Separation Of Powers: Who Wins the Race – Legislature, Executive or Judiciary ?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Symbiosis of the Three Organs of State

The legislature, the executive, and the judiciary together form the foundational pillars of a democratic system.

The polity where these three wings are operated by a single authority is called an autocracy. The separation of these three wings is essential for the endurance of democracy. Each one is expected to function independently in its domain. When headship of two of these three organs is conferred upon one source of power, it gives rise to despotism.

Diversities are the real strength

We, the people of India, declared ourselves as a Republic and adopted the democratic Constitution 71 years back. When power of administration of the nation was handed down to Indians by the British in 1947, doubts were raised from various corners as to the survival of democratic institutions in India.

Several people doubted that diversities of India were so grave and myriad that it could not thrive as one nation for long. But, we proved that we are one and united, despite the diversities; and that the diversities are the real strength for our nation. Credit for the same goes to the personalities and forces that united India as a nation.

Energy emanated by the freedom struggle movement under the powerful icon, Mahatma Gandhi, is the main source of power that made an ever united India. The patriotic voice of the national leaders emerged in the freedom struggle marks the second position. Then comes the effect of the vibrant Book of the Nation, the Constitution of India.   

The Constitution

The Constitution promised a lively democratic nation. It served as a strong-bedrock to build up the lawful and realistic dreams and aspirations of all citizens who are entitled to live in this country. It assured safety to all the inhabitants of this land. It founded a systematic administrative system that can protect the nation guarding against all possible adversities.

No doubt, it is true that India as a nation, during the past decades, performed far better thorough well than certain critiques thought about infant India during the middle of twentieth century. If we are required to point out the slip-ups upon the legislature, executive and judiciary, we may have to pin-point the following downsides.

Legislature

Legislature that consists of the elected representatives of the people is the most important organ of democracy. Whole nation, especially those who are near to the steering wheel of the nation, has to keep an eternal vigilance to protect the democracy.  If religion-based politics is practised by the people who are steering wheel of the nation, it will begin to ruin the democracy; and if the system is deteriorated so that the legislatures can be easily ‘purchased’, the country will lose its title as a democratic nation and it can no longer survive as an independent republic.

Evaluating the general performance of legislatures in India, if one opines that our elected representatives have not performed well upto the expected level, it will be a sheer truth.   Because of the over politicisation, most of the representatives have forgotten that law-making is their prime duty. They even fail to regularly attend the parliament or legislature whereby the houses are frequently adjourned for no quorum. Boisterous and unruly MPs and MLAs are a curse to the democracy. Such elected representatives deteriorate and degenerate the status of the legislatures.  

Several elected representatives, having political affiliations, speak as mouthpieces of their masters who may be the religious forces or wealthy ones who funded them in their elections. Most are not allowed to work independently for they are forced to express the opinions and views of the political pundits who may have hidden motives or who may be narrow minded.  In our system, the elected representatives are forced to face-guard the corrupt practices of the parties to which they belong and of the tainted political leaders.

Executive

Executive is primarily expected to implement the laws in force and function independently without being guided by the legislators, or the political leaders who side with the party in power. It is shameful that we cannot think of ‘independent’ appointments, termed now-a-days as ‘political appointments’, after celebrating 73 independence-anniversary, even in constitutional appointments such as Election Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), Reserve Bank Governor etc..

Because of the conferment of actual executive power to the council of ministers, by our constitution, the executive is forced to function in accordance with the directions of the political aspirations of the parties in power. From experience we can say – police and various investigative agencies are the hand-maidens of political powers that be. We see change in the officers, from top to bottom, at least in certain departments, by the change of a ministry. Doesn’t it show – our executive is not independent as it was expected to be?

From experience we can realise – corruption is rampant in certain departments. No doubt, unless the god-fathers of such erring persons do not protect them, they cannot thrive and flourish in the present form they shaped themselves. That is, corrective-steps have to be begun from the top. 

It remains a fact – because of the intervention of judiciary, at least some major ‘political scandals’ and ‘political corruption’ are brought to light and at least some political-stalwarts are sent to jail after trial.  It is time to think – is not it necessary to liberate the executive wing of our nation from the clutches of the ‘political-executive’.

 From experience we can also realise – the police will be a threat to the citizens if that force is not controlled properly.  And, Excise-Tax- Registration departments will amass unless proper enacted laws are made to collect revenue properly and sufficient machinery is placed to trace the unerring officers. 

From experience we can definitely say – the ‘existing system’ promotes corruption in Excise-Custom-Tax-Revenue-Registration-Police-departments. It is a sheer fact that our high level political-masterminds do not want a change. Thy will not engage effective system to check the tax and revenue evaders.  There is only one reason for the same – that is, proper laws and simplification of the protracted procedures will stop, or at least reduce, corruption. The political-pundits will not allow to make proper Laws and Rules also with a view to safeguard the citizens of India, and to place a proper machinery to trace the unerring officers, in betterment of the nation.

Judiciary

The success of all establishments, especially judiciary, lies in the quality of persons who handle it. Independent judiciary is essential for proper working of democracy. Unqualified and petty elements that capture the high posts through front or back doors destroy the system. The appointment of proper persons in judiciary from top to bottom is essential for the strength of a democratic nation. The solicitors and other counsel for the government should also be appointed in a manner that they should not be guided by politicians or people in power.

Did our judiciary performed up-to-the-mark it was expected by the founders of our Constitution? Did the most important provision of the Constitution – Article 32 – is properly used-up by the persons who handled it? If the answer is no, the general grounds pointed out are the following:

  1. Incompetence of some judges.
  2. Forbearance from real issues, ignoring duty imposed upon them, by some judges.
  3. Illegal association of some judges with, or their undue obligation to, political or religious gurus.

All accusations as to corruption within the judiciary may not have been proved and allegations as to over-smartness or as to indulgence in self-promoting acts against some judges may not be correct, yet, no doubt, the conferment of post-retirement ‘political appointments’ to some selected retired hands raises doubts, and such acts of conferment and its acceptance lowers the dignity of the Judiciary.

Judicial Decisions are Commands of Law to be Obeyed – Until the Law is Altered

In Adani Power Ltd v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 1, our Apex Court (Aravind Kumar, N.V. Anjaria, J.), held that the Judicial pronouncements are not advisory opinions; they are binding commands of law, and it was incumbent upon the administrative authorities to conform their conduct to that declaration. It is also pointed out – the authorities were obliged to treat the matter as concluded until the law was altered by legislative action. The Court said as under:

  •  “81. We now turn to an aspect which goes beyond the immediate dispute between the parties. The case also concerns the obligation of the administration to give full effect to Commands of Law once they have attained finality. The authority of the rule of law rests not only in the pronouncement of judgments but equally in their proper implementation. It is therefore necessary to briefly recall the principles that govern the conduct of the executive after a court has finally settled the legal position.
  • 82. When a High Court of competent jurisdiction declares a levy to be ultra vires and unconstitutional, and this Court declines to interfere, that declaration cannot be treated as a one-time indulgence for a closed period. It is incumbent upon the authorities thereafter to conform their conduct to the law so declared. They cannot, consistent with constitutional discipline, continue to enforce the same levy for a later period on the strength of slightly altered subordinate instruments and then resist restitution on grounds of technical pleading.
  • 83. It is well settled that in the public interest there must be an end to litigation. The appellant succeeded in 2015. The Union failed in its challenge before this Court. The appellant then approached the High Court in 2016 essentially seeking implementation of the declaration already made. To deny relief on the footing that it is a new notification or that period was not expressly mentioned is to frustrate finality and to compel the citizen to engage in repetitive litigation to secure, in practice, what has already been recognised in principle.
  • 84. Accordingly we hold that once the 2015 judgment had declared the levy to be ultra vires and this Court had declined interference, it was incumbent upon the administrative authorities to conform their conduct to that declaration. Judicial pronouncements are not advisory opinions; they are binding commands of law. When the executive continues to enforce, under new guise, a levy that has been judicially struck down, it acts in defiance of constitutional discipline and erodes public confidence in the rule of law. Finality of adjudication is an essential component of good governance. The repetition of an invalidated levy through successive notifications compels needless litigation, burdens the courts, and subjects citizens to prolonged uncertainty. The authorities in this case were obliged to treat the matter as concluded and ought to have extended the benefit of the 2015 decision uniformly to all subsequent periods until the law was altered by legislative action. Their failure to do so justified judicial intervention. The doctrine interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which essentially means, that it is in the public interest that there be an end to litigation would squarely apply; the State must exemplify obedience to judgments, not resistance to them.”


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

Custom & Customary Easements in Indian Law

Adv. Saji Koduvath.

Definition of Custom

Halsbury’s Laws of England defines custom as under:

  • “A custom is a particular rule which exists either actually or presumptively from time immemorial and has obtained the force of law in a particular locality.” [Quoted in Manikrao v.  Maheshkumar, 2011-5 MhLJ 345.]

Ingredients of Custom

The essentials of a valid custom (SK Wodeyar v. Ganapati Madhuling Dixit, AIR 1935 Bom 371) are:

  • it must be definite,
  • ancient,
  • uniform and
  • not illegal in itself or unreasonable.

Our Apex Court observed in Ramkanya Bai v. Jagdish, AIR 2011 SC 3258, that to establish a custom, the following matters are to be proved:

  • (a) the usage is ancient or from time immemorial;
  • (b) the usage is regular and continuous;
  • (c) the usage is certain and not varied; and
  • (d) the usage is reasonable.

Custom must be construed strictly.

A custom that exist in a particular family or in a particular district, by its long usage will obtain the force of law. Besides it must be ancient, it must also be certain, reasonable and being in derogation of the general rules of law. It is further essential that it should be established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence for it is only by means of such evidence that the courts can be assured of its existence and of the fact that it possesses the conditions of antiquity and certainty on which alone its legal title to recognition depends. It must be not be opposed to morality or public policy and must not be expressly forbidden by the legislature. [Subramanian Chettiar v. Kumarappa Chettiar, AIR 1955 Mad 155.]

Customary Right

In Lakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal, AIR 1950 PC 56, the Privy Council saw ‘customary right’ and ‘custom’ thus:

  • “A customary right can exist only in relation to the inhabitants of a district and it cannot be claimed in respect of the public at large [Fitch v. Rawling (1795) 2 H BI 393 = 3 RR 425]. The custom, if established makes the local law of the district and it creates a right in each of the inhabitants irrespective of his estate or interest in any particular property.”

The right to bury dead body of a particular community in a particular locality or in the property of a particular person is a customary right; and to claim that right, it must be proved that such property has been used by custom from time immemorial.

Such a custom from long usage should have obtained the force of law. It must be

  • certain,
  • peaceable,
  • reasonable,
  • ancient and
  • not opposed to morality or public policy. [R. Venkateswara Raju v. State of AP, 2020 Supreme (AP) 206.]

It is held in Ganpatrao Madhorao Hatker v. Sheikh Badar Farid Musalman, AIR 1939 Nag 193, that a custom must be:

  • reasonable and certain; and
  • it must be proved that the user was not permissive,
  • the user was not exercised by stealth,
  • the user was not exercised by force, and
  • that the right had been enjoyed for such a length of time as to suggest that by agreement or otherwise the user has become the customary law of the locality.

Antiquity, an Element for Custom

The custom must have been originated in remote antiquity. It was found in Abid All Khan v. Secretary of State, AIR 1951 Nag 327, as under:

“63. A custom, in order that it may supersede the ordinary law, must, besides being reasonable, be ancient as well as certain. On the question whether a custom should also be immemorial, there appears to be a difference of opinion. In Kuar Sen v. Mamman, 17 All 87: (1995 AWN 10) and Mohidin v. Shivlingappa, 23 Bom 666: (1 Bom LR 170) the view taken is that the common law rule that the custom must have originated in remote antiquity does not apply to India. In Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas, 42 Cal 455: (AIR 1915 Cal 161), it was held, following Mayor of London v. Cox, (1867) 2 H L 239, that a custom originating within time of memory, even though existing in fact, is void at law and that for a custom to be valid it must be immemorial in addition to being reasonable and certain.” [Quoted in: Ilam Chand Vs Janeshwar Das, 2006-1 ADJ 266.]

Customary Easements – Both custom and easement are involved

The Indian Easements Act, 1882 refers to the different methods by which easements are acquired. They are, as pointed out in Ramkanya Bai v. Jagdish, AIR 2011 SC 3258, the following:

  1. easements by grant: a grant by the owner of the servient heritage
  2. easements of necessity: based on implied grants or reservations made by the owner of a servient heritage at the time of transfers or partitions
  3. easements by prescription: acquired by peaceable and open enjoyment, without interruption for twenty years and
  4. customary easements: acquired by virtue of a local custom.

The Apex Court pointed out in this decision that customary easements are the most difficult to prove among easements.

Section 18 of the Easement Act reads as under:

  • “18. Customary easements. An easement may be acquired in virtue of a local custom. Such easements are called customary easements.”

Both custom and easement are involved in customary easement. In other words, when customary easement is claimed, elements of both custom and prescriptive easement are to be proved. [Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89.]

Customary easement includes the right to take water and earth from a tank, use water for cattle from a tank,  graze cattle [Illustration (a) to sec. 18], to take earth for building and repairing their houses etc.[Jugal Kishore v. Umrao Singh, AIR 1949 All 272. ] These are rights of people of a locality; and not a public right.

Customary Right is independent of any Dominant Heritage

It is observed in Parbhawati Devi v. Mahendra Narain Singh (AIR 1981 Pat 133) that a customary right is not an easement. An easement belongs to a determinate person or persons in respect of his or their land. A fluctuating body like the inhabitants of the locality cannot claim an easement. Easements are private rights belonging to a particular person while customary rights are public rights annexed to the place in general. Customary right is also different from customary easement and Easements Act does not at all deal with it. It expressly excludes it from its scope and purview.

In Amar Singh v. Kehar Singh (AIR 1995 HP  82) also it is held that a customary right is not easement. An easement belongs to a determinate person or persons in respect of his or their land. A fluctuating body of persons like the inhabitants of the locality cannot claim an easement. Easements are private rights belonging to particular persons while customary rights are public rights annexed to the place in general.

A customary right by its very definition cannot be created under a written instrument. There cannot be a customary easement in favour of an individual. Customary easement acquired by local custom can only be in favour of a defined class of people or community of a particular locality.

A customary right can exist only in relation to the inhabitants of a district and it cannot be claimed in respect of the public at large. [Fitch v. Rawling, (1795) 2 HB. 393: (3 R.R. 425); Laxshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal, AIR1950 PC 56. Raj Nandan Singh v. Ram Kishun Lohar (AIR 1958 Pat 571). ] Therefore, a customary right is independent of any dominant heritage. [Jugal Kishore v. Umrao Singh, AIR 1949 All 272; Raj Nandan Singh v. Ram Kishun Lohar, AIR 1958 Pat 571.]

Easement -Indian law differs from English Law.

Under English Law, an easement is a privilege alone; and profit-a-prendre (right to take) is not an easement. The Indian Easements Act purposefully used “to do something in or upon”, decisively avoiding, ‘to use’ or ‘to enjoy’; because, Indian Law allows ‘profit-a-prendre’ [fishing, pasturing, grass-cutting for thatching, etc.]. It is allowed on Indian situations – without conferring substantial interest in the servient land. ‘Profit a predre’ is not appurtenant to any dominant land; and it is a right ‘in gross’ (for the benefit of individuals)

No profit-a-prendre in gross

Explanation in Sec. 4 reads:

  • “…’to do something’ includes removal and appropriation .. of any part of the soil .. or anything growing or subsisting thereon ..”

From Explanation in Sec. 4 it is clear that easement included appropriation of certain tangible material things. They are made clear by the Illustrations to various sections. Eg.

  • Illustn.-(d) of S.4 speaks as to Graze cattle, take water and fish out from the tank, take timber from wood, take fallen leaves for manuring.
  • Illustn.- (b) of S. 22 states cutting  thatching- grass
  • Illustn.- (a) of S. 24 refers to easement to lay pipes.

Hence, it is clear: Easement is not a mere ‘Privilege’ (as in English Law); but, it includes:

  • limited (legally-recognised) enjoyment /user/interest in serviant heritage, and
  • a right for (expressly-recognised) profit.

Though Profit-a-prendre is allowed by Indian law considering the peculiarities of Indian situations, it is not a corporeal right on land.  And it does not allow maintaining a substantial interest over the servient land.  No profit-a-prendre in gross, ie. for the benefit of individuals (primarily because, it comes out from the ‘Explanation’ of the Definition of Easement). On a close look, it can be seen that it is definitely related to ‘user’ of land, at least, in a ‘definite’ locality.

Customary Easement is not an Easement in its True Sense

In Yohannan Vs. Mathai, 1991-1 Ker LJ 605, 1991 KHC 571 it is held that Customary right is not an easement. It is pointed out that an easement belongs to a determinate person or persons in respect of his or their land. It is an accommodation over the land of another restricting the user of the servient tenement to that extent without otherwise affecting the title or possession of the servient owner. A fluctuating body cannot claim an easement. It is observed further in this decision as under:

“Easements are private rights belonging to particular persons and is only an accommodation in the servient tenement for the convenient enjoyment of the dominant tenement. Customary rights are public rights annexed to the place in general. Customary right is also different from customary easement. An easement is always appurtenant to the dominant tenement and inseparably attached to it and cannot be severed from it (Ram Chandra Sah v. Abdul Hannan and others, AIR 1984 Pat 313). Customary easement originates in a valid custom and vest in all owners of certain tenements within a particular locality, who form a class, for whose benefit the custom prevails. It can be claimed only as appurtenant to some dominant tenement and not independently as customary rights. village pathways based on customary rights vested in the people of the locality are not public highways (Narayani v. Govindan – 1968 Ker LT 626 ). Custom gives rise to customary easements. But there is a vital difference between the two. Easements Act deals with customary easements, but not customary rights. Customary rights are rights arising by custom, but not attached to a dominant tenement. But a customary easement can exist only for the beneficial enjoyment of other lands because it is merely appurtenant to a dominant heritage and cannot exist in gross (Ramachandra Singh v. Partapsingh and others, AIR 1965 Raj 217).”

It is also observed in Amar Singh v. Kehar Singh (AIR 1995 HP 82) that there is distinction between easement and customary easement and pointed out that an easement is always appurtenant to the dominant tenement and inseparably attached to it and cannot be severed from it. There can be no easement without dominant tenement and a servient tenement. Rights which are by a community or class or persons by virtue of a customary right are not easement but are right in gross. An easement must always be appurtenant to a dominant tenement. Indeterminate and fluctuating body of persons such as the public or the community cannot have an easement.

Parbhawati Devi v. Mahendra Narain Singh, AIR 1981 Patna 133, it is held as follows:

  • “A customary right is not easement. An easement belongs to a determinate person or persons in respect of his or their land. A fluctuating body like the inhabitants of the locality cannot claim an easement. Easements are private rights belonging to particular persons while customary rights are public rights annexed to the place in general. Customary right is also different from customary easement and Easements Act does not at all deal with it. It expressly excludes it from its scope and purview. An easement is always appurtenant to the dominant tenement and inseparably attached to it and cannot be served from it. Where the fluctuating body of persons namely, the villagers and not a particular person claimed easement to get water from a reservoir but there was nothing laid in the plaint as to for which land dominant tenement, easement was claimed, no case of easement could be said to have been made out.”

Customary Easement – Not Necessarily be Annexed to Ownership of Land

In State of Bihar v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1968 SC 281, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “By the Explanation to s. 4 the expression “to do something” includes removal and appropriation by the dominant owner, for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant heritage, of any part of the soil of the servient heritage, or anything growing or subsisting thereon. A profit-a- prendre is therefore included in the definition of “easement” in S. 4 of the Indian Easements Act. But an easement being a right which is super-added to the ordinary common law incidents of the ownership of a dominant tenement, and which connotes a corresponding burden on a servient tenement, can only be created by grant, or by statute. … ”
  • “An apparent exception to this rule is a customary easement. But a customary easement is not an easement in the true sense of that expression. It is not annexed to the ownership of a dominant tenement, and it is not exercisable for the more beneficial enjoyment of the dominant tenement: it is recognised and enforced as a part of the common law of the locality where it obtains. A customary easement arises in favour of an indeterminate class of persons such as residents of a locality or members of a certain community, and though not necessarily annexed to the ownership of land, it is enforceable as a right to do and continue to do something upon land or as a right to prevent and continue to prevent something being done upon land. Sanction for its enforceability being in custom, the right must satisfy all the tests which a local custom for recognition by courts must satisfy.
  • A profit-a-prendre in gross – that is a right exercisable by an indeterminate body of persons to take something from the land of others, but not for the more beneficial enjoyment of a dominant tenement – is not an easement within the meaning of the Easements Act. To the claim of such a right, the Easements Act has no application. 
  • Section 2 of the Easements Act expressly provides that nothing in the Act contained, shall be deemed to affect, inter alia, to derogate from any customary or other right (not being a license) in or over immovable property which the Government, the public or any person may possess irrespective of other immovable property. A claim in the nature of a profit-a-prendre operating in favour of an indeterminate class of persons and arising out of a local custom may be held enforceable only if it satisfies the tests of a valid custom. A custom is a usage by virtue of which a class of persons belonging to a defined section in a locality are entitled to exercise specific rights against certain other persons or property in the same locality. To the extent to which it is inconsistent with the general law, undoubtedly the custom prevails. But to be valid, a custom must be ancient, certain and reasonable, and being in derogation of the general rules of law must be construed strictly. A right in the nature of a profit-a-prendre in the exercise of which the residents of locality are entitled to excavate stones for trade purposes would ex facie be unreasonable because the exercise of such a right ordinarily tends to the complete destruction of the subject-matter of the profit.”

It is observed in Gopalbhai Jikabhai Suvagiya VS Vinubhai Nathabhai Hirani, 2018  Supreme (Guj) 924, that a customary easement is not an easement in the true sense of that expression; it is not annexed to the ownership of a dominant tenement, and it is not exercisable for the more beneficial enjoyment of the dominant tenement; it is recognized and enforced as a part of the common law of the locality where it obtains. A customary easement arises in favour of an indeterminate class of persons such as residents of a locality or members of a certain community, and though not necessarily annexed to the ownership of land, it is enforceable as a right to do and continue to do something upon land or as a right prevent and continue to prevent something done upon land. Sanction for its enforceability being in custom, the right must satisfy all the tests which a local custom for recognition by courts must satisfy.

Acquiring Customary Easement by One Person or even by a Fluctuating Body

Illustration (a) to sec. 18 runs as follows:

  • “By the custom of a certain village every cultivator of village land is entitled, as such, to graze his cattle on the common pasture. A having become the tenant of a plot of uncultivated land in the village, breaks up and cultivates that plot. He thereby acquires an easement to graze his cattle in accordance with the customs.”

Quoting Illustration (a), it was held in Chandgi Ram v. Ram Lal, AIR 1963 Raj 161, that the customary easement of having access to a field would be available to tenants of land, if it was newly brought under cultivation, and the customary easement was so well known that the court could give effect to it – even if it was not pleaded in the plaint.

A customary easement can be claimed by a family or an individual, and such claim need not be by a large community alone. [R. Venkateswara Raju v. State of AP, 2020 Supreme (AP) 206.] When the plaintiff sues in his personal capacity with respect to a customary easement the suit is maintainable in spite of the non-compliance with the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8, Civil P.C. [Jugal Kishore v. Umrao Singh,  AIR 1949 All 272.] To constitute a customary easement the right claimed must be an easement and it must be in virtue of a local custom. A customary right of uninterrupted user is quite different from setting up a local custom.

It is also pointed out that different persons may have a right of pasture over a land, but the plaintiff can nonetheless claim a right independent of others, provided the necessary conditions are satisfied. A customary easement, as is obvious, embraces the needs of variable persons belonging to a class or locality, while a right by prescription is always personal. Therefore, customary easement is unappurtenant to any dominant tenement, or it has no relation to the beneficial enjoyment of a dominant tenement as required in easement. A fluctuating body like the inhabitants of the locality cannot claim an easement as can be done in customary easement. Easements are private rights belonging to particular persons while customary rights are public rights annexed to the place in general. [Brahma Nand VS Teju Ram, 2019-195 AIC 584.]

 It is observed in R. Venkateswara Raju v. State of AP, 2020 Supreme (AP) 206, that customary easement, as provided under Section 18 of the Easements Act, is an amenity to the land own and possessed by the farmers within the vicinity, since the same is being used as cart track and thrashing floor. In Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89 it is held as under:

“Different persons may have a right of pasture over a land, but the plaintiff can nonetheless claim a right independent of others, provided the necessary conditions are satisfied. A customary easement, as is obvious, embraces the needs of variable persons belonging to a class or locality, while a right by prescription is always personal. These observations I have made, so that the evidence is properly appreciated, while the case goes back to lower Courts.”

Right of Privacy

According to the illustration (b) of Section 18 right of privacy is a customary right and there is no such thing as a natural right of privacy recognised by law anywhere in India. It is only a customary easement arising by virtue of a local custom. [See: Laxmi Bai VS K. Komaraiah, 1998 2 ALD 23; 1998 2 ALT 229.]

A Village pathway is a good example of Customary easement

It is observed in Yohannan Vs. Mathai, 1991-1 Ker LJ 605, 1991 KHC 571 that customary easement originates in a valid custom and vest in all owners of certain tenements within a particular locality, who form a class, for whose benefit the custom prevails. It can be claimed only as appurtenant to some dominant tenement and not independently as customary rights. village pathways based on customary rights vested in the people of the locality are not public highways (Narayani v. Govindan – 1968 Ker LT 626).

Village Pathways – Intermediate between the Public and Private Roads

In Harendra Nath Chakraborti v. Asim Sindhu Chakraborty, AIR 1981 Cal 325, it is observed as under:

“In the Full Bench case of Chunilal in (1888) ILR 15 Cal 460, it has been stated that a village pathway comes under the description of the second class of rights intermediate between the public and private roads. This decision was followed by Mukherjee, J. , in the case of Jatindra v. Satya in (1938) 42 Cal WN 445 : (AIR 1938 Cal 366 ). It has been stated that a village pathway is not a public highway and so interference with the user of the same docs not involve any invasion of public rights, vide the page 448 (of Cal WN) : (at p. 368 of AIR ). It however appears from these cases that a village pathway, which comes under the description of the second class of rights intermediate between the public and private way, has its origin in custom, but a public highway exists for all the citizens and has its origin in dedication The case of Harish Chandra v. Prannath (AIR 1921 Cal 405) (supra) is in the plaintiffs’ favour. The decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Subbamma v. Narain Murthi (AIR 1949 Mad 634) (supra) cannot be followed because the learned single Judge of the Madras High Court dissented from the decisions of this Court in the cases of M. Devi v. Basanta, ILR 60 Cal 1003 : (AIR 1933 Cal 884) and of Surendra v. District Board of Nadia (AIR 1942 Cal 360 ). A village pathway is not a public highway. So in the case of obstruction of a village pathway or road, no proof of special damage arises. Such question is relevant only in the case of a public highway, where there is allegation of public nuisance. This principle has been enunciated by the Court in the cases of (1924) 39 Cal LJ 347 at p. 352 : (AIR 1923 Cal 622 at p. 624); ILR (1946) 1 Cal 522 : (AIR 1949 Cal 209) (Hangsa Kalita v. Pradip Rai Deka ).”

Bury the dead in the land of another – only a Customary Right; and not Customary Easement

There is difference of opinion on this matter. It appears that the correct position is that it is not a customary easement; because the the right claimed cannot be related to user of land. In case of other rights claimed as customary easements, they can be related to user of land, in one way or other. As shown earlier, though Profit-a-prendre is allowed in Indian Law, it is not a corporeal right on land; and it does not allow maintaining a substantial interest over the servient land and there is no profit-a-prendre ‘in gross’. [See: Ramzan Momin  v. Dasrath Raut, AIR 1953 Patna 138. Mathura Prasad v. Karim Baksh, 31 Ind Cas 805.]

It is pointed out in Satyabhamakutty Pisharassiar v. Chinnathan Master (1976 Ker LT 78) a right to bury the dead in the land of another claimed by a section of the inhabitants of a locality can only be a customary right; and not an easement, as there is no question of beneficial enjoyment of a dominant tenement. It is held in this decision as under:

  • “A right to bury the dead in the land of another claimed by a section of the inhabitants of a locality can only be a customary right. It is a right claimed by a fluctuating body of persons. it is a right claimed in respect of a particular locality. It is a right which does not arise from a gram. It is not a claim by a defined person. It is not a claim that arises from the beneficial enjoyment of a dominant tenement. So the right claimed cannot be an easement. if such a right is to be upheld by courts it ‘should be immemorial in origin, certain and reasonable in nature and continuous in use’. In view of the peculiar nature of the right involved, a finding on the question of actual possession of the property cannot turn the tables against any party. Though the defendants claimed it as an easement, it is not really an easement.”

Customary Right Must Be Exercised in a Reasonable Manner

A customary right of the nature claimed by the plaintiffs must be exercised in a reasonable manner. [See: Jugal Kishore v. Umrao Singh,  AIR 1949 All 272; Ram Saran Singh v. Birju Singh 19 ALL. 172; Bhola Nath Nundi v. Midnapore Zemindari Co. 31 Cal. 503.]  The entire rights and limitations applicable in law to ‘Easements’ in general, under the scheme of the Easement Act, fully apply to customary easements also. Under Indian law a dominant owner ‘uses’ servient tenement and ‘enjoys the easement’. (See Sec. 31).

Easement is a right that allows:

  • Only ‘enjoyment’ of soil or things ‘subsisting’ thereon (Explanation in Sec. 4).
  • for limited enjoyment of (a) land & (b) advantages arising from its situation: S. 7
  • exercise right, in a way least onerous: S. 22
  • secure full enjoyment, but cause as little inconvenience: S. 24 2017(2) KLT 63

It is Not a right to:                                            

  • tend to total destruction of ser. tenement: S. 17 (2003 (1) KLT320)
  • make additional burden: S. 23
  • make constructions in, or cultivate upon: (2003 (1) KLT 320).
  • prevent servient owner to use: S. 27 : 2003 (1) KLT 320
  • enlarge purpose of, or accustomed, user: S. 28
  • substantially increase an easement: S. 29
  • prevent servient owner from obstructing excessive  ‘user’ of servient land – as ‘enjoyment of easement’: S. 31
  • increase burden by making permanent change in do. tent: S. 43
  • capable of forming grant – No easement-if Not capable of forming grant (without document or registration): 1987 (2) KLT 1037;

No easement if:

  • right claimed is incidents of ownership.
  • servient property belongs to him. Easement is a right with conscious knowledge that the servient property does not belong to him. AIR 1966 Raj 265. It must also be with proper animus as to easement: AIR 1973 Mad 173.

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Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction.

‘Res’, in Latin, means a thing or matter; and ‘Judicata’ means decided or judged.

  • Thus, Res Judicata applies when the ‘matter is decided’.

It is based on the public policy of finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions, and private interest of all persons sued; that is, one should not be tried twice for the same cause or a matter that has been directly and substantially in issue in an earlier suit. Sec. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, elucidates this principle.

Sec. 11, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, reads as under:

“Res Judicata No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.” … (Explanations I to VIII)

Core Ingredients of Res Judicata

  • The matter in issue has been an issue in a former suit.

Other Requirements

  • Same matter; Same Parties
  • Heard and finally decided
  • By a competent court

No Res judicata, where

  • Decision by fraud
  • Dismissal in limine
  • Suit was premature
  • Pure question of law
  • Compromise decree
  • Want of jurisdiction
  • Habeas corpus cases
  • Dismissal on ‘limitation’
  • New laws bring changes 
  • Public interest litigation
  • Decision not on the merits,
  • Dismissal for want of notice
  • Suit was not properly framed,
  • Dismissal on technical ground
  • Default of plaintiffs appearance,
  • Decision by an incompetent court
  • Cases where re-litigation is needed
  • Misjoinder or non-joinder of parties
  • Grounds not taken up by appeal court,
  • Earlier decision between co-defendants,
  • Findings on the Title in an injunction suit.
  • Ultimate decision – suit was not maintainable
  • Dismissed in limine without a Speaking Order
  • Intermediate reliefs in interlocutory applications.
  • Findings not Necessary (for supporting decree)
  • Taxation cases. Liability to pay tax each year differs.
  • Lower Court findings where appeal decree was passed
  • Former decision was too perverse (no proper reasoning)  
  • Adverse findings against one who got a favorable decree
  • Different causes of action, as in an injunction suit or in an eviction suit

Binding Precedent and Res Judicata – a Couplet

  • Binding Precedent refers to a judicial rule or principle established in an earlier binding decision that must be followed in subsequent similar cases.
  • Res Judicata applies to findings of both law and fact. It bars the same parties from re-litigating issues that have already been finally decided.
  • Binding Precedent pertains strictly to legal principles and technically bind courts, not parties.

No ‘Binding Precedent’ if earlier decision was –

  • without taking into account the statutory provision or factual situation
  • wrong in law.

Classifications of Res Judicata

In law, ‘res judicata’ signifies ‘bar-by-res-judicata’ to subsequent litigation. Based on practical application of bar-by-res-judicata, judicial findings can be broadly classified into 3 categories:

  • Res judicata (Bar by actual findings),
  • Constructive res judicata (Bar by res judicata, beyond findings), and
  • Ineffectual Res Judicata (Findings; but, no bar by res judicata)

Should the Matter be in “Actual Issue”, Or Need be in “Substance” alone

Earlier Broader View : Sufficient if the Matter was in Issue in Substance

In Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay, AIR 1965 SC 1153, it is held as under:   

  • “We therefore hold that on the general principle of res judicata, the decision of the High Court on a writ petition under Art. 226 on the merits on a matter after contest will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit between the same parties with respect to the same matter.”

In Nayan Bhebli v. Bhutnath Sardar, 2014 5 CHN 594, it is held as under:

  • “It is not necessary that a distinct issue should be raised. It is sufficient if the matter was in issue in substance [Md. Ali v. Upendra 58 CLJ 196].”

