The Doctrine of ‘Prima Facie Case’ in Criminal Cases

Jojy George Koduvath.

Preface

The term prima facie has been authoritatively explained by the Supreme Court in Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2023 SC 5551, wherein the Court laid down the meaning and scope of the words as under:

  • “The Latin expression prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first view”, or “based on first impression”. According, to Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”.
  • In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, or if an opposing party introduces contradictory evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties.”

Introduction:

The doctrine of prima facie Case’ arises for consideration in various stages of criminal proceedings, as under:

  1. For Ordering Investigation under [Section 156(3), CrPC ] and Taking Cognizance & Issuing Process [Sections 190 & 204 CrPC]:
    What is required is the Prima Facie existence of sufficient ground to proceed. At this stage, the Magistrate needs only to be satisfied that the complaint discloses a cognizable offence warranting investigation.
  2. For Quashing of FIR [Section 482, CrPC ] :
    The test is whether the allegations in the FIR Prima Facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or Article 226 of the Constitution, is not required to assess the merits of the allegations or examine the probability of conviction.
  3. For Framing of Charge / Discharge [Sections 227 to 239 CrPC]:
    The Court must examine whether the materials in the charge sheet and accompanying documents Prima Facie disclose sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. At this stage, the standard of proof required for conviction is not applicable—what is required is only a Prima Facie, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
  4. Grant or Refusal of Bail:
    While deciding bail applications, courts examine whether a Prima Facie case exists against the accused.

1. S. 156(3) – Prima Facie ‘EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT GROUND TO PROCEED’

It is held in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka as under:

  • “38. In the background of the factual position, the JMFC’s Order dated 18.01.2018 cannot be faulted. Enough material is available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police. The JMFC, to our mind, had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a prima facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC.
  • xxx
  • 40. The … JMFC had referred the matter to police under Section 156(3) of the Code, and the usage of ‘further’ was not in the context of Section 173(8) of the Code, which fine distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over. The case(s) at hand, in our considered view, demonstrate material showing the commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of itwhich would merit police investigation. Therefore, interdiction of the Impugned Orders is necessitated.”

Read also:

In Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2024 SC 4531, it is held as under:

  • “If at the stage of pre-cognizance, the Magistrate is expected to be careful or to put it in other words, the Magistrate is obliged to look into the complaint threadbare so as to reach to a prima facie conclusion whether the offence is disclosed or not, then he is expected to be more careful when he is actually taking cognizance upon a private complaint and ordering issue of process.”

In Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2019 SC 5233; 2019-17 SCC 1 (R.F. Nariman, Surya Kant, V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.) it is held as under:

  • “42. … To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases midway through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out.”

In Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage, (2016) 6 SCC 277, it is observed as under:

  • “2. This Court has held in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., that if a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or having been registered, proper investigation is not being done, then the remedy of the aggrieved person is not to go to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but to approach the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3) CrPC. If such an application under Section 156(3) CrPC is made and the Magistrate is, prima facie, satisfied, he can direct the FIR to be registered, or if it has already been registered, he can direct proper investigation to be done which includes in his discretion, if he deems it necessary, recommending change of the investigating officer, so that a proper investigation is done in the matter. We have said this in Sakiri Vasu case because what we have found in this country is that the High Courts have been flooded with writ petitions praying for registration of the first information report or praying for a proper investigation.
  • We are of the opinion that if the High Courts entertain such writ petitions, then they will be flooded with such writ petitions and will not be able to do any other work except dealing with such writ petitions. Hence, we have held that the complainant must avail of his alternate remedy to approach the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3) CrPC and if he does so, the Magistrate will ensure, if prima facie he is satisfied, registration of the first information report and also ensure a proper investigation in the matter, and he can also monitor the investigation.”

In Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda, (2015) 12 SCC 420, it is said as under:

  • “22… The satisfaction on the ground for proceeding would mean that the facts alleged in the complaint would constitute an offence, and when considered along with the statements recorded, would, prima facie, make the accused answerable before the court…In other words, the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking cognizance of each and every complaint filed before him and issue process as a matter of course. There must be sufficient indication in the order passed by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that the allegations in the complaint constitute an offence and when considered along with the statements recorded and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under Section 202 of CrPC, if any, the accused is answerable before the criminal court, there is ground for proceeding against the accused under Section 204 of CrPC, by issuing process for appearance. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction…To be called to appear before criminal court as an accused is serious matter affecting one’s dignity, self respect and image in society. Hence, the process of criminal court shall not be made a weapon of harassment.” (Quoted in: Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2024 SC 4531)

In Sunil Bharti Mittal v. C.B.I., (2015) 4 SCC 609, it is held as under:

  • “53. However, the words “sufficient ground for proceeding” appearing in Section 204 are of immense importance. It is these words which amply suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie, case against the accused, though the order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect.” (Quoted in: Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2024 SC 4531)

2. Quashing FIR – Prima Facie ‘DISCLOSE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENCE’ Matters

It is pointed out by the three-judge bench in  Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra (Dr. DY. Chandrachud, M.R. Shah,  Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.), (2021) 19 SCC 401, that the court has to exercise the powers for quashing the FIR in a very sparing manner. It is observed as under:

  • “33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.’

It is held as under:

  • “Therefore, a balance has to be struck between the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand and those innocent persons against whom the criminal proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case abuse of process of law and the process. However, if the facts are hazy and the investigation has just begun, the High Court would be circumspect in exercising such powers and the High Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed further with the investigation in exercise of its statutory duty under the provisions of the Code.” (Quoted in: Accamma Sam Jacob v. The State of Karnataka & Anr. Etc. (2026 INSC 362)

The Apex Court, while discussing the powers to quash the first information report under Section 482 Cr. P.C or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 (K.T. Thomas & M.B. Shah, JJ.), it was observed and held as under:

  • “14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. [State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283] It is also settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370, 395 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 180]”
  • (Quoted in  Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401)

3. No Quashing on the Ground – the Dispute Appeared to be Civil in Nature

Mere existence of a civil remedy does not by itself bar criminal proceedings. Where the allegations prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offence, the trial proceedings cannot be quashed. In Accamma Sam Jacob v. The State of Karnataka, 2026 INSC 362, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “In the facts and circumstances noted above, it was not at all justified for the High Court to have quashed proceedings merely on the ground that the dispute appeared to be civil in nature. It is well settled that the mere existence of a civil remedy does not by itself bar criminal proceedings where the allegations prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offencee. By entering into an evaluation of the dispute on merits and proceeding to quash the order directing investigation, the High Court effectively stifled the investigative process at its inception. Such an approach runs contrary to the principles consistently laid down by this Court.”

4. Framing Charges – Only a Prima Facie Case for PROCEEDING be Satisfied

In Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, AIR 2020 SC 554, 2020-2  SCC 217 (Hrishikesh Roy, A.S. Bopanna, R. Banumathi, JJ.), it is observed as under:

  • “12. Though the circumstances alleged in the charge sheet are to be established during the trial by adducing the evidence, the allegations in the charge sheet show a prima facie case against the accused-respondent Nos.1 and 2. The circumstances alleged by the prosecution indicate that there are  against the accused. At the time of framing the charges, only prima facie case is to be seen; whether case is beyond reasonable doubt, is not to be seen at this stage. At the stage of framing the charge, the court has to see if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. While evaluating the materials, strict standard of proof is not required; only prima facie case against the accused is to be seen.”

See also:

  • State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294
  • Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217
  • Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148
  • State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, AIR 2017 SC 796,
  • Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460
  • Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135
  • State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338
  • State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659
  • Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.
  • Union of India  v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4.

5. Grant or Refusal of Bail:
While deciding bail applications, courts examine whether a Prima Facie case exists against the accused.

In Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “19. Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence are required to be satisfied and further while granting such relief, the court must record the reasons therefor. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has falsely been enroped in the crime and would not misuse his liberty. (See D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran (2007) 4 SCC 434, State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain (2008) 1 SCC 213 and Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal (2008) 13 SCC 305.)”
  • (Quoted in: P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2019 SC  4198; (2019) 9 SCC 24.)

In P. Chidambaram v. Central Bureau Of Investigation, AIR 2019 SC 5272; 2020-13 SCC 337, it is observed as under:

  • “Expression of prima facie reasons for granting or refusing to grant bail is a requirement of law, especially where such bail orders are appealable so as to indicate application of mind to the matter under consideration and the reasons for conclusion. Recording of reasons is necessary since the accused/prosecution/victim has every right to know the reasons for grant or refusal to grant bail. This will also help the appellate court to appreciate and consider the reasonings for grant or refusal to grant bail. But giving reasons for exercise of discretion in granting or refusing to grant bail is different from discussing the merits or demerits of the case. At the stage of granting bail, an elaborate examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching upon the merit of the case, which may prejudice the accused, should be avoided. Observing that “at the stage of granting bail, detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case should be avoided”, in Niranjan Singh, it was held as under:-
    • “3. ……Detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits should be avoided while passing orders on bail applications. No party should have the impression that his case has been prejudiced. To be satisfied about a prima facie case is needed but it is not the same as an exhaustive exploration of the merits in the order itself.”

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Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka: Supreme Court held – Prima Facie Case as to Commission of Cognizable Offence, Merit Police Investigation

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

  • For Ordering Investigation under S. 156(3): Prima Facie ‘EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT GROUND TO PROCEED’ is enough.
  • For quashing the FIR: What is to be looked into is whether the allegations in the FIR Prima Facie Discloses The Commission Of A Cognizable Offence or not. The Court is not required to consider the merits while considering quashing the first information report under Section 482 Cr. P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

These were the matters discussed by the Supreme Court of India, in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka, 4 November 2025 (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Pankaj Mithal, JJ.).

Also Read: The Doctrine of ‘Prima Facie Case’ in Criminal Cases

Facts of the case

A Rent Agreement produced by the accused, on an E-Stamp Paper, was fake. Even the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of Stamps stated that Prima Facie the E- Stamp used was a fake E-Stamp. It was contended – since there was Prima Facie material that substantiates the appellant’s claim that the E- Stamp Paper is a forged document, the possibility of a conspiracy hatched by the accused cannot be ruled out.

The prime question for consideration

The prime question for consideration was the following:

  • Whether the direction for investigation to the police issued by the JMFC under  Section 156(3) of the Code, which was quashed by the Impugned Orders, is justified based on the facts and circumstances of the cases.

The Apex Court relied on the following decisions:

  • 1. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401,
  • 2. Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615,
  • 3. Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439.

The Apex Court, while exercising the powers to quash the first information report under Section 482 Cr. P.C or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is pointed out in a three-judge bench decision (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, M.R. Shah,  Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.) in  Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, that the court has to exercise the powers in a very sparing manner. It is observed as under:

  • ‘16. In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of process of law by converting a civil dispute into a criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurise the accused. Similarly, in a given case the complaint itself on the face of it can be said to be barred by law. The allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such cases and in exceptional cases with circumspection, the High Court may stay the further investigation. However, at the same time, there may be genuine complaints/FIRs and the police/investigating agency has a statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand and those innocent persons against whom the criminal proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case abuse of process of law and the process. However, if the facts are hazy and the investigation has just begun, the High Court would be circumspect in exercising such powers and the High Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed further with the investigation in exercise of its statutory duty under the provisions of the Code. Even in such a case the High Court has to give/assign brief reasons why at this stage the further investigation is required to be stayed. The High Court must appreciate that speedy investigation is the requirement in the criminal administration of justice.’
  • xxx
  •  ‘33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.’ (emphasis supplied)

In Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615 (P. Sathasivam, Jagdish Singh Khehar, JJ.), it was held as under:

  • “18. When a Magistrate receives a complaint he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The Magistrate has discretion in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint, he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence itself. As said earlier, in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). However, if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to revert back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3).”
  • “This position of law was recently reiterated in Lavanya C v Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 499, where one of us (P. Mithal, J.) was part of the coram.”

In Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439, three learned Judges (T.S. Thakur, Adarsh Kumar Goel, R. Banumathi) opined after noticing Cardinal Mar George Alencherry v. State of Kerala, (2023) 18 SCC 730, as under:

  • “13. We may first deal with the question as to whether the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3) or was justified in proceeding under Section 202(1) and what are the parameters for exercise of power under the two provisions.
  • xxx
  • 22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that:
  • 22.1. The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone the issuance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued.
  • 22.2. The cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine
    • existence of sufficient ground to proceed”.
  • Category of cases falling under para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] may fall under Section 202. Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case.
  • xxx
  • 38. In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy [(1976) 3 SCC 252: 1976 SCC (Cri) 380], National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz [(2013) 2 SCC 488: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 731], Madhao v. State of Maharashtra [(2013) 5 SCC 615: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 141], Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 4 SCC 185: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 801], the scheme of Sections 156(3) and 202 has been discussed. It was observed that power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before taking cognizance and was in the nature of pre-emptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its plenary power of investigation beginning with Section 156 and ending with report or charge-sheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 applies at post-cognizance stage and the direction for investigation was for the purpose of deciding whether there was sufficient ground to proceed.”

Finding of the Apex Court

It is held in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka as under:

  • “38. In the background of the factual position, the JMFC’s Order dated 18.01.2018 cannot be faulted. Enough material is available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police. The JMFC, to our mind, had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a Prima Facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC.
  • xxx
  • 40. The … JMFC had referred the matter to police under Section 156(3) of the Code, and the usage of ‘further’ was not in the context of Section 173(8) of the Code, which fine distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over. The case(s) at hand, in our considered view, demonstrate material showing the commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of itwhich would merit police investigation. Therefore, interdiction of the Impugned Orders is necessitated.”

Conclusion

In the background of the factual position, the Apex Court held that the JMFC’s Order cannot be faulted, and that enough material was available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police, and that the JMFC had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a Prima Facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC.

End Note:

Framing the Charges – Only a Prima Facie Case is to be Satisfied

In Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, AIR 2020 SC 554, 2020-2  SCC 217 (Hrishikesh Roy, A.S. Bopanna, R. Banumathi, JJ.), it is observed as under:

  • “12. Though the circumstances alleged in the charge sheet are to be established during the trial by adducing the evidence, the allegations in the charge sheet show a prima facie case against the accused-respondent Nos.1 and 2. The circumstances alleged by the prosecution indicate that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. At the time of framing the charges, only prima facie case is to be seen; whether case is beyond reasonable doubt, is not to be seen at this stage. At the stage of framing the charge, the court has to see if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. While evaluating the materials, strict standard of proof is not required; only prima facie case against the accused is to be seen.”

See also:

  • State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294
  • Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217
  • Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148
  • State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, AIR 2017 SC 796,
  • Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460
  • Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135
  • State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338
  • State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659
  • Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.
  • Union of India  v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

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Law on Damages

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Negotiable Instruments Act

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Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Trusts and Trust Deeds

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

A trust is what its authors or founders intended, as revealed from the deed of dedication, if any, or on other substantial evidence.  In CIT v. Kamala Town Trust, AIR 1996 SC 620, 1996-7 SCC 349, it is pointed out as under:

  • “A Trust Deed is a document which sets out the terms of an understanding between the author of the trust and the trustees. Though in form, the trustees are not signatories to the instrument as drawn up, they are parties to the instrument in a real sense, for it is on the terms of the instrument that they accept office and proceed to administer the trust. The law obliges them to act upon the terms of the Trust Deed, and they cannot commit a breach thereof.”

The trustee is bound to fulfil the purpose of the trust, and to obey the directions of the author of the trust given at the time of its creation (Sec. 11 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882). Usually, there will be trust deeds which direct the administration of the trusts, which include how the trustees are appointed, and how new trustees are selected.

As per the Indian Trust Act. 1882, the trustee holds the trust-property for ‘management’ or ‘administration’.  The legal ownership vests in the trustee for the purposes of the trust, and its administration should be in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust (Ramabai Govind  v. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106).

In Abdul Kayum Vs. Alibhai, AIR 1963 SC 309, our Apex Court expounded the following legal incidents of trusteeship:

  • (i) Trustees cannot transfer their duties, functions & powers to some other body of men and create them trustees in their own place unless this is clearly permitted by the trust deed, or agreed to by the entire body of beneficiaries (Sec. 48);
  • (ii) A trustee is not bound to accept the trust; but having once entered upon the trust he cannot renounce the duties and liabilities except with the permission of the Court or with the consent of the beneficiaries or by the authority of the trust deed itself (Sec. 46).
  • (iii) A trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his functions except in some specified cases (Sec. 47).

