Liability of Certain Plantation Tenants to Pay Rent To the Government: New Rules can be Made for its Effective Implementation

Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract

1. As per the Kerala Land Reforms Act, following Tenants are liable to pay rent to the Government.

  • (1) Tenants in Govt. land.
    • Because, no provision in the KLR Act affects the liability of the tenants of the Govt. lands to pay rent; and such Govt. lands are exempted from Chapter II (that deals with ‘fixity’, Purchase Certificate, vesting, etc..
  • (2) Tenants who have taken the lease of extensive parambus or waste-lands and in course of time by hard toil had developed those into plantations.
    • Because, the legislature had conferred the benefit of the fixity of tenure (Sec. 13, KLR Act) to such tenants; and such lands (over and above the land to which purchase certificate is given) vest in Govt., under Sec. 72, KLR Act.

2. Following Plantation-Tenants are liable to pay rent to the Land-owner (or the Land-lord) according to the KLR Act.

  • The tenants of those Plantations (i) above 30 acres and (ii) the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing (that is, plantation existed when land was leased).
    • Because, no provision in the KLR Act affects the liability of the tenants of such lands to pay rent to the land owners; and such lands are exempted from Chapter II (that deals with ‘fixity’, Purchase Certificate, vesting, etc..                            

Part I

Relevant provisions in the KLR Act:

Section 3(1)(viii):

  • Provisions of Chapter II (that deals with fixity, Purchase Certificate, vesting of leased land in Govt., etc.) of the KLR Act do not apply to tenements of Plantation above 30 acres where the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing (that is, plantation existed when land was leased).

Section 13:

  • There will be fixity to cultivating tenants.
  • But, (1) Plantation-tenants in Govt. land and (2) The tenants of Plantation above 30 acres, where the plantation existed when land was leased, do not have the right of fixity – for the provisions of Chapter II do not apply to such tenements.

Section 72:

  • It provides – automatic vesting of lease-properties held by ‘cultivating-tenants’, in Govt.
  • But, (1) Plantation-tenants in Govt. land and (2) The tenants of Plantation above 30 acres, , where the plantation existed when land was leased, do not vest in Govt. – for the provisions of Chapter II do not apply to such tenements.

Section 72E:

  • The cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay to the Government the rent payable under this Act from the date of vesting under Section 72.

Section 72F(h): 

  • Land Tribunal to fix the rent stated in Sec. 72E.

Section 81:

  • S. 81 (the first Section in Chapter III) deals with exemption from ceiling limit of plantation, industrial land, etc.

Section 82 & 83:

  • S.82 deals with ceiling area. Sec. 83 mandates that no person shall be entitled to own or hold lands in excess of the ceiling area. But it is not applicable to the plantations. (If no plantation, that would also have been treated in the same way – as excess land.)

Section 85:

  • S. 85 directs that excess land shall be surrendered to government (accepting the compensation fixed under Sec. 88).

Can the Govt. enact new Act (or Make Rules) for ensuring ‘Proper Rent’ (if it finds The Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980 not effective)?

Yes; because,

  1. the KLR Act does not affect rights of such land-owners/landlord  (including Govt.) for rent.
  2. The matter of fixation of rent is a State subject. 

The State Legislature is free, therefore, to make a proper enactment on public interest.  Here, it may also be noted that a large extent of Govt. land is in the possession of mighty and wealthy planters: and they do not pay any amount as rent (and, if paid, only a small amount). 

New ‘Rules’ or ‘Guidelines’ can also be made by the State in the light of Sec. 72F(h) [Land Tribunal to fix the rent stated in Sec. 72E] for ensuring ‘Proper Rent’.

In N. K. RAJENDRA MOHAN Vs. THIRVAMADI RUBBER CO.  LTD, AIR 2015 SC 2556; 2015-4 KLT 6, it is held as under:

  • “That the legislature had construed it to be unfair and improper to deny the benefit of the fixity of tenure to a lessee who might have taken the lease of extensive parambus or waste lands and in course of time by hard toil had developed those into plantations.

Analysis

Plantation leased
(Plantation existed when land was leased).
Land leased
Tenant made plantation.
Sec. 81 (exemption from ceiling limit) applies.
Plantation above 30 Acres. 
Will there be fixity to tenant?
No. 

Sec. 3 (1)(viii) (reversely) applies. (Poddar Plan. Ltd v. Thekkemariveettil Madhavi Amma, 2014 1 ILR(Ker) 813; 2013 4 KLJ 781; 2014 1 KLT 439,)
Yes. (Note: Ceiling limit (in Sec. 82) is not mentioned in Sec. 13 – as given in Sec. 72B and 72C.)
(Sec. 13 fixity is there for every tenant, if tenant toiled a plantation – See: Rev. Fr. Jerome Fernandes Vs. Be Be Rubber Estate, 1972 KLT 613.)
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72E & 72F
Plantation below 30 Acres.  Can a tenant get purchase certificate for 5 or 10 acres?
May be.
No specific provision. So, by virtue of Chapter II, a tenant can get Purchase Certificate; but, within ceiling limit – Sec. 13 – under Sec. 72B, 72C.
(See notes just below also)
No. 
No specific provision.
Fragmentation of plantation will not be allowed so as to get pur. certi. within ceiling limit (Sec. 87).
Plantation below 30 Acres. Will there be fixity to tenant?
Yes.
By virtue of S. 3(1)(viii), a Tenant has fixity (Sec.13). It is reasonable to say, a tenant cannot claim fixity and Purchase Certificate, simultaneously.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72E & 72F(h)
Yes.
(Because what is exempted is Plantation-Tenancies exceeding 30 acres)

Sec. 13 fixity, applies.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72E & 72F(h)
Who gets Sec. 81 exemption – land-owner or tenant – above 30 acres.
Land owner – For, plantation itself was leased.Tenant
Can landlord recover possession –
above 30 acres – from the tenant?
.
Yes.
No express provision.
But, contract holds the field (because no protection to tenant, under Chapter II).
No. (Because Plantation-Tenancies exceeding 30 acres is exempted, and therefore no protection to tenant)
Sec. 13 fixity, applies. See:
N. K. Rajendra Mohan Vs Thirvamadi Rubber Co.  Ltd.: AIR 2015 SC 2556; 2015-4 KLT 6
Will a tenant get Fixity (S. 13) or Purchase Certificate (S. 72) on “tenancies…”, ‘interspersed within the plantation’ S. 3(1)(viii)

(Not applicable)
Yes. But, within ceiling limit – Sec. 13 – under Sec. 72B, 72C.
Proviso refers to a special category on independent-tenancy [from the plantation-tenancy, mentioned in the main Section, S. 3(1)(viii)].
Will there be vesting of land below 30 acres in Govt?
Yes.
Then what is the relation between Govt. and the original tenant?
Relation that is recognised by the Statute. That is, fixity in the land vested in Government.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72E & 72F(h)
Yes (for both above and below 30 acres).
Then what is the relation between Govt. and the original tenant?
Relation that is recognised by the Statute. That is, fixity in the land vested in Government.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72E & 72F(h)

Part II

1. Who is the OWNER of Leasehold (Exempted) Plantation Lands in Kerala?

It is the Government

Reasons:

  • (i). Plantation (lease) lands Statutorily VEST in GOVT, under S. 72.
    • Sec. 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964, provides for absolute vesting (of lease-land) in Government.
    • Tenants of leasehold-exempted-plantation lands (above ceiling-limit) are entitled only to ‘fixity of tenure‘ by virtue of Chapter II, Sec. 13 (and they are not entitled for Purchase Certificate, over and above ‘ceiling limit’).
    • Note: ‘Tenure’ is derived from the Latin term, “tenere“;  means “to hold” or “to keep”.
  • (ii). Vesting’ in Govt. is ‘Vesting of Ownership
    • Sec. 72 speaks about ‘Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government’.
    • It pertains to –
      • all right, title and interest” of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants”.
  • (iii). Tenant has no “absolute rights” (above the ceiling limit)
    • Sec. 72B(2) KLR Act spells-out that a cultivating tenant will get Purchase Certificate for the extent below the ‘ceiling limit’ alone. That is, the tenant has no “absolute rights” above the ceiling limit. (It is limited to the improvements made, in case of acquisition, under Sec. 112(5A), as stated below.)
    • Plantation-lands, usually, involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land (above ceiling limit). The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be miniscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres).
    • Tenant to Pay Rent to the Govt.: Sec. 72E directs – such a cultivating tenant is liable to pay ‘Rent’ to the Government (obviously over and above ‘ceiling limit’).
    • Sec. 72F(5) authorises Land Tribunal to fix the rent.
  • (iv). Government Need Not Pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, if Acquired
    • Sec. 112(5A) provides that the Government need not pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, to the tenant, or the former land owner, if such Lands (above ceiling limit) are Acquired. (It is for the reason that ownership of such plantation-land vest in Govt., absolutely.)
  • (v). Art. 31A(1), Constitution (no compensation even to owners)
    • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation (even) to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
Proviso to Art. 31A(1), Constitution (no compensation even to owners) reads as under:
“Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivationit shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”

2. Tenant cannot ‘Sell’ Plantation Land as his Absolute Property

  • A tenant who got ‘fixity’ over such land cannot ‘sell’ this land as his absolute (ownership) property.

3. ‘Exemption’ in Chapter III Cannot be Read Into Sec. 72B(2)

  • The provision of law for giving Purchase-Certificate under Sec. 72B specifies that the provisions of Sec. 82 (as to ceiling limit) shall apply for the calculation of the ceiling area (alone).
  • Sec. 72B(2) reads-
    • “(2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may beapply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1)”
  • The exemption provision in Sec. 81 (Chapter III), which excludes plantation lands from the ceiling limit, cannot be brought-forth or read-into Sec. 72B (provision for assignment of purchase-certificate) in Chapter II.
    • In other words, purchase-certificates cannot be given for land above ceiling-limit, rigging the exemption provisions (for plantations etc.).
  • Because,
    • Sec. 72B(1), in Chapter II shows – Sec. 72B(1) is an independent provision (though the Proviso says – no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest … (more than) … the ceiling area, mentioned in Sec. 82 in Chapter III)
    • When a provision in a latter Chapter of an Act (here, Sec. 82 that deals with extent of ceiling limit, in Chapter III) is referred to in an independent provision in an earlier Chapter (here, Sec. 72B, as regards issuing purchase certificate, in Chapter II), for a specific purpose (here, to state the limit in area alone), it cannot be said – the attributed colour or smell of the provision in the latter chapter (by virtue of other provisions, i.e., entire characteristics or attributions added to Sec. 82 by virtue of other provisions in Chapter III), would stand reflected on the earlier provision (here, Sec. 72B).
  • Further:
    • Chapter II of the KLR Act (dealing with ‘Tenancy’) is exclusive and exhaustive as to ‘fixity’, and ‘vesting’ of land in Government.
    • It is not stated anywhere in the Act – the right and title of the (leased-plantation) land legitimately vested in Government under Sec. 72, will be divested in any manner (in favour of the previous owner, or of the tenant or anybody else), in any circumstance.
    • Sec. 72E provides for collection of ‘rent‘ from the holders of the plantation and Sec. 72F(5) authorises the Land Tribunal to fix the rent. (It goes without saying saying that it is for the reason that the ownership of the land vests in Govt.)
    • Note: Proceedings initiated by Taluk Land Board under Chapter III (in respect of plantation) do not confer title.

4. What is the legal right attached to former ‘tenants’, after vesting the land with Govt. under Sec. 72?

  • It is not Tenancy – For no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt.
  • Not Grant or Licence/Permission – for Grant as well as Licence/Permission arise from a contract (express or implied).
  • Therefore, it can termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, that is, the KLR Act.

5. What are the Stipulations attached to that “Legal Right conferred by Statute” to tenants (of Plantation land) having fixity?

  • 1. Liable to pay ‘Rent’ (under Sec. 72E).
  • 2. Subject to the condition – not to “convert” it for any other use, other than the specific plantation (Sec. 87).
  • 3. From Sec. 112(5A)(b) it is clear that the tenant will be entitled (on acquisition of the land) for the compensation for his homestead or hut, if any, and the value of his improvements (alone).

6. When Such a land (Vested In Govt. under S. 72) is Required for Govt. (Public Purpose), Should it be ‘Acquired’? Is the landowner Entitled for any Compensation? What is the Compensation Entitled to by the Tenant?

  • When Such a land (Vested In Govt. under S. 72) is Required for Govt. (Public Purpose), Should it be Acquired?
    • The ownership being vested in Govt. it need not be ‘strictly’ “acquired”. But no specific provision in Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’, if and when Govt. needs it. 
    • Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act uses the term ‘acquisition’ itself (for the possessory rights remain with the tenant).
  • Is the Landowner Entitled for any Compensation?
    • Sec. 112(5A) deals with the land acquired that has been vested in the Government under Section 72. From the sub section (5A) it is clear that the entire rights of the (former) landowner is vested with the Govt. and he cannot claim any right over the land (when it is acquired).
  • What is the Compensation Entitled to by the Tenant?
    • Sec. 112(5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonged to such land owner and intermediaries shall be awarded (?) to the Government ; and
    • from Sec. 112(5A)(b) it is clear that the tenant will be entitled for the compensation for his homestead or hut, if any, and the value of his improvements (alone).

7. Apportionment of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 of the KLR Act reads –

“112. Apportionment of land value in cases of acquisition  – (1) Where any land is acquired under the law for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, the compensation awarded under such law in respect of the land acquired shall be apportioned among the landowner, intermediaries, cultivating tenant and the kudikidappukaran in the manner specified in this Section.
(2) The compensation for any building or other improvements shall be awarded to the person entitled to such building or other improvements.
(3) The kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to the value of the land occupied by his homestead or hut subject to a minimum of-
               three cents in a city or major municipality; or
               five cents in any other municipally; or
               ten cents in a panchayat area or township.
(4) The difference between the value of three cents or five cents or ten cents, as the case may be, and the value of the extent of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, be borne by the Government or the local authority or the company or other person on whose behalf the land is acquired.
(5) The balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in Sub-section (2) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall he apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land acquired immediately before such acquisition .
Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to (i) in the case of a landowner, the rent which he was entitled to get from the tenant holding immediately under him; (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord; and (iii) in the case of a cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent payable by him; and the rent payable by the cultivating tenant and the intermediary for the purposes of this Explanation shall be as calculated under the provisions of this Act.
(5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
               (a) the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to such land owner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government ; and
               (b) the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to- in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
in the case of the Government, such rent.
(7) In this Section, “homestead” includes a dwelling house occupied by a person who is deemed to be a kudikidappukaran under Explanation IIA to clause (25) of Section 2.”

Part III

Vesting in  Govt. u/s. 72 is independent of issuance of Purchase Certificate

The rights of the landlord would vest in the Government, under Sec. 72 KLR Act. A tenant is free to apply for and obtain Purchase Certificate within the Ceiling Limit under Sect. 59(2) and 72B or 72C. from such property. Vesting of lease property in Government under Sec. 72 is independent of issuance of Purchase Certificate. In Perumal Smaraka Nidhi v. Harrisons Malayalam Limited (RFA No. 336/2011; dt. 31. 01. 2013; K.M. Joseph, J.) held –

  • The rights of the landlord would vest in the Government, under Sec. 72 KLR Act.
  •  Sec. 72 would appear to contemplate vesting when there is no certificate of purchase issued under Sec. 59 (2).
  • If no certificate of purchase has been issued under sub Sec. (2) of Sect. 59 (irrespective of whether the tenants have applied), under Section 72, there will be vesting, if other conditions are satisfied.

Plantation Land Cannot be Assigned to a Tenant

  • From the above, it is clear:
    1. Plantation-tenancy-lands above 30 acres are not exempted from Chapter II; and are exempted from ceiling limit (under Chapter III).
    2. Tenants who hold the plantation-tenancy-lands are entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13.
    3. As the tenants who hold the plantation land are cultivating tenants, such lands are vested in Government [according to Sec. 72].
    4. The plantation land, above ceiling limit [under Sec. 72B], cannot be assigned (by the Land Tribunal) to a tenant. (Note: No rider to Sec. 72B and 72C, by way of proviso or otherwise, exempting plantation.)
  • Therefore, the answer to the question – who is the OWNER of the (exempted) Leasehold-Plantation Lands in Kerala – is that the Government of Kerala is the OWNER. (See: Perumal Smaraka Nidhi vs M/S Harrisons Malayalam Ltd., 31. 01. 2013)

“Vesting” in Law

In Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v. Siddha Math,  (2015) 16 SCC 542, while dealing with the ‘vesting’ under Land Acquisition Act,1894, it is held that ‘it is a settled principle of law that once a property is vested by an Act of legislature, to achieve the laudable object, the same cannot be divested by the enactment of any subsequent general law and vest such property under such law.’

  • (LA Act, 1894, Sec. 16 reads as under: Power to take possession. When the Collector has made an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.)

The concept of ‘vesting’ was also considered in The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344. In this decision it is held as under:

  • “(19) That the word “vest” is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, S. 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the Court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that “such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver”. The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand, Ss. 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of LA), provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening of certain events, shall “vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances”. In the cases contemplated by Ss. 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that the word “vest” has not got a fixed connotation meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Ss. 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them.” [Quoted in Indore Development Authority vs Manoharlal (Arun Mishra, J.), (2020) 8 SCC 129.]

Provisions as to Fixity, Purchase Certificate,  Plantation-Exemption, Ceiling Area, etc.

  • Tenant & Fixity –
    • Section 13(1) reads as under:
    • 13. Right of tenants to fixity of tenure.  (1) Notwithstanding any thing to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage or contract or in any decree or order of court, every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding, and no land from the holding shall be Limited except as provided in Sections 14 to 22.”
    • Tenant is defined in Sec 2 (57) as under:
    • (57) tenant moans any person who has paid or has agreed to pay rent or other consideration for his being allowed to possess and to enjoy any land by a person entitled to lease that land, and includes- …. ….. ….. “
  • Cultivating Tenant & Vesting of land in Government –
    • Section 72(1) reads:
    • “72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”
    • It provides (automatic) vesting of leasehold properties in Govt. Conditions thereof are:
      • (i) the land must be held by cultivating tenants;
      • (ii) they should be entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13.
    • Sec. 2(8) defines cultivating tenant as under:
    • cultivating tenant means a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate, the land comprised in his holding.”
  • Issue of PurchaseCertificate
    • Section 72B, 72C and 72K(1) & (2) read as under:
    • 72B. Cultivating tenants right to assignment. – (1) The cultivating tenant of any holding or part of a holding, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Section 72, shall be entitled to assignment of such right, title and interest:
    • Provided that
    • (a) no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of any holding or part of a holding under this Section if he, or if he is a member of a family, such family, owns an extent of land not less than-the ceiling area.
    • (b) where the cultivating tenant or, if he is a member of a family, such family, does not own any land or owns an extent of land which is less than the ceiling area, he shall be entitled to the assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of only such extent of land as will, together with the land, if any, owned by him or his family, as the case may be, be equal to the ceiling area.
    • Explanation. – In calculating the extent of land owned by the cultivating tenant or, where he is a member of a family, by such family, for the purposes of clauses (a) and (b) of the foregoing proviso, the portion of the land owned by such cultivating tenant or by the family, which is liable to be assigned to the cultivating tenants holding under him or such family, shall not be taken into account.
    • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1);
    • Provided that if no date has been notified under Section 83, the date notified under Section 72 shall be deemed to be the date notified under Section 83.
    • (3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub-section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the dote of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.
    • (4) An application under Sub-section (3) shall contain the following particulars, namely:(a) the village, survey number and extent of the holding or part to which the assignment relates.(b) the name and address of the landowner and intermediaries and also of every other person interested in the land and the nature of their interest so far as they arc known to him;(c) the particulars regarding the other lands owned or held by him or if he is a member of a family; by such family; and(d) such other particulars as may be prescribed.
    • (5) Where a cultivating tenant is entitled to the assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of only a portion of the holding held by him, he may indicate in the application under Sub-section (3) his choice of the portion to which the assignment shall relate.”
    • 72C. Assignment where application is not made by cultivating tenant Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 72B [or Section 72BB], the Land tribunal may, subject to such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf, at any time after the vesting of the right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in tile Government under Section 72, assign such right, title and interest to the cultivating tenants entitled thereto, and the cultivating tenants shall be bound to accept such assignment.”
    • 72K. Issue of certificate of purchase. – (1) As soon as may be after the determination of the purchase price under Section 72F [or the passing of an order under Sub-section (3) of Section 72MM] the Land Tribunal shall issue a certificate of purchase to the cultivating tenant, and thereupon the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, in respect of the holding or part thereof to which the certificate relates, shall vest in the cultivating tenant free from all encumbrances created by the landowner or the intermediaries, if any.
    • (2) The certificate of purchase issued under Sub-section (1) shall be conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, over the holding or portion thereof to which the assignment relates.”
    • Note: Sec. 72F speaks as to ‘Land Tribunal to issue notices and determine the compensation and purchase price; and Sec. 72MM provides for jointly applying, by the cultivating tenant, the landowner, the intermediary, the holders of encumbrances, etc, to the Land Tribunal, for an order for ‘assignment by mutual agreement’ to the cultivating tenant.

Can a Tenant of Plantation Transfer his Rights, Fragmenting the Plantation

Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law. It is heritable and transferable. (Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179; Phirayalal Kapur Vs. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186; Nallammal Vs. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864). 

See Blog: POSSESSION is a Substantive Right in Indian Law

Therefore, a tenant of plantation having rights of fixity (Sec. 13) may have the right to transfer it to another. In any case, the change of character or nature of the plantation by fragmentation being amount to ‘conversion’ that will be against the provisions of the Act, as pointed out in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985.

What are the Stipulations attached to that “Legal Right” of Transfer?

  • Subject to the condition – not to “convert” it for any other use, other than the specific plantation (Sec. 87).

When Such a land is Required for Govt., Should it be Acquired?

  • The ownership being vested in Govt. it need not be ‘strictly’ “acquired”.
  • But no provision In Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’, if and when Govt. needs it.
  • But, it is said in Sec. 112 – Apportionment of land value in cases of ‘acquisition’.
    • Note:  It makes no difference (SUBSTANTIALLY, IN DETERMINING COMPENSATION) whether such a plantation land is “acquired” or not. Because, even if the land is not ‘acquired’, Govt. has to pay compensation for improvements to the former tenants (who holds the land by virtue of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act).

End Notes I

CAN AN EXEMPTED PLANTATION LAND BE SOLD AS AN ABSOLUTE PRIVATE PROPERTY?

No.

  • Sec. 82 deals with ceiling area. Sec. 83 mandates that no person shall be entitled to own or hold lands in excess of the ceiling area. Sec. 85 directs that excess land shall be surrendered to government (accepting the compensation fixed under Sec. 88).
  • But it is not made applicable to the plantations. (If no plantation, that would also have been treated in the same way – as excess land.)
  • Sec. 87 directs that the protection of plantation is available only so long as the plantation subsists.

Exemption does not Confer a vested right or ownership

  • If no plantation, plantation lands would also have been treated in the same way – as any other excess land that had been (forcibly) got surrendered by virtue of the KLR Act. The law has given only a sanction to the planters to continue because of the existence of the plantation. Therefore ‘exemption’ does not confer a vested right or ownership.

End Notes II

ACQUISITION OF PLANTATION-LANDS OWNED BY PRIVATE PERSONS

1. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India

It is plain – No compensation is payable to the land-owners, for the lands ‘above the ceiling limit’, according to the Constitution of India. If any authority gives it, it will be sheer unscrupulous act.

  • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
  • Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India reads as under:
    “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivationit shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limitapplicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”.

2. Exemption of ‘Plantation’ Does Not Cover Exemption of ‘Plantation LAND’

It is for the following reasons –

  • 1. The exemption is to the ‘plantation’, and not to the ‘LAND‘.
  • 2. Exemption is conditional – for it exists (only) as long as the plantation exists or continues;
  • Because,
    • (a) S. 2(44) defines ‘plantation’ as land used principally for the cultivation of a specific ‘plantation crop‘ like tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber etc.
    • (b) Section 87, Explanation II states that if a plantation for which exemption is given on recognition of a specific ‘plantation-crop’ is converted into any other ‘plantation-crop’ or the plantation activity is not continued, the exemption may be lost; and the land will be taken for considering the ceiling limit.

Effect of Conversion or Sale of A Portion of Exempted Land

Section 87 reads as under:

  • “S.87. Excess land obtained by gift, etc. to be surrendered – (1) Where any person acquires any land dafter the date notified under Section 83 by gift, purchase, mortgage with possession, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, such excess shall be surrendered to such authority as may be prescribed.
  •        Explanation 1 – Where any land is exempted by or under Section 81 and such exemption is in force on the date notified under Section 83, such land shall, with effect from the date on which it ceases to be exempted, be deemed to be land acquired after the date notified under Section 83.
  •        Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.

Explanation II is explained by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Mathew K. Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority,2018-4 KLT 913, as under:

  • “The consequence is that the benefit of the exemption would be lost and the extent added to the account of the assessee or the declarant in determination of his ceiling area.”

That is, if a person converts any portion of his exempted land to any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit; and the Taluk Land Board can proceed upon that (excess) land. In short, the exemption will be lost for that portion.

Fragmentation has to be Treated as Conversion for Non-exempted Category

The decision in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985, arose from the Writ Petition filed for a declaration that the fragmentation and sale of a Rubber Plantation for non-plantation purposes was illegal as it defeated the purpose of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. When the matter was placed before the Taluk Land Board under Sec 87, KLR Act, it found that there was no change in classification of the land and therefore dropped the proceedings. The High Court held as under:

  • “34. Section 81 of the KLR Act is in pith and substance a special provision, with its main objective of giving exemption to certain lands including the lands maintained as plantations is to prevent fragmentation of the land and to keep it as plantation itself to improve the economy of the state for welfare of people as a whole while the Act creates a regime, the State is under an obligation to safeguard, the intended purpose of the provisions of the Act in its spirit. ….. …… It could be gathered from the records that the proposal to transfer 1.03 acres of land to each workers in discharge of their service or retrenchment benefits will definitely divide the plantation into separate slots and that would definitely change the character/nature of the plantation, which could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act.”
  • “37. …. Fragmentation of the estate and transfer of it has to be treated as a case of conversion of plantation into some other category of land. Such being the scenario, fragmentation amounts to serious violation of the provisions of KLR Act. Hence, we are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No.18 that the fragmented plots will be maintained as plantation by the transferees, so as to extend/avail the benefit of HMT’s case (supra). Taking into account of all the relevant aspects, we have no hesitation in holding that dropping of the suo motu proceedings initiated under Section 87 of KLR Act by the TLB in a cursory manner, is not at all reasonable or justifiable when tested on the touchstone of the object and intention, which the legislation seeks to achieve and beyond what is required, in the interest of the public.”

End Notes III

Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v.  The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301

The Supreme Court, in Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301 (Sikri (Cj), Shelat, A.N. Ray, I.D. Dua, , H.R.  Khanna, JJ.) held that Kenan Devan Hills Concession (on grant deeds) fall within the expression “Janmam right” vested with Sircar. The State of Kerala made an Act – the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971, to “vest” the possession of the land remained in the possession of the Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd.

According to the petitioner Company, ‘it has at all times been holding, cultivating, enjoying and dealing with the Concession Land as the absolute, owner thereof’.

According to the State, this land is dealt with under this heading – Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar. and that it was only “granted” to the company for ‘coffee cultivation’. The State asserted in this case –

  • that the petitioner Company was not an absolute owner, but only a lessee under the Government, especially since the 1899 Proclamation issued by H.H. the Maharaja declaring that Kannan Devan Hills was ‘an integral part’ of the ‘territory’.
  • that the petitioner’s predecessor-in-title was John Danial Munro, who obtained, the first Pooniat Concession from Punjar Valiya Raja, on July 11, 1877. This Concession recited that an, application was made for the grant of the above property to the Raja for coffee cultivation.
  • It was further stipulated in the Concession that
    •  “you shall clear and remove the jungles, and reclaim the waste lands within the said boundaries, and cultivate them with coffee up to the year 1058 and from the year 1059, pay our rent collector a yearly rent at the rate of 3,000 British Rupees.”
  • H.H. the Maharaja executed a deed of ratification, dated November 28, 1878, by which the Government ratified the First Pooniat Concession dated July 11, 1877.
  • This deed of ratification laid down –  the Government permitted the grantee to hold the land. (it is similar to the ‘Grant/Title’ deeds executed by the State in all other ‘Grants’ – under the ‘Grant Rules’).
  • Clause 5 of the Deed of Ratification, is important. It provides, inter alia, that
    • “The grantee can appropriate to his own use within the limits of the grant all timber except the following and such as may hereafter be reserved namely, Teak, Cole Teak, Blackwood, Ebony, Karoonthaly, Sandalwood; should he carry any timber without the limits of the grant it will be subject to the payment of Kooteekanom, or Customs Duty……….
  • The eleventh clause reads – “The land granted shall be held in perpetuity as heritable or transferable property, but every case of transfer of the grant by the grantee shall be immediately made known to the Sircar, who shall have the right of apportioning the tax, if a portion of the holding is transferred.”
  • The twelfth clause stipulates – “The discovery of useful mines and treasures within the limits of the grant shall be communicated to the Sircar, and the grantee shall in respect to such mines and treasures, abide by the decision of the Sircar.”
  • The sixteenth clause provides – “The grantee shall be bound to preserve the forest trees growing on the banks of the principal streams running through the tract to the extent of fifty yards in breadth on each side of the stream, the Underwood only being permitted to be cleared and coffee planted instead. Similarly he shall also be bound to preserve the, trees about the crest of the hill to the extent of a quarter of a mile on each side.”
  • Royal Proclamation was made on September 24, 1899 provided that ‘Anjanad and Kannan Devan Hills is an integral portion of our territory and that the inhabitants of the said tract are ‘hereby informed and warned that they are not to pay any taxes, rents or dues, or make any other payment to the Poonjar Chief.

Points came for consideration in this decision were the following:

  • Whether the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 was protected from challenge under Art. 31A of the Constitution. That is, whether these lands fall within expression ‘Janmam right’ or “estate”  in art. 31A of the Constitution.
  • If the lands acquired were an “estate”, or with ‘Janmam right’ owned by the Company, the land reform enactment did not have stood valid. (Note: Kesavananda Bharathi Case came in 1973.)

The Apex Court found the following:

  • The janmam rights (even if remained with the Poonjar Chief, H.H. the Maharaja became the janmi by the Royal proclamation of 1899.
  • The nature of ‘janmam right’ has been examined by this Court previously in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887 Subba Rao, J., observed that janmam right in Kerala is an “estate and it is the freehold interest.
  • The Sircar itself is one of these janmis and it was the largest Janmi. It came to possess janmam lands by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation and other ways
  • If any person wants land in Travancore, he must obtain it from, some one of the body of Janmis, i.e. from the Sircar, which is the Chief Janmi, or from some other Janmi.

The Apex Court observed as under:

  • “… On the material placed before us it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the lands in dispute fall within the expression “Janmam right”.
  • If, as stated in Travancore Land Revenue Manual Volume IV, there are no lands that do not belong to a Janmi and the Sircar becomes a janmi by gift, escheat confiscation or otherwise, the effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1899 must be that the Sircar became the Janmi.”

The Apex Court further found –

  • The Registered Lands included inter alia, (a) Pandaravaka lands and (b) Janmam lands.
  • Regarding Pandaravaka lands it is stated : “Pandaravaka or Sircar lands are, lands of which the State is the landlord or the Jenmi and whatever rights which vest in the ryots are derived from the Sircar.”
  • Kenan Devan Hills Concession is dealt with under this heading, i.e. Pandaravaka Lands.
  • It thus appears that the State grants like Kanan Devan Hills Concession and Ten Square Miles Concession, and Munro Lands, were treated under the heading ‘Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar (that is, such Grant-lands were not ‘owned’ by the holders thereof).

On these findings The Apex Court upheld the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 and dismissed the challenge of the Company.

State of Kerala v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272

With respect to the same property  it was held in State of Kerala v. Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272as under:

  • “The Trial Court in a detailed and well-reasoned judgment dismissed the suit of the company. The Trial Court on the interpretation of First Concession (Exhibit P- 1), Second Concession (Exhibit P-2), deed of ratification (Exhibit P-62) and the Government agreement with the Society dated August 2, 1866 (Exhibit P-64) came to the conclusion that the company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession Area or the trees and timber in the said area. It was held that the Poonjar Chief had only conveyed heritable and transferable possessory rights over the Concession area to the grantee. It was also held that absolute rights over the trees and timber in the Concession Area did not pass to the grantee and it had only the right to use and remove timber subject to the restrictions imposed in the deeds of conveyance/ratification.”

