Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal: Landmark Decision on Trust – A Trust Cannot Be Made as a Party to a Litigation

Jojy George Koduvath.

See Earlier Article in ‘indianlawlive‘:
Does a Cheque-Case under NI Act Lie Against a Trust? Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR 2023-4 Ker 252 – Whether Correctly Decided?

Preface

Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ), 2025 INSC 1210 (09-10-2025), is a landmark decision on trust.

It held:

  • A Trust Is Not a Legal Person.
  • A Trust Operates through its Trustees.
  • Trustees Can Maintain and Defend a Suit.
  • Trust is an Obligation and not a Legal Entity.
  • No Legal Requirement For A Trust To Be Made A Party.
  • Just as a Managing Director is responsible for the affairs of a company, a Chairman or Managing Trustee is responsible for the affairs and administration of a Trust, within the powers and duties conferred by the Trust Deed and law.

Question Considered

Two principal questions arose for consideration in this case. They are:

  • (i) Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is maintainable against the Chairman or a Trustee of a Trust when the cheque in question has been issued on behalf of the Trust, without the Trust itself being made an accused; and
  • (ii) Whether the complainant under Section 138 must make specific averments regarding the accused-trustee’s role and responsibility in the conduct of the day-to-day affairs of the Trust, even though the person is admittedly a Trustee.

It arose from the decision of the Meghalaya High Court (2023-1 GLT 344) which quashed the proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate, Shillong.

The Impugned High Court Judgment

The respondent issued a Cheque to the complainant under the signature of the respondent as authorised signatory of Orion, a trust. The Cheque was dishonoured. It led to the filing of a complaint under Sections 138 and 142 of the NI Act, as well as under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Respondent preferred a Criminal Petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, before the High Court seeking to quash the complaint, on the ground, inter alia, that Orion (Trust) is a juristic entity and a necessary party.

Part I

Apex Court Adjudicated –  Trust is NOT a Legal Person

Decisions relied on (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) to show – Trust is not a ‘legal entity’ capable of being sued – are:

  • 1. Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712.
  • 2. K P Shibu v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 7585, 2019 (3) KHC 1.

Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank

In Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712, it is held

  • A Trust is not a person.
  • It could not be a consumer.
  • A Trust cannot be a complainant.
  • It would not fall under the definition of ‘person’ as per Section 2(m) of the Consumer Protection Act.

The Apex Court, in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra, quoted the following from the Pratibha Pratisthan case-

  • “4. A reading of the definition of the words “complaint”, “complainant” and “consumer” makes it clear that a trust cannot invoke the provisions of the Act in respect of any allegation on the basis of which a complaint could be made. To put this beyond any doubt, the word “person” has also been defined in the Act and Section 2(1)(m) thereof defines a “person” as follows:
    • “2. (1)(m) “person” includes—
    • (i) a firm whether registered or not;
    • (ii) a Hindu undivided family;
    • (iii) a cooperative society;
    •  (iv) every other association of persons whether registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or not;”
  • 5. On a plain and simple reading of all the above provisions of the Act it is clear that a trust is not a person and therefore not a consumer. Consequently, it cannot be a complainant and cannot file a consumer dispute under the provisions of the Act.”

After quoting Sections 3 (definition of Trust) and 13 (Trustee to protect title to trust-property) of the Trust Act, the Apex Court observed in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal as under:

  • “23. To our mind, the above-extracted Sections of the Trusts Act would also favour the view we are taking, as the obligation to ‘maintain and defend’ suits is placed on the shoulders of a Trustee and not the Trust itself. It is clear that only a Trustee has the obligation to file, maintain and defend any suit on behalf of the Trust. Meaning thereby, that a Trust does not have a separate legal existence of its own, making it incapable of suing or being sued.”

KP Shibu v. State of Kerala

The Kerala High Court, in  KP Shibu v. State of Kerala (B. Sudheendra Kumar, J.), 2019 (3) KHC 1, held –

  • Trustees can maintain and defend a suit to protect the Trust property.
  • A Trust is not a juristic person or a legal entity, and has no legal existence of its own.
  • A Trust itself cannot sue or be sued in a court of law.
  • A Trust would not fall within the term ‘association of individuals’.

In Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal the Apex Court quoted the following from KP Shibu v. State of Kerala, 2019 (3) KHC 1-

  • “16. Thus, it is clear from the above provisions that all the trustees are the owners of the property, but they are obliged to use the same in a particular manner. If a number of trustees exist, they are the joint owners of the property. The trustees are bound to maintain and defend all suits, for the preservation of the trust-property and the assertion or protection of the title thereto. Thus, it appears that the “Trust” is not capable of suing and being sued in a court of law, even though the trustees can maintain and defend suits for the preservation and protection of the trust-property. Therefore, a “Trust” is not a juristic person or a legal entity, as the juristic person has a legal existence of its own and hence it is capable of suing and being sued in a court of law. Thus, it appears that a “Trust” is not like a body corporate, which has a legal existence of its own and therefore can appoint an agent. The above discussion would make it clear that a “Trust” is not a body corporate.”

Trust is an Obligation and not a Legal Entity

Trust, as defined under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 is an obligation and not a legal entity.

The Apex Court, while discussing this matter, referred (with approval) the following decisions placed by the Appellant:

  • KR Rajan v. Cherian K Cherian, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 4699 (Kerala High Court)
  • Duli Chand v. M/s MPTC Charitable Trust, 1983 SCC OnLine Del 270 (Delhi High Court)
  • V Chandrasekaran v. Venkatanaicker Trust, 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 33745 (Madras High Court)
  • Narayana Iyer v. Anandammal Adheena Trust, (2021) 3 CTC 776; (Madras High Court)
  • Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin v. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat Ahmedabad, AIR 1968 Guj 184 (Gujarat High Court)
  • Vijay Sports Club v State of Bengal, 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 2331 (Calcutta High Court).

A Trust operates through its Trustees

After referring the aforestated decisions, the Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) said as under:

  • “25. …. A Trust is also not like a corporation which has a legal existence of its own and therefore can appoint an agent. A Trust operates through its Trustees, who are legal entities. We may gainfully refer to the decision of the Kerala High Court in KR Rajan (supra), where the said Court has rightly held:
  • ‘7. The legal status of a trust, is thus well discernible. Trust not being a legal person, and the Code of Civil Procedure not providing any enabling provision for the Trust to sue or for being sued in its name, there is no merit in the contention that the Trust is to be arrayed as a co-nominee party. The arraying of the trust in its own name is otiose or redundant. It is the trustees who are to be impleaded to represent the trust. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner on the ground of non-joinder, also fails’.”

Trust Is An Obligation Imposed On The Ostensible Owner – Trustee

The Apex Court held further as under (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal):

  • “26. Ergo, it is clear that though a Trust may act or even be treated as an entity for certain legal purposes and not all legal purposes, a Trust is an obligation imposed on the ostensible owner of the property to use the same for a particular object – for the benefit of a named beneficiary or charity, and it is the Trustee(s) who are bound to maintain and defend all suits and to take such other steps with regard to the nature, land or the value of the Trust property, that may be reasonably required for the preservation of the Trust property, and the assertion of protection of title thereto, subject to the provisions of the instructions of Trust to take such other steps.”

No Legal Requirement For A Trust To Be Made A Party

The Apex Court held further as under (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal):

  • “27. There exists no ambiguity about there being no legal requirement for a Trust to be made a party in a proceeding before a Court of Law since it is only a/the Trustee(s) who are liable and answerable for acts done or alleged to have been done for and on behalf of the said Trust. From a perusal of Orion’s Deed of Trust, of which the Respondent is the Chairman/Authorized Signatory, it emerges clearly that the relevant clauses deal with the Trustee insofar as administering and holding the funds and properties of the Trust are concerned. Which is to say that the Trust (i.e., Orion) operates only through the Trustee(s) and that the objects thereof were for charitable purposes. The Deed of Trust also provides for permitting one or more Trustees to operate a bank account. It becomes all the more apparent that it is the Trustees alone, through whom the Trust funds/property(ies) are managed and dealt with. The Trust itself is without any independent legal status.”

Apex Court Disapproved Prana Educational Trust Case

The Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) disapproved Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala, 2023 (6) KHC 175, holding as under:

  • “32. We do not approve of the manner in which the learned Single Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust  (supra) decided to ignore binding precedent in K P Shibu (supra), which was a judgment rendered by another learned Single Judge of the same Court, earlier in point of time, merely by noting ‘it is discernible that the said decision is not so elaborative and the interpretation of the term “association of individuals” not done by applying the ratio of ejusdem generis.’ It was not open to the learned Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) to prefer the view expressed by other High Courts in preference to the view of a Bench of the own High Court of equal strength expressed previously. At the most, recording his disagreement with the view in K P Shibu (supra), the learned Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) ought to have referred the matter to the learned Chief Justice of the High Court seeking constitution of a larger Bench. The only other way Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) could have gotten over K P Shibu (supra) despite being a co-equal Bench would have been by undertaking an analysis via the principles of per incuriam and/or sub-silentio, as undertaken by a 3-Judge Bench recently in A Raja v D Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1033. We say this illustratively. Not as a matter of routine can a later Bench of equal strength refuse to follow an earlier decision of a Bench of equal strength. The law hereon was stated in National Insurance Company Limited v Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 and Union Territory of Ladakh v Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140. Therefore, while not disturbing Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) inter- parties, we declare the statement of law therein incorrect to the extent it rules on the issue before us, on account of failure to adhere to binding precedent.”

Read Also:

Part II

Requirement of Averments – Role of Trustee-Accused in Affairs of Trust

The position of a Managing Director in a company carries responsibility for its affairs. A similar principle applies to Trusts — the Trustees (authorised signatory or Managing Trustee, where designated) are responsible for the administration and conduct of the Trust’s affairs, subject to the powers and duties defined by the Trust Deed and applicable law.

The Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) relied upon the decision SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89 [3-Judge Bench], wherein it was held that a position of a Managing Director would suggest responsibility of the person holding the said position, in the day-to-day affairs of the Company.

The following portion from SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) is quoted by the Apex Court.

  • “…. The answer to the question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. …
  • …. the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141.”

The Apex Court also sought support from KK Ahuja v. VK Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48, which held as under:

  • “27. The position under Section 141 of the Act can be summarised thus:
  • .(i) If the accused is the Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he is in charge of, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. It is sufficient if an averment is made that the accused was the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director at the relevant time. This is because the prefix “Managing” to the word “Director” makes it clear that they were in charge of and are responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company.”

The Apex Court also relied on Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, (2022) 10 SCC 152, where it was observed:

  • “36. The High Court also rightly held that the Managing Director or Joint ManagingDirector would admittedly be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business by virtue of the office they hold as Managing Director or Joint Managing Director. These persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, and they get covered under Section 141 of the NI Act.”

End Notes

Trustees Can Maintain and Defend a Suit

Sections 3 and 13 of the Trusts Act read thus:

  • “3. Interpretation-clause:
  • Trust”—A “trust” is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner;
  • the person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the “author of the trust”; the person who accepts the confidence is called the “trustee”;
  • the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the “beneficiary”; the subject-matter of the trust is called “trust-property” or “trust money”;
  • the “beneficial interest” or “interest” of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust-property; and the instrument, if any, by which the trust is declared is called the “instrument of trust”;
  • a breach of any duty imposed on a trustee, as such, by any law for the time being in force, is called a “breach of trust”; and in this Act, unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context, “registered” means registered under the law for the registration of documents for the time being in force;
  • a person is said to have “notice” of a fact either when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from inquiry or gross negligence, he would have known it, or when information of the fact is given to or obtained by his agent, under the circumstances mentioned in the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Section 229;
  • and all expressions used herein and defined in the Indian Contract Act, 1872, shall be deemed to have the meanings respectively attributed to them by that Act.
  • xxx
  • 13. Trustee to protect title to trust-property—A trustee is bound to maintain and defend all such suits, and (subject to the provisions of the instrument of trust) to take such other steps as, regard being had to the nature and amount or value of the trust-property, may be reasonably requisite for the preservation of the trust-property and the assertion or protection of the title thereto.”

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Right of a Co-Accused or Co-Defendant to Cross-Examine another Accused’s/Defendant’s Witness is Limited – It is Possible Only When the Statement of the Witness Becomes “Adverse”

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

Article 21 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty: The Supreme Court has consistently held that Article 21 includes the right to a fair trial, which necessarily includes the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.

In Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “In the Indian Criminal jurisprudence, the accused is placed on a somewhat advantageous position than under different jurisprudence of some of the countries in the world. The criminal justice administration system in India places human rights and dignity for human life at a much higher pedestal. In our jurisprudence an accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty, the alleged accused is entitled to fairness and true investigation and fair trial and the prosecution is expected to play balanced role in the trial of a crime. The investigation should be judicious, fair, transparent and expeditious to ensure compliance to the basic rule of law. These are the fundamental canons of our criminal jurisprudence and they are quite in conformity with the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India.” (Quoted in: Rattiram v. State of M.P., AIR 2012 SC 1485; (2012) 4 SCC 516)

INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 (Indian Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2025)

Section 138, Indian Evidence Act  

  • Order of Examinations “Witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined.”
  • Any adverse party has the right to cross-examine.
  • If a co-accused’s interests are adverse to the witness or to the party calling the witness, the co-accused becomes an “adverse party” for that limited purpose and may cross-examine.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 (CrPC) Indian Nagarik Suraksha Sanhitha, 2025

Evidence for Prosecution

Section 231 CrPC:

  • The prosecution shall be called upon to lead evidence, and the accused shall have the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.

Section 233, CrPC

  • Evidence for Defence: The accused may enter on his defence and produce his own witnesses.

Court Decisions

(a) In Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, AIR 1949 PC 257

  • The Privy Council (Sir John Beaumont) observed – “A confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of ‘evidence’ contained in S. 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination.” (Quoted in: Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184; Adambhai Sulemanbhai Ajmeri v. State of Gujarat, 2014-7 SCC 716; Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh VS Republic of India, AIR 2011 SC 1436; 2011-2 SCC 490; Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253.)

 (b) In P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 2012 SC 2242

  • Our Supreme Court examined the scope of the provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and held as under:
  • “Grant of fairest opportunity to the accused to prove his innocence was the object of every fair trial, observed this Court in Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector of Customs, Amritsar, (2000) 10 SCC 430. The following passage is in this regard apposite:
  • ‘In such circumstances, if the new Counsel thought to have the material witnesses further examined, the Court could adopt latitude and a liberal view in the interest of justice, particularly when the Court has unbridled powers in the matter as enshrined in Section 311 of the Code. After all the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts should afford the opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible.’
  • ‘We are conscious of the fact that recall of the witnesses is being directed nearly four years after they were examined in chief about an incident that is nearly seven years old….. we are of the opinion that on a parity of reasoning and looking to the consequences of denial of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, we would prefer to err in favour of the appellant getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against a possible prejudice at his cost. Fairness of the trial is a virtue that is sacrosanct in our judicial system and no price is too heavy to protect that virtue. A possible prejudice to prosecution is not even a price, leave alone one that would justify denial of a fair opportunity to the accused to defend himself.” (Quoted in: Natasha Singh v. CBI, 2013 5 SCC 741)

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 (CPC)

CPC does not expressly mention “cross-examination” though its procedural framework implies it through:

  • Order XVIII Rule 4 & 5: Evidence of witnesses to be taken orally in open court (subject to cross-examination by the adverse party).
    • Order XVIII Rule 2(2): Parties have the right to “state their case and produce their evidence.”
    • Order XVIII Rule 15: Continuation of hearing by successor judge includes evidence and cross-examination already done.

When several defendants are present, and their defences are mutually adverse, each defendant has the right to cross-examine the witness of the other.

Principle in Civil Trials

  • If the defenses of co-defendants are joint or identical, one defendant cannot cross-examine the other’s witness as an “adverse party.”
    • But if their defenses are hostile or conflicting, each becomes an adverse party and gains the right to cross-examine.

Treatises

Sarkar on Evidence, eight edition p.1141, it is said as under:

  • No special provision is made in the Evidence Act for the cross-examination of the co-accused’s or co-defendant’s witnesses. But the procedure to be adopted may be regulated by the well-known rule that no evidence should be received against one who had no opportunity of testing it by cross-examination; as it would be unjust and unsafe not to allow a co-accused or co- defendant to cross-examine witness called by one whose case was adverse to his, or who has given evidence against. If there is no clash of interest or if nothing has been said against the other party, there cannot be any right of cross-examination.

Quoted in:

  • Ennen Castings Private Ltd. v. Sundaresh, AIR 2003 Kar 293
  • Chinnaiah v. Valliammal, 2023-3 LW 356; 2023-4 MLJ 544
  • Akhilesh Singh v. Krishan Bahadur Singh, 2020-4 CivCC 779; 2020-1 JLJ 452; 2020-1 MPLJ 457
  • Shiv Pratap Singh Tomar v. Seema Tomar, 2018(1) MPWN 118; 2018 (4) MPLJ 74
  • Bhajinder Singh v. Hardev Singh, 2017-3 CivCC 260; 2017-238 DLT 422; 2017-3 LJR 7
  • Mohamed Ziaulla v. Sorgra Begum, 1997 ILR Kar 1378; 1997-5 KarLJ 709
  • Sohan Lal VS Gulab Chand, AIR 1966 Raj 229

In ‘Principles and Digest of the Law of Evidence’ by M. Monir, third edition, p.1114 , it is said as under:

  • “A defendant may cross-examine a co-defendant or any other witness who has given evidence against him, and reply on such evidence, though there is no issue joined between them.”

