Courts to Apply Different ‘STANDADARDS’ in Appreciation of Evidence

Old Document: Recent Challenge – Direct Evidence Need Not Be as Strong as might be Naturally Expected in a Recent Transaction.

Taken from: Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Different ‘STANDADARDS of Proof’

In the process to take a fact ‘proved’, ‘disproved’, or ‘not proved’ the courts have to weigh probabilities. In Bater v Bater,  (1950) 2 All ER 458, Lord Denning pointed out –  ‘there is no absolute standard’, and higher degree of proof is required for more serious matters like criminal cases. Therefore, the courts apply different ‘STANDADARDS of Proof’ in different cases and the courts use distinctive scales in the judicial process of pondering on probabilities.

From the above, it can be concluded –

  1. ‘Proof of Documents’ envisaged in the Evidence Act is proof of ‘facts’ as to the ‘existence’ or ‘contents’ of a document.
  2. TRUTH of contents of documents being remain in the judicial discretion, it could not have been expressly or directly dealt with in Evidence Act with precision.
  3. According to Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act ‘a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either BELIEVES it to exist, or CONSIDERS its existence so PROBABLE that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of the particular case to act upon the supposition that it exists …’.
  4. According to Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act ‘the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it THINKS likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business …’
  5. That is, TRUTH (or otherwise) of a disputed point is left to the SUBJECTIVE SATISFATION of the court inasmuch as the question whether a fact is proved (or not) is left to the evaluation of the court. Further, the court is specifically required to appraise – how a prudent man in the given circumstances “acts upon“. The court is also authorised to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happenedregard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct” etc.
  6. It is equally important – TRUTH of a disputed item is to be appreciated on the legal (subjective) reasoning after OBJECTIVE consideration of the matters before it” (Sec. 3 Evid. Act).

Our Apex Court in Mahasay Ganesh Prasad Ray v. Narendra Nath Sen, AIR 1953 SC 431, while dealing with 30-year-old Book of Accounts, though it came from the possession of its keeper, held as under:

  • “3. … … … Exhibit 32 series as noticed by the High Court, consists of loose sheets of papers. They have not the probative force of a book of account regularly kept. Being old documents, naturally, the writer is not called and barring the fact that they were produced from the Receiver’s possession there is nothing to show their genuineness. Section 90, Evidence Act, does not help the appellants because this is not a case where the signature of a Particular person is in question or sought to be established. … …”.

In Harihar Prasad Singh v. Deonarain Prasad, AIR 1956 SC 305, the Apex Court observed as under:

  •  “8. Strong reliance was placed by the respondents on Exhibits F-1 and F-1(1), which are khatians relating to the suit lands published on 7-12-1909, recording them as in the possession of the defendants of the second party as ‘kaimi’ and on the presumption under S. 103-B that entry is correct.

Court to invoke Presumptions Judiciously

In Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (Govt.  of NCT of Delhi), 2023 CrLJ 311; 2022-4 JT 477; 2022-6 Scale 794; 2022-4 SCR 989, it is held as under:

  • “In any case, when there is legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.”

In Nepurjan Bibi Choudhury v. Musabbir Ali Choudhury, AIR 2018 Gau 151, it is emphasised as under:

  •  “Court needs to exercise the discretion judiciously while taking presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, keeping in mind the underlying object of the provision, being the necessity and convenience and also the precondition required for taking a presumption. Section 90 of the Evidence Act provides that before taking a presumption, two basic ingredients should be there, namely the document sought to be proved must be of 30 years old and it must be produced from proper custody.”

Loose and Unfettered Discretion is a Dangerous Weapon

In Naresh Chandra Mital v. Bishamber Nath Chopra, 1966-2 DLT 352, it is observed as under:

  • “The Court has in exercising its discretion to keep in view the desirability of facilitating speedy decisions of suits upon bills of exchange, promissory notes and hundis and also to keep in view the drastic nature of the provisions contained in Rules 2 and 3 of Order 37. The presumption of consideration in the case of negotiable instruments on the one hand and the plea of the defendant and the attending circumstances tending to discount such presumption have to be considered and weighed judiciously by the Court. In otherwords, the Court has to exercise judicial discretion, keeping in view the basic dictates of justice when determining the question whether or not to permit the defendant to contest the suit and if so, whether unconditionally or on terms and what terms. The idea of discretion, which is always to be exercised in a disciplined and responsible manner, really represents a compromise between the idea that those who possess power should be trusted with free hand and not tied down to narrow and rigid groves and the competing notion that loose and unfettered discretion is a dangerous weapon to entrust to any one including Courts.”

Old Document: Recent Challenge – Vigor of Direct Evidence Need Not Be as Strong as might be Naturally Expected in a Recent Transaction.

In Jagna Sanyasiah v.  Mycherla Peda Atchanna Naidu, AIR 1921 Mad 624, it is held as under:

  • “5. The respondents’ contention in their memorandum of objections would, in my opinion, have to be allowed as the passing of consideration for a document which is more than 30 years old and which was ever questioned till this suits was brought should be taken as proved even if the direct evidence is not as strong as might be naturally expected in respect of recent transactions.”

In Muthialpet Benefit Fund Ltd.  v. V.  Devarajulu Chetty, AIR 1955 Mad 455, it is held as under:

  • “7. To my mind, neither of the first two points is convincing because the first is based on the rather over-optimistic and facile profession of faith made in every minors suit that he the minor is going to win and to which the statistics of our Courts do not unfortunately lend any support and especially so in this case and in the circumstances set out above, which make out prima facie that the mortgagee public institution made proper and bona fide enquiry as to the existence of necessity and did all that was reasonable to satisfy itself as to the existence of such necessity. In such a case even if there was no necessity in fact or even if the money borrowed was not applied to meet the necessity, the alienation will be upheld. The recitals of necessity in the deed are admissible in evidence as admissions of the Manager or father and also amount to representation of necessity though in the case of RECENT TRANSACTIONS evidence aliunde** would be NORMALLY EXPECTED. These elementary propositions require no buttressing by citations (See Mulla, Hindu Law, Edn.10, p.285; Raghavachari: Hindu Law, Edn.3, p.335 and following; Mayne: Hindu Law, Edn.11, Re-print pp.474-475). Secondly, it is in the best interest of the mortgagors themselves to prevent the deterioration of the value of the corpus and market it into cash and keep the sale proceeds in Court pending and abiding the result of the suit.”
  • (**from other sources)

Proof is given to find truth of the evidence, for adjudicate the issues

Evidence is given to to establish the truth of the questions in controversy. It is necessary for the adjudication of the issues.

Following general propositions will show the nexus between Proof and Truth.

  • Evidence Act does not expressly say as to “TRUTH“: Indian Evidence Act and other procedural laws do not expressly say anything as to “TRUTH of contents” of documents.
  • Truth is left to the discretion of the court. In proper cases court can presume truth.
  • Presumption as to truth: Presumption as to truth of the contents of a (proved) document can be invoked in proper cases. Official record is taken as correct on the presumption that the entries thereof are made only after satisfying its truth.
  • Courts to save the TRUTH: Function of the Court is to save the TRUTH from falsehood, and the Courts are created for the very object of finding the TRUTH.
  • Formal proof & Truth: Proof of documents includes – 
    • formal proof, and
    • truth of its contents.
  • Proof by one who can vouchsafe: Generally, proof must be given through persons who can vouchsafe for the truth.

Subjective Satisfaction and Objective Consideration by the Court

It is evident from Sec. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act that TRUTH (or otherwise) of a disputed matter is left to the Subjective Satisfaction of the court. The definition of ‘proved’ in Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act says that ‘a fact is said to be proved when (after considering the matter before it) the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists’.  Further, S.114 of the Evidence Act allows the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc.

The Evidence Act itself lays down the objective methods, including adequate restrictions, to arrive at the subjective satisfaction to determine the truth. The definition of ‘proved’ itself provides for ‘consideration of the matters before it. The provision in Sec. 27 which bars the use of statement, given to police while an accused is in custody, is an important restriction in that line.  

In Karunakaran v. State, (1960) 2 Ker LR 247, it is observed as under:

  • “The practice of attestation of confessional statement by witnesses is an objectionable one. It prejudices the accused to safeguard whose interest the Legislature has enacted Ss. 24 fo 26 of the Evidence Act. It has no legal sanction behind it. There is no harm in recording the accused’s statement in the first person at any great length in the case diary when the accused is arrested and questioned and in the preamble to the recovery mahazar reference to the reasons leading to the recovery may be made.
  • The whole thing appears to be an “intentional whittling down” of the wholesome provisions of Ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. It is very easily said that the incriminating portion of a lengthy confessional “statement should be excluded. But it is a very difficult mental process to close your eyes to the details in the confessional statement and see only the bracketed portion and remain uninfluenced by the confession of the accused. This feat is possible of performance only by a few specially trained experts. There is no reason why the overburdened judicial officers should be saddled with an additional burden which has not the support of law or procedure.” (Quoted in: Mohammed v. State of Kerala, 1963 Cri LJ 175; Thadiyanevida Nazeer @ Ummer Haji v. State of Kerala (2022) and K Babu v. State of Kerala, 2023(6) KLT 96)

Courts are Created for the Very Object of Finding TRUTH

Following decisions of our Apex Court bespeak, as to the significance of TRUTH in judicial determinations, as under:

It is the function of the Court to save the truth from falsehood–

  • Bhagwan Tana Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1974

There is a legal duty for the courts to find the truth and administer justice–

  • Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271.

The Courts are created for the very object of finding the truth

  • Mohan Singh v. State of MP, (1999) 2 SCC 428.

Right from the inception of the judicial system establishment of truth is the main purposes underlying existence of Courts of justice–

  • Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374.

The trial should be search for the truth

  • Himanshu Singh Sabharwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 3 SCC 602,

The people would have faith in Courts when they would find that truth alone triumphs in Courts–

  • Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421.  

The truth should be the guiding starin the entire legal process and it is the duty of the Judge to discover truth to do complete justice–

  • Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria, (2012) 5 SCC 370,.

It is the bounden duty of the Court to uphold the truth and do justice–

  • Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya, (2012) 6 SCC 430.

Now a question comes – Which provision of the Indian Evidence Act deals with ‘deducing or deriving’ TRUTH ?

In such an inquisition, we legitimately arrive at in-

  • (i) the definition of “Proved” in Sec. 3, and
  • (ii) “Presumption” in Sec. 114, Evidence Act.

The definition of “Proved” in Sec. 3 gives vast discretion to the court. It reads as under:

  • ” ‘Proved‘ — A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court; either BELIEVES it to exist, or CONSIDERS its existence so PROBABLE that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.”

To fulfill the prime and onerous duty on the court, that is deducing or deriving TRUTH from the disputed matters, the Evidence Act further enables and authorises the court to invoke PRESUMPTION under Sec. 114 Evidence Act, wherever it is required.

Sec. 114 reads as under:

  • “114. Court may presume existence of certain facts —The Court may PRESUME the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.”

Presumption of Truth is taken ‘on something Proved‘, or taken for granted

In Izhar Ahmad Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052, the Supreme Court definitely observed that presumption of truth is taken ‘on something proved or taken for granted ‘. It reads as under:

  • “The term ‘presumption’ in its largest and most comprehensive signification, may be defined to mean inference, affirmative or dis-affirmative of the truth or falsehood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn by a process of probable reasoning from something proved or taken for granted.”

The Apex Court further quoted James Bradley Tayer (American jurist and author of Treatise on Evidence) which reads as under:

  • “Presumptions are aids to reasoning argumentation, which assume the truth of certain matters for the purpose of some given inquiry. …”.

In State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar, 2000-8 SCC 382, it is observed as under:

  • “33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other factsunless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Sec. 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.”

TRUTH is left to Discretion or Presumption of Court

Sec. 67, Evidence Act lays down the fundamental principles as to the proof of documents. Sec. 67 reads as under:

“67. Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced—If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person’s handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting.”

Sec. 67 says as to ‘proof of signature and handwriting’ alone. Neither Sec. 67 nor any other section of the Ev

In this premise, it is legitimate to deduce the following inferences –

  • Evidence Act does not expressly proffer anything as to “TRUTH of contents” of documents.
  • It is left to the discretion (Sec. 3) of the court. In proper cases court can presume (Sec. 114) truth.
  • In most cases, ‘proof of execution’ may lead the court to presume ‘proof of truth’.
  • It is more so, when a document is admitted (by the other side) without objection.
  • But, when proof as to ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute, the party in whom the burden thereof rests has to discharge it.

Adjudication to Find Out Truth & Doctrines of Substantive Rights, Prejudice to Other Side, Procedure – a Handmaid Matter

In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal, (1969) 1 SCC 869 our Apex Court held, while dealing with amendment of pleadings, as under:

  • “5. …. Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the Rules of procedure. (Quoted in Varun Pahwa v. Renu Chaudhary, AIR 2019 SC 1186)

In Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, (2006) 1 SCC 75, our Apex  Court held that procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice by any oppressive or punitive use. The Court held as under:-

  • “17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice.
  • Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well-recognised exceptions to this principle are:
  • .(i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of non- compliance;
  • (ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
  • (iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
  • (iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court;
  • (v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.” (Quoted in Varun Pahwa v. Renu Chaudhary, AIR 2019 SC 1186.)

Adjudication is to Render Justice; it is Unmindful of Consequences

It was held by the Kerala High Court in Gopalakrishnan v. Joint Registrar of Co operative Societies (General), 08 Dec 2015, (Dama Seshadri Naidu, J) as under:

  • “23. I am very conscious that this Court, as a constitutional adjudicatory machinery, is called upon to interpret the statute straight and simple and render justice. Justice is not an inventive judicial instrument; it is rather a necessary corollary to the judicious application of the law to the facts following certain accepted cannons of construction of the statutes and the Constitution, too. The whole process is compendiously called judicial adjudication. Trite is the truth that adjudication is unmindful of consequences; it is, on the other hand, in the legislative wisdom to consider all the eventualities and bring about legislation or legislative changes to see that the varied needs of the organisations and institutions, including the administrative agencies, are best served—adverse fallout on the application of law is avoided.

30 Years Old Documents- No ‘Absolute’ Presumption of Truth of Contents, under Sec. 90 Evidence Act

90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old –– Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person’s handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested.
Explanation.–– Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable.
This explanation applies also to section 81.
  • Under Sec. 90, Not Truth of Contents, but, only presumption of Genuineness of a document (i.e., existence or handwriting), is drawn. Therefore, besides TRUTH, the contents of the documents also have to be proved by cogent evidence.
    • Indian Evidence Act and other procedural laws do not expressly say anything as to “TRUTH of contents” of documents. In proper cases court can presume truth.
    • No doubt, under Sec. 114, TRUTH can be presumed, directly, in proper cases, in their peculiar ensuring facts (regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case).
    • That is, if the document is a public document an “added presumption” (as to correctness) under Section 114(e) is available -Iqbal Basith and others v. N Subbalakshmi, (2021) 2 SCC 718.
  • Sec. 90 CPC, basically, speaks about two things – as regards 30-year-documents:
    • 1. A document purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person is presumed to be in his handwriting.
    • 2. A document purports to be executed or attested is presumed to be duly executed and attested.
  • The presumption, under Section 90, Evidence Act, as to regularity for documents having more than 30 years of age does not apply to Wills (Unless Sec. 71 Evid. Act can be Invoked).

Sec. 90, Evid. Aact – Not Truth of Contents; But, Genuineness Drawn

Under Sec. 90, Not Truth of Contents, but, only presumption of Genuineness of a document (i.e., existence or handwriting), is drawn (Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin: (2012) 8 SCC 148). Therefore, besides TRUTH, the contents of the documents also have to be proved by cogent evidence.

  • No doubt, under Sec. 114, TRUTH can be presumed, directly, in proper cases, in their peculiar ensuring facts (regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case).
  • That is, if the document is a public document an “added presumption” (as to correctness) under Section 114(e) is available -KalitaIqbal Basith and others v. N Subbalakshmi, (2021) 2 SCC 718.

Our Courts Act Upon ‘LEGAL TRUTH’; and not ‘ULTIMATE TRUTH’

As shown above, the very duty of a court is to find TRUTH. Our courts are said to be functioning in ‘adversarial system’ where advocates present the case of their parties before an impartial judge for determining the truth and for getting a judgment accordingly. In such a system, the courts are concerned with ‘PROCEDURAL TRUTH’ or ‘LEGAL TRUTH’ as emerged from the pleadings and evidence; and not ULTIMATE TRUTH.

In State of Rajasthan v. Asharam @ Ashumal, AIR  2023 SC 2228, it is observed as under:

  • “In a well-designed system, judicial findings of formal legal truth should coincide with substantive truth.” (Also see: Kailash Vijayvargiya v. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri, 2023-6 JT 138.)

Viscount Simon LC, explained it in Hickman v.  Peacey, [1945] AC 304, as under:

  • “A court of law … is not engaged in ascertaining ultimate verities: it is engaged in determining what is the proper result to be arrived at, having regard to the evidence before it.”

Conjectures and Suspicion Should Not take the place of Legal Truth.

In Ritesh Chakarvarti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2007-1 SCC(Cr) 744, our Apex Court warned as under:

  • “There is another aspect of the matter, which cannot be lost sight of. While dealing with a case of grave nature like the present one, there is always a danger that conjectures and suspicion may take the place of legal truth.” (See also: Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of West Bengal, 2007-12 SCC 230.)

“Preponderance of Probabilities”

Difference in appreciation of evidence in Criminal and Civil matters.

Civil courts proceeds on the principle – “preponderance of probability”. Criminal courts proceeds on the principle – guilt of the accused must be ‘proved beyond all reasonable doubts’.

Preponderance of Probabilities

‘Preponderance’ is used for it carries or conveys the idea that the conscience of the judge is important in appreciation of evidence and law in civil matters. It is also used in contrast to ‘certainty beyond doubt’ (pertains to criminal law).  In the process of appreciation of evidence, the ‘slight’ evidence may ‘tilt the balance’ in Civil cases on applying the principle of ‘preponderance’. Therefore, it is said that the evidence is to be weighed. That is, ‘count’ is not the material thing, for a ‘genuine’ judge.  It is laid down in Section 134 of the Evidence Act which reads as under:

  • “No particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact.”

In Narayan Ganesh Dastane v. Sucheta Narayan Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534, our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “The normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be estabilshed if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. This is for the reason that under the Evidence Act, Sec. 3, a fact is said to be proved when the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The belief regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities. A prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he finds that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second. Within the wide range of probabilities the court has often a difficult choice to make but it is this choice which ultimately determines where the preponderance of probabilities lies.”

Our Apex Court referred the following two English decisions-  

(1) Per Dixon,J.in Wright v.Wright (1948)77 C.L.R.191. It observed as under:

  • “The nature and gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue”;

(2) Blyth v. Blyth, [1966] 1 A.E.R. 524 (Lord Denning). It is observed as under:

  • “The degree of probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear”

Standard of proof required under Sect. 139 NI Act is ‘preponderance of probabilities’

In Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441, our Apex Court held that Sec. 139, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved”) contains ‘reverse onus clause‘; and that under Sect. 139, the standard of proof required for rebutting that presumption is ‘preponderance of probabilities’.  (Followed in Anss Rajashekar v. Augustus Jeba Ananth, AIR 2019 SC 942).

In Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, 2019-5 SCC 418, while considering the presumption in 138 NI Act, it is held that when financial capacity is questioned, it was incumbent on the complainant to have explained his financial capacity and that the Court cannot insist on a person to lead negative evidence.

In Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, 2019-5 SCC 418, while considering the presumption in 138 NI Act, it is held that when financial capacity is questioned, it was incumbent on the complainant to have explained his financial capacity and that the Court cannot insist on a person to lead negative evidence.

In Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Prabodh Kumar Tewari (AS Bopanna, Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud), 2022-7 SCR 72, it is held as under:

  • “12. Section 139 of the Act mandates that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received it, in discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt, or liability.
  • The expression “unless the contrary is proved” indicates that the presumption under Section 139 of the Act is rebuttable. Terming this as an example of a “reverse onus clause” the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rangappa held that in determining whether the presumption has been rebutted, the test of proportionality must guide the determination. The standard of proof for rebuttal of the presumption under Section 139 of the Act is guided by a preponderance of probabilities.”

Reasonable Possibility alone is needed to Rebut Presumption

In Kali Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808, it was laid down by our Apex Court as under:

  • “23. ……One of the cardinal principles which has always to be kept in view in our system of administration of justice for criminal cases is that a person arraigned as an accused is presumed to be innocent unless that presumption is rebutted by the prosecution by production of evidence as may show him to be guilty of the offence with which he is charged. The burden of proving the guilt of the accused is upon the prosecution and unless it relieves itself of that burden, the courts cannot record a finding of the guilt of the accused. There are certain cases in which statutory presumptions arise regarding the guilt of the accused, but the burden even in those cases is upon the prosecution to prove the existence of facts which have to be present before the presumption can be drawn. Once those facts are shown by the prosecution to exist, the Court can raise the statutory presumption and it would, in such an event, be for the accused to rebut the presumption. The onus even in such cases upon the accused is not as heavy as is normally upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. If some material is brought on the record consistent with the innocence of the accused which may reasonably be true, even though it is not positively proved to be true, the accused would be entitled to acquittal.” (Quoted in: Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa: 2019-5 SCC 418.)

In M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala, (2006) 6 SCC 39 (SB Sinha), it was held that a probable defence or reasonable possibility alone is needed to rebut the presumption, which must meet the standard of “preponderance of probability”.  In M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala, (2006) 6 SCC 39 (SB Sinha) observed as under:

  • “In Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee [(2001) 6 SCC 16], a 3- Judge Bench of this Court held that although by reason of Sections 138 and 139 of the Act (NI Act), the presumption of law as distinguished from presumption of fact is drawn, the court has no other option but to draw the same in every case where the factual basis of raising the presumption is established. Pal, J. speaking for a 3-Judge Bench, however, opined:
    • “Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter, all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact.
    • In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exist, no discretion is left with the court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, ‘after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists’. Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the ‘prudent man’.”

Standard of Proof in Civil and Criminal Cases

Our Apex Court continued in Narayan Ganesh Dastane v. Sucheta Narayan Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534, as under:

  • “In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof by a higher standard which generally governs criminal trials or trials involving inquiry into issues of a quasi-criminal nature. A criminal trial involves the liberty of the subject which may not be taken away on a mere preponderance of probabilities. If the probabilities are so’ nicely balanced that a reasonable, not a vascillating, mind cannot find where the preponderance lies, a doubt arises regarding the existence of the fact to be proved and the benefit of such reasonable doubt goes to the accused. It is wrong to import such considerations in trials of a purely civil nature.”

See Post: Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Claim of Adverse Possession Carries (Implied) Admission of Title of Other Party – State of Haryana  v. Amin Lal, 2024-4 CurCC(SC) 222

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

In State of Haryana v. Amin Lal (Vikram Nath,  Prasanna B. Varale JJ), November 19, 2024, it is held by the Supreme Court of India as under:

  • “By asserting adverse possession, the appellants have impliedly admitted the plaintiffs’ title.”

Facts & Findings – in a Nutshell

  • In the suit for recovery of possession, plaintiffs relied on jamabandi (revenue) entries, and sale deeds – a chain of title, to establish their ownership.
  • Revenue records are maintained by officials in regular course of duties. It carries a presumption of correctness under Sec. 35, Evid. Act.
  • While it is true that revenue entries do not by themselves confer title, they are admissible as evidence of possession.
  • And can support a claim of ownership when corroborated by other evidence.

HC decreed the suit holding

  • By taking the plea of adverse possession, the defendants impliedly admitted the title of the plaintiffs.

Dismissing the appeal filed by the defendant, SC held:

  • In a suit for possession plaintiffs must establish their ownership.
  • Here, defendants did not specifically deny plaintiffs’ ownership.
  • Instead, they primarily relied on plea of adverse possession.
  • Under O. VIII r. 5 CPC, facts not denied are deemed to be admitted.
  • By asserting Adv. Possn., the appellants impliedly admitted the plaintiffs’ title.
  • Defendants claim – long possession perfected title – Not sustainable. Instead, claim of hostile title in denial of the title of true owner needed for supporting plea of adverse possession.

Key Takeaways

  • (i) “By asserting adverse possession, the appellants have impliedly admitted the plaintiffs’ title.”
  • (ii) “The appellants claim that due to their long and continuous possession of the suit property since 1879-80, they have perfected their title, is also not sustainable in law.”
  • (iii) “However, it is a fundamental principle that the State cannot claim adverse possession over the property of its own citizens.”

Important Findings

“8. The appellants (defendants) contention that plaintiff failed to prove their title and ownership is completely misplaced for the reasons and analysis made hereunder:

  • 8.1 We find this argument unconvincing for several reasons: In their written statement before the Trial Court, the appellants did not specifically deny the plaintiffs’ ownership of the suit property. Instead, they primarily relied on the plea of adverse possession. Under Order VIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, allegations of fact not denied specifically are deemed to be admitted. By asserting adverse possession, the appellants have impliedly admitted the plaintiffs’ title.
  • 8.2 The plaintiffs relied on jamabandi entries to establish their ownership. The jamabandi for the year 1969-70 (Exhibit P1) records the name of Shri Amin Lal as owner to the extent of half share. Revenue records are public documents maintained by government officials in the regular course of duties and carry a presumption of correctness under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. While it is true that revenue entries do not by themselves confer title, they are admissible as evidence of possession and can support a claim of ownership when corroborated by other evidence.
  • 8.3 The respondents(plaintiffs) have produced copies of registered sale deeds and mutation records before this Court, which were part of the additional documents filed with the counteraffidavit. Plaintiff No. 1, Shri Amin Lal, derived title through a registered sale deed dated 5th July 1960, and mutation No. 8329 was sanctioned on 20th April 1982. Plaintiff No. 2, Shri Ashok Kumar, derived his title through a registered sale deed dated 12th March 1973, and mutation No. 8330 was sanctioned on 20th April 1982. These documents establish a chain of title and cannot be ignored.
  • 8.4 The appellants(defendants) did not dispute the plaintiffs’ title in their pleadings or during the trial. The First Appellate Court’s finding that the plaintiffs are not the true owners is based on conjecture and lacks evidentiary support. The appellants(defendants)  cannot now, at this appellate stage, challenge the plaintiffs’ ownership without having raised a specific denial earlier.
  • 9. The appellants’(defendants) next submission that the burden of proof lay on the plaintiffs to establish their title is equally not borne out from the records. It is a well-settled principle that in a suit for possession based on title, the plaintiffs must establish their ownership. In the present case, the plaintiffs have done so by producing revenue records and, subsequently, the registered sale deeds and mutation entries. Furthermore, as the appellants(defendants) failed to deny the plaintiffs’ title specifically and instead relied on adverse possession, the burden has shifted to the appellants to prove their adverse possession. In the present case, the plaintiffs have sought possession based on their title, which they have established through documentary evidence.
  • 10. The appellants(defendants) claim that due to their long and continuous possession of the suit property since 1879-80, they have perfected their title, is also not sustainable in law. However, it is a fundamental principle that the State cannot claim adverse possession over the property of its own citizens.”

