rightly so, is that before rejecting the Final Report he should have been heard. It is true that there is no statutory provision that before rejecting the Final Report the Magistrate must hear the accused but there is also no statutory requirement that before accepting the Final Report the complainant should be heard. If it is held that before accepting the Final Report the complainant must be heard, then it cannot be understood by what logic the accused should be denied a right of hearing before the Final Report is rejected. The same principle should apply to the complainant and the accused alike.”
  • 26. The Supreme Court in recent years has been steadily widening the scope of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
  • In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 (which is a Seven Judge Constitution Bench decision) the Supreme Court has emphasised that even where there is no specific statutory requirement the principles of natural justice may apply. It has been also held that the procedure for depriving a man of his life and liberty must be fair, reasonable and just. Similarly, in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1825 it was held by the Supreme Court that “every facet of the law which deprives a person of life or personal liberty would therefore have to stand the test of reasonableness, fairness and justice in order to be outside the inhibition of Article 21”. Having said so, once a Final Report is submitted, then before its rejection the accused should be heard, for, it may be that he may be able to persuade the Magistrate that the Final Report was justified and no case is made out against him. It will be unfair to hear only the person filing the protest petition but not the accused. Where a protest petition is filed against a Final Report, both the parties should be heard as that procedure would be fair to the accused and the complainant and hence in accordance with the trend of the decisions of the Supreme Court (from Maneka Gandhi’s case onwards) in which the scope of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution has been greatly expanded and it has been laid down that the procedure should be just, fair and reasonable. Once a final report is filed it is only fair and reasonable that the accused should be heard before rejecting the Final Report and taking cognizance. I do not mean to say that cognizance cannot be taken on the basis of the final report. The Supreme Court in M/s India Carat Pvt. Ltd. case (supra) has held that this can be done. But fairness demands that this should be done only after hearing the accused, otherwise the accused may be put to unnecessary harassment.

Magistrate takes a judicial decision on the Final Report

Jitender Mehta v. Shivani Mehta, AIR OnLine 2018 J & K 546;  2018 Kash LJ 918, continued as under:

  • “27. It may not be out of place to mention here that the Constitution of the India is the supreme law of the land and the provisions in the criminal statutes must be read and interpreted not in isolation but in the light of the constitutional provisions as interpreted by the Supreme Court. If upon an investigation, it appears to the officer-in-charge of the police station or to the police officer making the investigation that there is not sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, if such person is in custody, release him and the Final Report can be filed before the Magistrate. It is true that the Final Report is not binding on the Magistrate and if the Magistrate differs from the opinion of the I.O., he can take the cognizance or order for the further investigation, but that action of the Magistrate is a judicial action and at that stage while taking decision on the Final Report the Magistrate has to act judicially as a Court. The Magistrate is required to weigh the prima facie evidence and take a judicial decision.”

Complaint can be dismissed under Section 203 Cr.P.C.

The complaint filed by a private party can be dismissed by the Magistrate under Section 203 Cr.P.C., if he thinks that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding.

Further investigation by Police and Magistrate’ Order under 156(3)

Under Section 202 the Magistrate has power to order ‘further investigation’.

Under 173(8) of the CrPC, a police officer can carry on ‘further investigation’.

But our Apex Court held in Pramod Kumar v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 INSC 120, (Rajesh Bindal, Vijay Bishnoi, JJ.) while considering whether the police/investigating agency can conduct further investigation under Section 173(8) of CrPC (also refer to Section 193(9) of BNSS) without obtaining the leave of the Magistrate/ Court concerned, referring Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762 and  Peethambaran Versus State Of Kerala & Anr., reported in the (2024) 16 SCC 65, it was held – No.

The Apex Court, in Pramod Kumar v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 INSC 120, referred Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537, (as quoted in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762), which reads as under:

  • “In this very judgment, this Court, while noting that although there is no explicit mandate under Section 173(8) CrPC to seek the leave of the Court before conducting further investigation, nevertheless, over time, a practice has been developed to seek permission of the Court. Therefore, the practice of seeking the leave of the Court will have to be read into the provisions of Section 173(8), and it is essentially a prerequisite for directing further investigation.” 

Police should seek formal permission from the Court as held in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762, for further investigation.

No conflict with the power of the police to investigate further in light of Section 173(8) of the CrPC, and the Magistrate’s power to order further investigation under Section 202 of the CrPC and therefore the Magistrate can order reopening of the investigation, under Section 173(8).

Magistrate has three options – on receipt of a final (refer) report under Section 173:  

  • to accept the report and close the case,
  • disagree with the report and proceed with the case (under Section 202 CrPC),
  • order further investigation (under Section 202).

Order Further investigation – possible, under S. 173(8)

In Union Public Service Commission v. S. Papaiah, (1997) 7 SCC 614, it was held as under:

  • “The Magistrate could, thus in exercise of the powers under Section 173(8) CrPC direct the CBI to “further investigate” the case and collect further evidence keeping in view the objections raised by the appellant to the investigation and the “new” report to be submitted by the investigating officer would be governed by sub-sections (2) to (6) of Section 173 CrPC.”. (quoted in: Central Bureau Of India v. Hemendhra Reddy  (Surya Kant, J.B. Pardiwala, jj.)

It appears that this power to order ‘further investigation’ is under Sec. 202, and not under Sections 173(8) or 156, for the following reasons.

  • The CrPC does not give a power to the Magistrate to “monitor” the investigation. (If it was really intended, or the scheme was, to convey a ‘wide power’ including monitoring, it would have been stated in the Code itself.)
  • The power of Magistrate to order ‘further investigation’ is only in Sec. 202 CrPC.
    • Note: Sec. 156(3) deals with the power of Magistrate to direct investigation of cognizable offences by police.
    • Sec. 173(8) does not authorise the Magistrate to make an order for further investigation. (It authorises the the police officer alone.)
  • The power for ‘Ordering Proper Investigation’ (by police) may be a matter for the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The ‘grievance’ on investigation cannot be slipped-down to a magistrate, as laid down in Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage (2016- 6 SCC 277) as an ‘alternate remedy’.
  • The Magistrate derives powers to deal with (or take cognizance of) the facts which constitute an offence, under Clauses (a) to (c) of Sec. 190(1) of the CrPC. It is on the following –
    • (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;
    • (b) upon a police report of such facts;
    • (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.
  • Once a Final Report is filed, the Magistrate has to apply his mind – to decide whether to proceed with it (that is, to issue summons/warrant under Sec. 204) or not. At this stage, if the Magistrate finds it proper to take further evidence or conduct further investigation, he has to invoke Sec. 202 (and, he cannot go back to Sec. 156).
    It is for the following –
    (i) after getting the police report, the magistrate has to take cognizance of offences, under Sec. 190, if he decides to proceed.
    (ii) after taking cognizance on a police report, if the Magistrate finds it proper to take further evidence or conduct further investigation (to decide whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against accused), only enabling provision in the CrPC is Sec. 202.
    (iii) after taking cognizance, the Magistrate cannot go back to the pre-cognisance stage, Sec. 156(3).
    (iv) Sec. 202 expressly provides for taking further evidence or conducting further investigation by the Magistrate, after taking cognizance on a police report also.
    [ Note: It is not confined to “Complaint”. The term used is not mere “complaint”. It can also be a ‘complaint of an offence’ in a Charge also. It is clear from the words in Sec. 202 – “on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance the Magistrate can ‘either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer'” ]
  • Under Sec. 202, the Magistrate is required to act upon “receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under Sec. 192“; and he can exercise following powers –
    • “enquire into the case himself or
    • ordering further investigation, through police or any other person”
  • Note: Sec. 192 is in Chapter XIV, Conditions Requisite for Initiation of Proceedings; and Sec. 202 is in Chapter XV, Complaints to Magistrates. But, Sec. 202 deals with a matter “made over to him under Sec. 192“. It can include a Police Report.
    • Therefore, it is clear that the “Receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance” [in Sec. 202] is used in wider sense. It includes Police Report (See: Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, (1976) 3 SCC 252).
    • Sec. 192 says: “Any Chief Judicial Magistrate may, after taking cognizance of an offence, makeover the case for enquiry or trial to any competent Magistrate …” (It is not ‘Complaint’ alone.)
  • In other words, ‘complaint of an offence’, made over to him under section 192“, stated in Sec. 202, being refers to a Police Report (made over) also, it is clear – “complaint of an offence” [in Sec. 202] is used in a wider sense (and it is noteworthy – the term used is not mere “complaint”).
  • Therefore, Magistrate can ‘enquire into the case himself’ or ‘order further investigation’, under Sec. 202, upon a police report (on which cognizance is taken). It can be on both Refer Report or Charge under Sec. 173.
  • Once a Final Report is filed, the Magistrate has to apply his mind, under Sec. 204 – to decide to proceed with it or not. If the Magistrate finds it proper to take further evidence or conduct further investigation, only provision for the same is Sec. 202; he cannot go back to 156(3) – pre cognisance stage as held in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, (1976) 3 SCC 252.
  • There is no specific provision that allows the Magistrate to give specific directions as to investigation (to police) in ‘further investigation‘ also.
  • In short, the Code does not allow or direct the Magistrate to “give directions” or to “monitor” the investigation (while it is done by the police).

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Substantive Rights and Mistakes & Procedural Defects in Judicial Proceedings

Jojy George Koduvath

Procedure – a Handmaid;  Just Relief Cannot be Refused because of Mistake

In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal, (1969) 1 SCC 869 our Apex Court held, while dealing with amendment of pleadings, as under:

  • “5. …. Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the Rules of procedure. (Quoted in Varun Pahwa v. Renu Chaudhary, AIR 2019 SC 1186)

Procedural defects should not be allowed to defeat Substantive Rights

In Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, (2006) 1 SCC 75, our Apex  Court held that procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice by any oppressive or punitive use. The Court held as under:-

  • “17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice.
  • Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well-recognised exceptions to this principle are:
  • .(i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of non- compliance;
  • (ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
  • (iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
  • (iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court;
  • (v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.” (Quoted in Varun Pahwa v. Renu Chaudhary, AIR 2019 SC 1186).

Adjudication is to Render Justice; it is Unmindful of Consequences

It was held by the Kerala High Court in Gopalakrishnan v. Joint Registrar of Co operative Societies (General), 08 Dec 2015, (Dama Seshadri Naidu, J) as under:

  • “23. I am very conscious that this Court, as a constitutional adjudicatory machinery, is called upon to interpret the statute straight and simple and render justice. Justice is not an inventive judicial instrument; it is rather a necessary corollary to the judicious application of the law to the facts following certain accepted cannons of construction of the statutes and the Constitution, too. The whole process is compendiously called judicial adjudication. Trite is the truth that adjudication is unmindful of consequences; it is, on the other hand, in the legislative wisdom to consider all the eventualities and bring about legislation or legislative changes to see that the varied needs of the organisations and institutions, including the administrative agencies, are best served—adverse fallout on the application of law is avoided.

Suit in the name of ‘Wrong’ Plaintiff, out of Inadvertent Mistake

In Varun Pahwa v. Renu Chaudhary, AIR 2019 SC 1186, the plaint was not properly drafted in as much as in the memo of parties, the Plaintiff is described as ‘Varun Pahwa through Director of Siddharth Garments Pvt. Ltd.’; it should have been ‘Siddharth Garments Pvt. Ltd. through its Director Varun Pahwa’. It was an inadvertent mistake of the counsel.  Supreme Court [after referring State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Limited Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal, (1969) 1 SCC 869 and Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, (2006) 1 SCC 75], permitted the Company to correct the mistake.

Amendments allowed, if no injustice to the other side

In State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Limited, (2010) 4 SCC 518, Supreme Court held as under:-

  • “17. Insofar as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) is concerned, Order 6 Rule 17 provides for amendment of pleadings. It says that the court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.
  • 18. The matters relating to amendment of pleadings have come up for consideration before the courts from time to time. As far back as in 1884 in Clarapede & Co. v. Commercial Union Assn. (1883) 32 WR 262 (CA)  – an appeal that came up before the Court of Appeal, Brett M.R. stated:
  • “… The rule of conduct of the court in such a case is that, however negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs; but, if the amendment will put them into such a position that they must be injured, it ought not to be made….”

Mistakes Carried into Decrees

In Aliyar v. Raju V. Vayalat, 2016-1 KHC 763; 2016-1 KLJ 799; 2016-2 KLT 656, it is observed as under:

  • “It is needless to restate that the courts exercising power under the Act (Specific Relief Act, 1963) have both legal and equitable jurisdictions. It is common knowledge that in our country we do not have Courts of Equity and Law Courts separately. The Act confers equitable jurisdiction on the Civil Courts for granting specific relief.” (Quoted in: George, v.  Annakutty, ILR 2017-4 Ker 839; 2017-4 KHC 742; 2017-4 KerLT 553)

“Accidental slips or omissions may arise in the following circumstances –

  • .(1) In cases of suits based upon mortgage, sale, exchange, lease or agreement to purchase, survey numbers may be given correctly in the document anterior to the suit but a wrong survey number may be incorporated in the schedules by mistakes. Which mistakes may be carried into the decree schedules as well.
  • (2) In the above cases, even in the original document on the basis of which the suit is filed, there may be a mistake in regard to the survey numbers, though the extent and boundaries of the land belonging to the parties may be correctly described, and the same wrong survey number may be carried into the plaint schedules and as a consequences into the decree schedulesas well.
  • (3) In suits for partition and the like where there is no document anterior to the suit the mistake may occur in the plaint schedules by giving a wrong survey number or wrong extents though the properties have been correctly described by boundaries etc.”

Amendment of plaint and decree allowed under Sec. 151 and 152 CPC

In Niyamat Ali Molla v. Sonargon Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. (SB Sinha, J.),  AIR 2008 SC  225; 2007-13 SCC 421, it is held that a decree may be corrected by the Court both in exercise of its power under Section 152 as also under Section 151. It was a case where application for amendment of the plaint as also of the decree containing the Schedule describing the said property was filed. The Apex Court observed further as under:

  • “The courts power to amend a decree is not only confined to a clerical or arithmetical error but also the pleadings of the parties, if a mistake had occurred in the pleadings and the same is continued.”

The Apex Court upheld the Order allowing the amendment holding as under:

  • “26.It is not a case where the defendants could be said to have been misled. It is now well settled that the pleadings of the parties are to be read in their entirety. They are to be construed liberally and not in a pedantic manner. It is also not a case where by reason of an amendment, one property is being substituted by the other. If the Court has the requisite power to make an amendment of the decree, the same would not mean that it had gone beyond the decree or passing any decree. The statements contained in the body of the plaint have sufficiently described the suit lands. Only because some blanks in the schedule of the property have been left, the same, by itself, may not be a ground to deprive the respondents from the fruit of the decree. If the appellant herein did not file any written statement, he did so at its own peril. Admittedly, he examined himself as a witness in the case. He, therefore, was aware of the issues raised in the suit. It is stated that an Advocate-Commissioner has also been appointed. We, therefore, are of the opinion that only because the JL numbers in the schedule was missing, the same by itself would not be a ground to interfere with the impugned order.
  • 27.So far as the application for impleadment of the applicants are concerned, they being not parties to the suit are not bound by the decree. They would, thus, be entitled to take recourse to such remedies which are available to them in law including filing of an application under Order 21 Rules 97 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if any occasion arises therefor. As and when the said applicants take recourse to law, the same has to be determined in accordance with law.
  • 28.This appeal and the application for impleadment are dismissed accordingly. It would, however, for the Executing Court to consider at the time of execution of the decree to ascertain whether there exists any difficulty in executing the decree or not. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.”

This decision is referred to in Peethani Suryanarayana v. Repaka Venkata Ramana Kishore, 2009-11 SCC 308..

No limit to the Court to Correct Errors u/Sec. 152 CPC; Mistake in Suit Document – Corrections allowed in a Preliminary Decree.

In Yerramilli Satyanarayana Rao v. Kandukuri Purnayya, AIR 1931 Mad 260, it is held by Krishnan Pandalai J. (in a case in which a wrong description of mortgaged property was given in the bond and the same mistake was repeated in the plaint and in the preliminary decree) as under:

  • “The net result of the authorities appears to me to be that there is nothing which limits the power of the Court under Section 152 to correcting errors, mistakes and omissions, which arose in the suit and there is nothing which prevents the Court from doing justice in an appropriate case where such mistakes arose by reason of copying an erroneous document into the plaint. In my opinion, a suit for rectification although it may have been possible is not the only remedy. As for the suggestion of the Judge that a petition for review is appropriate, I fail to see that that is an obstacle to the present application. The order of the Judge dismissing the petition must be set aside and the petition will be remitted to the Lower Court for being dealt with on the merits. (referred to by the AP High Court in Kalkonda Pandu Rangaiah v. Kalkonda Krishnaiah, AIR1974 AP201)

In Yerramilli Satyanarayana Rao v. Kandukuri Purnayya, AIR 1931 Mad 260, several earlier decisions were relied on. They were analysed by the AP High Court in Kalkonda Pandu Rangaiah v. Kalkonda Krishnaiah, AIR1974 AP201 (Viswanatha Sastri, J.), to observe as under:

  • “The learned Judge considered in that case the decision in Narayanaswami v. Natesa, (1893) ILR 16, Mad 424 which was a case of wrong description of the hypothecated property in the plaint, whereas the mortgage consisted of the correct survey number and an application was made to bring the plaint schedule in conformity with that contained in the bond. It was held by the Full Bench consisting of Parker. Best and Muttusami Ayyar, JJ. that the alteration ordered was necessary to rectify a palpable error without which correction the decree was unexecutable. The error in the plaint was so palpable that to obstacle in the way of plaintiff executing his decree.  
  • The learned Judge in that decision referred to another decision of a Bench in Somasundaram Chettiar v. Vasuswami Naicker , 1914 Mad WN 107 = (AIR 1914 Mad 297 (1)) wherein there were errors in the description of the boundaries which makes the whole description palpably erroneous and if allowed to stand, would have made the decree absolutely useless and unexectuable. The latter Bench followed the earlier decision in (1893) ILR 16 Mad 424 and held that it was immaterial whether the errors were introduced into the plaint for the first time or in documents anterior to the plaint provided they are clerical errors and it was a case for amendment. Another Bench decision of their Lordships Sadasiva Ayyar and Spencer JJ. in Mahaboob Behum Sahiba v. Lal Begum Saheba, (1921) 14 Mad LW 445 which, followed the above decisions in ILR 16 Mad 424 and 1914 Mad WN 107 = (AIR 1914 Mad 297 (1)) was also followed in 61 Mad LJ 805 = (AIR 1931 Mad 260 ). The case in (1921) 14 Mad LW 445 was in respect of an amendment of survey numbers filed even after a final decree was passed.”

The AP High Court, further observed in in Kalkonda Pandu Rangaiah v. Kalkonda Krishnaiah, AIR1974 AP201, as under:

  • “(15) The decision of Krishnan Pandalai J. was followed by Patanjali Sastry, J. (as his Lordship then was) in Mad LJ 452 (AIR 1941 Mad 940 (1) ). The learned Judge observed that the Madras High Court has applied section 152 also to cases where the mistake occurred earlier in the document evidencing the transaction itself and was copied in the plaint and decree in the suit brought to enforce the transaction. The decision in Satyanarayana Rao v. Purnayya, (1931) 61 MLJ 805. was followed and the decision to the contra in Shujaatmand Khan v. Govind Behari. Both these decisions were followed in Vimalamba v. Ratnamma, (1965) 1 Andh WR 266 (AIR 1966 Andh Pra 26) by Venkatesam J, who also followed the Madras view in preference to that of Allahabad. The same view has adopted in Subramonia v. Joseph George, AIR 1959 Ker 336 by Kerala High Court and in Ghulam Ahmad v. Khizar Joo, AIR 1960 J and K 37 by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir.
  • (16) The view taken in Ramakrishnan v. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1948 Madras 13) by a Bench of Madras High Court consisting Gentle C. J. and Hapell J, no doubt struck a different footing. In that case there was a mortgage in 1922. In respect of three items of property, including an item, which was survey No. 1427. In 1928 a preliminary decree was passed , which was mortgagor had no title to survey No. 1467. In 1930 he filed E. A. 494 of 1930 for attachment of property in S. No. 464 to which it was common ground the mortgagor had a title. The attachment was ordered and affected. but nothing was done for three grounds years. In 1933 the mortgagee-decree-holder, assigned the decree to the respondent in the said appeal. Eight years later the assignee-decree-holder brought the properties in survey No. 1467 to sale in execution of the final mortgage decrees and at the sale he became the purchaser. The sale was confirmed and full satisfaction of the decree was entered up. When the assignee-decree-holder purchaser went to take possession, he was obstructed by one of the sons of appellant No. 1. An application to remove the obstruction was filed and was ordered by the trial court in 1943. In appeal to the High Court the appeal was allowed. Shortly after the appeal was allowed dismissing the application of the assignee-decree-holder for removal of obstruction. The assignee-decree-holder filed an application in the lower court to have the mortgage deed, plaint in the mortgage suit and the preliminary and final decrees altered by substituting properties in 1463 and 1466 in place of property number 1467. The provisions of law invoked for that application were Section 151 and 152 C. P. C. The Trial Court allowed the application and altered the instrument by substituting two survey numbers 1463 hypothecate of the mortgage. On those facts the learned Judges held that the remedy of the petitioner was only to file a suit under Section 31 of Specific Relief Act for rectification of the deed and not to file an application under Section 152 of the C. P. C. The learned Judges observed as follows:
  • “I am unable to see how Section 152 gives to a court jurisdiction and authority to modify documents, particularly documents upon which a suit is instituted. There is a remedy by way of suit and I find nothing in the provisions of Section 152 which confers upon it similar powers as are conferred by Section 31, Specific Relief Act. In my view Section 152 is for the purpose of correcting errors directly involved in the proceedings themselves and not for correcting errors which are anterior to the proceedings, particularly in documents upon which proceedings are brought. I am unable to see that property, wrongly described in a deed, can be included in any of the mistakes which the section allows to be corrected. It is not a clerical or an arithmetical error. and I cannot see that it is an accidental slip or an omission.”The learned Judges preferred to follow the view of Allahabad High Court in preference to the view of Madras High Court cited before it was enunciated in the two decisions of Madras High Court in (1931) 61 Mad LJ 805 (AIR 1931 Mad 260) and (1941) 2 Mad LJ 452 (AIR 1941 Mad 940 (1)) and the Rangoon High Courts view as enunciated in AIR 1924 Rang 104. ”
  • Their Lordships also negativated that there was power to amend as prayed for under Section 151 C. P. C. It is therefore clear that the application, out of which the said appeal arose, was for amending the mortgage deed itself and as a consequence the schedules in the plaint and the decrees. Their Lordships clearly laid down that Section 152 is intended only to correct errors involved in the proceedings themselves in the suit and not for correcting errors which are anterior to the proceedings and particularly in the document upon which the proceedings are brought.