Phipson on Evidence, tenth edition, para.1538 reads as under:

  • “A defendant may cross-examine a co-defendant or any other witness who has given evidence against him, and reply on such evidence though there is no issue joined between them.”

Court Decisions

1. In Ennen Castings Private Ltd. v. Sundaresh, AIR 2003 Kar 293, it is said as under:

  • “9. AS a general rule, evidence is not legally admissible against a party, who at the time it was given had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness or of rebutting their testimony by other evidence. When two or more persons are tried on the same indictment and are separately defended any witness called by one of them may be cross-examined on behalf of the others, if he gives any testimony to criminate them. A defendant may cross-examine his co-defendant who gives evidence or any of his co-defendant’s witnesses, if his co-defendant’s interest is hostile to his own.
  • 10.  THOUGH there is no specific provision in the Indian Evidence Act providing for such an opportunity for a defendant-respondent to cross-examine a co-defendant/co-respondent, however, having regard to the object and scope of cross-examination, it is settled law that when allegations are made against the party to the proceedings before that evidence could be acted upon, that party should have an ample opportunity to cross-examine the person who had given the evidence against him. It is only after such an opportunity is given, and witness is cross-examined that evidence becomes admissible.”

2. In Shiv Pratap Singh Tomar v. Seema Tomar, 2018(1) MPWN 118; 2018 (4) MPLJ 74, after quoting the above treatise it was observed as under:

  • “8. Though there is no specific provision in the Indian Evidence Act providing for such an opportunity for a defendant-respondent to cross-examine a co-defendant/ co-respondent, however, having regard to the object and scope of cross-examination, it is settled law that when allegations are made against the party to the proceedings, before that evidence could be acted upon, that party should have an ample opportunity to cross-examine the person who had given the evidence against him. It is only after such an opportunity is given, and the witness is cross-examined that evidence becomes admissible. (Quoted in:)

3. In Akhilesh Singh v. Krishan Bahadur Singh, 2020-4 CivCC 779; 2020-1 JLJ 452; 2020-1 MPLJ 457, (after quoting the said passages in Shiv Pratap Singh Tomar v. Seema Tomar, 2018(1) MPWN 118; 2018 (4) MPLJ 74) it was held as under:,

  • “9. Therefore, it is very clear from the aforesaid passages that it is settled law that no evidence should be received against one who had no opportunity of testing it by cross-examination; as it would be unjust and unsafe not to allow a co-accused or co-defendant to cross-examine a witness called by one whose case was adverse to him, or who has given evidence against. If there is no conflict of interest, such an opportunity need not to given. Therefore, the condition precedent for giving an opportunity to a defendant/respondent to cross-examine a co-respondent or a defendant is either from the pleadings of the parties or in the evidence, there should exist conflict of the interest between them. Once it is demonstrated that their interests is not common and there is a conflict of interest and evidence has been adduced, affecting the interest of the co-defendant/ co-respondents, then before the Court could act on that evidence, the person against whom the evidence is given should have an opportunity to cross-examine the said witness, so that ultimately truth emerges on the basis of which the Court can act.”

Conclusion

The right to cross-examine is both a statutory and constitutionally guaranteed right.

  • On the criminal side, a co-accused may cross-examine another’s witness only when the testimony adversely affects him.
  • On the civil side, a co-defendant may do so only when their defences are conflicting or adverse.

This doctrine ensures the principle of natural justice — audi alteram partem.

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What is Binding Judicial Precedent – In a Nutshell

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

No Binding Precedent if relevant STATUTORY PROVISION was Not considered. [Union of India v. Maniklal Banerjee, AIR 2006 SC 2844] 

Where no consideration was given to the question, the decision cannot be said to be binding; and precedents SUB SILENTIO – Without Arguments – are of NO MOMENT. [A-One Granites v. State of U.P., 2001-3 SCC 537] 
 
A decision is available as a precedent only if it DECIDES a QUESTION OF LAW. [State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1593: 1992-1 SCC 489]. Not facts. [Prakash Chandra Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1960 SC 195] 

RATIO DECIDENDIis Binding Precedent: Mere Casual Expressions – Not of Much Avail.[ Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555; State of Maharashtra v. Bhakti Vedanta Book Trust, AIR 2013 SC 1667; 2013-4 SCC 676; Shrirampur Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher, AIR 2013 SC 3757; 2013 5 SCC 627; Arun Kumar Aggarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 3056; 2014-13 SCC 707). 

For Binding Precedent, finding must be ‘RATIO DECIDENDI (necessary to the decision), and  Not obiter dicta. [Allen in ‘Law in the Making’; Quoted in: Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543; Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543)]

Court’s order is binding on the parties under res judicata; the RATIO DECIDENDIis bindingon other Courts as binding precedent. [The Modern English Legal System (4th Edition) by Smith, Bailey and Gunn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), pages 518-519] 
 
What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. [State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647; Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, 1996-6 SCC 44; Secunderabad Club v. CIT, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004, 2023-457 ITR 263 (SC) 

The doctrine of precedent mandates that an exposition of lawmust be followed and applied. [State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar Sharma, 2016-15 SCC 289]. 

Res judicata bars raising the same issue. Judicial precedent is not concerned with issues between parties. (Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley’s Commentary on the Doctrine of Res Judicata (Butterworths: London, Edinburgh, Dublin – 1996, pages 8 and 9)

Res judicata pertains to the parties;  precedent refers to a binding declaration of law that applies to courts or authorities. [Indian Broadcasting and Digital Foundation v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, 01 Nov 2024, 2024 KER 80988]. 

A decision on the ‘construction of that document’ can operates as a judicial precedent against one though he was not a party to that litigation (Sahu Madho Dass v. Mukand Ram, 1955 AIR SC 481).

A later judgment will not hold good if it had not taken note of an earlier judgment rendered by a Bench of co-equal strength; and the earlier judgment prevails, and it cannot be seen as per incuriam (Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2014 SC 1745, 2014 (16) SCC 623).

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“Nothing In This Adhiniyam Shall Apply To Deny The Admissibility” – New Provision (S. 61, BSA) to Ensure that S. 63, BSA (S. 65B, Evidence Act) is an Enabling Provision

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • 1. Section 61 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, affirms that a copy of an electronic record (computer output) can be produced and proved by any method permissible under the Act for proving a document.
  • 2. The expression “nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply” in Section 61 is enacted with a view to override the effect of the non obstante clause in Section 63.
  • 3. The procedural requirements under Section 63 (such as the furnishing of a certificate and hash value, etc.) apply only where the party opts to prove a copy of an electronic record (computer output) under the special method prescribed by Section 63.

Purport of S. 61, BSA, 2023

  • Sec. 61, BSA, says – Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital record—
    • and such record shall, subject to section 63, have the same legal effect, validity and enforceability as other documents.
  • The first part of Section 61 — “Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital record” — is broadly worded and makes no distinction between an original and a copy of an electronic record.
    • Therefore, this clause ensures the admissibility of electronic records — whether original or copy — solely on the ground of their digital nature.
  • The expression “subject to Section 63” in Section 61, BSA implies that the procedural requirements under Section 63 (such as the furnishing of a certificate and hash value, etc.) apply only where the party opts to prove a copy of an electronic record (computer output) under the special method prescribed by Section 63.
  • That is, the copy of an electronic record (computer output) can be proved by any other method provided under the Act (for proving a document).

Other Methods to Establish Proof are:

  • (i) oral evidence of one who can vouchsafe the same,
  • (ii) circumstantial evidence,
  • (iii) invoking ‘presumption’ and
  • (iv) express admission by the other side.

Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall Apply to Deny the Admissibility”: Significance

The words “nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility” in Section 61 are also made to expand the scope of admissibility of Electronic Evidence. The non-obstante clause in Section 63, BSA is capable of giving two (divergent) interpretations–

  • First, Section 63, BSA is an enabling provision to admit ‘computer output’ (copy – derived from the original)  as ‘document’ itself, in a simpler manner, by the deeming provision, ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’. That is, computer output (copy) can also be proved by any other manner provided for proving any other document.
  • Second, a computer output (copy) can be proved only under the provisions of Section 63, BSA, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’. (It is the view taken by the Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216.)

The words in the new Section 61, “nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility”, are an emphatic delineation of the legislative intent on the following matters –

  • 1. Section 63, BSA is an enabling provision to admit ‘computer output’ (copy)  as a ‘document’ itself, in a simpler(?) manner, by the deeming provision notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’.
  • 2. The interpretation given to Section 63, BSA, that a ‘computer output (copy) can be proved only’ under the provisions of Section 63, BSA, ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’, is not accepted by the legislature.
    • Or, the word “nothing” in Section 61 overrides, or nullifies, the effect of the non obstante clause in Section 63.
  • 3. Thereby, the words, ‘subject to section 63’ in Section 61, BSA, only direct to undergo the requirements in Section 63 (that is, production of Section 63 certificate, and HASH certificate) to prove the Computer output — only when one opts to prove it under the provisions of Section 63: that is, he can adopt any other method provided in the BSA.

Note: If this interpretation is not given, Section 61, the new provision in the BSA, stands meaningless.

Also Read: ‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be proved by ‘CERTIFICATE’ u/s. 65B

End Notes

“HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s”

The Certificate required in Section 63(4)(c) of the new Act must be “in the form specified in the Schedule”. It appears that this certificate is needed in addition to the Certificate that is required in sub-section (4) as regards the matters enumerated therein; or the Certificate should contain (additionally) the matters enumerated in sub-section (4).

The Form in the Schedule directs to state as under:

  • “I state that the HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s is …… ……… …… , obtained through the following algorithm –
  • SHA1:
  • SHA256:
  • MD5:
  • Other …….. …….. …….. (Legally acceptable standard)
  • (Hash report to be enclosed with the certificate)”

A Discordant Note

The requirement for this certificate is unnecessary, especially in situations where there is no dispute regarding the computer output (copy or print-out). It may be more feasible for many litigants to bring the original device, such as a CCTV Camera, computer, laptop, or mobile phone, to court than to get the HASH value fixed through an expert.

It is not clear –

  • (i) What is the precise purpose of ascertaining the hash value(s) of the (original) electronic or digital record?
    • Note: It appears that the hash value(s) of the original record are required to be stated, rather than that of the copy (‘computer output’) actually produced before the court. This raises a doubt: how is the court to verify the authenticity of the copy if the original’s HASH value alone is referenced?
  • (ii) Why does the requirement of including HASH value(s) appear only in the Schedule (certificate format) and not in the main body of Section 63 itself?

The lack of explicit mention in the section text also creates uncertainty about whether HASH values are ‘mandatory’ or merely a ‘directory’ one.

Section 63(4)(c), BSA

Section 63(4)(c), BSA reads as under:

  • “(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be  sufficient for a matter to bestated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.”

A question may arise –

  • Because the term “hash value” is not explicitly used the main body of Section 63(4)(c) BSA, can it be argued – Hash Value Certificate is not mandatory but directory (or merely illustrative of the best practices)?

An argument is possible (“hash value” certificate is not mandatory) for two matters –

  • 1. The requirement in the Certificate stated in Section 63(4)(c) is laid down in the sub-section (2) of Sec. 63. The “Part A” Certificate in the schedule contains all things in sub-section (2) of Sec. 63. So the “Part B” Hash Value Certificate is not mandatory as per the “Section”.
  • 2. The words “sufficient for a matter to be in the sub-section make it clear – the ‘verbatim adherence’ to the certificate format is not mandatory;*.* no doubt, the substance or contents thereof (particularly, the phraseology – “best of the knowledge and belief”) must have been placed in some (other) form. The particulars in the Certificate being the matters enumerated in the sub-section (2) of Sec 63 (and nothing is stated as regards Hash Value), the ‘Part B’ Hash Value Certificate cannot be a mandatory one.
    • *.*Note:
    • 1. See the difference between (i) reading Sec. 63(4)(c) without the words – sufficient for a matter to be and (ii) reading with these words. Relevant portion of Sec. 63(4)(c) is given below:
      • “(c) ….. for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be  sufficient for a matter to bestated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.”
    • 2. The beginning portion of Sec. 63(4)(c) emphasises that it pertains to the matters enumerated in sub-section(2) alone, and not to hash-value. Sec. 63(4)(c) begins as under:
      • “(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate…”
    • 3. It appears that the hash value(s) of the original record are expected to be stated, rather than those of the copy (or “computer output”) actually produced before the court. This raises several questions, including: how is the court to verify the authenticity of the copy, if only the original’s HASH is referenced?

Possible Counter Arguments

  • First: The “form A” itself requires Hash Value Certificate.
  • Second:  Section 63(4)(c) says, “a certificate specified in the Schedule”. The phrase “specified in the Schedule” explicitly ties the main section to the Schedule and makes it mandatory.
  • Third:  The Schedule provides a single, Certificate, divided into two parts – “Part A and “Part B”. It is not presented as two separate certificates, one mandatory and one optional.
  • Fourth: Legislative Intent (i.e., for ensuring the digital integrity of electronic records) reflects the mandatory nature.

Conclusion

The ‘Hash Value Certificate’ in the BSA is shrouded in several potential ambiguities. To dispel these uncertainties, a legislative amendment or a definitive ruling by an authoritative court that takes into account all pertinent arguments in this matter is imperative.

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Admissibility of Photographs, and Photo-Identification, in Court Cases

Adv. Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Nutshell – Photograph Evidence

Photographs are admissible in evidence as documents.  P.  Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1; 2020-9 SCC 161
While considering a case on dowry death, the prosecution argued that a photograph was not admissible in evidence as neither the person who took the photograph nor its negative was produced in evidence. But, the court accepted the photograph as ‘no dispute was raised by the prosecution witnesses’.Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2024 SC 4551
A large number of photographs were marked and considered in this case.
In para 525, it is stated – the witness “was confronted with photographs of the inscription”
There were three sets of albums containing photographs taken by the State Archaeological Department pursuant to an order dated 10 January 1990 (Para 533).
In para 538, the Court considered the evidence of a witness as to the “photographs placed within the structure in 1990”.
M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1 (Ayodhya case)
The factum of photo identification (of an accused) by PW 2, as witnessed by the officer concerned, is a relevant and admissible piece of evidence.Rabindra Kumar Pal v.  Republic of India, 2011-2 SCC 490
Nothing prevented the appellant-State Government from producing the relevant photographs of the purported pucca pond existing at some spots.State of Rajasthan v. Ultratech Cement Ltd. , 2022-12 Scale 606; 2022-13 SCR 1
A statement about the photograph made by any expert would not be admissible before examining the photographer.Dr. Pankaj Kumudchandra Phadnis v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 785
Photographs, tape-records of speeches [Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17] are documents.Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016 15 SCC 485;
Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2011-4 SCC 143
Photo identification of an accused during the investigation, who was seen by the witness at the relevant time.Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic  AIR 1999 SC  2562, 2000-1 SCC 138; Rabindra Kumar Pal v. Republic of India, AIR  2011 SC 1436; 2011 2 SCC 490
Inventory, photographs and the list of samples certified by the Magistrate are admissible as primary evidence. It is a substitute for the production of physical evidence of seized contraband samples.Nisar Ahmed Bhat, v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir 2024 0 Supreme(J&K) 187  
The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae.K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275;
R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157;
Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720

Nutshell – Photo and Video: Relevant and Admissibile

Audio/Video cassettes Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17
Tape records of speechesTukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329
Photo or videoMohammed Rafiq v. Madhan, 2018-1 Mad LJ(CRI) 641;
Moti Rabidas v. The State of Bihar, 2015-145 AIC 435;
Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan 2014-1 Raj Cri C 31;
State of MP v. Shankarlal, ILR 2010 MP 717;
P Rajagopal v. Inspector of police 2009-2 Mad LJ(Cri) 161;
Santhosh Baccharam Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 All MR (Cri)997, 2003 BCR (Cri) 120.
CD  Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, (2016) 15 SCC 485
Photographs including photographs of tombstones and houses Lyell v. Kennedy (No.3) (1884) 50 L.T. 730
Video recordings  State of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053
Audio and videoState of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053;
Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31;
Taylor v. Chief Constable Cheshire:1987(1) All.ER 225
CassettesTukaram S.Dighole v. Manik Rao Shivaji Kokate (2010)4 SCC 329
Moving cinematographSenior v. Holdsworth, Ex parte Independant Television New Ltd. (1976) Q.B. 23)
Film  Rex v. Daye ((1908)2 K.B. 333, 340)
Floppies, CCTV footages, CDs, DVDs, Chips, Hard discs, Pen drives North West Airlines v. Union of India 2007 (214) ELT 178 (Bom.)

Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witness Theory

  • Pictorial Testimony Theory – Photograph Need Not Be Proved.
  • Silent Witness Theory – Photograph Must Be Proved.

In Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State (2014 Ker HC 31), these two theories governing the proof and authenticity of photographs were explained.