It is observed:

  • “An identical clause in another grant entered into by the Travancore Government came for consideration before a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in George A Leslie v. State of Kerala, [1969] K. L.T. 378, K. K. Mathew, J. (as the learned Judge then was) interpreted the clause as under:
    •  We think that if title to the reserved trees passed to the grantees, a provision of this nature would have been quite unnecessary. There was no purpose in stating that the grantees will be free to appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant, if title to the trees passed to the grantees; the provision is a clear indication that the grantees were allowed to cut and appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant as a matter of concession.”
  • “We agree with the interpretation given to the clause by Mathew, J. and hold that the respondent- company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession Area or the trees and the timber therein.”

It is observed further:

  • “It was further held by Mathew, J. (in George A. Leslie v. State of Kerala, 1969 KLT 378) that kuttikanam being the governments share of the value of the trees owned by the government it has the power to fix the value of the trees. We agree with the reasoning and conclusions reached by Mathew, J.”

The Apex Court upheld and approved “the judgment and findings” of the Trial Court.

End Notes IV

Cultivating Tenants, were Obliged to Apply LT & The Legal Basis of Balanoor Plantations case

The legal basis of the decision, Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, can be derived from Sec. Sec. 85(3) of the KLR Act.

Sec. 85(3) and (3A) of the KLR Act read as under:

  • (3). Where, after the final settlement of claims for resumption of lands held by a person as tenant, such person holds land in excess of the ceiling area, or where after the purchase of the right, title and interest of the landowner** and the intermediary by the cultivating tenant in respect of lands owned by a person, such person owns land in excess of the ceiling area, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided.
  • (3A). The person bound to file a statement under Sub-section (2) shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same. [Substituted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]

**Why the WordsAfter The Purchase of the Right, Title And Interest of the Landowner” Included?

It is definite: It is for adjudicating the ‘tenancy right’, by the Land Tribunal – for, the Land Tribunal is the only authority that can decide on the “tenancy right.” (It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case.)

  • Note: A tenant cannot avail benefits declaring himself to be a cultivating-tenant; on the contrary, he has to approach the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act; that is, the Land Tribunal.
  • Land Board or Taluk Land Board (deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues etc.) cannot adjudicate on tenancy right.

A cultivating tenant, “entitled to assignment” of the right under Sec. 72B, if failed to apply the same, will not have ‘vested right to continue’, as a cultivating tenant and he will not be entitled to the benefit of fixity under Sec. 13 of the KLR Act.

  • Note: The tenant who opts to avail benefits of plantation-exemption, under Sec. 81, cannot seek fragmentation (Sec. 87, Explanation II) of the plantation land and obtain purchase-certificate (under Sec. 72A, 72B or 72C). Still, he stands as a cultivating tenant, “entitled to assignment” of the right under Sec. 72B. As shown elsewhere, there is an option for the tenant – either to obtain purchase-certificate or to avail plantation-exemption.

Sec. 72B provides for cultivating tenant’s rights to get assignment by purchase certificate (through LT) – within ceiling area. Tenant is “obliged to apply” for it within 2 years from 1-1-1970. Therefore, the cultivating tenants entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest were “obliged to apply” to the Land Tribunal within the time fixed for asserting the claim as cultivating tenants. This decision also says that tenants having ‘no bona fide claim’ as to cultivating-tenancy will not have the benefit of fixity under Sec. 13 of the KLR Act, and they will have ‘no vested right to continue’.

Sec. 73B(3) reads as under:

  • “(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

Read connected Blogs

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

A Criticism on Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati (2024 SC), as regards Finding on Adverse Possession

In Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle (2024 KLT(Online) 3058), the Supreme Court Failed to Notice the Change as regards Onus, Under 1963 Limitation Act.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Abstract

On December 20, 2024 our Apex Court, in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 0 KLT(Online) 3058, held –

  • a plaint deserves rejection under Order VII rule 11, CPC if the pleadings contained therein is founded on forgery or fabrication (of documents) that came to the knowledge of the plaintiff decades back,
  • for, such a claim would be hopelessly barred by limitation (as it is governed under Article 59, Limitation Act which fixes period of limitation as 3 years) [Paras 18, 20, 22, 26].

In paragraph 23 of the Judgment, while dealing with ‘adverse possession’, the Court observed as under:

  • “As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title can be sought within twelve years. …. The plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State for possession within twelve years.”

The Case of the Plaintiff, in Brief

  • The plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title and recovery of the plaint properties. It was alleged in the plaint that the predecessor of the plaintiff (belonging to Gosavis family) had no right, under the original Sanad, to sell the suit properties to the Defendant Trust (under the sale deeds of 1938 and 1952).
  • Since the original Sanad was lost, the defendants had initiated a suit against the State which was compromised. In the compromise, the State accepted that it was a “soil grant”. Plaintiff was not a party to the said suit and without his knowledge, the consent decree was obtained clandestinely
  • Though it was “only a revenue grant”, the defendants have played systematic fraud in Civil Suits of 1951 and 1988 and Civil Appeal of 2001. and without any judicial pronouncements they have usurped the lands under suspicious compromises arrived at before the Court.

The Case of the Defendants, in Brief

  • The defendant Trust contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The Plaintiff or his predecessors did not take any step to assert their title and rights. The plaintiff knows fully well that the challenge to the registered sale deeds of the years 1938 and 1952 would be barred by limitation.
  • The defendant Trust had purchased 3/4th share of the suit lands mentioned in the Schedule in an auction sale conducted by the Civil Court, Pune, in the year 1938 from the previous Inamdar Gosavis family and the same was duly registered; and they had also purchased the remaining 1/4th share in the suit lands in the year 1952 by another registered sale deed.
  • The cause of action to sustain his suit is an imaginary one.

The Application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC

  • The defendant filed application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC r/w Articles 58, 59 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking rejection of the plaint saying that the alleged cause of action in 2007 is ‘purely illusory and has been stated with a view to get over the bar’ of limitation.
  • The trial Court rejected the application. It observed that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, for which, the parties will have to lead evidence.
  • The Bombay High Court dismissed the Civil Revision Application by the defendant. Hence the SLP.
  • The Supreme Court allowed the the Order VII rule 11 petition of the defendant/appellant.

Analysis

The Court specifically considered the effect of (i) not seeking cancellation of the disputed deeds in the light of Sec. 31 of the Specific Relief Act (ii) not challenging a sale by the court in 1952 and that by the predecessors of the plaintiff and (iii) the averments in the plaint as regards fraud in relation to the compromise decrees.

  • As regards Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Apex Court found that a declaration to adjudge the sale deeds voidable must have been sought as it stood “adverse to the interest and right of the plaintiff” and caused a serious injury. (Para 19)
  • As regards the conveyance in 1952, it was found that the right to sue had first accrued to the predecessors of the plaintiff, when the properties were brought for sale by the court in1952; and that “no challenge was made to the court auction“. (Para 19.1)
  • As regards fraud in relation to the compromise decrees, the Apex Court pointed out that the averments in the plaint are “vague and general, besides baseless and unsubstantiated”; and, it was found that no case can be culled out from the averments made in the plaint” in this respect.  It was further observed that the Plaintiff was a stranger to the suits which ended in compromise. Therefore, in view of the direct bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC, applicable to third parties as well, the plaintiff could not have sought a declaration theron (Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh, (2020) 6 SCC 629), and the only remedy available was to approach the same court. (Para25)

The Apex Court Rejected the Plaint Observing the Following:

  • As settled in law, when an application to reject the plaint is filed, the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith alone are germane (Para 11, 12).
  • Though limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and question of ‘limitation’ has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record, if the averments made in the plaint, on bare perusal, disclosed that the reliefs were hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant to reject the suit under Order VII Rule 11 (Para 18, 26).
  • As per Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a declaration to adjudge the documents as void or voidable must be sought if it causes a serious injury. In the present case, the sale deeds “undisputably stand adverse to the interest and right of the plaintiff” and hence, a relief to declare them as invalid must have been sought. Though the plaintiff has pleaded the documents to be void and sought to ignore the documents, we do not think that the document is void, but rather, according to us, it can only be treated as voidable. (Para 19).
  • In paragraph 14 of the plaint, there is an averment that the original sanad was lost and a new sanad was given to the effect that the inam was a “revenue grant” based on the report of the Inam Commissioner. Again, specific dates are not mentioned in the plaint. In paragraph 25, the plaintiff alleges that “third party rights were created” by the Gosavi family without any right. Here also, the details are vague. It can be inferred that such rights ultimately culminated into court auction, in which, the property was sold to the appellant. (Para 19).
  • The Plaintiff is a “stranger to the suit properties”; the Defendants are the owners of the suit properties. It is a settled principle of law that the owners cannot be restrained from dealing with their own properties at the instance of a stranger. The said relief is again a consequential relief to the claim of title, which has been non-suited on the ground of limitation. The relief of title (founded on a plea of fraud) had to be established by the plaintiff, by a ‘declaration’. (Para 22, 24).
  • The plaintiff is to be non-suited on the ground of limitation; because, the limitation period is 3 years for both Article 58 (declaration) and Article 59 (cancellation of a decree) Limitation Act (Para 19.1, 20).
  • The case put forwarded by the Plaintiff as to fraud and compromise decrees are “vague and general, besides baseless and unsubstantiated” (only remedy on such situation lies in the same court) (Para 25).
  • It is not correct to contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application at all in the event the transaction is held to be void. [Relied on: Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353.]
  • The plaintiff has failed to sue the defendant for possession within twelve years of losing possession (para 23).

Nevertheless, allowing the appeal, the Apex Court observed in the penultimate paragraph as under:

  • “26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court.
  • We again place it on record that this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is committed which had recently come to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff and his predecessors did not take any steps to assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of action is also found to be creation of fiction. However, the trial Court erroneously dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC.
  • The High Court also erred in affirming the same, keeping the question of limitation open to be considered by the trial Court after considering the evidence along with other issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the averments made by the Respondent No.1 in the Plaint as mandated by Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC.
  • The spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC is only for the Courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex facie appears to be a clear abuse of process. The Courts by being reluctant only cause more harm to the defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence. Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold.”

A Criticism

Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 primarily governs the Law on Adverse Possession. According to this Article –

  • the starting point of Limitation is “When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.”

Articles 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:

65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.12 yearsWhen the possession of Defendant becomes
adverse to the plaintiff.

Art. 65 underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned (from 1908 Limitation Act). It casts the entire burden on the claimant/trespasser to plead and prove adverse possession.

Plaintiff need not have filed the suit within 12 years of losing possession

It is noteworthy – under Article 65, the plaintiff need not have come before the court within 12 years of losing possession; the period of 12 years has significance only if the defendant asserts “adverse possession”.

  • Because, the 12-year-period stated in Article 65 is not the period of
    • “mere losing possession” by the plaintiff;
  • on the contrary, what is stated is 12 years of
    • “adverse possession”
  • from the part of the defendant (with the required animus).

Finding in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati as to Recovery of Possession – Appears to be Incorrect

After definitely holding that the title claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation under Article 58 (declaration) and Article 59 (cancellation of a decree) of the Limitation Act, the Apex Court considered, in paragraph 23 of the Judgment, as an additional ground, whether the suit is barred under Article 65 of the Limitation Act that deals with ‘adverse possession’. It is observed that the plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State, for possession, within twelve years. (Therefore the suit is liable to be rejected on this ground also.)

Para 23 reads as under:

  • “23. Further, in the aforesaid suit, the Respondent No.1 also sought possession of the suit properties based on title. As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title can be sought within twelve years. From the records, it is evident that the possession of the subject properties was initially with the Government of Maharashtra, then with the Gonsavis and thereafter with the Defendant No. 1 and it can be safely said that at least for a century, the Respondent No. 1 nor his predecessors have been in possession of the properties after the grant of Inam. The plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State for possession within twelve years. We have already held that the title claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and therefore, the claim for possession is also barred and consequently, the relief of recovery of possession is also hopelessly barred by limitation.”

But it is trite law – to attract ‘Adverse Possession’ mere possession, however long,  is insufficient; it must be ‘adverse‘.

Limitation Act underwent Complete Change insofar as the ‘Onus’ 

In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988, our Apex Court (following P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59) pointed out that that the Limitation Act, 1963 underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned (from 1908 Limitation Act). The Court observed as under:

  • “34. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned : once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession….”

In T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570, it has been held as under:

  • “20. It is well-recognised proposition in law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner’s title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former’s hostile action.” (Quoted in: Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 2011 SC 1480, 2010 14 SCC 316)

In Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, 2019-15 SCC 756, it is held as under:

  • “It is a settled principle of law that mere continuous possession howsoever long it may have been qua its true owner is not enough to sustain the plea of adverse possession unless it is further proved that such possession was open, hostile, exclusive and with the assertion of ownership right over the property to the knowledge of its true owner.”

The law on this point (i.e., mere possession, however long,  is insufficient; but, it must be “adverse“, to attract ‘Adverse Possession’) is laid down in the following decisions also:

  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988
  • Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461,
  • Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) 8 SCC 729
  • Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai, 2019-13 SCC 324
  • Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, 2019-15 SCC 756
  • Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba  Rao, 2010-14 SCC 316
  • T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa – 2006(7) SCC 570.
  • Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India – (2004) 10 SCC 779.
  • Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, 1994-6 SCC 591
  • Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chandar 1984(2) SCC 286.

A Brief Note on Article 65

  • Article 65 deals with recovery based on title.
  • Under Article 65, in a suit on title, previous period in dispossession of plaintiff is immaterial. The onus is no longer on the plaintiff to prove that his dispossession took place within the period of limitation. (Jagannath Garnaik v. Sankar Samal, AIR 1990 Ori 124; State of Orissa v Jhunjhunwalla, 1986 CLT 55)  
  • Under Article 65, once title is established by the plaintiff, plaintiff cannot be non-suited, unless defendant establishes adverse possession.  (Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549; Bhushan Lal v. Suresh Kumar, AIR 1987 All 25,  Manikyala Rao v. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1996 SC 470; Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021.)
  • Under Article 65, if plaintiff could not prove his title, he will fail; and in such a case, whether the defendant proves title (or not) is immaterial. (Ranjit Kumar Bhowmik v.  Subodh Kumar Roy, (2004) I WBLR 228: (2004) 2 CHN 180).

‘Deemed Knowledge’ as to Registration to Persons Acquiring such Property

The Apex Court (in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati) referred to Dilboo v. Dhanraji, AIR 2000 SC 3146 : 2000-7 SCC 702, held as under:

  • “20…… Whenever a document is registered the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge. In other cases where a fact could be discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to the plaintiff because a party cannot be allowed to extend the period of limitation by merely claiming that he had no knowledge.”

It is noteworthy that the ‘deemed knowledge’ as to registration is confined to ‘persons acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property’ alone, as per Section 3 Explanation 1 of the TP Act. It reads as under:

  • “Explanation I – Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instruments, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or (where the property is not all situated in one sub-district….”

Registration is not a notice in rem

In Parganas Lawyers Clerks Association  v. State, AIR 1986  Cal. 205, it is unequivocally held as to Registration of deeds – “It is not a notice in rem“.

The law expounded in Explanation to Sec. 3 of the TP Act cannot be used as a shield to protect from the criminal actions on willful suppression of facts, in a criminal matter, as held in Kuldip Singh v. State, AIR 1954 P&H 31, it was observed as under:

  • “The object of the explanation to Section 3 is to safeguard the interests of a third party who has acquired a good title under a previous registered instrument but it does not in any way alter or modify the criminal liability of a person who deliberately suppresses certain facts or misstates certain facts.”

Law on this point is vividly explained in the following decisions:

  • Kuldip Singh v. State, AIR 1954 P&H 31
  • Parganas Lawyers Clerks Association  v. State, AIR 1986  Cal. 205,
  • Godhan Son of Pola v. Ram Bilas, AIR 1995 All. 357
  • R. Ravichandran v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 2002-2-LW 590
  • Arabia Bibi v. Sarbunnisa (2011, R. Subbiah, J.),
  • Ranjit Singh v. Punjab State, 2014-4 LawHerald 3533; 2014-3 RCR(Civ) 766

Read Blog: Does Registration of a Document give Notice to the Whole World?

Conclusion

(i) Law as to seeking declaration

The Apex Court vividly expounded the law as regards adjudging the documents as void or voidable invoking Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court pointed out that the plaintiff being challenged (i) the sale made by his predecessor itself, and also (ii) the auction sale conducted by a Civil Court, it was necessary to seek declarations in those regard.

(ii) Law on Adverse Possession

Nonetheless, as shown above, it is beyond doubt that mere possession, however long, is not sufficient to bring home the doctrine of adverse possession; but, it must have been held “adverse” to the interests of the true owner for the stipulated period and must have been tracked with the required animus from the part of the claimant.

Therefore, it can be stated – in accordance with Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963,

  • unless the defendant asserts and proves ‘adverse possession’, the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title need not be sought (by the plaintiff) within twelve years of losing possession.

Read Blog: How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept

End Notes – 1

Law on Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

Whether a declaration to adjudge the documents as void or voidable must be sought if it causes a serious injury?

End Notes – 2

Relevant portion of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

“3. Interpretation clause

……

  • a person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.
  • Explanation I.—Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated:
  • Provided that—(1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder, (2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under section 51 of that Act, and(3)the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under section 55 of that Act.
  • Explanation II.—Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.
  • Explanation III.—A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material:
  • Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud.”

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

A Criticism on Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle: Rejection of Plaint on ‘Bar of Limitation’ on Plea of Fraud

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

On December 20, 2024 our Apex Court, in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, held –

  • a plaint deserves rejection under Order VII rule 11, CPC if the pleadings contained therein is founded on forgery or fabrication (of documents) that came to the knowledge of the plaintiff decades back,
  • for, such a claim would be hopelessly barred by limitation (as it is governed under Article 59, Limitation Act which fixes period of limitation as 3 years) [Paras 18, 20, 22, 26].

In paragraph 23 of the Judgment, while dealing with ‘adverse possession’, the Court observed as under:

  • “As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title can be sought within twelve years. …. The plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State for possession within twelve years.”

Facts of the Case, in Brief

  • The plaintiff alleged that the defendants have played systematic fraud on various courts, and without any judicial pronouncements they usurped the lands, under suspicious compromises arrived at before the Court.
  • Though the alleged forgery or fabrication had been come to the knowledge of the plaintiff and his predecessors long back (more than 50 years), they did not take any step to assert their title and rights.
  • The defendant filed application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC r/w Articles 58, 59 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking rejection of the plaint.
  • The trial Court rejected the application. It observed that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, for which, the parties will have to lead evidence.
  • The High Court dismissed the Civil Revision Application. Hence the SLP.

Analysis

The Court specifically considered the effect of (i) not seeking cancellation of the disputed deeds in the light of Sec. 31 of the Specific Relief Act (ii) not challenging a sale by the court in 1952 and that by the predecessors of the plaintiff and (iii) the averments in the plaint as regards fraud in relation to the compromise decrees.

  • As regards Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Apex Court found that a declaration to adjudge the sale deeds voidable must have been sought as it stood “adverse to the interest and right of the plaintiff” and caused a serious injury. (Para 19)
  • As regards the conveyance in 1952, it was found that the right to sue had first accrued to the predecessors of the plaintiff, when the properties were brought for sale by the court in1952; and that “no challenge was made to the court auction”. (Para 19.1)
  • As regards fraud in relation to the compromise decrees, the Apex Court pointed out that the averments in the plaint are “vague and general, besides baseless and unsubstantiated”; and, it was found that “no case can be culled out from the averments made in the plaint” in this respect.  It was further observed that the Plaintiff was a stranger to the suits which ended in compromise. Therefore, in view of the direct bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC, applicable to third parties as well, the plaintiff could not have sought a declaration theron (Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh, (2020) 6 SCC 629), and the only remedy available was to approach the same court. (Para25)

Analysing the legal principles the Court held –

  • As settled in law, when an application to reject the plaint is filed, the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith alone are germane (Para 11, 12).
  • Though limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and question of ‘limitation’ has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record, if the averments made in the plaint, on a bare perusal, disclosed that the reliefs were hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant to reject the suit under Order VII Rule 11 (Para 18, 26).
  • A suit founded on fraud, must be proceeded with a ‘declaration’. Period of limitation for such a declaration (governed under under Article 58, Limitation Act) as well as that for cancellation of a decree (governed under under Article 59, Limitation Act) is 3 years (Para 19.1, 20).

The Apex Court Rejected the Plaint for the Following:

  • Plaintiff is a stranger. The relief of title (founded on a plea of fraud) had to be established by the plaintiff, by a ‘declaration’ (Para 24, 25).
  • The plaintiff is to be non-suited on the ground of limitation; because, the limitation period is 3 years for both Article 58 (declaration) and Article 59 (cancellation of a decree) Limitation Act (Para 19.1, 20).
  • The case put forwarded by the Plaintiff as to fraud and compromise decrees are “vague and general, besides baseless and unsubstantiated” (only remedy on such situation lies in the same court) (Para 25).
  • It is not correct to contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application at all in the event the transaction is held to be void. [Relied on: Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353.]

Nevertheless, allowing the appeal, the Apex Court observed in the penultimate paragraph as under:

  • “26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court.
  • We again place it on record that this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is committed which had recently come to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff and his predecessors did not take any steps to assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of action is also found to be creation of fiction. However, the trial Court erroneously dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC.
  • The High Court also erred in affirming the same, keeping the question of limitation open to be considered by the trial Court after considering the evidence along with other issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the averments made by the Respondent No.1 in the Plaint as mandated by Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC.
  • The spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC is only for the Courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex facie appears to be a clear abuse of process. The Courts by being reluctant only cause more harm to the defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence. Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold.”

A Criticism

Finding in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati as to Recovery of Possession – Appears to be Incorrect

After definitely holding that the title claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation under Article 58 (declaration) and Article 59 (cancellation of a decree) of the Limitation Act, the Apex Court considered, in paragraph 23 of the Judgment, as an additional ground, whether the suit is barred under Article 65 of the Limitation Act that deals with ‘adverse possession’. It is observed that the plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State, for possession, within twelve years. (Therefore the suit is liable to be rejected on this ground also.)

Para 23, reads as under:

  • 23. Further, in the aforesaid suit, the Respondent No.1 also sought possession of the suit properties based on title. As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title can be sought within twelve years. From the records, it is evident that the possession of the subject properties was initially with the Government of Maharashtra, then with the Gonsavis and thereafter with the Defendant No.1 and it can be safely said that at least for a century, the Respondent No.1 nor his predecessors have been in possession of the properties after the grant of Inam. The plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State for possession within twelve years. We have already held that the title claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and therefore, the claim for possession is also barred and consequently, the relief of recovery of possession is also hopelessly barred by limitation.”

But it is trite law – to attract ‘Adverse Possession’ mere possession, however long,  is insufficient; it must be ‘adverse‘.

Adverse Possession ‘Drastic’ Change of Law by 1963 Limitation Act

Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 primarily governs the Law on Adverse Possession. According to this Article –

  • the starting point of Limitation is “When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.”

Articles 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:

65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.12 yearsWhen the possession of Defendant becomes
adverse to the plaintiff.

Complete change insofar as the Onus Under 1963 Limitation Act

Art. 65 underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned (from 1908 Limitation Act). It casts the entire burden on the claimant/trespasser to plead and prove adverse possession.

Plaintiff need not have filed the suit within 12 years of losing possession

It is noteworthy – under Article 65, the plaintiff need not have come before the court within 12 years of losing possession; the period of 12 years has significance only if the defendant asserts “adverse possession”.

  • Because, the 12-year-period stated in Article 65 is not the period of
    • “mere losing possession” by the plaintiff;
  • on the contrary, what is stated is 12 years of
    • “adverse possession”
  • from the part of the defendant (with the required animus).

Limitation Act underwent Complete Change insofar as the ‘Onus’ 

In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988, our Apex Court (following P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59) pointed out that that the Limitation Act 1963 underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned (from 1908 Limitation Act). The Court observed as under:

  • “34. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned : once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession….”

The authoritative decisions say – mere possession, however long,  is insufficient; it must be adverse (to attract ‘Adverse Possession’). The law on this point (not mere long possession, but ‘Adverse Possession’ required by the drastic change in 1963 Act) is clearly laid down in the following decisions also:

  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988
  • Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461,
  • Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) 8 SCC 729
  • Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai, 2019-13 SCC 324
  • Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, 2019-15 SCC 756
  • Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba  Rao, 2010-14 SCC 316
  • T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa – 2006(7) SCC 570.
  • Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India – (2004) 10 SCC 779
  • Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, 1994-6 SCC 591
  • Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chandar 1984(2) SCC 286.

In T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570, it has been held as under:

  • “20. It is well-recognised proposition in law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner’s title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former’s hostile action.” (Quoted in: Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 2011 SC 1480, 2010 14 SCC 316)

In Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, 2019-15 SCC 756, it is held as under:

  • “It is a settled principle of law that mere continuous possession howsoever long it may have been qua its true owner is not enough to sustain the plea of adverse possession unless it is further proved that such possession was open, hostile, exclusive and with the assertion of ownership right over the property to the knowledge of its true owner.”

A Brief Note on Article 65

As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, starting point of Limitation is “When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.”

  • Article 65 deals with recovery based on title.
  • Under Article 65, in a suit on title, previous period in dispossession of plaintiff is immaterial. The onus is no longer on the plaintiff to prove that his dispossession took place within the period of limitation. (Jagannath Garnaik v. Sankar Samal, AIR 1990 Ori 124; State of Orissa v Jhunjhunwalla, 1986 CLT 55)  
  • Under Article 65, if plaintiff could establish his title, it would fail only if the defendant proves adverse possession over twelve years. (Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549; Bhushan Lal v. Suresh Kumar, AIR 1987 All 25,  Manikyala Rao v. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1996 SC 470; Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021.)
  • Under Article 65, if plaintiff could not prove his title, he will fail; and in such a case, whether the defendant proves title (or not) is immaterial. (Ranjit Kumar Bhowmik v.  Subodh Kumar Roy, (2004) I WBLR 228: (2004) 2 CHN 180).

Conclusion

The Apex Court vividly expounded the law as regards adjudging the documents as void or voidable invoking Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court pointed out that the plaintiff being challenged (i) the sale made by his predecessor itself, and also (ii) the auction sale conducted by a Civil Court, it was necessary to seek declarations in those regard.

Nonetheless, as shown above, it is indisputable that mere possession, however long, is not sufficient to bring home the doctrine of adverse possession; rather, it must be shown that such possession was held “adverse” to the interests of the rightful owner for the prescribed period and it must have been endured with the requisite animus on the part of the claimant.

Therefore, it can be stated that in accordance with Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, unless the defendant asserts and proves ‘adverse possession’

  • the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title need not have been sought (by the plaintiff) within twelve years of losing possession.

Read Blog: How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept

End Notes:

Order VII rule 11 CPC reads as under:

“11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases-

  • (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
  • (b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
  • (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
  • (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:
  • Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”

Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

“3. Interpretation clause.

  • a person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.
  • Explanation I.- Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated:
  • Provided that-(1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder, (2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under section 51 of that Act, and(3)the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under section 55 of that Act.
  • Explanation II.-Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.
  • Explanation III.-A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material: Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud.”

Rulings relied on:

Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra), (2020) 7 SCC 366

  • “23.2. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision.
  • 23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit,
    • no cause of action is disclosed, or
    • the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d),
  • the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.
  • 23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315 (Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823) this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words : (SCC p.324, para 12)
  • 23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
  • 23.6. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint (Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. V. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512), read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.
  • 23.7. Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under:
    • “14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.-
    • Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
    • Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
    • A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
    • Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”(emphasis supplied)
  • 23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.
  • 23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.
  • 23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration (Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137).
  • 23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I which reads as : (SCC p.562, para 139)
    • “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.”
  • 23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614, the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999) 3 SCC 267).
  • 23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
  • 23.14. The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain (supra).
  • 23.15. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint.
  • 24. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.
  • 24.1. In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam, (2005) 10 SCC 51, this Court held:
    • “24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove an order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded”(emphasis supplied)
  • 24.2. In T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, this Court held that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory, in the following words: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
    • “5. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing.”(emphasis supplied)
  • 24.3. Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 170, this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint.
  • 24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174, held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court.
  • 25. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section 2(j) defines the expression “period of limitation” to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary article.
Description of suitPeriod of limitationTime from which period begins to run
58. To obtain any other declarationThree yearsWhen the right to sue first accrues
59. To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contractThree yearsWhen the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
  • The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and 59 of the 1963 Act is three years, which commences from the date when the right to sue first accrues.
  • 27. In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126, this Court held that the use of the word ‘first’ between the words ‘sue’ and ‘accrued’, would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued.
  • 28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082, held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words “right to sue” means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected.”

R.K. Mohd. Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab, (2000) 6 SCC 402

  • “15. Notice is defined in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be actual where the party has actual knowledge of the fact or constructive. “A person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.
  • Explanation II of said Section 3 reads:
    • “Explanation II.-Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.”

Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar, (1968) 2 SCJ 555 : AIR 1968 SC 956

  • “5. The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable. In Foster v. Mackinon [(1869) 4 CP 704] the action was by the endorsee of a bill of exchange. The defendant pleaded that he endorsed the bill on a fraudulent representation by the acceptor that he was signing a guarantee. In holding that such a plea was admissible, the Court observed:
    • “It (signature) is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and therefore in contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended. The defendant never intended to sign that contract or any such contract. He never intended to put his name to any instrument that then was or thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived, not merely as to the legal effect, but as to the ‘actual contents’ of the instrument.”
  • This decision has been followed by the Indian courts Sanni Bibi v. Siddik Hossain [AIR 1919 Cal 728], and Brindaban v. Dhurba Charan [AIR 1929 Cal 606]. It is not the contention of the appellant in the present case that there was any fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the gift deed but Shiddappa fraudulently included in the gift deed plots 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village without her knowledge. We are accordingly of the opinion that the transaction of gift was voidable and not void and the suit must be brought within the time prescribed under Article 95 of the Limitation Act.”

Dilboo v. Dhanraji, (2000) 7 SCC 702

  • “20. Whenever a document is registered the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge. In other cases where a fact could be discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to the plaintiff because a party cannot be allowed to extend the period of limitation by merely claiming that he had no knowledge

Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa, (1996) 7 SCC 767

  • “5. Section 55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 regulates rights and liabilities of the buyer and seller. The seller is bound to disclose to the buyer any material defect in the property or in the seller’s title thereto of which the seller is, and the buyer is not, aware, and which the buyer could not with ordinary care discover. The seller is to answer, to the best of his information, all relevant questions put to him by the buyer in respect of the property or the title thereto. The seller shall be deemed to contract with the buyer that the interest which the seller professes to transfer to the buyer subsists and that he has power to transfer the same.
  • Section 3 provides that “a person is said to have a notice of a fact when he actually knows the fact, or when but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it”. Explanation II amplifies that “any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof”. Constructive notice in equity treats a man who ought to have known a fact, as if he actually knows it. Generally speaking, constructive notice may not be inferred unless some specific circumstances can be shown as a starting point of enquiry which if pursued would have led to the discovery of the fact.
  • As a fact it is found that Rafique filed the sale deed dated 1-12- 1959 executed in his favour by Mahangu, in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 for which the petitioner claims to have derivative title through Rafique. Rafique had full knowledge that despite the purported sale, Bibi Raifunnisa got the preliminary decree passed in 1973 and in 1974 under the final decree the right, title and interest in the suit property passed on to her. Under Section 55 when second sale deed dated 6-9-1980 was got executed by the petitioner from Rafique, it is imputable that Rafique had conveyed all the knowledge of the defects in title and he no longer had title to the property.
  • It is also a finding of fact recorded by the appellate court and affirmed by the High Court that the petitioner was in know of full facts of the preliminary decree and the final decree passed and execution thereof. In other words, the finding is that he had full knowledge, from the inception of Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 from his benamidar. Having had that knowledge, he got the second sale deed executed and registered on 6-9-1980. Oblivious to these facts, he did not produce the second original sale deed nor is an attempt made to produce secondary evidence on proof of the loss of original sale deed.
  • 6. The question, therefore, is as to whether Article 59 or Article 113 of the Schedule to the Act is applicable to the facts in this case. Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 had provided inter alia for suits to set aside decree obtained by fraud. There was no specific article to set aside a decree on any other ground. In such a case, the residuary Article 120 in Schedule III was attracted. The present Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act will govern any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. Therefore, Article 59 would be applicable to any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground.
  • It is true that Article 59 would be applicable if a person affected is a party to a decree or an instrument or a contract. There is no dispute that Article 59 would apply to set aside the instrument, decree or contract between the inter se parties. The question is whether in case of person claiming title through the party to the decree or instrument or having knowledge of the instrument or decree or contract and seeking to avoid the decree by a specific declaration, whether Article 59 gets attracted? As stated earlier, Article 59 is a general provision. In a suit to set aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud, Article 59 is attractedThe starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud.
  • When the plaintiff seeks to establish his title to the property which cannot be established without avoiding the decree or an instrument that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him, though not a party, the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set aside or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 regulates suits for cancellation of an instrument which lays down that any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, can sue to have it adjudged void or voidable and the court may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered or cancelled.
  • It would thus be clear that the word ‘person’ in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is wide enough to encompass a person seeking derivative title from his seller. It would, therefore, be clear that if he seeks avoidance of the instrument, decree or contract and seeks a declaration to have the decrees set aside or cancelled he is necessarily bound to lay the suit within three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set aside, first became known to him.
  • 7. The question, therefore, is as to when the facts of granting preliminary and final decrees touching upon the suit land first became known to him. As seen, when he claimed title to the property as owner and Rafique to be his benamidar, as admitted by Rafique, the title deed dated 1-12-1959 was filed in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969. Thereby Rafique had first known about the passing of the preliminary decree in 1973 and final decree in 1974 as referred to earlier. Under all these circumstances, Article 113 is inapplicable to the facts on hand.
  • Since the petitioner claimed derivative title from him but for his wilful abstention from making enquiry or his omission to file the second sale deed dated 6-9-1980, an irresistible inference was rightly drawn by the courts below that the petitioner had full knowledge of the fact right from the beginning; in other words right from the date when title deed was filed in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 and preliminary decree was passed on 2-1-1973 and final decree was passed on 5-2-1974. Admittedly, the suit was filed in 1981 beyond three years from the date of knowledge. Thereby, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The decree of the appellate court and the order of the High Court, therefore, are not illegal warranting interference.”

Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353

  • “11. Limitation is a statute of repose. It ordinarily bars a remedy, but, does not extinguish a right. The only exception to the said rule is to be found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides that at the determination of the period prescribed thereby, limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.
  • 12. An extinction of right, as contemplated by the provisions of the Limitation Act, prima facie would be attracted in all types of suits. The Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, as prescribed by the articles, provides that upon lapse of the prescribed period, the institution of a suit will be barred. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that irrespective of the fact as to whether any defence is set out or is raised by the defendant or not, in the event a suit is found to be barred by limitation, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and every application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed.
  • 13. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when a relief is claimed on the ground of fraud or mistake. It only encompasses within its fold fraudulent transactions which are voidable transactions.
  • 14. A suit for cancellation of instrument is based on the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under:
    • “31. When cancellation may be ordered.-Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
    • If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.”
  • 15. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 thus, refers to both void and voidable documents. It provides for a discretionary relief.
  • 16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non est in the eye of the law, as it would be a nullity.
  • 17. Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by Article 59. Even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary article would be.
  • 18. Article 59 would be attracted when coercion, undue influence, misappropriation or fraud which the plaintiff asserts is required to be proved. Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore, apply where a document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to instruments which are presumptively invalid. (See Unni v. Kunchi Amma [ILR (1891) 14 Mad 26] and Sheo Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri [ILR (1897) 24 Cal 77].)
  • 19. It is not in dispute that by reason of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the scope has been enlarged from the old Article 91 of the 1908 Act. By reason of Article 59, the provisions contained in Articles 91 and 114 of the 1908 Act had been combined.
  • 20. If the plaintiff is in possession of a property, he may file a suit for declaration that the deed is not binding upon him but if he is not in possession thereof, even under a void transaction, the right by way of adverse possession may be claimed. Thus, it is not correct to contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application at all in the event the transaction is held to be void.
  • 21. Respondent 1 has not alleged that fraudulent misrepresentation was made to him as regards the character of the document. According to him, there had been a fraudulent misrepresentation as regards its contents.
  • 22. In Ningawwa v. Byrappa [(1968) 2 SCR 797 : AIR 1968 SC 956] this Court held that the fraudulent misrepresentation as regards character of a document is void but fraudulent misrepresentation as regards contents of a document is voidable stating: (SCR p. 801 C-D)
    • “The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable.”
  • In that case, a fraud was found to have been played and it was held that as the suit was instituted within a few days after the appellant therein came to know of the fraud practised on her, the same was void. It was, however, held: (SCR p. 803 B-E)
    • “Article 91 of the Limitation Act provides that a suit to set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for (and no other provision of the Act applies to the circumstances of the case) shall be subject to a three years’ limitation which begins to run when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside are known to him.
    • In the present case, the trial court has found, upon examination of the evidence, that at the very time of the execution of the gift deed, Ext. 45 the appellant knew that her husband prevailed upon her to convey Surveys Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village to him by undue influence. The finding of the trial court is based upon the admission of the appellant herself in the course of her evidence. In view of this finding of the trial court it is manifest that the suit of the appellant is barred under Article 91 of the Limitation Act so far as Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village are concerned.”
  • “27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.
  • 28. If a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property purportedly conveyed thereunder. He could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority. Here, the plaintiff did not either sue within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority. Therefore, the suit was rightly held to be barred by limitation by the trial court.”

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land-Owners/Tenants?

Jojy George Koduvath.

Abstract

In the context of Acquisition, it is necessary to examine three categories of plantation lands.

  • 1. Private plantation lands.
  • 2. Government lands on lease for plantation.
  • 3. Plantation-lease-lands vested in Government under Sec. 72 of the KLR Act (and formerly owned by private persons).

GENERAL

1. Chapter III – Exemption of Plantation Land

Chapter III (Sections 81 to 98A) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 deals with ‘Restriction on Ownership and Possession of Land in Excess of Ceiling Area and Disposal of Excess Lands’.

Among other things, Chapter III lays down provisions as to:

  • ceiling limit,
  • exemptions from ceiling limit,
  • effect of conversion of exempted land.

2. Sec. 81(1)says that the provisions of Chapter III shall not apply to –

  • lands owned or held by the Government,
  • private forests, 
  • plantations, etc.
  • Note: 1. Section 81(1) exempts Government lands from the provisions of Chapter III. The Proviso says that following Government lands will not stand exempted. 
    • 1. Government-lease-lands
    • 2. Lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and
    • 3. Lands that fall under Section 72 (Lease lands vest in Government).
  • 2. The effect of Chapter III on Government-lease-lands and on the lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and 72 (vest in Government) is that the tenants (both Government’s tenants and the erstwhile Private landholders’ tenants) have to pay ‘rent‘ to the Government under Sec. 72F(h).
  • 3. Section 81(4)permits use of the land not exceeding 5% of the extent of such holding for floriculture, dairy farms, hotels, restaurants, etc.

3. Fixity, Vesting in Govt. and Purchase Certificate:

  • Sec. 13 says – every tenant (who pays rent) has fixity. But, holdings held by cultivating tenants (in actual possession) alone will vest in Govt., under Section 72(1).
  • Purchase certificates can be obtained by ‘cultivating tenants’ only whose lands are vested in Govt. according to Sec. 72B and 72C. (Sec. 53 purchase also.)
  • Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of leasehold properties held by ‘cultivating tenants’ in Govt.  (ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845). 

PART I

ACQUISITION OF PLANTATION-LANDS OWNED BY PRIVATE PERSONS

1. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India

It is plain – No compensation is payable to the land-owners, for the lands ‘above the ceiling limit’, according to the Constitution of India. If any authority gives it, it will be sheer “corruption”.

  • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit.
  • Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India reads as under:
    “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivationit shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”.
  • Under Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act, on acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Sec. 72.
    Sec. 112 (5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the landowner shall be awarded to the Government; and clause (b) says that the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • The effect of Chapter III on Government-lease-lands and on the lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and 72 (vest in Government) is that the tenants (both Government’s tenants and the erstwhile Private landholders’ tenants) have to pay ‘rent‘ to the Government under Sec. 72F(h).
  • Section 81(4)permits use of the land not exceeding 5% of the extent of such holding for floriculture, dairy farms, hotels, restaurants, etc.

2. Exemption of ‘Plantation’ Does Not Cover Exemption of ‘Plantation LAND’

It is for the following reasons –

  • 1. The exemption is to the ‘plantation’, and not to the ‘LAND‘.
  • 2. Exemption is conditional – for it exists (only) as long as the plantation exists or continues;
  • Because,
    • (a) S. 2(44) defines ‘plantation’ as land used principally for the cultivation of a specific ‘plantation crop‘ like tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber etc.
    • (b) Section 87, Explanation II states that if a plantation for which exemption is given on recognition of a specific ‘plantation-crop’ is converted into any other ‘plantation-crop’ or the plantation activity is not continued, the exemption may be lost; and the land will be taken for considering the ceiling limit.

3. Effect of CONVERTION TO ANY OTHER CLASS 

Sec. 87 Exp. II  provides – If CONVERTED TO ANY OTHER CLASS and the person (who gets the property) owns excess of ceiling area – the excess shall be deemed to be land acquired (and fall under Sec. 87) .

Explanation II of Sec. 87 reads as under:

  • “Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.”
  • Sec. 87(1A) provides – Person referred to above (transferee) also should file statement (Return).
    • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).

4. No Total Prohibition in using Exempted Land for a Different Purpose

Explanation II does not make a total bar. It only causes to lose benefit of the exemption to a certain extent. That is, if a person converts any portion of his exempted land to any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit; and the Taluk Land Board can proceed upon that (excess) land. In short, the exemption will be lost for that portion. In this premises, in Wayanad Granites v. District Collector, 2023-4 KLT 874, it is held that ‘fragmentation is per se not illegal’. similarly, in District Collector v. Sajith Lal, 2023-4 KLJ 851, it is held that ‘there is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non-exempted purposes as well’.

In Mathew K.T v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024, in the light of earlier decisions, observed that there is no total prohibition in using an exempted land for a different purpose under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The impediment or restriction is (only) the following –

  • If a portion of the exempted land is utilised for any other purpose, that would fall within his ceiling area and the authorities may be able to initiate ceiling proceedings.

5. The Full Bench decision, Mathew K. Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority [AIR 2019 Ker. 67, affirmed by the Supreme Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob, 2020-14 SCC 126] held as under:

  • “We however add that any class of land earlier exempted in the ceiling case can be converted into any class of land not liable to be exempted under Explanation II to Section 87 of the Act. The consequence is that the benefit of the exemption would be lost and the extent added to the account of the assessee or the declarant in determination of his ceiling area. That is a matter to be dealt with by the Taluk Land Board with the assessee or the declarant and other interested parties on the party array and we desist from elaborating further.”

6. In District Collector v. Sajith Lal (2023-4 KLJ 851; 2023 KLT OnLine 1225) it is held as under:

  • “5. There is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non- exempted purposes as well. If the land is used for non-exempted purposes, the holder of the land will lose the qualification for exemption, thus giving authority to the Land Board to initiate ceiling proceedings.” (Quoted in: Mathew K.T v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024)

7. No Embargo to Transfer Plantation Land

In R. V.  Devassia v. Sub Registrar, Idukki, 2015-1 ILR(Ker) 1047; 2015-1 KHC 805; 2015-2 KLJ 17, it is held as under:

  • “9. On promulgation of the KLR Act in the State, the entire landed property in the State is subjected to State control as envisaged under the provisions of the KLR Act. No piece of the land escapes the clutches of the KLR Act including exempted land for ceiling purposes. The ceiling proceedings is a continuing proceedings and can be reopened in any of the circumstances, if so warranted, as contemplated under Section 87 of the KLR Act. Exemption granted from ceiling is the qualification to use the land in a particular manner, which means a burden is imposed on the land. The moment the qualification for exemption is vanished by conversion of the land, the protection from ceiling will also be extinguished to bring the land within the fold of the ceiling area. The exemption is in the nature of a burden on the land to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted. The eminent domain power of the State can be exercised for acquiring land without consent and also to regulate the use of land in public interest. The eminent domain is power inherent in any Sovereign State. This burden would bind the holder of the land as on 01/01/1970 and the successor-in-interest. The Division Bench of this Court in the State Human Rights Protection Centre, Thrissur and another v. State of Kerala and others [2009 (3) ILR 695] held that exemption granted under S.81(1)(a) is for the land and would continue to operate irrespective of change of ownership of the exempted land and the transferee would have to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted.”

8. In Everest Stone Crusher and Granites v. District Collector, Kannur, 2020-6 KHC 289, it is observed as under:

  • “16. In Devassia R.V. this Court noticed that, the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act do not place any embargo on transfer. The transfer of registry is for fiscal purposes. The power of the competent authority to reopen the ceiling proceedings to include the land exempted for the purpose of ceiling is not lost on account of effecting mutation. Therefore, the Revenue Officials cannot refuse to effect mutation of the property purchased by the transferee.”

9. Effect of Fragmentation for Non-exempted Category

The decision in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985, arose from the Writ Petition filed for a declaration that the fragmentation and sale of a Rubber Plantation for non-plantation purposes was illegal as it defeated the purpose of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. When the matter was placed before the Taluk Land Board under Sec 87, KLR Act, it found that there was no change in classification of the land and therefore dropped the proceedings. The Court held as under:

  • “34. Section 81 of the KLR Act is in pith and substance a special provision, with its main objective of giving exemption to certain lands including the lands maintained as plantations is to prevent fragmentation of the land and to keep it as plantation itself to improve the economy of the state for welfare of people as a whole while the Act creates a regime, the State is under an obligation to safeguard, the intended purpose of the provisions of the Act in its spirit. ….. …… It could be gathered from the records that the proposal to transfer 1.03 acres of land to each workers in discharge of their service or retrenchment benefits will definitely divide the plantation into separate slots and that would definitely change the character/nature of the plantation, which could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act.”

9. Compensation to the Owner who Surrunders land within Ceiling limit

Sec. 88, KLR Act determines the compensation to the owners who surrunders land. It provides only nominal compensation (Maximum compensation is only Rs. 2 lakhs). No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter. Sec. 88 reads as under:

“88. Persons surrendering land entitled to compensation.

  • (1) Where ownership or possession or both of any land is vested in the Government under Section 86 or Section 87, such person shall be entitled to compensation. Where the rights of an intermediary are extinguished, such intermediary shall also be entitled to compensation.
  • (1A)  Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), no person shall be entitled to any compensation in respect of any land owned by the Government of Kerala and held by him under lease or otherwise.
  • (2) The compensation payable to an owner for the vesting in the Government of ownership and possession of land shall be an amount calculated at the rates specified in Schedule IV.
  • (3) The compensation payable to the landowner, intermediary or cultivating tenant for the vesting in the Government or extinguishment of his rights shall be the portion of an amount calculated at the rates specified in Schedule IV that will fall to his share if such amount were apportioned among the landowner, cultivating tenant and intermediary, if any, in respect of the land according to the following provisions:
  • .(i) ninety percent of the portion of the compensation for the site of any homestead or hut in the occupation of a kudikidappukaran shall be deducted from the total amount of compensation;
  • (ii) the balance remaining after deducting the amount referred to in clause (1) shall be apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land immediately before the surrender, assumption or vesting in the Government, as the case maybe.
  • Explanation. -“Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to
  • .(i) in the case of a landowner; the rent which he was entitled to get immediately before the 1st day of January, 1970, from the tenant holding immediately under aim;
  • (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get immediately before the 1st day of January, 1970, from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord immediately before that day; and
  • (iii) in the case of a cultivating Tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the said day.
  • (3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (3), where the compensation due under those Sub-sections to an adult unmarried person, family or any other person (other than a joint family), as owner, landowner, intermediary or cultivating tenant or in any two or more of such capacities exceeds one lakh rupees, the compensation payable shall be limited to the amount specified in the Table below:
  • TableScales of compensation
  • Total Amount of compensation                         Rate
  • On the first Rs. 1 lakh                                     100 per cent
  • On the next Rs. 50,000                                    30 per cent
  • On the balance amount                                    23 per cent:

Provided that the compensation payable shall in no case exceed:  Rs. 2 lakhs.

  • (4) Where the rights of a mortgagee in possession are vested in the Government –
  • .(i) Where the ownership of the land mortgaged [has vested in the Government the mortgagee shall be treated as a holder of an encumbrance in respect of the land, and the encumbrance shall be discharged as provided in Sections 91 and 92;
  • .(ii) in other cases, the Government shall pay to the mortgagee the amount to which he would have been entitled under clause (i) if the ownership of the land mortgaged (Iliad vested in) the Government, and hold the land as mortgagee with possession with all the rights and liabilities of the mortgagee.
  • (5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the compensation payable under this Section in respect of a land shall be deemed to include the compensation for growing crops and improvements, if any, thereon and that no person shall be entitled to any amount other than the compensation payable under this Section for The vesting in the Government or extinguishment of his rights (including his rights in respect of growing corps and improvements if any) in respect of the land.
Finale on Acquisition of Plantation Lands Owned By Private Persons
When plantation-land is acquired, there will be stark difference, between land within ceiling limit and that beyond ceiling limit.
The compensation as regards plantations above ceiling limit is not made mention of in the KLR Act. Article 31A of the Constitution of India does not ensure compensation above ceiling limit.

PART II

ACQUISITION” OF PLANTATION-LEASE-LANDS OWNED BY GOVT.

1. Sec. 81 exemptions do not apply to Government lands; But, Exemptions apply to (Government) lease-lands

Government-lease-lands are also exempted under Sec. 81(1)(a).

81(1)(a) Proviso says –

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease“.

This proviso is introduced in 1971. By virtue of this amendment (introducing Section 81(1)(a) Proviso) “Plantation-Exemption” takes effect on Government-lease-land (with tenants).

2. However, it must be noted that a ‘valid lease’ must exist. That is, the person in possession of government land should be a “lessee”; he must not be trespasser or a person who forfeit the title of Government.

Section 81(1)(a) Proviso reads as under:

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease whether current or time expired or otherwise.”

3. The word “otherwise” must be understood as a permissive occupation

In MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28, it is held-

  • “Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 81 by which “Government lands held under a lease current or time expired or otherwise” can be understood only as referring to such lands which are held by persons in permissive possessionThe word “otherwise” must be understood as a permissive occupation otherwise than under a lease. The word “otherwise” has no wider meaning in the context. So understood, the exemption to Clause (a) of that Section is perfectly legal and in that limited sense we uphold that provision as valid.”

4. Govt. Lands – No Fixity of Tenure, as Exempted u/s 3(1)(x)

Government lands are covered by the exemption u/s 3(1)(x) of the Land Reforms Act and therefore he cannot claim any fixity of tenure. It applies to lands shown in the settlement register and land register as the property as Temple puramboke.

(Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair M.N., (2013) 3 KLT 132, (T.R. Ramachandran NairJ; A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J.)

5. From the above, it is clear – by virtye of Sec. 81 exemption, though there is no ‘fixity of tenure’, there is “legal protection” to the tenants, to hold the land (so long as there is plantation crop) – without being affected by the ceiling (limit) in Chapter III.

Note: The net result is that such tenants are bound by the terms of the lease deeds.

Finale on Acquisition of Plantation-Lease-Lands Owned By the Govt.
There is no question of awarding land value to the tenants of Government lands.
No compensation is ensured to such tenants under any provision of the KLR Act.

[Note:Under Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Sec. 72.
Sec. 112 (5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the landowner shall be awarded to the Government; and clause (b) says that the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.

PART III

ACQUISITION OF PLANTATION-LEASE-LANDS (Formerly) OWNED BY PRIVATE LAND OWNERS

  1. Sec. 13 says every tenant has fixity.
  2. But, no Purchase certificate can be obtained beyond ceiling limit (under Sec. 72B or 72C). (Note: No rider to Sec. 72B and 72C, by way of proviso or otherwise, exempting plantation.)
  3. However, the holdings held by cultivating tenants will vest in Govt., under Section 72(1).

Note: Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of leasehold properties (held by ‘cultivating tenants’) in Govt. ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 

4. VESTING OF LAND IN GOVT. & RIGHT OF GOVT. TO COLLECT RENT

According to the provisions of the KLR Act, lands held by individuals (or associations of persons) vest in Govt. under two provisions. They are-

  • First, Sec. 72 – Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government. (Obviously it applies to tenancy-land alone.)
  • Second, Sec. 86. – Vesting of excess lands in Government.
    • Note: Sec. 86 does not apply to Plantations, for (i) they being already vest in Govt. under Sec. 72, and (ii) if Govt. land, no question of vesting arises.

5. Section 72(1) reads:              

  • 72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”

6. Who is the OWNER of Exempted (Private-Leasehold) Plantation Lands in Kerala?

It is Government, though by virtue of Chapter II (Sec. 13) the tenant has ‘Fixity’. 

  • 1. Plantation (lease) Lands VEST in GOVT, automatically
  • Because,
  • Sec. 72 provides for
    • mandatory and involuntary vesting in Government
    • of leasehold lands that is held by cultivating tenants entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13 (even if the extent exceeds ceiling limit).
    • See: Perumal Smaraka Nidhi vs M/S Harrisons Malayalam Ltd., 31. 01. 2013.
  • 2. ‘Vesting’ in Govt. is ‘Vesting of Ownership‘
  • It is for the reasons –
    • Declared to be ‘vested’ in Government (Sec. 72).
    • Such a tenant is liable to pay ‘rent’ to the Government (Sec. 72E) for the unassigned land (e.g. exempted plantation land).
  • 3. ‘Exemption’ in Chapter III Cannot be read into Sec. 72B(2)
  • The provision of law for giving Purchase-Certificate under Sec. 72B specifies that the provisions of Sec. 82 (as to ceiling limit) shall apply for the calculation of the ceiling area (alone).
  • Sec. 72B(2) reads-
    • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1)
  • The exemption provision in Sec. 81 (Chapter III), which excludes plantation lands from the ceiling limit, cannot be brought-forth or read-into Sec. 72B (provision for assignment of purchase-certificate) in Chapter II.
    • In other words, purchase-certificates cannot be given for land above ceiling-limit, rigging the exemption provisions (for plantations etc.).
  • Because,
    • Sec. 72B(1), in Chapter II shows – Sec. 72B(1) is an independent provision (though the Proviso says – no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest … (more than) … the ceiling area, mentioned in Sec. 82 in Chapter III)
    • When a provision in a latter Chapter of an Act (here, Sec. 82 that deals with extent of ceiling limit, in Chapter III) is referred to in an independent provision in an earlier Chapter (here, Sec. 72B, as regards issuing purchase certificate, in Chapter II), for a specific purpose (here, to state the limit in area alone), it cannot be said – the attributed colour or smell of the provision in the latter chapter (by virtue of other provisions, i.e., entire characteristics or attributions added to Sec. 82 by virtue of other provisions in Chapter III), would stand reflected on the earlier provision (here, Sec. 72B).
  • Further – Sec. 72E provides for  ‘rent’ to Government
    • Chapter II of the KLR Act (dealing with ‘Tenancy’) is exclusive and exhaustive as to ‘fixity’, and ‘vesting’ of land in Government.
    • It is not stated anywhere in the Act – the right and title of the (leased-plantation) land legitimately vested in Government under Sec. 72, will be divested in any manner (in favour of the previous owner, or of the tenant or anybody else), in any circumstance.
    • Sec. 72E provides for collection of ‘rent‘ from the holders of the plantation, for the unassigned land (e.g. exempted plantation land) and Sec. 72F(5)(h) authorises the Land Tribunal to fix the rent. (It goes without saying that it is for the reason that the ownership of the land vests in Govt.)
    • Note: Proceedings initiated by Taluk Land Board under Chapter III (in respect of plantation) do not confer title.
    • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).
  • 4.  Tenant cannot ‘Sell’ Plantation Land as his absolute property
    • A tenant who got ‘fixity’ over such land cannot ‘sell’ this land as his absolute (ownership) property.

7. Rights of ‘tenants’ of Plantations (after vesting the land with Govt.) is a ‘Legal Right conferred by Statute’

  • It is not Tenancy – For no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt.
  • Not Grant or Licence/Permission – For Grant as well as Licence/Permission arise from a contract (express or implied).
  • Therefore, it can termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act.

8. What are the Stipulations attached to that “Legal Right”?

  • Subject to the condition – not to “convert” it for any other use, other than the specific plantation (Sec. 87).

9. When Such a land is Required for Govt., Should it be Acquired?

  • The ownership being vested in Govt. it need not be ‘strictly’ “acquired”.
  • But no provision In Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’, if and when Govt. needs it.

10. Sec. 112 of the KLR ActApportionment’s of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act reads-

  • “112. …..
  • (5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
    • (a) the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to such landowner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government; and
    • (b) the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to-
    • in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
    • in the case of the Government, such rent.”

Because of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“ upon the former tenants of the plantation, they are entitled for certain compensation, when that land is required for the Govt..

  • In cases falling under Chapter II (pertaining to, tenants entitled for fixity, issuance of purchase certificate etc.) Section 72 deals with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants; and says -the land will be free from encumbrances created by the land-owners and intermediaries.

Therefore, it is said – Apportionment of land value in cases of ‘acquisition’.

  • Note:  It makes no difference (SUBSTANTIALLY, IN DETERMINING COMPENSATION) whether such a plantation land is “acquired” or not. Because, even if the land is not ‘acquired’, Govt. has to pay compensation for improvements to the former tenants (who holds the land by virtue of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act).

Apportionment depends upon rights on the date of acquisition

  • Valia Raja v. Veeraraghava Iyer, 1961 Ker LT 103, it was held that the question of apportionment of compensation has to depend upon the rights of the parties on the date of the acquisition. Referrd to in: Varkey Thomas Vs. Annamma Abraham,  1969 Ker LT 903.

11. Though the tenant has fixity, he is not the owner of such land. Because, such lands vest in Govt. under Sec. 72.

If tenant had raised plantation on bare land leased –

  • Such plantations are not excluded (from Chapter II) by the ‘Exemption’ clause under S. 3(1)(viii).
    • Therefore, tenants of such tenancy-land are entitled for benefits under Chapter II such as
      • Fixity under Sec. 13,
      • purchase certificate within ceiling limit etc.
    • Though the tenant has fixity, he is not the owner of such land. Because, such lands vest in Govt. under Sec. 72. (Purchase certificate cannot be obtained for the extent below ceiling limit.)

12. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India

  • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit
  • It goes without saying – If no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it cannot be given to tenants.
  • Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India reads as under:
    “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivationit shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”.
Finale on Acquisition of Plantation-Lease-Lands Owned By Private Land Owners
There is no question of awarding land value to the landowners and/or tenants of private landowners.
Under Sec. 72 under Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act, the cultivating tenants
are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government.
Sec. 112 (5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the landowner shall be awarded to the Government; and clause (b) says that the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.

KLR Act Overrides Land Acquisition Act

Sec. 127 of the KLR Act declares – it override other Laws. It reads as under:

  • “127. Act to override other laws, etc.- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other taw or any custom or usage or in any contract, express or implied, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.”

Can a Tenant of Plantation Transfer his Rights, Fragmenting the Plantation

Possession is a heritable and transferable right. [See: Nallammal v. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864; Phirayalal Kapur Vs. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186]. Therefore, a tenant of plantation having rights of fixity (Sec. 13) may have the right to transfer it to another. In any case, the change of character or nature of the plantation by fragmentation being amount to ‘conversion’ (as Provided in Sec. 87 Expl. II) that will be against the provisions of the Act, as pointed out in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985.

11. In Secretary, TDB v. Mohanan Nair (T.R. Ramachandran Nair & A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, JJ.), ILR 2013-2 Ker 883; 2013-3 KLT 132, an important decision on Kerala Land Reforms Act, it is found that Purchase Certificate issued by Land Tribunal, for land belonging to Government Devaswom (exempted category under S.3(1)(x) of the Act), will be in total violation of Rules, and will be a nullity.

End Notes I

1.Cultivating Tenant & Vesting of land in Government

Section 72(1) reads:

  • 72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”.
  • It provides (automatic) vesting of leasehold properties in Govt. Conditions thereof are:
    • (i) the land must be held by cultivating tenants;
    • (ii) they should be entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13.
  • Sec. 2(8) defines cultivating tenant as under:
  • cultivating tenant means a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate, the land comprised in his holding.”

2. For Exemption Tenant must have Approached LT

For getting the Exemption under Chapter III, the tenant must have approached the Land Tribunal for getting the tenancy ‘declared’.

Sec. 85(3) and (3A) of the KLR Act read as under:

  • (3). Where, after the final settlement of claims for resumption of lands held by a person as tenant, such person holds land in excess of the ceiling area, or where after the purchase of the right, title and interest of the landowner** and the intermediary by the cultivating tenant in respect of lands owned by a person, such person owns land in excess of the ceiling area, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided.
  • (3A). The person bound to file a statement under Sub-section (2) shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.] [Substituted by Act No. 35 of 1969.
  • ** See Notes below. As per Sec. 85(3) it is a mandatory requirement to approach the Land Tribunal for getting the Purchase Certificate.

Why the Words “After The Purchase of the Right, Title And Interest of the Landowner” Included?

It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.

  • Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.

It is definite: It is for adjudicating the ‘tenancy right’, by the Land Tribunal – for, the Land Tribunal is the only authority that can decide on the “tenancy right.” (It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case.)

  • Note: A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and avail benefits – the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.

Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).

3. Excess, Ceiling ReturnSurrenderExemption Etc.

Section 81:

S. 81, the first Section in Chapter III deals with exemption from ceiling limit of plantation, industrial land, etc.

Sec. 81 reads as under:

  • Exemptions: (1)The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to –
  • (a) lands owned or held by the Government of Kerala or
  • the Government of any other State in India or
  • the Government of India or
  • a local authority [or the Cochin Port Trust] [Inserted by Act 35 of 1969.] 
  • or any other authority which the Government may, in public interest, exempt, by notification in the Gazette, from the provisions of this Chapter.
  • [Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease whether current or time expired or otherwise.] [Inserted by Act 17 of 1972.]
  • [Explanation I. [Numbered as Explanation I by Act 35 of 1969.] – “Lands owned by the Government of Kerala” shall, for the purposes of this clause, have the same meaning as “Government Lands” under Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960; [but lands escheated to the Government and held by tenants entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 shall not be deemed to be lands owned by the Government of Kerala.]]
  • [Explanation II. [Inserted by Act 35 of 1969.] – Lands, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Sub-section (9) of Section 66 or Section 72, shall not be deemed to be “lands owned by the Government of Kerala” for the purposes of this clause;]
  • [Explanation III. [Inserted by Act 25 of 1971.] – For the purposes of this clause, “other authority”, shall include a corporation owned or controlled by the Government of Kerala or the Government of any other State in India or the Government of India;]
  • (b) lands taken under the management of the Court of Wards:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply at the end of three years from the commencement of this Act;
  • (c) lands comprised in mills, factories or workshops and which are necessary for the use of such mills, factories or workshops;
  • (d) private forests;
  • (e) plantations;
  • (f)[ cashew estate [Inserted by Act No. 6 of 2012.]
  • Explanation. – For the purpose of this clause “cashew estate” shall mean dry land principally cultivated with not less than 150 cashew trees per hectare.]
  • (g)[***] [Omitted by Act 35 of 1969.]
  • (h) lands mortgaged to the Government, or to a co-operative society (including a co-operative land mortgage bank) registered or deemed to be registered under the Co-operative Societies Act for the time being in force, or to the Kerala Financial Corporation, or to the Kerala Industrial Development Corporation or to the State Small Industries Corporation, as security for any loan advanced by the Government or by such Society or Corporation, so long as the mortgage subsists:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply at the end of three years from the commencement of this Act;
  • (i)lands purchased by the Kerala Co-operative Central Land Mortgage Bank or a Primary Mortgage Bank under Sec Lion 18 of the Kerala State Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks Act, 1960, or by the Kerala State Co-operative Bank Ltd., or by a primary agricultural credit co- operative society or by a scheduled bank as defined in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 so long as such lands continue in the possession of the bank;
  • (j)lands purchased by the Kerala Financial Corporation or lands the management of which has been taken over by that Corporation, under Section 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, so long as such lands remain in the ownership, or continue under the management, as the case may be, of the said Corporation:
  • [Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply in the case of lands the management of which has been taken over by the Corporation on or after the 1st day of April, 1964;] [Added by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (k)lands belonging to or held by an industrial or commercial undertaking at the commencement of this Act, and set apart for use for the industrial or commercial purpose of the undertaking:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply if such land is not actually used for the purpose for which it has been set apart, within such time as the District Collector may, by notice to the undertaking, specify in that behalf;
  • (l)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (m)[ house sites, that is to say, sites occupied by dwelling houses and lands, wells, tanks and other structures necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the dwelling houses.] [Substituted by Act No. 17 of 1972.]
  • Explanation. – For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that a compound wall shall not he deemed to he a structure necessary for the convenient enjoyment of a dwelling house, if the land on which the dwelling house is situated and enclosed by the compound waif is more than the (and necessary (or the convenient enjoyment of the dwelling house.
  • (n)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (o)sites of temples, churches, mosques and cemeteries and burial and burning grounds:
  • (p)sites of buildings including warehouses;
  • (q)commercial sites;
  • (r)land occupied by educational institutions including land necessary for the convenient use of the institutions and playgrounds attached to such institutions;
  • (s)lands vested in the Bhoodan Yagna Committee;
  • (t)lands owned or held by -(i)a University established by law; or(i)the entire income of such lands is appropriated for the University, institution or trust concerned; and(ii)where the University, institution or trust comes to hold the said lands after the commencement of this Act, the Government have certified previously that such lands are bona fide required for the purposes of the University, institution or trust, as the case may be; and(u)lands granted to defence personnel for gallantry.(ii)a religious, charitable or educational institution of a public nature; or(iii)a public trust which expression shall include a wakf;
  • Provided that-
  • (2)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (3)[ The Government may if they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the public interest -(a)on account of any special use to which any land is put; or (b)on account of any land being bonafide required for the purpose of conversion into plantation or for the extension or preservation of an existing plantation or for any commercial, industrial, educational or charitable purpose, by notification in the Gazette, exempt such land from the provisions of this Chapter, subject to such restrictions and conditions as they may deem fit to impose:
  • Provided that the land referred to in clause (b) shall be used for the purpose for which it is intended within such time as the Government may specify in that behalf; and, where the land is not so used within the time specified, the exemption shall cease to he in force.] [Substituted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (4)[ Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force of in any contract or other documents or in any judgement, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal or Taluk Land Board or Land Board or other authority, a person holding plantation and lands ancillary thereto or interspersed within such* plantation, [may, subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed, use] [Inserted by Act No. 6 of 2012.] not exceeding five per cent of the extent of such holding for floriculture or for the cultivation of Vanila or medicinal plants or other [agricultural crops or for conducting dairy farms] [Substituted ‘agricultural crops’ by Act No. 6 of 2015.] or for establishing hotels or resorts or other tourism projects and for purposes ancillary or connected therewith.]

