Do the Plantation-Tenants have a Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land, beyond the Ceiling Limit (under Purchase Certificates)?

Are Such Tenants Entitled for Full Compensation if the Land is Acquired?

‘No’ is the Answer.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Contents in a Nutshell

  • 1. Ceiling Limit: The maximum extent of land assignable under a Purchase Certificate is circumscribed by the ceiling limit, under Section 72B(1)(a) and (b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.
  • 2. Plantation Exemption: Owners and tenants of plantations are permitted to retain plantation lands in excess of the ceiling limit by availing the ‘exemption’ provided under Section 81. However, the said exemption does not confer any absolute proprietary right over such land.
  • 3. Exempted plantation (lease) land Vest in Government: Title/ownership of unassignedexempted-plantation-lease-land is vested with the Government, under Section 72(1).
  • 4. Tenant Cannot Claim Better Right than the Landowner: Section 72G provides for payment of compensation to the former landowner; consequently, the vesting of the land in the Government under Section 72 stands absolutely affirmed. In such a situation, the tenant cannot claim any right better than that which the landowner himself did not possess.
  • 5. Tenants will be Deemed as Tenants of the Govt. Such tenants have to pay ‘Rent’ to the Government (Section 72E) for the unassignedexempted-plantation-lease-land.  The rent is fixed by the Land Tribunal [Section 72F(5)(h) ].
  • 6 On Acquisition, No Land Value to Previous Owners or Tenants: If the land vested in Government under Section 72 is acquired, land-value will not be paid to the former land-owner or the tenant (Section 112(5A).
  • 7. Exemption will be lost, if “Fragmented”:The exemption granted to a plantation will be lost if it is “fragmented” or the plantation-crop is abandoned (under Section 87).
  • 8. It is stated in Sec. 72B: “The provisions of Sec. 82 shall so far as may be applied to the CALCULATION of the ceiling area for the purpose of the proviso to sub section (1)”. It is obvious –
    • The legislature incorporated Sec. 82 only for a limited or a “specific” purpose – to the calculation of the ceiling area.

Relevant Provisions of Law

  • Sec. 53 – Cultivating tenant’s right to purchase landlord’s rights.
  • Sec. 55 – Purchase price to land owner – It is 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees.
    • Sec. 59 – Deposit purchase price by cultivating tenant before Land Tribunal.  Purchase Certificate is conclusive proof.
    • Sec. 64– Payment of purchase price to land owner – full discharge (from the part of land owner)
  • Section 72(1), Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963: All right, title and interest of the land-owners held by cultivating-tenants as on 1. 1. 1970 entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 shall vest in the Government.
  • Sec. 72A – Compensation to land owner for vesting under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter.
    • Sec. 72D – Cultivating tenant to pay purchase price (for getting assignment).
    • Sec. 72D(1A)- No purchase price is land below One Hect.
    • Sec. 72D(2)  – Purchase price to Govt. – 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees) Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 55
  • 2. Section 72B: It deals with “cultivating tenants’ right to assignment” (of the land vested in Government under Section 72).  Sub Section 1(a) and (b) of this Section direct that the assignment should be within the ceiling limit (mentioned in Section 82). It is stipulated – “The provisions of Sec. 82 shall so far as may be applied to the CALCULATION of the ceiling area for the purpose of the proviso to sub section (1)”.
  • 3. Section 72C: It deals with assignment of land, where the cultivating-tenant has not made application under Section 72B. All provisions of Section 72B, except sub section 3, are made applicable to Section 72C.  The opening words of Section 72C (“notwithstanding anything contained in sub Section 3 of Section 72B”), indicate the nexus between Section 72B and Section 72C.  Therefore, the purchase certificate can be issued, within ceiling limit alone, under Section 72C, as in the case of Section 72B.
  • 4. Section 72E: As stated above, tenancy-lands vest in the Government, under Section 72. The tenants (under Government) of unassigned-exempted-plantation-land, etc., are liable to pay rent to the Government for the unassigned (over and above the ceiling limit).
  • 5. Section 72F(5)(h): Land Tribunal fixes the rent for the said unassigned–exempted-land (under Section 81) .
  • 6. Section 72G: For the land vested in the Government under Section 72, compensation is paid to the former landowner. Subsections (2) and (3) ensure the payment of substantial compensation. Consequently, the vesting effected under Section 72(1) stands duly justified and legally sustained.
  • 7. Section 87(1) and its Explanations I and II: Only a limited right to continue; and, fragmentation is prohibited.  The specified plantation-crop alone is permitted.  The exemption is given subject to the condition – not to “convert” the land for any other use.
    • In case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost, and the exemption may be withdrawn under Explanation II of Section 87(1).  
  • 8. Section 112 (5A)On acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Section 72.
  • 9. Section 112 (5A)(a):The compensation for any building or other improvements  belonging to the land-owner shall be awarded to the Government.
  • 10. Section 112 (5A)(b):The balance-compensation remaining after deducting the amount referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • 11. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India:The State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
    • The provisions of the KLR Act, in this regard, are legislated following this proviso in Article 31A(1). It goes without saying – if no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.

Legal Right Conferred by the Statute
From the above, it is clear:

  • The unassigned land allowed to be occupied by a tenant (over and above the ceiling limit for which the tenant is liable to pay rent to the Government under Section 72E) can be termed as a “Legal Right conferred by the Statute”. It is not an absolute right that is conferred to some, including the BIG plantation tenants.

Land Owners’s Right for Compensation

The right for the same arises in the following three instances.

  • On Assignment to CULTIVATING TENANT: Sec. 55
  • On VESTING under Sec. 72:  Sec. 72A
  • On Surrendering SURPLUS LAND: Sec. 88

Sec. 55 – Purchase price to land owner –

Sec. 53 lays down the cultivating tenant’s right to purchase landlord’s rights. Sec. 55 provides for the purchase price entitled to by the land owner. It is 16 times the fair rent for land, plus the value of the structures on the land, plus half the value of the timber trees. [Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 72D(2) ].

  • Sec. 59 – Deposit purchase price by cultivating tenant before Land Tribunal.  Purchase Certificate is conclusive proof.
  • Sec. 64– Payment of purchase price to land owner is a full discharge (from the part of land owner).

Sec. 72A – Compensation to land owner for vesting under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter.

It is 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees. [ Note: Same rate under Sec. 55 & 72D(2) ]

  • Sec. 72D – Cultivating tenant to pay purchase price (for getting assignment – below the ceiling limit alone).
  • Sec. 72D(1A)- No purchase price is land below One Hect.
  • Sec. 72D(2)  – Purchase price to Govt. – 16 times fair rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees) Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 55.
  • Land above the ceiling limit payment is only under Sec. 88 – on surrendering land. (It is paid by the Government, not by the tenant.)

The Policy of the KLR Act
Section 83, lays down the policy of the Act – No person “be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” (Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State of Kerala v. Puliyangattu Krishnan Master, 2008(1) KLJ 571).

S. 82 (in Chp. III) cannot be enlarged while referring it in S. 72B (in Chp. II)

Section 82 deals with ceiling area. Sec. 81 states about the exemption of various provisions of Chapter III. By virtue of Sec. 81 private forests, plantations, etc. are exempted. Therefore, the provisions of ‘ceiling area’ in Sec. 82 do not apply to plantations, private forests, etc.

Section 72B(1) in Chapter II limits the assignment of land (within the ceiling area) while a Purchase Certificate is given. Section 72B(2) says –

  • “The provisions of Sec. 82 shall so far as may be applied to the CALCULATION of the ceiling area for the purpose of the proviso to sub section (1)”.

From the above it is clear –

  • The provisions as to the exemption in Section 81 will not be attracted to sec. 72B.
  • The legislature incorporated the referred provision only for a limited or a “specific” purpose – to the calculation of the ceiling area.
    • It can be made clear on a reading of the relevant provision – without the words “the CALCULATION of “.
  • Calculation of the ceiling area‘ in Section 82 stands independent to Section 81.
  • Therefore, other controlling provisions of Section 82 (such as Section 81) do not automatically brought in.

Interpretation of Law in this regard

  • In Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 : (1963) 3 SCR 858, it is held as under:
    • “Where the provisions of an Act are incorporated by reference in a later Act the repeal of the earlier Act has, in general, no effect upon the construction or effect of the Act in which its provisions have been incorporated.”
  • In TVS Motor Company Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2018 SC 5624; 2019-13 SCC 403, it is held as under:
    • “It is, therefore, clear that the definition of ‘motor vehicle’ as existing prior to 1956 Amendment would alone be applicable as being incorporated in the Taxation Act.”

‘Doctrine of Incorporation’ and the ‘Doctrine of Reference’

The ‘principles’ of doctrine of incorporation (only a restrictive and strict application) is to be applied in this matter – whether Section 72B(1) in Chapter II limits the assignment of land (within the ceiling area) while a Purchase Certificate is given. The decisive factor to determine whether a case is of ‘legislation by incorporation’ or ‘legislation by reference’ is whether “the reference is specific or general”.

  • Doctrine of incorporation (only a restrictive and strict application) – subsequent change (amendment or repeal) of the referred provision does not affect the incorporating provision.  That is, the incorporated original provision alone applies, verbatim.
  • Doctrine of reference or a citation (wider application) – future changes in the referred provision will also apply to the referring provision. The statute referred to is taken as it exists from time to time. Therefore, subsequent amendments to the referred statute will apply.
  • Doctrines of ‘legislation by reference’ and ‘legislation by incorporation’ are the creation of judicial pronouncements. See:
    • Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu, BR Gavai, Sandeep Mehta, JJ., AIR 2024 SC 2835; 2024-4 SCC 508
    • Bolani Ores v. State of Orissa : (1974)2 SCC 777
    • Mahindra v. Union of India: (1979)2 SCC 529
    • State of M.P. v. Narasimhan : (1975)2 SCC 377;
    • Bharat Co-operative Bank v. Employees’ Union : (2007)4 SCC 685
    • Girnar Tradeers v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 (3) SCC 1
    • Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., AIR 1931 PC 149.
    • Municipal Commissioner of Howrah v. Shalimar Wood Products, (1963) 1 SCR 47;
    • Ujagar Prints v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488;
    • U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam, (1998) 2 SCC 467;
    • Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasant Rao, (2002) 7 SCC 657 and
    • Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Maharashtra. (2003) 4 SCC 200.

When a statute refers to another provision, only the provision specifically referred to is attracted, and it shall not be construed as importing the entire body of law relating to that subject, or other connected or ancillary provisions – especially in the absence of express words and the intention is manifest.

It is reasonable to hold that the same position applies when a section incorporates a provision in another section, in the same Act. That is, that particular provision alone is attracted.

  • See: K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, AIR 2005 SC 688, 2005 (1) SCC 754.

Unjustifiable to Confer Undue Benefits to Plantation-Tenants Ignoring Ground Realities and Invoking Petty Grounds
Under Section 72A and Section 88, meagre compensation is paid to the land owners on vesting landlords’ rights in the Government and on surrendering the surplus land.  It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits on the tenants or lessees (which is not given to the land owners) when their lease-hold-lands are acquired (the majority of such plantation-lessees are Companies).

Lands of the Maharaja of Travancore were taken

It is a matter of record that even the lands of the Maharaja of Travancore—191 acres situated within Thiruvananthapuram City,  far in excess of the statutory ceiling of 7.5 acres, were taken over pursuant to the orders of the Land Board, Thiruvananthapuram, vide Order No. LB(B)2-18919/70 dated 15-01-1972. Equally, it is an indisputable fact that thousands of middle-class landowners were subjected to the rigour of the Act, and their excess lands were taken by the force of law.

  • Therefore, it would be wholly unreasonable to contend that the Legislature intended to confer any special or undue benefit upon plantation-tenants (benefits which were not extended to middle-class landowners, to other categories of tenants governed by the Act and even to the Maharaja of Travancore).

Any interpretation that elevates plantation-tenants to a privileged class, beyond the plain limits imposed by the statute, would be contrary to the scheme, object, and egalitarian ethos of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.

Section 72, KLR Act – ‘Vesting of Ownership’ in Government

Section 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act speaks about ‘vesting of landlord’s rights in Government’.  It pertains to –

  • All right, title and interest of the land-owners and intermediaries … and in respect of which  certificates of  purchase… have not been issued, shall …. vest in the government”.

As compensation is paid to the former landowner under Section 72G, the vesting of the land in the Government under Section 72 is absolute.

Fixity of Tenure and Assignment under Kraya Certificate

Section 13 of the KLR Act, which declares Fixity of Tenure to the cultivating tenants, is dealt with under Chapter II that governs tenancies; whereas the provisions of ceiling (Section 82 and Section 83) come under Chapter III that governs restriction on ownership, ceiling area, etc.  (Section 83 restricts holding land, excess of ceiling limits prescribed under Section 82.)

  • Fixity of tenure is assured in Section 13(1) “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage of contract, etc.”
  • The Fixity of Tenure (laid down under Section 13, in Chapter II) is not controlled by the ceiling provisions  in Section 82 and 83 (in Chapter III).  That is, the provisions as to Fixity of Tenure will prevail, without being affected by the ceiling provisions in Chapter III.
  • Note: (1) Section 13 (Fixity of Tenure) is controlled by Section 72 (in Chapter II itself) as to vesting in Government.
  • (2) The stipulations as to ceiling-limit were specifically brought into Sec. 72B (Chapter II) for the reason that Chapter II stands independent of Chapter III .

Therefore, land cannot be assigned under Section 72B and 72C, by the Land Tribunal, by Purchase Certificates, over and above the ceiling limit.

  • In sum, though a plantation-tenant will definitely have the right of ‘fixity’, those tenants will not have the right of assignment (under Section 72B and 72C) over and above the ceiling limit.

Tenants Obligated to Approach the LT for Availing Plantation Exemption

It is beyond doubt – the excess land in possession of a tenant, over which he has fixity of tenure under Section 13 (other than the lands exempted under Section 81), has to be surrendered. If the claimant of Plantation Exemption (under Section 81) is a tenant, he must have approached the Land Tribunal under subsection (3) of Section 85 – within the stipulated time (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations under different landlords), because:

  • (i) subsection (3) of Section 85 itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant under Section 72B (or for getting a Certificate to the effect that he is not eligible to purchase any more land, for he is already holding maximum within the limit prescribed under Section 82),
  • (ii) the Land Tribunal is the only authority to deal with tenancy in this regard (the Land Board or Taluk Land Board – deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues, etc. – cannot adjudicate on tenancy-rights),
  • (iii) Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11). Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).  
  • In Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736; 1993 2 KLT 962, it is pointed out: “If there is dispute on any of these points necessarily the Land Tribunal has to go into the question of possession and the alleged tenancy”
  • (iv) the Land Board cannot accept the self-declaration that one is a tenant. 
  • (v) It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government, for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.
    • Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.

Note: 1. The entire tenancy-land being vested with the Government by virtue of Section 72, the tenants of the exempted-plantation-land (above the ceiling limit), will be the tenants under the Government liable to pay rent under Section 72E.

