Survey Plan and Area Calculation: A Cursory Look

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

A survey plan shows the shape and size of a property. It also helps to calculate the area of the land. Section 82 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, provides as under:

  • “82. Presumption as to maps or plans made by authority of Government: The Court shall presume that maps or plans purporting to be made by the authority of the Central Government or any State Government were so made, and are accurate; but maps or plans made for the purposes of any cause must be proved to be accurate.”

A proper survey commission report, supported by a correct and reliable survey plan, is indispensable for the effective adjudication of a large number of civil disputes. Courts and advocates should have a general idea and understanding of surveys and survey plans.

F-lines and G-lines

In survey plans, two types of lines are commonly seen—continuous lines and broken (or dashed) lines. Alongside the survey plan, we also see the field book (or ladder).

Continuous lines show the outer Field-lines (F-lines) of the plot.

Broken lines in a survey plan represent the Guidelines (or Baselines) called G-lines drawn from one bend or a corner of the plot to an opposite bend or corner.

  • The purpose of a G-line is to measure the perpendicular distances (offsets) from the G-line to the boundary bends on either side of the G-line. It is for dividing the land into imaginary right-angle triangles (triangles with one angle of 90 degrees) or trapeziums (four-sided quadrilaterals, two sides of which lie parallel), enabling the area to be calculated in a simple and systematic manner.
  • In surveying practice, these internal G-lines are fixed first, as an axis, and the measurement begins from the starting point of a G-line.

In the case of a large plot, there may be more than one G-line with a view to making the entire plot into triangles or trapeziums.

Offsets Fixed with the Cross-Staff

In surveying, the cross-staff is used to measure the offsets (perpendicular distances from the G-lines to the boundary bends). The cross staff is used to ensure a 90-degree angle for every offset.

Calculation of Area

Each triangle and trapezium, stated above, is shaped in the following manner:

  • Triangle: The required portion of the G-line will be its one side; the offset measurement will be the second side; and the outer field boundary (F-line) will be the third side.
  • Trapezium: Apart from the G-line portion and the outer boundary, two (parallel) offsets are taken into consideration for forming the four sides.

The area of a right-angle triangle is calculated using Heron’s formula. It is:

  • Area = ½ base × altitude.

The area of certain parts (triangles that are not right-angle triangles) may have to be calculated with the side measurements of the triangles. The formula applied in such a case, with side measurements a, b and c, is the following:

  • A = √[s(s-a)(s-b)(s-c)]
  • ‘s’ is the semi-perimeter of the triangle given by s = ½ of (a + b + c).

In certain cases, a portion of the area between two G-lines may need to be calculated by drawing (and measuring) a diagonal (check line) to form two triangles.

Trapeziums are formed between two G-lines or between two offsets. The area of a trapezium is calculated using the following formula:

  • A = ½ of (a + b) × h, where a and b are the lengths of the parallel sides and h is the perpendicular distance between them (required length of the G-line).

Surveying Steps Taken by the Surveyor

The surveyor follows these steps:

  • A rough sketch (draft) of the plot is prepared.
  • One or more G-lines are fixed and drawn in the sketch. The beginning and end points of each G-line are shown with letters (A–B; if there are multiple G-lines, they are placed as C–D, E–F, and so on).
  • To fix and measure the offset length — from the G-line to the boundary-bend (which are marked L, M, N, O, P, etc.) — the cross-staff is used. Flags will be placed at the starting and end points of the G-line, and also at the bend. The surveyor aligns the cross-staff along the G-line by sighting (i) the beginning and end points of the G-line through the slit of the cross-staff and (ii) the required outer bend through the opposite cross-slit.
  • After fixing the cross staff as stated above, the distance (i) from the beginning point of the G-line to the position of the cross staff, (ii) the distance from the outer bend to the G-line (position of the cross staff), and (iii) the outer boundary forming the third side of the triangle, or the fourth side of the trapezium are measured, and the measurements are duly entered in the diagram.
  • In this manner, all offsets—namely, the distances measured from the bends to the G-lines —and the lengths of the outer field boundaries, are taken and recorded in the sketch.

Field Book or Ladder

The field book is usually recorded in the following pattern:

D (75.0)
69.02.0T
68.027.0S
43.07.0R
38.015.0Q
23.02.0P
16.07.0O
10.05.0N
5.05.0M
C
B
(192.0)
L11.0190.0
M14.0188.0
N15.0157.08.0Z
O13.0132.028.0Y
P13.0124.020.0X
Q10.0115.028.0W
R12.0100.0 26.0 V
 S1 3.088.032.0U
 T1 3.076.024.0D
U110.049.0 
V110.027.0  
  4.06.0C
2.03.0L
  A  

It is prepared in the following manner:

  • AB and CD are G-lines.
  • At the bottom, the starting point (alphabet A) of the G-line (AD) is entered.
  • Above it, the distance from the point A to the first offset point on the G-line (2.0 metres) is written.
  • Since the first offset (first bend) is towards the right, the offset distance (3.0 metres) is entered in the right-hand column, and the corresponding boundary bend (L) is stated in the further right column.
  • The second offset (second bend) is also towards the right, the offset distance (6.0 metres) is entered in the right-hand column, and the corresponding boundary bend (C) is stated in the further right column.
  • The third offset being 27 meters away from the point A, and the length of the offset is 10 meters, these matters are also entered.
  • In this manner, entire boundary points (letters L to Z1) and the offset points and measurements are entered.
    • Note: If a and b are the sides of the 90-degree angle of a rectangle triangle, the length of the opposite side (hypotenuse) will be √[a2 + b2]. It is represented by: c2 = a2 + b2.
    • The measurements of all the trapeziums can be checked, applying the formula: c2 = a2 + b2 (after measuring/ drawing the diagonals, or check-lines, in these trapeziums).

Area Calculation

  • Areas of all the triangles and trapeziums are calculated using the required formula.
  • Finally, the areas (all triangles and trapeziums) are added together to get the total extent of the property.

Read also:

End Notes:

Accuracy Presumed on Govt. Maps and Plans u/s 82 BSA (83, IEA)

In Dnyaneshwar Balu Patole v State of Maharashtra, 2011 AllMR(Cri) 1889; 2011-4 MhLJ(Cri) 208, it is held as under:

  • “From the language of section 83 (IEA), it is clear that Court shall presume that the maps or plans purporting to be made by the authority of the Central Government or any State Government were so made and are accurate but maps or plans made for the purposes of any cause must be proved to be accurate. It shows that when plans of town or area or certain roads, forests, rivers, nalas, etc. are prepared for public record and general information there is presumption of its accuracy. However, when a map is prepared for particular cause or purpose, there is no presumption of accuracy and that map has to be proved by leading necessary evidence. If a map is prepared by the investigating agency to prove scene of offence ,that map is prepared for the particular purpose, i.e., to establish scene of offence and certain facts, which the prosecution wants to establish, there can not be any presumption of accuracy to such map. Such map will have to be proved like any other fact by leading necessary evidence.”

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Photographs and Videos: Admissibility, and Proof Invoking Presumptions and ‘Silent Witness’ Theory

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • 1. Once a photograph or a copy of a video is duly admitted in evidence—having been produced along with the certificate required under Section 63(4) of the Bharathiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA)—
  • the court can rely upon it as a piece of evidence,
    • (i) based on the general (and reliable) evidence’ (such as the identity of the persons seen in the photograph/video, the place, time, etc.)
    • (ii) as substantive evidence,
    • (iii) invoking the discretionary presumption under Section 119, BSA,
    • (iv) without insisting on any further independent proof.
  • 2. The presumption under Section 119, BSA, is rebuttable.

Key Points at a Glance

  • The only statutorily recognised mode of proof of a Computer Output (copy) is the production of a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA .
  • This certificate is accepted unless its correctness is specifically challenged.
  • A photograph or a copy of video stands on a distinct footing (in contradistinction to a statement-of-account) by reason of the statutory presumptions that the court can invoke.
  • The court is entitled to infer that a photograph or video correctly represents the scene or object as it existed at the time of recording, under the silent witness’ theory – the document “speaks for itself”.
  • A photograph or a video, by its very nature, speaks for itself. Upon its due admission in evidence, the court can rely upon it, on the basis of general (and reliable) evidence’, such as the identity of the persons seen in the photograph/video, the place, the time, or the occasion in which the photo or video was taken, without insisting upon further formal or technical proof.
  • The person who refutes the correctness of the photograph or video has the duty to adduce proper and admissible evidence, to discredit the presumption as to its correctness (This presumption under Section 119, BSA is ‘rebuttable’ for the word “may” in that Section).

Presumptions on Photographs and Videos: Discretionary and Rebuttable

Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (Section 114 of the Evidence Act) allows the Court to

  • ‘presume the existence of any fact ….. regard being had to the common course of natural events‘.

A photograph or a video, by its very nature, speaks for itself. They are “silent witnesses. It may be the most effective evidence in the peculiar nature of a case. (For example, the photograph that represents the scene of an accident.) It is on the supposition – photographs do not lie (Rajesh Khaitan v. State of WB, 1983 CrLJ 877; Anurag Sharma v. Manushi Sharma, 2017 AIR(CC) 332; 2016-234 DLT 530).

Invoking the legal presumptions under Section 119 of the BSA, a court can begin with an assumption as to the correctness of a photograph or video, casting the onus on the opposite party to rebut that presumption by placing on record material sufficient to dislodge or shift it. The presumption under Section 119 is discretionary and rebuttable. Consequently, the law does not oblige the proponent of the photograph or video to negate every theoretical possibility of manipulation.

However, it must have been fairly and accurately depicted. Where the rebuttal evidence creates a reasonable doubt regarding the authenticity or integrity of the photograph or video—whether on the ground of tampering, manipulation, fabrication, or otherwise—or where the court considers that further clarification is necessary to assess its probative value, the court may insist on further proof.

  • Note: The court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove even documents admitted (by the opposite side). Besides Section 53, BSA (facts admitted need not be proved: S. 58, IEA) and the powers of the court under Section 168, BSA (S. 165, IEA), the scheme of the Procedural Acts (CPC and BNSS/CrPC) also shows it. See – 
    • Order VIII Rule 5, CPC
    • Order XII, Rule 2A(1) [Proviso], CPC and 
    • S. 330, BNSS (S. 294 of the CrPC).

Invoking the general presumption (Section 119 of the BSA), as regards the video properly admitted in evidence, the courts in India have consistently held –

  • ‘A mere bald denial of the contents of a video recording is insufficient‘; but, ‘there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed [State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129.]
    • See also: Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1 [The court proceeded, observing – ‘there is no room for doubting the authenticity and accuracy of the electronic evidence‘].

Photographs – In many cases, a Corroborative Piece; It Can be the Best Evidence also

A photograph, being a document, ordinarily requires proof through a proper witness to establish its authenticity and relevance. However, it need not invariably be proved by examining the photographer, and may be proved through any competent witness capable of speaking to the facts depicted or the circumstances of its production. Once duly admitted, a photograph may constitute primary or substantive evidence, though in many cases it is used to corroborate other evidence.

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it is held that CCTV footage can be a ‘Best Evidence‘. The court said it as under:

  • “Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, prosecution in possession of the best evidence– CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced.”

In short, a photograph or copy of a video, once duly admitted in evidence, may constitute substantive and even the best evidence. The court can rely upon it by invoking the statutory presumptions, without insisting on further independent proof.

International Criminal Proceedings: No strict Requirement – Photographs be Corroborated

According to Rule 63(4) of the  of the ‘International Criminal Proceedings (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, it is pointed out in Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842,14 March 2012, TC I-718, that there is no strict legal requirement that a photograph has to be corroborated by other evidence for the Court to be able to rely on it and establish a specific fact [See: End Notes ].

The probative value of a document is a matter for the Court

Though in many cases a photograph or video is relied upon only as a corroborative piece of evidence, it can be substantive and independent evidence. It may also be a ‘best evidence‘, as shown above.

It is also important – the determination of the probative value of a document is a matter for the court. In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684, it is observed:

  • “Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”

Silent Witnesses Theory – Photograph /Video Speaks for Itself

In State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, the Madras High Court explained the “silent witness” theory, stating as under:

  • “115. We may also incidentally notice the developments in the law on video and photographic evidence in the West where the “silent witness” theory is deployed to admit video and photographic evidence. The theory proceeds on the footing that photographic and video evidence are “silent witnesses” which speak for themselves. They are substantive evidence of what they portray.”

The following two foreign decisions were specifically dealt with by the High Court:

  • (a) State of Nevada v. Archanian, [145 P 3d 1008 (2006)]: The Supreme Court of Nevada admitted the video evidence under the silent witness theory and held as under:
    • “There is no evidence suggesting that the composite videotape was inaccurate, that any relevant or exculpatory information had been deleted from it, or that the modifications made to it adversely affected or obscured the content.”
  • (b) Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He [2017 ONCJ 790]: The Ontario Court of Justice in Canada opined to the following effect:
    • The party seeking to tender a video in evidence must show two things to meet the threshold test of admissibility: (i) The video is relevant, showing the crime scene or other evidence linked to the issues at trial; and (ii) the video is authentic — that it accurately represents the events depicted.
  • Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He [2017 ONCJ 790] referred R. v. Bulldog (2015 ABCA 251, Alberta (Western Canada) Court of Appeal).

Should there be Proof – Video not been Altered or Changed?

The appellants in R. v. Bulldog (2015 ABCA 251, Alberta (Western Canada) Court of Appeal) challenged the authenticity and admissibility of the DVD. They relied on R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197.    The Court considered whether the Crown was bound to prove that the video recording had not been altered or changed. The appellants argued that R. v. Nikolovski mandated a two-fold test (i) requiring proof that the video accurately depicted the facts and (ii) proof that it had not been altered or changed. The Alberta Court of Appeal disagreed. It held (paragraphs 26 to 33):

  • 1. As long as other evidence satisfied the accuracy, no evidence regarding the presence or absence of alteration was necessary.
  • 2. The mere fact of alteration did not automatically render a video recording inadmissible.
  • 3. The Crown’s failure to establish that the DVD was not altered was not fatal as long as the Crown had proven that the DVD was a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purported to show.
  • See: End Notes

Bald Denials are Insufficient to Discredit the Authenticity of Video Footage

The Madras High Court, in this decision (State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi), also observed as under:

  • “113. It is true that the cameraman can zoom or minimize an image. It is also true that trick photography is possible. In Suo Motu taken up (PIL) WP Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others (WP 3335 etc. of 2009) decided on 29.10.2009, a Division Bench of this Court (F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla and R. Banumathi, JJ) held that bald denials are insufficient to discredit the authenticity of video footage. In her lead judgment, Banumathi, J (as she then was) has opined as under:
    • ‘349. That a bald denial of the contents of a videotape is not adequate to doubt its authenticity; there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed.
  • The Division Bench proceeded to look into the video tape as a corroborative piece of evidence and held as under:
    • ‘350. The respondents have not disputed that the video clippings filed by the petitioners relate to the occurrence. Even though video clippings filed by the petitioners do not have the running time, we have watched the videos and looked into the photos as corroborative piece of evidence’.”

In Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1, the conclusion of the Speaker on CDs received from TV News Channels, that ‘there is no room for doubting the authenticity and accuracy of the electronic evidence produced by the petitioner’, was accepted by the Apex Court, holding as under:

  • “The petitioners despite grant of opportunity had declined to watch the recorded interview. It is one thing to watch the interview, point out in what manner the recording was not genuine but instead of availing of that opportunity, the petitioners preferred to adopt the course of vague denial.”

In Umesh v. State of Karnataka, 2023-2 KarLJ 397, while dealing with a ‘trap case’, after laying down the importance of digital evidence, it is cautioned as under:

  • “Qualified and trained expert should test the samples. The report should contain the procedure adopted for testing the samples. The equipments used should be duly calibrated and updated periodically. The electronic device should be tested for editing and tampering in order to establish its genuineness and authenticity.
  • Digital evidence form be created for every memory card/chip used in the trap case containing the unique identification features of the memory chip/card used. The defence should be provided with a cloned copy or a mirror image of the electronic device.”

Distinct Evidentiary Position of a Section 63(4) Certificate

Once the Section 63(4) certificate accompanies the computer output (copy), the computer output becomes admissible in evidence, and it is not mandatory to examine the CCTV operator, or the person who snapped the photograph, for the purpose of its admission.

  • See: Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473,
  • Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1.

The Person who Signed Section 63/65B Certificate Need Not be Examined: Having regard to the special features of the photographs and videos (that is, visual depictions of facts), even if the Section 63(4) certificate is not that given either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, but by another, the photograph or video can be marked in evidence through the plaintiff or the defendant.

Unless the authenticity or correctness of the certificate issued under Section 63(4) is specifically disputed, oral evidence has no role to play in proving (for the purpose of marking) that the computer output is the exact copy of the (original) electronic record. Therefore, the photographer who issued the certificate under Section 63(4) need not be examined if the correctness of the certificate is not specifically disputed.

In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, our Apex Court further affirmed as under:

  • “50. … However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such certificate be given by such person/persons.”

Definition of Document Includes Photographs and Videos

Section 2(1)(d) of the Bharat Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), defines ‘document’ as under:

  • “ (d) ‘document’ means any matter expressed or described or otherwise recorded upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or any other means or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter and includes electronic and digital records.”