4. Section 82 & 83: Ceiling area 

Sec. 82 reads as under:

  • 82. Ceiling area. – [(1) The ceiling area of land shall be,
  • (a) in the case of an adult unmarried person or a family consisting of a sole surviving member, five standard acres, so however that the ceiling area shall riot be less than six and more than seven arid a half acre in extent;
  • (b) in the case of a family consisting of two or more, but not more than five members, ten standard acres, so however that the ceiling area shall not be less than twelve and more than fifteen acres in extent.
  • (c) in the case of a family consisting of more than five members, ten standard acres increased by one standard acre for each member M excess of five, so however that the ceiling area shall not he less than twelve and more than twenty acres in extent; and
  • (d) in the case of any other person, other than a joint family, ten standard acres, so however that the ceiling are shall not be less than twelve and more than fifteen acres in extent.]

Section 83

Sec. 83 reads as under:

  • “83. No person to hold land in excess of the ceiling areaWith effect from such dates as may be notified by the Government in the Gazette, no person shall be entitled to own or hold or to possess under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area.”

Section 85(1) reads as under:

  • 85. Surrender of excess land. (1) Where a person owns or holds land excess of the ceiling area on the date notified under Section 83, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided: …. ….”

Section 2(3) defines ceiling area as under:

  • “Ceiling area” means the extent of land specified in section 82 as the ceiling area”.
  • It is a total bar.
    • Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB),
    • The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137) – quoted in 2008(1) KLJ 571 (State Vs. Puliyangattu). Followed in State vs Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16; Bhikoba S. Vs. ML Punchand Tathed, AIR 1982 (SC) 865.

S. 82 & 83 deal with ceiling area and bars holding land excess of ceiling fixed.

5. Section 86 reads:

  • 86. Vesting of excess lands in Government. (1) On the determination of the extent and other particulars of the lands, the ownership or possession or both of which is or are to be surrendered under Section 85, the ownership or possession or both, as the case may be of the land shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances and the Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
  • (2) On receipt of [the order of the Taluk Land Board under Sub-section (1)] such person shall make the surrender demanded, in such manner as may he prescribed.
  • (3) Where any person fails to make the surrender demanded, the [Taluk Land Board] may authorise any officer to take possession or assume ownership of the land in such manner as may be prescribed.
  • [(4) Where the ownership of any land vests in the Government under Sub-section (1), the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of the land shall stand extinguished, and where possession of any land which was in the possession of a cultivating tenant vests in the Government under that Sub-section, the ownership of such land shall vest in the Government and the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of such land shall stand extinguished.]

Section 87 reads as under:

  • “S.87. Excess land obtained by gift, etc. to be surrendered – (1) Where any person acquires any land dafter the date notified under Section 83 by gift, purchase, mortgage with possession, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, such excess shall be surrendered to such authority as may be prescribed.
  •        Explanation 1 – Where any land is exempted by or under Section 81 and such exemption is in force on the date notified under Section 83, such land shall, with effect from the date on which it ceases to be exempted, be deemed to be land acquired after the date notified under Section 83.
  •        Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.

6. Apportionment’s of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 of the KLR Act reads-

  • “112. Apportionment’s of land value in cases of acquisition – (1) Where any land is acquired under the law for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, the compensation awarded under such law in respect of the land acquired shall be apportioned among the landowner, intermediaries, cultivating tenant and the kudikidappukaran in the manner specified in this Section.
  • (2) The compensation for any building or other improvements shall be awarded to the person entitled to such building or other improvements.
  • (3) The kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to the value of the land occupied by his homestead or hut subject to a minimum of-
    • three cents in a city or major municipality; or
    • five cents in any other municipally; or
    • ten cents in a panchayat area or township.
  • (4) The difference between the value of three cents or five cents or ten cents, as the case may be, and the value of the extent of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, be borne by the Government or the local authority or the company or other person on whose behalf the land is acquired.
  • (5) The balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in Sub-section (2) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall he apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land acquired immediately before such acquisition.
    • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to (i) in the case of a landowner, the rent which he was entitled to get from the tenant holding immediately under him; (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord; and (iii) in the case of a cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent payable by him; and the rent payable by the cultivating tenant and the intermediary for the purposes of this Explanation shall be as calculated under the provisions of this Act.
  • (5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the land owner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
    • (a) the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to such landowner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government; and
    • (b) the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.*fn*
  • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to-
    • in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
    • in the case of the Government, such rent.
  • (7) In this Section, “homestead” includes a dwelling house occupied by a person who is deemed to be a kudikidappukaran under Explanation IIA to clause (25) of Section 2.”
  • Foot Note:
    • *fn* 1. “Value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” says as to the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
    • 2. This provision is applied to lease-lands vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 and no purchase certificate is given (to the tenant).

No Land value to be given for the “excess” land (Beyond Ceiling Limit)

From Sect. 112, it is beyond doubt that no Land value to be given for the entire land and it is limited to a portion.

Plantation: Definition

  • “S.2.(44)” plantation” means any land used by a person principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon (hereinafter in this clause referred to as ‘plantation crops’) and includes.-
    • (a) land used by the said person for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of plantation crops or for the preparation of the same for the market;
    • [(b) xxxx]
    • (c) agricultural lands interspersed within the boundaries of the area cultivated by the said person with plantation crops, not exceeding such extent as may be determined by the Land Board [or the Taluk land Board, as the case may be] as necessary for the protection and efficient management of such cultivation.
  • Explanation:- Lands used for the construction of office buildings, godowns, factories quarters for workmen, hospitals, schools and play grounds shall be deemed to be lands used for the purposes of sub-clause (a).

Is the Tenant of a Plantation a Cultivating Tenant?

  • Yes.
  • Sec. 2(8) defines cultivating tenant as under:
  • Cultivating tenant means a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate, the land comprised in his holding.”

Can Purchase-Certificate be given to Plantation-Land, over & above Ceiling-Limit?

  • No.
  • Because, under Sec. 72B(2) a cultivating tenant is entitled to get assigned the area within the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 alone.

Sec. 72B reads as under:

  • “72B. Cultivating tenants right to assignment. – (1) The cultivating tenant of any holding or part of a holding, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Section 72, shall be entitled to assignment of such right, title and interest: ….. ….
  • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1);
  • (3) (4) (5)

Is Purchase Certificate (inaccurate on its face, or fraud, for excess of the ceiling area) Conclusive Proof?

  • No.

Our Apex Court considered this matter in Chettian Veetil Ammad v. Taluk Land BoardAIR 1979 SC 1573; 1980 1 SCC 499 (P.N. Shinghal & O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.) where Purchase Certificate was issued, excess of the ceiling area, as under:

  • “27. It would thus appear that even though the certificate of purchase issued under sub-section (1) of Section 72-K is conclusive proof of the assignment of the right, title and interest of the landowner in favour of the holder in respect of the holding concerned under sub-section (2), that only means that no contrary evidence shall be effective to displace it, unless the so called conclusive proof is inaccurate on its face, or fraud can be shown (Halsburys – Laws of England, fourth edition, Vol. 17, page 22 paragraph 28), It may be stated that “inaccuracy on the face” of the certificate is not as wide in its connotation as an “error apparent on the face of the record.” It will not therefore be permissible for the Board to disregard the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase merely on the ground that it has not been issued on a proper appreciation or consideration of the evidence on record, or that the. Tribunals finding suffers from any procedural error. What sub-section (2) of Section 72-K provides is an irrebuttable presumption of law, and it may will be regarded as a rule of substantive law. But even so, for reasons already stated, it does not thereby take away the jurisdiction of the Taluk Land Board to make an order under Section 85 (5) after taking into consideration the “conclusive” evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase according to Section 72-K (2) as far as it goes.”

It is also noteworthy (as stated above) that purchase certificate shall not bind one, who was not party to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, having better title over the property covered by the purchase certificate (Thayukutty v. Manikandan, the Kerala High Court (2023).

Extent of Land that for which a Purchase Certificate can be issued by LT

If a cultivating tenant (of a plantation land) possessed land at or above the ceiling limit, no purchase certificate can be issued to him, from the plantation property in question. 

If a tenant holds some land, he will receive a Purchase Certificate for the extent – equal to the Ceiling Limit minus the land he already possesses.

If such a tenant holds land at or above the ceiling limit (and, for that reason,  no purchase certificate can be given with respect to the plantation property), proceedings are to be promulgated, or an order is to be issued, by the Land Tribunal  to that effect, if it finds that he is a cultivating tenant of that plantation. This proceedings also has to be presented with the lease-agreement and other documents, before the Taluk Land Board, for getting the order of exemption.  

Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439

  • In Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439, the question as to ‘rival claims raised by the cultivating tenant and landlord for compensation on acquisition’ arose. The land was leased out by landlords. The lease-rights came in the cultivating tenants by transfer. The Government contended that the tenant was a cultivating tenant and the land vested upon the Govt. under Sec. 72 KLR Act. Hence tenant alone would be entitled to get compensation for the improvements to be determined under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, in view of Section 20(1) of the KLR Act.
  • The landlords argued that the land was a plantation (over 30 acres) when it was (originally) leased, and therefore, they are entitled to claim exemption and benefits in the light of the exemption under clause (viii)  of Section 3 (1) of the KLR Act. Since there would be no fixity of tenure, it being a plantation, there would not be vesting of rights of the land owner in the Government. Hence, there should be the apportionment of the compensation between the lessor and the lessee and it should be decided in the acquisition proceedings.
  • The single Judge dismissed the writ petition, ‘leaving open the liberty of the lessee as well as the landlords, to approach the civil court seeking relief against the Government, and also to resolve the inter se dispute by and between the tenant and the landlords’.
  • The Division Bench, in appeal held that ‘land acquisition’ proceedings are to be initiated. It is pointed out that (even if it is a land vested in Govt.) there is no provision in Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’ if and when Govt. need it. The court also observed as under –
    • “31. On an analysis of the provisions of Section 72(1) of the Act, 1963, it is clear that when the Government notified the said provision with effect from 01.01.1970, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under sub-Section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, vested in the Government.
    • 32. Therefore, it is clear from Section 72 that what is vested with the Government is the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants. It is nothing but a legal fiction by which the interest held by a cultivating tenant in a property of a landlord or intermediary is protected from 01.01.1970 .
    • 34. On a conjoint reading of Sections 72 and 72A, it can be seen that vesting of rights in the Government contained under Section 72 is the rights held by the landlord and the intermediary in respect of holdings held by the cultivating tenants. However, the same will not, in any manner, interfere with the rights enjoyed by a cultivating tenant in contemplation of the provisions of the Act, 1963.”
    • 42. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 72 of Act, 1963 would only deal with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants free from encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries. However, the legal provisions discussed above would make it clear that insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.
  • While considering the right of landlord, it is pointed out (basing on the principle, or scheme of the KLR Act**) that the landlord may have right for compensation under Section 72BB. The Division Bench said-
    • “36. So also, sub-Section (1) of Section 72BB dealing with ‘the right of landlord to apply for assignment and compensation’ specifies that any landowner or intermediary, whose right, title and interest in respect of any holding have vested in the Government, may apply to the Land Tribunal for the assignment of such right, title and interest to the cultivating tenant and for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A.”
  • **Note: 1. If plantation-lease-(leasing a land when plantation existed)-above-30-acre-
    • Sec. 72, 72 BB etc. will not apply (such land being excluded from Chapter II, under Sec. 3(1)(viii), KLR Act).
  • 2. In case of a plantation-lease-above-30-Acre-
    • on termination of the lease period, the land lord can resume the land, on the basis of his title; for, the tenant will not have fixity in such case, the land being exempted from the benefits of Chapter II (as per Sec. 3(1)(viii) of the KLR Act).
  • 3. The landlords of such plantation will get the benefits (under Sec. 81) and protection from ceiling limit that is stipulated under the provisions of Sec. 82, 83 etc. (that is, there will be no ceiling limit).
  • 4. In such a case, the right of landlord may be on a higher level or footing than the tenant (to get compensation).
  • 5. It cannot be compared with a plantation that is put up by the tenant. The tenants of such plantation will-
    • get fixity under Sec. 13 (though they will not get Purchase Certificate),
    • get the benefits and protection (under Sec. 81) from ceiling limit that is stipulated under the provisions of Sec. 82, 83 etc. (that is, there will be no ceiling limit).
    • In such a case, the right for compensation, if any, of the landlord will be nil or negligible.
      • The Division Bench, inter alia, on the above observations directed ‘the State and its officials to take proceedings for the acquisition of the land’.

Criticism on Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439

The Division Bench failed to consider–

  • The right, title and interest of the land (above ceiling limit) ‘vest’ with the Government under Sec. 72. It is absolute. It is not a ‘fiction; but, it is real and actual (as seen from Sec. 72E and Sec. 112(5A).
  •  The nature of this statutory ‘vesting in Govt’ (under Sec. 72) is further clear from – Sec. 72E (tenant has to pay rent (for the unassigned land (e.g. exempted plantation land)).
  • Sec. 112(5A) deals with unassaigned land (that is, no purchase certificate is given). Under this sub section land-value need not be given to the land-owner or the tenant over and above the “value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” – that is, the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
  • This provision is applied to lease-lands vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 and no purchase certificate is given (to the tenant)., in case of acquisition).
  • Sec. 72B(2) KLR Act spells-out that a cultivating tenant will get Purchase Certificate for the extent below the ‘ceiling limit’ alone. That is, the tenant has no “absolute rights” above the ceiling limit.
  • Plantation-lands, usually, involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land. The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be miniscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres). Therefore, the analogy drawn by the Bench (tenant has a right seek assignment) is not apt at all.
  • When land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 is acquired, in the light of Sec. 112(5A) land-value need not be given to the land-owner or the tenant, over and above the “value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” – that is, the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
  • The aforesaid provision of law in the KLR Act is legislated following Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
  • The rights of ‘tenants’ of Plantations, to continue in the land till the plantation exists, after vesting the land with Govt., is a ‘Legal Right conferred by Statute’. It is not Tenancy – for no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt. It is not a Grant or Licence/Permission – for such rights arise from a contract (express or implied). Therefore, it can be termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act.
  • It goes without saying – If no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.
  • It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation-tenants (majority are BIG Companies) which had not been given to Maharaja of Travancore (whose 191 acres of lands in Thiruvananthapuram – above the ceiling limit, 15 acres – in the City was ‘mercilessly’ taken under the Orders of the Land Board Trivandrum, No. LB(B)2-18919/70, dated 15.01.1972). It is a sheer fact that lands of thousands of middleclass property owners was also harshly taken by under the provisions of the Act. (Note: Only limited right to continue the specified plantation-crop alone is given by the ‘exemption’; and, according to law, in case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost.)

No Land value to be given for the “excess” land (Beyond Ceiling Limit)

As stated above, under Sec. 112(5A) the claimants will not be entitled (on acquisition of the land) for the compensation for the entire area. It is limited to the following –

  • building or other improvements
  • land occupied by the homestead or hut”
  • any building or other improvements“.

It is true, “exemption” is given to plantation, to hold land over and above ceiling limit. It is only a statutory permission to continue, subject to conditions. It will be lost when it is “fragmented” or the crop is abandoned. As stated elsewhere, it is also most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation owners or tenants (majority are BIG Companies) which had not been given to thousands of middleclass property owners whose property had been harshly sized or expropriated under the provisions of the KLR Act.

The Govt. is Entitled Reasonable ‘Rent and Land Tax (for previous leasehold land)

The land being vest in Govt., it can collect reasonable ‘rent’. Sec. 72E reads as under:

  • 72E. Rent of holdings vested in Government but not assigned to cultivating tenants. – Where in respect of any holding or part thereof, the right, title and interest of the landowner and intermediaries have vested in the Government under Section 72 and the cultivating tenant is not entitled to the assignment of such right, title and interest by virtue of Sub-section (1) of Section 72, the cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay to the Government the rent payable under this Act from the date of vesting under Section 72.

With respect to payment of tax it is stated as under in Sec. 72S:

  • 72S. Liability for assessment alter the date of vesting under Section 72. (1)] Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract, where the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, in respect of a holding have vested in the Government under Section 72, the cultivating tenant of that holding shall be liable to pay the basic tax payable in respect of that holding under the said Act and other taxes and cesses due in respect of that holding.
  • (2) In the case of a holding or part of a holding in respect of which an application for resumption under the provisions of this Act is rejected, the cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay the basic tax and other taxes and cesses in respect of such holding or part of the holding, as the case may be, with effect on and from the date notified under Sub-section (1) of Section 72.

End Notes – II

Effect of Travancore Govt. Leases after Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061

Now a question arises: What is the impact of ‘Government Land Leases’ (with strict conditions) after 1061 (1886)? Do such leased lands qualify as “estate” under Article 31A of the Constitution?

The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out after 1061 (1886) do not inherit the rights granted by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061. If we look at it differently it would mean, or tantamount to say, that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands after the Proclamations (for, by virtue of the Proclamations it would lose the lease-character at the moment it is made).

In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (five Judge Bench), 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.), concluded that the land covered by the Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 were “estates” falling under Art. 31A of the Constitution. It was on the finding that the Proclamation “secured permanency of tenure”, and “proprietary interest” in the soil. It was observed as under:

  • “7. It is impossible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that,even after the Proclamation of 1040, the holders of these lands had no proprietary interest whatsoever in the soil and remained tenants in the strict sense of that term, with only the right of enjoyment, the only difference being that they secured permanency of tenure, the Government still remaining the full and absolute proprietor of the soil.”

Therefore, there is a clear difference between leases made before and after the Proclamations, and the rights conferred by the Proclamations do not apply to leases made after them.

End Notes – III

CAN AN EXEMPTED PLANTATION LAND BE SOLD AS AN ABSOLUTE PRIVATE PROPERTY?

No.

  • Sec. 82 deals with ceiling area. Sec. 83 mandates surrender of excess land. Sec. 85 directs that excess land shall be surrendered to government (accepting the compensation fixed under Sec. 88).
  • But it is not made applicable to the plantations.
  • Sec. 87 mandates that the protection of plantation is available only so long as the plantation subsists.

Exemption does not Confer any vested Right or Ownership

  • If no plantation, plantation lands would also have been treated in the same way – as any other excess land that had been (forcibly) got surrendered by virtue of the KLR Act. The law has given only a sanction to the planters to continue because of the existence of the plantation. Therefore ‘exemption’ does not confer a vested right or ownership.

ACQUISITION OF PLANTATION-LANDS OWNED BY PRIVATE PERSONS

1. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India

It is plain – No compensation is payable to the land-owners, for the lands ‘above the ceiling limit’, according to the Constitution of India. If any authority gives it, it will be sheer unscrupulous act.

  • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
  • Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India reads as under:
    • “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivationit shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limitapplicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”.

2. Exemption of ‘Plantation’ Does Not Cover Exemption of ‘Plantation LAND’

It is for the following reasons –

  • 1. The exemption is to the ‘plantation’, and not to the ‘LAND‘.
  • 2. Exemption is conditional – for it exists (only) as long as the plantation exists or continues;
  • Because,
    • (a) S. 2(44) defines ‘plantation’ as land used principally for the cultivation of a specific ‘plantation crop‘ like tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber etc.
    • (b) Section 87, Explanation II states that if a plantation for which exemption is given on recognition of a specific ‘plantation-crop’ is converted into any other ‘plantation-crop’ or the plantation activity is not continued, the exemption may be lost; and the land will be taken for considering the ceiling limit.

End Notes IV

Relevant provisions of KLR Act, in a Nutshell

Section Provisions in a Nutshell
Chap. II 
3(1)
Exemptions – (i) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to – (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
“Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.
7 EPersons acquired lands (before 2005 amendment in KLR Act) for consideration below 1 Ha. 61 Are 87 Sq.m. (4 acre) will be deemed to be tenants .
13Fixity: “Every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding.”
22Landlord desiring to resume any land shall apply to the Land Tribunal.
31Fair rent determined by Land Tribunal.
51B. Landlord not to enter on land surrendered or abandoned by the tenant. 
Contravention is made punishable.
54(1)
55
57
57 (3)
57 (6)
61
54(1). A cultivating tenant (to purchase the right) has to apply Land Tribunal.
55. Purchase price is fixed by LT (on fair rent u/s. 31) to be paid u/s. 59
57. The LT after enquiries, pass orders determining purchase price.
(3). The Land Tribunal allows the purchase of the land it determines.
(6). The Land Tribunal forwards  orders to the Land Board.
61. Tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) pending proceedings.
59When Sec. 54 application is allowed (by the LT), the purchase price (determined u/s. 57 by the LT) shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal to the credit of the Land Board and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
72Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating tenants in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
72(1) says: Holdings upon which tenanat entilted fixity under sec. 13 vest in govt.
72BCultivating-tenant “shall be entitled to assignment” of land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 –within ceiling area and get purchase certificate (through LT) (2 years from 1-1-1970). Effect of non-filing (See Balanoor Plantations case. 2018(3) KLT 283.)
72DThe cultivating tenant has to pay the purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
72ESuch a tenant is liable to pay rent to the Govt. for the unassigned land – under Purchase Certificate (E.g., exempted-plantation-land). The Land Tribunal fixes the rent under Sec. 72F(5)(h).
72CProvides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit). Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S. 72C also). 
72KLT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.
74Prohibition of future tenancies.
Chap. III 
81
Exemption from ceiling and excess for Govt. lands, private forests, plantations, industrial or commercial undertakings, etc.
Proviso – There will be an exemption (as plantation, land given to educational institution, trust, etc.) on Government lands, given under grant, lease, etc.
See: HMT (Machine Tools) Limited v. Taluk Land Board, 2009 (3) KLJ 110; MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28.
82Ceiling area – 5/10 standard acres.
83No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  It is a total bar. (Note:  plantations, industrial area etc. are exempted.)
Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB), Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137)
The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571.
84Certain transfers – void.
85(1)Surrender excess.
85(2)Owners and Tenants (having land in excess of the ceiling area) should furnish ceiling return to Land Board before March31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
Note: Effect of non-filing: See – Balanoor Plantations case – 2018(3) KLT 283.State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
 According to S. 3(1) (viii), “tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres” is exempted from Chapter II. Therefore, the landlord can recover such plantation lands after the period of tenancy. Such landlords also had to file a ceiling return within the time stipulated.
85(3)Excess shall be surrendered.
Note: Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant) It is clear from the following provisions: 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT (or the purchase of right, title and interest.)
55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.
Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.
It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case. Note: (i) The sub-section (3) itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant, (ii) LT is the only authority to determine tenancy (Land Board cannot determine it), and (iii) it is clear that even if it is a plantation-exemption-land (beyond ceiling limit), the tenant has to file petition under Section 54 – for fixing Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT and for allotting the land under section 57(3) and for effecting the payments of ‘rent’ and ‘purchase price’(to the credit of the Land Board)  under sec. 61 and 59.
85(3A)The person bound to file a statement under sub-section (2) (that is, Owners and Tenants – having land in excess of the ceiling area)  shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.
85(5)On receipt of the statement under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3A), the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Board and such Taluk LandBoard shall determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered.
85(7)Whereon a person fails to file statement under 85(2) or (3A), LB shall intimate that fact to TLB  –  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered. It is obvious – The LB can intimate TLB as to non-filing, on the basis of the records it obtained under Sec. 57(6) and 59. That is, those tenants who are not entitled to get a purchase certificate also has to file an application under Sec. 54(1) and 85(2) or (3A). Effect of non-filing: See – Balanur Plantations case (With respect to Sec. 72B application) – 2018(3) KLT 283. Statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit to file statement:  State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
[TLB not to do, suo motu, without direction from LB. 1980 KLT 120, referred to in 2019(1) KLT 985.]
85AFile ceiling return within March  2, 1973 before Land Board..
86(1)On determination of the extent to be surrendered under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
86(3)Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession
86(4)Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
86(6)Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
87
Exp. II
If a person converts any portion of exempted land for any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit. That is, the exemption will be lost for the portion that exceeds the ceiling limit. (Mathew K Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913)

Connected Blogs on Land Reform Laws

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

A. K. Sreekumar v. Director, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau: Members of a Charitable Society which Runs a College are Tractable to Prevention of Corruption Act

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Preface

A. K. Sreekumar v. Director, Vigilance And Anti Corruption Bureau (K Babu, J.), 12 Dec, 2024 (Ker) considered whether selling the ‘Government-seats’ to private students after receiving huge capitation amount, and its misappropriation, by the members of a charitable society, attract the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The court found –

  • the allegations fall under ‘public duty’ (as defined in Section 2(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) to attract Section 13 of the Act; and
  • prior approval under Section 17A of the P.C. Act is not necessary for the court to invoke its provisions.  

Facts of the case:

  • The petitioner alleged a conspiracy among the members of a charitable society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955, which runs a college.
  • The suspected persons, in furtherance of their common intention, denied admission to eligible students in the Pharmacy College in the Government seats and sold the said seats to private students after receiving a huge capitation amount and misappropriated the amount so obtained to their credit causing wrongful loss to the society and wrongful monetary gain to them.
  • It is in violation of Section 5 read with Section 15 of the Kerala Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee, Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-Exploitative Fee & Other Measures to Ensure Equity & Excellence in Professional Education) Act, 2006.
  • Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 406 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • The Vigilance and Anti-corruption Bureau (VACB) refused to take action on the complaint.
  • Thereon, the petitioner filed a complaint under Sections 190 and 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Court of Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kottayam, and prayed for conducting an inquiry under Section 202 or for a direction to conduct investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.  
  • The Special Judge posted the matter for report from the VACB.
  • The VACB took the stand – approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 from the competent authority is required.
  • The petitioner thereafter filed an application seeking investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
  • The Special Court dismissed the prayer and adjourned the matter, instructing the petitioner/complainant to produce Section 17A approval under the PC Act.
  • The Vigilance submitted an application seeking prior approval from the competent authority.
  • The Government, by Ext.P5 decision, took the stand that no vigilance enquiry was to be conducted. The reason showed was that the allegations had already been referred to the Admission Supervisory Committee for Medical Education.
  • The petitioner challenged the legality of the order passed by the Government (Ext.P5).

Relevant legal Provisions

Section 2(b) of the P.C. Act defines ‘public duty’ as follows:-

  • “public duty” means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest.”

Section 2(c) defines ‘public servant’.

  • (c) “public servant” means,-
  • (i) … (to) (vii) ….
  • (viii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty;……”

Section 17A of the PC Act provides –

  • no police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under the PC Act without prior approval from appropriate authority. 

Legal Issues

  • Whether the allegations attract a ‘public duty’ and
  • Whether prior approval under Section 17A P.C. Act is necessary.

Findings of Court:

1. “ ‘Public duty’ as defined in Section 2(b) of the PC Act, means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest. Thus a ‘public servant’ must be under the positive command of a State law or valid executive direction to discharge such a ‘public duty’. If a body or a corporation exercises a State function under the obligation of the existing laws, it is to be treated as a discharge of ‘public duty’.”

Rulings relied on

  • Karthikeya Varma v. Union of India, 2015 KHC 567 (distinguished).
  • Central Bureau of Investigation, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell v. Ramesh Gelli and Others [(2016) 3 SCC 788],
  • P.V.Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) [(1998) 4 SCC 626],
  • Manish Trivedi v. State of Rajasthan [(2014) 14 SCC 420]
  • Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2016) 7 SCC 353],
  • K.Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655],
  • State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah (AIR 2020 SC 2203),
  • Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [(2012) 3 SCC 64],

2. The approval under Section 17A of the PC Act arises only when the offence is relatable to any recommendation made or it is a decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties. So, this Court is of the view that prior approval, as provided in Section 17A, is not applicable (for investigation) in the present facts.

Rulings relied on

  • Sankarabhat and Others v. State of Kerala (2021 (5) KHC 248) and
  • Venugopal V. and Others v. State of Kerala and Another (2021 KHC 565)

Result:

  • Ext. P5 order (no vigilance enquiry be conducted, for the allegations had already been referred to the Admission Supervisory Committee for Medical Education) is quashed.
  • Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are directed to conduct a preliminary enquiry into the matter.

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma – Suit on Title can be Defeated only by a Plea of Adverse Possession

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

The relevant provision in the Limitation Act, 1963, that fixes the limitation period for a suit for declaration of title is Art. 58. It stipulates 3 years “when the right to sue first accrues”. For recovery, the limitation period is 12 years, under Art. 65, “when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff”.

The Supreme Court decision, Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3846, JB Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ., considered – what is the period of limitation for a suit in which (both) declaration of title and recovery are sought for.

  • It is held that Article 65 would be the relevant provision (and the period of limitation would be 12 years); and not Article 58 (which stipulates 3 years as the period of limitation).

Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021, Facts, in Brief

The suit was (originally filed) for declaration of title, and injunction. The trial held that the plaintiff was the absolute owner. But the suit was dismissed for it was found that the plaintiff was not in possession, and she failed to seek ‘possession’.

The legal heirs of the plaintiff who filed the 1st Appeal amended the plaint to include a prayer for possession, alternatively.

The First Appellate Court reversed the judgment, and decreed the suit, allowing the First Appeal. It  observed –

  • (i) When the suit is for possession based on title, once the title is established, unless the defendant proves adverse possession, the plaintiff cannot be non suited; and
  • (ii) the defendants, nowhere pleaded that they were in possession of the suit property, adverse to the interest of the plaintiff.

The defendants filed 2nd appeal before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal. It observed –

  • The plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit property, entitled for possession.
  • The case is not covered under Article 58 of the Limitation Act (which requirs filing suit within 3 years of cause of action).
  • The defendants had no case – they were in adverse possession.
  • Article 65 of the Limitation Act has to be applied (under which the defendant should have claimed adverse possession, to nonsuit plaintiff) and consequently, the suit of the plaintiff cannot be held as barred by limitation.
  • In other words, when the suit is based on title, the question of limitation does not arise, unless the defendant has pleading on adverse possession.

In such circumstances (the High Court being upheld the decree in favour of the plaintiff), the defendants came before the Apex Court.

Part I

Adverse Possession

In the factual situation of the case, the defendant mainly founded its argument in the Apex Court on ‘adverse possession’. The Apex Court (Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, Dec. 20, 2024: 2024 INSC 1021) found –

  • (i) the plaintiff has established her title and
  • (ii) the case raised by the defendant on adverse possession was not one pleaded or established.

Following legal assertions were placed by the Apex Court (referring its earlier decisions).

1. Suit-On-Title – Plaintiff Cannot Be Non-Suited, Unless Adverse Possession

  • Indira v. Arumugam, (1998) 1 SCC 614: If title is established in a suit-on-title (for possession) – plaintiff cannot be non-suited unless defendant proves adverse possession.

2. Limitation Article Applicable is – that provided For “Further Relief” (to Declaration)

  • C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808: In a suit for declaration with a “further relief” (injunction), the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief. The suit for a declaration for a right cannot be held to be barred so long as Right to property subsists.

3. Mere Possession For A Long PeriodNo Adverse Possession

  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph,  AIR 2023 SC 3988: Mere possession for a long period does not grant right of adverse possession.

The Supreme Court quoted from Government of Kerala v. Joseph which asserted the following legal assertions (referring the following decisions) –

(i). Some Overt Act For Adverse Possession

  • Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander, (1984) 2 SCC  286: There must be some overt act on the part of the licensee indicating assertion of hostile title.

(ii). Title And Adverse Possession – Contradictory pleas

  • Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant (1995) 2 SCC 543:  Independent title and adverse possession – will stand as contradictory pleas.

(iii). If Permissive Possession, Disclaim That Right

  • Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (1996) 1 SCC 639: Possession under the agreement – to bring-home plea of adverse possession, the claimant thereof should disclaim his right and plead and prove independent hostile adverse possession.