Claimant must have accepted title of the true owner

It is a basic factor in adverse possession- the claimant thereof must have accepted the title of the true owner.

In In Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao v. Galla Jani Kamma Alias Nacharamma, (2008) 15 SCC 150, it was pointed out – if according to the defendant, the plaintiff was not the true owner, his possession would not have been sufficient to term it ‘hostile’ to the plaintiff’s title; and that the defendant had to show, to attract adverse possession, that his possession was also hostile to the title and possession of the true owner.

In Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393, it was pointed out by the Apex Court :

  • The question of adverse possession without admitting the title of the real owner is not tenable.

In Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461, our Apex Court allowed the appeal, negating the claim of adverse possession raised by the defendant, inter alia, for not accepting the title of the plaintiff (true owner), by the defendant. It was observed  as under:

  • “16. In the present case, the defendants have not admitted the vestingof the suit property with the Managing Officer and the factum of its transfer in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants have denied the title not only of the Managing Officer but also of the plaintiff.”

KNOWLEDGE of True Owner sine qua non of ADVERSE POSSESSION

1. For a possession to be ADVERSE”, it must be one obviously arose by Dispossessing true owner, admitting his Title (Knowing him).

It is trite law – after 1963 Limitation Act, under Article 65 – the defendants should have founded its case on “adverse” possession with the pleading –

  • Started with wrongful dispossession,
    • – obviously – knowing True Owner.
  • hostile or notoriousenough
    • with a view to make True Owner aware
  • specifying date of starting
    • – obviously – knowing True Owner
  • admitting ‘real/true’ owner as ‘rightful’ owner,  
    • – obviously – knowing True Owner
  • with some overt act (Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chandar, 1984(2) SCC 286; Government of Kerala v. Joseph –AIR 2023 SC 3988).
    • – obviously – knowing True Owner”

See:

  • RadhesiamLal v. Sandhya – AIR 2024 SC 1595
  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph – AIR 2023 SC 3988
  • Ram NaginaRai v. DeoKumarRai – 2019-13 SCC 324.
  • Karnataka Board of Wakaf v. Govt of India – AIR 2004 SC 2096;
  • T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa – [(2006) 7 SCC 570]; and
  • PT Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma – AIR 2007 SC 1753;
  • Nand Ram v. Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393
  • Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. NirmalChandar 1984(2) SCC 286, P.N. Bhagwati, D.P. Madon
  • T. Lakshmi Reddi v. L. Lakshmi Reddi 1957 SCR 195).

2. If permissive holder, no adverse possession. See:

  • State of Haryana v. AminLal – 19 Nov. 2024 SC
  • NeelamGupta v. Rajendrakumar – 2024 INSC 769
  • Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai – 2019-13 SCC 324
  • Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, 1994-6 SCC 591
  • L.N. Aswathama v. P. Prakash  (2009) 13 SCC 229
  • R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203.

3. Permissive holder is Estopped from raising claim of Adverse Possession

  • Nand Ram v.Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393.

4. Mere possession, however long,  insufficient.  It must be adverse.  There is drastic change after 1963 Limitation Act.

  • Govt. of Kerala v. Joseph – AIR 2023 SC 3988
  • T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa – 2006(7) SCC 570.
  • Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chandar 1984(2) SCC 286.
  • Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India – (2004) 10 SCC 779.

It not sure who the true owner is, there will be no Adverse Possession

Adverse possession is hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner. To attract adverse possession there must be animus possidendi to hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner (Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, 2010-14 SCC 316; M. Venkatesh v. BDA, 2015-17 SCC 1; Brijesh Kumar v. Shardabai, 2019-9 SCC 369) with the knowledge of the true owner. If the defendants are not sure who the true owner is, there will be no question of possessing the property hostile to the true owner.

In T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, 2006-7 SCC 570, it is held as under:.

  • …The High Court has erred in holding that even if the defendants claim adverse possession, they do not have to prove who is the true owner and even if they had believed that the Government was the true owner and not the plaintiffs, the same was inconsequential. Obviously, the requirements of proving adverse possession have not been established. If the defendants are not sure who is the true owner the question of their being in hostile possession and the question of denying title of the true owner do not raise…… Therefore, the defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the property knowing fully well that the property belonged to the plaintiff’s father and the plaintiff’s vendor also did not take any action to evict them and the plaintiff and his vendor were aware that the properties belonged to them and despite the same, the plaintiff’s vendor did not take any action to evict them. Hence, the appellants/defendants have also perfected title by adverse possession. Therefore, the 2nd substantial question of law of is answered in favour of the appellants/defendants.” (Followed in: Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 46.)

No Adverse Possession Without Admitting Title of Real Owner

In Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2020 SC 1884; (2020) 9 SCC 393, it was pointed out by the Apex Court :

  • “The question of adverse possession without admitting the title of the real owner is not tenable.”

Our Apex Court, in Ayodhya case Judgment, M Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1, it is held as under:

  • “747. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other.”

This principle is laid down in the following decisions also:

  • The State of Haryana v. Amin Lal, 2024-4 CurCC(SC) 222,
  • Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao v. Galla Jani Kamma, (2008) 15 SCC 150,
  • Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461.

Claim of Adverse Possession by Tenant

In Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393, the claim of adverse possession by the tenant was negatived by the Apex Court on the following grounds:

  • The respondent-tenant had admitted the ownership of the landlord in earlier proceedings.
  • Such plea operates as estoppel. The subsequent claim of adverse possession of the tenant as owner is not sustainable.
  • The respondent was to prove his continuous, open and hostile possession to the knowledge of true owner for a continuous period of 12 years. The respondent has not led any evidence of hostile possession to the knowledge of true owner.
  • He has also not surrendered possession before asserting hostile, continuous and open title to the knowledge of the true owner. (In terms of Sec. 108(q) of the TP Act possession of tenant remains permissive till it has been actually restored to the landlord.)

In Bishwanath Agarwala v. Sabitri Bera -2009(15) SCC 693 (Deepak Varma & SB Sinha, JJ) it is held as under:

  • “The landlord in a given case though may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the event, he proves his general title, may obtain a decree on the basis thereof.”

The Apex Court referred to Champalal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra, 1990 (1) DJLR 298, where SB Sihna, J. himself held:

  • “It is also well settled that one such relationship is admitted or established tenant would be estopped and precluded from challenging the title of the landlord; and if he does so, under the general rulemake himself liable for eviction on that ground”.

Plea of Title or permissive Possession  And Adverse Possession Are Mutually Contradictory.

Adverse possession can be raised only against the property owned by another person. In Abdul Hameed Rawther v. Basheer, ILR 2024-2 Ker 527; 2024-3 KLT 812, it is held as under:

  • “25. The law is well settled that the plea of adverse possession can be raised only against the property owned by another person against whom he asserts possession adverse to the title of the other (Raghavan v. Devayani [2024 (2) KHC 417] and Shri Uttam Chand (D) through LRs. v. Nathu Ram (D) through LRs. and Others [2020 KHC 6034]).”

In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988, it is held as under: 

  • “21.9 Claim of independent title and adverse possession at the same time amount to contradictory pleas. The case of Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant, (1995) 2 SCC 543 elaborated this principle as:
  • “15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another’s title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other’s title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all.”
  • This principle was upheld in the case of Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (AIR 1996 SC 910, 1996 1 SCC 639 –two Judge Bench) –
  • “4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, necprecario. Since the appellant’s claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.”
  • The Court in Uttam Chand (Sri Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram AIR 2020 SC 461) has reiterated this principle of adverse possession.”

(Note: Mutually destructive plea is impermissible: (2006) 12  SCC 233, AIR 2009 SC 2355).


End Notes – 1

The same matter (adv. possn. is founded on acceptance of ownership of opposite side) has been examined in M Siddiq (D) through LRs v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020) 1 SCC 1 (Constitution Bench – Ayodhya Case).

  • It has been held – a plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance of ownership of the property with the other side.

The Court held as under:

  • “747. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed.
  • Evidently, therefore, the plaintiffs in Suit 4 ought to be cognisant of the fact that any claim of adverse possession against the Hindus or the temple would amount to an acceptance of a title in the latter.
  • Dr Dhavan has submitted that this plea is a subsidiary or alternate plea upon which it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to stand in the event that their main plea on title is held to be established on evidence. It becomes then necessary to assess as to whether the claim of adverse possession has been established.
  • 748. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous – possession which meets the requirement of being ‘nec vi nec claim and nec precario’. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence, it is well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case. Reading paragraph 11(a), it becomes evident that beyond stating that the Muslims have been in long exclusive and continuous possession beginning from the time when the Mosque was built and until it was desecrated, no factual basis has been furnished. This is not merely a matter of details or evidence. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner and the law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence.”

It is Quoted in:

  • Neelam Gupta v Rajendra Kumar Gupta, AIR 2024 SC 5374
  • M.  Radheshyamlal v. V Sandhya, 2024 AIR SC 1595
  • Sri Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461.

End Notes – 2

Easement: Dominant Owner  Cannot Dispute The Title Of The Servient Owner

  • Note: Prescriptive easement is also created by adverse user, by the hostile use (Kantaben Parsottamdas v. Ganshyambhai Ramkrishan Purohit, AIR 2022  Guj  146).

It is trite law that the dominant owner  cannot dispute the title of the servient owner (Reghuprasad v. M.  Raghunathan, AIR 2020 Ker 16). 

In Omana v. Reji Kurian, AIR 2022 Ker 91, it is held (K. Babu, J.) as under:

  • “19. Yet another aspect that requires consideration is that the pleadings of the defendants in the written statement go in the line, denying the title of the plaintiff over the ‘B’ schedule way. One of the fundamental ingredients in a claim of easement is the admission of the title of the servient owner by the dominant owner. On this ground alone, the claim of the defendants over plaint ‘B’ schedule property by way of easement by prescription must fail.”

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Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd., Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 73 – A Land Mark Decision on Order II rule 2, CPC

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Abstract

  • The Supreme Court found in this case: to attract Order II Rule 2 CPC –
    • the omission in the fist suit must have been “deliberate
    • the relief in the second suit must have been “available” at the time of first suit.
    • cause of action in both suits must have been the identical in substance and not merely technically.
    • evidence required to support the claims must have been the same.
  • Brief Facts: The sale deed executed between the parties could not have been registered owing to the ‘ban’ under a GO. The purchaser filed a suit for injunction to restrain the ‘previous’ owner. Subsequently the GO was quashed by the HC. The second suit for Sp. Performance was resisted by the ‘previous’ owner saying – ‘no injunction against owner’. Trial Court rejected the plaint allowing the Order II Rule 2 CPC petition. First Appellate Court confirmed the Order. But the HC reversed. The SC dismissed the appeal.

Agreement for Sale between plaintiff and defendant

The original plaintiff entered into an agreement for sale of suit property with original defendant no. 1 (owner). The plaintiff (purchaser) was put in possession of the property.

The purchaser visited the office of the Sub Registrar on multiple occasions for the purpose of registering the sale deed executed between the parties. However, the registration was refused pointing out general ban against registration under a G.O. The Writ Petition was filed challenging the decision of the revenue authorities.

Plaintiff (purchaser) filed Suit for injunction

The defendant (owner) started to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff (purchaser). Hence he filed the “first suit” before the Principal District Judge for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant (owner) from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property.

The defendant (owner) in its written statement stated that he was in possession of the suit property, at the time of both the sale agreement and the sale deed. And, that the plaintiff (purchaser) cannot seek an injunction against the appellant, as he was the actual owner in possession of the suit property and that the injunction suit was still pending before the concerned court.

Plaintiff (purchaser) filed the second OS for Specific Performance

Subsequently, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court quashed the G.O. The High Court directed the revenue authorities to receive and register all the documents.

In this situation the plaintiff (purchaser) filed the second Original Suit praying (inter alia) that the defendant (owner) “be directed to specifically perform the terms and conditions of the agreement for sale”.

Argument of Appellant defendant (owner)

In Vurimi Pullarao v. Vemari Venkata Radharani, (2020) 14 SCC 110, it was held that (in the light of earlier injunction suit) the second suit for specific performance was barred under Order II Rule 2.

HC found – no “deliberate omission” in suing for Sp. Performance, earlier

The defendant (owner), contending that the second suit is hit by the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC, moved an I.A. under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC, for the rejection of plaint. It was allowed by the Trial Court. The First Appellate Court confirmed the order. But the High Court allowed the second appeal ex-parte and restored the plaint finding that the second suit was not hit by the bar under Order II Rule 2. It observed that there was no “deliberate omission on the part of the plaintiff to make a claim in the earlier suit”.  The High Court held:

  • “Further, in a case of this nature wherein the possession of the suit property is said to have been handed over to the agreement holder, it is not an unusual situation of sudden interference by the land owner warranting the agreement holder to file a suit for bare injunction. Therefore, if any such situation arises, the agreement holder cannot be precluded from claiming or seeking an immediate and emergent relief first in order to prevent further damage or abuse. Therefore, filing of such suit for bare injunction also by reserving the right to file a comprehensive suit later cannot be construed or considered as the one arising out of same cause of action in order to bring it under the hammer of Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C.”

Hence the defendant (owner) filed this Appeal before the Supreme Court.

Findings of the SC, on Order II Rule 2 CPC, in a Nutshell

Appeal is dismissed by the Supreme Court (in Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd., Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 73, J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, JJ.) on the following main observations.

  • i. Order II Rule 2 contemplate – where a plaintiff omits or relinquishes
    • a part of a claim which he is entitled to make and,
    • secondly, one out of the several reliefs that he could have claimed in the suit.
  • ii. The mandate of Order II Rule 2 is the inclusion of the whole claim arising in respect of one and the same cause of action, in one suit; it is not different causes of action arising from the same transaction.
  • iii. Several definitions have been given to the phrase “cause of action” and it can safely be said to mean – “every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court”. Such a cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence that may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief which is prayed for by the plaintiff but refers to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.
  •  iv. The applicability of Order II Rule 2 is depended upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
  • v. Additionally, if the evidence required to support the claims is different, then the causes of action can also be considered to be different.
  • vi. The plaintiff must have been entitled to more than one relief in respect of that cause of action.
  • vii. The plaintiff, without any leave of the Court, omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed.
  • vi. The  plaintiff must have deliberately relinquished the relief.
  • vii. Since the plea is a technical bar, it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on the basis of inferential reasoning.

The Supreme Court Court held in para 44 as under:

  • “44. Therefore, the phrase “cause of action” for the purposes of Order II Rule 2 would mean the cause of action which gives an occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. If that cause enables a person to ask for a larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his claim, he cannot be permitted to recover the balance reliefs through independent proceedings afterwards, especially when the leave of the court has not been obtained.”

Authorities relied on by the Apex Court While Discussing General Principles on Order II Rule 2  

1. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary: Words and Phrases (4th Edn.): “cause of action” – existence of those facts which give a party the right to judicial interference on his behalf. It is the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain a judgment.

2. Black’s Law Dictionary – Cause of action is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person.

3. Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.): ‘Cause of action’ -simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person. It includes every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. “’Cause of action’ has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action.”

4. Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian, AIR 1949 PC 78

  • “Cause of action” is facts for the Plaintiff to prove to get a judgment
  • It depends on the particular facts of each case.
  • It is the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.
  • The test is whether the foundation of the cause of action is distinct from that of the former suit.
  • The evidence to support the claims determines whether the cause of action is different or not.
  • The causes of action is same if they are identical in substance and not merely technically identical.
  • Cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation of the former suit.
  • The cause of action has no relation to the defence that may be set up by the defendant. It is not depended on the character of the relief prayed for by the Plaintiff, also.

5. In Brunsden v. Humphrey (14 Q.B.D. 141)

  • The principal consideration is whether the same cause of action in both suits.
  • One of the tests that is applied is whether the same evidence will maintain both suits.
  • If the evidence required to support the claims is different, then the causes of action are also different.
  • The application of the rule depends, not upon any technical consideration of the identity of forms of action, but upon matter of substance.
  • The cause of action arising from damage to the plaintiff’s cab is in substance identical with that which accrues in consequence of the damage caused to his person.

6. Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanund [12 Beng. [(1873) 12 Beng L.R. 304, 315]

  • Cause of action is to be construed with reference rather to the substance than to the form of action.

7. Krishna Behari Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdranne [(1875) LR 2.I.A. 283, 285.

  • Cause of action cannot be taken in its literal and most restricted sense.

8.  Pittapur v. Sri Rajah Venkata Mahipati Surya [(1885) L.R. 12.I.A. 116]

  • The plaintiff sued to recover immovable property he being improperly turned out of possession; and afterwards sued to recover from the same defendant, in consequence of its wrongful detention. It was held that the causes of action in the two suits were distinct.

9. Muhammad Hafiz v. Muhammad Zakariya [(1921) L.R. 49.I.A. 9, 15]:

  • If the cause enables a man to ask for larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the balance by independent proceedings.

10. Brunsden v. Humphrey (14 Q.B.D. 141)

  • The cause of action which gave occasion for and formed the foundation for the first suit in that case was different from the cause of action which gave occasion for and formed the foundation for the second suit.

11. Gurbux Singh v. Bhoorala, AIR 1964 SC 1810 (Constitutional Bench)

  • The plaint in the former suit would have to be produced in the subsequent suit.
  • The “cause of action” would be the facts which the plaintiff had then alleged to support the right to the relief that he claimed.
  • The defendant who seeks to take recourse to a successful plea under Order II Rule 2(3) must make out the following:
  • .(a) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based;
  • (b) that in respect of that cause of action, the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; and
  • (c) that being thus entitled to more than one relief, the plaintiff, without any leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed.

The Court had observed further as under:

  • “6. In order that a plea of a Bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out;
  • .(i) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based;
  • (2) that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief;
  • (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed.
  • From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the latter suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily be traceable to a particular cause of action but this might, by no means, be the universal rule.
  • As the plea is a technical bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason that we consider that a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits. It is common ground that the pleadings in CS 28 of 1950 were not filed by the appellant in the present suit as evidence in support of his plea under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • The learned trial Judge, however, without these pleadings being on the record inferred what the cause of action should have been from the reference to the previous suit contained in the plaint as a matter of deduction. At the stage of the appeal the learned District Judge noticed this lacuna in the appellant’s case and pointed out, in our opinion, rightly that without the plaint in the previous suit being on the record, a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code was not maintainable.”

12. S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore, (2007) 11 SCC 75

  • It is necessary to mark the earlier plaint in evidence and then make out that there was a relinquishment of a relief by the plaintiff, without the leave of the Court.

13. Virgo Industries (Eng.) Private Limited v. Venturetech Solutions Private Limited, (2013) 1 SCC 625

 The bar under Order II Rule 2 would apply to the subsequent suits filed for specific performance   when the plaintiff itself had claimed in the first set of suits for injunction that the defendant had no intention to honour the agreement to sell.

14. Inbasagaran v. S. Natarajan reported in (2015) 11 SCC 12

  • The respondent was allotted the suit property as a house site by the Housing Board through a lease-cum-sale agreement, however, on a condition that a sale deed would be executed in favour of the respondent only when he constructs a building in the suit property. In the meantime, the respondent had entered into an agreement for sale with the appellant and obtained a part of the sale consideration as well.
  • It was agreed that the appellant shall prepare a plan for construction of the building in the suit property, the respondent would get it approved and thereafter, the appellant would undertake the construction at his own cost. The appellant took possession of the suit property and completed the construction. Thereafter, the Housing Board on 18.02.1985 had executed the sale deed in favour of the respondent. The appellant alleged that the respondent attempted to forcefully take possession of the building constructed on the suit property and was therefore, constrained to file a suit for permanent injunction on 11.09.1985. In response to this, the respondent also filed a similar suit for permanent injunction to restrain the appellant from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit property.
  • It was in this suit for injunction that the respondent disclosed to the appellant that the execution of the sale deed in his favour by the Housing Board was complete. After the said factum of transfer was brought to the notice of the appellant, he had sent a legal notice to the respondent and on 25.04.1986, he filed another suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell. In short, since the plaintiff-appellant only came to know of the sale deed executed by the Housing Board in favour of the respondent after the institution of the first suit, the cause of action was held to be different and distinct in both the suits.

14. Rathnavati v. Kavita Ganashamdas, (2015) 5 SCC 223

The Court refused to accept the submission that the second suit for specific performance was barred by the principles underlying Order II Rule 2. Here, an agreement for sale was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant no. 2 for the sale of the suit house and part payment was also made by the plaintiff. Later, the plaintiff had filed the first suit against the defendants for seeking permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession over the suit house since the defendant no. 1 who is a total stranger to the suit house, along with defendant no. 2 who was the vendor.

15. Vurimi Pullarao v. Vemari Venkata Radharani, (2020) 14 SCC 110

It is held as under:

  • “The cause of action for the suit for specific performance had arisen when the plaintiff had notice of the denial by the defendant to perform the contract. On 30-10- 1996 when the suit for injunction was instituted, the plaintiff was entitled to sue for specific performance. There was a complete identity of the cause of action between the earlier suit (of which para 2 of the plaint has been reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment) and the cause of action for the subsequent suit. Yet, as the record indicates, the plaintiff omitted to sue for specific performance. This is a relief for which the plaintiff was entitled to sue when the earlier suit for injunction was instituted. Having omitted the claim for relief without the leave of the Court, the bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3) would stand attracted.”

16. Ramjilal v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, AIR 1964 Raj 114

The Rajasthan High Court had opined that Order II Rule 2 does not require that a person must seek all the remedies to which he may be entitled to even though it would be impossible for him to obtain the remedy from the opposite party. That is, the relief in the second suit became “available” on the happening of a subsequent event; post the institution of the first suit. Hence, the bar under Order II Rule 2 would not stand in the way of the plaintiff for claiming those reliefs.

17. National Security Assurance Company Ltd. v. S.N. Jaggi, AIR 1971 All 421

The Allahabad High Court  held that a subsequent suit in respect of a claim which was barred at the time of the earlier suit but revived later on by an enactment would not be hit by the provisions of Order II Rule 2. Here also the relief became “available”, post the institution of the first suit.

The Supreme Court summarised the General Principles under Order II Rule 2 CPC as under:

  • i. The object of Order II Rule 2 is to prevent the multiplicity of suits and the provision is founded on the principle that a person shall not be vexed twice for one and the same cause.
  • ii. The mandate of Order II Rule 2 is the inclusion of the whole claim arising in respect of one and the same cause of action, in one suit. It must not be misunderstood to mean that all the different causes of action arising from the same transaction must be included in a single suit.
  • iii. Several definitions have been given to the phrase “cause of action” and it can safely be said to mean – “every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court”. Such a cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence that may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief which is prayed for by the plaintiff but refers to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.
  • iv. Similarly, several tests have been laid out to determine the applicability of Order II Rule 2 to a suit. While it is acknowledged that the same heavily depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case, it can be said that a correct and reliable test is to determine whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation of the former suit. Additionally, if the evidence required to support the claims is different, then the causes of action can also be considered to be different. Furthermore, it is necessary for the causes of action in the two suits to be identical in substance and not merely technically identical.
  • v. The defendant who takes shelter under the bar imposed by Order II Rule 2(3) must establish that
  • (a) the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based;
  • (b) in respect of that cause of action, the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; and
  • (c) being thus entitled to more than one relief, the plaintiff, without any leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed.
  • vi. The defendant must also have produced the earlier plaint in evidence in order to establish that there is an identity in the causes of action between both the suits and that there was a deliberate relinquishment of a larger relief on the part of the plaintiff.
  • vii. Since the plea is a technical bar, it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on the basis of inferential reasoning.

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‘Suppression of Facts’: Not a Weapon of Technicality; No Suppression, if the Facts are ‘Known to Each Other’.

Jojy George Koduvath.

Abstract

The intent and purport of the ‘Doctrine of Suppression of Facts’, articulated by our Apex Court (through various decisions), can be foreshowed as under:

  • It is not to arm one party with a weapon of technicality over its adversary. It is to serve as a crucial safeguard against the abuse of the judicial process. It is to ensure that a party approaches Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation.
  • It must be a material suppression; that is, it must have a crucial role to play in determination of the lis, or the merits of the case.
  • The suppression could only be where a fact is known to the particular person; and it was intentionally/deliberately withheld by him, to cause injury or prejudice to another.
  • And, there will be no “suppression” if the facts are “known” to the opposite side. But, in proper cases ‘suppressio veri’ and ‘suggestio falsi’ itself may bring adverse results.

Part I

Doctrines on Suppression of Facts – Only a Safeguard

This principle is not designed to provide one party with an advantage based on technicalities over its opponent.

In Government of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP, 2024-7 SCC 370, relying on S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd v. State of Bihar and others, (2004) 7 SCC 166 and Arunima Baruah v. Union of India and others, (2007) 6 SCC 120, it is held as under:

  • “30. Law is well settled that the fact suppressed must be material in the sense that it would have an effect on the merits of the case. The concept of suppression or non-disclosure of facts transcends mere concealment; it necessitates the deliberate withholding of material facts — those of such critical import that their absence would render any decision unjust. Material facts, in this context, refer to those facts that possess the potential to significantly influence the decision-making process or alter its trajectory. This principle is not intended to arm one party with a weapon of technicality over its adversary but rather serves as a crucial safeguard against the abuse of the judicial process.”