  • First, the pictorial testimony theory: It is applied when a photograph is used merely as an aid to a witness in explaining or illustrating his testimony—for example, a doctor explaining injuries with reference to a photograph, or identification of a deceased through a photograph.  In such a case, the evidence of the witness will be the primary matter rather than what is depicted in the photograph; and the photographer need not be examined in court, since the photograph is admitted merely to aid a witness in explaining his testimony.
  • Secondly, under the silent witness theory or communication theory: It is invoked when the photograph itself constitutes substantive and probative evidence of what it depicts, speaking for itself without supporting oral testimony—for instance, an X-ray film showing a fracture, a photograph depicting the accused in a crowd holding a weapon (though the photographer did not notice him), or a photograph of the scene of occurrence of a crime. In such cases, the photographs must be proven.

Presumptions on Photographs and Videos

Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (Section 114 of the Evidence Act) allows the Court to ‘presume the existence of any fact ….. regard being had to the common course of natural events‘.

A photograph or a video, by its very nature, speaks for itself. Therefore, the courts in India can commence with a presumption as to the correctness of the photograph or video, placing the onus on the opposite party to rebut that presumption by placing material on record sufficient to dislodge or shift the same.

Invoking this general presumption, the courts in India have consistently held –

  • ‘a mere bald denial of the contents of a video recording is insufficient‘; but, ‘there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed’.

Photographs – In many cases a Corroborative Piece; It Can be the Best Evidence also

A photograph, being a document, ordinarily requires proof through a proper witness to establish its authenticity and relevance. However, it need not invariably be proved by examining the photographer, and may be proved through any competent witness capable of speaking to the facts depicted or the circumstances of its production. Once duly admitted, a photograph may constitute primary or substantive evidence, though in many cases it is used to corroborate other evidence.

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it is held that CCTV footage can be a ‘Best Evidence‘. The court said it as under:

  • “Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, prosecution in possession of the best evidence – CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced.”

In short, a photograph or video, once duly admitted and properly proved, constitutes substantive evidence. Though in many cases it is relied upon as corroborative evidence, in an appropriate case it may, by itself, establish the fact in issue, independently and without the aid of other evidence.

Silent Witnesses Theory – Photograph /Video Speaks for Itself

In State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, the Madras High Court explained the “silent witness” theory, stating as under:

  • “115. We may also incidentally notice the developments in the law on video and photographic evidence in the West where the “silent witness” theory is deployed to admit video and photographic evidence. The theory proceeds on the footing that photographic and video evidence are “silent witnesses” which speak for themselves. They are substantive evidence of what they portray.”

The following two foreign decisions were specifically dealt with by the High Court:

  • (a) State of Nevada v. Archanian, [145 P 3d 1008 (2006)]: The Supreme Court of Nevada admitted the video evidence under the silent witness theory and held as under:
    • “There is no evidence suggesting that the composite videotape was inaccurate, that any relevant or exculpatory information had been deleted from it, or that the modifications made to it adversely affected or obscured the content.”
  • (b) Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, [2017 ONCJ 790,]: The Ontario Court of Justice in Canada opined to the following effect:
    • The party seeking to tender a video in evidence must show two things to meet the threshold test of admissibility: (i) The video is relevant, showing the crime scene or other evidence linked to the issues at trial; and (ii) the video is authentic — that it accurately represents the events depicted.

Bald Denials are Insufficient to Discredit the Authenticity of Video Footage

The Madras High Court, in this decision (State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi), also observed as under:

  • “113. It is true that the cameraman can zoom or minimize an image. It is also true that trick photography is possible. In Suo Motu taken up (PIL) WP Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others (WP 3335 etc. of 2009) decided on 29.10.2009, a Division Bench of this Court (F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla and R. Banumathi, JJ) held that bald denials are insufficient to discredit the authenticity of video footage. In her lead judgment, Banumathi, J (as she then was) has opined as under:
    • ‘349. That a bald denial of the contents of a videotape is not adequate to doubt its authenticity; there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed’.
  • The Division Bench proceeded to look into the video tape as a corroborative piece of evidence and held as under:
    • ‘350. The respondents have not disputed that the video clippings filed by the petitioners relate to the occurrence. Even though video clippings filed by the petitioners do not have the running time, we have watched the videos and looked into the photos as corroborative piece of evidence’.”

In Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1, the conclusion of the Speaker on CDs received from TV News channels, that ‘there is no room for doubting the authenticity and accuracy of the electronic evidence produced by the petitioner’, was accepted by the Apex Court holding as under:

  • “The petitioners despite grant of opportunity had declined to watch the recorded interview. It is one thing to watch the interview, point out in what manner the recording was not genuine but instead of availing of that opportunity, the petitioners preferred to adopt the course of vague denial.”

In Umesh v. State of Karnataka, 2023-2 KarLJ 397, while dealing with a ‘trap case’, after laying down the importance of digital evidence, it is cautioned as under:

  • “Qualified and trained expert should test the samples. The report should contain the procedure adopted for testing the samples. The equipments used should be duly calibrated and updated periodically. The electronic device should be tested for editing and tampering in order to establish its genuineness and authenticity.
  • Digital evidence form be created for every memory card/chip used in the trap case containing the unique identification features of the memory chip/card used. The defence should be provided with a cloned copy or a mirror image of the electronic device.”

Distinct Evidentiary Position of a Section 63(4) Certificate

Once the Section 63(4) certificate accompanies the computer output (copy), the computer output becomes admissible in evidence, and it is not mandatory to examine the CCTV operator, or the person who snapped the photograph, for the purpose of its admission.

  • See: Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473,
  • Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1.

The Person Who Signed Section 63/65B Certificate Need Not Be Examined: Having regard to the special features of the photographs and videos (that is, visual depictions of facts), even if the Section 63(4) certificate is not that given either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, but by another, the photograph or video can be marked in evidence through the plaintiff or the defendant.

Unless the authenticity or correctness of the certificate issued under Section 63(4) is specifically disputed, oral evidence has no role to play in proving (for the purpose of marking) that the computer output is the exact copy of the (original) electronic record. Therefore, the photographer who issued the certificate under Section 63(4) need not be examined if the correctness of the certificate is not specifically disputed.

In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC, our Apex Court further affirmed as under:

  • “50. … However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such certificate be given by such person/persons.”

Presumption on Computer Output (copy) Admitted under Sec. 63

A computer output (copy) of a CCTV footage or video, or of a photograph captured on a mobile phone, can be admitted in evidence in place of the original — if it is produced with a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA.

  • Note: Section 63(1), BSA says about admissibility of copy — “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.”

Proof by Certificate under Section 63(4)

In view of the non-obstante clause (“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam”) in Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the only Mode of Proof of a computer output (copy) is the evidence through a certificate under Section 63(4).

  • Therefore, even in cases where formal proof of the digital photos or videos is dispensed with (for the opposite party admits it), a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA is necessary.

Admission and Proof of Computer Output (copy): Independent Matters

(i) Admitting a copy of a computer output (such as copy of a statement of accounts) in evidence (with a certificate under Section 63), and (ii) the formal proof thereof at the time of trial, are two distinct and independent matters.

  • The questions as to substantive proof — whether the computer output or copy is relevant, and how it should be proved — are not determined by Section 63 of the BSA. They are to be established independently, as in the case of any other class of documents.

The burden of Impeaching the Certificate is upon the Party who Disputes it

The presumption arising under Section 63—by which a computer output is deemed to be a document—is rebuttable and does not render the contents of the electronic record conclusive.

If such a challenge on the certificate is overruled by the court, it can draw a presumption as to the genuineness and authenticity of the photographs or videos contained in the computer output (copies).

S. 63 deals with Admissibility of computer output or copy, and not Proof

The questions as to substantive proof — whether the computer output or copy is relevant, and how it should be proved — are not determined by Section 63 of the BSA. They are to be established independently, as in the case of any other class of documents.

  • However, the court can draw presumptions as to the genuineness and authenticity of such photographs or videos, as stated earlier.

Once Copy Admitted by S. 63 Certificate, Oral Evidence has No Place in Marking

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, is an authority on the following matters –

  • (i) The certificate under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to admissibility of the computer output (copy);
  • (ii) The certificate is meant to replace the oral evidence of the device-handler or operator.
  • (iii) Once the certificate is produced, oral evidence has no place (for the purpose of marking it).

However, the person who issued the certificate (operator) has to be examined if:

  • the authenticity or correctness of the certificate is specifically disputed;
  • allegations of fabrication, manipulation, or false certification are raised;
  • the issuer’s control over the device/system is seriously questioned; or
  • the court needs clarification to assess probative value, not admissibility.

Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witness Theory

  • Pictorial Testimony Theory — Photograph Need Not Be Proved.
  • Silent Witness Theory — Photograph Must Be Proved.

Photographer Need Not be examined (In pictorial testimony theory)

When a photograph is admitted merely to aid a witness in explaining his testimony, it need not be proved formally. 

Photograph Must Have Been Proved (In silent witness theory)

As stated above, in silent witness theory cases, the photographs must be proved. No doubt, in the peculiar nature of a particular case, the examination of the photographer may not be insisted upon, and the photograph could be proved by another ‘proper’ witness. Formal proof of a photograph may not be necessary where the opposite party admits its genuineness or correctness.

Examination of the Photographer may not be insisted (In silent witness theory)

As stated above, in silent witness theory cases, photographs or videos are required to be proved. However, such proof need not necessarily be by way of formal proof through the examination of the photographer or the person who captured the image. Besides admission of the other side as regards the authenticity, the photographs or videos may instead be proved through a ‘proper’ witness who is competent to depose by way of general evidence regarding the factual features depicted therein, such as the identity of the persons shown, the place, the time, or the surrounding circumstances.

  • Note: 1. Formal proof of a photograph or copy of a video and the requirement of the certificate under Section 63(4) are two distinct and independent matters.
  • 2. Even in cases where formal proof of the photographs or copies of videos is dispensed with, the certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA (Section 65B of the IEA) is necessary, when a computer output (copy) of a photograph or video is produced — in view of the non-obstante clause in Section 63 of the BSA.
  • 3. A photograph or a copy of video, admitted in evidence on the strength of a certificate under Section 63(4), stands on a distinct footing (in contradistinction to a statement-of-account) by reason of the statutory presumptions that the court can invoke, it being direct visual depictions of facts.
  • 4. The certificate under Section 63(4) is accepted unless its correctness is specifically challenged. The oral evidence of the person who issued the certificate becomes relevant (for the purpose of admitting the document) only where the certificate itself is specifically and successfully challenged by the party who disputes its authenticity or correctness.
  • 5. Therefore, the court is entitled to infer that a photograph or video, once duly admitted in evidence, correctly represents the scene or object as it existed at the time of recording. It is doctrinally recognised as the ‘silent witness’ theory – the document “speaks for itself”.
  • 6. Accordingly, once a photograph or copy of a video is duly admitted in evidence, the court can act upon it (usually as a corroborative piece of evidence), on the basis of general evidence relating to the identity of the persons depicted, the place, the time, and the surrounding circumstances, without insisting upon any further primary or direct proof of the facts.
  • 7. The presumption attached to a photograph or a video admitted in evidence being one rebuttable, the opposite party can rebut it by placing appropriate evidence to show that the photograph or video does not correctly represent the scene, object, or occurrence as it existed at the relevant point of time, or that the factual position had materially changed.

Pictorial Testimony Theory: No Enacted Law; Only Judicial Exposition

The pictorial testimony theory rests on judicial exposition rather than statutory codification. It finds only indirect support, in principle, from Section 162 (Refreshing Memory), BSA. Section 162 is to be understood as one not exhaustive in its operation.

Section 162 of the BSA reads as under:

  • “Refreshing memory: (1) A witness may, while under examination, refresh his memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or so soon afterwards that the Court considers it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in his memory:
    • Provided that the witness may also refer to any such writing made by any other person, and read by the witness within the time aforesaid, if when he read it, he knew it to be correct.
  • (2) Whenever a witness may refresh his memory by reference to any document, he may, with the permission of the Court, refer to a copy of such document:
    • Provided that the Court be satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the non-production of the original:
    • Provided further that an expert may refresh his memory by reference to professional treatises.”

Definition of Evidence

According to the Section 2(1)(e) of the Bh. Sak. Act 

  • ” ‘evidence’ means and includes–

    (i) all statements including statements given electronically which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters of fact under inquiry and such statements are called oral evidence;

    (ii) all documents including electronic or digital records produced for the inspection of the Court and such documents are called documentary evidence.”

Connected Articles:

Definition of document

Section 2(1)(d) of the Bh. Sak. Act defines ‘document’ as under:

  • “ (d) ‘document’ means any matter expressed or described or otherwise recorded upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or any other means or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter and includes electronic and digital records.

    Illustrations.
  • (i) A writing is a document.

    (ii) Words printed, lithographed or photographed are documents.

    (iii) A map or plan is a document.

    (iv) An inscription on a metal plate or stone is a document.

    (v) A caricature is a document.

    (vi) An electronic record on emails, server logs, documents on computers, laptop or smartphone, messages, websites, locational evidence and voice mail messages stored on digital devices are documents.”

‘Document’ takes in photographs of words as could be seen from the illustration.

By virtue of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (computer output) shall be ‘deemed to be also a document’.

Besides the Evidence Act, the term ‘document’ has been defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the Indian Penal Code, 1860.  

Section 3(18), General Clauses Act defines document as under:

  • Document shall include any matter written, expressed, or described upon any substances by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means which is intended to be used, or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter.”

Section 29, Indian Penal Code explains that the word document denotes any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.

In Explanation 1, it is stated:

  • “It is immaterial by what means or upon what substance the letters, figures or marks are formed, or whether the evidence is intended for, or may be used in a court of justice, or not.”

Going by the definitions, ‘document ‘ includes not only all materials or substances upon which thoughts of a man are represented by writing or any other species of conventional mark or symbol, but also records of information of some sort (Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State, 2014 KerHC 31).

In P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1, it is observed that tape records of speeches (Also in: Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, 2010-4 SCC 329; Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra(1976) 2 SCC 17 ) and audio/video cassettes (See: Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, 1976-2 SCC 17) including compact disc (See also: Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016-15 SCC 485) were “documents” under Section 3 of the 1872 Act, which stand on no different footing than photographs and were held admissible in evidence. It is by now well established that the electronic record produced for the inspection of the Court is documentary evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act (Anwar PV v. PK Basheer, 2014-10 SCC 473).

Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720

  • “The process of tape-recording offers an accurate method of storing and later reproducing sounds. The imprint on the magnetic tape is the direct effect of the relevant sounds. Like a photograph of a relevant incident, a contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under s. 7 of the Indian Evidence Act.”

R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157

In R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157, summarised this case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri) as under:

  • “In Nagree’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720) the appellant offered bribe to Sheikh a Municipal Clerk. Sheikh informed the Police. The Police laid a trap. Sheikh called Nagree at the residence. The Police kept a tape recorder concealed in another room. The tape was kept in the custody of the police inspector  Sheikh gave evidence of the talk. The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae. It is also comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident. The tape recorded conversation is therefore a relevant fact and is admissible under section 7 of the Evidence Act.”

After summarising Nagree’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720), the Supreme Court said as under:

  • “The Court will take care in two directions in admitting such evidence. First, the Court will find out that it is genuine and free from tampering or mutilation. Secondly, the Court may also secures scrupulous conduct and behaviour on behalf of the Police. The reason is that the Police Officer is more likely to behave properly if improperly obtained evidence is liable to be viewed with care and caution by the Judge. In every case the position of the accused, the nature of the investigation and the gravity of the offence must be judged in the light of the material facts and the Surrounding circumstances.”

K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275:

  • 7. The amended definition of “evidence” in section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872 read with the definition of “electronic record” in section 2(t) of the Information Technology Act 2000, includes a compact disc containing an electronic record of a conversation. Section 8 of Evidence Act provides that the conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit, in reference to such suit, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto. In R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157, this court made it clear that electronically recorded conversation is admissible in evidence, if the conversation is relevant to the matter in issue and the voice is identified and the accuracy of the recorded conversation is proved by eliminating the possibility of erasureaddition or manipulation. This Court further held that a contemporaneous electronic recording of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident and is admissible as evidence under Section 8 of the Act. There is therefore no doubt that such electronic record can be received as evidence.”

The Kerala High Court (KT Thomas, J.), in Ponnappan v. State of Kerala, ILR 1994(3) Ker 370, in appeal, confirmed the conviction holding that Chacko was the person who was killed. It was on a photo identification – Pictorial testimony. The Court held as under:

  • “PW I identified the person in M.O.9 photo as the person who was killed. There is no doubt that M.O.9 is the photograph of Chacko, the film representative. It was contended that since P. W.I himself admitted that he had not observed the features or facial peculiarities of the person when he was inside the car, the identification made by him with the help of the photo is not of any use. We are of the view that even without noticing any translatable mark or feature of a person it would be possible to identify him later.”

Here the photo had not been proved through the photographer.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

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Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

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Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

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Will

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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

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If a Document is Per Se Illegal, or Void Ab Initio, it Need Not be Set Aside

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • If a document is per se invalid, it can be set aside by the Court.
  • In certain cases, if a document is per se invalid, it need not be set aside; the court can proceed, taking notice of its illegality, without setting it aside.

Void” has several facets.