Trustee is Obliged to Manage for Benefit of the Beneficiaries

As pointed out by our Apex Court, in WO Holdsworth  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,[AIR1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106.]  the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 declares vesting legal ownership with trustees. The vesting of ownership of trust property with the trustee is under an obligation to manage it for the benefit of the beneficiaries.[Chhatra Kumari Vs.  Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin  Vs. Trustees Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184. See also: RamabaiGovind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj)]  Though, in a trust, the trust property must have been transferred to the trustees, and the trust property vests in the trustee as owner thereof, it does not absolutely belong to any individual.

Trustee has no ‘Proprietor Interest’

It is observed by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Special Secretary Land and Land Revenue [1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30] that the trustee would become the owner of the trust property for the purpose of effectively executing or administering the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries and for due administration thereof, and not for any other purpose. Merely because the property is vested in the trustee as the legal owner, he has no ‘proprietor interest’, inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’ in the property itself. 

Trustee Deals with the Property According to the Deed of Trust

The property is vested in trustees subject to the obligations upon which the trustees accepted the trust.[Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997  Kar 2460; Mathura Bai Fatechand Damani Vs. Regional PF: 1992 WLN  206(Raj)] The trustee deals with the property in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust.[Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106]  In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property.[Govardhandhari Devsthan  Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982  Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Vs. Parasnath Digambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199]The legal ownership which vests in the trustee is for the purposes of the trust and to administer [Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529] the same.

Basic Principle of Foundation of a Trust Cannot be Changed

The trustees are bound to administer the affairs of the trust to attain the objects (Commr of IT Vs. Rajmitra Bhailal: 1964-54 ITR 241) envisioned by the founder and in accordance with his directions laid down in the trust deed; and the acts and actions of trustees ultra vires such objects or directions are void.  If a trustee fails to administer in accordance with the terms of the trust, it amounts to breach of trust (RP Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Educational Trust:1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801).

The basic principle of foundation of a trust cannot be changed.  Tudor on Charities [6th Edn.  At p. 131], explained it as under:

  • “When a charity has been founded and trusts have been declared, the founder has no power to revoke, vary or add to the trusts. This is so irrespective of whether the trusts have been declared by an individual, or by a body of subscribers, or by the trustees.” (Agasthyar Trust Vs. Commr IT Madras ; 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;1998-5 SCC 588)

No Change to Basic Principles, Even By Majority, Unless Specific Power

Fundamental principles upon which an association is founded (as revealed from the deed of dedication, if any, or on other substantial evidence) are also not open to alteration, even for the majority of its members, unless such a power is specifically reserved. This principle is laid down in

  • Milligan Vs.  Mitchell, (1837) 3 My. & Cr. 72 : 40 ER 852,
  • Attorney General Vs. Anderson, (1888) 57 LJ Ch 543, and
  • Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun, (1904) AC 515

These decisions are referred to in –

  • Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao, AIR 1931 Mad. 12.

See also:

  • Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547;
  • Allahabad High School Society Vs. State of UP: 2010-5 ADJ 734, 2010-82 All LR 83;
  • P. Jayader  Vs. Thiruneelakanta Nadar Chinnaneela Nadar: ILR  1966-2 Mad 92.

Ultra Vires Acts, Void; It Constitutes ‘Breach of Trust’.

A company is a juristic person. The actions and functioning of a company differ from that of a natural person who is free to act on his whims and fancies. The actions and functioning of a company are limited by its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association.

Deed of Endowment/Dedication

A declaration by a registered deed or vesting/transferring property to a trustee is the usual mode of dedication of immovable property for the creation of a public trust; though no document is necessary for creating an endowment.

If the founders’ intention is clear from the document of foundation or other direct evidence, oral or documentary, no difficulty arises. In cases where express dedication cannot be proved, it will be a matter for legal inference from the proved facts and circumstances of each case. In Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Reli. Endts, it is held:

  • “Where, however, a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and the recitals of the document show that the control and management of the temple is retained with the founder or his descendants, and that extensive properties are dedicated for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple belonging to the founder himself, this will be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature.”[AIR 1981 SC 798; (quoted in Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685).]

In S. Shanmugam Pillai . Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai .[AIR 1972 SC 2069] it is held:

  • “Whether or not a dedication is complete would naturally be a question of fact to be determined in each case on the terms of the relevant document if the dedication in question was made under a document. … “[Quoted in Sitaram Agarwal Vs. Subarata Chandra: AIR 2008 SC 952; Controller of Estate Duty West Bengal Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312]

In Hemanta Kumari Debi Vs. Gauri Shankar Tewari [AIR 1941 PC 38; Quoted in Kuldip Chand Vs. AG to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685.  Terms of the document, important:1951 SCR 1122;  Sri. Govindlalji Vs. State of Rajasthan: AIR 1963  SC  1638; R Venugopala Reddiar Vs. Krishnaswamy: AIR 1971 Mad  262; Kuldip Chand Vs. A G to Govt of H P: AIR 2003  SC  1685. Importance of document: Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Endts.: AIR 1981 SC 798; Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts: Page 188] it is held, while dealing with a bathing ghat on the banks of the River Ganges, that complete relinquishment of title was not the only form of dedication under Hindu Law.

It further observed as under:

  • “In the absence of a formal and express endowment evidenced by deed or declaration, the character of the dedication can only be determined on the basis of the history of the institution and the conduct of the founder and his heirs.”

Our Apex Court observed the following, interpreting a deed, in Idol of Sri Renganatha-swamy Vs. PK Thoppulan Chettiar [(2020) 5 Mad LJ 331(SC)] as under:

  • “The Deed of Settlement must be examined as a whole to determine the true intention of the settlor. Where the settlor seeks to divest himself of the property entirely for a religious purpose, a public religious charity is created. In the present case, the Deed of Settlement creates an absolute prohibition on the subsequent sale or mortgage of the suit property. The Deed of Settlement provides that, the settler purchased the punja land mentioned in the schedule of property… for the performance of charity work in reference to Sri Renganathan-swamy sanctum. The property outlined in the schedule of the Deedof Settlement is described as, property allotted for charity work. With respect to the legal heirs, the Deed of Settlement creates an obligation on the settlors legal heirs to continue the charitable activities at the suit property out of their business incomes. The settlor had a clear intent to divest himself and his legal heirs of the property and endow it for the continuation of the charitable activities at the suit property. The purpose of the endowment was to carry on charitable work. The Deed of Settlement obligates the legal heirs to continue the charitable activities at the suit property.”

West and Buhler in Digest of Hindu Law [at page 248] reads further as under:

  • “Like the trustee in English law, a Shebait has to act gratuitously and he cannot charge the debutter estate for any remuneration on account of the time and labour he spends over his affairs. The position would certainly be different if there is a provision in the deed of dedication to that effect; or, in the absence of any deed of endowment, there is a usage sanctioning such remuneration to the Shebait. The law is well established that, in the absence of any provision in the deed of dedication or any usage to that effect, a Shebait has no right to take any portion of the income of the debutter estate nor even the surplus that remains after meeting the expenses of the deity. In this income would be included not merely the rents and profits of the debutter property but the offerings which are made to the deity by its devotees. “

Underhill in his treatise Law relating to Trusts and Trustees under the caption, Right to Reimbursement and Indemnity, it has been stated as under:

  • “Trustee is entitled to be reimbursed out of the trust property all expenses which he has properly incurred having regard to the circumstances of each particular case but without interest unless he has paid an interest bearing claim in which case he stands in the shoes of the creditor by subrogation.”

Description of Property as Debutter in a Deed, Not Conclusive

Execution of a deed by itself will not prove dedication.  Though it is a piece of evidence, it is not conclusive for determining the dedication.  In Paras Nath Thakur Vs. Mohani Dasi Deceased Ana [AIR 1959 SC 1204 ] it is held that when a document is solemnly executed and registered, burden is heavy on the person who plead it to be fictitious. [ILR 18 Cal. 10;  ILR 42 All. 295]

Appointment and Succession of Trustees

Method of appointment of trustees and the mode of their succession are the matters for the author of the trust. If sought for, court will give effect to the same. In the absence of an instrument of trust, custom and usage will hold the field. Under Sec. 92 CPC, when the trustees fail to take administration of the trust, the designated court is destined to interfere in the appointment of new trustees if the trust deed is silent as to the appointment of the new trustees.

Under Hindu Law, when there is no provision in the deed of endowment about the succession of office of Shebait, or the succession provided therein comes to an end, the management and control of the property follows the ordinary rule of inheritance from the founder and passes to his heirs. (Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228)

Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Trustees in a Nut Shell

Trustee has all rights as a legal-owner of the trust property. It includes possession of the trust property. Rights enumerated under Chapter IV (The Rights and Powers of Trustee) of the Indian Trusts Act, which includes the following:

  • Sec.31. Right to title-deed.

All Trustees Should Act Jointly

Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads as under:

  • 48. Co-trustees cannot act singly.—When there are more trustees than one, all must join in the execution of the trust, except where the instrument of trust, otherwise provides.

The instrument of trust may provide that one or more trustees shall be managing trustees and where such provision is made, those who are empowered to act as managing trustees would be entitled to execute the duties of the office without the concurrence of the other co-trustees.

Lewin on Trusts reads as under [Sixteenth Edition, page 181]:

  • “In the case of co-trustees of a private trust, the office is a joint one. Where the administration of the trust is vested in co-trustees, they all form as it were but one collective trustee and therefore must execute the duties of the office in their joint capacity. Sometimes, one of several trustees is spoken of as the acting trustees, but the Court knows of no such distinction: all who accept the office are in the eyes of the law acting trustees. If anyone refuses or is incapable to join, it is not competent for the others to proceed without him, and, if for any reason they are unable to appoint a new trustee in his place under Section 36(1) of the Act, the administration of the trust must devolve upon the Court. However, the act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee may be regarded as the act of both, though such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.” [Quoted in: Atmaram Ranchhodbhai  Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin, AIR 1973 Guj 113]

No trustee can delegate his powers and duties to another trustee and any agreement to do so would be against the obligations he had undertaken, illegal and void [H.E.H. The Nizam’s Jewellery Trust (in re:): AIR 1980 SC 17]. But in the absence of such provision, all co-trustees must join in the execution of the duties of the office [Atmaram Ranchhodbhai  Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113]. This principle applies both to Public and private trusts[Atmaram Ranchhodbhai Vs. Gulamhuse in Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113. Also See: Man Mohan Das Vs. Janki Prasad, AIR 1945 PC 23].

In Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joodeo [AIR 1978 All 1] it has been held that the trustees would join to file an application to execute the decree obtained on behalf of the idol of a temple. However, it was also observed that it was a settled law that it was Shebait alone who can file a suit. But in exceptional circumstances, persons other than Shebait can institute a suit on behalf of the idol. Our Apex Court in M/s. Shanti Vijay and Co. Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzfa [AIR 1980 SC 17] held as under:

  • “The act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee may be regarded as the act of both. But such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.” [Quoted in: JP Srivastava and Sons Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co.AIR2005 SC 83].

Suit by One of its Trustees: Effect

The trustees altogether constitute one body in the eye of law and all must act together. A suit against a trust is not maintainable without impleading all its trustees. However, suits can be filed by any one (or more) of the trustees, when so authorised in that behalf by the rest.[Kishorelal  Asera Vs. Haji Essa Abba Sait Endowments: 2003-3 Mad LW 372: 2003-3 CCC367] But such sanction or approval must be strictly proved.[ Shanti Vijay Co. Vs. Princess Fatima: AIR 1980 SC 17. Lewin’s Law of Trusts referred to. Vaidyaratnam P. S. Variers Arya Vaidyasla Vs. K. C. Vijaikumar: ILR 1990-1 Del 124.]  It is doubtful whether it can be by a resolution, otherwise than executing powers of attorney. Similarly, all co-trustees together should determine the tenancy by issuing notice;[ Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973  Guj 113; Duli Chand Vs. Mahabir Pershad Trilok Chand Charitable Trust: AIR 1984 Del 144] and all together should file the suit for eviction.[ Kansara Abdulrahman Vs. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj. 184; Uma Ray Vs. Smt. Meghamala: AIR 1989  NOC. 166 (Cal); Iswardas Vs. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal: AIR 1968 SC 1364; Baisnab Das Sen Vs. Bholanath Sen: AIR 1986 Cal 118; M. M. Nagalinga Nadar Vs. Sri. Lakshmi Family Trust: 2001- 3 MLJ 523]  In J.P. Srivastava and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. [(2005) 1 SCC 172] it is held by the Supreme Court as follows:

  • “Therefore, although as a rule, trustees must execute the duties of their office jointly, this general principle is subject to the following exceptions when one trustee may act for all
  • .(1) where the trust deed allows the trusts to be executed by one or more or by a majority of trustees;
  • (2) where there is express sanction or approval of the act by co-trustees;
  • (3) where the delegation of power is necessary;
  • (4) where the beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation;
  • (5) where the delegation to a co-trustee is in the regular course of the business,
  • (6) where the co-trustee merely gives effect to a decision taken by the trustees jointly.”

Our Apex Court, in Kanakarathanammal Vs. Loganatha  Mudaliar [AIR 1965 SC 271]  has observed that where all the trustees were not joined as parties the omission was fatal and that in appropriate cases it was not impermissible for the Court, to permit the impleading of the other Trustees in exercise of its powers under Order I Rule 10 (2) of the CPC, 1908. The Apex Court cautioned that this should be done at the stage of trial and that too, without prejudice to the plea of the parties as to limitation.

But it is held otherwise by Bombay High Court in Namdeo Vs. Shahi Gupta Masjid Chandrapur,[2014-4 AIR Bom R 657]  pointing out that the trust represented by one of the co-trustees itself was the ‘landlord’ and that the ‘landlord’ was entitled to file a petition for eviction under the Rent Control Act and also referring the definition of ‘landlord’ mentioned in the Act.

Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts speaks in this regard as under:

  • “When there are more Shebaits than one, they constitute one body in the eyes of law, and all of them must act together. The management may be for practical purposes in the hands of one of the Shebaits who is called the managing Shebait or the Shebaits themselves may exercise their right of management by turns; but in neither case it is competent for one of the Shebaits to do anything in relation to the Debutter estate without the concurrence either express or implied of his co-Shebaits. This is of course, subject to any express direction given by the grantor.”[Quoted in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. LaxminathjiMaharaj: AIR 1985 All 228]

Managing Trustees Would be Entitled to Execute the Duties

The instrument of trust may provide that one or more trustees shall be managing trustees and where such provision is made, those who are empowered to act as managing trustees would be entitled to execute the duties of the office without the concurrence of the other co-trustees. But in the absence of such provision, all co-trustees must join in the execution of the duties of the office. [Atmaram Ranchhodbhai Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin: AIR 1973 Guj 113; Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joo Deo: AIR 1978 All 1; Shanti Vijay and Co. Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzfa: AIR 1980 SC 17.]

In JP Srivastava and Sons Ltd. Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co [AIR 2005 SC 83] it is held by the Supreme Court as follows:

  • “Therefore, although as a rule, trustees must execute the duties of their office jointly, this general principle is subject to the following exceptions when one trustee may act for all:
  • (1) where the trust deed allows the trusts to be executed by one or more or by a majority of trustees;
  • (2) where there is express sanction or approval of the act by co-trustees;
  • (3) where the delegation of power is necessary;
  • (4) where the beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation;
  • (5) where the delegation to a co-trustee is in the regular course of the business,
  • (6) where the co-trustee merely gives effect to a decision taken by the trustees jointly.”

If the Trust Deed Permits One Trustee can Execute the Duties

The observation in J.P. Srivastava and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd., AIR 2005 SC 83; (2005) 1 SCC 172 – if the trust deed so permits, one trustee can execute the duties for other trustees also –  is referred to in the following decisions:

  • Charu Kishor Mehta v. Joint Charity Commissioner, 2015-8 SCC 207
  • Tapendro Mullick v. Kumar Mrigendro Mallick, 20193 CHN 640 (Cal)
  • Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Digvijaysingh Gangasingh, 2017-6 AllMR 346; 2018-1 MhLJ 259
  • Namdeo v. Shahi Gupta Masjid Chandrapur, 2014-3 AllMR 592; 2014-4 MhLJ 209
  • Shyamabai v. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha, 2014-1 AllMR 810; 2014-2 BomCR 436; 2014-2 MhLJ 547
  • Indian Youth Centres Trust v. Shishir Bajaj, 2012-193 DLT 584
  • Shyamabai v. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha, AIR 2010 Bom  88
  • Canbank Mutual Fund v. Nuclear Power Corporation, 2007-145 DLT 1; 2007-98 DRJ 464; ILR 2007-16 Dlh 1303.