CONCEALMENT – There must be a Direct Attempt to Hide

In T. Ashok Pai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore, 2007-7 SCC 162, (S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju, JJ.) while dealing with ‘concealment’ of income as provided in Section 271 of the Income Tax Act, 1961,  it is pointed out that ‘Concealment refers to deliberate act on the part of the assessee. A mere omission or negligence would not constitute a deliberate act of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi’. The Court said further as under:

  • “14. In Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint Commissioner of Income-Tax, Mumbai delivered today, this Court (2007-6 SCC 329, S.B. Sinha & P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.) observed:
  • “The expression “conceal” is of great importance. According to Law Lexicon, the word “conceal” means: “to hide or keep secret. The word “conceal” is con plus celare which implies to hide. It means to hide or withdraw from observation; to cover or keep from sight; to prevent the discovery of; to withhold knowledge of. The offence of concealment is, thus, a direct attempt to hide an item of income or a portion thereof from the knowledge of the income tax authorities.”

Suppression of Material Facts – Disqualifies litigants from obtaining any Relief

In SJS Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 2421, it is pointed out – as a general rule, suppression of material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief.

Suppression of Material Facts – Evolved to deter Abusing the Process of court

In the recent decision, The Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey (17th March, 2025; Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 348), it is held that this rule has been evolved out of the need of the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it; and pointed out that similar view has been taken in General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Jai Bhagwan, (2008) 4 SCC 127,  in Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India, (2007) 8 SCC 449.

Suppression of Material Facts – Writ Court may Refuse to Entertain Petition

In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India, 2007- 8 SCC 449 (C.K. Thakker, Altamas Kabir, JJ.), it was held as under:

  • “The High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter.”(Quoted in G. M. Haryana Roadways v. Jai Bhagwan, S.B. Sinha & V.S. Sirpurkar, JJ., 2008-4 SCC 127)

SUPPRESSION Must be one that is Material for Determination of the Lis

In Arunima Baruah v. Union of India and others, (2007) 6 SCC 120 (S.B. Sinha and Markandey Katju, JJ.), it was held that it was obligatory on the part of the appellant to disclose the fact that the writ petition was filed only when no order of interim injunction was passed in a civil suit. It was held thus:

  • “12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.” (Referred to in Sardar Associates v. Punjab & Sind Bank, S.B. Sinha  & Deepak Verma, AIR 2010 SC 218; 2009-8 SCC 257; G. M. Haryana Roadways v. Jai Bhagwan, S.B. Sinha & V.S. Sirpurkar, JJ., 2008-4 SCC 127)

In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India, (2007) 8 SCC 449, the Apex Court held as under:

  • “The High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter.” (Quoted in:  G. M. Haryana Roadways v. Jai Bhagwan, S.B. Sinha & V.S. Sirpurkar, JJ., 2008-4 SCC 127)

SUPPRESSION – Material One That Affects Merits of the case.

In S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd v. State of Bihar, (2004) 7 SCC 166, it is held that a fact suppressed must be material; that is, if it had not been suppressed, that would have influenced the merits of the case. It was held thus:

  • “13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken ……
  • 14. Assuming that the explanation given by the appellant that the suit had been filed by one of the Directors of the Company without the knowledge of the Director who almost simultaneously approached the High Court under Article 226 is unbelievable (sic), the question still remains whether the filing of the suit can be said to be a fact material to the disposal of the writ petition on merits. We think not…… the fact that a suit had already been filed by the appellant was not such a fact the suppression of which could have affected the final disposal of the writ petition on merits.” (Referred to in:  Mayar (H. K. ) LTD.  v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M. V. Fortune Express, AIR 2006 SC 1828; 2006 3 SCC 100)

CONCEALMENT – Implicit a Deliberate Act to Injure or Prejudice Another

In K. C. Builders v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 2004-2 SCC 731, our Apex Court considered the what is ‘concealment’, while dealing with Section 271 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which lays down the effect of ‘failure to furnish returns, comply with notices, concealment of income, etc.’ The supreme Court said as under:

  • “15. One of the amendments made to the abovementioned provisions is the omission of the word “deliberately” from the expression “deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income”. It is implicit in the word “concealed” that there has been a deliberate act on the part of the assessee. The meaning of the word “concealment” as found in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Volume I, is as follows:-
  • “In law, the intentional suppression of truth or fact known, to the injury or prejudice of another.”
  • The word “concealment” inherently carried with it the element of mens rea. Therefore, the mere fact that some figure or some particulars have been disclosed by itself, even if takes out the case from the purview of non-disclosure, it cannot by itself take out the case from the purview of furnishing inaccurate particulars.”
  • Quoted in: T. Ashok Pai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore, 2007-7 SCC 162
  • Hemant Mahipatray Shah v.  Anand Upadhyay, 2024 0 BHC(AS) 32589
  • Commissioner, Sales Tax, U. P., Lucknow v.  Bhawani Paper Mills Ltd. 2006-2 ADJ 204
  • Northland Development and Hotel Corp. v. Commr. of Income-tax, 2006-285 ITR 265;
  • Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Someshwar Saran Kothiwal, 2006 205 CTR 448
  • Bharat Rice Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2006 200 CTR 481; 2005 278 ITR 599)

Merely for some figures  were not disclosed, by itself, not Concealment

In Shri T. Ashok Pai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore, 2007-7 SCC 162,it is observed as under:

  • “It is implicit in the word ‘concealed’ that there has been a deliberate act on the part of the assessee. The meaning of the word ‘concealment’ as found in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, third edition, Volume I, is as follows: ‘In law, the intentional suppression of truth or fact known, to the injury or prejudice of another.’ The word ‘concealment’ inherently carried with it the element of mens rea. Therefore, the mere fact that some figure or some particulars have been disclosed by itself, even if it takes out the case from the purview of non-disclosure, it cannot by itself, even if it takes out the case from the purview of non-disclosure, it cannot by itself take out the case from the purview of non-disclosure, it cannot by itself take out the case from the purview of furnishing inaccurate particulars. Mere omission from the return of an item of receipt does neither amount to concealment nor deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income unless and until there is some evidence to show or some circumstances found from which it can be gathered that the omission was attributable to an intention or desire on the part of the assessee to hide or conceal the income so as to avoid the imposition of tax thereon. In order that a penalty under Section 271 (1) (iii) may be imposed, it has to be proved that the assessee has consciously made the concealment or furnished inaccurate particulars of his income.”

When a fact is not known to the concerned person, No Suppression

In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Manju Sharma, 2003-2 CLT 700; 2003-2 CPC 91; 2003-1 CPJ 620; 2003-2 CPR 175, it is held as under:

  • “The insured did not know about the disease and he cannot be said to have suppressed the material fact. The suppression could only be where a fact is known to a particular person. When a fact is not known to that person how could he be said that the fact has been suppressed.”

Recently, in Bhushan Sadashiv Raut v. Priyanka Ravindra Ghatage, 27 January, 2025, our Apex Court expunged certain adverse comments of the High Court against an advocate saying as under:

  • “We find that the High Court was not justified in making the observations against the appellant herein, inasmuch as the order of the Family court was very much on record. As such, there could be no question of suppression of facts. We, therefore, expunge the observations made in paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment and order dated 05.09.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court.”

Part II

No “Suppression” if the facts are “Known” to the Court or Opposite Side

In a taxation matter, in Pushpam Pharmaceutical Co. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, 1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 462, it is held as under:

  •  “Where facts are known to both the parties the omission by one to do what he might have done and not that he must have done, does not render it suppression.”
  • Quoted in: Anand Nishikawa Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, AIR 2005 SC 3660, 2005-7 SCC 749.
  • Uniworth Textiles Ltd.  v. Commissioner Of Central Excise, Raipur, 2013-9 SCC 753.

In Nizam Sugar Factory v. CCE, A.P. 2008 (9) STR 314 (SC). Supreme Court held as under:

  • “9. Allegation of suppression of facts against the appellant cannot be sustained. When the first SCN was issued all the relevant facts were in the knowledge of the authorities. Later on, while issuing the second and third show cause notices the same/similar facts could not be taken as suppression of facts on the part of the assessee as these facts were already in the knowledge of the authorities. We agree with the view taken in the aforesaid judgments and respectfully following the same hold that there was no suppression of facts on the part of the assessee/appellant.”

In Prakash Singh Thakur v. Bharti, AIR 2001 MP 1; 2000 2 DMC 368, it is held as under:

  • “19. Moreover, it may be noted that the parties were known to each other from much prior to their marriage. In the circumstances, it is inconceivable that the appellant would not have come to know about the earlier marriage or divorce of the respondent and would have come to know of the said fact on the next day, immediately after their marriage on 4.5.94. As noticed earlier, the statement of appellant is not only unsubstantiated, but appears to be unnatural and untrustworthy.”

In State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad, AIR 2017 SC 630; 2017 2 SCC 178, it is held as under:     

  • Statement of Principal Additional Advocate General that the State had no objection for the consideration of the bail application by the said Court has been recorded in the beginning of the order itself and, therefore, question of suppression thereof does not arise. This fact was known to this Court when the SLP was entertained and notice was issued. Therefore, the question of misleading the Court on this count does not arise.”

In Virinder Nayar v. Jatinder Singh, 19 Sep 2023, 2023 Supreme (P&H) 351, it is held as under:

  • “10. In terms of the above discussion, in the present set of facts wherein the petitioner himself was party-tenant to the previous litigation qua the same premises, having complete knowledge of its outcome, the non-disclosure thereof merely in the eviction petition though the same having been acknowledged in their rejoinder by the respondents as well as in her cross-examination by respondent No.2 (PW-5) can’t be taken to be an act of concealment or suppression of material fact, the same being not an information exclusively known to respondents. Besides it, nothing has been pointed out from the side of petitioner about any prejudice having been caused to him on account of non-disclosure of filing or dismissal of previous ejectment petition. ….. Thus the non-disclosure of the previous eviction petition was rightly not considered to be a material concealment by the Authorities below as the outcome of the previous eviction petition in no manner affected or impacted the rights of the parties in the present eviction petition, the same being based on entirely a fresh and new cause of action with material change in circumstances.

In P. S. Agarwal v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 2003 3 CPJ 579, it is observed that there would be  no suppression of material facts, if every fact was known to the Insurance.

In National Insurance Co. Ltd.  v. Kusum Devi Mishra, 1998 1 MPLJ 676, 1999(2) ACJ 1213, it is held as under:

  • “In view of the above, the contention that the insurer is not liable to pay compensation and the policy is void due to suppression of material fact, has no merit. Even otherwise, there was no suppression of material fact. The agent of the Insurance Company knew full well that the owner is a minor. He accepted the premium and the policy of insurance covering third party risks was issued in the name of the minor by the appellant. The said policy was never repudiated or cancelled.” (Referred to in: Gaurav Sharma v. National Insurance Company Limited, 2018-5 LawHerald 4064; 2018-3 PLR 106)

Suppressio Veri and Suggestio Falsi – Gravity Differs in “Material”or “Trivial Matter”

Though it is definite – no “suppression” if the facts are

  • (i) Not Material and
  • (ii) “Known” to the opposite side.

But, in proper cases ‘suppressio veri’ and ‘suggestio falsi’ itself may bring adverse results. Still, gravity of it is depended upon the nature of suppression – whether it is on a “material” matter or on a “technical or trivial” matter.In Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471, (in a case of information given to the employer by a candidate) it is held as under:

  • “34. No doubt about it that verification of character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to assess suitability and it is open to employer to adjudge antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action should be based upon objective criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects.
  • 35. Suppression of “material” information presupposes that what is suppressed that “matters” not every technical or trivial matter. The employer has to act on due consideration of rules/instructions, if any, in exercise of powers in order to cancel candidature or for terminating the services of employee. Though a person who has suppressed the material information cannot claim unfettered right for appointment or continuity in service but he has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily and exercise of power has to be in reasonable manner with objectivity having due regard to facts of cases.
  • 36. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon the nature of post, higher post would involve more rigorous criteria for all services, not only to uniformed service. For lower posts which are not sensitive, nature of duties, impact of suppression on suitability has to be considered by authorities concerned considering post/nature of duties/services and power has to be exercised on due consideration of various aspects.
  • 38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise our conclusion thus:
  • 38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information.
  • 38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information.
  • 38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision.
  • 38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted:
  • 38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse.
  • 38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee.
  • 38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.
  • 38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.
  • 38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case.
  • 38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper.
  • 38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.
  • 38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form.
  • 38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for.
  • 38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.”

Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471, is referred to in:

  • Union of India v. Shishu Pal, AIR 2024  SC 3652
  • Ravindra Kumar v. State of U. P., 2024 5 SCC 264
  • State of West Bengal v. Mitul Kumar Jana, 2023-14 SCC 719
  • Ex-Const/Dvr Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union Of India, AIR 2023 SC 482
  • Satish Chandra Yadav v. Union Of India, 2023-7 SCC 536
  • Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, 2022 AIR SC 2829; 2023-12 SCC 317
  • State of Madhya Pradesh v. Abhijit Singh Pawar, 2018-18 SCC 733

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

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Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

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Contract Act

Law on Damages

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Negotiable Instruments Act

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Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Plantation-Exemption Does Not Confer Ownership over the Land

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • In the event – plantation activities cease or are discontinued, that land would also be treated as ‘excess land’.
  • Hence, it is indisputably explicit – NO VESTED RIGHT or OWNERSHIP is conferred on LAND by the ‘plantation-exemption’.
  • It is beyond doubt – the legislature never intended (where a large extent of land had been forcibly got surrendered from other land owners), to bring an inequitable and discriminatory disparity, while ‘plantation-exemption’ was conferred under Sec. 81 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

Part I.

CAN AN AN EXEMPTED PLANTATION LAND BE SOLD AS AN ABSOLUTE PRIVATE PROPERTY?

No.

  • Sec. 82 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act deals with ceiling area.
  • Sec. 83 mandates that no person shall be entitled to own or hold lands in excess of the ceiling area.
    • Sec. 83 reads – “83. No person to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. With effect from such dates as may be notified by the Government in the Gazette, no person shall be entitled to own or hold or to possess under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area.”
  • Sec. 85 directs that excess land shall be surrendered to Government (accepting the compensation fixed under Sec. 88).
  • Though Sec. 81 (generally?) exempts plantations from the provisions of Chapter III, Sec. 87 directs that the protection of plantation is available only so long as the plantation subsists.
  • Therefore, if the plantation activities cease or are discontinued, such land shall likewise be regarded in the same manner – as excess land.
  • Consequently, it is unequivocally clear that NO VESTED RIGHT or OWNERSHIP would be conferred on LAND by virtue of the ‘plantation-exemption’.
  • It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights to plantation-tenants (majority are BIG Companies) which had not been given to Maharaja of Travancore (whose 191 acres of lands in Thiruvananthapuram – above the ceiling limit, 15 acres – in the City was ‘mercilessly’ taken under the Orders of the Land Board Trivandrum, No. LB(B)2-18919/70, dated 15.01.1972) so also lands of thousands of middleclass property owners.

Part II.

ACQUISITION OF PLANTATION-LANDS OWNED BY PRIVATE PERSONS

1. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India

It is plain – No compensation is payable to the land-owners, for the lands ‘above the ceiling limit’, according to the Constitution of India. If any authority gives it, it will be a sheer unscrupulous act. Because:

  • The provisions of the KLR Act, as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc., are legislated predicating upon the Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India which states that the State need not pay compensation to the lands above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
  • Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India reads as under:
  • “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”

Also Read: Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy’; TLB to Fix Plantation Exemption.  

2. Exemption of ‘Plantation’ Does Not Cover Exemption of ‘Plantation LAND’

It is for the following reasons –

  • 1. The exemption is to the ‘plantation’, and not to the ‘LAND‘.
  • 2. Exemption is conditional – for it exists (only) as long as the plantation exists or continues;
  • Because,
    • (a) Section 2(44) defines ‘plantation’ as land used principally for the cultivation of a specific ‘plantation crop‘ like tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber etc.
    • (b) Section 87, Explanation II states that if a plantation for which exemption is given on recognition of a specific ‘plantation-crop’ is converted into any other ‘plantation-crop’ or the plantation activity is not continued, the exemption may be lost; and the land will be taken for considering the ceiling limit.
    • Section 81(4) allows the person holding a plantation to use land “not exceeding 5% of the extent of such holding for floriculture, medicinal plants, for conducting dairy farms, for establishing hotels or resorts or other tourism projects etc.

Effect of Conversion or Sale of a Portion of Exempted Land

Section 87 reads as under:

  • “S.87. Excess land obtained by gift, etc. to be surrendered – (1) Where any person acquires any land dafter the date notified under Section 83 by gift, purchase, mortgage with possession, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, such excess shall be surrendered to such authority as may be prescribed.
  •        Explanation 1 – Where any land is exempted by or under Section 81 and such exemption is in force on the date notified under Section 83, such land shall, with effect from the date on which it ceases to be exempted, be deemed to be land acquired after the date notified under Section 83.
  •        Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.

Explanation II is explained by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Mathew K. Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913, as under:

  • “The consequence is that the benefit of the exemption would be lost and the extent added to the account of the assesse or the declarant in determination of his ceiling area.”

That is, if a person converts any portion of his exempted land to any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit; and the Taluk Land Board can proceed upon that (excess) land. In short, the exemption will be lost for that portion and that land would also be treated as excess land.

Fragmentation has to be Treated as Conversion for Non-exempted Category

The decision in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985, arose from the Writ Petition filed for a declaration that the fragmentation and sale of a Rubber Plantation for non-plantation purposes was illegal as it defeated the purpose of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. When the matter was placed before the Taluk Land Board under Sec 87, KLR Act, it found that there was no change in classification of the land and therefore dropped the proceedings. The High Court held as under:

  • “34. Section 81 of the KLR Act is in pith and substance a special provision, with its main objective of giving exemption to certain lands including the lands maintained as plantations is to prevent fragmentation of the land and to keep it as plantation itself to improve the economy of the state for welfare of people as a whole while the Act creates a regime, the State is under an obligation to safeguard, the intended purpose of the provisions of the Act in its spirit. ….. …… It could be gathered from the records that the proposal to transfer 1.03 acres of land to each workers in discharge of their service or retrenchment benefits will definitely divide the plantation into separate slots and that would definitely change the character/nature of the plantation, which could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act.”
  • “37. …. Fragmentation of the estate and transfer of it has to be treated as a case of conversion of plantation into some other category of land. Such being the scenario, fragmentation amounts to serious violation of the provisions of KLR Act. Hence, we are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No.18 that the fragmented plots will be maintained as plantation by the transferees, so as to extend/avail the benefit of HMT’s case (supra). Taking into account of all the relevant aspects, we have no hesitation in holding that dropping of the suo motu proceedings initiated under Section 87 of KLR Act by the TLB in a cursory manner, is not at all reasonable or justifiable when tested on the touchstone of the object and intention, which the legislation seeks to achieve and beyond what is required, in the interest of the public.”

Apportionment of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 of the KLR Act reads-

  • “112. Apportionment’s of land value in cases of acquisition – (1) Where any land is acquired under the law for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, the compensation awarded under such law in respect of the land acquired shall be apportioned among the landowner, intermediaries, cultivating tenant and the kudikidappukaran in the manner specified in this Section.
  • (2) The compensation for any building or other improvements shall be awarded to the person entitled to such building or other improvements.
  • (3) The kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to the value of the land occupied by his homestead or hut subject to a minimum of-
    • three cents in a city or major municipality; or
    • five cents in any other municipally; or
    • ten cents in a panchayat area or township.
  • (4) The difference between the value of three cents or five cents or ten cents, as the case may be, and the value of the extent of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, be borne by the Government or the local authority or the company or other person on whose behalf the land is acquired.
  • (5) The balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in Sub-section (2) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall he apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land acquired immediately before such acquisition.
    • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to (i) in the case of a landowner, the rent which he was entitled to get from the tenant holding immediately under him; (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord; and (iii) in the case of a cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent payable by him; and the rent payable by the cultivating tenant and the intermediary for the purposes of this Explanation shall be as calculated under the provisions of this Act.
  • (5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the land owner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
    • (a) the compensation for any buildinor other improvements belonging to such landowner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government; and
    • (b) the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.*fn*
  • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to-
    • in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
    • in the case of the Government, such rent.
  • (7) In this Section, “homestead” includes a dwelling house occupied by a person who is deemed to be a kudikidappukaran under Explanation IIA to clause (25) of Section 2.”
  • Foot Note:
    • *fn* 1. “Value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” says as to the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
    • 2. This provision is applied to lease-lands vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 and no purchase certificate is given (to the tenant).

No Land value to be given for the “excess” land (Beyond Ceiling Limit)

From the following words in Sect. 112, it is beyond doubt that no Land value to be given for the “excess” land (Beyond Ceiling Limit).

  • building or other improvements
  • land occupied by the homestead or hut”
  • any building or other improvements“.

It is true, “exemption” is given to plantation, to hold land over and above ceiling limit. It is only a statutory permission to continue, subject to conditions. It will be lost when it is “fragmented” or the crop is abandoned. It is also most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation owners or tenants (majority are BIG Companies) which had not been given to thousands of middleclass property owners whose property had been harshly sized or expropriated under the provisions of the KLR Act.


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End Notes

Relevant provisions of KLR Act, in a Nutshell

Section Provisions in a Nutshell
Chap. II 
3(1)
Exemptions – (i) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to – (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
“Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.
7 EPersons acquired lands (before 2005 amendment in KLR Act) for consideration below 1 Ha. 61 Are 87 Sq.m. (4 acre) will be deemed to be tenants .
13Fixity: “Every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding.”
22Landlord desiring to resume any land shall apply to the Land Tribunal.
31Fair rent determined by Land Tribunal.
51B. Landlord not to enter on land surrendered or abandoned by the tenant. 
Contravention is made punishable.
54(1)
55
57
57 (3)
57 (6)
61
54(1). A cultivating tenant (to purchase the right) has to apply Land Tribunal.
55. Purchase price is fixed by LT (on fair rent u/s. 31) to be paid u/s. 59
57. The LT after enquiries, pass orders determining purchase price.
(3). The Land Tribunal allows the purchase of the land it determines.
(6). The Land Tribunal forwards  orders to the Land Board.
61. Tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) pending proceedings.
59When Sec. 54 application is allowed (by the LT), the purchase price (determined u/s. 57 by the LT) shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal to the credit of the Land Board and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
72
Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating tenants in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
72(1) says: Holdings upon which tenanat entilted fixity under sec. 13 vest in govt.
72BCultivating-tenant “shall be entitled to assignment” of land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 –within ceiling area and get purchase certificate (through LT) (2 years from 1-1-1970). Effect of non-filing (See Balanoor Plantations case. 2018(3) KLT 283.)
72DThe cultivating tenant has to pay the purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
72ESuch tenant is liable to pay rent to the Government.
72CProvides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit). Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 
72KLT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.
74Prohibition of future tenancies.
Chap. III 
81
Exemption from ceiling and excess for Govt. lands, private forests, plantations, industrial or commercial undertakings, etc.
Proviso – There will be an exemption (as plantation, land given to educational institution, trust, etc.) on Government lands, given under grant, lease, etc.
See: HMT (Machine Tools) Limited v. Taluk Land Board, 2009 (3) KLJ 110; MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28.
82Ceiling area – 5/10 standard acres.
83No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  It is a total bar. (Note:  plantations, industrial area etc. are exempted.)
Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB), Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137)
The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571.
84Certain transfers – void.
85(1)Surrender excess.
85(2)Owners and Tenants (having land in excess of the ceiling area) should furnish ceiling return to Land Board before March31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
Note: Effect of non-filing: See – Balanoor Plantations case – 2018(3) KLT 283.State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
 According to S. 3(1) (viii), “tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres” is exempted from Chapter II. Therefore, the landlord can recover such plantation lands after the period of tenancy. Such landlords also had to file a ceiling return within the time stipulated.
85(3)Excess shall be surrendered.
Note: Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant)
It is clear from the following provisions:
S. 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT(for the purchase of right, title and interest.)
S. 55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
S. 57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
S. 57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
S. 57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board.
S. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT)
S. 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
S. 72D. The cultivating tenant has to pay purchase price to the Government (fixed by the LT) on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case. Note: (i) The sub-section (3) itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant, (ii) LT is the only authority to determine tenancy (Land Board cannot determine it), and (iii) it is clear that even if it is a plantation-exemption-land (beyond ceiling limit), the tenant has to file petition under Section 54 – for fixing Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT and for allotting the land under section 57(3) and for effecting the payments of ‘rent’ and ‘purchase price’(to the credit of the Land Board)  under sec. 61 and 59.
85(3A)The person bound to file a statement under sub-section (2) (that is, Owners and Tenants – having land in excess of the ceiling area)  shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.
85(5)On receipt of the statement under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3A), the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Board and such Taluk LandBoard shall determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered.
85(7)Whereon a person fails to file statement under 85(2) or (3A), LB shall intimate that fact to TLB  –  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered. It is obvious – The LB can intimate TLB as to non-filing, on the basis of the records it obtained under Sec. 57(6) and 59. That is, those tenants who are not entitled to get a purchase certificate also has to file an application under Sec. 54(1) and 85(2) or (3A). Effect of non-filing: See – Balanur Plantations case (With respect to Sec. 72B application) – 2018(3) KLT 283. Statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit to file statement:  State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
[TLB not to do, suo motu, without direction from LB. 1980 KLT 120, referred to in 2019(1) KLT 985.]
85AFile ceiling return within March  2, 1973 before Land Board..
86(1)On determination of the extent to be surrendered under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
86(3)Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession
86(4)Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
86(6)Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
87
Exp. II
If a person converts any portion of exempted land for any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit. That is, the exemption will be lost for the portion that exceeds the ceiling limit. (Mathew K Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Liability of Certain Plantation Tenants to Pay Rent To the Government: New Rules can be Made for its Effective Implementation

Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract

1. As per the Kerala Land Reforms Act, following Tenants are liable to pay rent to the Government.

  • (1) Tenants in Govt. land.
    • Because, no provision in the KLR Act affects the liability of the tenants of the Govt. lands to pay rent; and such Govt. lands are exempted from Chapter II (that deals with ‘fixity’, Purchase Certificate, vesting, etc..
  • (2) Tenants who have taken the lease of extensive parambus or waste-lands and in course of time by hard toil had developed those into plantations.
    • Because, the legislature had conferred the benefit of the fixity of tenure (Sec. 13, KLR Act) to such tenants; and such lands (over and above the land to which purchase certificate is given) vest in Govt., under Sec. 72, KLR Act.