2. Under Section 72F(5)(h), the Land Tribunal fixes the rent for the unassigned-exempted-land.

3. These legal principles are adopted in Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, , 2018(3) KLT 283.

Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala, 2022 (4) KHC 97.

Following were the basic factual situation in Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala (supra)  –

  • The land was leased out by landlords.
  • The lease-rights came in the petitioners (cultivating tenants) by transfer.

The following were the rival contentions or claims raised by the parties.

Contention of the Government

  • The tenant was a cultivating tenant. The land (absolutely) vested in the Government under Section 72 KLR Act.
    • Hence, tenant would be entitled to get compensation for the improvements (alone) to be determined under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, in view of Section 20(1) of the KLR Act.

Contention of the Tenants

  • cultivating tenant has absolute right to seek assignment (subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D). Therefore, vesting of rights in the Government under Section 72 is a legal fiction.

Claims of Land-Owners

  • In view of Section 3(i)(viii), if the extent of the plantation is above 30 acres, and if the land was a plantation (put up by the land owner) when it was leased, the tenant will not be entitled for ‘fixity’; and the land will return to the land owner after the lease-period.  Therefore, the land owners (in one Writ Appeal) claimed that the land involved therein was such a land entitled to by them (after the lease period).
  • Land owners also claimed that Section 72BB(1) gives them a right (i) to apply for assignment to the tenant and (ii) for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A (as regards the property within ceiling limit).

The Division Bench Finding on Vesting Under Section 72

  • The contention of the Government that the land was (absolutely) vested in it was rejected and held –
    • 1. the vesting in Government ‘is a legal fiction‘.
    • 2. cultivating tenant ‘has an absolute right to seek assignment‘ subject to the payment of purchase price.

The Division Bench observed as under:

  • “41. On an indepth analysis of the aforesaid provision, we find that when Section 72 came into force on 01.01.1970, the cultivating tenant is entitled for the assignment of the land for possession, subject to the liabilities fixed under Section 72 of the Act, 1963 to pay the purchase price. As per Section 72C, if no application is filed by the cultivating tenant, the Land Tribunal shall subject to the Rules made by the Government ensure that the assignment is granted to the cultivating tenant, assigning such title and interest to the cultivating tenant entitled thereto, which rights, title and interest are vested with the Government by virtue of the legal fiction created under Section 72 of the Act, 1963.
  • 42. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 72 of Act, 1963 would only deal with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants free from encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries. However, the legal provisions discussed above would make it clear that insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.”

Tanya Alice Stephen v. Manager, Perumal Smaraka Nidhi, 2025:KER:97401

In this case, the High Court held, on 17.12.2025, to the following effect:

  • Under Ext. P3, the Land Tribunal “restricted the purchase certificate to an extent of 12 acres and has rejected the claim regarding the balance extent out of 94.54 acres”.
  • The HC directed the Government on 18.3.2024 to file an affidavit “by the person who authored Ext. P3 explaining and referring to the reasons as to why the earlier decision of the Land Tribunal affirmed in the judgment of the Sub Court, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court and the Apex Court was not followed….”
  • Though a counter affidavit was filed “the affidavit does not explain why the relief was restricted to 12 acres”
  • It is stated in the affidavit that “the attempt to obtain purchase certificate is an attempt to defeat the KLR Act and to alienate the land vested in the Government and not to pay rent under Section 72E”.
  • The High Court observed “no such contention is available to the respondents in view of the categoric finding of this court that the lessees … …. are entitled to fixity of tenure”; and that “there is no explanation as to why the finding of this Court affirmed by the Supreme Court have not been followed…..”.

The High Court erroneously interlinked two independent rights—fixity of tenure and the right to obtain a purchase certificate. It failed to advert to the following vital aspects:

  1. Fixity of tenure under Section 13 is conceptually and statutorily distinct from the issuance of a purchase certificate under Section 72B, and the two cannot be conflated.
  2. A purchase certificate can indeed be issued only in respect of land over which tenants have fixity of tenure.  However, that does not mean – the stipulation in Section 72B (that the maximum extent to be assigned must be within the ceiling limit) can be ignored.
  3. Sec. 72A directs compensation to the land owner for vesting land under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter. 
  4. For the land above the ceiling limit, payment is made under Sec. 88 – on surrendering land. It is paid by the Government; not by the tenant. (Under Sec. 72D, the cultivating tenant pays the purchase price for getting the assignment – below the ceiling limit – alone.)
  5. The previous judgment of the High Court with respect to the same land, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, regarding the fixity of tenure (over 94.54 acres), is wholly unrelated to and does not govern the statutory ceiling prescribed under Section 72B (7.5 or 15 acres) while issuing a purchase certificate.

The Line of Reasoning Put Forward in the above decisions is Inappropriate.  

The interpretative approach adopted by the High Court (an absolute right vests in the tenants to seek assignment—upon payment of the purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D—in respect of the entire land over which tenants have fixity of tenure) appears to be legally untenable.

  • It is mainly because such lands stand vested in the Government; and upon such vesting, the former tenants are deemed to be tenants under the Government and are statutorily obliged to pay rent to the Government by virtue of Section 72E.

Section 72B, falling under Chapter II of the Act, unequivocally mandates that a purchase certificate may be issued only in respect of land within the prescribed ceiling limit. The exemption provisions, on the other hand, form part of Chapter III and operate independently. It is precisely for this reason that the ceiling-related stipulations were expressly incorporated into Section 72B.

  • Further, in the event of acquisition of unassigned exempted plantation land vested in the Government, Section 112(5A) specifically provides that no land value shall be payable either to the former landowner or to the tenant.

It goes without saying that the plantation holdings typically extend to hundreds or thousands of acres, of which the assignable extent within the ceiling may be a negligible fraction (7.5 or 15 acres).

Therefore, extending the statutory right of assignment to the vast excess land will stand against the express provisions of the Statute. It will also annihilate the public interest well-visioned by the erudite legislatures considering the well-being of the generations to come, and the whole ecology of the nation.

The High Court failed to consider the Earlier Decisions

  • In K. Jayaprakashan v. State of Kerala, 2023-3 KLT 541, it is observed as under:
    • “Section 72 of the Act deals with vesting of landlord’s rights in Government. As per sub-section (1) of Section 72 ….  all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyiruppus and holders of karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 … shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon on the said date”.
  • In V.N. Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (P.T. Raman Nayar, T.C.Raghavan, K.K.Mathew, JJ.) , AIR 1971 Ker 98, it is held as under:
    • “By Section 72 the rights of landlords whose rights have not been purchased by cultivating tenants vest in the Government free of all encumbrances on a date to be notified by the Government in that behalf -the date has been notified as the 1st January, 1970”
  • In Lakshmi v. Rama Iyer, 1992-1 ILR-Ker 398; 1991-2 KLT 897it is pointed out: “Consequently the title and interest of the land-lord would vest in the Government on the appointed day that is, on 1-1-1970. Then as per S. 72Q the land owner would be entitled to recover rent accrued till 1-1-1970 only”.
  • In Aru v. Nakunni (Padmanabhan, J.), 1987-1 KLT 177, it is held as under:
    • “Under S.72 of the Act all the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of a holding held by a cultivating tenant entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 shall, subject to the various provisions of S.72, vest in the Government free of all encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries and subsisting on the date notified by the Government. ….. When once vesting has taken place there cannot be any further rights in any body. . …. By assignment all such rights vest in the tenant”.

Land Reform Wearied Middle Class Landlords and Tenants

When Land Reform Measures were implemented in the State of Kerala, it wearied small and moderate landlords and tenants, on the bedrock of “ceiling limit”.  But the Plantations were not “touched”, taking “the economy” into consideration.  Still, the well-visioned legislators were particular to see that the ownership of this large extent of plantations (otherwise thick forest of the Western Ghats) remained with the State.  It was based on the principles in Article 31A(1) of the Constitution, which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit’.

Conclusion

1. The exemption provisions confer only a limited and conditional right—namely, the right to continue the specified plantation crop alone. Upon conversion of the land or deviation from the permitted use, the exemption will be forfeited, and the land will become fully subject to the statutory regime.

2. It can be stated with legal certainty that:

  • (i) Where the landowner himself has no vested or proprietary right over land held beyond the ceiling limit, a tenant cannot claim any such right. To hold otherwise would be illogical, irrational, and contrary to settled principles of property law, as a tenant cannot acquire a higher or superior right than that of the landowner.
  • (ii) Statutory interpretation, particularly when constitutional principles are implicated, must advance the larger public interest, including the interests of the nation and future generations, and not operate to confer benefits on a select class.
  • (iii) It is wholly unjustifiable to confer disproportionate rights or benefits upon plantation tenants—many of whom are large corporate entities—when even the Maharaja of Travancore was denied retention of land beyond the ceiling limit. It is a sheer fact that thousands of middle-class landowners were divested of their lands under the rigorous operation of the Act.

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“Once a Mortgage Always a Mortgage”: Usufructuary Mortgage is ‘Always’ Redeemable; Limitation of 30 Years NOT Applicable.

Jojy George Koduvath

Legal Principles

  • 1. In a usufructuary mortgage, the usufruct (profits) of the land are being adjusted towards interest on the mortgage amount.
  • 2. Therefore, in a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagee continues to remain in possession of the mortgaged security, appropriating the usufruct of the mortgaged land towards the interest on the mortgaged debt till the mortgager makes the (re)payment of the mortgage money.
  • 3. Accordingly, the right to seek redemption (i.e., recover possession) of a usufructuary mortgage accrues only on payment of the mortgage money, and the limitation period of 30 years is not related to (any) date of the mortgage.
  • 4. For the above reason, the right of foreclosure (forcing sale through the court) will not accrue to the mortgagee till such time he remains in possession (appropriating the usufruct of the mortgaged land towards the interest).
  • 5. The limitation of 30 years under Article 61(a) begins to run “when the right to redeem or the possession accrues” (that is, on the payment of the mortgage money).
  • 6. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for a declaration that he had become an owner (merely) on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage.
  • 7. The right to seek foreclosure is co-extensive with the right to seek redemption.
  • 8. As shown above, the period of redemption will not start as long as the usufruct of the land is adjusted towards interest on the mortgage amount. In this situation, the principle is invoked: “once a mortgage, always a mortgage” and is “always redeemable”.

In Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, AIR 2014 SC 3447; 2014-9 SCC 185, the above propositions are laid down as under –

  • “15. We, thus, hold that special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act to recover possession commences in the manner specified therein, i.e., when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by mortgagor. Until then, limitation does not start for purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for declaration that he had become an owner merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage. We answer the question accordingly.
  • 16. On this conclusion, the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court will stand affirmed and contrary view taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Bhandaru Ram (D) Thr. L.R. Ratan Lal vs. Sukh Ram (supra) will stand overruled.”

This decision (Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, AIR 2014 SC 3447; 2014-9 SCC 185) is followed in –

  • Harminder Singhv. Surjit Kaur, 2022-3 CivCC 266; 2022-2 RCR(Civ) 859,
  • Bir Singh v. Ram Kanwar Singh, 2018- 5 RCR(Civ) 403; 2018-15 SCC 341,
  • Mohan Lal v. Mohan Lal, 2016-13 SCC 90.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Contents of a Document are to be Proved in Court by Producing Original or Secondary Evidence

Jojy George Koduvath

Also Read: Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant

Abstract.

1. The contents of a document cannot be proved by oral evidence. The document itself must be produced. (Sections 61 and 62 of the Evidence Act).

2. Secondary evidence can be given if permitted under Sections 65 of the Evidence Act, read with Section 63.

3. Section 91 expressly bars oral evidence to prove the terms of a contract, disposition of property, etc., by oral evidence if they are reduced to writing.

4. Sec. 22 and 144 of the Evidence Act postulate that the oral admissions or assertions as to contents of documents are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under Sec. 65, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

5. If the original document is not produced, right to adduce Secondary Evidence is not automatic. Loss, non-availability, etc., are to be proved under Sec. 65; and no oral statement about its contents is inadmissible. Secondary evidence of a document’s contents cannot be admitted unless the non-production of the original is first accounted for.

6. Withholding the best evidence attracts adverse inference. When a party relies on a document but does not produce it, the Court must presume it would have gone against that party. A party in possession of the best evidence must produce it; otherwise, the court is entitled to drawadverse inference’.

7. No amount of oral evidence can substitute documentary evidence, where the law requires the document itself to be produced.

8. A document which is not proved (even if produced) in accordance with law cannot be relied upon by the court for deciding the rights of the parties.

9. Documents which are not proved (even if produced) in accordance with the law cannot be taken into consideration.

PRODUCTION, ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

A document to be used in court has to pass through three steps. They are:

  1. Production of documents in court
  2. Admittance and exhibition
  3. Proof (formal proof and truth of contents).

Modes of Proof of Documents

Modes of Proof of Documents (as to, both, ‘formal proof’ and ‘truth of the contents’) include the following:

  • Admission of the person who wrote or signed the document (Sec. 17, 21, 58, 67, 70).
  • Evidence of a person in whose presence the document was signed or written – ocular evidence (Sec. 59).
  • An attesting witness (Sec. 59).
  • Opinion of a person who is acquainted with the writing of the person who signed or wrote (Sec. 47).
  • Admission made by the person who signed or wrote the document made in judicial proceedings (Sec. 32, 33).
  • Evidence of a handwriting expert-opinion evidence/scientific evidence (Sec.45).
  • Evidence of a person who in routine has been receiving the document; or a document signed by such a person in the ordinary course of his business or official duty, though he may have never seen the author signing the document (Sec. 32, 34, 35 or 114).
  • Invoking (specific) presumptions under Sec. 79 to 90A.
  • Presumptions (general) under Sec. 114.
  • Circumstantial evidence: on probability or inferences (Sec. 114).
  • Court-comparison (Sec. 73).
  • Facts judicially noticeable (Sec. 56 and 57).
  • A fact of common-knowledge. (It does not require proof. See: Union Of India Vs. Virendra Bharti: 2011-2 ACC 886, 2010  ACJ 2353; Rakhal Chakraborty Vs. Sanjib Kumar Roy: 1998-1 GauLR 253, 1997-2 GauLT 705)
  • Internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document; a link in a chain of correspondence; recipient of the document. (Mobarik Ali Ahmed Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857)

Rule of Best Evidence

The Evidence Act project the rule of best evidence and it directs that the contents of the document are to be proved by the original document itself, unless secondary evidence is provided under Sec. 65. (See: Bimla Rohal v. Usha, 2002-2 HLJ 745; 2002-2 Shim LC 341)

Oral Evidence on Contents of Documents

No Use, Unless Secondary Evidence Permitted

Sec. 22 and 144 of the Evidence Act postulate that the oral admissions or assertions as to contents of documents are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under Sec. 65, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22 emphasises that oral evidence as to contents of documents , even if adduced, will be of no use, as it will be ‘irrelevant’. By virtue of Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act, the adverse party may object to giving oral evidence as to contents of the same until such document itself is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.