  • ‘Void’ nature has several facets. No declaration needed if a document is void. The court can proceed by ignoring the deed.
  • One type of void acts, those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration is necessary,
  • The other type of void act (e.g., may be transaction against a minor without being represented by a next friend) is a good transaction against the whole world except the minor. If he decides to avoid the same and succeeds in avoiding it by taking recourse to appropriate proceeding the transaction becomes void from the very beginning.
  • Another type of void act may be which is not a nullity but for avoiding the same a declaration has to be made.

Transfer Per Se Invalid or Ab-initio Void, Need Not Set Aside

The general principle is – if a document is per se invalid, it can be set aside by the Court. In certain cases, if a document is per se invalid, it need not be set aside; the court can proceed, taking notice of its illegality, without setting it aside.

In Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, (2002) 1 SCC 178, it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “25………Undoubtedly Smt Madamma, sister of the minor, is not a “guardian” as defined in Section 4(b) of the Act (Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956). Therefore, she can only be taken to be a “de facto guardian” or more appropriately “de facto manager”. To a transfer in such a case Section 11 of the Act squarely applies. Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor’s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding. The minor, on attaining majority, can repudiate the transfer in any manner as and when occasion for it arises. After attaining majority if he/she transfers his/her interest in the property in a lawful manner asserting his/her title to the same that is sufficient to show that the minor has repudiated the transfer made by the de facto guardian/manager.”

In Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

  • “When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

  • “39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
  • 40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

Also read:

If Voidable, to be Set Aside

In Amirtham Kudumbah v. Sarnam Kudumbah, (1991) 3 SCC 20, it is held as under:

  • “8. .. The property was transferred by him without obtaining the previous permission of the Court and the transfer was not for the benefit of the minor. Such a sale by the minor’s father who is his natural guardian is, unlike in the case of transfer by a de facto guardian (Section 11), not a void sale, but only a voidable sale. Such a sale until set aside is sufficiently effective to pass title, but being a voidable sale, what the buyer has obtained is a defeasible title which is liable to be set aside at the instance of the person entitled to impeach it. Section 8(3) of the Guardianship Act says: “Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him.”(emphasis supplied)

In Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan, (2001) 6 SCC 163, Vishwambhai v. Laxminarayan, (2001) 6 SCC 163, and Nangali Amma Bhavani Amma v. Gopalkrishnan Nair, (2004) 8 SCC 785, also, the challenge was made to alienation of minor’s property without Court’s sanction and without legal necessity. It was held that the alienation by natural guardian was voidable.

No declaration Needed if a Document is Void

In Sarojini v. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, and in Gomathy v. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43, it is held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.

In Laxmanan v. Padmini, (2009) 1 SCC 354, wherein our Apex Court had considered a deed of Will and a Gift allegedly executed by the very same person on the very same day. In that particular case also, it was a simple suit for partition, even when the said two documents were propounded by the opponent. Even though such contentions were taken in the written statement, regarding the existence of a Will as well as a gift deed, the plaint was not amended and any other reliefs were not incorporated. The propounder of the Will failed to dispel the suspicious circumstances existed in the execution of the Will. Same was the case with the gift deed also. Both the said documents were registered documents. Even then, the Apex court found that the suit for partition, disregarding and ignoring the said two documents, was maintainable, and the decree was granted.

Void has several facets; If ab initio Void, No declaration Needed

Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University, (2001) 6 SCC 534, laid down the distinction between Void and Voidable. It reads as under:

  • “22. Thus the expressions “void and voidable” have been the subject-matter of 20 consideration on innumerable occasions by courts. The expression “void” has several facets. One type of void acts, transactions, decrees are those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration is necessary, law does not take any notice of the same and it can be disregarded in collateral proceeding or otherwise. The other type of void act, e.g., may be transaction against a minor without being represented by a next friend. Such a transaction is a good transaction against the whole world. So far as the minor is concerned, if he decides to avoid the same and succeeds in avoiding it by taking recourse to appropriate proceeding the transaction becomes void from the very beginning. Another type of void act may be which is not a nullity but for avoiding the same a declaration has to be made. Voidable act is that which is a good act unless avoided, e.g., if a suit is filed for a declaration that a document is fraudulent and/or forged and fabricated, it is voidable as the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs and a party who alleges otherwise is obliged to prove it. If it is proved that the document is forged and fabricated and a declaration to that effect is given, a transaction becomes void from the very beginning. There may be a voidable transaction which is required to be set aside and the same is avoided from the day it is so set aside and not any day prior to it. In cases where legal effect of a document cannot be taken away without setting aside the same, it cannot be treated to be void but would be obviously voidable.”

Document Void Ab Initio – Need Not Be Set Aside, Neither Should There Be A Prayer

In Prem Singh v. Birbal, AIR 2006 SC 3608, the Supreme Court has held as under:

  • “16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non-est in the eye of law, as it would be a nullity.”

 In Pragnya Rout v. Hemaprava Ray AIR 2006 Ori. 21, it was held as under:

  • “22. Law is well settled that a decree and/or a registered document which is otherwise ab initio void need not be set aside. Such decree does not strip the right of a party who is the real owner and was not a signatory to the document in question or a party to the suit…. If the deed is void at the threshold, no steps need be taken to set it aside. The vendor may not have title to convey, and in such a case the title deed conveys no title and can be ignored as not worth the paper written on. (see: 1992-2 OLR 362, Sarbeswar v. Commissioner, Consolidation).” (Quoted in: Gulam Mustafa v. Md.  Yusuf Ansari, 2018-3 JBCJ 606; 2019-1 JCR 83 (Jhk).

In Natarajan v. M.  Ravi, 2019-4 CTC 543; 2019-2 LW 673 (Mad), the High Court found that the release deed being a fraudulent document, ‘it is a void document’- void ab initio, which need not have been be set aside and neither should there be a prayer to set aside the document. The Court said it as under:

  • “53. I hold that the release deed being a fraudulent document cannot be upheld by this Court. It is a void document. Its basis is not free consent. The basis is an agreement entered to defeat the rights of the plaintiffs and to grab the property. Consequently, I hold that the doubt being void ab initio, need not be set aside neither should there be a prayer to set aside the document. It is a non-est document in law. It is void. It is a null document. It does not give any right to the releasee. The point is answered accordingly.”

Babulal Tiwari v. Jabbar Singh, 2018-1 MPWN 41, also it is held that the law is well settled that a registered document which is otherwise void ab initio need not be set aside. Such deeds do not strip the right of the party who is the real owner.

In Kaka Hajee Md. Ishaque Sahib v. Kaka Md. Saddiq Sahib, (1970) 1 MLJ 207, it has been held as under:

  • “Normally a transaction will bind a person if he or persons under whom he derives title are eo nomine parties to the same, and must be set aside before any relief is claimed thereunder. This, however, is subject to two important, exceptions : (1) Where the transaction is only a sham and nominal one, not intended to be given effect to; and (2) Where the transaction is void in law. It necessarily follows that (1) transactions to which a person or persons under whom the said persons derive title are not eo nomine parties; (2) transactions which are challenged as sham and nominal and (3) transactions which are void ab initio are not legally binding in character need not be cancelled and set aside, before any claim is made thereunder. …”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Thummala Krishna Rao Case Misread by High Courts

In this case, an earlier suit had been dismissed on the ground that one had perfected his title by adverse possession; and thereafter, the University requested the Government to initiate summary eviction proceedings.

Saji Koduvath, Advocates, Kottayam.

Introspection

Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081, 1982 (2) SCC 134, arose from a summary eviction proceeding initiated by the Government under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The facts of the case, in a nutshell, were the following:

  • (i) A suit for possession filed by Osmania University had earlier been dismissed on the ground that one Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession; and (ii) thereafter, Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to initiate summary eviction proceedings.

The Apex Court held in those circumstances that the summary suit for eviction could not have been resorted to by the Government, and that it could have been only be by due process in a civil court action. The Apex Court pointed out that long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in- title of these plots raised a genuine dispute.

In a subsequent decision in V. Laxminarasamma v. A. Yadaiah (S.B. Sinha, A.K. Ganguly & R.M. Lodha, JJ.), 2009-5 SCC 478, it was pointed out –

  • “The observations made therein must be held to have been made in the aforementioned factual matrix.”

Does ‘Long Possession’ Necessarily Trigger a Civil Suit by the State?

In the facts of Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081, 1982 (2) SCC 134 (Y.V. Chandrachud, A. Varadarajan, Amarendra Nath Sen, JJ.), the Supreme Court found that the respondents and their predecessors had ‘long possessionover the suit properties with a ‘genuine dispute on title‘; and therefore, a Civil Court enquiry on title was required on two matters:

  • 1. whether the title was vested in the Government
  • 2. whether the title by adverse possession was perfected (by the private person) against the Government of Andhra Pradesh.

The Apex Court said it as under:

  • “The conspectus of facts in the instant case justifies the view that the question as to the title to the three plots cannot appropriately be decided in a summary inquiry contemplated by sections 6 and 7 of the Act. The long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in- title of these plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title, remembering especially that the property, admittedly, belonged originally to the family of Nawab Habibuddio from whom the respondents claim to have purchased it. The question as to whether the title to the property came to be vested in the Government as a result of acquisition and the further question whether the Nawab encroached upon that property thereafter and perfected his title by adverse possession must be decided in a properly constituted suit. May be that the Government may succeed in establishing its title to the property but until that is done, the respondents cannot be evicted summarily.”

A three Judge Bench in State of Rajasthan v. Padmavatidevi (S.C. Agrawal, Sujata V. Manohar and S. Saghir Ahmad, JJ.), 1995 Suppl(2) SCC 290, which referred Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao, (1982) 2 SCC 134, observed that the factor that mandates a civil-court-action, rather than a summary remedy, is ‘the bona fide claim‘ of the person in occupation. The Court was observed as under:

  • “6. … Dealing with similar provisions contained in Section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1945, this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao (1982) 2 SCC 134 : (1982) 3 SCR 500, has laid down that the summary remedy for eviction provided by Section 6 of the said Act could be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of the Government and if the person in occupation has a bona fide claim to litigate he could not be ejected save by the due process of law and that the summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 was not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. ….. In such a case the proper course is to have the matter adjudicated by the ordinary courts of law.”(Quoted in: Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji v. Union of India, AIR 2019 SC 1692; 2019 20 SCC 705)

Govt. of AP v. Thummala Krishna RaoCritical Appreciation

Upon examining the facts of Thummala Krishna Raocase, it is evident that the concepts of ‘long possession’ and ‘adverse possession’ were considered therein in the following factual context:

  • (i) A suit for possession filed by Osmania University had earlier been dismissed on the ground that one Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession.
  • (ii) Thereafter, Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to initiate summary eviction proceedings.

Therefore, it is clear that the Government need not have gone for a civil suit, if the following conditions were satisfied –

  • (i) the title of the disputed property unequivocally vested with the Government and
  • (ii) there had been no chance of a plausible claim of adverse possession for the private person.

Analysis of Thummala Krishna Rao Case in a Reference Matter

V. Laxminarasamma v. A. Yadaiah (S.B. Sinha, A.K. Ganguly & R.M. Lodha, JJ.), 2009-5 SCC 478, dealt with a Reference concerning the legal question — whether the adjudication of a claim based on adverse possession falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. The Reference arose due to an apparent conflict in the decisions of two Division Benches of the Supreme Court.

S.B. Sinha, J., distinguished the Thummala Krishna Rao case, pointing out the factual situation in which it arose. They were: (i) an earlier suit for possession filed by Osmania University had been dismissed on the ground that Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession, and (ii) the summary action of the Government had ensued since Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to initiate summary eviction proceedings.

The three Judge Bench observed as under:

  • 45. … We are not oblivious of a decision of this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and Anr. [(1982) 2 SCC 134] wherein it was held that a question of title could not properly be decided in a summary enquiry contemplated by Sections 6 and 7 of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905. In that case, the principal question, which arose for consideration, was as to whether the property in question was in possession of the family of one Habibuddin for a long time and, thus, the same had not vested in the Government by reason of a land acquisition proceeding initiated for acquisition of the land for Osmania University. In that case, Osmania University filed a suit for possession which was dismissed on the premise that Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession. Thereafter Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to take steps for summary eviction of the persons who are not in authorized occupation of the said plots. The observations made therein must be held to have been made in the aforementioned factual matrix.”
  • See also: Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah, AIR 2010 SC 744; 2010-2 SCC 461.

Axioms on ‘Long Possession‘ Stand Against Presumptions Favours Govt.

The axioms, in the Government of AP v. Thummala Krishna Rao, on ‘long possession‘ and the scope of adjudication on ‘title by adverse possession‘ were not seen followed in subsequent pronouncements. Later decisions have clarified and reinforced certain key legal principles, including:

  • 1. Presumption available in favour of the government – all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government (R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Govt of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203).
  • 2. The court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property (Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988).

Also Read: Title of Property: As the Government is regarded as the ‘original’ and ‘ultimate’ owner of all land, private persons to prove their title, the State need not.

Conclusion

It is seen that several High Courts deal with Government of AP v. Thummala Krishna Rao, without noticing the distinguishing points* (laid down in V. Laxminarasamma v. A. Yadaiah – S.B. Sinha, A.K. Ganguly & R.M. Lodha, JJ., 2009-5 SCC 478), and the principles of law manifested in R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Govt of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203, and Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988.

  • * The distinguishing points are: (i) a suit for possession filed by Osmania University had earlier been dismissed on the ground that one Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession; and (ii) thereafter, Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to initiate summary eviction proceedings.
  • That the Apex Court held in those circumstances that the summary suit for eviction under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act could not have been resorted to by the Government, and that it could have been only be by the due process in a civil court action.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

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PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

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Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Title of Property: As the Government is regarded as the ‘original’ and ‘ultimate’ owner of all land, private persons to prove their title, the State need not.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introspection

  • Governments’ rights and powers based on the doctrine, ‘Eminent Domain‘ (arises from:  dominium eminens or ‘supreme ownership’ – Wikipedia) are accepted by all democratic jurisdictions, including the UK, US, and India.  
  • In a dispute between the State and a private individual over property ownership, the burden rests upon the private individual to affirmatively establish his title supported by valid and legally admissible documentary evidence. The State enjoys a presumption of ownership. It becomes even stronger (1) when certain factors are present—such as the land’s proximity to forest areas, coastal zones, or other ecologically sensitive locations—and (2) when foundational revenue documents, including the General Land Register and Settlement Register, indicate a strong likelihood that the property belongs to the Government.
  • In such a dispute, if the private person fails to establish a valid title, it is not open to him to contend that the State has also failed to prove its title or discharge any burden. This is because the law recognises certain presumptions in favour of the State, particularly in cases involving land situated near forests, coastal areas, etc.
  • Disputes may arise when (1) a piece of land is recorded as Government property in revenue or other official records, and (2) a private individual asserts ownership based on a title deed in his possession. In such cases, courts place significant reliance on foundational documents, such as the General Land Register and the Settlement Register, as well as prior deeds of the claimant. And, it will consider whether the doctrine nemo dat quod non habet—one cannot give what one does not have—is to be applied.

Key decisions

  • 1. Usha Kapoor v. Govt.  of India, 2014-16 SCC 481: (The General Land Register maintained by the Cantonment Board under the Cantonment Act and the Rules framed thereunder is a public document and the entries therein are conclusive evidence of title and of the fact that the land is covered by an old grant. Followed: Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, 2012-8 SCC 148; Union of India v. Kamla Verma, 2010-13 SCC 511; Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil, AIR 1999 SC 2294.)
  • 2. Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, 2012(8) SCC 148: (General Land Register are public documents, and the certified copies of the same are admissible in evidence in view of the provisions of Section 65 read with Section 74 of the Evidence Act. It is a settled legal position that the entries are conclusive evidence of title. The title of Government cannot be disputed.)
  • 3. Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil, AIR 1999 SC 2294; 1999-3 SCC 555: (Had there been any conveyance or lease, it should have come from their custody. The Regulations, as well as the General Land Register maintained under the Cantonment Land Administration Rules of 1925, which are old documents, clearly indicate that the land is held on an old grant.)
  • 4. R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Govt of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203: (Presumption available in favour of the government – all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government.)
  • 5. Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988 (When the land subject to proceedings wherein adverse possession has been claimed, belongs to the Government, the court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property.)
  • 6. Ameer Hussain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 204, 1977 AWC 1: (It would be deemed that the disputed land vested in the State, and if the other side fails, in law,  it would be taken that the land was vested in the State. Quoted in Mohd.  Shafiq v. Asstt.  Director Of Consolidation, Lucknow, 2011- 9 ADJ 24.)
  • 7.. Pierce Lessley & Company Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlong Waoshare, AIR 1969 SC 843: (Ultimate ownership by the State of all property within the jurisdiction of the State.)
  • 8.. Khan v. Muhammed Obedulla Khan, AIR 1953 Nag. 361: (The State is the ultimate owner of all property.)
  • 9.. Sahana Industries v. State of Kerala, 2021 KHC OnLine 7110, Kerala High Court, Devan Ramachandran, J.: (If the Settlement Register shows this land to be Government land, then certainly, the petitioner is obliged to establish their title over the property through competent documents. (Followed in: Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, WP(C) No. 25830/2010, 24.01. 2025, Harisankar V. Menon, J.)
  • 10.. The Secretary of State for India v. Chimanlal Jamnadas, (1942)44 BomLR 295, AIR 1942 Bom 161: “Even assuming that the lease be not held as proved, the plaintiffs had no title to the land as rightly held by the lower Court and as nobody else was its owner at the time when it was occupied by the plaintiffs’ ancestor, the presumption under Section 37 of the Land Revenue Code which was also applicable before its enactment was that Government were its owner at that date. If the plaintiffs claim to remain in possession merely on the strength of their long possession in the past, though without any rightful title in them, Government had the right to assert their ownership which had not been divested by the act of the plaintiffs’ ancestor, and they had a right of resumption so long as the plaintiffs had not proved any acquisition of right in them by adverse possession against the Government.”
  • 11.. Union of India v. Laxman Yadneshwar Sathe, 2018-4 AllMR 157: “As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court therefore in the case of R. Hanumaiah and Another v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department and Others (supra), the west lands are presumed to be the Government lands. Rights, entitlement and presumptions of title lie in favour of the Government, distinguished from those of private parties. As held by this Court also, way back in the year 1941, in the case of The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Chimanlal, Jamnadas and Others (1942) Indian Law Reports 358), the Government is presumed to be the owner in case of lands which are not proved to be of a private party.”
  • 12. Satpal Nahar v. Union of India (Sanjay Karol, TS Chauhan, JJ.), 2017 Supp HimLR 2994; ILR 2017-4 (HP) 196: “Even otherwise, it is settled that all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the Government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the Government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the Government is not available to any person or individual.”