2. Following Plantation-Tenants are liable to pay rent to the Land-owner (or the Land-lord) according to the KLR Act.

  • The tenants of those Plantations (i) above 30 acres and (ii) the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing (that is, plantation existed when land was leased).
    • Because, no provision in the KLR Act affects the liability of the tenants of such lands to pay rent to the land owners; and such lands are exempted from Chapter II (that deals with ‘fixity’, Purchase Certificate, vesting, etc..                            

Part I

Relevant provisions in the KLR Act:

Section 3(1)(viii):

  • Provisions of Chapter II (that deals with fixity, Purchase Certificate, vesting of leased land in Govt., etc.) of the KLR Act do not apply to tenements of Plantation above 30 acres where the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing (that is, plantation existed when land was leased).

Section 13:

  • There will be fixity to cultivating tenants.
  • But, (1) Plantation-tenants in Govt. land and (2) The tenants of Plantation above 30 acres, where the plantation existed when land was leased, do not have the right of fixity – for the provisions of Chapter II do not apply to such tenements.

Section 72:

  • It provides – automatic vesting of lease-properties held by ‘cultivating-tenants’, in Govt.
  • But, (1) Plantation-tenants in Govt. land and (2) The tenants of Plantation above 30 acres, , where the plantation existed when land was leased, do not vest in Govt. – for the provisions of Chapter II do not apply to such tenements.

Section 72E:

  • The cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay to the Government the rent payable under this Act from the date of vesting under Section 72.

Section 72F(h): 

  • Land Tribunal to fix the rent stated in Sec. 72E.

Section 81:

  • S. 81 (the first Section in Chapter III) deals with exemption from ceiling limit of plantation, industrial land, etc.

Section 82 & 83:

  • S.82 deals with ceiling area. Sec. 83 mandates that no person shall be entitled to own or hold lands in excess of the ceiling area. But it is not applicable to the plantations. (If no plantation, that would also have been treated in the same way – as excess land.)

Section 85:

  • S. 85 directs that excess land shall be surrendered to government (accepting the compensation fixed under Sec. 88).

Can the Govt. enact new Act (or Make Rules) for ensuring ‘Proper Rent’ (if it finds The Kerala Grants and Leases (Modification of Rights) Act, 1980 not effective)?

Yes; because,

  1. the KLR Act does not affect rights of such land-owners/landlord  (including Govt.) for rent.
  2. The matter of fixation of rent is a State subject. 

The State Legislature is free, therefore, to make a proper enactment on public interest.  Here, it may also be noted that a large extent of Govt. land is in the possession of mighty and wealthy planters: and they do not pay any amount as rent (and, if paid, only a small amount). 

New ‘Rules’ or ‘Guidelines’ can also be made by the State in the light of Sec. 72F(h) [Land Tribunal to fix the rent stated in Sec. 72E] for ensuring ‘Proper Rent’.

In N. K. RAJENDRA MOHAN Vs. THIRVAMADI RUBBER CO.  LTD, AIR 2015 SC 2556; 2015-4 KLT 6, it is held as under:

  • “That the legislature had construed it to be unfair and improper to deny the benefit of the fixity of tenure to a lessee who might have taken the lease of extensive parambus or waste lands and in course of time by hard toil had developed those into plantations.

Analysis

Plantation leased
(Plantation existed when land was leased).
Land leased
Tenant made plantation.
Sec. 81 (exemption from ceiling limit) applies.
Plantation above 30 Acres. 
Will there be fixity to tenant?
No. 

Sec. 3 (1)(viii) (reversely) applies. (Poddar Plan. Ltd v. Thekkemariveettil Madhavi Amma, 2014 1 ILR(Ker) 813; 2013 4 KLJ 781; 2014 1 KLT 439,)
Yes. (Note: Ceiling limit (in Sec. 82) is not mentioned in Sec. 13 – as given in Sec. 72B and 72C.)
(Sec. 13 fixity is there for every tenant, if tenant toiled a plantation – See: Rev. Fr. Jerome Fernandes Vs. Be Be Rubber Estate, 1972 KLT 613.)
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72E & 72F
Plantation below 30 Acres.  Can a tenant get purchase certificate for 5 or 10 acres?
May be.
No specific provision. So, by virtue of Chapter II, a tenant can get Purchase Certificate; but, within ceiling limit – Sec. 13 – under Sec. 72B, 72C.
(See notes just below also)
No. 
No specific provision.
Fragmentation of plantation will not be allowed so as to get pur. certi. within ceiling limit (Sec. 87).
Plantation below 30 Acres. Will there be fixity to tenant?
Yes.
By virtue of S. 3(1)(viii), a Tenant has fixity (Sec.13). It is reasonable to say, a tenant cannot claim fixity and Purchase Certificate, simultaneously.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72E & 72F(h)
Yes.
(Because what is exempted is Plantation-Tenancies exceeding 30 acres)

Sec. 13 fixity, applies.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72E & 72F(h)
Who gets Sec. 81 exemption – land-owner or tenant – above 30 acres.
Land owner – For, plantation itself was leased.Tenant
Can landlord recover possession –
above 30 acres – from the tenant?
.
Yes.
No express provision.
But, contract holds the field (because no protection to tenant, under Chapter II).
No. (Because Plantation-Tenancies exceeding 30 acres is exempted, and therefore no protection to tenant)
Sec. 13 fixity, applies. See:
N. K. Rajendra Mohan Vs Thirvamadi Rubber Co.  Ltd.: AIR 2015 SC 2556; 2015-4 KLT 6
Will a tenant get Fixity (S. 13) or Purchase Certificate (S. 72) on “tenancies…”, ‘interspersed within the plantation’ S. 3(1)(viii)

(Not applicable)
Yes. But, within ceiling limit – Sec. 13 – under Sec. 72B, 72C.
Proviso refers to a special category on independent-tenancy [from the plantation-tenancy, mentioned in the main Section, S. 3(1)(viii)].
Will there be vesting of land below 30 acres in Govt?
Yes.
Then what is the relation between Govt. and the original tenant?
Relation that is recognised by the Statute. That is, fixity in the land vested in Government.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72E & 72F(h)
Yes (for both above and below 30 acres).
Then what is the relation between Govt. and the original tenant?
Relation that is recognised by the Statute. That is, fixity in the land vested in Government.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72E & 72F(h)

Part II

1. Who is the OWNER of Leasehold (Exempted) Plantation Lands in Kerala?

It is the Government

Reasons:

  • (i). Plantation (lease) lands Statutorily VEST in GOVT, under S. 72.
    • Sec. 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964, provides for absolute vesting (of lease-land) in Government.
    • Tenants of leasehold-exempted-plantation lands (above ceiling-limit) are entitled only to ‘fixity of tenure‘ by virtue of Chapter II, Sec. 13 (and they are not entitled for Purchase Certificate, over and above ‘ceiling limit’).
    • Note: ‘Tenure’ is derived from the Latin term, “tenere“;  means “to hold” or “to keep”.
  • (ii). Vesting’ in Govt. is ‘Vesting of Ownership
    • Sec. 72 speaks about ‘Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government’.
    • It pertains to –
      • all right, title and interest” of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants”.
  • (iii). Tenant has no “absolute rights” (above the ceiling limit)
    • Sec. 72B(2) KLR Act spells-out that a cultivating tenant will get Purchase Certificate for the extent below the ‘ceiling limit’ alone. That is, the tenant has no “absolute rights” above the ceiling limit. (It is limited to the improvements made, in case of acquisition, under Sec. 112(5A), as stated below.)
    • Plantation-lands, usually, involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land (above ceiling limit). The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be miniscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres).
    • Tenant to Pay Rent to the Govt.: Sec. 72E directs – such a cultivating tenant is liable to pay ‘Rent’ to the Government (obviously over and above ‘ceiling limit’).
    • Sec. 72F(5) authorises Land Tribunal to fix the rent.
  • (iv). Government Need Not Pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, if Acquired
    • Sec. 112(5A) provides that the Government need not pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, to the tenant, or the former land owner, if such Lands (above ceiling limit) are Acquired. (It is for the reason that ownership of such plantation-land vest in Govt., absolutely.)
  • (v). Art. 31A(1), Constitution (no compensation even to owners)
    • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation (even) to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
Proviso to Art. 31A(1), Constitution (no compensation even to owners) reads as under:
“Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivationit shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”

2. Tenant cannot ‘Sell’ Plantation Land as his Absolute Property

  • A tenant who got ‘fixity’ over such land cannot ‘sell’ this land as his absolute (ownership) property.

3. ‘Exemption’ in Chapter III Cannot be Read Into Sec. 72B(2)

  • The provision of law for giving Purchase-Certificate under Sec. 72B specifies that the provisions of Sec. 82 (as to ceiling limit) shall apply for the calculation of the ceiling area (alone).
  • Sec. 72B(2) reads-
    • “(2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may beapply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1)”
  • The exemption provision in Sec. 81 (Chapter III), which excludes plantation lands from the ceiling limit, cannot be brought-forth or read-into Sec. 72B (provision for assignment of purchase-certificate) in Chapter II.
    • In other words, purchase-certificates cannot be given for land above ceiling-limit, rigging the exemption provisions (for plantations etc.).
  • Because,
    • Sec. 72B(1), in Chapter II shows – Sec. 72B(1) is an independent provision (though the Proviso says – no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest … (more than) … the ceiling area, mentioned in Sec. 82 in Chapter III)
    • When a provision in a latter Chapter of an Act (here, Sec. 82 that deals with extent of ceiling limit, in Chapter III) is referred to in an independent provision in an earlier Chapter (here, Sec. 72B, as regards issuing purchase certificate, in Chapter II), for a specific purpose (here, to state the limit in area alone), it cannot be said – the attributed colour or smell of the provision in the latter chapter (by virtue of other provisions, i.e., entire characteristics or attributions added to Sec. 82 by virtue of other provisions in Chapter III), would stand reflected on the earlier provision (here, Sec. 72B).
  • Further:
    • Chapter II of the KLR Act (dealing with ‘Tenancy’) is exclusive and exhaustive as to ‘fixity’, and ‘vesting’ of land in Government.
    • It is not stated anywhere in the Act – the right and title of the (leased-plantation) land legitimately vested in Government under Sec. 72, will be divested in any manner (in favour of the previous owner, or of the tenant or anybody else), in any circumstance.
    • Sec. 72E provides for collection of ‘rent‘ from the holders of the plantation and Sec. 72F(5) authorises the Land Tribunal to fix the rent. (It goes without saying saying that it is for the reason that the ownership of the land vests in Govt.)
    • Note: Proceedings initiated by Taluk Land Board under Chapter III (in respect of plantation) do not confer title.

4. What is the legal right attached to former ‘tenants’, after vesting the land with Govt. under Sec. 72?

  • It is not Tenancy – For no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt.
  • Not Grant or Licence/Permission – for Grant as well as Licence/Permission arise from a contract (express or implied).
  • Therefore, it can termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, that is, the KLR Act.

5. What are the Stipulations attached to that “Legal Right conferred by Statute” to tenants (of Plantation land) having fixity?

  • 1. Liable to pay ‘Rent’ (under Sec. 72E).
  • 2. Subject to the condition – not to “convert” it for any other use, other than the specific plantation (Sec. 87).
  • 3. From Sec. 112(5A)(b) it is clear that the tenant will be entitled (on acquisition of the land) for the compensation for his homestead or hut, if any, and the value of his improvements (alone).

6. When Such a land (Vested In Govt. under S. 72) is Required for Govt. (Public Purpose), Should it be ‘Acquired’? Is the landowner Entitled for any Compensation? What is the Compensation Entitled to by the Tenant?

  • When Such a land (Vested In Govt. under S. 72) is Required for Govt. (Public Purpose), Should it be Acquired?
    • The ownership being vested in Govt. it need not be ‘strictly’ “acquired”. But no specific provision in Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’, if and when Govt. needs it. 
    • Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act uses the term ‘acquisition’ itself (for the possessory rights remain with the tenant).
  • Is the Landowner Entitled for any Compensation?
    • Sec. 112(5A) deals with the land acquired that has been vested in the Government under Section 72. From the sub section (5A) it is clear that the entire rights of the (former) landowner is vested with the Govt. and he cannot claim any right over the land (when it is acquired).
  • What is the Compensation Entitled to by the Tenant?
    • Sec. 112(5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonged to such land owner and intermediaries shall be awarded (?) to the Government ; and
    • from Sec. 112(5A)(b) it is clear that the tenant will be entitled for the compensation for his homestead or hut, if any, and the value of his improvements (alone).

7. Apportionment of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 of the KLR Act reads –

“112. Apportionment of land value in cases of acquisition  – (1) Where any land is acquired under the law for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, the compensation awarded under such law in respect of the land acquired shall be apportioned among the landowner, intermediaries, cultivating tenant and the kudikidappukaran in the manner specified in this Section.
(2) The compensation for any building or other improvements shall be awarded to the person entitled to such building or other improvements.
(3) The kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to the value of the land occupied by his homestead or hut subject to a minimum of-
               three cents in a city or major municipality; or
               five cents in any other municipally; or
               ten cents in a panchayat area or township.
(4) The difference between the value of three cents or five cents or ten cents, as the case may be, and the value of the extent of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, be borne by the Government or the local authority or the company or other person on whose behalf the land is acquired.
(5) The balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in Sub-section (2) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall he apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land acquired immediately before such acquisition .
Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to (i) in the case of a landowner, the rent which he was entitled to get from the tenant holding immediately under him; (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord; and (iii) in the case of a cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent payable by him; and the rent payable by the cultivating tenant and the intermediary for the purposes of this Explanation shall be as calculated under the provisions of this Act.
(5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
               (a) the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to such land owner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government ; and
               (b) the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to- in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
in the case of the Government, such rent.
(7) In this Section, “homestead” includes a dwelling house occupied by a person who is deemed to be a kudikidappukaran under Explanation IIA to clause (25) of Section 2.”

Part III

Vesting in  Govt. u/s. 72 is independent of issuance of Purchase Certificate

The rights of the landlord would vest in the Government, under Sec. 72 KLR Act. A tenant is free to apply for and obtain Purchase Certificate within the Ceiling Limit under Sect. 59(2) and 72B or 72C. from such property. Vesting of lease property in Government under Sec. 72 is independent of issuance of Purchase Certificate. In Perumal Smaraka Nidhi v. Harrisons Malayalam Limited (RFA No. 336/2011; dt. 31. 01. 2013; K.M. Joseph, J.) held –

  • The rights of the landlord would vest in the Government, under Sec. 72 KLR Act.
  •  Sec. 72 would appear to contemplate vesting when there is no certificate of purchase issued under Sec. 59 (2).
  • If no certificate of purchase has been issued under sub Sec. (2) of Sect. 59 (irrespective of whether the tenants have applied), under Section 72, there will be vesting, if other conditions are satisfied.

Plantation Land Cannot be Assigned to a Tenant

  • From the above, it is clear:
    1. Plantation-tenancy-lands above 30 acres are not exempted from Chapter II; and are exempted from ceiling limit (under Chapter III).
    2. Tenants who hold the plantation-tenancy-lands are entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13.
    3. As the tenants who hold the plantation land are cultivating tenants, such lands are vested in Government [according to Sec. 72].
    4. The plantation land, above ceiling limit [under Sec. 72B], cannot be assigned (by the Land Tribunal) to a tenant. (Note: No rider to Sec. 72B and 72C, by way of proviso or otherwise, exempting plantation.)
  • Therefore, the answer to the question – who is the OWNER of the (exempted) Leasehold-Plantation Lands in Kerala – is that the Government of Kerala is the OWNER. (See: Perumal Smaraka Nidhi vs M/S Harrisons Malayalam Ltd., 31. 01. 2013)

“Vesting” in Law

In Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v. Siddha Math,  (2015) 16 SCC 542, while dealing with the ‘vesting’ under Land Acquisition Act,1894, it is held that ‘it is a settled principle of law that once a property is vested by an Act of legislature, to achieve the laudable object, the same cannot be divested by the enactment of any subsequent general law and vest such property under such law.’

  • (LA Act, 1894, Sec. 16 reads as under: Power to take possession. When the Collector has made an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.)

The concept of ‘vesting’ was also considered in The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344. In this decision it is held as under:

  • “(19) That the word “vest” is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, S. 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the Court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that “such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver”. The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand, Ss. 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of LA), provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening of certain events, shall “vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances”. In the cases contemplated by Ss. 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that the word “vest” has not got a fixed connotation meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Ss. 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them.” [Quoted in Indore Development Authority vs Manoharlal (Arun Mishra, J.), (2020) 8 SCC 129.]

Provisions as to Fixity, Purchase Certificate,  Plantation-Exemption, Ceiling Area, etc.

  • Tenant & Fixity –
    • Section 13(1) reads as under:
    • 13. Right of tenants to fixity of tenure.  (1) Notwithstanding any thing to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage or contract or in any decree or order of court, every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding, and no land from the holding shall be Limited except as provided in Sections 14 to 22.”
    • Tenant is defined in Sec 2 (57) as under:
    • (57) tenant moans any person who has paid or has agreed to pay rent or other consideration for his being allowed to possess and to enjoy any land by a person entitled to lease that land, and includes- …. ….. ….. “
  • Cultivating Tenant & Vesting of land in Government –
    • Section 72(1) reads:
    • “72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”
    • It provides (automatic) vesting of leasehold properties in Govt. Conditions thereof are:
      • (i) the land must be held by cultivating tenants;
      • (ii) they should be entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13.
    • Sec. 2(8) defines cultivating tenant as under:
    • cultivating tenant means a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate, the land comprised in his holding.”
  • Issue of PurchaseCertificate
    • Section 72B, 72C and 72K(1) & (2) read as under:
    • 72B. Cultivating tenants right to assignment. – (1) The cultivating tenant of any holding or part of a holding, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Section 72, shall be entitled to assignment of such right, title and interest:
    • Provided that
    • (a) no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of any holding or part of a holding under this Section if he, or if he is a member of a family, such family, owns an extent of land not less than-the ceiling area.
    • (b) where the cultivating tenant or, if he is a member of a family, such family, does not own any land or owns an extent of land which is less than the ceiling area, he shall be entitled to the assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of only such extent of land as will, together with the land, if any, owned by him or his family, as the case may be, be equal to the ceiling area.
    • Explanation. – In calculating the extent of land owned by the cultivating tenant or, where he is a member of a family, by such family, for the purposes of clauses (a) and (b) of the foregoing proviso, the portion of the land owned by such cultivating tenant or by the family, which is liable to be assigned to the cultivating tenants holding under him or such family, shall not be taken into account.
    • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1);
    • Provided that if no date has been notified under Section 83, the date notified under Section 72 shall be deemed to be the date notified under Section 83.
    • (3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub-section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the dote of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.
    • (4) An application under Sub-section (3) shall contain the following particulars, namely:(a) the village, survey number and extent of the holding or part to which the assignment relates.(b) the name and address of the landowner and intermediaries and also of every other person interested in the land and the nature of their interest so far as they arc known to him;(c) the particulars regarding the other lands owned or held by him or if he is a member of a family; by such family; and(d) such other particulars as may be prescribed.
    • (5) Where a cultivating tenant is entitled to the assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of only a portion of the holding held by him, he may indicate in the application under Sub-section (3) his choice of the portion to which the assignment shall relate.”
    • 72C. Assignment where application is not made by cultivating tenant Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 72B [or Section 72BB], the Land tribunal may, subject to such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf, at any time after the vesting of the right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in tile Government under Section 72, assign such right, title and interest to the cultivating tenants entitled thereto, and the cultivating tenants shall be bound to accept such assignment.”
    • 72K. Issue of certificate of purchase. – (1) As soon as may be after the determination of the purchase price under Section 72F [or the passing of an order under Sub-section (3) of Section 72MM] the Land Tribunal shall issue a certificate of purchase to the cultivating tenant, and thereupon the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, in respect of the holding or part thereof to which the certificate relates, shall vest in the cultivating tenant free from all encumbrances created by the landowner or the intermediaries, if any.
    • (2) The certificate of purchase issued under Sub-section (1) shall be conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, over the holding or portion thereof to which the assignment relates.”
    • Note: Sec. 72F speaks as to ‘Land Tribunal to issue notices and determine the compensation and purchase price; and Sec. 72MM provides for jointly applying, by the cultivating tenant, the landowner, the intermediary, the holders of encumbrances, etc, to the Land Tribunal, for an order for ‘assignment by mutual agreement’ to the cultivating tenant.

Can a Tenant of Plantation Transfer his Rights, Fragmenting the Plantation

Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law. It is heritable and transferable. (Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179; Phirayalal Kapur Vs. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186; Nallammal Vs. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864). 

See Blog: POSSESSION is a Substantive Right in Indian Law

Therefore, a tenant of plantation having rights of fixity (Sec. 13) may have the right to transfer it to another. In any case, the change of character or nature of the plantation by fragmentation being amount to ‘conversion’ that will be against the provisions of the Act, as pointed out in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985.

What are the Stipulations attached to that “Legal Right” of Transfer?

  • Subject to the condition – not to “convert” it for any other use, other than the specific plantation (Sec. 87).

When Such a land is Required for Govt., Should it be Acquired?

  • The ownership being vested in Govt. it need not be ‘strictly’ “acquired”.
  • But no provision In Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’, if and when Govt. needs it.
  • But, it is said in Sec. 112 – Apportionment of land value in cases of ‘acquisition’.
    • Note:  It makes no difference (SUBSTANTIALLY, IN DETERMINING COMPENSATION) whether such a plantation land is “acquired” or not. Because, even if the land is not ‘acquired’, Govt. has to pay compensation for improvements to the former tenants (who holds the land by virtue of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act).

End Notes I

CAN AN EXEMPTED PLANTATION LAND BE SOLD AS AN ABSOLUTE PRIVATE PROPERTY?

No.

  • Sec. 82 deals with ceiling area. Sec. 83 mandates that no person shall be entitled to own or hold lands in excess of the ceiling area. Sec. 85 directs that excess land shall be surrendered to government (accepting the compensation fixed under Sec. 88).
  • But it is not made applicable to the plantations. (If no plantation, that would also have been treated in the same way – as excess land.)
  • Sec. 87 directs that the protection of plantation is available only so long as the plantation subsists.

Exemption does not Confer a vested right or ownership

  • If no plantation, plantation lands would also have been treated in the same way – as any other excess land that had been (forcibly) got surrendered by virtue of the KLR Act. The law has given only a sanction to the planters to continue because of the existence of the plantation. Therefore ‘exemption’ does not confer a vested right or ownership.

End Notes II

ACQUISITION OF PLANTATION-LANDS OWNED BY PRIVATE PERSONS

1. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India

It is plain – No compensation is payable to the land-owners, for the lands ‘above the ceiling limit’, according to the Constitution of India. If any authority gives it, it will be sheer unscrupulous act.

  • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
  • Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India reads as under:
    “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivationit shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limitapplicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”.

2. Exemption of ‘Plantation’ Does Not Cover Exemption of ‘Plantation LAND’

It is for the following reasons –

  • 1. The exemption is to the ‘plantation’, and not to the ‘LAND‘.
  • 2. Exemption is conditional – for it exists (only) as long as the plantation exists or continues;
  • Because,
    • (a) S. 2(44) defines ‘plantation’ as land used principally for the cultivation of a specific ‘plantation crop‘ like tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber etc.
    • (b) Section 87, Explanation II states that if a plantation for which exemption is given on recognition of a specific ‘plantation-crop’ is converted into any other ‘plantation-crop’ or the plantation activity is not continued, the exemption may be lost; and the land will be taken for considering the ceiling limit.

Effect of Conversion or Sale of A Portion of Exempted Land

Section 87 reads as under:

  • “S.87. Excess land obtained by gift, etc. to be surrendered – (1) Where any person acquires any land dafter the date notified under Section 83 by gift, purchase, mortgage with possession, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, such excess shall be surrendered to such authority as may be prescribed.
  •        Explanation 1 – Where any land is exempted by or under Section 81 and such exemption is in force on the date notified under Section 83, such land shall, with effect from the date on which it ceases to be exempted, be deemed to be land acquired after the date notified under Section 83.
  •        Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.

Explanation II is explained by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Mathew K. Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority,2018-4 KLT 913, as under:

  • “The consequence is that the benefit of the exemption would be lost and the extent added to the account of the assessee or the declarant in determination of his ceiling area.”

That is, if a person converts any portion of his exempted land to any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit; and the Taluk Land Board can proceed upon that (excess) land. In short, the exemption will be lost for that portion.