A person/trustee is not bound to accept the trust; but having once accepted, he cannot renounce the duties and liabilities except with the permission of the Court or with the consent of the beneficiaries or under the authority of the trust deed itself.

Delegatus Non Potest Delegare (a delegate has no power to delegate, unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words by the terms of the deed or necessary implication (Director General, ESI Vs. T. Abdul Razak AIR 1996  SC 2292.Shanti Vijay And Co Vs. Princess Fatima Fouzia: AIR1980 SC  17;Also see: Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309.) is a well-settled principle of law

‘Cy pres’ Doctrine

When it is found by the court that the particular mode of charity, indicated by the donor, cannot be carried on for impossibility or impracticability, the court will execute and accomplish the donor’s intention applying ‘cy pres’ doctrine.  It is applied where from lapse of time or change of circumstances it is no longer possible to apply the property left by the founder or donor in the precise way in which it was directed to be applied. [Balkrishna Vishvanath Vs. Vinayak Narayan: AIR 1932 Bom 191; AP Shah Vs. BM Institute of Mental Health: 1986  GLH 262.] It is based on the principle that the court is the protector of all charities; [C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia: AIR 1952 Kar14] and that the court will not allow to fail a validly created trust or objects of foundation. 

Invoking ‘cy pres’ doctrine the court will apply the property of the Trust to a charitable purpose ‘as nearly as possible’ [In Re Man Singh and Others, AIR 1974 Del. 228]. Besides physical impossibility, becoming the trust valueless, owing to attendant circumstances, also invites application of cy pres doctrine [Hormusji Franji Warden, ILR 32  B. 214] resembling the original Trust.

The trustees are bound to carry out the directions of the author under Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act and the only way in which the directions of the testament may be varied is by applying ‘cy  pres’ doctrine.

Amendment of Objects in Trust Deed – If Only Original Trust-Deed Permitted

If only the original trust-deed permitted amendment to the objects of the trust, then only the object clauses could be amended. It is settled principle of trust law that once a trust is created and certain objects stipulated therein, even the settler has no power to delete any of the objects. [Association of University Teachers Tamilnadu, v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2012 3 MLJ 875]

CIT v. Kamala Town Trust,  AIR 1996 SC 620, 1996-7 SCC  349

The Apex Court considered the effect of amendment made to a trust deed – which had  earlier been rectified by a Civil Court – in CIT v. Kamala Town Trust,  AIR 1996 SC 620, 1996-7 SCC  349. It was held that whatever might be the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Civil Court under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to say that the trustees could administer the trust in accordance with the original deed and that the claim for exemption had to be dealt with on the basis of the original deed. It is held as under:

  • “In this connection it is profitable to have a look at the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Jagdamba Charity Trust v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi (Central) (1981) 128 I.T.R. 377. In that case Deed of Trust was got rectified by the parties from the Civil Court. These proceedings had to be initiated in the light of judgment of the High Court which had held that due to provisions in certain clauses of the Trust Deed the trust was non-charitable and the trust was not entitled to exemption under Income-tax Act and that since the decision had created some doubts regarding the validity of some clauses of the deed it was necessary that the deed should be rectified. The Civil Court granted a decree and directed that the Trust Deed be rectified. The question was whether such rectification order of the Civil Court was binding on the Income Tax Department when the assessee-trust armed with such rectification order claimed exemption from income tax under Section 11 of the 1961 Act. S. Ranganathan, J., as he then was, speaking for the Delhi High Court took the view that the word ‘instrument’ used in Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act has a very wide meaning and includes every document by which any right or liability is, or is purported to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. There is no reason to exclude a Trust Deed from its purview. A Trust Deed is a document which sets out the terms of an understanding between the author of the trust and the trustees. Though in form, the trustees are not signatories to the instrument as drawn up, they are parties to the instrument in a real sense for it is on the terms of the instrument that they accept office and proceed to administer the trust. The law obliges them to act upon the terms of the Trust Deed and they cannot commit a breach thereof. If a gift deed, sale deed or promissory note could be within the terms of the section, there is no reason why a Trust Deed cannot be rectified under Section 26. It was further held that since there was an order of Civil Court binding on the author and the trustees, they could administer the trust only in terms of the amendment directed by the Court. The trustees were and must be deemed, from the beginning, to have been under a legal obligation to hold the properties only for the object and with the powers set out in the Trust Deed as amended. Therefore, whatever might be the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the Civil Court under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to say that the trustees could administer the trust in accordance with the original deed and that the claim for exemption had to be dealt with on the basis of the original deed. Nor was it open to the Income-tax Officer to say that in the relevant accounting year, the trustees held the property subject to the terms of the original and not the amended deed. In our view the aforesaid decision of the Delhi High Court lays down the correct legal position in connection with proceedings for rectification of instruments like trust deeds, initiated before competent civil courts under the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act.”

CIT, Amritsar v. Rattan Trust, AIR 1997 SC 2831; 1997-11 SCC 56

In this decision it is held as under:

  • “10. The requirements of the proviso with which we are concerned are (1) Trust should have been created before April 1, 1962 and (2) the trustees apply the funds of the Trust in concern in which they themselves are interested if there was a mandatory provision in the Trust Deed for such a purpose. The question which squarely falls for consideration is if the second condition should have been there is the Trust Deed before April 1, 1962 when the I.T. Act came into force or if such a condition could be added subsequently in the Trust Deed after this date if the propounder of the Trust in the Trust-Deed so authorised the trustees to amend the Trust-Deed allowing the trustees to invest the funds of the Trust in a concern in which they might be interested. To us it appears the answer is quite obvious that such a mandate in the Trust-Deed should have existed before April, 1, 1962 and could not have been brought in by amending the Trust-Deed at a later stage after that crucial date even if the Trust-Deed so authorised the Trustees to amend the Trust-Deed to bring in the mandatory condition or requirement for them to invest funds of the Trust in a concern in which they might be interested. Any other interpretation would set at naught the proviso and would defeat the very purpose for which the proviso was added in Section 13. If we accept any other interpretation then the Trustees even today could amend the Trust-Deed and bring in their case to fall within the proviso.”

Is Trust  a ‘Living Person’ under S. 5 of the TP Act 

Can transfer of property be made to or by Trusts/Associations?

Sec. 5 of the TP Act reads as under:

  • 5. “Transfer of property” defined:  In the following sections “transfer of property” means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such act.
  • In this section “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals.

Existing Laws as to Transfer of Property will Remain in Force

Two points are emphasised in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 5 –

  • First, all unregistered associations, whether incorporated or not, are ‘living persons’, so that transfer of property can be made.
  • Second, the qualifying second limb – ‘nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals‘ – made it clear:
    • if any law regulates transfer of property to (or by) companies, associations or bodies of individuals, it will remain in force.

Bodies of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act

It may also be pointed out that, “bodies of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act is wide in meaning; and it stands independent. It is broad enough to take-in Beneficiaries/ Trustees of a Trust.

Accordingly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

  • Note: Order 31 rule 1 CPC spells out – a trust is not a legal person. It enables to file a suit by (or be sued) a trustee concerning ‘property vested in trustees’.

Can ‘Law for the Time Being in Force’ Include ‘Common Law’

‘Law for the time being in force’ in Sec. 5 TP Act includes “common law”.

It is a reality – the common law of our country accepts as valid the ‘transfer of property’ made to or effected by well-known institutions, organisations, and associations attached to reputed trusts, institutions etc., though they are not juristic-persons in its strict senseOur courts sumptuously refer to such deeds as documents executed by or in favour of such entities, when they are referred to as exhibits. For example:

  • Settlement deed by Ashramam–Swayam  Prakash  Ashramam Vs. G Anandavally  Amma : AIR  2010 SC 622;
  • Settlement to trust – S N Mathur  Vs. Board of Revenue: 2009-13  SCC 301;
  • Sale deed by unregistered society – Suresh s/o. Bhagwanrao  Puri Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2016-3 AIR Bom R (Cri.) 603;
  • Gift to unregistered Association – Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna Satram: 1984-2 ALT 157;
  • Sale deed to an association – K. Kala Vs. Dist Registrar, Madurai: 2016 3 MLJ 50, 
  • Sale deed to an association – State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 P&H 218.
  • Sale deed to an association – Asst. Commr. Vs. Shivalingawwa: ILR 2003 Kar 2855;
  • Lease deed by trust to school – TNP Mothoo  Natarajan Vs. PV Ravi: 2015-2 MLJ (Cri.) 656;
  • Lease deed by a firm -2014-3 ALT 46;
  • Settlement deed to private trust –Kolli  Venkata Raja Vs. Govt. of AP: 2014-1 ALT 155;
  • Lease deed to a public trust –Nadigar  Sangham Charitable Trust, rep. by its managing Trustee, R. Sarathkumar Vs. S. Murugan:2013-1 MLJ 433;
  • Sale deed to Board of Trustees – Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chemists and Druggists Association Building Trust: 1995-215 ITR(Mad) 741;
  • Mortgage deed by a College – Sonar Bangla Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College:  AIR 1960 Cal 450.

Similarly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

It was held by our Apex Court in Kamaraju  Venkata Krishna Rao Vs. Sub Collector,  Ongole, AIR 1969 SC 563, that, under Hindu Law, a tank can be an object of charity and when a dedication was made in favour of a tank, the same was considered as a charitable institution. Without deciding whether that institution can also be considered as a juristic person, it was held that the same had to be registered in its name (ie., in the name of the tank) in the Inam register though it had continue to be managed by its Manager.

It is also noteworthy that Salmond on Jurisprudence reads: “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases.”

Also read:

End Notes:

Vesting of Property in Various Kinds of Associations and Trusts

Club, Society, Firm and Company

Nature of Association.Vesting of Management and Legal Ownership.Vesting  of actual/ ultimate ownershipWhether perma-nent or can it be put an end to
  ClubTrustees or Gov. Body, as per  ByelawsMembers, subject to the byelaws and objectives of foundation.Presumed to be not permanent.
Unregistred. Society/ Association  -do-  -do-Presumed to be permanent.
Registered Society-do--do-Permanent.  SR Act governs dissolution.
FirmPartnersPartnersContract/partnership deed governs
Trading CompanyBoard of DirectorsCompanyPermanent. Co. Act governs winding up.
Charitable or Non-trading company  -do-  -do-  -do-

Trusts/Religious-Endowments:

Public Trust– English Law  TrusteesLegal ownership in Trustees; beneficial ownership in Beneficiaries.  Permanent
Public Trust-Indian (common) Law    Trustees  Beneficiaries have only beneficial interest; and, no beneficial ownership. Theoretically, properties vest in public or section who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as established by evidence or as revealed from the deed of founda-tion or byelaws, if any.        Permanent
Public School, Public Library, etc.  Trustees (called by different names).    -do-  Permanent.
Private religious or charitable trustsManagement on Trustees (called by different names). If the trust/ institution/ endowment is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership will be vested upon it.Properties vest in trust/ institution/endowment itself.  If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person – property vests in such persons as established by evidence or the deed of foundation or byelaws.  Beneficiaries have no beneficial ownership.        Presumed to be permanent.
Mosque, Church, Gurudwara, etc.  Management on Trustees (by different names).  If the trust/ institution/ endowment is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership will be vested upon it.In trust/institution or endowment itself.  If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person – section of public who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as established by evidence or as revealed from the deed of foundation or bylaws, if any.  Permanent
  Temple (Public)Management on Shebaits/ Darmkarta/ Ooralen. Since Idol/deity is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership vests upon it.  Idol/deitydo-
 Temple (private)-do--do--do-
   MuttManagement on Madathipathi. Since Mutt is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership vests upon it.  Mutt-do-
Private Trust (Coming under the Trusts Act  Trustees  Terms/ Deed of Trust govern.Trusts Act governs Extinction and Revocation.

Government School, University, etc.

University, Govt. Hospital, Govt. College, etc.  Administrators as provided in the statute concerned  In the institution itself, if not expressly stated to be in the Government.Presumed to be permanent. (Permanent until decided to close by the Government.)

.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal: Landmark Decision on Trust – A Trust Cannot Be Made as a Party to a Litigation

Jojy George Koduvath.

See Earlier Article in ‘indianlawlive‘:
Does a Cheque-Case under NI Act Lie Against a Trust? Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala, ILR 2023-4 Ker 252 – Whether Correctly Decided?

Preface

Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ), 2025 INSC 1210 (09-10-2025), is a landmark decision on trust.

It held:

  • A Trust Is Not a Legal Person.
  • A Trust Operates through its Trustees.
  • Trustees Can Maintain and Defend a Suit.
  • Trust is an Obligation and not a Legal Entity.
  • No Legal Requirement For A Trust To Be Made A Party.
  • Just as a Managing Director is responsible for the affairs of a company, a Chairman or Managing Trustee is responsible for the affairs and administration of a Trust, within the powers and duties conferred by the Trust Deed and law.

Question Considered

Two principal questions arose for consideration in this case. They are:

  • (i) Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is maintainable against the Chairman or a Trustee of a Trust when the cheque in question has been issued on behalf of the Trust, without the Trust itself being made an accused; and
  • (ii) Whether the complainant under Section 138 must make specific averments regarding the accused-trustee’s role and responsibility in the conduct of the day-to-day affairs of the Trust, even though the person is admittedly a Trustee.

It arose from the decision of the Meghalaya High Court (2023-1 GLT 344) which quashed the proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate, Shillong.

The Impugned High Court Judgment

The respondent issued a Cheque to the complainant under the signature of the respondent as authorised signatory of Orion, a trust. The Cheque was dishonoured. It led to the filing of a complaint under Sections 138 and 142 of the NI Act, as well as under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Respondent preferred a Criminal Petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, before the High Court seeking to quash the complaint, on the ground, inter alia, that Orion (Trust) is a juristic entity and a necessary party.

Part I

Apex Court Adjudicated –  Trust is NOT a Legal Person

Decisions relied on (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) to show – Trust is not a ‘legal entity’ capable of being sued – are:

  • 1. Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712.
  • 2. K P Shibu v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 7585, 2019 (3) KHC 1.

Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank

In Pratibha Pratisthan v. Manager, Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712, it is held

  • A Trust is not a person.
  • It could not be a consumer.
  • A Trust cannot be a complainant.
  • It would not fall under the definition of ‘person’ as per Section 2(m) of the Consumer Protection Act.

The Apex Court, in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra, quoted the following from the Pratibha Pratisthan case-

  • “4. A reading of the definition of the words “complaint”, “complainant” and “consumer” makes it clear that a trust cannot invoke the provisions of the Act in respect of any allegation on the basis of which a complaint could be made. To put this beyond any doubt, the word “person” has also been defined in the Act and Section 2(1)(m) thereof defines a “person” as follows:
    • “2. (1)(m) “person” includes—
    • (i) a firm whether registered or not;
    • (ii) a Hindu undivided family;
    • (iii) a cooperative society;
    •  (iv) every other association of persons whether registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or not;”
  • 5. On a plain and simple reading of all the above provisions of the Act it is clear that a trust is not a person and therefore not a consumer. Consequently, it cannot be a complainant and cannot file a consumer dispute under the provisions of the Act.”

After quoting Sections 3 (definition of Trust) and 13 (Trustee to protect title to trust-property) of the Trust Act, the Apex Court observed in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal as under:

  • “23. To our mind, the above-extracted Sections of the Trusts Act would also favour the view we are taking, as the obligation to ‘maintain and defend’ suits is placed on the shoulders of a Trustee and not the Trust itself. It is clear that only a Trustee has the obligation to file, maintain and defend any suit on behalf of the Trust. Meaning thereby, that a Trust does not have a separate legal existence of its own, making it incapable of suing or being sued.”

KP Shibu v. State of Kerala

The Kerala High Court, in  KP Shibu v. State of Kerala (B. Sudheendra Kumar, J.), 2019 (3) KHC 1, held –

  • Trustees can maintain and defend a suit to protect the Trust property.
  • A Trust is not a juristic person or a legal entity, and has no legal existence of its own.
  • A Trust itself cannot sue or be sued in a court of law.
  • A Trust would not fall within the term ‘association of individuals’.

In Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal the Apex Court quoted the following from KP Shibu v. State of Kerala, 2019 (3) KHC 1-

  • “16. Thus, it is clear from the above provisions that all the trustees are the owners of the property, but they are obliged to use the same in a particular manner. If a number of trustees exist, they are the joint owners of the property. The trustees are bound to maintain and defend all suits, for the preservation of the trust-property and the assertion or protection of the title thereto. Thus, it appears that the “Trust” is not capable of suing and being sued in a court of law, even though the trustees can maintain and defend suits for the preservation and protection of the trust-property. Therefore, a “Trust” is not a juristic person or a legal entity, as the juristic person has a legal existence of its own and hence it is capable of suing and being sued in a court of law. Thus, it appears that a “Trust” is not like a body corporate, which has a legal existence of its own and therefore can appoint an agent. The above discussion would make it clear that a “Trust” is not a body corporate.”

Trust is an Obligation and not a Legal Entity

Trust, as defined under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 is an obligation and not a legal entity.

The Apex Court, while discussing this matter, referred (with approval) the following decisions placed by the Appellant:

  • KR Rajan v. Cherian K Cherian, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 4699 (Kerala High Court)
  • Duli Chand v. M/s MPTC Charitable Trust, 1983 SCC OnLine Del 270 (Delhi High Court)
  • V Chandrasekaran v. Venkatanaicker Trust, 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 33745 (Madras High Court)
  • Narayana Iyer v. Anandammal Adheena Trust, (2021) 3 CTC 776; (Madras High Court)
  • Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin v. Trustees of the Maniar Jamat Ahmedabad, AIR 1968 Guj 184 (Gujarat High Court)
  • Vijay Sports Club v State of Bengal, 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 2331 (Calcutta High Court).

A Trust operates through its Trustees

After referring the aforestated decisions, the Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) said as under:

  • “25. …. A Trust is also not like a corporation which has a legal existence of its own and therefore can appoint an agent. A Trust operates through its Trustees, who are legal entities. We may gainfully refer to the decision of the Kerala High Court in KR Rajan (supra), where the said Court has rightly held:
  • ‘7. The legal status of a trust, is thus well discernible. Trust not being a legal person, and the Code of Civil Procedure not providing any enabling provision for the Trust to sue or for being sued in its name, there is no merit in the contention that the Trust is to be arrayed as a co-nominee party. The arraying of the trust in its own name is otiose or redundant. It is the trustees who are to be impleaded to represent the trust. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner on the ground of non-joinder, also fails’.”

Trust Is An Obligation Imposed On The Ostensible Owner – Trustee

The Apex Court held further as under (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal):

  • “26. Ergo, it is clear that though a Trust may act or even be treated as an entity for certain legal purposes and not all legal purposes, a Trust is an obligation imposed on the ostensible owner of the property to use the same for a particular object – for the benefit of a named beneficiary or charity, and it is the Trustee(s) who are bound to maintain and defend all suits and to take such other steps with regard to the nature, land or the value of the Trust property, that may be reasonably required for the preservation of the Trust property, and the assertion of protection of title thereto, subject to the provisions of the instructions of Trust to take such other steps.”

No Legal Requirement For A Trust To Be Made A Party

The Apex Court held further as under (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal):

  • “27. There exists no ambiguity about there being no legal requirement for a Trust to be made a party in a proceeding before a Court of Law since it is only a/the Trustee(s) who are liable and answerable for acts done or alleged to have been done for and on behalf of the said Trust. From a perusal of Orion’s Deed of Trust, of which the Respondent is the Chairman/Authorized Signatory, it emerges clearly that the relevant clauses deal with the Trustee insofar as administering and holding the funds and properties of the Trust are concerned. Which is to say that the Trust (i.e., Orion) operates only through the Trustee(s) and that the objects thereof were for charitable purposes. The Deed of Trust also provides for permitting one or more Trustees to operate a bank account. It becomes all the more apparent that it is the Trustees alone, through whom the Trust funds/property(ies) are managed and dealt with. The Trust itself is without any independent legal status.”

Apex Court Disapproved Prana Educational Trust Case

The Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) disapproved Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala, 2023 (6) KHC 175, holding as under:

  • “32. We do not approve of the manner in which the learned Single Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust  (supra) decided to ignore binding precedent in K P Shibu (supra), which was a judgment rendered by another learned Single Judge of the same Court, earlier in point of time, merely by noting ‘it is discernible that the said decision is not so elaborative and the interpretation of the term “association of individuals” not done by applying the ratio of ejusdem generis.’ It was not open to the learned Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) to prefer the view expressed by other High Courts in preference to the view of a Bench of the own High Court of equal strength expressed previously. At the most, recording his disagreement with the view in K P Shibu (supra), the learned Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) ought to have referred the matter to the learned Chief Justice of the High Court seeking constitution of a larger Bench. The only other way Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) could have gotten over K P Shibu (supra) despite being a co-equal Bench would have been by undertaking an analysis via the principles of per incuriam and/or sub-silentio, as undertaken by a 3-Judge Bench recently in A Raja v D Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1033. We say this illustratively. Not as a matter of routine can a later Bench of equal strength refuse to follow an earlier decision of a Bench of equal strength. The law hereon was stated in National Insurance Company Limited v Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 and Union Territory of Ladakh v Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140. Therefore, while not disturbing Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) inter- parties, we declare the statement of law therein incorrect to the extent it rules on the issue before us, on account of failure to adhere to binding precedent.”

Read Also:

Part II

Requirement of Averments – Role of Trustee-Accused in Affairs of Trust

The position of a Managing Director in a company carries responsibility for its affairs. A similar principle applies to Trusts — the Trustees (authorised signatory or Managing Trustee, where designated) are responsible for the administration and conduct of the Trust’s affairs, subject to the powers and duties defined by the Trust Deed and applicable law.

The Apex Court (in Sankar Padam Thapa  v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal) relied upon the decision SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89 [3-Judge Bench], wherein it was held that a position of a Managing Director would suggest responsibility of the person holding the said position, in the day-to-day affairs of the Company.

The following portion from SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) is quoted by the Apex Court.

  • “…. The answer to the question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. …
  • …. the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141.”

The Apex Court also sought support from KK Ahuja v. VK Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48, which held as under:

  • “27. The position under Section 141 of the Act can be summarised thus:
  • .(i) If the accused is the Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he is in charge of, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. It is sufficient if an averment is made that the accused was the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director at the relevant time. This is because the prefix “Managing” to the word “Director” makes it clear that they were in charge of and are responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company.”

The Apex Court also relied on Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, (2022) 10 SCC 152, where it was observed:

  • “36. The High Court also rightly held that the Managing Director or Joint ManagingDirector would admittedly be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business by virtue of the office they hold as Managing Director or Joint Managing Director. These persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, and they get covered under Section 141 of the NI Act.”

End Notes

Trustees Can Maintain and Defend a Suit

Sections 3 and 13 of the Trusts Act read thus:

  • “3. Interpretation-clause:
  • Trust”—A “trust” is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner;
  • the person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the “author of the trust”; the person who accepts the confidence is called the “trustee”;
  • the person for whose benefit the confidence is accepted is called the “beneficiary”; the subject-matter of the trust is called “trust-property” or “trust money”;
  • the “beneficial interest” or “interest” of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust-property; and the instrument, if any, by which the trust is declared is called the “instrument of trust”;
  • a breach of any duty imposed on a trustee, as such, by any law for the time being in force, is called a “breach of trust”; and in this Act, unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context, “registered” means registered under the law for the registration of documents for the time being in force;
  • a person is said to have “notice” of a fact either when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from inquiry or gross negligence, he would have known it, or when information of the fact is given to or obtained by his agent, under the circumstances mentioned in the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Section 229;
  • and all expressions used herein and defined in the Indian Contract Act, 1872, shall be deemed to have the meanings respectively attributed to them by that Act.
  • xxx
  • 13. Trustee to protect title to trust-property—A trustee is bound to maintain and defend all such suits, and (subject to the provisions of the instrument of trust) to take such other steps as, regard being had to the nature and amount or value of the trust-property, may be reasonably requisite for the preservation of the trust-property and the assertion or protection of the title thereto.”

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Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Right of a Co-Accused or Co-Defendant to Cross-Examine another Accused’s/Defendant’s Witness is Limited – It is Possible Only When the Statement of the Witness Becomes “Adverse”

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

Article 21 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty: The Supreme Court has consistently held that Article 21 includes the right to a fair trial, which necessarily includes the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.

In Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “In the Indian Criminal jurisprudence, the accused is placed on a somewhat advantageous position than under different jurisprudence of some of the countries in the world. The criminal justice administration system in India places human rights and dignity for human life at a much higher pedestal. In our jurisprudence an accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty, the alleged accused is entitled to fairness and true investigation and fair trial and the prosecution is expected to play balanced role in the trial of a crime. The investigation should be judicious, fair, transparent and expeditious to ensure compliance to the basic rule of law. These are the fundamental canons of our criminal jurisprudence and they are quite in conformity with the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India.” (Quoted in: Rattiram v. State of M.P., AIR 2012 SC 1485; (2012) 4 SCC 516)

INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 (Indian Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2025)

Section 138, Indian Evidence Act  

  • Order of Examinations “Witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined.”
  • Any adverse party has the right to cross-examine.
  • If a co-accused’s interests are adverse to the witness or to the party calling the witness, the co-accused becomes an “adverse party” for that limited purpose and may cross-examine.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 (CrPC) Indian Nagarik Suraksha Sanhitha, 2025

Evidence for Prosecution

Section 231 CrPC:

  • The prosecution shall be called upon to lead evidence, and the accused shall have the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.

Section 233, CrPC

  • Evidence for Defence: The accused may enter on his defence and produce his own witnesses.

Court Decisions

(a) In Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, AIR 1949 PC 257

  • The Privy Council (Sir John Beaumont) observed – “A confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of ‘evidence’ contained in S. 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination.” (Quoted in: Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184; Adambhai Sulemanbhai Ajmeri v. State of Gujarat, 2014-7 SCC 716; Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh VS Republic of India, AIR 2011 SC 1436; 2011-2 SCC 490; Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253.)

 (b) In P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 2012 SC 2242

  • Our Supreme Court examined the scope of the provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and held as under:
  • “Grant of fairest opportunity to the accused to prove his innocence was the object of every fair trial, observed this Court in Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector of Customs, Amritsar, (2000) 10 SCC 430. The following passage is in this regard apposite:
  • ‘In such circumstances, if the new Counsel thought to have the material witnesses further examined, the Court could adopt latitude and a liberal view in the interest of justice, particularly when the Court has unbridled powers in the matter as enshrined in Section 311 of the Code. After all the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts should afford the opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible.’
  • ‘We are conscious of the fact that recall of the witnesses is being directed nearly four years after they were examined in chief about an incident that is nearly seven years old….. we are of the opinion that on a parity of reasoning and looking to the consequences of denial of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, we would prefer to err in favour of the appellant getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against a possible prejudice at his cost. Fairness of the trial is a virtue that is sacrosanct in our judicial system and no price is too heavy to protect that virtue. A possible prejudice to prosecution is not even a price, leave alone one that would justify denial of a fair opportunity to the accused to defend himself.” (Quoted in: Natasha Singh v. CBI, 2013 5 SCC 741)

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 (CPC)

CPC does not expressly mention “cross-examination” though its procedural framework implies it through:

  • Order XVIII Rule 4 & 5: Evidence of witnesses to be taken orally in open court (subject to cross-examination by the adverse party).
    • Order XVIII Rule 2(2): Parties have the right to “state their case and produce their evidence.”
    • Order XVIII Rule 15: Continuation of hearing by successor judge includes evidence and cross-examination already done.

When several defendants are present, and their defences are mutually adverse, each defendant has the right to cross-examine the witness of the other.

Principle in Civil Trials

  • If the defenses of co-defendants are joint or identical, one defendant cannot cross-examine the other’s witness as an “adverse party.”
    • But if their defenses are hostile or conflicting, each becomes an adverse party and gains the right to cross-examine.

Treatises

Sarkar on Evidence, eight edition p.1141, it is said as under:

  • No special provision is made in the Evidence Act for the cross-examination of the co-accused’s or co-defendant’s witnesses. But the procedure to be adopted may be regulated by the well-known rule that no evidence should be received against one who had no opportunity of testing it by cross-examination; as it would be unjust and unsafe not to allow a co-accused or co- defendant to cross-examine witness called by one whose case was adverse to his, or who has given evidence against. If there is no clash of interest or if nothing has been said against the other party, there cannot be any right of cross-examination.

Quoted in:

  • Ennen Castings Private Ltd. v. Sundaresh, AIR 2003 Kar 293
  • Chinnaiah v. Valliammal, 2023-3 LW 356; 2023-4 MLJ 544
  • Akhilesh Singh v. Krishan Bahadur Singh, 2020-4 CivCC 779; 2020-1 JLJ 452; 2020-1 MPLJ 457
  • Shiv Pratap Singh Tomar v. Seema Tomar, 2018(1) MPWN 118; 2018 (4) MPLJ 74
  • Bhajinder Singh v. Hardev Singh, 2017-3 CivCC 260; 2017-238 DLT 422; 2017-3 LJR 7
  • Mohamed Ziaulla v. Sorgra Begum, 1997 ILR Kar 1378; 1997-5 KarLJ 709
  • Sohan Lal VS Gulab Chand, AIR 1966 Raj 229

In ‘Principles and Digest of the Law of Evidence’ by M. Monir, third edition, p.1114 , it is said as under:

  • “A defendant may cross-examine a co-defendant or any other witness who has given evidence against him, and reply on such evidence, though there is no issue joined between them.”

Phipson on Evidence, tenth edition, para.1538 reads as under:

  • “A defendant may cross-examine a co-defendant or any other witness who has given evidence against him, and reply on such evidence though there is no issue joined between them.”

Court Decisions

1. In Ennen Castings Private Ltd. v. Sundaresh, AIR 2003 Kar 293, it is said as under:

  • “9. AS a general rule, evidence is not legally admissible against a party, who at the time it was given had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness or of rebutting their testimony by other evidence. When two or more persons are tried on the same indictment and are separately defended any witness called by one of them may be cross-examined on behalf of the others, if he gives any testimony to criminate them. A defendant may cross-examine his co-defendant who gives evidence or any of his co-defendant’s witnesses, if his co-defendant’s interest is hostile to his own.
  • 10.  THOUGH there is no specific provision in the Indian Evidence Act providing for such an opportunity for a defendant-respondent to cross-examine a co-defendant/co-respondent, however, having regard to the object and scope of cross-examination, it is settled law that when allegations are made against the party to the proceedings before that evidence could be acted upon, that party should have an ample opportunity to cross-examine the person who had given the evidence against him. It is only after such an opportunity is given, and witness is cross-examined that evidence becomes admissible.”

2. In Shiv Pratap Singh Tomar v. Seema Tomar, 2018(1) MPWN 118; 2018 (4) MPLJ 74, after quoting the above treatise it was observed as under:

  • “8. Though there is no specific provision in the Indian Evidence Act providing for such an opportunity for a defendant-respondent to cross-examine a co-defendant/ co-respondent, however, having regard to the object and scope of cross-examination, it is settled law that when allegations are made against the party to the proceedings, before that evidence could be acted upon, that party should have an ample opportunity to cross-examine the person who had given the evidence against him. It is only after such an opportunity is given, and the witness is cross-examined that evidence becomes admissible. (Quoted in:)

3. In Akhilesh Singh v. Krishan Bahadur Singh, 2020-4 CivCC 779; 2020-1 JLJ 452; 2020-1 MPLJ 457, (after quoting the said passages in Shiv Pratap Singh Tomar v. Seema Tomar, 2018(1) MPWN 118; 2018 (4) MPLJ 74) it was held as under:,

  • “9. Therefore, it is very clear from the aforesaid passages that it is settled law that no evidence should be received against one who had no opportunity of testing it by cross-examination; as it would be unjust and unsafe not to allow a co-accused or co-defendant to cross-examine a witness called by one whose case was adverse to him, or who has given evidence against. If there is no conflict of interest, such an opportunity need not to given. Therefore, the condition precedent for giving an opportunity to a defendant/respondent to cross-examine a co-respondent or a defendant is either from the pleadings of the parties or in the evidence, there should exist conflict of the interest between them. Once it is demonstrated that their interests is not common and there is a conflict of interest and evidence has been adduced, affecting the interest of the co-defendant/ co-respondents, then before the Court could act on that evidence, the person against whom the evidence is given should have an opportunity to cross-examine the said witness, so that ultimately truth emerges on the basis of which the Court can act.”

Conclusion

The right to cross-examine is both a statutory and constitutionally guaranteed right.

