The petitioners in Yasmeen Zuber Ahmad Peerzade v. Union of India, filed the Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court, by way of a Public Interest Litigation, on March 26, 2019, seeking declaration that the practices of prohibition of entry of Muslim Women in Mosques in India is illegal and unconstitutional for being violative of the fundamental rights to equality, life and liberty and freedom of religion proclaimed under Articles 14, 15, 21, 25 and 29 of the Constitution and also to pass such further orders to provide a life of dignity to Muslim women. This case is tagged with Sabarimala temple-entry-matter and other cases in which rights of women are involved.
Sabarimala Decision
The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India, on September 28, 2018, headed by the Chief Justice, held in 4:1 majority (Indian Young Lawyers Association Vs. Union of India: 2019-1 SCC 1), that the custom that prohibited women from entering the Sabarimala temple violated the rights to equality enshrined under Article 14, and freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution. It was also pointed out that the Preamble to the Constitution of India proclaimed the ‘liberty of thought, expression, belief,faith, and worship‘.
Prohibition of Entry of Muslim Women: Points Placed in Challenge
The prohibition is void and unconstitutional as such practices are repugnant to the basic dignity of a woman as an individual.
The arbitrary prohibition imposed on women is violate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India – to be treated equally – and Article 15 of the Constitution which clearly prohibits discrimination by the government on the basis of sex.
The prohibition imposed is violative of fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 29 also of the Constitution of India.
Preventing the females from entering mosque is violative of Article 44 of the Constitution of India which directs the State to endeavour to secureuniform civil code.
The exclusion of women is, nonetheless, not supported by reasons of “public order”, “health”, “morality” (in Article 25), and, in any case, Article 25(1) will not take precedence over other articles.
A woman’s entry to a masjid or eidgah (a place where Muslims congregate for Eid-ul-Fitr and Eid-ul-Azha celebrations) does not create fitna (distress).
In the Hajj pilgrimage and Umrah (a lesser Hajj) thousands of Muslim women gather and perform Hajj rituals such as tawaf (walking around the Ka’ba) and sa’I (running between the hills of Safa and Marwa) and ramye zamrat (stoning of the devil ceremony) along with their male counterparts.
Religious bodies ask for and receive taxpayers’ money from the government are also subject to the conditions imposed by our Constitution.
The historical sources also show that Prophet Muhammad had himself encouraged women to actively participate in mosque congregations and prayer.
The most sacred mosque in the world for Muslims, Masjid-al-Haram in Mecca, embraces both men and women and there is complete unanimity in the Muslim community on the Masjid-al-Haram in Mecca – to all Muslims in the world.
The Apex Court, in Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2015) 8 SCC 439, has taken the view that practices permitted or not prohibited by a religion do not become a religious practice or a positive tenet of the religion, since a practice does not acquire the sanction of religion merely because it is permitted.
The petitioners also argued that there is nothing in the Quran and the Hadith that ‘requires gender segregation’and that the Legislature has failed to ensure the dignity and equality of women in general and Muslim women in particular.
Stance of the contesting respondents
The contesting respondents have not filed their response in Court. Their stance, as appears from the counter affidavit filed by the All India Muslim Personal Law Board, would be, mainly, the following:
The issues do not pertain to any statute.
The alleged rights cannot be enforced against non-state entities like Mosques.
Friday Namaz in congregation is not obligatory for women, though it is so, on Muslim men. As per doctrines of Islam, a woman is entitled to the same religious reward (Sawab) for praying as per her option either in Masjid or at home.
The matters involved are religious practices based upon beliefs of the religion; and not matters ‘merely concern’ the management of a religious place.
The matters involved are matters concern of Masjids, purely private bodies regulated by Muttawalis.
They are not the activities ‘only concern’ regulating the activities connected with religious practice, also.
It is not appropriate for the Court to enter into or interpret the religious principles/beliefs and tenets, invoking Articles 14, 15, 21, 25 and 29 of Constitution of India.
It is not appropriate for the Court to attempt to answer issues that are matters of faith alone, when there is no ‘threat to life and liberty’.
It is not appropriate for the Court to interfere in religious beliefs and the practice of the essential features of any religion protected underArticle 26.
In the absence of any state action, it is not appropriate for the Court to judicially determine or interfere in, or to seek resolution of, various aspects on ‘faith and belief’, and essential religious practices of faith, through judicial process. It should be left to be resolved through the processes of social transformation within the religious denomination itself.
During the pendency of the present petition, a five Judge Bench judgment in Kantaru Rajeevaru Vs. Indian Young Lawyers Association [Sabarimala-Case-Review from 2019-1 SCC 1] has referred matters involving Articles 14, 25 and 26 to larger bench. The matters involved in that case are much relevant in this case also.
Present Status of the Case
This case, on prohibition of Muslim women to enter Mosque, is tagged on with Sabarimala Review-Reference matter [Kantaru Rajeevaru Vs. Indian Young Lawyers Association : Review from 2019-1 SCC 1] and pending consideration before a 9 Judge Bench.
Conclusion
The (i) right of entry of women in Sabarimala, (ii) right of entry of Muslim women in durgahs/mosques, (iii) right of entry of Parsi women, married to non-Parsis, into the holy fire place of Agyari and (v) the challenge to the practice of female genital mutilation in Dawoodi Bohra Community are placed before the nine-judge-bench of the Supreme Court.
The result of the combined inquisitive analysis of all the aforesaid cases and the issues involved therein, in the constitutional ethos, by the nine-judge-bench, on every possibility, will not be against the so called ‘progressive view’ in favour of women. If the effect of answers of each segregated case and each separated issue is anatomically explored and blended together, the outcome may be diametrically opposite. The nine-judge-bench will analyse the matter, both ways; and, though it may appear that striking a balance between the divergent intransigence is impossible, the end-result will definitely be one which will be hailed ‘legitimate’, in future. It is the history of the Supreme Court of India, in similar matters.
The Constitution of India was made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, in its entirety, like any other States, by a Constitution Order passed by the President of India on 5th August, 2019. On 6th August, 2019, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (3) of Article 370 of the Constitution of India read with clause (1) of article 370, the President, on the recommendation of Parliament, declared that all special status given to J & K under Article 370 would cease to operate.
These developments are highly controversial. Some speak that the highest assurance of historical importance that has been given by the nation, India, through its Constitution, to a constituent state is betrayed. But, others say it is a mark of national integration.
Special status had been given to J&K in the following historical and significant background.
British Restores India 600 Princely States
The British, when left India, through the Indian Independence Act, 1947, restored sovereignty of about 600 princely states, including Kashmir. The princely states had three options: First, to remain as an independent country; Second, to join Dominion of India; and the Third, to join Dominion of Pakistan. The joining with India or Pakistan had to be through a mutual agreement – the Instrument of Accession (IoA.)
Instrument of Accession by J&K
The Maharaja of Kashmir, Raja Hari Singh, had initially decided to take an independent stand and to sign standstill agreements with India and Pakistan. But following an invasion of tribesmen and Army men in plainclothes from Pakistan, he sought the help of India, which in turn led to the accession of Kashmir to India.
Raja Hari Singh signed the IoA on October 26, 1947 and Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, accepted it on October 27, 1947.
The Schedule appended to the IoA between India and Kashmir gave the Parliament of India the power to legislate on Defence, External Affairs and Communications, with respect to J&K.
Article 370Reads:
“370. Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,—
(a) the provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to—
(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and (ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify.
Explanation. — For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja’s Proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948;
(c) the provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that State;
(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may by order specify:
Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State:
Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government.
(2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify:
Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification”
Article 370 and the Constituent Assembly of J&K.
The declared policy of India was that the disputes on accession should be settled in accordance with the wishes of people rather than a unilateral decision of the ruler of the princely state.
India regarded accession of J&K as purely temporary and provisional, as stated in the Government of India’s White Paper on J&K in 1948. In a letter to J&K Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah dated May 17, 1949, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote: “The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir is a matter for determination by the people of the state represented in a Constituent Assembly convened for the purpose.”
Article 370 – Subject to Plebiscite
The original draft of Article 370 was presented by the Government of J&K.
Following modifications and negotiations, on the draft placed by J&K, Article 306A (now 370) was passed in the Constituent Assembly on May 27, 1949. It was moved in the Constitution Assembly by Shri. Gopalaswami Ayyangar
Moving the motion, Ayyangar said that though accession was complete, India had offered to a plebiscite taken when the conditions were created, and if accession was not ratified then “we shall not stand in the way of Kashmir separating herself away from India”.
On October 17, 1949, when Article 370 was finally included in the Constitution by India’s Constituent Assembly, Ayyangar reiterated India’s commitment to plebiscite and drafting of a separate constitution by J&K’s Constituent Assembly.
Presidential Order of 1954 & Article 35A
Article 35A of the Constitution has been introduced through a Presidential Order in 1954 invoking Article 370. Article 35A empowered the J&K legislature to define the state’s permanent residents; and their special rights and privileges to Indian-administered Kashmir, including Jammu and Ladakh.
The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, had passed a law in 1927 to stop the influx of people from Punjab. Reports say that it was done as urged by Kashmiri Hindus. The same law was re-introduced in 1954. It was made part of Article 35A, and thus granted Kashmir special status to J&K within India.
After enacting Article 35A, all identified residents were issued a permanent resident certificate, which entitled them to special benefits related to employment, scholarships and other privileges. The biggest advantage considered by the permanent residents was that they alone had the right to own, buy, or sell immovable property in the state.
By the 1954 Presidential Order, almost the entire Constitution was extended to J&K. Besides 260 of 395 Articles, 94 out of 97 entries in the Union List were made applicable to J&K by this Order; 26 out of 47 items of the Concurrent List have been brought-in. Seven out of 12 Schedules were also extended to the state.
J & K Constitution
It is very important that Article 3 of the J&K Constitution declared J&K to be an integral part of India. In the Preamble to the Constitution, there was a categorical acknowledgement about the object of the J&K Constitution – “to further define the existing relationship of the state with the Union of India as its integral part thereof.” Moreover people of state were referred as ‘permanent residents’; not ‘citizens’. It is noteworthy that there was no claim as to ‘sovereignty’ of J&K in their Constitution. One of the main reasons for enacting a special Constitution for J&K is said to be to bring the provisions of the laws relating to J&K out of the clutches of the fundamental rights. Various fundamental rights (under Article 14, 19, 21 etc.) made it ‘difficult’ to provide special rights to J&K people and J&K situations.
Special Status given to J&K under Article 370
Article 370 itself exempted operation of other provisions of the Constitution except Article 1 and Article 370, to J&K. By virtue of Article 1, J&K was included in the list of states. It further permitted the J&K to draft its own Constitution.
With respect to the legislative powers of the Parliament, Article 370 restricted Centre to make laws on the subjects included in the IoA, only on “consultation” with the state government. But, if the concurrence of the Government of the State was to be given, or obtained, before the convening of the Constituent Assembly, it was provided to place the same before such Assembly (when it is convened.)
Similar Special Provisions in Other States also
Article 370 is captioned as ‘Temporary Provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir’. Article 371 and 371-A to 371-I speak of certain types of privileges or restrictions including purchase of land, in the Himachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, AP, Sikkim, Misoram, Arunachal Pradesh and Goa. Domicile-based reservation in admissions and even jobs is also allowed.
Why Article 370 was ‘Temporary’
Article 370 was ‘Temporary’ in the sense that the J&K Constituent Assembly had a right to modify/ delete/ retain it. It was temporary, for the validity of this provision depended upon the plebiscite to be held in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Does Article 370 Become a Permanent Provision?
Three views are propounded.
First, Article 370 became permanent when the Constituent Assembly of J&K was dissolved (on January 26, 1957). Article 370(3) permits deletion of Article 370 by a Presidential Order, preceded by the ‘concurrence’ of J&K’s Constituent Assembly. It was not happened by a decision of the Constituent Assembly of J&K.
Second view is that Article 370 continues to operate with obtaining the ‘concurrence’ from the State Assembly which stepped into the shoes of the Constituent Assembly.
And the third view is that on dispersal of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir (on January 27, 1957) after adopting the state’s constitution, ‘there vanished also the president’s powers – under Article 370 – to add more legislative powers to the Centre in respect of J&K or extend to the state any other provision of the constitution of India’. (Constitutional expert, AG Noorani, supports this view.)
Rajendra Prasad on ‘Temporary’ Nature of 370
AG Noorani pointed out in an essay that ‘President Rajendra Prasad, himself a distinguished lawyer’, wrote on September 6, 1952 as under:
“… under clause 1(b)(ii) and the second proviso to clause 1(d) of Article 370, it excludes altogether the parliament of India from having any say regarding the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir……The abrogation of Article 370 abrogates along with it application of Article 1 to the state, with the result that the state ceases to be part of the territory of India…”
Alleged aggressions of Centre by the Presidential Orders
The Centre has used Article 370 to amend J&K’s Constitution, though that power was not given (to the President) under Article 370.
Despite a similar provision that of Article 356 of the Indian Constitution (President’s Rule) is in an Article 92 of the J&K Constitution, Article 356 itself was extended to J&K.
The J&K Constitution provides for election of Governor by the Assembly. Article 370 was used to convert it into a nominee of the President.
To extend President’s rule beyond one year in other states, the government made Constitutional amendments one after the other. But, in J&K Article 370 was invoked without this Constitutional Amendment.
Article 249 (power of Parliament to make laws on State List entries) was extended to J&K without a resolution by the Assembly and just by a recommendation of the Governor. It is utter violation of Art. 370.
The Presidential Order and J & K Reorganisation Act of 2019
On August 5, 2019, the President of India issued the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019, under Article 370, superseding the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954. By virtue of the Order all the provisions of the Indian Constitution were made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir, whereby the separate status conferred to the State J&K was abolished. The Order stated that it was issued with the “concurrence” of the Government of State of J&K. The ‘concurrence’ was, apparently, that had been given by the Governor appointed by the President of India. The President issued the Order on the basis of the resolution adopted by both Houses of the Parliament, Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.
Jammu and Kashmir: Status Changed
On August 5, 2019 itself, the Bill, Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019, to change the status of Jammu and Kashmir and to form two separate union territories, namely Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh was introduced in Rajya Sabha; and on the next day, before the Lok Sabha. The union territory of Jammu and Kashmir was proposed to have a legislature, whereas the union territory of Ladakh didn’t.