Fragmentation has to be Treated as Conversion for Non-exempted Category

The decision in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985, arose from the Writ Petition filed for a declaration that the fragmentation and sale of a Rubber Plantation for non-plantation purposes was illegal as it defeated the purpose of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. When the matter was placed before the Taluk Land Board under Sec 87, KLR Act, it found that there was no change in classification of the land and therefore dropped the proceedings. The High Court held as under:

  • “34. Section 81 of the KLR Act is in pith and substance a special provision, with its main objective of giving exemption to certain lands including the lands maintained as plantations is to prevent fragmentation of the land and to keep it as plantation itself to improve the economy of the state for welfare of people as a whole while the Act creates a regime, the State is under an obligation to safeguard, the intended purpose of the provisions of the Act in its spirit. ….. …… It could be gathered from the records that the proposal to transfer 1.03 acres of land to each workers in discharge of their service or retrenchment benefits will definitely divide the plantation into separate slots and that would definitely change the character/nature of the plantation, which could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act.”
  • “37. …. Fragmentation of the estate and transfer of it has to be treated as a case of conversion of plantation into some other category of land. Such being the scenario, fragmentation amounts to serious violation of the provisions of KLR Act. Hence, we are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No.18 that the fragmented plots will be maintained as plantation by the transferees, so as to extend/avail the benefit of HMT’s case (supra). Taking into account of all the relevant aspects, we have no hesitation in holding that dropping of the suo motu proceedings initiated under Section 87 of KLR Act by the TLB in a cursory manner, is not at all reasonable or justifiable when tested on the touchstone of the object and intention, which the legislation seeks to achieve and beyond what is required, in the interest of the public.”

End Notes III

Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v.  The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301

The Supreme Court, in Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301 (Sikri (Cj), Shelat, A.N. Ray, I.D. Dua, , H.R.  Khanna, JJ.) held that Kenan Devan Hills Concession (on grant deeds) fall within the expression “Janmam right” vested with Sircar. The State of Kerala made an Act – the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971, to “vest” the possession of the land remained in the possession of the Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd.

According to the petitioner Company, ‘it has at all times been holding, cultivating, enjoying and dealing with the Concession Land as the absolute, owner thereof’.

According to the State, this land is dealt with under this heading – Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar. and that it was only “granted” to the company for ‘coffee cultivation’. The State asserted in this case –

  • that the petitioner Company was not an absolute owner, but only a lessee under the Government, especially since the 1899 Proclamation issued by H.H. the Maharaja declaring that Kannan Devan Hills was ‘an integral part’ of the ‘territory’.
  • that the petitioner’s predecessor-in-title was John Danial Munro, who obtained, the first Pooniat Concession from Punjar Valiya Raja, on July 11, 1877. This Concession recited that an, application was made for the grant of the above property to the Raja for coffee cultivation.
  • It was further stipulated in the Concession that
    •  “you shall clear and remove the jungles, and reclaim the waste lands within the said boundaries, and cultivate them with coffee up to the year 1058 and from the year 1059, pay our rent collector a yearly rent at the rate of 3,000 British Rupees.”
  • H.H. the Maharaja executed a deed of ratification, dated November 28, 1878, by which the Government ratified the First Pooniat Concession dated July 11, 1877.
  • This deed of ratification laid down –  the Government permitted the grantee to hold the land. (it is similar to the ‘Grant/Title’ deeds executed by the State in all other ‘Grants’ – under the ‘Grant Rules’).
  • Clause 5 of the Deed of Ratification, is important. It provides, inter alia, that
    • “The grantee can appropriate to his own use within the limits of the grant all timber except the following and such as may hereafter be reserved namely, Teak, Cole Teak, Blackwood, Ebony, Karoonthaly, Sandalwood; should he carry any timber without the limits of the grant it will be subject to the payment of Kooteekanom, or Customs Duty……….
  • The eleventh clause reads – “The land granted shall be held in perpetuity as heritable or transferable property, but every case of transfer of the grant by the grantee shall be immediately made known to the Sircar, who shall have the right of apportioning the tax, if a portion of the holding is transferred.”
  • The twelfth clause stipulates – “The discovery of useful mines and treasures within the limits of the grant shall be communicated to the Sircar, and the grantee shall in respect to such mines and treasures, abide by the decision of the Sircar.”
  • The sixteenth clause provides – “The grantee shall be bound to preserve the forest trees growing on the banks of the principal streams running through the tract to the extent of fifty yards in breadth on each side of the stream, the Underwood only being permitted to be cleared and coffee planted instead. Similarly he shall also be bound to preserve the, trees about the crest of the hill to the extent of a quarter of a mile on each side.”
  • Royal Proclamation was made on September 24, 1899 provided that ‘Anjanad and Kannan Devan Hills is an integral portion of our territory and that the inhabitants of the said tract are ‘hereby informed and warned that they are not to pay any taxes, rents or dues, or make any other payment to the Poonjar Chief.

Points came for consideration in this decision were the following:

  • Whether the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 was protected from challenge under Art. 31A of the Constitution. That is, whether these lands fall within expression ‘Janmam right’ or “estate”  in art. 31A of the Constitution.
  • If the lands acquired were an “estate”, or with ‘Janmam right’ owned by the Company, the land reform enactment did not have stood valid. (Note: Kesavananda Bharathi Case came in 1973.)

The Apex Court found the following:

  • The janmam rights (even if remained with the Poonjar Chief, H.H. the Maharaja became the janmi by the Royal proclamation of 1899.
  • The nature of ‘janmam right’ has been examined by this Court previously in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887 Subba Rao, J., observed that janmam right in Kerala is an “estate and it is the freehold interest.
  • The Sircar itself is one of these janmis and it was the largest Janmi. It came to possess janmam lands by gift, purchase, escheat, confiscation and other ways
  • If any person wants land in Travancore, he must obtain it from, some one of the body of Janmis, i.e. from the Sircar, which is the Chief Janmi, or from some other Janmi.

The Apex Court observed as under:

  • “… On the material placed before us it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the lands in dispute fall within the expression “Janmam right”.
  • If, as stated in Travancore Land Revenue Manual Volume IV, there are no lands that do not belong to a Janmi and the Sircar becomes a janmi by gift, escheat confiscation or otherwise, the effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1899 must be that the Sircar became the Janmi.”

The Apex Court further found –

  • The Registered Lands included inter alia, (a) Pandaravaka lands and (b) Janmam lands.
  • Regarding Pandaravaka lands it is stated : “Pandaravaka or Sircar lands are, lands of which the State is the landlord or the Jenmi and whatever rights which vest in the ryots are derived from the Sircar.”
  • Kenan Devan Hills Concession is dealt with under this heading, i.e. Pandaravaka Lands.
  • It thus appears that the State grants like Kanan Devan Hills Concession and Ten Square Miles Concession, and Munro Lands, were treated under the heading ‘Pandaravaka Lands, i.e. lands belonging to the Sircar (that is, such Grant-lands were not ‘owned’ by the holders thereof).

On these findings The Apex Court upheld the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971 and dismissed the challenge of the Company.

State of Kerala v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272

With respect to the same property  it was held in State of Kerala v. Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272as under:

  • “The Trial Court in a detailed and well-reasoned judgment dismissed the suit of the company. The Trial Court on the interpretation of First Concession (Exhibit P- 1), Second Concession (Exhibit P-2), deed of ratification (Exhibit P-62) and the Government agreement with the Society dated August 2, 1866 (Exhibit P-64) came to the conclusion that the company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession Area or the trees and timber in the said area. It was held that the Poonjar Chief had only conveyed heritable and transferable possessory rights over the Concession area to the grantee. It was also held that absolute rights over the trees and timber in the Concession Area did not pass to the grantee and it had only the right to use and remove timber subject to the restrictions imposed in the deeds of conveyance/ratification.”

It is observed:

  • “An identical clause in another grant entered into by the Travancore Government came for consideration before a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in George A Leslie v. State of Kerala, [1969] K. L.T. 378, K. K. Mathew, J. (as the learned Judge then was) interpreted the clause as under:
    •  We think that if title to the reserved trees passed to the grantees, a provision of this nature would have been quite unnecessary. There was no purpose in stating that the grantees will be free to appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant, if title to the trees passed to the grantees; the provision is a clear indication that the grantees were allowed to cut and appropriate the reserved trees for consumption within the limits of the grant as a matter of concession.”
  • “We agree with the interpretation given to the clause by Mathew, J. and hold that the respondent- company did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the Concession Area or the trees and the timber therein.”

It is observed further:

  • “It was further held by Mathew, J. (in George A. Leslie v. State of Kerala, 1969 KLT 378) that kuttikanam being the governments share of the value of the trees owned by the government it has the power to fix the value of the trees. We agree with the reasoning and conclusions reached by Mathew, J.”

The Apex Court upheld and approved “the judgment and findings” of the Trial Court.

End Notes IV

Cultivating Tenants, were Obliged to Apply LT & The Legal Basis of Balanoor Plantations case

The legal basis of the decision, Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, can be derived from Sec. Sec. 85(3) of the KLR Act.

Sec. 85(3) and (3A) of the KLR Act read as under:

  • (3). Where, after the final settlement of claims for resumption of lands held by a person as tenant, such person holds land in excess of the ceiling area, or where after the purchase of the right, title and interest of the landowner** and the intermediary by the cultivating tenant in respect of lands owned by a person, such person owns land in excess of the ceiling area, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided.
  • (3A). The person bound to file a statement under Sub-section (2) shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same. [Substituted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]

**Why the WordsAfter The Purchase of the Right, Title And Interest of the Landowner” Included?

It is definite: It is for adjudicating the ‘tenancy right’, by the Land Tribunal – for, the Land Tribunal is the only authority that can decide on the “tenancy right.” (It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case.)

  • Note: A tenant cannot avail benefits declaring himself to be a cultivating-tenant; on the contrary, he has to approach the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act; that is, the Land Tribunal.
  • Land Board or Taluk Land Board (deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues etc.) cannot adjudicate on tenancy right.
  • Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant)
    It is clear from the following provisions:
    S. 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT(for the purchase of right, title and interest.)
    S. 55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
    S. 57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
    S. 57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
    S. 57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board.
    S. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT)
    S. 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
    S. 72D. The cultivating tenant has to pay purchase price to the Government (fixed by the LT) on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)

A cultivating tenant, “entitled to assignment” of the right under Sec. 72B, if failed to apply the same, will not have ‘vested right to continue’, as a cultivating tenant and he will not be entitled to the benefit of fixity under Sec. 13 of the KLR Act.

  • Note: The tenant who opts to avail benefits of plantation-exemption, under Sec. 81, cannot seek fragmentation (Sec. 87, Explanation II) of the plantation land and obtain purchase-certificate (under Sec. 72A, 72B or 72C). Still, he stands as a cultivating tenant, “entitled to assignment” of the right under Sec. 72B. As shown elsewhere, there is an option for the tenant – either to obtain purchase-certificate or to avail plantation-exemption.

Sec. 72B provides for cultivating tenant’s rights to get assignment by purchase certificate (through LT) – within ceiling area. Tenant is “obliged to apply” for it within 2 years from 1-1-1970. Therefore, the cultivating tenants entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest were “obliged to apply” to the Land Tribunal within the time fixed for asserting the claim as cultivating tenants. This decision also says that tenants having ‘no bona fide claim’ as to cultivating-tenancy will not have the benefit of fixity under Sec. 13 of the KLR Act, and they will have ‘no vested right to continue’.

Sec. 73B(3) reads as under:

  • “(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

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A Criticism on Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati (2024 SC), as regards Finding on Adverse Possession

In Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle (2024 KLT(Online) 3058), the Supreme Court Failed to Notice the Change as regards Onus, Under 1963 Limitation Act.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Abstract

On December 20, 2024 our Apex Court, in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 0 KLT(Online) 3058, held –

  • a plaint deserves rejection under Order VII rule 11, CPC if the pleadings contained therein is founded on forgery or fabrication (of documents) that came to the knowledge of the plaintiff decades back,
  • for, such a claim would be hopelessly barred by limitation (as it is governed under Article 59, Limitation Act which fixes period of limitation as 3 years) [Paras 18, 20, 22, 26].

In paragraph 23 of the Judgment, while dealing with ‘adverse possession’, the Court observed as under:

  • “As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title can be sought within twelve years. …. The plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State for possession within twelve years.”

The Case of the Plaintiff, in Brief

  • The plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title and recovery of the plaint properties. It was alleged in the plaint that the predecessor of the plaintiff (belonging to Gosavis family) had no right, under the original Sanad, to sell the suit properties to the Defendant Trust (under the sale deeds of 1938 and 1952).
  • Since the original Sanad was lost, the defendants had initiated a suit against the State which was compromised. In the compromise, the State accepted that it was a “soil grant”. Plaintiff was not a party to the said suit and without his knowledge, the consent decree was obtained clandestinely
  • Though it was “only a revenue grant”, the defendants have played systematic fraud in Civil Suits of 1951 and 1988 and Civil Appeal of 2001. and without any judicial pronouncements they have usurped the lands under suspicious compromises arrived at before the Court.

The Case of the Defendants, in Brief

  • The defendant Trust contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The Plaintiff or his predecessors did not take any step to assert their title and rights. The plaintiff knows fully well that the challenge to the registered sale deeds of the years 1938 and 1952 would be barred by limitation.
  • The defendant Trust had purchased 3/4th share of the suit lands mentioned in the Schedule in an auction sale conducted by the Civil Court, Pune, in the year 1938 from the previous Inamdar Gosavis family and the same was duly registered; and they had also purchased the remaining 1/4th share in the suit lands in the year 1952 by another registered sale deed.
  • The cause of action to sustain his suit is an imaginary one.

The Application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC

  • The defendant filed application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC r/w Articles 58, 59 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking rejection of the plaint saying that the alleged cause of action in 2007 is ‘purely illusory and has been stated with a view to get over the bar’ of limitation.
  • The trial Court rejected the application. It observed that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, for which, the parties will have to lead evidence.
  • The Bombay High Court dismissed the Civil Revision Application by the defendant. Hence the SLP.
  • The Supreme Court allowed the the Order VII rule 11 petition of the defendant/appellant.

Analysis

The Court specifically considered the effect of (i) not seeking cancellation of the disputed deeds in the light of Sec. 31 of the Specific Relief Act (ii) not challenging a sale by the court in 1952 and that by the predecessors of the plaintiff and (iii) the averments in the plaint as regards fraud in relation to the compromise decrees.

  • As regards Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Apex Court found that a declaration to adjudge the sale deeds voidable must have been sought as it stood “adverse to the interest and right of the plaintiff” and caused a serious injury. (Para 19)
  • As regards the conveyance in 1952, it was found that the right to sue had first accrued to the predecessors of the plaintiff, when the properties were brought for sale by the court in1952; and that “no challenge was made to the court auction“. (Para 19.1)
  • As regards fraud in relation to the compromise decrees, the Apex Court pointed out that the averments in the plaint are “vague and general, besides baseless and unsubstantiated”; and, it was found that no case can be culled out from the averments made in the plaint” in this respect.  It was further observed that the Plaintiff was a stranger to the suits which ended in compromise. Therefore, in view of the direct bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC, applicable to third parties as well, the plaintiff could not have sought a declaration theron (Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh, (2020) 6 SCC 629), and the only remedy available was to approach the same court. (Para25)

The Apex Court Rejected the Plaint Observing the Following:

  • As settled in law, when an application to reject the plaint is filed, the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith alone are germane (Para 11, 12).
  • Though limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and question of ‘limitation’ has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record, if the averments made in the plaint, on bare perusal, disclosed that the reliefs were hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant to reject the suit under Order VII Rule 11 (Para 18, 26).
  • As per Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a declaration to adjudge the documents as void or voidable must be sought if it causes a serious injury. In the present case, the sale deeds “undisputably stand adverse to the interest and right of the plaintiff” and hence, a relief to declare them as invalid must have been sought. Though the plaintiff has pleaded the documents to be void and sought to ignore the documents, we do not think that the document is void, but rather, according to us, it can only be treated as voidable. (Para 19).
  • In paragraph 14 of the plaint, there is an averment that the original sanad was lost and a new sanad was given to the effect that the inam was a “revenue grant” based on the report of the Inam Commissioner. Again, specific dates are not mentioned in the plaint. In paragraph 25, the plaintiff alleges that “third party rights were created” by the Gosavi family without any right. Here also, the details are vague. It can be inferred that such rights ultimately culminated into court auction, in which, the property was sold to the appellant. (Para 19).
  • The Plaintiff is a “stranger to the suit properties”; the Defendants are the owners of the suit properties. It is a settled principle of law that the owners cannot be restrained from dealing with their own properties at the instance of a stranger. The said relief is again a consequential relief to the claim of title, which has been non-suited on the ground of limitation. The relief of title (founded on a plea of fraud) had to be established by the plaintiff, by a ‘declaration’. (Para 22, 24).
  • The plaintiff is to be non-suited on the ground of limitation; because, the limitation period is 3 years for both Article 58 (declaration) and Article 59 (cancellation of a decree) Limitation Act (Para 19.1, 20).
  • The case put forwarded by the Plaintiff as to fraud and compromise decrees are “vague and general, besides baseless and unsubstantiated” (only remedy on such situation lies in the same court) (Para 25).
  • It is not correct to contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application at all in the event the transaction is held to be void. [Relied on: Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353.]
  • The plaintiff has failed to sue the defendant for possession within twelve years of losing possession (para 23).

Nevertheless, allowing the appeal, the Apex Court observed in the penultimate paragraph as under:

  • “26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court.
  • We again place it on record that this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is committed which had recently come to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff and his predecessors did not take any steps to assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of action is also found to be creation of fiction. However, the trial Court erroneously dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC.
  • The High Court also erred in affirming the same, keeping the question of limitation open to be considered by the trial Court after considering the evidence along with other issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the averments made by the Respondent No.1 in the Plaint as mandated by Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC.
  • The spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC is only for the Courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex facie appears to be a clear abuse of process. The Courts by being reluctant only cause more harm to the defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence. Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold.”

A Criticism

Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 primarily governs the Law on Adverse Possession. According to this Article –

  • the starting point of Limitation is “When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.”

Articles 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:

65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.12 yearsWhen the possession of Defendant becomes
adverse to the plaintiff.

Art. 65 underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned (from 1908 Limitation Act). It casts the entire burden on the claimant/trespasser to plead and prove adverse possession.

Plaintiff need not have filed the suit within 12 years of losing possession

It is noteworthy – under Article 65, the plaintiff need not have come before the court within 12 years of losing possession; the period of 12 years has significance only if the defendant asserts “adverse possession”.

  • Because, the 12-year-period stated in Article 65 is not the period of
    • “mere losing possession” by the plaintiff;
  • on the contrary, what is stated is 12 years of
    • “adverse possession”
  • from the part of the defendant (with the required animus).

Finding in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati as to Recovery of Possession – Appears to be Incorrect

After definitely holding that the title claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation under Article 58 (declaration) and Article 59 (cancellation of a decree) of the Limitation Act, the Apex Court considered, in paragraph 23 of the Judgment, as an additional ground, whether the suit is barred under Article 65 of the Limitation Act that deals with ‘adverse possession’. It is observed that the plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State, for possession, within twelve years. (Therefore the suit is liable to be rejected on this ground also.)

Para 23 reads as under:

  • “23. Further, in the aforesaid suit, the Respondent No.1 also sought possession of the suit properties based on title. As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title can be sought within twelve years. From the records, it is evident that the possession of the subject properties was initially with the Government of Maharashtra, then with the Gonsavis and thereafter with the Defendant No. 1 and it can be safely said that at least for a century, the Respondent No. 1 nor his predecessors have been in possession of the properties after the grant of Inam. The plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State for possession within twelve years. We have already held that the title claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and therefore, the claim for possession is also barred and consequently, the relief of recovery of possession is also hopelessly barred by limitation.”

But it is trite law – to attract ‘Adverse Possession’ mere possession, however long,  is insufficient; it must be ‘adverse‘.

Limitation Act underwent Complete Change insofar as the ‘Onus’ 

In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988, our Apex Court (following P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59) pointed out that that the Limitation Act, 1963 underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned (from 1908 Limitation Act). The Court observed as under:

  • “34. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned : once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession….”

In T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570, it has been held as under:

  • “20. It is well-recognised proposition in law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner’s title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former’s hostile action.” (Quoted in: Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 2011 SC 1480, 2010 14 SCC 316)

In Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, 2019-15 SCC 756, it is held as under:

  • “It is a settled principle of law that mere continuous possession howsoever long it may have been qua its true owner is not enough to sustain the plea of adverse possession unless it is further proved that such possession was open, hostile, exclusive and with the assertion of ownership right over the property to the knowledge of its true owner.”

The law on this point (i.e., mere possession, however long,  is insufficient; but, it must be “adverse“, to attract ‘Adverse Possession’) is laid down in the following decisions also:

  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988
  • Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461,
  • Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) 8 SCC 729
  • Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai, 2019-13 SCC 324
  • Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, 2019-15 SCC 756
  • Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba  Rao, 2010-14 SCC 316
  • T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa – 2006(7) SCC 570.
  • Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India – (2004) 10 SCC 779.
  • Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, 1994-6 SCC 591
  • Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chandar 1984(2) SCC 286.

A Brief Note on Article 65

  • Article 65 deals with recovery based on title.
  • Under Article 65, in a suit on title, previous period in dispossession of plaintiff is immaterial. The onus is no longer on the plaintiff to prove that his dispossession took place within the period of limitation. (Jagannath Garnaik v. Sankar Samal, AIR 1990 Ori 124; State of Orissa v Jhunjhunwalla, 1986 CLT 55)  
  • Under Article 65, once title is established by the plaintiff, plaintiff cannot be non-suited, unless defendant establishes adverse possession.  (Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549; Bhushan Lal v. Suresh Kumar, AIR 1987 All 25,  Manikyala Rao v. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1996 SC 470; Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021.)
  • Under Article 65, if plaintiff could not prove his title, he will fail; and in such a case, whether the defendant proves title (or not) is immaterial. (Ranjit Kumar Bhowmik v.  Subodh Kumar Roy, (2004) I WBLR 228: (2004) 2 CHN 180).

‘Deemed Knowledge’ as to Registration to Persons Acquiring such Property

The Apex Court (in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati) referred to Dilboo v. Dhanraji, AIR 2000 SC 3146 : 2000-7 SCC 702, held as under:

  • “20…… Whenever a document is registered the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge. In other cases where a fact could be discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to the plaintiff because a party cannot be allowed to extend the period of limitation by merely claiming that he had no knowledge.”

It is noteworthy that the ‘deemed knowledge’ as to registration is confined to ‘persons acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property’ alone, as per Section 3 Explanation 1 of the TP Act. It reads as under:

  • “Explanation I – Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instruments, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or (where the property is not all situated in one sub-district….”

Registration is not a notice in rem

In Parganas Lawyers Clerks Association  v. State, AIR 1986  Cal. 205, it is unequivocally held as to Registration of deeds – “It is not a notice in rem“.

The law expounded in Explanation to Sec. 3 of the TP Act cannot be used as a shield to protect from the criminal actions on willful suppression of facts, in a criminal matter, as held in Kuldip Singh v. State, AIR 1954 P&H 31, it was observed as under:

  • “The object of the explanation to Section 3 is to safeguard the interests of a third party who has acquired a good title under a previous registered instrument but it does not in any way alter or modify the criminal liability of a person who deliberately suppresses certain facts or misstates certain facts.”

Law on this point is vividly explained in the following decisions:

  • Kuldip Singh v. State, AIR 1954 P&H 31
  • Parganas Lawyers Clerks Association  v. State, AIR 1986  Cal. 205,
  • Godhan Son of Pola v. Ram Bilas, AIR 1995 All. 357
  • R. Ravichandran v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 2002-2-LW 590
  • Arabia Bibi v. Sarbunnisa (2011, R. Subbiah, J.),
  • Ranjit Singh v. Punjab State, 2014-4 LawHerald 3533; 2014-3 RCR(Civ) 766

Read Blog: Does Registration of a Document give Notice to the Whole World?

Conclusion

(i) Law as to seeking declaration

The Apex Court vividly expounded the law as regards adjudging the documents as void or voidable invoking Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court pointed out that the plaintiff being challenged (i) the sale made by his predecessor itself, and also (ii) the auction sale conducted by a Civil Court, it was necessary to seek declarations in those regard.

(ii) Law on Adverse Possession

Nonetheless, as shown above, it is beyond doubt that mere possession, however long, is not sufficient to bring home the doctrine of adverse possession; but, it must have been held “adverse” to the interests of the true owner for the stipulated period and must have been tracked with the required animus from the part of the claimant.

Therefore, it can be stated – in accordance with Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963,

  • unless the defendant asserts and proves ‘adverse possession’, the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title need not be sought (by the plaintiff) within twelve years of losing possession.

Read Blog: How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept

End Notes – 1

Law on Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

Whether a declaration to adjudge the documents as void or voidable must be sought if it causes a serious injury?

End Notes – 2

Relevant portion of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

“3. Interpretation clause

……

  • a person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.
  • Explanation I.—Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated:
  • Provided that—(1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder, (2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under section 51 of that Act, and(3)the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under section 55 of that Act.
  • Explanation II.—Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.
  • Explanation III.—A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material:
  • Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud.”

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A Criticism on Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle: Rejection of Plaint on ‘Bar of Limitation’ on Plea of Fraud

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

On December 20, 2024 our Apex Court, in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, held –

  • a plaint deserves rejection under Order VII rule 11, CPC if the pleadings contained therein is founded on forgery or fabrication (of documents) that came to the knowledge of the plaintiff decades back,
  • for, such a claim would be hopelessly barred by limitation (as it is governed under Article 59, Limitation Act which fixes period of limitation as 3 years) [Paras 18, 20, 22, 26].

In paragraph 23 of the Judgment, while dealing with ‘adverse possession’, the Court observed as under:

  • “As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title can be sought within twelve years. …. The plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State for possession within twelve years.”

Facts of the Case, in Brief

  • The plaintiff alleged that the defendants have played systematic fraud on various courts, and without any judicial pronouncements they usurped the lands, under suspicious compromises arrived at before the Court.
  • Though the alleged forgery or fabrication had been come to the knowledge of the plaintiff and his predecessors long back (more than 50 years), they did not take any step to assert their title and rights.
  • The defendant filed application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC r/w Articles 58, 59 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking rejection of the plaint.
  • The trial Court rejected the application. It observed that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, for which, the parties will have to lead evidence.
  • The High Court dismissed the Civil Revision Application. Hence the SLP.