The AP High Court, in Kalkonda Pandu Rangaiah v. Kalkonda Krishnaiah, AIR1974 AP201, referring the following decisions and observed as under:

  • “(17) At this stage attention may be invited to another Bench decision in Latchavya v. Seethamma. (1932) 62 Mad LJ 350 (AIR 1932 Mad 275) rendered by their Lordships Pillay and Anantakrishna Aiyar JJ. That was a case in which there was a mistake in the mentioning of survey number in the mortgage deed itself. It was mentioned therein as survey No. 166 instead of survey number 168 and that mistake had been repeated in the plaint and decrees. On the basis of the said mortgage the suit O. S. 302 of 1919 was filed. A preliminary decree was passed against which there was no appeal. At that stage, the mortgagee decree-holder discovered that there was a mistake in the survey number. The mortgagee thereupon filed a suit under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act for rectification of the mistake in the suit O. S. 302 of 1919. The said suit was decreed as the mention of survey number 166 was done by mistake of the parties. The court also directed the amendment of the mortgage-preliminary decree. The decision was confirmed in appeal by the learned Subordinate Judge. But the suit was dismissed by waller J in appeal L.P.A. was preferred against that decision. Their Lordships considered relevant case law and ultimately held that where a mortgage deed has been rectified in respect of a mutual mistake in spite of a decree having been passed on the basis of the mortgage, though the plaintiff has adopted a wrong course in applying in the same suit for rectification of the prior decree, the order of the court should be allowed to stand as it amounted to an amendment which the plaintiffs might have got by first getting the mortgagee deed rectified and then amending the plaint by applying for review or on an application under S. 152 CPC but it was out of a suit for rectification of the mistake in the bond as well as the decree. It was therefore a converse case and their Lordships held that such a rectification of the decree cannot be interfered with, as it was a mutual mistake.”
  • (18) It may be relevant at this stage, to note the decision of Supreme Court in Sheodhyan Singh v. Mst. Santichara Kuer (1961) 2 Mad LJ (SC) 116 (AIR 1963 SC 1879 ). That was a case in which a suit was brought in respect of 10 plots of land, for declaration and possession. They were originally mortgaged to the defendants, on the basis of which a morgage suit was filed in 1932. The mortgaged property was sold in court auction and was purchased by the decree holders 1936. They took possession of the property through court and remained in possession till 1943. After the sale to the respondents, there were trouble created by the appellants, who ultimately took possession by force. The respondents thereupon filed the suit out of which the appeal arose. The appellants resisted the suit on a number of grounds. One of grounds related to plot No. 1060. the appellants contended that it was neither included in the final decree for sale in favour of the respondents predecessors in interest nor in the sale certificate. The final decree contained 10 plots. It gives the Tauzi number, the Khasra number the Thana number, the survey number and the area and the boundaries of each plot. Among the 10 plots mentioned in the final decree there was a plot No. 160 but not plot bearing No. 1060. In the sale certificate also the same plots were mentioned. The High Court held that plot 100 in the final decree and in the sale certificate was a mistake for 1060. In the sale certificate also the same plots were mentioned. The High Court held that plot 100 in the final decree and in the sale certificate was a mistake for 1060, and it was a case of misdescription and not a case of disputed identity. The plot which was taken possession of also was the plot in 1060 as per the description and the boundaries. It was also found that there was no plot bearing No. 160 in the Khata number as the identify of the lot was correctly given and it was only a misdescription of the plot in the final decree as well as in the sale certificate. The decree for possession was held to be good. Their Lordships also confirmed this decision and held that where there is no doubt as to the identity and there is only a misdescription that can be treated as a mere irregularity. This case no doubt related a suit wherein the possession of the correct plot was sought to be recovered. But there is no reason why the same principle laid down by their Lordships viz. , that where there is only a misdescription of the plot and there is no dispute about the identity and the suit could be decreed for the correct plot not covered by the decree and sale certificate, should not be applied even in cases arising, should not be applied even in case arising under Section 152 C. P. C. or clerical or mutual mistakes.
  • (19) I am also of the view that in view of the above principles laid down by their Lordships in the above Supreme Court case, the reasoning of the Bench in Ramakrishnan v. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1948 Mad 13 may have to be re-considered in a proper case. I need not pursue the matter further in this case as this case is not based upon a document anterior to the suit.
  • (20) I may now refer to a recent decision by a Bench of this Court in Peraju v. Venkamma, AIR 1971 in Andh Pra 74. Their Lordships preferred to follow the view of Madras High Court in (1931) 61 MLJ 805 (AIR 1931 Mad 260) and a decision of Rajamannar C. J. in Katamraju v. Paripurnandam. (1948) 2 Mad LJ 301 (AIR 1949 Mad 282) and that of Krishnaswami Nayudu in Apart Krishna Poduval v. Lakshmi Nethiar, (1950) 1 Mad LJ 120 (AIR 1950 Mad 751 ). In both the above cases, it was held that where an application is filed for correction of errors as regards survey numbers, in the plaint schedule and decree schedules, and there is no dispute as regards identity of the property amendments may be allowed under Section 152 C. P. C. The fact that the deed anterior to the plaint also contained the similar mistake cannot disentitle the appellant to have the error set right. The above Bench have distinguished the decision in AIR 1948 Mad 13 on facts stating that it related to the rectification of the document itself.
  • (21) It may also be mentioned here that a suit still continues even after the preliminary decree and it is only after passing of final decree the suit can be said to have terminated. It is certainly, therefore open to courts to amend a plaint and decree schedules at any stage before passing of final decree. (Vide somireddi Burrayya v. Somireddy Atchayyamma (1958) 2 Andh WR 208 (AIR 1959 Andh Pra 26) ; Basavayya v. Guruvayya, AIR 1951 Mad 938 (FB) and Venkata Reddy v. P. Reddy AIR 1963 SC 992.”

Corrections contemplated are of correcting only accidental omission or mistakes

In Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P., (1999) 3 SCC 500, it is held as under:

  • “The correction contemplated are of correcting only accidental omission or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the Court while passing the judgment, decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152 for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is to file appeal or review application. It implies that the Section cannot be pressed into service to correct an omission which is intentional, how erroneous that may be. It has been noticed that the courts below have been liberally construing and applying the province of Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC even after passing of effective order in the lis pending before them. No Court can under the cover of the aforesaid sections modify, alter or add to the terms of its original judgment, decree or order. In the instant case, the trial court had specifically held the respondents-State liable to pay future interest only despite the prayer of the appellant for grant of interest with effect from the date of alleged breach which impliedly meant that the court had rejected the claim of the appellant in so far as pendente lite interest was concerned.”

No party should suffer due to Mistake of the Court

In Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho, 2001-4 SCC 181, it is laid down as under:

  • “So far legal position is concerned, there would hardly be any doubt about the proposition that in terms of Section 152 C.P.C., any error occurred in the decree on account of arithmetical or clerical error or accidental slip may be rectified by the court. The principle behind the provision is that no party should suffer due to mistake of the court and whatever is intended by the court while passing the order or decree must be properly reflected therein, otherwise it would only be destructive to the principle of advancing the cause of justice. A reference to the following cases on the point may be made: The basis of the provision under Section 152 C.P.C. is found on the maxim Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit i.e. an act of Court shall prejudice no man (Jenk Cent-118) as observed in a case reported in AIR 1981 Guwahati 41, The Assam Tea Corporation Ltd. versus Narayan Singh and another. Hence, an unintentional mistake of the Court which may prejudice cause of any party must be rectified. In another case reported in AIR 1962 S.C. 633 I.L. Janakirama Iyer and others etc. etc. versus P.M. Nilakanta Iyer it was found that by mistake word net profit was written in the decree in place of mesne profit. This mistake was found to be clear by looking to the earlier part of the judgment. The mistake was held to be inadvertent. In Bhikhi Lal and others versus Tribeni and others AIR 1965 S.C. 1935 it was held that a decree which was in conformity with the judgment was not liable to be corrected. In another case reported in AIR 1966 S.C. 1047 Master Construction Co. (p) Ltd. versus State of Orissa and another it has been observed that arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation, a clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing whereas an error arising out of or occurring from accidental slip or omission is an error due to careless mistake on the part of the Court liable to be corrected. To illustrate the point, it has been indicated as an example that in a case where the order may contain something which is not mentioned in the decree would be a case of unintentional omission or mistake. Such omissions are attributable to the Court who may say something or omit to say something which it did not intend to say or omit. No new arguments or re-arguments on merits are required for such rectification of mistake. In a case reported in (1999) 3 S.C.C. 500 Dwarakadas Versus State of M.P. and Another this Court has held that the correction in the order or decree should be of the mistake or omission which is accidental and not intentional without going into the merits of the case. It is further observed that the provisions cannot be invoked to modify, alter or add to the terms of the original decree so as to in effect pass an effective judicial order after the judgment in the case. The trial court had not granted the interest pendente lite though such a prayer was made in the plaint but on an application moved under Section 152 C.P.C. the interest pendente lite was awarded by correcting the judgment and the decree on the ground that non-awarding of the interest pendente lite was an accidental omission. It was held that the High Court was right in setting aside the order. Liberal use of the provisions under Section 152 C.P.C. by the Courts beyond its scope has been deprecated. While taking the above view this Court had approved the judgment of the Madras High Court in Thirugnanavalli Ammal versus P. Venugopala Pillai AIR 1940 Madras 29 and relied on Maharaj Puttu Lal versus Sripal Singh reported in AIR 1937 Oudh 191: ILR 12 Lucknow 759. Similar view is found to have been taken by this Court in a case reported in (1996) 11 S.C.C. 528 State of Bihar and another versus Nilmani Sahu and another where the Court in the guise of arithmetical mistake on re-consideration of the matter came to a fresh conclusion as to the number of trees and the valuations thereof in the matter which had already been finally decided. Similarly in the case of Bai Shakriben (dead) By Natwar Melsingh and others versus Special Land Acquisition Officer and another reported in (1996) 4 S.C.C. 533 this Court found omission of award of additional amount under Section 23 (1-A), enhanced interest under Section 28 and solatium etc. could not be treated as clerical or arithmetical error in the order. The application for amendment of the decree in awarding of the amount as indicated above was held to be bad in law.

Clerical Error or Slip can be Corrected by all Courts and Authorities

Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho, 2001-4 SCC 181, continued as under:

  • As a matter of fact such inherent powers would generally be available to all courts and authorities irrespective of the fact whether the provisions contained under Section 152 C.P.C. may or may not strictly apply to any particular proceeding. In a matter where it is clear that something which the Court intended to do but the same was accidentally slipped or any mistake creeps in due to clerical or arithmetical mistake it would only advance the ends of justice to enable the Court to rectify such mistake. But before exercise of such power the Court must be legally satisfied and arrive at a valid finding that the order or the decree contains or omits some thing which was intended to be otherwise that is to say while passing the decree the court must have in its mind that the order or the decree should be passed in a particular manner but that intention is not translated into the decree or order due to clerical, arithmetical error or accidental slip. The facts and circumstances may provide clue to the fact as to what was intended by the court but unintentionally the same does not find mention in the order or the judgment or something which was not intended to be there stands added to it. The power of rectification of clerical, arithmetical errors or accidental slip does not empower the court to have a second thought over the matter and to find that a better order or decree could or should be passed.. There should not be re-consideration of merits of the matter to come to a conclusion that it would have been better and in the fitness of things to have passed an order as sought to be passed on rectification. On a second thought court may find that it may have committed a mistake in passing an order in certain terms but every such mistake does not permit its rectification in exercise of Courts inherent powers as contained under Section 152 C.P.C. It is to be confined to something initially intended but left out or added against such intention. So far the legal proposition relied upon by the learned Single Judge and the Honble Division Bench deciding the matter in its LPA jurisdiction, we are totally in agreement with the same i.e. an unintentional mistake which occurred due to accidental slip has to be rectified. The question however which requires consideration is as to whether on the facts of the present case and the principles indicated above, it could be said that there was any clerical or arithmetical error or accidental slip on the part of the Court or not.”

Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho, 2001-4 SCC 181, followed, in Neeraj Kumar Sainy v. State of U. P., AIR 2017 SC 1524; 2017-14 SCC 136, U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Imtiaz Hussain, 2006-1 SCC 380, State Of Punjab v. Darshan Singh, 2004-1 SCC 328

Mistake of a party cannot be Corrected taking the Benefit of Sec. 152

In Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust v. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel, AIR 2012 SC 3285, it is held as under:

  • “21. A person alleging his own infamy cannot be heard at any forum, what to talk of a Writ Court, as explained by the legal maxim ‘allegans suam turpitudinem non est audiendus’. If a party has committed a wrong, he cannot be permitted to take the benefit of his own wrong…. This concept is also explained by the legal maxims ‘Commodum ex injuria sua non habere debet’; and ‘nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria’.”

Referring Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust v. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel, it is observed in ONGC Ltd.  v.  Modern Construction, 2014-1 SCC 648, as under:

  • 17. Thus, the respondent cannot take the benefit of its own mistake. Respondent instituted the suit in Civil Court at Mehsana which admittedly had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In spite of the fact that the civil suit stood decreed, the High Court directed the court at Mehsana to return the plaint in view of the provisions of Order VII Rule 10 CPC. Thus, the respondent presented the plaint before the Civil Court at Surat on 3.2.1999.
  • 18. The judgment and decree dated 21.9.2006 clearly provided for future interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the suit till the realisation of the amount. The Executing Court vide judgment and decree dated 28.9.2007 rejected the claim of the respondent observing that the respondent had wrongly filed suit at Mehsana and the said court had no jurisdiction, and the “wrong doer cannot get benefit of its own wrong” i.e. the benefit of interest on the amount from the date of filing the suit in Mehsana court. The Appellate Court in its order dated 12.3.2010 reiterated a similar view rejecting the appeal of the respondent observing that “a public undertaking cannot be penalised for the mistake committed by the plaintiff by choosing a wrong forum”. Before the High Court when the matter was taken up on 14.9.2010, a similar view had been reiterated that the respondent cannot be allowed to take advantage of the words “from the date of the suit”, and conveniently overlook its own wrong of initially filing the suit in 1986 in the court at Mehsana. Though the court did not have jurisdiction, the plaintiff/respondent is now claiming interest for the period from 1986 to 1999 i.e. for 13 years by taking advantage of its own wrong and for that purpose, the plaintiff/respondent is trying to misconstrue the words mentioned by the learned trial court in the operative portion of the judgment dated 21.9.2006, viz., from the date of filing of the suit. However, while passing the impugned order, the High Court has used the language that the case stood transferred from the Mehsana court to the court at Surat and, therefore, interest has to be paid from the date of initiation of the suit at Mehsana i.e. from 1986 and in view thereof, allowed the claim.
  • 19. We are of the considered view that once the plaint was presented before the Civil Court at Surat, it was a fresh suit and cannot be considered to be continuation of the suit instituted at Mehsana. The plaintiff/respondent cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own mistake instituting the suit before a wrong court. The judgment and order impugned cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.”

When instrument may be rectified

Section 26 of Sp. Relief Act reads as follows:

“26. When instrument may be rectified
(1) When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties a contract or other instrument in writing (not being the articles of association of a company to which the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) applies) does not express their real intention, then-
either party or his representative-in- interest may institute a suit to have the instrument rectified; or
the plaintiff may, in any suit in which any right arising under the instrument is in issue, claim in his pleading that the instrument be rectified; or
a defendant in any such suit, as is referred to in Cl.(b), may, in addition to any other defence open to him, ask for rectification of the instrument.
(2) If, in any suit in which a contract or other instrument is sought to be rectified under sub-section (1), the Court finds that the instrument, through fraud or mistake, does not express the real intention of the parties, the Court may in its discretion direct rectification of the instrument so as to express that intention, so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good faith and for value.
(3) A contract in writing may first be rectified, and then if the party claiming rectification has so prayed in his pleading and the Court thinks fit, may be specifically enforced.
(4) No relief for the rectification of an instrument shall be granted to any party under this section, unless it has been specifically claimed:
Provided that, where a party has not claimed any such relief in his pleading, the Court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the pleading on such terms as may be just for including such claim.”

Suit for Rectification of Deed – When Needed?

In Aliyar v. Raju V. Vayalat, 2016-1 KHC 763; 2016-2 KLT 656, it is found as under:

  • “Admittedly, in Ext. A1 there are mistakes in the extent, survey number, boundaries and the details of the anterior title deeds. In these situations, it is clear that institution of a suit merely for the injunction reliefs will not serve the purpose of the respondent/plaintiff. Likewise, a suit for declaration that the plaint schedule property is the property that is included in Ext. A1 will also not help the respondent to get an effective and executable decree. It is, therefore, very clear that the patent mistakes in Ext. A1 will have to be rectified, otherwise the actual features available on the ground will be totally different from the descriptions shown in the respondent’s title deed. That apart, a declaratory relief can only be claimed in respect of a specific immovable property capable of being identified correctly. Indisputably, the descriptions in the schedule to Ext.A1 and the recital in the document do not reflect the actual state of affairs. Therefore, the declaratory relief can be effectively granted only after rectifying the mistakes in Ext. A1. Viewing from this angle, we are of the view that the most important and primary relief claimable under such a situation is the rectification of Ext. A1.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

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Will Boundaries of Properties (Always) Prevail Over Survey Number, Extent, Side Measurements, etc.?

Answer: No.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Abstract

Various Legal Propositions advanced
                •➧ 1. Intention is of the author/parties is important.
                •➧ 2. Boundaries preferred.
                •➧ 3. Test is – which is most unlikely, to be erred.
                •➧ 4. Vague and uncertain description rejected.
               •➧ 5. Definite and certain descriptions preferred.
The propositions are rules of construction or of evidence,
and not rules of law. Hence, they are flexible and variable.

Intention of the Parties

In Krishnamoorthi Iyer v. Janaki Amma, 1957 KHC 202 : 1957 KLT 886, it is said as under:

  • “2. ….. .. The usual rule, no doubt, is that when there is a conflict between the area and the boundaries mentioned in a document the description of the boundaries should be accepted in preference to the area mentioned in the document for determining the extent of the land conveyed thereunder. But, this is not an inflexible or infallible rule, and even in the cases in which this rule has been applied, it has been pointed out that when, from the proved circumstances it is clear that the intention of the parties was only to convey the extent mentioned in the document, even though the boundaries would take in a larger area, effect has to be given to their intention and the description of the boundaries cannot be allowed to prevail. .. .. …” (quoted in: Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959)

In The Church of South India Trust Association v. Raja Ambrose, 1978- 2 MLJ 620, it is observed as under.  

  • “6. The principle of construction grants made under instruments in writing seems to be now well-settled not only in this country, but in many other systems as well. The principle accords with common sense and might be stated, broadly, thus: The subject-matter of the grant would depend on the intention of the parties as expressed in the relative conveyance deed.”

Boundaries Preferred Over Survey Number, Extent

Our Apex Court, in Subhaga v. Shoba, 2006-5 SCC 466, observed as under:

  • “That a property can be identified either by boundary or by any other specific description is well established. Here the attempt had been to identify the suit property with reference to the boundaries and the Commissioner has identified that property with reference to such boundaries. Even if there was any discrepancy, normally, the boundaries should prevail.”

The Church of South India Trust Association v. Raja Ambrose, (1978) 2 MLJ 620, it is further laid down as under:

  • “Where the deed sets out the extent and measurements correctly, there can be no difficulty in determining the subject-matter of the grant. But where no measurements are given or the extent mentioned in the deed is either vague or is only a rough and ready approximation, one has to look to other indications in the deed in order to fix the identity of the property which is the subject of the grant. If the deed in question sets out the boundaries of the property conveyed, then these boundaries will have to be accepted as a clear reflection of the intention of the grantor and they will conclude not only the exact positioning of the property conveyed, but also its true extent. The boundaries given in the deed will also, in such cases, prevail over the measurements given in the deed, if these are given as approximations.”

 In T. Venkata Vijaya Lakshmi v. Kodali Rayana Rao, 2023-4 ALT 272; 2023-3 CivCC 746, it is held as under:

  • “It is settled law that boundaries prevail over extent and survey number as also measurements.”

Madhya Pradesh High Court  in Rajesh Parmar v. Under Secretary, Petroleum Corporation, MANU/MP/0121/2019, found that non-mentioning of survey number is not a ground to reject the application of Petrol Pump. It is stated as under:

  • “… However, inadvertence or clerical error occurred in the description of land in the application could not have been stretched too far to conclude that the land offered is at variance with the survey number mentioned in the application to declare the applicant not eligible for allotment of petrol pump. ….”

Relying on Rajesh Parmar v. Under Secretary  it is held in Indian Oil Corporation Limited v.  Gosala Raju, AIR 2022 AP (NOC) 260,  as under:

  • “10. In any view of the matter, as per the settled law, when there is a mistake in survey number, extent and boundaries will prevail.”

In Vishnu Anant Dessai v. Govind Vithal Sawant, 2020-5 All MR 496 (Bom), it is found as under:

  • “… On this score, the common law principles compel us to conclude that the boundaries prevail over extent  and even survey numbers.”

The same principle can be seen in Ramaiya Asari v. Ramakrishna Naicker, 2000 (3) MLJ 327.   

In Kannu Reddiar v. T. Palanirajan, 1995 (2) LW 769, it is emphasised as under:

  • “It is well established general principles of law that the boundary descriptions shall prevail over survey number, extent, etc., where there is conflict.”

In PKAB Coop. Society v. Govt. of Palestine, AIR 1948 PC 207,laid down as under:

  • “In construing a grant of land a description by fixed boundaries is to be preferred to a conflicting description by area. The statement as to area is to be rejected as falsa demonstratio.” (Quoted in: K. P. Parameswaran Pillai v. Parvathy Amma Gourikutty Amma, 1985  KerLJ 54).

In Ibrahim Koyakutty v. Varghese, 1951 KLT 117, it is observed as under:

  • “3. … .. But in the absence of circumstances indicating that application of the boundaries in determining the extent of the land that passed under the conveyance will lead to an error, usually in cases conflict between the area, survey number and the boundaries mentioned in the document the boundaries predominate and the rest is considered only as false or erroneous description. In this case there are no such circumstances and therefore we are clearly of the view that the disputed property is included in the documents mentioned above. … ……..” (quoted in: Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959.)

See also:

  • Aliyar v. Raju V. Vayalat, 2016-1 KHC 763; 2016-2 KerLT 656,
  • Chacko Joseph v. Varghese Markose (1957 KLT 485) and
  • Savarimuthu Nadar v, Kanakku Kali Pillai (1957 KLT 825)

Vague and Uncertain Description Rejected & Definite and Certain Preferred

In Sivaraman Nair v. Shamsuddin, 1990 (1) KerLT 187: 1990 KHC 295, it is found as under:

  • ‘9. In cases where there is a difference in the extent and the boundary covered by a document, one or the other which is clearer and more specific has to be preferred. In some cases it may be the boundary. In some other cases it may be the extent and in yet other cases it may be the side measurements. There is no invariable rule in this regard. None of the decisions on which the appellants rely has held positively that in all cases of such conflict the boundary alone shall prevail. On the other hand, in Krishnamurthy Iyer’s case (1957 KLT 886) Kumara Pillai, J. held that:
    • “The usual rule is that when there is a conflict between the area and the boundaries, the description of the boundaries should be accepted in preference to the area mentioned in the document for determining the extent of the land conveyed thereunder. This is not an inflexible rule. When from the proved circumstances it is clear that the intention of the parties was only to convey the extent mentioned in the document, even though the boundaries would take in a larger area, effect has to be given to their intention and the description of the boundaries cannot be allowed to prevail.” (quoted in: Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959)

Varadaraja Iyengar, J. in Krishnan v. Mathai, 1957 KerLT 42, held as under:

  • “The evidence supplied by boundaries, extent, survey numbers and lekhoms form the determining factors when the identity of the property is put in issue. If all these factors harmonise, there is little difficulty to identify the property in dispute. But when some of them are in conflict with the rest as when the extent and survey numbers do not agree with the boundaries usually the boundaries predominate and the rest is regarded as erroneous or inaccurate descriptions. This is not an inflexible rule and the guiding principle is to apply that test which is most unlikely to be vitiated by error.” (quoted in: Sumathi v. State of Kerala, ILR 2018-4 Ker 956; 2018-5 KHC 586; 2018-4 KLT 959)

In Velu v. Padmavathy Amma (UL Bhat, J.), ILR 1984-1 Ker 30; 1983 KLN Case Notes p.38 Case No. 39, it is stated as follows:

  • “A golden thread runs through all the decisions referred to above. A piece of land may be described in the document or decree correctly or wrongly. Description may be given by reference to village, locality, survey number, lekhom number, extent, measurements or boundaries. At times, descriptions may tally pointing unerringly to a particular plot of land in which case there will be no difficulty in locating the plot. Sometimes the various descriptions given in a document or decree may be in conflict with each other. In such a case, the court is called upon to adjudicate on the identity of the exact plot intended to be dealt with in the document or decree. No doubt, the court will at first try to reconcile the various descriptions. If that be not possible, one or more of the descriptions may have to be rejected and the other decision rested only on the other description or descriptions.
  • When one of the descriptions is vague and uncertain and another description is definite and certain, the latter may be preferred. If none of the descriptions is vague or uncertain, that description which is more certain and stable and least likely to have been mistaken or inserted inadvertantly must be preferred if it sufficiently identified the subject matter of the transaction and the other descriptions must be rejected as erroneous or inaccurate.
  • This is not a rule of law and therefore is not inflexible in character it is a mere rule of construction which appears to be safe and almost an infallible guide.” (Quoted in: K. P. Parameswaran Pillai v. Parvathy Amma Gourikutty Amma, 1985  KerLJ 54; Chandrakumar v. Narayana Bahuleyan, ILR 2011-2 Ker 897; 2011-2 KHC 884; 2011-3 KLT 185)

The decisions referred to in Velu v. Padmavathy Amma are the following:

  • Zamindar of Pachipenta v. Maharajah of Jeypore, XXIII MLJ 97,
  • Subbayya Chakkiliyan v. Manjan Muthia Goundan, AIR 1924 Mad. 493,
  • Durga Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Narain Bagehi, ILR 37 Cal. 293,
  • Kumaran Krishnan v. Ulahanna Mathai, 1957 KLT 42,
  • Chacko Joseph v. Varghese Markose, 1957 KLT 485,
  • Savarimuthu Nadar v. Kanakku Kali Pillai, 1957 KLT 825 and
  • Krishnamurthi Iyer v. Janaki Amma, 1957 KLT 886.

In Savithri Ammal v. Padmavathi Amma, 1990-1 KLT 187, Bhat J. reaffirmed the proposition.

Kerala High Court, in Ouseph Poulose v. Kuttappan Chothi (K. Vinod Chandran, J., on 12 November, 2012) referring Savithri Ammal, observed as under:

  • “11. This Court has time and again considered the procedure by which properties which are covered by documents come up for identification and difficulties are caused due to the change in extent, boundaries, survey numbers and so on and so forth. Reference can be safely made to Krishnan v. Mathai (1957 KLT 42), wherein the dispute on identity of the property relying on a mistake in survey number shown in the decree was negatived and Krishnamurthy Iyer v. Janaki Amma (1957 KLT 886) where it was held that the usual rule of predominance given to boundaries in the effect of conflict between boundaries and area was “not an inflexible rule”.

