Does Alternate Remedy Bar Civil Suits and Writ Petitions?

Saji Koduvath.

1. If Effective alternate remedyCourt refuses relief

In Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, AIR 2020 SC 2819,  it is pointed out by our Apex Court that when  the aggrieved person has an effective alternate remedy available in law, normally, the courts will not entertain a Writ petition. It is observed in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, 2014-1 SCC 603, that if the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction.

See also:

  • Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163.
  • G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192;
  • C.A. Abraham v. ITO, (1961) 2 SCR 765: AIR 1961 SC 609;
  • First IT Officer, Salem v. Short Brothers (P) Ltd. (1966) 60 ITR 83(SC);
  • L. Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly, (1970) 78 ITR 26 (SC);
  • State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. (1977) 2 SCC 724;
  • Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, (1979) 3 SCC 83;
  • Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433;
  • CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260;
  • H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312;
  • Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536;
  • Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1;
  • Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1998) 8 SCC 272;
  • Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999) 1 SCC 472;
  • Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5;
  • Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh, (1999) 1 SCC 209,  AIR 1999 SC 2859;
  • A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695;
  • Karnataka Chemical Industries v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 13;
  • Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6 SCC 569);
  • National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi, (2002) 7 SCC 456;
  • Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2003) 3 SCC 524;
  • Satya Pal Anand v. State of M.P. and Ors. ((2016)10 SCC 767;
  • Maharashtra Chess Assn. v. Union of India, 2019 SCC Online SC 932.

2. Alternative remedy not to operate as a bar in certain contingencies

Our Apex Court further observed in M/S Radha Krishan Industries v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 334, that alternative remedy would not operate as a bar in certain contingencies. They include:

  • where, the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the law or
  • acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; or
  • has resorted to invoke provisions, which are repealed; or
  • where an order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.

Their Lordships quoted the following from Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107:

  • “7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies:
    • (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;
    • (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or
    • (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See: Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks,(1998) 8 SCC 1 .)
  • The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the appellants’ dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.”

3. Appeal from “Caesar to Caesar’s wife”

In Ram and Shyam Co. vs. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 the Supreme Court has noticed that if an appeal is from “Caesar to Caesar’s wife” the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility (referred to in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, 2014-1 SCC 603; Shauntlabai Derkar v. Maroti Dewaji Wadaskar  2014-1 SCC 602).

4. Courts have wide discretionary powers in issuing Writs

It is pointed out in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, 2014-1 SCC 603, that various Constitution Benches of the Apex Court have held that though Article 226 confers a very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ absolutely discretionary in character.

  • See: K.S. Rashid vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207;
  • Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425;
  • Union of India vs. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882;
  • State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 and
  • K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089

5. If sufficient grounds, extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 invoked

The Supreme Court has pointed out in U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey, (2005) 8 SCC 264, that the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted.

As pointed out in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, 2014-1 SCC 603, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226.

  • See also: Union of India v. T.R. Verma AIR 1957 SC 882;
  • State of U.P. vs. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86;
  • Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433;
  • Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107;
  • State of H.P. vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 499).

6. Non-entertainment of writ (when exists alternative remedy) is a self-imposed rule only

It is further observed in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, 2014-1 SCC 603, that it is a settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available, is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy.

  • (Also See: Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419;
  • Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337;
  • U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey, (2005) 8 SCC 264).

7. Breach of principles of natural justice or procedure

It is also observed in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, 2014-1 SCC 603, that the Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power in the following instances:

  1. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or
  2. in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or
  3. has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or
  4. when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice,
  • See also:
  • N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422;
  • Municipal Council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar, (1965) 2 SCR 653;
  • Trimbak Gangadhar Telang v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide, AIR 1977 SC 1222;
  • Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436;
  • S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572;
  • Rajasthan SRTC vs. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75;
  • Kerala SEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293;
  • A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695;
  • L.L. Sudhakar Reddy vs. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC 634;
  • Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509;
  • Pratap Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484;
  • GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72;
  • Union of India v. Guwahati Carbon Ltd. 2012 (11) SCC 651.

8. Civil Court can Examine ‘Non-compliance of Law’

Even when a tribunal is provided for reddressal of remedies, the civil courts will have jurisdiction to examine the allegation of non-compliance of the provisions of the statute or of any of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. If the challenge is only as to the ‘erroneous’ character of the order, other than ‘jurisdictional error’, the suit will not be maintainable. (South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt.  Ltd.  2019-4 CivCC 150 (SC); 2019-3 CurCC 370(SC); 2019-11 Scale 33).

When an order is passed by a statutory Land-Tribunal violating a mandatory provision, the order will be illegal, without jurisdiction and a nullity. The civil courts which are courts of “general jurisdiction” can decide whether a tribunal or authority exercising statutory jurisdiction has acted in excess or beyond the statutory powers. The civil courts can interfere when the order of the statutory tribunal or authority is really not an order under the Act conferring jurisdiction on it. In other words, if a tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions (Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Ludhiana Municipality AIR 1963 SC 1547), the jurisdiction of the civil court will not stand excluded.

Transgression of Jurisdiction Order Nullity

A certificate of purchase is issued and an order passed by the Land Tribunal without complying with the provisions of the Act and the Rules would be a nullity (Muhammed Haji v. Kunhunni Nair, 1993-1 KLT 227; Secretary, TDB VS Mohanan Nair, ILR 2013-2 Ker883; P. N. Viswambaran v. T. P. Sanu, AIR 2018  Ker 116).

In Muhammed Haji v. Kunhunni Nair, 1993-1 KLT 227(FB),  it was found that the order passed by the Land Tribunal under the Kerala Land Reforms Act  was illegal, without jurisdiction and a nullity and that the order was of no legal effect for the provisions of the Act and the Rules have not been complied with and the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, as required by the Act, were totally contravened. In such cases, it was pointed out, the jurisdiction of the civil court was not excluded as stated by the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. (AIR 1940 PC 105) and Ram Swarup’s case (AIR 1966 SC 893).

Similarly, the ultimate decision can be challenged, in spite of finality and exclusionary clauses (or provision for appeal/revision), if the jurisdiction had been (wrongly) assumed by the tribunal, where it did not exist, and the decision was not a decision under the Act, but a nullity. (Muhammad Haji v. Kunhunni Nair, AIR  1993 Ker 104 – tribunal proceeded without issuing notice; Prasannakumar V. State of Kerala, Laws(Ker) 2014-10-127 – the statutory Land tribunal proceeded upon an exempted temple land illegally assuming jurisdiction; Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair, ILR 2013- 2 Ker 883).

It was observed in Mathew v. Taluk Land Board, AIR 1979 SC 1573 that the certificate of purchase issued under the Kerala Land Reforms Act was not conclusive proof of the assignment of the right, as provided under the Act, when title and interest of the landowner had been conferred, under the Act, in favour of the holder when it was found inaccurate on its face or when it is shown that it has been obtained by playing fraud (Relied on in: Ahmmed Kutty v. Mariakutty Umma, 2000 (1) KLT 829 (SC); Mathilakath Skaria VS Mathilakath Joseph, 2013 1 KHC 293; 2013 1 KLJ 410; P. N. Viswambaran v. T. P. Sanu, AIR 2018  Ker 116).

9. If disputed questions of fact, courts decline jurisdiction in a writ petition

It is observed in M/S Radha Krishan Industries vs The State Of Himachal Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 334, that where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition; and it is pointed out that this principle have been consistently upheld by the Apex Court in Seth Chand Ratan v Pandit Durga Prasad, (2003) 5 SCC 399, Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706 , and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 632, etc.

10. Important Legal Propositions on Jurisdiction of Civil Courts, Under Sec. 9 CPC

  • 1. When Right or Liability exists at common law, and is re-enacted by the statute with a special forum for efficacious remedy and civil court remedy is expressly barred, there will be an implied bar for civil courts.
  • Eg. Bylaws of a society provides for efficacious redressal of remedies on wrongful expulsion from a club and the bye laws states that the decisions of that authority is final.
  • 2. When Right or Liability exists at common law, and is re-enacted by the statute with a special forum for efficacious remedy and civil court remedy is not expressly barred, there will be an election of forum (that special forum or civil courts).
  • Municipal law provides for leaving a particular distance from the boundary so that no nuisance of obstructing light be caused to a neighbor by the building construction (a right exists in common law).
  • 3. New rights conferred by enacted laws (not pre-existing in common law) also provides the machinery for enforcement of such right or liability or for adjudication of disputes, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision, the jurisdiction of the civil court will be stood barred by necessary implication. (Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (Dead) By LRs v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 681; Quoted in South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt.  Ltd.  2019-4 CivCC 150 (SC); 2019-3 CurCC 370(SC); 2019-11 Scale 33).
  • 4. Noncompliance of fundamental principles of law – civil courts will have jurisdiction. Despite express bar, if the decision of the authority under challenge is in:
    • (i)    non-compliance of fundamental principles of law (like, natural justice),
    • (ii)   non-compliance of fundamental principles of (that or any other) statute or
    • (iii)  without jurisdiction (like, Village Officer takes decision where the Collector has to) civil courts will have jurisdiction
    • (iv) where the plea of illegality raised before the Civil Court goes to the root of the matter and would, if upheld, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order is a nullity (Ram Swamp v. Shikar Chand, AIR 1966 SC 893).
      • Eg. Rights to vote in an election, candidature (under Acts or Bylaws);
      • Right to Ration under Ration Supply Laws.

11. The fundamentals of these principles are laid down in the following two decisions:

  • 1. Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford, [1859] 6 C. B. (NS) 336: 28 LJ CP 242: 141 ER 486. It is observed as under:
    • “One is where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a Statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law: there, unless the Statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the Statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides, no particular form of remedy: there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a Statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it…….. The remedy provided by the Statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.”
  • 2. It is observed by Lord Thankerton in The Secretary of State vs Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105, as under:
    • “It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principle of judicial procedure.”
  • (See: Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433;
  • South Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs. Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2019-11 SCALE 33;
  • Zenith Steel Tubes and Industries Ltd Vs. Sicom Litd. AIR 2008  SC 451;
  • Devinder Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2006 SC 2850;
  • Mafatlal Industries Limited Vs. Union Of India, 1997-5 SCC 536;
  • Pandurang Ramchandra Mandlik Vs. Shantibai Ramchandra Ghatge, AIR 1989 SC 2240)

12. Dhulabhai v. State of MP, AIR 1969 SC 78

Hidayatullah, J. in Dhulabhai v. State of MP observed as to uster of jurisdiction of the civil courts as follows:

  • (1) Where the Statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Courts’ jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
  • (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
  • Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the Statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said Statute or not.
  • (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals.
  • (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional. or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
  • (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies.
  • (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.
  • (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.

These propositions are emphasised further in several Supreme Court decisions including the following:

  • Premier Automobiles Limited v. Kamalakar Shantharam Wadke, (1995) 5 SCC 75,
  • Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. v. Krishna Kant, AIR 1995 SC 1715,
  • Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536.

13. Construction in Violation of Municipal Building Regulation

In K. Ramdas Shenoy v. Chief Officer, Town Municipal Council, Udipi, AIR 1974 SC 2177, the Apex Court held as follows:

  • “An illegal construction of a cinema building materially affects the right to of enjoyment of the property by persons residing in the residential area. The Municipal Authorities owe a duty and obligation under the statute to see that the residential areas is not spoilt by unauthorized construction. The scheme is for the benefit of the residents of the locality. The Municipality acts in aid of the scheme. The rights of the residents in the area are invaded by an illegal construction of a cinema building. It has to be remembered that a scheme in residential area means planned orderliness in accordance with the requirements of the residents. If the scheme is nullified by arbitrary acts in excess and derogation of the powers of the Municipality the courts will quash orders passed by Municipalities in such cases.”

A person who is affected by neighbour’s illegal construction which is in infraction of a Municipal regulation will have the locus to maintain a suit for perpetual injunction. The Kerala High Court, in Saina v. Konderi, AIR 1984 Ker 170, turned down the argument that the matters concerning violation of the Municipal Rules are entirely rest in the look-out of the local authority. It was observed that unless, by express words or by necessary implication, he is debarred (Sec. 9 CPC) from doing so, the civil court would have jurisdiction if there was violation of Building Rules. Finally, it is held that the law recognises a citizen’s right to institute a suit with a view to ensure effective implementation of the Municipal regulations, such as the Buildings Rules, even in the absence of a specific personal injury to the person suing. The High Court quoted Lord Wright in (1868) 4 Ex. 43 where it was said:

  • “If you have an infringement of a legal right there is a right of action without actual damage being proved….  Where you have an interference with a legal right, the law presumes damage.”

Referring the Kerala decision, it is observed in Sindhu Education Society v. Municipal Corporation of City of Ulhasnagar, AIR 2001 Bom 145 and in Fatima v. Village Panchayat of Merces, AIR 2000 Bom 444, that the citizens will have the right to enforce Rules through Court if the Municipal Corporation fails to perform its duty and that courts in India has the duty to see that the law is obeyed and not violated.

(See also: Babulal Shivlal Upadhye v. Yadav Atmaram Joshi, 1994-2 Bom CR 583; 1994-2 MahLR 869; 1994-1 MhLJ 256; D.  Thomas v. N.  Thomas1999-2 MLJ 260;Musstt Anjira Khatoon Hazarika v. Tapan Kumar Das: 2015-1 GauLR 133.)

Andhra Pradesh High Court held in Bhagwan Das v. Harish ChetwalIt, as quoted in Sarada Bai v. Shakuntala Bai, AIR 1993 AP 20, as under:

  • “The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in K.R. Shenoy v. Udipi Municipality emboldens us to take a view at variance with the one expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Kamalamma v. Subba Rao and so hold that an individual, be he a neighbour or one of a class of persons where the infraction of a right is involved and complained of, is certainly clothed with a right to invoke the jurisdiction of a Civil Court not only to enforce the obligations and duties was on the concerned authorities, but also subject the individual or class of individuals to conform to the obligations of the statute.
  • If that be so, it presents no difficulty in answering one of the questions raised in this case, viz., whether it would be competent for the neighbour, namely, the petitioners herein to enforce the obligation cast on the Municipal Corporation to remove the structures constructed in contravention of the statutory provisions; and to seek a direction against an individual, plaintiff herein to conform to the obligation laid down in Chapter XII of the Act and to demolish any construction made in contravention thereof, either by way of a civil proceeding or seeking mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution. The answer is quite apparent and it is in the affirmative.”

15. Liquor Shop causing Public Nuisance

The question that required consideration in D.  Thomas v. N.  Thomas, 1999-2 MLJ 260 was whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendants from conducting a liquor shop for apprehended injury of public nuisance to the residents of locality. The plaintiffs filed the suit in representative capacity under Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC. The defendants resisted the suit on the ground that it was barred under Sec. 56 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act. In this decision the court held as under:

  • “Under Specific Relief Act, a suit to prevent the nuisance is maintainable under Secs. 38 and 39. Plaintiff is also entitled to file a suit for perpetual prohibitory and mandatory injunction from causing any nuisance. Nuisance is an act of omission which is an interference with, disturbance of or annoyance to a person in the exercise or enjoyment of (a) a right belonging to him as a member of the public, when it is a public nuisance, or (b) his ownership or occupation of land or of some easement, quasi-easement, or other right used or enjoyed in connection with land, when it is a private nuisance.
  •  Whether it is public or private, it is common law right and the suit to prevent the occurrence of nuisance is also a suit of civil nature. So the enforcement of such civil right can be had through court.”
  • “Plaintiffs are not claiming any right under Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act and what want to enforce is only a common law right. I do not find any prohibition under Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act that the common law right to prevent a nuisance is taken away by any other provisions of Prohibition Act. Plaintiffs are not claiming any right by virtue of statute which creates a right for do they want enforcement of such a right created by statute. To prevent a person from committing nuisance is all along a common law right and that could be enforced de hors the enactment of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act.”

16. Forum for Enforcement of Right like Avoidance of Nuisance

It was held in Saraswathi v. Lachanna (1994)1 SCC 611, while considering bar of suit, that the court had to see where a particular act creates a right and also provides a forum for enforcement of such right and bars the jurisdiction of the civil court, then ouster of the civil court jurisdiction had to be upheld. But the situation will be different where the statute neither creates the right in question nor provides any remedy or having created any right or liability no forum for adjudication of any dispute arising out or such right or liability is provided. In such a situation, the ouster of the civil courts jurisdiction is not to be easily inferred.

In D.  Thomas v. N.  Thomas, 1999-2 MLJ 260, a suit filed in representative capacity under O.1, Rule 8 of the CPC, it was observed that prevention of nuisance is not a matter to be decided by authorities under the Act and that for considering location of shop, certain guidelines were given under Rule 18. Though they were not exhaustive, it was clear that authorities under Prohibition Act could not adjudicate private rights of a citizen. So long as plaintiffs were not claiming right under the Act, nor the right to prevent nuisance was created under the Act, there could not be bar under Sec. 9 of Code of Civil Procedure read with Sec. 56 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act.



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When ‘Possession Follows Title’; When ‘Title Follows Possession’?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Inquisition.

  • Whether Section 110, Indian Evidence Act follows the principle ‘Title Follows Possession’? (Section 110: When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner)
    • Note: Section 110 is pertained to ownership; and NOT, title’.
  • Whether Section 114 admits both ‘Title Follows Possession’ and ‘Possession Follows Title’? (Section 114: The court may ‘presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc.)
    • Note: The principles ‘Title Follows Possession’ and ‘Possession Follows Title’ apply only when the facts disclose no title/possession, as the case may be, in either of the disputants.

Introduction.

The legal principles, ‘Possession Follows Title’ and ‘Title Follows Possession’, are Rules of Evidence. (In grammar – ‘B follows A’ means ‘A comes before B’ or ‘A is followed by B’.) They are applied in cases where there are no sufficient and independent evidence to prove possession or title, as the case may be.

Under S. 110 Evidence Act, ownership is presumed on the proof of possession. It ‘follows from well settled principle of law that normally, unless contrary is established, title always follows possession’ (Chuharmal v.  Commissioner of Income Tax, M P, AIR  1988 SC 1384; 1988 3 SCC 588).

S. 114 Evidence Act, expressly permits the court to ‘presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case’. Therefore, by virtue of Sec. 114,

  • (i) possession can be presumed on the basis of title (possession follows title), and
  • (ii) title/ownership can be presumed on the basis of possession (title follows possession).

Read Blog (Cllic): POSSESSION is a Substantive Right in Indian Law

S. 110 Evidence Act & the Principle, ‘Title Follows Possession’

Section 110 of the Evidence Act, 1872, reads as under:

  • “110. Burden of proof as to ownership.—When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner.”

This section deals with the burden of proof as to ownership – when a question arises as to whether a person in possession of anything is the owner of such thing. There, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who avers that he is not the owner.

In State of A.P. v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319, the Apex Court held that the object of Section 110 is based on public policy. The object is to prevent persons from committing a breach of peace by taking the law into their own hands however good their title may be over the land in question. This object underlies provisions such as Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963, Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and Sections 154 and 158 of the Indian Penal Code 1860.

In M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case), 2020-1 SCC 1, it is observed as under:

  •  “784. Section 110 deals with the burden of proof – Where the provision applies, the burden of proving that another person who is in possession is not the owner lies on the person who affirms against the ownership of that other person. But, for Section 110 to be attracted, there must be a question as to whether any person is the owner of anything and the ownership claimed must be that of which he is shown to be in possession. Section 110 is based on the principle that title follows possession. That is why the provision postulates that where a person is shown to be in possession, and a question arises as to whether that person is the owner, the law casts the burden of disproving ownership on the individual who affirms that the person in possession is not the owner.”
  • “785. Several decisions of this Court have interpreted the provisions of Section 110. Section 110 is based on the principle that possession in and of itself may raise a presumption of title. But this applies when the facts disclose no title in either of the disputants in which case, as it is said, possession alone decides. Hence, on the other hand, it is also well-settled that the presumption cannot be arise when the facts are known.”

The Apex Court, in M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, relied on Nair Service Society v. Fr. KC Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, wherein it was observed that when no title in either of the disputants, ‘possession alone decides’.

S. 110 Attracted only if possession is Not ‘prima facie’ Wrongful

In Municipality Indore v. Gopalpuri, AIR 1956 MB 70, it is pointed out as under:

  • “The presumption under Section 110 would apply only if the conditions are satisfied, viz., that the possession of the plaintiff is not ‘prima facie’ wrongful, and, secondly, the title of the defendant is not proved.”

‘Possession is good against all but the True Owner’ & Sec. 6 of the Sp. Relief Act

The principle ‘Possession is Good against all but the True Owner’ is declared in Parry v. Clissold, (1907) AC 73. In this decision it was also pointed out that if the rightful owner did not come forward and assert his title within the period of limitation, his right would be extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.

The Supreme Court of India while accepting this principle in Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, pointed out that the law in India allows a plaintiff to maintain a possessory suit under Sec. 9 (preset Sec. 6) of the Specific Relief Act. Such a suit can be filed against a title holder, if he had dispossessed the plaintiff ‘otherwise than in due course of law’.

Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act reads as under:

  • 6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.
  • (1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit.
  • (2) No suit under this section shall be brought
    • (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or
    • (b) against the Government.
  • (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.
  • (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.

In Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, it is observed as under:

  • “17. … To express our meaning we may begin by reading 1907 AC 73 (Perry V. Clissold), to discover if the principle that possession is good against all but the true owner has in any way been departed from.
  • 1907 AC 73 reaffirmed the principle by stating quite clearly:
    • “It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.”
  • Therefore, the plaintiff who was peaceably in possession was entitled to remain in possession and only the State could evict him. The action of the Society was a violent invasion of his possession and in the law as it stands in India the plaintiff could maintain a possessory suit under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act in which title would be immaterial or a suit for possession within 12 years in which the question of title could be raised.”

If Title not Perfected by Adver. Posn, Can one eject a Trespasser After 6 Months

High Courts differ, as pointed out in Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179.

Now it is settled that if one fails to exercise his option by filing a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act within six months, he is at liberty to file a suit to recover his possession (with or without declaration) by a regular suit for recovery of possession. It can be based on title or on his possession in assumed or presumed character of ownership (even if title not perfected by doctrine of adverse possession) on the principle that possession is good title against all the world but the rightful owner. See: Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179; Kanti Lal v. Smt. Shanti Devi, AIR 1997 Raj 230.

Sec. 110 is invoked on Ownership; and NOT on ‘title

 Section 110 of the Evidence Act, 1872, speaks of the burden of proof as to ownership (contra-distinct to title): when a question arises as to whether a person in possession of anything is the owner of such thing, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is cast on the person who avers that he is not the owner. Though it appears to be based on the principle ‘Title Follows Possession’, what is decisively articulated in this section is ‘ownership’; and not title.

M.  Siddiq  v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case), 2020-1 SCC 1, lays down (paras 784 and 785 – quoted above) the following:

  • For Section 110 to be attracted, there must be a question as to ownership of anything.
  • Section 110 deals with the burden of proof.
  • The ‘thing’ must be in possession of one individual.
  • That individual is presumed to be the owner (on the principle that ‘title follows possession’. That is, possession in and of itself may raise a presumption of title.)
  • Section 110 applies when the facts disclose no title in either of the disputants in which case, possession alone decides (presumption cannot be invoked when the facts are known).
  • The law casts the burden of disproving ownership on that individual in the person who affirms that the individual in possession is not the owner.

As signified in Sec. 110, Evidence Act, in law, ownership alone can be presumed; and not title. Title is the legal and authoritative expression of ownership; or, it is the legal recognition of a right. No doubt, it is true, one can acquire title by adverse possession. But, it is said to be inchoate until the such title is upheld by a competent court.

When Sec. 110 is invoked

It is held in Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collectors, AIR 2003 SC 1805, that Section 110 embodies the principle that possession of a property furnishes prima facie proof of ownership of the possessor and casts burden of proof on the party who denies his ownership, and that the presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted:

  • “when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has no title“.

The Supreme Court observed further as under:

  • ““Section 110 of the Evidence Act reads thus:
    • “110. Burden of proof as to ownership.-When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner.”
  • It embodies the principle that possession of a property furnishes prima facie proof of ownership of the possessor and casts burden of proof on the party who denies his ownership. The presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has no title.
  • This Court in Nair Service Society Limited v. K.C. Alexander and Ors., A.I.R. (1968) S.C. 1165 observed,
    • “the possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known, when the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.”
  • The pattedars proved their possession of the lands in question from 1312 Fasli (1902 A.D.) as pattedars. There is long and peaceful enjoyment of the lands in question but no proof of conferment of patta on the late Raja and the facts relating to acquisition of title are not known. The appellant- State could not prove its title to the lands. On these facts, the presumption under Section 110  of the Evidence Act applies and the appellants have to prove that the pattedars are not the owners. The appellants placed no evidence on record to rebut the presumption. Consequently, the pattedars, title to the land in question has to be upheld.”
  • But SeeNotes below under the following headings:
    • When the principles in Sec. 110 and 114 CANNOT be invoked
    • Mutation will not confer ‘title’” and
    • Revenue Records Do Not Confer Presumptive Value on Title

This principle in Section 110 of the Evidence Act is usually adopted in cases where it is not independently possible to prove possession (i) due to the nature of the property or (ii) due to the extent of the property available (Devasia @ Kutty v. Jose, 2014-4 KLJ 41; 2014-3 KLT(SN) 50).