The UK/England Decisions

  • Field Common Ltd v Elmbridge Borough Council (2008): When a local authority encroached the land of the claimant for the construction of a road, and the claimant sued for trespass, it was held that the claimant (private landowner) had to show that the council encroached. Since the defendant council asserted right of way by prescription over that land, it was held that the burden was on the council to prove the elements required for prescription.
  • Delaware Mansions Limited & Others v Lord Mayor and Citizens of the City of Westminster [2001]: In the case of encroachment by tree roots from property owned by Westminster City Council into property of the claimant, it was found that the claimant had to prove that roots had encroached, the existence of damage caused by those roots (for example, damage to drains/walls etc.). The technical distinction between trees being “self‑sown” versus planted, was rejected.
  • Entick v Carrington [1765]: Government agents entered private property under warrant, seized documents. It was held that the claimant had to show that the defendants entered without lawful authority/beyond their legal power. It was also found that the defendants would have to show lawful authority (warrant, statutory power etc.) they had the burden  to show they were acting under law.

The US Decisions

  • United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980): The US Supreme Court, while considering the burden of proof, made it clear that in ‘inverse condemnation’ the landowner must bring the claim, and that the landowner has the burden to demonstrate that a ‘taking’ in fact occurred. It is pointed out: “To accomplish a taking by seizure, on the other hand, a condemning authority need only occupy the land in question. Such a taking thus shifts to the landowner the burden to discover the encroachment and to take affirmative action to recover just compensation.”
  • Vaughn v. City of Muskogee, Oklahoma Civ. App., 2015: The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that in an ‘inverse condemnation’ proceeding, the landowner has the burden of proving that a taking has occurred, whether or not the government files an objection.
  • Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992 v. City of Boulder (Colorado, 2001): The Colorado Supreme Court held that in an inverse condemnation action, the landowner has the burden to prove both (i) a ‘taking’ has occurred and (ii) the amount of compensation.

Will ‘Long Possession’ Invite Civil Suit by the State?

In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081, 1982 (2) SCC 134 (Y.V. Chandrachud,A. Varadarajan, Amarendra Nath Sen, JJ.), the Supreme Court found that the respondents and their predecessors had long possession;  and therefore, a Civil Court enquiry on title was required on two matters:

  • 1. whether the title was vested in the Government
  • 2. whether the title by adverse possession was perfected (by the private person) against the Government of Andhra Pradesh.

The Apex Court said it as under:

  • “The conspectus of facts in the instant case justifies the view that the question as to the title to the three plots cannot appropriately be decided in a summary inquiry contemplated by sections 6 and 7 of the Act. The long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in- title of these plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title, remembering especially that the property, admittedly, belonged originally to the family of Nawab Habibuddio from whom the respondents claim to have purchased it. The question as to whether the title to the property came to be vested in the Government as a result of acquisition and the further question whether the Nawab encroached upon that property thereafter and perfected his title by adverse possession must be decided in a properly constituted suit. May be that the Government may succeed in establishing its title to the property but until that is done, the respondents cannot be evicted summarily.”

Govt. of AP v. Thummala Krishna Rao: Critical Appreciation

As pointed out in V. Laxminarasamma v. A. Yadaiah (S.B. Sinha, A.K. Ganguly & R.M. Lodha, JJ.), 2009-5 SCC 478, the ‘long possession’ and ‘adverse possession’ were considered in Thummala Krishna Rao case for the following:

  • (i) A suit for possession filed by Osmania University was dismissed earlier on the premise that Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession.
  • Thereafter Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to take steps for summary eviction

It is clear that the Government of AP need not have gone for a civil suit, if it was definite –

  • (i) the title of the disputed property vestd with the Government and
  • (ii) there was no scope for an argument by the private person as regards adverse possession.

In V. Laxminarasamma VS A. Yadaiah (S.B. Sinha, A.K. Ganguly & R.M. Lodha, JJ.), 2009-5 SCC 478, in a Reference for determination of a question of adverse possession — whether it would come within the purview of the jurisdiction of Special Tribunal and/or Special Court constituted under the AP Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, noticing purported conflict in the decisions of two Division Benches — held as under:

  • 45. … We are not oblivious of a decision of this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and Anr. [(1982) 2 SCC 134] wherein it was held that a question of title could not properly be decided in a summary enquiry contemplated by Sections 6 and 7 of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905. In that case, the principal question, which arose for consideration, was as to whether the property in question was in possession of the family of one Habibuddin for a long time and, thus, the same had not vested in the Government by reason of a land acquisition proceeding initiated for acquisition of the land for Osmania University. In that case, Osmania University filed a suit for possession which was dismissed on the premise that Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession. Thereafter Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to take steps for summary eviction of the persons who are not in authorized occupation of the said plots. The observations made therein must be held to have been made in the aforementioned factual matrix.”
  • See also: Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah, AIR 2010 SC 744; 2010-2 SCC 461.

It is further clear from State of Rajasthan v. Padmavatidevi, 1995 Suppl(2) SCC 290, which observed as under:

  • “6. As noticed earlier, Section 91 of the Act prescribes a summary procedure for eviction of a person who is found to be in unauthorised occupation of Government land. The said provisions cannot be invoked in a case where the person in occupation raises bona fide dispute about his right to remain in occupation over the land. Dealing with similar provisions contained in Section 6of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1945, this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao (1982) 2 SCC 134 : (1982) 3 SCR 500 has laid down that the summary remedy for eviction provided by Section 6 of the said Act could be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of the Government and if the person in occupation has a bona fide claim to litigate he could not be ejected save by the due process of law and that the summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 was not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. For the same reasons, it can be said that summary remedy available under Section 91 of the Act is not the legal process which is suited for adjudication of complicated questions of title where the person sought to be evicted as an unauthorised occupant makes a bona fide claim regarding his right to be in possession. In such a case the proper course is to have the matter adjudicated by the ordinary courts of law.
  • 7. In the present case, Respondent 1 has put forward a bona fide claim about her right to remain in occupation over the land. The said claim raises questions involving applicability and interpretation of various laws and documents as well as investigation into disputed questions of fact involving recording of evidence. These matters could not be satisfactorily adjudicated in summary proceedings under Section 91 of the Act and can be more properly considered in regular proceedings in the appropriate forum.
  • 8. In view of the fact that these proceedings have been pending for the past 25 years, we were not disinclined to consider the claim of Respondent 1 that she is entitled to remain in occupation of the land.”
  • (Quoted in: Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji v. Union of India, AIR 2019 SC 1692; 2019 20 SCC 705)

The axioms, in the Government of AP v. Thummala Krishna Rao, on ‘long possession‘ and the scope of adjudication on ‘title by adverse possession‘ were not seen followed in subsequent pronouncements. Later decisions have clarified and reinforced certain key legal principles, including:

  • 1. Presumption available in favour of the government – all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government (R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Govt of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203).
  • 2. The court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property (Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988).

Documents used to support the title of Government

  • Revenue records (Jamabandi),
  • Survey maps,
  • Poramboke Registers or other Government documents showing Government properties,
  • Land acquisition award (if acquired land),
  • Departmental records or plans,
  • Enacted Laws (Acts),
  • Gazettes (if acquired land),
  • Registered title documents (rare),
  • Correspondence or administrative orders.

Part I

State is the Ultimate Owner

The reply to the following questions determines the ‘ultimate ownership’ of a property.

  • Who is the owner of the property that is abandoned by all,
  • Who is the owner of the property that has no rightful owner,
  • Who is the owner of the property over which all claims raised are invalid,
  • Who is the owner of the property over which none can raise a valid claim?

Also Read:

Escheat and Bona Vecantia

What are the legal principles behind the doctrine that the State is the ‘ultimate owner’ of all properties?

  • Generally, there are two answers:
  • First, doctrine of Escheat; that is, land is escheated or reverted to the State, as the lord paramount, on the owner’s death without legal heirs or lawful claimants.
  • Second, bona vacantia; that is, Crown takes as bona vacantia goods in which no one else can claim property as a rightful owner.

Escheat and Bona Vecantia – Incident of Sovereignty

Our Apex Court, in Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlong Waoshare, AIR 1969 SC 843,  appraised the principles of escheat in the Constitutional context (particularly, Article 296 of the Constitution) and held as under:

  • “In this country escheat is not based on artificial Rules of Common Law and is not an incident of feudal tenure. It is an incident of sovereignty and rests on the principle of ultimate ownership by the State of all property within its jurisdiction.”

Article 296 of the Constitution of India, provides as under:

  • “Subject as hereinafter provided, any property in the territory of India which, if this Constitution had not come into operation, would have accrued to His Majesty or, as the case may be, to the Ruler of an Indian State by escheat or lapse, or as bona vacantia for want of a rightful owner, shall if it is property situate in a State, vest in such State, and shall, in any other case, vest in the Union.”

State is the Ultimate Owner of the Property – Recognised Long Back

In Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlong Waoshare, AIR 1969 SC 843, the Supreme Court relied on the Privy Council decision in 1860 in Collector of Massulipatnam v. Cavali Venata Narrainapeli, (1859-61) 8 MIR 500, where it was declared that the doctrine of bona vacantia or escheat was a part of the law in India. In Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavary Vancata Narrainappah it was observed as under:

  • “There can be, legally speaking, no unowned property, the law of escheat intervenes and prevails, and is adopted generally in all Courts of the Country alike. Private ownership not existing, the State must be owner as ultimate Lord.”

The same principle is iterated by Sinha, CJ, in in Chhote Khan v. Mohammad Obedulla Khan, AIR 1953 Nag 361, as under:

  • “The State Government is not in the position of the assignee interest of the proprietor, nor is it his successor in title, The State does not claim the proprietary interest, either through or under the outgoing proprietor. The State, as the ultimate ownerof all property situate within its boundaries, naturally becomes, the owner of all property in villages, except those interests which have been recognized by the State as still vesting in or held by individuals in their rights as cultivators (‘malik-makbuza’ or otherwise) or as house-holders by virtue of being inhabitants of the village, or as having acquired by purchase or otherwise house-sites or buildings on house-sites.”

General Law of Universal Application

In Amir Hussain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 204, it had been noted as under:

  • “All important systems of Law provide for escheat to the Crown or Government of the property of a deceased person in the absence or failure of heirs.”

It is pointed out in Biswanath v. Prafulla Kumar Khan, AIR 1988 Cal 275, also that it is a General Law of universal application that ‘private ownership not existing, the State must be the owner as the ultimate Lord’.

Private Person to Prove his TitleState need not Prove Title

  • From Article 296 of the Constitution of India, it is clear that where a property:
    • is abandoned by all,
    • that has no rightful owner,
    • over which all claims raised are invalid, and
    • over which none can raise a valid claim
  • it vests with State.

Therefore, when a dispute comes as to the ownership of property between State and a ‘private person’, and the private person fails to prove his title, it is not Constitutional for him to argue that ‘the State also failed to prove its title and failed in discharging its burden’.

In Amir Hussain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 204, 1977 AWC 1, it observed as under:

  • “But, in a case where in proceedings under Section 9, the consolidator authorities reached at the conclusion that both the claimants had failed to prove their title, the necessary consequence of the finding was that the land had to be recognised as having vested in the State and in the Gaon Sabha. … To require a Gaon Sabha to file a claim at the commencement of the consolidation proceedings would be placing an impossible burden upon the Gaon Sabha because at that stage the Gaon Sabha could not possibly be in a position to know that the claim of the contending parties would be negatived and the land would be deemed to have vested in the State. In our opinion, the proper course in these cases is that if the authorities find that both the parties have failed to prove their title, and that in law the land has vested in the State under the Rule of escheat, they, in order to give effect to their findings, should direct the land to be recorded in the name of the Gaon Sabha.”
  • (Quoted in Mohd.  Shafiq v. Asstt.  Director Of Consolidation, Lucknow, 2011- 9 ADJ 24.)

In Vishwa Vijai Bharti v. Fakhrul Hasan, AIR 1976 SC 1485, it is held as to the presumption of correctness on revenue-records as under:

  • “It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry in to their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry is the revenue record states but the entry is open to the attack that it was Made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title.”

Part II

Presumptions in Favour of Govt. Lands

(a) There is a presumption in favour of Government – all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the Government.

(b) In order to defeat the title of the Government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the Government.

(c) In Pierce Lessley & Company Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlong Waoshare, AIR 1969 SC 843, it was held as under –

  • “In this country escheat is not based on artificial rules of common law; and is not an incident of feudal tenure.  It is incident sovereignty and rests on principle of ultimate ownership by the State of all property within the jurisdiction.”

(d) In Chotte Khan v. Muhammed Obedulla Khan, AIR 1953 Nag. 361, held

  • “the State is the ultimate owner of all property situate within its boundaries”.

(e) In Ameer Hussain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 204, 1977 AWC 1, it is held that it would be deemed that the disputed land vested in State and if the other side fails, in law,  it would be taken that the land was vested in State. (Followed in: Mohd. Shafiq v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, 2011-9 ADJ 24)

(f) In R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, (2010) 5 SCC 203, it was held as under:

  • “15. Suits for declaration of title against the government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects.
  • The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the government, is not available to any person or individual. …”

(g) In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988, it was pointed out –

  • “When the land subject to proceedings wherein adverse possession has been claimed, belongs to Government, the court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property.”

PRIVATE PERSON v. GOVERNMENT

GENERAL LAND REGISTER under CANTONMENT LAND MANUAL RULES

In a dispute where a land is shown as Government property in revenue or other Government records, and the private person raises a claim on the strength of the title deed he holds, courts place credence on basic documents, such as the general land register and settlement registers.

It is a settled law that revenue records do not by themselves confer title. However, the General Land Register maintained under the Cantonment Land Manual Rules, and the Settlement Register of the erstwhile Travancore, are authoritative records used to establish the Government’s title. Other revenue records may also be relied upon as supporting evidence of title and possession.

It is Settled – General Land Register is Conclusive Evidence of Title

Union of India v. Robert Zomawia Street, AIR 2014 SC 2721

In Union of India v. Robert Zomawia Street, AIR 2014 SC 2721; 2014-6 SCC 707, the High Court allowed the second appeal preferred by the plaintiff and decreed the plaintiff’s suit.  Plaintiff claimed that he was the absolute owner of the property within the Shillong Military Cantonment area. The suit was necessitated when a show cause notice was issued against him claiming compensation ‘on account of resumption of the suit land’. The suit was filed for a declaration that the order of resumption was illegal, invalid, without jurisdiction and not binding on him and for prohibiting the Defendants from interfering with the possession of the Plaintiff in any manner.

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court decree and dismissed the suit. The Apex Court quoted para 19 of the High Court Judgment, where the views of the High Court can be discerned. They (reversed by the Supreme Court) can be summarised as under:

  • There was no evidence to prove the old grant by the State.
  • There can be no presumption of ownership in favour of the State.
  • The plaintiff had created a high degree of probability that he was the owner.
  • The onus to prove ownership had been shifted to the State.
  • Apart from admissions, no document to indicate the old grant.
  • The state miserably failed to discharge such onus.
  • The plaintiff was able to prove his title to the suit land.
  • The courts below put the onus of proving title wrongly upon the plaintiff.
  • The concurrent findings of the courts below were consequently perverse. It could not have been sustained in law and are liable to be interfered with in the second appeal.