See also –

  • Zamindar of Pachipenta v. Maharaja of Jeypore (XXIII MLJ. 97),
  • Subbayya Chakkiliyan v. Manjan Muthia Goundan (AIR 1924 Mad.493),
  • Durga Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Narain Bageni (ILT 37 Cal.293),
  • Savarimuthu Nadar v. Kanakku Kali Pillai (1951 KLT 825),
  • Kumaran Krishnan v. Ulahannan Mathai 1957 KerLT 42, 485,
  • Sheodhyan Singh v. Sanichara Kuer, AIR 1963 SC 1879,
  • KP Parameswaran Pillai v. Parvathy Amma, 1985  KerLJ 54,
  • Savithri Ammal v. Padmavathy, 1990 KHC 295,
  • Kamakshi Ammal v. R. Ranganathan, 82 LW 142.

Execution of ‘Rectification Deed’

In Rajesh Kumar KT  v. State of Kerala, 2024-3 KHC 425, it is held that a ‘rectification deed’ is enough if the wrong description is only in ‘Re-Suvey Number’. It reads as under:

  • “On the basis of the same, the petitioner would submit that the boundaries, extent and original survey numbers remain the same but the only anomaly is regarding the resurvey number in the description of the property and that is what is sought to be corrected by way of Ext.P2 rectification deed.”

The Court relied on the following decisions:

  • Vannathi Valatpil Mahmood v. State of Kerala, 2019 (2) KHC 736 (change in the description of the property)
  • Baburaj P.K and others v. State of Kerala, 2019 (2) KHC 628 (wrong description in a registered Will. Unanimity among legal heirs as to the intention of the testator. No impediment under the law in executing a rectification).
  • Jihas v. District Registrar, 2012 (3) KLT 194 (mistake in mentioning flat number in the sale deed).

Clerical or Arithmetical Errors in the plaint and Final Decrees can be Rectified

In Kalkonda Pandu Rangaiah v. Kalkonda Krishnaiah, AIR 1974 AP 201, it is laid down as under:

  • “Where clerical or arithmetical mistakes occur in copying the plaint schedules from the documents anterior to the suit the proceedings in the suit can always be corrected under Section 152, CPC. In such cases even the documents on the basis of which the suit was filed may be amended either in a suit under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act or in a proper case even by an application under Section 152 CPC provided it in a case of misdescription and not one of disputed identity. In such cases if Section 152 is invoked it would obviate a suit which have ultimately bring the same result. In all cases where clerical or arithmetical errors creep-in in the plaint and as a consequence in the decrees as well, they can be rectified at any time even after a final decree. A case of such an amendment petition under Section 152 CPC filed in a pending suit even after a preliminary decree is passed therein is an a fortiori case.”

When instrument may be rectified

Section 26 of Sp. Relief Act reads as follows:

  • “26. When instrument may be rectified
  • (1) When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties a contract or other instrument in writing (not being the articles of association of a company to which the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) applies) does not express their real intention, then-
  • either party or his representative-in- interest may institute a suit to have the instrument rectified; or
  • the plaintiff may, in any suit in which any right arising under the instrument is in issue, claim in his pleading that the instrument be rectified; or
  • a defendant in any such suit, as is referred to in Cl.(b), may, in addition to any other defence open to him, ask for rectification of the instrument.
  • (2) If, in any suit in which a contract or other instrument is sought to be rectified under sub-section (1), the Court finds that the instrument, through fraud or mistake, does not express the real intention of the parties, the Court may in its discretion direct rectification of the instrument so as to express that intention, so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good faith and for value.
  • (3) A contract in writing may first be rectified, and then if the party claiming rectification has so prayed in his pleading and the Court thinks fit, may be specifically enforced.
  • (4) No relief for the rectification of an instrument shall be granted to any party under this section, unless it has been specifically claimed:
  • Provided that, where a party has not claimed any such relief in his pleading, the Court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the pleading on such terms as may be just for including such claim.”

Suit for Rectification of Deed – When Needed?

In Aliyar v. Raju V. Vayalat, 2016-1 KHC 763; 2016-2 KLT 656, it is found as under:

  • “Admittedly, in Ext. A1 there are mistakes in the extent, survey number, boundaries and the details of the anterior title deeds. In these situations, it is clear that institution of a suit merely for the injunction reliefs will not serve the purpose of the respondent/plaintiff. Likewise, a suit for declaration that the plaint schedule property is the property that is included in Ext. A1 will also not help the respondent to get an effective and executable decree. It is, therefore, very clear that the patent mistakes in Ext. A1 will have to be rectified, otherwise the actual features available on the ground will be totally different from the descriptions shown in the respondent’s title deed. That apart, a declaratory relief can only be claimed in respect of a specific immovable property capable of being identified correctly. Indisputably, the descriptions in the schedule to Ext.A1 and the recital in the document do not reflect the actual state of affairs. Therefore, the declaratory relief can be effectively granted only after rectifying the mistakes in Ext. A1. Viewing from this angle, we are of the view that the most important and primary relief claimable under such a situation is the rectification of Ext. A1.”

Small Mistake (boundaries interchanged) will not Disentitle Decree

Order VII Rule 3 of C.P.C, hereunder:

  • “3. Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property—Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers.”

In Easwari Amma Prsannakumari v. Radhakrishna Pillai , 2015 (5) KerHC 922, it was found that even where the mistakes in the decree occurred on account of the mistaken description of the suit property in the plaint, the power under Section 152 of the Code would be available to the court to correct the decree.

In Mohammed Munvar v. N. C. Nesan, 21 Mar 2024, 2024 Supreme(Mad) 613, the eastern and western boundaries have been interchanged in the schedule to the plaint. But it did not create any confusion or lead to the wrong identification of the property. After quoting Order VII Rule 3 of C.P.C, observed as under:

  • “38. As such, if the suit is in respect of an immovable property, the plaint shall contain the description, sufficient to identify and if could be identified by boundaries or numbers and in such case, the plaintiff shall specify such boundaries or numbers. ….. The description given in the plaint schedule by the plaintiff, satisfies the provisions of Order VII Rule 3 of C.P.C., as the property is identifiable. Therefore, the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the decree cannot be granted as proper description of the suit property is not given, cannot be sustained. Even though the eastern and western boundaries have been interchanged in the schedule to the plaint, it does not create any confusion or lead to wrong identification of the property. Further, the Advocate Commissioner’s reports filed and evidence of C.W. 2/Deputy Inspector of Surveyor have fortified the fact that ‘C’ schedule suit property belongs to the plaintiff and the defendant has trespassed and also he is in possession of the ‘C’ schedule suit property.”

    In Chandran v. Amruthavally, 2016 (5) Ker HC 444, 2017 AIR (CC) 1405; 2016-4 KLT 753, there was a mistake in the survey number of the property recorded in the final decree in the partition suit. It was held that it was open to the court, in exercise of power under Section 152 of the CPC to correct such a mistake. Paragraph 10 of the said judgment reads as under:

    • “8. In Subramania Iyer v. Joseph George (1959 KLT 165) it was held that a decree could be corrected even in a case where the error or mistake occurred even anterior to the suit, namely in the instrument or the document based on which the suit has been filed, which has been carried forward into the plaint and repeated in the decree, by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 152 of the CPC. It was observed therein that, there is no reason to restrict the powers of the court under Section 152 of the CPC to errors made by the Courts alone. In the said decision the Court has taken note of the views expressed in
    • Satyanarayana v. Purnayya (supra),
    • Ramakrishnan v. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1948 Madras 13),
    • Katamaraju v. Paripurnannadam (AIR 1949 Mad. 282) and
    • Krishna Poduval v. Lekshmi Nathiar (AIR 1950 Madras 751).
    • This Court held that even the errors that occurred anterior to the decree and which were in existence even in the original document, which happened to be carried forward to the plaint and decree, could be corrected in the decree, by exercise of the powers under Section 152 of the CPC. The same view has been taken by this Court in
    • Abdhu v. Assainar (1993 [2] KLT 711)
    • wherein also this Court accepted the proposition that even the mistakes that had crept in anterior to the suit can be corrected by the court in the decree. That was a case where a mistake that had crept in the preliminary decree regarding the survey number of the property therein was corrected.
    • In Raman Nadar Velayudhan Nadar v. Janaki Karthi (2011 [2] KLT 149)
    • this Court held that a decree can be corrected not only under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but even the inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC could be invoked in an appropriate case.”
    • 10. In the instant case, as pointed out earlier, there is no dispute between parties regarding the identity of the property sought to be partitioned. The respondents have no objection to the correction of the survey number of the property in the manner as sought for by the revision petitioner. If the correction is allowed that will not cause prejudice to any of the parties to the litigation. The only apprehension is whether as per the revenue records the property in the particular survey number sought to be incorporated namely Sy. No. 644/5, is shown to be in the possession of third parties, in which event, the rights of the said third parties would be affected by the inclusion of the said survey number in the present case. I make it clear that the right of third parties, if any, over the property described in the survey number sought to be incorporated, will not be affected by such inclusion. If there is any disputed right, the parties to the present suit will have to approach the appropriate Court or authorities, seeking necessary reliefs.”

    In M. K. Soumini v. M. K. Sreedharen, 10 Jan 2017, 2017 Supreme(Ker) 173, it was found that the mistake occurred in the compromise petition, which led to the final decree could be corrected. It was pointed out that the documents produced before this Court showed that the correction of the mistakes in the final decree would not result in any change in the identity of the property.

    In J. Sarojini Alias Nesamma v. Narayani Sarojini, 2008-1 ILR(Ker) 153; 2008-1 KHC 897; 2008-1 KLT 516, the plaint schedule property was delivered . They have no complaint that the delivered property is a different property. Plaintiffs’ only grievance is that the survey number of the property was mistakenly shown as 237/2 instead of 238/1-A. This mistake had happened in the plaint when it was typed. Mistake was noticed only after the delivery. It was held that nothing prevents the Court from doing justice in an appropriate case where such mistakes arise; and that a suit for rectification of the instrument and decree is not the only remedy, an application for review may also be appropriate, that also is not the only way and will not be an obstacle for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 152 of the C.P.C. The court held as under:

    • “In the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view that if really there is a grievance that in the plaint a mistake has been crept there should be some remedy for the revision petitioners. One remedy available to the revision petitioners is that they can file a review petition to reopen the execution proceedings, so that the pendency of the suit will continue so long as the execution proceedings are pending. Then the revision petitioners can move the court which passed the decree to make the corretion. Alternatively the revision petitioners can also sue for rectification of he mistakes crept in the survey number of the plaint schedule property. These remedies are open to them and they are at liberty to avail the above said remedies to redress their grievance. In the circumstances no interference is possible in the impugned order.”

    In this decision (J. Sarojini Alias Nesamma v. Narayani Sarojini) the High Court referred to an earlier decision, Subramanian Iyer v. Joseph George( 1959 K.L.T. 165), where the boundaries of the schedule property alone had been wrongly described and the schedule was otherwise correct in so far as it elated to survey number, extent, village etc. The question of correcting the plaint and the decree arose in the case for consideration. It was found that the language of Section 152 of the Code which enables the court to correct the clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties.

    Court Orders – Technical Defects will not defeat Substantive Rights

    The suits will not fail merely because of an incorrect survey number. The principle to be invoked will be –

    • Technical defects or clerical mistakes in the description will not defeat substantive rights.
    • If property identity is clear from the record, relief should not be denied on technical grounds. Minor errors do not invalidate proceedings if identity is clear.
    • Procedural law is meant to facilitate justice. Technicalities should not defeat substantive rights.
    • “Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.” (State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719.
    • The Courts should give preference to the cause of substantive justice over the procedural technicalities.
    • Adjective law dealing with procedure alone be interpreted in such a manner as to sub-serve and advance the cause of justice. (Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India, (1984) 3 SCC 46).
    • Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar (1975) 1 SCC 774, said as under: “The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a Judge’s conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justiciae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence — processual, as much as substantive.”
    • See also:
    • Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425,
    • State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719,
    • Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480.

    Conclusion

    It is proper to epitomise this discussion as under:

    • Mutual mistakes and clerical mistakes in deeds are dealt with distinctively.
    • Patent mistakes in a deed will have to be rectified by a correction deed or by a court decree.
    • Even a wrong description in a registered Will can be remedied by executing a rectification deed by the legal heirs.
    • Dispute on identity of the property, relying on a mistake in survey number, cannot be validly raised.
    • Usually, boundaries would be accepted in preference to other descriptions; but, it is not an inflexible rule.
    • Court will at first try to reconcile the various (divergent) descriptions; if not possible, descriptions that are definite and certain (or clearer and more specific) have to be preferred; and the rest are rejected as erroneous or inaccurate.
    • The intention of the executant (or parties) is paramount.

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    Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

    Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

    Principles and Procedure

    PROPERTY LAW

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    Adverse Possession

    Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

    Power of attorney

    Evidence Act – General

    Sec. 65B

    Admission, Relevancy and Proof

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    Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

    Religious issues

    Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

    Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

    Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Salient Features & Major Changes from CrPC

    Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

    Introduction

    3 New Acts of 2023

    • Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023,
    • Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023,
    • Bharatiya Sakshya, 2023

    The new Acts replaced three colonial-era criminal laws –

    • The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC),1973 (upto 1973, 1898 CrPC),
    • The Indian Penal Code (IPC),1860 and
    • The Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
    Read – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Important Changes from the Indian Penal Code
    Major Changes in the Evidence Act by Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

    BNSS – Major Changes from CrPC

    CHAPTER I: PRELIMINARY

    S. 2 BNSS
    Definitions.

    (New) Insertions
    Sec. 2.
    (a) “Audio-video electronic”
    (b) “bail”
    (d) “bail bond”
    (e) “bond”
    (i) “Electronic communication”
    (l) “Investigation” – Explanation

    CHAPTER II: CONSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS AND OFFICES (s. 6 – 20)

    S. 15 BNSS (S. 21 – CrPC)
    Change –

    State Government may appoint –
    any police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police (“to be known”) as Special Executive Magistrates
    15. Special Executive Magistrates The State Government may appoint, for such term as it may think fit, Executive Magistrates or any police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police or equivalent, to be known as Special Executive Magistrates, for particular areas …. ….. …..
    S. 20 BNSS (S. 25A – CrPC)

    Change –

    Establishment of –
    District Directorate of Prosecution.
    [Earlier, there was Directorate of Prosecution in State-level (only); and there was Dy. Directors in District-level].

    Sub-sections (8), (9), (10) and (11) are
    new provisions.
    20.Directorate of Prosecution:
    (1) The State Government may establish,— (a) a Directorate of Prosecution in the State consisting of a Director of Prosecution and as many Deputy Directors of Prosecution as it think fit; and (b) District Directorate of Prosecution in every district consisting of as many Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors of Prosecution, as it thinks fit.
    (2) A person shall be eligible to be appointed,— (a) as a Director of Prosecution or a Deputy Director of Prosecution, if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than fifteen years or is or has been a Sessions Judge; (b) as an Assistant Director of Prosecution if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than seven years or has been a Magistrate of the first class.
    (3) The Directorate of Prosecution shall be headed by the Director of Prosecution, who shall function under the administrative control of the Home Department in the State.
    (4) Every Deputy Director of Prosecution or Assistant Director of Prosecution shall be subordinate to the Director of Prosecution; and every Assistant Director of Prosecution shall be subordinate to the Deputy Director of Prosecution.
    (5) …. (12) …..

    CHAPTER III: POWER OF COURTS (Ss. 21 to 29)

    S. 23 BNSS (S. 29 – CrPC)

    Change –
    in amount of fine.

    New punishment –
    community service.

    Community service” shall mean –
    the work
    which the Court may order
    a convict to perform
    as a form of punishment
    that benefits the community,
    for which “he” shall not be entitled to any remuneration.

    Omitted –
    jurisdiction in case of juveniles (S. 27 CrPC).
    23. Sentences which Magistrates may pass. (1) The Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate may pass any sentence authorised by law except a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life or of imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years.
    (2) The Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not exceeding fifty thousand rupees, or of both, or of community service.
    (3) The Court of Magistrate of the second class may pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or of fine not exceeding ten thousand rupees, or of both, or of community service.
    Explanation.—”Community service” shall mean the work which the Court may order a convict to perform as a form of punishment that benefits the community, for which he shall not be entitled to any remuneration.

    CHAPTER V: ARREST OF PERSONS (s. 35 – 62)

    S. 35(7) BNSS (S. 41 &41A – CrPC)

    New Provision – as to arrest

    Powers to SP
    in offences which are punishable for imprisonment, less than 3 years –
    Not to give permission to arrest
    an infirm person or
    a person above 60 years of age
    S. 35. When police may arrest without  warrant.
    (7). No arrest shall be made without prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police in case of an offence which is punishable for imprisonment of less than three years and such person is infirm or is above sixty years of age.  
    S. 40 BNSS (S. 43 – CrPC)
    Words-Change. S. 43 CrPC – “police officer shall re-arrest him”
    40. Arrest by private person
    S. 40(2) BNSS – “a police officer shall take him in custody”.
    S. 43(3) BNSS (S. 46 – CrPC)

    New subsection (3)
    Handcuffing
    Permitted to a habitual or repeat offender or accused of serious offences.
    S. 43(3). The police officer may, keeping in view the nature and gravity of the offence, use handcuff while effecting the arrest of a person who is a habitual, repeat offender who escaped from custody, who has committed offence of organised crime, offence of terrorist act, drug related crime, or offence of illegal possession of arms and ammunition, murder, rape, acid attack, counterfeiting of coins and currency notes, human trafficking, sexual offences against children, offences against the State, including acts endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India or economic offences.

    CHAPTER VI: PROCESSES TO COMPEL APPEARANCE  (s.63 – 93)

    S. 63(ii) BNSS (S. 61 CrPC)

    New Clause –
    Summons
    by electronic communication
    63. Form of Summons Every summons issued by a court under this Sanhita shall be (i) in writing ……..
    (ii) in an encrypted or any other form of electronic communication and shall bear the image of the seal of the court or digital signature.   
    S. 66 BNSS (S. 64 – CrPC)

    Change –
    Summons can be given to “some” (an) adult member
    Formerly “male” member.
    Service  when person summoned cannot be found
    BNSS 66-  “some adult member” of their family residing with him.
    CrPC 64-  “some adult male member” of their family residing with him.

    CHAPTER VII: PROCESSES TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF THINGS (S. 94 -110)

    S. 105 BNSS

    New Provision

    Search
    Shall be (by) recording through
    “any” (an) audio-video electronic means,
    preferably mobile phone .
    105: Recording of search and seizure through audio-video electronic means. The process of conducting search of a place or taking possession of any property, article or thing under this Chapter or under section 185, including preparation of the list of all things seized in the course of such search and seizure and signing of such list by witnesses, shall be recorded through any audio-video electronic means preferably mobile phone and the police officer shall without delay forward such recording to the District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class.
    S. 107  BNSS

    New Provision –

    (1) A police officer can,
    with the approval of the SP,
    apply for the attachment of any property obtained as a result of a criminal activity.

    (6) Court can direct –
    the District Magistrate
    to rateably distribute
    (the attached or seized properties)
    to the affected persons.
    107: Attachment, forfeiture or restoration of property
    (1) Where a police officer making an investigation has reason to believe that any property is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of a criminal activity or from the commission of any offence, he may, with the approval of the Superintendent of Police or Commissioner of Police, make an application to the Court or the Magistrate exercising jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence or commit for trial or try the case, for the attachment of such property.  
    (6) If the Court or the Magistrate finds the attached or seized properties to be the proceeds of crime, the Court or the Magistrate shall by order direct the District Magistrate to rateably distribute such proceeds of crime to the persons who are affected by such crime.

    CHAPTER X: ORDER FOR MAINTENANCE OF WIFES, CHILDREN AND PARENTS (S.144 – 147)

    S. 144 & 145 BNSS (S. 125 & 126 – CrPC)

    Change – maintenance of wifes, children and parents

    – Clause 1(d) added –
    proceedings can be taken –
    “where his father or mother resides”.
    144. Order for maintenance of wifes, children and parents
    (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain – (a)  his wife, unable to maintain herself …..”
    (child, parents etc. …..)
    145. Procedure: (1) Proceedings under section 144 may be taken against any person in any district—
    (a) where he is; or (b) where he or his wife resides; or (c) where he last resided with his wife, or as the case may be, with the mother of the illegitimate child; or (d) where his father or mother resides.

    CHAPTER XII: PREVENTIVE ACTION OF POLICE (s.168 -172)

    S. 172 BNSS

    New Provision –

    (1) All persons are bound to conform to
    lawful directions of police.

    (2) A police officer has power to detain or remove any person, also.

    Inspection of weights and measures
    [in S. 153 CrPC] omitted.
    172: Persons bound to conform to lawful directions of police: (1) All persons shall be bound to conform to the lawful directions of a police officer given in fulfilment of any of his duty under this Chapter.
    (2) A police officer may detain or remove any person resisting, refusing, ignoring or disregarding to conform to any direction given by him under subsection (1) and may either take such person before a Magistrate or, in petty cases, release him as soon as possible within a period of twenty-four hours.

    CHAPTER XIII: INFORMATION TO THE POLICE AND THEIR POWERS TO INVESTIGATE(S. 173 – 196)

    S. 173 BNSS (S. 154 – CrPC)

    – Furnishing FIR –
    (1) The scope of giving FIR is expanded
    –it can be “irrespective of the area”
    This corresponds to the concept of ‘Zero FIR’
    It can also be “by electronic communication” (e-FIR).
    (3) Police officer may with the prior permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police—
    (i) proceed to conduct Preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case – for offences punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years. 

    Note: The CrPC also requires (in assaults to outrage the modesty, rape etc.)– “the recording of such information shall be videographed”.

    173. Information in cognizable cases:
    (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, may be given orally or by electronic communication to an officer in charge of a police station, and if given— (i) orally, it shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it; (ii) by electronic communication, it shall be taken on record by him on being signed within three days by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may by rules prescribe in this behalf:
    Provided that if the information is given by the woman against whom an offence under section 64, section 65, section 66, section 67, section 68, section 69, section 70, section 71, section 74, section 75, section 76, section 77, section 78, section 79 or section 124 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such information shall be recorded, by a woman police officer or any woman officer:
    Provided further that— (a) in the event that the person against whom an offence under section 64, section 65, …. (etc.) ………. is alleged to have been committed or attempted, is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, then such information shall be recorded by a police officer, at the residence of the person seeking to report such offence or at a convenient place of such person’s choice, in the presence of an interpreter or a special educator, as the case may be; (b) the recording of such information shall be videographed; (c) ….. (2) …  
    (3) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in section 175, on receipt of information relating to the commission of any cognizable offence, which is made punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, the officer in-charge of the police station may with the prior permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, considering the nature and gravity of the offence,—
    (i) proceed to conduct preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter within a period of fourteen days; or
    (ii) proceed with investigation when there exists a prima facie case.
    (4) ….
    S. 174 (1) (ii) BNSS (S. 155 – CrPC)

    New provision –

    Investigation
    Forward the daily diary report of cases fortnightly to the Magistrate.
    174. Information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases.  (1) When information is given to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book ……. and,— (i) refer the informant to the Magistrate; (ii) forward the daily diary report of all such cases fortnightly to the Magistrate.
    (2) ….(3)…..(4) …
    S. 176 BNSS (S. 157 – CrPC)

    Change

    Investigation

    (1)In investigation of rape
    statement of the victim shall be recorded at her residence or a place of her choice and as far as practicable by a woman police officer and the statement may also be recorded through an audio-video
    electronic means including mobile phone

    (2) Forward the daily diary report fortnightly to the Magistrate.

    (3) Forensic expert’s visit (in major offences – punishable for 7 years or more).
    [It will come into effect –
    from such date, as may be notified (within a period of five years)
    by the State Government.]

    For offences punishable for seven years or more– the officer in charge of a police station shallcause the forensic expert to visit the crime scene to collect forensic evidence and also cause videography of the process on mobile phone or any other electronic device


    176. Procedure for investigation  (1) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under section 175 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate ….
    Provided that— (a) …. (b) …
    Provided further that in relation to an offence of rape, the recording of statement of the victim shall be conducted at the residence of the victim or in the place of her choice and as far as practicable by a woman police officer in the presence of her parents or guardian or near relatives or social worker of the locality and such statement may also be recorded through any audio-video electronic means including mobile phone.
    (2) In each of the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of the first proviso to sub-section (1), the officer in charge of the police station shall state in his report the reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that sub-section by him, and, forward the daily diary report fortnightly to the Magistrate and in the case mentioned in clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government.
    (3) On receipt of every information relating to the commission of an offence which is made punishable for seven years or more, the officer in charge of a police station shall, from such date, as may be notified within a period of five years by the State Government in this regard, cause the forensic expert to visit the crime scene to collect forensic evidence in the offence and also cause videography of the process on mobile phone or any other electronic device:
    Provided that ….
    S. 179 BNSS (S. 160 – CrPC)

    Change –

    Not to require attendance of witnesses at a place other than his residence
    male under the age of 15
    above the age of 60
    woman
    mentally or physically disabled
    a person with acute illness

    Age, “sixty-five years” (in CrPC) is reduced to “sixty years” and
    the words “or a person with acute illness” are added.
    179. Police officer’s power to require attendance of witnesses. (1) Any police officer making an investigation under this Chapter may, by order in writing, require the attendance before himself of any person …….”:
    Provided that no male person under the age of fifteen years or above the age of sixty years or a woman or a mentally or physically disabled person or a person with acute illness shall be required to attend at any place other than the place in which such person resides:
    Provided further that if such person is willing to attend at the police station, such person may be permitted so to do.
    (2) The State Government may, by rules made in this behalf, provide for the payment by the police officer of the reasonable expenses of every person, attending under sub-section (1) at any place other than his residence.
    S. 183 BNSS (S. 164 – CrPC)

    Change –
     
    – Confessions –

    If the person making the statement is disabled, the statement shall be recorded through audio-video electronic means preferably by mobile phone.