By virtue of Section 63 of the BSA, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (computer output) shall be ‘deemed to be also a document’.

Section 3(18), General Clauses Act, 1897, defines document as under:

  • Document shall include any matter written, expressed, or described upon any substances by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means which is intended to be used, or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter.”

Section 2(8) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, defines ‘document’ as any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, and includes electronic and digital record, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.

Going by the definitions, ‘document‘ includes not only all materials or substances upon which thoughts of a man are represented by writing or any other species of conventional mark or symbol, but also records of information of some sort (Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State, 2014 KerHC 31).

Electronic Record is Documentary Evidence

It is well established — under Section 3 of the Evidence Act (Sec. 2(1)(d) of the BSA), the electronic record produced for the inspection of the Court is documentary evidence (Anwar PV v. PK Basheer, 2014-10 SCC 473).

In P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1, it is observed that the following were “documents” under Section 3 of the Evidence Act-

  • (i) tape records of speeches (See also: Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, 2010-4 SCC 329; Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra(1976) 2 SCC 17 ) and
  • (ii) audio/video cassettes (See: Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, 1976-2 SCC 17) including compact disc (See also: Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016-15 SCC 485).

Presumption on Computer Output (copy) Admitted under Sec. 63

A computer output (copy) of a CCTV footage or video, or of a photograph captured on a mobile phone, can be admitted in evidence in place of the original — if it is produced with a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA.

  • Note: Section 63(1), BSA says about admissibility of copy — “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.”

Proof by Certificate under Section 63(4)

In view of the non-obstante clause (“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam”) in Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the only Mode of Proof of a computer output (copy) is the evidence through a certificate under Section 63(4).

  • Therefore, even in cases where formal proof of the digital photos or videos is dispensed with (for the opposite party admits it), a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA is necessary.

Admission and Proof of Computer Output (copy): Independent Matters

(i) Admitting a copy of a computer output (such as copy of a statement of accounts) in evidence (with a certificate under Section 63), and (ii) the formal proof thereof at the time of trial, are two distinct and independent matters.

The burden of Impeaching the Certificate is upon the Party who Disputes it

The presumption arising under Section 63—by which a computer output is deemed to be a document—is rebuttable and does not render the contents of the electronic record conclusive.

If such a challenge on the certificate is overruled by the court, it can draw a presumption as to the genuineness and authenticity of the photographs or videos contained in the computer output (copies).

S. 63 deals with Admissibility of computer output or copy, and not Proof

The questions as to substantive proof — whether the computer output or copy is relevant, and how it should be proved — are not determined by Section 63 of the BSA. They are to be established independently, as in the case of any other class of documents.

  • However, the court can draw presumptions as to the genuineness and authenticity of such photographs or videos, as stated earlier.

Once Copy Admitted by S. 63 Certificate, Oral Evidence has No Place in Marking

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, is an authority on the following matters –

  • (i) The certificate under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to admissibility of the computer output (copy);
  • (ii) The certificate is meant to replace the oral evidence of the device-handler or operator.
  • (iii) Once the certificate is produced, oral evidence has no place (for the purpose of marking it).

However, the person who issued the certificate (operator) has to be examined if:

  • the authenticity or correctness of the certificate is specifically disputed;
  • allegations of fabrication, manipulation, or false certification are raised;
  • the issuer’s control over the device/system is seriously questioned; or
  • the court needs clarification to assess probative value, not admissibility.

Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witness Theory

  • Pictorial Testimony Theory — Photograph Need Not Be Proved.
  • Silent Witness Theory — Photograph Must Be Proved.

Pictorial testimony theory

  • It is applied when a photograph is used merely as an aid to a witness in explaining or illustrating his testimony—for example,
    • a doctor explaining injuries with reference to a photographs,
    • witness identifying a scene/person with a photograph,
    • identification of a deceased through a photograph,  
    • accident site photos to explain the incident by a witness.
  • In these cases, the primary evidence is the oral testimony of the witness and not the contents of the photograph itself. The photograph is admitted merely as an aid to enable the witness to explain or illustrate what he personally perceived (and the photograph itself is not relied upon as substantive evidence). Consequently, it is not necessary to examine the photographer, provided the witness could affirm that the photograph fairly and accurately represents what he saw. In such cases, the photograph does not constitute substantive evidence, and therefore, no certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA (Section 65B of the IEA) is required.

Silent witness theory or Communication theory

  • It is invoked when the photograph itself constitutes substantive and probative evidence of what it depicts, speaking for itself without supporting oral testimony—for instance,
    • an X-ray film showing a fracture,
    • a photograph depicting the accused in a crowd holding a weapon (though the photographer did not notice him),
    • a photograph of the scene of occurrence of a crime.
    • CCTV footage.
    • speed camera photographs.
  • In these cases, the reliability and authenticity of the photographs or video must be proved, for the court relies upon what is depicted by the camera, CCTV, etc., in the mechanical/ electronic process, and not what the human witness who operated the process perceived.

In Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State (2014 Ker HC 31), these two theories, governing the proof and authenticity of photographs, were explained.

Examination of the Photographer may not be insisted (In silent witness theory)

As stated above, in silent witness theory cases, photographs or videos are required to be proved. However, such proof need not necessarily be by way of formal proof through the examination of the photographer or the person who captured the image.

Court to Draw a Prima Facie Presumption of Correctness

The law does not proceed on any presumption that electronic or visual evidence is to be viewed with constant suspicion.

The party producing a photograph or video is required only to establish foundational facts sufficient for its admissibility and relevance. Once this burden is discharged and the document is duly admitted, the Court can draw a prima facie presumption of correctness under Section 119 of the BSA (Section 114 of the IEA).

If S. 63/65B Requirement is fulfilled, CD is admissible, Like a Bocument

In Kailas v. The State of Maharashtra: 2025 INSC 1117, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “19. … However, strangely, the High Court opined that the video would become relevant only if it is played during deposition of each witness so that the witness could explain its contents in his own words resulting in a transcript of the video. In our view, this is a strange and unacceptable reasoning for the simple reason that the CD is an electronic record and once the requirement of Section 65B is fulfilled it becomes an admissible piece of evidence, like a document, and the video recorded therein is akin to contents of a document which can be seen and heard to enable the Court to draw appropriate inference(s). No doubt, there may be an occasion where to appreciate contents of a video an explanatory statement may be needed, but that would depend on the facts of a case. However, it is not the requirement of law that the contents of the video would become admissible only if it is reduced to a transcript in the words of a witness who created the video or is noticed in the video. Besides that, in the instant case, the search and seizure operation was sought to be proved by oral evidence of witnesses. The video, therefore, was perhaps to corroborate the oral testimony. …”

General Evidence on Factual Features through a ‘Proper’ Witness Sufficient

Besides admission of the other side as regards the authenticity, the photographs or videos may instead be proved through a ‘proper’ witness capable to furnish general (and reliable) evidence’ (to invoke the ‘general presumption‘ under Section 119, BSA) regarding the factual features depicted therein, such as the identity of the persons in the photograph, the place, the time, or the surrounding circumstances.

The following legal principles are relevant in this matter:

  • 1. The relevance of the photograph or video can be established by general evidence’ regarding the identity of the persons seen in the photograph, the place, etc.
  • 2. The admissibility of a photograph or copy of a video (under the Section 63(4) certificate) and its formal proof are two distinct and independent matters.
  • 2. Even in cases where formal proof of the photographs or copies of videos is dispensed with, the certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA (Section 65B of the IEA) is necessary — in view of the non-obstante clause in Section 63 of the BSA.
  • 3. A photograph or a copy of video, admitted in evidence on the strength of a certificate under Section 63(4), stands on a distinct footing (in contradistinction to a statement-of-account) by reason of the statutory (general) presumptions that the court can invoke (under Section 119 BSA), it being direct visual depictions of facts.
  • 4. The certificate under Section 63(4) is accepted unless its correctness is specifically challenged. The oral evidence of the person who issued the certificate becomes relevant (for the purpose of admitting the document) only where the certificate itself is specifically and successfully challenged by the party who disputes its authenticity or correctness.
  • 5. Therefore, the court is entitled to infer that a photograph or video, once duly admitted in evidence, correctly represents the scene or object as it existed at the time of recording. It is doctrinally recognised as the ‘silent witness’ theory – the document “speaks for itself”.
  • 6. Once a photograph or a copy of a video is duly admitted in evidence, the court cannot discard it, equating it to hearsay or corroborative evidence. The court cannot, as an invariable rule, insist upon further direct proof of the facts depicted in the photo or video. That is, the court has to accept it as a piece of (substantive) evidence.
  • 7. The presumption attached to a photograph or a video admitted in evidence being one rebuttable, the opposite party can rebut it by placing appropriate evidence to show that the photograph or video does not correctly represent the scene, object, or occurrence as it existed at the relevant point of time, or that the factual position had materially changed.

Photo Identification falls under the Pictorial Testimony Theory

Photo identification falls under the Pictorial testimony theory. Because the court has nothing to perceive from the photograph by itself; it only serves as an aid to the witness. The material and substantive evidence is the personal knowledge of the witness, and not what is depicted in the photograph.

The Kerala High Court (KT Thomas, J.), in Ponnappan v. State of Kerala, ILR 1994(3) Ker 370, confirmed the conviction, holding that Chacko was the person who was killed. It was on a photo identification. The Court held as under:

  • “PW I identified the person in M.O. 9 photo as the person who was killed. There is no doubt that M.O. 9 is the photograph of Chacko, the film representative. It was contended that since P. W. 1 himself admitted that he had not observed the features or facial peculiarities of the person when he was inside the car, the identification made by him with the help of the photo is not of any use. We are of the view that even without noticing any translatable mark or feature of a person, it would be possible to identify him later.”

Read also:

Pictorial Testimony Theory: No Enacted Law; Only Judicial Exposition

The pictorial testimony theory rests on judicial exposition rather than statutory codification. It finds only indirect support, in principle, from Section 162 (Refreshing Memory), BSA. Section 162 is to be understood as one not exhaustive in its operation.

Section 162 of the BSA reads as under:

  • Refreshing memory: (1) A witness may, while under examination, refresh his memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or so soon afterwards that the Court considers it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in his memory:
    • Provided that the witness may also refer to any such writing made by any other person, and read by the witness within the time aforesaid, if when he read it, he knew it to be correct.
  • (2) Whenever a witness may refresh his memory by reference to any document, he may, with the permission of the Court, refer to a copy of such document:
    • Provided that the Court be satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the non-production of the original:
    • Provided further that an expert may refresh his memory by reference to professional treatises.”

R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157

In R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157, the Apex Court summarised the earlier decision, Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720, (which considered the evidentiary value of tape recording, compared to that of a photograph) as under:

  • “In Nagri’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720) the appellant offered bribe to Sheikh a Municipal Clerk. Sheikh informed the Police. The Police laid a trap. Sheikh called Nagree at the residence. The Police kept a tape recorder concealed in another room. The tape was kept in the custody of the police inspector  Sheikh gave evidence of the talk. The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae. It is also comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident. The tape recorded conversation is therefore a relevant fact and is admissible under section 7 of the Evidence Act.” (Referred to in: K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275)

After summarising Nagri’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720), the Supreme Court continued as under:

  • “The Court will take care in two directions in admitting such evidence. First, the Court will find out that it is genuine and free from tampering or mutilation. Secondly, the Court may also secures scrupulous conduct and behaviour on behalf of the Police. The reason is that the Police Officer is more likely to behave properly if improperly obtained evidence is liable to be viewed with care and caution by the Judge. In every case the position of the accused, the nature of the investigation and the gravity of the offence must be judged in the light of the material facts and the surrounding circumstances.”

Conclusion

  • The only Mode of Proof of a computer output (copy) is the certificate under Section 63(4).
  • Where formal evidence is required to establish the relevance or authenticity of a photograph or video, it is sufficient for the party concerned (under the silent witness theory) to adduce general evidence’ relating to the factual aspects depicted therein—such as the identity of the persons depicted, the place, the time, or the circumstances depicted.
  • As pointed out in State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, a bald denial of the contents of the videotape is not adequate to doubt its authenticity; there should be material to show that they are doctored or morphed.
  • The photograph or video constitutes substantive evidence. Though in many cases it is relied upon as corroborative evidence, in an appropriate case it may, by itself, establish the fact in issue, independently and without the aid of other evidence. It may also be from the ‘best evidence‘ in certain cases (Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178). In any case, the probative value of a document is a matter for the court.
  • The photograph admitted merely as a non-probative aid to enable a witness to explain or illustrate what he personally perceived need not be proved by a ‘proper’ witness; and, no certificate is required for such photographs under Section 63(4) of the BSA.

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End Notes — 1

Electronic Evidence — Indian Law in Comparative Perspective to Other Jurisdictions

Electronic Evidence – Cannot be Ignored on any Technicality

In Shafhi Mohammad s. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2018 SC 714; 2018-2 SCC 801, , our Supreme Court, stated as under:

  • “21. We have been taken through certain decisions which may be referred to. In Ram Singh vs. Ram Singh [Ram Singh vs. Ram Singh, 1985 Supp SCC 611] , a three-Judge Bench considered the said issue. English judgments in R. v. Maqsud Ali [R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1966) 1 QB 688] and R. v. Robson [R. vs. Robson, (1972) 1 WLR 651] and American Law as noted in American Jurisprudence 2d (Vol. 29) p. 494, were cited with approval to the effect that it will be wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved. Such evidence should always be regarded with some caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances of each case. Electronic evidence was held to be admissible, subject to safeguards adopted by the Court about the authenticity of the same. In the case of tape-recording, it was observed that voice of the speaker must be duly identified, accuracy of the statement was required to be proved by the maker of the record, possibility of tampering was required to be ruled out. Reliability of the piece of evidence is certainly a matter to be determined in the facts and circumstances of a fact situation. However, threshold admissibility of an electronic evidence cannot be ruled out on any technicality if the same was relevant”. (Quoted in: Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1)

Proof on Video – UK, US and Canada 

The following are the well-accepted UK authorities on proof of electronic evidence.

  • (i) R. v. Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688) – on tape recordings,
  • (ii) R v. Clare and Peach (1995] 2 Cr App R 333) – on photograph,
  • (iii) R v. Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 – on CCTV.

The following is the important US authority on proof of videos.

  • State of Nevada v. Archanian, 145 P 3d 1008 (2006) – Supreme Court of Nevada (a U.S. state)

The following are the well-accepted Canadian authorities on proof of videos.

  • (i)  R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251 – Alberta Court of Appeal(Western Canada).( It is followed in  Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790 –  Ontario Court of Justice in Canada)
  •  (ii) Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790 –  Ontario Court of Justice in Canada.

These decisions consistently laid down the following as to the admissibility of a video in evidence:

  • (a) The video must be relevant to the issues at trial.
  • (b) The video must be authentic – that it accurately represents the events depicted.

Madras High Court Relied on the above Canada Decisions

While considering the developments in the law on video and photographic evidence, the Madras High Court, in State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P. Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019-2 CTC 391; 2019-3 CTC 391; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, relied on the aforesaid decisions –

  • (a) State of Nevada v. Archanian, 145 P 3d 1008 (2006);
  • (b) Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790.

 The Madras High Court held as under:

  • 115. We may also incidentally notice the developments in the law on video and photographic evidence in the West where the “silent witness” theory is deployed to admit video and photographic evidence. The theory proceeds on the footing that photographic and video evidence are “silent witnesses” which speak for themselves. They are substantive evidence of what they portray. Two examples may be noticed.
    • (a) State of Nevada v. Archanian, 145 P 3d 1008 (2006) was a murder case before the Supreme Court of Nevada, where, a key piece of evidence was the digital video recorded by the store’s surveillance system. The accused attacked the authenticity of the video footage on the ground that the VHS tape given to the police video technician was not the original and that the technician had isolated the relevant camera view and highlighted certain portions of the video. It was this composite videotape that was shown to the jury. In the trial, the prosecution acknowledged that they had no way of knowing whether the images were accurately transferred from the original digital recording to the VHS version but testified that they appeared to be the same. The Supreme Court of Nevada admitted the video evidence under the silent witness theory and held as under:
    • “There is no evidence suggesting that the composite videotape was inaccurate, that any relevant or exculpatory information had been deleted from it, or that the modifications made to it adversely affected or obscured the content.”
    • (b) More recently, in Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790 Kenkel, J. of the Ontario Court of Justice in Canada formulated a test, very similar to our own and that has been alluded to by us in para 105 (supra). The Court opined:
    • “The party seeking to tender a video in evidence must show two things to meet the threshold test of admissibility:
    • They must prove the video is relevant, showing the crime scene or other evidence linked to the issues at trial.
    • They must prove the video is authentic – that it accurately represents the events depicted.”