What Kashmiris Fear
Kashmir is a Muslim-majority Territory. It is said that Kashmiris fear that the unique privileges, including property rights, coherent culture out of Muslim population etc. will be eroded; and a change in the law will affect the state’s demographics. Already tensions are high in this region. Apart from enjoying the benefits, the situation prevailed permitted a separate flag and independence over all matters except foreign affairs, defence and communications. The article 370 allowed the state a certain amount of autonomy – and freedom to make laws. It was possible to restrain Indians or Hindus from purchasing property or settle there. And, they were proud of own Constitution and special status.
Kashmiris suspect that by advent of Constitutional changes Hindus would migrate to the state. This would sound well. Former Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti has pointed out that changing the law would further alienate Kashmiris.
There had been fights and struggles since 1989. India blames Pakistan. Pakistan raises claim on Kashmir in its entirety.
Stand of Modi Goverment
The government says that the change of law will bring development to the region.
“I want to tell the people of Jammu and Kashmir what damage Articles 370 and 35A did to the state,” said Mr Amith Shah, Home Minister, in the Parliament, “it’s because of these sections that democracy was never fully implemented, corruption increased in the state, that no development could take place.”
Legal Challenge
According to the Constitution, Article 370 could be changed only with ‘concurrence’ of the State. But there hasn’t been normal a state government in Jammu and Kashmir for over a year now. In June last year, federal rule was imposed after the government of the then chief minister, Mehbooba Mufti, was reduced to a minority. Therefore, the governor imposed its rule. The government of India says it is well within its rights to bring in the changes with the concurrence of Governor and that similar decisions have been taken by federal governments in the past.
AG Noorani
AG Noorani says that the Presidential Orders which made the Constitution of India applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in its entirety, like other States, was ‘an illegal decision, akin to committing fraud’.
Political Criticism
P Chidambaram, a senior leader in the opposition (Congress Party) described the decision as a “catastrophic step” and warned in parliament that it may lead to serious consequences. He said: “You may think you have scored a victory, but you are wrong and history will prove you to be wrong. Future generations will realise what a grave mistake this house is making today”.
Earlier Court Decisions
In Prem Nath Kaul (1959) the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court accepted the argument that the Article 370 was a temporary provision. But in Sampat Prakash (1969) the SC refused to accept Article 370 as temporary. The five-judge Bench said that ‘Article 370 has never ceased to be operative’; and that it was a permanent provision.
Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India
The Amendments made to Article 35A and 370 were questioned before the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India. The Advocates argued that the Supreme Court had given its earlier decision in Sampat Prakash, without taking into account the law laid down in Prem Nath Kaul. Thereon they called for a ‘reference’ to a larger bench since the present bench was of the same strength as Sampath Prakash and Prem Nath Kaul. The 5-judge bench of the Supreme Court, on 2nd March 2020, rejected the request to refer these petitions to a larger bench holding that there was no such ‘oversight’ or ‘conflict’ as argued.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court will examine in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India whether the abolition of Article 370 is unconstitutional and violates the basic structure of the Constitution. If the change made is held to be unconstitutional, several earlier Presidential Orders may have to be rendered invalid.
Now, from August 2, 2023, the Constitution Bench, headed by the Chief Justice of India, considers this matter under the Caption “In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution”.
The argument of the Petitioners were over, after 10 days’ hearing, on August 23, 2023.
Sec. 65B deals with ‘Admissibility’ (alone) of a Computer Output/Copy. If ‘truth’ is in question, it must be proved.
“31. … admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B … Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose. ……”
2
Sec. 65B is an (additional) enabling provision to prove copy. Non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding Anything’) in Sec. 65B – Not exclude Sec. 65.
“34. …. special provisions of Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are a complete Code in themselves ……” “34. …a written certificate under Section 65B(4) is a sine qua non …”
3
Conditions in S. 65B(2) are to be satisfied through oral evidence or affidavit, (except for ‘Statements’; they can be by “Certificate” also).
“59. … Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. … To hold otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose.”
4
Photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc. cannot be used under Sec. 65B. •The computer output (copy) is ‘deemed to be (also) a document’ if only the conditions mentioned in S. 65B(2) are fulfilled, that is: • USED REGULARLY to STORE or process information • activities REGULARLY CARRIED ON • BY THE PERSON having lawful control, •information was REGULARLY FED •in the ORDINARY COURSE, • information is REPRODUCED in the •ORDINARY COURSE of the SAID ACTIVITIES.
Apex Court accepted – CCTV footage in: Navjot Sandhu, (2005); Tomaso Bruno (2015), CDs/VCDs in: Arjun Panditrao (2020) CDs in: Anvar PV (2014). CDR in: Sonu (2017) Tape recorded conversation: Vikram Singh (2017) Videography of scene of crime in: Shafhi (2018).
5
‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be PROVED by ‘Certificate’ under S. 65B(4).
“59. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of EVIDENCE by way of ELECTRONIC RECORD…. . “
What is brought about by Section 65B, Evidence Act?
It enables a litigant to prove computer output (secondary evidence)
‘without further proof or production of electronic record’ (original), and
by producing a ‘certificate’ (as provided in this Section).
Presumption is provided as to the correctness of the computer output (copy or print out) under Sec. 65B(5)(c).
Contents in a Nutshell
Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020) 3 SCC 216, is per incurium as it went wrong in observing:
that ‘the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility’ of ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence);
that by virtue of the non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act .. .. the computer output shall be deemed to be ALSO a document’) Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot at all be adverted to in proving a computer output (secondary evidence); and
that Section 65B being a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield; and therefore, the computer outputs (secondary evidence) can be proved by “certificate” alone, and cannot be proved by the usual method of oral evidence or affidavit.
It failed to observe:
that “Electronic record containing the statement” alone can be proved with Sec. 65B(4) Certificate (statement is confined to the matters that can be made in a written form: e.g. call-records of phones, bank-account-statements); and not all information (includes photo, video etc. in a computer, pen-drive or CD etc.).
It should have noticed:
that Section 65B deals with ‘computer output’ (perceived as secondary evidence) alone; and
only formal evidence and admissibility (and not truth of contents) are dealt with in Sec. 65B.
It was thoroughly mistaken in holding:
that a certificate, swearing ‘best of the knowledge and belief’, can be brought by ‘force’ (as a ‘thing’).
It missed to see:
that the changes made to law by the introduction of Sec. 65A and 65B are:
simplification of procedure for proving electronic record by producing a copy (computer output) by declaring the copy also as a (deemed) document – if the conditions are satisfied (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course, etc.).
only “where it is desired to give a ‘statement’ in evidence” it can be had by “a certificate” as provided in Sec. 65B(4).
the computer output (print or copy) can be tendered in evidence without evidence as to the computer which (finally) produced it – for, it will be presumed (shall be taken) “to have been produced by a computer … by means of any appropriate equipment”, as per Sec. 65B(5)(c).
What is brought about by Section 65B, Evidence Act?
Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act enables a litigant to prove computer output (derived from original – secondary evidence) ‘without further proof or production of electronic record’ (original), provided the conditions laid down in Sec. 65B(2) are fulfilled (such as: the computer was operating properly, the electronic record is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the activities, etc.). Sec. 65B declares that the computer output (copy or print out) ‘shall be deemed to be also a document‘.
The (general) provision, in the Evidence Act, to admit a copy of a document is Sec. 65. Under Sec. 65, it must be proved by evidence – oral evidence or affidavit – that one of the conditions laid down in the section, for production of copy, is satisfied (that is: loss of original, original with other side and notice given, etc.). Sec. 63, Evidence Act lays down the sorts of admissible copies (such as: certified copies, copies made from the original by mechanical processes etc.).
The non-obstante clause (‘notwithstanding anything’) in Sec. 65B, Evidence Act does not oust Sec. 63 and 65; Sec. 65B is only an added provisionto prove copy or print out.
Note: If the computer was one not used regularly, or the information was one not ‘regularly fed’ into the computer in the ordinary course, etc., Sec. 65B cannot be invoked (‘without further proof or production of the original’). E.g. photo or video captured in a mobile phone; ‘trap-video’. In such a case, we have to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act.
Still simpler provisions are introduced to prove ‘statements‘ (call-records of phones, bank-account-statements, etc.), inasmuch as:
‘Statements’ can be proved by a mere ‘certificate‘ provided under Sec. 65B(4).
[Note: It is not made applicable to ‘information’ like CCTV Footage, photo in a pen-drive or video in a CD (Contra view in Court decisions) ].
There is presumption as to correctness (not truth) of the computer output (copy or print out) under Sec. 65B(5)(c), as it provides:
‘a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.
PART I – GENERAL
Relevancy, Admissibility and Probative Value of Documents
Sec. 5 and 136 of the Evidence Act stipulate that evidence can be given only on ‘facts in issue’ or ‘relevant facts’. Relevant facts are enumerated in Sec. 6 onwards.
Generally speaking, all relevant documents are admissible. But, various provisions of the Evidence Act, Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, Stamp Act, Registration Act etc. stipulate various formalities or regulations for tendering documents in evidence.
Whenever a document is admitted in court, the probative value thereof will be a matter for the court to determine. In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh (AIR 1983 SC 684) it is observed:
“Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”
Electronic Record
Section 2(1)(t) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 defines an ‘electronic record’ as under:
“electronic record” means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro film or computer generated micro fiche;
Technically, the ‘electronic record’ will be (i) the data (E-mails, telephonic recordings, CCTV footage, etc.) or (ii) other material in an electronic form (video recordings in CD, DVD), so also the (iii) microfilm, the computer-generated microfiche, etc. attached, or attachable, to a computer, or other electronic equipment.
It can be seen that our Apex Court, in the following (earlier) cases, had held that the tape records of conversations and speeches were admissible under the Indian Evidence Act:
S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, (1964) 4 SCR 753; AIR 1964 SC 72
Yusaffalli Esmail Nagree v. State of Maharashtra, (1967) 3 SCR 720.
Sri Rama Reddy v. V. V. Giri, AIR 1972 SC 1162
R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157
Ziyauddin Burhanuddin v. Brijmohan Ramdas, (1976) 2 SCC 17
Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3
CD, Pen Drive etc. into which information is directly fed intoare ‘Electronic Records‘
By virtue of the provisions of the Evidence Act (Sec. 3, 22A, 59 and 62) the (original) CD, Pen Drive, Memory Card etc., into which information is directly fed into, are ‘electronic records‘ [State of Gujarat v. Shailendra Kamalkishor Pande: 2008 CriLJ 953 (Gujrat) ] ; and they are also Primary Evidence. They are subject to Sec. 22A and Sec. 59, Evid. Act.
Sec. 22A Reads as follows:
“Sec. 22A. When oral admission as to contents of electronic records are relevant: Oral admissions as to the contents of electronic records are not relevant, unless the genuineness of the electronic record produced is in question.”
Sec. 59 Reads as under:
“Sec. 59. Proof of facts by oral evidence: All facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence.”
‘Electronic record’ being perceived, in the Evidence Act, as the ‘original’ data, record, etc. that are put in or stored, casually, the ‘hard-disc’ of the computer is the ‘electronic record’ (rather than the computer itself); and it can also be an external hard-disc, CD, DVD or a chip or a memory-card or a pen-drive to which the ‘information’ is directly fed into – using a computer, a video camera, mobile phone, etc. [State of Gujarat v. Shailendra Kamalkishor Pande: 2008 CriLJ 953 (Gujrat) ]. It must have been self-generated without any human intervention. [Kishan Tripathi @ Kishan Painter v. The State (2016) 2 DLT (Cri) 666)].
Audio and Video Recordings were found to be relevant and admissible as ‘documents’ under section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, in earlier cases. See:
Shri N. Sri Rama Reddy v. Shri V. V. Giri: AIR 1971 SC 1162;
Rup Chand v. Mahabir Parshad, AIR 1956 P H 173;
Dr. Partap Singh v. The State Of Punjab, AIR 1963 P H 298;
R. M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, 1973 AIR 157;
Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. The State of Maharashtra: AIR 1968 SC 147.
See also: K. Ramajayam v. Inspector of Police, 2016 Cri. L.J. 1542;
R. Mohanraj v. TN Legislative Assembly, (2016) 6 SCC 82.
CCTV Footage is a strong piece of evidence
In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, Justice R. Banumathi, Justice Kurian Joseph and Justice Anil R. Dave observed as under:
“CCTV footage is a strong piece of evidence which would have indicated whether the accused remained inside the hotel and whether they were responsible for the commission of a crime. It would have also shown whether or not the accused had gone out of the hotel. CCTV footage being a crucial piece of evidence, it is for the prosecution to have produced the best evidence which is missing. Omission to produce CCTV footage, in our view, which is the best evidence, raises serious doubts about the prosecution case.”
Computer Output
According to Sec. 65B(1), ‘computer output’ is ‘any information contained in an electronic record which is
printed on a paper,
stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer’.
Section 65B(1) declares that the ‘computer output’
‘shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question’ (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course, etc.); and
‘shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence’.
Section 65A is only an introductory provision to Sec. 65B. It does not control Section 65B. Sec. 65A reads:
“The contents of electronic recordsmay beprovedin accordance with the provisions of section 65B”.
Therefore, it is clear, on a reading of both Sec. 65A and Sec. 65B:
Section 65B deals with ‘admissibility’ of ‘computer output’ (perceived as secondary evidence); and
it does not deal with proof/truth of contents of the ‘electronic record’ (perceived as primary evidence) as such.
Indian Evidence Act is amended in 2000 and introduced Sections 65A & 65B with a view to render a simple procedure to admit ‘computer output’, in evidence. It is explicit from the introductory part of Sec. 65B(1), which reads as under:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be … admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence….”
It is noteworthy that the ambiguity as to whether electronic–records are also ‘documents’ is already removed by the amendment to Sec. 3 Evd. Act. (‘Evidence’ means and includes … .. all documents including electronic records’.) ‘Electronic records’ being already declared as ‘documents’ by the Evidence Act, Section 65B (1) needed to declare ‘computer output’ (perceived as secondary evidence) alone as documents.
Section 65B is a borrowed provision
Section 65B is brought to Indian law from Section 5 of the UK Civil Evidence Act, 1968. It remains a sheer fact that by the time we borrowed this provision from the UK law, they repealed (1995) it. (It is pointed out in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020) 3 SCC 216, itself.)
The present UK Act (Civil Evidence Act 1995) does not make any special provision for Electronic Evidence or Computerised Records. It deals this matter under the head ‘hearsay evidence’ and makes ‘safeguards’ with respect to the hearsay evidence.
Landmark Decisions
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, two- judge bench decision. It is held:
“Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-section (4) of Section 65-B is 26 not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 63 and 65.”
Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473), three- judge bench decision. It is held:
“That (Sections 65A & 65B) is a complete code in itself. Being a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield.”
But finally held: “It is clarified that notwithstanding what we have stated herein in the preceding paragraphs on the secondary evidence of electronic record with reference to Sections 59, 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act, if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65B of the Evidence Act.”
Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015-7 SCC 178), three-bench decision.
It is held, as to make CCTV footage admissible, as under:
“Secondary evidence of contents of document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act”.
Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570): two- judge bench decision. It is held:
“The crucial test, as affirmed by this Court, is whether the defect could have been cured at the stage of marking the document. Applying this test to the present case, if an objection was takento the CDRs being marked without a certificate, the court could have given the prosecution an opportunity to rectify the deficiency.”
Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 ), two- judge bench decision.
Tomaso Bruno (2015) was followed in. It was held as under:
“(11) The applicability of procedural requirement under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act of furnishing certificate is to be applied only when such electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in a position to produce such certificate being in control of the said device and not of the opposite party. In a case where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device, applicability of Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be held to be excluded. In such case, procedure under the said Sections can certainly be invoked. If this is not so permitted, it will be denial of justice to the person who is in possession of authentic evidence/witness but on account of manner of proving, such document is kept out of consideration by the court in absence of certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, which party producing cannot possibly secure. Thus, requirement of certificate under Section 65B(h) [sic-65B(4)] is not always mandatory.
(12) Accordingly, we clarify the legal position on the subject on the admissibility of the electronic evidence, especially by a party who is not in possession of device from which the document is produced. Such party cannot be required to produce certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act. The applicability of requirement of certificate being procedural can be relaxed by Court wherever interest of justice so justifies.”
Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216, three-judge bench decision. It substantially followed PV Anwar (2014) with a ‘clarification’.
Because it is held in Anver PV v. PK Basheer that Section 62, 63 and 65 are not applied for electronic evidence – for 65A & B are ‘complete code’ – the further observation that ‘if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62’ stood incongruent and contradictory. Therefore, it is “clarified” and directed to “read” Anver “without the words – ‘under Section 62 of the Evidence Act’ ”.
In Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao it is found – Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP is per-incurium as under:
“What is clear from this judgment (Tomaso Bruno) is that the judgment of Anvar P. V. (supra) was not referred to at all. In fact, the judgment in State v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 was adverted to, which was a judgment specifically overruled by Anvar P. V. (supra). It may also be stated that Section 65B(4) was also not at all adverted to by this judgment. Hence, the declaration of law in Tomaso Bruno (supra) following Navjot Sandhu (supra) that secondary evidence of the contents of a document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to make CCTV footage admissible would be in the teeth of Anvar P. V., (supra) and cannot be said to be a correct statement of the law. The said view is accordingly overruled.”
Sub-section (4) of Section 65B
The ‘statements‘ (such as bank account statements) alone can be PROVED in evidence under S. 65B, through a ‘certificate’ provided under Sec. 65B(4).
Sec. 65B(2) conditions are to be satisfied for ADMISSIBILITY; and not proof. But, it appears that Sec. 65B(4) deals with authenticity or proof of truth;
because, it is laid down
(i) that the certificate “shall be evidence (proof?) of any (?) matter stated” therein, and
(ii) that for the purposes of this sub-section “it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.”
It is clear from a simple reading – 65B(4) is applicable only to ‘statements’.
Sec. 65B(4) reads:
“(4) In any proceedings where it is DESIRED TO GIVE a STATEMENT in evidence, by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,—
(a) identifying the electronic record CONTAINING the STATEMENT and describing the manner in which it was produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be EVIDENCE of any matter stated in the certificate;
and for the purposes of this sub-section
it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.”
1. Section 65B(4) allows a simple procedure of furnishing a Certificate ‘where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section’; that is, to admit a statement (which is a ‘computer output’), without further proof or production of the original. Then the following question is apposite:
“What is a ‘statement’ according to the Evidence Act”?
According to Evidence Act, ‘statement’ is – that which can be expressed in the form of ‘oral evidence’. Because, “Evidence” is defined in Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act as under:
“Evidence means and includes—
all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence.
all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such documents are called documentary evidence.”
“Evidence means and includes—
all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence.
all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such documents are called documentary evidence.”
See also: Sec. 8
Explanation 1.––The word “conduct” in this section does not include statements, unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act.
Explanation 2.––When the conduct of any person is relevant, any statement made to him or in his presence and hearing, which affects such conduct, is relevant.
Section–.32
Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.
Section–. 34
Entries in books of account when relevant. …. but such statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability
.Section–. 36
Relevancy of statements in maps, charts and plans.
Section–. 32
Relevancy of statement as to fact of public nature contained in certain Acts or notifications.
Section–. 37
Relevancy of statements as to any law contained in law-books.
Section–. 38
What evidence to be given when statement forms part of a conversation, document, electronic record, book or series of letters or papers.
Section–. 39
What evidence to be given when statement forms part of a conversation, document, electronic record, book or series of letters or papers.
Section–. 145
Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing
Section–. 157
Former statements of witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony as to same fact
Section–. 158
What matters may be proved in connection with proved statement relevant under section 32 or 33.
Thus it appears that the call-records of phones, bank-account-statements etc. alone can be proved as ‘statements’. The ‘statement’ referred to herein is that which can be pointed out “identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced” as stated in Section 65B(4)(a); and which can be ‘purporting to be signed‘, as stated in Section 65B(4)(c). And, it is clear that the ‘statement’ does not pertain to other ‘information’ like CCTV Footage, photo in a pen-drive or video in a CD (See also: Sec. 3 (definition of ‘evidence’), Sec. 8 Explanations, Sec. 32 to 39, 145, 157, and 158). (Note – contra view in Supreme Court decisions).
2. It is further stated in Section 65B(4) that such Certificate (i) ‘purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and (ii) for the purposes of this subsection it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it’.
3. It is noteworthy that it is expressly stated:
the certificate ‘shall be evidenceof any matter stated in the certificate’.
a ‘computer output’ (including printout or computer-copy of statement) can be admitted without further proof or production of the original, if conditions laid down are satisfied (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course, etc.).
4. The certificate must be ‘doing any of (?) the following things’:
(a) particulars for identifying the ELECTRONIC RECORD CONTAINING THE STATEMENTand describing the manner in which it was produced;
(b) such particulars of any device involved in the production of that (original) electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the (original) electronic record was produced by a computer;
(c) matters that deal with any of (?) the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course, etc.).
‘Statement‘ in S. 65B(4) is the “STATEMENT ‘CONTAINED‘ IN THE ELECTRONIC RECORD” and NOT that GIVEN IN COURT
Now, the potential question that arises for consideration is the following:
Whether the ‘statement’ mentioned in Sec. 65B(4) is
(i) that given in court, to support the copy or printout, or
(ii) that is contained in the electronic record?
It is beyond doubt that the ‘statement’ mentioned in Sec. 65B(4) is not the one that is given in court; but, the statement ‘CONTAINED‘ in “the electronic record”. Because:
The “statement” referred to in Sec. 65B (4) is one that-
may be:
“desired togive” “in evidence by virtue of this section” (Sec. 65B(4) first clause); and
The “certificate”-
must be one that
“identifying the ELECTRONIC RECORD CONTAINING THE STATEMENT and describing the manner in which it was produced” [Section 65B(4)(a)].
The above view is fortified by the following:
Sec. 65B(4) says that the certificate
must state, under Sec. 65B(4)(c), among other things, facts as to “dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate”
Note: Proving matter with’ certificate’ under Sec. 65B(4) is a species and proving the conditions laid down in Sec. 65B(2) is genus.
could be signed by a person who has
“a responsible officialposition in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities” (Section 65B(4)(c).
Thus, the formal assertions like statements of witnesses, call-records of phones, bank-account-statements, etc. alone can be proved as ‘statements’, by virtue of section 65B; and not ‘information’ like CCTV Footage, photo in a pen-drive or video in a CD.
In short, going by Sec. 65B, it is definite that-
the computer-output (copy) containing the ‘information’ (e.g. CCTV Footage, photo or video in a CD) in the electronic-record (original) can be admitted in evidence, under Sec. 65B, if only the conditions (such as: the computer was operating properly, the electronic record is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the activities, etc.) mentioned in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied (that is, the conditions are to be proved through the usual mode of oral evidence or affidavit); and
the ‘statements’ (e.g. call-records of phones, bank-account-statements) alone can be admitted in evidence, under Sec. 65B (by computer-output, without further proof or production of the original electronic-record), through a ‘certificate‘ (Note – Contra view in Court decisions. In the binding Court decisions it is stated that sans the Certificate, no computer-output can be taken into consideration).
Admissibility and Presumption as to correctness of Computer Output
Sec. 65B does not deal with ‘truth’ of the contents of the electronic record; it deals with only ‘admissibility of copy’.
The electronic record mentioned in Sec. 65B is – that is ‘relevant‘; for, it must be one “of which direct evidence would be admissible”.
Therefore, if truth is in question, it must be proved according to other provisions of the evidence act; ie. by oral, documentary (such as admission) or presumptive (including circumstantial) evidence.
Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:
The contents of electronic recordsMAY BEprovedin accordance with the provisions of section 65B.
Sec. 65B: Admissibilityof electronic records:
(1) … any information contained in an electronic record which is printed ….. or copied….. shall be ADMISSIBLE in any proceedings ….. as evidence of any contents of the original … of which direct evidence would be admissible.”
Sec. 65B declares and expressly lays down that computer output (copy or print)
(i) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and
(ii) shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence
of any contents of the original or
of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
If the conditions mentioned in this Section Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied, by necessary implication, it will bring a presumption under Sec. 114 with respect to regularity of the computer output . Because, admissibility of ‘any fact stated therein‘ ‘without further proof’ is nothing but ‘presumption’ of its regularity and correctness. The net result is that (if the conditions in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied) the burden to prove otherwise is cast on the person who opposes it.
The requirement in Sec. 65B(2) as to ‘proof’ (through witnesses or certificate) for ‘regularity‘ of feeding information into the computer in the ‘ordinary course‘ eloquently support this proposition.
Note:
(i) ‘Statements’ alone can be proved by ‘certificate’ under Sec. 65B(4); other ‘information’ are to be proved by proper evidence.
(ii) Presumption of ‘regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act can be applied in Sec. 65B.
(iii) Presumption of a ‘fact or regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act is, essentially presumption of ‘Truth’ and ‘Correctness’.
Presumption of Fact Means Truth/Correctness of Fact
St. of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar (AIR 2000 SC 2988) it is held by our Apex Court as under:
“Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the Court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process Court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.”
A combined reading of Section 65A and 65B will show:
(i) ‘Electronic record’ is primary evidence (original) and ‘computer output’ is derived-from-original;
‘Computer output’ (derived from original) stands akin to secondary evidence because: (i) it is (Sec. 65B) an ‘information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer‘;
(ii) it is stated that a ‘Computer output’ “shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible”;
Sans Sec. 65B, the provision for proving ‘computer output’ is Sec. 65 read with Sec. 63.
Certificateunder Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act isrequired only for proving ‘computer output’(derived from original) and not for proving an ‘Electronic Record'(original);
(iii) Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act enables a litigant to prove computer output (derived from original) without further proof or production of ‘electronic record’ (original) if the conditions laid down in Sec. 65B are fulfilled (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course, etc.).
(iv) Original (electronic record) can be given in evidence producing and proving ‘original’. Sec. 65B is an enabling provision to prove ‘computer output’ (copy/print).
(v) The enabling provision, Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act does not stand as a bar for proving a secondary evidence of the ‘electronic record’ (original – primary evidence), under Sec. 65 read with Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act. (Contra view in Arjun Panditrao).
(vi) There is presumption as to correctness of the computer output (not truth of contents), under Sec. 65B 5(c), as it reads ‘a computer output (print or copy) shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.
Then, the very important question in this subject is the following:
Does the duo by Sec. 65A & 65B Evid. Act Oust the Operation of Sec. 63 & 65?
That is, whether ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence of the ‘ electronic record’) can be proved only by Sec. 65B and it Constitute a ‘Complete Code’?
The Answer is No.
Then, what does the non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding anything’) denote? It is clear that Sec.62 to 65 are independent from the new provisions, Sec. 65A and 65B; and Sec. 62 to 65 can also be invoked to prove ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence of the ‘ electronic record’). It is definite that the non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act .. .. ’) in Sec. 65B does not oust Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act in proving a computer output (secondary evidence). Because:
Sec. 65A is an introductory provision to Sec. 65B.
Sec. 65A does not control Sec. 65B.
Sec. 65A directs only an (enabling) method to PROVE (not the only one method) the CONTENTS of electronic records – by print/copy – invoking Sec. 65B.
(Sec. 65A reads: The contents of electronic recordsmay beprovedin accordance with the provisions of section 65B.)
Thus, Sec. 65B is an Enabling or Added provision; and, other enabling (existing) provisions in the Indian Evidence Act, to prove documents by secondary evidence invoking Sec. 63 and 65, are not taken away.
Sec. 65B(1), further lays down that the computer output (copy) shall be “deemed to be ALSO” an (original) document, if the conditions in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied, “notwithstanding anything contained in the Act”.
That is, Sec. 65B, does not bar proving a print/copy (as secondary evidence) by satisfying the conditions laid down in Sec. 65, by oral evidence or affidavit, as to loss of original, original with other side and notice given, original not easily movable, etc., as the case may be.
Sec. 65B deals with ‘ADMISSIBILITY’ of ‘computer output’ (derived from original) alone.
The conditions in Sec. 65B(2) (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course) have to be satisfied by oral evidence or affidavit. In case of ‘statements’ alone, it can be had by the ‘certificate’ provided under Sec. 65B(4).
If the computer was one not used regularly, or the information was one not ‘regularly fed’ into the computer in the ordinary course, etc., Sec. 65B cannot be invoked (‘without further proof or production of the original’). E.g. photo or video captured in a mobile phone; ‘trap-video’. In such a case, we have to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act.
In short, compliance of this enabling provision is not an invariable or imperative condition precedent to the admissibility’ of ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence); and it does not stand in the way of proving a secondary evidence of the contents of the ‘electronic record’, invoking the usual method laid down in Sec. 65 read with Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act – that is, satisfying the conditions laid down in Sec. 65, by oral evidence or affidavit. (Note: Contra view in: Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216).
Photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc. cannot be used under Sec. 65B.(Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)
It is clear that the computer output (copy) is ‘deemed to be (also) a document’ if only the conditions mentioned in S. 65B(2) are fulfilled, that is:
S. 65B(2)(a) computer was USEDREGULARLY to STORE or process information
of the activities REGULARLY CARRIED ON
BY THE PERSON having lawful control,
S. 65B(2)(b) information was REGULARLY FED
in the ORDINARY COURSE,
S. 65B(2)(d) the information is REPRODUCED in the
ORDINARY COURSE of the SAID ACTIVITIES.
(For example – Computer Account statements in a Bank.)
For all other computer outputs (copy of, photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc.), one has to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act, by producing the original or by producing the copy after satisfying the circumstances under Sec. 65.
Therefore, it is beyond any doubt that the following computer output (copy) cannot be used under Sec. 65B:
CCTV footage – (i) not used to store or process information BY any PERSON and (ii) not reproduced in the ordinary course.
CDs containing speech – (i) not used REGULARLY to store or process information, (ii) not regularly fedin the ordinary course and (iii) not reproduced in the ordinary course.
videograph of the scene of crimeor trap-video – (i) not used REGULARLY to store or process information, (ii) not regularly fedin the ordinary course and (iii) not reproduced in the ordinary course.
But, the Supreme Court dealt with CCTV footage in the following landmark cases:
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,
Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015-7 SCC 178),
Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216
CDs containing election speeches and songs in:
Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473).
Call Detail Records – CDR – of mobile phonesin:
Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570)
Tape recorded conversation on the landline phone
Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518
Propriety of videography of the scene of crime or scene of recovery during investigation, in:
Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 ).
‘Computer output’can be got produced by ‘any computer‘ and no evidence/certificate required
A ‘Computer Output’ can be got copied or printed by ‘any computer’. It need not be the part of the device that was “used regularly to store or process information”. It is clear from the phrase – shall be taken to have been produced by “a computer” – in 65B(5)(c). It stands contradistinct to “the computer” in Sec. 65B(2).
Presumption on ‘Computer Output’(print or copy)
From the very wordings in Sec. 65B(5)(c), the ‘proof’ (through witnesses or certificate) as to the involvement of the computer which (finally) produced the computer output (print or copy) need not be furnished. Because, the legislature contemplated a presumption as to correctness of the computer output (not truth of contents), under Sec. 65B(5)(c), as it reads:
‘a computer output shall be taken to have been produced bya computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.
It is similar to Sec. 63 clause (2) which reads as under:
“Copies made from the original by mechanical processeswhich inthemselves insure the accuracy of the copy …. …”
Sec. 63 lays down the sorts of secondary evidence accepted by the Evidence Act. It is seen that Sec. 65B(5)(c) expressly says also as to presumption on correctness, as stated above.
Mere marking– not dispense with proof(of truth of contents)
In Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865, the Supreme Court observed that mere marking of a documents (day book and ledger) as exhibits do not dispense with the proof of documents. In Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta Vs. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796, it is observed that mere marking as exhibit and identification of executor’s signature by one of witnesses does not prove contents of a document.
In Kaliya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013-10 SCC 758) it is held as under:
“Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. (Vide: The Roman Catholic Mission Vs. The State, AIR 1966 SC 1457; Marwari Khumhar Vs. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri AIR 2000 SC 2629; RVE Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu AIR 2003 SC 4548; Smt. Dayamathi Bai Vs. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082; and LIC of India Vs. Rampal Singh Bisen,2010-4 SCC 491).”
“The court is obliged to examine the probative value of documents produced in court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence.”
[Note: Further held: “In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.”]
IF the TRUTH is IN ISSUEmere proof of handwriting or execution not evidence of truth: IF the TRUTH of the facts stated in a document is IN ISSUE mere proof of the hand-writing and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document.
In Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, it us held as under:
“If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”
If ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute, marking without objection by itself does not absolve the duty to prove the truth as to the contents of the documents. (See: Achuthan Pillai vs Marikar (Motors) Ltd., AIR 1983 Ker 81, 1976 Cr.LJ 1507; 2016 (1) Gau. LJ 88, 2012(1) CTC 53; 2013-1 KLT 293.)
PART III – Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216:
In the recent decision of our Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, substantially following Anvar v. Basheer [(2014)10 SCC 473] and overruling Shafhi Mohammad v. The State of Himachal [(2018)2 SCC 801], it is observed as under:
“The deeming fiction is for the reason that “document” as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include electronic records.”
“The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) makes it clear that when it comes to information contained in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf – Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose.”
“However, Section 65B(1) clearly differentiates between the “original” document – which would be the original “electronic record” contained in the “computer” in which the original information is first stored – and the computer output containing such information, which then may be treated as evidence of the contents of the “original” document. All this necessarily shows that Section 65B differentiates between the original information contained in the “computer” itself and copies made therefrom – the former being primary evidence, and the latter being secondary evidence.”
“However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such certificate be given by such person/persons.”
“So long as the hearing in a trial is not yet over, the requisite certificate can be directed to be produced by the learned Judge at any stage, so that information contained in electronic record form can then be admitted, and relied upon in evidence.”
“The …. required certificate under Section 65B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him.”
Analysed
Re: Provisions in Sec. 63 and 65, are taken away or not: The Supreme Court, in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020) 3 SCC 216, followed Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, which held that Sections 65A and 65B constitute a complete code as to admissibility of electronic records.
Therefore, it is laid down that Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to prove a computer-output (print or copy derived from original); and
the drill of Section 65A and 65B should be invariably followed, and a computer-output can be proved only by the ‘Certificate’ provided under Sec. 65B(4) of the Evidence Act.
It requires a re-look; because:
The other enabling provisions in the Indian Evidence Act to prove documents by secondary evidence, invoking Sec. 63 and 65, are not taken away by the new enabling provisions, Sec. 65A and 65B, as shown above.
Re: “statement”: Electronic record containing the statement” (e.g. call-records of phones, bank-account-statements) alone are dealt with in Sec. 65B(4) Certificate. (Contra view in Supreme Court decisions).
It does not pertain to ‘information’ like photo, video etc. in a computer, pen-drive or CD.
According to the Evidence Act, ‘statements’ are confined to the matters that can be made in a written form. [See: Sec. 3 (definition of ‘evidence’), Sec. 8 (Explanations), 32 to 39, 145, 157, and 158.]
Re: ‘admissibility’ and presumption of ‘computer output’: The intent of the legislature in enacting Sec. 65B was to specifically assign the principles as to presumption under Sec. 114 to the ‘computer output’, as far it considered possible. Section 65B deals with ‘admissibility’ of ‘computer output’ (perceived as secondary evidence). Only formal evidence (and not truth of contents) is envisaged in Sec. 65B.
Sec. 65B (1) states that the computer output shall be “admissible” ‘without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein’ (if the conditions mentioned Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied).
The requirement of condition as to ‘regularity’ of feeding information into the computer in the ‘ordinary course’ eloquently supports this proposition.
Though, generally, presumption of a ‘fact’ or ‘common/ordinary course’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act is, essentially, presumption of ‘Truth’ (See: State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar, AIR 2000 SC 2988) , it does not apply, here (in view of the wordings in Sec. 65B).
Re: Certificate: Certificate, swearing ‘best of the knowledge and belief’, cannot be brought by ‘force’ (as a ‘thing’).
Re: Process of taking print or copy need not be Proved: From the very wordings in Sec. 65B, the ‘evidence’ (through witnesses or certificate) as to the involvement of the computer which (finally) produced the computer output (print or copy) need not be furnished.
The legislature contemplated a presumption as to correctness of the computer output (not truth of contents), under Sec. 65B (5)(c), as it reads: ‘a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.
Re: Whether “document” includes electronic records’: The observation in Arjun Panditrao that ‘the deemingfictionis for the reason that “document” as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include electronic records’ is not correct,
inasmuch asthe ambiguity as to whether electronic records are also ‘documents’ is already removed by the amendment to Sec. 3, Evd. Act, which declared – ‘Evidence’ means and includes … .. all documents including electronic records’.
Substance and Conclusion
Sec. 65B is invoked only when a computer output (copy) is used in evidence.
Sec. 65B pertains to ‘admissibility'(not truth) of a computer output/copy.
It deals with computer output/copy alone; and it does not deal with (original) electronic record.
Non-obstante clause does not oust S. 63 and 65.
The non-obstante clause in Sec. 65B does not oust operation of Sec. 63 & 65 of the Evidence Act; and, therefore, secondary evidence of an electronic record can be given in evidence, invoking Sec. 65, read with Sec. 63.
Sec. 65B is an added and enabling provision to prove the copy or print out (otherwise than by proving the conditions laid down in Sec. 65, such as loss of original, original with other side).
It relates to relevant matters alone “of which direct evidence would be admissible”.
Conditions in S. 65B(2) are to be satisfied through oral evidence or affidavit.
The computer output (copy) containing the information, such as CCTV footage, photo or video in a CD etc., can be admitted in evidence under S. 65B if only the conditions (such as: computer was used regularly, information was regularly fed in the ordinary course, computer was operating properly) mentioned in S. 65B(2) are satisfied, through oral evidence or affidavit.
A computer output (copy) cannot be used under Sec. 65B if the computer was one not used regularly, or the information was one not ‘regularly fed’ into the computer in the ordinary course, etc., (as in the case of a photo or video captured in a mobile phone; ‘trap-video’, etc.).
In such a case (photo or video captured in a mobile phone; ‘trap-video’, etc.), we have to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act, by producing the original or by producing the copy after satisfying the circumstances under Sec. 65; because, if only the conditions (such as: computer was used regularly, information was regularly fed in the ordinary course, computer was operating properly) mentioned in S. 65B(2) are fulfilled, then only the computer output (copy) is ‘deemed to be (also) a document’.
Statements alone can be proved by ‘certificate’ under S. 65B(4).
The statements (such as e-mail, call records of phones, bank account statements, etc.) alone can be admitted in evidence under S. 65B, through a ‘certificate’ provided under S. 65B(4).
Sec. 65B(2) conditions are to be satisfied for ADMISSIBILITY; and not authenticity. Sec. 65B(4) alone deals with authenticity; because, it is laid down that the certificate “shall be evidence of any(?) matter stated” therein.
Presumption as to correctness of the copy or print-out ‘produced by a computer’ under S. 65B(5)(c).
S. 65B(5)(c) lays down a presumption as to correctness (not truth) of the computer out-put, inasmuch as S. 65B(5)(c) lays down that ‘a computer out-put shall be taken to have been produced by a computer’.
It is definite that that the new enabling provisions (Sec. 65A and 65B) are introduced in the Evidence Act to confer a right to a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of an electronic record by ‘computer output’ (copy or print – derived from original), adopting the procedure/drill given in Sec. 65B ‘without further proof or production of the original’; that is, without accounting for (original) electronic record. It is to simplify the proceedings and procedures. The purport of the enabling provision should not be allowed to be defeated.
End Notes – 1
What is ‘certificate’, in law
The usual method to prove documents is by giving oral evidence or furnishing affidavit. A certificate, in most cases, is an opinion, and prepared on the basis of other documents or evidences. In such cases, when it is an assumption or inference, it by itself, is not admissible, as it will only be, at the most, a secondary evidence. A Wound Certificate is not a substantive evidence. It has to be proved by a competent witness. If presumption cannot be invoked under Clause (e) of Sec. 114 Evidence Act (that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed), no certificate or report can be taken as proved unless its contents are proved in a formal manner. (This is why Order XXVI rule 10 CPC specifically says – Commission Report shall ‘form part of the record’.)
Our Apex Court held in Dharmarajan v. Valliammal, 2008 (2) SCC 741, that ‘a certificate issued by the Tahsildar cannot be relied on without examining the Tahsildar who issued the same’. It is referred to in Pankajakshan Nair v. Shylaja, ILR 2017-1 Ker 951.
End Notes – 2
APPARENT INCONSISTENCIESAPPEARIN ARJUN PANDITRAO v. KAILASH KUSHANRAO (2020)3 SCC 216:
Observations in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao
Criticism
1. Non-obstante clause is given in Sec. 63B – because, ‘Electronic Record’ is not a ‘document’. Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, para 21 reads as under:
1.‘Electronic records’ are already declared as ‘documents’(When defined ‘Evidence’ in S. 3 ). Section 65B (1) needed to declare ‘computer output’ (derived from original) alone as documents.
“Section 65B(1) opens with a non-obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, and shall be admissible in any proceedings without further proof of production of the original, as evidence of the contents of the original or of any facts stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deemingfiction is for the reason that “document” as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act does not includeelectronic records.”
The deeming fiction in S. 65B (1), need not be applied to an ‘electronic record’ (primary evidence). The principles of ‘presumption’ are introduced herein. It is needed only for the ‘computer output’; and not for ‘electronic record’. The doubt as to whether electronic – records are also ‘documents’ is already removed by the amendment to Sec. 3 Evd. Act. (‘Evidence’ means and includes … .. all documents including electronic records’.) Sec. 65A and 65B do not bar proving (i) (original) ‘electronic records’ under Sec. 62 and (ii) computer outputs (derived from original ) under Sec. 65. (Sec. 65 provides for adducing secondary evidence if the original is lost, not easily movable etc.)
2. Non-obstante clause (‘notwithstanding anything …’) excludes S. 62 and 65. It is observed in para 31:
2.Non-obstante clause does not exclude Sec. 62 and 65 –
“The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) makes it clear that when it comes to information contained in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf – Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose.” Para 59: “We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed (supra).”
The non-obstante clause is given to provide an enabling provision to admit ‘computer output’ (derived from original) as ‘document’ itself, in a simpler manner, by the deeming provision ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’.
The non-obstante clause is an enabling provision. (See ‘Note’ – 1 below.)
3. Production of Certificate under Sec. 65B(4):
3.A certificate cannot be ordered to be given as a ‘thing’:
In Arjun Panditrao para 50 it is observed as under: “However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/ persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such certificate be given by such person/ persons.” Arjun Panditrao directs to seek help of the court to obtain the required certificate under S. 65B(4) invoking Sec. 165, Evidence Act; Order XVI, CPC or Ss. 91 & 349 of the Cr.P.C.
This certificate ‘to the best of the knowledge and belief’ of a person, is based on his ‘subjective-satisfaction’. It cannot be ordered to be given as a ‘thing’ under S. 165 and Ss. 91 & 349 Cr.P.C. (Order XVI Rule 6, CPC says as to document alone; not any ‘thing’.) A certificate, swearing ‘best of the knowledge and (or?) belief’, cannot be brought by ‘force’ also. (See ‘Note’ – 2 below.)