    Note: In CrPC, only a “Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate” could record confession.
    It was also provided in CrPC that “no confession shall be recorded by a police officer on whom any power of a Magistrate has been conferred”.

    The CrPC also requires (in assaults to outrage the modesty, rape etc.)–
    “… may also be recorded by audio-video electronic means in the presence of the advocate …”

    The CrPC further requires –
    If the person making the statement is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, the statement made by the person, with the assistance of an interpreter or a special educator, shall be video graphed.
    183: Recording of confessions and statements (1) Any Magistrate of the District in which the information about commission of any offence has been registered, may, whether or not he has jurisdiction in the case, record any confession or statement made to him in the course of an investigation under this Chapter or under any other law for the time being in force, or at any time afterwards but before the commencement of the inquiry or trial: Provided that any confession or statement made under this sub-section may also be recorded by audio-video electronic means in the presence of the advocate of the person accused of an offence:
    ….
    (2) ….(3) …(4) ….(5) ….
    (6)(a) In cases punishable under section 64, section 65, section 66, section 67, section 68, section 69, section 70, section 71, section 74, section 75, section 76, section 77, section 78, section 79 or section 124 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Magistrate shall record the statement of the person against whom such offence has been committed in the manner specified in sub-section (5), as soon as the commission of the offence is brought to the notice of the police:
    Provided that such statement shall, as far as practicable, be recorded by a woman Magistrate and in her absence by a male Magistrate in the presence of a woman: Provided further that in cases relating to the offences punishable with imprisonment for ten years or more or with imprisonment for life or with death, the Magistrate shall record the statement of the witness brought before him by the police officer:
    Provided also that if the person making the statement is temporarily or permanently, mentally or physically disabled, the Magistrate shall take the assistance of an interpreter or a special educator in recording the statement:
    Provided also that if the person making the statement is temporarily or permanently, mentally or physically disabled, the statement made by the person, with the assistance of an interpreter or a special educator, shall be recorded through audio-video electronic means preferably by mobile phone;
    (b) ….
    (7) …
    S. 184 BNSS (S. 164A – CrPC)
    Change –   examination of victim of rape

    Time fixed –
    medical practitioner to forward the report
    – within a period of seven days
    184: Medical examination of victim of rape:
    (1) … to… (5) …..
    (6) The registered medical practitioner shall, within a period of seven days forward the report to the investigating officer who shall forward it to the Magistrate referred to in section 193 as part of the documents referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (6) of that section. (7) ….
    S. 185(2) BNSS (S. 165 – CrPC)
    new –

    Search
    Search shall be recorded through audio video, or electronic means.

    S. 185(5) requires
    copies of record be sent to Magistrate forthwith,
    but not later than 48 hours.


    S. 185: Search by police officer 185. (1) …. (2) A police officer proceeding under sub-section (1), shall, if practicable, conduct the search in person:
    Provided that the search conducted under this section shall be recorded through audio-video electronic means preferably by mobile phone.
    (5) Copies of any record made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall forthwith, but not later than forty-eight hours, be sent to the nearest Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence, and the owner or occupier of the place searched shall, on application, be furnished, free of cost, with a copy of the same by the Magistrate.
    S. 187(3) BNSS (S. 167(2) – CrPC)

    Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused in custody (beyond the period of fifteen days), if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, for a total period exceeding —
    (i) 90 days (for serious offences) or
    (ii) 60 days, other offence,
    and, on the expiry of the said period of 90 days, or 60 days, the accused shall be released on bail.

    Proviso to S. 167(2) – CrPC
    Referring s. 167 CrPC it is held in CBI v. Anupam J. Kulkarni: AIR 1992 SC 1768: 1992 (3) SCC 141, as under:
    “The legislature … has at the same time taken care to see that the interests of the accused are not jeopardised by his being placed under police custody beyond a total period of 15 days, under any circumstances, irrespective of the gravity of the offence or the serious nature of the case.”
    (Contra view: CBI v. Vikas Mishra, 2023-3 SCR 321, and V. Senthil Balaji v. State, 2024-3 SCC 51)..


    The clause “otherwise than in custody of the police” is omitted in BNSS.
    Thereby it is possible to order police custody (even) for the entire 90/60 days.
    187(3). The Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this sub-section for a total period exceeding—
    (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;
    (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence,
    and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIV for the purposes of that Chapter.

    Proviso to S. 167(2) – CrPC stipulated:
    “Provided that—(a) the magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist….”
    It is noticeable – (i) “otherwise than in custody of the police” is judicial custody. (ii) “Beyond the period of fifteen days” indicates that the maximum period allowed in police custody is 15 days (within the stipulated 90/60 days).
    S. 193 BNSS (S. 173 – CrPC)

    Change –

    (2) investigation
    investigation of some offences under BNSS and POCSO Act shall be completed within two months.  

    (9) further investigation.
    permission of magistrate is not needed after a (final) report has been forwarded.

    Further investigation “during the trial
    It can be conducted (only) with the permission of the Court
    and it shall be completed within a period of 90 days
    After 90 days, further permission of the Court is needed.
    193. Report of police officer on completion of investigation
    (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay.
    (2) The investigation in relation to an offence under sections 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 or under sections 4, 6, 8 or section 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 shall be completed within two months from the date on which the information was recorded by the officer in charge of the police station. (3) …. to (8) ……
    (9) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (3) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form as the State Government may, by rules, provide; and the provisions of sub-sections (3) to (8) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (3):
    Provided that further investigation during the trial may be conducted with the permission of the Court trying the case and the same shall be completed within a period of ninety days which may be extended with the permission of the Court.

    CHAPTER XIV: JURISDICTION OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS IN INQUIRIES AND TRIALS

    S. 209 BNSS (S. 189 – CrPC)

    Change – 

    In offences committed outside India Court can issue a commission for taking depositions made, or exhibits produced –
    • in physical or electronic form (also) before a judicial officer in that territory or before a diplomatic or consular representative of India for that territory.
    209. Receipt of evidence relating to offences committed outside India. When any offence alleged to have been committed in a territory outside India is being inquired into or tried under the provisions of section 208, the Central Government may, if it thinks fit, direct that copies of depositions made or exhibits produced, either in physical form or in electronic form, before a judicial officer, in or for that territory or before a diplomatic or consular representative of India in or for that territory shall be received as evidence by the Court holding such inquiry or trial in any case in which such Court might issue a commission for taking evidence as to the matters to which such depositions or exhibits relate.

    CHAPTER XVI COMPLAINTS TO MAGISTRATES

    S. 223 BNSS (S. 200 – CrPC)
    Examination of complainant.

    Change –

    New Proviso added to Sub Sec. (1) –
    whereby no cognizance shall be taken without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard:

    Sub Sec. (2) provided –
    a Magistrate shall not take cognizance on a complaint against a public servant unless
     the public servant is given an opportunity to make assertions as to the situation that led to the incident alleged.
    200. Examination of complainant.
     (1) A Magistrate having jurisdiction while taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:
    Provided that no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by the Magistrate without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard:
    Provided further …..
     (2) A Magistrate shall not take cognizance on a complaint against a public servant for any offence alleged to have been committed in course of the discharge of his official functions or duties unless
     (a) such public servant is given an opportunity to make assertions as to the situation that led to the incident so alleged; and
     (b) a report containing facts and circumstances of the incident from the officer superior to such public servant is received.

    CHAPTER XIX – TRIAL BEFORE A COURT OF SESSION (s.248 – 260)

    S. 250 BNSS (S. 227 – CrPC)
    (1) application for or Discharge –
    time limit 60 days of committal.
    250. Discharge. (1) The accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of committal under section 232.
    S. 251 BNSS (S. 228 – CrPC)

    Change
    (1) Time limit for framing charge –
    60 days from hearing on charge.

    (2) Accused can “present either physically or through audio-video electronic means.”
    251. Framing of charge. (1)(a) ….. (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused within a period of sixty days from the date of first hearing on charge. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-sec. (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused present either physically or through electronic means and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.
    S. 254 BNSS (S. 231 – CrPC)

    Change –

    Evidence of a witness
     • may be recorded by audio-video means
     • evidence of any police officer or public servant may be taken through audio-video means
    254. Evidence for prosecution (1) On the date so fixed, the Judge shall proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution:
    Provided that evidence of a witness under this sub-section may be recorded by audio-video electronic means.
    (2) The deposition of evidence of any police officer or public servant may be taken through audio-video electronic means. (3) …..
    S. 258 BNSS (S. 235 – CrPC)

    Change –

    Judgment: Period fixed –
    30 days from arguments
    258. Judgment of acquittal or conviction. (1) After hearing arguments and points of law (if any), the Judge shall give a judgment in the case, as soon as possible, within a period of thirty days from the date of completion of arguments, which may for specific reasons extend to a period of sixty days. (2) ….

    CHAPTER XXII – SUMMARY TRIALS (s. 283 – 288)

    S. 283 BNSS (S. 260 – CrPC)

    Replaces CrPC sections.  

    Offences listed in this Section shall be tried in a summary way.

    [In IPC, summary-trial (of certain offences) was at the discretion of the Magistrate]

    (2) Offences punishable below 3 years
    The Magistrate may,
    after hearing the accused,
    and recording reasons –
    try all or any of the offences
    punishable below 3 years
    in a summary way
    283. Power to try summarily.  
    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Sanhita—
    (a) any Chief Judicial Magistrate; (b) Magistrate of the first class, shall try in a summary way all or any of the following offences:—
    (i) theft….;
    (ii) receiving or retaining stolen property, …. value of the property does not exceed twenty thousand rupees;
    (iii) assisting in the concealment or disposal of stolen property …, where the value of such property does not exceed 20,000 rupees;
    (iv) offences under section 330 of the BNS, 2023;
    (v) insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, and criminal intimidation, under section 349 …
    (vi) abetment of any of the foregoing offences;
    (vii) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, …
    (viii) offence … under section 20 of the Cattle-trespass Act, 1871.
    (2) The Magistrate may, after giving the accused a reasonable opportunity of being heard, for reasons to be recorded in writing, try in a summary way all or any of the offences not punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding three years.

    CHAPTER XXIII: PLEA BARGAINING (s. 289 – 300)

    S. 290 BNSS (S. 265B – CrPC)

    Change –
    Plea bargaining: time limit –
    30 days from framing of charge.
    290. Application for plea bargaining.  (1) A person accused of an offence may file an application for plea bargaining within a period of thirty days from the date of framing of charge in the Court in which such offence is pending for trial.

    CHAPTER XXV: EVIDENCE IN INQUIRIES AND TRIALS (s. 307 – 336)

    S. 330 BNSS (S. 294 – CrPC)

    Change

    In calling upon (opposite side) to admit or deny the genuineness of document.

    New provisos
     • First, time limit of 30 days. (Court can relax the time limit)
     • Second, no expert be called to appear, unless report is disputed.
    330.No formal proof of certain documents
    (1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused or the advocate for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document soon after supply of such documents and in no case later than thirty days after such supply:
    Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, relax the time limit with reasons to be recorded in writing:
    Provided further that no expert shall be called to appear before the Court unless the report of such expert is disputed by any of the parties to the trial.
    S. 336 BNSS

    New

    Evidence” of public servants, experts, police officers
    transferred,
    retired, or
    died
     • “be secured” through the successor officer.
    336.  Evidence of public servants, experts, police officers in certain cases. Where any document or report prepared by a public servant, scientific expert, medical officer or investigating officer is purported to be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Sanhita, and—
    (i) such public servant, expert or officer is either transferred, retired, or died; or (ii) such public servant, expert or officer cannot be found or is incapable of giving deposition; or (iii) securing presence of such public servant, expert or officer is likely to cause delay in holding the inquiry, trial or other proceeding, the Court shall secure presence of successor officer of such public servant, expert, or officer who is holding that post at the time of such deposition to give deposition on such document or report.

    CHAPTER XXVI: GENERAL PROVISIONS AS TO INQUIRIES AND TRIALS (s. 337 to 366)

    S. 349 BNSS (S. 311A – CrPC)

    Power of Magistrate to order to give specimen signatures or handwriting

    The words “or finger impressions” and “or
    voice sample
    ” are new.

    Under S. 311A CrPC, no order could be made unless the person has (at some time) been arrested in that proceeding.
    349.Power of Magistrate to order person to give specimen signatures or handwriting. If a Magistrate of the first class is satisfied that, for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under this Sanhita, it is expedient to direct any person, including an accused person, to give specimen signatures or finger impressions or handwriting or voice sample, he may make an order to that effect and in that case …
    Provided …
    Provided further that the Magistrate may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, order any person to give such specimen or sample without him being arrested.
    S. 356 BNSS

    New –

    proclaimed offenders – no immediate prospect of arresting him-
    • Court shall, proceed with the trial in the like manner as if he was present.
    356. Inquiry trial or judgment in absentia of proclaimed offender
    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Sanhita or in any other law for the time being in force, when a person declared as a proclaimed offender, whether or not charged jointly, has absconded to evade trial and there is no immediate prospect of arresting him, it shall be deemed to operate as a waiver of the right of such person to be present and tried in person, and the Court shall, after recording reasons in writing, in the interest of justice, proceed with the trial in the like manner and with like effect as if he was present, under this Sanhita and pronounce the judgment.

    CHAPTER XXIX: THE JUDG MENT (s. 392 – 406

    S. 398 BNSS

    New –
    Witness protection scheme
    398. Witness protection scheme. Every State Government shall prepare and notify a Witness Protection Scheme for the State with a view to ensure protection of the witnesses.

    CHAPTER XXXIX: MISCELLANEOUS (S. 520 – 531)

    S. 530 BNSS

    New –

    Trial and proceedings
    may be held in electronic mode,
    by use of electronic communication or use of audio-video electronic means.
    530. Trial and proceedings to be held in electronic mode
    All trials, inquires and proceedings under this Code, including – (i) summons and warrant, issuance, service and execution thereof; (ii) holding of inquiry; (iii) examination of complainant and witnesses; (iv) trial before a Court of Session, trial in warrant cases, trial in summons-cases, summary trials and plea bargaining; (v) recording of evidence in inquiries and trials; (vi) trials before High Courts; (vii) all appellate proceedings and such other proceedings, may be held in electronic mode, by use of electronic communication or use of audio-video electronic means.
    S. 531 BNSS
    Repeal and savings

    All investigations, trials, appeals, etc. pending on 1st July 2024 shall be proceeded under the provisions of the CrPC (except inquiry under Chapter XIV of the CrPC – as to taking cognizance etc.)  

    Note:
    The offences, committed before 1st July 2024 (and its punishment), are dealt with under the IPC.
    531. Repeal and savings.
    (1) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is hereby repealed.
    (2) Notwithstanding such repeal—
    (a) if, immediately before the date on which this Sanhita comes into force, there is any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, then, such appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as in force immediately before such commencement (hereinafter referred to as the said Code), as if this Sanhita had not come into force;

    Epitome

    Major changes include –

    • 1. Use of technology and electronic mode
    • 2. Mandates collection of forensic evidence in investigation (after effecting Notification thereof within 5 years) – for offences punishable for seven years or more.
    • 3. Deadlines –
      • Judgment within 30 days of the arguments (extendable up to 60 days);
      • Information to the victim as to the progress of the investigation within 90days, and
      • Framing of charges by a sessions court within 60 days of the first hearing on such charges.
    • 4. Trial, even in absence of a proclaimed offender.
    • 5. Introduced:
      • ‘Preliminary inquiry’ before filing FIR (for offences punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years).
      • Concept of Zero FIR (“irrespective of the area”) and e-FIR.
    • 6. Further investigation –
    • permission of magistrate is not needed after a (final) report has been forwarded.
    • But, for further investigation “during the trial” permission of the Court is needed.
    • 7. “Evidence” of public servants can “be secured” through the successor officer.
    • 8. Collection of Samples (including finger impressions and voice), without arrest.
    • 9. Power of police to detain or remove any person.
    • 10. State Government shall prepare Witness protection scheme

    Conclusion

    Doubts are seen raised, and questions are boosted –

    • Was a new enactment really required?
    • Wasn’t it proper to bring-in the changes by an amendment?

    Whatever may be the answer, one thing is important –

    • Implementation of technology and electronic mode in Investigation and Trial (including that in Recording certain FIRs, Search and Seizure etc.) is ‘in tune with the times’.

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    Sec. 65B

    Admission, Relevancy and Proof

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    All Illegal Agreements are Void; but All Void Agreements are Not Illegal

    Taken from – “Void, Voidable, Ab Initio Void, and Sham Transactions

    Jojy George Koduvath, Saji Koduvath Associates

    All Illegal Agreements are Void, But the Reverse is Not True

    J.B. Pardiwala, J., in Hasvantbhai Chhanubhai Dalal v. Adesinh Mansinh Raval, 2019-2 GujLH 357, observed as under:

    • “DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “VOID” AND “ILLEGAL” AGREEMENT:
    • 58. The Indian Contract Act, 1872 has made it clear that there is a thin line of difference between void and illegal agreement.
      • A void agreement is one which may not be prohibited under law, while –
        • an illegal agreement is strictly prohibited by law and the parties to the agreement can be penalized for entering into such an agreement.
      • A void agreement has no legal consequences, because it is null from the very beginning.
      • Conversely, the illegal agreement is devoid of any legal effect, since it is started.
      • All illegal agreements are void, but the reverse is not true.
      • If an agreement is illegal, other agreements related to it are said to be void.
      • An agreement that violates any law or whose nature is criminal or is opposed to any public policy or immoral is an illegal agreement.
    • These agreements are void ab initio, and so the agreements collateral to the original agreement are also void. Here the collateral agreement refers to the transaction associated or incidental to the main agreement. The difference between void and illegal agreement can be drawn clearly on the following grounds:
    • [1] An agreement which loses its legal status is a void agreement. An illegal agreement is one which is not permissible under law.
    • [2] Certain void agreements are void ab initio while some agreements become void when it loses its legal binding. On the other hand, an Illegal agreement is void since the very beginning. A void agreement is not prohibited by Indian Penal Code (IPC), but IPC strictly prohibits an illegal agreement.
    • [3] The scope of a void contract is comparatively wider than an illegal contract as all agreements which are void may not necessarily be illegal, but all illegal agreements are void from its inception.
    • [4] A void agreement is not punishable under law whereas an illegal agreement is considered as an offence, hence the parties to it are punishable and penalised under Indian Penal Code (IPC).
    • [5] Collateral agreements of a void agreement may or may not be void i.e. they may be valid also. Conversely, collateral agreements of an illegal agreement cannot be enforceable by law as they are void ab initio.
    • It is quite clear that the void and illegal agreement are very different. One of the factors that make an agreement void is the illegality of the contract, such as contract whose object or consideration is unlawful. Moreover, in both the two agreements loses its enforceability by law.”

    Also Read:

    What is Illegal and What is Void

    In Kantilal Manilal Parekh v. Ranchhoddas K.  Bhatt, AIR 1953 Bom 98, it is said as under:

    • “Now, it must be observed that the words “illegal” and “void” are often loosely used as synonymous terms even by lawyers, jurists and sometimes Judges. None the less, for the purposes of the present discussion it is essential to distinguish between what is illegal and what is merely void. All unlawful or illegal agreements are void; but all void agreements are not necessarily illegal. It is often difficult to determine whether an agreement which is void is or is not also illegal. But a long line of cases in England enables one to deduce certain principles for the purpose of determining whether a contract or agreement in merely void or is illegal.
    • Sir Fredrick Pollock in his Principles of Contract (13th edn.) after reviewing a number of cases lays down the following propositions (p.276) :
      • ‘When conditions are prescribed by statute for the conduct of any particular business or profession, and such conditions are not observed, agreements made in the course of such business or profession – …
      • (e) are void if it appears by the context that the object of the legislature in imposing the condition was the maintenance of public order or safety or the protection of the persons dealing with those on whom the condition is imposed :
      • (f) are valid if no specific penalty is attached to the specific transaction, and if it appears that the condition was imposed for merely administrative purposes … :
      • (h) Where no penalty is imposed, and the intention of the legislature appears to be simply that the agreement is not to be enforced, there neither the agreement itself nor the performance of it is to be treated as unlawful for any purpose’.”

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    Sec. 65B

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    Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Important Changes from the Indian Penal Code

    Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

    Indian Penal Code

    The Indian Penal Code (IPC) was (originally) drafted by the First Law Commission in 1834.

    • Chairman of the first Law Commission was Thomas Babington Macaulay.
    • It was introduced on January 1, 1860, after making certain changes to the draft.

    3 New Acts of 2023

    • Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023,
    • Bharatiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhita, 2023,
    • Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

    The new Acts replaced three colonial-era criminal laws –

    • the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC),1973,
    • the Indian Penal Code (IPC),1860 and
    • the Indian Evidence Act,1872.
    Read: BNSS – Major Changes from CrPC
    Major Changes in the Evidence Act by Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

    Union Home Minister introduced the new Acts

    Union Home Minister, Amit Shah, introduced the new Acts. He said in Lok Sabha –

    • “These three Acts, which will be replaced, were made to strengthen and protect British rule and their purpose was to punish, not to give justice. We are going to bring changes in both these fundamental aspects.”

    Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)

    The IPC, and the new Sanhita, covered the criminal offences affecting –

    • the property,
    • the human body,
    • animals,
    • public order,
    • defamation,
    • public health, and
    • offences against the state.

    The Bharatiya Nyaya (Second) Sanhita Bill, 2023, received the assent of Indian President , on December 25, 2023.

    The Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 gives special attention to

    • offences against women, children, murder and state; and
    • offences by gang activity.

    It introduced a new punishment –

    • Community Service“.

    Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 consists of 358 sections. The IPC, 1860 consisted of 511 sections.

    Significant Changes

    1. Definition of ‘child’

    Sec. 2(3) of BNS defined “child” as under:

    • “ ‘child’ means any person below the age of eighteen years.”

    In the IPC ‘minor’ was used. It was not defined. New definition in BNS – ‘child’ – gives clarity

    2. Definition of ‘document’ – Included Electronic and digital records

    Sec. 2(8) of BNS defines ‘document’ as under

    • Sec. 2(8) “ ‘document’ means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, and includes electronic and digital record, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.”

    IPC Provision

    • 29. “Document”.—’The word “document” denotes any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter. Explanation …”

    3. Definition of ‘movable property’

    • ‘movable property’ has been redefined in Sec. 2(21), BNS –
    • Sec. 2(21) “movable property” includes property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth;”

    IPC Provision

    • Sec. 22. “Movable property”.—’The words “movable property” are intended to include corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.’

    4. ‘Community Service’

    Sec. 4 of the new Act reads:

    • “4. Punishments: The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Sanhita are—
      • (a) Death;
      • (b) Imprisonment for life;
      • (c) Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely:—
      •         (1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour; (2) Simple;
      • (d) Forfeiture of property;
      • (e) Fine;
      • (f) Community Service.

    Sec. 8(4) and (5)

    Sec. 8(4) and (5) says as to ‘imprisonment in default of community service‘.

    It reads –

    • “(4) The imprisonment which the Court imposes in default of payment of a fine or in default of community service may be of any description to which the offender might have been sentenced for the offence.
    • (5) If the offence is punishable with fine or community service, the imprisonment which the Court imposes in default of payment of the fine or in default of community service shall be simple, and the term for which the Court directs the offender to be imprisoned, in default of payment of fine or in default of community service, shall not exceed,—
    • (a) two months when the amount of the fine does not exceed five thousand rupees; (b) four months when the amount of the fine does not exceed ten thousand rupees; and
    • (c) one year in any other case”

    Punishment of community service

    Punishment of community service are given in

    • ‘public servant unlawfully engaging in trade’,
    • ‘Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under Section 84 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023’,
    • Attempt to commit suicide,
    • to compel or restrain exercise of lawful power.
    • Misconduct in public by a drunken person’,
    • defamation.

    5. Sec. 48 – Abetment outside India constitute an offence

    • 48. Abetment outside India for offence in India – A person abets an offence within the meaning of this Sanhita who, without and beyond India, abets the commission of any act in India which would constitute an offence if committed in India.”