Modern Trend (Stricter Approach): Same Issue Must Have Been Adjudicated in the Former Suit

In M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1, paras 439 and 446 are noteworthy. They read as under:

  • 439. The applicability of Section 11 is premised on certain governing principles. These are:
    • .(i) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the suit should have been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit;
    • (ii) The former suit should be either between the same parties as in the latter suit or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title;
    • (iii) The court which decided the former suit should have been competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which the issue has been subsequently raised; and
    • (iv) The Issue should have been heard and finally decided by the court in the former suit.
  • 446. There is absolutely no merit in the contention that the principles of constructive res judicata will bar the subsequent suits. The parties were distinct. The claim in the earlier suit was distinct. The basis of the claim was indeed not that which forms the subject matter of the subsequent suits.

In Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat, AIR 2021 SC 3802; 2021-9 SCC 99, it was held as under:

  • “26. Section 11 of the CPC enunciates the rule of res judicata: a court shall not try any suit or issue in which the matter that is directly in issue has been directly or indirectly heard and decided in a former suit? Therefore, for the purpose of adjudicating on the issue of res judicata it is necessary that the same issue (that is raised in the suit) has been adjudicated in the former suit. It is necessary that we refer to the exercise taken up by this Court while adjudicating on res judicata, before referring to res judicata as a ground for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11.”

In Mohd. Saeed v. Munnu Khan, AIR 2014 All. 125, it is held as under:

  • “Identity of matter in issue, i.e. the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit either actually (Expln 3) or constructively (Explan 4).
  • “The subject-matter and the causes of actions of the two suits may be different but the issues may be the same. Expln III refers to direct res judicata and Expln. IV to constructive res judicata. It is not necessary that a distinct issue should be raised. It is sufficient if the matter was in issue in substance.”

Conscious Adjudication of an Issue Constitutes Res Judicata

In Erach Boman Khavar v. Tukaram Shridhar Bhat, 2013-15 SCC 655, it is held that the doctrine of res judicata can only apply when there has been a conscious adjudication of the issue on merits. It is held as under:

  • “39. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that to attract the doctrine of res judicata it must be manifest that there has been a conscious adjudication of an issue. A plea of res judicata cannot be taken aid of unless there is an expression of an opinion on the merits. It is well settled in law that principle of res judicata is applicable between the two stages of the same litigation but the question or issue involved must have been decided at earlier stage of the same litigation.” (Quoted in: Ebix Singapore Private Limited v. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited, 2022-2 SCC 401)

Read Also: Res Judicata: ‘Same issue’ must have been ‘Adjudicated’ in the former suit

Bar by Res-judicata, When Attracted

  1. Same matter in issue: The matter in issue in earlier suit and the subsequent suit must be directly and substantially same. It need not have been considered, actually; a constructive consideration will be sufficient. But, the consideration of the same should not have been ‘incidental or collateral’.
  2. Same Parties: Parties to both suits must be same. It includes their privies on whom the concerned right or interest may have devolved. No Res Judicata Between Co-Defendants.
  3. Parties litigating under the same title: Parties must be litigating under the same title, in both suits. It refers to the capacity of persons who are suing or who are sued.  That is, whether the suit is for the benefit of the person named in the suit alone, or whether that person also represents the interest of another or others. A decision on such a suit will be binding on all such persons represented, and it will be independent of any particular cause of action on which one sues or is sued. In Ram Gobinda v. Bhaktabala, AIR 1971 SC 664, it is observed that the test for res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the subject matter involved in the two cases. Explanation VI lays down that where persons litigate bona fide in respect of public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.  It is clear that to attract Explanation VI, all persons who are represented in the representative capacity need not be expressly named in the suit. A suit instituted under Order I, rule 8, CPC will fall under this category.
  4. Tried by a competent court: The former suit must have been tried by a competent court. The principle behind this proposition is that the finding of a Court of limited jurisdiction will not be final and binding.  In Explanation II it is clarified that for the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court.
  5. Heard and finally decided: The matter must have been heard and finally decided by the earlier court in the earlier suit. What is material is the date on which the earlier suit was decreed; and not its date of filing.

The Supreme Court pointed out five conditions to attract Res judicata, in Sheldon Singh v. Daryao Kunwar. AIR 1966 SC 1332. They were –

  • (i) The matter directly substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit;
  • (ii) The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim;
  • (iii) The parties must have litigated under the same title in the former suit;
  • (iv) The court which decided the former suit must be a Court competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue is subsequently raised; and
  • (v) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first suit.

In Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woollen, Cotton, and Silk Mills Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 1128, it is emphasised that the court must look at the nature of the litigation, what the issues were raised therein, and what was actually decided in it, to decide whether a decision in an earlier litigation operated as res judicata.

Read Also:

             •➧ Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent; Not the Final Order or Conclusion.
             •➧ Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases: Does a Civil Court Judgment Bind a Criminal Court?
             •➧ Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon (SC), April 2, 2024 – An Odd Decision on ‘Civil Court Judgment Does Not Bind Criminal Court’.
             •➧ Cheating and Breach of Contract: Distinction lies in Fraudulent Intention ‘at the time of Promise’.  No Criminal Case endures on a Dispute Essentially Civil in Nature.
             •➧ No Res judicata on Finding on Title in an Injunction Suit
             •➧ Res Judicata and Judicial Precedent
             •➧ What are “Relevant Under Some Other Provisions of this Act” in Sec. 43?
             •➧ Judicial Precedent and Res Judicata – a Couplet
             •➧Alternative Pleadings on Title and Adverse Possession: Mutually Inconsistent or Mutually Destructive?
             •➧ Res Judicata: ‘Same issue’ must have been ‘Adjudicated’ in the former suit

Issue Must Have Been Raised

Sufficient pleading should have been raised by the party (in the subsequent suit) who seeks dismissal on bar by ‘res judicata’ so that an issue must have been raised on the same.  (Kalawati Kotla vs. Shokilal, AIR 2013 Chh. 12)

In Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage, AIR 2002 SC 637, it is observed as under:

  • “We are not inclined, in the facts and circumstances of this case, to weight the admissibility and binding efficacy of the decision rendered in the earlier suit on the doctrine of res judicata and holding the earlier decisions as conclusive between the parties. Res judicata is a mixed question of fact and law. We do not find the plea of res judicata having been raised in the plaint. Copies of pleadings and issues framed in the earlier suit have not been tendered in evidence and we do not find any issue on res judicata having been framed and tried between the parties in the present suit. No submission raising the plea of res judicata was made before any of the courts below or the High Court. We do not think such a plea can be permitted to be raised before this Court for the first time and at the hearing.”

Dismissed in limine without a Speaking Order No Res Judicata

In Hoshnak Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1328, it was held by the Supreme Court as under:

  • “If the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata. It is true that, prima facie, dismissal in limine even without passing a speaking order may strongly suggest that the Court took the view that there was no substance in the petition at all, but in the absence of a speaking order it would not be easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind of the Court and that makes it difficult and unsafe to hold that such a summary dismissal is a dismissal on merits and as such constitutes a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed under Article 32.” (Quoted in: Satpura Narmada Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Chhindwara v. A. K.  Chaturvedi, 2012-1 JLJ 78; 2012-1 MPLJ 282)

No Res Judicata Between Co-Defendants

Abubakar Husein Mulani v. Jafar Ahmad Mulani, 2010-1 CivCC 324; 2010-1 MhLJ 243; 2010-6 RCR(Civ) 1008, it is observed as under”

  • “In view of the settled legal position, the finding of the appellate Court in the said Appeal No.304/1984 would operate as a res judicata if a similar issue arises between the said plaintiffs and the defendant No.1 in future, but it could not operate as res judicata in the litigation between the present plaintiff and the defendant No.1, who were co-defendants in that earlier litigation.”

Res Judicata Rests Upon Pleadings

Res judicata arises on finding of a matter in an earlier case. But, res judicata always rests upon pleadings; because ‘the matter directly and substantially in issue’ is the decisive factor to determine res judicata.

Referring to earlier decisions, it is pointed out by our Apex Court in V Rajeswari v. T C Saravanabava, 2004-1 SCC 551, that the plea of res judicata is founded on proof of certain facts and then by applying the law to the facts so found; and that it is, therefore, necessary that the foundation for the plea must be laid in the pleadings and then an issue must be framed and tried. It was also emphasised that a plea not properly raised in the pleadings or in issues at the stage of the trial, would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of appeal.

However, the Apex Court added:

  • The view taken by the Privy Council was cited with approval before this Court in State of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal. However, an exception was carved out by this Court and the plea was permitted to be raised, though not taken in the pleadings nor covered by any issue, because the necessary facts were present to the mind of the parties and were gone into by the Trial Court. The opposite party had ample opportunity of leading the evidence in rebuttal of the plea. The Court concluded that the point of  res judicata had throughout been in consideration and discussion and so the want of pleadings or plea of waiver of res judicata cannot be allowed to be urged.” (Quoted in Swamy Atmananda Vs. Ramkrishna Tapovanam, AIR 2005 SC 2392)

Necessary to examine plaint, written statement, issues and judgment

For determining res judicata it is necessary to examine the plaint, the written statement, the issues and the judgment to find out if the matter was directly and substantially in issue (Ishwer Singh v. Sarwan Singh AIR 1965 SC 948; Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa, (1976) 4 SCC 780; Nand Ram v. Jagdish Prasad: AIR  2020 SC 1884).

In Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa, (1976) 4 SCC 780, it was observed as under

  • “8. In the instant case according to the plaintiffs- respondents, the identity of the subject matter in the present suit is quite different from the one which was adjudicated upon in the suits which formed the basis of the previous litigation. In our opinion, the best method to of decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suits and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgments which operate rt as res judicata. Unfortunately however in this case the pleadings of the suits instituted by the parties have not at all been filed and we have to rely upon the facts as mentioned in the judgments themselves. It is well settled that pleadings cannot be proved merely by recitals of the allegations mentioned in the judgment.”

In V. Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava, (2004) 1 SCC 551, it is observed as under:

  • “12. The plea of res judicata is founded on proof of certain facts and then by applying the law to the facts so found. It is, therefore, necessary that the foundation for the plea must be laid in the pleadings and then an issue must be framed and tried. A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or issues at the stage of the trial, would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of appeal [see (Raja) Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb v. Gour Hari Mahato AIR 1936 PC 258: 1936 All LR 786, Medapati Surayya v. Tondapu Bala Gangadhara Ramakrishna Reddi [AIR 1948 PC 3 : (1947) 2 MLJ 511] and Katragadda China Anjaneyulu v. Kattaragadda China Ramayya [AIR 1965 AP 177 : (1965) 1 An LT 149 (FB)] ]. The view taken by the Privy Council was cited with approval before this Court in State of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal.(1970) 3 SCC 656. However, an exception was carved out by this Court and the plea was permitted to be raised, though not taken in the pleadings nor covered by any issue because the necessary facts were present to the mind of the parties and were gone into by the trial court.The opposite party had ample opportunity of leading the evidence in rebuttal of the plea. The Court concluded that of the point of res judicata had throughout been in consideration and discussion and so the want of pleadings or plea of waiver of res judicata cannot be allowed to be urged.
  • 13. Not only the plea has to be taken, but it has to be substantiated by producing copies of the pleadings, issues and judgment in the previous case. Maybe, in a given case only a copy of the judgment in the previous suit is filed in proof of plea of res judicata and the judgment contains exhaustive or in requisite details the statement of pleadings and the issues which may be taken as enough proof. But as pointed out in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa (1976) 4 SCC 780 the basic method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suit and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgment which operates as res judicata. It is risky to speculate about the pleadings merely by a summary of recitals of the allegations made in the pleadings mentioned in the judgment. The Constitution Bench in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal AIR 1964 SC 1810 : (1964) 7 SCR 831 placing on a par the plea of res judicata and the plea of estoppel under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that proof of the plaint in the previous suit which is set to create the bar, ought to be brought on record. The plea is basically founded on the identity of the cause of action in the two suits and, therefore, it is necessary for the defence which raises the bar to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. Such pleas cannot be left to be determined by mere speculation or inferring by a process of deduction what were the facts stated in the previous pleadings. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kali Krishna Tagore v. Secy. of State for India in Council (1887-88) 15 IA 186: ILR 16 Cal 173 pointed out that the plea of res judicata cannot be determined without ascertaining what were the matters in issue in the previous suit and what was heard and decided. Needless to say, these can of be found out only by looking into the pleadings, the issues and the judgment in the previous suit.”

In Prem Kishore v. Brahm Prakash, 2023-3 MLJ 200 (SC); 2023-2 PLJR(SC) 270, it is pointed out as under:

  • “Since an adjudication of the plea of res judicata requires consideration of the pleadings, issues and decision in the ‘previous suit’, such a plea will be beyond the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 (d), where only the statements in the plaint will have to be perused.”

A “collateral or incidental” finding would not ordinarily be res judicata.

If only finding is “Necessary”, then only it is “Directly and Substantially” in issue

In Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350 the Supreme Court held that to attract res judicata on an earlier finding, the matter must have been directly and substantially in issue and that the finding on an issue came “collaterally or incidentally” would not ordinarily be res judicata. It was pointed out that if only the issue was “necessary” to be decided for adjudicating on the principal issue and had actually been decided, then only it would have to be treated as “directly and substantially” in issue; and that it is also necessary that the judgment was in fact based upon that decision.

For Res Judicata – Adjudication of the Issue Material and Essential

In Sajjadanashin it is pointed out as under:

  • “Where title to property is the basis of the right of possession, a decision on the question of possession is res judicata on the question of title to the extent that adjudication of title was essential to the judgment; but where the question of the right to possession was the only issue actually or necessary involved, the judgment is not conclusive on the question of ownership or title.”

Referring to Sajjadanashin Sayed, it is observed in Nand Ram v. Jagdish Prasad: AIR  2020 SC 1884 that a material test to be applied is whether the court considered the adjudication of the issue material and essential for its decision.

  • (Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350, is quoted and followed in: M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 273)

Referring Sajjadanashin Sayed it is observed in Union of India Vs. Vijay Krishna Uniyal, 2017-12 SCALE 704, that one has to examine the plaint, the written statement, the issues and the judgment to find out if the matter was directly and substantially in issue.

In Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, AIR 2000 SC 1238, observed as under:

  • “Point No. 1:
  • 11. The words “collaterally” or “incidentally in issue” have come up for interpretation in several common law jurisdictions in the context of the principle of res judicata. While the principle has been accepted that matters collaterally or incidentally in issue are not ordinarily res judicata, it has however been accepted that there are exceptions to this rule. The English, American, Australian and Indian Courts and Jurists have therefore proceeded to lay down certain tests to find out if even an earlier finding on such an issue can be res judicata in a later proceedings. There appears to be a common thread in the tests laid down in all these countries. We shall therefore refer to these developments.
  • 12. Matters Collaterally or incidentally in issue:
  • It will be noticed that the words used in Section 11 CPC are “directly and substantially in issue.” If the matter was in issue directly and substantially in a prior litigation and decided against a party then the decision would be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. Judicial decisions have however held that if a matter was only `collaterally or incidentally in issue and decided in an earlier proceeding, the finding therein would not ordinarily be res judicata in a latter proceeding where the matter is directly and substantially in issue.
  • 13. As pointed out in Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. 16, Para 1538) (4th Ed.), the fundamental rule is that a judgment is not conclusive if any matter came collaterally in question [R. vs. Knaptoft Inhabitants, Heptulla Bros vs. Thakore; or if any matter was incidentally cognizable Sanders (otherwise Saunders) vs. Sanders (otherwise Saunders)].
  • 14. A collateral or incidental issue is one that is ancillary to a direct and substantive issue; the former is an auxiliary issue and the latter the principal issue. The expression collaterally or incidentally in issue implies that there is another matter which is directly and substantially in issue (Mulla, CPC 15th Ed. p. 104).
  • 15. Difficulty in distinguishing whether a matter was directly in issue or collaterally or incidentally in issue and tests laid down in various Courts:
  • Difficulty in this area of law has been felt in various jurisdictions and therefore some tests have been evolved. Halsbury says (Vol. 16, Para 1538) (4th Ed.) that while the general principle is clear “difficulty arises in the application of the rule in determining in each case what was the point decided and what was the matter incidentally cognizable, and the opinion of Judges seems to have undergone some fluctuations.”
  • 16. Spencer Bower and Turner on The Doctrine of Res Judicata (2nd Ed, 1969) (p. 181) refer to the English and Australian experience and quota Dixon, J. of the Australian High Court in Blair v. Curran to say: “The difficulty in the actual application of these conceptions is to distinguish the matters fundamental or cardinal to the prior decision on judgment, or necessarily involved in it as its legal justification or foundation, from matters which, even though actually raised and decided as being in the circumstances of the case the determining considerations, yet are not in point of law the essential foundation of a groundwork of the judgment.” The authors say that in order to understand with essential distinction, one has always to inquire with unrelenting severity – is the determination upon which it is sought to find an estoppel so fundamental to the substantive decision that the latter cannot stand without the former. Nothing less than this will do. It is suggested by Dixon, J that even where this inquiry is answered satisfactorily, there is still another test to pass: viz. whether the determination is the immediate foundation” of the decision as opposed to merely “a proposition collateral or subsidiary only, i.e. not more than part of the reasoning supporting the conclusion.” It is well settled, say the above authors “that a mere step in reasoning is insufficient. What is required is no less than the determination of law, or fact or both, fundamental to the substantive decision.”

A deliberate judicial decision alone is Judicial Precedent

As regards binding precedent it is observed in Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44, as under:

  • “9…..It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates-
    • (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts;
    • (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and
    • (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides.
  • What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. “

Constructive Res-Judicata: For Not Making Whole Pleadings

In Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal, Andheri, AIR 1986 SC 391, the Supreme Court observed the scope of Explanation IV to Section 11 of CPC as under:

  • “An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue, it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided.”

In Mahesh Kumar Singh v. Union of India (Vipin Sanghi, Rekha Palli, JJ.), 2017-242 DLT 467, it was held as under:

  • “21. There is a clear distinction between proceedings where the issue could have been raised, and proceedings where issue should have been raised. In our opinion, the principle of constructive res judicata cannot be applied to bar an adjudication on an issue which was neither necessary to be raised, nor averted to by the court in the earlier proceedings.”

Explanation IV of Sec. 11 CPC brings-forth the bar on ‘constructive res judicata’. It sounds that the parties to the litigation should bring their whole case before the court in a candid manner. To attract the contention as to bar on constructive res judicata it must be shown that the particular matter in issue or ground must have been a matter which ‘might and ought’ to have raised as a  point in the former suit.

The majority view authored by Justice Untwalia in a full bench decision in Baijnath Prasad Sah vs. Ramphal Sahni (AIR 1962 Pat 72) examined the scope of ‘might and ought’ in the Explanation IV of Sec. 11 CPC and explained as under:

  • “If a party takes an objection at a certain stage of a proceeding and does not make another objection which it might and ought to have taken at the same stage, it must be deemed the Court has adjudicated upon the other objection also and has held against it. This principle of constructive res judicata has been extended further. If a party has knowledge of a proceeding, and having had an opportunity when it might and ought to have raised an objection, it does not do so, it cannot be allowed to raise that objection subsequently, if the Court passes an order which it could not have passed in case that objection had succeeded, on the ground that it must be deemed to have been raised by the party and decided against it. Though a transaction is void if a certain provision of law applies, it is for the court to decide whether that provision is applicable. Once a competent court has given a decision, holding expressly or by implication, that provision of law is inapplicable and the transaction is not void, that decision operates as res judicata between the parties. So also if an order of the court is deemed to have decided the question, the order is binding upon the parties.” Quoted in: Bhanu Shankar Raikwar Vs. Vijay Shankar Raikwar: 2018-3 MPLJ 569

From the above, it is clear that constructive res judicata is invited in the following two situations:

  • Out of wilful act: If a party takes a particular objection on a specific matter or allegation at a certain stage of a proceeding and does not make another objection which it might and ought to have taken at that stage.
  • Out of tacit or implicit act: If a party has (i) knowledge of a proceeding, and (ii) having had an opportunity to raise a particular objection, omits to do so; that is, tacitly or implicitly omits when it might and ought to have done.

It is held in Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar, AIR 2011 SC 2161; (2011) 5 SCC 607, as under:

  • “77. In the present case, it is admitted fact that when the contesting Respondents filed W.P. No. 1051 of 1966, the ground of non-compliance of statutory provision was very much available to them, but for the reasons best known to them, they did not raise it as one of the grounds while challenging the notification dated 11.12.1952 issued under the Evacuee Property Act. In the subsequent writ petition filed in the year 1990, initially, they had not questioned the legality of the notification, but raised it by filing an application, which is no doubt true, allowed by the High Court. In our view, the High Court was not justified in permitting the petitioners therein to raise that ground and answer the same, since the same is hit by the principles analogous to constructive res judicata.”

Res Judicata by Implied Finding

There should be a specific and express finding on a specific issue in the earlier suit, for invoking res judicata. Constructive res judicata is an exception to the general rule.  Explanation IV of S. 11, CPC, lays down that res judicata may be deemed ‘beyond findings’.

Though res judicata may arise on an implied finding, it does not dehors the proposition that pleadings are the decisive factor for res judicata. It is held in Nikunja Behari Das v. Jatindra Nath Kar, AIR 1956 Cal 613, as under :

  • “A decision by necessary implication is as much res judicata as an express decision. That this is so in the case where Explanation IV of S. 11, Civil Procedure Code, has to be considered, there can be no doubt, but even in other cases where a matter has been raised in the pleadings but there is no express decision but there is a decision by necessary implication, the Courts have always held that the principle of res judicata is applicable.” [Quoted in: Globe Publications Vs. Madan Gopal: AIR 1996 P&H 115]

Referring Greenhalgh v. Mallard (1576 ER 123) the Supreme Court explained in the State of UP v. Nawab Hussain (AIR 1969 SC 1256) that if a person is allowed to choose one cause of action from two or more causes of action from the same set of facts he would not be allowed to choose one at a time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation. It amounts to abuse of process of the court.

No Res judicataWhere suit dismissed on Technical Ground

It is trite law – there will not be res judicata if a suit is dismissed not on merit but on technical ground. (See: Niloufer Siddiqui v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., AIR 2008 Patna 5 upheld by the Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.  v. Niloufer Siddiqui, 2015-16 SCC 125: Referred to in: P. Rajesh v. V. Shanthi, 2015-5 LW 27; 2015-7 MLJ 648)

Therefore, there may not be any bar on the ground of res judicata even if a suit is dismissed on the technical ground of claiming inconsistent pleas of easement.

No Res Judicata, in spite of findings (Ineffectual Res Judicata)

Though there may be a previous decision on a particular issue, it may not bar the trial of subsequent suit as res judicata in the following instances.

  1. Former decision was not from a competent court; or order/decree was without jurisdiction. Fatma Bibi Ahmed Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 6 S.C.C. 789.
  2. Where ultimate decision in earlier case was on the ground that the suit was not maintainable, findings on merits in such cases do not constitute res judicata.
  3. Adverse finding against a party in whose favour the suit or the appeal is ultimately decided: PMA Metripolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001; Bakerbag Subhanbeg Vs. Shrikant Laxminarayan Zanwar: 2008-3 All MR 656.
  4. Former decision was too perverse for no proper reasoning was given.  
  5. Pure question of law.  Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar, (2008) 9 S.C.C. 54.
  6. Public interest litigation (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2000) 5 S.C.C. 525).   Principles of res judicata do not strictly apply to public interest writs – under Article 32 and Article 226.
  7. Dismissal of earlier suits and writs in limine. Daryao v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457.
  8. Dismissal of earlier suits and writs on technical ground or for want of parties: Ram Gobinda v. Bhaktabala, AIR 1971 SC 664; Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee Vs Mahant Harman Singh AIR 2003 SC 3349.
  9. Dismissal of earlier suits on a technical ground that they were for a mere declaration without seeking consequential relief: Inacia Martins v. Narayan Hari Naik AIR 1993 SC 756.
  10. First suit was dismissed for want of notice: Ramasami v. Thalawasal Marudai Reddi, l.L.R. 47 Mad. 453.
  11. First suit was dismissed on the ground of bar by ‘limitation. Munishi Chinadandasi v. Munishi Pedda Tatiah, AIR 1921 Mad 279; Krishnan Vs. Perumal Nadar, AIR 1973 Mad 81
  12. Dismissal of earlier suit for default of plaintiff or on limitation. Ram Gobinda v. Bhaktabala, AIR 1971 SC 664.
  13. In earlier suit, the plaintiff was non-suited on the ground of limitation, res judicata, mis-joinder, insufficient court fees on the plaint, jurisdiction or a like technical and preliminary ground: Venkatasuryanarayana v. Sivasankara-narayana (1914) 17 M.L.T. 85, Rama Krishna Naidu v. Krishnaswami Naidu, 36 M.L.J. 641.
  14. If appeal in earlier litigation was dismissed on technical grounds, lower court decision holds the field. Sheodan Singh v. DaryaoKunwar, AIR 1966 SC 1332.
  15. Findings on several grounds against a party. In appeal lower court decree confirmed; but, only one ground considered. Res judicata on that one ground alone.
  16. Cases where re-litigation is needed.
  17. Habeas corpus cases. If one habeas corpus petition is dismissed, then subsequent petition with fresh grounds will not be discarded. Sunil Dutt v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 53.
  18. New laws bring new changes that lead to the filing of a subsequent suit with the same cause of action. 
  19. Decision in the former suit has been obtained by fraud (Section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 refers to such judgments). Beli Ram v. Chaudri Mohammad Afzal, (1948) 50 Bom.L.R. 674.
  20. Different causes of action, as in an injunction suit or in an eviction suit.
  21. Intermediate reliefs in interlocutory applications.
  22. Taxation cases. Liability to pay tax each year differs is independent of each other.  Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v. Broken Hill Municipal Council, 1926 A.C. 94.   Instalment Supply Private Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1962 S.C. 53.

Ultimate Decision – Suit Not Maintainable, NO Res Judicata on findings on Merits

Our Apex Court pointed out in Vithal Yeshwant Jathar v. Shikandar Khan Makhtum Khan, AIR 1963 SC 385, as under:

  • “It is well settled that if the final decision in any matter at issue between the parties is based by a Court on its decisions on more than one point – each of which by itself would be sufficient for the ultimate decision – the decision on each of these points operates as res judicata between the parties. ” (Quoted in: Commissioner of Endowments Vs. Vittal Rao, AIR 2005 SC 454)

However, where the ultimate decision in the early suit was on a technical or other ground that the suit was not maintainable, there will be no res judicata on findings on merits in other issues of that case.

In PMA Metripolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, it is held as under:

  • “In Abdullah Ashgar Ali Khan v. Ganesh Dass AIR 1917 PC 201 the Court while considering the expression, ‘heard and finally decided’ in Section 10 of the British Baluchistan Regulation IX of 1896 held that where the suit was dismissed by two courts on merits but the decree was maintained in second appeal because the suit was not properly constituted then the finality on merits stood destroyed. In Sheosagar Singh & Ors. v. Sitaram Singh ILR 1897 Cal. Vol. XXIV where parentage of defendant was decided in his favour by the Trial Court but the High Court maintained the order as the suit was defective the claim of the defendant in the latter suit that the finding on parentage operated as res judicata was repelled and it was held, that the question of parentage had not been heard and finally decided in the suit of 1885. The appeal in that suit had put an end to any finality in the decision of the first Court, and had not led to a decision on the merits. The rationale of these decisions is founded on the principle that if the suit was disposed of in appeal not on merits but for want of jurisdiction or for being barred by time or for being defectively constituted then the finality of the findings recorded by the Trial Court on merits stands destroyed as the suit having been found to be bad for technical reasons it becomes operative from the date the decision was given by the trial court thus rendering any adjudication on merits impliedly unnecessary.”

In Pawan Kumar Gupta Vs. Rochiram Nagdeo, 1999-4 SCC 243, it is observed as under:

  • “19. Thus the second legal position is this: If dismissal of the prior suit was on a ground affecting the maintainability of the suit any finding in the judgment adverse to the defendant would not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. But if dismissal of the suit was on account of extinguishment of the cause of action or any other similar cause a decision made in the suit on a vital issue involved therein would operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties.”[Quoted in: Director, WB Fire Service Vs. Shyam Sundar Kalra: 2018-2 CalLT 389; Mir Shah Zahoor Trustee Vs. Haji Shaik Madhar: 2009-2 ALD 557, 2009-4 ALT 263; Bakerbag Subhanbeg Vs. Shrikant Laxminarayan Zanwar: 2008-3 All MR 656; Mahadu Punjaba Dhage Vs. Prabhakar Trimbak: 1999-4 All MR 381, 2000-2 BCR 817.]

It is pointed out in D. Kandaswamy Naicker v. R. Kumaraswamy (1990-1 MadLJ 166) that where a finding in a judgment is a mere opinion and it is neither an order nor a decree, it can bind none, and it cannot be treated as a judicial and enforceable determination of a matter. (Also see:Rama Shankar v. Hubraji (AIR 1969 All 407) It is held in Pakkran v. Pathuamma, 25 M.L.J. 279, that any decision on a collateral matter would not operate as res judicata. In Rama Krishna Naidu v. Krishnaswami Naidu, (1918) 36 M.L.J. 641, it was held that if the findings rendered were wholly inconsistent with the decree, they would not operate as res judicata.

In Venkata-surya-narayana v. Siva-sankara-narayana, (1914) 17 M.L.T. 85, it was observed that where the plaintiff was non-suited on the ground of limitation, res judicata, mis-joinder, insufficient court fees on the plaint, jurisdiction or a like technical and preliminary grounds, and at the same time the court proceeded to give a finding on the merits against defendants to save a remand by the Appellate Court, such findings on merits would not be res judicata if, on appeal, the appellate Court did not itself think it necessary to give its decision based on such findings on merits, or if in case there was no appeal. It was observed in that case that it was evident that the first Court did not intend its findings on merits to be final.

See also:

Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti Vs. Sanjeevprasad, 2004-7 SCC 482,
Karnail Singh Vs. Bhajan Singh, 2005 AIR(P& H) 207,
Phonographic Performance Vs. Union of India: 2015-220 DLT 90.

NO Res Judicata on Adverse Findings, In a Favourable Decree, For No Appeal

There will be no res judicata on adverse findings (on other issues) if the suit or appeal is ultimately decided in favour of a party.  In PMA Metripolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, it is observed as under:

  • “59. Last but not the least reason to hold that the finding in the Vattipanam Suit recorded by the High Court in its original judgment on canon etc. could not operate as res judicata is where a decree is one of dismissal in favour of the defendants, but there is an adverse finding against him, a plea of res judicata cannot be founded upon that decision because the defendant having succeeded on the other plea had no occasion to go further in appeal against the adverse finding recorded against him [see Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd. vs. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1922 PC 241 ] …..
  • Similarly, in the decision of the Patna High Court in Arjun Singh v. Tara Das Ghosh, AIR 1974 Pat 1 the primary question was whether a party against whom a finding is recorded has got a right of appeal even though the ultimate decision was in his favour and it was held that there was no bar, but what was necessary was that the finding so recorded should operate as res judicata. On facts it was found that the Appellate Court while maintaining the order of dismissal of the suit on preliminary issue recorded findings on other issues which were against the plaintiff, yet the plaintiff was not entitled to file an appeal as the findings on merits which were adverse to him could not operate as res judicata.
  • In Sham Nath’s case (Sham Nath Madan vs. Mohammad Abdullah, AIR 1967 J&K 85) the learned Single Judge rejected the plea of res judicata raised on behalf of the plaintiff, but while considering the alternative argument, observed that an adverse finding recorded against a defendant in a suit dismissed could not operate as res judicata unless the adverse finding formed a fundamental part of the decree itself.”

In Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam, AIR 1999 SC 3571, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “23. The respondents before us are, therefore, entitled to contend that the finding of the High Court in regard to absence of reasonable and probable cause or malice – (upon which the decree for pecuniary damages in B and C Schedules was based) can be attacked by the respondents for the purpose of sustaining the decree of the High Court refusing to pass a decree for non-pecuniary damages as per the A Schedule. The filing of cross-objections against the adverse finding was not obligatory. There is no res judicata. …” (Quoted in: Mohammed v. Chandrika, ILR 2010-3 Ker  358; 2010-3 KHC 233;  2010-3 KLT 306)

In Balu Mahadeo Randhir v. Nabilal Haji Habib Gadiwale, 1997-2 BomCR 462; 1997-1 MhLJ 302, it is oheld as under:

  • “Where a suit is dismissed, the defendant against whom an adverse finding might have come to be recorded on some issue has no right of appeal and he canot question those findings before the Appellate Court. Inasmuch as the defendant could not have filed an appeal, the decision in the aforesaid Regular Civil Suit No. 298 of 1971 cannot act as res judicata…”

In Bakerbag Subhanbeg Vs. Shrikant Laxminarayan Zanwar: 2008-3 All MR 656 it is pointed out that an appeal would lie against only those findings that amount to a ‘decree’ or ‘order’ that falls under Section 96 or Section 100 CPC. Similarly, no appeal lies against an Order under Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1. In Bakerbag Subhanbeg earlier decisions were referred to in detail. It includes the following:

Midanpur Zamindari Co. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1922 PC 241; 
Run Bahadur Singh v. Lucnokoer,  ILR (1885)11 Cal 301 (PC); 
Pateswari Din v. Mahant Sarjudass, AIR 1938 Oudh 18;
Bansi Lal Ratwa v. Laxminarayan, 1969 2 AWR 246,
Arjun Singh v. Tara Das Ghosh, AIR 1974 Pat 1.

Res Judicata: The issue should have been necessary to be decided

In PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, it is held as under:

  • “57. It is fairly settled that the finding on an issue in the earlier suit to operate as res judicate should not have been only directly and substantially in issue but it should have been necessary to be decided as well.”