4. Tomaso Bruno was held to be ‘per incurium‘:
4.Should have been referred to a higher bench.
PV Anwar (2014-10 SCC 473), three-judge bench decision, was not followed in the three-judge bench decision in Tomaso Bruno (2015-7 SCC 178). Tomaso Bruno (2015) was followed in Shafhi Muhammed (2018-2 SCC 801 ). Arjun Panditrao substantially followed PV Anwar (2014).
It was observed in Arjun Panditrao (3-judge bench) that Tomaso Bruno was per incurium. Tomaso Bruno being of a 3-judge bench, the case should have been referred to a higher bench. [PV Anwar (2014) was rendered by Kurian Joseph, J. He was a judge in the unanimous 3-bench decision in Tomaso Bruno (2015) which was ‘followed’ in Shafhi Muhammed (2018) ].
End Note – 3
Why the Non-obstante Clause (The Entire Confusion Centers Round it)
The non-obstante clause is not to exclude Sec. 62 and 65. Because, on a combined reading of Section 65A and 65B it is clear that these provisions deal with evidence ‘derived from original’ (computer output) alone; and not about original (electronic record).
Sec. 65B speaks: ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act .. .. the computer output shall be deemed to be ALSO a document’ (if the conditions laid down are fulfilled).
Sec. 65B is an enabling provision. Sec. 65A and 65B do not bar proving (i) (original) ‘electronic records’ under Sec. 62 and (ii) computer outputs (derived from original ) under Sec. 65 (Sec. 65 provides for adducing secondary evidence if the original is lost, not easily movable etc.). From Sec. 65A and 65B it is clear that Sec. 62 to 65 are independent from Sec. 65B (‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’); and, therefore,
Sec. 62 to 65 can also be invoked to prove ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence of the ‘electronic record’). That is, otherwise than by producing the Certificate under Sec. 65B(4).
It is held in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, as under:
“Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65-B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65.”(Contra view in Arjun Panditrao).
Assume, the competent person gives a ‘statement’ that he cannot vouchsafe as to the truth and veracity of the document, then what will be the next step? Or, what will be the position if that person gives a false statement with respect to the document (though he knows it to be true and genuine)? Further, if the circumstances or admission by the parties show it is a genuine copy and the competent person pretends ignorance as to the truth of the document, how it will be dealt with?
In all these circumstances, the ultimate way-out is to apply the principle accepted by Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP (and followed in Shafhi Muhammed – the overruled decision).
End Notes – 4
Sec. 65A and Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act reads:
Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:
The contents of electronic recordsmay beprovedin accordance with the provisions of section 65B.
65B. Admissibility of electronic records
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:—
(a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer;
(b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
(c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer wasoperating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
(d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces (sic?) or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
(3) Where over any period, the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by computers, whether—
(a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
(b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
(c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or
(d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers, all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
(4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,—
(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate;
and for the purposes of this sub-section
it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.
(5) For the purposes of this section,—
(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
(b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any official information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities;
(c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section any reference to information being derived from other information shall be a reference to its being derived therefrom by calculation, comparison or any other process.
Lord Rama is one of the widely worshipped Hindu deities. Rama has been venerated as personification of all goodness in life. Rama, the ideal man and ideal king, is believed to be born in Ayodhya in the ‘Treta yuga’. (It is believed that ‘Treta yuga’ is the 2nd of the four yugas (Krita, Treta, Dwapara, and Kali). It lasted for 12,96,000 years. Dwapara yuga lasted for 864,000 years. Present yuga, Kali, began in 3,102 BC and will last 4,32,000 years.)
Babri Masjid (Babur’s Mosque) is assumed to be constructed in 1528 by Mir Baqi, one of the generals of Babur. Babur was the first Mughal emperor and the founder of the Mughal empire in India.
Brief History of Disputes
Emergence of Ayodhya Disputes: During 1857, both the Hindus and Muslims worshipped in the same compound where the mosque stood. Muslims worshipped inside the mosque and Hindus outside. The compound was having the area of 2.77 acres. Hindus raised disputes on the belief that the Janamsthan (birthplace) of Rama is where the mosque stood. There being clashes, in 1857, a British administrator erected a railing within the area of 2.77 acres to separate the two groups.
Mosque Was ‘Desecrated’ By a Group: The ‘controversy entered a new phase’ on the night intervening 22 and 23 December 1949, when the mosque was ‘desecrated by a group of about fifty or sixty people’ who broke open its locks and placed idols of Lord Ram under the central dome.
Allahabad High Court Judgement: The civil disputes triggered in 1950 took a long journey before its culmination in the Supreme Court decision in 2019 under the caption M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1). By the time, on December 6, 1992, the Babri Masjid, had been destroyed.
Three judges of the Allahabad High Court had decreed the suits, in 2010, directing to divide the 2.77 acre disputed land equally between the three parties – Ram Lalla Virajman, Nirmohi Akharaand Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Waqf Board.
Core-Crux of the Argument in Supreme Court
1. Was the disputed land considered as the birth-place of Rama?
2. Was there a temple in the disputed site before constructing Babri Masjid?
3. Is there ‘presumed dedication’ in favour of Musjid and ‘waqf by user; alternatively, did Muslims perfect right of adverse-possession over the disputed property?
The Judgment
The afore-stated questions were answered (Ranjan Gogoi, S A Bobde, Dr D Y Chandrachud, Ashok Bhushan, S Abdul Nazeer,JJ) as under-
1. Faith and belief of Hindus has always been that Janamasthan of Lord Ram is the place where Babri Mosque has been constructed.
2. No evidence is available – whether the pre-existing structure was demolished for the construction of the mosque.
3. No ‘presumed dedication’ and ‘waqf by user; and also no adverse possession, as claimed.
PART II
Suits Considered in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das
Suit No. 1 considered in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) was the suit instituted on 13 January 1950 by Gopal Singh Visharad, a resident of Ayodhya in his capacity as a follower of Sanatan Dharmseeking for:
(i) A declaration of his entitlement to worship and seek the darshan of Lord Rama, according to religion and custom at the Janambhumi temple without hindrance; and
(ii) A permanent and perpetual injunction restraining defendant nos. 1 to 10 from removing the idols of the deity and other idols from the place where they were installed; from closing the way leading to the idols; or interfering in worship and darshan. This suit was filed for a right in common with and for the benefit of the other Hindu devotees.
Suit No. 2 was filed on 5 December 1950 by Paramhans Ramchandra Das before the Civil Judge, Faizabad seeking reliefs similar to those in Suit 1. Suit 2 was subsequently withdrawn on 18 September 1990.
Suit No. 3 was instituted on 17 December 1959 by Nirmohi Akhara,claiming shebaitship rights, through Mahant Jagat Das seeking a decree for the removal of the receiver from the management and charge of the Janmabhumi temple and for delivering it to the plaintiff.
Suit No. 4 was instituted on 18 December 1961 by the Sunni Central Waqf Board and nine Muslim residents of Ayodhya. It has been averred that the suit has been instituted on behalf of the entire Muslim community together with an application under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC. As amended, the following reliefs have been sought in the plaint:
(a) A declaration to the effect that the property indicated by letters ABCD in the sketch map attached to the plaint is public mosque commonly known as ‘Babari Masjid’ and that the land adjoining the mosque shown in the sketch map by letters EFGH is a public Muslim graveyard as specified in para 2 of the plaint may be decreed.
(b) That in case in the opinion of the Court delivery of possession is deemed to be the proper remedy, a decree for delivery of possession of the mosque and graveyard in suit by removal of the idols and other articles which the Hindus may have placed in the mosque as objects of their worship be passed in plaintiff‘s favour, against the defendants.
(bb) That the statutory Receiver be commanded to hand over the property in dispute described in ScheduleAof the Plaint by removing the unauthorized structures erected thereon.
Suit No. 5 was instituted on 1 July 1989 in the name of Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman at Sri Ram Janmabhumi, Ayodhya also called Bhagwan Sri Ram Lalla Virajman as the first plaintiff. The second plaintiff is described as Asthan Sri Rama Janambhumi, Ayodhya. Both the plaintiffs were represented by Sri Deoki Nandan Agrawala, a former judge of the Allahabad High Court as next friend. The next friend is impleaded as the third plaintiff. The defendants to the suit include: (i) Nirmohi Akhara which is the Plaintiff in Suit 3; (ii) Sunni Central Waqf Board, the Plaintiff in Suit 4; (iii) Hindu and Muslim residents of Ayodhya; and (iv) The State of Uttar Pradesh, the Collector and Senior Superintendent of Police. Several other Hindu entities including the All India Hindu Mahasabha and a Trust described as the Sri Ram Janmabhumi Trust, are parties to the Suit as is the Shia Central Board of Waqfs. Following reliefs were claimed in this suit:
(A) A declaration that the entire premises of Sri Rama Janma Bhumi at Ayodhya, as described and delineated in Annexure I, II and III belongs to the plaintiff Deities.
(B) A perpetual injunction against the Defendants prohibiting them from interfering with, or raising any objection to, or placing any obstruction in the construction of the new Temple building at Sri Rama Janma Bhumi, Ayodhya, after demolishing and removing the existing buildings and structures etc., situate thereat, in so far as it may be necessary or expedient to do so for the said purpose.
The Judgment
Appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the verdict of the Allahabad High Court. The five-judge bench of the Apex Court heard the title-dispute cases, and passed the Judgment (M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das).
(Who authored the Judgment was not specified in the Judgment. In Committee of Management Anjuman Intezamia Masajid, Varanasi v. Rakhi Singh, 2024-3 SCC 336, authored by Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, this case (Ayodhya case) was called as ‘Ram Janmabhumi Temple Case’)
The Judgment in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) was delivered on November 9, 2019. The Constitution Bench comprising the Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Justices SA Bobde, DY Chandrachud, Ashok Bhusan and Abdul Nazeer were unanimous in their verdict. And, the judgment was per curiam also, i.e., a collective one without specifying the author or authors.
There was an ‘addenda’ authored by one of the judges (undisclosed) recording his reasons on the issue of ‘whether the disputed structure was the birth place of Lord Ram, as per the faith and belief of the Hindus’.
Rights of ‘Next Friend’ to File Suits for Protection of Trust Properties
The possession and management of the property of a temple or Idol, with the right to sue, are vested in the Shebait. But, where the Shebait is negligent or where the Shebait himself is the guilty party against whom the deity needs relief, it is open to the worshippers or other persons interested in the religious endowment, to file suits for the protection of the trust properties.
A suit by worshippers in their personal capacity cannot however canvas the range of threats the idol may face at the hands of a negligent shebait and it may be necessary for the court to permit the next friend to sue on behalf of the idol itself to adequately protect the interests of the idol.
Under Sec. 92, CPC, in the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the Court, may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree.
Therefore, where a shebait acts adverse to the interests of the deity, a worshipper can, as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the deity itself, provided that if the next friend’s bona fides are contested, the court must scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend to adequately represent the deity.
Locus standi of worshipper to question affairs of a temple
In this case, with respect to the locus standi, our Apex Court considered the following questions:
Can a worshipper institute a suit?
If so, in what circumstance?
Can it be in his personal capacity?
What are the reliefs entitled to by the worshipper?
Should idol be a necessary party in such a suit?
Should Shebait be a necessary party in such a suit?
Should there be a court-appointment as ‘next friend’ of deity?
The legal position handed-down by the Supreme Court can be summarised as under:
(i) A worshipper can file a suitfor enforcing individual rights (like access to the idol or worship) in a personal capacity. Such an ordinary suit can be filed in his own name without being obliged to bring a suit in the name of the idol. The relief may be against the Shebait. The deity is not bound by the suit of the worshippers unless the remedy provided is in rem in nature.
(ii) If the suit for enforcing individual rights is actually to protect the deity’s interests, such a suit can be filed by a worshipper only ‘on behalf of the deity’.
(iii) When a Shebait is negligent in its duties or takes actions that are hostile to the deity or improperly alienated trust property or refuses to act for the benefit of the idol or where the Shebait’s actions are prejudicial to the interest of the idol, it becomes necessary to confer on a next friend the right to bring an action in law against the Shebait; and a worshipper has an ad hoc power of representation to protect the interest of the idol.
(iv) No decree for recovery of possession can be made in such a suit unless the worshipper has the ‘present right to the possession’. But a mere declaratory decree that the alienation is not binding on the deity can be granted.
(v) The worshippers, out of their own independent action, cannot exercise the deity’s power of suing to protect its own interests, like taking action against a Shebait who acts adverse to the interests of the deity, or for recovery of possession of the property improperly alienated by the Shebait.
(vi) In such situations, a worshipper must be permitted to sue as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the idol itself – directly exercising the deity’s right to sue.
(vii) The next friend being so allowed,steps into the shoes of the Shebait for the limited purpose of the litigation. Or, the next friend, the worshipper, directly exercises the deity’s right to sue.
(viii) In a suit for the recovery of property on behalf of the idol, the court cannot deliver possession of the property to the next friend. The next friend is merely a temporary representative of the idol.
(ix) The court can craft any number of reliefs, including the framing of a scheme. The question of relief is fundamentally contextual and must be framed by the court in light of the parties before it and the circumstances of each case.
(x) To protect against the threat of a wayward ‘next friend’, the court has to satisfy, in some manner, that the next friend is bona fide and that he can satisfactorily represent the deity.
(xi) If the next friend’s bona fides are contested, the court must scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend to adequately represent the deity. In the absence of any objection, and where a court sees no deficiencies in the actions of the next friend, there is no reason why a worshipper should not have the right to sue on behalf of the deity where a Shebait abandons his sacred and legal duties.
(xii) In an appropriate case, the court can scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend, of its own accord.
An Appointment of Next Friend Under Order XXXII, CPC Not Necessary
It was made clear in the judgment that ‘the worshipper must be permitted to sue as next friend’. It is not specifically stated that the permission must have been obtained as provided under Order XXXII, CPC (Suits by or against Minors). But, it appears that a ‘scrutiny’ is warranted only ‘if the next friend’s bona fides are contested’. It is held as under:
“Therefore, where a shebait acts adverse to the interests of the deity, a worshipper can, as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the deity itself, provided that if the next friend’s bona fides are contested, the court must scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend to adequately represent the deity. The court may do so of its own accord, ex debito justitae.”
PART III
Findings: Limitation
The Suit No.1, was maintainable since it was filed by a devotee (Gopal Singh Visharad) not for the assertion of any private right, but for a right in common with and for the benefit of the other Hindu devotees.