    6. Exception 2 to sec. 63 – Rape Wife – age changed

    Sec. 63 deals with offence of Rape. Exception 2 to sec. 63 of BNS provides –

    • “Exception 2.––Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under eighteen years of age, is not rape.”
      • Under section 375 of IPC the age limit was 15 years.

    7. Sec. 69Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc.

    • “69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc.: Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.
    • Explanation.—“deceitful means” shall include inducement for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.”

    8. Sec. 70Gang Rape

    IPC – S. 376D corresponds to S. 70(1). IPC – S. 376DB corresponds to S. 70(2).

    The age 12 years in IPC is increased to 18 years in BNS.

    Ingredients (Gang Rape) in nutshell –

    • rape by one or more persons
    • they constitute a group or
    • acting in furtherance of a common intention

    Punishment

    • each one shall be deemed to have committed the offence of rape
    • punished with rigorous imprisonment – not be less than twenty years,
    • may extend to imprisonment for life – mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life.
    • If woman under eighteen years of age is raped – shall be punished with imprisonment for life – mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life.

    70. Gang Rape:  

    • (1) Where a woman is raped by one or more persons constituting a group or acting in furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be deemed to have committed the offence of rape and shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with fine:
    • Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:
    • Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim.
    • (2) Where a woman under eighteen years of age is raped by one or more persons constituting a group or acting in furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be deemed to have committed the offence of rape and shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with fine, or with death:
    • Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:
    • Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim”

    9. Sec. 103 – Murder

    Higher punishment for certain offences (Mob Lynching etc.).

    • 103. Murder (1) Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
    • (2) When a group of five or more persons acting in concert commits murder on the ground of race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other similar ground each member of such group shall be punished with death or with imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

    10. Sec. 106Causing death by negligence.

    Under Sec. 106 (i), the BNS, modified the punishment – from 2 years (in IPC) to 5 five years imprisonment.

    If negligence by a registered medical practitioner – be punished with imprisonment for a term extending to 2 years and a fine.

    Sec. 106(ii) of BNS in cases of hit and run – punishment may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

    • 106. Causing death by negligence (1) Whoever causes death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if such act is done by a registered medical practitioner while performing medical procedure, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine.
    • Explanation.— For the purposes of this sub-section, “registered medical practitioner” means a medical practitioner who possesses any medical qualification recognised under the National Medical Commission Act, 2019 and whose name has been entered in the National Medical Register or a State Medical Register under that Act.
    • (2) Whoever causes death of any person by rash and negligent driving of vehicle not amounting to culpable homicide, and escapes without reporting it to a police officer or a Magistrate soon after the incident, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description of a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

    11. Sec. 111 – Organised crime.

    Sec. 111 of the BNS, – punishments for organized crime such as –

    • land grabbing, kidnapping,
    • contract killing, cybercrime, extortion,
    • trafficking of persons or goods or weapons or drugs, and
    • financial scams etc.

    Ingredients to attract this offence, in nutshell –

    • unlawful activity (stated above)
    • by any person or a group of persons acting in concert,
    • (acting) singly or jointly (appears – these words are surplusage),
    • either as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate,
    • by use of violence, threat etc.
    • to obtain direct or indirect material benefit

    Punishment –

    • life imprisonment or death and a fine of Rs. 10 Lakhs in case the offence results in the death of any individual and
    • for others the punishment – 5 years to life imprisonment and a fine of at least 5 lakh rupees.

    111. Organised crime.

    • (1) Any continuing unlawful activity including kidnapping, robbery, vehicle theft, extortion, land grabbing, contract killing, economic offence, cyber-crimes, trafficking of persons, drugs, weapons or illicit goods or services, human trafficking for prostitution or ransom, by any person or a group of persons acting in concert, singly or jointly, either as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate, by use of violence, threat of violence, intimidation, coercion, or by any other unlawful means to obtain direct or indirect material benefit including a financial benefit, shall constitute organised crime.
      • Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,––
      • (i) “organised crime syndicate” means a group of two or more persons who, acting either singly or jointly, as a syndicate or gang indulge in any continuing unlawful activity;
      • (ii) “continuing unlawful activity” means an activity prohibited by law which is a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment of three years or more, undertaken by any person, either singly or jointly, as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate in respect of which more than one charge-sheets have been filed before a competent Court within the preceding period of ten years and that Court has taken cognizance of such offence, and includes economic offence;
    • (iii) “economic offence” includes criminal breach of trust, forgery, counterfeiting of currency-notes, bank-notes and Government stamps, hawala transaction, mass-marketing fraud or running any scheme to defraud several persons or doing any act in any manner with a view to defraud any bank or financial institution or any other institution or organisation for obtaining monetary benefits in any form.
    • (2) Whoever commits organised crime shall,— (a) if such offence has resulted in the death of any person, be punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than ten lakh rupees; (b) in any other case, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than five lakh rupees.
    • (3) Whoever abets, attempts, conspires or knowingly facilitates the commission of an organised crime, or otherwise engages in any act preparatory to an organised crime, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than five lakh rupees.
    • (4) Any person who is a member of an organised crime syndicate shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than five lakh rupees.
    • (5) Whoever, intentionally, harbours or conceals any person who has committed the offence of an organised crime shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than five lakh rupees:
    • Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to any case in which the harbour or concealment is by the spouse of the offender.
    • (6) Whoever possesses any property derived or obtained from the commission of an organised crime or proceeds of any organised crime or which has been acquired through the organised crime, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than two lakh rupees.
    • (7) If any person on behalf of a member of an organised crime syndicate is, or at any time has been in possession of movable or immovable property which he cannot satisfactorily account for, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to imprisonment for ten years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees.

    12. Sec. 113Terrorist act

    It is an act performed with “an intent to threaten or likely to threaten the

    • unity, integrity, sovereignty
    • security, or economic security of India or
    • with the intent to strike terror or
    • likely to strike terror in the people or
    • any section of the people in India orin any foreign country”.

    Ingredients in nutshell –

    • (a) using bombs, firearms, poisonous substance etc. to cause death, loss etc.
    • (b) show of criminal force or causes death of any public functionary or
    • (c) abducts any person and threatening to kill or injure

    Punishment – imprisonment may extend to life imprisonment and fine.

    In case resulted in the death of any person – death or life imprisonment and fine. 

    113. Terrorist act: 

    • (1) Whoever does any act with the intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, sovereignty, security, or economic security of India or with the intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country,––
    • (a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substance or inflammable substance or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substance (whether biological, radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause,—
      • (i) death of, or injury to, any person or persons; or
      • (ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or
      • (iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country; or
      • (iv) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of production or smuggling or circulation of counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other material; or
      • (v) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies; or
    • (b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public functionary; or
    • (c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatening to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the Government of India, any State Government or the Government of a foreign country or an international or inter-governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commit a terrorist act.
       Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section,—
      • (a) “public functionary” means the constitutional authorities or any other functionary notified in the Official Gazette by the Central Government as public functionary; (
        b) “counterfeit Indian currency” means the counterfeit currency as may be declared after examination by an authorised or notified forensic authority that such currency imitates or compromises with the key security features of Indian currency.
    • (2) Whoever commits a terrorist act shall,—
      (a) if such offence has resulted in the death of any person, be punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine;
      (b) in any other case, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
    • (3) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directly or knowingly facilitates the commission of a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine
    • (4) Whoever organises or causes to be organised any camp or camps for imparting training in terrorist act, or recruits or causes to be recruited any person or persons for commission of a terrorist act, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
    • (5) Any person who is a member of an organisation which is involved in terrorist act, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
    • (6) Whoever voluntarily harbours or conceals, or attempts to harbour or conceal any person knowing that such person has committed a terrorist act shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to any case in which the harbour or concealment is by the spouse of the offender.
    • (7) Whoever knowingly possesses any property derived or obtained from commission of any terrorist act or acquired through the commission of any terrorist act shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
      Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police shall decide whether to register the case under this section or under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

    13. Sec. 141 – Importation of girl or boy from foreign country

    Ingredients in nutshell –

    • imports into India
    • girl under the age of twenty-one years or
    • boy under the age of eighteen years
    • with intent – to illicit intercourse

    141. Importation of girl or boy from foreign country

    • Whoever imports into India from any country outside India any girl under the age of twenty-one years or any boy under the age of eighteen years with intent that girl or boy may be, or knowing it to be likely that girl or boy will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.”

    14. Sec. 152 – Act endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India.

    Ingredients, in nutshell –

    • purposely, by words, or by visible representation
    • excites secession or armed rebellion or
    • encourages separatist activities or
    • endangers sovereignty and integrity of India; or
    • indulges in or commits any such act.

    152. Act endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India

    • Whoever, purposely or knowingly, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or by electronic communication or by use of financial mean, or otherwise, excites or attempts to excite, secession or armed rebellion or subversive activities, or encourages feelings of separatist activities or endangers sovereignty or unity and integrity of India; or indulges in or commits any such act shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
    • Explanation.––Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures, or administrative or other action of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means without exciting or attempting to excite the activities referred to in this section do not constitute an offence under this section.”

    15. Sec. 304 – Snatching

    Ingredients –

    • Theft
    • suddenly or forcibly
    • seizes any movable property.

    304. Snatching

    • (1) Theft is snatching if, in order to commit theft, the offender suddenly or quickly or forcibly seizes or secures or grabs or takes away from any person or from his possession any movable property.
    • (2) Whoever commits snatching, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.

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    Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

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    Declaration of Title & Recovery of Possession: Art. 65, not Art. 58, Limitation Act Governs

    Jojy George Koduvath

    Introduction

    A suit for declaration is governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act and the period of limitation is three years. However, when (i) declaration of Title and (ii) Recovery are sought for, Article 65 governs; Not, Art. 58.

    Declaration of Title & Recovery: Article 65  Governs; Not, 58

    Following decisions declares the law on this matter:

    • C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai,  (2007) 14 SCC 183
    • N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641
    • State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, (2000) 3 SCC 460
    • Padmavathy v. Kesava Reddy, 1987-2 KLT 386, Dr. Kochuthomman, J.
    • Unnikrishnan v. Ponnu Ammal, AIR 1999 Ker. 405
    • Seshumull M. Shah v. Sayed Abdul Rashid, AIR 1991 Kar. 273
    • S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840
    • Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478
    • Aishani Chandna Mehra v. Rajesh Chandna,2019-0-Supreme(Del) 1-70; Laws (Dlh) 2019-1-288, (Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.) 
    • Ashok Kumar v. Gangadhar, 2007 (2) ALD 313
    • Mechineni Chokka Rao v. Sattu Sattamma2006 (1) ALD 116
    • K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.)

    (a) In N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641, it is held as under:

    • “In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
    • In C. Mohammad Yunus vs. Syed Unnissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 808 it has been laid down that in a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief. In fact, a suit for a declaration of title to immovable property would not be barred so long as the right to such a property continues and subsists. When such right continues to subsist, the relief for declaration would be a continuing right and there would be no limitation for such a suit. The principle is that the suit for a declaration for a right cannot be held to be barred so long as Right to Property subsist.”

    (b) In Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 it is held as under:

    • “Article 58 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in a suit for declaration, but it has no application when the relief sought in the plaint is not for a mere declaration, but coupled with other reliefs like injunction, partition, possession etc. and Article 65 of the Limitation Act would come into play giving 12 year period. In the instant case, the relevant Article which can be applied is not Article 58, but Article 65 as the suit was filed not merely for a relief of declaration, but for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of immovable property.”

    (c)   In Aishani Chandna Mehra v. Rajesh Chandna,2019-0-Supreme(Del) 1-70; Laws (Dlh) 2019-1-288, (Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.) observed, referring his own earlier 3 judgments, as under:

    • “23. Otherwise also, I have in Sunil Kohli v. Subhash Chand Dua 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3244, Ashok Kumar v. Mohd. Rustam(2016) 227 DLT 385,  and Capital Land Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Komal, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11867, held –
    • (i) that in suits claiming relief with respect to immoveable property, the relief of declaration, even if claimed, is superfluous and the limitation for the suit would be governed by the limitation provided for the relief of possession; the longer limitation period provided for instituting a suit for recovery of possession would not be curtailed by the lesser limitation of three years provided for a suit for declaration;
    • (ii) that to hold otherwise would tantamount to providing two different periods of limitation for a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property based on title i.e. of three years if the suit, besides for the said relief is also for the relief of declaration of title and of twelve years, if no relief of declaration is claimed;
    • (iii) that a relief of declaration of title to immovable property is implicit in a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property based on title inasmuch as without establishing title to property, if disputed, no decree for the relief of possession also can be passed;
    • (iv) that thus, merely because a plaintiff in such a suit also specifically claims the relief of declaration of title, cannot be a ground to treat him differently and reduce the period of limitation available to him from that provided of twelve years, to three years; and,
    • (v) that when a relief of declaration is coupled with the relief of possession, the larger period of limitation for the relief of possession and not the lesser period of limitation for the relief of declaration would apply.
    • Reference in this regard may also be made to Vidur Impex and Traders Pvt. Ltd. v. Pradeep Kumar Khanna (2017) 241 DLT 481 and C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai (2007) 14 SCC 183.”

    (d)   In Ashok Kumar v. Mohd. Rustam2016 SCC OnLine Del 466: MANU/DE/0197/2016
    (Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.), it was held as under:

    • “16. Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, for the relief of declaration, undoubtedly provides limitation of three years from the date when the cause of action accrues. However I am of the opinion that once the plaintiff, besides suing for declaration of title also sues for recovery of possession of immovable property on the basis of title, the limitation for such a suit would be governed by the limitation provided for the relief of possession and not by limitation provided for the relief of declaration. To hold otherwise would tantamount to providing two different periods of limitation for a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property based on title i.e. of three years if the suit besides for the said relief is also for the relief of declaration of title and of twelve years as aforesaid if no relief of declaration is claimed. A relief of declaration of title to immovable property is implicit in a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property based on title inasmuch as without establishing title to property, if disputed, no decree for the relief of possession also can be passed. Thus, merely because a plaintiff in such a suit also specifically claims the relief of declaration of title, cannot be a ground to treat him differently and reduce the period of limitation available to him from that provided of twelve years, to three years. “ (referred to in Vidur Impex and Traders Pvt. Ltd. v. Pradeep Kumar Khanna, 2017- 241 Del LT 481)

    (e) In Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh vs Randhir Singh, AIR 2010 SC 2807, 2010-12 SCC 112, it is observed as under: 

    • “6. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to ‘A’ and ‘B’ — two brothers. `A’ executes a sale deed in favour of `C’. Subsequently `A’ wants to avoid the sale. `A’ has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if `B’, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by `A’ is invalid/void and non- est/ illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If `A’, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad-valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If `B’, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if `B’, a non- executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of Section 7.”

     (f)   In S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840, it is held that Article 58 is not applicable for declaration that is sought only as an ancillary relief. It is held as under:

    • “When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought for that is which would not govern the period of limitation for the suit. The consequential relief sought for is to be treated as main relief governing the period of limitation for the suit. (See Mrs. Indira Bhalchandran Gokhale v. Union of India & Another-AIR 1990 Bombay 98). Therefore declaration prayed for in this case as relief Nos. 1 and 2 were unnecessary, and even if made, need only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition of immovable properties and the claim that appellant is entitled to get family pension.”

    (g) In Ashok Kumar v. Gangadhar2007 (2) ALD 313, 2007 (3) ALT 561, it is held:

    • “If the contention of the defendants that Article 58 applies to the suit for possession based on title where declaration of title is also sought, is accepted, it would amount to ignoring the relief for recovery of possession and application of Article 65 to a suit for possession and taking away the right of the plaintiff to prove that the suit is within 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.  If such a suit were to be decided with reference to Article 58 on the ground that the declaration is sought for, application of Article 65 to the suit for possession would be rendered otiose.  Such a construction would be opposed to all principles of interpretation of statutes.  Therefore different Articles of the Limitation Act will have to be interpreted harmoniously.  When such an interpretation is given to Articles 58 and 65 and when the suit is filed for declaration of title to the suit property with consequential relief of possession in my humble view Article 65 of the Limitation Act would apply and not Article 58 of the Limitation Act”.

    (h) It is held in Mechineni Chokka Rao v. Sattu Sattamma2006 (1) ALD 116, as under:

    • “10…. It is obvious that Article 58 is in the nature of residuary provision among the declaratory suits. Indubitably the relief of declaration can be sought for in respect of an immovable property or movable property, or in respect of an instrument, or in respect of a decree, or in respect of an adoption. Thus, various types of declaratory reliefs can be sought for pertaining to those categories. Therefore, the relief of declaration alone appears to be not the criterion for prescribing the period of limitation but the subject-matter of the suit in respect of which the declaration is sought for, appears to be germane for consideration.”
    • “13. The problem can be viewed in a different dimension. The right over an immovable property will get extinguished as can be seen from Section 27 of the Act only after the expiry of the period prescribed for filing the suit for possession as per Articles 64 and 65 of the Act. Therefore, if the period falls short of the requisite period of 12 years the right over an immovable property will not get extinguished. When the person has a right over an immovable property which right is not extinguished as yet, he can lay the suit in respect of an immovable property even praying for the relief of declaration at any time within the period of 12 years at the end of which, his right would get extinguished. When we consider this clear mandate contained in Section 27 f the Act, it becomes manifest that a declaratory relief in respect of an immovable property can be sought for at any time within the period of 12 years after which the right will get automatically extinguished, notwithstanding the fact that Article 58, the residuary Article for filing declaratory suits, prescribes a period of three years limitation. … ….”

    (i)   In C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183, our Apex Court held as under:

    • “13. If the plaintiff is to be granted a relief of recovery of possession, the suit could be filed within a period of 12 years. It is one thing to say that whether such a relief can be granted or not after the evidences are led by the parties but it is another thing to say that the plaint is to be rejected on the ground that the same is barred by any law. If the suit has been filed for possession, as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiffs title, Article 58 will have no application.”

    (j)  State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, (2000) 3 SCC 460, was a suit for declaration in respect of a right of pre-emption and also for possession. It was contended that the deed was null and void. Our Apex Court held that merely for the fact that the plaintiff, besides the relief of possession, sought declaration also was of no consequence, and that in such a case the governing article of the Schedule to the Limitation Act would be Article 65. It is observed as under:

    • “As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji’s case, (AIR 1981 SC 234) (supra) Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable laid with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would   also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj v. Moti S/o. Mussadi, (1991) 3 SCC 136: (1991 AIR SCW 1576: AIR 1991 SC 1600) this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. …..”

    (k)   In Seshumull M. Shah v. Sayed Abdul Rashid , AIR 1991 Kar. 273, Karnataka High Court observed that a suit where possession is claimed as a consequence of the declaration, it would be governed by Article 65 and not Article 58 of the Limitation Act.

    (l)  If plaintiff has clear title in a suit for recovery on the strength of that title, plaintiff is not obliged to seek declaration (Padmavathy v. Kesava Reddy, 1987-2 KerLT 386, Dr. Kochuthomman, J.; Unnikrishnan v. Ponnu Ammal, AIR 1999 Ker. 405)

    (m)  In page 752 of the Treatise by B. B. Mitra, the Limitation Act, 23rd Edition, reads as under:

    • “Article 65, and not Article 58, was attracted because no separate declaration was necessary, and the suit was essentially a suit for possession attracting Article 65. (State of Maharashtra v. Praveen, AIR 2000 SC 1099)

    Declaration Stands as Subservient to main prayer of Recovery

    In K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.), held as under:

    • “27. Article 56 of the Act deals with declaration of forgery of an instrument and Article 57 deals with matters relating to validity of an adoption. Article 58 is the residuary Article for matters not falling within Articles 56 and 57 of the Act. It is well settled that Article 58 will apply only to a suit for declaration simplicitor.

    Question of limitation arises only when Adverse Possession

    • Q. of limitation comes if only Plaintiff has clear title and the defendant bases his claim on Adv. Possn.
      If defendant has title, or better title, it is immaterial when he got it (i.e., title deed). He has to just point it out.

    In K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.), held as under:

    • 30. It is clear from Article 65 of the Act that a right to recover possession of immovable property by a person on the claim of title can be defeated by another person after 12 years if only he establishes that he was holding possession of the property adverse to the person first mentioned. In other words, in a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property based on title, the question of limitation will arise only when the defendant pleads and proves adverse possession for a continuous period of 12 years. The above statement can be amplified by saying that in such a case, if the defendant fails to plead and prove adverse possession for the statutory period, there will be no bar for the plaintiff in getting recovery of possession of the property on the basis of title even after 12 years. The obvious reason is that a claim based on title paramount is a superior claim and it can be defeated only in a manner provided by law.

    Recovery of Possession on Title – Declaration Subservient to Main Prayer

    K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.), further held as under:

    • 37. Upshot of the discussion is that the above principles can be applied to the facts and circumstances of this case and therefore, it can only be held that the predominant nature of the suit is one for recovery of possession of property on the strength of title and declaration is only subservient to the main prayer. That is claimed only to dispel the cloud cast on the plaintiffs’ title. So much so, Article 58 of the Act has no application and Article 65 of the Act applies in this case.”

    The Kerala High Court (K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98) referred the following decisions:

    • (i) Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur   Prajapati, AIR 2004 SC 3782. (Adverse possession is a fact, which is to be specifically pleaded and proved.)
    • (2) Mst. Gulkandi v. Prahlad, AIR 1968 Raj 51. (It was contended by the plaintiff that certain documents were not binding on him as he was not a party thereto. The court held that there was no necessity to cancel or set aside those documents and therefore Article 91 of the old Act was not applicable. It was also held that Article 144 of the old Act, prescribing a period of 12 years in the case of recovery of possession of property, would be applied.)
    • (3) Pavan Kumar v. K. Gopalakrishnan, AIR 1998 AP 247. (The suit was essentially and primarily a suit for possession based on title and a mere fact that a declaration of title was also sought therein did not bring it within Article 58 or Article 113 of the Act so as to attract the three years period of limitation; a formal declaration of title was sought only by way of an abundant caution.)
    • (4) Rama Pujhari v. Gouri   Bewa, AIR 2006 Ori 129. (A suit in which declaratory and recovery of possession reliefs are claimed on the basis of the contention that the impugned document was void ab initio can only be viewed as a suit predominantly for recovery of possession and Article 65 of the Act applies.) 
    • (5) Seshumull M. Shah v. Sayed Abdul Rashid, AIR 1991 Kar 273. (Article 58 of the Act will not apply for a suit for possession as a consequence of declaration.)
    • (6) State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099. (The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration (documents void) is of no consequence. Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply.)

    If Title Established, Plaintiff cannot be non-suited, unless Adv. Possession proved

    In Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549, it was held that a plaintiff cannot be non-suited, in a suit based on title, unless the defendant proves adverse possession for the prescriptive period. It is held as under:

    • “It is, therefore, obvious that when the suit is based on title for possession, once the title is established on the basis of relevant documents and other evidence unless the defendant proves adverse possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited……” (Followed in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021)

    Same principle is applied in the following decisions also:

    • Saroop Singh v. Banto, (2005) 8 SCC 330,
    • M. Durai v. Muthu, (2007) 3 SCC 114,
    • P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59
    • Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta ((2024) 2 SCR 326; 2024 INSC 769: C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.

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    Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

    Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

    Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

    Principles and Procedure

    PROPERTY LAW

    Title, ownership and Possession

    Adverse Possession

    Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

    Power of attorney

    Evidence Act – General

    Sec. 65B

    Admission, Relevancy and Proof

    Law on Documents

    Interpretation

    Contract Act

    Law on Damages

    Easement

    Stamp Act & Registration

    Divorce/Marriage

    Negotiable Instruments Act

    Arbitration

    Will

    Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

    Religious issues

    Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

    Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

    Doctrine of Substantial Representation in Suits

    Notice to one in Tenants-in-Common and Joint Tenants; and Notice to Societies

    Jojy George Koduvath

    Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act provides that a registered society must sue or be sued through the office bearer or a nominee, as provided in that section. Therefore it can be concluded that Sec. 6 impliedly bars filing a suit in the name of the society, otherwise than through its President, Secretary or the nominated person.

    It is noteworthy that the diktats in Sec. 6 of the So. Registration Act are not invariably followed by our courts; but, adopted the doctrine of ‘substantial representation’ (Subramania Pillai Vs. Masterly, AIR1976 Mad 303). 

    In Singhai Lal Chand Jain Vs. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, Panna, AIR 1996 SC 1211, the High Court had held that the objection was sustainable as to the maintainability of representative suit for eviction against an unregistered association, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), without Order 1 Rule 8 CPC steps; and that the decree was a nullity and non est; and the execution was not maintainable. Our Apex Court observed as under:

    • “Procedure is the handmaid to the substantive justice. …. It is true that no permission of the Court was taken to be sued in a representative capacity by or on behalf of the Sangh. But Clause (b) of Order 1, Rule 8 indicates that it may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of all persons so interested. Clause (b) clearly applies to the facts in this case. The President of the Sangh, the Manager of the Sangh and a Member have duly represented the Sangh and defended the suit for the benefit of all the persons so interested in the Sangh.”