  • On the criminal side, a co-accused may cross-examine another’s witness only when the testimony adversely affects him.
  • On the civil side, a co-defendant may do so only when their defences are conflicting or adverse.

This doctrine ensures the principle of natural justice — audi alteram partem.

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What is Binding Judicial Precedent – In a Nutshell

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

No Binding Precedent if relevant STATUTORY PROVISION was Not considered. [Union of India v. Maniklal Banerjee, AIR 2006 SC 2844] 

Where no consideration was given to the question, the decision cannot be said to be binding; and precedents SUB SILENTIO – Without Arguments – are of NO MOMENT. [A-One Granites v. State of U.P., 2001-3 SCC 537] 
 
A decision is available as a precedent only if it DECIDES a QUESTION OF LAW. [State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1593: 1992-1 SCC 489]. Not facts. [Prakash Chandra Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1960 SC 195] 

RATIO DECIDENDIis Binding Precedent: Mere Casual Expressions – Not of Much Avail.[ Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555; State of Maharashtra v. Bhakti Vedanta Book Trust, AIR 2013 SC 1667; 2013-4 SCC 676; Shrirampur Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher, AIR 2013 SC 3757; 2013 5 SCC 627; Arun Kumar Aggarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 3056; 2014-13 SCC 707). 

For Binding Precedent, finding must be ‘RATIO DECIDENDI (necessary to the decision), and  Not obiter dicta. [Allen in ‘Law in the Making’; Quoted in: Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543; Chandrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (All), 2023-11 ADJ 543)]

Court’s order is binding on the parties under res judicata; the RATIO DECIDENDIis bindingon other Courts as binding precedent. [The Modern English Legal System (4th Edition) by Smith, Bailey and Gunn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), pages 518-519] 
 
What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. [State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647; Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, 1996-6 SCC 44; Secunderabad Club v. CIT, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1004, 2023-457 ITR 263 (SC) 

The doctrine of precedent mandates that an exposition of lawmust be followed and applied. [State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar Sharma, 2016-15 SCC 289]. 

Res judicata bars raising the same issue. Judicial precedent is not concerned with issues between parties. (Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley’s Commentary on the Doctrine of Res Judicata (Butterworths: London, Edinburgh, Dublin – 1996, pages 8 and 9)

Res judicata pertains to the parties;  precedent refers to a binding declaration of law that applies to courts or authorities. [Indian Broadcasting and Digital Foundation v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, 01 Nov 2024, 2024 KER 80988]. 

A decision on the ‘construction of that document’ can operates as a judicial precedent against one though he was not a party to that litigation (Sahu Madho Dass v. Mukand Ram, 1955 AIR SC 481).

A later judgment will not hold good if it had not taken note of an earlier judgment rendered by a Bench of co-equal strength; and the earlier judgment prevails, and it cannot be seen as per incuriam (Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2014 SC 1745, 2014 (16) SCC 623).

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“Nothing In This Adhiniyam Shall Apply To Deny The Admissibility” – New Provision (S. 61, BSA) to Ensure that S. 63, BSA (S. 65B, Evidence Act) is an Enabling Provision

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • 1. Section 61 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, affirms that a copy of an electronic record (computer output) can be produced and proved by any method permissible under the Act for proving a document.
  • 2. It is plain- the expression “nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply” in Section 61 of the Adhiniyam of 2023 is enacted with a view to overriding the effect of the Supreme Court decision in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 (otherwise, Section 61 would stand redundant).
    • The decision, Arjun Panditrao, had established a strict interpretation that proof by a certificate under Section 65B (Section 63, BSA) is mandatory to admit a computer output (copy) in evidence. 
    • Arjun Panditrao, interpreting Section 65B, said that this section is a complete code. That is, a computer output (copy) can be proved by way of the ‘certificate’ alone.
  • 3. In other words, Section 61 must be understood as a provision intended to secure alternative routes for admitting computer outputs (i.e., copies of electronic records), that is, otherwise than through the certificate contemplated under Section 63.
    • Note: An argument may yet be possible against this construction on the basis of the words “subject to Section 63” in Section 61, by suggesting that the admissibility of a computer output continues to depend upon the production of a certificate under Section 63.
    • However, this argument can be explained. If the certificate under Section 63 were to remain as an inflexible and universal requirement, Section 61 would be rendered redundant or otiose. Such an interpretation would defeat the very purpose of introducing a new provision, which must be presumed to have been enacted with a definite legislative intent.
    • A more harmonious construction would therefore be that Section 61 seeks to mitigate the rigidity of the earlier position and to permit proof of electronic evidence through recognised alternative modes, while retaining Section 63 as one of the available methods of proof.
    • Viewed in this light, Section 61 may be seen as a legislative response to the strict and mandatory approach adopted in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, and as an attempt to restore a measure of flexibility in the law relating to electronic evidence.
  • 4. Section 61 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 has been introduced with a clear and purposeful objective. The procedural requirements under Section 63—such as the furnishing of a certificate and hash value—apply only where a party chooses to prove a copy of an electronic record (i.e., a computer output) through the special mode prescribed therein, namely, without examining a witness. This approach also aligns with global trends in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.

Read the Article:

Purport of S. 61, BSA, 2023

  • Section 61 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, is introduced with clear and purposeful objectives:
    • To correct the doctrinal error that treated “statements” as including all forms of electronic material, such as videos and photographs (by the Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1).
    • To clarify that proof of a computer output (copy) can be given otherwise than through a certificate, including by leading oral evidence or examining a competent witness.
    • To confine the procedural requirements under Section 63—such as the furnishing of a certificate and hash value—to cases where a party chooses to rely on the special mode of proof prescribed therein, namely, proof by way of a certificate without examining a witness.
  • Sec. 61, BSA, says – Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital record—
    • and such record shall, subject to section 63, have the same legal effect, validity and enforceability as other documents.
  • The first part of Section 61 — “Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital record” — is broadly worded and makes no distinction between an original and a copy of an electronic record.
    • Therefore, this clause ensures the admissibility of electronic records — whether original or copy — solely on the ground of their digital nature.
  • The expression “subject to Section 63” in Section 61, BSA implies that the procedural requirements under Section 63 (such as the furnishing of a certificate and hash value, etc.) apply only where the party opts to prove a copy of an electronic record (computer output) under the special method prescribed by Section 63.
  • That is, the copy of an electronic record (computer output) can be proved by any other method provided under the Act (for proving a document).

Other Methods to Establish Proof are:

  • (i) oral evidence of one who can vouchsafe the same,
  • (ii) circumstantial evidence,
  • (iii) invoking ‘presumption’ and
  • (iv) express admission by the other side.

Nothing in this Adhiniyam shall Apply to Deny the Admissibility”: Significance

The words “nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility” in Section 61 are also made to expand the scope of admissibility of Electronic Evidence. The non-obstante clause in Section 63, BSA is capable of giving two (divergent) interpretations–

  • First, Section 63, BSA is an enabling provision to admit ‘computer output’ (copy – derived from the original)  as ‘document’ itself, in a simpler manner, by the deeming provision, ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’. That is, computer output (copy) can also be proved by any other manner provided for proving any other document.
  • Second, a computer output (copy) can be proved only under the provisions of Section 63, BSA, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’. (It is the view taken by the Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216.)

The words in the new Section 61, “nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility”, are an emphatic delineation of the legislative intent on the following matters –

  • 1. Section 63, BSA is an enabling provision to admit ‘computer output’ (copy)  as a ‘document’ itself, in a simpler(?) manner, by the deeming provision notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’.
  • 2. The interpretation given to Section 63, BSA, that a ‘computer output (copy) can be proved only’ under the provisions of Section 63, BSA, ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’, is not accepted by the legislature.
    • Or, the word “nothing” in Section 61 overrides, or nullifies, the effect of the non obstante clause in Section 63.
  • 3. Thereby, the words, ‘subject to section 63’ in Section 61, BSA, only direct to undergo the requirements in Section 63 (that is, production of Section 63 certificate, and HASH certificate) to prove the Computer output — only when one opts to prove it under the provisions of Section 63: that is, he can adopt any other method provided in the BSA.

Note: If this interpretation is not given, Section 61, the new provision in the BSA, stands meaningless.

Videos Speak for Themselves – English Decision

It is laid down by the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in R v. Downey, [1995] 1 Cr.App.R. 547 CA and R v Blenkinsop, [1995] 1 Cr.App.R. 7, CA as regards a video –

  • It “should be shown without comment, since it was for the jury to decide what they revealed.”

In R v. Downey, [1995] 1 Cr.App.R. 547, the principle accepted was that a video can “speak for itself” if properly proved. In this case, the same type of offence was committed at different places. Both were video recorded. The similarities were well identified. This led to an acceptance of the video by the court. It was found that the perpetrator of one of the crimes was likewise guilty of the other.

CCTV Footage – The Best Evidence

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it is held that the CCTV footage is the best evidence (R. Banumathi, Kurian Joseph, Anil R. Dave, JJ.). It was a case concerning two Italian nationals. They were accused of the murder of another Italian national. The place of occurrence was a hotel room. All were on their trip to Varanasi. It was a case of circumstantial evidence. Symptoms of strangulation were absent in the medical reports. The defence was that the death occurred during their absence. They relied on the non-production of the digital evidence – CCTV footage and SIM card details. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, pointing out –

  • “The courts below have ignored the importance of best evidence, i.e. CCTV camera in the instant case.”
  • “Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, prosecution in possession of the best evidence– CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced.”
  • Note: Tomaso Bruno is overruled in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, on the point – whether computer output can be proved otherwise than invoking Section 65(4) of the Evidence Act; that is, under Section 65. In Tomaso Bruno it was held that secondary evidence of the contents of CCTV footage can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. Hence the CCTV footage was found admissible. In this regard Tomaso Bruno followed Navjot Sandhu. It is held in Arjun Panditrao that in the teeth of Anvar P. V., it could not have been said to be a correct statement of the law.

Photographs/Videos Speak for Themselves – Indian Decisions

In Rajendra Sail v. M P High Court Bar Association, AIR 2005 SC 2473; 2005-6 SCC 109; (Y.K. Sabharwal & Tarun Chatterjee, JJ.), it is held that the video exhibited in that case speaks for itself.

The Madras High Court in Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai v. Kogila,
2021-3 CTC 118; 2021-2 LW 28, while dealing with a suit for damages, filed by the legal heirs of a person who died due to the fall of an electrical pole on him, held as under:

  • “Ex. A-10 photos and CD clearly show that the pole was heavily damaged. One could also to see the iron rods exposed and rusted. The cement concrete covering peeled off. The broken electrical pole on the ground with live wire seen in the photographs speak for itself.”

In Pawan Kumar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007-6 ADJ 551, Allahabad High Court held as under:.

  • “The photographs of the constructions which were given at that point of time, show that it was semi finished construction, and the photographs appended with this Review Application, show that constructions have been completed and they speak in volumes for itselfPhotographs, which have been filed as Annexure-16 to the writ petition, and the photographs, which have been annexed along with this Review Application clearly speak that the applicant had full knowledge of the pendency of the aforementioned writ petition and in spite of the same constructions were carried on and completed.”

Following decisions also say – the photographs/videos speak for itself.

  • Swami Vivekanandnagar Co-op. Housing So. Ltd. v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2022-3 GLH 122; 2022-4 GLR 2732 (Photograph)
  • Madhavnagar Coop. Housing So. Ltd v. Joint Registrar, 2020-2 GLR 1437, J.B. Pardiwala, J. (Photograph)
  • Jetunben v. State of Gujarat, 2017-2 GLR 1640, J.B. Pardiwala, J. (Video)
  • New India Assurance Company v. Mohd. Akram Bhat, 2016-2 JKJ 12 (Photograph)
  • Shakuntala Bhadouria v. M. P. Griha Nirman Mandal, 2014-3 MPHT 62; 2014-1 MPJR 131 (DB) (Photographs)
  • Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Bhagirathi Ganapathy, 2010-2 CCR 1041 (Photograph)
  • Raghuveer Singh v. Shiv Kumar Swami, 2006-3 RDD 1653; 2006-3 RLW(Raj) 2266; 2006-4 WLC 210 (Video)
  • Taran Parkash Mohan Lal v. State, 1962 CrLJ 189 (P&H) (Photograph)

Seizure Of Heroine Non-Production of CCTV Footage – Not Invite Acquittal

It is also relevant to note the following decision of the Madras High Court on seizure of the contraband, a commercial quantity of 1 kg. of Heroine, in Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, Chennai v. Rasool Mydeen, 2023-1 MLJ(Cri) 19, which reads as under:

  • “Though the prosecution could have also produced the CCTV footage from the Central Railway Station, the very absence by itself will not entitle the accused for acquittal. The principle that non-production of the best evidence in the case of the prosecution could not be employed, as the CCTV cannot be said to be a best evidence when the seizing officer and the witnesses have deposed and the mahazar is produced and the CCTV footage can at best be termed as a corroborative material. Therefore, the mere non-production thereof will not entitle the appellant for an acquittal.”

Also Read: ‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be proved by ‘CERTIFICATE’ u/s. 65B

End Notes

“HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s”

The Certificate required in Section 63(4)(c) of the new Act must be “in the form specified in the Schedule”. It appears that this certificate is needed in addition to the Certificate that is required in sub-section (4) as regards the matters enumerated therein; or the Certificate should contain (additionally) the matters enumerated in sub-section (4).

The Form in the Schedule directs to state as under:

  • “I state that the HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s is …… ……… …… , obtained through the following algorithm –
  • SHA1:
  • SHA256:
  • MD5:
  • Other …….. …….. …….. (Legally acceptable standard)
  • (Hash report to be enclosed with the certificate)”

A Discordant Note

The requirement for this certificate is unnecessary, especially in situations where there is no dispute regarding the computer output (copy or print-out). It may be more feasible for many litigants to bring the original device, such as a CCTV Camera, computer, laptop, or mobile phone, to court than to get the HASH value fixed through an expert.

It is not clear –

  • (i) What is the precise purpose of ascertaining the hash value(s) of the (original) electronic or digital record?
    • Note: It appears that the hash value(s) of the original record are required to be stated, rather than that of the copy (‘computer output’) actually produced before the court. This raises a doubt: how is the court to verify the authenticity of the copy if the original’s HASH value alone is referenced?
  • (ii) Why does the requirement of including HASH value(s) appear only in the Schedule (certificate format) and not in the main body of Section 63 itself?

The lack of explicit mention in the section text also creates uncertainty about whether HASH values are ‘mandatory’ or merely a ‘directory’ one.

Section 63(4)(c), BSA

Section 63(4)(c), BSA reads as under:

  • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.

A question may arise –

  • Because the term “hash value” is not explicitly used the main body of Section 63(4)(c) BSA, can it be argued – Hash Value Certificate is not mandatory but directory (or merely illustrative of the best practices)?

An argument is possible (“hash value” certificate is not mandatory) for two matters –

  • 1. The particulars in the Certificate stated in Section 63(4)(c) are specifically and categorically laid down in the sub-section (2) of Sec. 63. The “Part A” Certificate in the schedule contains all things in sub-section (2) of Sec. 63. So the “Part B” Hash Value Certificate is not mandatory as per the “Section”.
  • 2. The words “sufficient for a matter to be in the sub-section (4)(c) make it clear – the ‘verbatim adherence’ to the certificate format is not mandatory;*.* no doubt, the substance or contents thereof (particularly, the phraseology – “best of the knowledge and belief”) must have been placed in some (other) form. The particulars in the Certificate being the matters enumerated in the sub-section (2) of Sec 63 (and nothing is stated as regards Hash Value), the ‘Part B’ Hash Value Certificate cannot be a mandatory one.
    • *.*Note:
    • 1. See the difference between (i) reading Sec. 63(4)(c) without the words – sufficient for a matter to be and (ii) reading with these words. Relevant portion of Sec. 63(4)(c) is given below:
      • “(c) ….. for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be  sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.”
    • 2. The beginning portion of Sec. 63(4)(c) emphasises that it pertains to the matters enumerated in sub-section(2) alone, and not to hash-value. Sec. 63(4)(c) begins as under:
      • “(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate…”
    • 3. It appears that the hash value(s) of the original record are expected to be stated, rather than those of the copy (or “computer output”) actually produced before the court. This raises several questions, including: how is the court to verify the authenticity of the copy, if only the original’s HASH is referenced?