It is held in Nazir Mohamed v. J.  Kamala, AIR 2020 SC 4321, as under:

  • “52. The maxim “possession follows title” is limited in its application to property, which having regard to its nature, does not admit to actual and exclusive occupation, as in the case of open spaces accessible to all. The presumption that possession must be deemed to follow title, arises only where there is no definite proof of possession by anyone else.” 

When ‘Possession Follows Title invoked

In Jones v. Chopman, (1849) 2 Ex. 803: 18 LJ Ex. 456: 76 PR 794; Maule, J, expounded the doctrine ‘Possession Follows Title’ as under:

  • “If there are two persons in a field, each asserting that the field is his, and each doing some act in the assertion of the right of possession, and if the question is, which of these two is in actual possession, I answer, the person who has the title is in actual possession and the other person is a trespasser. In such a case who is in possession is to be determined by the fact of the title and having the same apparent actual possession; The question as to which of the two really is in possession is determined by the fact of the possession; following the title, that is by the law, which makes it follow the title.” (Mitra quoted it in “Law of Possession and Ownership of Property”, as pointed out in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129)

In Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129, Arun Misra, J. pointed out as to possession as under:

  • “247. The concept of possession is complex one. It comprises the right to possess and to exclude others, essential is animus possidendi. Possession depends upon the character of the thing which is possessed. If the land is not capable of any use, mere non-user of it does not lead to the inference that the owner is not in possession. The established principle is that the possession follows title. Possession comprises of the control over the property. The element of possession is the physical control or the power over the object and intention or will to exercise the power. Corpus and animus are both necessary and have to co-exist.”

It held further:

  • “251. A person with title is considered to be in actual possession. The other person is a trespasser. The possession in law follows the right to possess as held in Kynoch Limited v. Rowlands, (1912) 1Ch 527. Ordinarily, the owner of the property is presumed to be in possession and presumption as to possession is in his favour.”

Sec. 114 Evidence ActTitle Follows Possession & Possession Follows Title

In M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1, the Apex Court quoted the following from State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 where Justice B.S. Chauhan explained as under:

  • ‘21…..The said presumption is read under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and applies only in a case where there is either no proof, or very little proof of ownership on either side. The maxim – possession follows title – is applicable in cases where proof of actual possession cannot reasonably be expected, for instance, in the case of wastelands, or where nothing is known about possession one way or another.
  • Presumption of title as a result of possession, can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests in any party. Possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful, and title of the plaintiff is not proved. It certainly does not mean that because a man has title over some land, he is necessarily in possession of it. It in fact means, that if at any time a man with title was in possession of the said property, the law allows the presumption that such possession was in continuation of the title vested in him.
  • A person must establish that he has continued possession of the suit property, while the other side claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/ encroachment, etc.
  • Where the apparent title is with the plaintiffs, it is incumbent upon the defendant, that in order to displace this claim of apparent title and to establish beneficial title in himself, he must establish by way of satisfactory evidence, circumstances that favour his version.
  • Even, a revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession.
  • Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, both forward and backward, can also be raised under Section 110 of the Evidence Act.’ ”

In Anathula Sudhakar  v. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2033, Apex Court held as under:

  • “But what if the property is a vacant site, which is not physically possessed, used or enjoyed? In such cases the principle is that possession follows title. If two persons claim to be in possession of a vacant site, one who is able to establish title thereto will be considered to be in possession, as against the person who is not able to establish title. This means that even though a suit relating to a vacant site is for a mere injunction and the issue is one of possession, it will be necessary to examine and determine the title as a prelude for deciding the de jure possession.”

In Arumaraj Devadhas v. K. Sundaram Nadar, 2009-17 SCC 467, also it was held that the principle possession follows title applies in vacant land. This principle is applied in ‘open space‘ in Praprai N Kothari Vs. John Braganza, AIR 1999 SC 1666 and in Rajendar Singh Vs. Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537. In Naval Shankar Ishwarlal Dave v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1994 SC 1496,  the Apex Court observed that it was ‘settled law that in respect of open land, title follows possession’. In  Kashi Bai v. Sudha Rani Ghose, AIR 1958 SC 434, it was observed that when the land was vacant and was lying open, it was presumed to be that of the owner (possession follows title).

Possession Follows Title and Adverse Possession

It is held in MS Jagadambal v. Southern Indian Education Trust, 1988 (Supp) SCC 144 that the possession continues with the title holder unless and until the defendant acquires title by adverse possession (possession follows title). In LN Aswathama v. P Prakash, 2009-13 SCC 229, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “In law, possession follows title. The plaintiffs having established title to the suit property, will be entitled to decree for possession, unless their right to the suit property was extinguished, by reason of defendant being in adverse possession for a period of twelve years prior to the suit.”

When the principles in Sec. 110 and 114 CANNOT be invoked

As we find in M.  Siddiq  v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case), 2020-1 SCC 1, Section 110 or the principle ‘title follows possession‘ applies when the facts disclose no title in either of the disputants in which case, possession alone decides (presumption cannot be invoked when the facts are known). But, with respect to the principle ‘possession follows title‘, as we find in Anathula Sudhakar  v. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2033, if only title is proved by one party, then only the principle ‘possession follows title’ comes in.

It is equally important that both these principles on presumption, ‘possession follows title’ and ‘title follows possession’, cannot be invoked in cases where:

  • (i) the defendants do not claim title/possession to the suit property (Devasia @ Kutty v. Jose, 2014-4 KLJ 41; 2014-3 KLT(SN) 50).
  • (ii) the facts (on title/possession) are known (M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1), or
  • there is evidence of independent possession/title (Bhavnagar Municipality Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 717).

Possession is a Good Title of right Against any one who cannot Show a Better

In Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813, our Apex Court explained the principle ‘possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better’ as under:

  • “9. The law in India, as it has developed, accords with jurisprudential thought as propounded by luminaries like Salmond. Salmond on Jurisprudence states:­
    • “These two concepts of ownership and possession, therefore, may be used to distinguish between the de facto possessor of an object and its de jure owner, between the man who actually has it and the man who ought to have it. They serve also to contract the position of one whose rights are ultimate, permanent and residual with that of one whose rights are only of a temporary nature.
    • x x x x x In English law possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who takes his own, may be forced in this way to  restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law.
    • Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit).”
  • 10. As far back as 1924, in the case of Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144, the learned Judge observed that in India, persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a court. Later, in the case of Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, this Court ruled that when the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. It was further held that if Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (corresponding to the present Section6) is employed, the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. When, however, the period of six months has passed, questions of title can be raised by the defendant, and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words, such a right is only restricted to possession in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (corresponding to the present Section 6) but does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years from the date of dispossession, and title need not be proved unless the defendant can provide one.
  • 11. It was also observed by this Court in Nair Service Society Ltd (supra) that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against the entire world except the rightful owner. In such a case, the defendant must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title and probably a possession prior to the plaintiff’s, and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time.”

Settled Possession and Established Possession

In A. Subramanian v. R. Pannerselvam, AIR 2021 SC 821, the Supreme Court held that even a trespasser, who is in established possession of the property could obtain injunction. But, it was cautioned that the matter would be different, if the plaintiff himself elaborated in the plaint about title dispute and fails to make a prayer for declaration of title along with injunction relief.

In Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, AIR 2019 SC 813, it was pointed out in a case where there was no document to prove settled possession that ‘merely on doubtful material and cursory evidence, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was ever in possession of the property, and that too in settled possession’. It held further as under:

  • “13. The crux of the matter is that a person who asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. Settled possession means such possession over the property which has existed for a sufficiently long period of time, and has been acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. Settled possession must be (i) effective,(ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. There cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine settled possession. Occupation of a property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual legal possession. The possession should contain an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser is to be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

See Blog (Click): Declaration and Injunction

Nature of Property and Claim of Occupant Whether Bona Fide were Determinative Factors

In Government of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao, (1982) 2 SCC 134,  the question considered was whether summary remedy for evicting a person provided for by section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905, could be resorted to. It was pointed out

  • the duration of encroachment, short or long, was not the determinative matter
  • what was relevant for the decision was more the nature of the property and
  • whether the claim of the occupant was bona fide.

It was also found that if there was bona fide dispute, on title between the Government and the occupant, it must be adjudicated upon by the Ordinary courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily. Duration of occupation would be relevant requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law, if the person –

  • occupied openly for an appreciable length of time and
  • could be taken, prima facie, to have a bonafide claim to the property.

Possession is Heritable and Transferable

Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law. It is heritable and transferable. (Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathayi, AIR 1966 Ker 179; Phirayalal Kapur Vs. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186; Nallammal Vs. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864). 

Injunction is a Possessory Remedy.

Courts protect settled possession (Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, 2004-1 SCC 769). Injunction is a possessory remedy. (See: Ladies Corner, Bangalore vs State of Karnataka, ILR 1987 KAR 1710, 1987 (1) KarLJ 402. Patil Exhibitors (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Corporation of The City (M Venikatachaliah, J.) : AIR 1986 Kant 194, ILR 1985 KAR 3700, 1985 (2) KarLJ 533. Referred to in Chetak Constructions Vs. Om Prakash, AIR 2003 MP 145. )

But, an injunction cannot be issued against a true owner or title holder and in favour of a trespasser or a person in unlawful possession. See: Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji vs Maniben Jagmalbhai: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 258.

See Blog: Civil Rights and Jurisdiction of Civil Courts

Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal – HC and SC Approached in different Perspectives

Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal, 2022-10 SCC 217, arose from a suit seeking declaration of ownership and permanent injunction. The findings of the High Court were the following:

  • the plea of ownership claimed by the plaintiff based on a sale deed and the plea of adverse possession were contrary to each other;
  • the plaintiffs could not have been permitted to take both the pleas at the same time;
  • but, in view of the fact that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land since the execution of the said sale deed, the plaintiff was entitled for injunction on the basis of his possession.

Setting aside the High Court judgment the Apex Court held as under:

  • “The possession/alleged possession of the plaintiffs could not have been protected by passing a decree of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiffs”.

Should the Defendant-Rightful-Owner Approach the Court Again For Recovery?

No.

Before Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal, our Apex Court held in Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji v. Maniben Jagmalbhai, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 258 (M.R. Shah, B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.) to the following effect (see ‘End Notes’ below):

  • The plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction and/or protect his possession against the rightful owner, more particularly, when he fails to get the declaratory relief with respect to the title.
  • In a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession, the only thing the plaintiff will have to establish is that as on the date of the suit, he was in lawful possession of the suit property and the defendant has tried to interfere or disturb his possession
  • the plaintiff, who has failed to get any declaratory relief on title cannot be said to be in “lawful possession”. Only when the person seeking the relief is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the property, he is legally entitled to be in possession, and not to disposes him, except in due process of law.
  • The contention of the plaintiff that even if the plaintiff failed to get the declaratory relief and the suit is dismissed, once the plaintiff is found to be in possession, her possession cannot be disturbed except in due process of law and the only remedy available to the defendant would be “to file a substantive suit to get back the possession is noticed only to be rejected outright”.
  • In Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes Vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370, it was held that the ‘due process’ or ‘due course’ condition was satisfied the moment the rights of the parties were adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it did not matter who brought the action to court.
  • In Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes Vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, the Court has approved the following findings of the High Court of Delhi in Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. Vs. Hotel Imperial (2006) 88 DRJ 545:
    • “In this context, when a party approaches a court seeking a protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails in setting up a good case, can it then say that the other party must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing his rights i.e. for taking back something from the first party who holds it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the injunction action must grant an injunction anyway? I would think not.”

Even the Rightful Owner is NOT entitled to Eject a Trespasser, by Force

It goes without saying that the the rightful owner is not legally entitled to eject the interloper or trespasser by force, otherwise than by due process of law; especially when the trespasser is in settled possession.

In Karthiyayani Amma v. Govindan, AIR 1980 Ker 224, the High Court considered the question whether the rightful owner can eject a trespasser in possession with force; and whether a person in illegal possession could sustain a suit for injunction against the true owner, from forcibly dispossessing him from the property.  It was held as under:

  • “The ultimate position, therefore, reduces itself to this:
  • Can a person in possession without title sustain a suit for injunction against the rightful owner if he proves possession?
  • Yes.
  • In this case, plaintiff is found to in be possession. On the finding, he should be granted the injunction prayed for. A person in possession can be evicted only in due process of law. Even the rightful owner cannot eject him with force. If he cannot be evicted with force, he continues to be in possession and he can resist invasion of his possession by everyone including the rightful owner. If the rightful owner threatens his peaceful possession, he can approach Courts of Law and pray for the equitable relief of injunction to protect his possession”. (Followed in Aiysumma Vs. Mariyamma, 1994-2 CIVCC 52, 1994-1 KerLT 570. )

It is pointed out in Suresh v. Ashok Girdharilal Chandak, 2016-1 MHLJ 171 that ‘bearing in mind the basic principle of law in civil jurisprudence that even a trespasser cannot be evicted without following due process of law and no one can be allowed to take law into his own hands to recover possession of the property without following due process of law and without proving title to the immovable property in possession of a person holding actual physical possession thereof’.

Person in possession can use Reasonable Force to keep out a Trespasser

In Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769, our Apex Court Court, observed as under:­ 

  • “8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser.
  • A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force.
  • If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession.
  • The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force.
  • In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.” (quoted in: Subramanya Swamy Temple, Ratnagiri v. V. Kanna Gounder, 2009-3 SCC 306)

What is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner was made clear in Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769. It reads as under:

  • “9. …The “settled possession” must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase “settled possession” does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a straitjacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession.” (quoted in Samarpan Varishtha Jan Parisar vs Rajendra Prasad Agarwal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 564)

No decree for recovery unless ‘present right to the possession’

While considering the question whether a worshipper can file a suit for recovery, it is held by our Apex Court, in M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case) 2019-1 SCC 1, that no decree for recovery of possession can be made in such a suit unless the worshipper has the ‘present right to the possession’. But it is pointed out that in such situations, a worshipper must be permitted to sue as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the idol itself – directly exercising the deity’s right to sue.

See Blog: Mandatory Injunction – Law and Principles

Govt. to Prove Title, When Pattedars are in PossessionChief Conservator of Forests v. Collectors, AIR 2003 SC 1805

It is held in Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collectors, AIR 2003 SC 1805, that Section 110 embodies the principle that possession of a property furnishes prima facie proof of ownership of the possessor and casts burden of proof on the party who denies his ownership, and that the presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has no title. The Supreme Court observed further in Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collectors, as under:

  • “Section 110 of the Evidence Act reads thus:
    • “110. Burden of proof as to ownership.-When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner.”
  • It embodies the principle that possession of a property furnishes prima facie proof of ownership of the possessor and casts burden of proof on the party who denies his ownership. The presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has no title.
  • This Court in Nair Service Society Limited v. K.C. Alexander and Ors., A.I.R. (1968) S.C. 1165 observed,
    • “The possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known, when the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.”
  • The pattedars proved their possession of the lands in question from 1312 Fasli (1902 A.D.) as pattedars. There is long and peaceful enjoyment of the lands in question but no proof of conferment of patta on the late Raja and the facts relating to acquisition of title are not known. The appellant- State could not prove its title to the lands. On these facts, the presumption under Section 110  of the Evidence Act applies and the appellants have to prove that the pattedars are not the owners. The appellants placed no evidence on record to rebut the presumption. Consequently, the pattedars, title to the land in question has to be upheld.”

In short, in Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collectors (supra) our Apex Court decided the case against the State for the following:

  • State could not prove its title to the lands;
  • the respondents/pattedars were in possession, and hence presumption under Section 110  of the Evidence Act (‘Possession Follows Title’) applies; and
  • therefore, the State had to prove that the pattedars are not the owners.

Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collectors – Proffers a Bad Law

It is beyond doubt that the following important and subsequent decisions took a contra-view to Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collectors (supra):

  • R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, (2010) 5 SCC 203;
  • Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988.

In R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, (2010) 5 SCC 203, it was held as under:

  • “15. Suits for declaration of title against the government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects.
  • The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the government, is not available to any person or individual. …”

In Government of Kerala v. Joseph, AIR 2023 SC 3988 – It was pointed out –

  • “When the land subject to proceedings wherein adverse possession has been claimed, belongs to Government, the court is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care and circumspection as it may lead to destruction of a right/title of the State to immovable property.”

Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collectors Stands Against Several Decisions on the following Propositions

  • 1. Mutation will not confer ‘title’ (see notes below)
  • 2. Revenue Records Do Not Confer Presumptive Value on Title (see notes below).

The principles in Sec. 110 and 114 CANNOT be invoked –

It is held in the following decisions that the Principle ‘Possession Follows Title’ does not apply in the following situations-

  • The facts (on title/possession) are known (M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1)
  • There is evidence of independent possession/title (Bhavnagar Municipality v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 717).

As we find in M.  Siddiq  v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case), 2020-1 SCC 1, Section 110 or the principle title follows possession‘ applies when the facts disclose no title in either of the disputants in which case, possession alone decides (presumption cannot be invoked when the facts are known). But, with respect to the principle ‘possession follows title‘, as we find in Anathula Sudhakar  v. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2033, if only title is proved by one party, then only the principle ‘possession follows title’ comes in.

It is equally important that both these principles on presumption, ‘possession follows title’ and ‘title follows possession’, cannot be invoked in cases where:

  • (i) the defendants do not claim title/possession to the suit property (Devasia @ Kutty v. Jose, 2014-4 KLJ 41; 2014-3 KLT(SN) 50).
  • (ii) the facts (on title/possession) are known (M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1), or
  • (iii) there is evidence of independent possession/title (Bhavnagar Municipality v.. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 717).

Mutation will not confer ‘title’

It is a settled proposition of law (i) that the mutation entry in revenue documents will not confer any right, title or interest in favour of any person and (ii) that the mutation in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose. After pointing out these legal propositions it is observed in Jitendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802, as under:

  • “6. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the case of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 137 , this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is observed and held that mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive value on title. Such entries are relevant only for the purpose of collecting land revenue. Similar view has been expressed in the series of decisions thereafter.
  • 6.1 In the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186 , it is observed and held by this Court that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose”, i.e., payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. It is further observed that so far as the title of the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court. Similar view has been expressed in the cases of Suman Verma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58; Faqruddin v. Tajuddin (2008) 8 SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368; Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689; T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342; Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259; and Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70.”

Revenue Records Do Not Confer Presumptive Value on Title

The Supreme Court in  Smt. Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import and Export Company (2019) and Commissioner, Bruhath Bangalore Mahanagra Palike v. Faraulla Khan (2021)observed that mutation in revenue records will not confer or lose title (Relied on Sawarni (Smt.) v. Inder Kaur (1996) 6 SCC 223, Balwant Singh & Anr. v. Daulat Singh (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. (1997) 7 SCC 137,  Narasamma & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2009) 5 SCC 591).

As pointed out above, it is observed by the Apex Court in State of AP v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 that revenue record is not a document of title; it merely raises a presumption in regard to possession (Quoted in M.  Siddiq   v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1). The argument as to ownership based upon entries in the revenue records had been negated in Prahlad Pradhan  v. Sonu Kumhar,(2019) 10 SCC 259. It was held that the revenue record does not confer title to the property nor do they have any presumptive value on the title. (Quoted in Prabhagiya Van Adhikari Awadh Van Prabhag v. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj (SC): 2021).

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Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged in Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala

Postscript – In the recent decision, Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 KHC OnLine 6764, our Apex Court observed that burden of proof rests on the person claiming adverse possession. The Court followed P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59.

Saji Koduvath.

1. Introduction.

Adverse Possession is a common law doctrine. The true title holder loses his title by adverse possession; and it is acquired by the ‘trespasser’. Period of limitation, for acquiring adverse possession, under Article 65 of The Limitation Act, is 12 years. It starts, ‘when the possession of defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff’.

2. ‘Evolving’ Concept

Adverse possession being essentially a judge-made law, and not exhaustively defined in any statute, the concept of adverse possession has been ‘evolving’. It is interesting to note that there were divergent views even with respect to the very fundamentals of ‘adverse possession’.

3. Earlier view – Inaction of true-owner matters (not overt-acts of trespasser) 

At one time it was considered that inaction/acquiescence of the true owner for 12 years brings-in adverse possession. Because,

  • Article 65, which speaks of as to limitation of suits (to be filed by the plaintiffs) does not specifically speak as to (i)  intention to dispossess title owner or (ii) knowledge on the part of trespasser as to who is the true owner.
  • “Nec vi, nec clam, nec precario” does not refer to (or speak as to) ‘hostile’ possession
  • “Animus possidendi” also does not say – hostile possession.
  • Inaction, acquiescence etc. of true owner are the material considerations – to become a ‘possession’ adverse to plaintiff.
  • Therefore, to attract adverse possession the trespasser need not know the true owner.

Philosophy of the earlier view can be seen from Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Behadur (Para 22 – AIR 2004 SC 3782)

  • “What is adverse possession? ………The process of acquisition of title by adverse possession springs into action essentially by default or inaction of the owner. ……… The law does not intend to confer any premium on the wrong doing of a person in wrongful possession; it pronounces the penalty of extinction of title on the person who though entitled to assert his right and remove the wrong doer and re-enter into possession, has defaulted and remained inactive for a period of 12 years, which the law considers reasonable for attracting the said penalty. ………..”

4. Present view – Give prominence to overt and adverse acts of trespasser. 

Following are the important decisions to see the present view on adverse possession:

  1. Karnataka Board of Wakaf v. Govt of India – AIR 2004 SC 2096
  2. T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa [(2006) 7 SCC 570]
  3. PT Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, AIR 2007 SC 1753
  4. Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit KaurAIR 2019 SC 3827: (2019) 8 SCC 729

PT Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, AIR 2007 SC 1753, is the latest decision of the Supreme Court that discussed various views on adverse possession. It is observed in this decision as under:

  • “Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile.”
  • Thus, there must be intention to dispossess. And it needs to be open and hostile enough to bring the same to the knowledge and plaintiff has an opportunity to object

In a nutshell, adverse possession arises from:

  1. acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts
  2. hostile acts of the trespasser.

5. Article 142 of the (Repealed) Limitation Act, 1908

Article 142 of the (repealed) Limitation Act, 1908, which dealt with the subject, did not put down the term ‘adverse’ in the relevant article concerned with “adverse possession”. 

Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 reads as under:

142. For possession of immovable property when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession12 yearsThe date of the dispossession or discontinuance

Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provided that the true owner would lose his right to recover the property from a trespasser if he failed to file a suit within the period of 12 years.

6. Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963: Complete Change in Law of Adverse Possession

Articles 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 brought-in  complete change insofar as the onus of proof is concerned: The new provision casted onus on the trespasser to prove claims of title by ‘adverse’ possession. Adverse possession arises, under Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963, only ‘by the positive and hostile acts’ of the trespasser; that is, mere possession is not sufficient, but, it must be ‘adverse’ to the true owner.

Article 65 of Limitation Act reads as under:

65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.12 yearsWhen the possession of Defendant becomes
adverse to the plaintiff.

In T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570, it is observed by our Apex Court as under:

  • The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former’s hostile action. … … The person who bases his title on adverse possession, therefore, must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i.e. possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed…. …. If the defendants are not sure who is the true owner the question of their being in hostile possession and the question of denying title of the true owner do not arise.

7. Burden of Proof Sabotaged

Is it the burden of the defendant, in a suit for recovery, to plead adverse possession? Or, is it the duty of the plaintiff to show that the suit for possession was within the period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act (especially where there is a possible claim of Adverse Possession)?

Supreme Court of India considered hitherto that the burden fully rested upon the defendant.

But, in Nazir Mohamed v. J.  Kamala, AIR 2020 SC 4321, arose from a suit for recovery of possession, the Apex Court held that the plaintiff had to plead the date on which the defendant took possession and in the absence of pleading to show that the relief of decree for possession was within limitation, the suit would be dismissed; for, Section 3 of the Limitation Act barred the institution of any suit after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed in the said Act, even though the plea of limitation had not been taken in defence. It is pointed out in this decision that the Presumption that possession must be deemed to follow title, arises only where there is no definite proof of possession by anyone else.

The dispute in the case as to title is stated in Para 5 and 6 of the judgment, as under:

  • “5. In the plaint filed in the said suit, it has been alleged that the said premises, which had been purchased by the Respondent Plaintiff’s father, by a registered sale deed dated 17.9.1940, had originally been let out to the Appellant’s father M. Abdul Aziz. After the death of M. Abdul Aziz, the tenancy was attorned in the name of the Appellant, who agreed to pay rent of Rs.25/- per month, and also the requisite Panchayat Tax.
  • 6. Alleging that the Appellant had been trying to set up title in respect of the said premises, by applying for ‘Patta’ to the Tahsildar Natham, and further alleging that the Appellant was in arrears of rent to the tune of Rs.1225/- up to February, 1994, the Respondent Plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit.”