    It was also pointed out:

    • “Thus it could be held that the Sangh having been duly represented in the previous proceedings and conducted the litigation on behalf of the Sangh bona fide and were unsuccessful in the suit, no one on behalf of the Sangh can lay any objection in the execution nor plead nullity of the decree. The doctrine of res judicata prohibited the members of the Sangh to obstruct the execution of the decree. The decree of ejectment binds every member of the Sangh and, therefore, the appellant is entitled to have the decree executed and possession taken.”

    In this decision the following passage from Surayya Begum Vs. Mohd. Usman, (1991) 3 SCC 114, was quoted:

    • “The principle of representation of the interest of a person, not impleaded by name in a judicial proceeding, through a named party is not unknown. A karta of a Joint Hindu Family has always been recognised as a representative of the other members of the Joint Hindu Family, and so has been a trustee. In cases where the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code are attracted a named party in a suit represents the other persons interested in the litigation, and likewise a receiver appointed in one case represents the interest of the litigating parties in another case against a stranger. Similarly the real owner is entitled to the benefits under a decree obtained by his benamidar against a stranger and at the same time is also bound by the decision. Examples can be multiplied. It is for this reason that we find Explanation VI in the following words in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure: ‘Explanation VI. – Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating’.”
    • Note:
      • 1. RSS was a defendant in Singhai Lal Chand Jain Vs. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, Panna (supra); and the suit was for eviction of RSS through its Manager, its President; and the Head Master of Saraswati Shishu Mandiras a member of the Sangh.
      • 2, It is not legitimate to take this decision as an authority for ‘substantial representation’ in an internal matter of an association in which all members of the association may be ‘interested’ or ‘affected’.

    Notice to one in Tenants-in-Common and Joint Tenants

    In Ramubai v. Jiyaram Sharma, AIR 1964 Bom  96, it was held as under:

    • “18. Another aspect of the question may be considered so far as the facts of the case are concerned. The interest claimed is an interest in the leasehold property. That interest is claimed by defendants 9 to 11 who are admittedly residing out of the town in which the premises are located. The nexus which creates a relationship between the lessors and the defendants claiming interest in the leasehold is the leasehold property which is occupied by defendants 1 to 8. The question is whether there could be implied in such circumstances a jointness in interest which would clothe the persons in occupation the capacity to receive notice or to do acts which will be binding on all those joint tenants. It is urged on behalf of the defendants that the moment it is held that the leasehold interest is inherited as ten-ants-in-common with defined shares inter se among them, the capacity of any one of those tenants-in-common to represent the other is at an end. Such a capacity to represent others could only be assumed or inferred in the case of persons who own only as joint tenants, but never in case of persons who hold as tenants-in-common. I find it difficult to accept this interpretation. If there is a unity of interest, common enjoyment and possession of the property, if all these joint tenants hold qua landlord as one tenant, if each of these joint tenants had an interest in the whole of the leasehold, if the acts of any one of them are the acts of all such tenants, such as act of re-entry or act of wrongful conversion, then it is difficult to hold why a notice received by one of them should not have the effect of a valid notice in respect of all on whom the notice is meant to operate. There is sufficient community of interest and joint interest inter se in them which clothes everyone of them with a representative, character vis-a-vis the landlord. I therefore hold agreeing with the Court below, that notice to one ; of them was enough and served as a good notice I to all as the notice was meant to be/ operative against all the joint tenants.”

    Ramubai v. Jiyaram Sharma, AIR 1964 Bom  96, is referred to in the following decisions:

    • Chinta John Sundar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2023-2 ALD 282; 2023-1 ALT 170
    • Sagar Bhagwat v. Kiran, 2016 5 AIR(Bom)(R) 366; 2016-5 AllMR 826; 2017-1 BomCR 476; 2016-6 MhLJ 368
    • Vasant Raghu Bhingardive v. Nagori Muslim Misgar Jamat Trust, 2007- 3 AIR(Bom)(R) 435; 2007-2 AllMR 504; 2007-4 MhLJ 216,
    • Emilia Tinoco v. Shashikant Naguesh Gad, 1997AIR(Bom) 319
    • Dashrathlal v. Kanhaiyalal Daga, 1977-2 MPWN 412.

    Who is a Necessary Party

    The ‘necessary party’ is not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. But, from the judicial dicta following are the matters that come for consideration:

    • There must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceedings in question, and
    • It will not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such a party (The Banaras Bank Ltd. Vs. Bhagwan Das: AIR 1947 All 18; Udit Narain Singh, Malpatharia vs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786).
    • Whether such a party is directly affected by the decision (Udit Narain Singh, Malpatharia vs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786).

    In Udit Narain Singh, Malpatharia vs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786, the Constitution Bench held as under:

    • “7. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.
    • 9. The next question is whether the parties whose rights are directly affected are the necessary parties to a writ petition to quash the order of a tribunal. … Without the presence of the successful party the High Court cannot issue a substantial order affecting his right. Any order that may be issued behind the back of such a party can be ignored by the said party, with the result that the tribunal’s order would be quashed but the right vested in that party by the wrong order of the tribunal would continue to be effective. Such a party, therefore, is a necessary party and a petition filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari without making him a party or without impleading him subsequently, if allowed by the court, would certainly be incompetent. A party whose interests are directly affected is, therefore, a necessary party.”

    Suit to protect or recover property

    The Privy Council in Jagadinadra Nath Vs.  Hemanta Kumari Debi, (1904) 31 Ind App 203 (PC), and our Apex Court in Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddi Vs. Kondaru Seshu Reddi,  AIR 1967 SC 436, (Referring: Pramathanath Nath Vs. Pradyumna: AIR 1925 PC 139) held that Shebait of a temple has the authority to institute a suit in his own name to protect and recover property belonging to the deity. (Also see: Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joo Deo, AIR  1978  All  1 – Referring: Jagadindra Nath Vs. Hemanta Kumari, (1904) 31 Ind App 203.)

    By various authoritative decisions, it is made clear that when the trust is admitted, or where the right or title over the property is not in dispute the deity will not be a necessary party, in suits for protection of the property and the rights of the trust (Hangi Mal Vs. Panna Lal:  AIR 1957 All 743).

    The same is the case for framing a scheme also (Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar Radha Ealla:  AIR 1937 Cal 338).

    In Monindra Mohan Vs.  Shamnagar Jute Factory, AIR 1939 Cal 699, a Division Bench held that the deity is not a necessary party in a suit filed on behalf of the Hindu public for declaration that the land in question was a debasthan of the idol and that it is a public place of warship.

    It is appropriate to import this analogy to matters of societies also. Where the right or title over the property is not in dispute, and the suit is filed by a person who is bound to protect the property of a society, it can be concluded that the suit is not liable to be dismissed holding that the society as such (that is, all its members) is a necessary party.

    It is observed in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez, 2013(4) Ker LT 283, that, though, as per the Canon Law the church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar, the parish being by law a public juridic person, and the plaintiffs (the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church) were entitled to represent the juridic person, the plaintiffs were competent to initiate civil proceedings (with the ultimate  aim of  protecting  the  property belonging  to  the church) before a Civil Court. 

    Is Society, a Necessary Party?

    Kania, J., in AS Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram,  AIR 1941 Bom. 312, laid down (earlier view) as under:

    • “In my opinion as the position of the members of this society is similar to that of the share holders of the company and as the acts of the defendants which are challenged are in respect of the society it is necessary that the society should be a party to this litigation. I do not think it is competent to the plaintiff either alone or representing himself and the other members of the society other than defendants to bring a suit. …… In the absence of the society as a party to this litigation, I am of opinion that the suit as framed is not maintainable and the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in the absence of the society.”

    Since it is unequivocally held by our Apex Court in Illachi Devi case, AIR 2003 SC 3397, that a (registered) society cannot sue or be sued in its name, it is peremptory that the suit by or against a society should be brought as provided under Sec. 6 of the So. Regn. Act.

    Notice to a Society, Notice to all Members

    The notice to a Co-operative Society will be deemed as notice to all its members. In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana, AIR1985 SC 973, it is pointed out by our Apex Court, with respect to a Co-operative Society, that S. 13(9)(a) provides for the issue of notice to the societies and not to individual members and that S. 13(9)(b), however, gives the members an opportunity to be heard.

    It is legitimate to maintain that, in appropriate cases, it may be proper to extend these principles as to service of notice, to both registered and unregistered societies, and a club also, with regard to the matters-touching-rights-or-duties of the society ‘as a body’; for example, notice as to nonpayment of tax or revenue. The notice to the society or a proper office bearer will be deemed as notice to all its members.

    Read Blog: Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs

    Our Law Does Not Favour ‘Corporation Sole’  

    Our law does not favour characterising a ‘Corporation Sole’ as a Juristic Person except officials such as President of India, District Collectors, Secretaries/Office-Heads of various Departments of Government, Village Officers, etc.  [See: Samatha Hyderabad Abrasives And Minerals Vs. State of AP: AIR 1997 SC 3297; T.K. Santhanagopala Chettiar Vs. Thimmi M. Seetharama Chettiar 1968-2 Mad LJ  41; S Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India: AIR 1967 SC 1274; S C Sreemanavikraman Raja Vs. Controller of Estate Duty: 1957-2 Mad LJ  226].

    S Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India: AIR 1967 SC 1274

    Our Apex Court held in S Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India: AIR 1967 SC 1274 as under:

    • “It was also contended by the appellant in this connection that as the Commissioner was made a Corporation sole under s. 80 of the Act as a separate and independent personality, he was not subject to the control of the Government and no disciplinary proceedings ‘Could be initiated against him. We do not think there is any substance in this argument. It is true that the Commissioner has been made a Corporation sole under s. 80 of the Act which states that the Commissioner shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be sued in his corporate name. Section 81(1) of the Act provides for the establishment of a Fund called ‘The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Administration Fund’ and further states that the Fund shall vest in the Commissioner. It was argued for the appellant that the corporate entity created by s. 80 of the Act has a separate legal personality. But there is a juristic distinction between a Corporation sole and a Corporation aggregate, and the Corporation sole is not endowed with a separate legal personality as the Corporation aggregate. As Maitland said:
      • “If our corporation sole really were an artificial person created by the policy of man we ought to marvel at its incompetence. Unless custom or statute aids it, it cannot (so we are told) own a chattel, not even a chattel real. A different and an equally inelegant device was adopted to provide an owning ‘subject’ for the ornaments of the church and the minister thereof-adopted at the end of the Middle Ages by lawyers who held themselves debarred by the theory of corporations from frankly saying that the body of parishioners is a corporation aggregate. And then, we are also told that in all probability a corporation sole ‘Cannot enter into a contract except with statutory authority or as incidental to an interest in land ………. Be that as it may, the ecclesiastical corporation sole is no juristic person‘; he or it is either natural man or juristic abortion.” (See ‘Selected Essays of’ Maitland” pp. 100 & 103).
    • Keeton has also observed as follows
      • “It was a device for transmitting real property to a, succession of persons without the necessity for periodic. conveyances. It was never intended that this device should’ be erected into a psychological person with a developed existence of its own In dealing with a corporation sole, the courts have never treated it as a conception similar in essential characteristics to a corporation aggregate. They have restricted its utility to the transmission of real, or exceptionally, by custom, as in Byrd v. Wilford, and now by statute, personal property from one holder of an office, lay or ecclesiastical, to his successor” (See ‘Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence’ by Keeton, 2nd Edn. pp. 155 & 162).”
    • We accordingly reject the contention of the appellant that the Commissioner has a separate legal personality as corporation sole under s. 80 of the Act and that he is exempt from disciplinary proceedings for any act or omission committed in his capacity as. Commissioner. In our opinion, the object of the legislature in enacting ss. 80 and 81 of the Act was to constitute a separate Fund and to provide for the vesting of that Fund in the Commissioner as a corporation sole and thereby avoid the necessity of periodic conveyances in the transmission of title to that Fund.”

    How to Sue an Unregistered Society or a Club

    An unregistered society or a club is not a legal person; and therefore, it has to sue or be sued only in the name of all its members. It can be done by invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC which enables one or more of ‘numerous’ persons having common (community of) interest to sue or be sued in a representative character. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State, AIR 1962 SC 458; Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India, AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.)

    When an Association be represented by the Plaintiff; when by the Defendants?

    When a suit is filed by a member seeking reliefs concerning the society or a club, relating to a matter common to all members, he has to file it (also) as representing other members of the society other than the defendants (usually office-bearers of the society or club); and if it is a personal matter of the plaintiff, seeking relief against all other members, the plaintiff has to sue against one or two members (usually office-bearers) as representatives of others.

    Order I Rule 8 CPC

    The objective of the enabling provision, Order I Rule 8 CPC, is avoidance of multiplicity in litigation; and the decision in such a suit binds all present and future members. (TN Housing Board Vs. TN Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1990 SC 642; Jamiat Ulama Vs. Maulana Mahmood Asad Madni: ILR 2008-17 Dlh 1950).

    TN Housing Board Vs. TN Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608, was a case where the suit was filed by allottees of plots of low-income groups against the appellant-Housing Board seeking injunction from demanding and collecting any additional price and the suit was held maintainable under Order I Rule 8, even though separate demand notices were issued to each allottees (Referred to in Manish Kumar v. Union of India, 2021-5 SCC 1).

    Decision Binds all Represented, and Constitute Res Judicata

    The condition necessary for the application of Order I Rule 8 is that the persons on whose behalf the suit is brought must have the same interest and the decision in a representative suit would bind all the persons sought to be represented, and constitute res judicata, under Section 11, CPC. (Mahboob Sahab Vs. Syed Ismail: AIR1995 SC 1205; T N Housing Board Vs. T N Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1990 SC 642; Venugopala Naidu Vs. Venkatarayulu: (1989) Supp 2 SCC 3 56: AIR 1990 SC 444. Ahmed Adam Sait Vs. M. E. Makhri AIR 1964 SC 107. C Arumughathan Vs. S Muthusami Naidu: 1993-1 CivCC 79: 1992-1 Mad LJ 532

    Registration does not Confer Juristic Personality

    In Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State, AIR 1962 SC 458, it is held that the registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status.

    In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India: AIR 2003 SC 3397, it is held that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act as a society even after registration does not become distinct from its members and does not become a separate legal person like a company. (Referred to in Vivek Narayan Sharma Vs. Union of India, 2023-3 SCC 1)

    In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India, AIR2003 SC 3397, says as under: 

    • i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
    • ii) A Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  (Para 21)
    • iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)

    Society is the Compendium of its Members

    A society or a club, both registered and unregistered, is the compendium of its members. When it sues or is sued all its members should be made parties. Registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458. Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India: AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata, AIR 2010 SC 2943)

    Property Belonging to a Society’, “Merely Describes” Property Vests in Gover. Body

    Expressions in the Societies Registration Act, ‘property belonging to a society’ (Societies Registration Act: Sec. 5) and  ‘property of the society’, (Societies Registration Act: Sec. 8 and 10) do not give the society a corporate status; and it “merely describes the property which vests in trustees or Governing Body”. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458)

    ‘Suit By or Against a Regd. So.’ is Virtually Suit By or Against Entire Members

    Following the above propositions, it can be legitimately concluded that the common expression, ‘suit by or against a society’, legally and virtually denotes suit by or against its entire members.

    How Sec. 6 is an Enabling Provision

    The earlier view taken by various courts in India was that the registered societies were legal persons and they could sue or be sued in their own name; and that Sec. 6 was only an enabling (or added) provision to sue or be sued in the name of the president, secretary, etc.. (Shanti Sarup Vs. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha, Dayalbagh Agra: AIR 1969 All. 248; K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook, AIR 1970 Pat 163;  Khiri Ram Gupta and Another versus Nana Lal:  AIR 1964 Pat. 114, Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay : AIR 1946 Bom. 516; Nabadwip Bhajan Asram Vs. Commissioner of Nabadwip Municipality : AIR 1959 Cal 361; Sonar Bangala Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College: AIR 1960 Cal 409)

    This view does not hold good in the light of Unani Tibia College case, AIR 1962 SC 458, Illachi Devi case,  AIR 2003 SC 3397, and Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.

    Suing entire members of the society, either in person or invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC, is the normal rule. But, Sec. 6 enables ‘to sue or be sued’ every registered society in the name of its president, secretary, etc., as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society (or through such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion).

    Suit shall be in the Personal Name of President, Chairman, etc.

    From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ as President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees.

    Sec. 6 Impliedly Bars Filing a Suit in the Name of Society

    As already stated, our Apex Court has repeatedly  made it clear that Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act provides that a registered society must sue or be sued through the office bearer or a nominee, as provided in that section. Therefore, it can be concluded that Sec. 6 impliedly bars filing a suit in the name of the society, otherwise than through its President, Secretary or the nominated person. (Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.)

    Procedural Defects Should Not Defeat A Just Cause

    It is trite law that one should not be non-suited for technical reasons, and that procedural defects or curable procedural irregularity which is curable or which does not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. (United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar: AIR 1997 SC 3; Uday Shankar Triyar Vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh: AIR  2006 SC 269; Varun Pahwa Vs. Mrs. Renu Chaudhary: AIR  2019 SC 1186: 2019-3 JT 109.)

    It was pointed out in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3, by our Apex Court that there is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case.  

    Supreme Court Expanded Powers of Authorities of Companies in Filing Pleadings

    Under Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, Secretary or any Director or other Principal officer of a Corporation can sign pleadings by virtue of their office. A company being a juristic entity, Board of Directors can authorise any person to sign pleadings by passing a resolution or giving a power of attorney, by virtue of Order 6 Rule 14 read with Order 29 Rule 1 CPC. If pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, a Company can ratify it. Such action can be express or implied.

    It is held in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar (1997), AIR 1997 SC 3, that a Court can, after taking all the circumstances of the case, come to the conclusion that the company must have ratified the act of signing the pleading. It was pointed out that the courts below should have, in any case, directed the company to produce a proper power of attorney or they must have allowed a competent person to be examined to prove ratification.

    United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar (1997), AIR 1997 SC 3, reads as under:

    • “10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and de hors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement or its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a Corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.”

    Proper Authorisation Essential

    It is beyond doubt that a proper authorisation is essential for filing suit by a Company. Though, Secretary or any Director or other Principal officer can sign pleadings by virtue of their office, as per Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, the view followed in some earlier decisions was that neither the directors nor the managing director would have the right to represent the Company in the suit unless duly authorised by a resolution taken by the Board of Directors to that effect, at a meeting duly constituted for the said purpose.(B. Mookerjee Vs State Bank of India: AIR 1992 Cal 250; Nibro Limited Vs National Insurance Co:  AIR 1991  Del 25)

    In State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers, 2011-11 SCC 524, it is held by our Apex Court as under:

    • “14. In our view, the judgment under challenge is liable to be set aside because the Respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was appointed as a Director of the company and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the company to file suit against the Appellant and authorised Shri Ashok K. Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K. Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers to Shri Raj K. Shukla to authorise another person to file suit on behalf of the company.”

    In this decision (State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers) there was no scope to ponder on the doctrines as to ‘technical or procedural defects’ as done in the earlier decision in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar,  AIR 1997 SC 3.

    The decision, State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers may be distinguishable from United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar. In State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers there was no evidence to show that the signatory was a Director of the Company, and no resolution of the Board of Directors was produced to prove that the signatory was authorized  to file the suit. 

    It was observed by Delhi High Court in Nibro Limited Vs National Insurance Co., AIR 1991  Del 25, that if a director or a secretary was authorised by law to file a suit on behalf of a company, then he could certainly give the authority to another person as provided under Order III Rule 1 CPC. Order III Rule 1 provides that ‘any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. Provided, that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person’. However, if there is an express provision of law, then that will prevail. Thus, if an authority is given to a pleader or a recognised agent as provided by law, the recognised agent or pleader can file an appearance or file a suit in court if the party himself is not in a position to file it.

    The Bombay High Court held, in Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd Vs.  (2015), 2015-1 Mh L 852, with respect to the source of power of the Directors, as under:

    •  “The essential requirement of this provision is that the Company which is a juristic person must itself decide to sue. Once that is done, it would authorise one of its Directors who is the agent of the Company or its principal officers the Secretary of the Company or the Managing Director to file the Suit. The suing in each case is a separate act. The Company acts only through its meetings. Hence the Board of Directors in the day to day management of the company must decide and resolve to sue or not to sue. A blanket authority cannot be given to a particular Managing Director or Director to sign the papers and document/s, including the power to sue. The power to sue requires application of mind upon the particular cause of action. It requires the Company to pay the requisite Court fee. It requires the Company to be represented by a legal officer being an Advocate of the Court. It is an act which, therefore, is not a part of the day to day management of the Company. A Company would decide in a given case upon legal advice or otherwise whether or not it would sue upon a given cause of action. Such exercise is imperatively required to be performed if the intention of the Company, which is only a juristic person, is to be deciphered. That act, of course, may be undertaken even after the filing of the Suit and ratified by the Board as all other acts of management. However, the seminal requirement is to see the act of the Company though its Board or members (dependent upon whether the resolution is passed in the Board meeting or a general meeting) or is given by the Company itself (under its Articles of Association).”

    In Nibro Limited Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., AIR 1991 Delhi 25, it is observed, with regard to the source of power of the Directors, as under:

    • “25. It is well-settled that under Section 291 of the Companies Act except where express provision is made that the powers of a company in respect of a particular matter are to be exercised by the company in general meeting–in all others cases the Board of Directors are entitled to exercise all its powers. Individual directors have such powers only as are vested in them by the Memorandum and Articles. It is true that ordinarily the court will not unsuit a person on account of technicalities. However, the question of authority to institute a suit on behalf of a company is not a technical matter. It has far-reaching effects. It often affects policy and finances of the company. Thus, unless a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on a particular director, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of the company. Needless to say that such a power can be conferred by the Board of Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard.” Quoted in: United India Periodicals Pvt. Ltd.  Vs. CMYK Printech Ltd. : 2018-248 DLT 227

    The law as to the authority of ratification of the act of the officers in signing pleadings, by a Company is detailed by the Delhi High Court in Radico Khaitan Limited Vs. J D Wines,  2020-2 AD(Del)  421, .

    Persons Represented need not have “same cause of action“; must have “common interest”

    In Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madras vs. T. N. Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608, it was held by this Court that the persons who may be represented in a suit under Order 1 Rule 8 of Civil Procedure Code need not have the same cause of action and all that is required for application of said provision is that the persons concerned must have common interest or common grievance. What is required is sameness of interest. Paragraphs 7 and 9 of the decision says as under:

    • 7. On the question of maintainability of the suit in a representative capacity under Order I, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been contended that since the injury complained of is in regard to demand of money and that too by a separate demand against each of the allottees, giving rise to different causes of action, Rule 1 has no application. … The provisions of Order I of Rule 8 have been included in the Code in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The condition necessary for application of the provisions is that the persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must have the same interest. In other words either the interest must be common or they must have a common grievance which they seek to get redressed. In Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar (ILR 1955 Mad 339: AIR 1955 Mad 281) a Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed that on the plain language of Order I Rule 8, the principal requirement to bring a suit within that rule is the sameness of interest of the numerous persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is instituted. The court, while considering whether leave under the rule should be granted or not, should examine whether there is sufficient community of interest to justify the adoption of the procedure provided under the rule. The object for which this provision is enacted is really to facilitate the decision of questions, in which a large number of persons are interested, without recourse to the ordinary procedure. The provision must, therefore, receive an interpretation which will subserve the object for its enactment. There are no words in the rule to limit its scope to any particular category of suits or to exclude a suit in regard to a claim for money or for injunction as the present one. … … …
    • 9. It is true that each of the allottees is interested individually in fighting out the demand separately made or going to be made on him and, thus, separate causes of action arise in the case, but, that does not make Order I Rule 8 inapplicable. Earlier there was some doubt about the rule covering such a case which now stands clarified by the Explanation introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, which reads as follows:
    • “Explanation.— For the purpose of determining whether the persons who sue or are sued, or defend, have the same interest in one suit, it is not necessary to establish that such persons have the same cause of action as the persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or defend the suit, as the case may be.” (Quoted in: Anjum Hussain Vs. Intellicity Business Park Pvt.  Ltd., 2019-6 SCC 519)

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    Order I rule 8, CPC (Representative Suit) When and How? Whether Order I rule 8 Decree is Enforceable in Execution?

    Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

    Introduction

    Order I rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, enables the plaintiffs to file a suit in a representative capacity on behalf of or for the benefit of a class of (numerous) persons. There should be a common grievance, seeking a common relief also. Law requires proper notice (including news-paper advertisement) to all such persons interested.

    Object of Order I rule 8

    The object of Order I rule 8 is to avoid multiplicity of litigation (Chairman, T. N. Housing Board, Madras v. T. N. Ganapathy, AIR 1990 SC 642, 1990-1 SCC 608).

    In Narayanan v. Kurichitanam Educational Society, AIR 1959 Ker 379, it was pointed out that it would be difficult to prescribe a minimum number which would be sufficient to satisfy the expression ‘numerous’ as used in Order I, r. 8. It is a matter of discretion left to the court.