Possible Counter Arguments (This author does not subscribe)

  • First: The “form A” itself requires Hash Value Certificate.
  • Second:  Section 63(4)(c) says, “…. and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate… “
  • Third:  Section 63(4)(c) says, “a certificate specified in the Schedule”. The phrase “specified in the Schedule” explicitly ties the main section to the Schedule and makes it mandatory.
  • Fourth:  The Schedule provides a single, Certificate, divided into two parts – “Part A and “Part B”. It is not presented as two separate certificates, one mandatory and one optional.
  • Fifth: Legislative Intent (i.e., for ensuring the digital integrity of electronic records) reflects the mandatory nature.

Conclusion

The ‘Hash Value Certificate’ in the BSA is shrouded in several potential ambiguities. To dispel these uncertainties, a legislative amendment or a definitive ruling by an authoritative court that takes into account all pertinent arguments in this matter is imperative.

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Admissibility of Photographs, and Photo-Identification, in Court Cases

Adv. Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Nutshell – Photograph Evidence

Photographs are admissible in evidence as documents.  P.  Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1; 2020-9 SCC 161
While considering a case on dowry death, the prosecution argued that a photograph was not admissible in evidence as neither the person who took the photograph nor its negative was produced in evidence. But, the court accepted the photograph as ‘no dispute was raised by the prosecution witnesses’.Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2024 SC 4551
A large number of photographs were marked and considered in this case.
In para 525, it is stated – the witness “was confronted with photographs of the inscription”
There were three sets of albums containing photographs taken by the State Archaeological Department pursuant to an order dated 10 January 1990 (Para 533).
In para 538, the Court considered the evidence of a witness as to the “photographs placed within the structure in 1990”.
M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1 (Ayodhya case)
The factum of photo identification (of an accused) by PW 2, as witnessed by the officer concerned, is a relevant and admissible piece of evidence.Rabindra Kumar Pal v.  Republic of India, 2011-2 SCC 490
Nothing prevented the appellant-State Government from producing the relevant photographs of the purported pucca pond existing at some spots.State of Rajasthan v. Ultratech Cement Ltd. , 2022-12 Scale 606; 2022-13 SCR 1
A statement about the photograph made by any expert would not be admissible before examining the photographer.Dr. Pankaj Kumudchandra Phadnis v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 785
Photographs, tape-records of speeches [Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17] are documents.Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016 15 SCC 485;
Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2011-4 SCC 143
Photo identification of an accused during the investigation, who was seen by the witness at the relevant time.Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic  AIR 1999 SC  2562, 2000-1 SCC 138; Rabindra Kumar Pal v. Republic of India, AIR  2011 SC 1436; 2011 2 SCC 490
Inventory, photographs and the list of samples certified by the Magistrate are admissible as primary evidence. It is a substitute for the production of physical evidence of seized contraband samples.Nisar Ahmed Bhat, v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir 2024 0 Supreme(J&K) 187  
The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae.K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275;
R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157;
Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720

Nutshell – Photo and Video: Relevant and Admissibile

Audio/Video cassettes Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17
Tape records of speechesTukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329
Photo or videoMohammed Rafiq v. Madhan, 2018-1 Mad LJ(CRI) 641;
Moti Rabidas v. The State of Bihar, 2015-145 AIC 435;
Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan 2014-1 Raj Cri C 31;
State of MP v. Shankarlal, ILR 2010 MP 717;
P Rajagopal v. Inspector of police 2009-2 Mad LJ(Cri) 161;
Santhosh Baccharam Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 All MR (Cri)997, 2003 BCR (Cri) 120.
CD  Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, (2016) 15 SCC 485
Photographs including photographs of tombstones and houses Lyell v. Kennedy (No.3) (1884) 50 L.T. 730
Video recordings  State of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053
Audio and videoState of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053;
Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31;
Taylor v. Chief Constable Cheshire:1987(1) All.ER 225
CassettesTukaram S.Dighole v. Manik Rao Shivaji Kokate (2010)4 SCC 329
Moving cinematographSenior v. Holdsworth, Ex parte Independant Television New Ltd. (1976) Q.B. 23)
Film  Rex v. Daye ((1908)2 K.B. 333, 340)
Floppies, CCTV footages, CDs, DVDs, Chips, Hard discs, Pen drives North West Airlines v. Union of India 2007 (214) ELT 178 (Bom.)

Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witness Theory

  • Pictorial Testimony Theory – Photograph Need Not Be Proved.
  • Silent Witness Theory – Photograph Must Be Proved.

In Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State (2014 Ker HC 31), these two theories governing the proof and authenticity of photographs were explained.

  • First, the pictorial testimony theory: It is applied when a photograph is used merely as an aid to a witness in explaining or illustrating his testimony—for example, a doctor explaining injuries with reference to a photograph, or identification of a deceased through a photograph.  In such a case, the evidence of the witness will be the primary matter rather than what is depicted in the photograph; and the photographer need not be examined in court, since the photograph is admitted merely to aid a witness in explaining his testimony.
  • Secondly, under the silent witness theory or communication theory: It is invoked when the photograph itself constitutes substantive and probative evidence of what it depicts, speaking for itself without supporting oral testimony—for instance, an X-ray film showing a fracture, a photograph depicting the accused in a crowd holding a weapon (though the photographer did not notice him), or a photograph of the scene of occurrence of a crime. In such cases, the photographs must be proven.

Presumptions on Photographs and Videos

Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (Section 114 of the Evidence Act) allows the Court to ‘presume the existence of any fact ….. regard being had to the common course of natural events‘.

A photograph or a video, by its very nature, speaks for itself. Therefore, the courts in India can commence with a presumption as to the correctness of the photograph or video, placing the onus on the opposite party to rebut that presumption by placing material on record sufficient to dislodge or shift the same.

Invoking this general presumption, the courts in India have consistently held –

  • ‘a mere bald denial of the contents of a video recording is insufficient‘; but, ‘there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed’.

Photographs – In many cases a Corroborative Piece; It Can be the Best Evidence also

A photograph, being a document, ordinarily requires proof through a proper witness to establish its authenticity and relevance. However, it need not invariably be proved by examining the photographer, and may be proved through any competent witness capable of speaking to the facts depicted or the circumstances of its production. Once duly admitted, a photograph may constitute primary or substantive evidence, though in many cases it is used to corroborate other evidence.

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it is held that CCTV footage can be a ‘Best Evidence‘. The court said it as under:

  • “Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, prosecution in possession of the best evidence – CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced.”

In short, a photograph or video, once duly admitted and properly proved, constitutes substantive evidence. Though in many cases it is relied upon as corroborative evidence, in an appropriate case it may, by itself, establish the fact in issue, independently and without the aid of other evidence.

Silent Witnesses Theory – Photograph /Video Speaks for Itself

In State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, the Madras High Court explained the “silent witness” theory, stating as under:

  • “115. We may also incidentally notice the developments in the law on video and photographic evidence in the West where the “silent witness” theory is deployed to admit video and photographic evidence. The theory proceeds on the footing that photographic and video evidence are “silent witnesses” which speak for themselves. They are substantive evidence of what they portray.”

The following two foreign decisions were specifically dealt with by the High Court:

  • (a) State of Nevada v. Archanian, [145 P 3d 1008 (2006)]: The Supreme Court of Nevada admitted the video evidence under the silent witness theory and held as under:
    • “There is no evidence suggesting that the composite videotape was inaccurate, that any relevant or exculpatory information had been deleted from it, or that the modifications made to it adversely affected or obscured the content.”
  • (b) Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, [2017 ONCJ 790,]: The Ontario Court of Justice in Canada opined to the following effect:
    • The party seeking to tender a video in evidence must show two things to meet the threshold test of admissibility: (i) The video is relevant, showing the crime scene or other evidence linked to the issues at trial; and (ii) the video is authentic — that it accurately represents the events depicted.
  • (See – End Notes)

Circumstantial evidence be Used – No Particular Evidence or Class of Witness

In State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, the Madras High Court said further as under:

  • “Referring to the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Bulldog (2015 ABCA 251), the Ontario Court (in Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790), said: “Circumstantial evidence may be used to authenticate real evidence – Bulldog at para 35. There is no particular evidence or class of witness that must be called to authenticate a video provided the whole of the evidence establishes that the video in question is substantially accurate and a fair depiction.”

Can a digital video only be Authenticated by an Eyewitness”?

This was the second question raised in R. v. Bulldog (2015 ABCA 251). The question was whether a digital video can only be authenticated by an eyewitness or whether a member of any class of witnesses can provide evidence of authentication.

The answer of Alberta Court of Appeal (in R. v. Bulldog) was “No.”

It held as under:

  • “[20] [The appellants argue] that Nikolovski sets two preconditions to the admissibility of video recordings – specifically, proof that the video accurately depicts the facts, and that it has not been altered or changed. The appellants refer to the process of establishing these facts as ‘authentication,’ and we are content to adopt that term, since ‘authentication’ simply refers to the process of convincing the court that certain tangible evidence matches the claims made about it . . .
  • [21] The second proposition, which relies on R v Doughty, 2009 ABPC 8 (CanLII) at para 37 (citing Elliot Goldstein, Visual Evidence, A Practitioner’s Manual, Vol 1 (Thomson-Carswell, 2007) at 2-19 to 2-20), is that there is an exclusive list of classes of witnesses who can authenticate a video in a manner that meets these two putative Nikolovski preconditions: (1) the camera operator; (2) an eye-witness present when the video is taken who can testify that the video accurately represents what he or she saw; (3) a person qualified to state that the representation is accurate; or (4) an expert witness.
  • [22] Based on these two propositions, the appellants argue that the Crown’s evidence in this case could not authenticate the DVD. They submit (but do not really argue) that the authenticating witness was Reddick, who did not create the DVD tendered, did not know who created it, did not know whether the person who did create it used or might have used options which changed the content of the source video footage, was not an expert in the software and in the format changes entailed in copying the DVD and, accordingly, could not give the expert evidence of the effect of format changes which the appellants say is necessary to authenticate the DVD: R v Penney, 2002 NFCA 15 (CanLII), 2002 NFCA 15 at para 24, 210 Nfld& PEIR 209.
  • [23]           In short, the appellants say that, absent evidence from a particular class of qualified person verifying that the video recording had not been altered or changed in the course of undergoing various format changes, the DVD was inadmissible.
  • . . . . . .
  • [34] It will be recalled that the appellants say that, because Reddick does not fit into any of the four categories identified by Goldstein
  • [at para. 21 of the judgment and consisting of:
    • (1) the camera operator;
    • (2) an eye-witness present when the video is taken who can testify that the video accurately represents what he or she saw;
    • (3) a person qualified to state that the representation is accurate; or
    • (4) an expert witness.]
  • as persons capable of authenticating video evidence, it follows that the Crown could not authenticate the video recording. We assume that the appellants also maintain that none of the other Crown witnesses would fit into those categories, although we observe that Hodge would have fallen into Goldstein’s second category as an eyewitness, had he viewed the video in court and testified that it accurately depicted what he saw. In any event, these categories are not exhaustive in the sense that, if the Crown does not call one of these four kinds of witnesses, the video recording is inadmissible. Rather, other kinds of evidence or different combinations of witnesses may be employed to satisfy a court of the video recording’s substantial accuracy and fairness.”

Should there be Proof – Video not been Altered or Changed?

The appellants in R. v. Bulldog (Alberta Court of Appeal) challenged the authenticity and admissibility of the DVD. They relied on R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197.    The Court considered whether the Crown was bound to prove that the video recording had not been altered or changed. The appellants argued that R. v. Nikolovski mandated a two-fold test (i) requiring proof that the video accurately depicted the facts and (ii) proof that it had not been altered or changed. The Alberta Court of Appeal disagreed. It held (paragraphs 26 to 33):

  • 1. As long as other evidence satisfied the accuracy, no evidence regarding the presence or absence of alteration was necessary.
  • 2. The mere fact of alteration did not automatically render a video recording inadmissible.
  • 3. The Crown’s failure to establish that the DVD was not altered was not fatal as long as the Crown had proven that the DVD was a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purported to show.

The Alberta Court of Appeal said it as under:         

  • “[26]  . . . the appellants say that Nikolovski creates a two-part test which must be met before admitting video evidence, requiring the Crown to show not only that the video recording accurately depicts the facts, but also that it has not been altered or changed. This is incorrect.
  • [27]  It must first be borne in mind that Nikolovski was not a case about the admissibility of a video recording (which had been conceded), but rather about identity (specifically, whether a trier of fact could identify the accused beyond a reasonable doubt as the offender by relying solely upon that video recording). The critical passage from Nikolovski, para 28 upon which the appellants rely, is found under a heading discussing ‘Use That Can Be Made of Photographs or Videotapes,’ which clearly presupposes admissibility.
  • [28]      Further, the passage itself fails to support the appellants’ contention. It reads as follows: 
  • Once it is established that a videotape has not been altered or changed, and that it depicts the scene of a crime, then it becomes admissible and relevant evidence.
  • This statement does not state a necessary condition for admission, but rather a sufficient condition. It does not, even implicitly, preclude admission of video recordings under other circumstances. Indeed, where an alteration enhances a video recording, its accuracy might well be served by such an alteration: R v Jamieson, [2004] OTC 369 at paras 36-37, [2004] OJ No 1780 (QL) (SCJ).
  • [29] We do agree with the appellants, however, that in some cases Nikolovski has been taken as requiring the tendering party to show an absence of alteration or change: Penney; R v.MacNeil, 2008 QCCS 915 (CanLII) at para 11, [2008] QJ No 1784 (QL); R v Chevannes, 2011 ONCJ 754 (CanLII) at para 16, [2011] OJ No 5937; R v Ellard, 2004 BCSC 780 (CanLII) at para 11, [2004] BCJ No 2914. In Penney, for example, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal (at para 17) cited Nikolovski as authority for the statement that ‘[e]vidence establishing that the video has not been altered or changed is a precondition to its admission as evidence.’ With respect, we do not read Nikolovski as stating so broad a proposition, and we see no principled reason to support it. Indeed, taken to its extreme, it could render almost any DVD left unattended next to a computer inadmissible . . .
  • [30]  Other courts have taken a different view of Nikolovski, to the effect that a video recording may be admitted into evidence, even if it has been altered in some way, so long as it is shown to be a substantially accurate depiction of the event in question. In R v Brown, [1999] OTC 213, [1999] OJ No 4865 (CJ), where the Crown sought to tender at trial a security surveillance videotape and enhanced copies, the court stated (at para 3) that, when a videotape has been altered, the test for admissibility is: one of substantial accuracy . . . [T[he Crown must … prove on a balance of probabilities the substantial accuracy of the original tape and the enhancements of it to obtain the permission of the court to tender them in accordance with [Nikolovski] ….
  • [31] Similarly, in R v Crawford, 2013 BCSC 2402 (CanLII) at para 48, [2013] BCJ No 2879 (emphasis added), the court said that Nikolovski should be interpreted in a ‘purposive’ manner, such that a video recording’s admissibility is not precluded, even if ‘complete accuracy’ no longer subsists, so long as ‘the alteration of the recorded event is not so substantial as to be misleading’ or ‘if the image is distorted or otherwise changed in a material way.’ What matters, said the court in Crawford, is that the video recording ‘accurately and fairly presents he information that it is to convey.’ Other courts, including this Court, said much the same thing prior to Nikolovski . . .
  • [32] There is an important distinction between recordings (video or audio) and other forms of real evidence (such as a pistol or an article of clothing found at a crime scene) which supports a test of ‘substantial’ accuracy over the appellants’ preferred test of ‘not altered.’ It will be recalled that ‘authentication’ simply requires that the party tendering evidence establish (to the requisite standard of proof, which we discuss below) the claim(s) made about it. What authentication requires in any given instance therefore depends upon the claim(s) which the tendering party is making about the evidence. In the case of most real evidence, the claim is that the evidence is something – the pistol is a murder weapon, or the article of clothing is the victim’s shirt. Chain of custody, and absence of alteration will be important to establish in such cases. In the case of recordings, however, the claim will typically be not that it is something, but that it accurately represents something (a particular event). What matters with a recording, then, is not whether it was altered, but rather the degree of accuracy of its representation. So long as there is other evidence which satisfies the trier of fact of the requisite degree of accuracy, no evidence regarding the presence or absence of any change or alteration is necessary to sustain a finding of authentication.
  • [33] Put simply, the mere fact of alteration does not automatically render a video recording inadmissible. It follows that the Crown’s failure to establish that this video recording was not altered should not be fatal, so long as the Crown proves that it is a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purports to show. All this is, of course, subject to the standard framework for admission, under which a video recording may be excluded on the basis of irrelevance (Penney), where its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value (R v Veinot, 2011 NSCA 120 (CanLII) at paras 24-27, 311 NSR (2d) 267), or where there is reasonable doubt that the video identifying the accused is a fabrication.”