Halsbury’s Laws of England

In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, 2006 reissue, Vol. 11(3) Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure, it is stated while dealing with “Documentary and Real Evidence”, as under:

  • “1471. Audio and video recordings. – An audio recording is admissible in evidence provided that the accuracy of the recording can be proved, the recorded voices can be properly identified, and the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible [R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1965) 2 All ER 464, R v. Ashiq Hussain [1966] 1 QB 688, 49 Cr. App. Rep 230, CCA. For the considerations relevant to the determination of admissibility see R. v. Stevenson, R. v. Hulse, R. v. Whitney [1971] 1 All ER 678, 55 Cr. App. Rep 171; R. v. Robson, R. v. Harris [1972] 2 All ER 699, 56 Cr.App. Rep 450. See also R. v. Senat, R. v. Sin (1968) 52 Cr. App. Rep 282, CA; R. v. Bailey [1993] 3 All ER 513, 97 Cr. App. Rep 365, CA. Where a video recording of an incident becomes available after the witness has made a statement, the witness may view the video and, if necessary, amend his statement so long as the procedure adopted is fair and the witness does not rehearse his evidence: R. v. Roberts (Michael), R. v. Roberts (Jason) [1998] Crim. LR 682, 162 JP 691, CA.]. However, that evidence should always be regarded with caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances [R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1965) 2 All ER 464, R. v. Ashiq Hussain [1966] 1 QB 688, 49 Cr.App. Rep 230, CCA. As to the use of tape recordings and transcripts see R. v. Rampling [1987] Crim. LR 823, CA; and see also Buteria v. DPP (1986) 76 ALR 45, Aust. HC. As to the tape recording of police interviews see para 971 et seq ante; and as to the exclusion of a tape recording under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 s. 78 (as amended) (see para 1365 ante) as unfair evidence see R. v. H [1987] Crim. LR 47, Cf R. v. Jelen, R. v. Karz (1989) 90 Cr. App. Rep 456, CA (tape recording admitted despite element of entrapment).].
  • A video recording of an incident which is in issue is admissible [Taylor v. Chief Constable of Cheshire [1987] 1 All ER 225, 84 Cr.App. Rep 191, DC.]. There is no difference in terms of admissibility between a direct view of an incident and a view of it on a visual display unit of a camera or on a recording of what the camera has filmed. A witness who sees an incident on a display or a recording may give evidence of what he saw in the same way as a witness who had a direct view [Taylor v. Chief Constable of Cheshire [1987] 1 All ER 225, 84 Cr.App. Rep 191, DC. As to the admissibility of video recordings as evidence identifying the defendant see also R. v. Fowden and White [1982] Crim. LR 588, CA; R. v. Grimer [1982] Crim. LR 674, CA; R. v. Blenkinsop [1995] 1 Cr.App. Rep 7, CA. A recording showing a road on which an incident had occurred was admitted in R. v. Thomas [1986] Crim. LR 682. As to the identification of the defendant by still photographs taken by an automatic security camera see R. v. Dodson, R. v. Williams [1984] 1 WLR 971, 79 Cr.App. Rep 220, CA; as to identification generally see para 1455 ante; and as to the admissibility of a copy of a video recording of an incident see Kajala v. Noble (1982) 75 Cr.App. Rep 149, CA.].” (Quoted in: P.  Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1; 2020-9 SCC 161)

R. v. Maqsud Ali

R v. Maqsud Ali, (Court of Appeal, England and Wales, Criminal Division [1966] 1 QB 688), considered the admissibility of secret tape recordings. It is a foundational case on audio recordings. It was cautioned that such evidence should be relevant and reliable, and also be a legitimate exhibit.

R v. Clare and Peach

R v. Clare and Peach (Court of Appeal, England and Wales, Criminal Division [1995] 2 Cr App R 333)  is an authority concerning the admissibility of photographic identification evidence under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 (UK). It is held that the production of photographs to witnesses amounts to a “recognition” rather than aformal identification” procedure.

R v. Atkins

R v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA Crim 1876, of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) ), England and Wales, is a modern locus classicus on the visual evidence (CCTV) and identification testimony and expert opinion in criminal proceedings. The Court of Appeal held that expert evidence, in cases involving CCTV footage and photographic comparisons, could be admissible when it assisted the jury beyond their ordinary experience. However, the Court emphasized that such evidence must be based on a demonstrably reliable methodology.

R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251

This decision of the Alberta (Western Canada) Court of Appeal is the leading authority on the following:

  • (i) A video can be proved by any one of the following –
    • (1) the camera operator;
    • (2) an eye-witness present when the video is taken who can testify that the video accurately represents what he or she saw;
    • (3) a person qualified to state that the representation is accurate; or
    • (4) an expert witness.
  • (ii) What is required is the proof as to authenticity of the video; and not the evidence that the video is ‘not altered’.

Two questions came for consideration in this case. They were –

  • .1. “Can a digital video only be authenticated by an eyewitness”?
  • 2. Should there be proof – video was not altered or changed?

Both questions were answered negatively in R. v. Bulldog.

Can a digital video only be authenticated by an eyewitness”?

One of the main questions in R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251, was whether a digital video can only be authenticated by an eyewitness.

It held as under:

  • “[20] [The appellants argue] that Nikolovski sets two preconditions to the admissibility of video recordings – specifically, proof that the video accurately depicts the facts, and that it has not been altered or changed. The appellants refer to the process of establishing these facts as ‘authentication,’ and we are content to adopt that term, since ‘authentication’ simply refers to the process of convincing the court that certain tangible evidence matches the claims made about it . . .
  • [21] The second proposition, which relies on R v Doughty, 2009 ABPC 8 (CanLII) at para 37 (citing Elliot Goldstein, Visual Evidence, A Practitioner’s Manual, Vol 1 (Thomson-Carswell, 2007) at 2-19 to 2-20), is that there is an exclusive list of classes of witnesses who can authenticate a video in a manner that meets these two putative Nikolovski preconditions:
  • (1) the camera operator;
  • (2) an eye-witness present when the video is taken who can testify that the video accurately represents what he or she saw;
  • (3) a person qualified to state that the representation is accurate; or
  • (4) an expert witness.
  • [22] Based on these two propositions, the appellants argue that the Crown’s evidence in this case could not authenticate the DVD. They submit (but do not really argue) that the authenticating witness was Reddick, who did not create the DVD tendered, did not know who created it, did not know whether the person who did create it used or might have used options which changed the content of the source video footage, was not an expert in the software and in the format changes entailed in copying the DVD and, accordingly, could not give the expert evidence of the effect of format changes which the appellants say is necessary to authenticate the DVD: R v Penney, 2002 NFCA 15 (CanLII), 2002 NFCA 15 at para 24, 210 Nfld& PEIR 209.
  • [23] In short, the appellants say that, absent evidence from a particular class of qualified person verifying that the video recording had not been altered or changed in the course of undergoing various format changes, the DVD was inadmissible.
  • . . . . . .
  • [34] It will be recalled that the appellants say that, because Reddick does not fit into any of the four categories identified by Goldstein
    • [at para. 21 of the judgment and consisting of: the camera operator; an eye-witness present when the video is taken who can testify that the video accurately represents what he or she saw; a person qualified to state that the representation is accurate; or an expert witness.]  
  • as persons capable of authenticating video evidence, it follows that the Crown could not authenticate the video recording. We assume that the appellants also maintain that none of the other Crown witnesses would fit into those categories, although we observe that Hodge would have fallen into Goldstein’s second category as an eyewitness, had he viewed the video in court and testified that it accurately depicted what he saw. In any event, these categories are not exhaustive in the sense that, if the Crown does not call one of these four kinds of witnesses, the video recording is inadmissible. Rather, other kinds of evidence or different combinations of witnesses may be employed to satisfy a court of the video recording’s substantial accuracy and fairness.”

Should there be Proof – Video not been Altered or Changed?

Another main question in R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251, was whether a digital video can only be authenticated by an eyewitness. The appellants argued that R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 3 S.C.R. mandated a two-fold test: that is  –

  • .(i) requiring proof that the video accurately depicted the facts and
  • (ii) proof that it had not been altered or changed.

The Alberta Court of Appeal (R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251) disagreed with the appellant finding, in a nutshell, as under:

  • 1. When accuracy of the video is satisfied, evidence regarding the absence of alteration was not necessary.
  • 2. The mere fact of alteration did not automatically render a video recording inadmissible.
  • 3. The Crown’s failure to establish that the DVD was not altered was not fatal if it is proved that the DVD was a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purported to show.

The Alberta Court of Appeal (R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251) said it as under:         

  • “[26]  . . . the appellants say that Nikolovski creates a two-part test which must be met before admitting video evidence, requiring the Crown to show not only that the video recording accurately depicts the facts, but also that it has not been altered or changed. This is incorrect.
  • [27]  It must first be borne in mind that Nikolovski was not a case about the admissibility of a video recording (which had been conceded), but rather about identity (specifically, whether a trier of fact could identify the accused beyond a reasonable doubt as the offender by relying solely upon that video recording). The critical passage from Nikolovski, para 28 upon which the appellants rely, is found under a heading discussing ‘Use That Can Be Made of Photographs or Videotapes,’ which clearly presupposes admissibility.
  • [28]      Further, the passage itself fails to support the appellants’ contention. It reads as follows: 
  • Once it is established that a videotape has not been altered or changed, and that it depicts the scene of a crime, then it becomes admissible and relevant evidence.
  • This statement does not state a necessary condition for admission, but rather a sufficient condition. It does not, even implicitly, preclude admission of video recordings under other circumstances. Indeed, where an alteration enhances a video recording, its accuracy might well be served by such an alteration: R v Jamieson, [2004] OTC 369 at paras 36-37, [2004] OJ No 1780 (QL) (SCJ).
  • [29] We do agree with the appellants, however, that in some cases Nikolovski has been taken as requiring the tendering party to show an absence of alteration or change: PenneyR v. MacNeil, 2008 QCCS 915 (CanLII) at para 11, [2008] QJ No 1784 (QL); R v Chevannes, 2011 ONCJ 754 (CanLII) at para 16, [2011] OJ No 5937; R v Ellard, 2004 BCSC 780 (CanLII) at para 11, [2004] BCJ No 2914. In Penney, for example, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal (at para 17) cited Nikolovski as authority for the statement that ‘[e]vidence establishing that the video has not been altered or changed is a precondition to its admission as evidence.’ With respect, we do not read Nikolovski as stating so broad a proposition, and we see no principled reason to support it. Indeed, taken to its extreme, it could render almost any DVD left unattended next to a computer inadmissible . . .
  • [30]  Other courts have taken a different view of Nikolovski, to the effect that a video recording may be admitted into evidence, even if it has been altered in some way, so long as it is shown to be a substantially accurate depiction of the event in question. In R v Brown, [1999] OTC 213, [1999] OJ No 4865 (CJ), where the Crown sought to tender at trial a security surveillance videotape and enhanced copies, the court stated (at para 3) that, when a videotape has been altered, the test for admissibility is: one of substantial accuracy . . . [T[he Crown must … prove on a balance of probabilities the substantial accuracy of the original tape and the enhancements of it to obtain the permission of the court to tender them in accordance with [Nikolovski] ….
  • [31] Similarly, in R v Crawford, 2013 BCSC 2402 (CanLII) at para 48, [2013] BCJ No 2879 (emphasis added), the court said that Nikolovski should be interpreted in a ‘purposive’ manner, such that a video recording’s admissibility is not precluded, even if ‘complete accuracy’ no longer subsists, so long as ‘the alteration of the recorded event is not so substantial as to be misleading’ or ‘if the image is distorted or otherwise changed in a material way.’ What matters, said the court in Crawford, is that the video recording ‘accurately and fairly presents he information that it is to convey.’ Other courts, including this Court, said much the same thing prior to Nikolovski . . .
  • [32] There is an important distinction between recordings (video or audio) and other forms of real evidence (such as a pistol or an article of clothing found at a crime scene) which supports a test of ‘substantial’ accuracy over the appellants’ preferred test of ‘not altered.’ It will be recalled that ‘authentication’ simply requires that the party tendering evidence establish (to the requisite standard of proof, which we discuss below) the claim(s) made about it. What authentication requires in any given instance therefore depends upon the claim(s) which the tendering party is making about the evidence. In the case of most real evidence, the claim is that the evidence is something – the pistol is a murder weapon, or the article of clothing is the victim’s shirt. Chain of custody, and absence of alteration will be important to establish in such cases. In the case of recordings, however, the claim will typically be not that it is something, but that it accurately represents something (a particular event). What matters with a recording, then, is not whether it was altered, but rather the degree of accuracy of its representation. So long as there is other evidence which satisfies the trier of fact of the requisite degree of accuracy, no evidence regarding the presence or absence of any change or alteration is necessary to sustain a finding of authentication.
  • [33] Put simply, the mere fact of alteration does not automatically render a video recording inadmissible. It follows that the Crown’s failure to establish that this video recording was not altered should not be fatal, so long as the Crown proves that it is a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purports to show. All this is, of course, subject to the standard framework for admission, under which a video recording may be excluded on the basis of irrelevance (Penney), where its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value (R v Veinot, 2011 NSCA 120 (CanLII) at paras 24-27, 311 NSR (2d) 267), or where there is reasonable doubt that the video identifying the accused is a fabrication.”

Circumstantial Evidence be Used – No Particular Evidence or Class of Witness

Referring to the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251, the Ontario Court in Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790, KENKEL J., said:

  • Introduction
  • [1] Constable Sebastian found a white Mercedes stopped in the roadway and a man lying unconscious on the grass nearby. Mr. He was subsequently charged with having care or control of a vehicle while his ability to operate that vehicle was impaired by consumption of alcohol. The next day, another officer went to a business near the scene of the incident and saw two surveillance cameras that could have captured the events on video. He spoke with a manager who had access to the surveillance video system, watched the videos from those cameras and found that one captured this incident. The manager copied the video from their system to a DVD the officer had brought for that purpose. At issue is whether the Crown has proved the surveillance video admissible where no person from the business was called to authenticate the copy.
  • Surveillance Video Authentication
  • [2] The party seeking to tender a video in evidence must show two things to meet the threshold test of admissibility:
    • They must prove the video is relevant, showing the crime scene or other evidence linked to the issues at trial.
    • They must prove the video is authentic – that it accurately represents the events depicted.
    • The test is satisfied on a balance of probabilities – R v Bulldog 2015 ABCA 251 at paras 39-40.[1]
  • [3] The defence refers to a statement in R v Nikolovski, [1996] SCJ No 122 at para 28 as setting the test for authentication, “Once it is established that a videotape has not been altered or changed, and that it depicts the scene of a crime, then it becomes admissible and relevant evidence.” The defence submits that while there is eye witness evidence that can authenticate a portion of this video, there is no witness who can identify the initial events so there’s no evidence that portion of the video is an accurate representation. Second, the Crown has failed to prove that the video has not been altered or changed. The Crown has not called anyone from the company that kept the surveillance system so the video has not been authenticated and should not be admitted.
  • [4] The argument that Nikolovski sets out a two-step test for video authentication was rejected by the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Bulldog supra. The court noted that Nikolovski was not a case about video admissibility as that had been conceded at trial.[2] They found that the passage cited above does not state a test or necessary condition for authentication, but rather a sufficient condition – Bulldog at para 28. What matters with video evidence is the degree of accuracy of its representation. So long as there is other evidence which shows the video is accurate, no evidence regarding the absence of any change or alteration is necessary – Bulldog at para 32.
  • [5] Constable Lewis went back to the scene during business hours the day after the accused’s arrest. He spoke to the people at the company and was referred to a manager who had access to the surveillance video equipment. Constable Lewis saw the video recording system, he viewed the surveillance video at the relevant time and found that it showed this incident. He watched the manager make a digital copy directly onto a DVD that the officer had brought for that purpose.
  •  [6] Circumstantial evidence may be used to authenticate real evidence – Bulldog at para 35. There is no particular evidence or class of witness that must be called to authenticate a video provided the whole of the evidence establishes that the video in question is substantially accurate[3] and a fair depiction – Bulldog at para 37.
  • The surveillance system described by the officer operates automatically. The copying of a digital record as described by the officer is a simple and now familiar procedure. A side by side comparison of the two videos is not necessary to prove the reliability of the copy in that context. There’s nothing in the evidence that casts doubt on the integrity of this record. I find the circumstances described by the officer and his direct observations establish the integrity and accuracy of the video on the balance of probabilities. The testimony of a company representative to confirm the officer’s observations about the video system and the fact that a direct digital copy was made would add little to the officer’s evidence. The absence of a company witness does not render the video inadmissible.
  • “7. While the circumstantial evidence is sufficient, in this case, there is further direct evidence that independently shows the video is accurate. The surveillance video is in sync with all of the other evidence at trial. The officers’ testimony as to the scene when they arrived, the times the various officers arrived, their actions, the position of the accused, the departure of other parties, the arrival of the ambulance is all consistent with this video. The two police in-car videos are also consistent with this surveillance video.
  • [8] On this point, the defence submits that the evidence of the officers and the police in-car videos may confirm the accuracy of the surveillance video after they arrived, but it cannot confirm the accuracy of the video prior to that time. I disagree. The fact that every part of the video that could be confirmed by independent evidence is consistent with that evidence is a circumstance which strongly supports the accuracy of the entire video including those minutes before the police arrived. I find the surveillance video is also admissible on that basis.”