    When Order I Rule 8 Representation allowed

    Order I Rule 8 reads as under

    8. One person may sue or defend on behalf of all in same interest.

    • (1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit,-
      (a) one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested;
      (b) the Court may direct that one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested.
    • (2) The Court shall, in every case where a permission or direction is given under sub-rule (1), at the plaintiff’s expense, give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons so interested either by personal service, or, where, by reason of the number of persons or any other cause, such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct.
    • (3) Any person on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, a suit is instituted or defended, under sub-rule (1), may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit.
    • (4) No part of the claim in any such suit shall be abandoned under sub-rule (1), and no such suit shall be withdrawn under sub-rule (3), of rule 1 of Order XXIII, and no agreement, compromise or satisfaction shall be recorded in any such suit under rule 3 of that Order, unless the Court has given, at the plaintiff’s expense, notice to all persons so interested in the manner specified in sub-rule (2).
    • (5) Where any person suing or defending in any such suit does not proceed with due diligence in the suit or defence, the Court may substitute in his place any other person having the same interest in the suit.
    • (6) A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended, as the case may be.
    • Explanation
      For the purpose of determining whether the persons who sue or are sued, or defend, have the same interest in one suit, it is not necessary to establish that such persons have the same cause of action as the person on whom behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or defend the suit, as the case may be.”

    Numerous Persons “Having The Same Interest”

    Order I Rule 8 can be invoked,  with the permission of the Court –

    • (i) where numerous persons having the same interest have to sue (as plaintiff) or
    • (ii) numerous persons having the same interest are to be sued (as defendants)
    • (iii) it can be invoked by the defendants also, for Order I Rule 8 (1) (a) says – “one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court … defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested”.

    “Numerous Persons” need not have “same cause of action”

    The Explanation to this rule was introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. It was needed as doubts arose as to whether the party representing others should have the ‘same cause of action as the persons represented by him’.

    The objects and reasons for the amendment were stated below:

    • “Rule 8 of O. I deals with representative suits. Under this rule, where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of them may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, on behalf of all of them. The rule has created a doubt as to whether the party representing others should have the same cause of action as the persons represented by him. The rule is being substituted by a new rule and an explanation is being added to clarify that such persons need not have the same cause of action. ” (Quoted in Chairman, T. N. Housing Board, Madras v. T. N. Ganapathy, AIR 1990 SC 642, 1990-1 SCC 608)

    ‘Sameness of Interest’ Or ‘Community of Interest’ of Numerous Persons

    In Chairman, T. N. Housing Board, Madras v. T. N. Ganapathy, AIR 1990 SC 642, 1990-1 SCC 608, it is said as under:

    • “7. … The provisions of O. 1 R. 8 have been included in the Code in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The condition necessary for application of the provisions is that the persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must have the same interest. In other words either the interest must be common or they must have a common grievance which they seek to get redressed. In Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar, ILR (1955) Mad 335, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed that on the plain language of 0.1, R.8, the principal requirement to bring a suit within that Rule is the sameness of interest of the numerous persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is instituted.”
    • The Court, while considering whether leave under the Rule should be granted or not, should examine whether there is sufficient community of interest to justify the adoption of the procedure provided under the Rule. The object for which this provision enacted is really to facilitate the decision of questions, in which a large number of persons are interested, without recourse to the ordinary procedure.”       

    Chairman, T. N. Housing Board, Madras v. T. N. Ganapathy, AIR 1990 SC 642, 1990-1 SCC 608. Is referred to in the following decisions:

    • Brigade Enterprises Limited v. Anil Kumar Virmani, AIR 2022  SC 119; 2022-4 SCC 138
    • Manish Kumar v Union of India, 2021-5 SCC 1
    • Anjum Hussain v. Intellicity Business Park Pvt Ltd., 2019-6  SCC 519,
    • Shri V. J. Thomas v Shri Pathrose Abraham, AIR 2008 SC 1503; 2008-5 SCC 84.

    Interest Need Not be Identical or joint and concurrent

    To invoke O I r 8 CPC what is needed is same or similar interest. It need not be identical or ‘interest in entirety’.

    In K. P. Venkata Subbaiah v. Hlndupur Municipality, 1976-1 APLJ 302, it was pointed out that Community of Interest is therefore essential and it is a condition precedent for bringing a representative suit. (Referred: Kodla v. Velandi, ILR 1955 Madras 339). But, the Madras High Court (K. P. Venkata Subbaiah) pointed out that “it is not necessary that the interest should be identical or should be joint and concurrent“.

    Whether O.I r.8 Decree is Res Judicata

    • Order I Rule 8(6)says that a decree passed in a suit under this rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended, as the case may be.

    Whether the decree in such a suit operates as res judicata against the persons who are represented remains as a controversy.  In any event, by the insertion of Sub-rule (6) to rule 8 of Order I, in 1976, it became legitimate to say that the decree stands as res judicata. Sub-rule (6) lays down that a decree passed in a suit under rule 8 shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is instituted or defended.

    Therefore, the view taken in Srinivasa Aiyankar v. Aryar Srinivasa Aiyankar, (1910) ILR 33 Mad 483 : 6 IC 229, that the decisions do not bind on those who were not actually (eo nominee)  parties (and hence not res judicata and not enforceable in execution)  does not hold good at present. This view in Srinivasa Aiyankar had been taken in following cases (prior to 1976) also:

    • Sahib Thampi v. Hamid, 36 Mad. 414
    • Walker v. Sur, 1914-2 KB 930
    • Hardie and Lane Limited v. Chiltern, 1928-1 KB 663
    • Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar. AIR 1955 Mad 281

    When Order 1 rule 8 Petitions are Dismissed

    • No sameness of the interest i.e. no common grievance – Surender Pal Singh VS DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt.  Ltd., 2018-3 CPJ(NC) 534; 2018-2 CPR (NC) 752
    • No common interest or common grievance – Surender Pal Singh VS DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt.  Ltd., 2018-3 CPJ(NC) 534; 2018-2 CPR (NC) 752
    • Not seeking same/identical relief- Surender Pal Singh VS DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt.  Ltd., 2018-3 CPJ(NC) 534; 2018-2 CPR (NC) 752
    • Suit/complaint must necessarily be filed on behalf of or for the benefit of all the persons having a common grievance, seeking a common relief (Surender Pal Singh VS DLF Homes Panchkula Pvt.  Ltd., 2018-3 CPJ(NC) 534; 2018-2 CPR (NC) 752)

    Whether O.I r.8 Decree is Enforceable in Execution against one ‘Represented’

    The enforceability of an injunction decree, under r. 32 of O. XXI, in a representative suit against the persons represented is yet to be resolved either by enactment, or by an authoritative decision taking note of the divergent views of various High Courts in this matter.

    It is noteworthy that even when Sub-r. (6) of r. 8 of O. I was not available in the Code, it was observed in Waryam Singha v. Sher Singh, AIR 1942 Lah 136, that the decree for injunction could be executed against any of the persons who were represented under O. 1 r. 8 CPC; because,  all the persons who were represented must be held to be parties as the decree obtained in such a suit was binding on all of them. This view is taken in following cases also:

    • Mool Chandra Jain v. Jagdish Chandra Joshi, AIR 1955 All 385
    • Abdulla v. Parshotam Singh, AIR  1935 Lah 33
    • Jatindra Mohan Banerje v. Kali Charan, AIR 1960 Cal 623

    Relying on Shri V. J. Thomas v. Shri Pathrose Abraham, AIR 2008 SC 1503, and Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar, AIR 1955 Mad 281,the Kerala High Court has in Narayanan v. Periyadan Narayanan Nair, 2021 (3) KHC 211 (FB) held that execution of a decree is not possible if he was not impleaded as a defendant. The Full Bench overruled James Vs. Mathew (ILR 2012-4 Ker 753, 2012-4 Ker 640, 2012-4 Ker LT 666, 2012-4 KHC 604 ), which held that a decree for injunction obtained in a representative suit is binding on all persons for whose benefit the suit was defended, though they were not eo nomine parties to the suit; and that in case of wilful disobedience of such a decree by those persons for whose benefit the suit was defended, it is enforceable against them under r. 32 of O. XXI of the Code.

    Theory of Revival of Decree of Injunction by a Separate Suit

    The Madras High Court, in Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar, AIR 1955 Mad 281, propounded a theory of ‘revival of injunction‘, in a representative suit, by a separate suit. It was observed as under:

    • “11. This principles that a decree for injunction cannot be extended so as to render those who are not ‘eo-nomine’ defendants liable for disobedience of the decree is based on sound and equitable grounds. Before any person could be proceeded against personally for disobedience of a decree of court, it must be shown that he was bound personally by the decree and obliged to obey such a decree. To entitle the decree-holder therefore to proceed against such persons who are not parties on record the injunction must be revived against them, which must be by a separate suit and in such a suit an opportunity will be afforded to them to raise appropriate defences. Without a revival therefore of the decree for injunction against these other persons, no proceedings in pursuance of the decree could be started against them.”  

    Representative Suit (OI, r8) Not Abate on death of a Plaintiff or a defendant

    In Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh, AIR. 1975 SC 371, it was held by our Apex Court as under:

    • “… Since the suit had been filed in a representative capacity, it is clear that on the death of one of the plaintiffs it did not abate.”

    In Jagdam Ram v. Asarfi Ram, AIR 1937 Pat. 149, it was held that the provisions of Order 22, CPC relating to the death of a plaintiff or a defendant cannot be applied to a case instituted or defended by a few persons on behalf of numerous persons not on record under Order I, Rule 8, CPC. (Referred to in: C. Ramasamy v. The District Collector, 1990-2 LW 363; 1990-2 MLJ 562).

    In C. R. Ramakrishnan v. Raman, 1983 1 ILR(Ker) 566; 1983 KLT 63, it was held (referring Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh, AIR. 1975 SC. 371) as under:

    • ” 7. Learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection to the effect that since the legal representatives of the 6th respondent have not been impleaded, the appeal has abated cot only against the 6th respondent but as a whole. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the suit being a representative one, it was unnecessary to implead the legal representatives of a deceased defendant and the death of such a representative party cannot lead to abatement of the appeal to any extent.
    • 9. …. In an appeal filed before the Supreme Court (in Charan Singh and another v. Darshan Singh, AIR. 1975 SC. 371) by some of the defendants, it was contended that the second appeal had abated in view of the failure to implead the legal representatives of one of the plaintiffs. Relying on the decision Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram (AIR. 1921 P.C.123), the Supreme Court held that as the suit was filed in a representative capacity, on the death of one of the representatives, the suit did not abate. That was because the suit was not prosecuted by individuals in their own interest but as representatives of others. There could be no abatement in such a case. We also notice that various High Courts have taken the same view. Vide

    In K. Suseelan, v. Thamarakshy, 2020-1 KHC 618; 2020-1 KLJ 745, it is observed as under:

    • “But, the death of any of the defendants would attract the rigour of Order 22 C.P.C. ( Rule 3 or 4),unless it was defended in a representative capacity for the persons having the same defence in the suit.”

    In G.F.F. Foulkes v. Suppan Chettiar, AIR 1951 Mad 296, Rajamannar, C.J., observed at page 300 as follows:

    • “There is authority for the position that when a suit is brought by several persons in a representative capacity, and if one of them dies, the suit does not abate, because, the right to represent others of a class is not a right which ipso facto survives to the legal representatives of the deceased party. The source of that right is the order of the court permitting the party to represent others. In such a contingency, namely, the death of one of the parties to whom originally permission was granted to institute a suit in a representative capacity, it is for the court to decide whether the suit can be allowed to be continued by the surviving person or persons or whether other person or persons should be joined….” (Quoted in: C. Ramasamy v. The District Collector, 1990-2 LW 363; 1990-2 MLJ 562; C. Ramasamy v. The District Collector, 1990-2 MLJ 562;

    In G. Christhudas v. Anbiah, AIR 2003 SC 1590: 2003-3 SCC 502, the Apex Court held that a representative suit does not abate on the death of the plaintiff. It is for two reasons:

    • Firstly the plaintiff does not represent only himself but represents all other persons on whose behalf he is prosecuting the suit, thus all those persons are also parties to the suit albeit constructively, the conduct of the suit being in the hands one person to whom permission has been granted by the court and in case of his death, any other person can continue the suit.
    • And secondly, the persons represented by the plaintiff cannot said to be legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff within meaning of Section 2 (11) of Code of Civil Procedure and hence the provisions of order 22 would not apply to such case. (See: Sadati Al Hussaini Al Jalali Trust v. Qasim Ganaie (J&K High Court, 03.05.2024)

    The Apex Court held as under:

    • “… The High Court after adverting to the decision of this Court in Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh, AIR 1975 SC 371, and Ramaswamy vs. Collector of Dindigul, 1990 II MLJ 562, set out the law correctly to the effect that if a suit had been filed in a representative capacity, there can be no abatement on the death of any one of the plaintiffs or the appellants; that only Article 137 of the Limitation Act is applicable and within the period set out therein an application for impleadment could be made inasmuch as no particular provision is made therein as to the period within which such application can be filed.”

    In Abdulkhader Haji v. Kunhammed, AIR 1986 Ker 3, it is pointed out relying on T K. Amma v. M. K. Ravunni Nair, AIR 1965 Ker. 303, and Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh, AIR. 1975 SC 371, that there would be no abatement of a representative suit by the death of the plaintiff.

    On death of a Trustee, Trust Would Not Fail; Vests in Remaining Trustees

    In Kapoorchand Rajendra Kumar Jain v. Parasnath Digambar Jain Bada Mandir, 2000-1 MPJR 199, it is held as under:

    • “A trustee exercises the rights of the beneficiary in such a dispute. He represents and personates the beneficiary, while dealing with the world at large. Thus, he acquires a legal personality. If there be more than one trustee, then all of them conjointly form a corporate or legal personality. This principle has been recognized under Order 31 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court has ample power to order that a suit on behalf of the beneficiary shall be represented by one or more trustees. Where there be order of the Court or if the requirement of the law, all trustees have to be joined as parties to the suit. The trust would not fail because one of the trustees had died after filing of the suit. The body of trustees is not dissolved. The trust vested in the remaining trustees shall continue. The rights and the duties of the trustees are not abrogated by the death of one of trustees. So in this case, the remaining trustees after the death of two trustees could continue the suit. The right to sue for and on behalf of the beneficiary continued. There was no abatement. This principle was recognized by the Privy Council in the case of Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram and others, reported in AIR 1921 P.C. 123, wherein their Lordships stated that a suit, filed under Section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1882, could continue even after the death of person whom the Court granted permission to sue. It could be continued by a member of the public. This case was referred to with approval of the decision in the case of Charan Singh and Anr. v. Darshan Singh and others, reported in AIR 1975 SC 371 (at para 5 page 373). In somewhat similar circumstances, the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir and others, reported in AIR 1980 SC 707, held that the death of Mahant during the pendency of a suit for ejectment brought by him against a trespasser would no cause the suit, to abate. It is true that the obligations of a Mahant are not that of a trustee but his office is akin to the office of a trustee. Therefore, the principle laid down in that case would apply.”

    Effect of the death of a party in a suit under Section 92, CPC

    In Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh, AIR. 1975 SC. 371, considering the effect of the death of a party in a suit under Section 92, CPC, the Supreme Court held that there was no abatement on the death of one of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court referred to with approval the decision of the Privy Council in Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Deduram, 48 LA. 12. (See: C. Ramasamy v. The District Collector, 1990-2 LW 363; 1990-2 MLJ 562).

    On death of a Trustee, new Trustee cannot be a Legal Representative

    It is pointed out in Sadati Al Hussaini Al Jalali Trust v. Qasim Ganaie (J&K High Court, 03.05.2024) the Apex Court had held, in two cases, that on the death of a trustee new trustee (elected or appointed) cannot be said to be a legal representative of the deceased trustee but is a person on whom the interest of the Trust property devolves, under the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10; as it applies to him. The cases referred to by the J&K High Court are the following –

    • Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh,1975 (1) SCC 298;
    • Karuppaswamy v. C. Ramamurthy, 1993(4) SCC 41.

    But, in G.F.F. Foulkes v. A.S. Suppan Chettiar, AIR 1951 Mad 296, it was held as under:

    • “When a suit is brought by several persons in a representative capacity, and if one of them dies, the suit does not abate because, the right to represent others of a class is not right which ipso facto survives to the legal representatives of the deceased party. The source of that right is the order of the Court permitting the party to represent others. In such a contingency, namely, the death of one of the parties to whom originally permission was granted to institute a suit in a representative capacity, it is for the Court to decide whether the suit can be allowed to be continued by the surviving person or persons or whether other persons should be joined. The proper procedure , in a case like this, is for the remaining person or persons to apply to the Court for directions and it is for the Court to decide whether it will permit the remaining person or persons to whom the original sanction was given to continue to prosecute or defend the suit or appeal or it will give directions to bring on record additional person or persons.”

    In a subsequent suit, Ram Kumar v. Jiwanlal, AIR 1960 Mad 288, the Madras High Court took a liberal view. It was held in this decision that a representative suit does not abate on the death of the representative as he or she can be substituted by another member of the plaintiff on defendant. (See also: Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram, AIR 1921 PC 123, State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Parwati Devi, AIR 1966 Raj 210).

    O 22 Not Apply to Repre. Suits where devolution (Not Substitution) takes place

    In Jagadamba Bai & Beharilal Khandelwal v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala, 1978 Cal HN 1050, it is observed as under:

    • 8. In a case reported in AIR 1975 SC page 371 between Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh, Supreme Court has held that where the suit is filed in a representative capacity death of one of the plaintiffs during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal does not abate. In AIR 1921 PC at page 123 in the case of Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Dadu Rao, a distinction was drawn between a suit which was prosecuted by an individual for his own interests and persons suing as representatives of the general public.
    • 9. Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Code provides the rules for recording the death and/or substitution of the parties.
    • Order 22 Rule 1 provides-
      • “The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause a suit to abate if the rights of suit survive”.
    • Order 21 Rule 2 provides that
      • where there are more plaintiffs or defendants than one, and anyone of them dies and where the rights of a suit survive against the surviving defendants alone, the court shall cause an entry to that effect to be, made on the record and the suit shall proceed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs or against the surviving defendant or defendants.
    • Order 22 Rule 10 provides
      • in other cases of assignments, creation or devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may by leave of the court be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved.
    • 10. Order 22 does not apply to representative suits. Suits brought in a representative character can be continued under Order 22 Rule 20(10) by the successor in office. Where a trustee dies or retires or is removed and another is elected it is a case of devolution. In this respect the relevant cases are reported in AIR 1928 Cal. page 651 and also in AIR 1926 page 540. The right to apply in such a case is pending law and accrues from day to day and is therefore not barred by the law of limitation. In this respect, reference can be made to cases reported in 57 CWN page 710 and also AIR 1952 Pat. 323 and 30 Cal. page 609. In case reported in 36 CWN at page 816 (Sri Sri Keshab Rai Jeu Thakur & Raja Jyoti Prasad Sinsh Deo) a Division Bench judgment of this High Court presided over by Mitter J. and Bartley J. it was held that Order 22 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to a case of substitution of a person who had sued or held been sued against in a representative capacity. In the case reported in 27 CWN at page 710 which was referred in my order, Chatterjee J. and Pearson J. held that where the heirs are substituted on the ground of devolution of interest such interest would be governed by Order 22 Rule 10. It further held that three months limitation does not apply to a case of devolution pending the suit. It further held that application under Order 22 Rule 10 can be made in the Appellate Court even over the devolution of interest when the case was pending before the Trial Court.”

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    Sec. 7 Easements Act – Natural Advantages Arising from the Situation of Land & Natural Flow of Water

    Jojy George Koduvath.

    Introduction

    • Easement (सुखाधिकार)  is a right possessed by the owner of a land (dominant land),
      • to use the land of another (servient land),
      • for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant land.
    • By virtue of easement –
      • No Ownership is bestowed in the (servient) land (AIR 2004 All 359; AIR 1925 Bom 335).
      • No Possession is obtained in the (servient) land. (2011 (2) KLT 605; AIR 1925 Bom 335)  
      • No Substantive Interest is created in the (servient) land. (2003 (1) KLT 320; AIR 1954 All 393).
    • SECTION 4 of the Indian Easements Act defines Easements as under:
    • “An easement is a right
      • which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses,
        • as such,
      • for the beneficial enjoyment of that land 
      • to do and continue to do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done,
      • in or upon, or in respect of, certain other land not his own.”

    Significance of Section 7, Easements Act

    Section 7, Easements Act further explains legal incidents of Easement

    • In the heading (Easements restrictive of certain rights) itself it is explicated that easement is only “restrictive” to certain rights; that is,
    • it only ‘restricts’ exclusive (civil) right to enjoy a property by its owner (servient owner); and
    • it does not confer a right to ‘exclude’ the servient owner or it ‘extinguishes’ his rights.

    Section 7 Easements Act, 1882

    • “Sec. 7.  Easements restrictive of certain rights:    Easements are restrictions of one or other of the following rights (namely):—
      • (a) Exclusive right to enjoy. —The exclusive right of every owner of immovable property (subject to any law for the time being in force) to enjoy and dispose of the same and all products thereof and accessions thereto.
      • (b) Rights to advantages arising from situation. —The right of every owner of immovable property (subject to any law for the time being in force) to enjoy without disturbance by another the natural advantages arising from its situation.
    •  Illustrations of the Rights above referred to –
    • (a) The exclusive right of every owner of land in a town to build on such land, subject to any municipal law for the time being in force.
    • (b) The right of every owner of land that the air passing thereto shall not be unreasonably polluted by other persons.
    • (c) The right of every owner of a house that his physical comfort shall not be interfered with materially and unreasonably by noise or vibration caused by any other person.
    • (d) The right of every owner of land to so much light and air as pass vertically thereto.
    • (e) The right of every owner of land that such land, in its natural condition, shall have the support naturally rendered by the subjacent and adjacent soil of another person.
    • Explanation.—Land is in its natural condition when it is not excavated and not subjected to artificial pressure; and the “subjacent and adjacent soil” mentioned in this illustration means such soil only as in its natural condition would support the dominant heritage in its natural condition.
    • (f) The right of every owner of land that, within his own limits, the water which naturally passes or percolates by, over or through his land shall not, before so passing or percolating, be unreasonably polluted by other persons.
    • (g) The right of every owner of land to collect and dispose within his own limits of all water under the land which does not pass in a defined channel and all water on its surface which does not pass in a defined channel.
    • (h) The right of every owner of land that the water of every natural stream which passes by, through or over his land in a defined natural channel shall be allowed by other persons to flow within such owner’s limits without interruption and without material alteration in quantity, direction, force or temperature; the right of every owner of land abutting on a natural lake or pond into or out of which a natural stream flows, that the water of such lake or pond shall be allowed by other persons to remain within such owner’s limits without material alteration in quantity or temperature.
    • (i) The right of every owner of upper land that water naturally rising in, or falling on, such land, and not passing in defined channels, shall be allowed by the owner of adjacent lower land to run naturally thereto.
    • (j) The right of every owner of land abutting on a natural stream, lake or pond to use and consume its water for drinking, household purposes and watering his cattle and sheep; and the right of every such owner to use and consume the water for irrigating such land and for the purposes of any manufactory situate thereon, provided that he does not thereby cause material injury to other like owners.
    • Explanation.—A natural stream is a stream, whether permanent or intermittent, tidal or tideless, on the surface of land or underground, which flows by the operation of nature only and in a natural and known course.  

    Section 7 lays down

    • First – easement is a restriction to the civil right of exclusive enjoyment of immovable property by its owner  (Servient owner).  That is, the civil right of the servient owner, to use his property without being disturbed by anybody, is meddled by virtue of the provisions of the Easement Act.
    •  Second – easements are also rights that stand against the (otherwise) civil right of owner of an immovable property not to shoulder the burden of supporting-with the natural advantages arising from its situation (to the neighbours property). 
    • What is stated here is,  by virtue of the statutory provisions of the Easement Act the dominant owner (neighbour) can enjoy (i) the rights recognised by the Easements Act in the servient land and (ii) the natural advantages arising from its situation (though they may negatively affect the civil rights of the servient owner).

    Two Natural Rights to Flow Water (in Sec. 7, Illustrations – h and i)

    Illustration (h) reads as under:

    • (h) The right of every owner of land that the water of every natural stream which passes by, through or over his land in a defined natural channel shall be allowed by other persons to flow within such owner’s limits without interruption and without material alteration in quantity, direction, force or temperature; the right of every owner of land abutting on a natural lake or pond into or out of which a natural stream flows, that the water of such lake or pond shall be allowed by other persons to remain within such owner’s limits without material alteration in quantity or temperature.”

    Illustration (i) reads as under:

    • (i) The right of every owner of upper land that water naturally rising in, or falling on, such land, and not passing in defined channels, shall be allowed by the owner of adjacent lower land to run naturally thereto.