The Apex Court, while reversing the findings of the High Court, laid down the following –

  • 1. In Union of India v. Kamla Verma, (2010) 13 SCC 511, and Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil, (1999) 3 SCC 555, the Supreme Court observed that “it is settled legal position that the entries made in the General Land Register maintained under the Cantonment Land Manual Rules are conclusive evidence of title“.
  • Rule 6 of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules classifies ‘B3 land’ as “held by any private person”. In the GLR the property in question was recorded as ‘B3 land’ and the landlord was shown as Govt. of India.
  • 2. Relied on the following findings in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148) –
    • The GLR and other documents maintained by the Cantonment Board under the Cantonment Act, 1924, and the Rules made thereunder were public documents.
    • The certified copies of the same are admissible in evidence in view of the provisions of Section 65 read with Section 74 of the Evidence Act.
    • It is a settled legal position that the entries made in the General Land Register maintained under the Cantonment Land Administration Rules are conclusive evidence of title.
  • 3. Also relied on Union of India v. Kamla Verma (2010) 13 SCC 511, to emphasise that the documents under the GLR were conclusive evidence of title.
    • The land in question was originally permitted to be used by a civilian on an “old grant” basis.
    • This fact is reflected in the lease deed executed by the late Shri Roop Krishan Seth.
    • Even in the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent, it has been stated that the vendor was an “occupancy-holder of the land and trees of the aforesaid premises and owner of superstructure of the bungalow…”.
    • Even in the land register, the Government of India has been shown as a “landlord” and Shri Mohan Krishan Seth has been shown to have occupancy right, and his nature of right was shown to be of old grant.
  • 4. Also relied on Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil, (1999) 3 SCC 555.
  • 5. The argument that the word “held” meant “to own with legal title” was rejected. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot be a tenant was not accepted.
  • 6. The GLR showed that the Government was the Landlord.
  • 7. The GLR provided for the ‘table’ of rent and the details of the property.
  • 8. Since the State failed to produce the actual grant documents and there was no explanation for the same, it was not possible to accept the contentions – (1) adverse inference to be drawn against the State, and (2) the grant not being proved, the plaintiff’s suit deserved to be decreed.
  • 9. The GLR supported the contention of the State that the plaintiff held the land on an old grant basis.
  • 10. The plaintiff, on the other hand, has not produced any document to show the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Nemo dat quod non habet is the maxim, which means no one gives what he does not possess, aptly applied in the case.
  • 11. The classification of the land as B3 land also points towards the same conclusion.

Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (B.S. Chauhan, Dipak Misra, JJ.), 2012(8) SCC 148.

The law as to title of property is laid down in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (B.S. Chauhan, Dipak Misra, JJ.), 2012(8) SCC 148 as under –

  • “65. …. The partition made among the ancestors of plaintiff/respondent No.1 in 1819 would not be a conclusive factor to determine the title of ownership in favour of the plaintiff/respondent No.1.
  • 66. The General Land Register and other documents maintained by the Cantonment Board under the Cantonment Act, 1924 and the Rules made thereunder are public documents, and the certified copies of the same are admissible in evidence in view of the provisions of Section 65 read with Section 74 of the Evidence Act. It is settled legal position that the entries made in General Land Register maintained under Cantonment Land Administration Rules is conclusive evidence of title. (Vide: Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil, AIR 1999 SC 2294; and Union of India & Ors. v. Kamla Verma, (2010) 13 SCC 511).
  • 68. The appellate courts examined the title of government instead of the plaintiff/respondent no.1. Such a course was not warranted. The title of Government cannot be disputed. In any event possession of government for decades is not disputed. The plaintiff shifted the case from time to
    time but failed to prove his title.
  • 69. To sum up: In view of the above discussion, we reach the following conclusion: ……
  • (xiv) The first appellate court as well as the High Court recorded a finding that the Union of India failed to prove its title over the suit land. The said courts did not realise that this was not the issue to be determined, rather the issue had been as to whether the plaintiff/ respondent No.1 was the owner of the suit land. ….”

In Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil (Sujata V. Manohar, R.C. Lahoti, JJ.), AIR 1999 SC 2294;1999-3 SCC 555, it was held as under:

  • “In the present case, however, apart from the requirements of Order No.179 of Governor General in Council, 1836, the general land register maintained under the Cantonment Land Administration Rules of 1925 has been produced which supports the contention of the appellants that the land is held on old grant basis. The appellants have also led evidence to show that the file containing grant in respect of the said property, is not available with them because it has been stolen in the year 1985. The respondents on the other hand have not produced any document of title pertaining to the said land or showing the nature of the rights of the respondents over the said land except the sale deeds referred to earlier. The stand of the respondents relating to their rights over the said land has changed from time to time. In the sale deeds executed by the Vendees in favour of the respondents, the land is described as lease hold cantonment land. This was later changed by the respondents in the amendment deeds to old grant land. In the suit, the respondents have contended that they have become the absolute owners of the said land. These bare assertions do not carry any conviction. Had there been any conveyance or lease in respect of the said lands executed in favour of the respondents or their predecessor in title, such conveyance or lease should have come from their custody. There is, therefore, no document before the Court which would show that the respondents were the absolute owners of the said land as now contended by them. The Regulations as well as the general land registers, on the other hand, which are old documents maintained in the regular course and coming from proper custody, clearly indicate that the land is held on old grant basis. This is, therefore, not a case where the appellants had not produced any evidence in support of their contention that the land in the cantonment area was held on old grant basis by Mukherjee.

In Usha Kapoor v. Govt.  of India, 2014-16 SCC 481, it is said as under:

  • “13. The decision of this Court in Chief Executive Officer vs. Surendra Kumar Vakil (AIR 1999 SC 2294; 1999-3 SCC 555) also considered the legal effect of the entries in the G.L.R. which Register is required to be maintained by the Military Estates Officer of the Cantonment under the provisions of the Cantonment Land Administrative Rules framed in exercise of power under Section 280 of the Cantonment Act, 1924. The General Land Register maintained by the Cantonment Board under the Cantonment Act and the Rules framed thereunder is a public document and the entries therein are conclusive evidence of title. This is the view expressed by this Court in two other decisions, namely, Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin & Anr.  [2012 (8) SCC 148] and Union of India & Ors. vs. Kamla Verma [2010 (13) SCC 511], apart from the decision in Chief Executive  Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil (AIR 1999 SC 2294; 1999-3 SCC 555). The reference to the nature of the holding i.e. old grant and the nature of rights of the holder i.e. occupancy rights, in the G.L.R. extracted above, in our considered view, is conclusive of the fact that the land is covered by an old grant and the rights enjoyed by the appellants were mere possessory or occupancy rights in respect of the structures thereon. The terms of such grants being statutory and the same having vested title of the land in the UOI with the power of resumption, the impugned notices dated 14th December, 2001 and 5 th February, 2002 must be acknowledged to be legal and valid.”

SETTLEMENT REGISTER OF TRAVANCORE

As stated earlier, the Settlement Register of the erstwhile Travancore is an authoritative record used to establish the Government’s title. (Other revenue records may also be relied upon as supporting evidence of title and possession.)

If Settlement Register says Government Land, Petitioner to Establish Title

In Vallikunnil Janaki Amma v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram MoorthiKozhikode, 2014 (1) KHC 57, Kerala High Court, referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur, AIR 1951 SC 288, observed as under:  

  • “Even though Ext. A2 is only an extract of the Settlement RegisterAdangal extract , which may not by itself prove or confer title to a party in whose name the property stood registered, it can be accepted as evidence of title when there is no contra evidence. Admittedly, it is adjacent to Amruthamangalam temple. The temple compound and this suit property, which is adjacent to the temple, are shown to be of Amruthamangalam Devaswom as per revenue record. In these circumstances, the contention that this property did not and does not belong to the temple/Devaswom cannot be sustained at all.” (Referred to in: Kunhimangalam Devaswam v. State of Kerala (2022 KHC OnLine 7354), 6 April, 2022, Anil K. Narendran, J. and Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, WP(C) No, 25830/2010,24.01. 2025, Harisankar V. Menon, J.)

In Sahana Industries v. State of Kerala, in WP(C) 20520/2021 (2021 KHC OnLine 7110), Kerala High Court (Devan Ramachandran, J.) held (October 11, 2021) as under:

  • “… If the Settlement Register shows this land to be Government land, then certainly, the petitioner is obliged to establish their title over the property through competent documents”. (Referred to in: Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, WP(C) No. 25830/2010, 24.01. 2025, Harisankar V. Menon, J.)

In Chitharanjan v. State of Kerala, WP(C) No. 25830/2010 (2025:KER:5422) 24.01. 2025 (Harisankar V. Menon, J.) it is pointed out as under:

  • “7. …. In the settlement register at Ext. R1(a), there is no dispute that the entire properties under old Survey No. 2211 having an extent in excess of 107 Acres are shown as “puramboke….
  • 8…. As regards the petitioner in WP(C) No. 25830 of 2010 also, the title is traceable to some documents of the Attingal Sub Registry of the yeas 1959, 1957 and 1061. But, it is categorically found that even in these documents, there is no mention as to the receipt of pattayam with respect to the property in question.
  • 11. …. As already noticed, the settlement register describes the property as “Puramboke”. … In view of the discussions made above, I am of the opinion that the contentions raised by the learned Senior Government Pleader with respect to the malpractices committed, cannot be brushed aside.
  • 13….. However, I notice that WP(C) No.25830 of 2010 the entry with respect to the Settlement Register is to be considered at first, which admittedly is against the petitioner. The case of the State is that some foul play is carried out subsequently at the instance of those interested and therefore, the subsequent entries cannot be acted upon.
  • 14. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader relied on Vallikunnil Janaki Amma and Ors. v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode and Anr. [2014 (1) KHC 57], which laid down the principle with respect to the acceptability/relevance of the Settlement Register. As already noticed, I have found that the Settlement Register describes the property under old Survey No. 2211 as “Puramboke”. To the same effect is the judgment of a learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 20520 of 2021 dated 11.10.2021. This Court further notices the judgment of the Apex Court in Suraj Bhan and Ors. v. Financial Commissioner and Ors. [(2007) 6 SCC 186] which held that mere entry in the revenue records does not confer title on a person. As already noticed, in view of the entries in the Settlement Register, the requirement of an appropriate assignment cannot be lost sight of.

In Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair M.N.,  (2013) 3 KLT 132, (T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J ; A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J), it is observed as under:

  • “18. …. The land register as well as the settlement register will establish the plea of the Board that the property having an extent of 2.26 acres is Temple property. Thus, Section 27 of Act of 1950 is clearly attracted and the property is clearly Devaswom property.”
  • “51. As far as the property herein is concerned, the land register and the settlement register produced herein are relevant. The property having the entire extent of 2.26 acres is described as ”kavu” (holy grove) in the settlement register. In the land register also it is described as ”kshethram irippu sthalam” (property where the temple is situated). No other document or other evidence is there to prove the contrary. Therefore, these documents will definitely show that the item of property will fit in with the requirement of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.”
  • “75. … Apart from that, in the light of Section 27 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act and in the light of the settlement register and land register, the property is described as Temple puramboke and not Government puramboke. Further Government lands are covered by the exemption u/s 3(1)(x) of the Land Reforms Act and therefore he cannot claim any fixity of tenure. There is no claim by the Government here to the property.”

The principles in S. 110 and 114 CANNOT be invoked –

It is held in the following decisions that the Principle ‘Possession Follows Title’ does not apply in the following situations-

  • The facts (on title/possession) are known (M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1)
  • There is evidence of independent possession/title (Bhavnagar Municipality v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 717).

As we find in M.  Siddiq  v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case), 2020-1 SCC 1, Section 110 or the principle title follows possession‘ applies when the facts disclose no title in either of the disputants in which case, possession alone decides (presumption cannot be invoked when the facts are known). But, with respect to the principle ‘possession follows title‘, as we find in Anathula Sudhakar  v. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2033, if only title is proved by one party, then only the principle ‘possession follows title’ comes in.

It is equally important that both these principles on presumption, ‘possession follows title’ and ‘title follows possession’, cannot be invoked in cases where:

  • (i) the defendants do not claim title/possession to the suit property (Devasia @ Kutty v. Jose, 2014-4 KLJ 41; 2014-3 KLT(SN) 50).
  • (ii) the facts (on title/possession) are known (M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1), or
  • (iii) there is evidence of independent possession/title (Bhavnagar Municipality v.. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 717).

Mutation will not confer ‘title (only Presumption on Possession)

It is a settled proposition of law (i) that the mutation entry in revenue documents will not confer any right, title or interest in favour of any person and (ii) that the mutation in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose. Mutation is made mainly based on possession. After pointing out these legal propositions, it is observed in Jitendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802, as under:

  • “6. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the case of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 137 , this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is observed and held that mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive value on title. Such entries are relevant only for the purpose of collecting land revenue. Similar view has been expressed in the series of decisions thereafter.
  • 6.1 In the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186 , it is observed and held by this Court that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose”, i.e., payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. It is further observed that so far as the title of the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court. Similar view has been expressed in the cases of Suman Verma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58; Faqruddin v. Tajuddin (2008) 8 SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368; Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689; T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342; Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259; and Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70.”

Revenue Records Not Confer Presumptive Value on Title

The Supreme Court in  Smt. Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import and Export Company (2019) and Commissioner, Bruhath Bangalore Mahanagra Palike v. Faraulla Khan (2021)observed that mutation in revenue records will not confer or lose title (Relied on Sawarni (Smt.) v. Inder Kaur (1996) 6 SCC 223, Balwant Singh & Anr. v. Daulat Singh (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. (1997) 7 SCC 137,  Narasamma & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2009) 5 SCC 591).

As pointed out above, it is observed by the Apex Court in State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 that revenue record is not a document of title; it merely raises a presumption in regard to possession (Quoted in M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1). The argument as to ownership based upon entries in the revenue records had been negated in Prahlad Pradhan  v. Sonu Kumhar,(2019) 10 SCC 259. It was held that the revenue record does not confer title to the property nor do they have any presumptive value on the title. (Quoted in Prabhagiya Van Adhikari Awadh Van Prabhag v. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj (SC): 2021).

Read Also: ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’

End Notes -I

LAW IN UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES

United Kingdom: Government Property Records

In the UK, government-owned land is often registered with the Land Registry, like private land. However, not all government land is registered, especially ‘historically held’ land.

  1. Land Registry Title Register
    • Shows ownership, including if the Crown or a public body owns the land.
    • Many parcels of government property (especially since 1990) are now registered.
  2. Crown Estate Records
    • The Crown Estate manages land owned by the monarch but held in trust for the nation.
    • Their ownership records are public.
  3. Public Body Asset Registers
    • Government departments (like the Ministry of Defence or NHS) often maintain internal asset registers.
  4. Council Property Records
    • Local councils maintain asset or property registers of municipal land.

Revenue records are not a primary form of land documentation in the UK. The Land Registry and statutory asset registers are considered authoritative.

United States: Government Property Records

Government Property Records:

  • Government property can be owned by federal, state, or local entities.
  • The General Services Administration (GSA) manages federal ‘real estate’.

Key Documents are the Following:

  1. County Recorder Deeds / Land Records
  2. For state/local government, land may still have recorded deeds.
  3. Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP)
  4. Database managed by the GSA listing federally owned land.
  5. GIS and Cadastral Systems
  6. Many states and counties have GIS-based cadastral maps indicating government land.
  7. Military or Agency-Specific Registers. E.g., the Department of Defense or Bureau of Land Management (BLM) maintain detailed internal records.

In the US also land ownership is deed-based, and even government lands are typically recorded in public deed registries.

End Notes -II

It is Settled – Revenue Records will not confer title

(Note: As stated earlier, the General Land Register maintained under the Cantonment Land Manual Rules and Settlement Register of the erstwhile Travancore are authoritative records used to establish the Government’s title. (Other revenue records may also be relied upon as supporting evidence of title and possession.)

Following decisions laid down the general principle – Revenue Records will not confer title

  • Sawarni v. Inder Kaur, (1996) 6 SCC 223
  • Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137
  • Suman Verma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58; 
  • Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, AIR 2008 SC 901
  • State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319
  • Faqruddin v. Tajuddin, (2008) 8 SCC 12;
  • Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368; 
  • Narasamma v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 5 SCC 591
  • Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689; 
  • T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342;
  • Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; 
  • Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259;
  • Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70.
  • Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import and Export Co. (2019) 3 SCC 191
  • Jitendra Singh v.  The State of Madhya Pradesh (2021 SCC OnLine SC 802) [M.R. Shah,  Aniruddha Bose, JJ.]
  • P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2024-1 CTC 547; 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278
  • Laxkshmi B. v. Suku, 2024-1 KerHC 380
  • The State of Punjab vs Bhagwantpal Singh Alias Bhagwant Singh, 10 July, 2024: 2024 INSC 518
  • Ram Balak Singh v. State of Bihar, 2024 INSC 360, 01 May 2024 [Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale, JJ.]

Revenue Records Prove Possession

  • Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund, AIR 2008 SC 901 (Revenue record merely raises a presumption in regard to possession)
  • State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 (Revenue records merely show possession of a person)
  • Zila Panchayat Etah v. Om Prakash Shah, 01 Sep 2017; 2017 0 Supreme(SC) 1418 (There is statutory presumption of correctness of revenue entries which has not been rebutted in the instant case.)
  • Krishnamurthy S.  Setlur v.  O.V.  Narasimha Setty, 2019-9 SCC 488 (Revenue records prove possession)

Survey Authorities Not to decide Title; Only Conclusive proof – Boundaries recorded correctly (when survey was made)

  • Kannan v. Kannan, (1964 KLT 228), 
  • The Cheriyanad Grama Panchayath v. The State of Kerala,  (2019 (5) KHC 699),
  • Venugopalan Nair v. Saraswathy Amma, (2013 (4) KLT 717),
  • Karthyayani v. Balakrishnan, (2014 (2) KLT Suppl. 67 (Ker.),
  • Ibrahim v. Saythumuhammed, (2013 (4) KLT 435)
  • Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259
  • Achama Alexander v. Asst. Director, Survey and Land Records, 2022 (2) KHC 131: 2022-3 KLT 198.
  • Thomas v. Philip,2022(4) KerHC 451;
  • Elambilan Nani Amma v. Mulavana Antony (K. Babu, J,), 2023-7 KHC 418.