It is the appellate decision that operates as res judicata

PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, continued as under:

  • “When a decision is taken in appeal the rule is that it is the appellate decision and not the decision of the Trial Court that operates as res judicata.”

Appeal dismissed on limitation; Trial Court decision on merits ceases to be final

PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, further continued as under:

  • “Where a suit is decided both on merits and on technical grounds by the Trial Court, and the appellate court maintains it on technical ground of limitation or suit being not properly constituted then the decision rendered on merits by the Trial Court ceases to have finality.
  • In Abdullah Ashgar Ali Khan v. Ganesh Dass AIR 1917 PC 201 the Court while considering the expression, `heard and finally decided’ in Section 10 of the British Baluchistan Regulation IX of 1896 held that where the suit was dismissed by two courts on merits but the decree was maintained in second appeal because the suit was not properly constituted then the finality on merits stood destroyed.”  (The apex Court also referred to Sheosagar Singh & Ors. v. Sitaram Singh ILR 1897 Cal. Vol. XXIV. )
  • “58. The rationale of these decisions is founded on the principle that if the suit was disposed of in appeal not on merits but for want of jurisdiction or for being barred by time or for being defectively constituted then the finality of the findings recorded by the Trial Court on merits stands destroyed as the suit having been found to be bad for technical reasons it becomes operative from the date the decision was given by the trial court thus rendering any adjudication on merits impliedly unnecessary. “

Finding in Review Sustains; Other Earlier Findings Not Res Judicate

PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, proceeded further as under:

  • “58. …. On the same rationale, once the Royal Court of Appeal allowed the Review Petition and dismissed the appeal as the ex-communication of Dionysius was contrary to principles of natural justice and he had not become heretic then the finding on authenticity of the canon etc. rendered in the original order was rendered unnecessary. Therefore, the finding recorded on the authenticity of the canon and power of the Patriarch etc. recorded in the earlier order could not operate as res judicate in subsequent proceedings.”

No Res Judicata on a Finding on Title, in an Injunction Suit and in Probate Action

An incidental finding will not constitute res judicata.

In Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350, it is observed as under:

  • “24. Before parting with this point, we would like to refer to two more rulings. In Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair [(1994) 2 SCC 14] this Court held that a finding as to title given in an earlier injunction suit would be res judicata in a subsequent suit on title. On the other hand, the Madras High Court, in Vanagiri Sri Selliamman Ayyanar Uthira-soma-sundareswarar Temple v. Rajanga Asari [AIR 1965 Mad 355 : ILR (1965) 1 Mad 232] held (see para 8 therein) that the previous suit was only for injunction relating to the crops. Maybe, the question of title was decided, though not raised in the plaint. In the latter suit on title, the finding in the earlier suit on title would not be res judicata as the earlier suit was concerned only with a possessory right. These two decisions, in our opinion, cannot be treated as being contrary to each other but should be understood in the context of the tests referred to above. Each of them can perhaps be treated as correct if they are understood in the light of the tests stated above. In the first case decided by this Court, it is to be assumed that the tests above-referred to were satisfied for holding that the finding as to possession was substantially rested on title upon which a finding was felt necessary and in the latter case decided by the Madras High Court, it must be assumed that the tests were not satisfied. As stated in Mulla, it all depends on the facts of each case and whether the finding as to title was treated as necessary for grant of an injunction in the earlier suit and was also the substantive basis for grant of injunction. In this context, we may refer to Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 50, para 735, p. 229) where a similar aspect in regard to findings on possession and incidental findings on title were dealt with. It is stated:
  • “Where title to property is the basis of the right of possession, a decision on the question of possession is res judicata on the question of title to the extent that adjudication of title was essential to the judgment; but where the question of the right to possession was the only issue actually or necessarily involved, the judgment is not conclusive on the question of ownership or title.””
  • (Quoted and followed in: M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 273; 27.02.2025)

The Apex Court (Sulochana Amma Vs. Narayanan Nair, (1994) 2 SCC 14) also pointed out as under:

  • “The decision in earlier case on the issue between the same parties or persons under whom they claim title or litigating under the same title, it operates as a res-judicata. A plea decided even in a suit for injunction touching title between the same parties, would operate as res-judicata. It is a settled law that in a Suit for injunction when title is in issue, for the purpose of granting injunction, the issue directly and substantially arises in that suit between the parties when the same is put in issue in a later suit based on title between the same parties or their privies in a subsequent suit, the decree in injunction suit equally operates as a res-judicata.”

Anathula Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2033, the Supreme Court held that where the issue of title involves complicated or complex questions of fact and law, or where court feels that parties had not proceeded on the basis that title was at issue, the court should not decide the issue of title in a suit for injunction. It is clear that findings of title in such suits are redundant so far as res judicata is concerned, the Court proceeded to hold as under:

  • “21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under:
  • (a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff’s title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff’s title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff’s lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter.
  • (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession.
  • (c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar [Annaimuthu Thevar v. Alagammal, (2005) 6 SCC 202] ). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction.
  • (d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.”
  • (Quoted and followed in: M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 273; 27.02.2025)

(Both, Sulochana Amma and Anathula Sudhakar are referred to in T. Ravi Vs. B. Chinna Narasimha, 2017-7 SCC 342)

In Hem Nolini Judah v. Isolync Saroibashini Bose, AIR 1962 (SC) 1471, it was held that questions of title are not decided in proceedings for the grant of probate or letters of administration.

Appellate Decision Operates As Res Judicata

Decree of a lower court merges with the decree of the appellate court. Hence appellate decree is to be looked into to determine res judicata. In PMA Metripolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, it is observed as under:

  • “If the ex-communication of Dionysius was invalid for violation of principles of natural justice, as was found by the Bench reviewing the order, then the findings on earlier issues were rendered unnecessary and it is fairly settled that the finding on an issue in the earlier suit to operate as res judicata should not have been only directly and substantially in issue but it should have been necessary to be decided as well. For instance, when a decision is taken in appeal the rule is that it is the appellate decision and not the decision of the Trial Court that operates as res judicata. Consequently where a suit is decided both on merits and on technical grounds by the Trial Court, and the appellate court maintains it on technical ground of limitation or suit being not properly constituted then the decision rendered on merits by the Trial Court ceases to have finality. In Abdullah Ashgar Ali Khan v. Ganesh Dass AIR 1917 PC 201 the Court while considering the expression, `heard and finally decided’ in Section 10 of the British Baluchistan Regulation IX of 1896 held that where the suit was dismissed by two courts on merits but the decree was maintained in second appeal because the suit was not properly constituted then the finality on merits stood destroyed. In Sheosagar Singh & Ors. v. Sitaram Singh ILR 1897 Cal. Vol. XXIV where parentage of defendant was decided in his favour by the Trial Court but the High Court maintained the order as the suit was defective the claim of the defendant in the latter suit that the finding on parentage operated as res judicata was repelled and it was held, that the question of parentage had not been heard and finally decided in the suit of 1885. The appeal in that suit had put an end to any finality in the decision of the first Court, and had not led to a decision on the merits.”

Res Judicata on Ex Parte Decree

An ex-parte decree might also will constitute res judicata if the defendant  had express notice of the pleadings and the prayer that a particular issue or matter would be decided.

  • (State of UP v. Jagdish Saran Agrawal: AIR  2008 SC 817;
  • Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen – AIR 1953 SC 33;
  • Ram Gobinda Dawan v. Bhaktabala – AIR 1971 SC 664;
  • Pandurang v. Shantabai – AIR 1989 SC 2240;
  • Thiruvengadam Mammad v. Chathamkara Ammad – AIR 1929 Madras 89;   
  • H.R  C.E. Commissioner v. V. Krishnaswami – AIR 1975 Madras 167).

Whether a Consent/Compromise Decree Operates as Res judicata

In Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao, AIR 1967 SC 591, the Supreme Court observed as under:

  • “….A compromise decree is not a decision by the Court. It is acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties had agreed. The decree merely sets the seal of the Court on the agreement of the parties. The Court does not decide anything. Nor can it be said that the decision of the Court was implicit in it. Only that decision by the Court can be res judicata where the case has been heard and decided on merit . … the statutory prohibition under Sec. 11 of the code of civil procedure or that of constructive res judicata would apply as a matter of public policy ….. Such a decree cannot strictly be regarded as a decision on the matter which was heard and finally decided, and cannot operate as res judicata. ..”. 
  • See also: Daryao v. State of UP, 1962- I SCR 574;
  • Vidya Sagar v. Sudesh Kumari, 1976-1 SCC 115;
  • Jamia Masjid v. K. V.  Rudrappa, AIR 2021 SC 4523; 2022-9 SCC 225.

It is held in Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (I) P. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 406, that ‘a matter in contest in a suit may operate as res judicata only if there is an adjudication by the Court’. 

Ratio Decidendi is the Binding Precedent; Not  Findings on Facts or Issues

In Jagdish Prasad v. State of MP, 2004(4) MPLJ 537, it was held by the Supreme Court as under:

  • “Any observation made or relief given by a Court, out of sympathy, compassion, sentiments and not based on any discernible principle of law or de hors the merits of the case, cannot be a binding precedent. A judgment of a Court contains three parts :
    • (i) finding of facts;
    • (ii) statement of principle of law applicable to the legal problem raised on the facts, based on which the case is decided; and
    • (iii) decision which is based on the finding of fact, applicable principles of law, and in some cases, discretion and the need to mould the relief in a particular manner.
  • Out of the three parts, it is only the second part, that is ratio decidendi or statement of law applied and acted upon by the Court, that is a binding precedentNeither the findings on facts nor the ultimate decision, that is, the relief given or the manner adopted to dispose of the case, is a precedent.” (Quoted in: Satpura Narmada Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Chhindwara v. A. K.  Chaturvedi, 2012-1 JLJ 78; 2012-1 MPLJ 282)

In A-One Granites v. State of U.P. [(2001)3 SCC 537], the Supreme Court observed that where no consideration was given to the question, the decision cannot be said to be binding; and precedents sub silentio and without arguments are of no moment. (Referred to in: Satpura Narmada Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Chhindwara v. A. K.  Chaturvedi, 2012-1 JLJ 78; 2012-1 MPLJ 282.)

Res Judicata Binds Parties; Ratio Decidendi (as Binding Precedent) Binds Courts

In The Modern English Legal System (4th Edition) by Smith, Bailey and Gunn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), pages 518-519, says as under:

  • “…. Thus the Court’s order is binding on the parties under the res judicata doctrine; the ratio decidendi is binding on other Courts in accordance with the principles outlined above under the doctrine of binding precedent. A startling illustration of the distinction was provided by the following series of cases. A testator, John Arkle Waring, left annuities to Mr. Howard and Mrs. Louie Burton-Butler ‘free of income tax’. In 1942 the Court of Appeal in Re warning, Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Awdry : (1942) Ch. 426 on an appeal in which Howard was a party, held that income tax had to be deducted. Louie was not a party as she was in an enemy occupied country. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. Four years later the House of Lords in Berke¬ley v. Berkeley : (1946) A.C. 555 overruled the Awdry case. Subsequently, Jenkins J. held that the Awdry case was res judica¬ta so far as Howard was concerned notwithstanding that its ratio had been overruled in Berkeley v. Berkeley and that Louie’s annuity would be dealt with in accordance with the later case. (See Re Warning, Westminster Bank v. Burton-Butler : (1948) Ch. 221).”
  • (Quoted in: Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India (AK Ganguly, CJ, then) 2007-104 CLT 737, Ori)

Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley’s Commentary on the Doctrine of res judicata (Butterworths: London, Edinburgh, Dublin – 1996, pages 8 and 9), explains the concept of res judicata as under:

  • “There is an essential difference between res judicata estoppel and the doctrine of judicial precedent. Under the former a final decision in fact or law by any Court having jurisdiction precludes either party (except on appeal) from again raising the same issue against the other in any Court. The doctrine of judicial precedent, on the other hand, is not concerned with issues between parties. …
  • The difference is illustrated by the cases of Re Waring decided in 1942 and 1948. In the first Farwell J held that Section 25 of the Finance Act 1941 was not applicable (1942) Ch. 309 to an annuity; but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision. (1942) Ch. 426. The effect was two-fold; it decided as res judicata between the parties that Section 25 applied, and it bound Courts up to the Court of Appeal in other cases. In Berkeley v. Bekeley (1946) AC 555, the House of Lords overruled Re Waring. In 1948 the trustees sought a decision as between themselves and the annuitant who had not been joined in the first proceedings. (1948) Ch. 221. The other annuitant remained bound by the earlier decision, but the result (see Duke of Bedford v. Elliz : (1901) AC 1 at 8), was otherwise governed by Berkeley v. Berkeley: Gisborne Sheepfarmers’ Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. IRC : (1962) NZLR 810 at 814.” (Quoted in: Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India (AK Ganguly, CJ, then) 2007-104 CLT 737, Ori)

In State of M.P. v. Mulam Chandi, AIR 1973 MP293, it has been held as under:

  • “As between a decision which operates a s res judicata and a decision which is binding as a precedent but not res judicata, the former must prevail.”

Interpretation of a Document can Be A Binding Judicial Precedent

In Sahu Madho Dass v. Mukand Ram, 1955 AIR SC 481, it was observed out as under:

  • “Mukand Ram was not a party to that litigation and the decision does not bind him but it operates as a judicial precedent about the construction of that document, a precedent with which we respectfully agree.”
  • (Referred to in: Syed Hafiz Mir v. Abdul Nayeemkhan, AIR 1960  MP 50; Potluri Saraswathi v. Vallabhaneni Veerabhadra Rao, 2004-7 ALT 120; Harabati v. Jasodhara Debi, AIR 1977  Ori  143; Ramachandra Bhat v. Srideviamma, AIR 1976 Kar 217; Katragadda China Anjaneyulu v. Kattragadda China Ramayya, 1965  AIR AP 177.)

In R. V. Bhupal Prasad v. Saleha Begum, 2002 Supp2 ALD 735; 2001-5 ALT 770, it is pointed out that in Anjaneyulu v. Ramaiah, 1965-1 ALT 149, a Full Bench of the Andhra High Court held that interpretation of a material document in a prior proceeding between the same parties even if does not operate as res judicata would be a binding judicial precedent in a subsequent proceeding between the parties based on that document.

Even an erroneous decision operates as Res Judicata

In Bindeswari v. Bageshwari, AIR 1936 PC 46, it was held as under:

  • “Where the decision of the Court in a previous suit determined that the section had never applied to a transaction, a Court in a new suit between the same parties with regard to the same transaction cannot try a new the issue as to its applicability in face of the express prohibition in Section 11 of the Code. “

In Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna, AIR 1953 SC 65 it was laid down  as under:

  • “(23) There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as res judicata. A decision in the previous execution case between the parties that the matter was not within the competence of the executing court even though erroneous is binding on the parties; see Abhoy Kanta Gohain v. Gopinath Deb Goswami AIR 1943 Cal. 460.”

No Binding Precedent if relevant statutory provision was Not considered

In Union of India v. Maniklal Banerjee, AIR 2006 SC 2844, the Apex Court has held as under:

  • “It is now well-settled that if a decision has been rendered without taking into account the statutory provision, the same cannot be considered to be a binding precedent. This Court, in Pritam Singh, while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, might have refused to interfere with the decision. The same, therefore, did not constitute any binding precedent.” (Referred to in: Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain (Arun Misra, J.), ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472)

Arun Misra, J., referred to the House of Lords’ decision in Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain, ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472, and said as under:

  • “(35) Another decision relied upon is rendered by the House of Lords in Watt vs. Ahsan (2007) UKHL 51. In the aforesaid case, question arose on Section 12 of the Race Relations Act, 1976. The submission was made that they were party and that All vs. Mcdonagh (2002) ICR 1026 was wrongly decided. In any case, the interpretation given to Section 12 by the EAT in Sawyer v. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 is res judicata between him and the Labour Party, not only for the purposes of his first complaint but for the other two as well. It was opined that the EAT was wrong in Sawyer vs. Ahsan (2000) ICR 1 to hold that the Labour Party was a qualifying body, but there was no appeal against the decision of EAT , it was held that decision was binding upon the parties though wrong in law. When the Tribunal was-having the jurisdiction to decide the question, it is binding upon the parties though erroneous.
  • There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition, but here we are concerned with the fresh cause of action on which suit is based and previously relevant statutory provision of Section 111 (d) of TP Act was not taken into consideration, question of determination of tenancy was also not decided.”

Exceptions to the Rule of Res Judicata

Arun Misra, J., pointed out as regards Rule of Res Judicata, in Hameeda Begum v. Champa Bai Jain, ILR 2009 MP 2328; 2009-3 MPLJ 472 (referring to State of MP. v. Mulamchand 1973 MPLJ 832), as under:

  • ( 36 ) …. The rule admits of certain exceptions.
    • One is that where the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, it will not operate as res judicata if in the subsequent suit it is found to be erroneous because the question of jurisdiction is unrelated to rights claimed by one party and denied by other.
    • Another exception is where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties.
    • Third exception is that a decision of a Court sanctioning something which is illegal does not operate as res judicata, and a party affected by the decision is not precluded from challenging its validity.
  • In the instant case, the earlier decisions rendered by this Court were not on the question of law of merger of tenancy into co-ownership and section 111 (d) of the TP Act was not considered, thus, it cannot be said to be operating as res judicata in the present suit based on fresh cause of action of ejectment of tenant and title. Tenant has protection under Rent Act, he can be evicted only on availability of ground under Section 12 of the Act. It is a question pertaining to jurisdiction to evict. There is no finding of fact which is coming in the way in the instant suit. The main question is that of the status of the defendants and beyond iota of doubt, they are tenants and tenancy is not determined by the fact that only portion of the property had been purchased by one of the heirs of the original tenant.”

Whether O. I, r. 8 Decree is Res Judicata 

Order I rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, enables the plaintiffs to file a suit in a representative capacity for the benefit of a class of (numerous) persons.

Whether the decree in such a suit operates as res judicata against the persons who are represented remains as a controversy.  In any event, by the insertion of Sub-rule (6) to rule 8 of Order I, in 1976, it became legitimate to say that the decree stands as res judicata. Sub-rule (6) lays down that a decree passed in a suit under rule 8 shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is instituted or defended.

Therefore, the view taken in Srinivasa Aiyankar v. Aryar Srinivasa Aiyankar, (1910) ILR 33 Mad 483 : 6 IC 229, that the decisions do not bind on those who were not actually (eo nominee)  parties (and hence not res judicata and not enforceable in execution)  does not hold good at present. This view in Srinivasa Aiyankar had been taken in following cases (prior to 1976) also:

  • Sahib Thampi v. Hamid, 36 Mad. 414
  • Walker v. Sur, 1914-2 KB 930
  • Hardie and Lane Limited v. Chiltern, 1928-1 KB 663
  • Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar. AIR 1955 Mad 281

It is noteworthy that even when Sub-r. (6) of r. 8 of O. I was not available in the Code, it was observed in Waryam Singha v. Sher Singh, AIR 1942 Lah 136, that the decree for injunction could be executed against any of the persons who were represented under O. 1 r. 8 CPC; because,  all the persons who were represented must be held to be parties as the decree obtained in such a suit was binding on all of them. This view is taken in following cases also:

  • Mool Chandra Jain v. Jagdish Chandra Joshi, AIR 1955 All 385
  • Abdulla v. Parshotam Singh, AIR  1935 Lah 33
  • Jatindra Mohan Banerje v. Kali Charan, AIR 1960 Cal 623

Relying on Shri V. J. Thomas v. Shri Pathrose Abraham, AIR 2008 SC 1503, and Kodia Goundar Vs. Velandi Goundar, AIR 1955 Mad 281, the Kerala High Court has in Narayanan V. Periyadan Narayanan Nair, 2021 (3) KHC 211 (FB) held that execution of a decree is not possible if he was not impleaded as a defendant. The Full Bench overruled James Vs. Mathew (ILR 2012-4 Ker 753, 2012-4 Ker 640, 2012-4 Ker LT 666, 2012-4 KHC 604 ), which held that a decree for injunction obtained in a representative suit is binding on all persons for whose benefit the suit was defended, though they were not eo nomine parties to the suit; and that in case of wilful disobedience of such a decree by those persons for whose benefit the suit was defended, it is enforceable against them under r. 32 of O. XXI of the Code.

See Blog: Decree in OI R8 CPC-Suit & Eo-Nomine Parties

Res Judicata, Order II Rule 2 Bar and Sec. 10 CPC

Sec. 11 CPC and Order II rule 2 CPC bar suit/relief. But, Sec. 10 CPC bars trial only. Because:

  • Sec. 11 CPC (Res Judicata) begins as – “No Court shall try any suit or issue”.
  • Order II Rule 2 bars to – “sue for any relief omitted“.
  • Sec. 10 CPC (Res sub judice – Latin: ‘under judgment’) begins as – “No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit“.

See Blog: Order II, Rule 2 CPC – Not to Vex Defendants Twice for the Same Cause of Action

Change of Law and Res judicata

When the law has been changed, subsequent to a decision rendered by a Court, it is held in Alimunnissa Chowdharani v. Shyam Charan Roy, 1905-1 CLJ 176, that the earlier decision would not operate as res judicata.

In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, 1970-1 SCC 613, it is observed that when the law has undergone a change, there would be no question of res judicata or constructive res judicata. It is observed as under:

  • “5. But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure: it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative direction between the parties so as to determine the question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and relating to the right in dispute between the parties has been determined thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties: the “matter in issue” may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be reopened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are not res judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is the right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A previous decision of a competent Court on facts which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transaction which is the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transactions which is the soured of the right is res judicata. A previous decision on a matter in issue is a composite decision: the decision of law cannot be dissociated from the decision on facts on which the right is founded. A decision on an issue of law will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, if the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous proceeding, but not when the cause of action is different, nor when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is prohibited by law. …….
  • 7. Where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same, parties: Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee’s case. It is obvious that the matter in issue in a subsequent proceeding is not the same as in the previous proceeding, because the law interpreted is different.”

Can res judicata be raised as a preliminary point/issue

The Kerala High Court in V. Narayana Bhakthan v. The President, Anantha Narayanapuram, 2008-3 Ker LT 840 it is held as under:

  • “The question of res judicata can be raised as a preliminary point in certain circumstances. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order XIV of the CPC states that where issues, both of law and of fact, arise in the same suit, and the Court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to: (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by law for the time being in force. The said sub-rule also provides that the Court may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue. In ML Sethi v. RP Kapur, AIR 1972 SC 2379, it was held that it is well settled that a plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the court and a finding on the plea in favour of the party raising it would oust the jurisdiction of the court. If the question of res judicata can be decided without reference to the disputed questions of fact and without the necessity of there being any evidence to be adduced, the Court would be justified in dealing with the said contention as a preliminary issue. However, if the Court finds that disputed questions of fact are involved or that the plea of res judicata is a mixed question of law and fact, the Court is not bound to decide the said question as a preliminary issue.”

Effect of failure to raise bar of res judicata as a preliminary issue

In V. Narayana Bhakthan v. The President, Anantha Narayanapuram, 2008-3 Ker LT 840, it is held, further as under:

  • Even if a party, who is entitled to request the court to consider the contention of res judicata as a preliminary issue, fails to make a request in that behalf at the appropriate time, that does not operate as a bar for him to raise the contention of res judicata at the final stage of the suit. Such a contention would not be barred by res judicata by his not requesting the same to be considered as a preliminary issue. On the other hand, if such a question is raised as a preliminary issue and a decision is rendered against the party raising it, he would be precluded at a later stage of the same proceeding from raising the very same contention that the suit is barred by res judicata except by challenging the final decision in Appeal.”

S. Nagaraj (dead) by LRs. VS B. R. Vasudeva Murthy, 08 Feb 2010
2010 2 AIR(Kar)(R) 274; 2010 Supp AIR(SC) 551; 2010 0 AIR(SCW) 1519; 2010 2 JT 185; 2010 3 KarLJ 513; 2010 Supp1 KLT 95; 2010 2 Scale 232; 2010 3 SCC 353; 2010 1 SCC(Civ) 695; 2010 4 SCJ 258; 2010 2 SCR 586; 2010 2 SLT 441; 2010 0 Supreme(SC) 140;

Correctness of the Finding has no bearing

Rankin, C.J. of the Calcutta High Court in Tarini Charan Bhattacharjee v. Kedar Nath Haldar,AIR 1928 Cal. 777 held as under:

  • “The question whether decision is correct or erroneous has no bearing upon the question whether it operates or does not operate as res judicata.”

Res Judicata in Writ Proceedings

Our Apex Court observed in State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala, AIR 2014 SC 2407; 2014-12 SCC 696as under:

  • “156. The rule of res judicata is not merely a technical rule but it is based on high public policy. The rule embodies a principle of public policy, which in turn, is an essential part of the rule of law. In Duchess of Kingston; 2 Smith Lead Cas 13 Ed. Pp. 644, 645, the House of Lords (in the opinion of Sir William de Grey) has observed:
    • “From the variety of cases relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suits, these two deductions seem to follow as generally true: first, that the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question in another court; secondly, that the judgment of a court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in question in another court, for a different purpose.”
  • 157. Corpus Juris explains that res judicata is a rule of universal law pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds, embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation; and the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.
  • 158. In Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Prashad Narayan Singh; [AIR 1916 PC 78], Sir Lawrence Jenkins noted the statement of law declared by Lord Coke, ‘interest reipublica ut sit finis litium,’ otherwise great oppression might be done under colour and pretence of law. – (6 Coke, 9A.)
  • 159. In Daryao and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors.; [AIR 1961 SC 1457], P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. while explaining the rule of res judicata stated that on general considerations of public policy there seems to be no reason why rule of res judicata should be treated as inadmissible or irrelevant while dealing with the petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. referred to earlier decision of this Court in Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and Ors.; [AIR 1960 SC 1186] wherein the application of the rule of res judicata to a petition filed under Article 32 was considered and it was observed that the question determined by the previous decision of this Court cannot be reopened and must govern the rights and obligations of the parties which are subsequently the same.
  • 160. In Gulab Chand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay; [(1965) 2 SCR 547], this Court stated that a decision in a writ petition is res judicata in a subsequent suit.
  • 161. In Union of India v. Nanak Singh; [(1968) 2 SCR 887 : AIR 1968 SC 1370] the question whether the decision in a writ petition operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit filed on the same cause of action has been settled. In Nanak Singh, this court observed that there is no good reason to preclude decisions on matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and, thus, to give limited effect to the principle of finality of decision after full contest.
  • 162. Union of India v. Nanak Singh; [(1968) 2 SCR 887 : AIR 1968 SC 1370] has been followed by a three Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal; [ (1970) 3 SCC 656]. In our view, the rule of res judicata which is founded on public policy prevents not only a new decision in the subsequent suit but also prevents new investigation. It prevents the defendant from setting up a plea in a subsequent suit which was decided between the parties in the previous proceedings. The legal position with regard to rule of res judicata is fairly well-settled that the decision on a matter in controversy in writ proceeding (Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution) operates as res judicata in subsequent suit on the same matters in controversy between the same parties. For the applicability of rule of res judicata it is not necessary that the decision in the previous suit must be the decision in the suit so as to operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. A decision in previous proceeding, like under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution, which is not a suit, will be binding on the parties in the subsequent suit on the principle of res judicata.
  • 163. For the applicability of rule of res judicata, the important thing that must be seen is that the matter was directly and substantially in issue in the previous proceeding and a decision has been given by the Court on that issue. A decision on issue of fact in the previous proceeding – such proceeding may not be in the nature of suit – constitutes res judicata in the subsequent suit.
  • 164. In light of the above legal position, if the 2006 judgment is seen, it becomes apparent that after considering the contentions of the parties and examining the reports of Expert Committee, this Court posed the issue for determination about the safety of the dam to increase the water level to 142 ft. and came to a categorical finding that the dam was safe for raising the water level to 142 ft. and, accordingly, in the concluding paragraph the Court disposed of the writ petition and the connected matters by permitting the water level of Mullaperiyar dam being raised to 142 ft. and also permitted further strengthening of the dam as per the report of the Expert Committee appointed by the CWC. The review petition filed against the said decision was dismissed by this Court on 27.7.2006. The 2006 judgment having become final and binding, the issues decided in the said proceedings definitely operate as res judicata in the suit filed under Article 131 of the Constitution.
  • 165. Shri Harish Salve, learned senior counsel for Kerala, placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in N.D. Jayal and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.; [(2004) 9 SCC 362]. In N.D. Jayal69 Dharmadhikari, J. made general observations on the dam safety aspect that plea like res judicata on the earlier decisions passed by the Supreme Court cannot be allowed to be raised. The observations made by Dharmadhikari, J. in N.D. Jayal have to be read as an exception to the res judicata rule in the matters where, by their very nature, the factual situation has drastically changed in course of time. If substantial changes in the circumstances occur and such circumstances are shown to the Court necessitating departure from the earlier finding on the issue of safety, the Court can be approached and in that event the Court itself may exercise its discretion to reopen the safety aspect having regard to the drastic change in circumstances or in emergent situation as to the safety of dam. In our view, a judicial decision, having achieved finality, becomes the last word and can be reopened in the changed circumstances by that Court alone and no one else.
  • 166. On behalf of Kerala, it is contended that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution is ousted or excluded in respect of disputes between two or more States: since such disputes fall within the ambit of the original jurisdiction of this Court under Article 131 of the Constitution or jurisdiction of a tribunal constituted under the provisions of Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 read with the provisions of Article 262 of the Constitution. Thus, it was submitted that the 2006 judgment is not binding and that the rule of res judicata can hardly be attracted in this situation.
  • 167. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel for Kerala. The label of jurisdiction exercised by this Court is not material for applicability of principles of res judicata if the matter in issue in the subsequent suit has already been concluded by the earlier decision of this Court between the same parties. The 2006 judgment was the result of judicial investigation, founded upon facts ascertained in the course of hearing. The plea of lack of jurisdiction of this Court was taken in the earlier proceedings on both the grounds, viz.,
  •        (1) whether the jurisdiction of this Court is barred in view of Article 262 read with Section 11 of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, and
  •        (2) whether Article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of this Court. On both these questions the findings were recorded against Kerala. It is too much for Kerala to say that the 2006 judgment is without jurisdiction and not binding.
  • xxxxx
  • 169. Explanations VII and VIII were inserted in the above provision by Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 w.e.f. 1.2.1977. Explanation VIII in this regard is quite relevant. The principles of res judicata, thus, have been made applicable to cases which are tried by Courts of limited jurisdiction. The decisions of the Courts of limited jurisdiction, insofar as such decisions are within the competence of the Courts of limited jurisdiction, operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, although, the Court of limited jurisdiction that decided the previous suit may not be competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such question is subsequently raised. If a decision of the Court of limited jurisdiction, which was within its competence, operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit even when the subsequent suit is not triable by it, a fortiori, the decision of the highest Court of the land in whatever jurisdiction given on an issue which was directly raised, considered and decided must operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit triable exclusively by the highest Court under Article 131 of the Constitution. Any other view in this regard will be inconsistent with the high public policy and rule of law. The judgment of this Court directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question before this Court, though, label of jurisdiction is different.
  • 170. The principles of res judicata are clearly attracted in the present case. The claim of Kerala in the earlier proceeding that water level cannot be raised from its present level of 136 ft. was expressly not accepted and the obstruction by Kerala to the water level in the Mullaperiyar dam being raised to 142 ft. on the ground of safety was found untenable. The judgment dated 27.2.2006 of this Court, thus, operates as res judicata in respect of the issue of safety of the dam by increasing its water level from 136 ft. to 142 ft.”

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End Notes:

Sec. 11 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, reads as under:

  • Res Judicata -No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
  • Explanation I– The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
  • Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court.
  • Explanation III.- The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.
  • Explanation IV.- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
  • Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.
  • Explanation VI– Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
  • Explanation VII.- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to proceedings for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.
  • Explanation VIII.-An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in as subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.


Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Is Decree in a Representative Suit (OI r8 CPC) Enforceable Against Persons Not Eo-Nomine Parties?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Answer in a nutshell

No specific provision in the CPC. High Courts differ in views.

Introduction

Order I rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, enables the plaintiffs to file a suit in a representative capacity for the benefit of a class of (numerous) persons. Suits against similarly interested persons can also be brought under Order I rule 8 by suing one or a few representatives of such persons on behalf of others also. Law requires proper notice (including news-paper advertisement) to all such persons interested.

The object of Order I rule 8 is to avoid multiplicity of litigation.

In Narayanan v. Kurichitanam Educational Society, AIR 1959 Ker 379, it was pointed out that it would be difficult to prescribe a minimum number which would be sufficient to satisfy the expression ‘numerous’ as used in Order I, r. 8. It is a matter of discretion left to the court.

Read Blog: Order I rule 8, CPC (Representative Suit) When and How? Whether Order I rule 8 Decree is Enforceable in Execution?

Whether O.I r.8 Decree is Res Judicata

 Whether the decree in such a suit operates as res judicata against the persons who are represented remains as a controversy.  In any event, by the insertion of Sub-rule (6) to rule 8 of Order I, in 1976, it became legitimate to say that the decree stands as res judicata. Sub-rule (6) lays down that a decree passed in a suit under rule 8 shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is instituted or defended.

Therefore, the view taken in Srinivasa Aiyankar v. Aryar Srinivasa Aiyankar, (1910) ILR 33 Mad 483 : 6 IC 229, that the decisions do not bind on those who were not actually (eo nominee)  parties (and hence not res judicata and not enforceable in execution)  does not hold good at present. This view in Srinivasa Aiyankar had been taken in following cases (prior to 1976) also:

  • Sahib Thampi v. Hamid, 36 Mad. 414
  • Walker v. Sur, 1914-2 KB 930
  • Hardie and Lane Limited v. Chiltern, 1928-1 KB 663
  • Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar. AIR 1955 Mad 281

Whether O.I r.8 Decree is Enforceable in Execution

The enforceability of an injunction decree, under r. 32 of O. XXI, in a representative suit against the persons represented is yet to be resolved either by enactment, or by an authoritative decision taking note of the divergent views of various High Courts in this matter.