It is held further, as under:

  • “46. A decree of possession does not automatically follow a decree of declaration of title and ownership over property. It is well settled that, where a Plaintiff wants to establish that the Defendant’s original possession was permissive, it is for the Plaintiff to prove this allegation and if he fails to do so, it may be presumed that possession was adverse, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
  • 47. The Appellant-Defendant has in his written statement in the suit, denied the title and ownership of the Respondent- Plaintiff to the suit property. The Appellant-Defendant has asserted that the Appellant-Defendant is the owner of the suit property and has been in possession and in occupation of the suit premises as owner from the very inception.
  • 52. The maxim “possession follows title” is limited in its application to property, which having regard to its nature, does not admit to actual and exclusive occupation, as in the case of open spaces accessible to all. The presumption that possession must be deemed to follow title, arises only where there is no definite proof of possession by anyone else. In this case it is admitted that the Appellant-Defendant is in possession and not the Respondent Plaintiff.
  • 53. A suit for recovery of possession of immovable property is governed by the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 3 of the Limitation Act bars the institution of any suit after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed in the said Act. The Court is obliged to dismiss a suit filed after expiry of the period of limitation, even though the plea of limitation may not have been taken in defence.”

After quoting Article 65 of the Limitation Act the Court observed as under:

  •  “55. In the absence of any whisper in the plaint as to the date on which the Appellant-Defendant and/or his Predecessor-in-interest took possession of the suit property and in the absence of any whisper to show that the relief of decree for possession was within limitation, the High Court could not have reversed the finding of the First Appellate Court, and allowed the Respondent-Plaintiff the relief of recovery of possession, more so when the Appellant-Defendant had pleaded that he had been in complete possession of the suit premises, as owner, with absolute rights, ever since 1966, when his father had executed a Deed of Release in his favour and/or in other words for over 28 years as on the date of institution of the suit.
  • 56. As held by the Privy Council in Peri v. Chrishold reported in (1907) PC 73, it cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner…and if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his right of possession by law, within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of limitation applicable to the case, his right is forever distinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.”

Above decision stands against the consistent earlier view

It is pertinent to see that above decision stands against the consistent earlier view of the Supreme Court as expressed in L N Aswathama v. P Prakash, 2009-13 SCC 229, as under:

  • “In law, possession follows title. The plaintiffs having established title to the suit property, will be entitled to decree for possession, unless their right to the suit property was extinguished, by reason of defendant being in adverse possession for a period of twelve years prior to the suit.”

It is held in MS Jagadambal v. Southern Indian Education Trust, 1988 (Supp) SCC 144, that the possession continues with the title holder unless and until the defendant acquires title by adverse possession (possession follows title).

Postscript – In the recent decision, Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 KHC OnLine 6764, our Apex Court observed that burden of proof rests on the person claiming adverse possession. The Court followed P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59, where it is observed as under:

  • “34. The law in this behalf has undergone a change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show within 12 years from the date of institution of the suit that he had title and possession of the land, whereas in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legal position has underwent complete change insofar as the onus is concerned : once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove claims of title by adverse possession….”

Our Apex Court referred, in Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 KHC OnLine 6764, the following decisions, also :

  • (i) M Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (five-Judge Bench). It observed as under:
  • “748. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous – possession which meets the requirement of being ‘nec vi nec claim and nec precario’. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence.”
  • (ii) Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, (1994) 6 SCC 591. It is held as under:
  • “5. A possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession…”
  • (iii) Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, (2010) 14 SCC 316, (two-Judge Bench). It is observed as under:
  • “15. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the property adverse to the title of the true owner for the said purpose. The person who claims adverse possession is required to establish the date on which he came in possession, nature of possession, the factum of possession, knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed…”


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Sec. 65B, Evidence Act: Arjun Paditrao Criticised.

Saji Koduvath.

Introduction.  

Sec. 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are the new enabling provisions introduced to confer a right to a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of an ‘electronic record’ by ‘computer output’ (copy or print – derived from original), adopting the procedure/drill given in Sec. 65B ‘without further proof or production of the original’; that is, without accounting for (original) ‘electronic record’. It is to simplify the proceedings and procedures.

Landmark Decisions

  1. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,  two- judge bench decision. It is held:
    • “Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-section (4) of Section 65-B is 26 not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 63 and 65.”
  2. Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473), three- judge bench decision. It is held:
    • That (Sections 65A & 65B) is a complete code in itself. Being a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield.”
    • But finally held: “It is clarified that notwithstanding what we have stated herein in the preceding paragraphs on the secondary evidence of electronic record with reference to Sections 59, 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act, if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65-B of the Evidence Act.”
  3. Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015-7 SCC 178), three-bench decision.
    • It is held, as to make CCTV footage admissible, as under:
      • Secondary evidence of contents of document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act”.
  4. Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570) two- judge bench decision. It is held:
    • “The crucial test, as affirmed by this Court, is whether the defect could have been cured at the stage of marking the document. Applying this test to the present case, if an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked without a certificate, the court could have given the prosecution an opportunity to rectify the deficiency.”
  5. Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 ) two- judge bench decision. Tomaso Bruno (2015) was followed in. It was held as under:
    • “(11) The applicability of procedural requirement under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act of furnishing certificate is to be applied only when such electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in a position to produce such certificate being in control of the said device and not of the opposite party. In a case where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device, applicability of Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be held to be excluded. In such case, procedure under the said Sections can certainly be invoked. If this is not so permitted, it will be denial of justice to the person who is in possession of authentic evidence/witness but on account of manner of proving, such document is kept out of consideration by the court in absence of certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, which party producing cannot possibly secure. Thus, requirement of certificate under Section 65B(h) [sic-65B(4)] is not always mandatory.
    • (12) Accordingly, we clarify the legal position on the subject on the admissibility of the electronic evidence, especially by a party who is not in possession of device from which the document is produced. Such party cannot be required to produce certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act. The applicability of requirement of certificate being procedural can be relaxed by Court wherever interest of justice so justifies.”
  6. Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216, three-judge bench decision. It substantially followed PV Anwar (2014) with a ‘clarification’.
    • Because it is held in Anver PV v. PK Basheer that Section 62, 63 and 65 are not applied for electronic evidence – for 65A & B are ‘complete code’ – the further observation that ‘if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62’ stood incongruent and contradictory. Therefore, it is “clarified” and directed to “read” Anver “without the words – ‘under Section 62 of the Evidence Act’  ”.
    • In Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao it is found – Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP is per-incurium as under:
      • “What is clear from this judgment is that the judgment of Anvar P.V. (supra) was not referred to at all. In fact, the judgment in State v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 was adverted to, which was a judgment specifically overruled by Anvar P.V. (supra). It may also be stated that Section 65B(4) was also not at all adverted to by this judgment. Hence, the declaration of law in Tomaso Bruno (supra) following Navjot Sandhu (supra) that secondary evidence of the contents of a document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to make CCTV footage admissible would be in the teeth of Anvar P.V., (supra) and cannot be said to be a correct statement of the law. The said view is accordingly overruled.”

ARJUN PANDITRAO v. KAILASH KUSHANRAO (2020)3 SCC 216, CRITICISED: 

  1. Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020) 3 SCC 216, is per incurium as it went wrong in observing:
    • that ‘the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility’ of ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence);
    • that by virtue of the non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act .. .. the computer output shall be deemed to be ALSO a document’) Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot at all be adverted to in proving a computer output (secondary evidence); and
    • that Section 65B being a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield; and therefore, the computer outputs (secondary evidence) cannot be proved under Sec. 65 read with Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act.
  2. It failed to observe:
    • that “Electronic record containing the statement alone can be proved with Sec. 65B(4) Certificate (statement is confined to the matters that can be made in a written form: e.g. call-records of phones, bank-account-statements); and not all information (such as: photo, video etc. in a computer, pen-drive or CD etc.).
    • The non-obstante clause is for enabling admission of ‘computer output’ (derived from original) in evidence, as (original) ‘document’ itself (“the computer output shall be deemed to be ALSO a document”), in a simpler manner,  notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’.
  3. It should have noticed:
    • only formal evidence and admissibility (and not truth of contents) are dealt with in Sec. 65B; and
    • correctness of the computer output produced by a computer (print out or other copy), is presumed under Sec. 65B(5)(c).
  4. It was thoroughly mistaken in holding:
    • that a certificate, swearing ‘best of the knowledge and belief’, can be brought by ‘force’ (as a ‘thing’).
  5. It missed to see:
    • that the changes made to law by the introduction of Sec. 65A and 65B are:
      1. simplification of procedure for proving electronic record (‘Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act) by producing a copy (computer output) by declaring the copy also as a (deemed) document – if the conditions are satisfied.
      2. “where it is desired to give a statement in evidenceit can be had by “a certificate” as provided in Sec. 65B(4).
      3. the computer output (print or copy) can be tendered in evidence without evidence as to the computer which (finally) produced it – for, it will be presumed (shall be taken) “to have been produced by a computer … by means of any appropriate equipment”, as per Sec. 65B(5)(c).
Observations in   Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash KushanraoCriticism
1. Non-obstante clause is given in Sec. 63B – because, ‘Electronic Record’ is not a ‘document’. Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, para 21 reads as under:1. Electronic records’ are already declared as ‘documents’ (When defined ‘Evidence’ in S. 3 ). Section 65B (1) needed to declare ‘computer output’ (derived from original) alone as documents.
“Section 65B(1) opens with a non-obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, and shall be admissible in any proceedings without further proof of production of the original, as evidence of the contents of the original or of any facts stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that “document” as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include electronic records.The deeming fiction in S. 65B (1), need not be applied to an ‘electronic record’ (primary evidence). The principles of ‘presumption’ are introduced herein.  It is needed only for the ‘computer output’; and not for ‘electronic record’. The doubt as to whether electronic – records are also ‘documents’ is already removed by the amendment to Sec. 3 Evd. Act. (Evidence’ means and includes … .. all documents including electronic records’.)
Sec. 65A and 65B do not bar proving (i) (original) ‘electronic records’ under Sec. 62 and (ii) computer outputs (derived from original ) under Sec. 65. (Sec. 65 provides for adducing secondary evidence if the original is lost, not easily movable etc.)
2. Non-obstante clause (‘notwithstanding anything …’) excludes S. 62 and 65. It is observed in para 31:2. Non-obstante clause does not exclude Sec. 62 and 65 –
“The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) makes it clear that when it comes to information contained  in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf – Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose.”  
Para 59: “We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed (supra).”
 The non-obstante clause is for enabling admission of ‘computer output’  (derived from original)  as ‘document’ itself, in a simpler manner, by the deeming provision notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’.

The non-obstante clause is an enabling provision. (See ‘Note’ – 1 below.)
3. Production of Certificate  under Sec. 65B(4):3. A certificate cannot be ordered to be given as a thing:
In Arjun Panditrao para 50 it is observed as under: “However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/ persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence  Act, and require that such  certificate be given by such person/ persons.” Arjun Panditrao directs  to seek help of the court to obtain the required certificate under S. 65B(4) invoking Sec. 165, Evidence Act; Order XVI, CPC or Ss. 91 & 349 of the Cr.P.C.  
This certificate ‘to the best of the knowledge and belief’ of a person, is based on his ‘subjective-satisfaction’.
It cannot be ordered to be given as a thing’ under S. 165 and Ss. 91 & 349 Cr.P.C.
(Order XVI  Rule 6, CPC says as to document alone; not any ‘thing’.) 
A certificate, swearing ‘best of the knowledge and (or?) belief’, cannot be brought by ‘force’ also. (See ‘Note’ – 2 below.)
4. Tomaso Bruno was held to be ‘per incurium‘:4. Should have been referred to a higher bench. 
 PV Anwar (2014-10 SCC 473), three-judge bench decision, was not followed in the three-judge bench decision in Tomaso Bruno (2015-7 SCC 178).
Tomaso Bruno (2015) was followed in Shafhi Muhammed (2018-2 SCC 801 ).
Arjun Panditrao substantially followed PV Anwar (2014).
It was observed in Arjun Panditrao (3-judge bench) that Tomaso Bruno was per incurium (3-judge bench).  Tomaso Bruno being of a 3-judge bench, the case should have been referred to a higher bench.  
[PV Anwar (2014) was rendered by Kurian Joseph, J.  He was a judge in the unanimous 3-bench decision in Tomaso Bruno (2015) which was ‘followed’ in Shafhi Muhammed (2018) ].

‘Note: 1’:  Why the Non-obstante Clause

Sec. 65B speaks: ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act .. .. the computer output shall be deemed to be ALSO a document’ (if the conditions laid down are fulfilled). It is clear:

  • Sec. 65B is an enabling provision. The non-obstante clause is introduced not to exclude Sec. 62 and 65.  (Contra view in Arjun Panditrao).
  • It declares ‘computer output’ (derived from original or copy) ALSO as an (original) document by the deeming provision.
  • Section 65A and 65B deal with evidence ‘derived from original’ (computer output) alone; and not about original (electronic record).
  • From Sec. 65A and 65B it is clear that its application is ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’, and the application of Sec. 62 to 65 are not curtailed; and, therefore, copy or computer outputs (derived from original ) can be used under Sec. 65 (Sec. 65 provides for adducing secondary evidence if the original is lost, not easily movable etc.); that is, otherwise than by producing the ‘Certificate’ under Sec. 65B(4).

It is correctly held in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu,  (2005) 11 SCC 600, as under:

  • “Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65.

Sec. 65A and 65B do not bar proving (i) (original) ‘electronic records’ under Sec. 62 and (ii) computer outputs (derived from original ) under Sec. 65 (Sec. 65 provides for adducing secondary evidence if the original is lost, not easily movable etc.).  From Sec. 65A and 65B it is clear that Sec. 62 to 65 are independent from Sec. 65B (‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’); and, therefore,

  • Sec. 62 to 65 can also be invoked to prove ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence of the ‘electronic record’). That is, otherwise than by producing the Certificate under Sec. 65B(4). (Contra view in Arjun Panditrao).

‘Note: 2’: Assume, the competent person gives a ‘statement’ that he cannot vouchsafe as to the truth and veracity of the document, then what will be the next step? Or, what will be the position if that person gives a false statement with respect to the document (though he knows it to be true and genuine)? Further, if the circumstances or admission by the parties show it is a genuine copy and the competent person pretends ignorance as to the truth of the document, how it will be dealt with?

  • In all these circumstances, the ultimate way-out is to apply the principle accepted by by Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP (and followed in Shafhi Muhammed – the overruled decision).

Does the duo by Sec. 65A & 65B Evid. Act Oust the Operation of Sec. 63 & 65?

  • That is, whether ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence of the ‘ electronic record’) can be proved only by Sec. 65B and it Constitute a ‘Complete Code’?

The Answer is No.

Then, what does the non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding anything’) denote? It is clear that Sec.62 to 65 are independent from the new provisions, Sec. 65A and 65B; and Sec. 62 to 65 can also be invoked to prove ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence of the ‘electronic record’). It is definite that the non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act .. .. ’) in Sec. 65B does not oust Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act in proving a computer output (secondary evidence). Because:

  1. Sec. 65A is an introductory provision to Sec. 65B.
  2. Sec. 65A does not control Sec. 65B.
  3. Sec. 65A directs only an (enabling) method to PROVE (not the only one method) the CONTENTS of electronic records –  by print/copy – invoking Sec. 65B.
    • (Sec. 65A reads: The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B.) 
    • Thus, Sec. 65B is an Enabling or Added provision; and, other enabling (existing) provisions in the Indian Evidence Act, to prove documents by secondary evidence invoking Sec. 63 and 65, are not taken away.
  4. Sec. 65B(1), further lays down that the computer output (copy) shall be “deemed to be ALSO” an (original) document, if the conditions in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied, “notwithstanding anything contained in the Act”.
    • That is, Sec. 65B, does not bar proving a print/copy (as secondary evidence) by satisfying the conditions laid down in Sec. 65, by oral evidence or affidavit, as to loss of original, original with other side and notice given, original not easily movable, etc., as the case may be.
  5. Sec. 65B deals with ‘ADMISSIBILITY of ‘computer output’ (derived from original) alone. 
  6. The conditions in Sec. 65B(2) (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course, etc.) have to be satisfied by oral evidence or affidavit. In case of ‘statements’ alone, it can be had by the ‘certificate’ provided under Sec. 65B(4).

In short, compliance of this enabling provision is not an invariable or imperative condition precedent to the admissibility’ of ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence); and it does not stand in the way of proving a secondary evidence of the contents of the ‘electronic record’, invoking the usual method laid down in Sec. 65 read with Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act – that is, satisfying the conditions laid down in Sec. 65, by oral evidence or affidavit. (Note: Contra view in: Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216).

‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be proved by ‘CERTIFICATE’ under Sec. 65B

  • Sec. 65B(2) conditions are to be satisfied for ADMISSIBILITY; and not authenticity. Sec. 65B(4) alone deals with authenticity; because, it is laid down that the certificate “shall be evidence of any(?) matter stated” therein.

Sec. 65B(4) reads as under:

“(4) In any proceedings where

it is desired to give a statement  

in evidence, by virtue of this section,

a certificate doing any of the

following things, that is to say,—

  • (a) identifying the electronic record CONTAINING the STATEMENT and describing the manner in which it was produced;
  • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
  • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate;
  • and for the purposes of this sub-section

it shall be sufficient

for a matter to be stated to the

best of the knowledge and belief

f the person stating it.”

What is a “Statement” in Evidence Act?

According to Evidence Act, ‘statement’ is – that which can be expressed in the form of ‘oral evidence’. Because, “Evidence” is defined in Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act as under:

  • “Evidence means and includes—
    • all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence.
    • all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such documents are called documentary evidence.”
  • See also: Sec. 8
    • Explanation 1.––The word “conduct” in this section does not include statements, unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act.
    • Explanation 2.––When the conduct of any person is relevant, any statement made to him or in his presence and hearing, which affects such conduct, is relevant.
  • Section–32
    • Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.
  • Section–. 34
    • Entries in books of account when relevant. …. but such statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability
  • Section–. 36
    • Relevancy of statements in maps, charts and plans.
  • Section–. 32
    • Relevancy of statement as to fact of public nature contained in certain Acts or notifications.
  • Section–. 37
    • Relevancy of statements as to any law contained in law-books.
  • Section–. 38
    • What evidence to be given when statement forms part of a conversation, document, electronic record, book or series of letters or papers.
  • Section–. 39
    • What evidence to be given when statement forms part of a conversation, document, electronic record, book or series of letters or papers.
  • Section–. 145
    • Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing
  • Section–. 157
    • Former statements of witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony as to same fact
  • Section–. 158
    • What matters may be proved in connection with proved statement relevant under section 32 or 33.

Thus it appears that the call-records of phones, bank-account-statements etc. alone can be proved as ‘statements’. The ‘statement’ referred to herein is that which can be pointed out “identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced” as stated in Section 65B(4)(a); and which can be ‘purporting to be signed‘, as stated in Section 65B(4)(c). And, it is clear that the ‘statement’ does not pertain to other ‘information’ like CCTV Footage, photo in a pen-drive or video in a CD. (Note – contra view in Supreme Court decisions).

See Blog: How to Prove WhatsApp Chats, Facebook Messages and Website Information in Courts?

‘Statement‘ in S. 65B(4) is the ‘STATEMENT ‘CONTAINED‘ IN THE ELECTRONIC RECORD‘and NOT that GIVEN IN COURT

Now, the potential question that arises for consideration is the following:

  • Whether the ‘statement’ mentioned in Sec. 65B(4) is
    • (i) that given in court, to support the copy or printout, or
    • (ii) that is contained in the electronic record?

It is beyond doubt that the ‘statement’ mentioned in Sec. 65B(4) is not the one that is given in court; but, the statement ‘CONTAINED‘ in “the electronic record“. Because:

  1. The “statement” referred to in Sec. 65B (4) is one that-
    • may be:
      • desired to give” “in evidence by virtue of this section” (Sec. 65B(4) first clause); and
  2. The “certificate”-
    • must be one that
      • “identifying the ELECTRONIC RECORD CONTAINING THE STATEMENT and describing the manner in which it was produced” [Section 65B(4)(a)].

The above view is fortified by the following:

  • Sec. 65B(4) says that the certificate
    1. must state, under Sec. 65B(4)(c), among other things, facts as to “dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate”
      • Note: Proving matter with ’certificate’ under Sec. 65B(4) is a species and proving the conditions laid down in Sec. 65B(2) is genus.
    2. could be signed by a person who has
      • “a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities” (Section 65B(4)(c).

Thus, the formal assertions like statements of witnesses, call-records of phones, bank-account-statements, etc. alone can be proved as ‘statements’, by virtue of section 65B; and not ‘information’ like CCTV Footage, photo in a pen-drive or video in a CD.

In short, going by Sec. 65B, it is definite that-

  • the computer-output (copy) containing the ‘information’ (e.g. CCTV Footage, photo or video in a CD) in the electronic-record (original) can be admitted in evidence, under Sec. 65B, if only the conditions (such as: the computer was operating properly, the electronic record is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the activities, etc.) mentioned in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied (that is, the conditions are to be proved through the usual mode of oral evidence or affidavit); and
  • the ‘statements’ (e.g. call-records of phones, bank-account-statements) alone can be admitted in evidence, under Sec. 65B (by computer-output, without further proof or production of the original electronic-record), through a ‘certificate‘ (Note – Contra view in Court decisions. In the binding Court decisions it is stated that sans the Certificate, no computer-output can be taken into consideration).

Photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc. cannot be used under Sec. 65B.

  • It is clear that the computer output (copy) is ‘deemed to be (also) a document’ if only the conditions mentioned in S. 65B(2) are fulfilled, that is:
    • S. 65B(2)(a) computer was USED REGULARLY to STORE or process information
      • of the activities REGULARLY CARRIED ON
      • BY THE PERSON having lawful control,
    • S. 65B(2)(b) information was REGULARLY FED
      • in the ORDINARY COURSE,
    • S. 65B(2)(d) the information is REPRODUCED in the
      • ORDINARY COURSE of the SAID ACTIVITIES.
    • (For example – Computer Account statements in a Bank.)
  • For all other computer outputs (copy of, photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc.), one has to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act, by producing the original or by producing the copy after satisfying the circumstances under Sec. 65.
  • Therefore, it is beyond any doubt that the following computer output (copy) cannot be used under Sec. 65B:
    • CCTV footage – (i) not used to store or process information BY any PERSON and (ii) not reproduced in the ordinary course.
    • CDs containing speech – (i) not used REGULARLY to store or process information, (ii) not regularly fed in the ordinary course and (iii) not reproduced in the ordinary course.
    • videograph of the scene of crime or trap-video – (i) not used REGULARLY to store or process information, (ii) not regularly fed in the ordinary course and (iii) not reproduced in the ordinary course.
  • But, the Supreme Court dealt with CCTV footage in the following landmark cases:
    • State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,
    • Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015-7 SCC 178),
  • CDs/VCDs in respect of video recording by the Election Commission
    • Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216
  • CDs containing election speeches and songs in:
    • Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473).
  • Call Detail Records – CDR – of mobile phones in:
    • Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570)
  • Tape recorded conversation on the landline phone
    • Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518
  • Propriety of videography of the scene of crime or scene of recovery during investigation, in:
    • Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 ).

Computer output’ can be got produced by ‘any computer‘ and no evidence/certificate required

A ‘Computer Output’ can be got copied or printed by ‘any computer’. It need not be the part of the device that was “used regularly to store or process information”. It is clear from the phrase – shall be taken to have been produced by “a computer” – in 65B(5)(c). It stands contradistinct to “the computer” in Sec. 65B(2).

Presumption on ‘Computer output’ (print or copy)

From the very wordings in Sec. 65B(5)(c), the ‘proof’ (through witnesses or certificate) as to the involvement of the computer which (finally) produced the computer output (print or copy) need not be furnished. Because, the legislature contemplated a presumption as to correctness of the computer output (not truth of contents), under Sec. 65B(5)(c), as it reads:

  • ‘a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.

It is similar to Sec. 63 clause (2) which reads as under:

  • “Copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy …. …”

Sec. 63 lays down the sorts of secondary evidence accepted by the Evidence Act. It is seen that Sec. 65B(5)(c) expressly says also as to presumption on correctness, as stated above.

Mere marking– not dispense with proof (of truth of contents)

In Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865, the Supreme Court observed that mere marking of a documents (day book and ledger) as exhibits do not dispense with the proof of documents. In Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta Vs. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796, it is observed that mere marking as exhibit and identification of executor’s signature by one of witnesses does not prove contents of a document.

In Kaliya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013-10 SCC 758) it is held as under:

  • “Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. (Vide: The Roman Catholic Mission Vs. The State, AIR 1966 SC 1457; Marwari Khumhar Vs. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri AIR 2000 SC 2629; RVE Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu AIR 2003 SC 4548; Smt. Dayamathi Bai Vs. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082; and LIC of India  Vs. Rampal Singh Bisen,2010-4 SCC 491).”
  • “The court is obliged to examine the probative value of documents produced in court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence.”
  • [Note: Further held: “In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.”]