Sec. 22 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 22. When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant.—Oral admissions as to the contents of a document are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under the rules hereinafter contained, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22A says as to oral admissions as to contents of electronic records as under:

  • 22A. When oral admissions as to contents of electronic records are relevant
  • Oral admissions as to the contents of electronic records are not relevant, unless the genuineness of the electronic record produced is in question.”

Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 144. Evidence as to matters in writing.—Any witness may be asked, whilst under examination, whether any contract, grant or other disposition of property, as to which he is giving evidence, was not contained in a document, and if he says that it was, or if he is about to make any statement as to the contents of any document, which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to be produced, the adverse party may object to such evidence being given until such document is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.
  • Explanation.—A witness may give oral evidence of statements made by other persons about the contents of documents if such statements are in themselves relevant facts.
  • Illustration. The question is, whether A assaulted B. C deposes that he heard A say to D—”B wrote a letter accusing me of theft, and I will be revenged on him”. This statement is relevant as showing A’s motive for the assault, and evidence may be given of it, though no other evidence is given about the letter.

Documentary Evidence becomes meaningless if oral evidence Allowed

In Bhima Tima Dhotre v. The Pioneer Chemical Co. (1968) 70 Bom LR 683,  it is observed as under:

  • Documentary evidence becomes meaningless if the writer has to be called in every case to give oral evidence of its contents. If that were the position, it would mean that, in the ultimate analysis, all evidence must be oral and that oral evidence would virtually be the only kind of evidence recognised by law. That, however, is not the position under the Evidence Act. … Section 59 of the said Act enacts that all facts, except the “contents” of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. This provision would clearly indicate that to prove the contents of adocument by means of oral evidence would be a violation of that section.”

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The contents of a document are to be proved by producing it

To prove the contents of a document, it must have been produced before the court.

  • Sections 61 & 62 of the Evidence Act require proof of the contents of a document by the production of the document itself (or its secondary evidence).

If the document is not produced, its contents are legally non-existent for the Court. Following are the well-accepted principles in this regard:

  • Oral evidence cannot substitute documentary proof.
  • Court cannot decide rights on “assumed” contents

Principles of Law – in a Nutshell

The Principles of Law in this regard can be discerned from the following decisions of our Apex Court:

1. It is held in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595, that Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act bar amendment, variation, etc. of a document; oral variations—whether by the party or the opposite side—are barred. The Court laid down as under:

  • “Wherever written instruments are appointed, either by the requirement of law, or by the contract of the parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter them.”(Quoted in: Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., 2024-4 SCC 1; V. Anantha Raju v. T. M. Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)
  • “The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence are (i) to admit inferior evidence when law requires superior would amount to nullifying the law, (ii) when parties have deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory.” (Quoted in Placido Francisco Pinto v. Jose Francisco Pinto, 2021-10 SCR 676; V Anantha Raju v. T M Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)

2. In Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413, para 5, it is held that in a case where one party withholds a document, the court takes an adverse inference under Section 114(g). The Court said as under:

  • Even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue..”

3. The Constitution Bench of our Apex Court laid down in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 330; 2023-4 SCC 731, as under:

  • 47. Section 61 deals with proof of contents of documents which is by either primary or by secondary evidence.
  • When a document is produced as primary evidence, it will have to be proved in the manner laid down in Sections 67 to 73 of the Evidence Act.
  • Mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence. On the other hand, when a document is produced and admitted by the opposite party and is marked as an exhibit by the court, …  (sic – no objection can be raised at any later stage with regard to proof of its contents).
  • The contents of the document must be proved either by the production of the original document i.e., primary evidence or by copies of the same as per Section 65 as secondary evidence.
  • So long as an original document is in existence and is available, its contents must be proved by primary evidence.
  • It is only when the primary evidence is lost, in the interest of justice, the secondary evidence must be allowed.
  • Primary evidence is the best evidence and it affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.
  • Thus, when a particular fact is to be established by production of documentary evidence, there is no scope for leading oral evidence.
  • What is to be produced is the primary evidence i.e., document itself. It is only when the absence of the primary source has been satisfactorily explained that secondary evidence is permissible to prove the contents of documents.
  • Secondary evidence, therefore, should not be accepted without a sufficient reason being given for non-production of the original.”
  • 48. ……. Once a document is admitted, the contents of that document are also admitted in evidence, though those contents may not be conclusive evidence.
  • Moreover, once certain evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence.
  • There is a prohibition for any other evidence to be led which may detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence and the court has no option to hold the existence of the fact otherwise when such evidence is made conclusive.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Fraudulent or Void Transaction: Is ‘Declaration’ Required? The Supreme Court Says No (in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105).

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

A Seeming Conflict Between Two Decisions

  • 1. Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)
  • 2. Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)

In the earlier decision in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.), it was clearly opined, as regards an assailed instrument, as under:

  • “In a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, a declaration must have been sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff.”

However, in the subsequent decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105 (per Pardiwala and Mahadevan JJ.), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier position by holding that where the very character of a sale deed is assailed as fraudulent or bogus, the requirement of seeking a declaration stands implicitly satisfied. The Court said as under:

  • In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”

As a result –

  • a void document need not be challenged by claiming a declaration (that the said instrument is not binding), as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.

It is also made clear –

  • A plaintiff who was not a party to the instrument need not seek its cancellation; and
  • Relevant article in the Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 65 (12-year period) and not Article 59 (3-year period).

Subsequent Decision (Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi) Vividly Explained the Legal Position

In Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September 2025, made it clear – when a deed is fraudulent or a sham and bogus one, ‘it is not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that a document is void‘. It is held as under:

  • “25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. ….”
  • “28. In State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, reported in 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522, this Court held that as far as void and non-est documents are concerned, it would be enough for the plaintiff to file a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. …… Subsequently, the decision of this Court in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 186 … opined as follows:
    • .i. First, the contention of the State that it is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that would apply, was rejected. It was held that the suit is primarily one for possession of property based upon title. It was observed that owing to the decision in Bhim Singhji (supra), the order dated 26.05.1976 along with the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 became void ab intio and without jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that they are void. The plea about their invalidity could be raised in the course of any proceedings. Therefore, it is Article 65, which deals with a suit for possession based on title, that would apply from the date on the which the possession of the defendant State became adverse to the plaintiff.
    • ii. Secondly, though the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order dated 26.05.1976 and the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 were void, yet it was held that the same would be of no consequence insofar as the question of limitation is concerned.
  • The fact would still remain that the possession of the property was taken by the defendants via void documents. Therefore, such documents could be ignored and a suit for possession simpliciter, for which the period of limitation prescribed under Article 65, i.e., 12 years, could be filed. In the course of such proceedings, it could be contended by the plaintiff that the documents are a nullity.
  • …”
  • “29. This Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353, discussed the position of law as to when Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and opined as follows:
    • .i. First, that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only encompass within its fold fraudulent transactions which are ‘voidable’ transactions and not those that are ‘void’. In other words, Article 59 would apply only where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to those instruments which are presumptively invalid.
    • ii. Secondly, that when the document in question is void ab initio/or void, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary since such a transaction would be non-est in the eyes of law, owing to it being a nullity.
    • iii. Thirdly, a fine distinction was drawn between fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ and fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘contents of a document’. It is only in the former situation that the instrument would be void and, in the latter, it would remain voidable. To put it simply, Article 59 would not govern the period of limitation in respect of a void transaction.
    • iv. Lastly, that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was thereby void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder, i.e., he could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority.
    • ….”
  • “30. In the decision of this Court in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, where one of us, J.B. Pardiwala J., was a member of the Bench, it was reiterated that a person who is not a party to an instrument would not be obliged in law to seek its cancellation. The reason being that such an instrument would neither be likely to affect his title nor be binding on him. However, such a plaintiff must at least seek a declaration that the said instrument is not binding on him or that is invalid insofar as he is concerned. ………
  • 31. As per the dictum in Prem Singh (supra), this Court, in order to ascertain whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed. Both the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed therein. Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio. Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation. The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale deed. Consequently, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would find no application to the case in hand.
  • 32. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury (supra), it was clearly opined that a plaintiff who is not a party to the instrument in question need not seek its cancellation. We are not oblivious to the fact that in a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrumentthe said decision laid down a requirement that a declaration must be sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff. Howeverthe said decision clarified that whether the plaintiff has sought such a declaration or not could be culled out from a holistic reading of the plaint along with the relief(s) sought. In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”
  • …..
  • “34. We may look at the matter from one another angle. Apart from the aspect of fraud, the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 18 SCC 489, while looking into whether the defendants had paid any sale consideration to the plaintiff while purchasing the plaintiff’s share in the property, held as follows:
    • .i. First, that the sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future. If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
    • ii. Secondly, that, in the said case, the defendants could not rebut the allegation of the plaintiff that no sale consideration was paid as no evidence was adduced to indicate – (a) the actual payment of the price mentioned in the sale deeds and, (b) that the defendants had any earning capacity at the time of the transaction such that the sale consideration could have been paid. As such the sale deed being void for want of valid consideration, could not be said to have affected the one-half share of the plaintiff in the suit properties nor have conferred any right of title on the defendants. In fact, it was held that the sale deeds were a sham and must be ignored.
    • iii. Lastly, it was reiterated that a document that is void need not be challenged by seeking a declaration as the said pleas can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.”
  • “The relevant observations are thus:
    • “……
    • Thus, the sale deeds of 10-4-1981 will not confer any right, title and interest on Sudarshan Kumar’s wife and children, as the sale deeds will have to be ignored, being void. It was not necessary for the appellant to specifically claim a declaration as regards the sale deeds by way of amendment to the plaint. The reason being that there were specific pleadings in the plaints as originally filed that the sale deeds were void. A document which is void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
    • …..”

End Notes I

A suit for (i) declaration of Title and (ii) Recovery – Art. 65 Governs; Not, Art. 58.

Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September, 2025,  (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)  1. Crux of the issue: whether Article 65 or Article 59 
2. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460 – void and non-est documents – a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 would apply
3. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 186 – Claim of title void ab initio and without jurisdiction – suit for possession based upon title – not necessary to claim any separate declaration that they are void. -invalidity could be raised in any proceedings. – Article 65 deals with.
N. Thajudeen v. TN Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641  declaration of title and recovery of possession – relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one
K. Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)If the document ex facie reveals that the conveyer had no title, no specific declaration is needed.  
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183Suit for possession, as a consequence of the declaration, Article 58 will have no application
Prem Singh v. Birbal  (2006) 5 SCC 3531. Article 59 fraudulent transactions – ‘voidable’ not ‘void’. 2. Article 59 applies where an instrument is prima facie valid and not presumptively invalid. 3. Article 65 applies when the document is void ab initio or void 4. A decree for setting aside the document void ab initio or void would not be necessary since non-est. 5. Fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ would be void, not ‘contents’.  Article 59 would not govern a void transaction.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460The sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of the plaintiff having sought such a remedy to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply, and the limitation to file the suit will be 12 years.
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549Once the title is established,  the defendant has to prove adverse possession (Followed in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021)
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808Declaration with a further relief – Article governing such a suit will be that for such further relief.
Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 Declaration with possession – Article 65 would come into play, giving a 12-year period, not Article 58.
S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought, the consequential relief sought for is to be treated as the main relief governing the period of limitation. A declaration is unnecessary in such a case, and even if made, it needs only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition.
Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek cancellation of such a document.
K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.)1. suit for recovery based on title,  limitation arise only when adverse possession. 2.  Recovery of possession on title – declaration is only subservient to the main prayer, possession. 3. Article 58 will apply only to a suit for declaration simpliciter.

End Notes II

Declaration of Title & Recovery: Article 65 of the Limitation Act Governs; Not, 58

58To obtain any other declarationThree years.When the right to sue first accrues.
59To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract.Three years.When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
65  For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.Twelve years.When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

End Notes III

Earlier Supreme Court Decisions

1. Kizhakkevattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024-4 SCR 383; 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)

  • “If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence.”

2. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641

  • “In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

3. C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183

  • “If the plaintiff is to be granted a relief of recovery of possession, the suit could be filed within a period of 12 years. It is one thing to say that whether such a relief can be granted or not after the evidences are led by the parties but it is another thing to say that the plaint is to be rejected on the ground that the same is barred by any law. If the suit has been filed for possession, as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiffs title, Article 58 will have no application.”

4. Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, AIR 2002 SC 215; (2002) 1 SCC 178.

  • “Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding.”

5. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460, held as under:

  • “6. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji’s case (Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 166), Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj & Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi2 this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.”

6. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 808

  • In a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief.

The Kerala High Court, in Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

  • “When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

  • “39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
  • 40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

In Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 it is held as under:

  • “Article 58 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in a suit for declaration, but it has no application when the relief sought in the plaint is not for a mere declaration,but coupled with other reliefs like injunction, partition, possession etc. and Article 65 of the Limitation Act would come into play giving 12 year period. In the instant case, the relevant Article which can be applied is not Article 58, but Article 65 as the suit was filed not merely for a relief of declaration, but for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of immovable property.”

In S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840, it is held that Article 58 is not applicable for declaration that is sought only as an ancillary relief. It is held as under:

  • “When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought for that is which would not govern the period of limitation for the suit. The consequential relief sought for is to be treated as main relief governing the period of limitation for the suit. (See Mrs. Indira Bhalchandran Gokhale v. Union of India & Another-AIR 1990 Bombay 98). Therefore declaration prayed for in this case as relief Nos. 1 and 2 were unnecessary, and even if made, need only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition of immovable properties and the claim that appellant is entitled to get family pension.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

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PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

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Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

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Did the Supreme Court Depart From its Earlier Position in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, in its Subsequent Decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

A Seeming Conflict Between Two Decisions

In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury  v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.), it was clearly opined, as regards an assailed instrument, as under:

  • “In a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, a declaration must have been sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff.”

However, in the subsequent decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105 (per Pardiwala and Mahadevan JJ.), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier position by holding that where the very character of a sale deed is assailed as fraudulent or bogus, the requirement of seeking a declaration stands implicitly satisfied. The Court said as under:

  • In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”

As a consequence –

  • a void document need not be challenged by claiming a declaration (that the said instrument is not binding), as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.