The Suit No. 3, filed by Nirmohi Akhara claiming shebaitship rights, was found to be not maintainable. The cause of action for Suit No. 3had been arisen in January 1950, when the receiver took custody of the disputed structure. But, the suit was filed only in December 1959, more than 9 years after the cause of action had arisen. Akhara claimed that it was within the limitation as it was a suit for possession and the limitation period thereof was 12 years. Court rejected Akhara’s argument observing that the suit was filed against the order of the Magistrate passed under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It was a suit for restoration of management and charge, and not one for possession. The applicable limitation period for the suit was 6 years (residuary provision) and not 12 years as claimed by the Akhara.
The Court also rejected Akhara’s argument that the action of the Magistrate amounted to a ‘continuous wrong’ and therefore the limitation period continued to reset. It noted that it was ‘inherently fallacious’ to argue that the order of a Magistrate would give rise to a wrong, let alone a continuous wrong.
The Suit No.4, filed by the Sunni Waqf Board, the Apex Court found that it was one for possession falling under Article 142 with a limitation period of 12 years; and thus the suit was held to be within limitation period.
Suit No. 5 was filed by Plaintiff No. 3 as the ‘next friend’ of the Plaintiff No.1, the deity. Although it was only filed in 1989, the Court held it to be within the limitation period for: (i) the deity was not impleaded in any of the earlier suits, and (ii) the interests of the Plaintiff No.1 were not being protected by Nirmohi Akhara which was pursuing its own personal interest in suit 3.
Nirmohi Akhara did not enjoy Shebaitship
Court observed that Nirmohi Akhara, who filed Suit No. 3 claiming to be the de facto shebait, had no locus standi to file the suit. Akhara did not demonstrate continuous management of the idols in the outer courtyard. The Akhara lacked de facto shebaitship, even though the next friend in suit 5 never had historically disputed the Akhara’s shebaitship. Relying on Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar [AIR 1954 SC 5]), it was held that the ‘next friend’ in suit 5 did not have to demonstrate that the Nirmohi Akhara was guilty of “misconduct”.
Nirmohi Akhara did not always act in the interests of the deity. It failed to prove de facto shebaitship. There was no deed to entrust it with management of the deity. Therefore, ‘next friend’ in suit 5 could sue on behalf of the deity. The Court reliedon Sankaranarayanan Iyer: AIR 1949 Mad 721.
Findings on Title and Possession
The Apex Court found that the disputed land (Ram Janmabhoomi) is not a ‘juristic person’. Thereon it proceeded to consider the contentions of both sides on title and possession of the disputed land. The Supreme Court determined title with the deity, Shri Ram Virajman. The Court rejected the claim of Sunni Waqf Board on ‘presumed dedication’ and ‘waqf by user; and also the alternative contention on adverse possession. Injunction was issued against the other parties from interfering in the construction of a new temple at the site.
Legal Personality of the Deity, Lord Rama
The Court proceeded, inter alia, on the following findings: The Nirmohis (Hindus) claimed that they were, at all material times, in charge and management of the structure at the disputed site which according to them was a temple until 29 December 1949, on which date legal steps were ordered under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
Two important questions were formulated in this case: First, what are the exact contours of the legal personality ascribed to a Hindu Idol. Second, can property of a corporeal nature (in this case land) be ascribed a distinct legal personality.
The nuances of juristic personality of ‘Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman’, the deity Lord Rama, was one of the main points discussed in this case.
Collection of Persons or Inanimate Object (Ship) Can Be a Legal Person
Juristic persons hold rights, entitlements, liabilities and duties. The artificial legal persons may be a collection of natural persons (e.g. corporation) or an inanimate object (e.g. a ship). A ship has a juridical personality, having both rights and liabilities (sometimes distinct from those of the owner) which may be enforced by process, and that the decree against the vessel is binding upon all interested in her. It is irrespective of the nationality of the ship or that of its owners, or the place of business or domicile or residence of its owners or the place where the cause of action arose wholly or in part.
Courts Recognises Legal Personality to Give Effect to the Dedication
The Supreme Court observed that courts recognised the legal personality of the Hindu Idol to give effect to the dedication of the founder of the endowment. The ‘recognition of juristic personality was…devised by the courts to give legal effect to the Hindu practice of dedicating property for a religious or ‘pious’ purpose’. When the founder was not alive and the shebait was not the owner of the lands, the courts (and through them the State) give effect to the original dedication conferring the legal personality to the idol. The legal personality of the idol, and the rights of the idol over the property endowed and the offerings of devotees, are guarded by the law to (a) protect the endowment against mal-administration by the human agencies entrusted with the day to day management of the idol,and (b) protect the interests of devotees. It was also found that legal rights entitled to by the idol was not dependent on the existence of an express trust.
Juristic Personality of ‘Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman’
Before exploring whether the disputed site, ‘Ram Janmabhoomi’ itself is a juristic person, the Court enquired into the legal status of the idol (First plaintiff in suit 5 – Shri Ram Virajman). Relying on statements of witnesses and travelogues of historical importance, it was found by the Apex Court that Hindu devotees believed that the resident deity of Ram Janmabhoomi was the embodiment of Lord Ram.
Conferral of Legal Personality Is Recognition of Pious Purpose
While delving into the jurisdictional foundation as to juristic personality of Idols, the Apex Court observed as under:
“116. … The idol constitutes the embodiment or expression of the pious purpose upon which legal personality is conferred. The destruction of the idol does not result in the termination of the pious purpose and consequently the endowment. Even where the idol is destroyed, or the presence of the idol itself is intermittent or entirely absent, the legal personality created by the endowment continues to subsist. In our country, idols are routinely submerged in water as a matter of religious practice. It cannot be said that the pious purpose is also extinguished due to such submersion. The establishment of the image of the idol is the manner in which the pious purpose is fulfilled. A conferral of legal personality on the idol is, in effect, a recognition of the pious purpose itself and not the method through which that pious purpose is usually personified. The pious purpose may also be fulfilled where the presence of the idol is intermittent or there exists a temple absent an idol depending on the deed of dedication. In all such cases the pious purpose on which legal personality is conferred continues to subsist.”
Legal Fictions Are to Protect Properties Dedicated to Pious Purpose
The Supreme Court concluded the rationale of conferring legal personality to Idol as under:
“123. The recognition of the Hindu Idol as a legal or ‘juristic’ person is therefore based on two premises employed by courts. The first is to recognise the pious purpose of the testator as a legal entity capable of holding property in an ideal sense (absent the creation of a trust-sic). The second is the merging of the pious purpose itself and the Idol which embodies the pious purpose to ensure the fulfillment of the pious purpose. So conceived, the Hindu Idol is a legal person. The property endowed to the pious purpose is owned by the Idol as a legal person in an ideal sense. The reason why the court created such legal fictions was to provide a comprehensible legal framework to protect the properties dedicated to the pious purpose from external threats as well as internal maladministration. Where the pious purpose necessitated a public trust for the benefit of all devotees, conferring legal personality allowed courts to protect the pious purpose for the benefit of the devotees.”
Destruction of Idol Does Not Affect Legal Personality
Our Apex Court, explained further as under:
“127. … In the case of Hindu idols, legal personality is not conferred on the idol simpliciter but on the underlying pious purpose of the continued worship of the deity as incarnated in the idol. Where the legal personality is conferred on the purpose of a deity’s continued worship, moving or destroying the idol does not affect its legal personality. The legal personality vests in the purpose of continued worship of the idol as recognised by the court. It is for the protection of the continued worship that the law recognises this purpose and seeks to protect it by the conferral of juristic personality.”
Legal Personality of Idol Is Not Dependent On Its Continued Existence
The Court pointed out that the legal personality of the deity is not dependent on the continued existence of the idol. It reads as under:
“129. In the present case, the first plaintiff has been the object of worship for several hundred years and the underlying purpose of continued worship is apparent even absent any express dedication or trust. The existence of the idol is merely a question of form, or corpus, and the legal personality of the first plaintiff is not dependent on the continued existence of the idol. At the heart of the present dispute are questions pertaining to the rightful manager of the deity and the access of the devotees of Lord Ram to the idols.”
Beneficiaries of Endowments Are Not Idols but Worshippers
The Supreme Court quoted the following from Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar (1957): AIR 1957 SC 133:
“6. …The true purpose of a gift of properties to the idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship. In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v Ram Lal Maitra (1910) it was held on a consideration of these and other texts that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a ‘sentient being‘, and that the dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment of the owner of his dominion over them for the purpose of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J at p. 138 that “the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected” and that “the dedication to a deity” may be “a compendious expression of the pious purpose for which the dedication is designed”.
7. When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof.”
Idol as Representing Spiritual Purpose of Donor Is the Juristic Person
The Supreme Court quoted the following from Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1969): AIR 1969 SC 1089:
“6. …It should however be remembered that the juristic person in the idol is not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that the image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated and vivified by the Pran Pratishta ceremony. It is not also correct that the Supreme Being of which the idol is a symbol or image is the recipient and owner of the dedicated property.
…The correct legal position is that the idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests. As observed by Mr. Justice B.K. Mukherjea: “With regard to the debutter… It is not only a compendious expression but a material embodiment of the pious purpose and though there is difficulty in holding that property can reside in the aim or purpose itself, it would be quite consistent with sound principles of Jurisprudence to say that a material object which represents or symbolises a particular purpose can be given the status of a legal person, and regarded as owner of the property which is dedicated to it. … The legal position is comparable in many respects to the development in Roman Law.”
Doctrine on ‘Merger’ – ‘Entity of the Idol’ Is Linked With ‘Pious Purpose’
As established in earlier decisions, neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law; and it is not correct that the idol or image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated. Juristic personality of an Idol stands connected to the ‘pious purpose’ of the founder. Therefore, to give a logical proposition as to the ‘juristic personality’ of idol, the ‘entity of the idol’ has to be linked with the ‘pious purpose’. It is vividly explained in this decision.
While explaining the legal personality of an Idol the Court held as under:
“123. … The first is to recognise the pious purpose of the testator as a legal entity capable of holding property in an ideal sense. The second is the merging of the pious purpose itself and the Idol which embodies the pious purpose to ensure the fulfillment of the pious purpose”
It is obvious that the Court brings-forth the doctrine of “merger” based on the following well accepted jurisprudential notions:
Legal entity of an idol is conceived only in an ideal sense.
The idol is chosen as the centre for legal relations.
Idol is the embodiment of the pious purpose of its founder.
A material object that represents a ‘purpose’ can be a legal person.
It Is the Idol that is the Embodiment of Pious Purpose
Relying mainly upon one of the oldest decisions in this subject, Manohar Ganesh Tambekar Vs. Lakhmiram (1887), ILR (1888) 12 Bom 247, our Apex Court held that juristic personality could not be conferred upon Ram Janmabhumi. It is held as under:
“138. …The decision (Manohar Ganesh Tambekar Vs. Lakhmiram) clarifies that an Idol as a juridical person is the ‘ideal embodiment’ of a pious or benevolent idea. The status of a juristic person was conferred on the Idol as an entity which encompasses the purpose itself in which capacity the properties and offerings vest. The observations in this case affirm the position that juridical personality was conferred on the pious purpose and the property endowed or accumulated did not itself become a juristic entity. It is not the property endowed which is a juridical person – it is the Idol which as an embodiment of a pious purpose which is recognised as a juristic person, in whom the property stands vested.”
Hindu devotees were in settled possession in the outer courtyard
Until 1877, there was only one entry through which access could be gained to the inner courtyard which was the door on the eastern side called Hanumat Dwar.
The construction of the railing by the colonial administration was not an attempt to settle proprietary rights. It was an expedient measure to ensure law and order.
The decision of the colonial administration to allow the opening of an additional door to the outer courtyard in 1877 was to facilitate the entry of Hindu devotees against which objections were raised and rejected.
The need for an additional point of entry for Hindu devotees was an indicator of the extensive nature of their use to offer worship.
On gaining entry, the Hindu devotees offered worship at several structures such as the Ramchabutra and Sita Rasoi. The Bhandar was also under their control in the outer courtyard.
This indicated that insofar as the outer courtyard was concerned, the Hindu devotees were in settled possession and actively practicing their faith.
Continuing Dispute.
This possession of the Hindu devotees over the outer courtyard was open and to the knowledge of the Muslims.
The extensive nature of worship by the Hindus was indicated by the existence of specific places of worship and the permission by the administration for the opening of an additional point of entry in 1877 due to a large rush of devotees.
Disputes between 1858 and 1883 indicated that the attempt to exclude the Hindus from the inner courtyard by raising a railing was a matter of continuing dispute.
Significantly, the activities of the Hindu devotees in the outer courtyard continued.
PART IV
Claim and Argument on Ram Janmabhumi
The plaintiffs in Suit No. 5 in the batch of suits considered by the Supreme Court, were the deity of Lord Ram and the Janmasthan (both of whom were asserted to be juridical persons) through a next friend impleaded as a third plaintiff. The suit was for a declaration that the entire premises comprised of annexures 1, 2 and 3 to the plaint constituted Ram Janmabhumi and for an injunction against interference in the construction of a new temple after the demolition of the existing building.
Placing reliance on the decision of the Madras High Court in TRK Ramaswami Servai Vs. The Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, 1950 ILR(Mad) 799 it was contend that the presence of an idol is not an indispensable requirement with respect to religious worship and that the faith and belief of the worshippers along with the performance of the parikrama around the disputed land is sufficient for a court to confer on the disputed site legal personality.
Significant reliance was placed on the existence of certain temples which do not possess idols, in particular the Chidambaram temple in Tamil Nadu, to advance two legal propositions: First, that a Hindu deity possessing juristic personality could exist even absent an idol, and second that unadorned land, absent any distinguishing features, could constitute a Swayambhu deity and consequently a juristic person.
The Muslim parties (defendant Nos. 6 to 8) in their written statement took the plea that in the Suit of 1885, which was instituted by Mahant Raghubar Das, the relief was confined to the Chabutra outside the mosque and no objection was taken in respect of the mosque which was depicted in the site plan.
Ram Janmabhumi: Conception on Legal Personality
One of the main points came for consideration was whether the Ram Janmabhumi, or the birth-place of Lord Ram, was an object of worship and whether the land itself was a Deity, and therefore it was a legal person. It was argued that the construction of the mosque on the land by Emperor Babur in 1528 did not take away its character as a Deity. It was also contended that the disputed land being a legal person, it was res nullius (vest in nobody) and res extra commercium (not alienable); and therefore, not a property that could be subjected to adverse possession. The land itself had legal personality and that therefore it was not subject to the possessory claims of other parties. On behalf of the plaintiffs in suit No. 5, it had also been argued that a juristic entity cannot be owned, nor is it divisible.