It is noteworthy that even when Sub-r. (6) of r. 8 of O. I was not available in the Code, it was observed in Waryam Singha v. Sher Singh, AIR 1942 Lah 136, that the decree for injunction could be executed against any of the persons who were represented under O. 1 r. 8 CPC; because,  all the persons who were represented must be held to be parties as the decree obtained in such a suit was binding on all of them. This view is taken in following cases also:

  • Mool Chandra Jain v. Jagdish Chandra Joshi, AIR 1955 All 385
  • Abdulla v. Parshotam Singh, AIR  1935 Lah 33
  • Jatindra Mohan Banerje v. Kali Charan, AIR 1960 Cal 623

Relying on Shri V. J. Thomas v. Shri Pathrose Abraham, AIR 2008 SC 1503, and Kodia Goundar Vs. Velandi Goundar, AIR 1955 Mad 281,the Kerala High Court has in Narayanan V. Periyadan Narayanan Nair, 2021 (3) KHC 211 (FB) held that execution of a decree is not possible if he was not impleaded as a defendant. The Full Bench overruled James Vs. Mathew (ILR 2012-4 Ker 753, 2012-4 Ker 640, 2012-4 Ker LT 666, 2012-4 KHC 604 ), which held that a decree for injunction obtained in a representative suit is binding on all persons for whose benefit the suit was defended, though they were not eo nomine parties to the suit; and that in case of wilful disobedience of such a decree by those persons for whose benefit the suit was defended, it is enforceable against them under r. 32 of O. XXI of the Code.

Theory of Revival of Decree of Injunction by a Separate Suit

The Madras High Court, in Kodia Goundar Vs. Velandi Goundar, AIR 1955 Mad 281, propounded a theory of ‘revival of injunction‘, in a representative suit, by a separate suit. It was observed as under:

“11. This principles that a decree for injunction cannot be extended so as to render those who are not ‘eo-nomine’ defendants liable for disobedience of the decree is based on sound and equitable grounds. Before any person could be proceeded against personally for disobedience of a decree of court, it must be shown that he was bound personally by the decree and obliged to obey such a decree. To entitle the decree-holder therefore to proceed against such persons who are not parties on record the injunction must be revived against them, which must be by a separate suit and in such a suit an opportunity will be afforded to them to raise appropriate defences. Without a revival therefore of the decree for injunction against these other persons, no proceedings in pursuance of the decree could be started against them.”  

Conclusion:

Enactment or Authoritative Decision is Essential on this matter. Because:

  1. The principles laid down in Kodia Goundar Vs. Velandi Goundar, AIR 1955 Mad 281, as to ‘revival of injunction’ by a separate suit against the persons who were represented in the earlier litigation, for proceeding against them in execution, are quite logical and convincing.
  2. But, the principles of law laid down in Kodia Goundar Vs. Velandi Goundar are not uniformly accepted. The main reason may be that there is no specific provision for such ‘revival of decree’, by a summary procedure or otherwise, in the CPC; and that r. 32 of O. XXI CPC can be invoked only if the Judgment Debtor “has had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has willfully failed to obey” it .
  3. Equally, there is no specific provision in the CPC for the proposition that a decree for injunction obtained in a representative suit (despite the fact that ‘the decree for injunction obtained in a representative suit is binding on all persons for whose benefit the suit was defended’) can be executed against those who were not eo-nominee parties.  It is also noteworthy that r. 32 of O. XXI of the Code specifically states that it is attracted only “Where the party against whom a decree …. for an injunction, has been passed …. .”


End Note:

Rule 32 of Order XXI CPC reads as under:

32. Decree for specific performance for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction.- (1) Where the party against whom a decree for the specific performance of a contract, or for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction, has been passed, has had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has willfully failed to obey it he decree may be enforced the case of decree for restitution of conjugal rights by the attachment of his property or, in the case of a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction by his detention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his property, or by both.”

Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society/Trust

Admissibility of Visual and Audio Evidence (Including Photographs, Cassettes, Tape-recordings, Films, CCTV Footage, CDs, e-mails, Chips, Hard-discs, Pen-drives)

Adv. Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Nutshell – Photo and Video: Evidence.

While considering a case on dowry death, the prosecution argued that a photograph was not admissible in evidence as neither the person who took the photograph nor its negative was produced in evidence. But, the court accepted the photograph as ‘no dispute was raised by the prosecution witnesses’.Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2024 SC 4551
A large number of photographs were marked and considered in this case (Ayodhya case).
In para 525, it is stated – the witness “was confronted with photographs of the inscription”
There were three sets of albums containing photographs taken by the State Archaeological Department pursuant to an order dated 10 January 1990 (Para 533).
In para 538, the Court considered the evidence of a witness as to the “photographs placed within the structure in 1990”.
M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1
The factum of photo identification (of an accused) by PW 2 as witnessed by the officer concerned is a relevant and an admissible piece of evidence.Rabindra Kumar Pal v.  Republic of India, 2011-2 SCC 490
Nothing prevented the appellant-State Government from producing the relevant photographs of the purported pucca pond existing at some spotsState of Rajasthan v. Ultratech Cement Ltd. , 2022-12 Scale 606; 2022-13 SCR 1
Photographs are held admissible in evidence as documents.P.  Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1; 2020-9 SCC 161
Statement about the photograph made by any expert would not be admissible, before examining photographer.Dr. Pankaj Kumudchandra Phadnis v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 785
Photographs, tape-records of speeches [Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17] are documents.Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016 15 SCC 485; Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2011-4 SCC 143
Photo identification of an accused during the investigation, who was seen by the witness at the relevant time.Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic  AIR 1999 SC  2562, 2000-1 SCC 138; Rabindra Kumar Pal v. Republic of India, AIR  2011 SC 1436; 2011 2 SCC 490
Inventory, photographs and the list of samples certified by the Magistrate are admissible as primary evidence. It is a substitute for the production of physical evidence of seized contraband samples.Nisar Ahmed Bhat, v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir 2024 0 Supreme(J&K) 187  
The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae. K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275;
R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157;
Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720

Nutshell – Photo and Video: Relevant and Admissibile

Audio/video cassettes –Ziyauddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, 1976-2 SCC 17
Photo or video Mohammed Rafiq v. Madhan, 2018-1 Mad LJ(CRI) 641;
Moti Rabidas v. The State of Bihar, 2015-145 AIC 435;
Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan 2014-1 Raj Cri C 31;
State of MP v. Shankarlal, ILR 2010 MP 717;
P Rajagopal v. Inspector of police 2009-2 Mad LJ(Cri) 161;
Santhosh Baccharam Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 All MR (Cri)997, 2003 BCR (Cri) 120.
CD –  Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016-15 SCC 485
Photographsincluding photographs of tombstones and houses  Lyell v. Kennedy (No.3) (1884) 50 L.T. 730
Video recordings  State of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053
Audio and video State of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053;
Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31;
Taylor v. Chief Constable Cheshire:1987(1) All.ER 225
Cassettes Tukaram S.Dighole v. Manik Rao Shivaji Kokate (2010)4 SCC 329
Moving cinematograph Senior v. Holdsworth, Ex parte Independant Television New Ltd. (1976) Q.B. 23)
Film  Rex v. Daye ((1908)2 K.B. 333, 340)
Floppies, CCTV footages, CDs, DVDs, Chips, Hard discs, Pen drives North West Airlines v. Union of India 2007 (214) ELT 178 (Bom.)

According to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 3,

  • Evidence’ means and includes:
  • (1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence;
  • (2) all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such documents are called documentary evidence.

Definition of document

Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 defines ‘document’ as under:

  • “ ‘Document’ means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter.”
  • Illustrations:
    • A writing is a document;
    • Words printed, lithographed or photographed are documents;
    • A map or plan is a document;
    • An inscription on a metal plate or stone is a document;
    • A caricature is a document.

‘Document’ takes-in photographs of words as could be seen from the illustration.

By virtue of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act,[1]  any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (computer output) shall be ‘deemed to be also a document’.

Besides the Evidence Act, term document has been defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, and Indian Penal Code, 1860.  

Section 3(18), General Clauses Act defines document as under:

  • Document shall include any matter written, expressed, or described upon any substances by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means which is intended to be used, or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter.”

Section 29, Indian Penal Code explains that the word document denotes any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.

In Explanation 1, it is stated:

  • “It is immaterial by what means or upon what substance the letters, figures or marks are formed, or whether the evidence is intended for, or may be used in a court of justice, or not.”

Going by the definitions, ‘document ‘ includes not only all materials or substance upon which thoughts of a man are represented by writing or any other specious of conventional mark or symbol, but also records of information of some sort.[2]

In P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1, it is observed that tape records of speeches (Also in: Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, 2010-4 SCC 329; Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17 ) and audio/video cassettes (See: Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, 1976-2 SCC 17) including compact disc (See also: Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016-15 SCC 485) were “documents” under Section 3 of the 1872 Act, which stand on no different footing than photographs and were held admissible in evidence. It is by now well established that the electronic record produced for the inspection of the Court is documentary evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act (Anwar PV v. PK Basheer, 2014-10 SCC 473).

Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720

  • “The process of tape-recording offers an accurate method of storing and later reproducing sounds. The imprint on the magnetic tape is the direct effect of the relevant sounds. Like a photograph of a relevant incident, a contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under s. 7 of the Indian Evidence Act.”

R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157

In R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157, summarised this case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri) as under:

  • “In Nagree’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720) the appellant offered bribe to Sheikh a Municipal Clerk. Sheikh informed the Police. The Police laid a trap. Sheikh called Nagree at the residence. The Police kept a tape recorder concealed in another room. The tape was kept in the custody of the police inspector  Sheikh gave evidence of the talk. The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae. It is also comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident. The tape recorded conversation is therefore a relevant fact and is admissible under section 7 of the Evidence Act.”

After summarising Nagree’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720), the Supreme Court said as under:

  • “The Court will take care in two directions in admitting such evidence. First, the Court will find out that it is genuine and free from tampering or mutilation. Secondly, the Court may also secures scrupulous conduct and behaviour on behalf of the Police. The reason is that the Police Officer is more likely to behave properly if improperly obtained evidence is liable to be viewed with care and caution by the Judge. In every case the position of the accused, the nature of the investigation and the gravity of the offence must be judged in the light of the material facts and the Surrounding circumstances.”

K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275:

  • 7. The amended definition of “evidence” in section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872 read with the definition of “electronic record” in section 2(t) of the Information Technology Act 2000, includes a compact disc containing an electronic record of a conversation. Section 8 of Evidence Act provides that the conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit, in reference to such suit, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto. In R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157, this court made it clear that electronically recorded conversation is admissible in evidence, if the conversation is relevant to the matter in issue and the voice is identified and the accuracy of the recorded conversation is proved by eliminating the possibility of erasure, addition or manipulation. This Court further held that a contemporaneous electronic recording of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident and is admissible as evidence under Section 8 of the Act. There is therefore no doubt that such electronic record can be received as evidence.”

Photographs, Audio and Video Cassettes, CCTV footage, Electronic Documents etc.

It is clear that a document means something which conveys or affords information, notwithstanding the matter or medium on which it is exhibited, inscribed or contained.[3] Apart from a writing, picture, caricature, map or plan printed, lithographed or photographed on a piece of paper, document includes an inscription on a metal plate or stone. It also comprises:[4] Photographs including photographs of tombstones and houses,[5] Video recordings,[6] Audio and video[7] cassettes[8] or tape-recordings,[9] Moving cinematograph[10] film,[11] Electronic documents such as floppies, CCTV footages, CDs, DVDs, Chips, Hard discs, Pen drives,[12] e-mails- Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise v. KS Infraspace LLP Limited (AIR 2020 SC 307); Sailendra Kumar Goswami v. State of Assam, 2022 CrLJ 4694, 2022-237 AIC 506; Facebook messages- Sanjib Sarkar v. Rajasree Roy, AIR  2022 Cal- 12; Whatsapp messages- Rakesh Kumar Singla v. Union Of India, 2021-1 RCR(CRI) 704, 2021-3 Cri CC 452; Priyanka Singh v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 All MR(Cri)  1276, 2021-3 Cri CC 110, 2021-4 BCR(Cri) 393 etc.

Photo identification has been held to be valid in Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia v. Narcotic Control Bureau, (2000) 1 SCC 138, and Vasudevan v. The State, 1993 CrLJ 3151 (Ker). But in Sahadevan Sagadevan v. State by Inspector of Police, Chennai, AIR  2003  SC 215, the Apex Court did not accept  the identification through the photograph, after nearly 7 years. Similarly, in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsal Guru, AIR 2005  SC 3820, ‘in regard to the identification of the photograph of deceased terrorist’, the  evidence was not accepted because it did ‘not inspire confidence, in view of the time lag of 8 months’.

Degree of Proof and Probability

In M. Siddiq (D) thr. L.Rs. v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1; 2019(15) Scale 1, it is held as under:

  • “506. The court in a civil trial applies a standard of proof governed by a preponderance of probabilities. This standard is also described sometimes as a balance of probability or the preponderance of the evidence. “Phipson on Evidence” formulates the standard succinctly: If therefore, the evidence is such that the court can say “we think it more probable than not”, the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not. 114 In Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 ALL ER 372, Lord Denning, ] (as the Master of Rolls then was) defined the doctrine of the balance or preponderance of probabilities in the following terms:
  • (1)… It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence, “of course

Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witnesses Theory

Photographs, audio and video cassettes etc. are, as shown above, ‘documents ‘.  Depend upon the requirement of proving the authenticity, they are divided into two categories (Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State: 2014 KHC 31). They are:

  • (i)  aid a witness in explaining his testimony (Pictorial testimony theory) – (E.g. a doctor explains injury with the help of a photograph; identification of a deceased with photo.);
  • (ii) probative evidence of what those evidence (photo, X-ray etc.) depict (Silent witness theory) – (E.g. X-ray film; a photograph showing accused – in a crowd – armed with weapon, though the photographer did not see him; photograph of a scene of occurrence of a crime.)

Witnesses may, with their personal knowledge, state that a photograph is a fair and accurate representation of the fundamental facts appear therein. In such a case, the evidence of the witness will be the primary matter rather than what is depicted in the photograph; and the the photographer need not be examined in court, inasmuch as the photograph is admitted merely to aid a witness in explaining his testimony. They are, explained by Wigmore as, ‘nothing more than the illustrated testimony of that witness’. This principle gives rise to Pictorial testimony theory or communication theory.

But, when a photograph itself is taken as as probative and substantial evidence of the matters appear therein, it acquires the glorified status of independentsilent witnesses’. In such cases, there should be cogent evidence before the court, to admit the photograph in evidence.

Silent Witness Theory – which speaks for itself – A Proper Witness should be examined

When a photograph itself is used as an independent and substantive piece of evidence under the status of ‘independent silent witnesses’ – which speaks for itself, eg. photo of scene of occurrence of a crime – a proper witness (not necessarily the photographer) must be examined to show that the photograph accurately represent what is depicted; and when, where, and under what circumstances the photograph was taken.

In Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, at page 1508, ‘Silent Witness Theory’ is mentioned as under:[13]

  • “A method of authenticating and admitting evidence (such as a photograph), without the need for a witness to verify its authenticity, upon a sufficient showing of the reliability of the process of producing the evidence, including proof that the evidence has not been altered.”

In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 1 7, at page 158, it is noticed as follows:[14]

  • “224. Photographs. Photographs properly verified on oath by a person able to speak to their accuracy are generally admissible to prove the identity of persons, or the configuration of land as it existed at a particular moment (scientific deductions from them being made by a witness both skilled and experienced in such a task, or radar echoes or the contents of a lost document. In the High Court a photograph is receivable in evidence at the trial only when certain provisions have been complied with.”

In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fifth Edition,Vol.11, at page 723, [15] it is stated as follows:

  • 958.  Photographs, films, records, tape recordings and video recordings. At common law, photographs properly verified on oath by a person able to speak to their accuracy were generally admissible to prove the identity of persons, or the configuration of land as it existed at a particular moment (scientific deductions from them being made by a witness both skilled and experienced in such a task), or radar echoes or the contents of a lost document. For the purpose of Civil Evidence Act 1995, ‘document ‘means anything in which information of any description is recorded and a similarly wide definition applies for the purposes of disclosure under the Civil Procedure Rules.  Thus photographs, films, records, tape recordings and video recordings are all admissible in evidence, subject, if appropriate, to the statutory safeguards with regard to hearsay evidence. Prior notice must be given of a party’s intention to put photographs and certain other items in evidence.
  • The court has power to order the photographing of property which is, or may become, the subject matter of proceedings.

Wigmore on Evidence, Chgadbourn Revision, Vol. III at page 220, it is observed as follows:[16]

  • “Given an adequate foundation assuring the accuracy of the process producing it, the photograph should then be received as a so-called silent witness or as a witness which speaks for itself.”

Authentication Require from a Photographer in ‘Silent Witness‘ Theory

As shown above, examination of the photographer (or some other competent person) is required in the cases which fall in the category of ‘proving photograph (or CCTV, film, CD, e-mails etc.) under Silent-Witness-Theory’. In Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State: 2014 KHC 31 the Kerala High Court examined what quantum of authentication do courts require before a photograph may be admissible in evidence. It is held as under:

  • “It is simply this – that some witness (not necessarily the photographer) be able to give some indication as to when, where, and under what circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated.  The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury.
  • In Taylor v. Chief Constable Cheshire, (1987)1 All.E.R.225, it was held as under: “The next case to which I would refer is the case of RV Fowden and White [1982] Crim LR 588. There two persons, the appellants, were alleged to have been photographed on a video film carrying out acts of theft. At their trial the Crown sought to call evidence from a police officer and a store detective who knew Fowden and While to say that the persons on the film were the accused.  The judge admitted that evidence of identity, against the contention for the defence that it was purely a matter for the jury, looking at the film, to determine the question of identity. 
  • On appeal it was held as under: ‘There was no difference in principle between a video film and a photograph or tape recording.  Although it was not strictly necessary to decide the point the Court was of the opinion there was no reason in principle why the Crown should not be able to call a witness who knows someone to look at a photograph and give evidence to the effect that he knows the person, and it is the accused.
  • However, in the circumstances of that particular case the court held: ‘ … the evidence should not have been admitted as the prejudicial value outweighed its probative effect, because the identifying witnesses knew the accused for a similar shoplifting case a week later, and accordingly the defence were deprived from testing the accuracy of the identification without causing prejudice and embarrassment ‘”

Pictorial Testimony’ Theory Photographer Need Not be Testified

It is explained in Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State: 2014 KHC 31, that the photographer need not be examined under the ‘pictorial testimony’ theory. It is observed as under:

  • Pictorial testimony theory or communication theory is based on the notion that any witness with knowledge that a photograph is a fair and accurate representation may testify to the fundamental facts. There is no requirement that the person who took the photograph should testify in order to authenticate the photograph.  It is enough that the individual testifying recognises the subject that is depicted in the photograph. Authenticity of the photograph is to be established like in the case of any other document. It must be noticed that documentary testimony theory only covers the admissibility of evidence and it does not refer to the evidence of the photographer as a fact finder. Under the silent witness theory, the following factors will have to be established:
  • “Under “silent witness” theory, testimony, establishing authenticity, integrity, and competency of video recording.
  • Photograph expert’s determination that video recording was not altered in any way, built-up or faked.
  • Continuous chain of custody established. Video camera or camcorder was checked and property operating.
  • Video recording is same as what witness saw on playback immediately after recording.
  • No material alteration, surreptitious editing, or fabrications have taken place.”

Silent Witness Theory as applied in UK

The law in UK, as to admission of a video (or any other ‘electronic evidence’), can be understood from the decision, State v. Stangle, 166 N.H. 407, 97 A.3d 634 (The State of New Hampshire v. Stephen Stangle, 2014). It allows the trial court ample discretion as to admission of such evidence and to play or show such evidence before the jury.

In this decision, State v. Stangle, it is pointed out that, in past, courts admitted videos, in evidence, when it was introduced to illustrate the testimony of a witness who observed the same scene viewed by the recording equipment.  The “foundational requirements” should have been complied with for admitting such videos. But, where there was no first-hand witness, courts had adopted the ‘silent witness’ theory (which speaks for itself) to admit video recordings. This theory allowed “the introduction of the recording as primary, substantive evidence of the events depicted”.

It was further pointed out in this decision –

  • Under this theory, “a witness need not testify to the accuracy of the image depicted in the photographic or videotape evidence if the accuracy of the process that produced the evidence is established with an adequate foundation.’’ (People v. Taylor, 353 Ill.Dec. 569, 956 N.E.2d 431, 438 (Ill.2011).
  • It was not “wise to establish specific foundational requirements for the admissibility of photographic [or video] evidence under the ‘silent witness’ theory, since the context in which the … evidence was obtained and its intended use at trial will be different in virtually every case.” Fisher v. State, 7 Ark. App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Ark.Ct.App.1982).
  • It was enough to say, that adequate foundational facts must be presented to the trial court, so that the trial court can determine that the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the subject matter is what its proponent claims.

The law in US on Silent Witness Theory

In State v. Reeves, 2021 S.D. 64; 967 N.W.2d 144 (Supreme Court of South Dakota, US) observed, referring State v. Stangle (supra) as under:

  • “[16] Although we have not yet had occasion to analyze the foundational rules for authenticating automatic video distinctly from a video recorded by a human actor, many courts across the nation have implemented the silent witness theory to hold that photographs and videos may be admitted into evidence without foundation from a witness who took the photograph or video. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rengifo, 789 F.2d 975 (1st Cir. 1986); State v. Stangle, 166 N.H. 407, 97 A.3d 634 (N.H. 2014); State v. Luke, 464 P.3d 914 (Haw. Ct. App. 2020). However, “jurisdictions differ on what evidentiary showing is required to satisfy the ‘silent witness’ standard.” Stangle, 97 A.3d at 637. Generally, there are two categories of approaches employed. Some states implement a flexible, fact-based approach to allow a judge to tailor the authentication process to the individual case; in contrast, others use various “multi-factor test[s] for determining the admissibility of photographs or videos.”
  • [17] The New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed the silent witness theory in State v. Stangle, 166 N.H. 407, 97 A.3d 634 (N.H. 2014) and declined to adopt a formulaic, factor-based approach to authentication. The Court reasoned that: ‘it is not wise to establish specific foundational requirements for the admissibility of photographic [or video] evidence under the ‘silent witness’ theory, since the context in which the evidence was obtained and its intended use at trial will be different in virtually every case. It is enough to say, that adequate foundational facts must be presented to the trial court, so that the trial court can determine that the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the subject matter is what its proponent claims. This allows the trial court to consider the unique facts and circumstances in each case—and the purpose for which the evidence is being offered—in deciding whether the evidence has been properly authenticated.”’”

Relevancy and Admissibility of Photo and Video Evidence

Photo or video evidence may be the most valuable evidence in the facts of certain cases. Under the ‘Best Evidence Rule’ it may have great importance, as stated in the following decisions:

  • Mohammed Rafiq Vs. Madhan, 2018-1 Mad LJ(CRI) 641;
  • Moti Rabidas Vs. The State of Bihar, 2015-145 AIC 435;
  • Vaman Narain Ghiya Vs. State of Rajasthan 2014-1 Raj Cri C 31;
  • State of MP Vs. Shankarlal, ILR 2010 MP 717;
  • P Rajagopal Vs. Inspector of police 2009-2 Mad LJ(Cri) 161;
  • Santhosh Baccharam Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 All MR (Cri)997, 2003 BCR (Cri) 120.

A greedy Indian from Kerala, S., employed in Abudabi, took insurance policy for a large amount.  With a view to claim that amount, S. and his fellows killed an innocent man, Chacko, while S. was in Kerala, and blazed him in the car owned by S. Police investigation revealed the conspiracy. S. being absconded, he could not be tried.  

The Kerala High Court, in Ponnappan v. State of Kerala, ILR 1994(3) Ker 370, in appeal, confirmed the conviction holding that Chacko was the person who was killed. It was on a photo identification – Pictorial testimony. The Court held as under:

  • “PW I identified the person in M.O.9 photo as the person who was killed. There is no doubt that M.O.9 is the photograph of Chacko, the film representative. It was contended that since P. W.I himself admitted that he had not observed the features or facial peculiarities of the person when he was inside the car, the identification made by him with the help of the photo is not of any use. We are of the view that even without noticing any translatable mark or feature of a person it would be possible to identify him later.”

Apex Court Refers to viewing a Video by the High Court

In Lochan Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2022 SC 252, our Apex Court referred to the following as to viewing a video by the High Court-

  • “35. It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations made by the High Court in para (35) of the impugned judgment:
    • “35. We have gone through the video movie prepared and after watching the video, we are of the view that the recovery of dead body was made from a place which cannot be said to be accessible to an ordinary person without prior knowledge as the body recovered was kept concealed in a gunny bag inside the shrubs situated at sufficient distance from the main road. In the statement under Section 313 CrPC, the accused/appellant failed to explain how he came to know that the deceased had been murdered and thrown in the shrubs after wrapping her in a gunny bag………”
  • It could thus be seen that the High Court had itself viewed the video and on seeing the same, it was of the view that the recovery of the dead body was made from a place, which cannot be said to be accessible to an ordinary person without prior knowledge since the body recovered was kept concealed in a gunny bag inside the shrubs situated at sufficient distance from the main road.”

Determination of Possession – DVDs and CDs not acceptable

In Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, 2020-8 SCC 129, AIR  2020 SC 1496, it is observed as under:

  • “270. The decision in Velaxan Kumar (supra) cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly. The Court considered the photographs also to hold that the possession was not taken. Photographs cannot evidence as to whether possession was taken or not. Drawing of a Panchnama is an accepted mode of taking possession. Even after re-entry, a photograph can be taken; equally, it taken be taken after committing trespass. Such documents cannot prevail over the established mode of proving whether possession is taken, of lands. Photographs can be of little use, much less can they be a proof of possession. A person may re-enter for a short period or only to have photograph. That would not impinge adversely on the proceedings of taking possession by drawing Panchnama, which has been a rarely recognised and settled mode of taking possession.
  • 271. In the decision in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 792 the observation made was that it is not possible to take the possession of entire land in a day on which the award was declared, cannot be accepted as laying down the law correctly and same is contrary to a large number of precedents. The decision in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of M.P. (2011) 7 SCC 639, is confined to particular facts of the case. The Commissioner was appointed to find out possession on the spot. DVDs and CDs were seen to hold that the landowners were in possession. The District Judge, Indore, recorded the statements of the tenure-holder. We do not approve the method of determining the possession by appointment of Commissioner or by DVDs and CDs as an acceptable mode of proving taking of possession. The drawing of Panchnama contemporaneously is sufficient and it is not open to a court Commissioner to determine the factum of possession within the purview of Order XXVII, Rule 9 CPC. Whether possession has been taken, or not, is not a matter that a court appointed Commissioner cannot opine. However, drawing of Panchnama by itself is enough and is  a proof of the fact that possession has been taken.”

Relevancy of Documents

Sec. 5 and 136 of the Evidence Act stipulate that evidence can be given only on ‘facts in issue’ or ‘relevant facts’. Relevant facts are enumerated in Sec. 6 onwards.

Admissibility of Documents

Generally speaking, all relevant documents are admissible. But, various provisions of the Evidence Act, Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, Stamp Act, Registration Act etc. stipulate various formalities or regulations for tendering documents in evidence.

Probative Value of Documents

Whenever a document is admitted in court, the probative value thereof will be a matter for the court to determine.

State of Bihar Vs. Radha Krishna Singh (AIR 1983 SC 684) it is observed:

  • “Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”

If there is a dispute regarding age, the Supreme Court, in State of Punjab Vs. Mohinder Singh (AIR 2005 SC 1868), held that the date of birth available in the School Admission Register has more probative value than the horoscope. The probative value of FIR, Scene-Mahazar, Post-Mortem Report, photocopy of a Registered Deed etc., by itself, will be lesser. In such cases the court can refrain from acting upon such documents until substantive or regular evidence is offered, by examining the proper witness.

In Om Prakash Vs. State of Punjab, 1993(2) CLR 395 and Jora Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1984(2) Crimes 837, it has been held that an entry in the school leaving certificate regarding date of birth of a student is not a conclusive proof or high ‘probity evidence’ because it is a matter of common knowledge that the date of birth given at the time of the admission of a boy or girl in a school is seldom correct and more often than not the age given is less than the actual age of the child. (See also: C. Doddanarayana Reddy Vs. C. Jayarama Reddy: AIR 2020 SC 1912; Commissioner of Central Excise And Service Tax Vs. M/S. Sanjivani Non-Ferrous Trading: AIR 2019 SC 203.)

Negative of Photos – ‘Primary Document’

In Laxman Ganpati Khot v. Anusuyabai, AIR 1976 Bom 168, it was observed that the photographs should not be admitted in evidence without examining the person who took the photographs and the negatives of the same being produced on record. 

Similar view in other cases also.

  • State of Gujrat v. Bharat alias Bhupendra, 1991 Crl. L J 978 ;
  • Joyita Saha v. Rajesh Kumar Pandey, AIR 2000 Cal 109;
  • P. Rama Srinivasa Rao v. Dr. N. Ragavan, the Madras High Court (R Banumathi, J), (2006) 3 MLJ 625.
  • Shubhangi Krishna Patil v. Rupali Krishnan Bachhe, 2010 1 MhLJ 253; 2011-7 RCR(Civ) 1687.
  • Shamim Alam v. Dinesh Aggarwal, AIR 2013 Uchal  73.

In Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan 2014-1 Raj Cri C 31 it is observed as under:

  • “Relevance, admissibility and authentication of photographs have always posed a problem for the courts. These issues were limited as long as the courts were dealing with conventional photography using a camera with a film. The film was treated as the ‘primary’, or the  best evidence for the photograph taken. Thus, the courts required that the ‘negative’ be produced, and be proved by the photographer. An unquestioned belief entertained by the court was that the ‘print’ of the negative was an authentic copy of the negative. However, over the last four decades photography has undergone a technological revolution. From the conventional photography, the world has moved into the era of digital photography.

Tape-Record (Audio) Evidence 

It is held by our Apex Court in the following (earlier) cases that the tape records of conversations and speeches are admissible under the Indian Evidence   Act:

  • S.   Pratap   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab, (1964) 4 SCR 753; AIR 1964 SC 72
  • Yusaffalli Esmail  Nagree  v.  State  of  Maharashtra, (1967) 3 SCR 720N. 
  • Sri Rama Reddy v. V. V. Giri, AIR 1972 SC 1162
  • R.M. Malkani v. State of   Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157
  • Ziyauddin   Burhanuddin v. Brijmohan   Ramdas, (1976) 2 SCC 17
  • Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3

In S. Partap Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 it was laid down that the tape record evidence was admissible. In Yusufalli Esmail Nagree vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 147 (Also: Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manik Rao Shivaji Kokate (2010)4 SCC 329; Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3), it was pointed out that the tape record evidence was prone to tampering and that it must be proved by a competent witness.  

In Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra ((1976) 2 SCC 17) it is observed as under:

  • “19. We think that the High Court was quite right in holding that the tape-records of speeches were  ‘documents’ as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act, which stood on no different footing than photographs, and that they were admissible in evidence on satisfying the following conditions:
  • (a) The voice of the person alleged to be speaking must be duly identified by the maker of the record or by others who know it.
  • (b) Accuracy of what was actually recorded had to be proved by the maker of the record and satisfactory evidence, direct or circumstantial, had to be there so as to rule out possibilities of tampering with the record.
  • (c) The subject-matter recorded had to be shown to be relevant according to rules of relevancy found in the Evidence Act.”

In R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtras, 1973 Cri. L J 228: AIR 1973 SC 157, it was observed that the tape is primary and direct evidence of what has been said and recorded. However, in Mahabir Prasad Verma v. Dr. Surinder Kaul, AIR 1982 SC 1043, it was held that tape-recorded evidence can be used for corroboration alone (not as substantive evidence). Subsequently, it was observed by the Apex Court in Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3, it was receivable in evidence, not only to corroborate the evidence given by the witness but also to contradict the evidence, if there is proper authority – indicating the place, time and the name of person making the statement.

Contemporaneous Dialogue Admissible Under S. 7, Evidence Act

In Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State of Maharashtra [1961] (3) S.C.R. 720 this Court has observed:

  • “Like a photograph of a relevant incident a contemporaneous dialogue of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 7 of the Indian Evidence Act. Reference has been made in that case to
    • Roop Chand v. Mahabir Parshad and Anr. A.I.R. 1956 Punj. 173; 
    • Mahindra Nath v. Biswanath Kundu 67 C.W.N. 191; 
    • Pratap Singh v. The State of Punjab [1964] 4 S.C.R. 733 and
    • B. v. Maqsud Ali [1965] 2 All E.R. 464.”
  • (Quoted in Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3)

In Shri U. Sri Rama Reddy Etc. v. Shri V.V. Giri [1971] 1 S.C.R. 399, a decision of five learned Judges of this Court the following observation made in Yusufalli’s case (supra) has been quoted with approval:

  • “The contemporaneous dialogue between them formed part of the res gestae and is relevant and admissible under s.8 of the Indian Evidence Act. The dialogue is proved by Shaikh. The tape record of the dialogue corroborates his testimony. The process of tape-recording offers an accurate method of storing and later reproducing sounds. The imprint on the magnetic tape is the direct effect of the relevant sounds. Like a photograph of a relevant incident, a contemporaneous tape- record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under s. 7 of the Indian Evidence Act.” (Quoted in Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3)

In R.M. Malkani V. State of Maharashtra [1973] 3 S.C.R. 417, this Court observed:

  • “Tape recorded conversation is admissible, provided first that the conversation is relevant to the matters in issue; secondly, there is identification of the voice, and thirdly, the accuracy of the tape-recorded conversation is proved by eliminating the possibility of erasing the tape-record. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae. It is also comparable to a photo graph of a relevant incident. The tape recorded conversation is therefore a relevant fact and is admissible under section 7 of the Evidence Act.” (Quoted in Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3)

Acceptance of Tape-recorded Phone Conversation

In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsal Guru, AIR 2005  SC 3820: (2005) 11 SCC 600 (the case of storming the Parliament House complex and inflicted heavy casualties on the security men on duty), our Apex Court considered ‘auditory and spectrographic analysis’ of voice samples by expert. The Court accepted the report observing as under:

  • “The Conversation was taped and PW48 the Senior Scientific Officer in CFSL, Delhi compared the voice samples of Shaukat and Afsan Guru sent to him with the voice on the cassette which recorded intercepted conversation. He made auditory and spectrographic analysis of voice samples. He submitted a report Ext. PW 48/1. PW 48 testified that on comparison the voice was found to be the same. The High Court doubted the authenticity of the intercepted conversation on the ground that duration noted by the expert in his report was two minutes and 16 seconds was at variance with the duration of 49 seconds noted in the call records. The High Court laboured under the mistaken impression that the duration was 2 minutes and 16 seconds which was the duration of conversation between Gilani and his brother. Even then there is some discrepancy (between 49 and 74 seconds which according to PW48 was approximate) but no question was put to PW 48 in this regard nor any suggestion was put to PW 48 that the voice was not the same. If any such challenge was made the trial Court would have heard the conversation from the tape and noted the duration.”

In Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518, a three-Judge Bench of our Apex Court held as under:

  • “23. …… The conversation on the landline phone of the complainant situate in a shop was recorded by the complainant. The same cassette containing conversation by which ransom call was made on the landline phone was handed over by the complainant in original to the Police. This Court in its judgment dated 25.01.2010 has referred to the aforesaid fact and has noted the said fact to the following effect:
    • “The cassette on which the conversations had been recorded on the landline was handed over by Ravi Verma to S.I. Jiwan Kumar and on a replay of the tape, the conversation was clearly audible and was heard by the Police.”
  • 24. The tape recorded conversation was not secondary evidence which required certificate under Sec 65B, since it was the original cassette by which ransom call was tape-recorded, there cannot be any dispute that for admission of secondary evidence of electronic record a certificate as contemplated by Sec 65B is a mandatory condition.”

Admissibility of Digital Evidence

In Vaman Narain Ghiya Vs. State of Rajasthan 2014-1 Raj Cri C 31 it is observed, with regard to digital evidence, as under:

  • Digital photographs exist as digital data. Unlike conventional photographs, no film or paper are employed in their capture or storage. The image is captured and stored in the ”disk drive” or ”the chip”. Although digital photographs may ultimately be displayed in a printed form, it is not necessary to do so – they can just be easily displayed on a monitor screen or, there never need be an analogue representation of the scene or image. Digital photography uses an array of electronic photo-detectors to capture the image focused by the lens, as opposed to an exposure on photographic film. The captured image is then digitised and stored as a computer file ready for digital processing, viewing, digital publishing, or printing. Until the advent of such technology, photographs were made by exposing light sensitive photographic film, and used chemical photographic processing to develop and stabilise the image. By contrast, digital photographs can be displayed, printed, stored, manipulated, transmitted, and archived using digital and computer techniques, without chemical processing.
  • While digital photography has many advantages over the conventional photography, one of the disadvantages it has is the risk of tampering with the image. Unlike conventional photograph which was hard to tamper with, the easy availability of software permit manipulation of images. This raises questions about the relevance, the admissibility and the authentication of digital photography. Section 65B of the Evidence Act deals with admissibility and authenticity of electronic records. This new provision was inserted in the Evidence Act in the year 2000. Since it is a new provision, not much case law has emerged with regard to the said provision.”

Admissibility of CDs

The Speaker of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha disqualified six Members of the Vidhan Sabha for ‘defection’. When the matter was placed before the Apex Court, in Jagjit Singh  Vs. State of Haryana, 2006 (11) SCC 1, the Court had to consider the legality of the consideration of CDs by the Speaker in taking the impugned decision. The Speaker found that the CDs of the interview produced by Zee News and Haryana News (Punjab Today Television Channel) “corroborated” the documentary evidence as to ‘defection’. Supreme Court found no infirmity in the action of the speaker.  

In Paras Jain v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 2 RLW 945 (Raj), it is pointed out that an electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 65-B are satisfied.

Admissibility and Presumption as to E-mails

Evidence Act allows to present e-mails by a print on a paper or copied in a CD or Pen-drive.

  • According to Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act, Evidence’ means and includes: … all documents including electronic records …..
  • According to the Illustration of Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act, ‘Words printed, lithographed or photographed are documents
  • Sec. 65B states that computer output is any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein or which direct evidence would be admissible.

It must also be noted that Sec. 3 and 65B of the Evidence Act refer to mode of presentation of the e-mail; and not its relevancy or proof.

Section 88A of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • “88A. Presumption as to electronic messages.—The Court may presume that an electronic message, forwarded by the originator through an electronic mail server to the addressee to whom the message purports to be addressed corresponds with the message as fed into his computer for transmission; but the Court shall not make any presumption as to the person by whom such message was sent.
  • Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expressions “addressee” and “originator” shall have the same meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses (b) and (za) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.”

Analysing Section 88A of the Evidence Act and the relevant provisions of the Information and Technology Act, it is observed in Abdul Rahaman Kunji vs The State Of West Bengal, 2016 CriLJ 1159 (Cal), that the e-mails were admissible in evidence. The court acted upon the presumption under Sec. 88A.  It was found that the e-mails were proved and that the accused/appellant was the originator of the e-mails and that he had participated in the crime of abduction in equal measure as the others. It was observed as under:

  • “It is apparent that the Court may presume the veracity of the message fed into the computer for transmission by the originator through his mail server to an addressee, that is, the person who is intended by the originator to receive the electronic record and does not include any intermediary. However, this is a rebuttable presumption. Besides, no presumption can be drawn about the person who has sent such a message. Therefore, even if we accept the fact that these e-mails have been downloaded as stated by the Webel expert or sent by using the e-mail address of Akib Ali, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that Akib Ali was in fact the originator of these e-mails. The disclosure, if any, made by Akib Ali of the e-mail address and password would have to be made under Sec. 27 of the Evidence Act. PWs 118 and 132 have both stated that Akib Ali has disclosed his e-mail identities and passwords in their presence. They have signed the seizure list under which the e- mails accessed from these accounts and printed have been seized. Therefore, in our opinion, these e-mails are admissible in evidence.”

It was also pointed out by the High Court that besides denying everything in the statement recorded under section 313 CrPC, the accused has not given any specific explanation about his e-mail accounts and passwords or about the contents of the e-mails.

CCTV Footage is a strong piece of evidence

CCTV Footage is also admissible in evidence under Sec. 3 and 65B of the Evidence Act. For admitting this type of evidence also the requirements under Section 65B are to be satisfied. In Tomaso Bruno Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015-7 SCC 178), it is observed:

“CCTV footage is a strong piece of evidence which would have indicated whether the accused remained inside the hotel and whether they were responsible for the commission of a crime. It would have also shown whether or not the accused had gone —- best evidence which is missing. Omission to produce CCTV footage, in our view, which is the best evidence, raises serious doubts about the prosecution case.”

The facts of the case: Three Italian nationals namely Tomaso Bruno (Accused No.1), Elisa Betta Bon Compagni (Accused No. 2) and Francesco Montis (Deceased) came as tourists to India. They arrived at Varanasi and they checked in at Hotel Buddha. On 4.2.2010 at about 8.00 a.m. A-2 informed the Manager of the hotel that the condition of the deceased was not fine. All took the deceased to a Hospital at Varanasi, where the doctors declared the ailing tourist as ‘brought dead’. In post mortem autopsy the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation.

Cross examination of witnesses with CD images playing it in Court

In State of Gujarat v. Shailendra Kamalkishor Pande, 2008 CriLJ 953 (Gujrat), the witnesses were cross examined, from the side of the accused playing the CD, under Sec. 153 and 155 of the Evidence Act. The High Court observed that the trial Court had committed serious error in not considering the fact that the CD had not been prepared and preserved safely by an independent authority like police, but the same has been produced by the accused persons; and the matter was remanded to consider the authenticity of the CD.

The Delhi High Court, in Ram Singh v. State (NCT) of Delhi (2013), followed State of Gujarat v. Shailendra Kamalkishor Pande, 2008 CriLJ 953 (Gujrat), and observed that a previous statement in the video CD could be used under Section 145 Indian Evidence Act (to impeach credit of a witness under Section 155). The court referred to the Punjab High Court decision in Rup Chand v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1956 Punj. 173; and a judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 72 (the Supreme Court had held that the previous statement made by a person recorded on tape could be used not only to corroborate the evidence given by the witness in Court but also to contradict his evidence given before the Court as well as to test veracity of the witness and also to impeach his impartiality.) See also: Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3.

It was also pointed out by the Delhi High Court (Ram Singh v. State (NCT) of Delhi) that, in R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157) that the Supreme Court had observed that tape recorded version was admissible provided that the conversation was relevant to the matter in issue and its genuineness is proved by the person who seeks to rely on the same.

Mere marking– not dispense with proof (of truth of contents)

In Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865, the Supreme Court observed that mere marking of a documents (day book and ledger) as exhibits do not dispense with the proof of documents. In Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta Vs. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796, it is observed that mere marking as exhibit and identification of executor’s signature by one of witnesses does not prove contents of a document.

In Kaliya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013-10 SCC 758) it is held as under:

  • “Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. (Vide: The Roman Catholic Mission Vs. The State, AIR 1966 SC 1457; Marwari Khumhar Vs. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri AIR 2000 SC 2629; RVE Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu AIR 2003 SC 4548; Smt. Dayamathi Bai Vs. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082; and LIC of India  Vs. Rampal Singh Bisen,2010-4 SCC 491).”
  • “The court is obliged to examine the probative value of documents produced in court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence.”
  • [Note: Further held: “In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.”]

IF the TRUTH is IN ISSUE mere proof of handwriting or execution not evidence of truth:   IF the TRUTH of the facts stated in a document is IN ISSUE mere proof of the hand-writing and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document.

In Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, it us held as under:

  • “If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”

If ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute, marking without objection by itself does not absolve the duty to prove the truth as to the contents of the documents. (See: Achuthan Pillai vs Marikar (Motors) Ltd., AIR 1983 Ker 81, 1976 Cr.LJ 1507; 2016 (1) Gau. LJ 88,  2012(1) CTC 53; 2013-1 KLT 293.)

Probative Value and Standard of Proof of Visual and Voice Evidence

Degree or probative value of visual and voice evidence depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The method adopted may be the ‘pictorial testimony theory’ or the ‘silent theory’.  In both cases, one fact is absolutely essential: that is, it should be established that they are authenticated and accurate.

In Mahabir Prasad Verma v. Dr. Surinder Kaul, AIR 1982 SC 1043 (See also: Ram Singh vs. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3), it is laid down that tape-recorded evidence can only be used as a piece of corroboration (not substantive evidence). It is held as under

  • “22…. Tape-recorded conversation can only be relied upon as corroborative evidence of conversation deposed by any of the parties to the conversation and in the absence of evidence of any such conversation, the tape-recorded conversation is indeed no proper evidence and cannot be relied upon. In the instant case, there was no evidence of any such conversation between the tenant and the husband of the landlady; and in the absence of any such conversation, the tape-recorded conversation could be no proper evidence.”

In Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manik Rao Shivaji Kokate (2010)4 SCC 329, the Respondent won the election as a Shiv Sena — BJP alliance candidate. A Cassette was produced as true reproduction of the original speeches by the respondent or his agent.

It is held that the video/audio cassette is admissible.  But, appellant has failed to properly identify and prove voices recorded and the corrupt practices (communal and racial speeches) by that Cassette. It is observed in this decision as under:

  • “23. The second issue, in our opinion, is of greater importance than the first one. It is well settled that tape-records of speeches are “documents” as defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act and stand on no different footing than photographs. (See: Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17).  There is also no doubt that the new techniques and devices are the order of the day. Audio and video tape technology has emerged as a powerful medium through which a first-hand information about an event can be gathered and in a given situation may prove to be a crucial piece of evidence.  At the same time, with fast development in the electronic techniques, the tapes/cassettes are more susceptible to tampering and alterations by transposition, excision, etc. which may be difficult to detect and, therefore, such evidence has to be received with caution. Though it would neither be feasible nor advisable to lay down any exhaustive set of rules by which the admissibility of such evidence may be judged but it needs to be emphasised that to rule out the possibility of any kind of tampering with the tape, the standard of proof about its authenticity and accuracy has to be more stringent as compared to other documentary evidence.”

Voice Identification Is More Difficult Than Visual

In Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2011)4 SCC 143 it was held as under:

  • “31. In our opinion, the evidence of voice identification is at best suspect, if not, wholly unreliable. Accurate voice identification is much more difficult than visual identification. It is prone to such extensive and sophisticated tampering, doctoring and editing that the reality can be completely replaced by fiction. Therefore, the courts have to be extremely cautious in basing a conviction purely on the evidence of voice identification. This Court, in a number of judgments emphasised the importance of the precautions, which are necessary to be taken in placing any reliance on the evidence of voice identification.”

In Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra it is further observed that Chapter 14 of Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice discusses the law in England with regard to evidence of identification. It is pointed out that Section 1 of this Chapter deals with visual identification and Section 2 relates to voice identification and that it is emphasised that voice identification is more difficult than visual identification. Therefore, the precautions to be observed should be even more stringent than the precautions which ought to be taken in relation to visual identification. Speaking of lay listeners (including police officers), it enumerates the factors which would be relevant to judge the ability of such lay listener to correctly identify the voices. The Apex Court pointed out that these factors include:

  • “(a) the quality of the recording of the disputed voice,
  • (b) the gap in time between the listener hearing the known voice and his attempt to recognise the disputed voice,
  • (c) the ability of the individual to identify voices in general(research showing that this varies from person to person),
  • (d) the nature and duration of the speech which is sought to be identified, and(e) the familiarity of the listener with the known voice; and even a confident recognition of a familiar voice by a way listener may nevertheless be wrong.”

The Court of Appeal in England in R. v. Chenia and R. v. Flynn has reiterated the minimum safeguards which are required to be observed before a court can place any reliance on the voice identification evidence, as follows:

  • (a) the voice recognition exercise should be carried out by someone other than the officer investigating the offence;
  • (b) proper records should be kept of the amount of time spent in contact with the suspect by any officer giving voice recognition evidence, of the date and time spent by any such officer in compiling any transcript of a covert recording, and of any annotations on a transcript made by a listening officer as to his views as to the identity of a speaker; and
  • (c) any officer attempting a voice recognition exercise should not be provided with a transcript bearing the annotations of any other officer.

Conditions for Accepting Audio and Video Evidence

In Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh AIR 1986 SC 3, the Apex Court stated some of the conditions necessary for admissibility of tape-recorded statements, as under:

  • (1) The voice of the speaker must be duly identified by the maker of the record or by others who recognise his voice. In other words, it manifestly follows as a logical corollary that the first condition for the admissibility of such a statement is to identify the voice of the speaker.  Where the voice has been denied by the maker it will require very strict proof to determine whether or not it was really the voice of the speaker.
  • (2) The accuracy of the tape-recorded statement has to be proved by the maker of the record by satisfactory evidence – direct or circumstantial.
  • (3) Every possibility of tampering with or erasure of a part of a tape -recorded statement must be ruled out otherwise it may render the said statement out of context and, therefore, inadmissible.
  • (4) The statement must be relevant according to the rules of the Evidence Act.
  • (5) The recorded cassette must be carefully sealed and kept in safe or official custody.
  • (6) The voice of the speaker should be clearly audible and not lost or distorted by other sounds or disturbances.

In Ram Singh case the Apex Court approved the observations made by the Court of Appeal in England in R. v. Maqsud Ali where, Marshall, J. observed as under:( QB p.701 C -F)

  • “…We can see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we must not be taken as saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the circumstances, but it does appear to this Court wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly identified; provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, we are satisfied that a tape recording is admissible in evidence.  Such evidence should always be regarded with some caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances of each case.  There can be no question of laying down any exhaustive set of rules by which the admissibility of such evidence should be judged.

In Ram Singh case, the Supreme Court approved judgment in R. v. Robson, where Shaw, J. of the Central Criminal Court observed as under: ( Robson case 6,WLR p.653 F -G)

  • “…The determination of the question is rendered the more difficult because tape recordings may be altered by the transposition, excision and insertion of words or phrases and such alterations may escape detection and even elude it on examination by technical experts.”

In Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2011)4 SCC 143 it is also observed that in America, similar safeguards have been evolved through a series of judgments of different courts. The principles evolved have been summed up in American Jurisprudence 2d (Vol.29) in regard to the admissibility of tape-recorded statements, which are stated as under:

  • “The cases are in general agreement as to what constitutes a proper foundation for the admission of a sound recording, and indicate a reasonably strict adherence to the rules prescribed for testing the admissibility of recordings, which have been outlined as follows:
  • (1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
  • (2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
  • (3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the re -cording;
  • (4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
  • (5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
  • (6) identification of the speakers; and
  • (7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement.
  • However, the recording may be rejected if it is so inaudible and indistinct that the jury must speculate as to what was said.”

Who can sign the Certificate under Sec. 65B ?

Sec. 65B(4) answers it. It can ‘be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate)’.

Time of furnishing Certificate under Sec. 65B

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, 2020-3 SCC 216, answers it with respect to both civil and criminal cases. It is observed as under:

“50. We may hasten to add that  Sec. 65B does not speak of the stage at which such certificate must be furnished to the Court. …… This, the trial Judge ought to do when the electronic record is produced in evidence before him without the requisite certificate in the circumstances aforementioned. This is, of course, subject to discretion being exercised in civil cases in accordance with law, and in accordance with the requirements of justice on the facts of each case. ..

53. In a criminal trial, it is assumed that the investigation is completed and the prosecution has, as such, concretised its case against an accused before commencement of the trial. It is further settled law that the prosecution ought not to be allowed to fill up any lacunae during a trial. …..

54. Therefore, in terms of general procedure, the prosecution is obligated to supply all documents upon which reliance may be placed to an accused before commencement of the trial. Thus, the exercise of power by the courts in criminal trials in permitting evidence to be filed at a later stage should not result in serious or irreversible prejudice to the accused. A  balancing exercise in respect of the rights of parties has to be carried out by the court, in examining any application by the prosecution under Sec. 91 or 311 of the Cr.P.C. or Sec. 165 of the Evidence Act.

55. Depending on the facts of each case, and the Court exercising discretion after seeing that the accused is not prejudiced by want of a fair trial, the Court may in appropriate cases allow the prosecution to produce such certificate at a later point in time. If it is the accused who desires to produce the requisite certificate as part of his defence, this again will depend upon the justice of the case – discretion to be exercised by the Court in accordance with law.”

Relevancy, Admissibility and Probative Value of Documents

Sec. 5 and 136 of the Evidence Act stipulate that evidence can be given only on ‘facts in issue’ or ‘relevant facts’. Relevant facts are enumerated in Sec. 6 onwards.

Generally speaking, all relevant documents are admissible. But, various provisions of the Evidence Act, Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, Stamp Act, Registration Act etc. stipulate various formalities or regulations for tendering documents in evidence.

Whenever a document is admitted in court, the probative value thereof will be a matter for the court to determine. In State of Bihar Vs. Radha Krishna Singh (AIR 1983 SC 684) it is observed:

  • “Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”

Admission of Copy of Electronic Evidence (Sec. 65A & 65B of the Evid. Act)   

Sec. 65A of the Evidence Act reads: “The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B”. 

Sec. 65B states that ‘computer output’ is an ‘information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer.

Section 65B further declares that the ‘computer output’ (derived from original):

  • ‘shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question’; and
  • ‘shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence’.
  • ‘a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’. [Sec. 65B 5(c). ]

Read Blog: ‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be proved by ‘CERTIFICATE’ u/s. 65B

Sec. 65B enables to admit CONTENTS of electronic records without original

Sec. 65A and 65B pertain to admission of the CONTENTS of electronic records. Sec. 65B enables a party to a suit to prove any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (computer output), without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original (notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act).

Admissibility and Presumption as to correctness of Computer Output

Sec. 65B declares and expressly lays down that computer output (copy or print)

  • (i) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and
  • (ii) shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence
    • of any contents of the original or
    • of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.

If the conditions mentioned in this Section Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied, by necessary implication, it will bring a presumption under Sec. 114 with respect to regularity of the computer output . Because, admissibility of ‘any fact stated therein‘ ‘without further proof’ is nothing but ‘presumption’ of its regularity and correctness. The net result is that (if the conditions in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied) the burden to prove otherwise is cast on the person who opposes it.

The requirement in Sec. 65B(2) as to ‘proof’ (through witnesses or certificate) for ‘regularity‘ of feeding information into the computer in the ‘ordinary course‘ eloquently support this proposition.

  • Note:
    • (i) ‘Statements’ alone can be proved by ‘certificate’ under Sec. 65B(4); other ‘information’ are to be proved by proper evidence.
    • (ii) Presumption of ‘regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act can be applied in Sec. 65B.
    • (iii) Presumption of a ‘fact or regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act is, essentially presumption of ‘Truth’ and ‘Correctness’.

Presumption of Fact Means Truth/Correctness of Fact

St. of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar (AIR 2000 SC 2988) it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the Court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process Court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.”

A combined reading of Section 65A and 65B will show:

  • (i) ‘electronic record’ is primary evidence (original) and computer output’  is derived-from-original (secondary evidence);
  • (ii) Certificate under Section 65B(4) is required only for proving ‘computer output’ (derived from original)  and not for proving an ‘Electronic Record'(original); and
  • (iii) Sec. 65B enables a litigant to prove computer output (derived from original) without without further proof or production of electronic record’ (original) if the conditions laid down in Sec. 65B are fulfilled.
  • There is presumption as to correctness of the computer output, under Sec. 65B 5(c), as it reads ‘a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.
  • The enabling provision, Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act does not stand as a bar for proving a secondary evidence of the ‘electronic record’ (original – primary evidence), under Sec. 65 of the Evidence Act.

Because:

  1. Sec. 65A is an introductory provision to Sec. 65B.
  2. Sec. 65A does not control Sec. 65B;
  3. Sec. 65A directs only a method to PROVE (not the only one method) the CONTENTS of electronic records –  by print/copy – invoking Sec. 65B..
  4. Sec. 65B deals with ‘admissibility of ‘computer output’ (derived from original) alone; and not with respect to ‘electronic record  (original) as such;
  5. Computer output’ (derived from original) stands akin to secondary evidence – because it is (Sec. 65B) an ‘information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer and it is stated – ‘Computer output’  “shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible”.

It is also noteworthy that the ambiguity as to whether electronic-records are also ‘documents’ is already removed by the amendment to Sec. 3 Evd. Act (Evidence’ means and includes … .. all documents including electronic records’).  ‘Electronic records’ (original) being already declared as ‘documents’ (Sec. 3), Sec. 65B (1) needed to declare ‘computer output’ (derived from original) alone as (deemed) documents.

Electronic Record is the ‘hard-disc’ of the computer or a chip or a memory-card

Section 2(1)(t) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 defines an ‘electronic record’ as under:

  • “electronic record” means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro film or computer generated micro fiche;

Technically, the ‘electronic record’ will be the data or other material in an electronic form, so also the microfilm, the computer-generated microfiche, etc. attached, or attachable, to a computer, or other electronic equipment.

‘Hard-disc’, CD, DVD, Pen-drive etc. can be an (original) ‘Electronic Record’. In the Evidence Act, ‘electronic record’ is perceived as the ‘original’ data, record, etc. that are put in or stored. On that basis, casually saying, the ‘hard-disc’ of the computer is an ‘electronic record’; and it can also be an external hard-disc, CD, DVD or a chip or a memory-card or a pen-drive to which the ‘information’ is directly fed into – using a computer, a video camera, mobile phone, etc. [State of Gujarat vs Shailendra Kamalkishor Pande: 2008 CriLJ 953 (Gujrat) ].   It must have been self-generated without any human intervention. [Kishan Tripathi @ Kishan Painter vs. The State (2016) 2 DLT (Cri) 666)]. Thus e-mails, telephonic recordings, CCTV footage, video recordings in CD, DVD, etc. can be ‘electronic record’ in law; and they can be proved in a court of law.

Computer output’ can be got produced by ‘any computer

A Computer Output’ that is copied in optical or magnetic media, can also be got copied by ‘any computer’ other than the computer that was “used regularly to store or process information”. It is clear from the phrase “a computer” in Sec. 65B(1) and 65B(5)(c) – contradistinct to “the computer” in Sec. 65B(2).

Why and How Sec. 65 B is an Enabling Provision

A Certificate under Section 65 B(4) is required for proving ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence) alone; and not for all ‘Electronic Records’. As stated earlier, it is held in Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518, by a three-Judge Bench of our Apex Court as under:

  • “24. The tape recorded conversation was not secondary evidence which required certificate under Sec 65B, since it was the original cassette by which ransom call was tape-recorded, there cannot be any dispute that for admission of secondary evidence of electronic record a certificate as contemplated by Sec 65B is a mandatory condition.”

The above passage is quoted in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, 2020-3 SCC 216.

As pointed out by our Apex Court in various decisions including M. Chandra Vs. M. Thangamuthu, (2010) 9 SCC 712, production of primary document is the rule; the secondary evidence would be admissible only in exceptional cases; and to admit secondary evidence, (i) there should be authenticated foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original and (ii) the party concerned was genuinely unable to produce the original.

From the above, it is definite that that the new enabling provisions (Sec. 65A and 65B) are introduced to confer a right to a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of an electronic record to adduce evidence of the same by ‘computer output’ (derived from original), adopting the procedure/drill given in Sec. 65B ‘without further proof or production of the original’; that is, without accounting for (original) electronic record. It would appear that the Non-obstante clause is not to exclude Sec. 62 to 65. Because, on a combined reading of Section 65A and 65B it would appear that these provisions deal with evidence ‘derived from original’ (computer output) alone; and not about original. Sec. 65B speaks: ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act .. .. the computer output shall be deemed to be also a document’ (if the conditions laid down are fulfilled).

Authoritative Decision in Arjun Panditrao on Electronic Evidence Holds the field

In view of the authoritative decision of the Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, 2020-3 SCC 216 (concerning the video recording as to fix the time of filing nomination paper), the following principles hold the field:

  1. Because of the non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) of Sec. 65B, for ‘admissibility and proof’ as to the information contained  in a ‘computer output’, the drill of Sec. 65B, must be followed (by producing the certificate provided for in Sec. 65B) and no other method is acceptable, since Sec. 65B is a special provision and Sections 62 to 65 are irrelevant for this purpose.
  2. If the authority concerned does not issue Certificate, the Court may order the production of the Certificate.
  3. The Certificate has to be produced at the time of filing of document. However, if it could not be produced at that stage, it may be permitted to be produced later; provided such later production of certificate would not prejudice the accused.


[1] Sec. 65A and 65B reads of the Evidence Act reads:  

Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record.

The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. 

65B. Admissibility of electronic records

  1. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein or which direct evidence would be admissible.
  2. The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely :-
    • (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer;
    • (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
    • (c) throughout the materiel part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
    • (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
  3. Where over any period, the functions of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities of any regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by computer, whether-
    • (a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
    • (b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
    • (c)by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or
    • (d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers, all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
  4. In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,-
    • (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
    • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate)
      • shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purpose of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.
  5. For the purposes of this section,-
    • (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
    • (b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any official, information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities;
    • (c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section any reference to information being derived from other information shall be a reference to its being derived there from by calculation, comparison or any other process.

[2] Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State (2014 KHC 31)

[3] P. Gopalakrishnan @ Dileep Vs. State Of Kerala: KERLT 2018 4 1159, KERLJ 2018 4 189, KHC 2018 4 437

[4] P. Gopalakrishnan @ Dileep Vs. State Of Kerala: KERLT 2018 4 1159, KERLJ 2018 4 189, KHC 2018 4 437

[5] Lyell v. Kennedy (No.3) (1884) 50 L.T. 730

[6] State of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053

[7] State of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053; Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31; Taylor v. Chief Constable Cheshire:1987(1) All.ER 225

[8] Tukaram S.Dighole v. Manik Rao Shivaji Kokate (2010)4 SCC 329

[9] P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1; tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, 2010-4 SCC 329; Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State: 2014 KHC 31; Grand v. Southwestern and County Properties Ltd. (1975)Ch.185, (1974)2 All.E.R. 465; Rex v. Daye : (1908)2 K.B. 333, 340; Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brij Mohan Ramdas Mehra:  (1976) 2 SCC 17.  

[10] Senior v. Holdsworth, Ex parte Independant Television New Ltd. (1976) Q.B. 23)

[11] Rex v. Daye ((1908)2 K.B. 333, 340)

[12] North West Airlines v. Union of India 2007 (214) ELT 178 (Bom.)

[13] Quoted in: Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31

[14] Quoted in: Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31

[15] Quoted in: Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31

[16] Quoted in: Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31


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Free and Fair Elections are Basic Features of Democracy

The Supreme Court of India held as under in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, AIR 1993 SC 412:

  • Democracy is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution, and rule of law; and free and fair elections are basic features of democracy, One of the postulates of free and fair elections is provision for resolution of election disputes as also adjudication of disputes relating to subsequent disqualifications by an independent authority. It is only by a fair adjudication of such disputes relating to validity of elections and subsequent disqualifications of members that true reflection of the electoral mandate and governance by rule of law essential for democracy can be ensured.”

‘Democracy’ and free and fair election’ are inseparable twins.

It has been held in Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Union of India [AIR 2006 SC 980]  as under:

“…The well recognised position in law is that purity in the electoral process and the conduct of the elected representatives cannot be isolated from the constitutional requirements. ‘Democracy’ and free and fair election’ are inseparable twins. There is almost an inseverable umbilical cord joining them. In a democracy the little man-voter has overwhelming importance and cannot be hijacked from the course of free and fair elections…….”

In Nimba Rajaram Mali Vs. Collector, Jalgaon[1] our Apex Court held as under:

“In a democratic society what is important is the Will of the majority and the elected representatives must honour the will of the majority. It is immaterial to analyse and debate on the reasons behind the will of the majority or the specific reasons for such will being expressed. The will of the majority is of paramount importance and it must be respected by all elected representatives responsible for the governance of such democratic institutions. … Unless it is shown that while passing such a resolution of No Confidence Motion, there was flagrant violation of any of mandatory procedure laid down, such a resolution cannot be interfered with by the Court or statutory authorities adjudicating such disputes. “

Nomination Paper Rejected: Writ Petition not Maintainable

From the very beginning, the Supreme Court of India took the firm stand that the Court would not interfere in the election process if it is started.

In NP Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer[2] the nomination paper of the appellant for election to the Madras Legislative Assembly was rejected by the Returning Officer. The appellant challenged the rejection of the nomination paper by filing a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Returning Officer on account of Article 329(b) of the Constitution, which says that no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature. In appeal, our Apex Court with a Bench of six learned Judges examined the question whether the writ petition would be maintainable at the initial stage against an order rejecting the nomination paper.

It was observed in this decision:

“The law of elections in India does not contemplate that there should be two attacks on matters connected with election proceedings, one while they are going on by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts having been expressly excluded), and another after they have been completed by means of an election petition. Any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a special tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any court.”

Electoral Roll:  Illegality in Preparation: Courts Interfere

If the electoral roll itself has been challenged on the ground that the members enrolled are in violation of the provisions of the Scheme of Administration then in such cases the courts can interfere. A valid electoral role is the basic requirement of a fair election.[3]

In Chief Commissioner, Ajmer Vs. Radhey Shyam Dani,[4] the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court upheld the decision of the Chief Commissioner on the ground that the electoral roll prepared was invalid as it was prepared in accordance with some invalid rules.[5] This decision is followed in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[6] 

In Ramgulam Shri Baijnath Prasad Vs. Collector, Guna[7] it was observed that when election held on the basis of rolls which had not been prepared in accordance with law, the petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground of delay.

In Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra[8] it is held by our Apex Court that where the voters’ list had been prepared on the basis of non-existent Rules, it would be illegal and the Court could interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In Dev Prakash Balmukund Vs. Babu Ram Rewti Mal[9], it is held that if the very foundation of the election, namely, the electoral roll was illegal, no election on its basis could be proceed or be allowed to stand, but that did not mean that any kind of defect in the roll, however technical in its nature, would be suffice to reach such a conclusion.[10]

Strict Pleading and Standard of Proof

In Sushila Prasad Vs. State of Bihar, 2015-4 PLJR 881, the High Court dealt with the requirement of strict pleading observing as under:

  • “There is absolute lack of pleadings to support that the voters who had been illegally included in the list had contributed to the success of the returned candidate and which had materially affected the election nor is there any thing on record to show whether any such prayer had been made by the petitioner in conformity with the statutory provisions. In fact even in absence of such prayer the petitioner simply proceeded to seek a declaration that the entire election was void on such infirmity.” (Referred to in Tanu Singh Vs. State of Bihar, 2019-4 Pat LJR 784)

An election petition is a strict statutory proceeding.[11] In Jagan Nath Vs. Jaswant Singh[12] it is observed:

  • “The general rule is well settled that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and the Court possesses no common law power.” [13]

In election matters the standard of proof is high and burden is on the election petitioner. Mere preponderance of probabilities or presumptions cannot be the basis to challenge an election. The election proceedings are akin to criminal proceedings.[14]

It is held in Gajanan Krishnaji Barat Vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe[15] that in an election petition, based on allegations of commission of corrupt practice, the onus lies heavily on the petitioner to establish the charge of corrupt practice and in case of doubt the benefit goes to the returned candidate.

Courts Sparingly Exercise Jurisdiction – Must be cogent and compelling grounds.