It is also made clear –

  • A plaintiff who was not a party to the instrument need not seek its cancellation; and
  • Relevant article in the Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 65 (12-year period) and not Article 59 (3-year period)

Subsequent Decision (Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi) Vividly Explained the Legal Position

In Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September 2025, made it clear – when a deed is fraudulent or a sham and bogus one,it is not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that a document is void‘. It is held as under:

  • “25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. ….”
  • “28. In State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, reported in 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522, this Court held that as far as void and non-est documents are concerned, it would be enough for the plaintiff to file a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. …… Subsequently, the decision of this Court in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 186 … opined as follows:
    • .i. First, the contention of the State that it is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that would apply, was rejected. It was held that the suit is primarily one for possession of property based upon title. It was observed that owing to the decision in Bhim Singhji (supra), the order dated 26.05.1976 along with the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 became void ab intio and without jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that they are void. The plea about their invalidity could be raised in the course of any proceedings. Therefore, it is Article 65, which deals with a suit for possession based on title, that would apply from the date on the which the possession of the defendant State became adverse to the plaintiff.
    • ii. Secondly, though the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order dated 26.05.1976 and the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 were void, yet it was held that the same would be of no consequence insofar as the question of limitation is concerned.
  • The fact would still remain that the possession of the property was taken by the defendants via void documents. Therefore, such documents could be ignored and a suit for possession simpliciter, for which the period of limitation prescribed under Article 65, i.e., 12 years, could be filed. In the course of such proceedings, it could be contended by the plaintiff that the documents are a nullity.
  • …”
  • “29. This Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353, discussed the position of law as to when Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and opined as follows:
    • .i. First, that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only encompass within its fold fraudulent transactions which are ‘voidable’ transactions and not those that are ‘void’. In other words, Article 59 would apply only where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to those instruments which are presumptively invalid.
    • ii. Secondly, that when the document in question is void ab initio/or void, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary since such a transaction would be non-est in the eyes of law, owing to it being a nullity.
    • iii. Thirdly, a fine distinction was drawn between fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ and fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘contents of a document’. It is only in the former situation that the instrument would be void and, in the latter, it would remain voidable. To put it simply, Article 59 would not govern the period of limitation in respect of a void transaction.
    • iv. Lastly, that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was thereby void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder, i.e., he could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority.
    • ….”
  • “30. In the decision of this Court in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, where one of us, J.B. Pardiwala J., was a member of the Bench, it was reiterated that a person who is not a party to an instrument would not be obliged in law to seek its cancellation. The reason being that such an instrument would neither be likely to affect his title nor be binding on him. However, such a plaintiff must at least seek a declaration that the said instrument is not binding on him or that is invalid insofar as he is concerned. ………
  • 31. As per the dictum in Prem Singh (supra), this Court, in order to ascertain whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed. Both the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed therein. Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio. Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation. The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale deed. Consequently, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would find no application to the case in hand.
  • 32. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury (supra), it was clearly opined that a plaintiff who is not a party to the instrument in question need not seek its cancellation. We are not oblivious to the fact that in a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrumentthe said decision laid down a requirement that a declaration must be sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff. Howeverthe said decision clarified that whether the plaintiff has sought such a declaration or not could be culled out from a holistic reading of the plaint along with the relief(s) sought. In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”
  • “34. We may look at the matter from one another angle. Apart from the aspect of fraud, the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 18 SCC 489, while looking into whether the defendants had paid any sale consideration to the plaintiff while purchasing the plaintiff’s share in the property, held as follows:
    • .i. First, that the sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future. If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
    • ii. Secondly, that, in the said case, the defendants could not rebut the allegation of the plaintiff that no sale consideration was paid as no evidence was adduced to indicate – (a) the actual payment of the price mentioned in the sale deeds and, (b) that the defendants had any earning capacity at the time of the transaction such that the sale consideration could have been paid. As such the sale deed being void for want of valid consideration, could not be said to have affected the one-half share of the plaintiff in the suit properties nor have conferred any right of title on the defendants. In fact, it was held that the sale deeds were a sham and must be ignored.
    • iii. Lastly, it was reiterated that a document that is void need not be challenged by seeking a declaration as the said pleas can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.”
  • “The relevant observations are thus:
    • “……
    • Thus, the sale deeds of 10-4-1981 will not confer any right, title and interest on Sudarshan Kumar’s wife and children, as the sale deeds will have to be ignored, being void. It was not necessary for the appellant to specifically claim a declaration as regards the sale deeds by way of amendment to the plaint. The reason being that there were specific pleadings in the plaints as originally filed that the sale deeds were void. A document which is void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
    • …..”

End Notes I

A suit for (i) declaration of Title and (ii) Recovery – Art. 65 Governs; Not, Art. 58.

Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) v. Jagan Devi,  2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September, 2025,  (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)  1. Crux of the issue whether Article 65 or Article 59 
2. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460 – void and non-est documents – a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 would apply
3. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 186 – Claim of title void ab initio and without jurisdiction – suit for possession based upon title – not necessary to claim any separate declaration that they are void. -invalidity could be raised in any proceedings. – Article 65 deals with.
N. Thajudeen v. TN Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641  declaration of title and recovery of possession – relief of declaration would only be an ancillaryone
K. Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)  If Document ex-facie reveals- conveyer hadno title – No Specific declaration needed.  
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183  Suit for possession, as a consequence of declaration – Article 58 will have no application
Prem Singh v. Birbal  (2006) 5 SCC 3531. Article 59 fraudulent transactions – ‘voidable’ not ‘void’. 2. Article 59 apply where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to presumptively invalid. 3. Article 65 apply when document is void ab initio or void 4. A decree for setting aside the document void ab initio or void would not be necessary since – non-est. 5. Fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ would be void, not ‘contents’.  Article 59 would not govern a void transaction.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460The sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply, and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years.
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549Once the title is established,  the defendant to prove adverse possession (Followed in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021)
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808  declaration with a further reliefArticle governing -that for such further relief
Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 Declaration with possession – Article 65 would come into play giving 12 year period – not Article 58.
S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840Article 58 is not applicable for declaration sought only as an ancillary relief.
Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47Document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47) referred.
K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.)1. suit for recovery based on title,  limitation arise only when adverse possession 2.  recovery of possession on title – declaration is only subservient to the main prayer, possession 3. Article 58 will apply only to a suit for declaration simplicitor.

End Notes II

Declaration of Title & Recovery: Article 65 of the Limitation Act Governs; Not, 58

58To obtain any other declarationThree years.When the right to sue first accrues.
59To cancel or set aside an instrumentor decree or for the rescission of a contract.Three years.When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
65  For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.Twelve years.When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

End Notes III

Earlier Supreme Court Decisions

1. Kizhakkevattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024-4 SCR 383; 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)

  • “If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence.”

2. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641

  • “In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

3. C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183

  • “If the plaintiff is to be granted a relief of recovery of possession, the suit could be filed within a period of 12 years. It is one thing to say that whether such a relief can be granted or not after the evidences are led by the parties but it is another thing to say that the plaint is to be rejected on the ground that the same is barred by any law. If the suit has been filed for possession, as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiffs title, Article 58 will have no application.”

4. Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, AIR 2002 SC 215; (2002) 1 SCC 178.

  • “Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding.”

5. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460, held as under:

  • “6. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji’s case (Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 166), Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj & Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi2 this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.”

6. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 808

  • In a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief.

The Kerala High Court, in Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

  • “When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

  • “39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
  • 40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

In Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 it is held as under:

  • “Article 58 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in a suit for declaration, but it has no application when the relief sought in the plaint is not for a mere declaration,but coupled with other reliefs like injunction, partition, possession etc. and Article 65 of the Limitation Act would come into play giving 12 year period. In the instant case, the relevant Article which can be applied is not Article 58, but Article 65 as the suit was filed not merely for a relief of declaration, but for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of immovable property.”

In S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith:  2009 (4) KerLT 840, it is held that Article 58 is not applicable for declaration that is sought only as an ancillary relief. It is held as under:

  • “When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought for that is which would not govern the period of limitation for the suit. The consequential relief sought for is to be treated as main relief governing the period of limitation for the suit. (See Mrs. Indira Bhalchandran Gokhale v. Union of India & Another-AIR 1990 Bombay 98). Therefore declaration prayed for in this case as relief Nos. 1 and 2 were unnecessary, and even if made, need only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition of immovable prop

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Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic)

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Pleadings are to be Considered as a Whole. When Lack of Pleadings Amounts to a Material Flaw?

Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract: Why ‘Particulars’ are Insisted in Pleadings

  • 1. To give Notice to the other side.  
  • 2. To narrow down the controversy.
  • 3. To give definiteness to the stance of parties in court.
  • 4. Pleadings must be pregnant enough to produce an issue.
  • 5. It is Court that draws inference as to ‘abstract’ propositions.
  • 6. Pleadings constitute the skeleton that give shape to the case.
  • 7. In the Absence of Pleading, Evidence cannot be Considered.

Classic Rulings on this Subject

  • Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067
  • Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260
  • Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Asstt. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137
  • Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555
  • Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, 1978 KHC 500: AIR 1978 SC 484
  • Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735

Fundamental Rules of Pleadings

The Supreme Court of India pointed out, in Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067, the fundamental rules of pleadings, as under:

  • The pleadings must be read as a whole,
  • The purport of proper pleadings is – caused no prejudice to the other side.
  • When a question arises as to a flaw in the pleadings, it must be considered in the light of the evidence.
  • Impropriety (or otherwise) of a lack of pleading is tested on the touchstone – whether it caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants (or not).

The Apex Court (Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067) explained the position vividly as under:

  • “17. A comprehensive look at the pleadings taken by the appellant along with the site-plan attached to the petition makes it evident that the appellant gave out a detailed description of the extent of accommodation available in the suit property as also the accommodation presently in her occupation and the nature and extent of her requirement. In the pleadings, it was indeed specified that the appellant was residing on the property bearing No. “C-586/587”. The pleadings taken by the appellant in paragraph 18(a)(ii) of her petition, of course, begin with the expression “as stated above” and there had not been any earlier mention of property bearing No. “C-586/587” but, there had been detailed description in the preceding paragraphs and the site plan was also attached to the petition. The appellant further made the position clear in her cross-examination that the building in question was constructed on Plot Nos.586 and 587 jointly and she and her sister-in-law were residing in the same building as one family.
  • 18. Taking the pleadings as a whole and reading the same with the evidence, it is clear that there had not been any such mis-description of the property which would amount to a material flaw in the case of the appellant or which could have caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants.”

Object and Purpose of Pleadings

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, it was held as under:

  • “The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise.”

Order VI, rule 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 lay down the basics of pleading. They read as under:

  • Rule 1: Pleading: “Pleading” shall mean plaint or written statement.
  • Rule 2: Pleading to state material facts and not evidence:
  • (1) Every pleading shall contain, and contain only a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.
  • (2) Every pleading shall, when necessary, be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively, each allegation being, so far as is convenient, contained in a separate paragraph.
  • (3) Dates, sums and numbers shall be expressed in a pleading in figures as well as in words.

Pleadings should Receive a Liberal Construction

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, it was held as under:

  • “The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law, in such a case it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial.

Deficiency in Pleadings Doesn’t Matter if the Parties Knew the Case

In Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, 1966-2 SCR 286, the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court observed as under :

  • “If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is : did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another.”

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, relying on Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, 1966-2 SCR 286, it was held as under:

  • “Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.”

No Pedantic Approach and Hair Splitting Technicalities Permitted

In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Asstt. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137, it was held as under:

  • “15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair­splitting technicalities.”(Quoted in: Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR 2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260)

In Augustine @ Mervin Alexander v. Josmy @ Geetha, 2022-5 KerHC(SN) 13; 2022-4 KerLT 966, it is held that it is well settled that pleadings should receive a liberal construction. The High Court continued as under:

  • “No pedantic approach is to be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Pleadings has to be construed reasonably. The contention of the parties has to be culled out from the pleadings by reading the same as a whole. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with the strict interpretation of the law. In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised, the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings. The court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues, upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of the deficiency in the pleadings, parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on the issues by producing evidence, it would not be open to a party to raise the question of lack of pleadings [See: Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College AIR 1987 SC 1242].”

In the Absence of Pleading, Evidence cannot be Considered

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, it was also pointed out as under:

  • “6. … It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it.”

Plea of Adverse Possession

In M. Siddiq (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1, on the question of Adverse Possession it is pointed out that the plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat rights of true owner and law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence and that the ingredients must be set up in pleadings and proved in evidence. There can be no proof sans pleadings and pleadings without evidence will not establish a case in law. (Paras 748, 751, 752, 754 and 755)

Pleadings and Future Damages

In Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735; 1966-2 SCR 286, it was held as under:

  • “Once it is held that the plaintiff is entitled to eject the defendant, it follows that from the date of the decree granting the relief of ejectment to the plaintiff, the defendant who remains in possession of the property despite the decree, must pay mesne profits or damages for use and occupation of the said property until it is delivered to the plaintiff. A decree for ejectment in such a case must be accompanied by a direction for payment of the future mesne profits or damages. Then as to the rate at which future mesne profits can be awarded to the plaintiff, we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the trial Court that the reasonable amount in the present case would be Rs. 300/- per month.”

Rejection of Plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and Pleading

In Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706, it is observed as under: ­

  • “10 … It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial.
  • This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557, in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under: (SCC p. 560, para 9)
    • “9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.”
  • It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. vs. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184 and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. vs. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100.
  • It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, wherein while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in considering such application, this Court has reminded the trial Judges with the following observation: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
    • “5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10, C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.”
  • It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer J., in the above referred decision, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code.”(Quoted in: Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260).

In Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174, the legal position is analysed as under: ­

  • “7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.” (Quoted in: Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260.)

Why should crucial documents be produced along with the Plaint or WS?

  • 1. To prevent surprise to the opposite side.
  • 2. To substantiate and assure pleadings, and ensure fair play.
  • 3. To enable the court and the opposite side to understand the case fully.
  • 4. The CPC mandates it (Order VII Rule 14 & Order VIII Rule 1A).

CPC also mandates the production of all remaining documents before framing of issues (so that the court can frame proper issues).

Documents Are Not Pleadings; But, They Support Pleadings

  • Pleadings mean Plaint or Written Statement.  They are statements of fact alone (Order VI Rule 1 CPC).
  • The documents cannot be used to supplement missing facts, and will not cure the defect of ‘not pleading’ a fact merely because the document is produced with the pleadings that contain the relevant fact.
  • The documents, even if produced along with the Pleadings, will not automatically become evidence.
  • The documents cannot be used as materials to introduce new facts (without making an amendment of the pleadings).

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Foundational or Crucial Documents Be Produced Along With the Plaint or WS. Why?

Order VII Rule 14(3) and Order VIII Rule 1A C.P.C Confer Power to Receive Documents if ‘Good Cause‘ is shown for the Late Production of the Documents

Jojy George Koduvath

PART I

Why should foundational or crucial documents be produced along with the plaint or WS?

  • 1. To prevent surprise to the opposite side.
  • 2. To substantiate and assure pleadings, and ensure fair play.
  • 3. To enable the court and the opposite side to understand the case fully.
  • 4. The CPC mandates it (Order VII Rule 14 & Order VIII Rule 1A).

CPC also mandates the production of all remaining documents before framing of issues (so that the court can frame proper issues).

Documents Are Not Pleadings; They only Support Pleadings

  • Pleadings mean Plaint or Written Statement.  They are statements of fact alone (Order VI Rule 1 CPC).
  • The documents cannot be used to supplement missing facts, and will not cure the defect of ‘not pleading’ a fact merely because the document is produced with the pleadings that contain the relevant fact.
  • The documents, even if produced along with the Pleadings, will not automatically become evidence.
  • The documents cannot be used as materials to introduce new facts (without making an amendment of the pleadings).