Conferment of Legal Personality on ‘Immoveable Property’ – Not Law
This argument was opposed by the Sunni Waqf Board pointing out that the conferment of legal personality on immoveable property was not supported by the existing law. It was also asserted that the law of adverse possession and limitation would apply to claims involving property owned by the Idol.
The Court held that the Ram Jamnabhoomi itself could not be conferred with legal rights. First, it emphasised that land, were it given legal rights, would be an entirely different type of juristic entity than a Hindu idol. The question became not whether the land could be vested in the idol, but rather whether the land itself had legal rights. The Bench held that were it to confer the land with legal rights, it would in effect be extinguishing competing claims for the title purely on the basis of the faith and belief of Hindu devotees. After all, a legal personality is not subject to title claims. The Bench observed that to resolve the dispute in this manner would be against the secular nature of the Constitution.
Conferment of Legal Personality – will alter characteristics of property
Referring to The Mosque, Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar (AIR 1940 PC 116) the Court observed that recognision of immovable property as a juristic entity, would alter the essential characteristic of immovable property. Unlike a juristic entity, immovable property is subject to ownership and division. The Bench reiterated that the purpose of conferring an inanimate object with legal rights in the context of Hindu endowments, is to legally protect endowed property.It is observed that ‘the conferral of legal personality in the context of endowments was to ensure the legal protection of the endowed property, not to confer upon the property legal impregnability by placing it outside the reach of the law. The elevation of land to the status of a juristic person fundamentally alters its characteristics as immoveable property, a severe consequence against which a court must guard. Nor is it a valid safeguard to postulate that the court will decide on a case to case basis where a particular immoveable property should have a juristic status.’ .
Whether a temple pre-existed
Though it had been asserted that the disputed structure was constructed over a Hindu temple, there was no specific finding in the report of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) that the underlying structure was a Lord Ram temple. The ASI has also not opined whether a structure was demolished for the purpose of building the disputed structure, though it clearly demonstrated the presence of successive structural activity underneath the disputed structure.
Report of the ASI, not sufficient to claim title
With respect to the Report of Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) the Supreme Court held as follows:
“648. No argument other than a bare reliance on the ASI report was put forth. No evidence was led by the plaintiffs in Suit 5 to support the contention that even if the underlying structure was believed to be a temple, the rights that flow from it were recognised by subsequent sovereigns. The mere existence of a structure underneath the disputed property cannot lead to a legally enforceable claim to title today. Subsequent to the construction of the ancient structure in the twelfth century, there exists an intervening period of four hundred years prior to the construction of the mosque. No evidence has been led with respect to the continued existence of the legal regime or any change in legal regime. It is admitted by all parties that at some point during the reign of the Mughal empire, a mosque was constructed at the disputed site. Even if this Court was to assume that the underlying structure was in fact a Hindu temple which vested title to the disputed site in the plaintiff deities, no evidence has been led by the plaintiffs in Suit 5 to establish that upon the change in legal regime to the Mughal sovereign, such rights were recognised.”
PART V
Mosque Was Constructed Upon a (Hindu) Structure of Twelfth Century
Marshaling together the evidence on the claim of title in Suit 4 and Suit 5 to pave the way for the ultimate determination of the relief to be granted, the Court held in para 788 as under:
“I. The report of the ASI indicates the following position:
Archaeological findings in the area of excavation reveal significant traces of successive civilisations, commencing with the age of the North Black Polished Ware traceable to the second century B.C.;
The excavation by the ASI has revealed the existence of a preexisting underlying structure dating back to the twelfth century. The structure has large dimensions, evident from the fact that there were 85 pillar bases comprised in 17 rows each of five pillar bases;
On a preponderance of probabilities, the archaeological findings on the nature of the underlying structure indicate it to be of Hindu religious origin, dating to twelfth century A.D.;
The mosque in dispute was constructed upon the foundation of the pre-existing structure. The construction of the mosque has taken place in such a manner as to obviate an independent foundation by utilising the walls of the pre-existing structure; and
The layered excavation at the site of excavation has also revealed the existence of a circular shrine together with a makarapranala indicative of Hindu worship dating back to the eighth to tenth century.
A reasonable inference can be drawn on the basis of the standard of proof which governs civil trials that:
The foundation of the mosque is based on the walls of a large pre-existing structure;
The pre-existing structure dates back to the twelfth century; and
The underlying structure which provided the foundations of the mosque together with its architectural features and recoveries are suggestive of a Hindu religious origin comparable to temple excavations in the region and pertaining to the era.
No Evidence What Transpired In Four Centuries
II. The conclusion in the ASI report about the remains of an underlying structure of a Hindu religious origin symbolic of temple architecture of the 12th century A.D. must however be read contextually with the following caveats:
(i) While the ASI report has found the existence of ruins of a preexisting structure, the report does not provide:
(a) The reason for the destruction of the pre-existing structure; and
(b) Whether the earlier structure was demolished for the purpose of the construction of the mosque.
(ii) Since the ASI report dates the underlying structure to the twelfth century, there is a time gap of about four centuries between the date of the underlying structure and the construction of the mosque.
No evidence is available to explain what transpired in the course of the intervening period of nearly four centuries;
(iii) The ASI report does not conclude that the remnants of the preexisting structure were used for the purpose of constructing the mosque (apart, that is, from the construction of the mosque on the foundation of the erstwhile structure); and
(iv) The pillars that were used in the construction of the mosque were black Kasauti stone pillars. ASI has found no evidence to show that these Kasauti pillars are relatable to the underlying pillar bases found during the course of excavation in the structure below the mosque.
Finding of Title Cannot Be Based on Archaeological Findings
III. A finding of title cannot be based in law on the archaeological findings which have been arrived at by ASI.
Between the twelfth century to which the underlying structure is dated and the construction of the mosque in the sixteenth century, there is an intervening period of four centuries. No evidence has been placed on the record in relation to the course of human history between the twelfth and sixteen centuries. No evidence is available in a case of this antiquity on
(i) the cause of destruction of the underlying structure; and
(ii) whether the pre-existing structure was demolished for the construction of the mosque. Title to the land must be decided on settled legal principles and applying evidentiary standards which govern a civil trial.”
Case on ‘Dedication of Waqf’ and ‘Waqf by User’
The plaintiffs in Suit No. 4, the Sunni Waqf Board, claimed that the entire disputed site was dedicated by Babur for the purpose of public worship and a waqf was creared. Alternatively it was claimed that the disputed site had become a ‘waqf by user’.
The Court placed the case of the Sunni Waqf Board as under:
“728. The documentary evidence relied upon by the plaintiffs in Suit 4 to demonstrate that the mosque stood on dedicated land originates after the colonial annexation of Oudh and after the year 1856. This was fairly admitted by Dr Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing in behalf of the plaintiffs in Suit 4. The plaintiffs in Suit 4 were unable to establish a specific grant of the land as a foundation of legal title prior to the annexation of Oudh or upon the transfer of power to the colonial administration after 1857.
729. An attempt was made at an advanced stage of the hearing to contend that the disputed site marked out by the letters ABCD is waqf property, not by virtue of a specific dedication, but because of the long usage of the property as a site of religious worship by the Muslim community. Dr Dhavan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs in Suit 4 contended that the concept of a waqf has a broad connotation in Islamic Law. Hence, it was urged that even in the absence of an express dedication, the long use of the disputed site for public worship as a mosque elevates the property in question to a ‘waqf by user’. To support this proposition, Dr Dhavan contended that since the construction of the mosque by Emperor Babur in 1528 till its desecration on 22/23 December 1949, namaz has been offered in the mosque. Hence, the disputed property has been the site of religious worship. Further, he urges that the Muslims have been in settled possession of the disputed property and had used the mosque for the performance of public religious worship. Thus, despite the absence of a deed of dedication, the disputed site has been used for public religious worship for over four centuries, resultingly constituting its character as waqf property by long use.”
Court Rejected the Arguments on ‘Doctrine of Waqf by User’
The Court rejected the arguments on ‘doctrine of waqf by user’ observing the following:
“743. The contention of the plaintiffs in Suit 4 is that the entire property of the mosque, including both the inner and outer courtyards is waqf property. Once a property is recognised as waqf, the property is permanently and irrevocably vested in the Almighty, Allah from the date the waqf is deemed to be in existence. The land is rendered inalienable and falls within the regulatory framework of waqf legislation and Islamic law. The doctrine of waqf by user is well established in our law. However, as noted by the precedents detailed above, it is a doctrine of necessity to deal with cases where a property has been the site of long and consistent religious use by members of the Islamic faith but the original dedication is lost to the sands of time. Given the radical alterations to the characteristics of ownership of the property consequent upon a recognition of a waqf by user, the evidentiary burden to prove a waqf by useris high. The pleadings in the plaint in Suit 4 are deficient. No particulars of the extent or nature of the use have been set out. A stray sentence in paragraph 2 of the plaint cannot sustain a case of waqf by user. Moreover, the contention that the entire property was a single composite waqf cannot be assessed in a vacuum. The Court cannot ignore the evidence of established religious worship by Hindu devotees within the premises of the disputed site. If the contention urged by the plaintiffs in Suit 4 that the entire disputed property is a waqf by user is accepted, it would amount to extinguishing all rights claimed by the Hindus in the disputed property as a site of religious worship.
744. In the decisions adverted to above in which claims of a waqf by user have been recognised, the claims were not made in the context of another religious community also utilising the property for the conduct of religious worship. It flows that the consequence of recognition of a waqf by user in the facts of these cases did not lead to the extinguishing of competing and legally tenable rights of another religious community.”
No Abandonment of the Mosque or Cessation of Namaz
The court observed in para 721 that there was no abandonment of the structure of the mosque or cessation of namaz within, as under:
“721. In so far as the inner courtyard is concerned, it appears that the setting up of the railing was a measure to ensure that peace prevailed by allowing the worship of the Muslims in the mosque and the continuation of Hindu worship outside the railing. In so far as the worship by the Muslims in the inner courtyard is concerned, the documentary material would indicate that though obstructions were caused from time to time, there was no abandonment of the structure of the mosque or cessation of namaz within.”
PART VI
Why Awarded the Title to the Entire Site to the Deity, in a Nutshell
The Court found –
(i) “no conclusion can be drawn that prior to 1857, the disputed site was used for worship by the resident Muslim community”,
(ii) “there is a lack of adequate evidence to establish that there was exclusive or unimpeded use of the inner courtyard after 1858” (para 742),
(iii) the Hindus had an “exclusive and unimpeded possession of the outer courtyard”,
(iv) Hindus Never Accepted the Division (para 773),
(v) Hindus made “offerings to the ‘Garbh Grih’ while standing at the railing” in furtherance of their belief that “the birth-place of Lord Ram was within the precincts of and under the central dome of the mosque”
(vi) the “possession over the inner courtyard was a matter of serious contestation” and “it cannot be said that the Muslims have been able to establish their possessory title to the disputed site as a composite whole” (para 781).
Cannot Conclude – Prior To 1857 Muslims worshipped at Disputed Site
In Para 741 the court observed as under:
“741. Dr Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs in Suit 4, admitted that there is no evidence of possession, use or offering of worship in the mosque prior to 1856-7. No evidence has been produced to establish worship at the mosque or possessory control over the disputed property marked by the letters A B C D over the period of 325 years between the alleged date of construction in 1528 until the erection of railing by the colonial government in 1857. Hence in the absence of evidence on record, no conclusion can be drawn that prior to 1857, the disputed site was used for worship by the resident Muslim community. Following the events in 1856-57, the colonial government erected the railing to bifurcate the areas of worship into the inner courtyard and the outer courtyard. Shortly thereafter, the Ramchabutra was constructed in the outer courtyard. Worship at the Ramchabutra and at the pre-existing Sita Rasoi led to the worship of the Hindus being institutionalised within the property marked by the letters A B C D.”
Claim of Unimpeded Possessory Title Raised by the Muslims Rejected
Pointing out that a claim to possessory title has to be based on exclusive and unimpeded possession which has to be established by evidence, the Court held as under:
“772. In assessing the title of the Muslims, the physical structure of the mosque is one fact to be taken into consideration. But a claim to possessory title has to be based on exclusive and unimpeded possession which has to be established by evidence. As shown above, the disputed premises are characterised by distinct architectural characteristics of Hindu and Islamic cultures. The claim to title will have to be judged from the perspective of long and continued possession. It becomes relevant to note the extent to which the Muslims have asserted their claim to the entirety of the property, which forms a composite whole, comprised of the inner and outer courtyards in comparison with the contesting claims of the Hindus. In relation to the outer courtyard, both Hindu and Muslim witnesses have admitted the presence of the Ramchabutra and other places of religious significance which were being continuously worshipped by the Hindus. The access of Hindus to and their possession of the outer courtyard was unimpeded.”
Hindus Never Accepted the Division
“773. Despite the setting up of the grill-brick wall in 1857, the Hindus never accepted the division of the inner and the outer courtyard. For the Hindus, the entire complex as a whole was of religious significance. A demarcation by the British for the purposes of maintaining law and order did not obliterate their belief in the relevance of the ‘Garbh-Grih‘ being the birth-place of Lord Ram. This is evident from the witness testimonies which indicate that pilgrims offered prayer standing at the railing by looking towards the sanctum sanctorum. Another relevant piece of evidence is the admission of the Moazzin of the Babri Mosque in his complaint dated 30 November 1858 against Nihang Singh. The Moazzin admitted that previously the symbol of Janamsthan had been there for hundreds of years and Hindus did puja inside the three domed structure. Absent any division of the site, the Hindus had multiple points and forms of worship within the disputed premises which included the Ramchabutra and Sita Rasoi and the parikrama of the disputed premises. Even after the railing was set up, Hindu worship at Ramchabutra, Sita Rasoi and of the idols placed below the fig and neem tree clearly indicated their exclusive and unimpeded possession of the outer courtyard. All the evidence indicates that a reasonable inference based on a preponderance of probabilities can be made that there was continuum of faith and belief of the Hindus that the ‘Garbh-Grih‘ was the place of birth of Lord Ram both prior to and after the construction of the wall. The use of the area within the railing by the Muslims was contentious and their access to the inner courtyard was landlocked; the only access being through the two gates to the outer portion and the area which were in the control of the Hindus.”