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Res Judicata: Should Substantially the ‘Same Issue’ Must Have Been ‘Adjudicated’ in the Former Suit

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

The authoritative modern decisions reflect a ‘strict and technical’ interpretation of res judicata, in contrast to earlier broader views that required only a decision on the same matter, or a ‘similar issue‘ in both suits.

The modern trend, in substance, requires the following:

  • The ‘same issue‘ must have been adjudicated in the former suit.
  • Finding on the issue in the earlier suit must have been ‘necessary or essential‘.
  • That is, the issue must have been heard and decided consciously.
  • The parties should have had an opportunity to meet the contentions on the matter.

Sec. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with Res Judicata. It reads as under:

  • Res Judicata -No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.”

Res Judicata: The Issue Should Have Been ‘Necessary to be Decided

In PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, it is held as under:

  • “57. It is fairly settled that the finding on an issue in the earlier suit to operate as res judicate should not have been only directly and substantially in issue but it should have been necessary to be decided as well.”

Should the Matter be in “Actual Issue”, Or Need be in “Substance” alone

Sec. 11 CPC says as to “suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue“. There are two views in the matter.

Earlier Broader View: Sufficient if a similar issue arises

In Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay, AIR 1965 SC 1153, it is held as under:      

  • “We therefore hold that on the general principle of res judicata, the decision of the High Court on a writ petition under Art. 226 on the merits on a matter after contest will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit between the same parties with respect to the same matter.”

In Abubakar Husein Mulani v. Jafar Ahmad Mulani, 2010-1 CivCC 324; 2010-1 MhLJ 243; 2010-6 RCR(Civ) 1008, it is observed as under:

  • “In view of the settled legal position, the finding of the appellate Court in the said Appeal No.304/1984 would operate as a res judicata if a similar issue arises between the said plaintiffs and the defendant No.1 in future…”

In Nayan Bhebli v. Bhutnath Sardar, 2014-5 CHN 594, it is held as under:

  • “It is not necessary that a distinct issue should be raised. It is sufficient if the matter was in issue in substance [Md. Ali v. Upendra 58 CLJ 196].”

In Mohd. Saeed v. Munnu Khan, AIR 2014 All. 125, it is held as under:

  • “Identity of matter in issue, i.e. the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit either actually (Expln 3) or constructively (Explan 4).
  • “The subject-matter and the causes of actions of the two suits may be different but the issues may be the same. Expln III refers to direct res judicata and Expln. IV to constructive res judicataIt is not necessary that a distinct issue should be raised. It is sufficient if the matter was in issue in substance.

In Ravi Azta v. Union of India (TS Chauhan, J.), ILR 2018-2 (HP) 129, it is observed as under:

  • “13. The doctrine of res judicata is applied to give finality to ‘lis’ and in substance means that an issue or a point decided and attaining finality should not be allowed to be reopened and re-agitated twice over. The literal meaning of res is ‘everything that may form an object of rights and includes an object, subject-matter or status; and res judicata literally means ‘a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. Even otherwise, the provision of CPC, more particularly, those contained in Section 11 are not exhaustive and contain only the general principles of res judicata.”

Modern Trend (Stricter Approach): Same Issue Must Have Been Adjudicated in the Former Suit giving due emphasis to ‘directly and substantially in issue

In M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1, paras 439 and 446 are noteworthy. They read as under:

  • 439. The applicability of Section 11 is premised on certain governing principles. These are:
    • .(i) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the suit should have been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit;
    • (ii) The former suit should be either between the same parties as in the latter suit or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title;
    • (iii) The court which decided the former suit should have been competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which the issue has been subsequently raised; and
    • (iv) The Issue should have been heard and finally decided by the court in the former suit.
  • 446. There is absolutely no merit in the contention that the principles of constructive res judicata will bar the subsequent suits. The parties were distinct. The claim in the earlier suit was distinct. The basis of the claim was indeed not that which forms the subject matter of the subsequent suits.

In Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat, AIR 2021 SC 3802; 2021-9 SCC 99, it was held as under:

  • “26. Section 11 of the CPC enunciates the rule of res judicata: a court shall not try any suit or issue in which the matter that is directly in issue has been directly or indirectly heard and decided in a former suit? Therefore, for the purpose of adjudicating on the issue of res judicata it is necessary that the same issue (that is raised in the suit) has been adjudicated in the former suit. It is necessary that we refer to the exercise taken up by this Court while adjudicating on res judicata, before referring to res judicata as a ground for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11.
  • Justice R C Lahoti (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for a two Judge bench in V. Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava, (2004) 1 SCC 551, discussed the plea of res judicata and the particulars that would be required to prove the plea. The Court held that it is necessary to refer to the copies of the pleadings, issues and the judgment of the former suit, while adjudicating on the plea of res judicata:
  • “11. The rule of res judicata does not strike at the root of the jurisdiction of the court trying the subsequent suit. It is a rule of estoppel by judgment based on the public policy that there should be a finality to litigation and no one should be vexed twice for the same cause.
  • xxx xxx xxx
  • … Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kali Krishna Tagore v. Secy. of State for India in Council, (1887-88) 15 IA 186 : ILR 16 Cal 173 pointed out that the plea of res judicata cannot be determined without ascertaining what were the matters in issue in the previous suit and what was heard and decided. Needless to say, these can be found out only by looking into the pleadings, the issues and the judgment in the previous suit.”
  • (See also: Prem Kishore v. Brahm Prakash, 2023 SCC Online SC 356, 2023-3 MLJ 200 (SC))

Conscious Adjudication of an Issue alone Constitutes Res Judicata

In Erach Boman Khavar v. Tukaram Shridhar Bhat, 2013-15 SCC 655, it is held that the doctrine of res judicata can only apply when there has been a conscious adjudication of the issue on the merits. It is held as under:

  • “39. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that to attract the doctrine of res judicata it must be manifest that there has been a conscious adjudication of an issue. A plea of res judicata cannot be taken aid of unless there is an expression of an opinion on the merits. It is well settled in law that principle of res judicata is applicable between the two stages of the same litigation but the question or issue involved must have been decided at earlier stage of the same litigation.” (Quoted in: Ebix Singapore Private Limited v. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited, 2022-2 SCC 401)

In Jamia Masjid v. K. V.  Rudrappa (DY Chandrachud, Vikram Nath, Hima Kohli, JJ.), AIR 2021 SC 4523; 2022-9 SCC 225, the pragmatic approach to be adopted in this matter is laid down as under:

  • “In order to adjudicate on the applicability of the plea of res judicata vis-à-vis the first suit, it is necessary that we decide on the following three issues:
  • .A. The scope of the first suit which was instituted under Section 92 of the CPC;
  • B. Whether the parties in the first suit and the instant proceedings are the same; and
  • C. Whether the issue of title over the suit property was conclusively decided in the first suit.”

For Res Judicata – Adjudication of the Issue must have been Material and Essential

If only finding is “Necessary”, then only it is “Directly and Substantially” in issue.

In Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350, the Supreme Court held that to attract res judicata on an earlier finding, the matter must have been directly and substantially in issue and that the finding on an issue came “collaterally or incidentally” would not ordinarily be res judicata. It was pointed out that if only the issue was “necessary” to be decided for adjudicating on the principal issue and had actually been decided, then only it would have to be treated as “directly and substantially” in issue; and that it is also necessary that the judgment was in fact based upon that decision.

  • (Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350, is quoted and followed in: M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 273.)

In Sajjadanashin, it is pointed out as under:

  • “Where title to property is the basis of the right of possession, a decision on the question of possession is res judicata on the question of title to the extent that adjudication of title was essential to the judgment; but where the question of the right to possession was the only issue actually or necessary involved, the judgment is not conclusive on the question of ownership or title.”

Referring to Sajjadanashin Sayed, it is observed in Nand Ram v. Jagdish Prasad: AIR  2020 SC 1884 that a material test to be applied is whether the court considered the adjudication of the issue material and essential for its decision.

Referring to Sajjadanashin Sayed, it is observed in Union of India Vs. Vijay Krishna Uniyal, 2017-12 SCALE 704, that one has to examine the plaint, the written statement, the issues and the judgment to find out if the matter was directly and substantially in issue.

See also:

  • Har Narayan Tewari v. Cantonment Board, Ramgarh Cantonment, 2024-8 SCC 114,
  • Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat, AIR 2021 SC 3802; 2021-9 SCC 99

In Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, AIR 2000 SC 1238, it is observed as under:

  • “12. Matters Collaterally or incidentally in issue:
  • It will be noticed that the words used in Section 11 CPC are “directly and substantially in issue.” If the matter was in issue directly and substantially in a prior litigation and decided against a party then the decision would be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. Judicial decisions have however held that if a matter was only `collaterally or incidentally in issue and decided in an earlier proceeding, the finding therein would not ordinarily be res judicata in a latter proceeding where the matter is directly and substantially in issue.
  • 13. As pointed out in Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. 16, Para 1538) (4th Ed.), the fundamental rule is that a judgment is not conclusive if any matter came collaterally in question [R. vs. Knaptoft Inhabitants, Heptulla Bros vs. Thakore; or if any matter was incidentally cognizable Sanders (otherwise Saunders) vs. Sanders (otherwise Saunders)].
  • 14. A collateral or incidental issue is one that is ancillary to a direct and substantive issue; the former is an auxiliary issue and the latter the principal issue. The expression collaterally or incidentally in issue implies that there is another matter which is directly and substantially in issue (Mulla, CPC 15th Ed. p. 104).
  • 15. Difficulty in distinguishing whether a matter was directly in issue or collaterally or incidentally in issue and tests laid down in various Courts:
  • Difficulty in this area of law has been felt in various jurisdictions and therefore some tests have been evolved. Halsbury says (Vol. 16, Para 1538) (4th Ed.) that while the general principle is clear “difficulty arises in the application of the rule in determining in each case what was the point decided and what was the matter incidentally cognizable, and the opinion of Judges seems to have undergone some fluctuations.”
  • 16. Spencer Bower and Turner on The Doctrine of Res Judicata (2nd Ed, 1969) (p. 181) refer to the English and Australian experience and quota Dixon, J. of the Australian High Court in Blair v. Curran to say:
  • “The difficulty in the actual application of these conceptions is to distinguish the matters fundamental or cardinal to the prior decision on judgment, or necessarily involved in it as its legal justification or foundation, from matters which, even though actually raised and decided as being in the circumstances of the case the determining considerations, yet are not in point of law the essential foundation of a groundwork of the judgment.”
  • The authors say that in order to understand with essential distinction, one has always to inquire with unrelenting severity – is the determination upon which it is sought to find an estoppel so fundamental to the substantive decision that the latter cannot stand without the former. Nothing less than this will do. It is suggested by Dixon, J that even where this inquiry is answered satisfactorily, there is still another test to pass: viz. whether the determination is the immediate foundation” of the decision as opposed to merely “a proposition collateral or subsidiary only, i.e. not more than part of the reasoning supporting the conclusion.” It is well settled, say the above authors “that a mere step in reasoning is insufficient. What is required is no less than the determination of law, or fact or both, fundamental to the substantive decision.”

A Deliberate Judicial Decision alone is Judicial Precedent

As regards binding precedent, it is observed in Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44, as under:

  • “9…..It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates-
    • (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts;
    • (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and
    • (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides.
  • What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. “

Compromise/Consent Decree is no Adjudication; No Res Judicata

In Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao, AIR 1967 SC 591, the Supreme Court has laid down as under:

  • “A compromise decree is not a decision by the Court, it is the acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties had agreed. It has been said that a compromise decree merely sets the seal of the Court on the agreement of the parties. The Court did not decide, anything. Nor can it be said that the decision of the Court was implicit in it.”
  • See also: Daryao v. State of UP, 1962- I SCR 574;
  • Vidya Sagar v. Sudesh Kumari, 1976-1 SCC 115;
  • Jamia Masjid v. K. V.  Rudrappa, AIR 2021 SC 4523; 2022-9 SCC 225.

In Baldevdas Shivlal and another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 406, it is held as under:

  • “A consent decree according to the decisions of this Court does not operate as res-judicata because a consent decree is merely the record of contract between the parties to a suit, to which is superadded the seal of the Court. A matter in contest in a suit may operate as res-judicata only if there is an adjudicationby the Court; the terms of section 11 of the Code leave no scope for a contrary view.”

Estoppel by Conduct in a Compromise Suit

It is pointed out in Jamia Masjid v. K. V.  Rudrappa (DY Chandrachud, Vikram Nath, Hima Kohli, JJ.), AIR 2021 SC 4523; 2022-9 SCC 225 – (i) A ‘compromise decree is not a decision of court, principle of res judicata cannot be made applicable’ (ii) ‘However, compromise decree may in effect create estoppel by conduct between parties and parties by estoppel will be prevented from initiating a subsequent suit’.

Conclusion

With regard to res judicata, the modern trend in law adopts a more technical approach, requiring actual adjudication of the ‘same issue‘ in both the former and the subsequent suits. In contrast, the earlier view was broader, holding that res judicata would be attracted if the matter was in issue ‘in substance’, even if not the same or substantially identical.

Read Also:

             •➧ Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent; Not the Final Order or Conclusion.
             •➧ Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases: Does a Civil Court Judgment Bind a Criminal Court?
             •➧ Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon (SC), April 2, 2024 – An Odd Decision on ‘Civil Court Judgment Does Not Bind Criminal Court’.
             •➧ Cheating and Breach of Contract: Distinction lies in Fraudulent Intention ‘at the time of Promise’.  No Criminal Case endures on a Dispute Essentially Civil in Nature.
             •➧ No Res judicata on Finding on Title in an Injunction Suit
             •➧ Res Judicata and Judicial Precedent
             •➧ What are “Relevant Under Some Other Provisions of this Act” in Sec. 43?
             •➧ Judicial Precedent and Res Judicata – a Couplet
             •➧ Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
             •➧ Alternative Pleadings on Title and Adverse Possession: Mutually Inconsistent or Mutually Destructive?

End Notes:

Sec. 11 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, reads as under:

  • Res Judicata -No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
  • Explanation I– The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
  • Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court.
  • Explanation III.- The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.
  • Explanation IV.- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
  • Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.
  • Explanation VI– Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
  • Explanation VII.- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to proceedings for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.
  • Explanation VIII.-An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in as subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.

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Alternative Pleadings on Title and Adverse Possession: Mutually Inconsistent or Mutually Destructive?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • The answer is that such claims are mutually destructive and defeat each other.
  • However, in cases involving alternative pleadings of ‘title’ and ‘adverse possession’, it appears that our Apex Court tends to favour the doctrine of ‘mutual inconsistency’ over ‘mutual destructiveness’— perhaps as a pragmatic approach to manage and circumvent the inherent complexities arising from conventional pleading practices in such matters.

Introduction

The plea on claim of title and that on adverse possession are inherently contradictory and cannot logically coexist within the same suit, as they originate from fundamentally different legal premises.

The simultaneous assertion of both claims would be akin to advancing the following two mutually exclusive assertions:

  • (i) “I lawfully own the property.”
  • (ii) “I do not own it lawfully, but I have acquired title by possessing it unlawfully for a sufficient period to attract the doctrine of adverse possession.”

Origin and Nature of Enjoyment Make Certain Dual Pleas Inconsistent

In Kerala State v. Brijit (A. Hariprasad, J.), ILR 2018-2 (Ker) 483; 2018-2 KHC 521; 2018-2 KLT(SN) 53, it is pointed out as under:

  • “53. As we all know, there are certain claims which are mutually inconsistent and exclusive, like
    • easement by prescription and easement of necessity,
    • ownership and easement,
    • lease and license, etc.
  • In the case of easement by prescription and easement of necessity, origin of the rights are entirely different. Easement right by prescription arises by proving the ingredients under Section 15 of the Easements Act, 1882, whereas a claim for easement of necessity, under Section 13, essentially arises out of severance of the tenements by transfer, partition or bequest. It is therefore clear that they cannot be claimed together as they originate from different sources.
  • Likewise, easement and ownership cannot be claimed together for the reason that easement is a right not claimable on one’s own property going by the definition in Section 4 of the Easements Act.
  • Lease and license also cannot be claimed together because a lease is a transfer of property falling within the provisions of the TP Act and a license is in the nature of a permission granted to one person for doing something in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, under the provisions of Section 52 of the Easements Act, which does not involve a transfer of property. Such incompatible rights originate from different sources and, therefore, nature of their enjoyment also would be different.”

The pleas of title and adverse possession are based on fundamentally different legal principles that cannot coincide without inherent contradiction.

  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988,
  • Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, AIR 2004 SC 2096; 2004-10 SCC 779,
  • P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, AIR 2007 SC 1753; 2007-6 SCC 59 (S.B. Sinha, J.);
  • Narasamma v. A. Krishnappa, AIR 2020 SC 4178; 2020-15 SCC 218.