Relevant Provisions in the CPC

Order VII Rule 14 CPC:

“Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies:

  • (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
    • (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
    • (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
    • (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiffs witnesses, or handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”

Order VIII Rule 1A CPC:

“Duty of defendant to produce documents upon which relief is claimed or relied upon by him

  • .(1) Where the defendant bases his defence upon a document or relies upon any document in his possession or power, in support of his defence or claim for set-off or counter-claim, he shall enter such document in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the written statement is presented by him and shall, at the same time, deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the written statement.
  • (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the defendant, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
  • (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the defendant under this rule, but, is not so produced shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
  • (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to documents— (a) produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”

Order 13 Rule 1.

“Original documents to be produced at or before the settlement of issues

  • .(1) The parties or their pleader shall produce on or before the settlement of issues, all the documentary evidence in original where the copies thereof have been filed along with plaint or written statement.
  • (2) The court shall receive the documents so produced:
  • Provided that they are accompanied by an accurate list thereof prepared in such form as the High Court directs.
  • (3) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to documents
  • (a) produced for the cross-examination of the witnesses of the other party; or
  • (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”

Rule 4 of Order 18.

“Recording of evidence

  • .(1) In every case, the examination-in-chief of a witness shall be on affidavit and copies thereof shall be supplied to the opposite party by the party who calls him for evidence:
  • Provided that where documents are filed and the parties rely upon the documents, the proof and admissibility of such documents which are filed along with affidavit shall be subject to the orders of the court.
  • xxx”

Rule 27 of Order 41.

“Production of additional evidence in appellate court

  • “(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court. But if—
  • (a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted; or
  • (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed; or
  • (b) the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined.
  • (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate court, the court shall record the reason for its admission….”

Documents Filed With the Pleadings Do Not Automatically Become Evidence

  • Though documents filed with the plaint or WS form part of the record, they do not automatically become evidence (that is, done at the evidentiary stage).

Requirement Of Production Of Documents Along With Plaint / WS

  • When deciding an application under Order VII, Rule 11 (i.e., for rejection of plaint). See: Gurmeet Singh Sachdeva v. Skyways Air Services (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3017,

Fundamental Rules of Pleadings

The Supreme Court of India pointed out, in Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067, the fundamental rules of pleadings, as under:

  • The pleadings must be read as a whole,
  • The purport of proper pleadings is – caused no prejudice to the other side.
  • When a question arises as to a flaw in the pleadings, it must be considered in the light of the evidence.
  • Impropriety (or otherwise) of a lack of pleading is tested on the touchstone – whether it caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants (or not).

When Documents Produced with the Plaint are Considered as Part of Pleadings

They are considered when an ambiguity arises as to pleadings. In Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067, our Apex Court explained the position as under:

  • “17. A comprehensive look at the pleadings taken by the appellant along with the site-plan attached to the petition makes it evident that the appellant gave out a detailed description of the extent of accommodation available in the suit property as also the accommodation presently in her occupation and the nature and extent of her requirement. In the pleadings, it was indeed specified that the appellant was residing on the property bearing No. “C-586/587”. The pleadings taken by the appellant in paragraph 18(a)(ii) of her petition, of course, begin with the expression “as stated above” and there had not been any earlier mention of property bearing No. “C-586/587” but, there had been detailed description in the preceding paragraphs and the site plan was also attached to the petition. The appellant further made the position clear in her cross-examination that the building in question was constructed on Plot Nos.586 and 587 jointly and she and her sister-in-law were residing in the same building as one family.
  • 18. Taking the pleadings as a whole and reading the same with the evidence, it is clear that there had not been any such mis-description of the property which would amount to a material flaw in the case of the appellant or which could have caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants.”

When Documents Produced With the Plaint are Treated As “Part Of The Plaint

  • When deciding an application under Order VII, Rule 11 (i.e., for rejection of the plaint).

The Supreme Court observed in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajrat), (2020) 7 SCC 366, as under:

  • “23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.”(Followed in: Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 INSC 1025; 2024 KLT Online 3058).

PART II

Leave of the Court Necessary

The Supreme Court, in Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar, AIR 2020 SC 5486; 2020-10 SCC 706, held as under:

  • “Sub-rule (3), as quoted above, provides a second opportunity to the defendant to produce the documents which ought to have been produced in the court along with the written statement, with the leave of the court. The discretion conferred upon the court to grant such leave is to be exercised judiciously. While there is no straight-jacket formula, this leave can be granted by the court on a good cause being shown by the defendant.”

Court Should Take a Lenient View

Our Apex Court, in Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar, AIR 2020 SC 5486; 2020-10 SCC 706, further held as under:

  • “It is often said that procedure is the handmaid of justice. Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of the court while doing substantial justice. If the procedural violation does not seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party, courts must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violation. We should not forget the fact that litigation is nothing but a journey towards truth which is the foundation of justice and the court is required to take appropriate steps to thrash out the underlying truth in every dispute. Therefore, the court should take a lenient view when an application is made for production of the documents under Sub-rule (3).”

In Dewanti Devi v. Radheshyam Tiwary, 2019 SCC Online Pat 28, it is held as follows:

  • “6. Order 8 Rule 1A(3) of the CPC provides that the documents, which have not been produced along with the written statement, cannot be produced to the court later on without the leave of the court. Thus, if a document is to be produced by a defendant, the same is to be produced with the written statement. Subsequent production of document can be done only if the court is satisfied with the grounds explained for non-production of the documents at the time of filing of the written statement.”

Late Production & “Good Cause”

In S. Rathinaswamy v. S. Bhanumathi, AIR 2006 Mad 221; 2006-3 MLJ 593, R. Banumathi, J. found as under:

  • “18. The main object of Or. 7 R. 14(3) C.P.C conferring the power upon the Court to receive the documents in genuine cases is to receive the documents if good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for the non-production of the documents at the earlier stage. The Courts are expected to receive the documents and give an opportunity to the parties.”

Law on Sufficient Cause

In Kasthuri v. C. Mohan, 2007-1 (Mad) LW 560 (V. Ramasubramaniam, J.), pointed out the difference between the language in the provisions of Order VII Rule 14 Sub Rule 3, after the amendment by Act 46 of 1999 and the provisions of Order XIII Rule 1 and 2 (1), as under:

  • “13. But it is not so. The Amendment Act 22 of 2002 has introduced a new Sub-rule (3) to Rule 14 of Order VII, in the place of the Sub-rule (3) substituted by Amendment Act 49 of 1999. The new Sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 of Order VII, after the Amendment of 2002 reads as follows:
  • Substituted by Act 22 of 2002 w.e.f. 1.7.2002 – (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
  • Thus the deletion of the provision, enabling to production of documents “at any subsequent stage of the proceedings” under Order XIII Rule 2 as it stood before amendment, has been compensated by the introduction of Sub-rule (3) under Rule 14 of Order VII under Amendment Act of 2002. Therefore, the right of a party to file a document at the time of hearing of the suit, if he has not already filed such document along with the plaint, is retained by the Amendment of 2002. All that is required under such circumstances, is that the plaintiff should take “the leave of the Court“. Even the words “good cause” that appeared under Order XIII Rule 2(1) before the amendment are absent in the newly introduced Sub Rule 3 of Rule 14 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a matter of fact, even in the judgment cited by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Madanlal v. Shyamlal, 2002 (1) SC 535, the Apex Court observed that the power under Order XIII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure(before amendment) should be exercised liberally and that “good cause” requires lesser decree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. Therefore, in view of the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 14 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act 22 of 2002, the respondents were entitled to file the documents in question, with the leave of the Court, which is what they have done in this case. The power of the Court to grant leave for a plaintiff to file additional documents under Order VII Rule 14 (3) is not even circumscribed by words such as “good cause” that were found in Order XIII Rule 2 before Amendment.”

In Hindustan Unilever Limited, Chennai v. Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd., 22 Mar 2018(Mad), after referring to Kasthuri v. C. Mohan, 2007 (1) LW 560 (Mad), it was observed as under:

  • “8. The sum and substance of the conclusions of the learned Judge is that on a comparative reading of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, regarding the receipt of documents as they stood prior to the amendment in 1999 and after the amendment would show that the power of the Court to receive documents is much more wider and liberal than what it was prior to the amendment of the Code.
  • In S. Rathinaswamy v. S. Bhanumathi, reported in 2006 (2) CTC 491, this Court had considered the scope of Order VII Rule 14(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, again after referring to the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, introduced in the year 1999 and 2002, it was held that the main object of Order VII Rule 14(3), conferring the power of the Court to receive the documents in genuine cases is to receive the documents if good cause, is shown to the satisfaction of the Court, for the non-production of the documents at an earlier stage. It was also pointed out that after all the procedure is only a handmaid of justice and Courts should always attempt to do complete justice between the parties, based on the evidence that is produced and not shut out the evidence.”

Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Usha Kiran Saxena v. Amit Maheshwari, Jan 8, 2025 (Ramesh Phadke, J.) stated as follows:

  • “11. Whenever documents are sought to be adduced as a corroborative evidence in support of the claim made in the plaint rigor of the rules can be said to be relaxed. Order 7 Rule 14 (3) C.P.C. enables the Court to receive the documents which are not filed along with the plaint in genuine cases and obviously the reason behind this is to avoid delay and when the documents are necessary for adjudication of the matter in dispute then the application can be allowed even if it is belatedly filed.”

The  Madhya Pradesh High Court relied on the Apex Court decision in the case of Rani Kusum v. Kanchan Devi Rani, AIR 2005 SC 3304; 2005-6 SCC 705, which laid down as under:-

  • “No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending, and if, by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. (See Blyth v. Blyth (1966 (1) All E.R. 524 (HL). A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. (See Shreenath and Anr. v.Rajesh and Ors. (AIR 1998 SC 1827) Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.”

Madhya Pradesh High Court, in a subsequent decision, Usha Kiran Saxena v. Amit Maheshwari (Anand Pathak, J.), July 27, 2023, held as under:

  • “7. …. Although documents were filed but not accompanied with the application under Order VII Rule 14(3) of CPC. Objection was raised by the petitioner but once the trial Court allowed the application preferred by respondent No.1 under Order VII Rule 14(3) of CPC then objections of petitioner were impliedly considered and rejected. Even otherwise, it is bi-parte order, therefore, all the parties were given opportunity to advance arguments.
  • 8. Procedures are handmaid to Justice and not Master of it and taking such hyper technical approach does not lead to justice.”

The Delhi High Court in Pradeep Bailey v. Gilma Daniel (18 June, 2025, Ravinder Dudeja, J.) after quoting Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, said as under:

  • “11. A plain reading of Order 7 Rule 14 CPC makes it clear that plaintiff has to present the relevant documents with the plaint. Subsequently, such documents cannot be presented without the leave of the court. The provision thus creates a bar on production of additional documents if the same have not been mentioned in the list of documents annexed to the plaint and produced at the time of filing the same, unless the leave of the court is sought. This principle was reiterated by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Polyflor Limited Vs. Sh. A. Goenka & Ors. in OA No. 84/2016 CS (OS) 504/2016.
  • 12. The Coordinate Bench of the this Court in Haldiram (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held that it is a discretionary power of the court to allow belated filing of a document. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:
  • “21. In any event, both under the old Order 7 Rule 18 sub-rule (1) and new Order 7 Rule 14 sub-rule (3) CPC a new document can certainly be produced on behalf of plaintiff at the final hearing of suit, but the same has to be done with leave of the Court. It is not that the plaintiff has a legal vested right to file a document at a belated stage i.e. at the final hearing of the suit. The said provision gives a discretionary power to the Court, which needless to say has to be exercised in a reasonable and legal manner. In fact, this power has to be exercised sparingly and for some overpowering reason and not as a matter of routine. If petitioners‟ interpretation of Sub Rule 3 is accepted, it would make it impossible for the trial court to conclude the hearing of any suit.”
  • 13. It is no more res-integra that the rules of procedure are handmaid of justice and should not come in the way of delivering substantial justice. In the case of Sugandhi (dead) by Lrs. & Anr. Vs. P. Rajkumar, represented by his power agent Imam Oli(2020) 10 SCC 706, the Apex Court discussed the factors which must be considered while granting permission to produce additional documents under Section 8 Rule 1-A CPC. It was observed that procedure is handmaid of justice. If the procedural violation does not cause prejudice to the adversary party, procedural and technical hurdles should not come in the way of the courts while doing substantial justice. Thus, the courts should take a lenient view while deciding an application under Order 8 Rule 1-A CPC.
  • 14. In Mrs. Nalini Lal Vs State of NCT of Delhi & Others, TEST.CAS.22/2009, a Coordinate Bench of this Court while allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 14 of CPC, held that the said provision allows for the submission of additional documents if the Court grants leave and if such documents are necessary for resolving the real issues between the parties. It was again emphasized that procedural rules should not hinder substantive justice.
  • 15. In the case of Mohanraj Vs. Kewalchand Hastimal Jain &Ors. AIR 2007 Bom. 69, the Bombay High Court discussed the object of Order 7 Rule 14 CPC and observed that the provision is enacted to assist the parties and the courts in the manner of production of documentary evidence while adjudicating the disputes, to arrive at an appropriate decision on the matter. In this regard, the provision is to be construed liberally and a pedantic approach should not be taken while enforcing the provision of law. A documentary evidence which is relevant and material for the just and appropriate decision should be allowed to be produced and merely because the party failed to enter the same in the list annexed to the plaint, it should not be ignored unless the plaintiff can show that there would be real prejudice caused if such permission is granted.

Finally the High Court held as under:

  • “21. The documents referred to in the application under Order 7 Rule 14 CPC are for the purpose of showing that petitioner was not sitting idle and was indulging in work and was earning income, as also for showing that he has been making the payment of house tax of the property since after its purchase and was making payment of electricity and water bills and was also looking after his mother. The trial court failed to appreciate that additional documents sought to be placed were relevant to counter the averments of the respondent, as mentioned in the written statement. Undisputedly, the documents are relevant. Some of the documents are, in fact public documents. The authenticity and genuineness of the documents can be considered after granting an opportunity to the petitioner to prove the same. The contention of the petitioner that Wills dated 19.09.2000 & 24.08.2000 were not in his possession and he received them from his sister in law at a later stage, and therefore, being filed belatedly, cannot be disbelieved at this stage. The learned trial court disbelieved the argument of the petitioner that documents could not be filed due to negligence of the previous counsel of the petitioner. Be that as it may, even if it was a mistake on the part of the petitioner, as per the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Nishant Hannan (supra), the parties do make the mistakes in the conduct of their cases and therefore such mistakes should be allowed to be corrected unless there is a great prejudice to the other side. The trial is still at an initial stage. The parties are yet to lead evidence, and therefore, no great prejudice shall be caused to the respondent in case the documents are allowed to be taken on record.
  • 22. The procedural rules under the CPC are intended to ensure substantive justice and exclusion of the documents in the present case would amount to elevating procedural technicalities over substantive justice, thereby, defeating the very purpose of fair adjudication.
  • 23. In view of the above, I find that the impugned order suffers from gross illegality and perversity in disallowing the petitioner/plaintiff from filing the additional documents by dismissing the application of the petitioner/plaintiff.”