Quoting the para 6 and 7 above, the Madras High Court, in State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P. Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019-2 CTC 391; 2019-3 CTC 391; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129), said as under:

  • “We have referred to these decisions in order to reiterate that a pragmatic and purposive interpretation of the law governing the admission of electronic evidence is consistent with the development of the law in international jurisdictions as well.
  • 116. We, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the photos and videos in M.Os.45,49,50,51,52 and 53 were taken contemporaneously when the attack was taking place and have not been doctored and can be read in evidence.”

 “Balance of Probabilities”

In R v Penney, (2002) 163 CCC (3d) 329, the court considered the ‘falsification of evidence’ and pointed out that the members of a jury ‘can be expected to have, if not experience with, knowledge of the possibilities for manipulating the content of photographs and videotapes’, and concluded that the ‘standard by which the trial judge is to determine the question is on the balance of probabilities’

Conclusion

The following are the distinctive features of Indian law that significantly relax the strict burden of proof governing electronic evidence:

  • (i) Section 63(4) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 stipulates that a computer output (i.e., a copy of an electronic record) is ordinarily admissible upon the production of the prescribed certificate, thereby facilitating the mode of proof of secondary electronic evidence; and
  • (ii) Section 119 of the Adhiniyam enables the Court to presume the accuracy of electronic records, including photographs and video recordings, with the result that the evidential burden shifts to the opposing party to rebut such presumption by placing cogent material on record.

In contrast, UK law adopts a more common law–driven and cautionary approach. While electronic and video evidence is readily admissible upon proof of relevance and authenticity, the courts have consistently emphasised the risks inherent in visual identification, particularly from CCTV footage. The leading authority in this regard is R v Atkins. It emphasises careful judicial scrutiny, especially where the quality of the images is poor or where identification rests on inference.

Thus, Indian law tends to ease the evidentiary burden at the threshold of admissibility. The UK law places comparatively greater emphasis on rigorous scrutiny at the stage of evaluation and weight, particularly in cases involving identification from video recordings

A similar facilitative approach is discernible in Canadian law. Both the Canada Evidence Act and the Ontario Evidence Act recognise a presumption as to the “integrity of an electronic documents system”, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In this respect, Indian law aligns more closely with the Canadian model, in that it employs statutory presumptions to ease the evidentiary burden, rather than relying predominantly on case-by-case judicial calibration (as it prevails in the UK).

End Notes – 2

International Criminal Proceedings: No strict Requirement – Photographs be Corroborated

Rules 63 and 64 of the ‘International Criminal Proceedings (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ say about the discretion of a Chamber to assess freely all evidence submitted in order to determine its relevance or admissibility. From the above, it is clear that there should be reliable information as to

  • the date,
  • location and
  • events depicted   

for determining the

  • relevance,
  • probative value and
  • admissibility of the photograph-evidence.

Rules 63 and 64 of the ‘International Criminal Proceedings (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ read as under:

“Rule 63: General provisions relating to evidence

  • .1. The rules of evidence set forth in this chapter, together with article 69, shall apply in proceedings before all Chambers.
  • 2. A Chamber shall have the authority, in accordance with the discretion described in article 64, paragraph 9, to assess freely all evidence submitted in order to determine its relevance or admissibility in accordance with article 69.
  • 3. A Chamber shall rule on an application of a party or on its own motion, made under article 64, subparagraph 9 (a), concerning admissibility when it is based on the grounds set out in article 69, paragraph 7.
  • 4. Without prejudice to article 66, paragraph 3, a Chamber shall not impose a legal requirement that corroboration is required in order to prove any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, in particular, crimes of sexual violence.
  • 5. The Chambers shall not apply national laws governing evidence, other than in accordance with article 21.”

“Rule 64: Procedure relating to the relevance or admissibility of evidence

  • .1. An issue relating to relevance or admissibility must be raised at the time when the evidence is submitted to a Chamber. Exceptionally, when those issues were not known at the time when the evidence was submitted, it may be raised immediately after the issue has become known. The Chamber may request that the issue be raised in writing. The written motion shall be communicated by the Court to all those who participate in the proceedings, unless otherwise decided by the Court.
  • 2. A Chamber shall give reasons for any rulings it makes on evidentiary matters. These reasons shall be placed in the record of the proceedings if they have not already been incorporated into the record during the course of the proceedings in accordance with article 64, paragraph 10, and rule 137, sub-rule 1.
  • 3. Evidence ruled irrelevant or inadmissible shall not be considered by the Chamber.”

According to Rule 63(4) of the  International Criminal Courts (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence, it is pointed out that there is no strict legal requirement that a photograph has to be corroborated by other evidence for the Court to be able to rely on it and establish a specific fact [Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842,14 March 2012, TC I-718 ].

In Prosecutor v Lubanga it is observed as under:

  • “644. The prosecution relies on a number of video excerpts to establish that some of the UPC/FPLC recruits were “visibly” under the age of 15. The defence argues that it is impossible to distinguish reliably between a 12 or 13 year-old and a 15- or 16-year-old on the basis of a photograph or video extract alone. The Chamber accepts that for many of the young soldiers shown in the video excerpts, it is often very difficult to determine whether they are above or below the age of 15. Instead, the Chamber has relied on video evidence in this context only to the extent that they depict children who are clearly under the age of 15.”

(See: Prosecutor v. Ntaganda: Decision on Prosecution’s request for admission of documentary evidence,  ICC-01/04-02/06-1838 (28 March 2017) (TC VI) [68]. Prosecutor v Oussama Achraf Akhlafa, ECLI: EN: RBDHA: 2019: 7430, the Dutch District Court in Hague noted that “determining the date on which a particular image was taken is potentially an interesting element in the context of a criminal investigation”.)

Specific Presumptions on Elc. Record in S. 81 & 93, BSA

Specific presumptions relating to electronic records are contained in Sections 81, 85, 86, 87, 90 and 93 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. Two of them are very important. They are given below.

S. 81 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 reads as under:

  • 81. Presumption as to Gazettes in electronic or digital record: The Court shall presume the genuineness of every electronic or digital record purporting to be the Official Gazette, or purporting to be electronic or digital record directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such electronic or digital record is kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody.
  • Explanation.—For the purposes of this section and section 93 electronic records are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and looked after by the person with whom such document is required to be kept; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render that origin probable.

Section 93 BSA reads as under:

  • “93. Presumption as to electronic records five years old: Where any electronic record, purporting or proved to be five years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the electronic signature which purports to be the electronic signature of any particular person was so affixed by him or any person authorised by him in this behalf.
  • Explanation.—The Explanation to section 81 shall also apply to this section.”

End Notes — 3

Photograph-Evidence: In a Nutshell

Photographs are admissible in evidence as documents.  P.  Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1; 2020-9 SCC 161
While considering a case on dowry death, the prosecution argued that a photograph was not admissible in evidence as neither the person who took the photograph nor its negative was produced in evidence. But, the court accepted the photograph as ‘no dispute was raised by the prosecution witnesses’.Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2024 SC 4551
A large number of photographs were marked and considered in this case.
In para 525, it is stated – the witness “was confronted with photographs of the inscription”
There were three sets of albums containing photographs taken by the State Archaeological Department pursuant to an order dated 10 January 1990 (Para 533).
In para 538, the Court considered the evidence of a witness as to the “photographs placed within the structure in 1990”.
M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1 (Ayodhya case)
The factum of photo identification (of an accused) by PW 2, as witnessed by the officer concerned, is a relevant and admissible piece of evidence.Rabindra Kumar Pal v.  Republic of India, 2011-2 SCC 490
Nothing prevented the appellant-State Government from producing the relevant photographs of the purported pucca pond existing at some spots.State of Rajasthan v. Ultratech Cement Ltd. , 2022-12 Scale 606; 2022-13 SCR 1
A statement about the photograph made by any expert would not be admissible before examining the photographer.Dr. Pankaj Kumudchandra Phadnis v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 785
Photographs, tape-records of speeches [Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17] are documents.Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016 15 SCC 485;
Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2011-4 SCC 143
Photo identification of an accused during the investigation, who was seen by the witness at the relevant time.Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic  AIR 1999 SC  2562, 2000-1 SCC 138; Rabindra Kumar Pal v. Republic of India, AIR  2011 SC 1436; 2011 2 SCC 490
Inventory, photographs and the list of samples certified by the Magistrate are admissible as primary evidence. It is a substitute for the production of physical evidence of seized contraband samples.Nisar Ahmed Bhat, v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir 2024 0 Supreme(J&K) 187  
The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae.K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275;
R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157;
Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720

End Notes — 4

Decisions on Electronic Records

  • CCTV footage in the following landmark cases:
    • State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,
    • Tomaso Bruno Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015-7 SCC 178)
  • CDs/VCDs in respect of video recording by the Election Commission
    • Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216
  • CDs containing election speeches and songs in:
    • Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473).
  • Conclusion of the Speaker on CDs received from TV News Channels:
    • Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1
  • Call Detail Records – CDR – of mobile phonesin:
    • Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570)
  • Tape recorded conversation on the landline phone
    • Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518
  • Propriety of videography of the scene of crime or scene of recovery during investigation, in:
    • Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 )

End Notes — 5

Decisions on Photo/Audio/Video

Audio/Video cassettesZiyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17
Tape records of speechesTukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329
Photo or videoMohammed Rafiq v. Madhan, 2018-1 Mad LJ(CRI) 641;
Moti Rabidas v. The State of Bihar, 2015-145 AIC 435;
Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan 2014-1 Raj Cri C 31;
State of MP v. Shankarlal, ILR 2010 MP 717;
P Rajagopal v. Inspector of police 2009-2 Mad LJ(Cri) 161;
Santhosh Baccharam Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 All MR (Cri)997, 2003 BCR (Cri) 120.
CD  Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, (2016) 15 SCC 485
Photographs including photographs of tombstones and houses Lyell v. Kennedy (No.3) (1884) 50 L.T. 730
Video recordings  State of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053
Audio and videoState of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053;
Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31;
Taylor v. Chief Constable Cheshire:1987(1) All.ER 225
CassettesTukaram S.Dighole v. Manik Rao Shivaji Kokate (2010)4 SCC 329
Moving cinematographSenior v. Holdsworth, Ex parte Independant Television New Ltd. (1976) Q.B. 23)
Film  Rex v. Daye ((1908)2 K.B. 333, 340)
Floppies, CCTV footages, CDs, DVDs, Chips, Hard discs, Pen drives North West Airlines v. Union of India 2007 (214) ELT 178 (Bom.)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

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Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

What is the Period of Limitation for a Suit on a Promissory Note?

Jojy George Koduvath

Does the Cause of Action Arise only on a ‘Demand’?

No is the answer.

The ‘Cause of Action’ and the ‘Limitation’ begin from the date of the promissory note itself, unless –

  • a promissory note is made payable on a specified contingency (must be express), or the payment is explicitly made conditional upon an express demand, or the governing contract or statute specifically requires a demand as a condition precedent.

Relevant Provision: Article 35, Limitation Act, 1963

The period of limitation for a suit on a promissory note payable on demand is governed by Article 35 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Article 35 reads as under:

Description of suitPeriod of limitationTime from which period begins to run
35. On a bill of exchange or promissory note payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue.Three years.  The date of the bill or note.

Thus, where a promissory note is payable on demand, and there is no clause postponing or restraining the right to sue, the money is payable immediately, and limitation begins to run from the date of the promissory note itself, not from the date of any subsequent demand.

Authoritative Judicial Pronouncements

The Supreme Court, in Syndicate Bank v. Channaveerappa Beleri, AIR 2006 SC 1874: (2006) 11 SCC 506, held to the following effect:

  • The words “on demand” do not have a uniform meaning in all contexts.
  • In the case of promissory notes or bills of exchange, this means the amount is always payable, i.e., payable forthwith.
  • A demand is not a condition precedent for the cause of action in such cases.

The Supreme Court clarified that a promissory note payable on demand stands on the same footing as Article 21, and not Article 22.

  • Article 21 (Money lent payable on demand): Limitation begins from the date of the loan, because the money is payable immediately.
  • Article 22 (Money deposited payable on demand): Limitation begins only when a demand is actually made, as demand is a condition precedent.

Our Apex Court, in Syndicate Bank v. Channaveerappa Beleri, held as under:

  • “12. We will examine the meaning of the words ‘on demand‘. As noticed above, the High Court was of the view that the words ‘on demand’ in law have a special meaning and when an agreement states that an amount is payable on demand, it implies that it is always payable, that is payable forthwith and a demand is not a condition precedent for the amount to become payable.
  • The meaning attached to the expression ‘on demand’ as ‘always payable‘ or ‘payable forthwith without demand’ is not one of universal application. The said meaning applies only in certain circumstances. The said meaning is normally applied to promissory notes or bills of exchange payable on demand.
  • We may refer to Articles 21 and 22 in this behalf. Article 21 provides that for money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, the period of limitation (3 years) begins to run when the loan is made. On the other hand, the very same words ‘payable on demand’ have a different meaning in Article 22 which provides that for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, the period of limitation (3 years) will begin to run when the demand is made.
  • Thus, the words ‘payable on demand’ have been given different meaning when applied with reference to ‘money lent’ and ‘money deposited’. In the context of Article 21, the meaning and effect of those words is ‘always payable’ or payable from the moment when the loan is made, whereas in the context of Article 22, the meaning is ‘payable when actually a demand for payment is made’.”

Legal Principles Evolved

The limitation begins from the date of the promissory note, and the suit must be filed within three years from that date. Apart from the express legal provision contained in the Limitation Act, it is logically sound for the following reasons:

  • 1. A promissory note that is ‘payable on demand’ is enforceable immediately upon its execution.
  • 2. No separate or subsequent demand is required to set the limitation in motion. That is, the cause of action arises immediately on the execution of the note.
  • 3. A creditor cannot postpone limitation indefinitely by delaying demand.

The law affirmed in Syndicate Bank v. Channaveerappa Beleri is followed in the following cases

  • Manjunath S. v. B. K. Subbarao, ILR 2020 Kar 227
  • K. V. G. Rajan v. Karnataka State Financial Corporation, 2017 (4) AIR (Kar) (R) 563
  • Subhash Chand v. State Bank of Patiala, AIR 2014 Del 82
  • Seelak Ram Balhara v. Bank of Baroda, 2014 (2) BC 46 (All)
  • Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Rajit Subodhbhai Shah, 2013 (5) GLR 4289 (Guj)

Earlier Contrary View (Now No Longer Good Law)

An earlier line of decisions had taken the view that a demand promissory note does not become payable until a demand is made, and therefore limitation would begin only from the date of demand. Illustrative cases include:

  • Gopalan v. Lakshminarasamma, AIR 1940 Mad 631
  • Braja Kishore Dikshit v. Purna Chandra Panda, AIR 1957 Ori 153
  • Ghania Lal v. Karam Chand, AIR 1929 Lah 240

‘On Demand’ Subjected to Different Connotations in the Limitation Act

In Seethamma v. Kamala, ILR 1980-2 Ker 339; 1980 KLT 755 (P. Subramonian Poti, P. Janaki Amma, JJ.) made it clear as under:

  • “8. The expression ‘on demand’ has been subjected to different treatment at the hands of the framers of the Limitation Act.
  • Under Art. 21 which deals with suits for money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, and
  • under Art. 35, which deals with suits on a bill of exchange or promissory note, payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue, limitation starts from the date of the loan or the document, as the case may be. On the other hand,
  • under Art. 22, in the case of a suit for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand limitation starts only when a demand is made.”

Conclusion

  • Period of limitation for a promissory note is three years from the date of the promissory note
  • Governing provision: Article 35, Limitation Act, 1963. (It lays down – time from which the limitation period begins to run is the date of the note.)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Rejection of Plaint is a Procedural Termination, and Dismissal of Suit on Preliminary Issue is a Summary Decision on Merits

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

The following provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be invoked by a defendant, to seek rejection or dismissal of a suit, at the threshold, without a trial:

  1. Order VII Rule 11, CPCRejection of plaint (on the specific grounds enumerated).
  2. Order XIV Rule 2(2), CPCDecision on preliminary issues, where the issue relates to –
    (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a statutory bar to the suit, and(c) such issues that can be decided as a pure question of law.
  3. Section 151, CPCInherent powers of the court  (exercised in exceptional cases where the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of the court or no specific provision in the CPC).

The following are the general provisions of law that may be invoked by a defendant for summary termination of a suit, without a full trial:

  • Section 9 CPC – Civil court jurisdiction expressly or impliedly barred
  • Section 11 CPC – Bar of Res judicata
  • Limitation Act, 1963 – Barred by limitation, apparent on the plaint
  • Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Bar under Sections 14, 41, etc.
  • Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 69 – Suit by unregistered firm, to enforce contractual rights
  • Public Premises Act/ Rent Control Acts/ Land Reforms Acts – Statutory exclusion of civil jurisdiction.

Part I

Order VII rule 11 of the CPC

Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC is the specific provision for the rejection of the plaint. It reads as under:

  • “11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:
  • (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
  • (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
  • (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
  • (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9″.

Rejection of Plaint under O. VII r. 11Following are the Basic Principles

  • Rejection is a procedural termination (and not a dismissal on the merits).
  • A plaint is rejected only in the specific situations enumerated in Order VII rule 11 CPC.
  • Only plaint averments are looked into for determining rejection of plaint.
  • Defence pleadings or disputed facts cannot be looked into.
  • Rejection can be ordered at any stage. (Usually it is a threshold determination.)
  • A fresh plaint can be presented after curing the defects (if not barred by limitation or under any provision of law).