Analysis

The Court specifically considered the effect of (i) not seeking cancellation of the disputed deeds in the light of Sec. 31 of the Specific Relief Act (ii) not challenging a sale by the court in 1952 and that by the predecessors of the plaintiff and (iii) the averments in the plaint as regards fraud in relation to the compromise decrees.

  • As regards Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Apex Court found that a declaration to adjudge the sale deeds voidable must have been sought as it stood “adverse to the interest and right of the plaintiff” and caused a serious injury. (Para 19)
  • As regards the conveyance in 1952, it was found that the right to sue had first accrued to the predecessors of the plaintiff, when the properties were brought for sale by the court in1952; and that “no challenge was made to the court auction”. (Para 19.1)
  • As regards fraud in relation to the compromise decrees, the Apex Court pointed out that the averments in the plaint are “vague and general, besides baseless and unsubstantiated”; and, it was found that “no case can be culled out from the averments made in the plaint” in this respect.  It was further observed that the Plaintiff was a stranger to the suits which ended in compromise. Therefore, in view of the direct bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC, applicable to third parties as well, the plaintiff could not have sought a declaration theron (Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh, (2020) 6 SCC 629), and the only remedy available was to approach the same court. (Para25)

Analysing the legal principles the Court held –

  • As settled in law, when an application to reject the plaint is filed, the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith alone are germane (Para 11, 12).
  • Though limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and question of ‘limitation’ has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record, if the averments made in the plaint, on a bare perusal, disclosed that the reliefs were hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant to reject the suit under Order VII Rule 11 (Para 18, 26).
  • A suit founded on fraud, must be proceeded with a ‘declaration’. Period of limitation for such a declaration (governed under under Article 58, Limitation Act) as well as that for cancellation of a decree (governed under under Article 59, Limitation Act) is 3 years (Para 19.1, 20).

The Apex Court Rejected the Plaint for the Following:

  • Plaintiff is a stranger. The relief of title (founded on a plea of fraud) had to be established by the plaintiff, by a ‘declaration’ (Para 24, 25).
  • The plaintiff is to be non-suited on the ground of limitation; because, the limitation period is 3 years for both Article 58 (declaration) and Article 59 (cancellation of a decree) Limitation Act (Para 19.1, 20).
  • The case put forwarded by the Plaintiff as to fraud and compromise decrees are “vague and general, besides baseless and unsubstantiated” (only remedy on such situation lies in the same court) (Para 25).
  • It is not correct to contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application at all in the event the transaction is held to be void. [Relied on: Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353.]

Nevertheless, allowing the appeal, the Apex Court observed in the penultimate paragraph as under:

  • “26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court.
  • We again place it on record that this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is committed which had recently come to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff and his predecessors did not take any steps to assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of action is also found to be creation of fiction. However, the trial Court erroneously dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC.
  • The High Court also erred in affirming the same, keeping the question of limitation open to be considered by the trial Court after considering the evidence along with other issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the averments made by the Respondent No.1 in the Plaint as mandated by Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC.
  • The spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC is only for the Courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex facie appears to be a clear abuse of process. The Courts by being reluctant only cause more harm to the defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence. Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold.”

A Criticism

Finding in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati as to Recovery of Possession – Appears to be Incorrect

After definitely holding that the title claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation under Article 58 (declaration) and Article 59 (cancellation of a decree) of the Limitation Act, the Apex Court considered, in paragraph 23 of the Judgment, as an additional ground, whether the suit is barred under Article 65 of the Limitation Act that deals with ‘adverse possession’. It is observed that the plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State, for possession, within twelve years. (Therefore the suit is liable to be rejected on this ground also.)

Para 23, reads as under:

  • 23. Further, in the aforesaid suit, the Respondent No.1 also sought possession of the suit properties based on title. As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title can be sought within twelve years. From the records, it is evident that the possession of the subject properties was initially with the Government of Maharashtra, then with the Gonsavis and thereafter with the Defendant No.1 and it can be safely said that at least for a century, the Respondent No.1 nor his predecessors have been in possession of the properties after the grant of Inam. The plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the State for possession within twelve years. We have already held that the title claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and therefore, the claim for possession is also barred and consequently, the relief of recovery of possession is also hopelessly barred by limitation.”

But it is trite law – to attract ‘Adverse Possession’ mere possession, however long,  is insufficient; it must be ‘adverse‘.

Adverse Possession ‘Drastic’ Change of Law by 1963 Limitation Act

Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 primarily governs the Law on Adverse Possession. According to this Article –

  • the starting point of Limitation is “When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.”

Articles 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:

65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.12 yearsWhen the possession of Defendant becomes
adverse to the plaintiff.

Complete change insofar as the Onus Under 1963 Limitation Act

Art. 65 underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned (from 1908 Limitation Act). It casts the entire burden on the claimant/trespasser to plead and prove adverse possession.

Plaintiff need not have filed the suit within 12 years of losing possession

It is noteworthy – under Article 65, the plaintiff need not have come before the court within 12 years of losing possession; the period of 12 years has significance only if the defendant asserts “adverse possession”.

  • Because, the 12-year-period stated in Article 65 is not the period of
    • “mere losing possession” by the plaintiff;
  • on the contrary, what is stated is 12 years of
    • “adverse possession”
  • from the part of the defendant (with the required animus).

Limitation Act underwent Complete Change insofar as the ‘Onus’ 

In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988, our Apex Court (following P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59) pointed out that that the Limitation Act 1963 underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned (from 1908 Limitation Act). The Court observed as under:

  • “34. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned : once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession….”

The authoritative decisions say – mere possession, however long,  is insufficient; it must be adverse (to attract ‘Adverse Possession’). The law on this point (not mere long possession, but ‘Adverse Possession’ required by the drastic change in 1963 Act) is clearly laid down in the following decisions also:

  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023  SC 3988
  • Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461,
  • Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) 8 SCC 729
  • Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai, 2019-13 SCC 324
  • Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, 2019-15 SCC 756
  • Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba  Rao, 2010-14 SCC 316
  • T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa – 2006(7) SCC 570.
  • Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India – (2004) 10 SCC 779
  • Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, 1994-6 SCC 591
  • Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chandar 1984(2) SCC 286.

In T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570, it has been held as under:

  • “20. It is well-recognised proposition in law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner’s title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former’s hostile action.” (Quoted in: Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 2011 SC 1480, 2010 14 SCC 316)

In Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, 2019-15 SCC 756, it is held as under:

  • “It is a settled principle of law that mere continuous possession howsoever long it may have been qua its true owner is not enough to sustain the plea of adverse possession unless it is further proved that such possession was open, hostile, exclusive and with the assertion of ownership right over the property to the knowledge of its true owner.”

A Brief Note on Article 65

As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, starting point of Limitation is “When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.”

  • Article 65 deals with recovery based on title.
  • Under Article 65, in a suit on title, previous period in dispossession of plaintiff is immaterial. The onus is no longer on the plaintiff to prove that his dispossession took place within the period of limitation. (Jagannath Garnaik v. Sankar Samal, AIR 1990 Ori 124; State of Orissa v Jhunjhunwalla, 1986 CLT 55)  
  • Under Article 65, if plaintiff could establish his title, it would fail only if the defendant proves adverse possession over twelve years. (Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549; Bhushan Lal v. Suresh Kumar, AIR 1987 All 25,  Manikyala Rao v. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1996 SC 470; Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021.)
  • Under Article 65, if plaintiff could not prove his title, he will fail; and in such a case, whether the defendant proves title (or not) is immaterial. (Ranjit Kumar Bhowmik v.  Subodh Kumar Roy, (2004) I WBLR 228: (2004) 2 CHN 180).

Conclusion

The Apex Court vividly expounded the law as regards adjudging the documents as void or voidable invoking Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court pointed out that the plaintiff being challenged (i) the sale made by his predecessor itself, and also (ii) the auction sale conducted by a Civil Court, it was necessary to seek declarations in those regard.

Nonetheless, as shown above, it is indisputable that mere possession, however long, is not sufficient to bring home the doctrine of adverse possession; rather, it must be shown that such possession was held “adverse” to the interests of the rightful owner for the prescribed period and it must have been endured with the requisite animus on the part of the claimant.

Therefore, it can be stated that in accordance with Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, unless the defendant asserts and proves ‘adverse possession’

  • the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title need not have been sought (by the plaintiff) within twelve years of losing possession.

Read Blog: How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept

End Notes:

Order VII rule 11 CPC reads as under:

“11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases-

  • (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
  • (b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
  • (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
  • (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
  • (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:
  • Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”

Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

“3. Interpretation clause.

  • a person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.
  • Explanation I.- Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated:
  • Provided that-(1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder, (2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under section 51 of that Act, and(3)the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under section 55 of that Act.
  • Explanation II.-Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.
  • Explanation III.-A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material: Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud.”

Rulings relied on:

Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra), (2020) 7 SCC 366

  • “23.2. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision.
  • 23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit,
    • no cause of action is disclosed, or
    • the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d),
  • the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.
  • 23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315 (Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823) this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words : (SCC p.324, para 12)
  • 23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
  • 23.6. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint (Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. V. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512), read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.
  • 23.7. Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under:
    • “14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.-
    • Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
    • Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
    • A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
    • Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”(emphasis supplied)
  • 23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.
  • 23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.
  • 23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration (Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137).
  • 23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I which reads as : (SCC p.562, para 139)
    • “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.”
  • 23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614, the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999) 3 SCC 267).
  • 23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
  • 23.14. The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain (supra).
  • 23.15. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint.
  • 24. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.
  • 24.1. In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam, (2005) 10 SCC 51, this Court held:
    • “24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove an order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded”(emphasis supplied)
  • 24.2. In T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, this Court held that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory, in the following words: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
    • “5. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing.”(emphasis supplied)
  • 24.3. Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 170, this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint.
  • 24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174, held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court.
  • 25. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section 2(j) defines the expression “period of limitation” to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary article.
Description of suitPeriod of limitationTime from which period begins to run
58. To obtain any other declarationThree yearsWhen the right to sue first accrues
59. To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contractThree yearsWhen the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
  • The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and 59 of the 1963 Act is three years, which commences from the date when the right to sue first accrues.
  • 27. In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126, this Court held that the use of the word ‘first’ between the words ‘sue’ and ‘accrued’, would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued.
  • 28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082, held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words “right to sue” means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected.”

R.K. Mohd. Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab, (2000) 6 SCC 402

  • “15. Notice is defined in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be actual where the party has actual knowledge of the fact or constructive. “A person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.
  • Explanation II of said Section 3 reads:
    • “Explanation II.-Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.”

Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar, (1968) 2 SCJ 555 : AIR 1968 SC 956

  • “5. The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable. In Foster v. Mackinon [(1869) 4 CP 704] the action was by the endorsee of a bill of exchange. The defendant pleaded that he endorsed the bill on a fraudulent representation by the acceptor that he was signing a guarantee. In holding that such a plea was admissible, the Court observed:
    • “It (signature) is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and therefore in contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended. The defendant never intended to sign that contract or any such contract. He never intended to put his name to any instrument that then was or thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived, not merely as to the legal effect, but as to the ‘actual contents’ of the instrument.”
  • This decision has been followed by the Indian courts Sanni Bibi v. Siddik Hossain [AIR 1919 Cal 728], and Brindaban v. Dhurba Charan [AIR 1929 Cal 606]. It is not the contention of the appellant in the present case that there was any fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the gift deed but Shiddappa fraudulently included in the gift deed plots 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village without her knowledge. We are accordingly of the opinion that the transaction of gift was voidable and not void and the suit must be brought within the time prescribed under Article 95 of the Limitation Act.”

Dilboo v. Dhanraji, (2000) 7 SCC 702

  • “20. Whenever a document is registered the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge. In other cases where a fact could be discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to the plaintiff because a party cannot be allowed to extend the period of limitation by merely claiming that he had no knowledge

Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa, (1996) 7 SCC 767

  • “5. Section 55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 regulates rights and liabilities of the buyer and seller. The seller is bound to disclose to the buyer any material defect in the property or in the seller’s title thereto of which the seller is, and the buyer is not, aware, and which the buyer could not with ordinary care discover. The seller is to answer, to the best of his information, all relevant questions put to him by the buyer in respect of the property or the title thereto. The seller shall be deemed to contract with the buyer that the interest which the seller professes to transfer to the buyer subsists and that he has power to transfer the same.
  • Section 3 provides that “a person is said to have a notice of a fact when he actually knows the fact, or when but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it”. Explanation II amplifies that “any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof”. Constructive notice in equity treats a man who ought to have known a fact, as if he actually knows it. Generally speaking, constructive notice may not be inferred unless some specific circumstances can be shown as a starting point of enquiry which if pursued would have led to the discovery of the fact.
  • As a fact it is found that Rafique filed the sale deed dated 1-12- 1959 executed in his favour by Mahangu, in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 for which the petitioner claims to have derivative title through Rafique. Rafique had full knowledge that despite the purported sale, Bibi Raifunnisa got the preliminary decree passed in 1973 and in 1974 under the final decree the right, title and interest in the suit property passed on to her. Under Section 55 when second sale deed dated 6-9-1980 was got executed by the petitioner from Rafique, it is imputable that Rafique had conveyed all the knowledge of the defects in title and he no longer had title to the property.
  • It is also a finding of fact recorded by the appellate court and affirmed by the High Court that the petitioner was in know of full facts of the preliminary decree and the final decree passed and execution thereof. In other words, the finding is that he had full knowledge, from the inception of Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 from his benamidar. Having had that knowledge, he got the second sale deed executed and registered on 6-9-1980. Oblivious to these facts, he did not produce the second original sale deed nor is an attempt made to produce secondary evidence on proof of the loss of original sale deed.
  • 6. The question, therefore, is as to whether Article 59 or Article 113 of the Schedule to the Act is applicable to the facts in this case. Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 had provided inter alia for suits to set aside decree obtained by fraud. There was no specific article to set aside a decree on any other ground. In such a case, the residuary Article 120 in Schedule III was attracted. The present Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act will govern any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. Therefore, Article 59 would be applicable to any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground.
  • It is true that Article 59 would be applicable if a person affected is a party to a decree or an instrument or a contract. There is no dispute that Article 59 would apply to set aside the instrument, decree or contract between the inter se parties. The question is whether in case of person claiming title through the party to the decree or instrument or having knowledge of the instrument or decree or contract and seeking to avoid the decree by a specific declaration, whether Article 59 gets attracted? As stated earlier, Article 59 is a general provision. In a suit to set aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud, Article 59 is attractedThe starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud.
  • When the plaintiff seeks to establish his title to the property which cannot be established without avoiding the decree or an instrument that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him, though not a party, the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set aside or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 regulates suits for cancellation of an instrument which lays down that any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, can sue to have it adjudged void or voidable and the court may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered or cancelled.
  • It would thus be clear that the word ‘person’ in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is wide enough to encompass a person seeking derivative title from his seller. It would, therefore, be clear that if he seeks avoidance of the instrument, decree or contract and seeks a declaration to have the decrees set aside or cancelled he is necessarily bound to lay the suit within three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set aside, first became known to him.
  • 7. The question, therefore, is as to when the facts of granting preliminary and final decrees touching upon the suit land first became known to him. As seen, when he claimed title to the property as owner and Rafique to be his benamidar, as admitted by Rafique, the title deed dated 1-12-1959 was filed in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969. Thereby Rafique had first known about the passing of the preliminary decree in 1973 and final decree in 1974 as referred to earlier. Under all these circumstances, Article 113 is inapplicable to the facts on hand.
  • Since the petitioner claimed derivative title from him but for his wilful abstention from making enquiry or his omission to file the second sale deed dated 6-9-1980, an irresistible inference was rightly drawn by the courts below that the petitioner had full knowledge of the fact right from the beginning; in other words right from the date when title deed was filed in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 and preliminary decree was passed on 2-1-1973 and final decree was passed on 5-2-1974. Admittedly, the suit was filed in 1981 beyond three years from the date of knowledge. Thereby, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The decree of the appellate court and the order of the High Court, therefore, are not illegal warranting interference.”

Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353

  • “11. Limitation is a statute of repose. It ordinarily bars a remedy, but, does not extinguish a right. The only exception to the said rule is to be found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides that at the determination of the period prescribed thereby, limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.
  • 12. An extinction of right, as contemplated by the provisions of the Limitation Act, prima facie would be attracted in all types of suits. The Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, as prescribed by the articles, provides that upon lapse of the prescribed period, the institution of a suit will be barred. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that irrespective of the fact as to whether any defence is set out or is raised by the defendant or not, in the event a suit is found to be barred by limitation, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and every application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed.
  • 13. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when a relief is claimed on the ground of fraud or mistake. It only encompasses within its fold fraudulent transactions which are voidable transactions.
  • 14. A suit for cancellation of instrument is based on the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under:
    • “31. When cancellation may be ordered.-Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
    • If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.”
  • 15. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 thus, refers to both void and voidable documents. It provides for a discretionary relief.
  • 16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non est in the eye of the law, as it would be a nullity.
  • 17. Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by Article 59. Even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary article would be.
  • 18. Article 59 would be attracted when coercion, undue influence, misappropriation or fraud which the plaintiff asserts is required to be proved. Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore, apply where a document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to instruments which are presumptively invalid. (See Unni v. Kunchi Amma [ILR (1891) 14 Mad 26] and Sheo Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri [ILR (1897) 24 Cal 77].)
  • 19. It is not in dispute that by reason of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the scope has been enlarged from the old Article 91 of the 1908 Act. By reason of Article 59, the provisions contained in Articles 91 and 114 of the 1908 Act had been combined.
  • 20. If the plaintiff is in possession of a property, he may file a suit for declaration that the deed is not binding upon him but if he is not in possession thereof, even under a void transaction, the right by way of adverse possession may be claimed. Thus, it is not correct to contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application at all in the event the transaction is held to be void.
  • 21. Respondent 1 has not alleged that fraudulent misrepresentation was made to him as regards the character of the document. According to him, there had been a fraudulent misrepresentation as regards its contents.
  • 22. In Ningawwa v. Byrappa [(1968) 2 SCR 797 : AIR 1968 SC 956] this Court held that the fraudulent misrepresentation as regards character of a document is void but fraudulent misrepresentation as regards contents of a document is voidable stating: (SCR p. 801 C-D)
    • “The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable.”
  • In that case, a fraud was found to have been played and it was held that as the suit was instituted within a few days after the appellant therein came to know of the fraud practised on her, the same was void. It was, however, held: (SCR p. 803 B-E)
    • “Article 91 of the Limitation Act provides that a suit to set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for (and no other provision of the Act applies to the circumstances of the case) shall be subject to a three years’ limitation which begins to run when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside are known to him.
    • In the present case, the trial court has found, upon examination of the evidence, that at the very time of the execution of the gift deed, Ext. 45 the appellant knew that her husband prevailed upon her to convey Surveys Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village to him by undue influence. The finding of the trial court is based upon the admission of the appellant herself in the course of her evidence. In view of this finding of the trial court it is manifest that the suit of the appellant is barred under Article 91 of the Limitation Act so far as Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village are concerned.”
  • “27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.
  • 28. If a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property purportedly conveyed thereunder. He could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority. Here, the plaintiff did not either sue within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority. Therefore, the suit was rightly held to be barred by limitation by the trial court.”

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Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land-Owners/Tenants?

Jojy George Koduvath.

Abstract

In the context of Acquisition, it is necessary to examine three categories of plantation lands.

  • 1. Private plantation lands.
  • 2. Government lands on lease for plantation.
  • 3. Plantation-lease-lands vested in Government under Sec. 72 of the KLR Act (and formerly owned by private persons).

GENERAL

1. Chapter III – Exemption of Plantation Land

Chapter III (Sections 81 to 98A) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 deals with ‘Restriction on Ownership and Possession of Land in Excess of Ceiling Area and Disposal of Excess Lands’.

Among other things, Chapter III lays down provisions as to:

  • ceiling limit,
  • exemptions from ceiling limit,
  • effect of conversion of exempted land.

2. Sec. 81(1)says that the provisions of Chapter III shall not apply to –

  • lands owned or held by the Government,
  • private forests, 
  • plantations, etc.
  • Note: 1. Section 81(1) exempts Government lands from the provisions of Chapter III. The Proviso says that following Government lands will not stand exempted. 
    • 1. Government-lease-lands
    • 2. Lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and
    • 3. Lands that fall under Section 72 (Lease lands vest in Government).
  • 2. The effect of Chapter III on Government-lease-lands and on the lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and 72 (vest in Government) is that the tenants (both Government’s tenants and the erstwhile Private landholders’ tenants) have to pay ‘rent‘ to the Government under Sec. 72F(h).
  • 3. Section 81(4)permits use of the land not exceeding 5% of the extent of such holding for floriculture, dairy farms, hotels, restaurants, etc.

3. Fixity, Vesting in Govt. and Purchase Certificate:

  • Sec. 13 says – every tenant (who pays rent) has fixity. But, holdings held by cultivating tenants (in actual possession) alone will vest in Govt., under Section 72(1).
  • Purchase certificates can be obtained by ‘cultivating tenants’ only whose lands are vested in Govt. according to Sec. 72B and 72C. (Sec. 53 purchase also.)
  • Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of leasehold properties held by ‘cultivating tenants’ in Govt.  (ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845). 

PART I

ACQUISITION OF PLANTATION-LANDS OWNED BY PRIVATE PERSONS

1. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India

It is plain – No compensation is payable to the land-owners, for the lands ‘above the ceiling limit’, according to the Constitution of India. If any authority gives it, it will be sheer “corruption”.

  • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit.
  • Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India reads as under:
    “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivationit shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”.
  • Under Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act, on acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Sec. 72.
    Sec. 112 (5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the landowner shall be awarded to the Government; and clause (b) says that the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • The effect of Chapter III on Government-lease-lands and on the lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and 72 (vest in Government) is that the tenants (both Government’s tenants and the erstwhile Private landholders’ tenants) have to pay ‘rent‘ to the Government under Sec. 72F(h).
  • Section 81(4)permits use of the land not exceeding 5% of the extent of such holding for floriculture, dairy farms, hotels, restaurants, etc.

2. Exemption of ‘Plantation’ Does Not Cover Exemption of ‘Plantation LAND’

It is for the following reasons –

  • 1. The exemption is to the ‘plantation’, and not to the ‘LAND‘.
  • 2. Exemption is conditional – for it exists (only) as long as the plantation exists or continues;
  • Because,
    • (a) S. 2(44) defines ‘plantation’ as land used principally for the cultivation of a specific ‘plantation crop‘ like tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber etc.
    • (b) Section 87, Explanation II states that if a plantation for which exemption is given on recognition of a specific ‘plantation-crop’ is converted into any other ‘plantation-crop’ or the plantation activity is not continued, the exemption may be lost; and the land will be taken for considering the ceiling limit.

3. Effect of CONVERTION TO ANY OTHER CLASS 

Sec. 87 Exp. II  provides – If CONVERTED TO ANY OTHER CLASS and the person (who gets the property) owns excess of ceiling area – the excess shall be deemed to be land acquired (and fall under Sec. 87) .

Explanation II of Sec. 87 reads as under:

  • “Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.”
  • Sec. 87(1A) provides – Person referred to above (transferee) also should file statement (Return).
    • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).

4. No Total Prohibition in using Exempted Land for a Different Purpose

Explanation II does not make a total bar. It only causes to lose benefit of the exemption to a certain extent. That is, if a person converts any portion of his exempted land to any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit; and the Taluk Land Board can proceed upon that (excess) land. In short, the exemption will be lost for that portion. In this premises, in Wayanad Granites v. District Collector, 2023-4 KLT 874, it is held that ‘fragmentation is per se not illegal’. similarly, in District Collector v. Sajith Lal, 2023-4 KLJ 851, it is held that ‘there is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non-exempted purposes as well’.

In Mathew K.T v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024, in the light of earlier decisions, observed that there is no total prohibition in using an exempted land for a different purpose under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The impediment or restriction is (only) the following –

  • If a portion of the exempted land is utilised for any other purpose, that would fall within his ceiling area and the authorities may be able to initiate ceiling proceedings.

5. The Full Bench decision, Mathew K. Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority [AIR 2019 Ker. 67, affirmed by the Supreme Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob, 2020-14 SCC 126] held as under:

  • “We however add that any class of land earlier exempted in the ceiling case can be converted into any class of land not liable to be exempted under Explanation II to Section 87 of the Act. The consequence is that the benefit of the exemption would be lost and the extent added to the account of the assessee or the declarant in determination of his ceiling area. That is a matter to be dealt with by the Taluk Land Board with the assessee or the declarant and other interested parties on the party array and we desist from elaborating further.”

6. In District Collector v. Sajith Lal (2023-4 KLJ 851; 2023 KLT OnLine 1225) it is held as under:

  • “5. There is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non- exempted purposes as well. If the land is used for non-exempted purposes, the holder of the land will lose the qualification for exemption, thus giving authority to the Land Board to initiate ceiling proceedings.” (Quoted in: Mathew K.T v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024)

7. No Embargo to Transfer Plantation Land

In R. V.  Devassia v. Sub Registrar, Idukki, 2015-1 ILR(Ker) 1047; 2015-1 KHC 805; 2015-2 KLJ 17, it is held as under:

  • “9. On promulgation of the KLR Act in the State, the entire landed property in the State is subjected to State control as envisaged under the provisions of the KLR Act. No piece of the land escapes the clutches of the KLR Act including exempted land for ceiling purposes. The ceiling proceedings is a continuing proceedings and can be reopened in any of the circumstances, if so warranted, as contemplated under Section 87 of the KLR Act. Exemption granted from ceiling is the qualification to use the land in a particular manner, which means a burden is imposed on the land. The moment the qualification for exemption is vanished by conversion of the land, the protection from ceiling will also be extinguished to bring the land within the fold of the ceiling area. The exemption is in the nature of a burden on the land to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted. The eminent domain power of the State can be exercised for acquiring land without consent and also to regulate the use of land in public interest. The eminent domain is power inherent in any Sovereign State. This burden would bind the holder of the land as on 01/01/1970 and the successor-in-interest. The Division Bench of this Court in the State Human Rights Protection Centre, Thrissur and another v. State of Kerala and others [2009 (3) ILR 695] held that exemption granted under S.81(1)(a) is for the land and would continue to operate irrespective of change of ownership of the exempted land and the transferee would have to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted.”