IF the TRUTH is IN ISSUE mere proof of handwriting or execution not evidence of truth:   IF the TRUTH of the facts stated in a document is IN ISSUE mere proof of the hand-writing and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document.

In Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, it us held as under:

  • “If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”

If ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute, marking without objection by itself does not absolve the duty to prove the truth as to the contents of the documents. (See: Achuthan Pillai vs Marikar (Motors) Ltd., AIR 1983 Ker 81, 1976 Cr.LJ 1507; 2016 (1) Gau. LJ 88,  2012(1) CTC 53; 2013-1 KLT 293.)

Admissibility and Presumption as to correctness of Computer Output

  • Sec. 65B does not deal with ‘truth’ of the contents of the electronic record; it deals with only ‘admissibility of copy’.
  • The electronic record mentioned in Sec. 65B is – that is ‘relevant‘; for, it must be one “of which direct evidence would be admissible”.
  • Therefore, if truth is in question, it must be proved according to other provisions of the evidence act; ie. by oral, documentary (such as admission) or presumptive (including circumstantial) evidence.
  • Relevant portions of 65A & 65B read as under:
    • Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:
      • The contents of electronic records MAY BE proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. 
    • Sec. 65B: Admissibility of electronic records:
      • (1) … any information contained in an electronic record which is printed ….. or copied ….. shall be ADMISSIBLE in any proceedings ….. as evidence of any contents of the original … of which direct evidence would be admissible.”

Sec. 65B declares and expressly lays down that computer output (copy or print)

  • (i) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and
  • (ii) shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence
    • of any contents of the original or
    • of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.

If the conditions mentioned in this Section Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied, by necessary implication, it will bring a presumption under Sec. 114 with respect to regularity of the computer output . Because, admissibility of ‘any fact stated therein‘ ‘without further proof’ is nothing but ‘presumption’ of its regularity and correctness. The net result is that (if the conditions in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied) the burden to prove otherwise is cast on the person who opposes it.

The requirement in Sec. 65B(2) as to ‘proof’ (through witnesses or certificate) for ‘regularity‘ of feeding information into the computer in the ‘ordinary course‘ eloquently support this proposition.

  • Note:
    • (i) ‘Statements’ alone can be proved by ‘certificate’ under Sec. 65B(4); other ‘information’ are to be proved by proper evidence.
    • (ii) Presumption of ‘regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act can be applied in Sec. 65B.
    • (iii) Presumption of a ‘fact or regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act is, essentially presumption of ‘Truth’ and ‘Correctness’.

Presumption of Fact Means Truth/Correctness of Fact

St. of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar (AIR 2000 SC 2988) it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the Court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process Court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.”

Substance and Conclusion

  1. Sec. 65B is invoked only when a computer output (copy) is used in evidence.
    • Sec. 65B pertains to ‘admissibility'(not truth) of a computer output/copy.
    • It deals with computer output/copy alone; and it does not deal with (original) electronic record.
  2. Non-obstante clause does not oust S. 63 and 65.
    • The non-obstante clause in Sec. 65B does not oust operation of Secs. 63 & 65 of the Evidence Act; and, therefore, secondary evidence of an electronic record can be given in evidence, invoking Sec. 65, read with Sec. 63.
    • Sec. 65B is an added and enabling provision to prove the copy or print out (otherwise than by proving the conditions laid down in Sec. 65, such as loss of original, original with other side).
    • It relates to relevant matters alone “of which direct evidence would be admissible”.
  3. Conditions in S. 65B(2) are to be satisfied through oral evidence or affidavit.
    • The computer output (copy) containing the information, such as CCTV footage, photo or video in a CD etc., can be admitted in evidence under S. 65B if only the conditions (such as: computer was used regularly, information was regularly fed in the ordinary course, computer was operating properly) mentioned in S. 65B(2) are satisfied, through oral evidence or affidavit.
    • A computer output (copy) cannot be used under Sec. 65B if the computer was one not used regularly, or the information was one not ‘regularly fed’ into the computer in the ordinary course, etc., (as in the case of a photo or video captured in a mobile phone; ‘trap-video’, etc.).
    • In such a case (photo or video captured in a mobile phone; ‘trap-video’, etc.), we have to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act, by producing the original or by producing the copy after satisfying the circumstances under Sec. 65; because, if only the conditions (such as: computer was used regularly, information was regularly fed in the ordinary course, computer was operating properly)  mentioned in S. 65B(2) are fulfilled, then only the computer output (copy) is ‘deemed to be (also) a document’.
  4. Statements alone can be proved by ‘certificate’ under S. 65B(4).
    • The statements (such as e-mail, call records of phones, bank account statements, etc.) alone can be admitted in evidence under S. 65B, through a ‘certificate’ provided under S. 65B(4). 
    • Sec. 65B(2) conditions are to be satisfied for ADMISSIBILITY; and not authenticity. Sec. 65B(4) alone deals with authenticity; because, it is laid down that the certificate “shall be evidence of any(?) matter stated” therein.
  5. Presumption as to correctness of the copy or print-out ‘produced by a computer’ under S. 65B(5)(c)
    • S. 65B(5)(c) lays down a presumption as to correctness (not truth) of the computer out-put, inasmuch as S. 65B(5)(c) lays down that ‘a computer out-put shall be taken to have been produced by a computer’. 

As shown by Justice V. Ramasubramanian in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, Sec. 65B is a substantial reproduction of Sec. 5 of the UK Civil Evidence Act, 1968, and that it is introduced in India 10 years after it was repealed in UK. No doubt, it will stand as a masterly provision, if it aids simplification of procedure and leads to attain ends of justice. Even if any deflection in any corner, the judicial wisdom of the Apex Court will guide the courts in India through correct path.

The present UK Act (Civil Evidence Act 1995) does not make any special provision for Electronic Evidence or Computerised Records. It deals this matter under the head ‘hearsay evidence’ and makes ‘safeguards’ with respect to the hearsay evidence.


End Notes – 1

What is ‘certificate’, in law

  • The usual method to prove documents is by giving oral evidence or furnishing affidavit. A certificate, in most cases, is an opinion, and prepared on the basis of other documents or evidences. In such cases, when it is an assumption or inference, it by itself, is not admissible, as it will only be, at the most, a secondary evidence. A Wound Certificate is not a substantive evidence. It has to be proved by a competent witness. If presumption cannot be invoked under Clause (e) of Sec. 114 Evidence Act (that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed), no certificate or report can be taken as proved unless its contents are proved in a formal manner. (This is why Order XXVI rule 10 CPC specifically says – Commission Report shall ‘form part of the record’.)
  • Our Apex Court held in Dharmarajan v. Valliammal, 2008 (2) SCC 741, that ‘a certificate issued by the Tahsildar cannot be relied on without examining the Tahsildar who issued the same’. It is referred to in Pankajakshan Nair v. Shylaja, ILR 2017-1 Ker 951.

End Notes – 2

Landmark Decisions

  1. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,  two- judge bench decision. It is held:
    • “Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-section (4) of Section 65-B is 26 not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 63 and 65.”
  2. Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473), three- judge bench decision. It is held:
    • That (Sections 65A & 65B) is a complete code in itself. Being a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield.”
    • But finally held: “It is clarified that notwithstanding what we have stated herein in the preceding paragraphs on the secondary evidence of electronic record with reference to Sections 59, 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act, if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65B of the Evidence Act.”
  3. Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015-7 SCC 178), three-bench decision.
    • It is held, as to make CCTV footage admissible, as under:
    • Secondary evidence of contents of document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act”.
  4. Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570): two- judge bench decision. It is held:
    • “The crucial test, as affirmed by this Court, is whether the defect could have been cured at the stage of marking the document. Applying this test to the present case, if an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked without a certificate, the court could have given the prosecution an opportunity to rectify the deficiency.”
  5. Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 ), two- judge bench decision. Tomaso Bruno (2015) was followed in. It was held as under:
    • “(11) The applicability of procedural requirement under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act of furnishing certificate is to be applied only when such electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in a position to produce such certificate being in control of the said device and not of the opposite party. In a case where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device, applicability of Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be held to be excluded. In such case, procedure under the said Sections can certainly be invoked. If this is not so permitted, it will be denial of justice to the person who is in possession of authentic evidence/witness but on account of manner of proving, such document is kept out of consideration by the court in absence of certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, which party producing cannot possibly secure. Thus, requirement of certificate under Section 65B(h) [sic-65B(4)] is not always mandatory.
    • (12) Accordingly, we clarify the legal position on the subject on the admissibility of the electronic evidence, especially by a party who is not in possession of device from which the document is produced. Such party cannot be required to produce certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act. The applicability of requirement of certificate being procedural can be relaxed by Court wherever interest of justice so justifies.”
  6. Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216, three-judge bench decision. It substantially followed PV Anwar (2014) with a ‘clarification’.
    • Because it is held in Anver PV v. PK Basheer that Section 62, 63 and 65 are not applied for electronic evidence – for 65A & B are ‘complete code’ – the further observation that ‘if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62’ stood incongruent and contradictory. Therefore, it is “clarified” and directed to “read” Anver “without the words – ‘under Section 62 of the Evidence Act’  ”.
    • In Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao it is found – Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP is per-incurium as under:
    • “What is clear from this judgment (Tomaso Bruno) is that the judgment of Anvar P. V. (supra) was not referred to at all. In fact, the judgment in State v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 was adverted to, which was a judgment specifically overruled by Anvar P. V. (supra). It may also be stated that Section 65B(4) was also not at all adverted to by this judgment. Hence, the declaration of law in Tomaso Bruno (supra) following Navjot Sandhu (supra) that secondary evidence of the contents of a document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to make CCTV footage admissible would be in the teeth of Anvar P. V., (supra) and cannot be said to be a correct statement of the law. The said view is accordingly overruled.”

End Notes – 3

Sec. 65A and Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act reads:

Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:

The CONTENTS of electronic records may be PROVED in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. 

65B. Admissibility of electronic records

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.

(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:—

  • (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer;
  • (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
  • (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
  • (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.

(3) Where over any period, the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by computers, whether—

  • (a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
  • (b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
  • (c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or
  • (d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers, all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.

(4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,—

  • (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
  • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
  • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.

(5) For the purposes of this section,—

  • (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
  • (b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any official information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities;
  • (c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section any reference to information being derived from other information shall be a reference to its being derived therefrom by calculation, comparison or any other process.

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Is the Basis of Every Easement, Theoretically, a Grant

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

 “An easement is a Right

  • Easement is a right possessed by the owner of a land (dominant land),
    • to use the land of another (servient land),
    • for the beneficial enjoyment of the (dominant) land.

Easement Does Not Confer Ownership or Possession

  • No Ownership is bestowed in the (servient) land (AIR 2004 All 359; AIR 1925 Bom 335).
  • No Possession obtained in the (servient) land. (2011 (2) KLT 605; AIR 1925 Bom 335).  
  • No Interest is created in the (servient) land. (2003 (1) KLT 320; AIR 1954 All 393).

Easement (सुखाधिकार) is Well Recognised; And Circumscribed by Law

  • Easement is a limited right touse’or ‘enjoyanother’s land.
  • It is to do, or to prevent to do, some specific thing.
  • It is to be exercised in a way least onerous to ‘another’s land’.
  • It is not a right to build and enjoy.
  • The right gained cannot be enlarged.
    • That is, an easement of way to a particular (dominant) property cannot be extended to another property by the dominant owner; an easement for residential purpose cannot be enlarged for an industrial purpose. (Sec. 28, 29, 43 etc.)
  • Servient owner can use his land in any manner (without disturbing enjoyment of the easement).

According to ‘Katiyar on Easements’:                                                                   

  • Easement is not a right to land or exclude owner.
  • It is not a right to permanent occupation. 
  • It does not confer exclusive right of user/enjoyment.
  • And, it is not a corporeal interest in land.

Easement – Definition under the Indian Easements Act

SECTION 4 of the Indian Easements Act defines Easements as under:

  • “An easement is a right
  • which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses,
    • as such,
  • for the beneficial enjoyment of that land 
  • to do and continue to do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done,
  • in or upon, or in respect of, certain other land not his own.”

Salient Limitations of Easement under the Indian Easements Act

  • The owner of a land only ‘uses’or ‘enjoys‘ another’s land (Sec. 31)
  • Only ‘enjoyment’ of soil or things ‘subsisting’ (Explanation in Sec. 4).
  • Limited enjoyment of (a) land & (b) advantages from its situation: S. 7
  • Right be exercised in a way least onerous to ‘another’s land’: Sec. 22
  • Secure full enjoyment, cause as little inconvenience: Sec. 24: 2017-2 KLT 63

It is Not a right to:                                            

  • tend to total destruction of servient tenement: S. 17 (2003 (1) KLT320)
  • make additional burden: S. 23
  • make constructions in, or cultivate upon: (2003 (1) KLT 320).
  • prevent servient owner to use: S. 27 : 2003 (1) KLT 320
  • enlarge purpose of, or accustomed user: S. 28
  • substantially increase an easement: S. 29
  • prevent servient owner from obstructing excessive  ‘user’ of servient land – as ‘enjoyment of easement’: S. 31
  • increase burden by making permanent change in do. tent: S. 43
  • capable of forming grant – No easement, if Not capable of forming grant (without document or registration): Mohammed vs. Doomunhi Achari, 1987 (2) KLT 1037.

No easement if:

  • right claimed is incidents of ownership.
  • servient property belongs to him. Easement is a right with conscious knowledge that the servient property does not belong to him. AIR 1966 Raj 265. It must also be with proper animus as to easement: AIR 1973 Mad 173.

The word ‘Servient’ is derived from ‘Serve’

Literal meaning of the word ‘servient’ is – subordinate, subservient and subject to another. Etymologically it is derived from ‘servus’ (Latin) meaning – slave or servant.

Sec. 4 Explains ‘Servient Heritages’ as under:

  • “Dominant and Servient Heritages and OwnersThe land for the beneficial enjoyment of which the right exists is called the dominant heritage, and the owner or occupier thereof the dominant owner; the land on which the liability is imposed is called the servient heritage, and the owner or occupier thereof the servient owner.”

Thus, the land upon which the right is claimed is ‘servient’ land.

Methods of Acquisition of Easements

The Indian Easements Act, 1882 refers to the different methods by which easements are acquired. They are pointed out (Ramkanya Bai v. Jagdish, AIR 2011 SC 3258) to be the following:

  1. easements by grantexpress grant by the owner of the servient heritage
  2. easements of necessity: based on implied grants or reservations made by the owner of a servient heritage at the time of transfers or partitions
  3. easements by prescription: that it is presumed to be acquired by peaceable and open enjoyment, without interruption for twenty years and
  4. customary easements: it is inferred to be acquired by virtue of a local custom.

For easement by prescription, it is not necessary that the user should be exclusive, but the claimant should exercise it under some claim existing in his own favour independently of all others.

‘Grant’ in Law

The term ‘Grant’ is used to denote-

  • A generic term to mean ‘transfer’ of immovable property (e.g., sale, lease, gift etc.).
  • But, in judicial parlance, it will not be an absolute ‘transfer’ of property; and remain as a concession, permission, settlement, grant of easement etc., if it is used in place of ‘transfer’ of property.
  • Present, aid, help etc., and the act of a settlor of trust, or of donor of a charity.
  • A technical term to denote conditional-transfer of lands by sovereign especially when it is purposefully used to differentiate from ‘transfer’ of property.
  • More than a licence (which does not create an estate or interest) and less than an outright and unconditional ‘transfer’ of property similar to sale, gift etc. (Note: A license is personal to an individual, whereas a ‘grant’ in an easement pertains to a right attached to the land.)

Characteristics of ‘Grant’

  • Usually it denotes a grant by deed.
  • It can be with or without consideration.
  • Unless specifically specified, it is creation of an ‘interest’ in property. 
  • As long as the conditions are fulfilled, grant is usually irrevocable.
  • Conditions can also be fixed to limit the period of grant.
  • Inferior interest, out of an interest retained by the grantor, e.g. the grant of a lease of land by the person holding the freehold. (Collins Dictionary of Law).

‘Grant’ – Salmond on Jurisprudence

What is ‘grant’ is stated in Salmond’s Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, at pages 338-339, under the heading ‘The Classes of Agreements’, as under:

  • • “…. A contract is an agreement which creates an obligation or a right in Personam between the parties to it. A grant is an agreement which creates a right of any other description; examples being grants of leases, easements, charges, patents, franchises, licences and so forth. An agreement which transfers a right may be termed generically an assignment. On which extinguishes a right is a release, discharge, or surrender.” (Quoted in H. Anraj v. Government of Tamil Nadu  (& Shri Dipak Dhar v. The State of West Bengal), AIR 1986 SC 63: (1986) 1 SCC 414.)

Grant by a Co-owner

Grant effected by a co-owner with the consent of other co-owners, or validated by their approval or ratification, alone is valid. In proper cases such consent or ratification may be presumed.

Grant of Land by Government

The lands granted continued to be lands belonging to the Government and the grantees did not acquire absolute proprietary rights over the granted area under the grant. We can see the ‘conditions’ of deeds under which the grants were made by the Travancore government in the following decisions-

  • State of Kerala v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd., (1991) 2 SCC 272
  • Kannan Devan Hills Produce v.  The State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301
  • State of Kerala v. The Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co.,  AIR 1998 Ker 267

See also:

  • Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86
  • Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 gives us “illuminative information as to the concept of ‘jenmom’” as pointed out in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, 2018 2 KHC 719; 2018 2 KLT 369 – though this decision was overruled by the larger Bench in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez Vs. Albert Fernandez, AIR 1971 Ker 168 :1971 KLT 216).

Grant may be Express or “Implied

The origin of all easements is, theoretically, grant by the servient owner. It may be express or implied. It may also be presumed from long user.

  • Note: Traditionally, the term ‘implied easement’ was used by the conventional authorities only to denote ‘easement of necessity‘. However, in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, the Supreme Court used the same to refer to an easement of grant ‘arising by implication‘.

It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

  • “13. On the question of easement by grant, the Appellate Court was of the opinion that the plaintiff’s claim in that respect stood proved. The plaintiff had acquaintance and association with the Ashramam and Yogini Amma from his childhood days as revealed from the oral and documentary evidence. Considering the location and nature of `B’ schedule pathway, the location of two pillars at its inception and the gate from which it started, it could be seen that it had been in use by the plaintiff as a pathway. The plaintiff had been residing in the house on `A’ schedule property even prior to the deed of settlement. Therefore, the Appellate Authority arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff had obtained right of easement of grant from Yogini Amma over the `B’ schedule pathway.
  • An easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties and it may have its own consideration. (B.B. Katiyar’s Commentaries on Easements and Licenses, p. 762).  It may be either express or even by necessary implication. Though easement of necessity will come to an end with the termination of necessity, easement acquired by grant cannot be extinguished on that ground as per section 13(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Therefore, even assuming that the plaintiff had an alternative pathway as contended by the defendants, it does not extinguish the right of easement of grant in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the Trial Court was justified in granting a relief of declaration of right of easement of grant over the `B’ schedule pathway. However, the declaration granted on the ground of easement of necessity was not justified.”

The aforesaid Supreme Court decision (Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622) arose from the Kerala High Court decision, Sree Swyam Prakash Ashramam v. N. Gopala Pillai on 9 May, 2006. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Kerala High Court held as under:

  • “Theoretically all easements have their origin in some sort of grant by the servient owner. The grant may be express or it may be implied from the surrounding attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties or it may even be presumed from long user. In the case of an express grant of easement the limit thereof depends on the words used.”

Upholding the view of the Kerala High Court the Apex Court held as under:

  • “In our view, therefore, the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as pathway by the original plaintiff (since deceased) at least up to 1982, when alone the cause of action for the suit arose.”

No Explicit ‘Consideration’ Required for Easement by Grant

Neither the provisions of the enacted law (Easements Act, 1882) nor judicial decisions specifically address the requirement of ‘consideration’ in the creation of easements by grant. This omission is understandable, as Indian law clearly permits the acquisition of easements by grant – both express and implied. Since an easement may arise by implication, and the intention to grant can be inferred from the terms of the grant or the surrounding circumstances, the fundamental principle of easement law – that every easement is, in theory, rooted in a grant – supports the conclusion that no express consideration is required for the creation of an easement by grant.

Sec. 8 of the Indian Easements Act reads:

  • “An easement may be acquired by the owner of the immovable property for the beneficial enjoyment of which the right is created, or, on his behalf, by any person in possession of the same.”

Sec. 13 further elaborates on easements of necessity and quasi-easements, indicating that such easements can arise from the transfer or bequest of immovable property, again without a requirement for consideration.

In Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, the Supreme Court held:

  • “Theoretically all easements have their origin in some sort of grant by the servient owner. The grant may be express or it may be implied from the surrounding attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties or it may even be presumed from long user.”

Also read: Implied Grant: A Valid Mode of Creation of Easement under Indian Law

Basis of every Right of Easement is Theoretically a Grant

In Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89, it is held as under:

  • “The basis of every right of easement by whatsoever method it may have been acquired, is theoretically a grant from the servient-owner.
    • It may be expressed, as is mentioned in Sections 8 to 12 of the Act, or
    • it may be implied from the circumstances as in Section 13 of the Act. or
    • it may be presumed from long and continued user for a certain period as in Section 15 of the Act, or
    • it may be inferred from a long and continued practice of user by a certain class of the public in certain locality.” 

No Explicit ‘Consideration’ Required for Easement by Grant

Neither the provisions of the enacted law (Easements Act, 1882) nor judicial decisions specifically address the requirement of ‘consideration’ in the creation of easements by grant. This omission is understandable, as Indian law clearly permits the acquisition of easements by grant – both express and implied. Since an easement may arise by implication, and the intention to grant can be inferred from the terms of the grant or the surrounding circumstances, the fundamental principle of easement law – that every easement is, in theory, rooted in a grant – supports the conclusion that no express consideration is required for the creation of an easement by grant.

Sec. 8 of the Indian Easements Act reads:

  • “An easement may be acquired by the owner of the immovable property for the beneficial enjoyment of which the right is created, or, on his behalf, by any person in possession of the same.”

Sec. 13 further elaborates on easements of necessity and quasi-easements, indicating that such easements can arise from the transfer or bequest of immovable property, again without a requirement for consideration.

In Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, the Supreme Court held: “Theoretically all easements have their origin in some sort of grant by the servient owner. The grant may be express or it may be implied from the surrounding attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties or it may even be presumed from long user.”

Grant of Right of Way must be Liberally Construed

Katiyar on Easements repeatedly said in his treatise that a ‘grant of right of way must be liberally construed’ to ensure the dominant owner’s beneficial enjoyment of his land. Gale on Easements (leading English treatise) and “Law of Easements and Licenses” by P.S. Narayana also emphasised this principle.

In Mathai v. Jordi Poulose,  ILR 2011-2 Ker 484; 2011-2 KHC 591; 2011-2 KLT 605, it was found that the suit agreement, made it clear that the right given thereunder was not a personal right but a right for the beneficial enjoyment for the property, and it could only be a right of easement and not a licence. The High Court  referring Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242, said further as under:

  • “18. True, the plaint did not specifically show that appellant has claimed a right of easement by grant. But as rightly argued by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, a pleading must be liberally construed and placing undue emphasis on the form is not in the interest of justice. The Honourable Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College (AIR 1987 SC 1242) held:
  • “It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law, in such a case it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.”

Lost Grant

In Easements Act by Dr. Karandikar & Chitaley at Page 425, note 20 (Title by lost grant), it is observed as follows:

  • “(2) The evidence from which a lost grant may be inferred is not very different from the evidence on which a claim for a prescriptive easement may be established.
  • (3) (Drainage system of defendant’s building connected with sewer line of plaintiff’s building – Right claimed by defendant exercised secretly – Held, right was not proved.) The presumption of lost grant may be negatived by showing legal incompetence as regards owner of the servient tenement to grant an easement or a physical incapacity of being obstructed as regard the easement itself or an uncertainty or secrecy of enjoyment putting out of the category of all known easements.
  • (4) Where the plaintiff did make out a case of user from time immemorial in the plaint a decree could be granted on the basis of lost grant.
  • (5) Acquisition of easement by immemorial user based on doctrine of lost grant can be claimed when dominant and servient tenements are held under same landlord.
  • (6) Proof of the origin of right or by such proof of long & uninterrupted usage as in the absence of a documentary title will suffice to establish a prescriptive right.” (Quoted in Varghese v. Jose Mathew, 2014-3 Ker LT 1065).