Grounds for Rejection

Following are the grounds for Rejection of Plain in Order VII rule 11 CPC:

  • No Cause of Action Disclosed [Order VII Rule 11(a)]
  • Relief Undervalued [Order VII Rule 11(b)]
  • Insufficient Court Fee [Order VII Rule 11(c)]
  • Suit Barred by Law [Order VII Rule 11(d)] such as:
    • Limitation
    • Res judicata (when evident on the plaint)
    • Statutory bar (e.g., Section 69 of the Partnership Act for unregistered firms)
  • Duplicate Plaint Not Filed [Order VII Rule 11(e)]
  • Non-compliance with Rule 9 [Order VII Rule 11(f)]

Order VI rule 16

Order VI rule 16 provides for striking out pleadings at any stage. (It may not lead to dismissal of the entire plaint.) It reads as follows:

  • “16. Striking out pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading-
  • a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or
  • b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or
  • c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.”

Order 14 rule 2

Order 14 rule 2 CPC provides for the hearing of any preliminary issue, including the maintainability of the suit. It reads as follows:

  • “2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-
    • (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
    • (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in-force.
  • and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.”

Order 10 rule 1 CPC

Order 10 rule 1 CPC reads as under:

  • Examination of parties by the court: 1. Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied.—At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain from each party or his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The Court shall record such admissions and denials.”

Part II

Inherent Powers Cannot be used for Rejection’ of Plaints. But it can be used for “Dismissal” of Suits in Rare Cases.

  • PLAINT cannot be rejected invoking Section 151 CPC (Inherent Powers of courts).
  • But, the court can dismiss a SUIT, at the threshold, in exceptional cases, invoking inherent powers.
  • Inherent powers are not invoked for the Rejection of the plaintiff, for it is a Statutory-Affair, and specific provisions are laid down in Order VII Rule 11. (It cannot be supplemented, expanded, or substituted, invoking Section 151. In such cases, the inherent powers stand excluded.)

Inherent Powers Not Used if in Conflict with Express Provisions

In Padam Sen v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218, our Apex Court found: “the Additional Munsiff had DO inherent powers to pass the order appointing a Commissioner to seize the plaintiff’s account books”.

It had been observed in this decision, as under:

  • “It is submitted for the State, that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, can adopt any procedure not prohibited by the Code expressly or by necessary implication if the Court considers it necessary, for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Section 151 of the Code reads:
    • ” Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court “.
  • The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the puposes mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.”

In Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee, (1970) 1 SCC 732, the Apex Court cautioned as under:

  • “Under the inherent power of courts recognised by Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, a court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglected to avail himself of the same. Further the power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power.”

S. 151 is Not a Provision Conferring Power of Substantive Relief

It is held in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1, as under:

  • Section 151 is not a provision of law conferring power to grant any kind of substantive relief. It is a procedural provision saving the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It cannot be invoked with reference to a matter which is covered by a specific provision in the Code. It cannot be exercised in conflict with the general scheme and intent of the Code. It cannot be used either to create or recognise rights, or to create liabilities and obligations not contemplated by any law.”

Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss the Suit) in the Following Situations

T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, is an authority to argue that inherent powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss a Suit) in the Following Situations:

  • Abuse of process of court
  • Fraud on court
  • Sham, vexatious, or illusory litigation
  • Re-litigation amounting to judicial harassment.

Order VII Rue 11 is not Exhaustive; Court can invoke Inherent Power

In K. Akbar Ali v. K. Umar Khan, AIR 2021 SC 1114; 2021-14 SCC 51 it is held as under:

  • “Moreover, the provisions of Order VII Rue 11 are not exhaustive and the Court has the inherent power to see that frivolous or vexatious litigations are not allowed to consume the time of the Court.”

Se. 151, Inherent Power to Dismiss a Suit – if ‘Abuse of Process of the Court’

The Courts have inherent powers to dismiss a suit that is an ‘abuse of their process’. It can also be invoked for rejection or setting aside a suit if an absolutely groundless suit is filed.

Re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. If the Court finds that there is an abuse of the process of court, and is satisfied that there is no chance of succeeding, the Court may exercise its discretion with circumspection, though only in rare situations.

In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, AIR 1998 SC 1297: 1998 (3) SCC 573, it is observed as under:

  •  “32. Under Order 6 Rule 16, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding, order to be struck out, inter alia, any matter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Mulla in his treatise on the Code of Civil Procedure. (15th Edition, Volume II, page 1179 note 7) has stated that power under clause (c) of Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code is confined to cases where the abuse of the process of the Court is manifest from the pleadings; and that this power is unlike the power under Section 151 whereunder Courts have inherent power to strike out pleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings which are an abuse of their process.
  • In the present case the High Court has held the suit to be an abuse of the process of Court on the basis of what is stated in the plaint.”
  • (Quoted in: Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, AIR 2016 SC 1948; 2016 11 SCC 484;
  • Reddy Enterprises, Vijayawada v. Appellate Authority & Additional Commissioner (ST) Vijayawada, 2024-5 ALD 452;
  • Raahul Foundations Private Ltd. v. S. Chandrababu, 2019-2 LW 148; 2019-3 MLJ 321)

Where No express provision, Inherent Powers can be Invoked

In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 2554, while dealing with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, the Supreme Court held that where there is no express provision, inherent power can be invoked. The Court said as under:

  • “2. …It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code…..”

Part III

Manifestly Vexatious Suit –  ‘Nipped in the bud’, Searchingly u/Or. 10, CPC

Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer:  T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, held that on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint, if it is found that a manifestly vexatious suit is filed, it must be nipped in the bud searchingly under Order 10, CPC. The Court held as under:

  • “We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, be should exercise his power under Or. VII r. 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first bearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code (Ch. XI) is also resourceful enough to meet such men, and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too good.”

Fraud or Abuse of judicial process — May Invite Dismissal of Suit

It is trite law – Fraud vitiates all judicial acts (See: A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. (2007) 4 SCC 221. [Quoted in: Yashoda (Alias Sodhan) VS Sukhwinder Singh, AIR 2022 SC 4623; 2022-12 SCR 31; Smriti Madan Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra, AIR 2021 SC 5423].  Courts take suppression of material facts seriously, and if there is deliberate misuse of judicial process, courts may even dismiss the suit outright invoking inherent powers. (See: K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3SCC 573).

Fraud on Court and fraud on a party

In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550, referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court’s business”.

In Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 289; 2024-5 SCC 481, it is held as under:

  • It is trite that fraud vitiates everything. It is a settled proposition of law that fraud avoids all judicial acts. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (Dead) through LRs, (1994) 1 SCC 1 (“S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu”), it has been observed that “fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” Further, “no judgment of a court, no order of a minister would be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. fraud unravels everything” vide Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasley, (1956) 1 all ER 341 (“Lazarus Estates Ltd.”).
  • It is well-settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and that the discretion must be exercised equitably for promotion of good faith vide State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 (“Prabhu”). This Court has further emphasized that fraud and collusion vitiate the most solemn precedent in any civilized jurisprudence; and that fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). This maxim has never lost its lustre over the centuries. Thus, any litigant who is guilty of inhibition before the Court should not bear the fruit and benefit of the court’s orders. This Court has also held that fraud is an act of deliberation with a desire to secure something which is otherwise not due. fraud is practiced with an intention to secure undue advantage. Thus, an act of fraud on courts must be viewed seriously.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Can a Plaint be Rejected Invoking the Inherent Powers of the Court?

Yes, But Only in Exceptional Circumstances.

Jojy George Koduvath.

Introduction

The following provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be invoked by a defendant, to seek rejection or dismissal of a suit at the threshold, without a full-fledged trial:

  1. Order VII Rule 11, CPCRejection of plaint (on the specific grounds enumerated).
  2. Order XIV Rule 2(2), CPCDecision on preliminary issues, where the issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a statutory bar to the suit, and(c)such issues that can be decided as a pure question of law.
  3. Section 151, CPCInherent powers of the court  (exercised in exceptional cases where the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of the court or no specific provision in the CPC).

The following are the general provisions of law that may be invoked by a defendant for summary termination of a suit, without a full trial:

  • Section 9 CPC – Civil court jurisdiction expressly or impliedly barred
  • Section 11 CPCRes judicata
  • Limitation Act, 1963 – Time-bar apparent on plaint
  • Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Bar under Sections 14, 41, etc.
  • Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 69 – Suit by unregistered firm
  • Public Premises Act / Rent Control Acts / Land Reforms Acts – Statutory exclusion of civil jurisdiction.

Part I

Rejection of Plaint under O. VII r. 11: Following are the Basic Principles

  • Rejection is a procedural termination (and not a dismissal on the merits).
  • A plaint is rejected only in the specific situations enumerated in Order VII rule 11 CPC.
  • Only plaint averments are looked into for determining rejection of plaint.
  • Defence pleadings or disputed facts cannot be looked into.
  • Rejection can be ordered at any stage. (Usually it is a threshold determination.)
  • A fresh plaint can be presented after curing the defects (if not barred by limitation or under any provision of law).

Grounds for Rejection

Following are the grounds for Rejection of Plain in Order VII rule 11 CPC:

  • No Cause of Action Disclosed [Order VII Rule 11(a)]
  • Relief Undervalued [Order VII Rule 11(b)]
  • Insufficient Court Fee [Order VII Rule 11(c)]
  • Suit Barred by Law [Order VII Rule 11(d)] such as:
    • Limitation
    • Res judicata (when evident on the plaint)
    • Statutory bar (e.g., Section 69 of the Partnership Act for unregistered firms)
  • Duplicate Plaint Not Filed [Order VII Rule 11(e)]
  • Non-compliance with Rule 9 [Order VII Rule 11(f)]

Order VII rule 11 of the CPC

Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC is the specific provision for the rejection of the plaint. It reads as under:

  • “11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:
  • (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
  • (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
  • (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
  • (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9″.

Order VI rule 16

Order VI rule 16 provides for striking out pleadings at any stage. (It may not lead to dismissal of the entire plaint.) It reads as follows:

  • “16. Striking out pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading-
  • a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or
  • b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or
  • c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.”

Order 14 rule 2

Order 14 rule 2 CPC provides for the hearing of any preliminary issue, including the maintainability of the suit. It reads as follows:

  • “2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
  • (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-
    • (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
    • (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in-force.
  • and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.”

Order 10 rule 1 CPC

Order 10 rule 1 CPC reads as under:

  • Examination of parties by the court: 1. Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied.—At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain from each party or his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The Court shall record such admissions and denials.”

Part II

Inherent Powers Cannot be used for “Rejection” of plaints. But it Can be used for “Dismissal” of Suits in Rare Cases.

  • A PLAINT cannot be rejected invoking Section 151 CPC (inherent powers of courts).
  • But, a court can dismiss a SUIT, at the threshold, in exceptional cases, invoking inherent powers.
  • Inherent powers are not invoked for the Rejection of the plaintiff, for it is a Statutory-Affair, and specific provisions are laid down in Order VII Rule 11. (It cannot be supplemented, expanded, or substituted, invoking Section 151. In such cases, the inherent powers stand excluded.)

Inherent Powers Not Used if in Conflict with Express Provisions

In Padam Sen v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218, our Apex Court found: “the Additional Munsiff had DO inherent power to pass the order appointing a Commissioner to seize the plaintiff’s account books”.

It had been observed in this decision, as under:

  • “It is submitted for the State, that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, can adopt any procedure not prohibited by the Code expressly or by necessary implication if the Court considers it necessary, for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Section 151 of the Code reads:
    • ” Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court “.
  • The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the puposes mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.”

In Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee, (1970) 1 SCC 732, the Apex Court cautioned as under:

  • “Under the inherent power of courts recognised by Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, a court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglected to avail himself of the same. Further the power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power.”

S. 151 is Not a Provision Conferring Power of Substantive Relief

It is held in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1, as under:

  • Section 151 is not a provision of law conferring power to grant any kind of substantive relief. It is a procedural provision saving the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It cannot be invoked with reference to a matter which is covered by a specific provision in the Code. It cannot be exercised in conflict with the general scheme and intent of the Code. It cannot be used either to create or recognise rights, or to create liabilities and obligations not contemplated by any law.”

Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss the Suit) in the Following Situations

T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, is an authority to argue that Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss a Suit) in the Following Situations:

  • Abuse of process of court
  • Fraud on court
  • Sham, vexatious, or illusory litigation
  • Re-litigation amounting to judicial harassment

Order VII Rue 11 is not Exhaustive; Court can invoke Inherent Power

In K. Akbar Ali v. K. Umar Khan, AIR 2021 SC 1114; 2021-14 SCC 51 it is held as under:

  • “Moreover, the provisions of Order VII Rue 11 are not exhaustive and the Court has the inherent power to see that frivolous or vexatious litigations are not allowed to consume the time of the Court.”

Se. 151, Inherent Power to Dismiss a Suit – if ‘Abuse of Process of the Court’

The Courts have inherent power to dismiss a suit that is an ‘abuse of their process’. It can also be invoked for rejection or setting aside a suit if an absolutely groundless suit is filed.

Re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. If the Court finds that there is an abuse of the process of court, and is satisfied that there is no chance of succeeding, the Court may exercise its discretion with circumspection, though only in rare situations.

In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, AIR 1998 SC 1297: 1998 (3) SCC 573, it is observed as under:

  •  “32. Under Order 6 Rule 16, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding, order to be struck out, inter alia, any matter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Mulla in his treatise on the Code of Civil Procedure. (15th Edition, Volume II, page 1179 note 7) has stated that power under clause (c) of Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code is confined to cases where the abuse of the process of the Court is manifest from the pleadings; and that this power is unlike the power under Section 151 whereunder Courts have inherent power to strike out pleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings which are an abuse of their process.
  • In the present case the High Court has held the suit to be an abuse of the process of Court on the basis of what is stated in the plaint.”
  • (Quoted in: Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, AIR 2016 SC 1948; 2016 11 SCC 484;
  • Reddy Enterprises, Vijayawada v. Appellate Authority & Additional Commissioner (ST) Vijayawada, 2024-5 ALD 452;
  • Raahul Foundations Private Ltd. v. S. Chandrababu, 2019-2 LW 148; 2019-3 MLJ 321)

Where no express provision, Inherent Power can be Invoked

In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 2554, while dealing with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, the Supreme Court held that where there is no express provision, inherent power can be invoked. The Court said as under:

  • “2. …It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code…..”

Part III

Manifestly Vexatious Suit –  ‘Nipped in the bud’, Searchingly u/Or. 10, CPC

Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer:  T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, held that on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint, if it is found that a manifestly vexatious suit is filed, it must be nipped in the bud searchingly under Order 10, CPC. The Court held as under:

  • “We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, be should exercise his power under Or. VII r. 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first bearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code (Ch. XI) is also resourceful enough to meet such men, and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too good.”

Fraud or Abuse of judicial process — May Invite Dismissal of Suit

It is trite law – Fraud vitiates all judicial acts (See: A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. (2007) 4 SCC 221. [Quoted in: Yashoda (Alias Sodhan) VS Sukhwinder Singh, AIR 2022 SC 4623; 2022-12 SCR 31; Smriti Madan Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra, AIR 2021 SC 5423].  Courts take suppression of material facts seriously, and if there is deliberate misuse of judicial process, courts may even dismiss the suit outright invoking inherent powers. (See: K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3SCC 573).

Fraud on Court and fraud on a party

In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550, referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court’s business”.

In Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 289; 2024-5 SCC 481, it is held as under:

  • It is trite that fraud vitiates everything. It is a settled proposition of law that fraud avoids all judicial acts. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (Dead) through LRs, (1994) 1 SCC 1 (“S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu”), it has been observed that “fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” Further, “no judgment of a court, no order of a minister would be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. fraud unravels everything” vide Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasley, (1956) 1 all ER 341 (“Lazarus Estates Ltd.”).
  • It is well-settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and that the discretion must be exercised equitably for promotion of good faith vide State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 (“Prabhu”). This Court has further emphasized that fraud and collusion vitiate the most solemn precedent in any civilized jurisprudence; and that fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). This maxim has never lost its lustre over the centuries. Thus, any litigant who is guilty of inhibition before the Court should not bear the fruit and benefit of the court’s orders. This Court has also held that fraud is an act of deliberation with a desire to secure something which is otherwise not due. fraud is practiced with an intention to secure undue advantage. Thus, an act of fraud on courts must be viewed seriously.

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Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic)

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Do the Plantation-Tenants have a Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land, beyond the Ceiling Limit (under Purchase Certificates)?

Are Such Tenants Entitled for Full Compensation if the Land is Acquired?