The decision taken by the concerned authority during the course of election is not open to judicial review except on the ground of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power.[16] Courts will not interfere with discharging duties by the elected office bearers of an organisation, without cogent and compelling grounds. A simple breach of any Rule will not give rise to a cause of action for any member unless there is manifest illegality, or act or omission that goes to the root of the matter.  In other words, the alleged violation should be so grave that it could not be condoned by the general body.[17]

Court interfere if only Election Materially Affected by Illegality

In election cases courts enquire whether the alleged illegality materially affected the result of the election. See:

  • Hariprasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V. B. Raju, AIR 1973 SC 2602,
  • Kunwar Nripendra Bahadur Singh v. Jai Ram Verma, AIR 1977 SC 1992
  • P T Rajan v. T P M Sahir, AIR 2003 SC 4603,
  • Baidyanath Panjira v. Sita Ram Mahto,AIR 1970 SC 314
  • I. Vikheshe Sema v. Hokishe Sema, 1996-4 SCC 53.

Illegal inclusion of voters in Voters-list

If the result of election is not materially affected by illegal inclusion of voters in Electoral Roll, the court will not delve to the allegation. In Shyamdeo Prasad Singh Vs. Nawal Kishore Yadav, (2000) 8 SCC 46 the Supreme Court considered the effect of improper reception of votes cast by illegal electors in the voter list and observed as under:

  • “26. To sum up we are of the opinion that inclusion of person or persons in the electoral roll by an authority empowered in law to prepare the electoral rolls, though they were not qualified to be so enrolled, cannot be a ground for setting aside an election of a returned candidate under sub-clause (iii) or (iv) of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.” (Referred to in Tanu Singh Vs. State of Bihar, 2019-4 Pat LJR 784)

Right To Vote or Stand as a Candidate, Not a Civil Right

Right to Challenge an Election Is Not a Common Law Right. In NP Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer, Namakkal[18] it was observed:

“The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it.”

The rights arising out of elections including the right to contest or challenge an election are not common law rights but are creatures of the statutes which create, confer or limit those rights; and, therefore, for deciding the question whether an election can be set aside on any alleged ground, the Courts have to function within the framework of that law and not travel beyond it.[19] It is a special right conferred under a self contained special law. Right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right, but is a creature of a statute or a special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it. It will, therefore, be advantageous to look into the scheme of the Act.[20]

It is observed in S Thamil Arasan Vs. R Narayanan[21] that since there is no specific provision permitting the challenge of an election to the society, the only remedy for challenging such election is by means of a civil suit.

Locus Standi of an Individual Member to Challenge Election

In Tej Bahadur vs Shri Narendra Modi, AIR 2021 SC 217,  the Apex Court considered the question of the validity of the appellant’s nomination since that had a direct bearing on the question whether he had a right to question the election. After finding that the appellant was not a duly nominated candidate, it is held as under:

  • “We find that the averments in the petition do not disclose that the appellant has a cause of action which invest him with right to sue. It is settled that where a person has no interest at all, or no sufficient interest to support a legal claim or action he will have no locus standi to sue. The entitlement to sue or locus standi is an integral part of cause of action. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467, V.R. Krishna Iyer J., speaking for this Court held that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing.”

A member of a Society does not have the right to challenge Election unless his rights are personally affected by the impugned action. An individual member cannot challenge an order finalising a voter list. He should have been a candidate or acquired the right to vote. [22]

The Apex Court held in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh, AIR 1980 SC 1612:

  • A voter could challenge the election.
  • Merely because he took part in the election by standing as a candidate or by exercise of his right of franchise he cannot be estopped from challenging the whole election when the election was glaringly illegal and void on the basis of the obnoxious proviso. There is no question of approbation and reprobation at the same time in such a case.
  • A voter could come to the High Court even earlier before the election was held. But merely because he came to challenge the election after it was held it cannot be said that he was guilty of any laches and must be non-suited only on that account.

In Committee of Management, Sri Kachcha Baba Inter College, Varanasi Vs. Regional Committee, Pancham Mandal[23] it was held that a group of members of the General Body (and not by a rival committee of management) had no locus standi to challenge the result of the elections.[24]

There were divergent views, in UP, on the right of an individual member to file a writ petition. In certain cases (Dr. P.P. Rastogi v. Meerut University, Meerut, 1997-1 UPLBEC 415; Smt. Vimla Devi v. The Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra, 1997-3 ESC 1807; Bhagwan Kaushik v. State of U.P., 2006-2 UPLBEC 1372; Amanullah Khan v. State of U.P. , 2009-75 All LR 29) it was held that an individual member had no right to file the writ petition. The other set of decisions (Kamla Kant Agrawal v. State of U.P., 2008-7 ADJ 601; Committee of Management, Janta Inter College, Sultanpur, District Haridwar v. Joint Director of Education, I Region, Meerut, 1999-1 UPLBEC 170; Ratan Kumar Solanki v. State of U.P., 2010-1 ADJ 262) observed that the writ petition could be maintained, subject to the existence of efficacious alternative remedy, when there was a breach of right of a person affecting his right to form an association, which was a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, or there was a breach of the Statute. Both the divergent views had been considered by a Division Bench in Committee of Management, Arya Kanya Pathshala Inter College, Bulandshahar v. State of U.P. (2011-2 ADJ 65). The Division Bench observed as under:

  •  “There is no such proposition that an individual member cannot, in no circumstance, challenge the election of the Committee of Management….. It is clear that the question as to whether an individual member has locus to challenge the election of Committee of Management depends on facts of each case…..” (See: Laxman Singh Vs. State of UP, ADJ 2014-9 242, AWC 2014-5 4382, LBESR 2014-3 415)

Individual Can Maintain Cause of the Collective Body 

Where the right of an individual is affected or infringed, and, he has no other effective remedy, and where there are no vitiating circumstances such as delay, latches, etc., the cause of the collective body will be maintainable at the instance of an individual.[25] 

Individual Membership Rights and Corporate Membership Rights

The Kerala High Court in Joseph Vs. Jos[26] observed as under:

“…  There are two kinds of rights for a member of the company, one the individual membership right, and the other the corporate membership right. So far as the corporate membership rights are concerned, a shareholder can assert those rights only in conformity with the decision of the majority of the shareholders. An individual membership right is a right to maintain himself in full membership with all the rights and privileges appertaining to that status. …”

Election Process and Powers of a Returning Officer

Elections in associations are conducted in accordance with their Rules. If it is warrented, the court may intervene. In Hardeo Singh Vs. Union of India[27] the High Court of Uttarakhand being found it necessary that there should be a duly elected Management Committee for a Gurudwara for its proper management and administration, inter alia, following directions were issued with respect to election:

“The Election Officer for the purposes of the completion of the election process including
de-limitation/re-determination of wards,
preparation of electoral rolls,
verification of electors,
qualification of members,
election process,
publication of results,
first meeting of elected committee,
election of office bearers,
first meeting of the committee, constitution of sub-committees etc.,
may constitute a committee not exceeding five members, whom the Election Officer finds suitable.
Such five persons should be respectable and educated persons with no criminal record and no history of association with election of Gurudwara Sri Nanakmatta Sahib. These persons should have no interest or association with any candidate or group. They will also give an undertaking to the Election Officer that they have no interest in the election and they will not participate in canvassing or election etc. in any manner. The Election Officer shall follow such procedure, which is reasonable and on the basis of the principles of natural justice and in accordance with the Sikh principles and values.”

In the absence of express or implied regulations to the contrary,[28] the returning officers, domestic tribunals, syndicate of a university, enquiry committees, etc. are also free to evolve and follow their own procedure as they are ‘masters of their own procedure’;[29] but, they must ensure natural justice in their proposed actions.[30] Lord Denning, Master of Rolls, in the Court of Appeal in England observed, in the matter of a non-statutory domestic tribunal, as under:[31]

“Is a party who is charged before a domestic tribunal entitled as of right to be legally represented, much depends on what the rules say about it. When the rules say nothing, then the party has no absolute right to be legally represented. It is a matter for the discretion of the tribunal. They are masters of their own procedure: and, if they, in the proper exercise of their discretion, decline to allow legal representation, the Courts will not interfere….”[32]

It is held in Guru Nanak University Vs. Iqbal Kaur Sandhu[33] as under:

“It is not the province and the function of this Court to lay down either the time or the mode and manner in which autonomous and high-powered bodies like the Syndicate of the appellant-University are entitled to conduct their business in the meetings. They are equally masters of their own procedure and unless there is an infraction of the clear statutory rules in carrying out their duties and in conforming to the procedure prescribed by law, this Court would be ill-advised to render any gratuitous advice to them in their autonomous field in dealing and disposing of their business.”

A Returning Officer merely conducts the election and has no power to consider the question as to whether a member is eligible to vote or not.[34] He cannot also cancel the membership of a person. After the declaration of the result, the Returning Officer becomes functus officio and he has no power or jurisdiction to change the declaration or to make any other declaration or to make an order to recount or to reconsider the result of election. The returning officer who makes the scrutiny of nominations has the power to reject nomination on proper grounds and he can decide on the eligibility of a candidate.

Duties of Returning Officer

The Returning Officer has to be perform his duties with detachment and impartiality.[35] Our Apex Court, in Food Corporation of India Staff Union Vs. Food Corporation of India,[36]  propounded norms and procedures to be followed for assessing the representative character of the trade union.

Ordinarily, Courts will not Interfere with Election Process

In Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik[37]  our Apex Court held:

“Since 1952 this Court has authoritatively laid down that once election process has started the courts should not ordinarily interferewith the said process by way of granting injunction.”

In Jagan Nath Vs. Jaswant Singh[38] it is observed: 

“… It is also well settled that it is a sound principle of natural justice that the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law.”

Remedies with respect to the disputes as to elections will have to be sought for after elections are over. This time-honoured principle is emphasised in the following decisions also.

  • Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath[39]
  • N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer[40]
  • Nanhoo Mal and Others Vs. Hira Mal[41].
  • Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commr.[42]:
  • Boddula Krishnaiah Vs. State Elec. Commissioner, A.P.[43]
  • Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra[44]
  • Anugrah Narain Singh Vs. State of U.P.[45]
  • Election Commissioner of India Vs. Ashok Kumar[46] 
  • Abdulla Khan Vs. State of Orissa[47].
  • Abdul Latheef C.K. Vs. K.M. Haneefa[48]
  • Medical Council of India Vs. Regar/Returning Officer, TN[49] 
  • Avtar Singh Vs. Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Mgmnt. Comtee,[50]
  • C. Subrahmanyam Vs. K. Ramanjaneyullu[51]
  • Ashok Kumar Jain Vs. Neetu Kathoria[52]
  • K.K. Shrivastava Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Jain[53]

It is observed in Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath[54] while considering election to Dental Council of India under Section 3 (a) of the Dentists Act, 1948:

“So far as the issue with regard to eligibility of Respondent no.1 for contesting the election is concerned, though prima facie it appears that Respondent No.1 could contest the election, we do not propose to go into the said issue because, in our opinion, as per the settled law, the High Court should not have interfered with the election after the process of election had commenced. The judgments referred to herein above clearly show the settled position of law to the effect that whenever the process of election starts, normally courts should not interfere with the process of election for the simple reason that if the process of election is interfered with by the courts, possibly no election would be completed without court ‘s order. Very often, for frivolous reasons candidates or others approach the courts and by virtue of interim orders passed by courts, the election is delayed or cancelled and in such a case the basic purpose of having election and getting an elected body to run the administration is frustrated. For the aforestated reasons, this Court has taken a view that all disputes with regard to election should be dealt with only after completion of the election.”

In K.K. Shrivastava Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Jain[55] with respect to election to the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh under the Advocates Act our Apex Court held:

“Where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hands off. This is more particularly so where the dispute relates to an election. Still more so where there is a statutorily prescribed remedy which almost reads in mandatory terms.”[56]

Standard of Proof in Election Matters:

The election of a returned candidate will not be set aside unless there are cogent and convincing reasons.[57] In election matters the standard of proof is high and burden is on the election petitioner. The court proceedings on election disputes are akin to criminal proceedings.[58] It is held in Gajanan Krishnaji Barat Vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe[59] that in an election petition, based on allegations of commission of corrupt practice, the standard of proof required is, generally speaking, that in a criminal trial.  The onus lies heavily on the petitioner to establish the charge of corrupt practice and in case of doubt the benefit goes to the returned candidate.

It is pointed out in Seth Gulabchand v. Seth Kudilal[60] that the rules applicable to circumstantial evidence in criminal cases would not apply to civil cases. The ordinary rules governing civil cases of balance of probabilities will continue to apply. Mere preponderance of probabilities or presumptions cannot be the basis to challenge an election.

Temporary Injunctions

Interference of courts after election-process commenced [61] and stopping an election are very much against public policy.[62]  But, there is no absolute restriction upon court; it is only limited.[63] 

Election Tribunals under the Representation of Peoples Act are not conferred with power to grant temporary injunctions. When granting injunction is subject to the declaration sought for, in election matters it will be proper not to grant temporary injunction.[64] The success of a winning candidate at an election cannot be lightly interfered with; more so when no fault of his. [65] If ultimately, the suit is dismissed, the court cannot compensate for granting a temporary injunction.[66]

Technicalities of Election Petitions

In Umesh Challiyill Vs. K.P. Rajendran[67] our Apex Court ruled that the election petitions should not be dismissed at the threshold on technical defects which were purely cosmetic and do not go to the root of the matter. It is observed: 

“However, in fairness whenever such defects are pointed out then the proper course for the Court is not to dismiss the petition at the threshold. In order to maintain the sanctity of the election the Court should not take such a technical attitude and dismiss the election petition at the threshold. On the contrary after finding the defects, the Court should give proper opportunity to cure the defects and in case of failure to remove/cure the defects, it could result into dismissal on account of Order 6 Rule 16 or Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Though technically it cannot be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act of 1951 but it can be rejected when the election petition is not properly constituted as required under the provisions of CPC but in the present case we regret to record that the defects which have been pointed out in this election petition were purely cosmetic and do not go to the root of the matter  and secondly even if the Court found them of serious nature then at least the Court should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to rectify such defects.”[68] 

Instances of Courts Interference before Completion of Election:

  1. Election process was not in conformity with the relevant statutory provisions.[69]
  2. Election Meeting not in conformity with Articles.[70]
  3. Conduct of elections was not in accordance with the Bye laws of the Association.[71]
  4. Voters’ list had been prepared on the basis of nonexistent rules.[72]
  5. Violation of the essential provisions of the Election Rules and the Act and validity of the entire election is in challenge.[73]
  6. Mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power.[74] Court interferes for fair and impartial election.[75]
  7. Where validity of the entire election is in challenge beyond the election of a particular candidate, on the ground of the violation of the essential provisions of the Election Rules and the Act [76]
  8. Where alternative remedy is no remedy in the eye of law.[77]

When the challenge of whole election is such that the alternative remedy is no remedy in the eye of law to cover the challenge; or, in any event, is not adequate and efficacious remedy, then the remedy of writ petition to challenge the whole election is available. In Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[78] the Court interfered since the Election Tribunal would have found itself incompetent to declare the proviso to R. 3 (3) of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules ultra vires and that being so the alternative remedy provided in R. 34 (8) was no remedy at all. The illegalities made the entire election void and the statutory rules under which the election was conducted was invalid.

No Question of Estoppel if Inherent Illegality

If a member participated in a meeting or election knowing the illegality of the same he would be deemed to have acquiesced or concurred in the election and would be estopped from challenging its validity.[79]

But, neither the principle of estoppel nor the principle of approbation and reprobation can be pressed into service in case of an election which is liable to be set aside by a court. Therefore, even a defeated candidates can challenge an election on its inherent illegality. [80]

ELECTIONS OF SOCIETIES AND CLUBS

Court Interfere for Fair and Impartial Election

In proper cases the courts appoint Returning Officers or administrators for societies. The Calcutta High Court in East Bengal Club Vs. Paltu Mukherjee[81] appointed an impartial special officer to hold the election under his supervision for ensuring fair and impartial election of the club. In Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society[82] the court appointed Retired Chief Justice of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh to be the Administrator of the Society and gave him directions for convening GB and election.

Principles of General Election Extended to Elections in General

The principles of law under the Representation of People Act, 1951 have been extended by our courts to elections in general[83] including that in Societies and Educational Institutions.[84]

Electoral Roll of Bar Council: Preparation on Invalid Provisions, Court Interferes

In Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[85] it was found by our Apex Court that the electoral roll prepared on the basis of invalid provisions resulted in vitiating the entire election, and that the writ petition for setting aside the election of the Bar Council of Delhi was maintainable. The Supreme Court while considering the validity of an electoral roll of Delhi Bar Council, omitting as many as 2000 Advocates on the basis of an invalid Rule framed by that Council, observed:

“9. We, therefore, hold that the impugned proviso to R. 3 (j) to the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules is ultra vires and invalid and the electoral roll prepared by the Delhi Bar Council on the basis of the same resulting in the exclusion of the names of about 2000 Advocates from the said roll was not valid in law. We are further of the opinion that the whole election was invalid on that account and it could be challenged as such in a writ petition. It was not a case of challenging the preparation of the electoral roll on the factual basis of wrong exclusion of a few names. For the said purpose R.4 occurring in Chapter I of the Bar Council of India Rules could come into play. But here, because of the invalidity of the Rules itself, the preparation of the electoral roll was completely vitiated-a matter which cannot be put within the narrow limit of the said rule. 10. The illegal preparation of the electoral roll by the Delhi Bar Council on the basis of the invalid proviso to R. 3(j) goes to the very root of the matter and no election held on the basis of such an infirmity can be upheld. There is no question of the result being materially affected in such a case.” [86] 

Electoral Roll of University: Court Interfere when Election on Nonexistent Rules

In N Thippanna Vs. State of Karnataka[87] Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court by its interim order directed to hold the election but withheld the results. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeeth Singh[88] the Karnataka High Court in its final Judgment held that the electoral rolls prepared by the University, omitting a very large number of registered graduates, was not in conformity with the Act, the statutes and the general principles for preparation of electoral rolls, and that it was void in law.  A valid electoral role is the basic requirement of a fair election.[89]

Though it is observed by our Apex Court in Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra that when the process of election has been commenced it would be impermissible for the court to go into the questions as to breach of the Rule in the preparation of the voters’ list, it observed that where the voters’ list had been prepared on the basis of nonexistent rules, it would be illegal and the Court could interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In Ahmednagar Zilla SDV and P Sangh Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra[90] though the appeal was dismissed following the principles of law laid down in Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra,[91]the Court directed the District Collector, Ahmednagar, to conduct fresh election of the Board of Directors to the appellant Society, forthwith.

Electoral Roll of Societies:  Illegality in Preparation: Remedy is Election Petition

Even as to alleged illegality or breach of rules while preparing the electoral roll, courts will not interfere in the election process, once it is started.[92]

With regard to elections in a society registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, the Supreme Court[93] observed in Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra as under:

“In view of our finding that preparation of the electoral roll being an intermediate stage in the process of election of the Managing Committee of a specified society and the election process having been set in motion, it is well settled that the High Court should not stay the continuation of the election process even though there may be some alleged illegality or breach of rules while preparing the electoral roll. It is not disputed that the election in question has already been held and the result thereof has been stayed by an order of this Court, and once the result of the election is declared, it would be open to the appellants to challenge the election of the returned candidate, if aggrieved, by means of an election petition before the election Tribunal.”

Electoral Rolls of Societies – Non-inclusion: Courts Will Not Interfere

In MARVS Sai Baba Vs. Commissioner and Registrar of Co-Op. Societies,[94] held as under:

“7. . . It is pertinent to mention that the issue relating to the validity of membership of a society including that of wrong admission of a member or non-inclusion of a valid member in the rolls of the society is an issue to be decided before the election process begins and that can be a valid ground to invoke Section 32 (7) (a) of the Act to set right the things and then proceed for the elections and appoint a Person-in-charge to manage the affairs of the society in the interregnum. But, once a decision is taken to hold the elections and the election process commences by issue of notification, Section 32 (7) (a) of the Act has got no role and any dispute in connection with the election, be it of the nomination, of improper electoral roll and other aspects, have to be settled only by way of a judicial adjudication contemplated in Section 61 (3) of the Act. “

Holding Annual General Meeting is Statutory; Election, Not

Sec. 4 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 postulates holding of Annual General Meeting. These provisions (also the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the society) as to holding Annual General Meetings, are mandatory; and not directory.[95] As per Sec. 2 of the Societies Registration Act the management of the affairs of a society is entrusted with the governing body.  The rules of the society have to direct the details of such entrustment.

It is pertinent to note that the Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not specifically direct ‘election’ of the governing body. But various States’ amendments (and State-Acts) provide for the same. The mode and modalities of formation of the governing body is determinedly left, under Sec.16, to the ‘Rules and Regulations of the society’.

Sec.16 reads:

Governing body defined: The governing body of the society shall be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees, or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted.

Permanent Governing Body and Right of Vote to Life-Members

Holding election in a society being not statutory, it can be demonstrated that the requirements in the definition of a member in Section 15 (payment of subscription and signature in the roll/list of members) do not control the right to vote in the election for governing body and to stand as a candidate (individual membership rights), as it is a matter left for bye laws. 

Sec. 15 reads:

Member defined: For the purposes of this Act, a member of a society shall be a person ….

Disqualified members: But in all proceedings under this Act, no person shall be entitled to vote or be counted as a member whose subscription at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months.

The provisions in the bye laws of a Society that permits vote in the election of the governing body of a society to life-members or honourary-members, who have not signed the roll/list of members, or even members in arrears, may be valid. It can as well be argued that in case the bye laws of a society provide for permanent governing body, without an election, the same (so also nomination of governing body by an ‘outsider’) will not be illegal; and it may not be legitimate to argue that the provisions of such bye laws are unreasonable or opposed to public policy on the premise that bye laws of a society or a club is a contract[96] amongst its members.

No Fundamental Right or Common Law Right to Contest Election

            The rights of a person to contest an election or to challenge it is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right; but are statutory rights[97] or rights originate from the bye laws of an association.[98]

Candidature:  An Individual Membership Right

Right to stand as a candidate for election as a Director of the Company is well accepted as an individual membership right.[99] Our courts have held that the general principles governing the individual membership rights, and right of suit, of an individual share holder (or a member) of the company would apply to the members of societies or clubs also.[100]

Definition of ‘Member’ & Right to Vote

The definition of ‘Member’ (in Sec.15) in the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is not exhaustive, as it is ‘for the purposes of this Act’ alone. Further, the words in the second limb of Section 15, ‘but in all proceedings under this Act’ bespeak that the disqualifications, or making restrictions, in voting, and not to count as a member, for subscription-arrears, is confined[101] to the activities enjoined to the members to take part in the meeting (i) to make bye laws (S. 9), (ii) to amend the ‘purposes’ (S. 12), (iii) take decision to ‘amalgamate’ with another society (S.12), (iv) dissolution (S. 13), etc.

Non-Payment of Subscription & Right to Vote in Election

Section 15 of the Societies Registration Act does not direct expulsion or removal of member from the society for nonpayment of subscription; in any case, unless an opportunity of hearing is given to the member. [102]  Section 15 of the Societies Registration Act only lays down that such member cannot be entitled to vote or participate in the meeting. However, that does not mean that notice of the meeting itself should not be issued to him.

T.N. Societies Registration Act Provides for Compulsory Election

Deviating from the (Central) So. Registration Act, 1860, T.N. Societies Registration Act, 1975, Sections 15(4) provides that ‘the term of office of the members of the committee shall not exceed three years from the date of their appointment’. S. 26(4) enables the Registrar to depute an officer to be present at the general meetings of the Institution and the Charitable Society.

In Periyar Self-respect Propaganda Institution, Trichy Vs. State of TN[103] the constitutional validity of these provisions were upheld observing the following:

“By putting an end to the life membership or life offices, there is no putting an end to the right to form an association as such. The holding of an office for a particular tenure or for that matter for life is a matter of internal arrangement amongst members constituting the Institution or the Charitable Society arid certainly it cannot assume the colour of a fundamental right. …..  As rightly contended by the learned Advocate General appearing for the State, neither the Institution nor the Charitable Society, nor the present incumbents of the life offices could claim that they could form associations only with the life offices engrafted in the rules, or if they had already formed, they must be allowed to continue to have that set up and any disturbance thereof would amount to violation of the right to form an association guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c). If at all, such a right could be characterised as a peripheral or concomitant right which may facilitate the fulfillment of the objectives of the founders of the Institution and the Charitable Society. But, there is no constitutional guarantee that every association formed shall effectively achieve its objectives without interference by law. This is not a case where the composition of the association is being altered. Neither the members nor the association of members could claim that they have a fundamental right to have office for life.”

Validity of Election: Jurisdiction with Courts; not with Registrar.

            Though Section 36(1) of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 empowers the Registrar, either of his own motion or on the Application of a majority of the members of the committee of management or on the Application, of not less than one third of the members of the Society to hold an enquiry into the Constitution, working and financial condition of a registered Society, it is held in S. Thamil Arasan President of Chennai Vyasarpadi Nadar Nagar Progressive Association Chennai Vs. R. Narayanan[104] that the Registrar is not competent to enquire into the validity of an election, while performing a mere ministerial function; the jurisdiction is vested with the Courts.

Acceptance of List of Governing Body District Registrar – Effect

If a dispute arises as to whom among the two sets were the lawful members of the Governing Committee, the Registrar has the power to decide upon such a dispute under the Societies Registration Act as an incidental or consequential power in itself. The Registrar has to prima facie satisfy from the materials and evidences. There may not be an elaborate enquiry. However, such an enquiry made by the Registrar and the decision taken from it does not become final and the aggrieved party can take up the matter before a competent court for a decision as to who are the members of the governing body. [105]

Section 25 of So. Regn. Act as Amended by State of U.P

Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act as amended by State of U.P. endows the ‘prescribed authority’ with the right to hear and decide in a summary manner disputes in respect of the election or continuance in office of office-bearers of societies.

Section 25 of the Societies Registration  Act as amended by State of U.P. reads as under:

25(1) The prescribed authority may, on a reference made to it by the registrar or by a least one-fourth of the members of a society registered in Uttar Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office -bearer of such society, and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit:     
Provided that the election of an office-bearer shall be set aside where the prescribed authority is satisfied –
(a) that any corrupt practice has been committed by such office-bearer; or
(b) that the nomination of an candidate has been improperly rejected; or
(c) that the result of the election in so far it concerns such office bearer has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void or by any non -compliance with the provisions of any rules of the society.
Explanation I. – …………….. ………… …
Explanation II. – ……………… ……..
Explanation III. –  ……………. ………..

But, when disputed questions of fact are involved, summary proceedings under Section 25 of the Act, 1860 will not be a bar for seeking remedy before the Civil Court as the summary proceedings under Section 25 is not an efficacious remedy.[106]

Non-convening of the Meetings: Acquiescence and Estoppel

Non-convening of Annual General Meetings is a serious allegation against the office-bearers of a Society.  But in proper cases courts can invoke doctrine of acquiescence and estoppel.

In TJ Thomas Vs. CS Joseph[107] reliefs were claimed under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 read with 3 and 4 of the Kerala Non-Trading Companies Act, 1961 alleging, inter alia, that the respondents were not convening the Annual General Meetings regularly. The prayers were, among other grounds, rejected  because it had come out in evidence that the non-convening of the meetings was due to the inaction on the part of petitioners; that the petitioners, if they were really interested in the affairs of the Sangam, should have taken appropriate steps at the appropriate time and seen that the Annual General Meetings were convened without fail; and that the conduct of the petitioners in this regard would show that they had without demur, acquiesced in the various activities of the respondents.

In Proper Cases Courts Order Election and Appoint Receivers

In K.P. Muhammed Vs. M. Abdurahiman[108] both sides did not want an election to be conducted; and both were aiming at the administration or control of the Society, and for that purpose they were not so eager or anxious to have an election conducted in the manner suggested by the Court. The Kerala High Court, in order to resolve stalemate, ordered election and appointed Receivers to manage its affairs.

If Violation of Bye laws Court Sets Right the Illegalities

In V. Arulkumar Vs. Tamil Nadu Government Nurses Association[109] it is held that the court has to necessarily see as to whether the conduct of elections was in accordance with the Bye laws of the Association. If the same was in total violation of the Bye laws of the Association the court was certainly empowered to set right the illegalities and put the election process in motion to be performed in accordance with the Bye laws. Therefore it was held that the suit was maintainable.

Effect of Failure to File Documents u/s 4 & Court Interference

Non-renewal of the registration of a society may be a bar to avail the benefits offered to registered societies, but the same by itself will not lead the inference that the society is not in existence.[110] 

It is held in Nand Deo Pandey Vs. Committees of Management[111] that properly constituted committee of management was required to continue the proceedings of inquiry against the Principal of a Vidyalaya. The Managing Committee had ceased to be valid due to non-renewal of the registration of the society and non-holding of periodical elections under the provisions of the Societies’  Registration (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960.

But in Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate[112] it is held that the courts cannot set aside elections on the sole ground of non compliance of certain statutory provisions by it, and that in the event of becoming a society defunct, or failure to file documents under Sec. 4 of the So. Regn. Act, there is no bar for its members to revive its activities and to conduct the election of the office bearers.

COURT INTERFERENCE UNDER ‘REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT, 1951

Trial of Election Petition is Different from Trial of a Civil Suit

In Kailash v. Nanhku, AIR  2005 SC 2441, our Apex Court held that the trial of an election petition is entirely different from the trial of a civil suit, as in a civil suit trial commences on framing the issues while trial of an election petition encompasses all proceedings commencing from the filing of the election petition up to the date of decision. Therefore, the procedure provided for the trial of civil suits under CPC is not applicable in its entirety to the trial of the election petition. For the purpose of the election petition, the word ‘trial’ includes the entire proceedings commencing from the time of filing the election petition till the pronouncement of the judgment. Relying on Kailash v. Nanhku it is observed in Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C P  Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127 that the applicability of the procedure in Election Tribunal is circumscribed by two riders :

  • firstly, the procedure prescribed in CPC is applicable only “as nearly as may be”, and
  • secondly, the CPC would give way to any provisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder.

Therefore, the procedure prescribed in CPC applies to election trial with flexibility and only as guidelines.

Election Law – Technical to Safeguard the Purity of the Election Process

In Harcharan Singh v. S. Mohinder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1500, our Apex Court pointed out that the election dispute was a statutory proceeding that required strict compliance, observing as under:

  • “The statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed. An election dispute is a statutory proceeding unknown to the common law; it is not an action at law or in equity. …… The primary purpose of the diverse provisions of the election law which may appear to be technical is to safeguard the purity of the election process, and the Courts will not ordinarily minimise their operation.” (Quoted in Kalyan Singh Chouhan VS C. P.  Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127).

Election Petition is not an Action at Common Law, Nor in Equity

In Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal,  AIR 1982 SC 983, also it was pointed out that an election petition was not an action at Common Law, nor in equity. The Supreme Court observed as under:

  • “A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a Common Law Right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an action at Common Law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction and a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it. Concepts familiar to Common Law and Equity must remain strangers to Election Law unless statutorily embodied. A Court has no right to resort to them on considerations of alleged policy because policy in such matters, as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, is what the statute lays down. In the trial of election disputes, Court is put in a straight jacket. …… We have noticed the necessity to rid ourselves of notions based on Common Law or Equity. We see that we must seek an answer to the question within the four corners of the statute.” (Quoted in Kalyan Singh Chouhan v.  CP  Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127).

Strict Pleading; and Evidence in Strict Adherence to Pleading

In Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe, AIR 1995 SC 2284, our Apex  Court held that the court cannot consider any fact which was beyond the pleadings of the parties; and that the parties have to take proper pleadings and establish by adducing evidence that by a particular irregularity/illegality the result of the election has been materially affected. Our Apex Court, further, held as under:

  • “To say the least, it was not a desirable or a proper course to be adopted in an election petition where, as pointed out by this Court in JagannathVs. Jaswant Singh (1954 SCR 892), the statutory requirements of the law of election must be strictly observed.”

Pleadings play an important role in election petitions – Section 83 of the Act mandatory and requires

It was held in Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe, AIR 1995 SC 2284, as under:

  • “Since, pleadings play an important role in an election petition, the legislature has provided that the allegations of corrupt practice must be properly alleged and both the material facts and particulars provided in the petition itself so as to disclose a complete cause of action.  Section 83 of the Act provides that the election petition must contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and further that he must set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice that he alleges including as full a statement as possible of the name of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practices and the date and place of the commission of each of such corrupt practice. This Section has been held to be mandatory and requires first a concise statement of material facts and then the full particulars of the alleged corrupt practice. So as to present a full picture of the cause of action.”

Pleading and Affidavit in Election Cases – to prevent fishing or roving enquiry

In Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe, AIR 1995 SC 2284, 1995 SCC (5) 347 it was held that a petition leveling a charge of corrupt practice was required, by law, to be supported by an affidavit and the election petitioner was also obliged to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of the corrupt practice. This became necessary to bind the election petitioner to the charge leveled by him and to prevent any fishing or roving enquiry and to prevent the returned candidate from being taken by a surprise. (Samant N. BalakrishnaVs. George Fernandez and others (AIR 1969 SC 1201 was referred to.)

In CR  Mahesh v.  R  Ramachandan, (2017 –  Kerala) it is held that specific pleading is necessary with regard to the corrupt practice in an election petition and in the affidavit under Section 123(4) of the R P Act, 1951. When there is no specific pleading to that fact, no specific denial is necessary and the above decision is not binding in this case.

Wide latitude cannot be left in the pleadings – No wild goose chase allowed

In Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe, AIR 1995 SC 2284, 1995 SCC (5) 347, the impropriety is described as under:

  • “In the pleadings a wide latitude was left by the election petitioners to lead evidence on any of the various ‘possibilities’ detailed in the election petition. The ‘vagueness’ of the pleadings even after amendment shows that the election petitioners were out on a wild goose chase and trying to fish for evidence so as to be able to fasten some liability on the returned candidate or his election agent at least in some case.”