    Drain Water is a “natural inherent right“, independent of easement

    This natural right of draining water that naturally falls on a property (by rain or rises in the same by other means) to the adjacent lower property is a natural right inherent in property (Viswanath Mohapatra v. Bhramdhar, ILR 1966 Cal. 118). Therefore it can be said to be ‘independent of easement‘ (Yesoda v. Yusuff Haji, 1991-2 KLT 306). The Bombay High Court in Sitaram Motiram v. Keshav Rachandra, AIR 1947 Bom 4, observed that this right is strictly not an easement.

    Natural Right is Independent of Easement Right

    In Secretary of State for India in Council v. Sannidhiraju Subbarayudu, AIR 1932 PC 46, it was pointed out – natural right of support could be distinguished from the easement of enhanced support. In K. Anantha Bhat v. K. M. Ganapathy Bhatta, AIR 1981 Ker 102, it was held that natural right is different from a right of easement, and that very owner of land abutting a natural stream has a natural right to the user of water in the stream.

    See also:

    • District Board of West Tanjore v. Secretary of State, AIR 1943 PC 133;
    • Rama Bhatta v. Krishna Bhatta, 1962  Ker LJ 45;
    • Kalyani  v. Bhaskaran, ILR 1993-2 Ker 689; 1993-1 KLT 415,
    • Medapti Nagi Reddy v. Sathi Satyanarayana Reddy, 2017-1 ALD 264; 2016-6 ALT 450; (AP)
    • Adikanda Swain v. Debaraj Mishra, 2015 Supp2 OLR 285 (Ori).

    English Law

    Kalyani  v. Bhaskaran, ILR 1993-2 Ker 689; 1993-1 KLT 415, referred the following authorities that say as to ‘natural tight’ and ‘easement’.

    • Chishire & Burn (13th Edition page 499). It reads:
    • “Thus “ex jure naturae’, an owner has a right to so much support from his neighbour’s land as will support his own land, unincumbered by buildings, at its natural level…. Such natural rights differ from easements in at least two respects – their existence does not depend upon some form of grant, and they cannot be extinguished by unit of seisin”.
    • R.E. Megary and H.W.R. Wade (Law of Real Property – 4th Edn. Page 814) highlight the distinction between an easement and a natural right:
    • “The most obvious difference between an easement and a natural right is that a natural right exists automatically but an easement must be acquired.”
    • Lord Denning describes the right to lateral support, very graphically in Crow v. Mood (1971) 1QB 77):
    • “It is not an easement strictly so called because it involves the servient owner in the expenditure of money. It was described by Gale as a “spurious kind of easement’. But it has been treated in practice by the courts as being an easement….”
    • In Davis v. Powell (1921 LJ. Ch. 40) it was observed:
    • “A proprietor of land has a right to support of it, not as an easement, but as an ordinary right of property necessarily and naturally attached to the soil.”

    Difference Between ‘Natural Right’ And ‘Right Of Easement’

    In Namitarani @ Pratimarani Khuntia v. State of Odisha, AIR 2019 Ori 41,  it is said as under:     

    • “11. The difference between ‘natural right’ and ‘right of easement’ before stated for proper appreciation.
    • In Peacock on Easements it was stated:-
    • “Natural rights are by law annexed to, and are inherent in a land exjure nature, of natural right, and exist prima facie in all cases as between a landowner and his neighbour, otherwise, as Mr. Goddard says in his work on Easements (7th Edn. P.3) no man would be assured that his land would not at any moment be rendered useless by a neighbour’s act otherwise lawful or a neighbor might deprive a landowner of the benefit of certain things which in the course of nature have been provided for the common good of mankind.”
    • The Division Bench in Girish Chandra Sahu and others –V- Nagendranath Mitra and others; 1978 (1) CWR 348, case held:
    • “Natural rights though resembling easements in some respects, are clearly distinguishable from them.
    • The essential distinction between easements and natural rights appears to lie in this that easements are acquired restrictions of the complete rights of property, or, to put it in another way, acquired rights abstracted from the ownership of one man and added to the ownership of another, whereas natural rights are themselves part of the complete rights of ownership, belonging to the ordinary incidents of property and are ipso facto enforceable in law.”
    • 12. The Madras High Court in the case of Bharathamatha Desiya Sangam, Madhavaram & Anr v. Roja Sundaram & Ors, AIR 1987 Madras 183, while dealing with right to access to highways held that owner of land abutting road is entitled to access to it from every point of his boundary. He is entitled to enforce his right notwithstanding the fact that there is some space available between the offending constructions. The Court further observed that the offending constructions would constitute a continuing wrong and though suit is filed after construction, it would be maintainable.
    • The Court in the foregoing decision referred to the case of Municipal Committee, Delhi v. Mohammed Ibrahim, AIR 1935 Lah 196, wherein it was laid down that to the owners of houses abutting a public highway, the question of frontage means a great deal and if anything is done by those in whom the highway vests which interferes with the rights of the owners with regard to the highway and which tends to diminish the comforts of the owners, they will undoubtedly have an actionable claim against the encroachers.
    • In the case of Patna Municipality v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1939 Pat 683, it was held that the owner of the land abutting a roadway is entitled to access to that roadway at all points on his boundary.
    • In the case of Damodara Naidu v. Thirupurasundari Ammal, AIR 1972 Mad 386, it was held that where there is a public highway, the owners of land adjoining the highway have a right to go upon the highway from any point of their land and if that right is obstructed by anyone the owner of the land abutting the highway is entitled to maintain an action for the injury, whether the obstruction does or does not constitute a public nuisance.”

    Right to Drain Water is a Restricted Easement

    In Nadupuri Narayana v. Ijjada Narayana, AIR 2002 AP 387, it is held as under:

    • “(11) The right of every owner of upper land that water naturally rising in, and not passing in defined channels is recognized by law as restricted easement. The right of every owner of the land to the natural flow of water by natural stream without interruption and without material alterations is also recognized.”

    Right of natural drainage includes discharge through a particular route

    Kerala High Court held in Yesoda v. Yusuff Haji, 1991-2 KLT 306, as under:

    • “8. Every property owner has a natural right of drainage of surface water in the property lying at a lower level. The owner of land has the natural right not only to collect and retain within the limits of his own land surface water not flowing in a defined channel, but also a right to draw it off on to his neighbours’ lower land or put it to whatever use he pleases.
    • 9. This principle applies to rain or flood waters naturally accumulating on land of higher level which must find its level by draining into the lower land. This is a natural right independent of an easement, grant or custom.
    • 10. This right of an owner of a land lying on a higher level could be an easement or quasi easement right as well. Easement of drainage is the right of the owner of one land to cause the water on his land to flow in defined channel on the land of his neighbour. This is also a natural right of the owner of the higher land that the water rising in or falling on his own land, shall be allowed by his neighbour owning the lower land to run naturally thereto. The natural right mentioned above is not restricted to natural drainage of water from higher to lower land but includes discharge of it through a particular route at a specified point. This natural right is a right which can be claimed in respect of water naturally rising in, or falling on, one’s land and not passing in defined channels. The right of an upper proprietor to throw natural water on the lower land is a natural right inherent in property. The lower riparian proprietor has no right to prevent such natural flow or to throw the flow back on to the upper riparian property.”

    The right to discharge water through a particular route at a specified point is considered by the Madras High Court also in in Samiappa Gounder v. Subbanna Gounder, 2017-4 LW 341, after referring Supreme Court decision in Patneedi Rudrayya v. Velugubantla Venkayya, AIR 1961 SC 1821. It held as under:

    • “16. Taking note of the said observation, this Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs have no right of easement to drain the water through “Vadikal Kavuru” as claimed in the plaint. However, when there is accumulation of excess water due to natural rain fall, the natural right of draining the water lower riparian cannot be taken away or deprived by means of artificial blockage. Therefore, whenever there is excess water, accumulated in the land of the plaintiffs, by natural means, riparian land owner shall not prevent the draining of excess water through the point ‘X’.

    Draining water through Natural Drain  is a Natural Right.

    The Supreme Court, in Patneedi Rudrayya v Velugubantla Venkayya, AIR 1961 SC 1821, considered the right of owner of upper land to pass flood water on to lower land based upon Section 7 Illustration (i) of the act, and it was held as under:

    • “Where a right is based upon the Illustration (i) to section 7 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), the owner of higher land can pass even flood water received by him on to the lower land, at any rate where the flood is a usual or a periodic occurrence in the locality. The High Court has quoted a passage from Coulson and forbes on Waters and Land Drainage, 6th ed, P. 191, and a passage from the judgment in Nield v London and North western Railway, (1874) 10 Ex 4, in support of its conclusions. In the passage in Coulson and Forbes it is stated that the owner of land must not take active steps to turn the flood water on to his neighbour’s property. Here, the dam erected by the defendants 1 and 2 stems flood waters going from plaintiffs land down to the defendant’s land and so the passage does not support the conclusion of the High court. The decision in Nield’s case, (1874) 10 Ex 4 is further based on the common enemy” doctrine. In that case also there are certain observations which would militate against the conclusion of the High Court. For instance:
      • “where, indeed, there is a natural outlet for natural water, no one has a right for his own purposes to diminish it, and if he does so he is, with some qualification perhaps, liable to any one who is injured by his act, no matter where the water which does the mischief came into the water course. “
    • Of course, the court in that case was dealing with water flowing along a natural water course. But the point is whether a person has a right to create an impediment in the flow of water along its natural direction. Now the water on a higher ground must by operation of the force of gravity flow on to lower ground. Where the owner of the lower ground by creating an embankment impedes the natural flow of water he would be obstructing the natural outlet for that water. It makes little difference that the water happens to be not merely rain water but flood water provided the flood is of the kind to which the higher land is subjected periodically.”

    Inferior Tenement Is Obliged To Receive The Water Which Falls From The Superior

    In Gibbons v. Lenfestey, AIR 1915 PC 165, the Privy Council held as follows:

    • “Where two contiguous fields one of which stands upon higher ground than the other, belong to different proprietors, nature itself may be said to constitute a servitude on the inferior tenement by which it is obliged to receive the water which falls from the superior. If the water, which would otherwise fall from the higher grounds insensibly without hurting the inferior tenement, should be collected into one body by the owner of the superior in the natural use of his property for draining or otherwise improving it, the owner of the inferior is without the positive constitution of any servitude, bound to receive that body of water on his property.” (Quoted in: Veniram v. Karam Singh, ILR 1993 MP 179; Medapti Nagi Reddy v. Sathi Satyanarayana Reddy, 2017-1 ALD 264; 2016-6 ALT 450)

    Full Bench of Madras High Court in Sheik Hussain Sahab v. Pachipulusu Subbavya, AIR 1926 Mad. 449, the Privy Council Judgment observed that the lower heritor cannot object so long as the flow whether above or below ground is due to gravitation or unless it has been unduly and unreasonably increased by operations which are in aemulationem vicini. (referred to in: Veniram v. Karam Singh, ILR 1993 MP 179)

    In Kaosal Mohan Pawar v. Kodu Dajiba Pawar, AIR 1946 Nag. 75, Bose, J. observed as under:

    • “The rightful possessors of land on a higher level than the defendant’s with a natural drainage in that direction have the right to discharge the surplus rain water which falls on their land on to the defendant’s land, and the defendant is bound to accept this water. He cannot raise artificial barriers on his land which will cause the water to accumulate on another’s property. He cannot do this even if it is necessary to protect his own property.” (quoted in: Veniram v. Karam Singh, ILR 1993 MP 179)

    In Veniram v. Karam Singh, ILR 1993 MP 179, it was observed that there should be no doubt that owner of a higher adjacent field has a right to uninterrupted flow of water to the lower field.

    In C. Venkatareddi v. Kotireddi, it was held by the Andhra High Court that right of owner of a high land to drain off the natural surface water to the adjacent lower lands is incidental to the ownership of the land. In Seshayya V. Seetayya, referring to Section 7 of the Act held that rights of every owner of upper land that water naturally raising in, or falling on the said land shall be allowed by the owner of the adjacent lower land to run naturally thereof, but excess water from the land cannot be allowed to flow into the land of defendants, since it is not surface water or natural water. (Both decisions were referred to in: Medapti Nagi Reddy v. Sathi Satyanarayana Reddy, 2017-1 ALD 264; 2016-6 ALT 450)

    Natural Right Even if Not Pleaded by Plaintiffs, Being Proved can be Granted

    Madras High Court held in Samiappa Gounder v. Subbanna Gounder, 2017-4 LW 341 as to pleading of natural right as under:

    • “13. It is found from the judgment of the trial Court that though the Court has found that there is natural right inured upon the plaintiffs to drain the water collected, naturally, since, they have pleaded their right to drain water based on the right of easement and since, they have failed to prove the fact that the time immemorial, they have been draining the water through “Vadikal Kavuru” as pleaded in the plaint, it has declined to grant the relief sought.”

    After referring decision of the Supreme Court in Patneedi Rudrayya v. Velugubantla Venkayya, AIR 1961 SC 1821, the Madras High Court continued as under:

    • “18. Under such circumstances, while dismissing the Second Appeal, on the ground the substantial questions of law raised are not in favour of the plaintiffs, and no easementary right by prescription proved by the plaintiffs, the natural right though not pleaded by the plaintiffs, being proved, to preserve the natural right of draining the excess water collected by natural course of event, it is necessary to point out that the survient land holder cannot block the flow of naturally collected water getting drained through point ‘X’ to the canal marked as ‘AB’.”

    Natural Right – No Need to Pray for a Declaration

    The Madras High Court (Madurai Bench) in  Gowri Bai v. Elizabath, (2011) 2 CTC 266, observed as under:

    • “17. Therefore, from the passages from the Book of Easements and License by Katiyar and also as per the judgments of our Court, it has been made clear that the water on a higher ground must by operation of the force of gravity flow on to the lower ground and if the owner of the lower ground raised an obstruction to the natural flow of water, he can be restrained if it causes damage to the owner of the land on the high level. No doubt, in the judgment reported in Saraswathi v. S. Ganapathy, 2001 (4) SCC 694, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when two properties were owned by a single person and subsequently he sold those two properties to different persons, no easementary rights regarding the drainage of water could have been acquired by one owner and the person cannot claim any right over the land of another by contending that previously the owner was allowing the rain water to drain from the roof on the other property and therefor, he also entitled to have the same facility after his purchase.
    • 20. Though the plaintiff could have applied for the relief of declaration in a Suit for injunction, the Court is entitled to give the findings regarding the rights of the parties and as a matter of right, injunction can be granted only when the Court gives the finding that the Plaintiff’s are entitled to prevent the Defendants from causing any obstruction or damages to the Plaintiffs property. Therefore, in a Suit for injunction, the Court has no necessarily give a finding regarding the right of the Plaintiffs. Therefore, it cannot be considered that without the prayer for declaration, the suit for bare injunction is not maintainable. As stated supra, the Plaintiffs are entitled to take the water which flows naturally from the western tank street through the Defendants property and when the Plaintiffs are entitled to allow the natural water to flow through the Defendants’ property, they are entitled to the relief of injunction, and there is no need to pray for a declaration that they are entitled to take the water from the Defendant’s property. Hence, the Suit is not bad for not praying for the relief of declaration and the third substantial question of law is also answered in favour of the Appellants.” (quoted in: C. Mani v. P. R. Sadhasivam, 2017-2 MLJ 271)

    No Natural Right to flow water from the roof to the land of his neighbour

    The Supreme Court, in Saraswathi v. S. Ganapathy, 2001-4 SCC 694, observed as under:

    • “19. …..As the 1st respondent had purchased the property he was entitled to construct on his own property. Mr. Sivasubramaniam seriously submitted that the 1st respondent was bound to allow water from the roof of the triangular room to flow on to the land of the 1st respondent as it had always done in the past. Mr. Sivasubramaniam seriously contended that the 1st respondent could not construct on his own land in a manner which would prevent the flow of such water into the 1st respondent’s land. In our view, this argument merely needs to be stated to be rejected. No person can have a right to have water from his property flow on to the land of his neighbour. No such right was granted under the sale deed. No such easementary right can be claimed in law. All that the appellants can claim is to see that water from the roof of his house is allowed to flow on to his own land.” (quoted in: C. Mani v. P. R. Sadhasivam, 2017-2 MLJ 271)

    Drain Off Natural Water Is Incidental to the Ownership

    The Bombay High Court in Sitaram Motiram v. Keshav Rachandra, AIR 1947 Bom 4, the Hon’ble dealt in detail the easement right of the dominant land owner vis-a-vis the right of the survient land owner in respect of discharging excess water. The Bombay High Court observed as under:

    • “9. … there is a natural right of drainage from higher lands to lower lands of water flowing in the usual course of nature in undefined channels. This principle is embodied in illust. (I) to S. 7, Easements Act, which says that every owner of upper land has a right that water naturally falling on such l and shall be allowed by the owner of the adjacent lower land to run naturally thereto. This right is incidental to the enjoyment of property and partakes of all the characteristics of an easement, but is really a part of the total content of the proprietary rights. This natural right exists ab initio and does not depend for its creation on prescription, grant or custom, but is inherent in the geographical configuration of the property. As this right is strictly not an easement as defined in the Indian Easements Act, S.23 of that Act does not come into play. Under that section the dominant owner may from time to time, alter the mode and place of enjoying the easement, provided that he does not thereby impose additional burden on the servient heritage. If S.23, Easements Act, could have been applied to the present case, the matter could have been easily disposed of, for it is obvious that the method of enjoyment of the right of the owner of the upper land to discharge water on the adjacent lower land could be altered only so far as it does not impose additional burden on the servient tenement. In the present instance the defendant could have altered the method of discharging his surface water on to the plaintiff’s land in any manner he pleased provided that he did not cast additional burden on the plaintiff’s servient tenement. As in point of fact additional burden has been cast, the defendant could be held to have contravened the provisions of S.23, Easements Act.” (quoted in: C. Mani v. P. R. Sadhasivam, 2017-2 MLJ 271)

    In Nadupuri Narayana v. Ijjada Narayana, AIR 2002 AP 387it is held as under:

    • “( 11 ) THE right of every owner of upper land that water naturally rising in, and not passing in defined channels is recognized by law as restricted easement. The right of every owner of the land to the natural flow of water by natural stream without interruption and without material alterations is also recognized. The right, however of an owner to claim a share in the water in a well constructed in a separate and distinct land is not recognized in law. Indeed Section 8 of the Transfer of Property act, 1882 lays down the effect of transfer of property. According to this Section, the transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interests, which the transferor is capable of passing in the property and the legal incidents thereof.”

    To Drain water through Artificial Channels, Perfection of Easement Required

    Commentaries on Easement by Peacock says:

    • “Every land owner has a natural right to deal with his surface drainage-water has he pleases. He can either let it find its way to his neighbour’s land if that is at a lower level than his own, or he can collect it or use it as he pleases on his own land, subject always to the reservation that if he allows it flow for the prescriptive period through defined and permanent artificial channels on to his neighbour’s land, his neighbour may acquire a right to its continuance, and, conversely the enjoyments of an out let for his surplus water for over a period of twenty years through defined artificial channels, may give him a right to the continuance of the outlet.” (quoted in Sitaram Motiram v. Keshav Rachandra, AIR 1947 Bom 4)

    No easement right can be acquired to surface water not flowing in a stream

    Section 17(c) of the Easements Act lays down that no easement right can be acquired to surface water not flowing in a stream and not permanently collected in a pool, tank or otherwise. Sec. 17 reads as under:

    • 17. Rights which cannot be acquired by prescription:
    • Easements acquired under section 15 are said to be acquired by prescription, and are called prescriptive rights. None of the following rights can be so acquired
    • (a) a right which would tend to the total destruction of the subject of the right, or the property on which, if the acquisition were made, liability would be imposed;
    • (b) a right to the free passage of light or air to an open space of ground;
    • (c) a right to surface-water not flowing in a stream and not permanently collected in a pool, tank or otherwise;
    • (d) a right to underground water not passing in a defined channel.

    Illustration G to Section 7(b) also speaks of the right of every owner of land to collect and dispose within his own limits, of all water under land which does not pass in a defined channel and all water on its surface which does not pass in a defined channel.

    In Medapti Nagi Reddy v. Sathi Satyanarayana Reddy, 2017-1 ALD 264; 2016-6 ALT 450, it is held as under:

    • “30. Section 17(c) of the Act does not prohibit the acquisition of easementary right regarding the trickling water from higher to lower plots in well defined channel as held by the Privy Counsel in Baswantappa v. Bhimappa. It is also clear from Section 17 (c) of the Act that such right to discharge excess water or collected rain water to the land of lower owner only for the purpose of discharging surface water and not any other water. But here the plaintiffs wanted to discharge or let out excess or collected rain water from their land, who is upper land owner to the land of the defendant, who is lower land owner without any defined channel or stream.”

    The High Court (Medapti Nagi Reddy v. Sathi Satyanarayana Reddy, 2017-1 ALD 264; 2016-6 ALT 450) pointed out – in Dharnidhar Sahu v Bhagirathi Sahu, AIR 1956 Ori 89, referring Section 17(c) of the Act, it was observed the following –

    • “Two principles thus emerge: firstly that an owner of land is entitled to collect and impound all surface water passing over his land and secondly, that no prescriptive right can be acquired in respect of such water against the servient owner. In other words, unless the water flows through a defined channel no right can be acquired either by lost grant or prescription to the use of such water.”

    The High Court (Medapti Nagi Reddy v. Sathi Satyanarayana Reddy, 2017-1 ALD 264; 2016-6 ALT 450) after quoting Dharnidhar Sahu v Bhagirathi Sahu, 1956 AIR Ori 89, continued as under:

    • “22. The main feature of surface water is its inability to maintain its identity and existence as a water body. Water flowing into a field from a known channel and passing along the field onwards into another field though not over a confined track in the former field but along its whole area is not surface water as held by this court in Venkataramanaiah v. Subbaramayya following the principles laid down by the Madras High Court in a judgment reported in Adinarayana v. Ramudu.
    • 23. In Adinarayana referred to supra, the Madras High Court had an occasion to decide similar question and held that the chief characteristics of surface water is its inability to maintain and existence of water body.
    • 24. Merely because water spreads itself over the upper field before it gets into the lower field, it does not fulfill the definition of surface water. If it flows in a well defined course into an upper land spreads itself over the whole field which is irrigated by it and then over the field ridge to another field or into an intermediate channel through which it comes into another field, it can be treated as surface water as held by this Court in Venkataramaiah referred to supra.
    • 25. Here, the plaintiffs claimed both natural right of discharging rain water and excess water to the field D as shown in the plan from field P. Such right is natural right and question of claiming easement by prescription does not arise, it is natural servitude. The other right is to discharge or let out excess water, such right cannot be acquired by prescription.
    • 26. In the present case, the excess or collected rain water is to be let or discharge into the field of the defendant, as the collected water from the field of deitys land is flowing into the land of the plaintiffs, but not in a definite course of channel or a stream. In such case, the question of easement by prescription as contemplated under Section 15 does not arise in view of bar under Section 17 (c) of the Act, since the acquisition of such right i.e letting out or discharge of excess water into the land of lower owner is impermissible, except by natural servitude of discharge natural surface water, but not collected water.”

    In Narsoo Bhandari v. Madan Lal Tulsiram, ILR 1975 MP 843, after analysing law on the subject, it is held as under:

    • “(54) A survey of the case law shows that rain water coming from upper lands to lower lands according to topographical features of the lands is surface water and it maintains that character until it begins to flow in a defined channel. Till then it cannot be said to flow in a stream and is not subject to any right of easement. To the same effect is the following statement by Peacock:
    • “it is settled Law both in India and England that water must flow in a defined channel whether natural or artificial, to become the subject of an easement by prescription. “
    • The Law relating to easements in British India, 2nd edition, p. 118] surface water may also become subject of an easement when it gets permanently collected in a pool or tank. Section 17 (c) of the Easements Act specifically enacts that “a right to surface water not flowing in a stream, and not permanently collected in a pool, tank or otherwise” cannot be acquired by prescription. The word “stream” in this section has been used in a technical sense, as explained above, meaning water flowing in a defined channel whether natural or artificial and not in a generic sense of mere flow of water. Surface water before it enters a defined channel remains the property of the owner of the land over which it flows and he can deal with it in any manner he likes. The owner of the land over which the surface water flows may collect the water by construing a tank and the water so collected will still remain the property of the owner of the land but it may then become subject of an easement by prescription. But, as already stated, until the surface water enters a defined channel or gets collected in pool or tank no easement by prescription can be acquired in it.”

    Public will have every right to use every inch of Public Property

    In Tata Seshaiah v. Maruboyina Sankaramma, 2018-2 ALD 380 (AP), it is observed as under:

    • “The public will have every right to use every inch of public property and that right is a natural right but not prescribed by easement. To buttress her argument, she relied upon the following judgments.
    • Mst. Bhagwanti v. Mst. Jiuti AIR 1975 Allahabad 341
    • S. Someswar Rao v. S.Tirupatamma 1988 (2) Law Summary 223
    • Movva Butchamma v. Movva Venkateswararao AIR 1969 AP 136.”

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