‘No’ is the Answer.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Contents in a Nutshell

  • 1. Ceiling Limit: The maximum extent of land assignable under a Purchase Certificate is circumscribed by the ceiling limit, under Section 72B(1)(a) and (b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.
  • 2. Plantation Exemption: Owners and tenants of plantations are permitted to retain plantation lands in excess of the ceiling limit by availing the ‘exemption’ provided under Section 81. However, the said exemption does not confer any absolute proprietary right over such land.
  • 3. Exempted plantation (lease) land Vest in Government: Title/ownership of unassignedexempted-plantation-lease-land is vested with the Government, under Section 72(1).
  • 4. Tenant Cannot Claim Better Right than the Landowner: Section 72G provides for payment of compensation to the former landowner; consequently, the vesting of the land in the Government under Section 72 stands absolutely affirmed. In such a situation, the tenant cannot claim any right better than that which the landowner himself did not possess.
  • 5. Tenants will be Deemed as Tenants of the Govt. Such tenants have to pay ‘Rent’ to the Government (Section 72E) for the unassignedexempted-plantation-lease-land.  The rent is fixed by the Land Tribunal [Section 72F(5)(h) ].
  • 6 On Acquisition, No Land Value to Previous Owners or Tenants: If the land vested in Government under Section 72 is acquired, land-value will not be paid to the former land-owner or the tenant (Section 112(5A).
  • 7. Exemption will be lost, if “Fragmented”:The exemption granted to a plantation will be lost if it is “fragmented” or the plantation-crop is abandoned (under Section 87).
  • 8. It is stated in Sec. 72B: “The provisions of Sec. 82 shall so far as may be applied to the CALCULATION of the ceiling area for the purpose of the proviso to sub section (1)”. It is obvious –
    • The legislature incorporated Sec. 82 only for a limited or a “specific” purpose – to the calculation of the ceiling area.

Relevant Provisions of Law

  • Sec. 53 – Cultivating tenant’s right to purchase landlord’s rights.
  • Sec. 55 – Purchase price to land owner – It is 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees.
    • Sec. 59 – Deposit purchase price by cultivating tenant before Land Tribunal.  Purchase Certificate is conclusive proof.
    • Sec. 64– Payment of purchase price to land owner – full discharge (from the part of land owner)
  • Section 72(1), Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963: All right, title and interest of the land-owners held by cultivating-tenants as on 1. 1. 1970 entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 shall vest in the Government.
  • Sec. 72A – Compensation to land owner for vesting under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter.
    • Sec. 72D – Cultivating tenant to pay purchase price (for getting assignment).
    • Sec. 72D(1A)- No purchase price is land below One Hect.
    • Sec. 72D(2)  – Purchase price to Govt. – 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees) Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 55
  • 2. Section 72B: It deals with “cultivating tenants’ right to assignment” (of the land vested in Government under Section 72).  Sub Section 1(a) and (b) of this Section direct that the assignment should be within the ceiling limit (mentioned in Section 82). It is stipulated – “The provisions of Sec. 82 shall so far as may be applied to the CALCULATION of the ceiling area for the purpose of the proviso to sub section (1)”.
  • 3. Section 72C: It deals with assignment of land, where the cultivating-tenant has not made application under Section 72B. All provisions of Section 72B, except sub section 3, are made applicable to Section 72C.  The opening words of Section 72C (“notwithstanding anything contained in sub Section 3 of Section 72B”), indicate the nexus between Section 72B and Section 72C.  Therefore, the purchase certificate can be issued, within ceiling limit alone, under Section 72C, as in the case of Section 72B.
  • 4. Section 72E: As stated above, tenancy-lands vest in the Government, under Section 72. The tenants (under Government) of unassigned-exempted-plantation-land, etc., are liable to pay rent to the Government for the unassigned (over and above the ceiling limit).
  • 5. Section 72F(5)(h): Land Tribunal fixes the rent for the said unassigned–exempted-land (under Section 81) .
  • 6. Section 72G: For the land vested in the Government under Section 72, compensation is paid to the former landowner. Subsections (2) and (3) ensure the payment of substantial compensation. Consequently, the vesting effected under Section 72(1) stands duly justified and legally sustained.
  • 7. Section 87(1) and its Explanations I and II: Only a limited right to continue; and, fragmentation is prohibited.  The specified plantation-crop alone is permitted.  The exemption is given subject to the condition – not to “convert” the land for any other use.
    • In case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost, and the exemption may be withdrawn under Explanation II of Section 87(1).  
  • 8. Section 112 (5A)On acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Section 72.
  • 9. Section 112 (5A)(a):The compensation for any building or other improvements  belonging to the land-owner shall be awarded to the Government.
  • 10. Section 112 (5A)(b):The balance-compensation remaining after deducting the amount referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • 11. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India:The State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
    • The provisions of the KLR Act, in this regard, are legislated following this proviso in Article 31A(1). It goes without saying – if no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.

Legal Right Conferred by the Statute
From the above, it is clear:

  • The unassigned land allowed to be occupied by a tenant (over and above the ceiling limit for which the tenant is liable to pay rent to the Government under Section 72E) can be termed as a “Legal Right conferred by the Statute”. It is not an absolute right that is conferred to some, including the BIG plantation tenants.

Land Owners’s Right for Compensation

The right for the same arises in the following three instances.

  • On Assignment to CULTIVATING TENANT: Sec. 55
  • On VESTING under Sec. 72:  Sec. 72A
  • On Surrendering SURPLUS LAND: Sec. 88

Sec. 55 – Purchase price to land owner –

Sec. 53 lays down the cultivating tenant’s right to purchase landlord’s rights. Sec. 55 provides for the purchase price entitled to by the land owner. It is 16 times the fair rent for land, plus the value of the structures on the land, plus half the value of the timber trees. [Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 72D(2) ].

  • Sec. 59 – Deposit purchase price by cultivating tenant before Land Tribunal.  Purchase Certificate is conclusive proof.
  • Sec. 64– Payment of purchase price to land owner is a full discharge (from the part of land owner).

Sec. 72A – Compensation to land owner for vesting under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter.

It is 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees. [ Note: Same rate under Sec. 55 & 72D(2) ]

  • Sec. 72D – Cultivating tenant to pay purchase price (for getting assignment – below the ceiling limit alone).
  • Sec. 72D(1A)- No purchase price is land below One Hect.
  • Sec. 72D(2)  – Purchase price to Govt. – 16 times fair rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees) Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 55.
  • Land above the ceiling limit payment is only under Sec. 88 – on surrendering land. (It is paid by the Government, not by the tenant.)

The Policy of the KLR Act
Section 83, lays down the policy of the Act – No person “be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” (Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State of Kerala v. Puliyangattu Krishnan Master, 2008(1) KLJ 571).

S. 82 (in Chp. III) cannot be enlarged while referring it in S. 72B (in Chp. II)

Section 82 deals with ceiling area. Sec. 81 states about the exemption of various provisions of Chapter III. By virtue of Sec. 81 private forests, plantations, etc. are exempted. Therefore, the provisions of ‘ceiling area’ in Sec. 82 do not apply to plantations, private forests, etc.

Section 72B(1) in Chapter II limits the assignment of land (within the ceiling area) while a Purchase Certificate is given. Section 72B(2) says –

  • “The provisions of Sec. 82 shall so far as may be applied to the CALCULATION of the ceiling area for the purpose of the proviso to sub section (1)”.

From the above it is clear –

  • The provisions as to the exemption in Section 81 will not be attracted to sec. 72B.
  • The legislature incorporated the referred provision only for a limited or a “specific” purpose – to the calculation of the ceiling area.
    • It can be made clear on a reading of the relevant provision – without the words “the CALCULATION of “.
  • Calculation of the ceiling area‘ in Section 82 stands independent to Section 81.
  • Therefore, other controlling provisions of Section 82 (such as Section 81) do not automatically brought in.

Interpretation of Law in this regard

  • In Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 : (1963) 3 SCR 858, it is held as under:
    • “Where the provisions of an Act are incorporated by reference in a later Act the repeal of the earlier Act has, in general, no effect upon the construction or effect of the Act in which its provisions have been incorporated.”
  • In TVS Motor Company Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2018 SC 5624; 2019-13 SCC 403, it is held as under:
    • “It is, therefore, clear that the definition of ‘motor vehicle’ as existing prior to 1956 Amendment would alone be applicable as being incorporated in the Taxation Act.”

‘Doctrine of Incorporation’ and the ‘Doctrine of Reference’

The ‘principles’ of doctrine of incorporation (only a restrictive and strict application) is to be applied in this matter – whether Section 72B(1) in Chapter II limits the assignment of land (within the ceiling area) while a Purchase Certificate is given. The decisive factor to determine whether a case is of ‘legislation by incorporation’ or ‘legislation by reference’ is whether “the reference is specific or general”.

  • Doctrine of incorporation (only a restrictive and strict application) – subsequent change (amendment or repeal) of the referred provision does not affect the incorporating provision.  That is, the incorporated original provision alone applies, verbatim.
  • Doctrine of reference or a citation (wider application) – future changes in the referred provision will also apply to the referring provision. The statute referred to is taken as it exists from time to time. Therefore, subsequent amendments to the referred statute will apply.
  • Doctrines of ‘legislation by reference’ and ‘legislation by incorporation’ are the creation of judicial pronouncements. See:
    • Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu, BR Gavai, Sandeep Mehta, JJ., AIR 2024 SC 2835; 2024-4 SCC 508
    • Bolani Ores v. State of Orissa : (1974)2 SCC 777
    • Mahindra v. Union of India: (1979)2 SCC 529
    • State of M.P. v. Narasimhan : (1975)2 SCC 377;
    • Bharat Co-operative Bank v. Employees’ Union : (2007)4 SCC 685
    • Girnar Tradeers v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 (3) SCC 1
    • Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., AIR 1931 PC 149.
    • Municipal Commissioner of Howrah v. Shalimar Wood Products, (1963) 1 SCR 47;
    • Ujagar Prints v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488;
    • U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam, (1998) 2 SCC 467;
    • Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasant Rao, (2002) 7 SCC 657 and
    • Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Maharashtra. (2003) 4 SCC 200.

When a statute refers to another provision, only the provision specifically referred to is attracted, and it shall not be construed as importing the entire body of law relating to that subject, or other connected or ancillary provisions – especially in the absence of express words and the intention is manifest.

It is reasonable to hold that the same position applies when a section incorporates a provision in another section, in the same Act. That is, that particular provision alone is attracted.

  • See: K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, AIR 2005 SC 688, 2005 (1) SCC 754.

Unjustifiable to Confer Undue Benefits to Plantation-Tenants Ignoring Ground Realities and Invoking Petty Grounds
Under Section 72A and Section 88, meagre compensation is paid to the land owners on vesting landlords’ rights in the Government and on surrendering the surplus land.  It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits on the tenants or lessees (which is not given to the land owners) when their lease-hold-lands are acquired (the majority of such plantation-lessees are Companies).

Lands of the Maharaja of Travancore were taken

It is a matter of record that even the lands of the Maharaja of Travancore—191 acres situated within Thiruvananthapuram City,  far in excess of the statutory ceiling of 7.5 acres, were taken over pursuant to the orders of the Land Board, Thiruvananthapuram, vide Order No. LB(B)2-18919/70 dated 15-01-1972. Equally, it is an indisputable fact that thousands of middle-class landowners were subjected to the rigour of the Act, and their excess lands were taken by the force of law.

  • Therefore, it would be wholly unreasonable to contend that the Legislature intended to confer any special or undue benefit upon plantation-tenants (benefits which were not extended to middle-class landowners, to other categories of tenants governed by the Act and even to the Maharaja of Travancore).

Any interpretation that elevates plantation-tenants to a privileged class, beyond the plain limits imposed by the statute, would be contrary to the scheme, object, and egalitarian ethos of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.

Section 72, KLR Act – ‘Vesting of Ownership’ in Government

Section 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act speaks about ‘vesting of landlord’s rights in Government’.  It pertains to –

  • All right, title and interest of the land-owners and intermediaries … and in respect of which  certificates of  purchase… have not been issued, shall …. vest in the government”.

As compensation is paid to the former landowner under Section 72G, the vesting of the land in the Government under Section 72 is absolute.

Fixity of Tenure and Assignment under Kraya Certificate

Section 13 of the KLR Act, which declares Fixity of Tenure to the cultivating tenants, is dealt with under Chapter II that governs tenancies; whereas the provisions of ceiling (Section 82 and Section 83) come under Chapter III that governs restriction on ownership, ceiling area, etc.  (Section 83 restricts holding land, excess of ceiling limits prescribed under Section 82.)

  • Fixity of tenure is assured in Section 13(1) “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage of contract, etc.”
  • The Fixity of Tenure (laid down under Section 13, in Chapter II) is not controlled by the ceiling provisions  in Section 82 and 83 (in Chapter III).  That is, the provisions as to Fixity of Tenure will prevail, without being affected by the ceiling provisions in Chapter III.
  • Note: (1) Section 13 (Fixity of Tenure) is controlled by Section 72 (in Chapter II itself) as to vesting in Government.
  • (2) The stipulations as to ceiling-limit were specifically brought into Sec. 72B (Chapter II) for the reason that Chapter II stands independent of Chapter III .

Therefore, land cannot be assigned under Section 72B and 72C, by the Land Tribunal, by Purchase Certificates, over and above the ceiling limit.

  • In sum, though a plantation-tenant will definitely have the right of ‘fixity’, those tenants will not have the right of assignment (under Section 72B and 72C) over and above the ceiling limit.

Tenants Obligated to Approach the LT for Availing Plantation Exemption

It is beyond doubt – the excess land in possession of a tenant, over which he has fixity of tenure under Section 13 (other than the lands exempted under Section 81), has to be surrendered. If the claimant of Plantation Exemption (under Section 81) is a tenant, he must have approached the Land Tribunal under subsection (3) of Section 85 – within the stipulated time (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations under different landlords), because:

  • (i) subsection (3) of Section 85 itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant under Section 72B (or for getting a Certificate to the effect that he is not eligible to purchase any more land, for he is already holding maximum within the limit prescribed under Section 82),
  • (ii) the Land Tribunal is the only authority to deal with tenancy in this regard (the Land Board or Taluk Land Board – deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues, etc. – cannot adjudicate on tenancy-rights),
  • (iii) Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11). Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).  
  • In Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736; 1993 2 KLT 962, it is pointed out: “If there is dispute on any of these points necessarily the Land Tribunal has to go into the question of possession and the alleged tenancy”
  • (iv) the Land Board cannot accept the self-declaration that one is a tenant. 
  • (v) It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government, for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.
    • Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.

Note: 1. The entire tenancy-land being vested with the Government by virtue of Section 72, the tenants of the exempted-plantation-land (above the ceiling limit), will be the tenants under the Government liable to pay rent under Section 72E.

2. Under Section 72F(5)(h), the Land Tribunal fixes the rent for the unassigned-exempted-land.

3. These legal principles are adopted in Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, , 2018(3) KLT 283.

Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala, 2022 (4) KHC 97.

Following were the basic factual situation in Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala (supra)  –

  • The land was leased out by landlords.
  • The lease-rights came in the petitioners (cultivating tenants) by transfer.

The following were the rival contentions or claims raised by the parties.

Contention of the Government

  • The tenant was a cultivating tenant. The land (absolutely) vested in the Government under Section 72 KLR Act.
    • Hence, tenant would be entitled to get compensation for the improvements (alone) to be determined under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, in view of Section 20(1) of the KLR Act.

Contention of the Tenants

  • cultivating tenant has absolute right to seek assignment (subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D). Therefore, vesting of rights in the Government under Section 72 is a legal fiction.

Claims of Land-Owners

  • In view of Section 3(i)(viii), if the extent of the plantation is above 30 acres, and if the land was a plantation (put up by the land owner) when it was leased, the tenant will not be entitled for ‘fixity’; and the land will return to the land owner after the lease-period.  Therefore, the land owners (in one Writ Appeal) claimed that the land involved therein was such a land entitled to by them (after the lease period).
  • Land owners also claimed that Section 72BB(1) gives them a right (i) to apply for assignment to the tenant and (ii) for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A (as regards the property within ceiling limit).

The Division Bench Finding on Vesting Under Section 72

  • The contention of the Government that the land was (absolutely) vested in it was rejected and held –
    • 1. the vesting in Government ‘is a legal fiction‘.
    • 2. cultivating tenant ‘has an absolute right to seek assignment‘ subject to the payment of purchase price.

The Division Bench observed as under:

  • “41. On an indepth analysis of the aforesaid provision, we find that when Section 72 came into force on 01.01.1970, the cultivating tenant is entitled for the assignment of the land for possession, subject to the liabilities fixed under Section 72 of the Act, 1963 to pay the purchase price. As per Section 72C, if no application is filed by the cultivating tenant, the Land Tribunal shall subject to the Rules made by the Government ensure that the assignment is granted to the cultivating tenant, assigning such title and interest to the cultivating tenant entitled thereto, which rights, title and interest are vested with the Government by virtue of the legal fiction created under Section 72 of the Act, 1963.
  • 42. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 72 of Act, 1963 would only deal with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants free from encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries. However, the legal provisions discussed above would make it clear that insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.”