See also:

  • Prabhakar Gones Prabhu Navelkar v. Saradchandra Suria Prabhu Navelkar, 2020-20 SCC 465
  • T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, 2017-7 SCC 342,
  • L.N. Aswathama v. V.P. Prakash, 2009-13 SCC 229 (R.V. Raveendran, J.),
  • Arundhati Mishra v. Shri Ram Charita Pandey, (1994) 2 SCC 29.

‘Mutually Destructive‘ Pleas Cannot Co-exist

When these two propositions are presented in a party’s pleadings that contradict or destroy each other, and both cannot be true simultaneously, they are considered “mutually destructive”. Such inconsistency renders both pleas unreliable, and consequently, both are liable to be rejected. Example:

  • 1. Claim of title and adverse possession.
  • 2. Claim of title and benefits under Section 60(b) Easements Act.
  • 3. Easement by prescription and easement of necessity.
  • 4. Ownership and easement.

In Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant Eknath Jajoo, 2009-5 SCC 713 (S.B. Sinha, Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, JJ.), it is held as under:

  •  “Pleadings of the parties, it is trite, are required to be read as a whole. Defendants, although are entitled to raise alternative and inconsistent plea but should not be permitted to raise pleas which are mutually destructive of each other.”

The Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 3229, 2006-12 SCC 233, (S.B. Sinha, Dalveer Bhandari) held as under:

  • “To raise such a mutually destructive plea is impermissible in law. Such mutually destructive plea, in our opinion, should not be allowed to be raised even in an industrial adjudication. Common law principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are applicable in an industrial adjudication.”

In Damodhar Narayan Sawale v. Tejrao Bajirao Mhaske, AIR 2023 SC 3319; it is pointed out as under:

  • “Contextually, it is apposite to state that though in a suit a defendant is entitled to raise alternative inconsistent plea he could not be permitted to raise pleas which are mutually destructive of each other and raising such pleas would only work out to his detriment.”

In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly, 2008-7 SCC 85 (V.S. Sirpurkar, S.B. Sinha, JJ.) it is held as under:

  • “22. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other.” (Quoted in: Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, 2009-15 SCC 693)

In Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, 2009-15 SCC 693 (Deepak Verma, S.B. Sinha JJ.), pointed out as under:

  • “A defendant, as is well known, may raise inconsistent pleas so long as they are not mutually destructive.

Following cases also dealt with ‘mutually destructive’ pleas:

  • Steel Authority of India Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 3229, 2006-12 SCC 233
  • Damodhar Narayan Sawale v. Tejrao Bajirao Mhaske, AIR 2023 SC 3319
  • Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant Eknath Jajoo, 2009-5 SCC 713
  • Narayan Sawale v. Tejrao Bajirao Mhaske, AIR 2023 SC 3319
  • Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, 2009-15 SCC 693
  • Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly, 2008-7 SCC 85.

Read Also:

             •➧ Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent; Not the Final Order or Conclusion.
             •➧ Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases: Does a Civil Court Judgment Bind a Criminal Court?
             •➧ Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon (SC), April 2, 2024 – An Odd Decision on ‘Civil Court Judgment Does Not Bind Criminal Court’.
             •➧ Cheating and Breach of Contract: Distinction lies in Fraudulent Intention ‘at the time of Promise’.  No Criminal Case endures on a Dispute Essentially Civil in Nature.
             •➧ No Res judicata on Finding on Title in an Injunction Suit
             •➧ What are “Relevant Under Some Other Provisions of this Act” in Sec. 43?
             •➧ Judicial Precedent and Res Judicata – a Couplet
             •➧ Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
             •➧Res Judicata: ‘Same issue’ must have been ‘Adjudicated’ in the former suit

Time to Choose and Confine to One of the Alternative Pleadings

Different views:

  • 1. Before the commencement of the trial and taking evidence.
  • 2. At least at the time of arguments.
  • 3. During trial.

One thing is definite – the stance on ‘election’ must have reflected in the trial.

The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent, and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Therefore, the time to choose and confine to one of the alternative inconsistent pleadings is before the commencement of the trial and taking evidence, so that the opposite party may not be prejudiced (See: P. V. Abdul Majeed Haji v. Shorabi, 2020-4 KerHC 53; 2020-4 KerLT 629).

But, according to the Andhra High Court, as held in Kavitha Goud v. Nookala Sudarshan Reddy, AIR 2004 AP 326; 2004-4 ALD 324; 2004-5 ALT 293, it is ‘at least at the time of arguments‘. In this case, it is said as under:

  • “It is true that a party can take inconsistent pleas, and can adduce evidence in respect of both the inconsistent pleas taken by him. But at least at the time of arguments, he must choose and confine his case to one of those pleas only, but cannot be permitted to urge the inconsistent pleas as grounds of attack or defence till the end of the lis, because the other side should know what exactly is his case.”

The Andhra High Court, in Atluri Prabhakara Rao v. Chalasani Krishna Kumari, 2017-2 ALT 240; 2017 3 ALT 785 (M. Satyanarayana Murthy, J.), observed that the time to confine to any one of the pleas is ‘during trial’. It is said as under:

  • “These two pleas are inconsistent to one another. Forgery is totally distinct from the fabrication. However, the defendant may take inconsistent pleas but she has to confine to any one of the pleas during trial.”

In Kuriakose v. Varkey, 1 August, 2017, (A. Muhamed Mustaque), it is pointed out as under:

  • “It is true that the defendant is entitled to take inconsistent pleas, but at the time of trial, he will have to stick on to one case.”

Plea of Title and Adverse Possession: ‘Mutually Inconsistent

In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, AIR 2004 SC 2096; 2004-10 SCC 779, it is held as under:

  • “The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent, and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced.”
  • (Quoted in: P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, AIR 2007 SC 1753; 2007-6 SCC 59 (S.B. Sinha, J.); Narasamma v. A. Krishnappa, AIR 2020 SC 4178; 2020-15 SCC 218.)

In L.N. Aswathama v. V.P. Prakash, 2009-13 SCC 229 (R.V. Raveendran, J.) also it was held that the pleas based on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent.

RC Lahoti J., opined in Kedar Nath v. Ram Parkash, 1997-2 AD(Del) 761; 1999-1 CLT 1; 1997-67 DLT 106, as under:

  • “However, a party would be better advised to abandon one of the two inconsistent pleas before going to the trial because contradictory inconsistent pleas may lead to effect associated with the peril of Court’s confidence being denied to both. Take the case of a person in possession pleading license and adverse possession in the alternative in an effect to protect his possession.”

In L.N. Aswathama v. V.P. Prakash, 2009-13 SCC 229, it is held as under:

  • “17. … The pleas based on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Unless the person possessing the property has the requisite animus to possess the property hostile to the title of the true owner, the period for prescription will not commence.
  • 18. …When a person is in possession asserting to be the owner, even if he fails to establish his title, his possession would still be adverse to the true owner. Therefore, the two pleas put forth by the defendant in this case are not inconsistent pleas but alternative pleas available on the same facts. Therefore, the contention of the plaintiffs that the plea of adverse possession is not available to defendant is rejected.”

In Arundhati Mishra v. Shri Ram Charita Pandey, (1994) 2 SCC 29, it is held as under:

  • “4. The question in this case is whether the plea of adverse possession sought to be set up by the respondent could be permitted to be raised. The pleas based on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced.”

In Om Prakash v. Bhaurao, 2022, it is held as under:

  • “18. The defendants are certainly entitled to take inconsistent pleas. However, mutually destructive or exclusive pleas stand on a different pedestal. A person who has set a title in himself cannot be permitted to alternatively plea perfection of title by adverse possession. The concept of adverse possession pre-supposes that the claimant accepts the title of the adversary. Adverse possession cannot begin to operate until the claimant renounces title and accepts the title of the adversary.”

In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988, the Supreme Court has affirmed the law as under:

  • “49. Claim of independent title and adverse possession at the same time amount to contradictory pleas.”

In Vidya Shanker v. Suresh Chandra, 2020-4 ADJ 547; 2020-5 AllLJ 290; 2020 142 AllLR 353; 2020 4 AWC 3430 (Sudhir Agarwal, J.) it is said as under:

  • “39. In the matter of plea of adverse possession, mutually inconsistent or mutually destructive pleas must not be taken in the plaint. Whenever the plea of adverse possession is raised, it pre supposes that owner is someone else and the person taking the plea of adverse possession is not the actual owner but has perfected his title by prescription since the real owner failed to initiate any proceeding for restoring the possession within the prescribed period under the statute.”

Sudhir Agarwal, J. then pointed out as under:

  • “40. In P. Periasami v. P.Periathambi, 1995 (6) SCC 523, it was said:
    • “Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property.”
  • 41. In Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1996) 1SCC 639, the Court said:
    • “As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario.”
  • 42. In Karnataka Board of Wakf Vs. Government of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779, Court held that whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent therein is that someone else is the owner of the property. In para 12 it said:
    • “The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced.”

Plea of Title and Adverse Possession: Mutually Destructive

The Kerala High Court, in P. S. George v. Balakrishnan, 2015-1 CivCC 26; ILR 2014-4 (Ker) 966; 2014-4 KHC 725; -2014-4 KLT 788, pointed out as under:

  • “Put it differently, he had been enjoying the disputed property as his own property. So also, there is no pleading either recognising or acknowledging the plaintiffs as the true owners of the property. Needless to say, the element of ‘animus possidendi’ is totally absent. I have already held that alternative plea of adverse possession is unsustainable, mutually destructive and liable to be rejected.”

In Kuriakose v. Varkey, 1 August, 2017, (A. Muhamed Mustaque), it is held as under:

  • “It is settled law that, claiming title in one self and claiming title by adverse possession will not go together and they are mutually exclusive and destructive to each other. It is true that the defendant is entitled to take inconsistent pleas, but at the time of trial, he will have to stick on to one case.”

In Rama Kanta Jain v. M.S. Jain, AIR 1999 (Del) 281, it was held as under:

  • “18. There is another aspect of the matter. The mere fact that the defendants have come forward with a plea of adverse possession, means that they admit the plaintiff to be the true owner. For a plea of ownership on the basis of adverse possession, the first and the foremost condition is, that the property must belong to someone else other than the person pleading his title on the basis of adverse possession, In the instant case the defendants have put forward defences which are irreconcilable’ and mutually destructive and inconsistent with one another.’” (Quoted in: Anu Gupta v. Vijay Gupta, 08 Aug 2022.

In Rattan Lal v. Ragunath, 18 Aug 2023, 2023 Supreme (Del) 3938, quoting Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988, it is held as under:

  • “11.2. Therefore, the plea of adverse possession raised by the Appellants as a new plea in first appeal is inconsistent with the case setup in the written statement and the trial. In law, the Appellants are precluded from taking the said plea in view of the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Bharat Bhushan Jain & Anr. v. UOI & Ors., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3577, wherein this Court has held that the plea of ownership by title and adverse ownership cannot be raised together being inconsistent and mutually destructive. The plea of adverse possession is a question of fact and cannot be raised in appeal only on the basis of prolonged possession of suit property in the absence of the proof of the other ingredients necessary for proving the said defence including the fact that the possession was hostile to the true owner of the property.”  

No Impediment in ‘Claiming’ Ownership and Adverse Possession

In Kerala State v. Brijit, ILR 2018-2 (Ker) 483; 2018-2 KHC 521; 2018-2 KLT(SN) 53, emphasised that there is no impediment in ‘claiming’ ownership and, in the alternative, a prescriptive title to it by adverse possession. The learned Judge stressed his point as under:

  • “54. … Exclusive possession of the thing owned and the right to exclude others from possession are two essential components in the bundle of rights called “title” or “ownership”. In other words, every owner has a right to possess property in exclusion of all the others. Every person holding property under a claim of adverse possession keeps possession of the same with a hostile animus to exclude all others, including the true owner. Therefore, both in a claim of ownership and adverse possession, assertive possession is an essential component. In the case of a person claiming adverse title by prescription, he must have been holding possession with an open hostile animus for the prescribed period. Therefore, I find no reason to think that there is any impediment in claiming ownership of property and in the alternative, a prescriptive title to it by adverse possession and limitation.”

Mutually Destructive Pleas Cannot be Permitted

In Mrs. Adarsh Kaur Gill v. Smt. Surjit Kaur Gill, FAO(OS) No.634/2009, decided on 15th January, 2009, it is held as under:

  • “13. The plea of ownership by way of adverse possession now sought to be taken is found to be mutually destructive to the plea of possession as co-owner, as a subrogatee-mortgagee in possession and as a tenant. The Supreme Court in L.M. Aswathama v. P. Prakash, MANU/SC/1222/2009 has also held that pleas based on title and adverse possession are mutually destructive; adverse possession does not begin to operate until title is renounced; unless the person possessing the property has the requisite animus to possess the property hostile to the title of the true owner, the period of prescription will not commence.” (Quoted in: Rishi Rathi v. Rishi Rathi, AIR 2022 (Del)(NOC) 585; Kewal Kishan v. Delhi Development Authority, 2013-137 DRJ 267)

In Combi v. K. S.  Ramachandran, 2021-6 KerHC 790; 2021-6 KerLT 379, it is held as under:

  • “3. The contention of tenancy right and adverse possession is mutually destructive and hence cannot be sustained. The tenancy right claimed was rejected by the Land Tribunal on a reference under Section 125 of the KLR Act due to lack of evidence. Nothing was brought to the notice of this court regarding any acceptable proof or evidence showing any existing tenancy right. As discussed earlier, the claim of adverse possession is mutually destructive and inconsistent, hence cannot be sustained.”

In Radheshyam Pathak v. Kanhaiyaa Gond, 2021, it is held as under:

  • “Plea of title and adverse possession, both, are mutually destructive plea and inconsistent as well. Therefore, the defendants cannot be permitted to raise mutually destructive plea.”

In Laxmi Narain v. Kartar Singh, 2021-1 LawHerald 322; 2021-2 RCR(Civ) 780, it is held as under:

  • “In the case titled Rama Kanta Jain v. M.S. Jain. Delhi High Court, 1999(2) RCR (Civil) page 685, it has been laid down that a person who traces his possession to a lawful title can never become an owner by adverse possession. The mere fact that the respondent has come forward with a plea of adverse possession means that he admits the appellant to be true owner. For a plea of ownership on the basis of adverse possession, the first and foremost condition is that the property must belong to someone else other than the person pleading his title. In the instant case, the respondent has put forward the defences which are irreconcilable and mutually destructive and inconsistent with one another.”

In Krishna Chandra v. Sarju Dei 2020-7 ADJ 416; 2020-5 AllLJ 363, it is held as under:

  • “34. Besides, alternative plea may be permissible, but mutually destructive pleas are not permissible. The defendants may raise inconsistent pleas so long as they are not mutually destructive as held in Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera. [JT 2009 (10) SC 538].
  • 35. In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly, [(2008) 7 SCC 85] the Court said that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea but such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other.”

No Adverse Possession Without Admitting Title of Real Owner

In Nand Ram v.  Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2020 SC 1884; (2020) 9 SCC 393, it was pointed out by the Apex Court :

  • “The question of adverse possession without admitting the title of the real owner is not tenable.”

Our Apex Court, in Ayodhya case Judgment, M Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1, it is held as under:

  • “747. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other.”

This principle is laid down in the following decisions also:

  • The State of Haryana v. Amin Lal, 2024-4 CurCC(SC) 222,
  • Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao v. Galla Jani Kamma, (2008) 15 SCC 150,
  • Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, 2020-11 SCC 263, AIR  2020 SC 461.

Conclusion

The law is well settled:

  1. Mutually destructive pleas cannot co-exist.
  2. If a party to the suit raises mutually inconsistent (but not mutually destructive) pleas, he must elect and confine himself to one in the trial.

With respect to alternative pleadings of title and adverse possession, there remains a divergence in judicial opinion on one key issue:

  • whether the alternative pleadings of ‘title and adverse possession’ are to be regarded as ‘mutually inconsistent’ or ‘mutually destructive’.

The fundamental difference in the origin of the rights, the claim of title and adverse possession cannot coexist in the same case. One is destructive to the other, also. Because, it involves two inherently contradictory pleas:

  • (i) “I own the lawful owner of the property”, and
  • (ii) “I do not own it lawfully; the true owner is someone else’’.

Therefore, the simple and clear answer is that such claims are, for obvious reasons, mutually destructive and defeat each other.

  • However, in cases involving alternative pleadings of ‘title’ and ‘adverse possession’, it appears that our Apex Court tends to favour the doctrine of ‘mutual inconsistency’ over ‘mutual destructiveness’— perhaps as a pragmatic approach to manage and circumvent the inherent complexities arising from conventional pleading practices in such matters.

While courts may show some leniency in permitting divergent pleas at the trial stage, appellate courts generally do not entertain a position that contradicts the stance previously ‘elected’ or opted at trial.

End Notes:

Sec. 11 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, reads as under:

  • Res Judicata -No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
  • Explanation I– The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
  • Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court.
  • Explanation III.- The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.
  • Explanation IV.- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
  • Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.
  • Explanation VI– Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
  • Explanation VII.- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to proceedings for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.
  • Explanation VIII.-An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in as subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.

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