Halsbury’s LawsPrescription based on presumed grant

In Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol 16(2) at Page 42, paragraph 76, it is observed as follows:

  • “76. Prescription based on presumed grant. The doctrine of prescription generally is based upon the presumption of a grant, the common law doctrine being that all prescription presupposes a grant once made and validly subsisting, but since lost or destroyed. The other forms of prescription are merely modifications of this doctrine. The presumption in the former instance of such a grant arises under the doctrine of prescription from the fact of enjoyment of the right. It therefore follows that a right claimed by prescription must be such that it could have formed the subject matter of a grant. Nothing which cannot have had a lawful beginning can be claimed by prescription. Recourse can only be had to the doctrine of prescription in cases where a grant of the right is not forthcoming, for prescription has no place if a grant is proved and its terms are known“. (Quoted in Varghese v. Jose Mathew, 2014-3 Ker LT 1065).

Prescriptive Rights are Inchoate until title thereof is upheld by a competent court

It was observed in Sultan Ahmad v. Valiullah (1912) 10 ALJ 227, that the result of the Easements Act and the similar provisions of the Limitation Act was that a right of easement could not be said to be perfected until the right was declared by a decree of court. It is more so, in case of prescriptive rights which are inchoate (started; but, not full-blown) until title thereof is upheld by a competent court. See also:

  • Sultan Ahmad v. Valiullah (1912) 10 ALJ 227 is referred to in: Nachiparayan v. Narayana Goundan, (1920): 60 Ind Cas 171, (1920) 39 MLJ 574; Arjuna Udayar v. Manuswamy Naicker, 1999-1 CurCC 97;
  • D. Ramanatha Gupta vs S. Razaack, AIR 1982 Kant 314..
  • See also: Tradesh and Miners, Ltd v. Dhirendra Nath Banerjee, AIR 1944 Pat 261.

Easement is acquired; not arise out of ‘Express Permission’

Sec. 12, Easements Act states that an easement is acquired by the owner of an immovable property. It is observed by the Apex Court in Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal, AIR 2009 SC 1103, that the claimant of easement (prescription) should plead and prove that the right claimed was enjoyed independent of any agreement with the owner of the property over which the right is claimed, as any user with the express permission of the owner will be a licence and not an easement. 

  • Note: A license is personal to an individual, whereas a ‘grant’ in an easement pertains to a right attached to the land.

Easement-by-Prescription – “Grantor Acquisition by “Hostile or Notorious Act? Is there incongruity?

The basis of every right of easement is theoretically a grant from the servient-owner. Grant is presumed in easement by prescription, from long and continued user. Is there incongruity (in easement by prescription) between ‘grant’ (on one part) and ‘acquisition’ of easement by “prescription” which suggests ‘adverse’ and ‘hostile or notorious’ user (on the other part)?

  • The answer is that the ‘grant’ herein is only a “presumption in law”; and virtually, easement by prescription has to be acquired by hostile and/or notorious acts.
  • It is clear from Sec. 12 and 15 of the Easement Act.

Tanba Nusaji Mahajan v. Pandhari Mahajan, 2004 (6) BomCR 782, 2004 (4) MhLJ 109 lays down the legal position accepted by Indian law, clearly, as under:

  • “The acquisition of way by adverse user is based upon the theory of the hostility of the use to the title of the person over whose lands it is acquired, while a way of necessity is based upon an implication of an intended grant and the use of it is based entirely upon such implication or consent to its use.”

Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Danad vs Purushotram, 1971 AIR 1878, it was pointed out as under:

  • “In Ravachand v. Maniklal (ILR 1946 Bom. 184), it was held that an easement by prescription under ss. 12 and 15 of the Act is in fact an assertion of a hostile claim of certain rights over another man’s property and in order to acquire the easement the person who asserts the hostile claim must prove that he had the consciousness to exercise that hostile claim on a property which is not his own and where no such consciousness is proved he cannot establish a prescriptive acquisition of the fight.”

In Raychand Vanmalidas vs Maneklal Mansukhbhai, (1946) 48 BomLR 25 it was held as under:

  • “In any case it must be shown that the right was enjoyed as an easement, that is, as an assertion of a hostile claim of certain limited rights over somebody else’s property. Such an assertion cannot be held proved without satisfactory proof of the requisite consciousness. Prescriptive easement, as opposed to easement by grant, is always hostile. It is in fact an assertion of a hostile claim of certain rights over another man’s property and as such it resembles in some respects the claim to ownership by adverse possession of property; both are of hostile origin and are, therefore, prescriptive rights obtained by adverse enjoyment for a certain period, the difference being that while in the case of adverse possession the possessor must assert his own ownership, in the case of easement he must assert limited rights of user on a property and acknowledge its ownership in some one else. It must, therefore, follow, in my opinion, that a person who asserts such a hostile claim must prove that he had the consciousness of exercising that hostile claim on a property which is not his own, and where no such consciousness is proved, he cannot prove the prescriptive acquisition of the right”.

Easement by prescription is ‘acquired’ by ‘prescriptive’ user. It should not have been by permission or agreement. In case of easement, law requires pleading and proof – that the right claimed was enjoyed independent of any express permission (Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal, AIR 2009 SC 1103).

It is held in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 62 that the acquisition of easement by prescription may be classified under the head of implied grant; for, all prescription presupposes a grant.

Implied Grant’ Recognised in Three Distinct Legal Connotations

  • 1. Theoretical Basis of Easement of Necessity. Implied from the necessity of enjoying the dominant tenement; arises by operation of law in the absence of any other access.
  • 2. Theoretical Basis of every Right of Easement  The origin of all easements is a grant by the servient owner; it may be expressed, as is mentioned in Sections 8 to 12, or implied from the circumstances as in Section 13, or presumed from long and continued user as in Section 15 of the Act.
  • 3. Judicially Acknowledged Sources of Easement. Common Law of India recognises following two modes of ‘easements’ –
    • (i) Village Pathways (falls under Sec. 18 Easements Act – Customary Easements): Easement inferred from a long and continued practice of user by a certain class of the public in certain locality. E.g.: a village pathway (See: Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89; Harendra Nath Chakraborti v. Asim Sindhu Chakraborty, AIR 1981 Cal 325; Yohannan Vs. Mathai, 1991-1 Ker LJ 605, 1991 KHC 571).
    • (ii) Implied Grant of Pathways: A species of easement by grant, inferred from the conduct of parties or surrounding circumstances; a recognised source of easement based on presumed intention. (See: Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622; L. Govindarajulu Chettiar v. V. N. Srinivasalu Naidu, AIR 1972 Mad 307).

Read Blog: Implied Grant: A Valid Mode of Creation of Easement under Indian Law

Implied Grant” has as much efficacy as an express grant

In Kuppakkal v. Mathan Chettiar, AIR 1924 Mad 834, Annapurna  v. Santosh Kumar, AIR 1937 Cal 661; Ratanchand Chordia v. Kasim Khaleeli, AIR 1964 Mad 209 and  L. Govindarajulu Chettiar v. V. N. Srinivasalu Naidu, AIR  1972 Mad 307, it was held that the grant of a right of way which had necessarily to be implied on a true construction of the deed, had as much efficacy as an express grant.

It was held in R. Sivanandan v. Rajammal, (1975) 1 Mad LJ 251, that the implied grant could be raised even if there was no express grant; and that the argument that the absence of an express grant would negative an implied grant was quite untenable.

Easement right by way of implied grant stated in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, is this ‘Easement by grant’ that arise by implication.

Alternative Way Will Not Defeat Claim of Implied Grant (Grant that arise by Implication)

The existence of alternative way will defeat easement of necessity and quasi easement. But, it will not defeat the claim of implied grant. (See: John, S/o. Ulahannan v. P. Janaki, D/o. Late Vava, 2012, Kerala High Court.)

Implied Grant and Easement by Prescription

  • Easement of Necessity and of Implied Grant (‘Easement by grant’ on implication) are sprouted on Analogous principles; because, both are based on some sort of ‘consent or permission’.
  • Implied Grants [both as (i) theoretical basis of Easement of Necessity and (ii) ‘Easement by grant’ on implication] are Antithetical to Easement by Prescription, because implied Grants are based on some sort of ‘consent, approval or permission’ and Easement by Prescription is arisen from prescriptive or hostile acts and it is to be ‘acquired’.

Easement by (implied) grant and quasi easement can be pleaded alternatively Easement by (implied) grant and quasi easement can be pleaded alternatively for it is permissible to raise inconsistent pleas (but  to confine either of the two at the time of evidence).

Easement of Necessity and Easement by Prescription are Antithetical (Easement of Necessity and of Implied-Grant (Grant that arise by Implication) are Analogous)

Easement by prescription is acquired by hostile and notorious acts; but user of it should be peaceable and open enjoyment, without interruption for twenty years. Therefore grant is presumed in easement by prescription.

Origin of Easements of necessity and Easement by prescription are different (Easements of necessity is based on implied grants. It is based on some sort of ‘consent, approval or permission’; but, Easement by Prescription is arisen from prescriptive or hostile acts). Hence, both these rights are antithetical to each other. In Natesa Gounder v. Raja Gounder, 2012-5 Mad LW 649, it is observed as under:

  • Implied grant and the concept easement by prescription are quite antithetical to each other. If a person is having an implied grant in his favour, then the question of prescription would not arise.” (Quoted in: Kalyan Spinning Mills v. M.  Chellappan, AIR  2023 Mad 8, P.  Sadayan v. Arumugam, 2020-1 Mad LW 535).
  • See also: Joy Joseph v. Jose Jacob, 2010 (4) KHC 167; Kochu Nadar v. Kunjan Nadar Gabriel,2011 SCC OnLine Ker 2674;  Kallen Devi v. Kizhakkekoroth Raghavan, 2012 (3) KLT 142; Kamala Devi Amma v. Rajan, 2017 (4) KLJ 700;  Lilly v. Wilson, 2018 (1) KLT 772.

Hero Vinoth v.  Seshammal, 2006-5 SCC 545, is the well accepted authority, as regards ‘easement of necessity’, for the following –

  • An easement of necessity is one which is not merely necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the dominant tenement, but one where dominant tenement cannot be used at all without the easement.
  • The burden of the servient owner in such a case is not on the basis of any concession or grant made by him for consideration or otherwise, but it is by way of a legal obligation enabling the dominant owner to use his land.
  • It is limited to the barest necessity however inconvenient it is irrespective of the question whether a better access could be given by the servient owner or not. When an alternate access becomes available, the legal necessity of burdening the servient owner ceases and the easement of necessity by implication of law is legally withdrawn or extinguished as statutorily recognized in Sec. 41.
  • Such an easement will last only as long as the absolute necessity exists.

Hero Vinoth v.  Seshammal, 2006-5 SCC 545, is the well accepted authority, as regards ‘easement by grant’, for the following –

  • Easement of necessity will not amount to an easement of necessity under Sec. 13 of the Act eventhough it may also be an absolute necessity for the person in whose favour the grant is made.
  • Limit of the easement acquired by grant is controlled only by the terms of the contract. If the terms of the grant restrict its user subject to any condition the parties will be governed by those conditions. Any how the scope of the grant could be determined by the terms of the grant between the parties alone.
  • If it is a permanent arrangement uncontrolled by any condition, that permanency in user must be recognized and the servient tenement will be recognized and the servient tenement will be permanently burdened with that disability.
  • Such a right does not arise under the legal implication of Sec. 13.
  •  An easement by grant does not get extinguished under Sec. 41 of the Act which relates to an easement of necessity.
  • Where the parties clearly provided for a right of access to the backyard of the defendant’s house when the Partition deed was executed and shares were allotted to various sharers taking into account various factors, it is a matter of contractual arrangement between them.
  • In such a contract if a right of way is provided to a particular sharer, it cannot be extinguished merely because such sharer has other alternative way.

Will Easement of Necessity Ripen into a Prescriptive Easement?

In other words-

  • Can one claim ‘easement of necessity’ and ‘easement by prescription’ with respect to a (same) way?  
  • Does a way  that started with minimum width (say a foot-path) under the claim ‘easement of necessity’, and continued with a higher width (so that cars can be taken), in the course of time,  for more than 20 years, will yield or bring-in ‘easement by prescription’?

We find answer in negative form in Tanba Nusaji Mahajan v, Pandhari Mahajan, 2004 (6) BomCR 782, 2004 (4) MhLJ 109. It is held as under:

  • “10. However, a way of necessity is distinguished from the right of way acquired by prescription and cannot ripen into a prescriptive easement so long as the necessity continues. A way of necessity arises by virtue of conditions entirely different from easement of way created by prescription. The former arises by implication of law out of the necessities of the case and is based upon principle of law which negative the existence of a way by continuous adverse user. The acquisition of way by adverse user is based upon the theory of the hostility of the use to the title of the person over whose lands it is acquired, while a way of necessity is based upon an implication of an intended grant and the use of it is based entirely upon such implication or consent to its use.”

Hero Vinoth v.  Seshammal, 2006-5 SCC 545, is the well accepted authority, to differentiate ‘easement of necessity and grant’. It is laid down –

  • Easement of necessity is depended upon absolute necessity.  Easement by grant does not depend upon absolute necessity of it. (It is the nature of the acquisition that is relevant.)
  • Many easements acquired by grant may be absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant tenement in the sense that it cannot be enjoyed at all without it. That may be the reason for the grant also. Still, easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties, and the parties are governed by the terms of the grant and not anything else; whereas easement of necessity is controlled under the legal implications of Sec. 13 and it is extinguished by the statutory provision under Sec. 41 (which is not applicable to easement by grant).
  • Easement by grant will not amount to an easement of necessity under Sec. 13 even when grant is an absolute necessity for the person in whose favour it is made.

Can Easement of Necessity and (Implied) Grant be Claimed Alternatively?

It is held in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, Easement of Implied Grant can be granted in a suit even though “Grant” alone was Claimed (Alternatively to easement of necessity). Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are the following –

  • Plaintiff, owner of A-schedule property (dominant tenement), claimed “easement of necessity or of grant” in B-schedule property (servient tenement).
  • “Implied grant” was not specifically pleaded (only ‘grant’ was pleaded).
  • Dominant tenement had been separated from the servient tenement.
  • Plaintiff has been using the way in B-schedule property for a long period (about 50 years).
  • The trial court observed that the plaintiff claiming easement by grant or easement of necessity has only a primary burden to prove the absence of any alternate pathway (these findings were accepted by the Apex Court).
  • Defendant alleged that two alternate pathways existed. But, No evidence of any other way to A-schedule property (dominant tenement).
  • The High Court found that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway.
  • The Supreme Court upheld the view of the High Court and the Trial Court and held as under:
    • “… the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that
      • (i) no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and
      • (ii) there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property …”

It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

  • “17. The High Court limited itself to the issue whether the decree of the first appellate court granting the original plaintiff (since deceased) right of easement over ‘B’ schedule property by way of grant concurring with the findings of the trial court was sustainable.
  • 18. Before the High Court, the defendants pleaded that there had been no appeal or cross objection filed by the original plaintiff (since deceased) against the order of the Appellate Court which disallowed the claim of easement of necessity and, therefore, the finding that there existed no easement of necessity in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased) over the ‘B’ schedule property stood confirmed. Further they contended that the alternative pathway on the western side of the ‘A’ schedule property was rendered inconvenient by the very act of the original plaintiff (since deceased) who sold that portion of the property to a third party who began digging that pathway resulting in the difference in level. The High Court, on consideration of these contentions, held that though the claim of right of easement by way of necessity over ‘B’ Schedule property may be affected by the subsequent sale of the said plot by the plaintiff in 1983, the claim of right of easement by way of grant over ‘B’ schedule property stood unaffected by the said conduct.
  • 21. The High Court relied on a number of observations in Katiyar’s Law of Easement and Licences (12th Edition) on law with respect to “implication of grant of an easement.” It may arise upon severance of a tenement by its owner into parts. The acquisition of easement by prescription may be classified under the head of implied grant for all prescription presupposes a grant. All that is necessary to create the easement is a manifestation or an unequivocal intention on the part of the servient owner to that effect.
  • 23. Applying these observations to the facts of the case, the High Court held that though the original grant was by Yogini Amma that grant could not perfect as an easement for the reason that Yogini Amma herself was the owner of both ‘A’ schedule and ‘B’ schedule properties and consequently there was no question of ‘B’ schedule property becoming the servient tenement and ‘A’ schedule property becoming the dominant tenement. However, it was the desire of Yogini Amma that was implemented by her disciples by virtue of the settlement deed. Therefore, the right of the plaintiff to have ‘B’ schedule property as a pathway could not have been taken away by the very same deed. In fact, there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway as can be inferred from the circumstances, namely,
    • i) no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property in the settlement deed and
    • ii) there was no objection to the use of ‘B’ schedule as pathway.
  • 25. We have heard Mr. T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Mr. Subramanium Prasad, learned senior counsel for the respondents. We have carefully examined the impugned judgment of the courts below and also the pleadings, evidence and the materials already on record. It is not in dispute that the trial court as well as the First Appellate Court concurrently found on a proper appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case that the ‘B’ Schedule Property of the plaint was being used by the original plaintiff (since deceased) and thereafter, by the respondents even after construction of the building in 1940 in ‘A’ Schedule property of the plaint. The appellants also did not dispute the case of the original plaintiff (since deceased) that he was in continuous occupation of the building even after its construction in the year 1940. It is also not in dispute that the appellants were not able to establish that the original plaintiff (since deceased) was using any other pathway for access to ‘A’ Schedule Property of the plaint and the building therein, which was in the occupation of the original plaintiff (since deceased). The case of the appellants that since there was no mention in the deed of settlement enabling the use of ‘B’ schedule pathway for access to ‘A’ schedule property and the building therein, cannot be the reason to hold that there was no grant as the grant could be by implication as well. It is not in dispute that the fact of the use of the ‘B’ schedule property as pathway even after execution of Exhibit A1, the settlement deed in the year 1982 by the original plaintiff (since deceased) would amply show that there was an implied grant in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased) relating to ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint for its use as pathway to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint in residential occupation of the original plaintiff (since deceased). In the absence of any evidence being adduced by the appellants to substantiate their contention that the original plaintiff (since deceased) had an alternative pathway for access to the ‘A’ schedule property, it is difficult to negative the contention of the respondent that since the original plaintiff (since deceased) has been continuously using the said pathway at least from the year 1940 the original plaintiff (since deceased) had acquired an easement right by way of an implied grant in respect of the ‘B’ Schedule property of the plaint. It is an admitted position that both ‘A’ schedule and ‘B’ schedule properties of the plaint belonged to Yogini Amma and her disciples and it was the desire of Yogini Amma that was really implemented by the disciples under the settlement deed executed in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased). Therefore, the High Court was perfectly justified in holding that when it was the desire of Yogini Amma to Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam & Anr vs. G.Anandavally Amma & Ors grant easement right to the original plaintiff (since deceased) by way of an implied grant, the right of the original plaintiff (since deceased) to have ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as a pathway could not have been taken away.
  • In Annapurna Dutta vs. Santosh Kumar Sett & Ors. [AIR 1937 Cal.661], B.K. Mukherjee, as His Lordship then was observed:
    • There could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent. Now a right of way is neither continuous nor always an apparent easement, and hence would not ordinarily come under the rule. Exception is no doubt made in certain cases, where there is a ‘formed road’ existing over one part of the tenement for the apparent use of another portion or there is ‘some permanence in the adaptation of the tenement’ from which continuity may be inferred, but barring these exceptions, an ordinary right of way would not pass on severance unless language is used by the grantor to create a fresh easement.”
  • 26. In our view, therefore, the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as pathway by the original plaintiff (since deceased) at least up to 1982, when alone the cause of action for the suit arose.”

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Polygraph, Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping Tests in Criminal Investigation

Saji Koduvath.

Introduction.

Polygraph (Lie Detector Test), Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping are tests used in Criminal Investigation. The investigation teams are not free to use it, as they think proper. It is so made clear in the Guidelines promulgated by the National Human Rights Commission, and in the Supreme Court decision in Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263.

Guidelines of National Human Rights Commission, in 2000

The National Human Rights Commission laid down the Guidelines in 2000, for using Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on the accused. It is made under Article 21 of the Constitution. Article 21 safeguards the rights of every person against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by any State-agency. These mandatory guiding principles read as under:

  • “(i) No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test.
  • (ii) If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical, emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer.
  • (iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate.
  • (iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer.
  • (v) At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is made shall not be a ‘confessional’ statement to the Magistrate but will have the status of a statement made to the police.
  • (vi) The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation.
  • (vii) The actual recording of the Lie Detector Test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
  • (viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record.”

Smt. Selvi  v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263

The Supreme Court has made it clear in Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263 that these guidelines issued by the National Human Rights Commission, in 2000, pertained to Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test), should be strictly adhered to. That is, if the accused objects such Tests, they cannot be forcibly administered. By virtue of the Supreme Court decision, similar safeguards should be adopted for conducting ‘Narco-Analysis Technique’ and the ‘Brain Electrical Activation Profile test’, also.

The Apex Court held that the forcible methods of carrying out Narco Analysis Test or Polygraph Test by the police are destructive of accused’s non-derogable rights against self-incrimination and personal liberty. It was held that this right against the self-incrimination was available even at the stage of investigation. In Smt. Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263,  the Apex Court observed as under:

  • “263. We are also of the view that forcing an individual to undergo any of the impugned techniques violates the standard of “substantive due process” which is required for restraining personal liberty. Such a violation will occur irrespective of whether these techniques are forcibly administered during the course of an investigation or for any other purpose since the test results could also expose a person to adverse consequences of a non-penal nature. The impugned techniques cannot be read into the statutory provisions which enable medical examination during investigation in criminal cases i.e. the Explanation to Sections 53, 53-A and 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Such an expansive interpretation is not feasible in light of the rule of “ejusdem generis” and the considerations which govern the interpretation of statutes in relation to scientific advancements. We have also elaborated how the compulsory administration of any of these techniques is an unjustified intrusion into the mental privacy of an individual. It would also amount to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” with regard to the language of evolving international human rights norms. Furthermore, placing reliance on the results gathered from these techniques comes into conflict with the “right to fair trial”. Invocations of a compelling public interest cannot justify the dilution of constitutional rights such as the “right against self-incrimination”.
  • 264. In light of these conclusions, we hold that no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty. However, we do leave room for the voluntary administration of the impugned techniques in the context of criminal justice provided that certain safeguards are in place. Even when the subject has given consent to undergo any of these tests, the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test. However, any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872.”

The Supreme Court summarised its decision as under:

VERY IMPORTANT POINTS

  • 1.            No individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the scientific techniques, Narcoanalysis, Polygraph Examination and Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty.
  • 2.            Scientific techniques such as narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test cannot be read into the statutory provisions which enable medical examination during investigation in criminal cases, i.e. the Explanation to Sections 53, 53-A and 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
  • 3.            Placing reliance on the results gathered from scientific techniques such as narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test comes into conflict with the ‘right to fair trial’.
  • 4.            It is a settled principle that a statement obtained through coercion, threat or inducement is involuntary and hence inadmissible as evidence during trial , in circumstances where it is shown that a person was indeed compelled to make statements while in custody, relying on such testimony as well as its derivative use will offend Article 20(3).
  • 5.            Results obtained through involuntary administration of any of the scientific tests namely narcoanalysis technique, polygraph examination and the BEAP test come within the scope of ‘testimonial compulsion’, thereby attracting the protective shield of Article 20(3).
  • 6.            Compulsory administration of any of the scientific tests namely narcoanalysis technique, polygraph examination and BEAP test constitutes ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ in the context of Article 21.

(This judgment, Smt. Selvi v. State of Karnataka, is referred to in:

  • Ajit Mohan Vs. Legislative Assembly, NCT of Delhi, 2021-8 SCALE 8;
  • Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2020 SC 5592;
  • Ashish Jain Vs. Makrand Singh, 2019-1 JT 342;
  • Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2018-12 JT 189  
  • K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.)

The Supreme Court in Amlesh Kumar v. The State of Bihar on 9 June, 2025, 2025 INSC 810 (Sanjay Karol, Prasanna B. Varale), 9th June, 2025, held as under:

  • “21. In view of the above exposition in Selvi (Supra), the third question is answered in the following terms :
  • The accused has a right to voluntarily undergo a narco- analysis test at an appropriate stage. We deem it appropriate to add, that the appropriate stage for such a test to be conducted is when the accused is exercising his right to lead evidence in a trial. However, there is no indefeasible right with the accused to undergo a narco- analysis test, for upon receipt of such an application the concerned Court, must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the matter, such as free consent, appropriate safeguards etc., authorizing a person to undergo a voluntary narco-analysis test. We deem it appropriate to reproduce and reiterate the guidelines issued in Selvi (Supra) in this regard as follows :
  • “265. The National Human Rights Commission had published Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on an Accused in 2000. These Guidelines should be strictly adhered to and similar safeguards should be adopted for conducting the “narcoanalysis technique” and the “Brain Electrical Activation Profile” test. The text of these Guidelines has been reproduced below:
  • (i). No lie detector tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test.
  • (ii). If the accused volunteers for a lie detector test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical, emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer.
  • (iii). The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate.
  • (iv). During the hearing before the Magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer.
  • (v). At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is made shall not be a “confessional” statement to the Magistrate but will have the status of a statement made to the police.
  • (vi). The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation.
  • (vii). The actual recording of the lie detector test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
  • (viii). A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record.”




Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Who has to fix Damages in Tort and Contract?

Jojy George Koduvath.

Damages under Tort and Contract

Damages arise from ‘tortious liability’ and ‘breach of contract’. It is observed in Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum,(1997) 9 SCC 552, as under:

  • “In tort, liability is primarily fixed by law while in contract they are fixed by the parties themselves. In tort, the duty is towards the persons generally while in contract it is towards specific persons or persons. If the claim depends upon proof of proof of the contract, action does not lie in tort. If the claim arises, from the relationship between the parties, independent of the contract, an action would lie in tort at the election of the plaintiff, although the might alternatively have pleaded in contract.”

Tortious Liability

Blacks Law Dictionary defines ‘tort’ as violation of duty imposed by general law or otherwise upon all persons occupying the relation to each other involved in a given transaction. There must always be a violation of some duty owed to plaintiff and generally such a duty must arise by operation of law and not by mere agreement of the parties.

Essential Elements of Tortious Liability

The essential elements of tortious liability are –

  • (a) some wrong doing and (b) negligence or strict liability.

Actual Damage for Tort must be Established before a Court

For asserting tortious liability, as observed by our Apex Court, in Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum, it must be established before a court of law that:

  • (i) The defendant was under duty of care, primarily fixed by law, not to create physical danger to the person or property of third party;
  • (ii)  The defendant ought to have reasonably foreseen the physical danger likely to be affected;
  • (iii)  Violation of such duty fastened liability upon the defendant to pay damages; and
  • (iv) Actual physical damage must have been caused to the plaintiff or his property out of such breach of duty.

Foreseeability of Damages

In United India Insurance Co.  v. Thomas, 1999-1 KLT 165; 1999 1 RCR(Civ) 610. the Kerala High Court held as under:

  •  “In a suit for damages in a tort case, the court has power to award pecuniary compensation to the plaintiff for the injury or damage caused to him out of the wrongful act of the defendant. The test employed for determining whether the defendant is liable for damages is the test of directness, that is to say the defendant is liable for all direct consequences of the tortuous acts suffered by the plaintiff whether or not a reasonable man would have foreseen them. The Court of Appeal in Re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co. Ltd. (1921) 3 K.B. 560) held that once the tortuous act is established the defendant is to be held liable for all the damages which ‘is in fact directly traceable to the negligent act, and not due to independent causes having no connection with the negligent act’.
  • Foreseeability of some damage is relevant to decide whether the act complained of was negligent or not. But the liability for damages is not restricted to foreseeable damage but extends to all the damage directly traceable to the negligent act. This view was adopted by the Privy Council in Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (1961) 1 All. E.R.404 (PC). In holding foresee ability to be the correct test, the judicial committee observed that Polemis” case (supra) should not be regarded as a good law. Lord Viscound Simonds observed:
    •        “For it does not seem consonant with current ideas of justice or morality that, for an act of negligence .however slight or venial, which results in some trivial foreseeable damage, the actor should be liable for all consequences, however, unforeseeable and however grave, so long as they can be said to be “direct”. It is a principle of civil liability subject only to qualifications which have no present relevance, that a man must be considered to be responsible for the probable consequences of his act.”
  • His Lordship further said:
    •        “But, with great respect to the full court, this is surely irrelevant, or, if it is relevant, only serves to show that the Polemis rule works in a very strange way. After the event even a fool is wise. Yet it is not the hindsight of a fool, but it is the foresight of the reasonable man which alone can determine responsibility. The Polemis rule, by substituting “direct” for “reasonably foreseeable” consequence, leads to a conclusion equally illogical and unjust.”
  •        The above test of foresee ability was affirmed in The Wagon Mound (No. 2) (1966) 2 All. E.R.709) and Hughes v. Lord Advocate (1963) 1 All. E.R.705). While adjudicating the claim for compensation by the Tribunal under S.165 of the Act the foresee ability test has no application. It is for the Civil Court to apply this test while assessing the damages in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case.”

Law of Tort Offers Compensation for Injuries; But, Not to All Losses

In Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. ManjulbenJayantilalNakum,(1997) 9 SCC 552, a celebrated decision on this subject, it is pointed out as under:

  • “The law of tort prevents hurting one another. All torts consist of violation of a right in the plaintiff.  Tort law, therefore, is primarily evolved to compensate the injured by compelling the wrong-doer to pay for the damage done. Since distributive losses are an inevitable by-product of modern living in allocating the risk, the law of tort makes less and less allowance to punishment, admonition and deterrence found in criminal law. The purpose of the law of tort is to adjust these losses and offer compensation for injuries by one person as a result of the conduct of another. The law could not attempt to compensate all losses.”

Damages Awarded After Adjudication

It is pointed out in State of UP  v.  Miss Nikhat Parveen, 2005-3 All WC 2733, that in case any person claims damage and compensation, he shall have to resort to the remedies provided to him in law and that the claim of damages requires adjudication and determination of facts. The Court observed further as under:

  •           “11.   A liability in tort arises from a breach of duty primarily fixed by law and this duty is towards person (s) generally and its breach is redressable by an action for unliquidated damages. In general, torts consist of some act done without just cause or excuse. Injury and damage are two basic ingredients of torts. These may be found either in contract or otherwise, the violation of which may result in tortuous liability as breach of duty primarily fixed by law or by parties in a contract. An action in tort is usually a claim for pecuniary compensation in respect of damages suffered as a result of invasion, of a legally protected interest. The action is founded and structured on morality, as no one has right to injure or harm others intentionally or even innocently. The liability in tort, in course of time has become known as strict liability, absolute liability or fault liability. The difference between strict liability and fault liability, arises from presence and absence of mental element. A breach of legal duty wilfully, or deliberately or even menacingly, is negligence emanating from fault liability, to injure and damage resulting without any intention, yet due to lack of foresight etc. is strict liability. The duty is the primary yardstick to determine the tortuous liability, and its ambit keeps on widening on the touchstone on fairness and practicability of the situation etc. These rules laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1932) AC 562 were recognised by Indian Courts in Jai Laxmi Salt Works (P.) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1994) 4 SCC 1.
  •           12.     Actionable negligence as a tort is to breach of a legal duty to take care which results in the State or an individual liable when the State is found reluctant in discharge of its duties or public responsibilities. It also amounts to negligence and is accountable in law of torts. According to Dias, liability in negligence, is technically prescribed ‘as arising out of damage caused by the breach of a duty to take care. The concept of duty, its reasonableness, the standard of care required however cannot be put into straitjacket formula or a rigid fixed formulae. The more advanced the society becomes, the more sensitive it grows to the violation of the duties by private or even public functionary. The negligence, in law of torts, is influenced by social, economic and political development. The distinction arising out of damages due to negligence and even when it, rather unintentionally and innocently is a firmly established branch of the law of torts. The negligence is only descriptive of those sum of activities which may result in injury and damage to the other side for voluntary discharging of duty both legal and due to lack of foresight and may comprise of more than one concept known and recognised in law intended or unintended.”

No Pecuniary Obligation or Debt for Breach of Contract (By Itself)

The Apex Court held in Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry, (1974)2 SCC 231, that when there is a breach of contract, the party who commits the breach does not incur any pecuniary obligation nor does the party complaining of the breach become entitled to a debt due from the other party. In Kaikkara Kaikkara Construction Company v. State Of Kerala, (2022) 1 Ker HC 541, the Kerala High Court observed as under:

  • “Two principles are laid down by the Apex Court in Raman Iron Foundry’s case:
  • 1) The law is well settled that a claim for unliquidated damages does not give rise to debt until the liability is adjudicated and damages assessed by a decree or order of a court or other adjudicatory authority. When a party who commits the breach does not eo instanti incur any pecuniary obligation nor does the party complaining of the breach become entitled to a debt due from the other party. The only right that the party aggrieved by the breach of the contract will get is the right to sue for damages.
  • 2) A claim for damages for breach of contract is therefore not a claim for a sum presently due and payable and the purchaser is not entitled, in exercise of the right conferred upon it under Clause 18, to recover the amount for such claim by appropriating other sum due to the contractor.”

It is held in Raman Iron Foundry‘s case as under.

  • “11. Having discussed the proper interpretation of clause 18, we may now turn to consider what is the real nature of the claim for recovery of which the appellant is seeking to appropriate the sums due to the respondent under other contracts. The claim is admittedly one for damages for breach of the contract between the parties. Now, it is true that the damages which are claimed are liquidated damages under clause 14, but so far as the law in India is concerned, there is no qualitative difference in the nature of the claim whether it be for liquidated damages or for unliquidated damages. S.74 of the Indian Contract Act eliminates the somewhat elaborate refinements made under the English common law in distinguishing between stipulations providing for payment of liquidated damages and stipulations in the nature of penalty. Under the common law a genuine pre-estimate of damages by mutual agreement is regarded as a stipulation naming liquidated damages and binding between the parties; a stipulation in a contract in terrorem is a penalty and the Court refuses to enforce it, awarding to the aggrieved party only reasonable compensation. The Indian Legislature has sought to cut across the web of rules and presumptions under the English common law, by enacting a uniform principle applicable to all stipulations naming amounts to be paid in case of breach, and stipulations by way of penalty, and according to this principle, even if there is a stipulation by way of liquidated damages, a party complaining of breach of contract can recover only reasonable compensation for the injury sustained by him, the stipulated amount being merely the outside limit. It, therefore makes no difference in the present case that the claim of the appellant is for liquidated damages. It stands on the same footing as a claim for unliquidated damages. Now the law is well settled that a claim for unliquidated damages does not give rise to a debt until the liability is adjudicated and damages assessed by a decree or order of a Court or other adjudicatory authority. When there is a breach of contract, the party who commits the breach does not eo instanti incur any pecuniary obligation, nor does the party complaining of the breach become party. The only right which the party aggrieved by the breach of the contract has is the right to sue for damages. That is not an actionable claim and this position is made amply clear by the amendment in S.6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, which provides that a mere right to sue for damages cannot be transferred. This has always been the law in England and as far back as 1858 we find it stated by Wightman, J., in Jones v. Thompson, (1858) 27 LJQB 234. “Ex parte Charles and several other cases decide that the amount of a verdict in an action for unliquidated damages is not a debt till judgment has been signed.” It was held in this case that a claim for damages does not become a debt even after the jury has returned a verdict in favour of the plaintiff till the judgment is actually delivered. So also in O’Driscoll v. Manchester Insurance Committee, 1915 (3) KB 499. Swinfen Eady, L., J., said in reference to cases where the claim was for unliquidated damages “……. in such cases there is no debt at all until the verdict of the jury is pronounced assessing the damages and judgment is given”. The same view has also been taken consistently by different High Court in India. We may mention only a few of the decisions, namely, Jabed Sheikh v. Taher Mallik, 45 Cal WN 519 : AIR 1941 Cal. 639; S. Milkha Singh v. M/s. N. K. Gopala Krishna Mudaliar, AIR 1956 Punj 174 Iron and Hardware (India) Co. v. Firm Shamlal and Bros, AIR 1954 Bom 423. Chagla, C. J., in the last mentioned case, stated the law in these terms:(at pp.425-26) “In my opinion it would not be true to say that a person who commits a breach of the contract incurs any pecuniary liability, nor would it be true to say that the other party to the contract who complains of the breach has any amount due to him from the other party.
  • As already stated, the only right which he has is the right to go to a Court of law and recover damages. Now, damages are the compensation which a Court of law gives to a party for the injury which he has sustained. But, and this is most important to note, he does not get damages or compensation by reason of any existing obligation on the part of the person who has committed the breach. He gets compensation as a result of the fiat of the Court. Therefore, no pecuniary liability arises till the Court has determined that the party complaining of the breach is entitled to damages. Therefore, when damages are assessed, it would not be true to say that what the Court is doing is ascertaining a pecuniary liability which already existed. The Court in the first place must decide that the defendant is liable and then it proceeds to assess what that liability is. But till that determination there is no liability at all upon the defendant.”
  • This statement in our view represents the correct legal position and has our full concurrence. A claim for damages for breach of contract is, therefore, not a claim for a sum presently due and payable and the purchaser is not entitled, in exercise of the right conferred upon it under clause 18, to recover the amount of such claim by appropriating other sums due to the contractor. On this view, it is not necessary for us to consider the other contention raised on behalf of the respondent, namely, that on a proper construction of clause 18, the purchaser is entitled to exercise the right conferred under that clause only where the claim for payment of a sum of money is either admitted by the contractor, or in case of dispute, adjudicated upon by a Court or other adjudicatory authority. We must, therefore, hold that the appellant had no right or authority under Clause 18 to appropriate the amounts of other pending bill of the respondent in or towards satisfaction of its claim for damages against the respondent and the learned Judge was justified in issuing an interim injunction restraining the appellant from doing so.”

The Supreme Court, in State of Karnataka v. Rameswara Rice Mill, (1987) 2 SCC 160, it is held as under:

  • “7 …. The terms of clause 12 do not afford scope for a liberal construction being made regarding the powers of the Deputy Commissioner to adjudicate upon a disputed question of breach as well as to assess the damages arising from the breach. The crucial words in Cl.12 are “and for any breach of conditions set forth herein before, the first party shall be liable to pay damages to the second party as may be assessed by the second party.”
  • On a plain reading of the words, it is clear that the right of the second party to assess damages would arise only if the breach of conditions is admitted or if no issue is made of it. It it was the intention of the parties that the officer acting on behalf of the State was also entitled to adjudicate upon a dispute regarding the breach of conditions the wording in clause 12 would have been entirely different. It cannot also be argued that a right to adjudicate upon an issue relating to a breach of conditions of the contract would flow from or is inhered in the right conferred to assess the damages arising from a breach of conditions. The power to assess damages, as pointed out by the Full Bench, is a subsidiary and consequential power and not the primary power. Even assuming for argument’s sake that the terms of clause 12 afford scope for being construed as empowering the officer of the Sate to decide upon the question of breach as well as assess the quantum of damages, we do not think that adjudication by the Officer regarding the breach of the contract can be sustained under law because a party to the agreement cannot be an arbiter in his own cause. Interests of justice and equity require that where a party to a contract disputes the committing of any breach of conditions, the adjudication should be independent person or body, and not by the other party to the contract.
  • The position will, however, be different where there is no dispute or there is consensus between the contracting parties regarding the breach of conditions. In such a case, the Officer of the State, even though a party to the contract, will be sell within his rights in assessing the damages occasioned by the breach in view of the specific terms of clause 12.
  • 8. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view of the Full Bench that the powers of the State under an agreement entered into by it with a private person providing for assessment of damages for breach of conditions and recovery of the damages will stand confined only to those cases where the breach of conditions is admitted or it is not disputed.”

In Abdul Rahiman v. Divisional Forest Officer, 1988 (2) KLT 290, the Kerala High Court observed as follows”

  • “When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby. This principle of S.73 of the Contract Act equally applies where one of the contesting parties is the Government. It is the breach of the contract that gives rise to the cause for damages. The primary duty therefore is to fix the liability for the breach. Assessment of damages is only an incidental or subsidiary function. The liability to pay damages is thus fastened where there is breach of contract.
  • However, when a dispute arises as to whether the contract has been broken or not, that dispute cannot be settled by one of the parties to the contract, for, he cannot be an arbiter in his own cause. The dispute may have to be referred to an arbitrator or the matter has to be settled in a court of law. This principle applies to the Government also as a party to the contract.
  • Where the breach of the contract is admitted ie. where there is no dispute that the contract has been broken by one of the parties, the Government as the party entitled to claim compensation for the breach need not wait for a determination by any outside agency as to whether there was any breach of contract. In that event, the question of damages alone remains to be considered. A sum can be named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of breach, an amount in liquidation of the claim for compensation. The contract can thus provide for liquidated damages in the event of breach and the Government claiming that amount as compensation for the admitted breach committed by the other party to the contract, need not seek the aid of court or any outside agency for the fixation of the quantum of damages.
  • Similarly, if the contract itself provides that “that one party shall be liable to pay damages to the second party as may be assessed by the second party”, the assessment by the second party, in case the breach is admitted, is binding on the first party and there is no more any necessity for a further quantification of the damages by any outside agency. The party assessing the damage can straight away seek to recover the amount and if that party is the Government, it can have recourse to the remedy available under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act.”

After quoting this decision it is held in Build Tech India Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2000 (2) Ker LJ 142 as under:

  • “The cumulative effect of the aforesaid decisions is that when breach is not admitted, one of the contracting parties cannot arrogate to itself the power to claim compensation for the breach from the other party without there being any adjudication by an outside agency as to whether there was any breach of contract. In the case on hand, going by the pleadings as already noticed, it cannot be held that the petitioner has admitted the breach. Therefore the respondents have no jurisdiction to quantify the damage or loss alleged to have sustained by it on account of the alleged breach.”

(All the aforesaid cases are referred to in Kaikkara Kaikkara Construction Company v. State Of Kerala, (2022) 1 Ker HC 541.)

Sec. 73 and 74 deals with Compensation for Breach of Contract

  • 73. Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract.—When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it.
  • —When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it.
  • Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach. Compensation for failure to discharge obligation resembling those created by contract.
  • —When an obligation resembling those created by contract has been incurred and has not been discharged, any person injured by the failure to discharge it is entitled to receive the same compensation from the party in default, as if such person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract.
  • —When an obligation resembling those created by contract has been incurred and has not been discharged, any person injured by the failure to discharge it is entitled to receive the same compensation from the party in default, as if such person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract.”
  • Explanation.—In estimating the loss or damage arising from a breach of contract, the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract must be taken into account. 
  • 74 Compensation for breach of contract where penalty stipulated for:- [When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for.
  • Explanation.— A stipulation for increased interest from the date of default may be a stipulation by way of penalty.]
  • (Exception) — When any person enters into any bail-bond, recognizance or other instrument of the same nature or, under the provisions of any law, or under the orders of the [Central Government] or of any [State Government], gives any bond for the performance of any public duty or act in which the public are interested, he shall be liable, upon breach of the condition of any such instrument, to pay the whole sum mentioned therein.
  • Explanation.— A person who enters into a contract with Government does not necessarily thereby undertake any public duty, or promise to do an act in which the public are interested. 

Can a Party to Contract Adjudicate Upon Breach and Quantum?

The Supreme Court, in State of Karnataka v. Rameshwara Rice Mills, Thirthahalli, AIR 1987 SC 1359, observed that even when the State is one of the contracting parties and seek to recover damages for breach of contract, the State cannot be a Judge in its own cause and cannot be its own arbitrator to determine the liability and quantum of damages. The Apex Court held as under:

  • “The terms of Clause 12 do not afford scope for a liberal construction being made regarding the powers of the Deputy Commissioner to adjudicate upon a disputed question of breach as well as to assess the damages arising from the breach. The crucial words in Clause 12 are “and for any breach of conditions set forth hereinbefore, the first party shall be liable to pay damages to the second party as may be assessed by the second party. On a plain reading of the word, it is clear that the right of the second party to assess damages would arise only if the breach of conditions is admitted or if no issue is made of it. If it was the intention of the parties that the officer acting on behalf of the State was also entitled to adjudicate upon a dispute regarding the breach of conditions the wording in Clause 12 would have been entirely different. It cannot also be argued that right to adjudicate upon an issue relating to a breach of conditions of the contract would flow from or is inhered in the right conferred to assess the damages arising from a breach of conditions. The power to assess damages, as pointed out by the Full Bench, is subsidiary and consequential power and not the primary power. Even assuming for argument’s sake that the terms of Clause 12 afford scope for being construed as empowering the office of the State of decide upon the question of breach as well as assess the quantum of damages, we do not think that adjudication by the officer regarding the breach of the contract can be sustained under law because a party to the agreement cannot be an arbiter in his own cause. Interests of justice and equity require that where a party to a contract disputes the committing of any breach of conditions the adjudication should be by an independent person or body and not by the other party to the contract. The position will, however, be different where there is no dispute or there is consensus between the contracting parties regarding the breach of conditions. In such a case, the Officer of the State, even though a party to the contract will be well within his rights in assessing the damages occasioned by the breach in view of the specific terms of Clause 12. .. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view of the Full Bench that the powers of the State under an agreement entered into by it with a private person providing for assessment of damages for breach of conditions and recovery of the damages will stand confined only to those cases where the breach of conditions is admitted or it is not disputed.”

This principles, dispute about the liability for damages is a matter for the civil court, and a party to an agreement cannot be an arbiter in its own cause, are followed in the following cases:

  • Abdul Rahiman v. Divisional Forest Officer, AIR 1989 Ker 1;
  • Latheef v. Superintending Engineer, ILR 1993(2) Ker 426;
  • Rambal Co. v. Kerala State Science & Technology Museum, 2000 (3) Arb. LR 212;
  • Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Motorola India Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2009 SC 357: 2009 2 SCC 337;
  • Mohammed Kunhi v. Executive Engineer, 2001(3) KLT 733;
  • Union of India v. Tejinder Kumar Dua, 2013-200 DLT 60;
  • Tulsi Narayan Garg v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Authority, Bhopal, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1158.

It is held in the following cases that if breach alleged by a party to the contract is denied by the other a unilateral decision as to damages is not proper.

  • Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry, AIR 1974 SC 1265: (1974) 2 SCC 231. (The principles in this decision is followed in the following cases.)
  • State of Karnataka v. Rameshwara Rice Mills, Thirthahalli, AIR 1987 SC 1359
  • JG Engineers Private Limited v. Union of India, AIR 2011 SC 2477: (2011) 5 SCC 758
  • State of Kerala and others v M.K.Jose, (2015) 9 SCC 433
  • M/s. Gangotri Enterprises Limited v Union of India, (2016) 11 SCC 720, AIR 2016 SC 2199.

It is pointed out in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Limited, AIR 2020 SC 59,   2019 SCC Online SC 1517, by our Apex Court that a Chief Managing Director of a Company by himself cannot appoint a sole arbitrator, as he himself cannot act as an arbitrator, emphasising the principle that ‘what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly’. (See also: TRF Limited vs. Energo Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377.)

Tender issuer cannot forfeit pre-bid payment as damages; He has to Prove it

In Sushil Kumar Thard v. National Jute Manufactures Corpn. Ltd., (2023) 2 HCC (Cal) 217, the successful bidder refused to sign the contract. It is held that the tender issuer cannot forfeit the earnest money or the pre-bid payment as damages. He has to prove the loss or damage by reason of such alleged breach; for, Sec. 73 of the Contract Act requires damages to be the reasonable compensation of breach suffered by the claimant and not remote. The High Court relied on the judgment of the Madras High Court in Rubina v. The Authorised Officer, M/s. Axis Bank Limited which held that the existence of a forfeiture clause does not imply that the entire amount deposited can be forfeited and that the right to forfeit must be balanced against the rule of unjust enrichment.

If Special Forum Provided, it must be Approached       

Supreme Court in the case of Western India Plywood Limited v. P Ashokan, AIR 1997 SC 3883, and BS Bharti v. IBP Co. Ltd, AIR 2004 SC 4355, it is laid down that where a special statute (Motor Vehicles Act, Workman’s Compensation Act, ESI Act, Industrial Disputes Act, etc.) bars jurisdiction of the civil court, and a special forum is provided, then the injured must seek his remedy before the special forum, and he cannot resort to remedy in a civil suit.

Pleadings and Future Damages

In Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735; 1966-2 SCR 286, It was held as under:

  • “Once it is held that the plaintiff is entitled to eject the defendant, it follows that from the date of the decree granting the relief of ejectment to the plaintiff, the defendant who remains in possession of the property despite the decree, must pay mesne profits or damages for use and occupation of the said property until it is delivered to the plaintiff. A decree for ejectment in such a case must be accompanied by a direction for payment of the future mesne profits or damages. Then as to the rate at which future mesne profits can be awarded to the plaintiff, we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the trial Court that the reasonable amount in the present case would be Rs. 300/- per month.”


Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

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Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

Can Courts Award Interest on Equitable Grounds?

Jojy George Koduvath.

Abstract of this Blog:

The Supreme Court, in the significant decision, Dushyant N. Dalal v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, AIR 2018 SC 447; 2017-9 SCC 660, it is held that the Interest Act of 1978 enables the courts and tribunals to award interest ‘in equity’. The Apex Court upheld the view that the words ‘other rule of law or usage having the force of law‘, in Sec. 4 (1) of the Interest Act, 1978, would justify payment of interest, in proper cases, ‘in equity’.

When courts award interest.

In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. S. Sindhu, AIR 2006 SC 2366 : (2006) 5 SCC 258 it is held that interest prior to the date of suit (as contrasted to pendente-lite interest and future interest) is awarded where:

  • (a) the contract provides;
  • (b) the statute applicable to the transaction, provides for; or
  • (c) as per the provisions of the Interest Act, 1978.

Interest Act, 1839 and interest ‘payable by law’ under ‘equity’

Proviso to Section 1 of the Interest Act, 1839 reads as under:

  • “Provided that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law.”