Pleading and Evidence

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242, 1987-2 SCC 555, it was held as under:

  • “6. … It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. To have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should settle the essential material facts so that the other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words that may not expressly make out a case in accordance with a strict interpretation of the law. In such a case the court must ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead, the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings; instead, the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings, parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal….” (Quoted in: Mohammed Abdul Wahid v. Nilofer, 2023 INSC 1075,  (2024) 2 SCC 144); Mohan Hirachand Shah v. Geeta Kumarchand Shah,19-03-2024)

It is also pointed out in this decision:

  • “Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead; the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.
  • In Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, [1956] 1 SCR 286 a Constitution Bench of this Court considering this question observed:
  • “If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is: did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to reply upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another.”

Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal (2008) 17 SCC 491:

  • “10(i). No amount of evidence can be looked into, upon a plea which was never put forward in the pleadings. A question which did arise from the pleadings and which was not the subject matter of an issue, cannot be decided by the court.” ….” (Quoted in: Mohan Hirachand Shah v. Geeta Kumarchand Shah,19-03-2024)

Biraji @ Brijraji v. Surya Pratap (2020) 10 SCC 729:

  • “8. …It is fairly well settled that in absence of pleading, any amount of evidence will not help the party….” (Quoted in: Mohan Hirachand Shah v. Geeta Kumarchand Shah,19-03-2024)

Delhi High Court, in Brij Praksh Gupta v. Ashwini Kumar, on 6 February, 2020, Prathiba M. Singh, J., observed as under:

  •  “A party to the suit cannot be permitted to travel beyond his pleadings. If any evidence is tried to be adduced which has no foundation in the pleadings, the Court always has a power to discard such evidence while finally deciding the suit or proceeding.”

Sikkim HC held in Surja Narayan Pradhan v. Jumden Lepcha (May 11, 2022) 03 SIK CK 0021, as under:

  • “It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered and no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings.” 

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

The Doctrine of ‘Prima Facie Case’ in Criminal Cases

Jojy George Koduvath.

Preface

The term prima facie has been authoritatively explained by the Supreme Court in Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2023 SC 5551, wherein the Court laid down the meaning and scope of the words as under:

  • “The Latin expression prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first view”, or “based on first impression”. According, to Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”.
  • In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, or if an opposing party introduces contradictory evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties.”

Introduction:

The doctrine of prima facie Case’ arises for consideration in various stages of criminal proceedings, as under:

  1. For Ordering Investigation under [Section 156(3), CrPC ] and Taking Cognizance & Issuing Process [Sections 190 & 204 CrPC]:
    What is required is the Prima Facie existence of sufficient ground to proceed. At this stage, the Magistrate needs only to be satisfied that the complaint discloses a cognizable offence warranting investigation.
  2. For Quashing of FIR [Section 482, CrPC ] :
    The test is whether the allegations in the FIR Prima Facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or Article 226 of the Constitution, is not required to assess the merits of the allegations or examine the probability of conviction.
  3. For Framing of Charge / Discharge [Sections 227 to 239 CrPC]:
    The Court must examine whether the materials in the charge sheet and accompanying documents Prima Facie disclose sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. At this stage, the standard of proof required for conviction is not applicable—what is required is only a Prima Facie, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
  4. Grant or Refusal of Bail:
    While deciding bail applications, courts examine whether a Prima Facie case exists against the accused.

1. S. 156(3) – Prima Facie ‘EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT GROUND TO PROCEED’

It is held in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka as under:

  • “38. In the background of the factual position, the JMFC’s Order dated 18.01.2018 cannot be faulted. Enough material is available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police. The JMFC, to our mind, had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a prima facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC.
  • xxx
  • 40. The … JMFC had referred the matter to police under Section 156(3) of the Code, and the usage of ‘further’ was not in the context of Section 173(8) of the Code, which fine distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over. The case(s) at hand, in our considered view, demonstrate material showing the commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of itwhich would merit police investigation. Therefore, interdiction of the Impugned Orders is necessitated.”

Read also:

In Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2024 SC 4531, it is held as under:

  • “If at the stage of pre-cognizance, the Magistrate is expected to be careful or to put it in other words, the Magistrate is obliged to look into the complaint threadbare so as to reach to a prima facie conclusion whether the offence is disclosed or not, then he is expected to be more careful when he is actually taking cognizance upon a private complaint and ordering issue of process.”

In Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2019 SC 5233; 2019-17 SCC 1 (R.F. Nariman, Surya Kant, V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.) it is held as under:

  • “42. … To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases midway through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out.”

In Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage, (2016) 6 SCC 277, it is observed as under:

  • “2. This Court has held in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., that if a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or having been registered, proper investigation is not being done, then the remedy of the aggrieved person is not to go to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but to approach the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3) CrPC. If such an application under Section 156(3) CrPC is made and the Magistrate is, prima facie, satisfied, he can direct the FIR to be registered, or if it has already been registered, he can direct proper investigation to be done which includes in his discretion, if he deems it necessary, recommending change of the investigating officer, so that a proper investigation is done in the matter. We have said this in Sakiri Vasu case because what we have found in this country is that the High Courts have been flooded with writ petitions praying for registration of the first information report or praying for a proper investigation.
  • We are of the opinion that if the High Courts entertain such writ petitions, then they will be flooded with such writ petitions and will not be able to do any other work except dealing with such writ petitions. Hence, we have held that the complainant must avail of his alternate remedy to approach the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3) CrPC and if he does so, the Magistrate will ensure, if prima facie he is satisfied, registration of the first information report and also ensure a proper investigation in the matter, and he can also monitor the investigation.”

In Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda, (2015) 12 SCC 420, it is said as under:

  • “22… The satisfaction on the ground for proceeding would mean that the facts alleged in the complaint would constitute an offence, and when considered along with the statements recorded, would, prima facie, make the accused answerable before the court…In other words, the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of each and every complaint filed before him and issue process as a matter of course. There must be sufficient indication in the order passed by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that the allegations in the complaint constitute an offence and when considered along with the statements recorded and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under Section 202 of CrPC, if any, the accused is answerable before the criminal court, there is ground for proceeding against the accused under Section 204 of CrPC, by issuing process for appearance. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction…To be called to appear before criminal court as an accused is serious matter affecting one’s dignity, self respect and image in society. Hence, the process of criminal court shall not be made a weapon of harassment.” (Quoted in: Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2024 SC 4531)

In Sunil Bharti Mittal v. C.B.I., (2015) 4 SCC 609, it is held as under:

  • “53. However, the words “sufficient ground for proceeding” appearing in Section 204 are of immense importance. It is these words which amply suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie, case against the accused, though the order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect.” (Quoted in: Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2024 SC 4531)

2. Quashing FIR – Prima Facie ‘DISCLOSE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENCE’ Matters

It is pointed out by the three-judge bench in  Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra (Dr. DY. Chandrachud, M.R. Shah,  Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.), (2021) 19 SCC 401, that the court has to exercise the powers for quashing the FIR in a very sparing manner. It is observed as under:

  • “33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.’

The Apex Court, while discussing the powers to quash the first information report under Section 482 Cr. P.C or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 (K.T. Thomas & M.B. Shah, JJ.), it was observed and held as under:

  • “14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. [State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283] It is also settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370, 395 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 180]”
  • (Quoted in  Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401)

3. Framing Charges – Only a Prima Facie Case for PROCEEDING be Satisfied

In Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, AIR 2020 SC 554, 2020-2  SCC 217 (Hrishikesh Roy, A.S. Bopanna, R. Banumathi, JJ.), it is observed as under:

  • “12. Though the circumstances alleged in the charge sheet are to be established during the trial by adducing the evidence, the allegations in the charge sheet show a prima facie case against the accused-respondent Nos.1 and 2. The circumstances alleged by the prosecution indicate that there are  against the accused. At the time of framing the charges, only prima facie case is to be seen; whether case is beyond reasonable doubt, is not to be seen at this stage. At the stage of framing the charge, the court has to see if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. While evaluating the materials, strict standard of proof is not required; only prima facie case against the accused is to be seen.”

See also:

  • State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294
  • Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217
  • Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148
  • State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, AIR 2017 SC 796,
  • Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460
  • Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135
  • State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338
  • State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659
  • Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.
  • Union of India  v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4.

4. Grant or Refusal of Bail:
While deciding bail applications, courts examine whether a Prima Facie case exists against the accused.

In Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “19. Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence are required to be satisfied and further while granting such relief, the court must record the reasons therefor. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has falsely been enroped in the crime and would not misuse his liberty. (See D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran (2007) 4 SCC 434, State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain (2008) 1 SCC 213 and Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal (2008) 13 SCC 305.)”
  • (Quoted in: P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2019 SC  4198; (2019) 9 SCC 24.)

In P. Chidambaram v. Central Bureau Of Investigation, AIR 2019 SC 5272; 2020-13 SCC 337, it is observed as under:

  • “Expression of prima facie reasons for granting or refusing to grant bail is a requirement of law, especially where such bail orders are appealable so as to indicate application of mind to the matter under consideration and the reasons for conclusion. Recording of reasons is necessary since the accused/prosecution/victim has every right to know the reasons for grant or refusal to grant bail. This will also help the appellate court to appreciate and consider the reasonings for grant or refusal to grant bail. But giving reasons for exercise of discretion in granting or refusing to grant bail is different from discussing the merits or demerits of the case. At the stage of granting bail, an elaborate examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching upon the merit of the case, which may prejudice the accused, should be avoided. Observing that “at the stage of granting bail, detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case should be avoided”, in Niranjan Singh, it was held as under:-
    • “3. ……Detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits should be avoided while passing orders on bail applications. No party should have the impression that his case has been prejudiced. To be satisfied about a prima facie case is needed but it is not the same as an exhaustive exploration of the merits in the order itself.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka: Supreme Court held – Prima Facie Case as to Commission of Cognizable Offence, Merit Police Investigation

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

  • For Ordering Investigation under S. 156(3): Prima Facie ‘EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT GROUND TO PROCEED’ is enough.
  • For quashing the FIR: What is to be looked into is whether the allegations in the FIR Prima Facie Discloses The Commission Of A Cognizable Offence or not. The Court is not required to consider the merits while considering quashing the first information report under Section 482 Cr. P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

These were the matters discussed by the Supreme Court of India, in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka, 4 November 2025 (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Pankaj Mithal, JJ.).

Also Read: The Doctrine of ‘Prima Facie Case’ in Criminal Cases

Facts of the case

A Rent Agreement produced by the accused, on an E-Stamp Paper, was fake. Even the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of Stamps stated that Prima Facie the E- Stamp used was a fake E-Stamp. It was contended – since there was Prima Facie material that substantiates the appellant’s claim that the E- Stamp Paper is a forged document, the possibility of a conspiracy hatched by the accused cannot be ruled out.

The prime question for consideration

The prime question for consideration was the following:

  • Whether the direction for investigation to the police issued by the JMFC under  Section 156(3) of the Code, which was quashed by the Impugned Orders, is justified based on the facts and circumstances of the cases.

The Apex Court relied on the following decisions:

  • 1. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401,
  • 2. Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615,
  • 3. Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439.

The Apex Court, while exercising the powers to quash the first information report under Section 482 Cr. P.C or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is pointed out in a three-judge bench decision (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, M.R. Shah,  Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.) in  Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, that the court has to exercise the powers in a very sparing manner. It is observed as under:

  • ‘16. In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of process of law by converting a civil dispute into a criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurise the accused. Similarly, in a given case the complaint itself on the face of it can be said to be barred by law. The allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such cases and in exceptional cases with circumspection, the High Court may stay the further investigation. However, at the same time, there may be genuine complaints/FIRs and the police/investigating agency has a statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand and those innocent persons against whom the criminal proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case abuse of process of law and the process. However, if the facts are hazy and the investigation has just begun, the High Court would be circumspect in exercising such powers and the High Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed further with the investigation in exercise of its statutory duty under the provisions of the Code. Even in such a case the High Court has to give/assign brief reasons why at this stage the further investigation is required to be stayed. The High Court must appreciate that speedy investigation is the requirement in the criminal administration of justice.’
  • xxx
  •  ‘33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.’ (emphasis supplied)

In Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615 (P. Sathasivam, Jagdish Singh Khehar, JJ.), it was held as under:

  • “18. When a Magistrate receives a complaint he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The Magistrate has discretion in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint, he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence itself. As said earlier, in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). However, if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to revert back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3).”
  • “This position of law was recently reiterated in Lavanya C v Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 499, where one of us (P. Mithal, J.) was part of the coram.”

In Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439, three learned Judges (T.S. Thakur, Adarsh Kumar Goel, R. Banumathi) opined after noticing Cardinal Mar George Alencherry v. State of Kerala, (2023) 18 SCC 730, as under:

  • “13. We may first deal with the question as to whether the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3) or was justified in proceeding under Section 202(1) and what are the parameters for exercise of power under the two provisions.
  • xxx
  • 22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that:
  • 22.1. The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone the issuance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued.
  • 22.2. The cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine
    • existence of sufficient ground to proceed”.
  • Category of cases falling under para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] may fall under Section 202. Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case.
  • xxx
  • 38. In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy [(1976) 3 SCC 252: 1976 SCC (Cri) 380], National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz [(2013) 2 SCC 488: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 731], Madhao v. State of Maharashtra [(2013) 5 SCC 615: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 141], Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 4 SCC 185: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 801], the scheme of Sections 156(3) and 202 has been discussed. It was observed that power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before taking cognizance and was in the nature of pre-emptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its plenary power of investigation beginning with Section 156 and ending with report or charge-sheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 applies at post-cognizance stage and the direction for investigation was for the purpose of deciding whether there was sufficient ground to proceed.”

Finding of the Apex Court

It is held in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka as under:

  • “38. In the background of the factual position, the JMFC’s Order dated 18.01.2018 cannot be faulted. Enough material is available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police. The JMFC, to our mind, had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a Prima Facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC.
  • xxx
  • 40. The … JMFC had referred the matter to police under Section 156(3) of the Code, and the usage of ‘further’ was not in the context of Section 173(8) of the Code, which fine distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over. The case(s) at hand, in our considered view, demonstrate material showing the commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of itwhich would merit police investigation. Therefore, interdiction of the Impugned Orders is necessitated.”

Conclusion

In the background of the factual position, the Apex Court held that the JMFC’s Order cannot be faulted, and that enough material was available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police, and that the JMFC had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a Prima Facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC.

End Note:

Framing the Charges – Only a Prima Facie Case is to be Satisfied

In Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, AIR 2020 SC 554, 2020-2  SCC 217 (Hrishikesh Roy, A.S. Bopanna, R. Banumathi, JJ.), it is observed as under:

  • “12. Though the circumstances alleged in the charge sheet are to be established during the trial by adducing the evidence, the allegations in the charge sheet show a prima facie case against the accused-respondent Nos.1 and 2. The circumstances alleged by the prosecution indicate that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. At the time of framing the charges, only prima facie case is to be seen; whether case is beyond reasonable doubt, is not to be seen at this stage. At the stage of framing the charge, the court has to see if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. While evaluating the materials, strict standard of proof is not required; only prima facie case against the accused is to be seen.”