Balance of probabilities

In R v Penney, (2002) 163 CCC (3d) 329, the court considered the ‘falsification of evidence’ and pointed out that the members of a jury ‘can be expected to have, if not experience with, knowledge of the possibilities for manipulating the content of photographs and videotapes’, and concluded that the ‘standard by which the trial judge is to determine the question is on the balance of probabilities’

Bald Denials are Insufficient to Discredit the Authenticity of Video Footage

The Madras High Court, in this decision (State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi), also observed as under:

  • “113. It is true that the cameraman can zoom or minimize an image. It is also true that trick photography is possible. In Suo Motu taken up (PIL) WP Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others (WP 3335 etc. of 2009) decided on 29.10.2009, a Division Bench of this Court (F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla and R. Banumathi, JJ) held that bald denials are insufficient to discredit the authenticity of video footage. In her lead judgment, Banumathi, J (as she then was) has opined as under:
    • ‘349. That a bald denial of the contents of a videotape is not adequate to doubt its authenticity; there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed’.
  • The Division Bench proceeded to look into the video tape as a corroborative piece of evidence and held as under:
    • ‘350. The respondents have not disputed that the video clippings filed by the petitioners relate to the occurrence. Even though video clippings filed by the petitioners do not have the running time, we have watched the videos and looked into the photos as corroborative piece of evidence’.”

In Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1, the conclusion of the Speaker on CDs received from TV News channels, that ‘there is no room for doubting the authenticity and accuracy of the electronic evidence produced by the petitioner’, was accepted by the Apex Court holding as under:

  • “The petitioners despite grant of opportunity had declined to watch the recorded interview. It is one thing to watch the interview, point out in what manner the recording was not genuine but instead of availing of that opportunity, the petitioners preferred to adopt the course of vague denial.”

In Umesh v. State of Karnataka, 2023-2 KarLJ 397, while dealing with a ‘trap case’, after laying down the importance of digital evidence, it is cautioned as under:

  • “Qualified and trained expert should test the samples. The report should contain the procedure adopted for testing the samples. The equipments used should be duly calibrated and updated periodically. The electronic device should be tested for editing and tampering in order to establish its genuineness and authenticity.
  • Digital evidence form be created for every memory card/chip used in the trap case containing the unique identification features of the memory chip/card used. The defence should be provided with a cloned copy or a mirror image of the electronic device.”

Distinct Evidentiary Position of a Section 63(4) Certificate

Once the Section 63(4) certificate accompanies the computer output (copy), the computer output becomes admissible in evidence, and it is not mandatory to examine the CCTV operator, or the person who snapped the photograph, for the purpose of its admission.

  • See: Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473,
  • Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1.

The Person Who Signed Section 63/65B Certificate Need Not Be Examined: Having regard to the special features of the photographs and videos (that is, visual depictions of facts), even if the Section 63(4) certificate is not that given either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, but by another, the photograph or video can be marked in evidence through the plaintiff or the defendant.

Unless the authenticity or correctness of the certificate issued under Section 63(4) is specifically disputed, oral evidence has no role to play in proving (for the purpose of marking) that the computer output is the exact copy of the (original) electronic record. Therefore, the photographer who issued the certificate under Section 63(4) need not be examined if the correctness of the certificate is not specifically disputed.

In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC, our Apex Court further affirmed as under:

  • “50. … However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such certificate be given by such person/persons.”

Presumption on Computer Output (copy) Admitted under Sec. 63

A computer output (copy) of a CCTV footage or video, or of a photograph captured on a mobile phone, can be admitted in evidence in place of the original — if it is produced with a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA.

  • Note: Section 63(1), BSA says about admissibility of copy — “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.”

Proof by Certificate under Section 63(4)

In view of the non-obstante clause (“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam”) in Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the only Mode of Proof of a computer output (copy) is the evidence through a certificate under Section 63(4).

  • Therefore, even in cases where formal proof of the digital photos or videos is dispensed with (for the opposite party admits it), a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA is necessary.

Admission and Proof of Computer Output (copy): Independent Matters

(i) Admitting a copy of a computer output (such as copy of a statement of accounts) in evidence (with a certificate under Section 63), and (ii) the formal proof thereof at the time of trial, are two distinct and independent matters.

  • The questions as to substantive proof — whether the computer output or copy is relevant, and how it should be proved — are not determined by Section 63 of the BSA. They are to be established independently, as in the case of any other class of documents.

The burden of Impeaching the Certificate is upon the Party who Disputes it

The presumption arising under Section 63—by which a computer output is deemed to be a document—is rebuttable and does not render the contents of the electronic record conclusive.

If such a challenge on the certificate is overruled by the court, it can draw a presumption as to the genuineness and authenticity of the photographs or videos contained in the computer output (copies).

S. 63 deals with Admissibility of computer output or copy, and not Proof

The questions as to substantive proof — whether the computer output or copy is relevant, and how it should be proved — are not determined by Section 63 of the BSA. They are to be established independently, as in the case of any other class of documents.

  • However, the court can draw presumptions as to the genuineness and authenticity of such photographs or videos, as stated earlier.

Once Copy Admitted by S. 63 Certificate, Oral Evidence has No Place in Marking

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, is an authority on the following matters –

  • (i) The certificate under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to admissibility of the computer output (copy);
  • (ii) The certificate is meant to replace the oral evidence of the device-handler or operator.
  • (iii) Once the certificate is produced, oral evidence has no place (for the purpose of marking it).

However, the person who issued the certificate (operator) has to be examined if:

  • the authenticity or correctness of the certificate is specifically disputed;
  • allegations of fabrication, manipulation, or false certification are raised;
  • the issuer’s control over the device/system is seriously questioned; or
  • the court needs clarification to assess probative value, not admissibility.

Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witness Theory

  • Pictorial Testimony Theory — Photograph Need Not Be Proved.
  • Silent Witness Theory — Photograph Must Be Proved.

Photographer Need Not be examined (In pictorial testimony theory)

When a photograph is admitted merely to aid a witness in explaining his testimony, it need not be proved formally. 

Photograph Must Have Been Proved (In silent witness theory)

As stated above, in silent witness theory cases, the photographs must be proved. No doubt, in the peculiar nature of a particular case, the examination of the photographer may not be insisted upon, and the photograph could be proved by another ‘proper’ witness. Formal proof of a photograph may not be necessary where the opposite party admits its genuineness or correctness.

Examination of the Photographer may not be insisted (In silent witness theory)

As stated above, in silent witness theory cases, photographs or videos are required to be proved. However, such proof need not necessarily be by way of formal proof through the examination of the photographer or the person who captured the image. Besides admission of the other side as regards the authenticity, the photographs or videos may instead be proved through a ‘proper’ witness who is competent to depose by way of general evidence regarding the factual features depicted therein, such as the identity of the persons shown, the place, the time, or the surrounding circumstances.

  • Note: 1. Formal proof of a photograph or copy of a video and the requirement of the certificate under Section 63(4) are two distinct and independent matters.
  • 2. Even in cases where formal proof of the photographs or copies of videos is dispensed with, the certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA (Section 65B of the IEA) is necessary, when a computer output (copy) of a photograph or video is produced — in view of the non-obstante clause in Section 63 of the BSA.
  • 3. A photograph or a copy of video, admitted in evidence on the strength of a certificate under Section 63(4), stands on a distinct footing (in contradistinction to a statement-of-account) by reason of the statutory presumptions that the court can invoke, it being direct visual depictions of facts.
  • 4. The certificate under Section 63(4) is accepted unless its correctness is specifically challenged. The oral evidence of the person who issued the certificate becomes relevant (for the purpose of admitting the document) only where the certificate itself is specifically and successfully challenged by the party who disputes its authenticity or correctness.
  • 5. Therefore, the court is entitled to infer that a photograph or video, once duly admitted in evidence, correctly represents the scene or object as it existed at the time of recording. It is doctrinally recognised as the ‘silent witness’ theory – the document “speaks for itself”.
  • 6. Accordingly, once a photograph or copy of a video is duly admitted in evidence, the court can act upon it (usually as a corroborative piece of evidence), on the basis of general evidence relating to the identity of the persons depicted, the place, the time, and the surrounding circumstances, without insisting upon any further primary or direct proof of the facts.
  • 7. The presumption attached to a photograph or a video admitted in evidence being one rebuttable, the opposite party can rebut it by placing appropriate evidence to show that the photograph or video does not correctly represent the scene, object, or occurrence as it existed at the relevant point of time, or that the factual position had materially changed.

Pictorial Testimony Theory: No Enacted Law; Only Judicial Exposition

The pictorial testimony theory rests on judicial exposition rather than statutory codification. It finds only indirect support, in principle, from Section 162 (Refreshing Memory), BSA. Section 162 is to be understood as one not exhaustive in its operation.

Section 162 of the BSA reads as under:

  • “Refreshing memory: (1) A witness may, while under examination, refresh his memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or so soon afterwards that the Court considers it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in his memory:
    • Provided that the witness may also refer to any such writing made by any other person, and read by the witness within the time aforesaid, if when he read it, he knew it to be correct.
  • (2) Whenever a witness may refresh his memory by reference to any document, he may, with the permission of the Court, refer to a copy of such document:
    • Provided that the Court be satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the non-production of the original:
    • Provided further that an expert may refresh his memory by reference to professional treatises.”

Definition of Evidence

According to the Section 2(1)(e) of the Bh. Sak. Act 

  • ” ‘evidence’ means and includes–

    (i) all statements including statements given electronically which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters of fact under inquiry and such statements are called oral evidence;

    (ii) all documents including electronic or digital records produced for the inspection of the Court and such documents are called documentary evidence.”

Connected Articles:

Definition of document

Section 2(1)(d) of the Bh. Sak. Act defines ‘document’ as under:

  • “ (d) ‘document’ means any matter expressed or described or otherwise recorded upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or any other means or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter and includes electronic and digital records.

    Illustrations.
  • (i) A writing is a document.

    (ii) Words printed, lithographed or photographed are documents.

    (iii) A map or plan is a document.

    (iv) An inscription on a metal plate or stone is a document.

    (v) A caricature is a document.

    (vi) An electronic record on emails, server logs, documents on computers, laptop or smartphone, messages, websites, locational evidence and voice mail messages stored on digital devices are documents.”

‘Document’ takes in photographs of words as could be seen from the illustration.

By virtue of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (computer output) shall be ‘deemed to be also a document’.

Besides the Evidence Act, the term ‘document’ has been defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the Indian Penal Code, 1860.  

Section 3(18), General Clauses Act defines document as under:

  • Document shall include any matter written, expressed, or described upon any substances by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means which is intended to be used, or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter.”

Section 29, Indian Penal Code explains that the word document denotes any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.

In Explanation 1, it is stated:

  • “It is immaterial by what means or upon what substance the letters, figures or marks are formed, or whether the evidence is intended for, or may be used in a court of justice, or not.”

Going by the definitions, ‘document ‘ includes not only all materials or substances upon which thoughts of a man are represented by writing or any other species of conventional mark or symbol, but also records of information of some sort (Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State, 2014 KerHC 31).

In P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1, it is observed that tape records of speeches (Also in: Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, 2010-4 SCC 329; Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra(1976) 2 SCC 17 ) and audio/video cassettes (See: Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, 1976-2 SCC 17) including compact disc (See also: Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016-15 SCC 485) were “documents” under Section 3 of the 1872 Act, which stand on no different footing than photographs and were held admissible in evidence. It is by now well established that the electronic record produced for the inspection of the Court is documentary evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act (Anwar PV v. PK Basheer, 2014-10 SCC 473).

Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720

  • “The process of tape-recording offers an accurate method of storing and later reproducing sounds. The imprint on the magnetic tape is the direct effect of the relevant sounds. Like a photograph of a relevant incident, a contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under s. 7 of the Indian Evidence Act.”

R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157

In R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157, summarised this case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri) as under:

  • “In Nagree’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720) the appellant offered bribe to Sheikh a Municipal Clerk. Sheikh informed the Police. The Police laid a trap. Sheikh called Nagree at the residence. The Police kept a tape recorder concealed in another room. The tape was kept in the custody of the police inspector  Sheikh gave evidence of the talk. The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae. It is also comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident. The tape recorded conversation is therefore a relevant fact and is admissible under section 7 of the Evidence Act.”

After summarising Nagree’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720), the Supreme Court said as under:

  • “The Court will take care in two directions in admitting such evidence. First, the Court will find out that it is genuine and free from tampering or mutilation. Secondly, the Court may also secures scrupulous conduct and behaviour on behalf of the Police. The reason is that the Police Officer is more likely to behave properly if improperly obtained evidence is liable to be viewed with care and caution by the Judge. In every case the position of the accused, the nature of the investigation and the gravity of the offence must be judged in the light of the material facts and the Surrounding circumstances.”

K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275:

  • 7. The amended definition of “evidence” in section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872 read with the definition of “electronic record” in section 2(t) of the Information Technology Act 2000, includes a compact disc containing an electronic record of a conversation. Section 8 of Evidence Act provides that the conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit, in reference to such suit, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto. In R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157, this court made it clear that electronically recorded conversation is admissible in evidence, if the conversation is relevant to the matter in issue and the voice is identified and the accuracy of the recorded conversation is proved by eliminating the possibility of erasureaddition or manipulation. This Court further held that a contemporaneous electronic recording of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident and is admissible as evidence under Section 8 of the Act. There is therefore no doubt that such electronic record can be received as evidence.”

The Kerala High Court (KT Thomas, J.), in Ponnappan v. State of Kerala, ILR 1994(3) Ker 370, in appeal, confirmed the conviction holding that Chacko was the person who was killed. It was on a photo identification – Pictorial testimony. The Court held as under:

  • “PW I identified the person in M.O.9 photo as the person who was killed. There is no doubt that M.O.9 is the photograph of Chacko, the film representative. It was contended that since P. W.I himself admitted that he had not observed the features or facial peculiarities of the person when he was inside the car, the identification made by him with the help of the photo is not of any use. We are of the view that even without noticing any translatable mark or feature of a person it would be possible to identify him later.”

Here the photo had not been proved through the photographer.

End Notes:

State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P. Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019-2 CTC 391; 2019-3 CTC 391; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, the Madras High Court held as under:

  • 115. We may also incidentally notice the developments in the law on video and photographic evidence in the West where the “silent witness” theory is deployed to admit video and photographic evidence. The theory proceeds on the footing that photographic and video evidence are “silent witnesses” which speak for themselves. They are substantive evidence of what they portray. Two examples may be noticed.
  • (a) State of Nevada v. Archanian, [145 P 3d 1008 (2006)] was a murder case before the Supreme Court of Nevada, where, a key piece of evidence was the digital video recorded by the store’s surveillance system. The accused attacked the authenticity of the video footage on the ground that the VHS tape given to the police video technician was not the original and that the technician had isolated the relevant camera view and highlighted certain portions of the video. It was this composite videotape that was shown to the jury. In the trial, the prosecution acknowledged that they had no way of knowing whether the images were accurately transferred from the original digital recording to the VHS version but testified that they appeared to be the same. The Supreme Court of Nevada admitted the video evidence under the silent witness theory and held as under:
    • “There is no evidence suggesting that the composite videotape was inaccurate, that any relevant or exculpatory information had been deleted from it, or that the modifications made to it adversely affected or obscured the content.”
  • (b) More recently, in Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, [2017 ONCJ 790] Kenkel, J. of the Ontario Court of Justice in Canada formulated a test, very similar to our own and that has been alluded to by us in para 105 (supra). The Court opined:
    • “The party seeking to tender a video in evidence must show two things to meet the threshold test of admissibility:
    • They must prove the video is relevant, showing the crime scene or other evidence linked to the issues at trial.
    • They must prove the video is authentic – that it accurately represents the events depicted.”
  • Referring to the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Bulldog (2015 ABCA 251), the Ontario Court said:
    • “Circumstantial evidence may be used to authenticate real evidence – Bulldog at para 35. There is no particular evidence or class of witness that must be called to authenticate a video provided the whole of the evidence establishes that the video in question is substantially accurate and a fair depiction.”
  • The Ontario Court has held that in a given case, whether the two part test (supra) is satisfied or not, would have to be decided on a balance of probabilities. The Court found that the testimony of the police officer was in sync with the narrative contained in the video, thereby establishing its authenticity on a balance of probabilities. The Ontario Court further observed:
    • “7. While the circumstantial evidence is sufficient, in this case, there is further direct evidence that independently shows the video is accurate. The surveillance video is in sync with all of the other evidence at trial. The officers’ testimony as to the scene when they arrived, the times the various officers arrived, their actions, the position of the accused, the departure of other parties, the arrival of the ambulance is all consistent with this video. The two police in-car videos are also consistent with this surveillance video.”
  • We have referred to these decisions in order to reiterate that a pragmatic and purposive interpretation of the law governing the admission of electronic evidence is consistent with the development of the law in international jurisdictions as well.
  • 116. We, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the photos and videos in M.Os.45,49,50,51,52 and 53 were taken contemporaneously when the attack was taking place and have not been doctored and can be read in evidence.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

If a Document is Per Se Illegal, or Void Ab Initio, it Need Not be Set Aside

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • If a document is per se invalid, it can be set aside by the Court.
  • In certain cases, if a document is per se invalid, it need not be set aside; the court can proceed, taking notice of its illegality, without setting it aside.