Tanya Alice Stephen v. Manager, Perumal Smaraka Nidhi, 2025:KER:97401

In this case, the High Court held, on 17.12.2025, to the following effect:

  • Under Ext. P3, the Land Tribunal “restricted the purchase certificate to an extent of 12 acres and has rejected the claim regarding the balance extent out of 94.54 acres”.
  • The HC directed the Government on 18.3.2024 to file an affidavit “by the person who authored Ext. P3 explaining and referring to the reasons as to why the earlier decision of the Land Tribunal affirmed in the judgment of the Sub Court, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court and the Apex Court was not followed….”
  • Though a counter affidavit was filed “the affidavit does not explain why the relief was restricted to 12 acres”
  • It is stated in the affidavit that “the attempt to obtain purchase certificate is an attempt to defeat the KLR Act and to alienate the land vested in the Government and not to pay rent under Section 72E”.
  • The High Court observed “no such contention is available to the respondents in view of the categoric finding of this court that the lessees … …. are entitled to fixity of tenure”; and that “there is no explanation as to why the finding of this Court affirmed by the Supreme Court have not been followed…..”.

The High Court erroneously interlinked two independent rights—fixity of tenure and the right to obtain a purchase certificate. It failed to advert to the following vital aspects:

  1. Fixity of tenure under Section 13 is conceptually and statutorily distinct from the issuance of a purchase certificate under Section 72B, and the two cannot be conflated.
  2. A purchase certificate can indeed be issued only in respect of land over which tenants have fixity of tenure.  However, that does not mean – the stipulation in Section 72B (that the maximum extent to be assigned must be within the ceiling limit) can be ignored.
  3. Sec. 72A directs compensation to the land owner for vesting land under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter. 
  4. For the land above the ceiling limit, payment is made under Sec. 88 – on surrendering land. It is paid by the Government; not by the tenant. (Under Sec. 72D, the cultivating tenant pays the purchase price for getting the assignment – below the ceiling limit – alone.)
  5. The previous judgment of the High Court with respect to the same land, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, regarding the fixity of tenure (over 94.54 acres), is wholly unrelated to and does not govern the statutory ceiling prescribed under Section 72B (7.5 or 15 acres) while issuing a purchase certificate.

The Line of Reasoning Put Forward in the above decisions is Inappropriate.  

The interpretative approach adopted by the High Court (an absolute right vests in the tenants to seek assignment—upon payment of the purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D—in respect of the entire land over which tenants have fixity of tenure) appears to be legally untenable.

  • It is mainly because such lands stand vested in the Government; and upon such vesting, the former tenants are deemed to be tenants under the Government and are statutorily obliged to pay rent to the Government by virtue of Section 72E.

Section 72B, falling under Chapter II of the Act, unequivocally mandates that a purchase certificate may be issued only in respect of land within the prescribed ceiling limit. The exemption provisions, on the other hand, form part of Chapter III and operate independently. It is precisely for this reason that the ceiling-related stipulations were expressly incorporated into Section 72B.

  • Further, in the event of acquisition of unassigned exempted plantation land vested in the Government, Section 112(5A) specifically provides that no land value shall be payable either to the former landowner or to the tenant.

It goes without saying that the plantation holdings typically extend to hundreds or thousands of acres, of which the assignable extent within the ceiling may be a negligible fraction (7.5 or 15 acres).

Therefore, extending the statutory right of assignment to the vast excess land will stand against the express provisions of the Statute. It will also annihilate the public interest well-visioned by the erudite legislatures considering the well-being of the generations to come, and the whole ecology of the nation.

The High Court failed to consider the Earlier Decisions

  • In K. Jayaprakashan v. State of Kerala, 2023-3 KLT 541, it is observed as under:
    • “Section 72 of the Act deals with vesting of landlord’s rights in Government. As per sub-section (1) of Section 72 ….  all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyiruppus and holders of karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 … shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon on the said date”.
  • In V.N. Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (P.T. Raman Nayar, T.C.Raghavan, K.K.Mathew, JJ.) , AIR 1971 Ker 98, it is held as under:
    • “By Section 72 the rights of landlords whose rights have not been purchased by cultivating tenants vest in the Government free of all encumbrances on a date to be notified by the Government in that behalf -the date has been notified as the 1st January, 1970”
  • In Lakshmi v. Rama Iyer, 1992-1 ILR-Ker 398; 1991-2 KLT 897it is pointed out: “Consequently the title and interest of the land-lord would vest in the Government on the appointed day that is, on 1-1-1970. Then as per S. 72Q the land owner would be entitled to recover rent accrued till 1-1-1970 only”.
  • In Aru v. Nakunni (Padmanabhan, J.), 1987-1 KLT 177, it is held as under:
    • “Under S.72 of the Act all the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of a holding held by a cultivating tenant entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 shall, subject to the various provisions of S.72, vest in the Government free of all encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries and subsisting on the date notified by the Government. ….. When once vesting has taken place there cannot be any further rights in any body. . …. By assignment all such rights vest in the tenant”.

Land Reform Wearied Middle Class Landlords and Tenants

When Land Reform Measures were implemented in the State of Kerala, it wearied small and moderate landlords and tenants, on the bedrock of “ceiling limit”.  But the Plantations were not “touched”, taking “the economy” into consideration.  Still, the well-visioned legislators were particular to see that the ownership of this large extent of plantations (otherwise thick forest of the Western Ghats) remained with the State.  It was based on the principles in Article 31A(1) of the Constitution, which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit’.

Conclusion

1. The exemption provisions confer only a limited and conditional right—namely, the right to continue the specified plantation crop alone. Upon conversion of the land or deviation from the permitted use, the exemption will be forfeited, and the land will become fully subject to the statutory regime.

2. It can be stated with legal certainty that:

  • (i) Where the landowner himself has no vested or proprietary right over land held beyond the ceiling limit, a tenant cannot claim any such right. To hold otherwise would be illogical, irrational, and contrary to settled principles of property law, as a tenant cannot acquire a higher or superior right than that of the landowner.
  • (ii) Statutory interpretation, particularly when constitutional principles are implicated, must advance the larger public interest, including the interests of the nation and future generations, and not operate to confer benefits on a select class.
  • (iii) It is wholly unjustifiable to confer disproportionate rights or benefits upon plantation tenants—many of whom are large corporate entities—when even the Maharaja of Travancore was denied retention of land beyond the ceiling limit. It is a sheer fact that thousands of middle-class landowners were divested of their lands under the rigorous operation of the Act.

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“Once a Mortgage Always a Mortgage”: Usufructuary Mortgage is ‘Always’ Redeemable; Limitation of 30 Years NOT Applicable.

Jojy George Koduvath

Legal Principles

  • 1. In a usufructuary mortgage, the usufruct (profits) of the land are being adjusted towards interest on the mortgage amount.
  • 2. Therefore, in a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagee continues to remain in possession of the mortgaged security, appropriating the usufruct of the mortgaged land towards the interest on the mortgaged debt till the mortgager makes the (re)payment of the mortgage money.
  • 3. Accordingly, the right to seek redemption (i.e., recover possession) of a usufructuary mortgage accrues only on payment of the mortgage money, and the limitation period of 30 years is not related to (any) date of the mortgage.
  • 4. For the above reason, the right of foreclosure (forcing sale through the court) will not accrue to the mortgagee till such time he remains in possession (appropriating the usufruct of the mortgaged land towards the interest).
  • 5. The limitation of 30 years under Article 61(a) begins to run “when the right to redeem or the possession accrues” (that is, on the payment of the mortgage money).
  • 6. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for a declaration that he had become an owner (merely) on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage.
  • 7. The right to seek foreclosure is co-extensive with the right to seek redemption.
  • 8. As shown above, the period of redemption will not start as long as the usufruct of the land is adjusted towards interest on the mortgage amount. In this situation, the principle is invoked: “once a mortgage, always a mortgage” and is “always redeemable”.

In Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, AIR 2014 SC 3447; 2014-9 SCC 185, the above propositions are laid down as under –

  • “15. We, thus, hold that special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act to recover possession commences in the manner specified therein, i.e., when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by mortgagor. Until then, limitation does not start for purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for declaration that he had become an owner merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage. We answer the question accordingly.
  • 16. On this conclusion, the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court will stand affirmed and contrary view taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Bhandaru Ram (D) Thr. L.R. Ratan Lal vs. Sukh Ram (supra) will stand overruled.”

This decision (Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, AIR 2014 SC 3447; 2014-9 SCC 185) is followed in –

  • Harminder Singhv. Surjit Kaur, 2022-3 CivCC 266; 2022-2 RCR(Civ) 859,
  • Bir Singh v. Ram Kanwar Singh, 2018- 5 RCR(Civ) 403; 2018-15 SCC 341,
  • Mohan Lal v. Mohan Lal, 2016-13 SCC 90.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Contents of a Document are to be Proved in Court by Producing Original or Secondary Evidence

Jojy George Koduvath

Also Read: Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant

Abstract.

1. The contents of a document cannot be proved by oral evidence. The document itself must be produced. (Sections 61 and 62 of the Evidence Act).

2. Secondary evidence can be given if permitted under Sections 65 of the Evidence Act, read with Section 63.

3. Section 91 expressly bars oral evidence to prove the terms of a contract, disposition of property, etc., by oral evidence if they are reduced to writing.

4. Sec. 22 and 144 of the Evidence Act postulate that the oral admissions or assertions as to contents of documents are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under Sec. 65, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

5. If the original document is not produced, right to adduce Secondary Evidence is not automatic. Loss, non-availability, etc., are to be proved under Sec. 65; and no oral statement about its contents is inadmissible. Secondary evidence of a document’s contents cannot be admitted unless the non-production of the original is first accounted for.

6. Withholding the best evidence attracts adverse inference. When a party relies on a document but does not produce it, the Court must presume it would have gone against that party. A party in possession of the best evidence must produce it; otherwise, the court is entitled to drawadverse inference’.

7. No amount of oral evidence can substitute documentary evidence, where the law requires the document itself to be produced.

8. A document which is not proved (even if produced) in accordance with law cannot be relied upon by the court for deciding the rights of the parties.

9. Documents which are not proved (even if produced) in accordance with the law cannot be taken into consideration.

PRODUCTION, ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

A document to be used in court has to pass through three steps. They are:

  1. Production of documents in court
  2. Admittance and exhibition
  3. Proof (formal proof and truth of contents).

Modes of Proof of Documents

Modes of Proof of Documents (as to, both, ‘formal proof’ and ‘truth of the contents’) include the following:

  • Admission of the person who wrote or signed the document (Sec. 17, 21, 58, 67, 70).
  • Evidence of a person in whose presence the document was signed or written – ocular evidence (Sec. 59).
  • An attesting witness (Sec. 59).
  • Opinion of a person who is acquainted with the writing of the person who signed or wrote (Sec. 47).
  • Admission made by the person who signed or wrote the document made in judicial proceedings (Sec. 32, 33).
  • Evidence of a handwriting expert-opinion evidence/scientific evidence (Sec.45).
  • Evidence of a person who in routine has been receiving the document; or a document signed by such a person in the ordinary course of his business or official duty, though he may have never seen the author signing the document (Sec. 32, 34, 35 or 114).
  • Invoking (specific) presumptions under Sec. 79 to 90A.
  • Presumptions (general) under Sec. 114.
  • Circumstantial evidence: on probability or inferences (Sec. 114).
  • Court-comparison (Sec. 73).
  • Facts judicially noticeable (Sec. 56 and 57).
  • A fact of common-knowledge. (It does not require proof. See: Union Of India Vs. Virendra Bharti: 2011-2 ACC 886, 2010  ACJ 2353; Rakhal Chakraborty Vs. Sanjib Kumar Roy: 1998-1 GauLR 253, 1997-2 GauLT 705)
  • Internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document; a link in a chain of correspondence; recipient of the document. (Mobarik Ali Ahmed Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857)

Rule of Best Evidence

The Evidence Act project the rule of best evidence and it directs that the contents of the document are to be proved by the original document itself, unless secondary evidence is provided under Sec. 65. (See: Bimla Rohal v. Usha, 2002-2 HLJ 745; 2002-2 Shim LC 341)

Oral Evidence on Contents of Documents

No Use, Unless Secondary Evidence Permitted

Sec. 22 and 144 of the Evidence Act postulate that the oral admissions or assertions as to contents of documents are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under Sec. 65, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22 emphasises that oral evidence as to contents of documents , even if adduced, will be of no use, as it will be ‘irrelevant’. By virtue of Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act, the adverse party may object to giving oral evidence as to contents of the same until such document itself is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.

Sec. 22 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 22. When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant.—Oral admissions as to the contents of a document are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under the rules hereinafter contained, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22A says as to oral admissions as to contents of electronic records as under:

  • 22A. When oral admissions as to contents of electronic records are relevant
  • Oral admissions as to the contents of electronic records are not relevant, unless the genuineness of the electronic record produced is in question.”

Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 144. Evidence as to matters in writing.—Any witness may be asked, whilst under examination, whether any contract, grant or other disposition of property, as to which he is giving evidence, was not contained in a document, and if he says that it was, or if he is about to make any statement as to the contents of any document, which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to be produced, the adverse party may object to such evidence being given until such document is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.
  • Explanation.—A witness may give oral evidence of statements made by other persons about the contents of documents if such statements are in themselves relevant facts.
  • Illustration. The question is, whether A assaulted B. C deposes that he heard A say to D—”B wrote a letter accusing me of theft, and I will be revenged on him”. This statement is relevant as showing A’s motive for the assault, and evidence may be given of it, though no other evidence is given about the letter.

Documentary Evidence becomes meaningless if oral evidence Allowed

In Bhima Tima Dhotre v. The Pioneer Chemical Co. (1968) 70 Bom LR 683,  it is observed as under:

  • Documentary evidence becomes meaningless if the writer has to be called in every case to give oral evidence of its contents. If that were the position, it would mean that, in the ultimate analysis, all evidence must be oral and that oral evidence would virtually be the only kind of evidence recognised by law. That, however, is not the position under the Evidence Act. … Section 59 of the said Act enacts that all facts, except the “contents” of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. This provision would clearly indicate that to prove the contents of adocument by means of oral evidence would be a violation of that section.”

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The contents of a document are to be proved by producing it

To prove the contents of a document, it must have been produced before the court.

  • Sections 61 & 62 of the Evidence Act require proof of the contents of a document by the production of the document itself (or its secondary evidence).

If the document is not produced, its contents are legally non-existent for the Court. Following are the well-accepted principles in this regard:

  • Oral evidence cannot substitute documentary proof.
  • Court cannot decide rights on “assumed” contents

Principles of Law – in a Nutshell

The Principles of Law in this regard can be discerned from the following decisions of our Apex Court:

1. It is held in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595, that Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act bar amendment, variation, etc. of a document; oral variations—whether by the party or the opposite side—are barred. The Court laid down as under:

  • “Wherever written instruments are appointed, either by the requirement of law, or by the contract of the parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter them.”(Quoted in: Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., 2024-4 SCC 1; V. Anantha Raju v. T. M. Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)
  • “The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence are (i) to admit inferior evidence when law requires superior would amount to nullifying the law, (ii) when parties have deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory.” (Quoted in Placido Francisco Pinto v. Jose Francisco Pinto, 2021-10 SCR 676; V Anantha Raju v. T M Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)

2. In Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413, para 5, it is held that in a case where one party withholds a document, the court takes an adverse inference under Section 114(g). The Court said as under:

  • Even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue..”

3. The Constitution Bench of our Apex Court laid down in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 330; 2023-4 SCC 731, as under:

  • 47. Section 61 deals with proof of contents of documents which is by either primary or by secondary evidence.
  • When a document is produced as primary evidence, it will have to be proved in the manner laid down in Sections 67 to 73 of the Evidence Act.
  • Mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence. On the other hand, when a document is produced and admitted by the opposite party and is marked as an exhibit by the court, …  (sic – no objection can be raised at any later stage with regard to proof of its contents).
  • The contents of the document must be proved either by the production of the original document i.e., primary evidence or by copies of the same as per Section 65 as secondary evidence.
  • So long as an original document is in existence and is available, its contents must be proved by primary evidence.
  • It is only when the primary evidence is lost, in the interest of justice, the secondary evidence must be allowed.
  • Primary evidence is the best evidence and it affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.
  • Thus, when a particular fact is to be established by production of documentary evidence, there is no scope for leading oral evidence.
  • What is to be produced is the primary evidence i.e., document itself. It is only when the absence of the primary source has been satisfactorily explained that secondary evidence is permissible to prove the contents of documents.
  • Secondary evidence, therefore, should not be accepted without a sufficient reason being given for non-production of the original.”
  • 48. ……. Once a document is admitted, the contents of that document are also admitted in evidence, though those contents may not be conclusive evidence.
  • Moreover, once certain evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence.
  • There is a prohibition for any other evidence to be led which may detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence and the court has no option to hold the existence of the fact otherwise when such evidence is made conclusive.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Fraudulent or Void Transaction: Is ‘Declaration’ Required? The Supreme Court Says No (in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105).

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

A Seeming Conflict Between Two Decisions

  • 1. Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)
  • 2. Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)

In the earlier decision in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.), it was clearly opined, as regards an assailed instrument, as under:

  • “In a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, a declaration must have been sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff.”

However, in the subsequent decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105 (per Pardiwala and Mahadevan JJ.), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier position by holding that where the very character of a sale deed is assailed as fraudulent or bogus, the requirement of seeking a declaration stands implicitly satisfied. The Court said as under:

  • In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”

As a result –

  • a void document need not be challenged by claiming a declaration (that the said instrument is not binding), as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.