It was uniformy held that interest was ‘payable by law’ under that Act in ‘equity’. (Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. vs. Rultanji Ramji, AIR 1938 PC 67; Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh, AIR 1961 SC 908; Hirachand Kothari  v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 Supp SCC 17.)  In Trojan and Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar, 1953 SCR 789, the Supreme Court observed that it was well settled that interest could be allowed by a Court of equity where money was obtained or retained by fraud.

Earlier view: Interest Act, 1978 did not Canvas Interest on Equitable Grounds

      In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. S. Sindhu, AIR 2006 SC 2366 : (2006) 5 SCC 258 it is pointed out that the Interest Act, 1978 made a significant departure from the old Interest Act of 1839. It is pointed out that the present Act does not contain the following provision contained in the proviso to section (1) of the old Act:

  • “Interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law”.

Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Interest Act, 1978 read as follows

  • 3. Power of court to allow Interest.-
  • (1) In any proceeding for the recovery of any debt or damage or in any proceedings in which a claim for interest in respect of any debt or damages already paid is made, the court may, if it thinks fit, allow interest to the person entitled to the debt or damages or to the person making such claim, as the case may be, at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest, for the whole or part of the following period, that is to say ;-
    •        (a) If the proceedings relate to a debt payable by virtue of a written instrument at a certain time, then, from the date when the debt is payable to the date of institution of the proceedings;
    •        (b) if the proceedings do not relate to any such debt, then, from the date mentioned in this regard in a written notice given by the person entitled or the person making the claim to the person liable that interest will be claimed to the date of institution of the proceedings:
      •        Provided that where the amount of the debt or damages has been repaid before the institution of the proceedings, interest shall not be allowed under this section for the period after such repayment.
  •        (2) Where in any such proceedings as are mentioned in sub-section (1),:—
    •        (a) judgment, order or award is given for a sum which, apart from interest on damages, exceeds four thousand rupees, and
    •        (b) the sum represents or includes damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person or in respect of a person’s death, then, the power conferred by that sub-section shall be exercised so as to include in that sum interest on those damages or on such part of them as the court considers appropriate for the whole or part of the period from the date mentioned in the notice to the date of institution of the proceedings, unless the court is satisfied that there are special reasons why no interest should be given in respect of those damages.
  •        (3) Nothing in this Section,—
    •        (a) shall apply in relation to—
      •        (i) any debt or damages upon which interest is payable as of right, by virtue of any agreement; or
      •        (ii) any debt or damages upon which payment of interest is barred, by virtue of an express agreement;
    •        (b) shall affect—
      •        (i) the compensation recoverable for the dishonour of a bill of exchange, promissory note or cheque, as defined in the Negotiable instrument Act, 1881 (26 of 1881); or
      •        (ii) the provisions of rule 2 of Order II of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908);
    •        (c) shall empower to court to award interest upon interest.
  • 4. Interest payable under certain enactments.—
  • (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3, interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is payable by virtue of any enactment or other rule of law or usage having the force of law.
  •        (2) Notwithstanding as aforesaid, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the court shall, in each of the following cases, allow interest from the date specified below to the date of institution of the proceedings at such rate as the court may consider reasonable, unless the Court is satisfied that there are special reasons why interest should not be allowed, namely:-
    •        (a) where money or other property has been deposited as security for the performance of any obligation imposed by law or contract, from the date of the deposit;
    •        (b) where the obligation to pay money or restore any property arises by virtue of a fiduciary relationship, from the date of the cause of action;
    •        (c) where money or other property is obtained or retained by fraud, from the date of the cause of action;
    •        (d) where the claim is for dower or maintenance, from the date of the cause of action.
  •        5. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to apply.—Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).”

Claim of Interest under Interest Act, 1978 – equity and common law principles

In Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited v. AP State Electricity Board, AIR 1993 SC 2005, the Supreme Court examined whether interest could be claimed on the basis of the Interest Act, 1978, equity or common law on deposits made with the Electricity Board. The Apex Court observed as under:

  • 128. If this be the position, could interest be claimed either on equity or common law?  The argument on behalf of the consumers is, if money belonging to any person is used by someone else he is obliged to pay interest for the period of its user. Halsbury, Volume 32 (page 53, para 106) defines “interest” as
    • “the return or compensation for the use or retention by one person of a sum of money belonging or owed to another….
  • 129. Strictly speaking, the word “interest” would apply only to cases where there is a relationship of debtor and creditor. A lender of money who allows the borrower to use certain funds deprives himself of the use of those funds. He does so because he charges interest which may be described as a kind of rent for the use of the funds. For example, a bank or a lender lending out money on payment of interest. In this case, as already noted, there is no relationship of debtor and creditor.
  • 130. We may now refer to Halsbury, 4th Edn., Vol. 32, para 108:
  • 108. When interest is payable at common law.”
    • At common law interest is payable
      • (1) where there is an express agreement to pay interest;
      • (2) where an agreement to pay interest can be implied from the course of dealing between the parties or from the nature of the transaction or a custom or usage of the trade or profession concerned;
      • (3) in certain cases by way of damages for breach of a contract (other than a contract merely to pay money) where the contract, if performed, would to the knowledge of the parties have entitled the plaintiff to receive interest. Except in the cases mentioned, debts do not carry interest at common law.”
  • Consumption security deposit does not fall under any of the categories mentioned above. Para 109 says:
    • “Equitable right to interest.” In equity interest may be recovered in certain cases where a particular relationship exists between the creditor and the debtor, such as mortgagor and mortgagee, obligor and obligee on a bond, personal representative and beneficiary, principal and surety, vendor and purchaser, principal and agent, solicitor and client, trustee and beneficiary, or where the debtor is in a fiduciary position to the creditor. Interest is also allowed on pecuniary legacies not paid within a certain time, on the dissolution of a partnership, on the arrears of an annuity where there has been misconduct or improper delay in payment, or in the case of money obtained or retained by fraud. It may also be allowed where the defendant ought to have done something which would have entitled the plaintiff to interest at common law, or has wrongfully prevented the plaintiff from doing something which would have so entitled him.”
  • 131. Even a case of wrongful detention of money cannot arise. In Bengal Nagpur Railway v. Ruttanji Ramji the question arose whether interest was payable on damages on account of wrongful detention of money. It was held: (IA pp. 71- 72)
    • “The Interest Act, however, contains a proviso that “interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law”. This proviso applies to cases in which the Court of equity exercises jurisdiction to allow interest. As observed by Lord Tomlin in Maine and New Brunswick Electrical Power Co. Ltd. v. Alice M. Hart: “In order to invoke a rule of equity, it is necessary in the first instance to establish the existence of a state of circumstances which attracts the equitable jurisdiction, as for example, non-performance of a contract of which equity can give specific performance.” The present case does not however attract the equitable jurisdiction of the Court and cannot come within the purview of the proviso.”

In H.P. State Financial Corporation, Shimla v. Prem Nath Nanda, (2000) 8 SCC 528, the Supreme Court rejected claim for interest on the ground that there was no statutory provision or agreement to pay interest. However, the Court noticed that in appropriate cases interest may be awarded in lieu of compensation or damages for wrongly retaining a amount payable to a party. For this, the Supreme Court relied upon Satinder Singh v. Umraon Singh, AIR 1961 SC 908 and Laxmichand v. Indore Improvement Trust, (1975) 1 SCC 565.

In Soviltorg (India) Ltd. v. State Bank of India, (1999) 6 SCC 406, the Delhi High Court observed as under:

  • “6. Relying upon the province of Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was entitled to the payment of interest at the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by Nationalised Banks in relation to commercial transactions. Referring to IA No. 2 filed in this Court and Banking Law and Practice in India issued in 1991, she had contended that the appellant was entitled to the payment of interest minimum at the rate of 19.4 per cent per annum. The general submission made in this behalf cannot be accepted in view of the provision of Section 14 of the Act. There was no contract between the parties regarding payment of interest on delayed deposit or on account of delay on the part of the opposite party to render the services. Interest cannot be claimed under Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code as its provisions have not been specifically made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. We, however, find that the general provision of Section 34 being based upon justice, equity and good conscience would authorise the Redressal Forums and Commissions to also grant interest appropriately under the circumstance of each case. Interest may also be awarded in lieu of compensation or damages in appropriate cases. The interest can also be awarded on equitable grounds…”

All these decisions are referred to in Ritu Sengupta v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 2008-152 DLT 68; 2008-106 DRJ 54; ILR 2009-1 Del 586.

SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN LAW By AIR 2018 SC 447; 2017-9 SCC 660

Other rule of law .. having the force of law” canvases ‘equity’

Section 4(1) of the Interest Act, 1978 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in section 3, interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is payable by virtue of any enactment or other rule of law or usage having the force of law.

In Dushyant N. Dalal v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, AIR 2018 SC 447; 2017-9 SCC 660, the Apex Court upheld the decision of the Bombay High Court in Prabhavati Ramgarib B. v. Divisional Railway Manager, (2010) 4 Mah LJ 691. The Bombay High Court held as under:

  • “35. The petitioner’s claim for interest would fall within the ambit of the words “or other rule of law in section 4(1). The other rule of law being on grounds of equity. Even under the Interest Act, 1839, interest was payable under the proviso to section 1 which reads: “Provided that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law.” Interest was payable by law under that Act in equity. This was recognized in a series of judgments. For instance in Trojan and Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar, 1953 SCR 789, the Supreme Court, in paragraph 23, observed that it was well settled that interest is allowed by a Court of equity in the case of money obtained or retained by fraud. Interest was, therefore, awarded in equity. …. ..
  • 36. The position is not different under the Interest Act, 1978. The words, in section 4(1) “or other rule of law” would include interest payable in equity. In fact, interest has been awarded by our Courts in equity as well as on principles analogous to section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the basis that section 34 is based upon principles of justice, equity and good conscience.”

After quoting the aforesaid passage from the Bombay decision it is held in Dushyant N. Dalal v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, AIR 2018 SC 447; 2017-9 SCC 660 as under:

  • “We agree with the aforesaid statement of the law. It is clear, therefore, that the Interest Act of 1978 would enable Tribunals such as the SAT to award interest from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date of commencement of proceedings for recovery of such interest in equity.”

Read in this cluster:

  1. Can Courts Award Interest on Equitable Grounds?
  2. Public & Private Trusts in India
  3. Presumptions on Registered Documents & Collateral Purpose
  4. EFFECT OF MARKING DOCUMENTS WITHOUT OBJECTION
  5. PRODUCTION, ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
  6. Modes of Proof of Documents
  7. Expert Evidence and Appreciation of Evidence
  8. Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting Witnesses
  9. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
  10. OBJECTIONS TO ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
  11. Order II, Rule 2 CPC – Not to Vex Defendants Twice for the Same Cause of Action
  12. Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney is Sufficient for Registration of a Deed
  13. Sec. 91 CPC and Suits Against Wrongful Acts
  14. Vesting of Property in Trusts
  15. Clubs and Societies, Bye Laws Fundamental
  16. The Law and Principles of Mandatory Injunction
  17. Natural Justice – Not an Unruly Horse, Cannot be Placed in a Straight-Jacket & Not a Judicial Cure-all.
  18. Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
  19. Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
  20. How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
  21. Rules on Burden of Proof & Adverse Inference
  22. Presumptions on Documents and Truth of its Contents
  23. Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
  24. Extent of Easement (Width of Way) in Easement of Necessity, Quasi Easement and Implied Grant
  25. Village Pathways and Right to Bury are not Easements.
  26. Sec. 65B,  Evidence Act: Certificate for Computer Output
  27. Legal Personality of Trustees and Office Bearers of Societies
  28. Interrogatories: When Court Allows, When Rejects?
  29. Can a Party to Suit Examine Opposite Party, as of Right?
  30. ‘Additional Burden Loses Lateral Support’ – Incorrect Proposition
  31. Production of Documents in Court: Order 11, Rule 14 CPC is not independent from Rule 12
  32. Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies.
  33. Management of Societies and Clubs, And Powers of General Body and Governing Body
  34. How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies
  35. Is Permission of Court Mandatory when a Power of Attorney Holder Files Suit
  36. Notary-Attested Documents: Presumption, Rebuttable
  37. Judicial & Legislative Activism in India: Principles and Instances
  38. Maratha Backward Community Reservation Case: Supreme Court Fixed Upper Limit at 50%.
  39. Separation Of Powers: Who Wins the Race – Legislature, Executive or Judiciary ?
  40. Custom & Customary Easements in Indian Law
  41. What is Easement? Does Right of Easement Allow to ‘Enjoy’ After Making a Construction?
  42. Constructive Res Judicata and Ineffectual Res Judicata
  43. Is Decree in a Representative Suit (OI R8 CPC) Enforceable Against Persons Not Eo-Nomine Parties?
  44. Admissibility of Visual and Audio Evidence (Including Photographs, Cassettes, Tape-recordings, Films, CCTV Footage, CDs, e-mails, Chips, Hard-discs, Pen-drives)
  45. Court Interference in Election Process
  46. Significance of Scientific Evidence in Judicial Process
  47. ‘Is Ban on Muslim Women to Enter Mosques, Unconstitutional’ Stands Tagged-on with Sabarimala Revision-Reference Matter
  48. Is Excommunication of Parsi Women for Marrying Outside, Unconstitutional
  49. Article 370: Is There Little Chance for Supreme Court Interference
  50. Certificate is Required Only for ‘Computer Output’; Not for ‘Electronic Records’: Arjun Panditrao Explored.
  51. M. Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das –Pragmatic Verdict on Ayodhya Disputes
  52. Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs
  53. Juristic Personality of Societies and Clubs
  54. Societies and Branches
  55. Effect of Registration of Societies and Incorporation of Clubs
  56. Clubs and Societies: General Features
  57. Indian Law of Trusts Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership
  58. Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
  59. What is Trust in Indian Law?
  60. Kesavananda Bharati Case: Effect and Outcome – Never Ending Controversy
  61. CAA Challenge: Divergent Views
  62. Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
  63. Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
  64. Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
  65. Declaration and Injunction
  66. Can Legislature Overpower Court Decisions by an Enactment?

Public & Private Trusts in India

Saji Koduvath.

Introduction

Each civilisation has its own peculiar concepts as to religious and charitable endowments and ‘trust’ attached to it.  India is rich of its ancient past with regard to the charitable and religious dedications and trusts. They have their own unique history of development and formulation of legal principles.

Private Trust – Indian Law and English Law

Charitable trusts of public nature alone, and not of private nature, are accepted as valid under English Law. The distinction between English Law and Hindu Law has been stated by Dr. Mukherjea in his Tagore Law Lectures ‘On the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’ as under:

  • “In English Law charitable trusts are synonymous with public trusts and what is called religious trust is only a form of charitable trust. The beneficiaries in a charitable trust being the general public or a Section of the same and not a determinate body of individuals, the remedies for enforcement of charitable trust are somewhat different from those which can be availed of by beneficiaries in a private trust. In English Law the Crown as ‘parens-patriae’ is the constitutional protector of all property subject to charitable trusts, such trusts being essentially matters of public concern. … One fundamental distinction between English and Indian Law lies in the fact that there can be religious trust of a private character under Hindu Law which is not possible in English Law.” [1]

Dedication to Family Idol – Recognised by Indian Law

In case of a public temple, dedication of property thereto is complete or absolute, as in the case of a public way. Though assignment of property in favour of a private temple is also recognised as ‘dedication’, it not ‘absolute’ as in the case of a public temple. 

In Deoki Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar[2] the Apex Court observed:

  • “(W)hen property is dedicated for the worship of a family Idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the Deity can only be the members of the family, and that is an ascertained group of individuals. “[3]

Distinction: Beneficiaries, Individuals or General Public

Dr. BK Mukherjea, J., ‘On the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’, has set out the difficulty to make a distinction between public and private charitable trust as under:

  • “The line of distinction between a public purpose and a purpose which is not public is very thin and technical and is difficult of an easy definition.”[4]

Where the beneficiaries of a trust or charity are limited to a finite group of identifiable individuals, the trust or charity is of a private character.[5]

As to determination of the nature of a temple, whether public or private, it is held in Deoki Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar,[6]  as under:

  • “The distinction between a private and a public trust is that whereas in the former, the beneficiaries are specific individuals, in the latter, they are the general public or a class thereof. While in the former the beneficiaries are persons who are ascertained or capable of being ascertained, in the latter they constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment.”

Public Trust – Cardinal Point, Intention of Founder

In Deoki Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar,[7]  it is held further:

  • “When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the Idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or specified portion thereof. In accordance with this theory, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family Idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the Deity can only be the members of the family, and that is an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, then the endowment can only be regarded as public, intended to benefit the general body of worshippers.” [8]

No Document  is Essential for Dedication in Public Trust

The act of delivering property, by its owner, for the use of the public is called ‘dedication’.

With regard to private trusts, under Sec. 5 of the Indian Trusts Act, for creation of trust on immovable property, ‘declaration by a non-testamentary instrument’ is essential; and for creation of trust on movable property, ‘transfer of ownership’ will be sufficient. 

Section 5 of The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (pertains to private trust lone) reads as under”

  • 5. Trust of immovable property – No trust in relation to immoveable property is valid unless declared by a non-testamentary instrument in writing signed by the author of the trust or the trustee and registered, or by the will of the author of the trust or of the trustee.
  • Trust of moveable property – No trust relating to movable property is valid unless declared as aforesaid, or unless the ownership of the property is transferred to the trustee. These rules do not apply where they would operate so as to effectuate a fraud.

Public Trust – Nature of Dedication – Terms of the Document, Important

Declaration by a registered deed or vesting/transferring property to a trustee is the usual mode of dedication of immovable property; though no document is necessary for creating a religious endowment.

If the founders’ intention is clear from the document of foundation or other direct evidence, oral or documentary, no difficulty arises. In cases where express dedication cannot be proved, it will be a matter for legal inference from the proved facts and circumstances of each case. In Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Reli. Endts, it is held:

  • “Where, however, a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and the recitals of the document show that the control and management of the temple is retained with the founder or his descendants, and that extensive properties are dedicated for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple belonging to the founder himself, this will be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature.”[9]

In S. Shanmugam Pillai . Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai .[10] it is held:

  • “Whether or not a dedication is complete would naturally be a question of fact to be determined in each case on the terms of the relevant document if the dedication in question was made under a document. … “[11]

In Hemanta Kumari Debi Vs. Gauri Shankar Tewari[12] it is held, while dealing with a bathing ghat on the banks of the River Ganges, that complete relinquishment of title was not the only form of dedication under Hindu Law.

It further observed as under:

  • “In the absence of a formal and express endowment evidenced by deed or declaration, the character of the dedication can only be determined on the basis of the history of the institution and the conduct of the founder and his heirs.”

Our Apex Court observed the following, interpreting a deed, in Idol of Sri Renganatha-swamy Vs. PK Thoppulan Chettiar[13]as under:

  • “The Deed of Settlement must be examined as a whole to determine the true intention of the settlor. Where the settlor seeks to divest himself of the property entirely for a religious purpose, a public religious charity is created. In the present case, the Deed of Settlement creates an absolute prohibition on the subsequent sale or mortgage of the suit property. The Deed of Settlement provides that, the settler purchased the punja land mentioned in the schedule of property… for the performance of charity work in reference to Sri Renganathan-swamy sanctum. The property outlined in the schedule of the Deedof Settlement is described as, property allotted for charity work. With respect to the legal heirs, the Deed of Settlement creates an obligation on the settlors legal heirs to continue the charitable activities at the suit property out of their business incomes. The settlor had a clear intent to divest himself and his legal heirs of the property and endow it for the continuation of the charitable activities at the suit property. The purpose of the endowment was to carry on charitable work. The Deed of Settlement obligates the legal heirs to continue the charitable activities at the suit property.”

Family Deity is also a Juristic Person

In case of dedication of property for creation of a public temple, the donor (i) completely relinquishes his title over the property, (ii) vests its ‘legal ownership’ with the Deity and (iii) transfers the possession thereof to the Shebaits (trustees) for administrating the same for the benefit of the public or a class thereof. It is beyond doubt that if the temple is a public temple, under Hindu Law, the idol is a juridical person; and so, the ownership of the temple and all its endowments including offerings made before the idol constitute the property of the idol.[14]

Principles as to legal personality, rights emanating therefrom, etc. with respect to a family temple are presented in the same manner as that of a public temple by Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. in his treatise ‘On Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts’.But it is observed (obiter) in Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs.   Shri Som Nath Dass[15] as under:

  • “The idol may be revered in homes but its juristic personality is only when it is installed in a public temple.”

The following passages in the Tagore Law Lectures by Dr. B.K. Mukherjea are relevant in this context.

  • i. “In the first place even if property is dedicated to a family Deity, the endowment is a religious and charitable trust in the proper sense of the term, and as the law of perpetuity or remoteness cannot affect such dedication, there is no reason why the other incidents of private trust should be applied to it.  In the second place, the Deity itself is a juridical person in Hindu Law and the dedicated property vests in it absolutely.”  (Page 197)[16]
  • ii. “When the Shebait himself is the misconducting party, whose removal is sought for or where property has been improperly alienated by the Shebait and he is unwilling or incapable of bringing a suit himself, any other person interested in the family debutter can sue, or the Deity itself as a juristic person can institute a suit through somebody as next friend.” (Page 462).[17]

Dedication of Property for Establishment of Dharmasala

While dealing with dedication of property for creation of a Dharmasala it is held in Kuldip Chand Vs. AG to Government of HP[18] as under:

  • “When the complete control is retained by the owner – be it be appointment of a Chowkidar, appropriation of rents, maintenance thereof from his personal funds – dedication cannot be said to be complete.”

‘Valid and Complete’ Dedication in Family Temple

Though control and management of the property are retained by the founder, if the temple is bestowed for the benefit of the family members, it could also be qualified as ‘dedication’. When the founder of a family temple releases his individual rights over the endowed property and vest the legal ownership of the same with the family Deity, such a dedication is alsovalid and complete’ in law.

Can a Private (Secular) Trust be Put to an End?

It is settled (Profulla Chorone Requitte  Vs.  Satya Chorone Requitte[19]) that in the matter of (secular) private trusts, English principles are followed in India which lay down that if the beneficiaries are sui juris and of one mind, the trust can be put to an end or use the trust fund for any purpose.

  • Chapter VIIII of the Indian Trusts Act is relevant here. It reads:
  • Chapter VIIII – The Extinction of Trusts  
  • 77. Trust how extinguished.—A trust is extinguished—(a) when its purpose is completely fulfilled; or (b) when its purpose becomes unlawful; or (c) when the fulfillment of its purpose becomes impossible by destruction of the trust property or otherwise; or (d) when the trust, being revocable, is expressly revoked.
  • 78. Revocation of trust.—A trust created by will may be revoked at the pleasure of the testator. A trust otherwise created can be revoked only— (a) where all the beneficiaries are competent to contract—by their consent; (b) where the trust has been declared by a non-testamentary instrument or by word of mouth—in exercise of a power of revocation expressly reserved to the author, of the trust; or (c) where the trust is for the payment of the debts of the author of the trust, and has not been communicated to the creditors—at the pleasure of the author of the trust. Illustration A conveys property to B in trust to sell the same and pay out of the proceeds the claims of A’s creditors. A reserves no power of revocation. If no communication has been made to the creditors, A may revoke the trust. But if the creditors, are parties to the arrangement, the trust cannot be revoked without their consent.
  • 79. Revocation not to defeat what trustees have duly done.—No trust can be revoked by the author of the trust so as to defeat or prejudice what the trustees may have duly done in execution of the trust.

Can Entire Family Members Put an End to Family Temple?

In case of public trusts, no doubt, the principle is: once a trust is made, it is final and irrevocable.[20] As observed by the Apex Court in Agasthyar Trust, Madras Vs. Commr. of Income Tax Madras, even the founder cannot revoke or put an end to it. Subsequent conduct of the founder or his descendants contrary to such dedication would amount to a breach of trust.[21] 

But there is difference of opinion in the matter of private religious trusts. It is held by Calcutta High Court in Sukumar Bose Vs. Abani Kumar (1956)[22] that the property once dedicated and a private trust created, the same cannot be put to an end even with the consent of all parties interested in the endowment. It was followed by the Calcutta High Court in Panna Banerjee Vs. Kali Kinkor Ganguli (1974).[23] Kerala (1961)[24] and Madras (1998)[25] High Court also took the same view.