8. In Everest Stone Crusher and Granites v. District Collector, Kannur, 2020-6 KHC 289, it is observed as under:

  • “16. In Devassia R.V. this Court noticed that, the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act do not place any embargo on transfer. The transfer of registry is for fiscal purposes. The power of the competent authority to reopen the ceiling proceedings to include the land exempted for the purpose of ceiling is not lost on account of effecting mutation. Therefore, the Revenue Officials cannot refuse to effect mutation of the property purchased by the transferee.”

9. Effect of Fragmentation for Non-exempted Category

The decision in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985, arose from the Writ Petition filed for a declaration that the fragmentation and sale of a Rubber Plantation for non-plantation purposes was illegal as it defeated the purpose of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. When the matter was placed before the Taluk Land Board under Sec 87, KLR Act, it found that there was no change in classification of the land and therefore dropped the proceedings. The Court held as under:

  • “34. Section 81 of the KLR Act is in pith and substance a special provision, with its main objective of giving exemption to certain lands including the lands maintained as plantations is to prevent fragmentation of the land and to keep it as plantation itself to improve the economy of the state for welfare of people as a whole while the Act creates a regime, the State is under an obligation to safeguard, the intended purpose of the provisions of the Act in its spirit. ….. …… It could be gathered from the records that the proposal to transfer 1.03 acres of land to each workers in discharge of their service or retrenchment benefits will definitely divide the plantation into separate slots and that would definitely change the character/nature of the plantation, which could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act.”

9. Compensation to the Owner who Surrunders land within Ceiling limit

Sec. 88, KLR Act determines the compensation to the owners who surrunders land. It provides only nominal compensation (Maximum compensation is only Rs. 2 lakhs). No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter. Sec. 88 reads as under:

“88. Persons surrendering land entitled to compensation.

  • (1) Where ownership or possession or both of any land is vested in the Government under Section 86 or Section 87, such person shall be entitled to compensation. Where the rights of an intermediary are extinguished, such intermediary shall also be entitled to compensation.
  • (1A)  Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), no person shall be entitled to any compensation in respect of any land owned by the Government of Kerala and held by him under lease or otherwise.
  • (2) The compensation payable to an owner for the vesting in the Government of ownership and possession of land shall be an amount calculated at the rates specified in Schedule IV.
  • (3) The compensation payable to the landowner, intermediary or cultivating tenant for the vesting in the Government or extinguishment of his rights shall be the portion of an amount calculated at the rates specified in Schedule IV that will fall to his share if such amount were apportioned among the landowner, cultivating tenant and intermediary, if any, in respect of the land according to the following provisions:
  • .(i) ninety percent of the portion of the compensation for the site of any homestead or hut in the occupation of a kudikidappukaran shall be deducted from the total amount of compensation;
  • (ii) the balance remaining after deducting the amount referred to in clause (1) shall be apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land immediately before the surrender, assumption or vesting in the Government, as the case maybe.
  • Explanation. -“Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to
  • .(i) in the case of a landowner; the rent which he was entitled to get immediately before the 1st day of January, 1970, from the tenant holding immediately under aim;
  • (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get immediately before the 1st day of January, 1970, from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord immediately before that day; and
  • (iii) in the case of a cultivating Tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the said day.
  • (3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (3), where the compensation due under those Sub-sections to an adult unmarried person, family or any other person (other than a joint family), as owner, landowner, intermediary or cultivating tenant or in any two or more of such capacities exceeds one lakh rupees, the compensation payable shall be limited to the amount specified in the Table below:
  • TableScales of compensation
  • Total Amount of compensation                         Rate
  • On the first Rs. 1 lakh                                     100 per cent
  • On the next Rs. 50,000                                    30 per cent
  • On the balance amount                                    23 per cent:

Provided that the compensation payable shall in no case exceed:  Rs. 2 lakhs.

  • (4) Where the rights of a mortgagee in possession are vested in the Government –
  • .(i) Where the ownership of the land mortgaged [has vested in the Government the mortgagee shall be treated as a holder of an encumbrance in respect of the land, and the encumbrance shall be discharged as provided in Sections 91 and 92;
  • .(ii) in other cases, the Government shall pay to the mortgagee the amount to which he would have been entitled under clause (i) if the ownership of the land mortgaged (Iliad vested in) the Government, and hold the land as mortgagee with possession with all the rights and liabilities of the mortgagee.
  • (5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the compensation payable under this Section in respect of a land shall be deemed to include the compensation for growing crops and improvements, if any, thereon and that no person shall be entitled to any amount other than the compensation payable under this Section for The vesting in the Government or extinguishment of his rights (including his rights in respect of growing corps and improvements if any) in respect of the land.
Finale on Acquisition of Plantation Lands Owned By Private Persons
When plantation-land is acquired, there will be stark difference, between land within ceiling limit and that beyond ceiling limit.
The compensation as regards plantations above ceiling limit is not made mention of in the KLR Act. Article 31A of the Constitution of India does not ensure compensation above ceiling limit.

PART II

ACQUISITION” OF PLANTATION-LEASE-LANDS OWNED BY GOVT.

1. Sec. 81 exemptions do not apply to Government lands; But, Exemptions apply to (Government) lease-lands

Government-lease-lands are also exempted under Sec. 81(1)(a).

81(1)(a) Proviso says –

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease“.

This proviso is introduced in 1971. By virtue of this amendment (introducing Section 81(1)(a) Proviso) “Plantation-Exemption” takes effect on Government-lease-land (with tenants).

2. However, it must be noted that a ‘valid lease’ must exist. That is, the person in possession of government land should be a “lessee”; he must not be trespasser or a person who forfeit the title of Government.

Section 81(1)(a) Proviso reads as under:

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease whether current or time expired or otherwise.”

3. The word “otherwise” must be understood as a permissive occupation

In MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28, it is held-

  • “Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 81 by which “Government lands held under a lease current or time expired or otherwise” can be understood only as referring to such lands which are held by persons in permissive possessionThe word “otherwise” must be understood as a permissive occupation otherwise than under a lease. The word “otherwise” has no wider meaning in the context. So understood, the exemption to Clause (a) of that Section is perfectly legal and in that limited sense we uphold that provision as valid.”

4. Govt. Lands – No Fixity of Tenure, as Exempted u/s 3(1)(x)

Government lands are covered by the exemption u/s 3(1)(x) of the Land Reforms Act and therefore he cannot claim any fixity of tenure. It applies to lands shown in the settlement register and land register as the property as Temple puramboke.

(Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair M.N., (2013) 3 KLT 132, (T.R. Ramachandran NairJ; A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J.)

5. From the above, it is clear – by virtye of Sec. 81 exemption, though there is no ‘fixity of tenure’, there is “legal protection” to the tenants, to hold the land (so long as there is plantation crop) – without being affected by the ceiling (limit) in Chapter III.

Note: The net result is that such tenants are bound by the terms of the lease deeds.

Finale on Acquisition of Plantation-Lease-Lands Owned By the Govt.
There is no question of awarding land value to the tenants of Government lands.
No compensation is ensured to such tenants under any provision of the KLR Act.

[Note:Under Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Sec. 72.
Sec. 112 (5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the landowner shall be awarded to the Government; and clause (b) says that the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.

PART III

ACQUISITION OF PLANTATION-LEASE-LANDS (Formerly) OWNED BY PRIVATE LAND OWNERS

  1. Sec. 13 says every tenant has fixity.
  2. But, no Purchase certificate can be obtained beyond ceiling limit (under Sec. 72B or 72C). (Note: No rider to Sec. 72B and 72C, by way of proviso or otherwise, exempting plantation.)
  3. However, the holdings held by cultivating tenants will vest in Govt., under Section 72(1).

Note: Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of leasehold properties (held by ‘cultivating tenants’) in Govt. ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 

4. VESTING OF LAND IN GOVT. & RIGHT OF GOVT. TO COLLECT RENT

According to the provisions of the KLR Act, lands held by individuals (or associations of persons) vest in Govt. under two provisions. They are-

  • First, Sec. 72 – Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government. (Obviously it applies to tenancy-land alone.)
  • Second, Sec. 86. – Vesting of excess lands in Government.
    • Note: Sec. 86 does not apply to Plantations, for (i) they being already vest in Govt. under Sec. 72, and (ii) if Govt. land, no question of vesting arises.

5. Section 72(1) reads:              

  • 72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”

6. Who is the OWNER of Exempted (Private-Leasehold) Plantation Lands in Kerala?

It is Government, though by virtue of Chapter II (Sec. 13) the tenant has ‘Fixity’. 

  • 1. Plantation (lease) Lands VEST in GOVT, automatically
  • Because,
  • Sec. 72 provides for
    • mandatory and involuntary vesting in Government
    • of leasehold lands that is held by cultivating tenants entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13 (even if the extent exceeds ceiling limit).
    • See: Perumal Smaraka Nidhi vs M/S Harrisons Malayalam Ltd., 31. 01. 2013.
  • 2. ‘Vesting’ in Govt. is ‘Vesting of Ownership‘
  • It is for the reasons –
    • Declared to be ‘vested’ in Government (Sec. 72).
    • Such a tenant is liable to pay ‘rent’ to the Government (Sec. 72E) for the unassigned land (e.g. exempted plantation land).
  • 3. ‘Exemption’ in Chapter III Cannot be read into Sec. 72B(2)
  • The provision of law for giving Purchase-Certificate under Sec. 72B specifies that the provisions of Sec. 82 (as to ceiling limit) shall apply for the calculation of the ceiling area (alone).
  • Sec. 72B(2) reads-
    • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1)
  • The exemption provision in Sec. 81 (Chapter III), which excludes plantation lands from the ceiling limit, cannot be brought-forth or read-into Sec. 72B (provision for assignment of purchase-certificate) in Chapter II.
    • In other words, purchase-certificates cannot be given for land above ceiling-limit, rigging the exemption provisions (for plantations etc.).
  • Because,
    • Sec. 72B(1), in Chapter II shows – Sec. 72B(1) is an independent provision (though the Proviso says – no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest … (more than) … the ceiling area, mentioned in Sec. 82 in Chapter III)
    • When a provision in a latter Chapter of an Act (here, Sec. 82 that deals with extent of ceiling limit, in Chapter III) is referred to in an independent provision in an earlier Chapter (here, Sec. 72B, as regards issuing purchase certificate, in Chapter II), for a specific purpose (here, to state the limit in area alone), it cannot be said – the attributed colour or smell of the provision in the latter chapter (by virtue of other provisions, i.e., entire characteristics or attributions added to Sec. 82 by virtue of other provisions in Chapter III), would stand reflected on the earlier provision (here, Sec. 72B).
  • Further – Sec. 72E provides for  ‘rent’ to Government
    • Chapter II of the KLR Act (dealing with ‘Tenancy’) is exclusive and exhaustive as to ‘fixity’, and ‘vesting’ of land in Government.
    • It is not stated anywhere in the Act – the right and title of the (leased-plantation) land legitimately vested in Government under Sec. 72, will be divested in any manner (in favour of the previous owner, or of the tenant or anybody else), in any circumstance.
    • Sec. 72E provides for collection of ‘rent‘ from the holders of the plantation, for the unassigned land (e.g. exempted plantation land) and Sec. 72F(5)(h) authorises the Land Tribunal to fix the rent. (It goes without saying that it is for the reason that the ownership of the land vests in Govt.)
    • Note: Proceedings initiated by Taluk Land Board under Chapter III (in respect of plantation) do not confer title.
    • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).
  • 4.  Tenant cannot ‘Sell’ Plantation Land as his absolute property
    • A tenant who got ‘fixity’ over such land cannot ‘sell’ this land as his absolute (ownership) property.

7. Rights of ‘tenants’ of Plantations (after vesting the land with Govt.) is a ‘Legal Right conferred by Statute’

  • It is not Tenancy – For no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt.
  • Not Grant or Licence/Permission – For Grant as well as Licence/Permission arise from a contract (express or implied).
  • Therefore, it can termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act.

8. What are the Stipulations attached to that “Legal Right”?

  • Subject to the condition – not to “convert” it for any other use, other than the specific plantation (Sec. 87).

9. When Such a land is Required for Govt., Should it be Acquired?

  • The ownership being vested in Govt. it need not be ‘strictly’ “acquired”.
  • But no provision In Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’, if and when Govt. needs it.

10. Sec. 112 of the KLR ActApportionment’s of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act reads-

  • “112. …..
  • (5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
    • (a) the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to such landowner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government; and
    • (b) the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to-
    • in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
    • in the case of the Government, such rent.”

Because of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“ upon the former tenants of the plantation, they are entitled for certain compensation, when that land is required for the Govt..

  • In cases falling under Chapter II (pertaining to, tenants entitled for fixity, issuance of purchase certificate etc.) Section 72 deals with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants; and says -the land will be free from encumbrances created by the land-owners and intermediaries.

Therefore, it is said – Apportionment of land value in cases of ‘acquisition’.

  • Note:  It makes no difference (SUBSTANTIALLY, IN DETERMINING COMPENSATION) whether such a plantation land is “acquired” or not. Because, even if the land is not ‘acquired’, Govt. has to pay compensation for improvements to the former tenants (who holds the land by virtue of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act).

Apportionment depends upon rights on the date of acquisition

  • Valia Raja v. Veeraraghava Iyer, 1961 Ker LT 103, it was held that the question of apportionment of compensation has to depend upon the rights of the parties on the date of the acquisition. Referrd to in: Varkey Thomas Vs. Annamma Abraham,  1969 Ker LT 903.

11. Though the tenant has fixity, he is not the owner of such land. Because, such lands vest in Govt. under Sec. 72.

If tenant had raised plantation on bare land leased –

  • Such plantations are not excluded (from Chapter II) by the ‘Exemption’ clause under S. 3(1)(viii).
    • Therefore, tenants of such tenancy-land are entitled for benefits under Chapter II such as
      • Fixity under Sec. 13,
      • purchase certificate within ceiling limit etc.
    • Though the tenant has fixity, he is not the owner of such land. Because, such lands vest in Govt. under Sec. 72. (Purchase certificate cannot be obtained for the extent below ceiling limit.)

12. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India

  • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit
  • It goes without saying – If no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it cannot be given to tenants.
  • Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India reads as under:
    “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivationit shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”.
Finale on Acquisition of Plantation-Lease-Lands Owned By Private Land Owners
There is no question of awarding land value to the landowners and/or tenants of private landowners.
Under Sec. 72 under Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act, the cultivating tenants
are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government.
Sec. 112 (5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the landowner shall be awarded to the Government; and clause (b) says that the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.

KLR Act Overrides Land Acquisition Act

Sec. 127 of the KLR Act declares – it override other Laws. It reads as under:

  • “127. Act to override other laws, etc.- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other taw or any custom or usage or in any contract, express or implied, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.”

Can a Tenant of Plantation Transfer his Rights, Fragmenting the Plantation

Possession is a heritable and transferable right. [See: Nallammal v. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864; Phirayalal Kapur Vs. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186]. Therefore, a tenant of plantation having rights of fixity (Sec. 13) may have the right to transfer it to another. In any case, the change of character or nature of the plantation by fragmentation being amount to ‘conversion’ (as Provided in Sec. 87 Expl. II) that will be against the provisions of the Act, as pointed out in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985.

11. In Secretary, TDB v. Mohanan Nair (T.R. Ramachandran Nair & A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, JJ.), ILR 2013-2 Ker 883; 2013-3 KLT 132, an important decision on Kerala Land Reforms Act, it is found that Purchase Certificate issued by Land Tribunal, for land belonging to Government Devaswom (exempted category under S.3(1)(x) of the Act), will be in total violation of Rules, and will be a nullity.

End Notes I

1.Cultivating Tenant & Vesting of land in Government

Section 72(1) reads:

  • 72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”.
  • It provides (automatic) vesting of leasehold properties in Govt. Conditions thereof are:
    • (i) the land must be held by cultivating tenants;
    • (ii) they should be entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13.
  • Sec. 2(8) defines cultivating tenant as under:
  • cultivating tenant means a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate, the land comprised in his holding.”

2. For Exemption Tenant must have Approached LT

For getting the Exemption under Chapter III, the tenant must have approached the Land Tribunal for getting the tenancy ‘declared’.

Sec. 85(3) and (3A) of the KLR Act read as under:

  • (3). Where, after the final settlement of claims for resumption of lands held by a person as tenant, such person holds land in excess of the ceiling area, or where after the purchase of the right, title and interest of the landowner** and the intermediary by the cultivating tenant in respect of lands owned by a person, such person owns land in excess of the ceiling area, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided.
  • (3A). The person bound to file a statement under Sub-section (2) shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.] [Substituted by Act No. 35 of 1969.
  • ** See Notes below. As per Sec. 85(3) it is a mandatory requirement to approach the Land Tribunal for getting the Purchase Certificate.

Why the Words “After The Purchase of the Right, Title And Interest of the Landowner” Included?

It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.

  • Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.

It is definite: It is for adjudicating the ‘tenancy right’, by the Land Tribunal – for, the Land Tribunal is the only authority that can decide on the “tenancy right.” (It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case.)

  • Note: A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and avail benefits – the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.
  • Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant)
    It is clear from the following provisions:
    S. 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT(for the purchase of right, title and interest.)
    S. 55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
    S. 57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
    S. 57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
    S. 57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board.
    S. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT)
    S. 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
    S. 72D. The cultivating tenant has to pay purchase price to the Government (fixed by the LT) on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)

Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).

3. Excess, Ceiling ReturnSurrenderExemption Etc.

Section 81:

S. 81, the first Section in Chapter III deals with exemption from ceiling limit of plantation, industrial land, etc.

Sec. 81 reads as under:

  • Exemptions: (1)The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to –
  • (a) lands owned or held by the Government of Kerala or
  • the Government of any other State in India or
  • the Government of India or
  • a local authority [or the Cochin Port Trust] [Inserted by Act 35 of 1969.] 
  • or any other authority which the Government may, in public interest, exempt, by notification in the Gazette, from the provisions of this Chapter.
  • [Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease whether current or time expired or otherwise.] [Inserted by Act 17 of 1972.]
  • [Explanation I. [Numbered as Explanation I by Act 35 of 1969.] – “Lands owned by the Government of Kerala” shall, for the purposes of this clause, have the same meaning as “Government Lands” under Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960; [but lands escheated to the Government and held by tenants entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 shall not be deemed to be lands owned by the Government of Kerala.]]
  • [Explanation II. [Inserted by Act 35 of 1969.] – Lands, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Sub-section (9) of Section 66 or Section 72, shall not be deemed to be “lands owned by the Government of Kerala” for the purposes of this clause;]
  • [Explanation III. [Inserted by Act 25 of 1971.] – For the purposes of this clause, “other authority”, shall include a corporation owned or controlled by the Government of Kerala or the Government of any other State in India or the Government of India;]
  • (b) lands taken under the management of the Court of Wards:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply at the end of three years from the commencement of this Act;
  • (c) lands comprised in mills, factories or workshops and which are necessary for the use of such mills, factories or workshops;
  • (d) private forests;
  • (e) plantations;
  • (f)[ cashew estate [Inserted by Act No. 6 of 2012.]
  • Explanation. – For the purpose of this clause “cashew estate” shall mean dry land principally cultivated with not less than 150 cashew trees per hectare.]
  • (g)[***] [Omitted by Act 35 of 1969.]
  • (h) lands mortgaged to the Government, or to a co-operative society (including a co-operative land mortgage bank) registered or deemed to be registered under the Co-operative Societies Act for the time being in force, or to the Kerala Financial Corporation, or to the Kerala Industrial Development Corporation or to the State Small Industries Corporation, as security for any loan advanced by the Government or by such Society or Corporation, so long as the mortgage subsists:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply at the end of three years from the commencement of this Act;
  • (i)lands purchased by the Kerala Co-operative Central Land Mortgage Bank or a Primary Mortgage Bank under Sec Lion 18 of the Kerala State Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks Act, 1960, or by the Kerala State Co-operative Bank Ltd., or by a primary agricultural credit co- operative society or by a scheduled bank as defined in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 so long as such lands continue in the possession of the bank;
  • (j)lands purchased by the Kerala Financial Corporation or lands the management of which has been taken over by that Corporation, under Section 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, so long as such lands remain in the ownership, or continue under the management, as the case may be, of the said Corporation:
  • [Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply in the case of lands the management of which has been taken over by the Corporation on or after the 1st day of April, 1964;] [Added by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (k)lands belonging to or held by an industrial or commercial undertaking at the commencement of this Act, and set apart for use for the industrial or commercial purpose of the undertaking:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply if such land is not actually used for the purpose for which it has been set apart, within such time as the District Collector may, by notice to the undertaking, specify in that behalf;
  • (l)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (m)[ house sites, that is to say, sites occupied by dwelling houses and lands, wells, tanks and other structures necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the dwelling houses.] [Substituted by Act No. 17 of 1972.]
  • Explanation. – For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that a compound wall shall not he deemed to he a structure necessary for the convenient enjoyment of a dwelling house, if the land on which the dwelling house is situated and enclosed by the compound waif is more than the (and necessary (or the convenient enjoyment of the dwelling house.
  • (n)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (o)sites of temples, churches, mosques and cemeteries and burial and burning grounds:
  • (p)sites of buildings including warehouses;
  • (q)commercial sites;
  • (r)land occupied by educational institutions including land necessary for the convenient use of the institutions and playgrounds attached to such institutions;
  • (s)lands vested in the Bhoodan Yagna Committee;
  • (t)lands owned or held by -(i)a University established by law; or(i)the entire income of such lands is appropriated for the University, institution or trust concerned; and(ii)where the University, institution or trust comes to hold the said lands after the commencement of this Act, the Government have certified previously that such lands are bona fide required for the purposes of the University, institution or trust, as the case may be; and(u)lands granted to defence personnel for gallantry.(ii)a religious, charitable or educational institution of a public nature; or(iii)a public trust which expression shall include a wakf;
  • Provided that-
  • (2)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (3)[ The Government may if they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the public interest -(a)on account of any special use to which any land is put; or (b)on account of any land being bonafide required for the purpose of conversion into plantation or for the extension or preservation of an existing plantation or for any commercial, industrial, educational or charitable purpose, by notification in the Gazette, exempt such land from the provisions of this Chapter, subject to such restrictions and conditions as they may deem fit to impose:
  • Provided that the land referred to in clause (b) shall be used for the purpose for which it is intended within such time as the Government may specify in that behalf; and, where the land is not so used within the time specified, the exemption shall cease to he in force.] [Substituted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (4)[ Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force of in any contract or other documents or in any judgement, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal or Taluk Land Board or Land Board or other authority, a person holding plantation and lands ancillary thereto or interspersed within such* plantation, [may, subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed, use] [Inserted by Act No. 6 of 2012.] not exceeding five per cent of the extent of such holding for floriculture or for the cultivation of Vanila or medicinal plants or other [agricultural crops or for conducting dairy farms] [Substituted ‘agricultural crops’ by Act No. 6 of 2015.] or for establishing hotels or resorts or other tourism projects and for purposes ancillary or connected therewith.]

4. Section 82 & 83: Ceiling area 

Sec. 82 reads as under:

  • 82. Ceiling area. – [(1) The ceiling area of land shall be,
  • (a) in the case of an adult unmarried person or a family consisting of a sole surviving member, five standard acres, so however that the ceiling area shall riot be less than six and more than seven arid a half acre in extent;
  • (b) in the case of a family consisting of two or more, but not more than five members, ten standard acres, so however that the ceiling area shall not be less than twelve and more than fifteen acres in extent.
  • (c) in the case of a family consisting of more than five members, ten standard acres increased by one standard acre for each member M excess of five, so however that the ceiling area shall not he less than twelve and more than twenty acres in extent; and
  • (d) in the case of any other person, other than a joint family, ten standard acres, so however that the ceiling are shall not be less than twelve and more than fifteen acres in extent.]

Section 83

Sec. 83 reads as under:

  • “83. No person to hold land in excess of the ceiling areaWith effect from such dates as may be notified by the Government in the Gazette, no person shall be entitled to own or hold or to possess under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area.”

Section 85(1) reads as under:

  • 85. Surrender of excess land. (1) Where a person owns or holds land excess of the ceiling area on the date notified under Section 83, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided: …. ….”

Section 2(3) defines ceiling area as under:

  • “Ceiling area” means the extent of land specified in section 82 as the ceiling area”.
  • It is a total bar.
    • Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB),
    • The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137) – quoted in 2008(1) KLJ 571 (State Vs. Puliyangattu). Followed in State vs Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16; Bhikoba S. Vs. ML Punchand Tathed, AIR 1982 (SC) 865.

S. 82 & 83 deal with ceiling area and bars holding land excess of ceiling fixed.

5. Section 86 reads:

  • 86. Vesting of excess lands in Government. (1) On the determination of the extent and other particulars of the lands, the ownership or possession or both of which is or are to be surrendered under Section 85, the ownership or possession or both, as the case may be of the land shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances and the Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
  • (2) On receipt of [the order of the Taluk Land Board under Sub-section (1)] such person shall make the surrender demanded, in such manner as may he prescribed.
  • (3) Where any person fails to make the surrender demanded, the [Taluk Land Board] may authorise any officer to take possession or assume ownership of the land in such manner as may be prescribed.
  • [(4) Where the ownership of any land vests in the Government under Sub-section (1), the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of the land shall stand extinguished, and where possession of any land which was in the possession of a cultivating tenant vests in the Government under that Sub-section, the ownership of such land shall vest in the Government and the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of such land shall stand extinguished.]

Section 87 reads as under:

  • “S.87. Excess land obtained by gift, etc. to be surrendered – (1) Where any person acquires any land dafter the date notified under Section 83 by gift, purchase, mortgage with possession, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, such excess shall be surrendered to such authority as may be prescribed.
  •        Explanation 1 – Where any land is exempted by or under Section 81 and such exemption is in force on the date notified under Section 83, such land shall, with effect from the date on which it ceases to be exempted, be deemed to be land acquired after the date notified under Section 83.
  •        Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.