Void” has several facets.

  • ‘Void’ nature has several facets. No declaration needed if a document is void. The court can proceed by ignoring the deed.
  • One type of void acts, those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration is necessary,
  • The other type of void act (e.g., may be transaction against a minor without being represented by a next friend) is a good transaction against the whole world except the minor. If he decides to avoid the same and succeeds in avoiding it by taking recourse to appropriate proceeding the transaction becomes void from the very beginning.
  • Another type of void act may be which is not a nullity but for avoiding the same a declaration has to be made.

Transfer Per Se Invalid or Ab-initio Void, Need Not Set Aside

The general principle is – if a document is per se invalid, it can be set aside by the Court. In certain cases, if a document is per se invalid, it need not be set aside; the court can proceed, taking notice of its illegality, without setting it aside.

In Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, (2002) 1 SCC 178, it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “25………Undoubtedly Smt Madamma, sister of the minor, is not a “guardian” as defined in Section 4(b) of the Act (Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956). Therefore, she can only be taken to be a “de facto guardian” or more appropriately “de facto manager”. To a transfer in such a case Section 11 of the Act squarely applies. Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor’s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding. The minor, on attaining majority, can repudiate the transfer in any manner as and when occasion for it arises. After attaining majority if he/she transfers his/her interest in the property in a lawful manner asserting his/her title to the same that is sufficient to show that the minor has repudiated the transfer made by the de facto guardian/manager.”

In Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

  • “When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

  • “39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
  • 40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

Also read:

•    Void, Voidable & Illegal Actions and Sham Transactions
•    Fraudulent or Void Transaction: Is ‘Declaration’ Required?
•  Cancellation, Avoidance or Declaration of a Void or Voidable Deed
•    All Illegal Agreements are Void; but All Void Agreements are Not Illegal
•    Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Settlement Deeds & Powers of Sub-Registrar in Cancelling Deeds
•    Can the True Owner Seek Cancellation of a Deed, Executed by a Stranger to the Property
•    Did the Supreme Court Depart From its Earlier Position in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman?
•    If a Document is Per Se Illegal, or Void Ab Initio, it Need Not be Set Aside

If Voidable, to be Set Aside

In Amirtham Kudumbah v. Sarnam Kudumbah, (1991) 3 SCC 20, it is held as under:

  • “8. .. The property was transferred by him without obtaining the previous permission of the Court and the transfer was not for the benefit of the minor. Such a sale by the minor’s father who is his natural guardian is, unlike in the case of transfer by a de facto guardian (Section 11), not a void sale, but only a voidable sale. Such a sale until set aside is sufficiently effective to pass title, but being a voidable sale, what the buyer has obtained is a defeasible title which is liable to be set aside at the instance of the person entitled to impeach it. Section 8(3) of the Guardianship Act says: “Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him.”(emphasis supplied)

In Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan, (2001) 6 SCC 163, Vishwambhai v. Laxminarayan, (2001) 6 SCC 163, and Nangali Amma Bhavani Amma v. Gopalkrishnan Nair, (2004) 8 SCC 785, also, the challenge was made to alienation of minor’s property without Court’s sanction and without legal necessity. It was held that the alienation by natural guardian was voidable.

No declaration Needed if a Document is Void

In Sarojini v. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, and in Gomathy v. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43, it is held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.

In Laxmanan v. Padmini, (2009) 1 SCC 354, wherein our Apex Court had considered a deed of Will and a Gift allegedly executed by the very same person on the very same day. In that particular case also, it was a simple suit for partition, even when the said two documents were propounded by the opponent. Even though such contentions were taken in the written statement, regarding the existence of a Will as well as a gift deed, the plaint was not amended and any other reliefs were not incorporated. The propounder of the Will failed to dispel the suspicious circumstances existed in the execution of the Will. Same was the case with the gift deed also. Both the said documents were registered documents. Even then, the Apex court found that the suit for partition, disregarding and ignoring the said two documents, was maintainable, and the decree was granted.

Void has several facets; If ab initio Void, No declaration Needed

Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University, (2001) 6 SCC 534, laid down the distinction between Void and Voidable. It reads as under:

  • “22. Thus the expressions “void and voidable” have been the subject-matter of 20 consideration on innumerable occasions by courts. The expression “void” has several facets. One type of void acts, transactions, decrees are those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration is necessary, law does not take any notice of the same and it can be disregarded in collateral proceeding or otherwise. The other type of void act, e.g., may be transaction against a minor without being represented by a next friend. Such a transaction is a good transaction against the whole world. So far as the minor is concerned, if he decides to avoid the same and succeeds in avoiding it by taking recourse to appropriate proceeding the transaction becomes void from the very beginning. Another type of void act may be which is not a nullity but for avoiding the same a declaration has to be made. Voidable act is that which is a good act unless avoided, e.g., if a suit is filed for a declaration that a document is fraudulent and/or forged and fabricated, it is voidable as the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs and a party who alleges otherwise is obliged to prove it. If it is proved that the document is forged and fabricated and a declaration to that effect is given, a transaction becomes void from the very beginning. There may be a voidable transaction which is required to be set aside and the same is avoided from the day it is so set aside and not any day prior to it. In cases where legal effect of a document cannot be taken away without setting aside the same, it cannot be treated to be void but would be obviously voidable.”

Document Void Ab Initio – Need Not Be Set Aside, Neither Should There Be A Prayer

In Prem Singh v. Birbal, AIR 2006 SC 3608, the Supreme Court has held as under:

  • “16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non-est in the eye of law, as it would be a nullity.”

 In Pragnya Rout v. Hemaprava Ray AIR 2006 Ori. 21, it was held as under:

  • “22. Law is well settled that a decree and/or a registered document which is otherwise ab initio void need not be set aside. Such decree does not strip the right of a party who is the real owner and was not a signatory to the document in question or a party to the suit…. If the deed is void at the threshold, no steps need be taken to set it aside. The vendor may not have title to convey, and in such a case the title deed conveys no title and can be ignored as not worth the paper written on. (see: 1992-2 OLR 362, Sarbeswar v. Commissioner, Consolidation).” (Quoted in: Gulam Mustafa v. Md.  Yusuf Ansari, 2018-3 JBCJ 606; 2019-1 JCR 83 (Jhk).

In Natarajan v. M.  Ravi, 2019-4 CTC 543; 2019-2 LW 673 (Mad), the High Court found that the release deed being a fraudulent document, ‘it is a void document’- void ab initio, which need not have been be set aside and neither should there be a prayer to set aside the document. The Court said it as under:

  • “53. I hold that the release deed being a fraudulent document cannot be upheld by this Court. It is a void document. Its basis is not free consent. The basis is an agreement entered to defeat the rights of the plaintiffs and to grab the property. Consequently, I hold that the doubt being void ab initio, need not be set aside neither should there be a prayer to set aside the document. It is a non-est document in law. It is void. It is a null document. It does not give any right to the releasee. The point is answered accordingly.”

Babulal Tiwari v. Jabbar Singh, 2018-1 MPWN 41, also it is held that the law is well settled that a registered document which is otherwise void ab initio need not be set aside. Such deeds do not strip the right of the party who is the real owner.

In Kaka Hajee Md. Ishaque Sahib v. Kaka Md. Saddiq Sahib, (1970) 1 MLJ 207, it has been held as under:

  • “Normally a transaction will bind a person if he or persons under whom he derives title are eo nomine parties to the same, and must be set aside before any relief is claimed thereunder. This, however, is subject to two important, exceptions : (1) Where the transaction is only a sham and nominal one, not intended to be given effect to; and (2) Where the transaction is void in law. It necessarily follows that (1) transactions to which a person or persons under whom the said persons derive title are not eo nomine parties; (2) transactions which are challenged as sham and nominal and (3) transactions which are void ab initio are not legally binding in character need not be cancelled and set aside, before any claim is made thereunder. …”

A voidable transaction, Declaration Not Essential: Can be repudiated by conduct

  • Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 350)
  • K.S. Shivappa v. K. Neelamma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2149.

In Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2026 INSC 350: Sanjai Kumar, Vinod Chandran, JJ.) it was held that the plaintiff need not have sought a declaration of nullity, for the following reasons:

  • The plaint only raised an apprehension of encroachment on the strength of a fabricated sale deed.
  • The defence was set up with respect to the sale deed. But, it was not produced.
  • It was not even a registered document available in the public domain.
  • The plaintiff claimed ‘khatedari’ rights based on the mutation entries in his father’s favour and the decree obtained thereat would be an effective repudiation of the document. (Relied on: K.S. Shivappa v. K. Neelamma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2149.)

In K.S. Shivappa v. K. Neelamma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2149, it was found that the repudiation of a voidable transaction need not necessarily be in a suit instituted to set it aside and could as well be, by way of an unequivocal conduct.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

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Thummala Krishna Rao Case Misread by High Courts

In this case, an earlier suit had been dismissed on the ground that one had perfected his title by adverse possession; and thereafter, the University requested the Government to initiate summary eviction proceedings.

Saji Koduvath, Advocates, Kottayam.

Introspection

Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081, 1982 (2) SCC 134, arose from a summary eviction proceeding initiated by the Government under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The facts of the case, in a nutshell, were the following:

  • (i) A suit for possession filed by Osmania University had earlier been dismissed on the ground that one Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession; and (ii) thereafter, Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to initiate summary eviction proceedings.

The Apex Court held in those circumstances that the summary suit for eviction could not have been resorted to by the Government, and that it could have been only be by due process in a civil court action. The Apex Court pointed out that long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in- title of these plots raised a genuine dispute.

In a subsequent decision in V. Laxminarasamma v. A. Yadaiah (S.B. Sinha, A.K. Ganguly & R.M. Lodha, JJ.), 2009-5 SCC 478, it was pointed out –

  • “The observations made therein must be held to have been made in the aforementioned factual matrix.”

Does ‘Long Possession’ Necessarily Trigger a Civil Suit by the State?

In the facts of Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081, 1982 (2) SCC 134 (Y.V. Chandrachud, A. Varadarajan, Amarendra Nath Sen, JJ.), the Supreme Court found that the respondents and their predecessors had ‘long possessionover the suit properties with a ‘genuine dispute on title‘; and therefore, a Civil Court enquiry on title was required on two matters:

  • 1. whether the title was vested in the Government
  • 2. whether the title by adverse possession was perfected (by the private person) against the Government of Andhra Pradesh.

The Apex Court said it as under:

  • “The conspectus of facts in the instant case justifies the view that the question as to the title to the three plots cannot appropriately be decided in a summary inquiry contemplated by sections 6 and 7 of the Act. The long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in- title of these plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title, remembering especially that the property, admittedly, belonged originally to the family of Nawab Habibuddio from whom the respondents claim to have purchased it. The question as to whether the title to the property came to be vested in the Government as a result of acquisition and the further question whether the Nawab encroached upon that property thereafter and perfected his title by adverse possession must be decided in a properly constituted suit. May be that the Government may succeed in establishing its title to the property but until that is done, the respondents cannot be evicted summarily.”

A three Judge Bench in State of Rajasthan v. Padmavatidevi (S.C. Agrawal, Sujata V. Manohar and S. Saghir Ahmad, JJ.), 1995 Suppl(2) SCC 290, which referred Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao, (1982) 2 SCC 134, observed that the factor that mandates a civil-court-action, rather than a summary remedy, is ‘the bona fide claim‘ of the person in occupation. The Court was observed as under:

  • “6. … Dealing with similar provisions contained in Section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1945, this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao (1982) 2 SCC 134 : (1982) 3 SCR 500, has laid down that the summary remedy for eviction provided by Section 6 of the said Act could be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of the Government and if the person in occupation has a bona fide claim to litigate he could not be ejected save by the due process of law and that the summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 was not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. ….. In such a case the proper course is to have the matter adjudicated by the ordinary courts of law.”(Quoted in: Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji v. Union of India, AIR 2019 SC 1692; 2019 20 SCC 705)

Govt. of AP v. Thummala Krishna RaoCritical Appreciation

Upon examining the facts of Thummala Krishna Raocase, it is evident that the concepts of ‘long possession’ and ‘adverse possession’ were considered therein in the following factual context:

  • (i) A suit for possession filed by Osmania University had earlier been dismissed on the ground that one Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession.
  • (ii) Thereafter, Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to initiate summary eviction proceedings.

Therefore, it is clear that the Government need not have gone for a civil suit, if the following conditions were satisfied –

  • (i) the title of the disputed property unequivocally vested with the Government and
  • (ii) there had been no chance of a plausible claim of adverse possession for the private person.

Analysis of Thummala Krishna Rao Case in a Reference Matter

V. Laxminarasamma v. A. Yadaiah (S.B. Sinha, A.K. Ganguly & R.M. Lodha, JJ.), 2009-5 SCC 478, dealt with a Reference concerning the legal question — whether the adjudication of a claim based on adverse possession falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. The Reference arose due to an apparent conflict in the decisions of two Division Benches of the Supreme Court.

S.B. Sinha, J., distinguished the Thummala Krishna Rao case, pointing out the factual situation in which it arose. They were: (i) an earlier suit for possession filed by Osmania University had been dismissed on the ground that Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession, and (ii) the summary action of the Government had ensued since Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to initiate summary eviction proceedings.

The three Judge Bench observed as under:

  • 45. … We are not oblivious of a decision of this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and Anr. [(1982) 2 SCC 134] wherein it was held that a question of title could not properly be decided in a summary enquiry contemplated by Sections 6 and 7 of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905. In that case, the principal question, which arose for consideration, was as to whether the property in question was in possession of the family of one Habibuddin for a long time and, thus, the same had not vested in the Government by reason of a land acquisition proceeding initiated for acquisition of the land for Osmania University. In that case, Osmania University filed a suit for possession which was dismissed on the premise that Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession. Thereafter Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to take steps for summary eviction of the persons who are not in authorized occupation of the said plots. The observations made therein must be held to have been made in the aforementioned factual matrix.”
  • See also: Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah, AIR 2010 SC 744; 2010-2 SCC 461.

Axioms on ‘Long Possession‘ Stand Against Presumptions Favours Govt.

The axioms, in the Government of AP v. Thummala Krishna Rao, on ‘long possession‘ and the scope of adjudication on ‘title by adverse possession‘ were not seen followed in subsequent pronouncements. Later decisions have clarified and reinforced certain key legal principles, including:

  • 1. Presumption available in favour of the government – all lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government (R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Govt of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203).
  • 2. The court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property (Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988).

Also Read: Title of Property: As the Government is regarded as the ‘original’ and ‘ultimate’ owner of all land, private persons to prove their title, the State need not.

Conclusion

It is seen that several High Courts deal with Government of AP v. Thummala Krishna Rao, without noticing the distinguishing points* (laid down in V. Laxminarasamma v. A. Yadaiah – S.B. Sinha, A.K. Ganguly & R.M. Lodha, JJ., 2009-5 SCC 478), and the principles of law manifested in R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Govt of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203, and Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988.

  • * The distinguishing points are: (i) a suit for possession filed by Osmania University had earlier been dismissed on the ground that one Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession; and (ii) thereafter, Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to initiate summary eviction proceedings.
  • That the Apex Court held in those circumstances that the summary suit for eviction under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act could not have been resorted to by the Government, and that it could have been only be by the due process in a civil court action.

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Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

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Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

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Evidence Act – General

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Documents – Proof and Presumption

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Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

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Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India