Pleadings and Issues are to Narrow the Area of Conflict

It is held in Kalyan Singh Chouhan v.  CP  Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127, that the pleadings are to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is pointed out that it is a settled legal proposition that  ‘as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted’ and emphasised that  a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. The Apex Court expressly referred the following decisions:

  • Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho, (1898) 25 Ind. App. 195;
  • M/s. Trojan & Co. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235;
  • J.K. Iron & Steel Co. v. The Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union, AIR 1956 SC 231;
  • Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh & Ors.; AIR 1961 SC 1097;
  • Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College,  AIR 1987 SC 1242;
  • Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe, AIR 1995 SC 2284;
  • Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, AIR 2002 SC 665;
  • Kashi Nath v. Jaganath, (2003) 8 SCC 740;
  • Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 2005 SC 3165;
  • Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, AIR 2009 SC 1103, and
  • State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company  Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 518.

No Adjudication If No Issue

In Kalyan Singh Chouhan v.  CP  Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127, the Apex Court held that no courts decide a suit on a matter/point on which no issue has been framed. It is to ascertain/shorten the area of dispute and pinpoint the points required to be determined by the court, so that no party at the trial is taken by surprise. The court referred following decisions:

  • Sayad Muhammad. v. Fatteh Muhammad20 (1894-95) 22 Ind. App. 4 (PC)
  • Raja Bommadevara Venkata v. Raja Bommadevara Bhashya (1902) 29 Ind. App. 76 (PC);
  • Siddik Mohd. Shah v. Saran, AIR 1930 PC 57;
  • Sita Ram v. Radha Bai, AIR 1968 SC 535;
  • Gappulal v. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji, AIR 1969 SC 1291; and
  • Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693).

With reference to the following decisions, in Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. CP Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127,   it was also pointed out that there may be exceptional cases wherein the parties proceeded to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the evidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation thereof by the other side; and in such an eventuality, it would not be permissible for a party to submit that the proceedings stood vitiated. The decisions were the following:

  • Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593;
  • Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao,23 AIR 1963 SC 884;
  • Kunju Kesavan v. M.M. Philip & Ors.,24 AIR 1964 SC 164;
  •  Kali Prasad Agarwalla v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1530;
  • Sayed Akhtar v. Abdul Ahad,26 (2003) (7) SCC 52; and
  • Bhuwan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co., AIR 2009 SC 2177.

No pleading in respect of the ‘remaining 4 tendered votes’

The Supreme Court observed in Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. CP Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127,  that during the trial of an election petition, it was not permissible for the court to permit a party to seek a roving enquiry; and that the party must plead the material fact and adduce evidence to substantiate the same. In this case the issue raised was pertaining to 6 improperly received votes mentioned in the election petition. Though there was no pleading  either in the election petition or in the written statement a new matter in respect of the ‘remaining 4 tendered votes’ came up. The Supreme Court held that before the court permitted the recounting, the following conditions were to be satisfied:

  • “(i) The Court must be satisfied that a prima facie case is established;
  • (ii) The material facts and full particulars have been pleaded stating the irregularities in counting of votes;
  • (iii) A roving and fishing inquiry should not be directed by way of an order to recount the votes;
  • (iv)  An opportunity should be given to file objection; and
  •  (v) Secrecy of the ballot requires to be guarded.

The Court referred following decisions:

  • Dr. Jagjit Singh v. Giani Kartar Singh,  AIR 1966 SC 773;
  • Suresh Prasad Yadav v. Jai Prakash Mishra,  AIR 1975 SC 376;
  • M. Chinnasamy v. K.C. Palanisamy,  AIR 2004 SC 541;
  • Chandrika Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 2036;
  • Tanaji Ramchandra Nimhan v. Swati Vinayak Nimhan,  AIR 2006 SC 1218;
  • Gursewak Singh v. Avtar Singh,   AIR 2006 SC 1791; and
  • Baldev Singh v. Shinder Pal Singh, (2007) 1 SCC 341).”

No Amendment of pleading After the Time Limit

In VS Achuthanandan v. PJ Francis, AIR 1999 SC 2044, it was held that material facts are preliminary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish existence of a cause of action; and that no amendment of the pleading is permissible to introduce such material facts after the time limit prescribed for filing the election petition, the absence of ‘material particulars’ can be cured at a later stage by an appropriate amendment.

Evidence led, beyond the pleadings without objections from the opposite side, the court could have evaluated worth of that evidence,

In Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe, AIR 1995 SC 2284, 1995 SCC (5) 347, it is held as under:

  • “Of course, since evidence was allowed to be led, though beyond the pleadings without any objectionsfrom the opposite side, the court could have evaluated and analysed the same to determine the worth of that evidence.”

[1]   1999 (1) BomCR 546; 1998-3 Mh. LJ 204

[2]      AIR 1952 SC 64

[3]      Laxman Singh Vs. State of U P: 2014 – 9 ADJ 242

[4]      AIR 1957 SC 304

[5]      Referred to in Bar Council Of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612

[6]      AIR 1980 SC 1612.

Referred: Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 1975 MP145;

Bhupendra Kumar Jain Vs. Y. S. Dharmadhikari, AIR 1976 MP 110.

[7] AIR 1975 MP145 (Oza J.)

[8] AIR 2005 SC 3746

[9]  AIR 1961 Punj 429; referred to in Bar Council Of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612. Electoral Roll is a fundamental factor: Devassy Vs. Asst. Registrar of Cooperative Societies: ILR 1976 (1) Ker. 95.

[10]    See also: Gopalan Vs. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies 1985 Ker LT 446; Joseph Vs. Kothamangalam Co-op. M. Society Ltd: 1994 (1) Ker LT 828

[11]    P Nalla Thampy Thera Vs. B L Shanker: AIR1984 SC 135

[12]    (1954) SCR 892

[13]    Referred to in Ram Sukh Vs. Dinesh Aggerwal: AIR 2010 SC 1227; Ram Phal Kundu Vs. Kamal Sharma : AIR 2004 SC 1657; Indrajit Barua Vs. Election Commission Of India: AIR 1986 SC 103;  P Nalla Thampy Thera Vs. BL Shanker AIR 1984 SC 135; Samant N Balkrishna Vs. George Fernandez ; AIR 1969 SC 1201; Kumaranand Vs. Brij Mohan Lal; AIR1965 SC 628; Mahila Krishna Kumari Vs. Mahila Sakun Bhatnagar: AIR 1972 MP 155; Jagannath Dalai Vs. Rama Chandra Nahak: AIR 1959 Ori 26.

[14]    Md. Majid Hussain Vs. Md Aqueel, AIR 2015 AP 21, that See also: Tanaji Ramchandra Nimhan Vs. Swati Vinayak Nimhan: AIR  2006 SC 1218.

[15]    1995-5 SCC 347

[16]    Manish Kansal Vs. State of U P: LAWS(ALL)-2015-5-194

[17]    A. S. Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram: A. I. R. 1941 Bom. 312; See also: Shridhar Misra Vs. Jaihandra, AIR 1959 All 598;   Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516 ; NagappaVs. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831.

[18]    (1952) SCR 218; AIR 1952 SC 64.

[19]    Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh: AIR 1984 SC 309; Referred to in Mithilesh Kumar Sinha Kaka Joginder Singh Vs. Returning Officer for Presidential Election: Dr Shanker Dayal Sharma: AIR1993 SC 20; P Nalla Thampy Thera Vs. B L Shanker: AIR  1984 SC 135. Also See: Satya Narain Vs. Dhuja Ram: AIR 1974 SC 1185; U S Sasidharan Vs. K Karunakaran: AIR1990 SC 924; Jyoti Basu Vs. Debi Ghosal: AIR 1982 SC 983: Sukumarakurup Vs. District Judge: AIR 1998 Ker 332; Ram Shankar Chaudhary Vs. Rama Shankar Singh: 1978 JLJ  401.

[20]    Sukumarakurup Vs. District Judge: AIR  1998 Ker 332

[21]    2005-1 CTC 399, (2005) 2 Mad LJ 102. See also: V. Arulkumar And Ors.  Vs. Tamil Nadu Government Nurses Association (Government Recognised): 2015-5 CTC 17: (2015) 5 Mad LJ 673.

[22]    Ram Pal Singh Vs. State of U P: LAWS (ALL)-2015-5-99.   Referred to: Ram Pyare Lal Vs. State of U.P. 2015-3 ADJ 577;  Also See: Vimla Devi Vs. Deputy Director of Education, 1997-3 ESC 1807;  2010 (1) ADJ 262

[23]   2007-7 ADJ 414; 2007-3 All LR 14; MANU/UP/2165/2007

[24]    Referred to in Satya Narain Tripathi Vs. State of U P: 2008 – 2 ADJ 222, 2008-71 ALLLR 698 .

[25]    Committee of Managt. Arya Kanya Pathshala Inter College Vs. State of UP: 2011- 2 ADJ 65; Gopal Y Unkal Vs. Karnataka Vidya Vardhaka Sangha, Dharwad, Dist: KarCCR 2018 2 1880

[26]    AIR 1965 Ker 68. Quoted in Rajeev Saumitra Vs. Neetu Singh: 2016-198 Comp Cases 359.

[27]    2016 3 UAD 656

[28]    See: Shyam Narain Shukla, Committee of Management Vs. State of UP: 1995-25 All LR 100; 1995-1 LBESR 174.

[29]    Kurukshetra University Vs. Vinod Kumar: AIR 1977 Pj & Hr 21;

        Sarup Singh Vs. State of Punjab: 1990-1 LLJ 285.

        See with respect to statutory tribunal: Annamalai Vs. R Doraiswamy: 1982 ACJ 371.

[30]    Ramesh Kapur Vs. Punjab University:  AIR 1965 Punj 120; Rakesh Kumar Vs. J & K State Board of School Education: AIR 1992 J&K 22.

[31]    Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. Vs. Football Association Ltd. (1971 Chancery Div. 591)

[32]    Quoted in J K Aggarwal Vs. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation:  AIR 1991 SC 1221.

[33]    AIR  1976 P & H 69.

[34]    K V Vijayakumar Vs. Joint Registrar of Co Operative Societies: AIR  1996 Ker 150

[35]    Pritam Singh Vs. S. Ranjit Singh: AIR 1965 Punjab 39.

[36]    AIR 1995 SC 1344.

[37]    (2011) 13 SCC 774

[38]    (1954) SCR 892. Also See: Jayanta Samal Vs. Kulamani Behera: 2004 13 SCC 552

[39]    AIR  2016 SC 1094.

[40]    AIR 1952 SC 64

[41]    (1976) 3 SCC 211

[42]    AIR 1978 SC 851.

[43]    AIR 1996 SC 1595

[44]    AIR 2001 SC 3982;

        Followed in Ahmednagar Zilla SDV P Sangh Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 1 SCC 133

[45]    (1996) 6 SCC 303

[46]    AIR 2000 SC 2977

[47]    2008 (Supp.) O.L.R. 251

[48]    2015-3 Ker LT 299.

[49]    AIR 2014 Mad 34

[50]    (2006) 8 SCC 487. 

[51]    (1998) 8 SCC 703.

[52]    (2004) 12 SCC 73; Also see: Harcharan Singh Vs. Mohinder Singh: AIR 1968  SC 1500; Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner: AIR 1978  SC 851; Jyoti Basu Vs. Debi Ghosal: AIR  1982  SC  983; Harikrishna Lal Vs. Bau Lal Marandi: 2003-8 SCC 613; Shyamdeo Pd. Singh Vs. Naval Kishore Yadav: 2000-8 SCC 46; Election Commission of India Vs. Ashok Kumar : AIR 2000 SC 2977.

[53]    AIR 1977 SC 1703.

[54]    AIR  2016 SC 1094: Referred: Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer: AIR 1952 SC 64;  Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2001 (8) SCC 509; Nanhoo Mal and others Vs. Hira Mal: 1976 (3) SCC 211.

[55]    AIR 1977 SC 1703.

[56]    See also: Abdul Latheef C.K. Vs. K.M. Haneefa:  2015-3 Ker LT 299.

[57] Kalyan Kumar Gogoi Vs. Ashutosh Agnihotri:AIR 2011 SC 760

[58]    Md Majid Hussain Vs. Md Aqueel, AIR 2015 AP 21, that See also: Tanaji Ramchandra Nimhan Vs. Swati Vinayak Nimhan: AIR  2006 SC 1218.

[59] 1995-5 SCC 347

[60] [1966]3 SCR 623. Referred to in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Vs. K S Gandhi: 1991 AIR-SCW 879.

[61]    Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath AIR  2016 SC 1094

[62]    In Re: T Balaji Rao Naidu Garu Vs. State: AIR 1933 Mad 103 (PC).

[63]    Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum, AIR 1963 SC 1144;

        Shridhar Misra Vs. Jaichandra Vidyalankar:   AIR 1959 All 598.

[64]    Raghubar Dayal Misra Vs. Shankar Lal: AIR  1934 All 876.

[65]    Kalyan Kumar Gogoi Vs. Ashutosh Agnihotri:AIR 2011 SC 760. Referred to in: Ashok Vs. Rajendra Bhausaheb Mulak: 2012-12 SCC 27;  Ravinder Kumar Rawal Vs. V.K. Sood: ILR 2011-2  P&H 704. See also: Jagan Nath Vs. Jaswant Singh (1954) SCR 892; Jayanta Samal Vs. Kulamani Behera: 2004-13 SCC 552

[66]    Saheed Sporting Club Vs. Kalyan Ray Choudhury : 2008 CLT Supp 338. AIR 1963 All 518 referred to.

[67]    (2008) 11 SCC 740.

[68] Quoted in G.M. Siddeshwar Vs. Prasanna Kumar: AIR  2013 SC 1549.

[69]    Chandrakant Mahadev Patole Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2010 All MR 457

[70]    Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585:

[71]    V. Arulkumar Vs. TN Government Nurses Association: 2015-5 CTC 17

[72]    Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 2001 SC 3982;  Ahmednagar Zilla SDV.  Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2004-1 SCC 133; Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2005 SC 3746;  Dev Prakash Balmukund Vs. Babu Ram Rewti Mal: AIR 1961 Punj 429 referred to in Bar Council Of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612. Electoral Roll is a fundamental factor: Devassy Vs. Asst. Regtr.: ILR 1976 (1) Ker. 95.; See also: Ajmer Vs. Radhey Shyam Dani: AIR 1957 SC 304; Gopalan Vs. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies 1985 Ker LT 446; Joseph Vs. Kothamangalam Co-op. M. Society: 1994 (1) Ker LT 828.  See Contra view Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;  Shri  Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982; Radheshyam Vs. Chairman, Sahakari Samiti, : AIR 1976 MP 156; Ram Swaroop, Dohare Vs. Ayukta Sahkarita: AIR 1996 MP 187.

[73]    Umakant Singh Vs. Bindra Chaudhary AIR 1965 Pat 459; Referred to in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612;

[74]    Manish Kansal Vs. State of U P: LAWS(ALL)-2015-5-194

[75]    East Bengal Club Vs. Paltu Mukherjee : 2011-1 Cal HN 184

[76]    Umakant Singh Vs. Bindra Chaudhary AIR 1965 Pat 459; Referred to in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612. Also: Parmeshwar Mahaseth Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 Pat 149:   Referred to in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612.

[77]    Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612.

[78]    Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612

[79]   Maksudan Raut Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1983 Pat 186. Followed in Satya Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1984 Pat 26. See also: R. Nanjundegowda Vs Revenue Secretary-Ii, Bangalore: AIR 2006-6 (Kar)(R) 523; Nand Parkash Vohra Vs. State of H P: AIR 2000 HP 65.

[80]    Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612; Kanglu Baula Kotwal Vs. Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Sabha, Durg: AIR 1955 Nag 49; Ramgulam Shri Baijnath Prasad Vs. Collector, Guna, AIR 1975 MP 145 (Oza J.)  referred to.

[81]    2011-1 Cal HN 184

[82]    ILR 1989-2 Del 585

[83]    See: Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982

[84]    Ram Pal Singh Vs. State of U P: LAWS(ALL)-2015-5-99

[85]    AIR 1980 SC 1612

[86]    Relied on in: Sanjeev Kumar and Vs. Registrar of Co-Operative Societies LAWS(DLH)-2015-8-175.

[87] 1982-2 Kant LJ 313

[88] AIR 1980 SC 1612

[89] Devassy Vs. Asst. Registrar of Cooperative Societies: ILR 1976 (1) Ker. 95; Gopalan Vs. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies 1985 Ker LT 446; Joseph Vs. Kothamangalam Co-op. M. Society Ltd: 1994 (1) Ker LT 828).

[90]    AIR 2004 SC 1329; followed in  Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2005 SC 3746

[91]    AIR 2001 SC 3982

[92]    See: Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;   Shri  Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982; Radheshyam Vs. Chairman, Sahakari Samiti, : AIR 1976 MP 156; 2008 (4) MPLJ 353 (Ram Singh Vs. State of MP and others); Ram Swaroop, Dohare Vs. Ayukta Sahkarita: AIR 1996 MP 187

[93]    Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982

[94]    1999(2) ALD 319 (DB)

[95]    Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts & Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585.

[96]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; 

Siddheshwar Sahkari Sakhar Karkhana Vs. Commissioner of I T: AIR 2004 SC 4716;

Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society Vs. Registrar of Societies: AIR 2000 SC 301;

Co- op. Central Bank Vs. Addl. Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh: AIR 1969  SC 245; 

Naresh Chandra Sanyal Vs. Calcutta Stock Exchange Assn Ltd. : AIR 1971  SC 422;

Damyanti Naranga Vs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966;

Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973.

Municipal Board Vs. Rizwan Beg: AIR 1964 All 544: Referred to:

Alty Vs. Farrell (1896) 1 QB 638;

Kruse Vs. Johnson, (1898) 2 QB 91,

Scott Vs. Pilliner, (1904) 2 KB 855,

Repton School Governors Vs. Repton Rural District Council, (1918) 2 KB 133;

Chester Vs. Bateson, (1920) 1 KB 829;

Attorney General Vs. Denhy, 1925 Ch 596.

[97]    Jyoti Basu Vs. Debi Ghosal AIR 1982 SC 983

[98]    Satya Narain Tripathi Vs. State of UP: 2008 – 2 ADJ 222; 2008-71 All LR 698.

[99]    Nagappa  Chettiar Vs. Madras Race Club: AIR 1951 Mad 831;

        C L Joseph Vs. Jos: AIR 1965 Ker 68; 

        Star Tiles Works Vs. N. Govindan: AIR 1959 Ker  254

[100] A. S. Krishnan Vs. M. Sundarum: AIR 1941 Bom 312;

        Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516; 

        Nagappa Vs. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831;

        Shridhar Misra Vs. Jihandra, AIR 1959 All 598. 

[101] See: Sec. 9-14, 17 and 20

[102] Shri Sarbjit Singh Vs All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society : ILR (1989) 2 Delhi 585.

[103] AIR 1988 Mad 27

[104]           2005 (1) CTC 399 : 2005 (2) MLJ 102. Referred to in Theni Melapettai Hindu Nadarkal Uravinmurai Vs. The District Registrar: 2007 6 MLJ 1528.

[105] AP Aboobaker Musaliar Vs. Dist. Registrar (G), Kozhikode: (2004) 11 SCC 247.See also:  CMZ Musliar Vs. Aboobacker: ILR 1998-2 Ker 76. Gyan Bharti Shiksha Sadan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2014 5 ADJ 263

[106] Nagri Pracharini Sabha Vs. Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi: 1991 Supp (2) SCC 36

[107] ILR1988-1 Ker 429

[108] LAWS (KER)-2013-3-137

[109] 2015-5 CTC 17

[110] Committee of Management  Vs. Commissioner, Kanpur Region: 2008 -1 AWC 695; 2008 -1 ADJ 706; 2008-70 All LR 368.  

[111]              AIR 1991 SC 413

[112] AIR 2007 SC 1337.


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Significance of Scientific Evidence in Judicial Process

Jojy George

Introduction

Hierarchy of scientific evidence – keys to scientific skepticism and  vaccines

Importance of testimony of witnesses in judicial process is expressed by the English philosopher and jurist Bentham about 150 years ago as: “Witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice” (State of U. P.  Vs. Krishna Gopal, AIR 1988 SC 2154).

An interesting question often arises- which will prevail, in case of a conflict between oral evidence or scientific evidence? The answer will be that it depends upon the nature of the subject matter. In everyday practice we see that trustworthy and credible oral evidence get primacy status over the scientific evidence. It is on the principle that the scientific evidence is always an ‘opinion’ or ‘possibility’ only. By the advent of scientific techniques in the field of judicial investigation and enquiry, our judicial process began to assign due importance to scientific evidence. Still, the oral evidence has primacy over the scientific evidence.  

Sec. 3 and 45 of the Evidence Act

On a broad classification, ‘evidence’ can be classified into following categories, according to Sec. 3 and 45 of the Evidence Act.

  • oral evidence
  • documentary evidence including electronic records
  • Opinions of experts including views of persons specially skilled in foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to identify of handwriting or finger-impressions. It may also be termed as scientific evidence.

Sec. 3 and 45 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

S.3: “Evidence”: “Evidence” means and includes:
(1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry, such statements are called oral evidence.
(2) all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such documents are called documentary evidence.

S.45: Opinions of experts: When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of science, or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger-impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to identify of handwriting or finger-impressions are relevant facts. Such persons are called experts.

Expert Evidence is only Corroborative

It is important that Section 45 of the Evidence Act does not say anything as to the weight to be attached to the expert evidence. This Section only says that expert’s evidence is admissible. The expert-evidence is not substantive evidence; and it is generally used as a piece of evidence for corroboration or conflict with oral evidence. The evidence of an expert only aids and helps the Court as advisory material. The expert being not a witness of fact, his opinion is to be analysed objectively by the court. The decision making process is never delegated to the expert; the expert only helps and assists the Court to decide. Courts always give due importance to the opinion of the experts. But, it will not substitute proof. Court is said to be the expert of experts.

In Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 2 SCC 174, it was held that the evidence of eyewitnesses should be preferred unless the medical evidence completely rules it out. It was held as under:

  • “13. Ordinarily, the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The use which the defence can make of the medical evidence is to prove that the injuries could not possibly have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the eyewitnesses. Unless, however the medical evidence in its turn goes so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence.”

In State of Haryana v. Bhagirath, (1999) 5 SCC 96, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “15. The opinion given by a medical witness need not be the last word on the subject. Such opinion shall be tested by the court. If the opinion is bereft of logic or objectivity, the court is not obliged to go by that opinion. After all opinion is what is formed in the mind of a person regarding a fact situation. If one doctor forms one opinion and another doctor forms a different opinion on the same facts it is open to the Judge to adopt the view which is more objective or probable. Similarly if the opinion given by one doctor is not consistent with probability the court has no liability to go by that opinion merely because it is said by the doctor. Of course, due weight must be given to opinions given by persons who are experts in the particular subject.”

The blood group on the dress of the accused and the dress of the deceased matched. It corroborates the prosecution story. However that by itself is not conclusive proof of the culpability of the accused.[1]

In Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1989 SCC (Cri) 649, it is observed that it would not be helpful to the prosecution if it was not shown that the blood-stains on the weapon recovered from the possession of the accused were of the same group as the blood of the deceased. (See also: Kansa Behera. v. State of Orissa.AIR 1987 SC 1507).

In State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, AIR 1988 SC 2154, the eye-witnesses were found credible and trustworthy. Therefore, the medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities was not accepted as conclusive. The Apex Court pointed out that witnesses, as Bantham said, were the eyes and ears of justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the orality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses’ account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent improbabilities.

Findings of a Serologist

As regards the findings of serologist, it is observed in R. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCC 266, as under:

  • “30. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that as the blood group of the bloodstains found on the chopper could not be ascertained, the recovery of the said chopper cannot be relied upon.
  • 31. A failure by the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to disintegration of the serum does not mean that the blood stuck on the axe could not have been human blood at all. Sometimes it is possible, either because the stain is insufficient in itself, or due to haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation, that a serologist may fail to detect the origin of the blood in question. However, in such a case, unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension, which a judicially conscientious mind may entertain with some objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the accused in this regard. Once the recovery is made in pursuance of a disclosure statement made by the accused, the matching or non-­matching of blood group(s) loses significance. (Vide Prabhu Babaji Navle v. State of Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 51 : 1956 Cri LJ 147] , Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P. [AIR 1963 SC 74 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 70] , State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram [(1999) 3 SCC 507 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 436] , Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [(2001) 2 SCC 205 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 323 : AIR 2001 SC 330 ], John Pandian v. State [(2010) 14 SCC 129 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 550 ] and Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab [(2012) 11 SCC 205 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 438 ] .)”

Appreciation of Evidence of Experts
In Mayur v. State of Gujarat AIR 1983 SC 5 , the Supreme Court observed that the evidence of a doctor has to be appreciated like the evidence of any other witness and there is no irrebuttable presumption that a doctor is always a witness of truth. The medical expert’s opinion is not always final and binding (Awadhesh v. State of MP, AIR 1988 SC 1158) . In an appropriate case on a consideration of the nature of the injuries and other relevant evidence, the Court can come to its own conclusion, if the medical evidence is deficient (Brij Bhukhan v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 474).

In practice, the investigating agencies and courts give very high importance to wound-certificates and post-mortem certificates. They are considered as an indispensable part in most criminal cases. Same is the case of evidence of Ballistic expert. Here also primacy is given to ocular evidence if it is found credible by the court, especially when the ocular evidence is supported by the wound certificate or post-motem report.

Sure-Science and Nuances of various Scientific Evidences

Besides expert opinion of doctors, scientific techniques now a days frequently adopted by our courts include technical expertise on ballistics, fingerprint matching, handwriting comparison, DNA testing, superimposition techniques etc. With regard to the gradation of acceptability of scientific evidence it is held in M.S. Vishwanatha Rao Vs. Rathnabai, 2015-154 AIC 371: 2015-3 Kant LJ 583 as under:

  • “Mere submission of a report by the handwriting expert is not enough. The author of the said report should have been examined by the plaintiff and  then only the defendant could have cross-examined him. In the hierarchy of expert’s evidence, the evidence of a handwriting expert is on the lower hierarchy. It is not a sure science like DNA test or finger print test. It is not the similarity which is relevant where the authenticity of signature or handwriting is in dispute, rather it is the dissimilarity which will have to be taken into consideration by evalulating the evidence of the expert.”

Evidence of a handwriting expert: The above view is taken in Alois Simon Parmar Vs. State of Gujarat, 2007-2 GCD 1606: 2007-16 GHJ 41, and observed that handwriting expert evidence is a weak piece of evidence. In Ravjappa v. Nilakanta Rao, AIR 1962 Mys 53, it is observed:

  • “In examining a disputed document, the true test is not the extent of the similarities observed when compared with genuine documents, as forged documents usually are good imitations of genuine documents, but the nature and extent of the dissimilarities noticed. It is these differences which expose the true character of the document in question.”

brain mapping test: While referring the legal effect of a report of brain mapping test it is pointed out in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2005 SC 2277 , that the admissibility of a result of a scientific test will depend upon its authenticity, and that whether the brain mapping test is so developed that the report will have a probative value so as to enable a court to place reliance thereupon, is a matter which would require further consideration, if and when the materials in support thereof are placed before the court.
thumb impression Science of identifying thumb impression is an exact science and does not admit any mistake or doubt (Jaspal singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 1708). The evidence of finger impression is admissible, but the person giving opinion must be an expert. The court has the liberty to accept or reject the opinion of the expert. The court must satisfy itself about the correctness of the conclusions by comparisons of the prints; it cannot be laid down as a rule of law that it is unsafe to have conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of a finger print expert. The SC held that it would be highly unsafe to convict on a capital charge without any independent corroboration of the opinion of the finger print experts (Mahmood v. State of UP, AIR 1976 SC 69).
footprints: Section 45 does not include footprints within the ambit of, as it does the finger print impressions. But, this omission, the evidence of the footprint expert has been admitted with the qualification that there should be other evidence to bring home the charge to the accused. The Supreme Court in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab observed as under:

  • “The science of identification of foot-prints is no doubt a rudimentary science and not much reliance can be placed on the result of such identification. The track evidence, however, can be relied upon as a circumstance which, along with other circumstances, would point to the identity of the culprit though by itself it would not be enough to carry conviction in the minds of the Court.”

Evidence of tracker dog: Evidence of tracker dog is of little importance. No adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution simply bvecuae the tracker was not examined by the prosecutor. In Abdul Razak v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1970 SC 283; the Supreme Court has expressed the opinion that in the present state of scientific knowledge, evidence of dog tracking, even if admissible, is not ordinarily of much weight.
superimposition of the skull: When the serologist who superimposed the skull of the deceased, opined that it was of an adult human female of certain age, and the same corroborated other evidences, it was sufficient to establish the identity of the deceased (State of Karnataka v. Bhoja Poojari, (1997) 11 SCC 537). If the report of the serologist corroborates other evidences, the court can believe it.
Ossification test: Ossification test is used to determine the age of a person. In Ram Deo Chauhan v. State of Assam, the Supreme Court held that ossification test is not conclusive. Positive evidence furnished by birth register, by members of the family, with regard to the age, will have preference over the opinion of the doctor; but if the evidence is wholly unsatisfactory, and if the ossification test in the case is complete, such test can be accepted as a surer ground for determination of age 23 . If the entry in the school register does not appear to be genuine, the medical evidence will prevail over it.

DNA Test: Scientific Proof Must Prevail Over ‘Conclusive Proof’.

It is observed in Pantangi Balarama Venkata Ganesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2003 Crl LJ 4508 , that DNA test is a ‘perfect science’. In K. Perumal v. S. Shakiladevi 2019 Cr LJ 1189, it is observed that DNA test only supplements oral evidence though it is ‘a strong piece of evidence’.

Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik Vs. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, AIR 2014 SC 932 (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad, Jagdish Singh Khehar) is a very important decision which changed the concept of law on ‘conclusive presumption’.  It is held as under:

  • “17. We may remember that Section 112 of the Evidence Act was enacted at a time when the modern scientific advancement and DNA test were not even in contemplation of the Legislature. The result of DNA test is said to be scientifically accurate. Although Section 112 raises a presumption of conclusive proof on satisfaction of the conditions enumerated therein but the same is rebuttable. The presumption may afford legitimate means of arriving at an affirmative legal conclusion. While the truth or fact is known, in our opinion, there is no need or room for any presumption. Where there is evidence to the contrary, the presumption is rebuttable and must yield to proof. Interest of justice is best served by ascertaining the truth and the court should be furnished with the best available science and may not be left to bank upon presumptions, unless science has no answer to the facts in issue. In our opinion, when there is a conflict between a conclusive proof envisaged under law and a proof based on scientific advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter must prevail over the former.”

Narcoanalysis: No Guarantee, Truthful; Scope for Error in Polygraph Examination

In Selvi Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2010 SC 1974, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, had clarified as under:

  • “210. Earlier in this judgment, we had surveyed some foreign judicial precedents dealing with each of the tests in question. A common concern expressed with regard to each of these techniques was the questionable reliability of the results generated by them. In respect of the narcoanalysis technique, it was observed that there is no guarantee that the drug- induced revelations will be truthful. Furthermore, empirical studies have shown that during the hypnotic stage, individuals are prone to suggestibility and there is a good chance that false results could lead to a finding of guilt or innocence. As far as polygraph examination is concerned, though there are some studies showing improvements in the accuracy of results with advancement in technology, there is always scope for error on account of several factors. Objections can be raised about the qualifications of the examiner, the physical conditions under which the test was conducted, the manner in which questions were framed and the possible use of ‘countermeasures’ by the test subject. A significant criticism of polygraphy is that sometimes the physiological responses triggered by feelings such as anxiety and fear could be misread as those triggered by deception. Similarly, with the Waves test there are inherent limitations such as the subject having had ‘prior exposure’ to the ‘probes’ which are used as stimuli. Furthermore, this technique has not been the focus of rigorous independent studies. The questionable scientific reliability of these techniques comes into conflict with the standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ which is an essential feature of criminal trials.”
  • “223. In light of these conclusions, we hold that no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty. However, we do leave room for the voluntary administration of the impugned techniques in the context of criminal justice, provided that certain safeguards are in place. Even when the subject has given consent to undergo any of these tests, the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test. However, any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted, in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The National Human Rights Commission had published ‘Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on an Accused’ in 2000. These guidelines should be strictly adhered to and similar safeguards should be adopted for conducting the ‘Narcoanalysis technique’ and the ‘Brain Electrical Activation Profile’ test. The text of these guidelines has been reproduced below:
  •  (i) No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except  on the basis of consent of the accused. An option  should be given to the accused whether he wishes  to avail such test.
  • (ii) If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he  should be given access to a lawyer and the physical,  emotional and legal implication of such a test  should be explained to him by the police and his  lawyer.
  • (iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate.  
  • (iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the  person alleged to have agreed should be duly  represented by a lawyer.
  • (v) At the hearing, the person in question should also  be told in clear terms that the statement that is  made shall not be a ‘confessional’ statement to the  Magistrate but will have the status of a statement  made to the police.
  • (vi) The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to  the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation.
  • (vii) The actual recording of the Lie Detector Test shall  be done by an independent agency (such as a  hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
  • (viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner  of the information received must be taken on record.”

(This judgment, Smt. Selvi v. State of Karnataka, is referred to in:

  • Ajit Mohan Vs. Legislative Assembly, NCT of Delhi, 2021-8 SCALE 8;
  • Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2020 SC 5592;
  • Ashish Jain Vs. Makrand Singh, 2019-1 JT 342;
  • Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2018-12 JT 189  
  • K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.)