6. Apportionment’s of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 of the KLR Act reads-

  • “112. Apportionment’s of land value in cases of acquisition – (1) Where any land is acquired under the law for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, the compensation awarded under such law in respect of the land acquired shall be apportioned among the landowner, intermediaries, cultivating tenant and the kudikidappukaran in the manner specified in this Section.
  • (2) The compensation for any building or other improvements shall be awarded to the person entitled to such building or other improvements.
  • (3) The kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to the value of the land occupied by his homestead or hut subject to a minimum of-
    • three cents in a city or major municipality; or
    • five cents in any other municipally; or
    • ten cents in a panchayat area or township.
  • (4) The difference between the value of three cents or five cents or ten cents, as the case may be, and the value of the extent of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, be borne by the Government or the local authority or the company or other person on whose behalf the land is acquired.
  • (5) The balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in Sub-section (2) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall he apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land acquired immediately before such acquisition.
    • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to (i) in the case of a landowner, the rent which he was entitled to get from the tenant holding immediately under him; (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord; and (iii) in the case of a cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent payable by him; and the rent payable by the cultivating tenant and the intermediary for the purposes of this Explanation shall be as calculated under the provisions of this Act.
  • (5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the land owner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
    • (a) the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to such landowner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government; and
    • (b) the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.*fn*
  • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to-
    • in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
    • in the case of the Government, such rent.
  • (7) In this Section, “homestead” includes a dwelling house occupied by a person who is deemed to be a kudikidappukaran under Explanation IIA to clause (25) of Section 2.”
  • Foot Note:
    • *fn* 1. “Value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” says as to the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
    • 2. This provision is applied to lease-lands vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 and no purchase certificate is given (to the tenant).

No Land value to be given for the “excess” land (Beyond Ceiling Limit)

From Sect. 112, it is beyond doubt that no Land value to be given for the entire land and it is limited to a portion.

Plantation: Definition

  • “S.2.(44)” plantation” means any land used by a person principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon (hereinafter in this clause referred to as ‘plantation crops’) and includes.-
    • (a) land used by the said person for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of plantation crops or for the preparation of the same for the market;
    • [(b) xxxx]
    • (c) agricultural lands interspersed within the boundaries of the area cultivated by the said person with plantation crops, not exceeding such extent as may be determined by the Land Board [or the Taluk land Board, as the case may be] as necessary for the protection and efficient management of such cultivation.
  • Explanation:- Lands used for the construction of office buildings, godowns, factories quarters for workmen, hospitals, schools and play grounds shall be deemed to be lands used for the purposes of sub-clause (a).

Is the Tenant of a Plantation a Cultivating Tenant?

  • Yes.
  • Sec. 2(8) defines cultivating tenant as under:
  • Cultivating tenant means a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate, the land comprised in his holding.”

Can Purchase-Certificate be given to Plantation-Land, over & above Ceiling-Limit?

  • No.
  • Because, under Sec. 72B(2) a cultivating tenant is entitled to get assigned the area within the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 alone.

Sec. 72B reads as under:

  • “72B. Cultivating tenants right to assignment. – (1) The cultivating tenant of any holding or part of a holding, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Section 72, shall be entitled to assignment of such right, title and interest: ….. ….
  • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1);
  • (3) (4) (5)

Is Purchase Certificate (inaccurate on its face, or fraud, for excess of the ceiling area) Conclusive Proof?

  • No.

Our Apex Court considered this matter in Chettian Veetil Ammad v. Taluk Land BoardAIR 1979 SC 1573; 1980 1 SCC 499 (P.N. Shinghal & O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.) where Purchase Certificate was issued, excess of the ceiling area, as under:

  • “27. It would thus appear that even though the certificate of purchase issued under sub-section (1) of Section 72-K is conclusive proof of the assignment of the right, title and interest of the landowner in favour of the holder in respect of the holding concerned under sub-section (2), that only means that no contrary evidence shall be effective to displace it, unless the so called conclusive proof is inaccurate on its face, or fraud can be shown (Halsburys – Laws of England, fourth edition, Vol. 17, page 22 paragraph 28), It may be stated that “inaccuracy on the face” of the certificate is not as wide in its connotation as an “error apparent on the face of the record.” It will not therefore be permissible for the Board to disregard the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase merely on the ground that it has not been issued on a proper appreciation or consideration of the evidence on record, or that the. Tribunals finding suffers from any procedural error. What sub-section (2) of Section 72-K provides is an irrebuttable presumption of law, and it may will be regarded as a rule of substantive law. But even so, for reasons already stated, it does not thereby take away the jurisdiction of the Taluk Land Board to make an order under Section 85 (5) after taking into consideration the “conclusive” evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase according to Section 72-K (2) as far as it goes.”

It is also noteworthy (as stated above) that purchase certificate shall not bind one, who was not party to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, having better title over the property covered by the purchase certificate (Thayukutty v. Manikandan, the Kerala High Court (2023).

Extent of Land that for which a Purchase Certificate can be issued by LT

If a cultivating tenant (of a plantation land) possessed land at or above the ceiling limit, no purchase certificate can be issued to him, from the plantation property in question. 

If a tenant holds some land, he will receive a Purchase Certificate for the extent – equal to the Ceiling Limit minus the land he already possesses.

If such a tenant holds land at or above the ceiling limit (and, for that reason,  no purchase certificate can be given with respect to the plantation property), proceedings are to be promulgated, or an order is to be issued, by the Land Tribunal  to that effect, if it finds that he is a cultivating tenant of that plantation. This proceedings also has to be presented with the lease-agreement and other documents, before the Taluk Land Board, for getting the order of exemption.  

Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439

  • In Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439, the question as to ‘rival claims raised by the cultivating tenant and landlord for compensation on acquisition’ arose. The land was leased out by landlords. The lease-rights came in the cultivating tenants by transfer. The Government contended that the tenant was a cultivating tenant and the land vested upon the Govt. under Sec. 72 KLR Act. Hence tenant alone would be entitled to get compensation for the improvements to be determined under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, in view of Section 20(1) of the KLR Act.
  • The landlords argued that the land was a plantation (over 30 acres) when it was (originally) leased, and therefore, they are entitled to claim exemption and benefits in the light of the exemption under clause (viii)  of Section 3 (1) of the KLR Act. Since there would be no fixity of tenure, it being a plantation, there would not be vesting of rights of the land owner in the Government. Hence, there should be the apportionment of the compensation between the lessor and the lessee and it should be decided in the acquisition proceedings.
  • The single Judge dismissed the writ petition, ‘leaving open the liberty of the lessee as well as the landlords, to approach the civil court seeking relief against the Government, and also to resolve the inter se dispute by and between the tenant and the landlords’.
  • The Division Bench, in appeal held that ‘land acquisition’ proceedings are to be initiated. It is pointed out that (even if it is a land vested in Govt.) there is no provision in Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’ if and when Govt. need it. The court also observed as under –
    • “31. On an analysis of the provisions of Section 72(1) of the Act, 1963, it is clear that when the Government notified the said provision with effect from 01.01.1970, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under sub-Section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, vested in the Government.
    • 32. Therefore, it is clear from Section 72 that what is vested with the Government is the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants. It is nothing but a legal fiction by which the interest held by a cultivating tenant in a property of a landlord or intermediary is protected from 01.01.1970 .
    • 34. On a conjoint reading of Sections 72 and 72A, it can be seen that vesting of rights in the Government contained under Section 72 is the rights held by the landlord and the intermediary in respect of holdings held by the cultivating tenants. However, the same will not, in any manner, interfere with the rights enjoyed by a cultivating tenant in contemplation of the provisions of the Act, 1963.”
    • 42. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 72 of Act, 1963 would only deal with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants free from encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries. However, the legal provisions discussed above would make it clear that insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.
  • While considering the right of landlord, it is pointed out (basing on the principle, or scheme of the KLR Act**) that the landlord may have right for compensation under Section 72BB. The Division Bench said-
    • “36. So also, sub-Section (1) of Section 72BB dealing with ‘the right of landlord to apply for assignment and compensation’ specifies that any landowner or intermediary, whose right, title and interest in respect of any holding have vested in the Government, may apply to the Land Tribunal for the assignment of such right, title and interest to the cultivating tenant and for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A.”
  • **Note: 1. If plantation-lease-(leasing a land when plantation existed)-above-30-acre-
    • Sec. 72, 72 BB etc. will not apply (such land being excluded from Chapter II, under Sec. 3(1)(viii), KLR Act).
  • 2. In case of a plantation-lease-above-30-Acre-
    • on termination of the lease period, the land lord can resume the land, on the basis of his title; for, the tenant will not have fixity in such case, the land being exempted from the benefits of Chapter II (as per Sec. 3(1)(viii) of the KLR Act).
  • 3. The landlords of such plantation will get the benefits (under Sec. 81) and protection from ceiling limit that is stipulated under the provisions of Sec. 82, 83 etc. (that is, there will be no ceiling limit).
  • 4. In such a case, the right of landlord may be on a higher level or footing than the tenant (to get compensation).
  • 5. It cannot be compared with a plantation that is put up by the tenant. The tenants of such plantation will-
    • get fixity under Sec. 13 (though they will not get Purchase Certificate),
    • get the benefits and protection (under Sec. 81) from ceiling limit that is stipulated under the provisions of Sec. 82, 83 etc. (that is, there will be no ceiling limit).
    • In such a case, the right for compensation, if any, of the landlord will be nil or negligible.
      • The Division Bench, inter alia, on the above observations directed ‘the State and its officials to take proceedings for the acquisition of the land’.

Criticism on Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439

The Division Bench failed to consider–

  • The right, title and interest of the land (above ceiling limit) ‘vest’ with the Government under Sec. 72. It is absolute. It is not a ‘fiction; but, it is real and actual (as seen from Sec. 72E and Sec. 112(5A).
  •  The nature of this statutory ‘vesting in Govt’ (under Sec. 72) is further clear from – Sec. 72E (tenant has to pay rent (for the unassigned land (e.g. exempted plantation land)).
  • Sec. 112(5A) deals with unassaigned land (that is, no purchase certificate is given). Under this sub section land-value need not be given to the land-owner or the tenant over and above the “value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” – that is, the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
  • This provision is applied to lease-lands vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 and no purchase certificate is given (to the tenant)., in case of acquisition).
  • Sec. 72B(2) KLR Act spells-out that a cultivating tenant will get Purchase Certificate for the extent below the ‘ceiling limit’ alone. That is, the tenant has no “absolute rights” above the ceiling limit.
  • Plantation-lands, usually, involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land. The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be miniscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres). Therefore, the analogy drawn by the Bench (tenant has a right seek assignment) is not apt at all.
  • When land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 is acquired, in the light of Sec. 112(5A) land-value need not be given to the land-owner or the tenant, over and above the “value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” – that is, the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
  • The aforesaid provision of law in the KLR Act is legislated following Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
  • The rights of ‘tenants’ of Plantations, to continue in the land till the plantation exists, after vesting the land with Govt., is a ‘Legal Right conferred by Statute’. It is not Tenancy – for no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt. It is not a Grant or Licence/Permission – for such rights arise from a contract (express or implied). Therefore, it can be termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act.
  • It goes without saying – If no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.
  • It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation-tenants (majority are BIG Companies) which had not been given to Maharaja of Travancore (whose 191 acres of lands in Thiruvananthapuram – above the ceiling limit, 15 acres – in the City was ‘mercilessly’ taken under the Orders of the Land Board Trivandrum, No. LB(B)2-18919/70, dated 15.01.1972). It is a sheer fact that lands of thousands of middleclass property owners was also harshly taken by under the provisions of the Act. (Note: Only limited right to continue the specified plantation-crop alone is given by the ‘exemption’; and, according to law, in case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost.)

No Land value to be given for the “excess” land (Beyond Ceiling Limit)

As stated above, under Sec. 112(5A) the claimants will not be entitled (on acquisition of the land) for the compensation for the entire area. It is limited to the following –

  • building or other improvements
  • land occupied by the homestead or hut”
  • any building or other improvements“.

It is true, “exemption” is given to plantation, to hold land over and above ceiling limit. It is only a statutory permission to continue, subject to conditions. It will be lost when it is “fragmented” or the crop is abandoned. As stated elsewhere, it is also most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation owners or tenants (majority are BIG Companies) which had not been given to thousands of middleclass property owners whose property had been harshly sized or expropriated under the provisions of the KLR Act.

The Govt. is Entitled Reasonable ‘Rent and Land Tax (for previous leasehold land)

The land being vest in Govt., it can collect reasonable ‘rent’. Sec. 72E reads as under:

  • 72E. Rent of holdings vested in Government but not assigned to cultivating tenants. – Where in respect of any holding or part thereof, the right, title and interest of the landowner and intermediaries have vested in the Government under Section 72 and the cultivating tenant is not entitled to the assignment of such right, title and interest by virtue of Sub-section (1) of Section 72, the cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay to the Government the rent payable under this Act from the date of vesting under Section 72.

With respect to payment of tax it is stated as under in Sec. 72S:

  • 72S. Liability for assessment alter the date of vesting under Section 72. (1)] Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract, where the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, in respect of a holding have vested in the Government under Section 72, the cultivating tenant of that holding shall be liable to pay the basic tax payable in respect of that holding under the said Act and other taxes and cesses due in respect of that holding.
  • (2) In the case of a holding or part of a holding in respect of which an application for resumption under the provisions of this Act is rejected, the cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay the basic tax and other taxes and cesses in respect of such holding or part of the holding, as the case may be, with effect on and from the date notified under Sub-section (1) of Section 72.

End Notes – II

Effect of Travancore Govt. Leases after Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061

Now a question arises: What is the impact of ‘Government Land Leases’ (with strict conditions) after 1061 (1886)? Do such leased lands qualify as “estate” under Article 31A of the Constitution?

The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out after 1061 (1886) do not inherit the rights granted by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061. If we look at it differently it would mean, or tantamount to say, that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands after the Proclamations (for, by virtue of the Proclamations it would lose the lease-character at the moment it is made).

In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (five Judge Bench), 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.), concluded that the land covered by the Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 were “estates” falling under Art. 31A of the Constitution. It was on the finding that the Proclamation “secured permanency of tenure”, and “proprietary interest” in the soil. It was observed as under:

  • “7. It is impossible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that,even after the Proclamation of 1040, the holders of these lands had no proprietary interest whatsoever in the soil and remained tenants in the strict sense of that term, with only the right of enjoyment, the only difference being that they secured permanency of tenure, the Government still remaining the full and absolute proprietor of the soil.”

Therefore, there is a clear difference between leases made before and after the Proclamations, and the rights conferred by the Proclamations do not apply to leases made after them.

End Notes – III

CAN AN EXEMPTED PLANTATION LAND BE SOLD AS AN ABSOLUTE PRIVATE PROPERTY?

No.

  • Sec. 82 deals with ceiling area. Sec. 83 mandates surrender of excess land. Sec. 85 directs that excess land shall be surrendered to government (accepting the compensation fixed under Sec. 88).
  • But it is not made applicable to the plantations.
  • Sec. 87 mandates that the protection of plantation is available only so long as the plantation subsists.

Exemption does not Confer any vested Right or Ownership

  • If no plantation, plantation lands would also have been treated in the same way – as any other excess land that had been (forcibly) got surrendered by virtue of the KLR Act. The law has given only a sanction to the planters to continue because of the existence of the plantation. Therefore ‘exemption’ does not confer a vested right or ownership.

ACQUISITION OF PLANTATION-LANDS OWNED BY PRIVATE PERSONS

1. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India

It is plain – No compensation is payable to the land-owners, for the lands ‘above the ceiling limit’, according to the Constitution of India. If any authority gives it, it will be sheer unscrupulous act.

  • The provisions of the KLR Act as regards ‘vesting’‘excess land’ etc. are legislated predicating upon Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which states that the State need not pay compensation to the former land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
  • Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India reads as under:
    • “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivationit shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limitapplicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”.

2. Exemption of ‘Plantation’ Does Not Cover Exemption of ‘Plantation LAND’

It is for the following reasons –

  • 1. The exemption is to the ‘plantation’, and not to the ‘LAND‘.
  • 2. Exemption is conditional – for it exists (only) as long as the plantation exists or continues;
  • Because,
    • (a) S. 2(44) defines ‘plantation’ as land used principally for the cultivation of a specific ‘plantation crop‘ like tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber etc.
    • (b) Section 87, Explanation II states that if a plantation for which exemption is given on recognition of a specific ‘plantation-crop’ is converted into any other ‘plantation-crop’ or the plantation activity is not continued, the exemption may be lost; and the land will be taken for considering the ceiling limit.

End Notes IV

Relevant provisions of KLR Act, in a Nutshell

Section Provisions in a Nutshell
Chap. II 
3(1)
Exemptions – (i) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to – (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
“Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.
7 EPersons acquired lands (before 2005 amendment in KLR Act) for consideration below 1 Ha. 61 Are 87 Sq.m. (4 acre) will be deemed to be tenants .
13Fixity: “Every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding.”
22Landlord desiring to resume any land shall apply to the Land Tribunal.
31Fair rent determined by Land Tribunal.
51B. Landlord not to enter on land surrendered or abandoned by the tenant. 
Contravention is made punishable.
54(1)
55
57
57 (3)
57 (6)
61
54(1). A cultivating tenant (to purchase the right) has to apply Land Tribunal.
55. Purchase price is fixed by LT (on fair rent u/s. 31) to be paid u/s. 59
57. The LT after enquiries, pass orders determining purchase price.
(3). The Land Tribunal allows the purchase of the land it determines.
(6). The Land Tribunal forwards  orders to the Land Board.
61. Tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) pending proceedings.
59When Sec. 54 application is allowed (by the LT), the purchase price (determined u/s. 57 by the LT) shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal to the credit of the Land Board and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
72Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating tenants in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
72(1) says: Holdings upon which tenanat entilted fixity under sec. 13 vest in govt.
72BCultivating-tenant “shall be entitled to assignment” of land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 –within ceiling area and get purchase certificate (through LT) (2 years from 1-1-1970). Effect of non-filing (See Balanoor Plantations case. 2018(3) KLT 283.)
72DThe cultivating tenant has to pay the purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
72ESuch a tenant is liable to pay rent to the Govt. for the unassigned land – under Purchase Certificate (E.g., exempted-plantation-land). The Land Tribunal fixes the rent under Sec. 72F(5)(h).
72CProvides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit). Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S. 72C also). 
72KLT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.
74Prohibition of future tenancies.
Chap. III 
81
Exemption from ceiling and excess for Govt. lands, private forests, plantations, industrial or commercial undertakings, etc.
Proviso – There will be an exemption (as plantation, land given to educational institution, trust, etc.) on Government lands, given under grant, lease, etc.
See: HMT (Machine Tools) Limited v. Taluk Land Board, 2009 (3) KLJ 110; MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28.
82Ceiling area – 5/10 standard acres.
83No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  It is a total bar. (Note:  plantations, industrial area etc. are exempted.)
Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB), Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137)
The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571.
84Certain transfers – void.
85(1)Surrender excess.
85(2)Owners and Tenants (having land in excess of the ceiling area) should furnish ceiling return to Land Board before March31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
Note: Effect of non-filing: See – Balanoor Plantations case – 2018(3) KLT 283.State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
 According to S. 3(1) (viii), “tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres” is exempted from Chapter II. Therefore, the landlord can recover such plantation lands after the period of tenancy. Such landlords also had to file a ceiling return within the time stipulated.
85(3)Excess shall be surrendered.
Note: Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant)
It is clear from the following provisions:
(Before 1. 1. 1970)
S. 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT(for the purchase of right, title and interest.)
S. 55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
S. 57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
S. 57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
S. 57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board.
S. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT)
S. 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
(After 1. 1. 1970)
S. 72B – cultivating tenant to apply to the LT, for Purchase Certificate.
S. 72D. The cultivating tenant has to pay purchase price to the Government [fixed by the LT] on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
S. 72F(5) – Land Tribunal shall issue notice to consider the claims and objections from the land owner or intermediaries, and pass an order specifying, inter alia, the rent [under S. 72F(5)(h) ] payable by the cultivating tenant to the Government.
S. 72F(6) & (7) – LT shall pass Orders on encumbrance or charge for maintenance or alimony and compensation payable to the landowner or that intermediary.
It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.
Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.
It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case. Note: (i) The sub-section (3) itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant, (ii) LT is the only authority to determine tenancy (Land Board cannot determine it), and (iii) it is clear that even if it is a plantation-exemption-land (beyond ceiling limit), the tenant has to file petition under Section 54 – for fixing Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT and for allotting the land under section 57(3) and for effecting the payments of ‘rent’ and ‘purchase price’(to the credit of the Land Board)  under sec. 61 and 59.
85(3A)The person bound to file a statement under sub-section (2) (that is, Owners and Tenants – having land in excess of the ceiling area)  shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.
85(5)On receipt of the statement under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3A), the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Board and such Taluk LandBoard shall determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered.
85(7)Whereon a person fails to file statement under 85(2) or (3A), LB shall intimate that fact to TLB  –  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered. It is obvious – The LB can intimate TLB as to non-filing, on the basis of the records it obtained under Sec. 57(6) and 59. That is, those tenants who are not entitled to get a purchase certificate also has to file an application under Sec. 54(1) and 85(2) or (3A). Effect of non-filing: See – Balanur Plantations case (With respect to Sec. 72B application) – 2018(3) KLT 283. Statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit to file statement:  State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
[TLB not to do, suo motu, without direction from LB. 1980 KLT 120, referred to in 2019(1) KLT 985.]
85AFile ceiling return within March  2, 1973 before Land Board..
86(1)On determination of the extent to be surrendered under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
86(3)Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession
86(4)Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
86(6)Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
87
Exp. II
If a person converts any portion of exempted land for any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit. That is, the exemption will be lost for the portion that exceeds the ceiling limit. (Mathew K Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913)

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A. K. Sreekumar v. Director, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau: Members of a Charitable Society which Runs a College are Tractable to Prevention of Corruption Act

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Preface

A. K. Sreekumar v. Director, Vigilance And Anti Corruption Bureau (K Babu, J.), 12 Dec, 2024 (Ker) considered whether selling the ‘Government-seats’ to private students after receiving huge capitation amount, and its misappropriation, by the members of a charitable society, attract the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The court found –

  • the allegations fall under ‘public duty’ (as defined in Section 2(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) to attract Section 13 of the Act; and
  • prior approval under Section 17A of the P.C. Act is not necessary for the court to invoke its provisions.  

Facts of the case:

  • The petitioner alleged a conspiracy among the members of a charitable society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955, which runs a college.
  • The suspected persons, in furtherance of their common intention, denied admission to eligible students in the Pharmacy College in the Government seats and sold the said seats to private students after receiving a huge capitation amount and misappropriated the amount so obtained to their credit causing wrongful loss to the society and wrongful monetary gain to them.
  • It is in violation of Section 5 read with Section 15 of the Kerala Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee, Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-Exploitative Fee & Other Measures to Ensure Equity & Excellence in Professional Education) Act, 2006.
  • Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 406 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • The Vigilance and Anti-corruption Bureau (VACB) refused to take action on the complaint.
  • Thereon, the petitioner filed a complaint under Sections 190 and 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Court of Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kottayam, and prayed for conducting an inquiry under Section 202 or for a direction to conduct investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.  
  • The Special Judge posted the matter for report from the VACB.
  • The VACB took the stand – approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 from the competent authority is required.
  • The petitioner thereafter filed an application seeking investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
  • The Special Court dismissed the prayer and adjourned the matter, instructing the petitioner/complainant to produce Section 17A approval under the PC Act.
  • The Vigilance submitted an application seeking prior approval from the competent authority.
  • The Government, by Ext.P5 decision, took the stand that no vigilance enquiry was to be conducted. The reason showed was that the allegations had already been referred to the Admission Supervisory Committee for Medical Education.
  • The petitioner challenged the legality of the order passed by the Government (Ext.P5).

Relevant legal Provisions

Section 2(b) of the P.C. Act defines ‘public duty’ as follows:-

  • “public duty” means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest.”

Section 2(c) defines ‘public servant’.

  • (c) “public servant” means,-
  • (i) … (to) (vii) ….
  • (viii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty;……”

Section 17A of the PC Act provides –

  • no police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under the PC Act without prior approval from appropriate authority. 

Legal Issues

  • Whether the allegations attract a ‘public duty’ and
  • Whether prior approval under Section 17A P.C. Act is necessary.

Findings of Court:

1. “ ‘Public duty’ as defined in Section 2(b) of the PC Act, means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest. Thus a ‘public servant’ must be under the positive command of a State law or valid executive direction to discharge such a ‘public duty’. If a body or a corporation exercises a State function under the obligation of the existing laws, it is to be treated as a discharge of ‘public duty’.”

Rulings relied on

  • Karthikeya Varma v. Union of India, 2015 KHC 567 (distinguished).
  • Central Bureau of Investigation, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell v. Ramesh Gelli and Others [(2016) 3 SCC 788],
  • P.V.Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) [(1998) 4 SCC 626],
  • Manish Trivedi v. State of Rajasthan [(2014) 14 SCC 420]
  • Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2016) 7 SCC 353],
  • K.Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655],
  • State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah (AIR 2020 SC 2203),
  • Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [(2012) 3 SCC 64],

2. The approval under Section 17A of the PC Act arises only when the offence is relatable to any recommendation made or it is a decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties. So, this Court is of the view that prior approval, as provided in Section 17A, is not applicable (for investigation) in the present facts.

Rulings relied on

  • Sankarabhat and Others v. State of Kerala (2021 (5) KHC 248) and
  • Venugopal V. and Others v. State of Kerala and Another (2021 KHC 565)

Result:

  • Ext. P5 order (no vigilance enquiry be conducted, for the allegations had already been referred to the Admission Supervisory Committee for Medical Education) is quashed.
  • Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are directed to conduct a preliminary enquiry into the matter.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

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