The contrary view in Narayan Vs. Narasing Charan (1876),[26] had been criticized by Sir George Rankin, in Surendra Krishna Roy Vs. Shree ShreeIswar Bhubaneshwari Thakurani (1933).[27]

It is observed by the Apex Court in Profulla Chorone Requitte  Vs.  Satya Chorone Requitte (1979)[28] as under:

  • “23. Then, there is a distinction between a public and private debutter. In a public debutter or endowment, the dedication is for the use or benefit of the public. But in a private endowment, when property is set apart for the worship of a family idol, the public are not interested. The present case is one of a private debutter. The distinction is important, because the results logically following therefrom have been given effect to by courts, differently.
  • 24. According to English law, the beneficiaries in a private trust, if sui juris and of one mind, have the power or authority to put an end to the trust or use the trust fund for any purpose and divert it from its original object. Whether this principle applies to a private endowment or debutter created under Hindu Law, is a question on which authorities are not agreed. In Doorganath Roy Vs. Ram Chunder Sen, LR4 IA 52 : ILR 2 Cal 233 it was observed that while the dedication is to a public temple, the family of the founder could not put an end to it, but “in the case of a family idol, the consensus of the whole family might give the (debutter) estate another direction” and turn it into a secular estate.
  • 25. Subsequently, in Pramatha Nath Mullick Vs. Pradhyumna Kumar Mullick, 52 IA 245 : AIR 1925 PC 139 the Judicial Committee clarified that the property cannot be taken away from the idol and diverted to other purposes without the consent of the idol through its earthly agents who, as guardians of the deity, cannot in law consent to anything which may amount to an extinction of the deity itself.”[29]

B.K. Mukherjea on ‘The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust’  speaks as under:

  • “In Narayan Vs. Narasing Charan, (1951)[30] there is an observation that the members of the family could by their consensus withdraw the endowment from the trust. But in Sukumar Bose Vs. Abani Kumar (1956)[31] it was held by the Calcutta High Court on a review of the authorities that it was not open to the members of the family even when there is a consensus of all of them to put an end to an endowment in favour of a family idol, and that the observations of Sir Montague Smith in Doorganath Roy v. Ram Chunder (1876)[32] to the contrary were not good law. It is submitted that the law has been correctly laid down in this decision.
  • Even if it be held that a consensus of the family can convert Debutter into secular estate, it must be noted that Shebaits qua Shebaits by their dealings with the property cannot give it a different turn. The Shebaits occupy the position of managers merely, and the acts of the manager which amount to breaches of trust cannot put an end to the trust. The consent must be expressed by all the beneficiaries which in the case of a family idol includes all the members of the family, both male and female, who are interested in the worship of the deity. If consent of the entire family is not proved, certain dealings with the property by some members of the family who happen to be Shebaits, as secular property, would not effect any conversion. Of course, if the transactions are such that the entire family took part in them they may be treated as evidence of consent. If the original Debutter character of the property is established, the fact that the property had been partitioned between the members of the family for the better enjoyment thereof, and that there had been sales and mortgages would not show that there was a consensus to give the property a secular turn”.

Private Temple Becoming Public Temple

In Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji  Vs.  Rannchhoddas Kalidas,[33]it is held that most of the present day Hindu public temples have been founded as public temples, and there are instances of private temples becoming public temples in course of time.It is held further:

  • “Some of the private temples have acquired great deal of religious reputation either because of the eminence of its founder or because of other circumstances. They have attracted large number of devotees. Gradually in course of time they have become public temples. … If a temple is proved to have originated as a private temple or its origin is unknown or lost in antiquity then there must be proof to show that it is being used as a public temple.” [34]

Once the private character of the temple is established, more strong proof is necessary to show that the temple was subsequently dedicated to the public.[35]

Public Temple Cannotbe Converted to a Private One

A private temple can be converted to a public one.  But vice versa is not legally accepted. It is based on the principles – ‘once a dedication, always stands dedicated’ and ‘once a trust always a trust’.[36]

Private Trust: Settlement of Scheme

Section 92 CPC will not apply to a private trust.  It does not necessarily mean that the civil court has no jurisdiction to settle a scheme for the management of a private trust. It is a civil right under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code and governed entirely by the general law of the land which prescribes the remedies for enforcement of civil rights.If the trustee or Shebait is guilty of mismanagement, waste, wrongful alienation of debutter property or other neglect of duties, a suit can be instituted for remedying these abuses of trust. A suit can also be filed for settlement of a scheme for the purpose of effectively carrying out of the trust. [37]

In Thenappa Chettiar  Vs.  Karuppan Chettiar[38]and Ramchand Vs. Thakur Janki Ballabhji Maharaj[39] the Supreme Court held that a Civil Court may frame a scheme for the purpose of effectively carrying out the object of the trust, even in the case of a private endowment.[40] In Thenappa Chettiar  Vs.  Karuppan Chettiar it was observed that a suit could be brought in a civil court by any person interested, like contributors to the trust, for the removal of the trustee and for the proper administration of the endowment, if there was a breach of trust or mismanagement on the part of the trustee.

Admission of Public: Not Readily Inferred, Public Temple

In Babu Bhagvan Din Vs. Gir Har Saroop[41] it is held:

  • “Dedication to the public is not to be readily inferred when it is known that the temple property was acquired by grant to an individual or family. Such an inference, if made from the fact of user by the public, is hazardous, since it would not in general be consonant with Hindu sentiments or practice that worshippers should be turned away and, as worship generally implies offerings of some kind, it is not to be expected that the manager of a private temple should in all circumstances desire to discourage popularity.”
  •  “Thus the mere fact of the public having been freely admitted to the temple cannot mean that courts should readily infer therefrom dedication to the public.[42] The value of such public user as evidence of dedication depends on the circumstances which give strength to the inference that the user was as of right.” [43]

Revenue Records and Private Ownership

Even if the ownership of property is set-down in revenue records in the name of Deity, it is not treated as inconsistent with its private ownership.[44]

Description of Property as Debutter in a Deed, Not Conclusive

Execution of a deed by itself will not prove dedication.  Though it is a piece of evidence, it is not conclusive for determining the dedication.  In Paras Nath Thakur Vs. Mohani Dasi Deceased Ana[45] it is held that when a document is solemnly executed and registered, burden is heavy on the person who plead it to be fictitious. [46]

Dedication and Long User and Inference

Long user of income from a land for support of an Idol renders strong corroborative evidence of debutter and that by itself would not lead to an inference that dedication of the property in favour of the public was complete and absolute. Instances of appropriation of property by a person to his own use for a long period will be a good evidence of his right; but, if instances are only recent or few and far between, it leads to inference as to abuse of trust.

In The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore v. Sri Ratnavarma Heggade, (1977) 1 SCC 525, our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “Neither a document nor express words are essential for a dedication for a religious or public purpose in our country. Such dedications may be implied from user permitted for public and religious purposes for sufficient length of time. The conduct of those whose property is presumed to be dedicated for a religious or public purpose and other circumstances are taken into account in arriving at the inference of such a dedication.Although religious ceremonies of Sankalpa and   Samarpanam are relevant for proving a dedication, yet, they are not indispensable.” 

In R.M. Sundaram v. Sri Kayarohanasamy, AIROnLine 2022 SC 1022, it was held that the extinction of private character of a property can be inferred from the circumstances and facts on record, including sufficient length of time, which shows user permitted for religious or public purposes.

Registration of Public Trusts

Various State Public Trusts Acts require registration of all public trusts with the authorities appointed under the said Acts. In New Noble Educational Society v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax-1, 2023-6 SCC 649, it is held with reference to Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, as under:

  • “67. In the event of failure to comply with Section 43(1), or failure to intimate changes in the trust, or for supplying false information, the trustee or other person in charge, can be penalized by Section 43 (11). Section 44 empowers the Commissioner to direct charitable organizations and trusts to comply and register under the Act.
  • 68.The assessees had argued that since they were registered under the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 or were trusts duly registered, they could not be compelled to comply with state laws as a condition for consideration of their application as charitable institutions, under Section 10 (23C).
  • 69. This court is of the opinion that the findings in the impugned judgment on this aspect are sound. The requirement of registration of every charitable institution is not optional. Aside from the fact that the consequences of non-registration are penal, which indicates the mandatory nature of the provisions of the A.P. Charities Act, such local laws provide the regulatory framework by which annual accounts, manner of choosing the governing body (in terms of the founding instrument: trust, society, etc.), acquisition and disposal of properties, etc. are constantly monitored. Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution reads as follows:
    • “32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, and universities; unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations; cooperative societies.”
  • By Entry 28, List III of the Seventh Schedule, the states have undoubted power to enact on the subject of charities:
    • “28. Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions.”

Private Religious Trusts

So far as private religious trusts are concerned, there are no specific statutory enactments to regulate their affairs. Such trusts are governed by the foundational principles upon which they are established, as evidenced by documents, if any; customs and usages;general law of contract and transfer of property, etc; apart from the Common Law of the Land applicable to such trusts.

How to Distinguish a Private Temple from a Public Temple

If the dedication with respect to a temple is proved to be for the benefit of members of a family, that temple will be identified as Family Temple. The facts and circumstances considered by our courts in this regard can be placed under two heads:

  • 1. Decisive characteristics.
  • 2. Indicative or relevant features.

Cardinal Point:  Intention of Founder

As stated above, Cardinal Point[47] to solve the question, whether an endowment is private or public, is Intention of Founder – whether specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or specified portion thereof.  Similarly, if the founders’ intention is clear from a document[48] of foundation, full importance will be given to it.

Decisive Characteristics:

  • i.  Is public the beneficiaries
    • If the beneficiaries are the unascertainable general public or a class thereof, the temple will be identified as the public temple; if the beneficiaries are ascertainable, it will be characterised as private temple.
  • ii.  Is there as-of-right user by public
    • As of right entry, worship and offerings by public are held to be conclusive peculiarities of public temple.  It may be noted that our courts have repeatedly cautioned that mere provision for unobstructed worship in a temple does not amount to ‘as of right user’; and that the facilities provided for public worship, by itself, will not make a temple with otherwise private character, a public temple.[49]

Indicative or Relevant Features

To determine the aforesaid ‘decisive characteristics’ (with regard to: who the beneficiaries are and as of right user) courts analyse various ‘indicative or relevant features’; and from among the heap of evidence the courts uphold certain features as significant and relevant, in the nature and circumstances of each case, in preference to other features.The supreme Court has alerted inKacha Kanti Seva Samity  Vs. Kacha Kanti Devi[50]that the question as to whether a religious endowment is of a private nature or of a public nature has to be decided with reference to the facts proved in each case. It is difficult to lay down any test or tests, which may be of universal application.[51]

Following peculiarities are noticeable in support of public nature of the temple:

1Worship by large number of devotees. AIR   2007   SC 1917,  AIR 1995 SC 167; 2006 AIR SCW 4622; AIR 1995 SC 167, AIR 1970 SC 2025,
2Construction of temple by subscription of public.AIR 1987 SC 2064,  AIR 1999 SC 329, AIR  2009 (1)  SC   1495,  AIR   2007   SC  1917
3Meeting of temple expenditure from the contribution of publicAIR  2009 (1)  SC 1495,  AIR 1995 SC 167,  AIR 1970 SC 2025,  AIR 1999 SC 329
4Consciousness of management and devotees in treating the temple. AIR 1924 PC 44, AIR 1987 SC 2064,  AIR 1995 SC 167, AIR 1970 SC 2025,  AIR 1999 SC 329,  AIR 2009 (1)  SC   1495
5Sevas/Poojas, conducted – usually seen in public temples.AIR 1995 SC 167, AIR 1970 SC 2025, AIR  2009 (1)  SC   1495, AIR   2007   SC  1917, AIR 1999 SC 329]
6Providing food and shelter for Sadhus and public.AIR 1999 SC 329,  AIR 1972 SC 1621, AIR 1980 SC 514
7Collection boxes for cash and grains from public. AIR   2009 (1)  SC   1495, AIR 2003 SC 1685
8Participation of public in festivals and ceremoniesAIR   2007   SC  1917, AIR 1999 SC 329
9Various poojas on payment and issuance of pamphlets showing details as to poojas.AIR 2007 SC 1917  
10Management – Appointment of Shebaits and managers from strangers to the family of founders.AIR  1981  SC  798, AIR 1987 SC 2064,  AIR 1999 SC 329, AIR 2007 SC 1917, AIR 1995 SC 167, AIR 2003 SC 1685, (2006) 7 SCC 490: 2006 AIR SCW 4622
11Entries in revenue records as to nature of the temple. AIR 1999 SC 329,  AIR 2009 (1)  SC   1495, (2006) 7 SCC 490=2006 AIR SCW 4622, AIR   2007   SC  1917, AIR 1995 SC 167
12Exemption from taxes and revenues.AIR 1987 SC 2064
13Vastness/appearance of temple.AIR 1960 SC 100,  AIR  1987 SC 2064,  AIR 1999 SC 329, AIR 2009 (1)  SC   1495,  AIR 1995 SC 167, AIR 1970 SC 2025, 2007  SC 1917
14Construction of circular roads for processions.AIR 1924 PC 44, AIR 1999 SC 329
15Installation of Idols outside precincts of residential quarters.AIR 1987 SC 2064, AIR 1995 SC 167, AIR 1999 SC 329,   AIR 2009 (1)  SC  1495, 1957 SC 133, AIR   2007  SC 1917, (2006) 7 SCC 490:2006 AIR SCW 4622
16Permanent installation of Deity on pedestal.AIR   2009 (1)  SC  1495;  1957 SC 133
17Procession taking out Idol.AIR   2009 (1)  SC   1495
18Right of public to scrutinize the accounts.AIR   2007   SC  1917, (2006) 7 SCC 490: 2006 AIR SCW 4622
19Prathishta instead of Utsarga.AIR   2007   SC  1917
20Recitals of Geetha, Bhagavath, etc. before large number of devotees. AIR 1999 SC 329  
21Placing along with permanent deities, minor deities.AIR 1999 SC 329  
22Existence of a shop in the temple premises for sale of bhog articles.AIR 1999 SC 329  
23Existence of a tank – it is usually a characteristic of public temple.AIR 1999 SC 329  
24Existence of Dharmasala for visitors. AIR 1999 SC 329  
25Cash allowance from treasury in the name of Deity.AIR 1995 SC 167  
Finite group of identifiable individuals2020 0 Supreme(SC) 177
Rock inscription specifically states that the charity of feeding the BrahminsAIR 2019 SC 4050 (2020) 5 Mad LJ 331(SC)  

Following peculiarities support private nature of the temple

1Family treated temple as a private propertyAIR 1940 PC 7,  AIR 1999 SC 329, AIR 2003 SC 1685, AIR  1971  SC 2057, AIR 1987 SC 2064, AIR  1981  SC  798
2Consciousness of managers and devoteesAIR 1972 SC 1716, AIR 1970 SC 2025, AIR 1976 SC 871, AIR 1987 SC 2064, AIR  1999  SC  329; (2011) 13 SCC 431
2Dedication of extensive family property and no provision made for offering or contribution from public.AIR 2009  SC 1495;  AIR 1987 SC 2064; AIR 2003 SC 1685, AIR  1981  SC  798
3Provision for family members to reimburse the manager/ Shebait from the family.AIR  1981  SC  798.  
4Vesting of management in family.AIR 2003 SC 1685, AIR 1981 SC 798
5Grant of property not in the name of Idol/temple, but in favour of founder.AIR 1940 PC 7;   AIR 1987 SC 2064, (2006) 7 SCC 490: 2006 AIR SCW 4622
6Rent profits appropriated by family.AIR 1940 PC 7,  AIR 1999 SC 329

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[1]      Quoted in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji Vs. S P Sahi Special Officer In Charge of Hindu Religious Trust: AIR 1959 SC 942.

[2]      AIR 1957 SC 133

[3]      Deoki Nandan Vs.Murlidhar: AIR 1957 SC 133 is Quoted and followed in: Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Reli. Endts:  AIR 1981 SC 798;  State of Bihar Vs. Charusila Dasi: AIR 1959 SC 1002; Dhaneshwarbuwa Vs. Charity Commr., AIR 1976 SC  871; Pratapsinhji N Desai Vs. Dy.  Chrty. Commr. Gujarat:  AIR 1987 SC 2064; Jammi Raja Rao Vs. Anjaneya Swami Temple Valuair 1992 SC 1110; Gedela Satchidananda  Vs.  Dy. Commr. Endts, A P AIR 2007 SC 1917.

[4]      Quoted in State of West Bengal Vs. Sri.Sri Lakshmi Janardan Thakur, (2006) 7SCC 490: 2006 AIR (SCW) 4622; Yelandau Arasikere Deshikendra Sammthana Vs.Gangadharaiah: 2007-5 AIR Kar R 565: 2008-4 Kat LJ 323.

[5]Idol of Sri Renganathaswamy Vs. PK Thoppulan Chettiar:(2020) 5 Mad LJ 331(SC); MJ  Thulasiraman Vs. Comr, HR & CE: AIR 2019 SC 4050.

[6]      AIR 1957 SC 133. See also: Commr. of Endowments Vs. VittalRao:  AIR  2005 SC 454; Bala Shankar MahaShanker Bhattjee Vs. Charity Commr. Gujarat State: AIR  1995 SC 167, Jammi Raja Rao Vs. Anjaneya Swami Temple Valu: AIR 1992 SC 1110, Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Religious Endowments Orissa: AIR  1981 SC 798, Commr. For Hindu Religious And Charitable Endowments Mysore Vs. Ratnavarma Hegade: AIR 1977 SC 1848, Dhaneshwarbuwa Guru Purshottambuwa Owner of Shri Vithal Rukhamai Sansthan Vs. Charity Commr. State of Bombay Citations: AIR  1976 SC 871; Mahant Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das Vs. Surajnarayan Das: AIR  1967 SC 256,

[7]      AIR 1957 SC 133.

[8]      Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar (AIR 1957 SC 133): Cardinal Point, intention of founder – Followed in State of Bihar Vs. CharusilaDasi AIR 1959 SC 1002; Dhaneshwarbuwa Guru Vs. Char. Commr. Bom., AIR 1976 SC   871 Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Reli. Endts,  AIR 1981 SC 798 Pratapsinhji N Desai Vs. Dy Char. Commr. Gujt, AIR 1987 SC 2064 Jammi Raja Rao Vs. Anjaneya Swami Temple Valuair, 1992 SC 1110 Gedela Satchid. Murthy Vs. Dy Commr. Endts, A P, AIR 2007 SC 1917.

[9]      AIR 1981 SC 798; (quoted in Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685).

[10]    AIR 1972 SC 2069

[11]    Quoted in Sitaram Agarwal Vs. Subarata Chandra: AIR 2008 SC 952; Controller of Estate Duty West Bengal Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312

[12]    AIR 1941 PC 38; Quoted in Kuldip Chand Vs. AG to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685.         Terms of the document, important:1951 SCR 1122;  Sri. Govindlalji Vs. State of Rajasthan: AIR 1963  SC  1638; R Venugopala Reddiar Vs. Krishnaswamy: AIR 1971 Mad  262; Kuldip Chand Vs. A G to Govt of H P: AIR 2003  SC  1685. Importance of document: Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Endts.: AIR 1981 SC 798; Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts: Page 188.

[13](2020) 5 Mad LJ 331(SC)

[14] Hindu Religious Endowments Vs. LakshmindraTirtha Swamiar:  AIR 1963 SC 1638

[15]AIR 2000 SC 1421

[16]    KM Senthivel Pillai Vs. Kulandaivel Pillai: 1970-2 MADLJ 555; P. Jayader Vs. Thiruneelakanta Nadar Chinnaneela Nadar: ILR 1966-2 Mad 92

[17]    Quoted in: Commr. of Endowments Vs. Sri Radhakanta Deb: 1969-35 CutLT 992.

[18]    AIR 2003 SC 1685.

[19]    AIR 1979 SC 1682.

[20]    See: Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17; M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; T C Chacko Vs. Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107. Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333

[21]    1998 AIR (SCW) 3945: (1998) 5 SCC 588. See also: Pramatha Nath Vs. Pradyumna Kumar, (1925) 52 IA 245;  Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Chorone, AIR 1979 SC 1682

[22]AIR 1956 Cal. 308

[23] AIR 1974  Cal 126. Appeal Judgment:  Kali Kinkor Ganguly  Vs. Panna Banerjee AIR 1974 SC 1932

[24]    Karumankavu Devaswon Kshethram Trust Board Members Vs. Damodaran Nair: ILR 2008 (1) Ker 742; Rajasekharan Naicker  Vs. Govindankutty 1983 Ker LJ 506. Kunhanandan Nambiar Vs. Kunhappa Nambiar: 1961 Ker LJ 1141

[25]Paramasivam Vs. SV Ravikumar: 1998-1 LW 37

[26]AIR 1951 Ori. 60

[27]AIR 1933 Cal. 286; ILR 60 Cal. 54

[28]    AIR 1979 SC 1682.

[29]   Quoted in Sri Marthanda Varma   Vs State of Kerala, 2020  Supreme (SC) 444.

[30]AIR 1951 Ori. 60

[31]AIR 1956 Cal. 308

[32] 4 IndApp52

[33]    AIR 1970 SC 2025.                                                                                                                             

[34]    See also: Mahadeva Vs. Commr, H. R. and C. E 1956 (1) MLJ 309; Marua Dei Alias Maku Dei Vs. Muralidhar Nanda AIR 1999 SC 329; Teki Venkata Ratnam Vs. Commr. of Endowment AIR 2001 SC 2436.

[35]    See: Commr. of HR&CE Admn Dept. Vs. N Sundaraswami Gounder, (2001) 2 Mad LJ 737; Chennammal Vs. Commr. of HR&CE, (1973) 2 Mad LJ 442;   TD Gopalan Vs. Commr of Hindu R & C Endts, AIR 1972 SC 1716

[36]    Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr of Hindu Religious Endts: AIR 1981 SC 798; Bhagwan Din Vs. Gir Har Saroop: AIR 1940 PC 7; Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[37]    Cheriyathu  Vs.  Parameswaran Namboodiripad: 1953 Ker LT 125; Also 1953 Ker LT 117; AIR 1922 P. C. 253: Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick: AIR 1925 PC 139. Also see: ManoharMukherji  Vs. Raja Peary Mohan Mukherji:24 CWN 478; Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar Radha Balla: 1937 Cal 338; Rajasekharan Naicker Vs. Govindankutty 1983 KerLJ 506.

[38]AIR 1968 SC 915. Followed in: Sujan Mohinder Charitable Trust VS MohinderKaur: 2019 0 Supreme(Del) 281; Radhamohan Dev Vs.Nabakishore Naik: AIR 1979 Ori 181. Brindaban Vs. Ram Lakhan Lalji: AIR 1975  All 255.

[39]AIR 1970 SC 532

[40]Ramchand Vs. Thakur Janki Ballabhji Maharaj: AIR 1970 SC 532

[41]    AIR 1940 PC 7.

[42]    See also:  Jadunath Roy Vs. Parameswar Mullick: (AIR 1940 P C 11), Sri. GovindlaljiVs. State of Rajasthan: (AIR 1963 SC 1638); Pratapsinhji N. Desai Vs. Deputy Charity Commr. Gujarat: Mundacheri Koman Vs. Thachangat Puthan Vittil Achuthan Nair: (AIR 1934 PC 230), Babu Bhagwan Din Vs. Gir Har Saroop: (AIR 1940 PC 7) The Bihar State Board of Religious Trust Vs. Mahanth Sri. Biseshwar Das: (AIR 1971 SC 2057), Shri Vallabharaya Swami Varu Vs. Deevi Hanumancharyulu: (AIR 1979 SC 1147).

[43]    See also: Bihar State Board Religious Trust Patna Vs. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das (AIR 1971 SC 2057); Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Religious Endts: AIR 1981 SC 798; Marua Dei Alias Maku Dei Vs. Muralidhar Nanda: AIR 1999 SC 329; Kuldip Chand Vs. A G to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685; Gurpur Guni V N Prabhu Vs. B. C. Achia: AIR 1977 SC 1192.

[44]    1964 KLT 1034; relied on in 2014 (3) KLT 497, 2013 (3) KLT 1017.

[45]    AIR 1959 SC 1204 

[46]    ILR 18 Cal. 10;  ILR 42 All. 295.

[47]    DeokiNandan  Vs.  Murlidhar: AIR 1957 SC 133.

[48]Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Reli.  Endts Orissa: AIR 1981 SC 798.

[49]    Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Reli.  Endts Orissa: AIR 1981 SC 798; GoswamiShri Mahalaxmi Vahuji Vs. Ranchhoddas: AIR 1970 SC 2025; Pratapsinhji N Desai Vs. Dy Charity Commr. Guj, AIR 1987 SC 2064; AIR 1995 SC 167; Marua Dei Alias Maku Dei Vs. Muralidhar Nanda: AIR 1999 SC 329; Kuldip Chand Vs. A G to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685;  Gedela SatchidanandaVs. Dy Commr. Endwts AP: AIR  2007  SC  1917. As of right user: Gedela Satchidananda Vs. D  Commr. EndwtsDeptt AP: AIR 2007 SC 1917; Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Rel. Endowts. Orissa: AIR 1981 SC 798; Bihar St. Brd. Religious Trust  Vs. Mahant Biseshwar Das: AIR 1971 SC 2057; Marua Dei Alias Maku Dei Vs. Muralidhar Nanda: AIR 1999 SC 329; Kuldip Chand Vs. A G to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685; Gurpur Guni Venkataraya NarashimaVs. B. C. Achia: AIR 1977 SC 1192.

[50] AIR 2004 SC 608

[51]See also: Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Religious Endts: AIR 1981 SC 798; Kuldip   Chand Vs. A G to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685; T D Gopalan  Vs. Commr. of Hindu R & C Endts AIR 1972 SC 1716.



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