Sri Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, AIR 2020 SC 461, has reiterated this principle.

(iv). By Limitation Act, 1963, Onus On Claimant of Adverse Possession

  • P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (2007) 6 SCC 59: Adverse Possession – In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned: once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession.

Reiterated this principle in Janata Dal Party v. Indian National Congress (2014) 16 SCC 731

Read Blog: How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept

Part II

Multiple Causes of Action: Limitation

Before the Apex Court, the defendant put forwarded an argument on ‘Multiple Causes of Action’ and claimed that the limitation begins to run from the limitation-period for declaration (3 years); and not from the limitation provided for ‘possession’ (12 years), for the law directs that the limitation-period starts ‘When Right To Sue First Accrued’. The defendants relied on (i) Khatri Hotels Private Limited v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126 and Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022) 15 SCC 260.

  • Note: The argument was not accepted by the Apex Court.
  • These decisions were distinguished on the ground that the reliefs in this case (Mallarme v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021) was ‘declaration and possession’; and not two “substantial” reliefs (such that came for consideration in Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022) 15 SCC 260 – cancellation and recovery).

1. Multiple Causes of Action: When the ‘Right to Sue First Accrued

The plaintiff in Khatri Hotels Private Limited v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126, had encroached upon the Govt. land meant for road. A suit was filed by one co-owner in1990 for Injunction. It was dismissed. Despite the status quo order in that case, and without the sanction of the municipal authority, large scale construction (restaurant) was raised by the plaintiff/appellant, another co-owner, over the said land. After 10 years, appellant filed another suit for injunction against alleged threat of demolition or dispossession. It was held that the second suit was clearly barred by limitation. Finally, a third suit for declaration of title, mandatory and permanent injunction was filed by the plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the suit for it was (i) barred for limitation and (ii) filed indirectly challenging the notification by which village Kishangarh was urbanized, without specifically challenging the same, as the entries made in the revenue record are only pursuant to the said notification.

The Apex Court, in Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021, apprised this decision and pointed out –

  • In Khatri Hotels Private Limited v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126, it was observed that the legislature had designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, while enacting Article 58 of the Limitation Act. The Court noted that the word “first” has been used between the words “sue” and “accrued”.
  • Therefore, if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation would begin to run from the date when the right of sue first accrued.
  • In other words, successive violation of the right would not give rise to fresh cause and the suit would be liable to be dismissed if it was beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued.

2. When a composite suit for cancellation (of the sale deed) and recovery sought for, substantive relief of cancellation holds the field Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022)

In Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022) 15 SCC 260, it is held – when a composite suit is filed for cancellation of the sale deed as well as for recovery of the possession, the limitation-period has to be computed with respect to the substantive relief of cancellation of the sale deed (three years from the date of the knowledge of the sale deed).

Two reliefs were prayed for in Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022) 15 SCC 260 – one for cancellation of the Sale Deed; and the second, for recovery of possession. The Court treated the relief for possession as consequential prayer and the relief for cancellation of Sale Deed as the substantive prayer.

Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022) 15 SCC 260, was distinguished in Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021, observing as under:

  • “38. The dictum as laid in Rajpal Singh (supra) cannot be made applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. The reason is simple. Ordinarily when, a suit is filed for cancellation of Sale Deed and recovery of possession, the same would suggest that the title of the plaintiff has already been lost.
  • By seeking to get the Sale Deed set aside on the grounds as may have been urged in the plaint, the plaintiff could be said to be trying to regain his title over the suit property and recover the possession. In such circumstances, the period of limitation would be three years and not twelve years.”

Conclusion

This decision (Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3846) definitely says – when a suit is filed for declaration (primary relief) and consequential relief (injunction or recovery),

  • the determinative factor as to the period of limitation will be the “substantive prayer” (i.e., injunction or recovery; and not that of primary relief of declaration).

In this case our Apex Court particularly considered what is the relevant Article that applies to a suit for ‘declaration and recovery’: and it is authoritatively held –

  • (if the plaintiff could establish title) the relevant Article would be Article 65 (that lays down limitation as to adverse possession) and not Art. 58 (that lays down limitation as to declaration).

Read Connected Posts:

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Recovery of Possession (Based on Title) and Eviction (of Tenants)

Taken from: SUIT on TITLE: Landlord can Recover Property on GENERAL TITLE (though Tenancy Not Proved) if Defendant Falsely Claimed Independent Title

Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract

Suit for RECOVERY, on title, Against a Trespasser   
Plaintiff has to succeed on the strength of his title.
If plaintiff shows high degree of probability, onus shifts.
Once the onus is on the defendant, it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff’s title.
Even if the defendant claims title as owner and fails to prove it, the plaintiff can win only if he establishes his title.
If the defendant establishes his right to continue possession (honouring title of the plaintiff) as lessee, licencee, mortgagee etc., the plaintiff will fail.

Suit for EVICTION of Tenants
Suit for eviction is filed against tenants or other persons in permissive possession. A finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction.    

Suit for possession under Sec. 6 of the Sp. Relf. Act –
If a person is dispossessed ‘otherwise than in due course of law’, he can recover the property under Sec. 6 of the Sp. Relf. Act, on the strength of his earlier possession.
In such a suit, though title is not perfected by adverse possession, one (plaintiff) in possession can eject a trespasser under Sec. 6 of the Sp. Relf. Act.

Suit For Eviction On Jural Relationship of Landlord and Tenant

When Courts “convert” suit for eviction into one for recovery of possession on title

Whether the Courts can convert the suit for eviction of the tenant (based on the ground of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant) into one for recovery of possession (based on the title of the plaintiff) is considered in the following two decisions of the Supreme Court:

  • Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693
  • Tribhuvanshankar v. Amrutlal, (2014) 2 SCC 788.

The Apex Court remanded the first case, a civil suit, and allowed to amend the plaint so as to claim the plea of adverse possession, invoking Article 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to do complete justice to the parties. In the latter case the suit was dismissed for it was filed under a special enactment (Accommodation Control Act), and it could not have been permitted to seek ‘recovery’ by an amendment.

In Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani, AIR 1966 SC  1718, it was pointed out that unless jurisdiction was excluded, the  civil court has jurisdiction entertain a suit based title.

Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera – Landlord can win the TITLE SUIT if he Proves his GENERAL TITLE

In Champa Lal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra, (1990) 1 BLJR 268, it was held as under:

  • “It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore** the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem Court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his general title. (Quoted in: Radha Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sinha, 1998-2 BLJR 1061; Biswanath Agarwala v. Sabitri Bera 2009-15 SCC 693)
  • ** Tenant challenges title of landlord; and no special law (e.g., BRC Act) bars to give such a relief.

Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, was a Civil Suit for eviction of defendant after issuing notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Following were the facts:

  • The defendant-tenant entered the suit shop in 1970.
  • Plaintiffs purchased the suit premises in 1980.
  • The plaintiffs served a notice on the defendant under Sec. 106, TP Act.
  • Plaintiffs instituted Suit for eviction claiming to be the owners and landlords.
  • Defendant denied the jural relationship and said that he had ever been a tenant.
  • He claimed independent title. He claimed to have an agreement for sale with the (original) owner.

The trial Court had dismissed the suit on the finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish the jural relationship of landlord and tenant. Still, it found –

  • that the plaintiffs proved to be the owner; and
  • the defendant had failed to prove independent title.

The First Appellate Court, relying on AIR 1984 ROC 78 (All.), page 35, and AIR 1984 All. 66 allowed the appeal and decreed the suit holding  –

  • the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for possession on the basis of their general title.

In the second appeal, it was found by the High Court –

  • the defendant was a trespasser and as such upheld the decree of eviction.

Hence the appeal before the Apex Court (Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693). The Supreme Court formulated the legal question to be considered as under:

  • “Whether a Civil Court can pass a decree on the ground that the defendant is a trespasser in a simple suit for eviction is the question involved in this appeal.”

The Plaintiffs- respondents contended as under:

  • i. Even in a suit for eviction, the plaintiffs would be entitled to obtain a decree for possession relying on or on the basis of his title.
  • ii. In a suit for eviction, it is for the defendant to show that he has a right to remain on the tenanted premises either as a permanent tenant or otherwise.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the defendant on the following grounds:

  • no issue as to whether the defendant was a trespasser or not,
  • non-valuation of the relief of recovery of possession based on title (and non-payment of ad-valorem Court-fee)
  • lack of opportunity to the defendant to take a plausible plea of acquisition of indefeasible title by adverse possession.

However, it is held by the Apex Court, inter alia, as under:

  • “The landlord in a given case** although may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the event he proves his GENERAL TITLE, may obtain a decree on the basis thereof.”
  • **Tenant challenges title of landlord; and no special law (e.g., BRC Act) bars to give such a relief.

Nevertheless, the Apex Court allowed –

  • “The plaintiffs may file an application for grant of leave to amend their plaint so as to enable them to pray for a decree for eviction of the defendant on the ground that he is a trespasser.”
  • “For the aforementioned purpose, he shall pay the requisite Court-fee in terms of the provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870.”
  • “The appellant-defendant would in such an event, be entitled to file his additional written statement” (to raise the plea of adverse possession).
  • “The learned Trial Judge shall frame an appropriate issue and the parties would be entitled to adduce any other or further evidence on such issue.”

The Apex Court pointed out –

  • The directions were given in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to do complete justice to the parties.
  • Note:
  • Article 142 had been invoked for there was (i) no issue as to whether the defendant was a trespasser or not, (ii) non-valuation of the relief of recovery of possession based on title and (iii) lack of opportunity to defendant to take a plausible plea adverse possession; and
  • it would not have been needed if the plaintiff had sought for relief of recovery(on title), alternatively.
  • This decision is referred to in TribhuvanShankar v. Amrutlal (S.B. Sinha and Deepak Misra, JJ.), 2014-2 SCC 788.

The right of the plaintiff (landlord) to recover, on the basis of “GENERAL TITLE” is asserted by the Supreme Court (Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693) referring following decisions.

1. Radha Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sinha, 1998 (2) BLJR 1061. The Patna High Court accepted that a landlord is entitled to obtain a decree of eviction on the basis of his GENERAL TITLE, though he could not prove the relationship of landlord and tenant (when the tenant raised false claim of title).

2. Champa Lal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra, S.B. Sinha, J., (1990) 1 BLJR 268. It was held:

  • “It is also well settled that one such relationship is admitted or established, tenant would be estopped and precluded from challenging the title of the landlord and if he does so, under the general rulemake himself liable for eviction on that ground.
  • It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem Court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his GENERAL TITLE.”

3. Hajee Golam Hossain Ostagar v. Sheik Abu Bakkar, AIR 1936 Cal. 351. It was held – in a suit for ejectment, if the defendant claims the right to remain on a land permanently, he was ‘bound to show‘ the right ‘wherefore the onus would be on him‘.

Payment of ad valorem court fee needed to obtain a decree on general title

In Anil Bansal v. Dinesh Kohli, ILR 2017-4  HP 524, it is held as under: 

  • “22. It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore, the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his general title.”

Tribhuvanshankar v. Amrutlal, (2014) 2 SCC 788

It was a suit for eviction under the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act.

The plaintiffs pleaded, in a nutshell, as under:

  • The defendant was a tenant under the earlier owner.
  • The rents were not paid by him.
  • The tenancy was terminated.
  • The defendant disputed the landlord and tenant relationship
  • The original owner sold the property without obtaining any sale consideration.
  • It was with the sole intention of obtaining possession by colluding with the plaintiff.
  • The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that –
    • The sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was without any consideration
    • The relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was not established
    • The defendant had perfected title on adverse possession.
  • The first appellate Court held to the following effect –
    • The relationship of landlord and tenant was not established
    • The finding of the trial Court that the sale deed is not supported by consideration is neither justified nor correct
    • There was no clinching evidence to establish that the defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession.
  • In the second appeal, one of the substantial questions of law formulated was – whether a decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff though such plaintiff fails to establish relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • The High Court had allowed the appeal and restored the decree and judgment of the trial Court. It was held –
    • Once the plaintiff had failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant which is a sine qua non in a suit for eviction, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to fall back on his title to seek eviction.
  • The Supreme Court distinguished Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, pointing out that it was a Civil Suit and not one under Accommodation Control Act (or Rent Control Act). Dismissing the suit, the Apex Court held as under:
    • “On a seemly analysis of the principle stated in the aforesaid authorities,**it is quite vivid that there is a difference in exercise of jurisdiction when the civil court deals with a lis relating to eviction brought before it under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and under any special enactment pertaining to eviction on specified grounds.”
    • **LIC v. India Automobiles & Co., (1990) 4 SCC 286, Dr. Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal (1995) 6 SCC 580 and Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad (2002) 1 SCC 90.

Suit for ‘Recovery on Title’ (from Tenant): Failure to Prove Lease – Not Disentitle Relief

In Bandaru Venugopala Rao v. Allure Anasuya, 2024-2 And LT 605, followingBiswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693,it is held that in a suit for recovery on title, failure to prove lease would not disentitle relief to the plaintiff.

Following are the facts in Bandaru Venugopala Rao v. Allure Anasuya (supra).

  • Plaintiff claimed to be the title holder.
  • Plaintiff sent a lawyer’s notice to defendant terminating the lease.
  • In the reply defendant alleged title for himself.
  • Hence,the plaintiff sued for declaration of title and possession.
  • Defendant claimed that an agreement for sale was entered into by him with the prior owner and claimed rights under Sec. 53A TP Act.
  • Plaintiff failed to prove lease.
  • Still the suit on title claiming possession was decreed.
  • It was held that the failure to prove the lease, by itself, did not disentitle the plaintiff.

It is held as under:

  • “Even if plaintiff alleged that the possession of defendant No.1 is only as lessee and even if plaintiff failed to prove it that by itself does not disentitle a title holder from claiming possession. In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India laid the law that in a case where the plaintiff sues for declaration of title and for recovery of possession alleging that the person in possession is a tenant, even if the plaintiff fails to prove such jural relationship of landlord and tenant he still is entitled for a decree for recovery of possession on proof of his GENERAL TITLE. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that on failure to prove the lease alleged by plaintiff, the suit ought to have been dismissed is a contention which lacks any legal basis. Therefore, point is answered against the appellant.”

Plaintiff in a suit against Tenant Failed to Prove Tenancy; Can he Win on Title

Plaintiff filed the suit, as landlord, for ejectment of a tenant. The plaintiff failed to establish the tenancy. Will he be entitled to a decree for possession on the basis of his title?

‘No’ was the argument for the defendant/appellant in Sri Venkateswara Oil Company, Tirupathi  v.  Guduru Jalaja Reddy, 2002-1 ALD 182; 2001-6 ALT 567. Following decisions were relied on.

  • Brahmanand v. Neki Puri, AIR 1965 SC 1506;
  • Bhagwari Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966  SC 735;
  • Sita Ram v. Radha Bai, AIR 1968  SC 534; and  
  • Bibt Rehana Khatun V. Iqtidar Uddin Hasan, AIR  1943 All. 184

The argument was not accepted by the Andhra High Court pointing out that the parties, had known that title to the suit land was in dispute, and they adduced evidence in that regard. Following decisions were relied on by the Court –

  • Ponnia Pillai v. Pannai, AIR 1947 Mad. 282 (relying on Bala Mukund V. Dalu, 25 All. 498 (FB) and 
  • Jagamohan Garnaik v. Sankar Samal,  AIR 1990 Ori. 124.

Court is Entitled to Consider the Title set up by the Defendants also 

In Ram Chandra Sakharam Mahajan Vs. Damodar Trimbak, AIR 2007 SC 2577, it is observed –

  • In a recovery on title suit, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish title.
  • Court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants
  • But, weakness of defence to establish title, would not enable plaintiff to a decree.

The Apex Court held:

  • “The suit is for recovery of possession on the strength of title. Obviously, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that title. No doubt in appreciating the case of title set up by the plaintiff, the Court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants. But the weakness of the defenceor the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these propositions.”
  • “14. We find that the trial Court and the Appellate Court were not justified in refusing the amendment of the plaint sought for by the plaintiff. No doubt there had been delay in seeking amendment but that delay could have been compensated by awarding costs to the contesting defendants 1 to 9. Therefore, we are satisfied that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff ought to have been allowed. We are inclined to allow the amendment sought for, since it would enable the Court to pin-pointedly consider the real dispute between the parties and would enable it to render a decision more satisfactorily to its conscience. We, therefore, allow the amendment as sought for by the plaintiff at a belated stage. The amendment will be carried out by the plaintiff in the trial Court within three months from this date as per the practice followed in the trial Court. Obviously defendants 1 to 9 would have an opportunity to file an additional written statement to the amended plaint. They will be entitled to file an additional written statement within a period of four months from the date of this judgment.”

Document ex-facie reveals no title – specific declaration as to invalidity not necessary

The Supreme Court held in Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki (Aniruddha Bose & Sudhanshu DhuliaJJ.), 2024 3 KerHC 169; 2024-2 KerLT 789; 2024-4 SCR 383, held as under:

  • “If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence. Chiruthey could not convey any property over which she did not have any right or title. Her right, if any, would stem from the second deed of lease (Exhibit A-1). We are conscious of the fact that no claim was made before any forum for invalidating the deed dated 14th July 1910 (Exhibit A-20).”

By proving a deed, title of the executing person is not automatically confirmed

The Supreme Court held in Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki (Aniruddha Bose & Sudhanshu DhuliaJJ.), 2024 3 KerHC 169; 2024-2 KerLT 789; 2024-4 SCR 383, also held as under:

  • “18. ….But it would be trite to repeat that even if subsistence of a deed is proved in evidence, the title of the executing person (in this case Chiruthey) does not automatically stand confirmed.. ….. … But in absence of proper title over the subject property, that lease deed even if she was its sole lessor would not have had been legally valid or enforceable. If right, title or interest in certain property is sought conveyed by a person by an instrument who herself does not possess any such form of entitlement on the subject being conveyed, even with a subsisting deed of conveyance on such property, the grantee on her successors-in-interest will not have legal right to enforce the right the latter may have derived from such an instrument.”

Plaintiff has to Win Suit for Recovery, on Title, on the Strength of his Title

In Vijay Pullarwar v. Shri Hanuman Deostan, (2019) 11 SCC 718, the suit for possession instituted by the plaintiffs trust on the basis of title, was found to be devoid of merits; for, there was no reference in the registration application of the public trust under the BPT Act, 1950 or in schedule I, where to record the properties of the public trust that the suit property belonged to the trust. Our Apex Court held as under:

  • “Needless to observe that the plaintiffs/respondents were primarily obliged to establish their title in the suit house bearing No.878 in Circle No.3 where the Padukas of Saint Haridas Baba have been installed, as being the property of the plaintiff trust. The plaintiffs must succeed or fail on the title they establish; and if they fail to do so, they must fail to get the relief of possession irrespective of title of the defendant in the suit property (See: Brahma Nand Puri v. Naki Puri, (1965) 2 SCR 233 and Bajaranglal Shivchandrai Ruia v. Shashikant N. Ruia, (2004) 5 SCC 272).”

In Brahma Nand Puri v. Neki Puri, AIR 1965 SC 1506, the Apex Court held as under:

  • “The plaintiff’s suit being one for ejectment he has to succeed or fail on the file that he establishes and if he cannot succeed on the strength of his title his suit must fail notwithstanding that the defendant in possession has no title to the property… …”

If Title of Plaintiff is Nullity, Defendant Need Not file a Substantive Suit;

  • Plaintiff in ejection suit must succeed or fail on his title
  • If Plaintiff Shows Apparent Title, Defendant to Plead Defects Thereon

In Bajaranglal Shivchandrai Ruia v. Shashikant N. Ruia, AIR 2004 SC 2546, the defendants contended that the plaintiff’s title, on the basis of the alleged auction sale ‘was a nullity, as it was ultra vires the legal provisions and on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, non-service of demand notice on all the heirs and co-owners’. It was contended from the part of the (original) plaintiff that the sale proceedings could be challenged only by way of a substantive suit, and that the High Court was right in characterising the challenge to the suit by the defendant as a ‘backdoor method’. The Apex Court held as under:

  • “If the title claimed by the plaintiff was a nullity and wholly void, there was no need for any of the defendants including Bajranglal to challenge it by way of a substantive suit. They could always set up nullity of title as a defence in any proceeding taken against them based upon such title. If, in fact, the sale was a nullity, it was non est in the eye of law and all that defendant had to do was point this out. (See in this connection: Ajudh Raz and Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi, [1991] 3 SCC 136 and the opinion of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Abdulla Mian v. Government of Bombay, (1942) 44 Bom LR 577.
  • In Vidyadhar v. Manikrao and Anr., [1999] 3 SCC 573, the plaintiff had filed a suit on the basis of a sale deed executed by D-2 in his favour and sought the relief of possession of the property from defendant no. 1 who was an absolute stranger to the sale deed. The question which arose was whether defendant No. l, who was in possession, could justify his possession by urging the nullity of sale transaction between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2. In these circumstances, this Court held (vide para 21):
    • ‘The above decisions appear to be based on the principle that a person in his capacity as a defendant can raise any legitimate plea available to him under law to defeat the suit of the plaintiff. This would also include the plea that the sale deed by which the title to the property was intended to be conveyed to the plaintiff was void or fictitious or, for that matter, collusive and not intended to be acted upon. Thus, the whole question would depend upon the pleadings of the parties, the nature of the suit, the nature of the deed, the evidence led by the parties in the suit and other attending circumstances.’
  • Here, the plaintiffs suit is for ejection of the defendant and for possession of the suit property. She must succeed or fail on the title that she establishes. If she cannot succeed in proving her title, the suit must fail notwithstanding that the defendant in possession may or may not have title to the property. (See in this connection: Brahma Nand Puri v. Neki Puri, [1965] 2 SCR 233 at p. 237).
  • Appellant Bajranglal had sufficiently pleaded in his written statement the defects in the title of the plaintiff and it was, therefore, open for the learned Single Judge to go into this question and decide if the plaintiff had good title or not. …… In our view, the finding of the learned Single Judge that the plaintiff’s title was invalid and non est for contravention of the provisions of Section 206 of the BMC Act and the Regulations made thereunder, is fully justified and brooked no interference in appeal. ……. In our view, the principle in Vidyadhar’s case clearly applies to the case on hand.”

Suit on Title – Both Parties Claim Title – Plaintiff Shows High Probability, Onus Shifts

In a suit for recovery on title, where both plaintiff and defendant claim title, if plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability, he will Win, if the defendant fails to discharge his onus. In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003 SC 4548: (2003) 8 SCC 752, the law is stated in the following terms :

  • “29. In a suit for recovery of possession based on title it is for the plaintiff to prove his title and satisfy the court that he, in law, is entitled to dispossess the defendant from his possession over the suit property and for the possession to be restored to him. However, as held in A. Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma there is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof: burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which never shifts. Onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff’s title.” (Quoted in: Anil. Rishi vs. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558; City Municipal. Council, Bhalki Vs. Gurappa, (2016) 2 SCC 200)

In Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 9,it is held bu our Apex Court as under:

  • “31. The burden of proof
    • [See Paragraph 19 in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558 where the expression ‘burden of proof’ is used in three ways, namely, (i) to indicate the duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition at the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a proposition as against all counter-evidence; and (iii) an indiscriminate use in which it may mean either, or both of the others.]
  • to establish a title in the present case lies upon the plaintiff as this burden lies on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which she claims relief [See Addagada Raghavamma and Another v. Addagada Chenchamma and Another, AIR 1964 SC 136.] This is mandated in terms of Sec. 101
    • [Sec. 101: Burden of Proof.- Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.]
  • of the Evidence Act, which states that burden on proving the fact rests with party who substantially asserts in the affirmative and not on the party which is denying it. This rule may not be universal and has exceptions,[See Ss. 103, 104 and 105 of the Evidence Act.] but in the factual background of the present case, the general principle is applicable. In terms of Sec. 102
    • [Sec. 102: On whom the burden of proof lies.- The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.]
  • of the Evidence Act, if both parties fail to adduce evidence, the suit must fail.[See Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558.] Onus of proof, no doubt shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence, but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the onus on the defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and can be discharged only when he is able to prove title.[See R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder  v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami V.P. Temple and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 752.] The weakness of the defence cannot be a justification to decree the suit. [See Union of India and Others v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and Others, (2014) 2 SCC 269.] The plaintiff could have succeeded in respect of the Schedule ‘A’ property if she had discharged the burden to prove the title to the Schedule ‘A’ property which squarely falls on her. This would be the true effect of Ss. 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act. [See Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (DEAD) Through LRs. And Others v. K.V.P. Shastri (DEAD) Through LRs. And Others, (2013) 15 SCC 161.]
  • Therefore, it follows that the plaintiff should have satisfied and discharged the burden under the provisions of the Evidence Act, failing which the suit would be liable to be dismissed.”

Burden of Proof General Principles and Nuances of Sections 101 to 106

Our Apex Court in Mohd.  Abdullah Azam Khan Vs. Nawab Kazim Ali Khan, 2023 KLT OnLine 1084(SC), authoritatively lays down the General principles as to Burden of Proof. It reads:

  • 12.1. The legal scheme governing various aspects of ‘burden of proof’ in the Indian context, is contained in Sections 101 to 106 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • 12.2. As per Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, when a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. This section is based on the rule, ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that the burden of proving a fact rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue and not upon the party who denies it, because a negative is usually incapable of proof. The burden of proving a fact always lies upon the person who asserts and until such burden is discharged, the other party is not required to be called upon to prove his case. The court has to examine as to whether the person upon whom the burden lies has been able to discharge his burden. However, the above rule is subject to the general principle that things admitted need not be proved.
  • 12.3. The question as to whether burden of proof has been discharged by a party to the lis or not, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. If the facts are admitted or, if otherwise, sufficient materials have been brought on record so as to enable a Court to arrive at a definite conclusion, it is idle to contend that the party on whom the burden of proof lies would still be liable to produce direct evidence, vide National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rattani (2009) 2 SCC 75: AIR 2009 SC 1499.
  • 12.4. Burden to prove documents lie on plaintiff alone as onus is always on the person asserting a proposition or fact which is not self­evident. This position is summarised in the observation to the effect that, an assertion that a man who is alive was born requires no proof; the onus, is not on the person making the assertion, because it is self­evident that he had been born. But to assert that he had been born on a certain date, if the date is material, requires proof; the onus is on the person making the assertion, vide Robins vs. National Trust & Co. Ltd. 1927 AC 515: 101 IC 903.
  • 12.5. It is also to be noted at this juncture that there is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof. Burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and it never shifts, onus of proof on the other hand, shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. For instance, In a suit for possession based on title, once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant, it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof, the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiffs title, vide RVE Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and VP Temple AIR 2003 SC 4548: (2003) 8 SCC 752.
  • 12.6. In terms of section 102 of the Evidence Act, the initial burden to prove its claim is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that burden and makes out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff of the same.
  • 12.7. Where, however, evidence has been led by the contesting parties, abstract considerations of onus are out of place and truth or otherwise must always be adjudged on the evidence led by the parties [Kalwa Devadattam vs. Union, AIR 1964 SC 880]
  • 12.8. As per Section 103, the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. This section amplifies the general rule in section 101 that the burden of proof lies on the person who asserts the affirmative of the issue. It lays down that if a person wishes the court to believe in the existence of a particular fact, the onus of proving that fact, is on him, unless the burden of proving it is cast by any law on any particular person.
  • 12.9. Section 105 is an application of the rule in section 103. When parties to a dispute adduce evidence to substantiate their claim, onus becomes academic and divided, entailing each party to prove their respective plea.
  • 12.10. Section 106 is an exception to the general rule laid down in Section 101, that the burden of proving a fact rest on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. Section 106 is not intended to relieve any person of that duty or burden but states that when a fact to be proved is peculiarly within the knowledge of a party, it is for him to prove it. It applies to cases where the fact is especially within a party’s knowledge and to none else. The expression ‘especially’ used in Section 106 means facts that are eminently or exceptionally within one’s knowledge. This means a party having personal knowledge of certain facts has a duty to appear as a witness and if he does not go to the witness box, there is a strong presumption against him. In an Election Petition, the initial burden to prove determination of age of returned candidate lies on the petitioner, however, burden lies on the respondent to prove facts within his special knowledge. (Sushil Kumar vs. Rakesh Kumar [ (2003) 8 SCC 673) ]. 
  • 12.11. The provisions of Section 106 are unambiguous and categorical in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. If he does so, he must be held to have discharged his burden but if he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106. [Source: Sarkar on Law of Evidence, 20th Edition, Volume 2.]
  • 12.12. In Sushil Kumar vs. Rakesh Kumar (supra), the controversy was with regard to the improper acceptance of the nomination of the sole respondent therein on the premise that he was under qualified to contest the Bihar Legislative Assemble election from 181, Parbatta Constituency. In the said case, inter alia, the horoscope of the respondent therein and admission register of New St. Xaviers School, Boring Road, Patna and transfer certificate issued by Swami Vivekananda Vidyalaya, Mithapur, Patna, were produced as documents to prove that the successful candidate therein was not eligible to contest the said Assembly election. In the said case, Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act was referred to and it was observed that the register maintained in terms of a statute or by a statutory authority in regular course of business would be a relevant fact and if such vital evidence had been produced, it would clinch the issue. It was observed that there is no reliable evidence on record to show that the date of birth was recorded in the school register on the basis of the statement of any responsible person and that the admission register or a transfer certificate issued by a primary school do not satisfy the requirements of Section 35 of the Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court in the case of Gian Chand and Bros v. Rattan Lal, (2013) 2 SCC 606, has held as under:

  • 18. It is well-settled principle of law that a person who asserts a particular fact is required to affirmatively establish it. In Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh [(2006) 5 SCC 558] (SCC p. 561, para 9), it has been held that the burden of proving the facts rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative issues and not the party who denies it and the said principle may not be universal in its application and there may be an exception thereto. The purpose of referring to the same is that if the plaintiff asserts that the defendant had acknowledged the signature, it is obligatory on his part to substantiate the same. But the question would be what would be the consequence in a situation where the signatures are proven and there is an evasive reply in the written statement and what should be construed as substantiating the assertion made by the plaintiff.
  • 19. In Krishna Mohan Kul v. Pratima Maity [(2004) 9 SCC 468] it has been ruled thus: (SCC p. 474, para 12) “12. … When fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence is alleged by a party in a suit, normally, the burden is on him to prove such fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation.”
  • 20. In Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 529] a Constitution Bench of this Court, while dealing with a mode of proof of a will under the Succession Act, 1925 observed that where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same.
  • 21. In A. Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma [AIR 1964 SC 136], while making a distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof, a three-Judge Bench opined thus: (AIR p. 143, para 12) “12. … There is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof: burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. The burden of proof in the present case undoubtedly lies upon the plaintiff to establish the factum of adoption and that of partition. The said circumstances do not alter the incidence of the burden of proof. Such considerations, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, may shift the onus of proof. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence.”

If Sale, on which Title rests, is Vitiated: Title will be Nullity

It was held by the Bombay High Court in Sarang Avinash Kamtekar v. Alpha Organic (2005) relying on

  • (1) Himadri Coke and Petro Ltd. v. Soneko Developers (P) Ltd., (2005) 12 SCC 364;
  • (2) Bajaranglal Shivchandrai Ruia v. Shashikant N. Ruia, 2004(3) SCR 373; and
  • (3) A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221.

that a sale on which title of a party to the suit rests is vitiated, title will be bad in law.

Principle Not Applicable with its Full Vigor in a suit filed by the State

From R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003 SC 4548, it is clear that, though in a suit for recovery on title, a plaintiff cannot argue that the defendant failed to prove his title.

But, it may not be applicable with its full vigor in a suit filed by the State, for it is the paramount title holder of the property by virtue of the Constitution.

Read Blog: Ultimate Ownership of All Property Vests in State; It is an Incident of Sovereignty.

Law Recognises Efficacy of Possession in Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act

Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act allows one to file a suit for recovery of property, on the strength of his prior possession, if he had lost his possession within 6 months of the suit. In such a case, he need not prove his title; and he can succeed on establishing that he has been dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law within six months.

Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 reads as under:

  • 6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property. (1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit.
  • (2) No suit under this section shall be brought
    • (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or
    • (b) against the Government.
  • (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.
  • (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.

If Title not Perfected by Adver. Posn, Can one Eject a Trespasser After 6 Months

High Courts differ, as pointed out in Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179.

Now it is settled that if one fails to exercise his option by filing a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act within six months, he is at liberty to file a suit to recover his possession (with or without declaration) by a regular suit for recovery of possession. It can be based on title or on his possession in assumed or presumed character of ownership (even if title not perfected by doctrine of adverse possession) on the principle that possession is good title against all the world but the rightful owner. See: Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179; Kanti Lal v. Smt. Shanti Devi, AIR 1997 Raj 230.