The Supreme Court in Amlesh Kumar v. The State of Bihar on 9 June, 2025, 2025 INSC 810 (Sanjay Karol, Prasanna B. Varale), 9th June, 2025, held as under:

  • “21. In view of the above exposition in Selvi (Supra), the third question is answered in the following terms :
  • The accused has a right to voluntarily undergo a narco- analysis test at an appropriate stage. We deem it appropriate to add, that the appropriate stage for such a test to be conducted is when the accused is exercising his right to lead evidence in a trial. However, there is no indefeasible right with the accused to undergo a narco- analysis test, for upon receipt of such an application the concerned Court, must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the matter, such as free consent, appropriate safeguards etc., authorizing a person to undergo a voluntary narco-analysis test. We deem it appropriate to reproduce and reiterate the guidelines issued in Selvi (Supra) in this regard as follows :
  • “265. The National Human Rights Commission had published Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on an Accused in 2000. These Guidelines should be strictly adhered to and similar safeguards should be adopted for conducting the “narcoanalysis technique” and the “Brain Electrical Activation Profile” test. The text of these Guidelines has been reproduced below:
  • (i). No lie detector tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test.
  • (ii). If the accused volunteers for a lie detector test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical, emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer.
  • (iii). The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate.
  • (iv). During the hearing before the Magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer.
  • (v). At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is made shall not be a “confessional” statement to the Magistrate but will have the status of a statement made to the police.
  • (vi). The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation.
  • (vii). The actual recording of the lie detector test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
  • (viii). A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record.”

Material Data are to be Placed by the Expert to Enlighten the Court

In Pattu Rajan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2019 SC 1674, it is observed that it is the duty of an expert witness to assist the Court effectively by furnishing it with the relevant report based on his expertise along with his reasons, so that the Court may form its independent judgment by assessing such materials and reasons furnished by the expert for coming to an appropriate conclusion. It was also pointed out in this case that the opinion evidence is only advisory in nature, and the Court is not bound by the evidence of the experts.[2]

If direct evidence of the witnesses to the occurrence is satisfactory and reliable, it cannot be rejected on hypothetical medical evidence. [3] The court does not accept the subjective result arrived at by an expert without satisfying itself as to the material data evaluated or analysed by the expert. All materials inclusive of the data are to be placed first by the expert to enlighten the court on the technical aspects; and, then the he has to satisfy the court the conclusion arrived at. In Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat, (2003) 9 SCC 322, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “Only in respect of Injury 1, there appears to be some confusion but that does not dilute the prosecution evidence. It would be erroneous to accord undue primacy to the hypothetical answers of medical witnesses to exclude the eyewitnesses’ account, which has to be tested independently and not treated as ‘variable’ keeping in view the medical evidence as ‘constant’.”

Similarly in Krishnan v. State (2003) 7 SCC 56 it was held as under:

  • “If the ocular evidence was cogent, credible and trustworthy, minor variance, if any, with the medical evidence pointing to alternative probabilities cannot be accepted as conclusive.”

Post-Mortem Report is not a Substantive Evidence

Post-mortem report or Wound Certificate is not a substantive evidence.[4] Unless the medical officer who conducted the post-mortem examination is examined in court, the post-mortem report cannot be used as substantive evidence. In Vadugu Chanti Babu v. State of A.P. (2002) 6 scc 547 it is observed that a stray statement of the doctor -cross-exam- not a conclusive opinion; but it is only a possibility.

Appreciation of Evidence is Both an Art and a Science

Once the expert’s opinion is accepted, it becomes the opinion of the court.  When there is stark conflict between medical and oral evidence, and oral evidence is found to be creditworthy, oral evidence is preferred. Minor contradictions do not weigh importance, and evidence of eyewitnesses is not thrown out on the ground of alleged (minor) inconsistency. Where medical evidence completely rules out the oral evidence, usually it used to discredit the eyewitnesses. Seldom medical evidence as such is relied upon by the courts, neglecting the oral evidence.

R. Basant, J., in Basheer Vs. Mahasakthi Enterprises – Ker LT 2005-3 163: 2005-1 Mad LJ 965, held as under:

  • “The appreciation of evidence is both an art and a science. All relevant inputs have to be taken into consideration for the Court to answer a disputed question of fact. Each circumstance including the opinion tendered by an expert must be taken into consideration. All the relevant inputs must be placed in the crucible. But the result of such appreciation must stem from prudence, reasonableness and intelligence of the Court. The knowledge of men and matters of the Court would be crucial. The knowledge of the court of common course of events and natural and probable behaviour of human beings will be vital. The yardsticks of a reasonably prudent mind have to be accepted. All relevant circumstances must go into the decision making. When the evidence is sifted, weighed, tested, analysed and evaluated, no one piece of evidence can be said to overrule the others unless such evidence be clinching, convincing and beyond doubt.”

With regard to the disputes as to the handwriting, it is pointed out in this decision that it is possible for a person to deliberately masquerade his handwriting to mislead others. Natural variations are all possible between standard writings and the disputed writings. Totality of circumstances has to be taken into consideration and no Court can decide the disputed questions sitting in the island of the opinion tendered by the handwriting expert.  With regard to the opinion of a hand-writing expert it is observed further as under:

  • “It is by now trite that the science of identification of handwriting is not a ‘perfect’ science and the opinion has to rely on subjective as well as objective observations and inferences drawn. As distinguished from scientific evidence like finger print etc., the science of identification of handwriting cannot be said to be absolutely fool-proof and cent-percent reliable.”

No Presumption of Truth

There is no presumption of truth as to the scientific evidence. It is also appreciated like the evidence of any other witness. The result of analysis and probabilities expressed by the experts are not accepted by the courts as conclusive evidence; because, they are not always final and binding upon the court, and the court can come to its own conclusion.

But, at the same time the courts cannot overlook the scientific evidence in toto. In Gajraj Vs. State (NCT) of Delhi, 2011-10 SCC 675, the Apex Court observed that the IEMI number of mobile phone (sim) registered in the name of a person being evidence of a conclusive nature, it cannot be discarded on the basis of minor discrepancies especially when there is serious discrepancy in oral evidence.  

Appreciation of Evidence of Experts

In Mayur v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 5 the Supreme Court observed that the evidence of a doctor has to be appreciated like the evidence of any other witness and there is no irrebuttable presumption that a doctor is always a witness of truth.  The medical expert’s opinion is not always final and binding.[5] In an appropriate case on a consideration of the nature of the injuries and other relevant evidence, the Court can come to its own conclusion, if the medical evidence is deficient.[6]

Where the opinion of a medical witness is contradicted by another medical witness both of whom are equally competent to form an opinion, the court should normally accept the evidence of the medical witness whose evidence is corroborated by direct evidence;[7] and whose testimony accords with the prosecution version.[8]

Impact of Scientific Evidence

Scientific evidence by itself does not prove or disprove a case.[9] The general rule that is followed by our courts is that unless the scientific evidence completely rules out the veracity of oral evidence, otherwise reliable, cannot be rejected.[10] At the same time, where there is glaring conflict between medical and oral evidence, the prosecution case must fail.[11]

Therefore, medical opinion alone will not be sufficient to find guilt of an accused. The courts give weight to the opinion of doctors as to whether the injuries are Anti-mortem or Post-mortem, the probable weapon used in causing injuries, the effect of injuries, consequences of injuries, whether they are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the duration of injuries and the probable time of death, cause of death, plea of unsoundness of mind, determination of age etc. When an expert gives evidence after conducting post-mortem examination or examination of the injuries he is also a ‘witness of fact’ and his evidence stands also as an independent testimony quite apart from the ‘opinion evidence’.

However, the opinion of a medical witness is not taken as the last word by the courts. They are to be analysed and tested by the court. If there are different opinions, the court would adopt the view which is more objective or probable.

Undue primacy will not be given to the hypothetical answers of medical witnesses to exclude the eye witnesses. The courts will take note of the size and dimension of injuries said to be caused by a particular weapon and decide on questions relating to the same. Though account of eyewitnesses must prevail, it is not a universal principle; it is to be used in conjunction with other circumstances. The Supreme Court in Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey,  (1992) 3 SCC 204 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 598  held: “34. A medical witness called in as an expert to assist the court is not a witness of fact and the evidence given by the medical officer is really of an advisory character given on the basis of the symptoms found on examination. The expert witness is expected to put before the court all materials inclusive of the data which induced him to come to the conclusion and enlighten the court on the technical aspect of the case by explaining the terms of science so that the court although, not an expert may form its own judgement on those materials after giving due regard to the expert’s opinion because once the expert’s opinion is accepted, it is not the opinion of the medical officer but of the court.”

Medical Evidence Totally Inconsistent With Direct Evidence, Effect

If the evidence of the witness for the prosecution is totally inconsistent with the medical evidence, or where there is a glaring inconsistency between the direct evidence and the medical evidence, it will stand as a fundamental defect in the prosecution case and it is sufficient to discredit the entire case. [12] 

Where the opinion of the doctor is that the assailant shot from a distance of four feet, and the oral evidence show the distance as 18 or 20 feet from the deceased it will be held as a serious contradiction requires acquittal of the accused. (State of U.P. v. Ram Bahadur Singh, (2004) 9 SCC 310.

But, if the inconsistency is reasonably explained the expert evidence will be ignored. When variances between the oral and medical evidence are minor, credible and acceptable oral evidence can be given primacy over the other. Oral evidence has to get primacy since medical evidence is basically opinionative. The medical evidence adduced by prosecution has corroborative value since it supports why the eye-witnesses should not be disbelieved.

In Purshottom v. State of M.P., AIR 1980 SC 1873 the prosecution evidence showed infliction of three separate blows to the deceased. The medical officer who conducted the post-mortem examination found only one wound. According to him the wound found on the deceased could not have been the result of two simultaneous blows. It was found that it was extremely improbable, if not altogether impossible that three blows simultaneously given by three different persons from different directions with sharp edged weapons would land with such precision and exactitude so as to cause a single wound of such a clear cut margins and such dimensions and other characteristics as those of the external wound found by medical officer on the head of the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the version of the prosecution witnesses with regard to this vital fact was inherently improbable and intrinsically incredible. The ocular account of the occurrence was held falsified by the medical evidence. The accused were acquitted.

Amar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 826, is a similar case to Purshottom v. State of M.P. , mentioned above. In this case the prosecution witness stated that all the accused were armed with deadly weapons viz. Sua Barchi, Kulhari (axe), Dang (Cudgel) and Kirpan, and gave repeated blows with their respective weapons to the deceased and many of the blows fell on the ribs, and abdomen of the deceased, but in the post-mortem examination no injury was found on the ribs and abdomen of the deceased, not a single incised wound was found on the body of the deceased, and only abrasions, confusions and fractures were found, it was held that if the oral evidence were to be accepted there would be incised wounds all over the body of the deceased. Thus, there was apparent irreconcilable inconsistency between the oral and the medical evidence. The Supreme Court acquitted all the accused charged for murder.

Duty of the Prosecution to Prove Use of Weapon by Expert Evidence

The Supreme Court has held in Gurmej Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 214 that the mere omission to elicit opinion of the medical officer in the witness box whether a particular injury was possible by the weapon of offence by showing weapon to the witness does not make difference where ocular testimony is acceptable and further corroborated by the first information report. 

In a case where death is due to injuries or wounds caused by a lethal weapon, it is always the duty of the prosecution to prove by expert evidence that it was likely or at least possible for the injuries to have been caused with the weapon with which and in the manner in which they are alleged to have been caused. (Mohinder Singh v. State, AIR 1953 SC 415; 1953 Cr.L.J. 1761).

In that case it was found doubtful whether the injuries which were attributed to the accused were caused by a gun or a rifle. The Supreme Court held that it was only by the evidence of a duly qualified expert that it could have been ascertained whether the injuries attributed to the accused were caused by a gun or a rifle and such evidence alone could settle the controversy as to whether they could possibly have been caused by a fire arm used at such a close range as was suggested in the evidence.

The principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the weapon of offence recovered in a case should be shown to an expert and he should be asked to say whether the injuries found on the deceased could be caused with that weapon has no application to cases where the alleged weapon of offence has not been recovered. (Jai Dev v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 612: 1963(1) Cr. L.J. 495).

 In Ishwar Singh v. State of U.P.,AIR 1976 SC 2423 (See also Kartarey v. State of UP, AIR 1976 SC 76: 1976 Cr.L.J. 13), the weapons were not shown to the medical officer who could have deposed which injury was caused by which weapon. The conviction of the accused was set aside by the Supreme Court and observed:

  • “It is the duty of the prosecution, and no less of the Court, to   see that the alleged weapon of the offence, if available, is  shown to the medical witness and his opinion invited as to  whether all or any of the injuries on the victim could be caused  with that weapon. Failure to do so may sometimes, cause aberration in the course of justice.”

But, where the medical evidence is clear, failure to produce weapon of offence would not negate the medical evidence (B.V. Danny Mao v. State, 1989 Cr LJ 226 (Gauh).

In Maghar Singh v. State: of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 642 the medical officer stated that the injuries found on the body of the deceased could be the result of either two shots or even more than two shots, but the evidence of eyewitnesses clearly showed that there were two shots. The Supreme Court held that there was no inconsistency between the medical evidence and the ocular evidence and the inconsistency deposed by the medical officer was merely a probability and it was not fatal to the prosecution case.

Use of Treatises

By the peculiar nature of scientific evidence, the court, in appraisal of such evidence, has power to refer to treatises of eminent authors acquainted with such matters.[13]

The Supreme Court requires that whenever it is intended to place reliance on a particular view taken by authors of book of Medical-jurisprudence, the said view must be put to the doctor to assess how far the view taken by the experts apply to the facts of the particular case.[14] Where conflicting views have been expressed in different books on Medical Jurisprudence, the conflict can be resolved by preferring the more specialised book on the subject.[15]

Conclusion

Courts always give due importance to the opinion of the experts. But, the expert-evidence is not a substantive evidence; and it is generally used as a piece of evidence for corroboration or for countering veracity of oral evidence. The evidence of an expert only aids and helps the Court as an advisory material.  The expert being not a witness of fact, his opinion is to be analysed objectively by the court. In this process, a Court is the expert of experts.


[1] Binder Munda v. State, 1992 Cr.L.J. 3508 Ori. (DB)

[2] The State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram ,(1979) 2 SCC 158;

State of H.P. v. Jai Lal & Ors ., (1999) 7 SCC280;

Baso Prasad and Ors. v. State of Bihar , (2006) 13 SCC 65;

Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee, (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 299.

[3] Solanki ChimanbhaiUkabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 484

Punjab Singh v. State of Haryana. AIR 1984 SC 1233

See also: Arjun v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1995 SC 2507

[4] Mohan Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1925 All. 413 (DB).

State v. Rakshpal Singh, AIR 1953 All. 520;

Ram Pratap v. State, 1967 All.W.R. (H.C.) 395;

Ram Balak Singh v. State, AIR 1964 Pat. 62(DB);

Mellor v. Walnesley, 1905, 2Ch. 164 (CA);

Hadi Kisani v. State, AIR 1966 Orissa 21

Gofur Sheikh v. State, 1984 Cr.L.J. 559 (Cal);

Bhanda Gorh v. State of Assam, 1984 Cr.L.J.217 (Gau);

Jagdeo Singh v. State, 1979 Cr.L.J.236 (All);  

K. Pratap Reddy v. State of A.P., 1985 Cr.L.J.1446.

[5] Awadhesh v. State of MP  AIR 1988 SC 1158

[6] Brij Bhukhan v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 474

[7] Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2274,

[8] Makhan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1971 SC 1797

[9] Stephen Seneviratne v. Kind, AIR 1936 P.C. 289,

Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 C 500

[10] Vahula Bhusan v.State of Tamil Nadu, (1989) 1 SCJ 255,

State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, AIR 1988 SC 2154,

Dharamvir v. State, 1989 All. L.J. 454,

Awadhesh v. State of M.P. AIR 1988 SC 1158.

[11] Awadhesh v. State of M.P., AIR 1988 SC 1158,

Mohd. Habib v. State, 1988 CC Cases 401.

[12] Ram Narain v. State of Punjab. AIR 1975 SC 1727

Amar Singh v. State of Punjab. AIR 1987 SC 826,

Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2274.

[13] MamjeePandey v. State of Bihar, 1989 Cr.L.J. (NOC) 186 (Pat.)

[14] Kusa v. State of Orissa, AIR 1980 SC 559,

Bhagwandas v. State of  Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 589,

Sunder Lal v. State of M.P., AIR 1954 SC 28,

Pratap Misra v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 1307.

[15] Mahendra Manilal Nanavati v. Sushila Mahendra Nanavati, AIR 1965 SC 364



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‘Is Ban on Muslim Women to Enter Mosques, Unconstitutional’ Stands Tagged-on with Sabarimala Review-Reference Matter

Saji Koduvath, Advocate

Introduction

The petitioners in Yasmeen Zuber Ahmad Peerzade v. Union of  India, filed the Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court, by way of a Public Interest Litigation, on March 26, 2019, seeking declaration that the practices of prohibition of entry of Muslim Women in Mosques in India is illegal and unconstitutional for being violative of the fundamental rights to equality, life and liberty and freedom of religion proclaimed under Articles 14, 15, 21, 25 and 29 of the Constitution and also to pass such further orders to provide a life of dignity to Muslim women. This case is tagged with Sabarimala temple-entry-matter and other cases in which rights of women are involved.

Sabarimala Decision

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India, on September 28, 2018, headed by the Chief Justice, held in 4:1 majority (Indian Young Lawyers Association Vs. Union of India: 2019-1 SCC 1), that the custom that prohibited women from entering the Sabarimala temple violated the rights to equality enshrined under Article 14, and freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution. It was also pointed out that the Preamble to the Constitution of India proclaimed the ‘liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship‘.

Prohibition of Entry of Muslim Women: Points Placed in Challenge

  1. The prohibition is void and unconstitutional as such practices are repugnant to the basic dignity of a woman as an individual.
  2. The arbitrary prohibition imposed on women is violate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India – to be treated equally – and Article 15 of the Constitution which clearly prohibits discrimination by the government on the basis of sex.
  3. The prohibition imposed is violative of fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 29 also of the Constitution of India.
  4. Preventing the females from entering mosque is violative of Article 44 of the Constitution of India which directs the State to endeavour to secure uniform civil code.
  5. The exclusion of women is, nonetheless, not supported by reasons of  “public order”, “health”, “morality” (in Article 25), and, in any case, Article 25(1) will not take precedence over other articles.
  6. A woman’s entry to a masjid or eidgah (a place where Muslims congregate for Eid-ul-Fitr and Eid-ul-Azha celebrations) does not create fitna (distress).
  7. In the Hajj pilgrimage and Umrah (a lesser Hajj) thousands of Muslim women gather and perform Hajj rituals such as tawaf (walking around the Ka’ba) and sa’I (running between the hills of Safa and Marwa) and ramye zamrat (stoning of the devil ceremony) along with their male counterparts.
  8. Religious bodies ask for and receive taxpayers’ money from the government are also subject to the conditions imposed by our Constitution.
  9. The historical sources also show that Prophet Muhammad had himself encouraged women to actively participate in mosque congregations and prayer.
  10. The most sacred mosque in the world for Muslims, Masjid-al-Haram in Mecca, embraces both men and women and there is complete unanimity in the Muslim community on the Masjid-al-Haram in Mecca – to all Muslims in the world.
  11. The Apex Court, in Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2015) 8 SCC 439, has taken the view that practices permitted or not prohibited by a religion do not become a religious practice or a positive tenet of the religion, since a practice does not acquire the sanction of religion merely because it is permitted.
  12. The petitioners also argued that there is nothing in the Quran and the Hadith that ‘requires gender segregation’and that the Legislature has failed to ensure the dignity and equality of women in general and Muslim women in particular.

Stance of the contesting respondents

The contesting  respondents have not filed their response in Court. Their stance, as appears from the counter affidavit filed by the All India Muslim Personal Law Board, would be, mainly, the following:

  1. The issues do not pertain to any statute.
  2. The alleged  rights cannot be enforced against non-state entities like Mosques.
  3. Friday Namaz in congregation is not obligatory for women, though it is so, on Muslim men. As per doctrines of Islam, a woman is entitled to the same religious reward (Sawab) for praying as per her option either in Masjid or at home.
  4. The matters involved are religious practices based upon beliefs of the religion; and not matters ‘merely concern’ the management of a religious place.
  5. The matters involved are matters concern of Masjids, purely private bodies regulated by Muttawalis.
  6. They are not the activities ‘only concern’ regulating the activities connected with religious practice, also.
  7. It is not appropriate for the Court to enter into or interpret the religious principles/beliefs and tenets, invoking Articles 14, 15, 21, 25 and 29 of Constitution of India.
  8. It is not appropriate for the Court to attempt to answer issues that are matters of faith alone, when there is no ‘threat to life and liberty’
  9. It is not appropriate for the Court to interfere in religious beliefs and the practice of the essential features of any religion protected underArticle 26.
  10. In the absence of any state action, it is not appropriate for the Court to judicially determine or interfere in, or to seek resolution of, various aspects on ‘faith and belief’, and essential religious practices of faith, through judicial process.  It should be left to be resolved through the processes of social transformation within the religious denomination itself.
  11. During the pendency of the present petition, a five Judge Bench judgment in Kantaru Rajeevaru Vs. Indian Young Lawyers Association [Sabarimala-Case-Review from 2019-1 SCC 1]  has referred matters involving Articles 14, 25 and 26 to larger bench. The matters involved in that case are much relevant in this case also.

Present Status of the Case

This case, on prohibition of Muslim women to enter Mosque, is tagged on with Sabarimala Review-Reference matter [Kantaru Rajeevaru Vs. Indian Young Lawyers Association : Review from 2019-1 SCC 1] and pending consideration before a 9 Judge Bench.

Conclusion

The (i) right of entry of women in Sabarimala, (ii) right of entry of Muslim women in durgahs/mosques, (iii) right of entry of Parsi women, married to non-Parsis, into the holy fire place of Agyari and  (v) the challenge to the practice of female genital mutilation in Dawoodi Bohra Community are placed before the nine-judge-bench of the Supreme Court.

The result of the combined inquisitive analysis of all the aforesaid cases and the issues involved therein, in the constitutional ethos, by the nine-judge-bench, on every possibility, will not be against the so called ‘progressive view’ in favour of women. If the effect of answers of each segregated case and each separated issue is anatomically explored and blended together, the outcome may be diametrically opposite. The nine-judge-bench will analyse the matter, both ways; and, though it may appear that striking a balance between the divergent intransigence is impossible, the end-result will definitely be one which will be hailed ‘legitimate’, in future. It is the history of the Supreme Court of India, in similar matters.



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Article 370: Is There Little Chance for Supreme Court Interference

Adv. Saji Koduvath.

Introduction

The Constitution of India was made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, in its entirety, like any other States, by a Constitution Order passed by the President of India on 5th August, 2019.  On 6th August, 2019, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (3) of Article 370 of the Constitution of India read with clause (1) of article 370, the President, on the recommendation of Parliament, declared that all special status given to J & K under Article 370 would cease to operate.

These developments are highly controversial. Some speak that the highest assurance of historical importance that has been given by the nation, India, through its Constitution, to a constituent state is betrayed. But, others say it is a mark of national integration.

Special status had been given to J&K in the following historical and significant background.

British Restores India 600 Princely States

The British, when left India, through the Indian Independence Act, 1947, restored sovereignty of about 600 princely states, including Kashmir. The princely states had three options: First, to remain as an independent country; Second, to join Dominion of India; and the Third, to join Dominion of Pakistan. The joining with India or Pakistan had to be through a mutual agreement – the Instrument of Accession (IoA.)  

Instrument of Accession by J&K

The Maharaja of Kashmir, Raja Hari Singh, had initially decided to take an independent stand and to sign standstill agreements with India and Pakistan. But following an invasion of tribesmen and Army men in plainclothes from Pakistan, he sought the help of India, which in turn led to the accession of Kashmir to India.

Raja Hari Singh signed the IoA on October 26, 1947 and Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, accepted it on October 27, 1947.

The Schedule appended to the IoA between India and Kashmir gave the Parliament of India the power to legislate on Defence, External Affairs and Communications, with respect to J&K.

Article 370 Reads:

  • 370. Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.—
  • (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,—
  • (a) the provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
  • (b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to—
  • (i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and (ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify.
  • Explanation. — For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja’s Proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948;
  • (c) the provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that State;
  • (d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may by order specify:
  • Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State:
  • Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government.
  • (2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.
  • (3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify:
  • Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification”

Article 370 and the Constituent Assembly of J&K.

The declared policy of India was that the disputes on accession should be settled in accordance with the wishes of people rather than a unilateral decision of the ruler of the princely state.

India regarded accession of J&K as purely temporary and provisional, as stated in the Government of India’s White Paper on J&K in 1948. In a letter to J&K Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah dated May 17, 1949, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote: “The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir is a matter for determination by the people of the state represented in a Constituent Assembly convened for the purpose.”

Article 370 – Subject to Plebiscite

The original draft of Article 370 was presented by the Government of J&K.

Following modifications and negotiations, on the draft placed by J&K, Article 306A (now 370) was passed in the Constituent Assembly on May 27, 1949. It was moved in the Constitution Assembly by Shri. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

Moving the motion, Ayyangar said that though accession was complete, India had offered to a plebiscite taken when the conditions were created, and if accession was not ratified then “we shall not stand in the way of Kashmir separating herself away from India”.

On October 17, 1949, when Article 370 was finally included in the Constitution by India’s Constituent Assembly, Ayyangar reiterated India’s commitment to plebiscite and drafting of a separate constitution by J&K’s Constituent Assembly.

Presidential Order of 1954 & Article 35A

Article 35A of the Constitution has been introduced through a Presidential Order in 1954 invoking Article 370. Article 35A empowered the J&K legislature to define the state’s permanent residents; and their special rights and privileges to Indian-administered Kashmir, including Jammu and Ladakh.

The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, had passed a law in 1927 to stop the influx of people from Punjab. Reports say that it was done as urged by Kashmiri Hindus. The same law was re-introduced in 1954. It was made part of Article 35A, and thus granted Kashmir special status to J&K within India.

After enacting Article 35A, all identified residents were issued a permanent resident certificate, which entitled them to special benefits related to employment, scholarships and other privileges.  The biggest advantage considered by the permanent residents was that they alone had the right to own, buy, or sell immovable property in the state.

By the 1954 Presidential Order, almost the entire Constitution was extended to J&K. Besides 260 of 395 Articles, 94 out of 97 entries in the Union List were made applicable to J&K by this Order; 26 out of 47 items of the Concurrent List have been brought-in. Seven out of 12 Schedules were also extended to the state.

J & K Constitution

It is very important that Article 3 of the J&K Constitution declared J&K to be an integral part of India. In the Preamble to the Constitution, there was a categorical acknowledgement about the object of the J&K Constitution – “to further define the existing relationship of the state with the Union of India as its integral part thereof.” Moreover people of state were referred as ‘permanent residents’; not ‘citizens’. It is noteworthy that there was no claim as to ‘sovereignty’ of J&K in their Constitution. One of the main reasons for enacting a special Constitution for J&K is said to be to bring the provisions of the laws relating to J&K out of the clutches of the fundamental rights. Various fundamental rights (under Article 14, 19, 21 etc.) made it ‘difficult’ to provide special rights to J&K people and J&K situations.

Special Status given to J&K under  Article 370

Article 370 itself exempted operation of other provisions of the Constitution except Article 1 and Article 370, to J&K. By virtue of Article 1, J&K was included in the list of states. It further permitted the J&K to draft its own Constitution.

With respect to the legislative powers of the Parliament, Article 370 restricted Centre to make laws on the subjects included in the IoA, only on “consultation” with the state government.  But, if the concurrence of the Government of the State was to be given, or obtained, before the convening of the Constituent Assembly, it was provided to place the same before such Assembly (when it is convened.)

Similar Special Provisions in Other States also

Article 370 is captioned as ‘Temporary Provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir’.  Article 371 and 371-A to 371-I speak of certain types of privileges or restrictions including purchase of land, in the Himachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, AP, Sikkim, Misoram, Arunachal Pradesh and Goa. Domicile-based reservation in admissions and even jobs is also allowed.

Why Article 370 was ‘Temporary’

Article 370 was ‘Temporary’ in the sense that the J&K Constituent Assembly had a right to modify/ delete/ retain it. It was temporary, for the validity of this provision depended upon the plebiscite to be held in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Does Article 370 Become a Permanent Provision?

Three views are propounded.

First, Article 370 became permanent when the Constituent Assembly of J&K was dissolved (on January 26, 1957). Article 370(3) permits deletion of Article 370 by a Presidential Order, preceded by the ‘concurrence’ of J&K’s Constituent Assembly. It was not happened by a decision of the Constituent Assembly of J&K.

Second view is that Article 370 continues to operate with obtaining the ‘concurrence’ from the State Assembly which stepped into the shoes of the Constituent Assembly.

And the third view is that on dispersal of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir (on January 27, 1957) after adopting the state’s constitution, ‘there vanished also the president’s powers – under Article 370 – to add more legislative powers to the Centre in respect of J&K or extend to the state any other provision of the constitution of India’. (Constitutional expert, AG Noorani, supports this view.)

Rajendra Prasad on ‘Temporary’ Nature of 370

AG Noorani pointed out in an essay that ‘President Rajendra Prasad, himself a distinguished lawyer’, wrote on September 6, 1952 as under:

  • “… under clause 1(b)(ii) and the second proviso to clause 1(d) of Article 370, it excludes altogether the parliament of India from having any say regarding the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir……The abrogation of Article 370 abrogates along with it application of Article 1 to the state, with the result that the state ceases to be part of the territory of India…”

Alleged aggressions of Centre by the Presidential Orders

  • The Centre has used Article 370 to amend J&K’s Constitution, though that power was not given (to the President) under Article 370.
  • Despite a similar provision that of Article 356 of the Indian Constitution (President’s Rule) is in an Article 92 of the J&K Constitution, Article 356 itself was extended to J&K.
  • The J&K Constitution provides for election of Governor by the Assembly. Article 370 was used to convert it into a nominee of the President.
  • To extend President’s rule beyond one year in other states, the government made Constitutional amendments one after the other. But, in J&K Article 370 was invoked without this Constitutional Amendment.
  • Article 249 (power of Parliament to make laws on State List entries) was extended to J&K without a resolution by the Assembly and just by a recommendation of the Governor. It is utter violation of Art. 370.

The Presidential Order and  J & K Reorganisation Act of 2019

On August 5, 2019, the President of India issued the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019, under Article 370, superseding the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954. By virtue of the Order all the provisions of the Indian Constitution were made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir, whereby the separate status conferred to the State J&K was abolished. The Order stated that it was issued with the “concurrence” of the Government of State of J&K. The ‘concurrence’ was, apparently, that had been given by the Governor appointed by the President of India. The President issued the Order on the basis of the resolution adopted by both Houses of the Parliament, Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.

Jammu and Kashmir: Status Changed

On August 5, 2019 itself, the Bill, Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019, to change the status of Jammu and Kashmir and to form two separate union territories, namely Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh was introduced in Rajya Sabha; and on the next day, before the Lok Sabha. The union territory of Jammu and Kashmir was proposed to have a legislature, whereas the union territory of Ladakh didn’t.

What Kashmiris Fear 

Kashmir is a Muslim-majority Territory. It is said that Kashmiris fear that the unique privileges, including property rights, coherent culture out of Muslim population etc. will be eroded; and a change in the law will affect the state’s demographics. Already tensions are high in this region. Apart from enjoying the benefits, the situation prevailed permitted a separate flag and independence over all matters except foreign affairs, defence and communications. The article 370 allowed the state a certain amount of autonomy – and freedom to make laws.  It was possible to restrain Indians or Hindus from purchasing property or settle there. And, they were proud of own Constitution and special status.

Kashmiris suspect that by advent of Constitutional changes Hindus would migrate to the state. This would sound well. Former Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti has pointed out that changing the law would further alienate Kashmiris.

There had been fights and struggles since 1989. India blames Pakistan. Pakistan raises claim on Kashmir in its entirety.

Stand of Modi Goverment

The government says that the change of law will bring development to the region.

“I want to tell the people of Jammu and Kashmir what damage Articles 370 and 35A did to the state,” said Mr Amith Shah, Home Minister, in the Parliament, “it’s because of these sections that democracy was never fully implemented, corruption increased in the state, that no development could take place.”

Legal Challenge

According to the Constitution, Article 370 could be changed only with ‘concurrence’ of the State. But there hasn’t been normal a state government in Jammu and Kashmir for over a year now. In June last year, federal rule was imposed after the government of the then chief minister, Mehbooba Mufti, was reduced to a minority. Therefore, the governor imposed its rule. The government of India says it is well within its rights to bring in the changes with the concurrence of Governor and that similar decisions have been taken by federal governments in the past.

AG Noorani

AG Noorani says that the Presidential Orders which made the Constitution of India applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in its entirety, like other States, was ‘an illegal decision, akin to committing fraud’.

Political Criticism

P Chidambaram, a senior leader in the opposition (Congress Party) described the decision as a “catastrophic step” and warned in parliament that it may lead to serious consequences. He said: “You may think you have scored a victory, but you are wrong and history will prove you to be wrong. Future generations will realise what a grave mistake this house is making today”.

Earlier Court Decisions

In Prem Nath Kaul (1959) the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court accepted the argument that the Article 370 was a temporary provision.  But in Sampat Prakash (1969) the SC refused to accept Article 370 as temporary. The five-judge Bench said that ‘Article 370 has never ceased to be operative’; and that it was a permanent provision.

Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India

The Amendments made to Article 35A and 370 were questioned before the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India. The Advocates argued that the Supreme Court had given its earlier decision in Sampat Prakash, without taking into account the law laid down in Prem Nath Kaul. Thereon they called for a ‘reference’ to a larger bench since the present bench was of the same strength as Sampath Prakash and Prem Nath Kaul.  The 5-judge bench of the Supreme Court, on 2nd March 2020, rejected the request to refer these petitions to a larger bench holding that there was no such ‘oversight’ or ‘conflict’ as argued.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court will examine in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India whether the abolition of Article 370 is unconstitutional and violates the basic structure of the Constitution. If the change made is held to be unconstitutional, several earlier Presidential Orders may have to be rendered invalid.

  • Now, from August 2, 2023, the Constitution Bench, headed by the Chief Justice of India, considers this matter under the Caption “In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution”.
  • The argument of the Petitioners were over, after 10 days’ hearing, on August 23, 2023.

Read Blog: Art. 370 – Turns the Constitution on Its Head



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