It is also made clear –

  • A plaintiff who was not a party to the instrument need not seek its cancellation; and
  • Relevant article in the Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 65 (12-year period) and not Article 59 (3-year period).

Subsequent Decision (Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi) Vividly Explained the Legal Position

In Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September 2025, made it clear – when a deed is fraudulent or a sham and bogus one, ‘it is not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that a document is void‘. It is held as under:

  • “25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. ….”
  • “28. In State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, reported in 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522, this Court held that as far as void and non-est documents are concerned, it would be enough for the plaintiff to file a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. …… Subsequently, the decision of this Court in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 186 … opined as follows:
    • .i. First, the contention of the State that it is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that would apply, was rejected. It was held that the suit is primarily one for possession of property based upon title. It was observed that owing to the decision in Bhim Singhji (supra), the order dated 26.05.1976 along with the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 became void ab intio and without jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that they are void. The plea about their invalidity could be raised in the course of any proceedings. Therefore, it is Article 65, which deals with a suit for possession based on title, that would apply from the date on the which the possession of the defendant State became adverse to the plaintiff.
    • ii. Secondly, though the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order dated 26.05.1976 and the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 were void, yet it was held that the same would be of no consequence insofar as the question of limitation is concerned.
  • The fact would still remain that the possession of the property was taken by the defendants via void documents. Therefore, such documents could be ignored and a suit for possession simpliciter, for which the period of limitation prescribed under Article 65, i.e., 12 years, could be filed. In the course of such proceedings, it could be contended by the plaintiff that the documents are a nullity.
  • …”
  • “29. This Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353, discussed the position of law as to when Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and opined as follows:
    • .i. First, that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only encompass within its fold fraudulent transactions which are ‘voidable’ transactions and not those that are ‘void’. In other words, Article 59 would apply only where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to those instruments which are presumptively invalid.
    • ii. Secondly, that when the document in question is void ab initio/or void, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary since such a transaction would be non-est in the eyes of law, owing to it being a nullity.
    • iii. Thirdly, a fine distinction was drawn between fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ and fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘contents of a document’. It is only in the former situation that the instrument would be void and, in the latter, it would remain voidable. To put it simply, Article 59 would not govern the period of limitation in respect of a void transaction.
    • iv. Lastly, that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was thereby void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder, i.e., he could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority.
    • ….”
  • “30. In the decision of this Court in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, where one of us, J.B. Pardiwala J., was a member of the Bench, it was reiterated that a person who is not a party to an instrument would not be obliged in law to seek its cancellation. The reason being that such an instrument would neither be likely to affect his title nor be binding on him. However, such a plaintiff must at least seek a declaration that the said instrument is not binding on him or that is invalid insofar as he is concerned. ………
  • 31. As per the dictum in Prem Singh (supra), this Court, in order to ascertain whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed. Both the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed therein. Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio. Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation. The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale deed. Consequently, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would find no application to the case in hand.
  • 32. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury (supra), it was clearly opined that a plaintiff who is not a party to the instrument in question need not seek its cancellation. We are not oblivious to the fact that in a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrumentthe said decision laid down a requirement that a declaration must be sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff. Howeverthe said decision clarified that whether the plaintiff has sought such a declaration or not could be culled out from a holistic reading of the plaint along with the relief(s) sought. In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”
  • …..
  • “34. We may look at the matter from one another angle. Apart from the aspect of fraud, the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 18 SCC 489, while looking into whether the defendants had paid any sale consideration to the plaintiff while purchasing the plaintiff’s share in the property, held as follows:
    • .i. First, that the sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future. If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
    • ii. Secondly, that, in the said case, the defendants could not rebut the allegation of the plaintiff that no sale consideration was paid as no evidence was adduced to indicate – (a) the actual payment of the price mentioned in the sale deeds and, (b) that the defendants had any earning capacity at the time of the transaction such that the sale consideration could have been paid. As such the sale deed being void for want of valid consideration, could not be said to have affected the one-half share of the plaintiff in the suit properties nor have conferred any right of title on the defendants. In fact, it was held that the sale deeds were a sham and must be ignored.
    • iii. Lastly, it was reiterated that a document that is void need not be challenged by seeking a declaration as the said pleas can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.”
  • “The relevant observations are thus:
    • “……
    • Thus, the sale deeds of 10-4-1981 will not confer any right, title and interest on Sudarshan Kumar’s wife and children, as the sale deeds will have to be ignored, being void. It was not necessary for the appellant to specifically claim a declaration as regards the sale deeds by way of amendment to the plaint. The reason being that there were specific pleadings in the plaints as originally filed that the sale deeds were void. A document which is void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
    • …..”

End Notes I

A suit for (i) declaration of Title and (ii) Recovery – Art. 65 Governs; Not, Art. 58.

Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September, 2025,  (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)  1. Crux of the issue: whether Article 65 or Article 59 
2. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460 – void and non-est documents – a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 would apply
3. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 186 – Claim of title void ab initio and without jurisdiction – suit for possession based upon title – not necessary to claim any separate declaration that they are void. -invalidity could be raised in any proceedings. – Article 65 deals with.
N. Thajudeen v. TN Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641  declaration of title and recovery of possession – relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one
K. Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)If the document ex facie reveals that the conveyer had no title, no specific declaration is needed.  
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183Suit for possession, as a consequence of the declaration, Article 58 will have no application
Prem Singh v. Birbal  (2006) 5 SCC 3531. Article 59 fraudulent transactions – ‘voidable’ not ‘void’. 2. Article 59 applies where an instrument is prima facie valid and not presumptively invalid. 3. Article 65 applies when the document is void ab initio or void 4. A decree for setting aside the document void ab initio or void would not be necessary since non-est. 5. Fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ would be void, not ‘contents’.  Article 59 would not govern a void transaction.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460The sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of the plaintiff having sought such a remedy to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply, and the limitation to file the suit will be 12 years.
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549Once the title is established,  the defendant has to prove adverse possession (Followed in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021)
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808Declaration with a further relief – Article governing such a suit will be that for such further relief.
Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 Declaration with possession – Article 65 would come into play, giving a 12-year period, not Article 58.
S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought, the consequential relief sought for is to be treated as the main relief governing the period of limitation. A declaration is unnecessary in such a case, and even if made, it needs only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition.
Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek cancellation of such a document.
K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.)1. suit for recovery based on title,  limitation arise only when adverse possession. 2.  Recovery of possession on title – declaration is only subservient to the main prayer, possession. 3. Article 58 will apply only to a suit for declaration simpliciter.

End Notes II

Declaration of Title & Recovery: Article 65 of the Limitation Act Governs; Not, 58

58To obtain any other declarationThree years.When the right to sue first accrues.
59To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract.Three years.When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
65  For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.Twelve years.When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

End Notes III

Earlier Supreme Court Decisions

1. Kizhakkevattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024-4 SCR 383; 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)

  • “If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence.”

2. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641

  • “In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

3. C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183

  • “If the plaintiff is to be granted a relief of recovery of possession, the suit could be filed within a period of 12 years. It is one thing to say that whether such a relief can be granted or not after the evidences are led by the parties but it is another thing to say that the plaint is to be rejected on the ground that the same is barred by any law. If the suit has been filed for possession, as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiffs title, Article 58 will have no application.”

4. Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, AIR 2002 SC 215; (2002) 1 SCC 178.

  • “Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding.”

5. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460, held as under:

  • “6. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji’s case (Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 166), Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj & Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi2 this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.”

6. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 808

  • In a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief.

The Kerala High Court, in Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

  • “When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

  • “39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
  • 40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

In Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 it is held as under:

  • “Article 58 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in a suit for declaration, but it has no application when the relief sought in the plaint is not for a mere declaration,but coupled with other reliefs like injunction, partition, possession etc. and Article 65 of the Limitation Act would come into play giving 12 year period. In the instant case, the relevant Article which can be applied is not Article 58, but Article 65 as the suit was filed not merely for a relief of declaration, but for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of immovable property.”

In S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840, it is held that Article 58 is not applicable for declaration that is sought only as an ancillary relief. It is held as under:

  • “When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought for that is which would not govern the period of limitation for the suit. The consequential relief sought for is to be treated as main relief governing the period of limitation for the suit. (See Mrs. Indira Bhalchandran Gokhale v. Union of India & Another-AIR 1990 Bombay 98). Therefore declaration prayed for in this case as relief Nos. 1 and 2 were unnecessary, and even if made, need only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition of immovable properties and the claim that appellant is entitled to get family pension.”

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Did the Supreme Court Depart From its Earlier Position in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, in its Subsequent Decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

A Seeming Conflict Between Two Decisions

In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.), it was clearly opined, as regards an assailed instrument, as under:

  • “In a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, a declaration must have been sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff.”

However, in the subsequent decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105 (per Pardiwala and Mahadevan JJ.), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier position by holding that where the very character of a sale deed is assailed as fraudulent or bogus, the requirement of seeking a declaration stands implicitly satisfied. The Court said as under:

  • In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”

As a consequence –

  • a void document need not be challenged by claiming a declaration (that the said instrument is not binding), as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.

It is also made clear –

  • A plaintiff who was not a party to the instrument need not seek its cancellation; and
  • Relevant article in the Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 65 (12-year period) and not Article 59 (3-year period)

Subsequent Decision (Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi) Vividly Explained the Legal Position

In Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September 2025, made it clear – when a deed is fraudulent or a sham and bogus one,it is not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that a document is void‘. It is held as under:

  • “25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. ….”
  • “28. In State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, reported in 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522, this Court held that as far as void and non-est documents are concerned, it would be enough for the plaintiff to file a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. …… Subsequently, the decision of this Court in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 186 … opined as follows:
    • .i. First, the contention of the State that it is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that would apply, was rejected. It was held that the suit is primarily one for possession of property based upon title. It was observed that owing to the decision in Bhim Singhji (supra), the order dated 26.05.1976 along with the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 became void ab intio and without jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that they are void. The plea about their invalidity could be raised in the course of any proceedings. Therefore, it is Article 65, which deals with a suit for possession based on title, that would apply from the date on the which the possession of the defendant State became adverse to the plaintiff.
    • ii. Secondly, though the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order dated 26.05.1976 and the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 were void, yet it was held that the same would be of no consequence insofar as the question of limitation is concerned.
  • The fact would still remain that the possession of the property was taken by the defendants via void documents. Therefore, such documents could be ignored and a suit for possession simpliciter, for which the period of limitation prescribed under Article 65, i.e., 12 years, could be filed. In the course of such proceedings, it could be contended by the plaintiff that the documents are a nullity.
  • …”
  • “29. This Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353, discussed the position of law as to when Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and opined as follows:
    • .i. First, that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only encompass within its fold fraudulent transactions which are ‘voidable’ transactions and not those that are ‘void’. In other words, Article 59 would apply only where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to those instruments which are presumptively invalid.
    • ii. Secondly, that when the document in question is void ab initio/or void, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary since such a transaction would be non-est in the eyes of law, owing to it being a nullity.
    • iii. Thirdly, a fine distinction was drawn between fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ and fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘contents of a document’. It is only in the former situation that the instrument would be void and, in the latter, it would remain voidable. To put it simply, Article 59 would not govern the period of limitation in respect of a void transaction.
    • iv. Lastly, that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was thereby void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder, i.e., he could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority.
    • ….”
  • “30. In the decision of this Court in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, where one of us, J.B. Pardiwala J., was a member of the Bench, it was reiterated that a person who is not a party to an instrument would not be obliged in law to seek its cancellation. The reason being that such an instrument would neither be likely to affect his title nor be binding on him. However, such a plaintiff must at least seek a declaration that the said instrument is not binding on him or that is invalid insofar as he is concerned. ………
  • 31. As per the dictum in Prem Singh (supra), this Court, in order to ascertain whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed. Both the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed therein. Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio. Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation. The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale deed. Consequently, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would find no application to the case in hand.
  • 32. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury (supra), it was clearly opined that a plaintiff who is not a party to the instrument in question need not seek its cancellation. We are not oblivious to the fact that in a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrumentthe said decision laid down a requirement that a declaration must be sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff. Howeverthe said decision clarified that whether the plaintiff has sought such a declaration or not could be culled out from a holistic reading of the plaint along with the relief(s) sought. In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”
  • “34. We may look at the matter from one another angle. Apart from the aspect of fraud, the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 18 SCC 489, while looking into whether the defendants had paid any sale consideration to the plaintiff while purchasing the plaintiff’s share in the property, held as follows:
    • .i. First, that the sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future. If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
    • ii. Secondly, that, in the said case, the defendants could not rebut the allegation of the plaintiff that no sale consideration was paid as no evidence was adduced to indicate – (a) the actual payment of the price mentioned in the sale deeds and, (b) that the defendants had any earning capacity at the time of the transaction such that the sale consideration could have been paid. As such the sale deed being void for want of valid consideration, could not be said to have affected the one-half share of the plaintiff in the suit properties nor have conferred any right of title on the defendants. In fact, it was held that the sale deeds were a sham and must be ignored.
    • iii. Lastly, it was reiterated that a document that is void need not be challenged by seeking a declaration as the said pleas can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.”
  • “The relevant observations are thus:
    • “……
    • Thus, the sale deeds of 10-4-1981 will not confer any right, title and interest on Sudarshan Kumar’s wife and children, as the sale deeds will have to be ignored, being void. It was not necessary for the appellant to specifically claim a declaration as regards the sale deeds by way of amendment to the plaint. The reason being that there were specific pleadings in the plaints as originally filed that the sale deeds were void. A document which is void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
    • …..”

End Notes I

A suit for (i) declaration of Title and (ii) Recovery – Art. 65 Governs; Not, Art. 58.

Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September, 2025,  (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)  1. Crux of the issue whether Article 65 or Article 59 
2. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460 – void and non-est documents – a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 would apply
3. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 186 – Claim of title void ab initio and without jurisdiction – suit for possession based upon title – not necessary to claim any separate declaration that they are void. -invalidity could be raised in any proceedings. – Article 65 deals with.
N. Thajudeen v. TN Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641  declaration of title and recovery of possession – relief of declaration would only be an ancillaryone
K. Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)  If Document ex-facie reveals- conveyer hadno title – No Specific declaration needed.  
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183  Suit for possession, as a consequence of declaration – Article 58 will have no application
Prem Singh v. Birbal  (2006) 5 SCC 3531. Article 59 fraudulent transactions – ‘voidable’ not ‘void’. 2. Article 59 apply where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to presumptively invalid. 3. Article 65 apply when document is void ab initio or void 4. A decree for setting aside the document void ab initio or void would not be necessary since – non-est. 5. Fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ would be void, not ‘contents’.  Article 59 would not govern a void transaction.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460The sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply, and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years.
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549Once the title is established,  the defendant to prove adverse possession (Followed in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021)
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808  declaration with a further reliefArticle governing -that for such further relief
Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 Declaration with possession – Article 65 would come into play giving 12 year period – not Article 58.
S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840Article 58 is not applicable for declaration sought only as an ancillary relief.
Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47Document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47) referred.
K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.)1. suit for recovery based on title,  limitation arise only when adverse possession 2.  recovery of possession on title – declaration is only subservient to the main prayer, possession 3. Article 58 will apply only to a suit for declaration simplicitor.

End Notes II

Declaration of Title & Recovery: Article 65 of the Limitation Act Governs; Not, 58

58To obtain any other declarationThree years.When the right to sue first accrues.
59To cancel or set aside an instrumentor decree or for the rescission of a contract.Three years.When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
65  For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.Twelve years.When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

End Notes III

Earlier Supreme Court Decisions

1. Kizhakkevattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024-4 SCR 383; 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)

  • “If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence.”

2. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641

  • “In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

3. C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183

  • “If the plaintiff is to be granted a relief of recovery of possession, the suit could be filed within a period of 12 years. It is one thing to say that whether such a relief can be granted or not after the evidences are led by the parties but it is another thing to say that the plaint is to be rejected on the ground that the same is barred by any law. If the suit has been filed for possession, as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiffs title, Article 58 will have no application.”

4. Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, AIR 2002 SC 215; (2002) 1 SCC 178.

  • “Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding.”

5. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460, held as under:

  • “6. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji’s case (Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 166), Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj & Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi2 this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.”

6. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 808

  • In a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief.

The Kerala High Court, in Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

  • “When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

  • “39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
  • 40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

In Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 it is held as under:

  • “Article 58 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in a suit for declaration, but it has no application when the relief sought in the plaint is not for a mere declaration,but coupled with other reliefs like injunction, partition, possession etc. and Article 65 of the Limitation Act would come into play giving 12 year period. In the instant case, the relevant Article which can be applied is not Article 58, but Article 65 as the suit was filed not merely for a relief of declaration, but for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of immovable property.”

In S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840, it is held that Article 58 is not applicable for declaration that is sought only as an ancillary relief. It is held as under:

  • “When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought for that is which would not govern the period of limitation for the suit. The consequential relief sought for is to be treated as main relief governing the period of limitation for the suit. (See Mrs. Indira Bhalchandran Gokhale v. Union of India & Another-AIR 1990 Bombay 98). Therefore declaration prayed for in this case as relief Nos. 1 and 2 were unnecessary, and even if made, need only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition of immovable prop

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India