Read Blog: POSSESSION is a Substantive Right in Indian Law

Courts Protect Settled Possession

  • Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law.
    • Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165
    • Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179;
    • Phirayalal Kapur v. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186;
    • Nallammal v. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864). 
  • It is trite law that courts protect settled possession.
    • Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813
    • Aarti v. Aruna Gautham. 2015 -1 RCR (Civil) 160,
    • Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, 2004-1 SCC 769.
    • Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131
    • Ram Rattan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 188.
    • Puran Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 518
    • Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration, (1968) 2 SCR 455.

Read Blog: Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal – Does Something Remain Untold?

Even Rightful Owner to Take Recourse to law; He cannot take the law in his own hands

In Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769, our Apex Court Court (R.C. Lahoti, B.N. Srikrishna, G.P. Mathur, JJ.) observed that the law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner. It is held as under:­ 

  • “8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser.
  • rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force.
  • If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. 
  • The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful ownerfrom using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force.
  • In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.” (quoted in: Subramanya Swamy Temple, Ratnagiri v. V. Kanna Gounder, 2009-3 SCC 306; Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813)

What is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner was made clear in Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769. It reads as under:

  • “9. …The “settled possession” must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase “settled possession” does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a straitjacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession.” (quoted in Samarpan Varishtha Jan Parisar vs Rajendra Prasad Agarwal, AIR 2022 SC 2209)

Even the Rightful Owner cannot Eject a Trespasser with Force

In Karthiyayani Amma v. Govindan, AIR 1980 Ker 224, the Kerala High Court considered the question whether the rightful owner can eject a trespasser in possession with force; and whether a person in illegal possession could sustain a suit for injunction against the true owner, from forcibly dispossessing him from the property.  It was held as under:

  • “The ultimate position, therefore, reduces itself to this:
  • Can a person in possession without title sustain a suit for injunction against the rightful owner if he proves possession?
  • Yes. In this case, plaintiff is found to in be possession. On the finding, he should be granted the injunction prayed for. A person in possession can be evicted only in due process of law. Even the rightful owner cannot eject him with force. If he cannot be evicted with force, he continues to be in possession and he can resist invasion of his possession by everyone including the rightful owner. If the rightful owner threatens his peaceful possession, he can approach Courts of Law and pray for the equitable relief of injunction to protect his possession”. (Followed in: Aiysumma v. Mariyamma, 1994-2 CIVCC 52, 1994-1 KerLT 570. )

It is pointed out in Suresh v. Ashok Girdharilal Chandak, 2016-1 MHLJ 171 that ‘bearing in mind the basic principle of law in civil jurisprudence that even a trespasser cannot be evicted without following due process of law and no one can be allowed to take law into his own hands to recover possession of the property without following due process of law and without proving title to the immovable property in possession of a person holding actual physical possession thereof’.

No Injunction in Favour of a Trespasser, Against the ‘True Owner’

It is observed by our Apex Court, in Prataprai N. Kothari v. John Braganza, AIR 1999 SC 1666, as under:

  • “It is quite obvious that the learned single Judge had not taken note of the principle of possessory title or the principle of law that a person who has been in long continuous possession can protect the same by seeking an injunction against any person in the world other than the true owner. It is also well settled that even the owner of the property can get back his possession only by resorting to due process of law.

Divergent Views are set out in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, AIR 2004 SC 1801 also. They are the following:

  • first, a person in settled possession cannot be disposed by the owner except by recourse of law
  • second, a trespasser in possession cannotnot seek injunction against the true owner.

In this case, a forceful postulation is posed-

  • A trespasser ousted can seek restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, (even) against the true owner. If so, can’t the trespasser seek injunction as to possession, against the true owner?

In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, AIR 2004 SC 1801, the appellants were the plaintiffs whose suit was rejected in terms of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is held in this decision as under:

  • “24. There are two different sets of principles which have to be borne in mind regarding course to be adopted in case of forcible dispossession. Taking up the first aspect, it is true that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he has no right to remain in property, he cannot be disposed by the owner except by recourse of law. This principle is laid down in Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. That Section says that if any person is dispossession without his consent from immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. That a person without title but in “settled” possession – as against mere fugitive possession – can get back possession if forcibly dispossessed or rather, if dispossessed otherwise than by due process of law, has been laid down in several cases. It was so held by this Court in
    • Yashwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620,
    • Krishna Ram Mohate v. Mrs. Shobha Venkata Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131 at p. 136;
    • Ram Rattan v. State of UP, (1977) 1 SCC 188, and
    • State of UP v. Maharaja Dharmender Prasad Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505.
  • The leading decision quoted in these rulings is the decision of the Bombay High Court in
    • K. K. Verma vs. Union of India, AIR 1954 Bom 358.
  • 25. Now the other aspect of the matter needs to be noted. Assuming a trespasser ousted can seek restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 can the trespasser seek injunction against the true owner?
  • This question does not entirely depend upon Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, but mainly depends upon certain general principles applicable to the law of injunctions and as to the scope of the exercise of discretion while granting injunction.
  • In Mahadeo Savlaram Sheike vs. Pune Municipal Corporation, (1995) 3 SCC 33, it was held, after referring to Woodrofe on “Law relating to injunction: L. C. Goyal Law of injunctions:
    • David Bean Injunction Jayce on Injunctions and other leading Articles on the subject that the appellant who was a trespasser in possession could not seek injunction against the true owner.
  • In that context this Court quoted Shiv Kumar Chadha vs. MCD, (1993) 3 SCC 161, wherein it was observed that injunction is discretionary and that:
    • “Judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or to perpetuate a wrong committed by a person who approaches the Court.”
  • 26. Reference was also made to Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh (1992) 1 SCC 719 in regard to the meaning of the words prima facie case and balance of convenience and observed in Mahadeos case (supra) that:
    • “It is settled law that no injunction could be granted against the owner at the instance of a person in unlawful possession.”
  • 27. The question of forcible possession as claimed is also a matter which can be pressed into service by the parties before the trial Court and if raised the Court shall deal with it considering its relevance to the suit and accept it or otherwise reject the plea in accordance with law. We do not think it necessary to express any opinion in that regard.
  • 28. …. Looking into the nature of dispute it would be appropriate if the trial Court makes an effort to complete the trial within six months from the date of the judgment. The parties are directed to co-operate for disposal of the suit early within the stipulated time. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated without any order as to costs.”

Burden on Plaintiff to Prove Title; Weakness of defence would not enable a decree

In Ram Chandra Sakharam Mahajan Vs. Damodar Trimbak, AIR 2007 SC 2577, it is observed –

  • In a recovery on title suit, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish title.
  • Court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants.
  • Weakness of defence to establish title, would not enable plaintiff to a decree.

The Apex Court held:

  • “The suit is for recovery of possession on the strength of title. Obviously, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that title. No doubt in appreciating the case of title set up by the plaintiff, the Court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants. But the weakness of the defence or the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these propositions.”
  • “14. We find that the trial Court and the appellate Court were not justified in refusing the amendment of the plaint sought for by the plaintiff. No doubt there had been delay in seeking amendment but that delay could have been compensated by awarding costs to the contesting defendants 1 to 9. Therefore, we are satisfied that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff ought to have been allowed. We are inclined to allow the amendment sought for, since it would enable the Court to pin-pointedly consider the real dispute between the parties and would enable it to render a decision more satisfactorily to its conscience. We, therefore, allow the amendment as sought for by the plaintiff at a belated stage. The amendment will be carried out by the plaintiff in the trial Court within three months from this date as per the practice followed in the trial Court. Obviously defendants 1 to 9 would have an opportunity to file an additional written statement to the amended plaint. They will be entitled to file an additional written statement within a period of four months from the date of this judgment.”

Possession is Good Against All But the True Owner

The principle that ‘possession is good against all but the true owner’ is stated in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, referring Judicial Committee decision in Parry v. Clissold, (1907) AC 73, as under:

  • “17. In our judgment this involves an incorrect approach to our problem. To express our meaning we may begin by reading 1907 AC 73, to discover if the principle that possession is good against all but the true owner has in any way been departed from. 1907 AC 73 reaffirmed the principle by stating quite clearly:
    • “It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.”

Following decisions also say – no injunction can be passed, in favour of a trespasser, against the ‘true owner’ of a property:

  • Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620 (possession after the termination of the tenancy);
  • M.C. Chockalingam v. Manickavasagam (1974) 1 SCC 48;
  • Krishan Ram Mahale v. Mrs. Shoba Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131;
  • Premji Ratansey Shah v. Union of India, 1994 (5) SCC 547;
  • Nagar Palika, Jind v. Jagat Singh, Advocate (1995) 3 SCC 426;
  • Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam, 1996 (8) SCC 259;
  • Ramesh Chand Ardawariya v. Anil Panjwani AIR 2003 SC 2508;
  • Gram Panchayat, Mundliyan, Tehsil Tohana v. Bawria, 1996(3) RCR (Civil) 349;
  • Gurcharan Singh v. District-Chief Agricultural Officer, Jalandhar, 1997(1) RCR (Civil) 1;
  • Sukhwant Singh vs Divisional Forest Officer; 2009(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2286, 2010-2 RCR(Civil) 394;
  • Mohini v. Thimmappa, 2015-4 Ker LT 759;
  • Lions Club of Thrikkakara v. Greater Cochin Development Authority, AIR 2017 Ker 77: 2017-2 Ker LT 158 (revocation of a licence).
  • Read Blog: Declaration and Injunction

Document ex-facie reveals no title – specific declaration as to invalidity not necessary

The Supreme Court held in Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki (Aniruddha Bose & Sudhanshu DhuliaJJ.) 9.4.2024, held as under:

  • “18. …. If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence. Chiruthey could not convey any property over which she did not have any right or title. Her right, if any, would stem from the second deed of lease (Exhibit A-1). We are conscious of the fact that no claim was made before any forum for invalidating the deed dated 14th July 1910 (Exhibit A-20).”

By proving a deed, title of the executing person is not automatically confirmed

The Supreme Court held in Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki (Aniruddha Bose & Sudhanshu DhuliaJJ.) 9.4.2024, also held as under:

  • “18. … It would be trite to repeat that even if subsistence of a deed is proved in evidence, the title of the executing person (in this case Chiruthey) does not automatically stand confirmed. ….. … But in absence of proper title over the subject property, that lease deed even if she was its sole lessor would not have had been legally valid or enforceable. If right, title or interest in certain property is sought conveyed by a person by an instrument who herself does not possess any such form of entitlement on the subject being conveyed, even with a subsisting deed of conveyance on such property, the grantee on her successors-in-interest will not have legal right to enforce the right the latter may have derived from such an instrument.”

Read Connected Blogs:

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Revenue Settlements and Settlement Registers of Travancore, Cochin and Malabar

1910 Settlement Register of Travancore: Basic Record of Land matters

Connected Blogs:

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Part I

Survey & Settlement

The state of Kerala was established in 1956. It consisted of three regions – Travancore, Cochin and Malabar. The state of Travancore–Cochin was organised in 1949 by merging the Travancore State and Cochin States. In 1956, Malabar district and Kasargod area of former Madras State was added to form Kerala. Each of this area had its own Survey & Settlement methods. https://dslr.kerala.gov.in/en/brief-history

Settlement in Cochin & Malabar

The Directorate of Survey & Land Records  presents further as under:

  • “The last settlement was conducted in Cochin during 1905-1909 following the settlement Proclamation of 1905 and in Malabar during 1926-1934 according to the resettlement Manual of 1930.”(https:// dslr.kerala.gov.in/ en/brief-history)

In the Malabar area of the erstwhile Madras State, settlement activities took place from 1894 to 1905. The lands in Malabar had been treated as being held on Ryotwari tenure. The re-settlement operations were conducted in the Malabar area during 1930-1933, under which the lands in the Malabar area were settled as lands held under the Ryotwari tenure and records – Settlement Registers and A Register – were made. ( See: Sukapuram Sabhayogam v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 101; M. J. Thomas v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 Ker 285.)

Revenue Settlements of Travancore

‘Kettezhuthu’ and Kandezhuthu’

First attempt to make a settlement in Travancore was in 1712.  It was on ‘Kettezhuthu’ (what is heard) basis; i.e., on discussions with landholders. Pattas were issued after the settlement. In 1775 a complete survey was conducted on ‘Kandezhuthu’ (what is seen) basis. Pattas were issued to the holders on this basis also.

Resurvey with the scale if a 10-Feet-Rod (15 links)

Complete resurvey of garden lands was conducted in 1836. This time measurements were made with the scale if a 10-Feet-Rod (15 links) (See: V. Purushothaman v. Asokan 10.11.2016, Kerala High Court, A.Hariprasad, J.) Pattas were issued this time also.

1910 Settlement (chain- survey)

The last settlement of Travancore was during 1882 to 1909. The survey (chain- survey) thereon was commenced in 1885 and finalised in 1910.

Travancore – A brief history of Survey & Settlement

The Directorate of Survey & Land Records, Kerala  places the following history:

“A brief history of Survey & Settlement is given below:

  1. Year 1712:

A complete survey and settlement was conducted. The survey was a ‘Kettezhuthu’ Record of “what is heard” and was based on discussions with landholders. The holders were issued pattas after settlement.

  1. Year 1738 to 1748:

This settlement was confined to the lands belonging to Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple. No measurement of land was conducted.

  1. Year 1775:

Ramayyan Dalava conducted a complete Survey and settlement. Holders were issued pattas. The nature of survey is not known.

  1. Year 1801:

A complete survey was conducted. This was a ‘Kandezhuthu’. (Record of what is seen). The tenures were similar to the previous settlement. Pattas were also issued after the settlement.

  1. Year 1817:

Year 1817:- This was only a settlement of garden lands. Pattas were issued subsequent to the settlement.

  1. Year 1836:

A complete resurvey of garden lands was conducted. Side measurements were made with a ‘10’ Feet Rod. Rough Pattas were issued after the settlements.

  1. Year 1882 to 1909:

This is the latest settlement record. A scientific Survey was conducted and pattas were issued for all the land owners.” (https:// dslr.kerala.gov.in/ en/brief-history)

Revenue Settlement Register of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters

The Kerala High Court held in Mohandas v. Santhakumari Amma, 2018-3 KLT 606 as under:

  • “We notice that, a new survey and settlement was undertaken in the erstwhile Travancore State for the purpose of putting in place a sound Revenue administration. Accordingly, it appears that a complete survey and reassessment of the entire State ’embracing an accurate measurement, demarcation, mapping and valuation of properties of every description and a registration of titles, as the basis of a sound Revenue Administration’ was carried out. On the basis of such a statement a proclamation was issued by the Maharaja of Travancore on 14 th Kumbhom 1061 corresponding to 24th February 1886.”

Revenue Records – Maintained Promptly

The Land Revenue Department was one of the main departments of the Travancore Government.  The ownership remained with the Jenmies and Sircar (Government). The agriculturists, who formed majority of population, had to pay various kinds of remunerations to the Janmies and the Sircar (Government),  based on the nature of tenancy and the nature of the ‘Jenmam (Janmam) right’. The lease arrangements were known by various nomenclatures based on the conditions of tenancies. Several enactments were made for proper collection of Taxes, and management of the Govt. lands and the lands upon which the tenants toiled. The Revenue Records were prepared and maintained promptly.

Chitta and Adangal in Madras and Andhra Pradesh

Chitta: Chitta is a revenue document maintained in Taluk office. It contains extent of land, name of owner and the type of land (wet/dry, irrigated/rainfed, etc.).

Adangal: Adangal is also a revenue record, prepared after surveying the land, that contains details about the land, such as the ownership, extent, classification of land, and details of cultivators. It is taken as a document for showing the ownership and possession of land. (See: D. Rajamanickam v. M.  Pasupathiammal, 2019-2 Mad LJ 208; N. Chandrasekaran v. Arulmighu Thiruvatteeswarar Thirukkoil, 2020-1 LW 631; 2020-5 Mad LJ 227)

Private Janmam in Malabar Area – Ended By 1934

In Sukapuram Sabhayogam v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 101, it was pointed out with referenceto the Madras District Gazetteer, Malabar as regards the history of settlement (1900 -1904) and re-settlement (1931-1934) and as regards the preparation of Adangal Registers after the settlement as under:

  • “67. In the Madras District Gazetteer, Malabar, by Inis, 1951 Edition, at page 344, it is stated that the settlement was introduced into the eight plain Taluks of Malabar between 1900 and 1904and the Revenue system of the District has been brought into line with that of the rest of the Presidency, due allowance being made for special local conditions.
  • 68. Dealing with the re-settlement, it is stated in the same Gazetteer, at page 848, that it took place between 1931 and 1934, and that the re-settlement was done because the term of 30 years for which the then existing rates of land assessment were sanctioned had expired between 1929-30 and 1932-33- A list of the taluks giving particulars as to when the last settlement expired and the new settlement came into operation, is also given at the same page.
  • 69. At page 349 of the same book, among the special features of the re-settlement, it is mentioned that the terms “janmabhogam” or “private janmam” were replaced by new holdings and old holdings respectively. That is, in the Adangal Registers etc., maintained after the settlement was introduced for the first time in 1900 and 1904, the lands of all the jenmis appear to have been shown as private janmam but in the re-settlement the register shows them as old holdings.”

Ryotwari Settlement in Malabar Area

In Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. The State of T.N., AIR 1972 SC 2240 while examining the status of land holders under ryotwari settlement it was pointed out that this system was brought about by Col. Read in 1792 consequent to ceding of territories by Tippu Sultan, as described in the Manual of Administration quoted by Baden-Powell, in Vol. III of Land Systems of British India.

Private Janmam in Malabar Area – Ended By1934

Lands held under Ryotwari tenure after Ryotwari Settlement

In Sukapuram Sabhayogam v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 101, it is also pointed out that notwithstanding the introduction of the Ryotwari settlement in Malabar area between 1900 and 1904, certain lands were shown as ‘private janmam’ as distinguished from ‘Government Janmam’. And, added as under:

  • “The practice of treating the properties of persons like the petitioner as private janmam has been completely given the go-by, at any rate, after the resettlement during 1931-1934.”

In Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301; 1972-2 SCC 218, it was pointed out that it was held by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Sukapuram Sabhayogam v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Kerala 101 that the lands, after 1934, were ‘held under Ryotwari tenure after the introduction of the Ryotwari Settlement in the Malabar area of Kerala State’.

Part II

LAND TENURES.

760 Types of Tenures in Travancore: In ‘Historical Introduction to the Kerala Land Reforms Act and the Working of the Land Tribunals’, PN Prabhakaran Pillai, Cochin University Law Review 1, No. 1 (1974), says as under:

  • “The land tenures that existed in the former Travancore area were very complex and special tenures and sub-tenures were numerous It may be seen that there were 760 types of tenures including sub-tenures in Travancore area alone. At the last Revenue Settlement’, an endeavour was made to systematise and simplify the tenures as far as possible. After the settlement, the number of tenures were reduced to a considerable minimum. The numerous tenures which have been recognised at the settlement may be generally traced to one or other of main two heads, viz., Sirkar or Pandaravaka and Jenmom.”

Land-Tenures – in Settlement (1910)

According to the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Volume III (1915), the tenures fall under two main heads:

  • (1) Sirkar or Pandaravaga (By virtue of Proclamation of 1040 (1865) and 1061 (1886), all Sircar-pattom-lands were converted into full proprietary-lands);
  • (2) Janmam (Note: Janmam includes Devaswom & Brahmaswom. )

In Settlement (1910), numerous tenures had been recognized. For practical purposes, as per the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, the tenures were classified as under:

  • 1. Sirkar or Pandaravaga
  • 2. Sirkar Devaswom vaga
  • 3. Kandukrishi
  • 4. Sreepadam vaga
  • 5. Sree pandaravaga
  • 6. Janmam (Includes Devaswom, Brahmaswom)

1. Sirkar or Pandaravaga:

This tenure represents Sirkar as the landlord.  The tenures fall under the following heads:

  • a)  Pandarapattom,
    • Pandarapattom was originally in the nature of lease without any proprietary or transferable right.  By the royal proclamations, the holders of these lands were given with full proprietary rights and declared to be private, heritable and transferrable property.  Puthuval lands came under this tenure. 
  • b)  Otti
    • It was originally in the nature of a mortgage.  It stood as a real or constructive loan by the State.  Interest was deducted from Pattom to be paid by the holder.  He had also to pay Rajabhogam (tax).
  • c)  Enams
    • Enams were service enams or personal enams.  Service enams were inalienable.  It continue as long as the holder was in service.  Personal enams were given to support individuals or families.  Such properties could have been transferred by the holders.
  • d)  Viruthi
    • It stood analogous to service enams.  But had permanency if the holder continued his service regularly.  When he died the holding passed to legal heirs subject to certain payments.
  • e)  Special tenures
    • It was in the nature of enam which received special treatment.
  • f)  Karamolivu
    • All Lands except janmam included under this head.  The land was tax-free.

2. Sirkar Devaswom vaga

  • The lands under this head were originally janmam lands or private property of Devaswoms.  They were held on venpattom tenure.  Later on, Sirkar took over the Devaswoms and the lands were treated as Sirkar lands.  Subsequently, Sirkar Devaswom lands were separated from Sirkar lands; and separate accounts were kept.

3. Kandukrishi

  • It was the home-farms or the private property of the sovereign.  The tenants had no right in such properties.

4. Sreepadam vaga

  • Sreepadam lands were-
    • (i) thelands comprised in the free-hold villages of Idakkode, Illamba, Mudakkal, Alamkodu, Avanavancherry, Attingal and Kilattingal in the Chirayinkil Taluk, the revenue from which was wholly assigned in favour of the Sreepadam Palace; and
    • (ii) other lands not being pandaravaka lands situate in the State of Kerala and owned by the Sreepadam Palace (See: The Sreepadam Lands Enfranchisement Act, 1969).

5. Sree Pandaravaga

  • Sree Pandaravaka land was the land owned by the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple and registered in the revenue records as ‘Sree Pandaravaka’ (See: The Sree Pandaravaka Lands (Vesting And Enfranchisement) Act, 1971).
  • Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple had originally been administered by Madathil Pillamars. The lands that belonged to the Temple were in the possession of various persons under different tenures. All such persons were liable to pay tax as ‘Rajabhogam’. The grants or Inams were made by the Kingdom for the services rendered. Such Inams included tenures like Adima, Anubhogam, Thiruvulam, Thiruvadayalam etc. The Madathil Pillamars collected the Michavaram due to Devaswom on those lands to be utilized for the poojas and other rituals to be performed in the temple.
  • When the Revenue Settlement was prepared (in 1910), all the properties that were classified under the names of the different Madoms were brought under the class ‘Sree Pandaravaka’. The lands that were in the names of the family members, received as personal Inams were described as Kudumbaporuthy lands.

6. Janmam (Thanathu)

  • It was the properties owned by Janmies.  Such lands were exempted from tax.
  • Regulation of 1071 (1896) attracted these properties.  The tax under Rajabhogam had to be paid for this land.   But Devaswom and Brahmaswom thanathu lands, though came under the head ‘Janmam’, and were exempted from tax, only so long as they remained unalienated.  When alienated it was charged under Rajabhogam assessment.  Devaswom and Brehmaswom properties could have been subjected to outright sale.

Registered lands

The Registered Lands include, inter alia,

  • (a) Pandaravaka lands and
  • (b) Janmam lands.

Pandaravaka or Sircar-lands are lands of which the State is the landlord or Jenmi. Whatever rights which vest in the ryots (tenants) in Govt. lands are taken as derived from the Sircar.

Registered lands were that included in Sirkar Revenue accounts as lands held by or granted to individuals, families, institutions, etc.

  • The revenue from these lands fell under the head, ‘Ayacut’ or ‘Settled Revenue’.
  • Each of this field had been surveyed and settled.
  • The functions of the Land Revenue Department were to collect the revenue and see that no encroachment was made on adjoining Sirkar lands (puramboke, tharisu, forests).

Our Apex Court in Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301, 1972-2 SCC 218, held as under:

  • “In the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Vol. III, Revised Edition, 1936, registered lands are described as follows:
  • Registered lands are lands registered in the revenue accounts as held by or granted to individuals, families, corporations or institutions, and comprise all the different kinds of tenures bearing either the full assessment or wholly or partially free of assessment. These lands comprise not only the areas brought under cadastral survey but include also coffee, tea, rubber and other estates, cardamom gardens and other special grants outside the limits of cadastral survey.’
  • The Registered Lands include, inter alia, (a) Pandaravaka lands and (b) Janmam lands.
  • Regarding Pandaravaka lands it is stated:
  • ‘Pandaravaka or Sircar lands are lands of which the State is the landlord or the Janmi and whatever rights which vest in the ryots are  derived from the Sircar.’ “

‘Jenmom’ was proprietary interest with Liability to Pay Tax (Freehold)

The concepts on ‘janmam’ continued even after introduction of Tax system by Government. ‘Jenmom’ was taken the proprietary interest of a landlord in lands (Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080). Subba Rao, J., observed as under:

  • “Under the definition, any janmam right in Kerala is an “estate”. A janmam right is the freehold interest in a property situated in Kerala.

Moor in his “Malabar Law and Custom” describes it as a hereditary proprietorship. A janmam interest may, therefore, be described as  “proprietary interest of a landlord in lands” and such a janmam right is described as “estate” in the Constitution. Substituting “janmam right” in place of “estate” in cl. 2 (b), the “rights” in Art. 31 A (1) (a) will include the rights of a proprietor and subordinate tenure-holders in respect of a janmam right.

  • It follows that the extinguishment or modification of a right refers to the rights of a proprietor or a subordinate tenure-holder in the janmam right. A proprietor called the janmi or his subordinate tenure-holder has certain defined rights in janmam right”. Land-tenures in Malabar are established by precedents or immemorial usage. Janmam right is a freehold interest in property and the landlord is called  “janmi”. He can create many subordinate interests or tenures therein.” (Quoted in: Kannan Devan Hills Produce v.  The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301)

In the Jenmi and Kudiyan Regulation, V of 1071 (1896), Jenmom land is defined as-

  • “land (other than Pandaravaka, Sripandaravaka, Kandukrishi or Sircar Devaswom land, recognised as such in the Sircar accounts) which is either entirely exempt from Government tax or if assessed to public revenue, is subject to Rajabhogam only, and the occupancy right in; which is created for a money consideration (Kanom) and is also subject to the payment of Michavaram or customary dues and the payment of the renewal fees.”

The Travancore Jenmi and Kudiyan Act, V of 1071 (1896), defines ‘Jenmi’ as under:

  • ” ‘Jenmi’ means a person in whom the proprietary right over Jenmom lands is vested and includes, in the case of Devaswoms owning Jenmom lands, the managing Trustee or Trustees of the Institution for the time being.”

In Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86, it was observed with respect to the ‘Janmi’ as under:

  • “What the definition stresses is the proprietary right in the land. We may in this connection extract a passage from the Memorandum of Mr. Kunhiraman Nair, one of the Judges of the High Court of Travancore, about 70 years ago:
  • “The term ‘Jenmom’ was originally used by the Brahmins exclusively to denote their allodial proprietorship and is still used in that sense in courts and cutcherries in Travancore, though in other parts of Malayalam and in popular parlance in Travancore, the term is now universally employed to denote the full proprietary right in the land of any class of people”.

Concept of ‘Freehold lands’

“In common law jurisdictions such as England and Wales, Australia, Canada, and Ireland, a freehold is the common mode of ownership of real property, or land, and all immovable structures attached to such land. It is in contrast to a leasehold, in which the property reverts to the owner of the land after the lease period expires or otherwise lawfully terminates” (Wikipedia). It doesn’t mean that such lands are free from payment of tax or revenue to the Government.

Travancore State Manual Vol. III published by the Travancore Government in 1940, says as to the class of jenmom land which were entirely freehold and exempted from payment of any kind of tax to Government under any circumstance. These were the special properties given by the Ruler to certain individuals considering their valid services or to certain institutions including temples.

Status in ‘Janmom’ cannot be Transferred

Theoretically, status in ‘Janmom’ cannot be transferred (it being an inherent right attached to land); though ‘rights in Janmam’ can be transferred.

Sale of Janmam Properties were Recorded as “Thettoms” in Settlement Register

In 1910 Travancore Settlement Register (and in the sale deeds), lands sold by Janmam holders were recorded as “Thettoms” (Devaswom Thettom/Namboori Thettom etc.).

  • Note: In the 1910 Settlement Register Janmam properties (with Brahmins and Devaswoms) were recorded as “Thanathu”.
  • When lands were classified under various heads, ‘Janmam’ lands were denoted as ‘Tanathu’ in the Settlement Register..

Read blog: Pandaravakapattom and Travancore Royal Proclamations of 1040 (1865) and 1061 (1886)

Meaning of the Word ‘Thettom’

  • Generally meant – acquisition by Mortgage.
  • When ‘Thettom’ refers to a property dealing with a Jenmam (Janmam) holder, it can be any ‘subordinate tenure falling short of the full proprietary title‘.
  • When it refers to a property dealing with a Non-Jenmom holder, it may mean a sale’

As regards ‘Thettom’, Raman Menon, C.J., said, in Augusti v. The Dewan of Travancore, 8 Travancore LJ 438, as under:

  • “In S.A. 17 of 1074, this Court remarked:-‘In the Sirkar registry of 1011, the plaint property is entered as ‘Thettom’ in the name of defendants’ Tarwad.
  • That expression, according to its ordinary meaning, implies at least a mortgage lien, if not more, as held by this Court in A.S.166 of 1070 and A.S. 285 of 1071. It always implies something more than a simple lease’.
  • In S.A. 61 of 1075, the terms was taken to be generic and to include ‘all subordinate tenures falling short of the full proprietory title‘.
  • In S.A. 302 of 1075, it was observed that the word ‘Thettom’, as applied to Nambudiri Jenmies, had been held by this court to mean ordinarily a Kanom.
  • In S.A. 48 of 1076, Vencoba Chariar, C.J. and Mr. Justice Kunhiraman Nair construed the words thus:- ‘The chief ground of the plaintiff’s second appeal is that in arriving at this finding the lower courts have not given sufficient weight to the fact appearing from the Ext. B – an old Revenue account – in which the land in dispute is entered as ‘Thettam’ from plaintiff’s Illom; but the word ‘Thettom’ is a somewhat ambiguous one and though, as remarked in the case in 15 TLR 161 and in other cases, it is generally used in the Revenue accounts to signify the Kanom tenure under Jenmies, it is also sometimes used to denote other subordinate tenures‘.
  • In S.A. 343 of 1078, we find the following remarks:-‘Thettom ordinarily means a ’Kanom’, and in any case, a derivative title when used in connection with Brahmaswam or Devaswom properties, as in the present case’.
  • Lastly, in A.S. Nos. 59 and 101 of 1083, Sadasiva Iyer, C.J., and Sankara Menon, J., observed thus:-‘Mr. Kochukrishna Marar quotes 15 TLR 161 and says the word ‘Thettom’ means a Kanom or mortgage.
  • No doubt, in the case of Jenmies, it has been so held; but we doubt whether in the case of non jenmies, any meaning other than the ordinary meaning of the word can be given to the word ‘Thettom’. The plaintiffs are Nairs and the tenure claimed is not Jenmom. The ordinary meaning of the word is acquisition. We are inclined to hold that a word ‘Thettom’, in cases of this sort, means only sale’.”
  • (Quoted in: Travancore Devaswom Board v. Uzhithiraru Uzhithiraru, 1957 KLT 315)

In Damodaran v. Sankaranarayanan Namboothiripad, ILR 1963-2 Ker. 707; 1964 KLT 25, the High Court referred to ‘thanathu thettom’ land (nilam); and observed – it conveys the idea of ‘acquisition’.

Pandarapattom lands in Cochin & Travancore – Proprietary Right in the Soil

In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Supreme Court held (by majority, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta; and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, dissenting) that Pandarappattom properties come within ‘estate’ under Article 31A of the Constitution. The Apex Court considered the proclamation issued by his Highness Sir Rama Varma Raja of Cochin on March 10, 1905. Clause 13 that rendered ‘full rights to the soil of the lands they hold’.

The Supreme Court (majority) held, with respect to Cochin Regulation, 1905 as under:

  • “It would thus be seen that under clause 13 the person holding lands on the Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure is not a tenant. He is given the proprietary right in the soil itself, subject of course to the rights as to metals and minerals reserved in favour of the State, indeed, the whole scheme of the new Proclamation appears to be to change the character of the possession of the Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure-holder from that of a tenant into that of a proprietor-holder. It is true that he is made liable to pay half of the net produce and that may appear to be a little too high, but the measure of the levy will not convert what is intended to be a recovery of assessment Into a recovery of rent. The proprietor of the land held on Verumpattom tenure is nevertheless a proprietor of the land and he holds the land subject to his liability to pay the assessment to the State. It is not difficult to imagine that in a fairly large number of lands held by Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure-holders the holders in turn would let out the the lands to the cultivators and thus would come into existence a local equivalent of the class of intermediaries. Land revenue record is required to be prepared by the Proclamation and relevant entries showing the extent of the properties belonging to the respective holders and the details about their liability to pay the assessment are intended to be shown in the said record. In our opinion, it would not be reasonable to hold that the ‘lands held by the petitioner under the Pandaravaha Verumpattom tenure do not confer on him the proprietary right at all but make him a tenant of the State“.

But, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., while descending, observed as under:

  • “In this connection I might usefully refer to a proclamation of the ruler of Travancore of 1865 (1040 M. E.) regarding Sarkar-pattom lands, with the observation that subject to variations dependent on local usages, the system of land tenure and the concepts as regards the rights of property in land were substantially similar in Travancore and Cochin. Sarkar-pattom lands were what might be termed ‘Crown lands’ of which the ruler was deemed to be the Jenmi or the landlord. Previous to the proclamation the lands were legally capable of being resumed by the ruler, though this was seldom done and the cultivators were not legally entitled to transfer their rights and where this was done the Government had the right to ignore the transaction. The fact that the cultivator was conceived of as having no proprietary interest on the land also bore adversely on the State since the State was deprived of the means of realising any arrears of revenue by bringing the holding to sale. It was to remedy this situation that the proclamation was issued and the preamble and its terms carry the impress of the impact of the ryotwari system of Madras.”

After referring the 1040 (1865) Proclamation, Ayyangar, J. said as under:

  • “The language employed in the proclamation is of significance. It speaks of the relinquishment or withdrawal of the right of the State and not of the conferment of a right on the ryot so as to render the ryot a grantee from the State, just in line with the Hindu Law theory of the proprietorship of the soil vesting in the occupant-cultivator.”

In Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 (FB), in spite of the decision in Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694 (pertained to Cochin), it was held that Pandarapattom (Pandaravaka pattom, Pandaravakappattom, or Pandarappattom) lands in the Travancore area cannot have the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution.

  • Note: Overruling Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, it was held in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1; AIR 1971 Ker 168, that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the State was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31-A(2)(a).

Analysing the 1040 ME Travancore Proclamation, it was held by the High Court in Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala as under:

  • “11. The provisions of the Proclamation do not, in our opinion, confer on the tenants absolute proprietary rights in the soil. There is no clause by which the Sirkar parted with all rights in favour of the tenants and in the absence of such a provision, the holders of such lands can only be treated as holding such lands on perpetual leases.”

Part III

Pandarapattom and Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061

Royal Proclamations of 1040 (1865) and 1061 (1886) bound only Travancore Govt. Leases or ‘Pandarappattoms’.

In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (five Judge Bench), 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.), concluded that the land covered by the Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 were “estates” falling under Art. 31A of the Constitution.

It was on the definite finding that –

  • the Proclamation “secured permanency of tenure” (to the tenants),
  • conferred (on the tenants) “proprietary interest” in the soil; and
  • the Government did not remain as the full and absolute proprietor

The Court said as under:

  • “7. It is impossible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that, evenafter the Proclamation of 1040, the holders of these lands had no proprietary interest whatsoever in the soil and remained tenants in the strict sense of that term, with only the right of enjoyment, the only difference being that they secured permanency of tenure, the Government still remaining the full and absolute proprietor of the soil.”

Effect of the Proclamations over ‘Government Land Leases’ after 1061 (1886)?

Now a question arises:

  • What is the impact of 1040 and 1061 (1886) Proclamations over the ‘Government Land Leases’ (Pandaravakappattoms) made after 1061 (1886)?

The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out (by the Government) after 1061 (1886) do not acquire the rights of ‘permanency of tenure’ or attain the ‘proprietary interest’ conferred by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061.

  • If such rights of permanency and ‘proprietary interest’ are axiomatically conferred as a matter of course, the result would be that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands (after the Proclamations), for, the lease character would be lost at the moment it is made.

Therefore, there is a clear difference between leases made before and after the Proclamations; and the rights conferred by the Proclamations do not apply to leases made after them.

Pandarapattom Confers Proprietary Rights:  Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez Case – 

As stated above, Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86, was overruled by the larger Bench in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168, and it was held that Pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the State was ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31-A(2)(a). (See: Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369).

It was found in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez case that by the Proclamation of 1040 (1865 AD), all Sircar-pattom-lands were converted into full proprietary-lands, and rights on tenants of Pandarapattom lands had thenceforth been conferred with proprietary-rights.

In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168, it was observed as under:

Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.:

  • “11. …. We have already shown how, in the face of the Proclamation of 1040, it is impossible to regard the holders of these lands as tenants in the strict sense of that term having only the right to enjoy the land and no interest in the land as such. We have also drawn attention to the fact that what they pay to the Government is, under the very terms of the Proclamation, assessment or land tax, in other words, land revenue, and not rent properly so-called. As stated in 1962 Ker LT 913 = (AIR 1963 Ker 86 FB). with reference to contemporary documents, the avowed purpose of the Proclamation of 1040 was to place pandarapattam lands on the same footing as ryotwari lands in the neighbouring province of Madras, and wo have no doubt that it succeeded in doing so. If the relations between the holder of a land and the Government are placed on the same footing as the relations between the holder of ryotwari land and the Government, it seems to us that it necessarily follows that the land is held under ryotwari settlement–it is the factual relationship and not the label that counts and no concept of legal rights is involved. ….

Per KK Mathew, J.

  • 17……. To my mind the terms of the Proclamation leave no doubt that full proprietary interest has been conferred upon the holders of pandarapattom lands. ….Clause (2) is the pivotal clause; and it provides that the ryots holding such lands may regard them fully private, saleable and otherwise heritable and transferable property. Clause (4) guarantees the continued undisturbed enjoyment of the land so long as the appointed assessment is paid. Clause (6) makes it clear that the lands will be resumable by the State like other jenmom or private land only for public purpose and when resumed for such purposes compensation will be paid by the Sirkar not only for the improvements but also for the full market value of the property. Clause (7) provided that the rights conferred by the Proclamation would not in any way affect the right of the Sirkar to regulate land tax or to resume escheats or to confiscate the property of criminals. Clauses (6) and (7) are very significant. What are reserved to the Sirkar by Clauses (6) and (7) are not anv proprietary rights in the land. The rights which inhere in every sovereign in respect of every property within his jurisdiction like eminent domain, the right to impose or regulate tax, to resume escheats, to confiscate property of criminals, are alone reserved by those clauses. They not only do not derogate from the grant of full proprietary interest made by Clauses (1), (2) and (4), but would highlight that no proprietary rights have been reserved to the State. If the sovereign was careful to reserve to himself in respect of these lands only those rights which appertain to sovereignty and not any right which relates to dominium, that is a clear indication that no right relating to dominium was intended to be retained by the Sirkar. Even if the clauses were absent, the Sirkar would have those rights as they appertain to sovereignty and not to dominium. In other words, if by way of abundant caution the clauses reserved to the Sirkar only rights which appertain to sovereignty, there was absolutely no reason why the rights, if any, relating to dominium or ownership were not reserved, if the sovereign intended to retain any right in respect of the lands.….. I think, a holder of pandarapattom land satisfies even the orthodox definition   of ownership by Austin.   Austin defines the right of ownership as a–“right indefinite in point of user, unrestricted in point of disposition, and unlimited in point of duration, over a determinate thing.” (See ‘Jurisprudence’ by Austin, 3rd Edn., page 817.) 
  • 19. The basic concept of ‘estate’ is that the person holding the estate should be the proprietor of the soil and should be in direct relationship with the State by paying land revenue to it except where it is remitted in whole or in part. See AIR 1962 SC 694. As I have said the pattom Proclamation conferred full proprietary rights on tenants of pandarapattom lands, and they are also in direct relation with the State by paying land revenue. Since there is no definition of the word ‘estate’ in the existing local law relating to land tenure, pandarapattom land is the local equivalent of ‘estate,’ because its attributes conform to the basic concept of the term.”

Note: Another decision (with the same parties), Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez, 1971 KLT 216, AIR 1973 Ker 55,  was overruled in Velayudhan Vivekanandan v. Ayyappan Sadasivan, ILR 1975-1 Ker 166; 1975  KerLT 1.

Part IV

If Settlement Register says Government Land, Petitioner to Establish Title

In Vallikunnil Janaki Amma v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode, 2014 (1) KHC 57, Kerala High Court, referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, observed as under:  

  • “Even though Ext. A2 is only an extract of the Settlement Register/ Adangal extract which may not by itself prove or confer title to a party in whose name the property stood registered, it can be accepted as evidence of title when there is no contra evidence. Admittedly it is adjacent to Amruthamangalam temple. The temple compound and this suit property which is adjacent to the temple are shown to be of Amruthamangalam Devaswom as per revenue record. In these circumstances, the contention that this property did not and does not belong to the temple/Devaswom cannot be sustained at all.” (Referred to in: Kunhimangalam Devaswam v. State of Kerala (2022 KHC OnLine 7354), 6 April, 2022, Anil K.Narendran, J.)

In Sahana Industries v. State of Kerala (2021 KHC OnLine 7110), Kerala High Court (Devan Ramachandran, J.) held (October 11, 2021) as under:

  • “… If the Settlement Register shows this land to be Government land, then certainly, the petitioner is obliged to establish their title over the property through competent documents”.

Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala – 0n Settlement Register

In Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, WP(C) No. 25830/2010 (2025:KER:5422) 24.01. 2025 (Harisankar V. Menon, J.) it is pointed out as under:

  • “7. …. In the settlement register at Ext. R1(a), there is no dispute that the entire properties under old Survey No. 2211 having an extent in excess of 107 Acres are shown as “puramboke….
  • 8…. As regards the petitioner in WP(C) No. 25830 of 2010 also, the title is traceable to some documents of the Attingal Sub Registry of the yeas 1959, 1957 and 1061. But, it is categorically found that even in these documents, there is no mention as to the receipt of pattayam with respect to the property in question.
  • 11. On the whole, the dispute in these writ petitions has to be considered with reference to the description of the properties falling under old survey No. 2211 in the settlement register. As already noticed, the settlement register describes the property as “Puramboke”.
  • The petitioners, it is true, have contended that the survey numbers as per Exts.P1 to P4 are not seen described as “Tharisu” in the BTR at Ext.R1(b) and Form No.7 prepared by the Survey Authority at Ext.R1(d). But as already noticed, the prior documents produced by the Senior Government Pleader, along with the memo as noted earlier, strike at the root of the contentions raised by the petitioners. In view of the discussions made above, I am of the opinion that the contentions raised by the learned Senior Government Pleader with respect to the malpractices committed, cannot be brushed aside.”
  • 13….. However, I notice that WP(C) No.25830 of 2010 the entry with respect to the Settlement Register is to be considered at first, which admittedly is against the petitioner. The case of the State is that some foul play is carried out subsequently at the instance of those interested and therefore, the subsequent entries cannot be acted upon.
  • 14. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader relied on Vallikunnil Janaki Amma and Ors. v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode and Anr. [2014 (1) KHC 57], which laid down the principle with respect to the acceptability/relevance of the Settlement Register. As already noticed, I have found that the Settlement Register describes the property under old Survey No. 2211 as “Puramboke”. To the same effect is the judgment of a learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 20520 of 2021 dated 11.10.2021. This Court further notices the judgment of the Apex Court in Suraj Bhan and Ors. v. Financial Commissioner and Ors. [(2007) 6 SCC 186] which held that mere entry in the revenue records does not confer title on a person. As already noticed, in view of the entries in the Settlement Register, the requirement of an appropriate assignment cannot be lost sight of.

Settlement Register T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J.

In Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair M.N.,  (2013) 3 KLT 132, (T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J.; A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J), it is observed as under:

  • “18. …. The land register as well as the settlement register will establish the plea of the Board that the property having an extent of 2.26 acres is Temple property. Thus, Section 27 of Act of 1950 is clearly attracted and the property is clearly Devaswom property.”
  • “51. As far as the property herein is concerned, the land register and the settlement register produced herein are relevant. The property having the entire extent of 2.26 acres is described as ”kavu” (holy grove) in the settlement register. In the land register also it is described as ”kshethram irippu sthalam” (property where the temple is situated). No other document or other evidence is there to prove the contrary. Therefore, these documents will definitely show that the item of property will fit in with the requirement of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.”
  • “75. … Apart from that, in the light of Section 27 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act and in the light of the settlement register and land register, the property is described as Temple puramboke and not Government puramboke. Further Government lands are covered by the exemption u/s 3(1)(x) of the Land Reforms Act and therefore he cannot claim any fixity of tenure. There is no claim by the Government here to the property.”

Tharisu or Assessed Waste

Tharisu was the waste lands ‘at the disposal of the Govt’ and available for ‘extension of cultivation’. It was distinguished from poramboke. Unauthorized occupation of tharisu was also punishable.

  • In K. P. C. Properties represented by its Managing Partner Jerald Jacob v. State of Kerala, 2014 3 KLT(SN) 31, it is observed as under:
  • “The said land was classified as ‘tharisu’ in Government records and was treated as assignable lands.”

Transposition ‘tharishu’ to ‘puthual-registry’:

  • Detailed procedure was prescribed for transposing ‘tharishu’ to ‘puthual-registry’ in the Revenue Manuel, Under the Puthuvel Rules (1097 ME : 1922).

(Puduval) Assignment Under the Puthuvel Rules (1097 ME : 1922)

Puduval Rules were framed under Section 7 of the Government Land Assignment Regulation, III of 1097 (Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, 24 January, 2025, 2025:KER:5422).

(Also in page 94 of the Report of the Special Officer & Collector, M.G. Rajamanickam IAS, No. GLR – (LR) – 1/2016/BRT/Co. Dated: 04.06.2016).

Puduval lands can be disposed of only in accordance with the aforestated Rules. In other words, insofar as the property is described as Puduval land, the same is required to be assigned as provided under Rule 13 of the Puduval Rules.

It was sale/lease to augment the King’s treasury and also to distribute the lands for cultivation among subjects.

  • Puthuval  lands  were  lands  (i) not assessed  and  registered  in  the  Sirkar  accounts  in  the  name  of  any  individual  and (ii) not  governed  by  Regulation  II  of  1040 (1865).  The lands, when remained unregistered, were the absolute property of Government.  Title was conferred to individuals by the Grant or assignment by the Government (under Puduval Rules). 
  • Under the Puthuvel Rules (1097 ME : 1922) it had to be done by ‘public auction’ or by ‘assignment otherwise than by auction’.

Rule 13 speaks about “Assignment  of  Unoccupied  Lands“. It reads as under:

  • “13.  (i)  All  unoccupied  lands  available  for  registry  shall,  subject  to the  provisions  of  Rules  24  to  28,  35  and  46  (i)  and  (ii)  and unless  otherwise  directed  by  Government,  be  sold  by  public auction  together  with  the  reserved  trees  standing  thereon, at  an  upset  price  to  be  fixed  in  each  case  by  the  Officer  conducting  the  auction.  The  upset  price  shall  he  equivalent  to the  estimated  value  of  the  reserved  trees  standing  on  the lands  plus  the  estimated  Tharavila  according  to  the  importance  of  the  land,  fixed  under  Rule  5  or  9  as  the  case  may be,  and  the  cost  of  demarcation  and  survey.”

Rule 16 reads as under:

  • “16.  On  the  day  fixed  for  the  sale  of  the  land,  the  land  shall,  as  proclaimed,  be  put  up  to  auction,  block  by  block,  if  it  consists  of  more  than  one block,  and  sold  to  the  highest  bidder  above  the  upset  price.  Provided  however  that  no  single  person  should  be  allowed,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  bid for  more  than  50  acres  of  the  land  advertised  for  sale.  The  sale  shall  be conducted  subject  to  the  following  general  conditions:-
  • (i)  The  highest  bidder  above  the  upset  price  shall  be  declared  to be  the  purchaser  of  the  land,  and  if  any  dispute  arises  between  two  or  more  bidders  at  the  same  price,  the  land  shall be  immediately  put  up  to  auction  again  at  the  last  preceding  undisputed  bid  and  sold…….”

In the Puthuval Rules there was provision for sale of lands below 5 acres, above 5 acres and also ‘Concessional Registry of Lands’ for the assignment to the members of the depressed classes or to indigent families belonging to other communities, on application made to the Tahsildar of the Taluk. 

Sub rule (iii) dealt with sale of area below 5 acres it reads as under:

  • “(iii)  If  the  entire  area  of  the  block  is  5  acres  or  less,  the  Tahsildar  need  not  make  a  requisition  to  the  Officer  referred  to above  but  shall  get  the  land  sub-divided,  if  necessary,  and demarcated  and  surveyed  by  the  Provertikar  and  a  sketch, drawn  to  scale,  prepared  by  him.  This  sketch  should  be cheeked  on  the  ground  by  the  Tahsildar  or  the  Assistant Tahsildar.”

If the encroachment was one where ‘Registry is desired’, the Rules provided for an application be taken from the occupier and dealt with under Puthuval rules.  If registry was ‘not desired’ or if Puthuval registry was refused, steps could have been taken against the encroachment.

Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, 24 January, 2025, 0n Puduval lands

In this decision it is held as under:

  • “9. Furthermore, this Court notices that the Government has produced the prior documents as regards the petitioner in W.P(C) No.25830 of 2010 along with a memo dated 13.11.2024. A reference to the said document – partition deed No. 460 of 64 – shows that the property in Survey No.2211 is recorded as “Puduval” land. In this connection, reference requires to be made to the Puduval Rules framed under Section 7 of the Government Land Assignment Regulation, III of 1097. Puduval lands can be disposed of only in accordance with the afore Rules. In other words, insofar as the property is described as Puduval land, the same is required to be assigned as provided under Rule 13 of the Puduval Rules. The prior deeds in support of the case set up by the petitioners do not disclose the existence of any such assignment with respect to the properties in question.
  • 10. As regards the claim of the petitioners in W.P(C) No. 30260 of 2010, this Court notices that the petitioners have attempted to trace the title of the properties in question to the decree of the Principal Sub Court, Attingal which was later purchased by one Neelakanda Pillai as per sale deed No. 2099 of 1940. The learned Government Pleader has produced the afore- sale deed along with a memo dated 29.10.2020. The said documents also show that the property in question is ‘Puduval’ land and therefore, the requirement of an assignment is essential. But as in the connected case, here also the petitioners have no case that the documents relied on by them show that the property was covered by an assignment to support their case.
  • 11. On the whole, the dispute in these writ petitions has to be considered with reference to the description of the properties falling under old survey No. 2211 in the settlement register. As already noticed, the settlement register describes the property as “Puramboke”.
  • The petitioners, it is true, have contended that the survey numbers as per Exts.P1 to P4 are not seen described as “Tharisu” in the BTR at Ext.R1(b) and Form No.7 prepared by the Survey Authority at Ext.R1(d). But as already noticed, the prior documents produced by the Senior Government Pleader, along with the memo as noted earlier, strike at the root of the contentions raised by the petitioners. In view of the discussions made above, I am of the opinion that the contentions raised by the learned Senior Government Pleader with respect to the malpractices committed, cannot be brushed aside.”

Settlement Register (Adangal) as Mentioned in Kerala VO Manual

Clause 280 in Chapter 25 of the Kerala Village Office Manual (included in Land Revenue Manual  Volume  VI) refers to ‘Settlement Register (Adangal)’. 

Clause 280 says:

  • 1. Settlement Register is a Permanent Register.
  • 2. It is also called “Adangal” or “A Register”.
  • 3. There will be 2 Annexures (or Supplements) to the Settlement Register.
  • 4. The 1st Annexure (or Supplement) Registers kept in the Village Offices contain all matters as to the lands subsequently surveyed (that were not surveyed at the time of Settlement).
  • 5. The 2nd Annexure (or Supplement) Registers kept in the Village Offices contain all changes subsequent to settlement (and also the changes to the land mentioned in the 1st Annexure Registers).
  • 6. The serial number of the entries in the 2nd Annexure Registers shall be noted in the remark column of the Settlement Register.

In Travancore, after 1910, no “Settlement” or “Settlement Register” has been made 2018(2) KLT 369 (HML case, Para 111).

  • ‘Adangal’ is a term originally used in the erstwhile Madras State. It is a Revenue Record based on the survey conducted.

In Cl. 281, Basic Tax Register (BTR) is specifically referred to.  It is described as a “Permanent Register”.

  • Note: Clause 280 in Chapter 25 of the Kerala Village Office Manual referred to the Supplements to the Settlement Register because the Re- Survey is not completed throughout the State. In the Areas where the Re-Survey is conducted and BTR is made, the Supplement Registers have no application.
  • But, even in places where Re-Survey is effected, the 1910 Settlement Register (“A-Register”) is to be maintained (as a ‘permanent register’).

It is also noteworthy that no Settlement is made after 1910.

As a matter of fact, in Village Offices the Registers are maintained with the name “A-Register” containing the particulars in BTR; and “B-Registers”, to incorporate the subsequent changes made in the land (after preparation of the BTR) though they are not specifically directed in Kerala Village Office Manual.  It is exactly corresponds to the “second additional register” stated in Cl. 281 of the Village Office Manual which is directed to be maintained in addition to the 1910 Settlement “A-Register”

  • Note: Settlement A to D Registers are (originally) referred to in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Vol. III (1915), in Cl. 712 and 713, respectively.

As regards the authority of “Manuals” it is observed in State of Kerala v. Navaneeth Krishnan, ILR 2023-3 Ker 686; 2023-4 KLT 756, as under:

  • “The Apex Court in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. [2013 (4) KHC 5522014-2 SCC 1] in paragraph 79 considered the binding authority of the CBI Crime Manual. It was held that CBI Crime Manual is not a statute, it is only a set of administrative orders issued for internal guidance of the CBI officers and it cannot supersede the provisions of Cr. P.C. It was further held that in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the Cr. P.C itself, the provisions of the CBI Crime Manual cannot be relied upon. A Single Bench of this Court in Santhosh T. A. And Another v. State of Kerala [2017 (5) KHC 107] dealt with the binding authority of the Kerala Excise Manual under the Abkari Act. It was held that the Manual contains only executive instruction and has no force of a statutory provision.”
  • In Jacob v. State of Kerala, 1964 KLT 359, it had been held (Vaidyalingam, J.), as under:
  • “The instructions or directions contained in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual … have not been given by virtue of any rule making power vested in the. Government, either under the provisions of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act or under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act. …. If that is so, the directions contained in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual can only be considered to be in the nature of executive directions and they will have no force whatsoever, especially in view of the fact that S.6 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951 lays down that the sale of immovable property of the defaulter shall be “in the manner provided hereinafter”.

End Notes

Presumption in Evidence Act under S. 114

Besides direct evidence and admission, the contents of a document can also be proved by circumstantial evidence or by invoking presumption. ‘Common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’, etc. under S. 114, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, can be used to prove the existence and genuineness/truth of a document.  Sec. 114 Evd. Act reads as under”

  • S. 114. Court may presume existence of certain facts The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.”

Under Sec. 114 the court can  presume existence of truth or correctness (a fact) which ‘it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business’.

Illustration (e) of Sec. 114, Evd. Act

Illustration (e) of Sec. 114, Evd. Act, demonstrates that presumption as to ‘regularity’ can be invoked on Judicial and official acts, in proper cases. 

‘Regularity’ in Illustration (e) is not exactly the presumption as to ‘correctness or truth’. For such presumption, we have to resort the main section, Sec. 114 – that is, ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’, etc.

General (Sec. 114) Presumptions in Evidence Act

Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act allows the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.

Relevancy, Admissibility and Presumptions on Truth under Sec. 16, 34, 35

Sec. 16, 34, 35, etc. of the Evidence Act speaks only on ‘relevancy’ of documents. It directs towards the ‘admissibility’. The ‘truth or otherwise’ attached to its contents can be ‘presumed’ under Sec. 114.

Documents in the Course of Business – Relevant Fact under Sec. 16 

Sec. 16 of the Indian Evidence Act: Sec. 16 reads as under:

  • 16. Existence of course of business when relevant: When there is a question whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course of business, according to which it naturally would have been done, is a.

Illustrations to Sec. 16 make it clear that (a) when a question arises whether a particular letter was dispatched, the facts that it was the ordinary course of business for all letters put in a certain place to be carried to the post, and that particular letter was put in that place, are relevant; and that (b) when a question arises whether a particular letter reached A, the fact that it was posted in due course, and was not returned through the Dead Letter Office, are relevant.

In Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkat Ramanaa, AIR 1976 SC 869, the Apex Court found that a letter sent by registered post, with the endorsement “refused” on the cover, could be presumed to have been duly served upon the addressee without examining the postman who had tried to effect service and it was observed that there was presumption under Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act that, in the ordinary course of business, it was received by the addressee and actually refused by him.

Illustration (f) of Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act speaks that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. Under this Illustration, it can be presumed the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. A registered postal receipt along with a copy of the letter containing the court notice and bearing correct address raises presumption that it was duly received by the addressee, in spite of the absence of a return of acknowledgement (Anil Kumar vs. Nanak Chandra: AIR 1990 SC 1215). but, the addressee can rebut it (Radha Kishan vs. State: AIR 1963 SC 822).

Sec. 32: ‘Presumption Of Truth’ on Documents Falls Relevant Under Sec. 32

Sec. 32 Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant. –– Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:  
  • (1) When it relates to cause of death …. …..
  • (2) Or is made in course of business. –– When the statement was made by such person in the ordinary course of business, and in particular when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in books kept in the ordinary course of business, or in the discharge of professional duty; or of an acknowledgement written or signed by him of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property of any kind; or of a document used in commerce written or signed by him; or of the date of a letter or other document usually dated, written or signed by him
  • (3) …..”

Presumption on Truth on Documents Prepared under Sec. 35

Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • “35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty: An entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.

In Inder Singh v. S. Raghbir Singh, AIR 1978 P&H 98, it is observed as under:

  • “The principle is that an official record, kept by a person, upon whom there is a public duty to make entries in it only after satisfying himself of the truth of those entries, is presumed to be correct. Such a document itself is evidence of the truth of its contents unless and until its falsity can be demonstrated by any of the various methods by which the evidentiary value of any public book, register or document may be attacked.”

Our Apex Court, in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: AIR 2020 SC 1382, referring relevant provisions of Himachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act, held that Record-of-rights (Revenue document) carries the ‘presumption of correctness‘.

In Shiv Ram v. Shiv Charan Singh, AIR 1964 Raj 126, it is observed as under

  • “Where Sec. 35 properly comes into play, an entry made by a public servant in any public or official book in the discharge of his official duty becomes relevant by itself, and no other proof of such entry is required as a matter of law by our Evidence Act, but this, does not exclude the possibility that such an entry may become admissible otherwise if it is properly proved to have been made by a person ordinarily competent to make it.” (Quoted in Mayadhar Nayak vs Sub-Divisional Officer, Jajpur, AIR 1982 Ori 221).

Wajibul-Arz – Part of Settlement Record Presumption of Correctness Attached

The Privy Council has held in Fatea Chand v. Knshan, 10 ALJ 335, that wajibul-arz is a cogent evidence of rights as they existed when it was made.

The value of wazibul-aiz has been accepted to be very high in Anant Prasad v. Raja Ram, 1984 Supp AWC 194 and Yash Pat Singh v. Jagannath, 1946 ALJ 132.

In Avadh Kishore Das v. Ram Gopal, AIR 1979 SC 861, (1979) 4 SCC 790, it is observed as under:

  • “Wajibularz is village administration paper prepared with due care and after due enquiry by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. It is a part of the settlement record and a statutory presumption of correctnesattaches to it. Properly construed, this Wajibularz shows that the entire revenue estate of village Bahawalpura vests in the Temple or the Math as a juristic person.”

In Harpal Singh v. State of H. P. , AIR 1981 SC 361; 1981-1 SCC 560, it was held as under:

  • A certified copy of the relevant entry in the birth register which shows that Saroj Kumari, who according to her evidence was known as Ramesh during her childhood, was born to Lajwanti wife of Daulot Ram on 11-11-1957. Mr, Hardy submitted that in the absence of the examination of the officer/chowkidar concerned who recorded the entry, it was inadmissible in evidence. We cannot agree with him for the simple reason that the entry was made by the concerned official in the discharge of his official duties, that it is therefore clearly admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine its author.”

In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U. P. , AIR 2006 SC 2157; 2006 5 SCC 584,  it was observed that there was nothing on record to show that the said date of birth was recorded in a register maintained by the school in terms of the requirements of law as contained in Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, and thereafter it was held as under:

  • “22. Section 35 of the Evidence Act would be attracted both in civil and criminal proceedings. The Evidence Act does not make any distinction between a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding. Unless specifically provided for, in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Actthe register maintained in ordinary course of business by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which, inter alia, such register is kept would be a relevant fact. Section 35, thus, requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document is held to be admissible thereunder :
  • (i) it should be in the nature of the entry in any public or official register;
  • (ii) it must state a fact in issue or relevant fact;
  • (iii) entry must be made either by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country; and
  • (iv) all persons concerned indisputably must have an access thereto.”

Revenue record Presumption of Truth Attached

It is held in Krishnamurthy S.  Setlur v.  O.V.  Narasimha Setty, 2019-9 SCC 488, that revenue record proves possession. It is said as under:

  • “14. In our considered view, the High Court has not given any cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion that KS was not in possession of the property. His name figured in the revenue record from 1963 to 1981 as the owner in possession. Presumption of truth is attached to revenue record which has not been rebutted.”

Referring relevant provisions of Himachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Sec. 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is held in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: AIR 2020 SC 1382, that Record-of-rights (Revenue document) carries the ‘presumption of correctness‘.

Read Connected Blogs:

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab, 2024-2 SCR 847

It is observed: There is ‘Duplicate Ownership’, in ‘Trust’, according to Salmond.

But, the Theory of ‘Duel Ownership’ (Propounded in English Trust Law) is Not Preferred in India

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab: Facts in a Nutshell

  • Raja of Mahmudabad owned the subject property situated at Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Lucknow. He had migrated to Pakistan in 1947.
  • His property was treated as an ‘Enemy Property’ under the Enemy Property Act, 1968.
  • There is a statutory vesting of such property in the Custodian for Enemy Property.
  • The Custodian is under the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India.
  • Raja Mohammed Amir Mohammad Khan, the son of the Raja of Mahmudabad, remained in India as an Indian citizen.
  • He had been actively seeking the release of enemy properties owned by his late father.
  • Though the Government had agreed to release 25% of these properties, it had not yet acted upon this commitment.
  • In this situation, Raja Mohammed Amir Mohammad Khan approached the Bombay High Court in 1997 filing a Writ Petition.
  • The High Court ruled in his favour, directing the Custodian to surrender possession of the properties to him.
  • Being aggrieved with this decision, the Union of India approached the Apex Court by way of filing SLP in 2001.
  • The Apex Court by its judgment, Union of India v. Raja Mohammad Amir Mohammad Khan, (2005) 8 SCC 696, dismissed the appeal.
  • The Apex Court also directed the Union of India to get the buildings (residence or offices) vacated from such officers and handover the possession to Raja Mohammed Amir Mohammad Khan within eight weeks.
  • Thereafter proceedings were initiated by various tenants, including respondent No.1.
  • The Apex Court, in the SLP clarified its earlier judgment dated 21.10.2005 saying that the persons claiming possession prior to the Custodian’s appointment, based on valid tenancy agreements established by Raja Mahmudabad or his General Power of Attorney, were exempted from the directives.
  • The enquiry conducted in pursuance to the above orders of the Apex Court resulted in a report in favour of respondent No.1 herein. Ergo, they continued to remain in possession.
  • Following these events, on 28.05.2011, the appellant No.3, Jal Sansthan Lucknow, issued a notice to respondent No.1, demanding payment of Rs. 7,57,239.00 to pay the pending bills of Water Tax/Sewer Tax/Water price of Rs. 7,57,239/- by 31.03.2011.
  • Aggrieved by the aforesaid action, the assesse, respondent No.1, approached the High Court of Allahabad at Lucknow by filing Writ Petition. It was allowed, holding that the assesse/ occupier was not liable to pay any property tax.
  • SLP was filed against this decision.

SC Findings in Brief

The Apex Court allowed the appeal on the following findings, in brief:

  • Custodian for Enemy Property in India is a trustee only.
  • Union of India cannot assume ownership of the enemy properties.
  • Occupier of the subject property is liable to pay local taxes.

The Apex Court held as under:

  • “1) That the Custodian for Enemy Property in India, in whom the enemy properties vest including the subject property, does not acquire ownership of the said properties. The enemy properties vest in the Custodian as a trustee only for the management and administration of such properties.
  • 2) That the Central Government may, on a reference or complaint or on its own motion initiate a process of divestment of enemy property vested in the Custodian to the owner thereof or to such other person vide Rule 15 of the Rules. Hence, the vesting of the enemy property in the Custodian is only as a temporary measure and he acts as a trustee of the said properties.
  • 3) That in view of the above conclusion, Union of India cannot assume ownership of the enemy properties once the said property is vested in the Custodian. This is because, there is no transfer of ownership from the owner of the enemy property to the Custodian and  consequently, there is no ownership rights transferred to the Union of India. Therefore, the enemy properties which vest in the Custodian are not Union properties.
  • 4) As the enemy properties are not Union properties, clause (1) of Article 285 does not apply to enemy properties. Clause (2) of Article 285 is an exception to clause (1) and would apply only if the enemy properties are Union properties and not otherwise.
  • 5) In view of the above, the High Court was not right in holding that the respondent as occupier of the subject property, is not liable to pay any property tax or other local taxes to the appellant. In the result, the impugned order of the High Court dated 29.03.2017 passed in Misc. Bench No.2317 of 2012 is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside.
  • 6) Consequently, any demand for payment of taxes under the Act of 1959 made and thereby paid by the respondent to the appellant-authority shall not be refunded. However, if no demand notices have been issued till date, the same shall not be issued but from the current fiscal  year onwards (2024-2025), the appellant shall be entitled to levy and collect the property tax as well as water tax and sewerage charges and any other local taxes in accordance with law.”