See also:

  • State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294
  • Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217
  • Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148
  • State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, AIR 2017 SC 796,
  • Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460
  • Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135
  • State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338
  • State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659
  • Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.
  • Union of India  v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Trusts and Trust Deeds

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

A trust is what its authors or founders intended, as revealed from the deed of dedication, if any, or on other substantial evidence.  In CIT v. Kamala Town Trust, AIR 1996 SC 620, 1996-7 SCC 349, it is pointed out as under:

  • “A Trust Deed is a document which sets out the terms of an understanding between the author of the trust and the trustees. Though in form, the trustees are not signatories to the instrument as drawn up, they are parties to the instrument in a real sense, for it is on the terms of the instrument that they accept office and proceed to administer the trust. The law obliges them to act upon the terms of the Trust Deed, and they cannot commit a breach thereof.”

The trustee is bound to fulfil the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation (Sec. 11 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882). Usually, there will be trust deeds which direct the administration of the trusts, which include how the trustees are appointed, and how new trustees are selected.

As per the Indian Trust Act. 1882, the trustee holds the trust-property for ‘management’ or ‘administration’.  The legal ownership vests in the trustee for the purposes of the trust, and its administration should be in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust (Ramabai Govind  v. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106).

In Abdul Kayum Vs. Alibhai, AIR 1963 SC 309, our Apex Court expounded the following legal incidents of trusteeship:

  • (i) Trustees cannot transfer their duties, functions & powers to some other body of men and create them trustees in their own place unless this is clearly permitted by the trust deed, or agreed to by the entire body of beneficiaries (Sec. 48);
  • (ii) A trustee is not bound to accept the trust; but having once entered upon the trust he cannot renounce the duties and liabilities except with the permission of the Court or with the consent of the beneficiaries or by the authority of the trust deed itself (Sec. 46).
  • (iii) A trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his functions except in some specified cases (Sec. 47).

Trustee is Obliged to Manage for Benefit of the Beneficiaries

As pointed out by our Apex Court, in WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,[AIR1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.]  the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 declares vesting legal ownership with trustees. The vesting of ownership of trust property with the trustee is under an obligation to manage it for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin  Vs. Trustees Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184. See also: RamabaiGovind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj)]  Though, in a trust, the trust property must have been transferred to the trustees, and the trust property vests in the trustee as owner thereof, it does not absolutely belong to any individual.

Trustee has no ‘Proprietor Interest’

It is observed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Special Secretary Land and Land Revenue [1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30] that the trustee would become the owner of the trust property for the purpose of effectively executing or administering the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries and for due administration thereof, and not for any other purpose. Merely because the property is vested in the trustee as the legal owner, he has no ‘proprietor interest’, inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’ in the property itself. 

Trustee Deals with the Property According to the Deed of Trust

The property is vested in trustees subject to the obligations upon which the trustees accepted the trust.[Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj)] The trustee deals with the property in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust.[Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106]  In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Vs. Parasnath Digambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199]The legal ownership which vests in the trustee is for the purposes of the trust and to administer [Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529] the same.

Basic Principle of Foundation of a Trust Cannot be Changed

The trustees are bound to administer the affairs of the trust to attain the objects (Commr of IT Vs. Rajmitra Bhailal: 1964-54 ITR 241) envisioned by the founder and in accordance with his directions laid down in the trust deed; and the acts and actions of trustees ultra vires such objects or directions are void.  If a trustee fails to administer in accordance with the terms of the trust, it amounts to breach of trust (RP Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Educational Trust:1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801).

The basic principle of foundation of a trust cannot be changed.  Tudor on Charities [6th Edn.  At p. 131], explained it as under:

  • “When a charity has been founded and trusts have been declared, the founder has no power to revoke, vary or add to the trusts. This is so irrespective of whether the trusts have been declared by an individual, or by a body of subscribers, or by the trustees.” (Agasthyar Trust Vs. Commr IT Madras ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;1998-5 SCC 588)

No Change to Basic Principles, Even By Majority, Unless Specific Power

Fundamental principles upon which an association is founded (as revealed from the deed of dedication, if any, or on other substantial evidence) are also not open to alteration, even for the majority of its members, unless such a power is specifically reserved. This principle is laid down in

  • Milligan Vs.  Mitchell, (1837) 3 My. & Cr. 72 : 40 ER 852,
  • Attorney General Vs. Anderson, (1888) 57 LJ Ch 543, and
  • Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun, (1904) AC 515

These decisions are referred to in –

  • Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao, AIR 1931 Mad. 12.

See also:

  • Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547;
  • Allahabad High School Society Vs. State of UP: 2010-5 ADJ 734, 2010-82 All LR 83;
  • P. Jayader  Vs. Thiruneelakanta Nadar Chinnaneela Nadar: ILR  1966-2 Mad 92.

Ultra Vires Acts, Void; It Constitutes ‘Breach of Trust’.

A company is a juristic person. The actions and functioning of a company differ from that of a natural person who is free to act on his whims and fancies. The actions and functioning of a company are limited by its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association.

Deed of Endowment/Dedication

A declaration by a registered deed or vesting/transferring property to a trustee is the usual mode of dedication of immovable property for the creation of a public trust; though no document is necessary for creating an endowment.

If the founders’ intention is clear from the document of foundation or other direct evidence, oral or documentary, no difficulty arises. In cases where express dedication cannot be proved, it will be a matter for legal inference from the proved facts and circumstances of each case. In Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Reli. Endts, it is held:

  • “Where, however, a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and the recitals of the document show that the control and management of the temple is retained with the founder or his descendants, and that extensive properties are dedicated for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple belonging to the founder himself, this will be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature.”[AIR 1981 SC 798; (quoted in Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685).]

In S. Shanmugam Pillai . Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai .[AIR 1972 SC 2069] it is held:

  • “Whether or not a dedication is complete would naturally be a question of fact to be determined in each case on the terms of the relevant document if the dedication in question was made under a document. … “[Quoted in Sitaram Agarwal Vs. Subarata Chandra: AIR 2008 SC 952; Controller of Estate Duty West Bengal Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312]

In Hemanta Kumari Debi Vs. Gauri Shankar Tewari [AIR 1941 PC 38; Quoted in Kuldip Chand Vs. AG to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685.  Terms of the document, important:1951 SCR 1122;  Sri. Govindlalji Vs. State of Rajasthan: AIR 1963  SC  1638; R Venugopala Reddiar Vs. Krishnaswamy: AIR 1971 Mad  262; Kuldip Chand Vs. A G to Govt of H P: AIR 2003  SC  1685. Importance of document: Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Endts.: AIR 1981 SC 798; Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts: Page 188] it is held, while dealing with a bathing ghat on the banks of the River Ganges, that complete relinquishment of title was not the only form of dedication under Hindu Law.

It further observed as under:

  • “In the absence of a formal and express endowment evidenced by deed or declaration, the character of the dedication can only be determined on the basis of the history of the institution and the conduct of the founder and his heirs.”

Our Apex Court observed the following, interpreting a deed, in Idol of Sri Renganatha-swamy Vs. PK Thoppulan Chettiar [(2020) 5 Mad LJ 331(SC)] as under:

  • “The Deed of Settlement must be examined as a whole to determine the true intention of the settlor. Where the settlor seeks to divest himself of the property entirely for a religious purpose, a public religious charity is created. In the present case, the Deed of Settlement creates an absolute prohibition on the subsequent sale or mortgage of the suit property. The Deed of Settlement provides that, the settler purchased the punja land mentioned in the schedule of property… for the performance of charity work in reference to Sri Renganathan-swamy sanctum. The property outlined in the schedule of the Deedof Settlement is described as, property allotted for charity work. With respect to the legal heirs, the Deed of Settlement creates an obligation on the settlors legal heirs to continue the charitable activities at the suit property out of their business incomes. The settlor had a clear intent to divest himself and his legal heirs of the property and endow it for the continuation of the charitable activities at the suit property. The purpose of the endowment was to carry on charitable work. The Deed of Settlement obligates the legal heirs to continue the charitable activities at the suit property.”

West and Buhler in Digest of Hindu Law [at page 248] reads further as under:

  • “Like the trustee in English law, a Shebait has to act gratuitously and he cannot charge the debutter estate for any remuneration on account of the time and labour he spends over his affairs. The position would certainly be different if there is a provision in the deed of dedication to that effect; or, in the absence of any deed of endowment, there is a usage sanctioning such remuneration to the Shebait. The law is well established that, in the absence of any provision in the deed of dedication or any usage to that effect, a Shebait has no right to take any portion of the income of the debutter estate nor even the surplus that remains after meeting the expenses of the deity. In this income would be included not merely the rents and profits of the debutter property but the offerings which are made to the deity by its devotees. “

Underhill in his treatise Law relating to Trusts and Trustees under the caption, Right to Reimbursement and Indemnity, it has been stated as under:

  • “Trustee is entitled to be reimbursed out of the trust property all expenses which he has properly incurred having regard to the circumstances of each particular case but without interest unless he has paid an interest bearing claim in which case he stands in the shoes of the creditor by subrogation.”

Description of Property as Debutter in a Deed, Not Conclusive

Execution of a deed by itself will not prove dedication.  Though it is a piece of evidence, it is not conclusive for determining the dedication.  In Paras Nath Thakur Vs. Mohani Dasi Deceased Ana [AIR 1959 SC 1204 ] it is held that when a document is solemnly executed and registered, burden is heavy on the person who plead it to be fictitious. [ILR 18 Cal. 10;  ILR 42 All. 295]

Appointment and Succession of Trustees

Method of appointment of trustees and the mode of their succession are the matters for the author of the trust. If sought for, court will give effect to the same. In the absence of an instrument of trust, custom and usage will hold the field. Under Sec. 92 CPC, when the trustees fail to take administration of the trust, the designated court is destined to interfere in the appointment of new trustees if the trust deed is silent as to the appointment of the new trustees.

Under Hindu Law, when there is no provision in the deed of endowment about the succession of office of Shebait, or the succession provided therein comes to an end, the management and control of the property follows the ordinary rule of inheritance from the founder and passes to his heirs. (Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228)

Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Trustees in a Nut Shell

Trustee has all rights as a legal-owner of the trust property. It includes possession of the trust property. Rights enumerated under Chapter IV (The Rights and Powers of Trustee) of the Indian Trusts Act, which includes the following:

  • Sec.31. Right to title-deed.

All Trustees Should Act Jointly

Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 48. Co-trustees cannot act singly.—When there are more trustees than one, all must join in the execution of the trust, except where the instrument of trust, otherwise provides.

The instrument of trust may provide that one or more trustees shall be managing trustees and where such provision is made, those who are empowered to act as managing trustees would be entitled to execute the duties of the office without the concurrence of the other co-trustees.

Lewin on Trusts reads as under [Sixteenth Edition, page 181]:

  • “In the case of co-trustees of a private trust, the office is a joint one. Where the administration of the trust is vested in co-trustees, they all form as it were but one collective trustee and therefore must execute the duties of the office in their joint capacity. Sometimes, one of several trustees is spoken of as the acting trustees, but the Court knows of no such distinction: all who accept the office are in the eyes of the law acting trustees. If anyone refuses or is incapable to join, it is not competent for the others to proceed without him, and, if for any reason they are unable to appoint a new trustee in his place under Section 36(1) of the Act, the administration of the trust must devolve upon the Court. However, the act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee may be regarded as the act of both, though such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.” [Quoted in: Atmaram Ranchhodbhai  Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin, AIR 1973 Guj 113]

No trustee can delegate his powers and duties to another trustee and any agreement to do so would be against the obligations he had undertaken, illegal and void [H.E.H. The Nizam’s Jewellery Trust (in re:): AIR 1980 SC 17]. But in the absence of such provision, all co-trustees must join in the execution of the duties of the office [Atmaram Ranchhodbhai  Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113]. This principle applies both to Public and private trusts[Atmaram Ranchhodbhai Vs. Gulamhuse in Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113. Also See: Man Mohan Das Vs. Janki Prasad, AIR 1945 PC 23].

In Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joodeo [AIR 1978 All 1] it has been held that the trustees would join to file an application to execute the decree obtained on behalf of the idol of a temple. However, it was also observed that it was a settled law that it was Shebait alone who can file a suit. But in exceptional circumstances, persons other than Shebait can institute a suit on behalf of the idol. Our Apex Court in M/s. Shanti Vijay and Co. Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzfa [AIR 1980 SC 17] held as under:

  • “The act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee may be regarded as the act of both. But such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.” [Quoted in: JP Srivastava and Sons Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co.AIR2005 SC 83].

Suit by One of its Trustees: Effect

The trustees altogether constitute one body in the eye of law and all must act together. A suit against a trust is not maintainable without impleading all its trustees. However, suits can be filed by any one (or more) of the trustees, when so authorised in that behalf by the rest.[Kishorelal  Asera Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endowments: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367] But such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.[ Shanti Vijay Co. Vs. Princess Fatima: AIR 1980 SC 17. Lewin’s Law of Trusts referred to. Vaidyaratnam P. S. Variers Arya Vaidyasla Vs. K. C. Vijaikumar: ILR 1990-1 Del 124.]  It is doubtful whether it can be by a resolution, otherwise than executing powers of attorney. Similarly, all co-trustees together should determine the tenancy by issuing notice;[ Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973  Guj 113; Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Trilok Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144] and all together should file the suit for eviction.[ Kansara Abdulrahman Vs. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj. 184; Uma Ray Vs. Smt. Meghamala: AIR 1989  NOC. 166 (Cal); Iswardas Vs. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal: AIR 1968 SC 1364; Baisnab Das Sen Vs. Bholanath Sen: AIR 1986 Cal 118; M. M. Nagalinga Nadar Vs. Sri. Lakshmi Family Trust: 2001- 3 MLJ 523]  In J.P. Srivastava and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. [(2005) 1 SCC 172] it is held by the Supreme Court as follows:

  • “Therefore, although as a rule, trustees must execute the duties of their office jointly, this general principle is subject to the following exceptions when one trustee may act for all
  • .(1) where the trust deed allows the trusts to be executed by one or more or by a majority of trustees;
  • (2) where there is express sanction or approval of the act by co-trustees;
  • (3) where the delegation of power is necessary;
  • (4) where the beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation;
  • (5) where the delegation to a co-trustee is in the regular course of the business,
  • (6) where the co-trustee merely gives effect to a decision taken by the trustees jointly.”

Our Apex Court, in Kanakarathanammal Vs. Loganatha  Mudaliar [AIR 1965 SC 271]  has observed that where all the trustees were not joined as parties the omission was fatal and that in appropriate cases it was not impermissible for the Court, to permit the impleading of the other Trustees in exercise of its powers under Order I Rule 10 (2) of the CPC, 1908. The Apex Court cautioned that this should be done at the stage of trial and that too, without prejudice to the plea of the parties as to limitation.

But it is held otherwise by Bombay High Court in Namdeo Vs. Shahi Gupta Masjid Chandrapur,[2014-4 AIR Bom R 657]  pointing out that the trust represented by one of the co-trustees itself was the ‘landlord’ and that the ‘landlord’ was entitled to file a petition for eviction under the Rent Control Act and also referring the definition of ‘landlord’ mentioned in the Act.

Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts speaks in this regard as under:

  • “When there are more Shebaits than one, they constitute one body in the eyes of law, and all of them must act together. The management may be for practical purposes in the hands of one of the Shebaits who is called the managing Shebait or the Shebaits themselves may exercise their right of management by turns; but in neither case it is competent for one of the Shebaits to do anything in relation to the Debutter estate without the concurrence either express or implied of his co-Shebaits. This is of course, subject to any express direction given by the grantor.”[Quoted in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. LaxminathjiMaharaj: AIR 1985 All 228]

Managing Trustees Would be Entitled to Execute the Duties

The instrument of trust may provide that one or more trustees shall be managing trustees and where such provision is made, those who are empowered to act as managing trustees would be entitled to execute the duties of the office without the concurrence of the other co-trustees. But in the absence of such provision, all co-trustees must join in the execution of the duties of the office. [Atmaram Ranchhodbhai Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113; Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joo Deo: AIR 1978 All 1; Shanti Vijay and Co. Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzfa: AIR 1980 SC 17.]

In JP Srivastava and Sons Ltd. Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co [AIR 2005 SC 83] it is held by the Supreme Court as follows:

  • “Therefore, although as a rule, trustees must execute the duties of their office jointly, this general principle is subject to the following exceptions when one trustee may act for all:
  • (1) where the trust deed allows the trusts to be executed by one or more or by a majority of trustees;
  • (2) where there is express sanction or approval of the act by co-trustees;
  • (3) where the delegation of power is necessary;
  • (4) where the beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation;
  • (5) where the delegation to a co-trustee is in the regular course of the business,
  • (6) where the co-trustee merely gives effect to a decision taken by the trustees jointly.”

If the Trust Deed Permits One Trustee can Execute the Duties

The observation in J.P. Srivastava and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd., AIR 2005 SC 83; (2005) 1 SCC 172 – if the trust deed so permits, one trustee can execute the duties for other trustees also –  is referred to in the following decisions:

  • Charu Kishor Mehta v. Joint Charity Commissioner, 2015-8 SCC 207
  • Tapendro Mullick v. Kumar Mrigendro Mallick, 20193 CHN 640 (Cal)
  • Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Digvijaysingh Gangasingh, 2017-6 AllMR 346; 2018-1 MhLJ 259
  • Namdeo v. Shahi Gupta Masjid Chandrapur, 2014-3 AllMR 592; 2014-4 MhLJ 209
  • Shyamabai v. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha, 2014-1 AllMR 810; 2014-2 BomCR 436; 2014-2 MhLJ 547
  • Indian Youth Centres Trust v. Shishir Bajaj, 2012-193 DLT 584
  • Shyamabai v. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha, AIR 2010 Bom  88
  • Canbank Mutual Fund v. Nuclear Power Corporation, 2007-145 DLT 1; 2007-98 DRJ 464; ILR 2007-16 Dlh 1303.

A person/trustee is not bound to accept the trust; but having once accepted, he cannot renounce the duties and liabilities except with the permission of the Court or with the consent of the beneficiaries or under the authority of the trust deed itself.

Delegatus Non Potest Delegare (a delegate has no power to delegate, unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words by the terms of the deed or necessary implication (Director General, ESI Vs. T. Abdul Razak AIR 1996  SC 2292.Shanti Vijay And Co Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR1980 SC  17;Also see: Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309.) is a well-settled principle of law

‘Cy pres’ Doctrine

When it is found by the court that the particular mode of charity, indicated by the donor, cannot be carried on for impossibility or impracticability, the court will execute and accomplish the donor’s intention applying ‘cy pres’ doctrine.  It is applied where from lapse of time or change of circumstances it is no longer possible to apply the property left by the founder or donor in the precise way in which it was directed to be applied. [Balkrishna Vishvanath Vs. Vinayak Narayan: AIR 1932 Bom 191; AP Shah Vs. BM Institute of Mental Health: 1986  GLH 262.] It is based on the principle that the court is the protector of all charities; [C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia: AIR 1952 Kar14] and that the court will not allow to fail a validly created trust or objects of foundation. 

Invoking ‘cy pres’ doctrine the court will apply the property of the Trust to a charitable purpose ‘as nearly as possible’ [In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228]. Besides physical impossibility, becoming the trust valueless, owing to attendant circumstances, also invites application of cy pres doctrine [Hormusji Franji Warden, ILR 32  B. 214] resembling the original Trust.

The trustees are bound to carry out the directions of the author under Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act and the only way in which the directions of the testament may be varied is by applying ‘cy  pres’ doctrine.

Amendment of Objects in Trust Deed – If Only Original Trust-Deed Permitted

If only the original trust-deed permitted amendment to the objects of the trust, then only the object clauses could be amended. It is settled principle of trust law that once a trust is created and certain objects stipulated therein, even the settler has no power to delete any of the objects. [Association of University Teachers Tamilnadu, v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2012 3 MLJ 875]

CIT v. Kamala Town Trust,  AIR 1996 SC 620, 1996-7 SCC  349

The Apex Court considered the effect of amendment made to a trust deed – which had  earlier been rectified by a Civil Court – in CIT v. Kamala Town Trust,  AIR 1996 SC 620, 1996-7 SCC  349. It was held that whatever might be the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Civil Court under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to say that the trustees could administer the trust in accordance with the original deed and that the claim for exemption had to be dealt with on the basis of the original deed. It is held as under:

  • “In this connection it is profitable to have a look at the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Jagdamba Charity Trust v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi (Central) (1981) 128 I.T.R. 377. In that case Deed of Trust was got rectified by the parties from the Civil Court. These proceedings had to be initiated in the light of judgment of the High Court which had held that due to provisions in certain clauses of the Trust Deed the trust was non-charitable and the trust was not entitled to exemption under Income-tax Act and that since the decision had created some doubts regarding the validity of some clauses of the deed it was necessary that the deed should be rectified. The Civil Court granted a decree and directed that the Trust Deed be rectified. The question was whether such rectification order of the Civil Court was binding on the Income Tax Department when the assessee-trust armed with such rectification order claimed exemption from income tax under Section 11 of the 1961 Act. S. Ranganathan, J., as he then was, speaking for the Delhi High Court took the view that the word ‘instrument’ used in Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act has a very wide meaning and includes every document by which any right or liability is, or is purported to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. There is no reason to exclude a Trust Deed from its purview. A Trust Deed is a document which sets out the terms of an understanding between the author of the trust and the trustees. Though in form, the trustees are not signatories to the instrument as drawn up, they are parties to the instrument in a real sense for it is on the terms of the instrument that they accept office and proceed to administer the trust. The law obliges them to act upon the terms of the Trust Deed and they cannot commit a breach thereof. If a gift deed, sale deed or promissory note could be within the terms of the section, there is no reason why a Trust Deed cannot be rectified under Section 26. It was further held that since there was an order of Civil Court binding on the author and the trustees, they could administer the trust only in terms of the amendment directed by the Court. The trustees were and must be deemed, from the beginning, to have been under a legal obligation to hold the properties only for the object and with the powers set out in the Trust Deed as amended. Therefore, whatever might be the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Civil Court under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to say that the trustees could administer the trust in accordance with the original deed and that the claim for exemption had to be dealt with on the basis of the original deed. Nor was it open to the Income-tax Officer to say that in the relevant accounting year, the trustees held the property subject to the terms of the original and not the amended deed. In our view the aforesaid decision of the Delhi High Court lays down the correct legal position in connection with proceedings for rectification of instruments like trust deeds, initiated before competent civil courts under the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act.”

CIT, Amritsar v. Rattan Trust, AIR 1997 SC 2831; 1997-11 SCC 56

In this decision it is held as under:

  • “10. The requirements of the proviso with which we are concerned are (1) Trust should have been created before April 1, 1962 and (2) the trustees apply the funds of the Trust in concern in which they themselves are interested if there was a mandatory provision in the Trust Deed for such a purpose. The question which squarely falls for consideration is if the second condition should have been there is the Trust Deed before April 1, 1962 when the I.T. Act came into force or if such a condition could be added subsequently in the Trust Deed after this date if the propounder of the Trust in the Trust-Deed so authorised the trustees to amend the Trust-Deed allowing the trustees to invest the funds of the Trust in a concern in which they might be interested. To us it appears the answer is quite obvious that such a mandate in the Trust-Deed should have existed before April, 1, 1962 and could not have been brought in by amending the Trust-Deed at a later stage after that crucial date even if the Trust-Deed so authorised the Trustees to amend the Trust-Deed to bring in the mandatory condition or requirement for them to invest funds of the Trust in a concern in which they might be interested. Any other interpretation would set at naught the proviso and would defeat the very purpose for which the proviso was added in Section 13. If we accept any other interpretation then the Trustees even today could amend the Trust-Deed and bring in their case to fall within the proviso.”

Is Trust  a ‘Living Person’ under S. 5 of the TP Act 

Can transfer of property be made to or by Trusts/Associations?

Sec. 5 of the TP Act reads as under:

  • 5. “Transfer of property” defined:  In the following sections “transfer of property” means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such act.
  • In this section “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals.

Existing Laws as to Transfer of Property will Remain in Force

Two points are emphasised in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 5 –

  • First, all unregistered associations, whether incorporated or not, are ‘living persons’, so that transfer of property can be made.
  • Second, the qualifying second limb – ‘nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals‘ – made it clear:
    • if any law regulates transfer of property to (or by) companies, associations or bodies of individuals, it will remain in force.

Bodies of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act

It may also be pointed out that, “bodies of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act is wide in meaning; and it stands independent. It is broad enough to take-in Beneficiaries/ Trustees of a Trust.

Accordingly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

  • Note: Order 31 rule 1 CPC spells out – a trust is not a legal person. It enables to file a suit by (or be sued) a trustee concerning ‘property vested in trustees’.

Can ‘Law for the Time Being in Force’ Include ‘Common Law’

‘Law for the time being in force’ in Sec. 5 TP Act includes “common law”.

It is a reality – the common law of our country accepts as valid the ‘transfer of property’ made to or effected by well-known institutions, organisations, and associations attached to reputed trusts, institutions etc., though they are not juristic-persons in its strict senseOur courts sumptuously refer to such deeds as documents executed by or in favour of such entities, when they are referred to as exhibits. For example:

  • Settlement deed by Ashramam–Swayam  Prakash  Ashramam Vs. G Anandavally  Amma : AIR  2010 SC 622;
  • Settlement to trust – S N Mathur  Vs. Board of Revenue: 2009-13  SCC 301;
  • Sale deed by unregistered society – Suresh s/o. Bhagwanrao  Puri Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2016-3 AIR Bom R (Cri.) 603;
  • Gift to unregistered Association – Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna Satram: 1984-2 ALT 157;
  • Sale deed to an association – K. Kala Vs. Dist Registrar, Madurai: 2016 3 MLJ 50, 
  • Sale deed to an association – State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 P&H 218.
  • Sale deed to an association – Asst. Commr. Vs. Shivalingawwa: ILR 2003 Kar 2855;
  • Lease deed by trust to school – TNP Mothoo  Natarajan Vs. PV Ravi: 2015-2 MLJ (Cri.) 656;
  • Lease deed by a firm -2014-3 ALT 46;
  • Settlement deed to private trust –Kolli  Venkata Raja Vs. Govt. of AP: 2014-1 ALT 155;
  • Lease deed to a public trust –Nadigar  Sangham Charitable Trust, rep. by its managing Trustee, R. Sarathkumar Vs. S. Murugan:2013-1 MLJ 433;
  • Sale deed to Board of Trustees – Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chemists and Druggists Association Building Trust: 1995-215 ITR(Mad) 741;
  • Mortgage deed by a College – Sonar Bangla Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College:  AIR 1960 Cal 450.

Similarly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

It was held by our Apex Court in Kamaraju  Venkata Krishna Rao Vs. Sub Collector,  Ongole, AIR 1969 SC 563, that, under Hindu Law, a tank can be an object of charity and when a dedication was made in favour of a tank, the same was considered as a charitable institution. Without deciding whether that institution can also be considered as a juristic person, it was held that the same had to be registered in its name (ie., in the name of the tank) in the Inam register though it had continue to be managed by its Manager.

It is also noteworthy that Salmond on Jurisprudence reads: “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases.”

Also read:

End Notes:

Vesting of Property in Various Kinds of Associations and Trusts

Club, Society, Firm and Company

Nature of Association.Vesting of Management and Legal Ownership.Vesting  of actual/ ultimate ownershipWhether perma-nent or can it be put an end to
  ClubTrustees or Gov. Body, as per  ByelawsMembers, subject to the byelaws and objectives of foundation.Presumed to be not permanent.
Unregistred. Society/ Association  -do-  -do-Presumed to be permanent.
Registered Society-do--do-Permanent.  SR Act governs dissolution.
FirmPartnersPartnersContract/partnership deed governs
Trading CompanyBoard of DirectorsCompanyPermanent. Co. Act governs winding up.
Charitable or Non-trading company  -do-  -do-  -do-

Trusts/Religious-Endowments:

Public Trust– English Law  TrusteesLegal ownership in Trustees; beneficial ownership in Beneficiaries.  Permanent
Public Trust-Indian (common) Law    Trustees  Beneficiaries have only beneficial interest; and, no beneficial ownership. Theoretically, properties vest in public or section who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as established by evidence or as revealed from the deed of founda-tion or byelaws, if any.        Permanent
Public School, Public Library, etc.  Trustees (called by different names).    -do-  Permanent.
Private religious or charitable trustsManagement on Trustees (called by different names). If the trust/ institution/ endowment is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership will be vested upon it.Properties vest in trust/ institution/endowment itself.  If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person – property vests in such persons as established by evidence or the deed of foundation or byelaws.  Beneficiaries have no beneficial ownership.        Presumed to be permanent.
Mosque, Church, Gurudwara, etc.  Management on Trustees (by different names).  If the trust/ institution/ endowment is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership will be vested upon it.In trust/institution or endowment itself.  If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person – section of public who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as established by evidence or as revealed from the deed of foundation or bylaws, if any.  Permanent
  Temple (Public)Management on Shebaits/ Darmkarta/ Ooralen. Since Idol/deity is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership vests upon it.  Idol/deitydo-
 Temple (private)-do--do--do-
   MuttManagement on Madathipathi. Since Mutt is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership vests upon it.  Mutt-do-
Private Trust (Coming under the Trusts Act  Trustees  Terms/ Deed of Trust govern.Trusts Act governs Extinction and Revocation.

Government School, University, etc.

University, Govt. Hospital, Govt. College, etc.  Administrators as provided in the statute concerned  In the institution itself, if not expressly stated to be in the Government.Presumed to be permanent. (Permanent until decided to close by the Government.)

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