In the Judgment, it is observed (obiter) as under:

  • A trust is a very important and curious instance of duplicate ownership.”

Theory of ‘Duel Ownership’, Under English Trust Law, is Not Preferred in India

Under English law of trusts, there is ‘duel ownership’ over the trust property.

  • First is the ‘legal ownership’. It is vested with trustees.
  • The other is the ‘equitable or beneficial ownership’. It is vested with the beneficiaries.

Indian law on trusts differs from English-Trust-Law on the doctrine of ‘duel ownership’. Under Indian law –

  1. Trustee is the ‘sole’ (legal) owner of the trust property; and, there is no ‘duel/duplicate ownership’.
  2. Beneficiaries do not have ‘beneficial ownership’; they have only ‘beneficial interest’.
  3. Trustees only ‘hold’ the trust property, and it is for mere administration.
  4. Trustees hold the trust property for the ‘benefit of the beneficiaries’; not ‘on their behalf‘.
  5. Since the trustees only ‘hold’ the properties for the beneficiaries, no legal ‘title’ vests with the trustees, though they have legal ‘ownership’.

Salmond Propounds Doctrine of ‘Duel Ownership’

Under English law, when the author of the trust creates a trust, by the dedication of the endowed property, he transfers the ‘legal ownership’ on the trust-property to the trustees and ‘beneficial ownership’ to the beneficiaries. Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th  Edition, page 256) refers these propositions as under:

  • “A trustee is the legal owner of the property, the actual owner thereof having lost title thereto by the creation of a trust. The equitable ownership in the trust property vests in the beneficiaries. The trust is thus an incident of dual ownership in which the creator of the trust no longer figures.”

Doctrine of ‘Duel Ownership’ has no Universal Acceptance.

Doctrine of duel-ownership on trust property is peculiar to English law. It has no universal acceptance.

In The I Congresso Del Partido [(1977) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 536] the Queen’s Bench Division (Admiralty Court) pointed out that the trust-concept ‘involving a dichotomy between legal and equitable ownership is unknown to some, and perhaps most, other jurisdictions’. [Referred to in Owners and Parties Interested in the Vessel M.V. “Dong Do” v. Ramesh Kumar, (2000) 1 Cal LT 367].

Definition of Trust in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882

Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 defines trust as under:

  • Trust: A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner:

From the definition it is clear that ‘Trust’, in law, holds the following conceptions:

  • Trust is ‘an obligation’ upon the trustee.
  • It is to administer the endowed property.
  • The administration must be done by the trustee as if he is the owner.
  • It must be done by him accepting the desire of the author.
  • And, the same must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.

‘Trustee’ is the Sole ‘Owner’ According to    the Definition of ‘Trust’

From the definition of ‘trust’ in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 it is clear that the Act does not recognise ‘beneficial ownership’ in the beneficiaries. It recognises ‘ownership in trustee’ alone.

The definition of trust in Sec. 3 can be analysed as under:

(i) A ‘trust’ is an obligation-

  • annexed to the ownership of property (to administer), and
  • (i) arising out of a confidence reposed in (trustee, by the author) and accepted by the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner), or (ii) declared and accepted by him(that is, trustee),#
    • for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner).
  • the obligation that is declared and accepted by the same person. This situation comes-up when the the author himself declares to act as trustee. See notes below under the head: ‘Obligation … Declared And Accepted By Him’.

(ii) Confidence is ‘Reposed’ by the Author

Trust is defined to be an obligation arising out of a confidence ‘reposed in’ (the owner/trustee). When the ‘author of the trust’ is defined, it is stated:

  • “The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’.”

Therefore, it is definite that the words, confidence reposed in the owner’, denote the confidence that is ‘reposed’ by the author ‘in the owner’. (Allahabad Bank Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.)

(iii) The ‘Owner’ in whom  the Confidence is ‘Reposed’, is Trustee

As stated above, it is the author who ‘reposes’ the confidence; and the confidence is ‘reposed in’ the ‘owner‘. Then, who is the ‘owner’?

  • It is trustee(Khairul Bashar Vs. ThannuLal: AIR1957 All 553; Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co Vs. CIT: 1966-61 ITR 572 (Bom); Christopher Karkada VS Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR  1969 SC 569;       Rajah SagiJanaki Vs. Appururu Bhukta: 1976-2 AndWR 117, 1976-1 APLJ 312;       Special Secy. Govt of WB Vs. State Bank of India: AIR  1989 Cal 40; CIT Vs. K Shyamaraju: 1991-1 KantLJ 233; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.)

The nexus between owner and trustee is clear from the definitions of ‘trust’ and ‘trustee’.

  • When ‘trust’ is defined, it is stated:
    • the confidence is ‘accepted by the owner’;
  • When ‘trustee’ is defined, it is stated:
    • the confidence is ‘accepted by the trustee’.

According to the definition of trust, the ‘obligation’ stands‘ annexed to the ownership’ of the trust-property. Sec. 6 of the Trusts Act makes it clear that ‘a trust is created when the author of the trust transfers the trust property to the trustee’. Therefore, the ‘obligation’ upon the trustee casts a duty upon him to administer the trust-property as (if) he is its ‘owner’.

(iv) The definition of Trust can be explained as under:

A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property,Trust is an obligation (upon trustee to administer the trust-property as its (legal) owner. (Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act casts duty on the trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling ‘the purpose of the trust’, and obeying ‘the directions of the author of the trust’.) (Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; State Bank of India Vs. Spl. Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529)
and arising out of a confidenceDuty of a Trustee is fiduciary in nature. (R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Edl Trust: 1982-21 DLT 46: ILR  1982-1Del 801; Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid: AIR1944  Cal 163) (Paru Vs. Chiruthai: 1985 KerLJ 480, 1985  KerLT 563: Referred: UN Mitra’s Law of Limitation and Prescription, 9th Edn., Vol. II, at page 1574, Para 66; Bhavna Nalinkant  Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529; CBSE Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay: AIR 2011 SCW  4888:  2011-8 SCC 497; Reserve Bank of India Vs. Jayantilal N. Mistry: AIR 2016 SC 1.)
It is moral as well as legal. (Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.)
reposed inConfidence is reposed in Trustee (by the Author). (Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Canara Bank Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1982 Ker 1: ILR 1981-2 Ker 649; R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1 Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.)
and accepted by the owner,Trustee the (legal) owner, must have accepted the confidence (reposed in by the author).(Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; DinshawRusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557. Trustee is the owner:       Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram   Shah:  AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887; Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553; Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW (Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169:  2011-52 DTR 89. Benafasilal Rajgorhia Vs. Central Bank of India: 1971-76 Cal WN 807; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993 BCR 301; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460.)
or declared and accepted by himTrustee (when author himself is the truste) (Heeralal  Vs. Firm RatanlalMahavir Prasad:1964 RajLW  33) can ‘declare and accept’ the ‘confidence’.
for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner.Author creates trust for the benefit of others. Trustee can be one among the beneficiaries.

Indian Law Recognises ‘Legal Ownership‘ on Trustees; Not ‘Title

The Privy Council, in Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram (AIR 1931 PC 196) held as under:

  • “The Indian Law does not recognise legal and equitable estates. By that law, therefore, there can be but one owner; and where the property is vested in a trustee, the owner must, their Lordship think, be the trustee. This is the view embodied in the Indian Trusts Act: See Sec. 3, 55, 56, etc. … ” (Quoted in Special Secy. Govt of W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar. 72; Raja Sir Muthiah Chettiar Vs. Commissioner of IT: 1984-38 CTR 76: 1984-17 TAXMAN 142: 1984-148 ITR532: Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Ganga Properties Ltd: 1970-77 ITR 637; Sardarilal Vs. Shrimati Shakuntla Devi: AIR 1961 P&H 378.)

Inasmuch as Indian Law does not recognise legal and equitable estates (‘ownership’) (Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196.) and trustee alone has ownership (legal ownership), this ‘ownership’ of trustees is not the ‘legal (or trust) ownership’ that is understood in English law.

In English law, when ‘legal ownership’ is referred to, it denotes ‘legal estate’. It is one component the duel-ownership. It confers a ‘title’ upon the trustee. But, in Indian Law, the trust properties ‘vest’ in the trustees for the limited purpose of administration or management; and the trustees only ‘hold’ the properties. (Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs. Comner. IT, Madras: AIR 1964Mad 483).

Indian Law Does Not Recognise Equitable Ownership (Estate) of Beneficiaries

Similarly, the Indian Trusts Act does not refer to ‘beneficial ownership’; it refers merely to ‘interest’ or ‘beneficial interest’ of the beneficiary. (See: Ram Bharose Sharma Vs. Mahant Ram Swaroop: 2001 AIR- SCW  4062:  Mitar Sain Vs. Data Ram: AIR 1926 All 7; Urshottam Vs. Kanhaiyalal: AIR 1966 Raj 70.) It is clear from the following affirmations in the definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882:

  • (i) “A ‘trust’ is an obligation … arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner… for the benefit of another….”
  • (ii) “(T)he ‘beneficial interest’…  is his (beneficiary’s) right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.”

In English law, when ‘beneficial interest’ is referred to, it denotes – ‘beneficial ownership’ or ‘beneficial estate’, the second component among the duel ownership.

The courts in India have followed the principles in Trusts Act, as to legal ownership of trustees and beneficial interest of the beneficiaries, in Common Law of Trust; and disfavoured doctrine of ‘duel ownership’. (Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram Shah:  AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887; Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Kripashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463, Bai Dosabai Vs. Mathuradas: AIR 1980 SC 1334; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-301; Hem Chandra Vs. Suradham Debya: AIR 1940 P.C. 134;       Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106. Deoki Nandan  Vs.  Murlidhar:  AIR 1957 SC 133; Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73.)

Thus, under the Law of Trust in India, trustee holds the trust property as its sole (legal) owner, subject to the obligation to use this ownership for the benefit of the beneficiaries (Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin Vs. Trustees,  Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184).

The legal entitlement of beneficiaries in a trust (that is, beneficial interest) is legibly stated in The Province of Bihar v. FR Hayes,  1946-14 ITR 326 (Patna), by Fazl Ali, CJ (as he then was) while interpreting Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1938, referring the definition of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, as under:

  • “The framers of the Act must be assumed to have known the accepted legal meaning of the expression and also known that the term ‘beneficiary’ in law is not generally used with reference to a full legal owner but with reference to a person who has ‘beneficial interest’ in some property which is usually in the possession and control of another person. The distinction between beneficial interest and legal ownership is one of the most notable features of a trust and in my judgment ‘beneficiaries’ referred to in Section 11 are those persons who have merely beneficial interest in a property while the legal ownership of the property vests in a person or persons who hold the property for their benefit.”

Trustee Holds ‘For the Benefit Of’; Not ‘On Behalf Of’ the Beneficiaries

The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 repeatedly lays down – trustees are ‘holding’ trust property (Sec. 10, 29 and Chap. IX: Sec. 80 onwards).  It is subject to the obligation to use his ownership ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.

Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 10. Who may be trustee.—Every person capable of holding property may be a trustee; but, where the trust involves the exercise of discretion, he cannot execute it unless he is competent to contract.

Sec. 29 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

  • 29. Liability of trustee where beneficiary’s interest is forfeited to Government.—When the beneficiary’s interest is forfeited or awarded by legal adjudication to the Government, the trustee is bound to hold the trust property to the extent of such interest for the benefit of such person in such manner as the State Government  may direct in this behalf.”

In WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106) it is laid down by our Apex Court as under:

  • “23. Whatever be the position in English Law, the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882) is clear and categoric on this point. … These definitions emphasise that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary only has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property. The trustee is thus, the legal owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such. He, no doubt, holds the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries but he does not hold it on their behalf. The expressions ‘for the benefit of’ and ‘on behalf of’ are not synonymous with each other. They convey different meanings.”

Our Apex Court observed in Comm. Wealth Tax Vs. Kirpashanker Dayashankar, AIR 1971 SC 2463, that the trustee holds the trust property ‘on his own right’ and not ‘on behalf of’ someone else though he holds it ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries. Obligations are casted upon trustees, only to manage the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.  It is beyond doubt that the trustee has no ‘proprietary interest’ inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out (Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012  Kar 725; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Special Secy. Govt. of W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40) in the property itself. (It is not a mere ‘right’ similar to ‘right of easement’ for the dominant owner; but, it is an ‘interest’.) In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property (Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Kumar Jain Vs. Parasnath Digambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199).

The Legal Principles are Vividly Explained

The legal principles related to the Trust are vividly explained by our Apex Court in Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab.  Pvt.  Ltd., 2024-2 SCR 847.

While so, the view of Salmond is pointed out –

  • “A trust is a very important and curious instance of duplicate ownershipAccording to Salmond, the trust property is that which is owned by two persons at the same time ….

It appears, the Court did not place the Indian law, on this matter (Note: Observations on this point is obiter.) 

The Apex Court said as under:

  • “14.9 Amongst the distinct kinds of ownerships, a trust ownership and beneficial ownership is relevant to the case. A trust is a very important and curious instance of duplicate ownership. According to Salmond, the trust property is that which is owned by two persons at the same time, the relation between the two owners being such that one of them is under an obligation to use his ownership for the benefit of the other. The former is called the ‘trustee’ and his ownership is the ‘trust ownership’; the latter is called the ‘beneficiary’ and his is beneficial ownership.
  • 14.10 The trustee’s ownership of any property is a matter of form rather than a substance and nominal rather than real. A trustee is not effectively an owner at all but in essence a mere agent, upon whom the law has conferred the power and imposed the duty of administering the property of another person. The trustee is a person to whom the property, substantially that of someone else is technically attributed by the law on the footing that the rights and powers that it vests under him are to be used by him on behalf of the real owner. As between the trustee and beneficiary, the law recognises that the property belongs to the latter and not to the former. But as between the trustee and the third persons, the fiction prevails, inasmuch as the trustee is clothed with the rights of his beneficiary and personate or represent him in dealings with the world at large. ……
  • 14.11 Thus, the trusteeship is to protect the rights and interests of persons, who, for any reason are unable effectively to protect them for themselves. The law vests those rights and interests for safe custody in a trustee, who is capable of guarding them and dealing with them and who is placed under an obligation to use it for the benefit of him to whom they in truth belong. One of the classes of persons on whose behalf the protection of the trusteeship is called is in respect of the property of those persons who are absent in the country, such as a person who has migrated to a country which is described as an enemy country by the Government of India as defined under the provisions of the Act under consideration.
  • 14.12 Thus, under the Act, the Custodian acts as a trustee. A trust is more than an obligation to use the property for the benefit of another; it is an obligation to use it for the benefit of another in whom it is already concurrently vested. Since the beneficiary is himself the owner of the enemy property, in the instant case, the Custodian who is the trustee appointed under the Act is therefore a statutory authority constituted for the administration of the enemy property, who is only a nominal owner of the property so administered by him vis-à-vis third parties. As already noted, the nominal ownership in the trustee is only for the purpose of using the rights and powers vesting with the trustee i.e., Custodian under the Act to be used by him or on behalf of the real owner of the property is absent, since he has left the country for an enemy country.
  • 14.13 The trustee or Custodian under the Act may, in pursuance of the powers vested in him under the Act which actually creates a trust by operation of law, can lease or mortgage the property without the concurrence of the beneficiary under the provisions of the Act just as the beneficiary could have dealt in the same way with his ownership of the property independently of the trustee as there is no bar in law to do so other than the provisions of the Act. Thus, a relationship of trusteeship exists between the trustee and all persons beneficially interested in the property, either as owners or encumbrancers.”

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Travancore Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 (1865 AD) and 1061 (1886 AD), And 1922 Devaswom Proclamation

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Connected Blogs:

Travancore – Padmanabha Swamy Temple and ‘Bhandara Vaka’ Lands

The powerful King, Marthandavarma, who ruled Travancore from 1729 to 1758, was successful in bringing all people and properties of Travancore (Southern Kingdom at present Kerala) under his administration; and collected tax from all lands except those that were expressly exempted.

The King of Travancore placed himself (trippadi-danam) as the servant of the deity. The entire assets of Travancore were regarded as the property that belonged to the Treasury or Offertory (Bhandaram in Malayalam; Pandaram in Tamil) of the Principal deity – Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple at Thiruvanamthapuram.

Royal Pattom Proclamation of 1040 (1865 AD) – Magna Carta in Land Reforms

During the second half of the 19th century several Royal Proclamations were promulgated with a view to confer rights, in the land, to the tenants who were the real cultivators. Majority of the people were engaged in agriculture; but the lands belonged to Jenmies (Sircar, Brahmins or Devaswoms). The cultivators held the land under lease arrangement known as Pattom, Otti, Inam and Viruthi etc. One of the important Regulations came in the line of agrarian reforms was the Royal Proclamation of 1040 ME (1865 AD). It pertained to Pattom (lease) tenements created (by Sircar) on Sirkar lands known as Pandaravaka lands. It is exalted as the Magna Carta of peasants of Travancore it being led to conferring land to tillers, step by step.

Travancore Proclamation of 1040 (1865) conferred Permanency

The Proclamation of 1040 (1865), assured the peasants to enjoy the Sircar-land “undisturbed”, so long as they paid the assessment (pattom). Though the Proclamation of did not expressly confer full proprietary rights on tenants, it gave the tenants permanency in the Pandaravaka soil; and it recorded the fist gigantic step towards the land reforms in Travancore.

The Proclamation of 1040 reads thus:

“PROCLAMATION

By His Highness the Maha Rajah of Travancore, issued under date the 2nd June 1865, corresponding to the 21st Edavam 1040.

Whereas we earnestly desire that the possession of landed as well as other property in Our territory should be as secure as possible; and whereas We are of opinion that, with this view, Sirkar Pattom lands can be placed on a much better footing than at present so as to enhance their value; We are pleased to notify to Our ryots

  • Istly- that the Sirkar hereby and for ever surrenders, for the benefit of the people all optional power over the following classes of lands, whether wet, garden or dry, and whether included in the Ayacut accounts or registered since:
    • Ven Pattom, Vettolivoo Pattom, Maraya Pattom, Olavoo Pattom, Mara Pattom, and all such Durkast Pattom the tax of which is understood to be fixed till the next Survey and Assessment;
  • 2ndly. that the ryots holding these lands may regard them fully as private, heri-table, saleable, and otherwise transferable, property;
  • 3rdly. accordingly, the sales, mortgages, & e., of these lands will hence-forward be valid; may be effected on stamped cadjans and will be duly registered; the lands may be sold for arrears of tax, in execution of decrees of Courts and such other legitimate purposes, and may also be accepted as security by the Sirkar as well as by private individuals;
  • 4thly. that the holders of the lands in question may rest assured that they may enjoy them undisturbed so long as the appointed assessment is paid;
  • 5thly. that the said holders are hence-forth at full liberty to lay out labour and capital on their lands of the aforesaid description to any extent they please, being sure of continued and secure possession;
  • 6thly. that the aforesaid description of lands will be resumable by the Sirkar like Jenmom and other private lands only for purely public purposes , as for instance, for making roads, canals, public buildings, & e., and when resumed for such purposes compensation will be paid by the Sirkar not for improvements only as here to fore, but equal, to the full market value of such lands;
  • 7thly. that the foregoing concessions are not however to be understood to affect in any way the rights of the Sirkar to regulate the land tax, to resume escheats, to confiscate the property of criminals, and generally such rights as have heretofore been exercised upon all property in general;
  • 8thly. that it is to be understood that when Pattom land being a portion of a holding, is transferred to a pauper, with the view of defrauding the Sirkar of the tax due to it, the Sirkar will have the right of apportioning the tax so as to prevent loss of revenue; and,
  • 9thly. (Repealed by Proclamation dated the 5th Karkadakam 1059). (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 : Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez Vs Albert Fernandez, AIR 1971 Ker 168; 1971 Ker LT 1.)

Proclamation of 1040 (1865) – No Proprietary Rights; But, Permanency to Cultivators

Legally speaking, the Pattom Proclamation of 1040 (1865) converted the pattom arrangement on pandaravaka lands into permanent leases and conferred on the holders thereof permanent rights of occupancy, heritable and alienable; inasmuch as, till 1040 ME (1865 AD), the agriculturists, who held the Pandaravaka (Government) lands under Pattom arrangement, were liable to be treated as mere tenants-at-will; the land being resumable (by the Government) at any time, as they were in the nature of temporary leases just like tenements created by private jenmis.

Royal Proclamation of 1061 (1886) Brings in Further Radical Changes

Paragraph 9 of the Proclamation of 1061 says, with reference to Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, as regards Pandarapattam lands, as under:

  • These lands were originally the absolute property of Government, and the tenants were mere tenants-at-will; but, by the Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, Government generously waived all right to these lands, and declared them to be the private, hereitable, saleable property of the holders.”

Section 22 of the Settlement Proclamation of 1061 (1886) made radical changes in land tenure.

Those changes were:

  • (1)   no debt shall be recognised as due to the holder;
  • (2) no interest shall be deducted from the Pattom on such debt;  
  • (3) no reduction of debt or a corresponding enhancement of the Sirkar demand shall be made when such properties were transferred by sale.
  • The properties held on the tenures in question shall be recognised as so many favourably assessed lands or Inams and confirmed to the holders as such.

Clause 7 of Section 24 of the Proclamation provided as under:

  • “There shall be no further interference on the part of the Government with these free holds, except such as might be necessary for the punctual realization of the quit rent payable”.(Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.)

Sale of Janmam Properties were Recorded as “Thettoms” in Settlement Register

In 1910 Travancore Settlement Register (and in the sale deeds), lands sold by Janmam holders were recorded as “Thettoms” (Devaswom Thettom/Namboori Thettom etc.).

  • Note: In the 1910 Settlement Register Janmam properties (with Brahmins and Devaswoms) were recorded as “Thanathu”.
  • When lands were classified under various heads, in Govindaru Nambooripad v. State of Kerala, 1962 Ker LT 913 :  AIR 1963 Ker 86, ‘Janmam’ lands were denoted as ‘Thanathu’.

Meaning of the Word ‘Thettom’

  • Generally meant – acquisition by Mortgage.
  • When ‘Thettom’ refers to a property dealing with a Jenmam (Janmam) holder, it can be any ‘subordinate tenure falling short of the full proprietary title‘.
  • When it refers to a property dealing with a Non-Jenmom holder, it may mean a sale’

As regards ‘Thettom’, Raman Menon, C.J., said, in Augusti v. The Dewan of Travancore, 8 Travancore LJ 438, as under:

  • “In S.A. 17 of 1074, this Court remarked:-‘In the Sirkar registry of 1011, the plaint property is entered as ‘Thettom’ in the name of defendants’ Tarwad.
  • That expression, according to its ordinary meaning, implies at least a mortgage lien, if not more, as held by this Court in A.S.166 of 1070 and A.S. 285 of 1071. It always implies something more than a simple lease’.
  • In S.A. 61 of 1075, the terms was taken to be generic and to include ‘all subordinate tenures falling short of the full proprietory title‘.
  • In S.A. 302 of 1075, it was observed that the word ‘Thettom’, as applied to Nambudiri Jenmies, had been held by this court to mean ordinarily a Kanom.
  • In S.A. 48 of 1076, Vencoba Chariar, C.J. and Mr. Justice Kunhiraman Nair construed the words thus:- ‘The chief ground of the plaintiff’s second appeal is that in arriving at this finding the lower courts have not given sufficient weight to the fact appearing from the Ext. B – an old Revenue account – in which the land in dispute is entered as ‘Thettam’ from plaintiff’s Illom; but the word ‘Thettom’ is a somewhat ambiguous one and though, as remarked in the case in 15 TLR 161 and in other cases, it is generally used in the Revenue accounts to signify the Kanom tenure under Jenmies, it is also sometimes used to denote other subordinate tenures‘.
  • In S.A. 343 of 1078, we find the following remarks:-‘Thettom ordinarily means a’Kanom’, and in any case, a derivative title when used in connection with Brahmaswam or Devaswom properties, as in the present case’.
  • Lastly, in A.S. Nos. 59 and 101 of 1083, Sadasiva Iyer, C.J., and Sankara Menon, J., observed thus:-‘Mr. Kochukrishna Marar quotes 15 TLR 161 and says the word ‘Thettom’ means a Kanom or mortgage.
  • No doubt, in the case of Jenmies, it has been so held; but we doubt whether in the case of non jenmies, any meaning other than the ordinary meaning of the word can be given to the word ‘Thettom’. The plaintiffs are Nairs and the tenure claimed is not Jenmom. The ordinary meaning of the word is acquisition. We are inclined to hold that a word ‘Thettom’, in cases of this sort, means only sale’.”
  • (Quoted in: Travancore Devaswom Board v. Uzhithiraru Uzhithiraru, 1957 KLT 315)

In Damodaran v. Sankaranarayanan Namboothiripad, ILR 1963-2 Ker. 707; 1964 KLT 25, the High Court referred to thanathu thettom land (nilam); and observed – it conveys the idea of ‘acquisition’.

Effect of Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061

Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 bound only Travancore Govt. Leases or ‘Pandarappattoms’.

In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (five Judge Bench), 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.), concluded that the land covered by the Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 were “estates” falling under Art. 31A of the Constitution.

It was on the definite finding that –

  • the Proclamation “secured permanency of tenure” (to the tenants),
  • conferred (on the tenants) “proprietary interest” in the soil; and
  • the Government did not remain as the full and absolute proprietor

The Court said as under:

  • “7. It is impossible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that, even after the Proclamation of 1040, the holders of these lands had no proprietary interest whatsoever in the soil and remained tenants in the strict sense of that term, with only the right of enjoyment, the only difference being that they secured permanency of tenure, the Government still remaining the full and absolute proprietor of the soil.”

Effect of the Proclamations over ‘Government Land Leases AFTER 1040 (1865)?

Now a question arises:

What is the impact of 1040 and 1061 (1886) Proclamations over the ‘Government Land Leases’ (Pandaravakappattoms) made after 1040 (1865)?

Do such leased lands qualify as “estate” under Article 31A of the Constitution?

  • The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out (by the Government) after 1040 (1865) do not acquire the rights of ‘permanency of tenure’ or attain the ‘proprietary interest’ conferred by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061.
  • If such rights of permanency and ‘proprietary interest’ are axiomatically conferred as a matter of course, the result would be that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands (after the Proclamations), for, the lease character would be lost at the moment it is made.

Therefore, there is a clear difference between leases made before and after the Proclamations; and the rights conferred by the Proclamations do not apply to leases made after them.

The nature of Pandaravaka lands is explained in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual (Revised Edition), Volume Ill, Part I, page 6 as under:

  • “The proclamation of 1040 converted them into permanent leases and conferred on the holders thereof permanent rights of occupancy, heritable and alienable.” (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.)

There is no scope for arguing that the future “Pandarappattoms” (future tenancy by Government) was ‘made void’ by the proclamation; or in other words, that the 1040 Proclamation “binds” the future Government tenancies also.

1865 Travancore Proclamation and 1905 Cochin Proclamation

In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, the Supreme Court (Rajagopala Ayyankar, J. Minority) pointed out the requirement and purport of these Proclamations. It reads as under:

  • “The evils which the system gave rise to, the economic insecurity of the tenant and the consequent lack of incentive on his part to put his best exertion on the land and the resultant loss to the state in the shape of revenue as well as the rise of a contented peasantry were exactly parallel to the situation which faced the ruler of Travancore leading to the proclamation of 1865. It was in these circumstances that the ruler of Cochin issued a proclamation on March 10, 1905, which defined with precision the rights of the State and of the cultivator in regard to these lands …”

Ayyankar, J. (Minority) observed that there was “conferment of proprietary rights by the Cochin Proclamation of 1905″ and “relinquishment by the State under the Travancore Proclamation of 1865″.

Finally, the Majority held that by virtue of the Cochin Proclamation of 1905 the holders of the Pandaravaka-verumpattom lands in Cochin were holding the property as “estate” within the meaning of Article 31A of the Constitution, and that the challenge thereon (to the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961) was not sustainable.

Devaswom Proclamation, 1922 & 1948 and Formation of Dev. Board

The History of Governmental Administration of Devaswoms mark four phases. They are:

  • (i) Administration as the Land Revenue Department – started in 987 ME (1811-1812 AD) under the edicts of Col. Munro.
  • (ii) Administration as the Devaswom Department – from 1922 Devaswom Proclamation.
  • (iii) Direct Administration by Maharaja by the 1948 Proclamation assuming control of Devaswoms and Devaswom Department.
  • (iv) Administration under Devaswom Board – from 1950 in accordance with the enactment, Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950.

Administration ‘AS’ the Governemnt Departments

By virtue of ‘organising’ the Devaswoms “as” the Land Revenue Department (from 987 ME) and “as” the Devaswom Department (by Proclamation, 1922), Devaswoms mentioned in the schedule thereof were treated as the ‘property of the State’.

The history as to the formulation of the Devaswom Proclamation, 1922, is given in  M. Muraleedharan Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR1991 Ker 25. It was laid down:

  • The Hindu temples in the State of Travancore were mostly under private management called Ooralars or Karakars.
  • As those bodies were found mismanaging the institutions, Col. Munro decided in 987 ME (1811-1812 AD) that the State should assume control over them.
  • With a view to secure better management of the Devaswoms, the Government appointed a committee to report upon the assumptions of those Devaswoms, the feasibility of separating their administration from the Land Revenue Department and cost if a separate department be deemed desirable.
  • The Commitlee, recommended that the administration of the Devaswom should be separated from the Land Revenue Department and entrusted to a distinct agency.
  • The Government of Travancore after taking necessary legal opinion came to the conclusion that creation of a separate department exclusively to the administration of Devaswoms was necessary.
  • Considering that it is the solemn right and duty of the Government to maintain efficiently and in good condition the Hindu Religious Institutions the State the Travancore Government issued the Devaswom Proclamation on 12th April, 1922 corresponding to 30th Meenom, 1097.
  • Section 7 of the Proclamation is as under:
    • “7.(1) Our Government may for the better and more efficient management and more effective control of the Devaswoms mentioned in the schedule organised a Devaswom Department of the State consisting of such number of officers and other servants as they think fit.
    • 2. The expenditure in connection with the said Department shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 3 and 4, be not out of the general revenue of the State.”
  • The Devaswom Department has become a part of the Government Department.

Administration ‘UNDER’ the Travancore Devaswom Board

The history shows that a “material change” was brought forth by the formulation of the Travancore Devaswom Board. It is laid down in  M. Muraleedharan Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR 1991 Ker 25, as under:

  • The Maharaja did not want to leave the administration of the Devaswoms to the State Government in the new set up. Therefore on 10-8-1123 (23-3-1948), yet another proclamation was issued by which the Maharaja assumed control of Devaswoms and Devaswom Department of the Government.
  • A material change also made in respect of funds from which expenditure. It was also provided that expenditure to be made not from general revenue but only from Devuswom fund.
  • Thereafter when Travancore-Cochin States were integrated it was provided by Section 8(c) of the Covenant that the administration of the Devaswoms, Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments and their properties and funds would vest with effect from 1-8-1949 in a Board known as Travancore Devaswom Board.
  • The Hindu Religious Institutions Ordinance 10 of 1124 was promulgated which came into force on 1-8-1949. Before expiry of the period of Ordinance, Act 15 of 1950, namely the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 was enacted.
  • Section 3 of the Act provided (as regards the formation of the Travancore Devaswom Board) as under:
    • “The administration of Incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and of Hindu Religious Endowments and all their properties and funds as well as the fund constituted under the Devaswom Proclamation, 1097 M. E. and the Surplus Fund Constituted under the Devaswom (Amendment) Proclamation, 1122 M. E. which were under the management of the Ruler of Travancore prior to the first day of July 1949, except the Sree Padrnanabhaswamy Temple, Sree Pandaravaga properties and all other properties and funds of the said temple, and the management of all institutions which were under the Devaswom Department shall vest in the Travancore Devaswom Board.”
  • The power of nomination given to the Ruler of Travancore was taken away and was given to the Council of Ministers by Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions (Amendment) Act 70 of 1974. Thereafter, of the three Hindu members of the Board, two will have to be nominated by the Hindus among the Council of Minister. The power given to Rajpramukh was subsequently vested in the Governor.

Connected Articles

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – How to Subscribe free 


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India