Evidence: Made Offerings to Birth-Place under the Central Dome
“781. From the documentary evidence, it emerges that: (i) Prior to 1856-7 there was no exclusion of the Hindus from worshipping within the precincts of the inner courtyard; (ii) The conflagration of 1856-7 led to the setting up of the railing to provide a bifurcation of the places of worship between the two communities; (iii) The immediate consequence of the setting up of the railing was the continued assertion of the right to worship by the Hindus who set up the Chabutra in the immediate proximity of the railing; (iv) Despite the existence of the railing, the exclusion of the Hindus from the inner courtyard was a matter of contestation and at the very least was not absolute; (v) As regards the outer courtyard it became the focal point of Hindu worship both on the Ramchabutra as well as other religious structures within the outer courtyard including Sita Rasoi. Though, the Hindus continued to worship at the Ramchabutra which was in the outer courtyard, by the consistent pattern of their worship including the making of offerings to the ‘Garbh Grih’ while standing at the railing, there can be no manner of doubt that this was in furtherance of their belief that the birth-place of Lord Ram was within the precincts of and under the central dome of the mosque; and (vi) The riots of 1934 and the events which led up to 22/23 December 1949 indicate that possession over the inner courtyard was a matter of serious contestation often leading to violence by both parties and the Muslims did not have exclusive possession over the inner courtyard. From the above documentary evidence, it cannot be said that the Muslims have been able to establish their possessory title to the disputed site as a composite whole.”
Possessory Rights – Historical records of Travellers
In Clauses IV to VII of the para 788 which ‘marshal together the evidence on the claim of title in Suit 4 and Suit 5’ the Apex Court discussed the Historical records of travellers.
“Para 788 IV. Historical records of travellers (chiefly Tieffenthaler and the account of Montgomery Martin in the eighteenth century) indicate:
(i) The existence of the faith and belief of the Hindus that the disputed site was the birth-place of Lord Ram;
(ii) Identifiable places of offering worship by the Hindus including Sita Rasoi, Swargdwar and the Bedi (cradle) symbolising the birth of Lord Ram in and around the disputed site;
(iii) Prevalence of the practice of worship by pilgrims at the disputed site including by parikrama (circumambulation) and the presence of large congregations of devotees on the occasion of religious festivals; and
(iv) The historical presence of worshippers and the existence of worship at the disputed site even prior to the annexation of Oudh by the British and the construction of a brick-grill wall in 1857.
Beyond the above observations, the accounts of the travellers must be read with circumspection. Their personal observations must carefully be sifted from hearsay – matters of legend and lore. Consulting their accounts on matters of public history is distinct from evidence on a matter of title. An adjudication of title has to be deduced on the basis of evidence sustainable in a court of law, which has withstood the searching scrutiny of cross-examination. Similarly, the contents of gazetteers can at best provide corroborative material to evidence which emerges from the record. The court must be circumspect in drawing negative inferences from what a traveller may not have seen or observed. Title cannot be established on the basis of faith and belief above. Faith and belief are indicators towards patterns of worship at the site on the basis of which claims of possession are asserted. The court has evaluated the rival claims to possessory title in a situation in which the state has expressly stated in its written statement that it claims no interest in the land.
Despite Mosque, Hindus worshiped as birth-place of Lord Ram
Para 788 V. The evidence indicates that despite the existence of a mosque at the site, Hindu worship at the place believed to be the birth-place of Lord Ram was not restricted. The existence of an Islamic structure at a place considered sacrosanct by the Hindus did not stop them from continuing their worship at the disputed site and within the precincts of the structure prior to the incidents of 1856-7. The physical structure of an Islamic mosque did not shake the faith and belief of Hindus that Lord Ram was born at the disputed site. On the other hand, learned counsel fairly stated that the evidence relied on by the Sunni Central Waqf Board to establish the offering of namaz by the Muslim residents commences from around 1856-7;
Disputed Site: a Composite Property despite Grill-Brick Wall
Para 788 VI. The setting up of a railing in 1857 by the British around the disputed structure of the mosque took place in the backdrop of a contestation and disputes over the claim of the Hindus to worship inside the precincts of the mosque. This furnished the context for the riots which took place between Hindus and Muslims in 1856-7. The construction of a grill-brick wall by the colonial administration was intended to ensure peace between the two communities with respect to a contested place of worship. The grill-brick wall did not constitute either a subdivision of the disputed site which was one composite property, nor did it amount to a determination of title by the colonial administration;
Ramchabutra – An Assertion of the Hindu Right to Worship
Para 788 VII. Proximate in time after the setting up of the railing, the Ramchabutra was set up in or about 1857. Ramchabutra was set up in close physical proximity to the railing. Essentially, the setting up of Ramchabutra within a hundred feet or thereabouts of the inner dome must be seen in the historical context as an expression or assertion of the Hindu right to worship at the birth-place of Lord Ram. Even after the construction of the dividing wall by the British, the Hindus continued to assert their right to pray below the central dome. This emerges from the evidentiary record indicating acts of individuals in trying to set up idols and perform puja both within and outside the precincts of the inner courtyard. Even after the setting up of the Ramchabutra, pilgrims used to pay obeisance and make offerings to what they believed to be the ‘Garbh Grih‘ located inside the three domed structure while standing at the iron railing which divided the inner and outer courtyards. There is no evidence to the contrary by the Muslims to indicate that their possession of the disputed structure of the mosque was exclusive and that the offering of namaz was exclusionary of the Hindus;
Hindus Asserted Right to Pray Inside Domes
Para 788 VIII. Hindu worship at Ramchabutra, SitaRasoi and at other religious places including the setting up of a Bhandar clearly indicated their open, exclusive and unimpeded possession of the outer courtyard. The Muslims have not been in possession of the outer courtyard. Despite the construction of the wall in 1858 by the British and the setting up of the Ramchabutra in close-proximity of the inner dome, Hindus continued to assert their right to pray inside the three-domed structure;
Opening Additional Door Indicates Presence of Large Hindu Devotees
Para 788 IX. In or about 1877, at the behest of the Hindus, another door to the outer courtyard was allowed to be opened by the administration on the northern side (Sing Dwar), in addition to the existing door on the east (Hanumat Dwar). The Deputy Commissioner declined to entertain a complaint against the opening made in the wall. The Commissioner while dismissing the appeal held that the opening up of the door was in public interest. The opening of an additional door with the permission of the British administration indicates recognition of the presence of a large congregation of Hindu devotees necessitating additional access to the site in the interest of public peace and safety;
Large Congregations of Hindu Devotees Visited
Para 788 X. Testimonies of both Hindu and Muslim witnesses indicate that on religious occasions and festivals such as Ram Navami, Sawan Jhoola, Kartik Poornima, Parikrama Mela and Ram Vivah, large congregations of Hindu devotees visited the disputed premises for darshan. The oral testimony of the Hindu devotees establishes the pattern of worship and prayer at Sita Rasoi, Ramchabutra and towards the ‘Garb Grih’, while standing at the railing of the structure of the brick wall;
Hindu Religious Symbols Inside and Outside Mosque
Para 788 XI. Hindu witnesses have indicated that Hindus used to offer prayer to the Kasauti stone pillars placed inside the mosque. Muslim witnesses have acknowledged the presence of symbols of Hindu religious significance both inside and outside the mosque. Among them, is the depiction of Varah, Jai-Vijay and Garud outside the three domed structure. They are suggestive not merely of the existence of the faith and belief but of actual worship down the centuries;
Contestation between the Two Communities over Worship
Para 788 XII. There can no denying the existence of the structure of the mosque since its construction in the sixteenth century with the inscription of ‘Allah’ on the structure. The genesis of the communal incident of 1856-7 lies in the contestation between the two communities over worship. The setting up of the railing in 1856-7 was an attempt by the administration to provide a measure of bifurcation to observe religious worship – namaz by the Muslims inside the railing within the domed structure of the mosque and worship by the Hindus outside the railing. Attempts by the Sikhs or faqirs to enter into the mosque and set up religious symbols for puja were resisted by the Muslims, resulting in the administration evicting the occupier;
Exclusive Possession of Hindus in the Outer Courtyard
Para 788 XIII. After the construction of the grill-brick wall in 1857, there is evidence on record to show the exclusive and unimpeded possession of the Hindus and the offering of worship in the outer courtyard. Entry into the three domed structure was possible only by seeking access through either of the two doors on the eastern and northern sides of the outer courtyard which were under the control of the Hindu devotees;
Preponderance of Probabilities – Muslims did not Abandon Mosque
Para 788 XIV. On a preponderance of probabilities, there is no evidence to establish that the Muslims abandoned the mosque or ceased to perform namaz in spite of the contestation over their possession of the inner courtyard after 1858. Oral evidence indicates the continuation of namaz;
Mosque continued to Exist & Muslims Asserted Their Right to Pray
Para 788 XV. The contestation over the possession of the inner courtyard became the centre of the communal conflict of 1934 during the course of which the domes of the mosque sustained damage as did the structure. The repair and renovation of the mosque following the riots of 1934 at the expense of the British administration through the agency of a Muslim contractor is indicative of the fact the despite the disputes between the two communities, the structure of the mosque continued to exist as did the assertion of the Muslims of their right to pray. Namaz appears to have been offered within the mosque after 1934 though, by the time of incident of 22/23 December 1949, only Friday namaz was being offered. The reports of the Waqf Inspector of December 1949 indicate that the Sadhus and Bairagis who worshipped and resided in the outer courtyard obstructed Muslims from passing through the courtyard, which was under their control, for namaz within the mosque. Hence the Waqf Inspector noted that worship within the mosque was possible on Fridays with the assistance of the police;
Ouster of Muslims: Otherwise Than By Due Process of Law
Para 788 XVI. The events preceding 22/23 December 1949 indicate the build-up of a large presence of Bairagis in the outer courtyard and the expression of his apprehension by the Superintendent of Police that the Hindus would seek forcible entry into the precincts of the mosque to install idols. In spite of written intimations to him, the Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate (K K Nayyar) paid no heed and rejected the apprehension of the Superintendent of Police to the safety of the mosque as baseless. The apprehension was borne out by the incident which took place on the night between 22/23 December 1949, when a group of fifty to sixty persons installed idols on the pulpit of the mosque below the central dome. This led to the desecration of the mosque and the ouster of the Muslims otherwise than by the due process of law. The inner courtyard was thereafter attached in proceedings under Section 145 CrPC 1898 on 29 December 1949 and the receiver took possession;
Obliteration of Mosque – Egregious Violation of Rule of Law
Para 788 XVII. On 6 December 1992, the structure of the mosque was brought down and the mosque was destroyed. The destruction of the mosque took place in breach of the order of status quo and an assurance given to this Court. The destruction of the mosque and the obliteration of the Islamic structure was an egregious violation of the rule of law”
Marshaling together the evidence on the claim of title in Suit 4 and Suit 5, the Court held in para 788 as under:
The Disputed Site is One Composite Whole; Mosque Destruction – a Serious Violation of the Rule of Law
“Para 788 XVII: (i) The disputed site is one composite whole. The railing set up in 1856-7 did not either bring about a sub-division of the land or any determination of title;
(ii) The Sunni Central Waqf Board has not established its case of a dedication by user;
(iii) The alternate plea of adverse possession has not been established by the Sunni Central Waqf Board as it failed to meet the requirements of adverse possession;
(iv) The Hindus have been in exclusive and unimpeded possession of the outer courtyard where they have continued worship;
(v) The inner courtyard has been a contested site with conflicting claims of the Hindus and Muslims;
(vi) The existence of the structure of the mosque until 6 December 1992 does not admit any contestation. The submission that the mosque did not accord with Islamic tenets stands rejected. The evidence indicates that there was no abandonment of the mosque by Muslims. Namaz was observed on Fridays towards December 1949, the last namaz being on 16 December 1949;
(vii) The damage to the mosque in 1934, its desecration in 1949 leading to the ouster of the Muslims and the eventual destruction on 6, December 1992 constituted a serious violation of the rule of law; and
(viii) Consistent with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, both Suits 4 and 5 will have to be decreed and the relief moulded in a manner which preserves the constitutional values of justice, fraternity, human dignity and the equality of religious belief.”
‘Janmasthan’ of Lord Rama
Finally, on the contentious point ‘whether disputed structure is the holy birth place of Lord Ram as per the faith, belief and trust of the Hindus’, the Apex Court (one among the learned Judges) ‘concluded on the conclusion that faith and belief of Hindus since prior to construction of Mosque and subsequent thereto has always been that Janamasthan of Lord Ram is the place where Babri Mosque has been constructed which faith and belief is proved by documentary and oral evidence’.
PART VII
Reliefs Granted
The Apex Court moulded the reliefs (M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das: 2020-1 SCC 1), directing the handing over of the entire disputed land to a trust to build a Hindu temple. It also directed the government to provide an alternative five-acre plot of land to the Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Waqf Board for the construction of the mosque.
Further, the Court directed the Central Government to formulate a scheme, within three months, for the setting up of a trust with the powers to build a temple at the disputed site. The Supreme Court also directed to give appropriate representation, in the proposed trust to Nirmohi Akhara (plaintiff in Suit No. 3, which claimed Shebait/management rights over the site).
Ayodhya Case – Proceeded on the principle: ‘The court is the protector of all charities’.
It is held in M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case) as under:
When a Shebait is negligent in its duties or takes actions that are hostile to the deity or improperly alienated trust property or refuses to act for the benefit of the idol or where the Shebait’s actions are prejudicial to the interest of the idol, it becomes necessary to confer on a next friend the right to bring an action in law against the Shebait; and a worshipper has an ad hoc power of representation to protect the interest of the idol.
The court can craft any number of reliefs, including the framing of a scheme. The question of relief is fundamentally contextual and must be framed by the court in light of the parties before it and the circumstances of each case.
It is clear that the our Apex Court has rendered the above edicts adopting the view that ‘the court is the protector of all charities’.
Conclusion – ‘Hard-Headedness of the Subject Matter’ is the Answer to all Difficulties.
It is a fact – the reliefs granted in this case were not that were asked for by the parties to these suits.
Doubts are raised – as to whether the legal riddles that were thrashed out in the Judgment are precisely translated into the reliefs granted.
Numerous suggestions could be proffered – as to formulating the decree in the frame of the conclusions in the Judgment [including the one to keep ‘open’ the disputed land without any structure, for various obvious reasons].
But, it is definite that the decree handed down settled the disputes.
The ‘hard-headedness of the subject matter’ is the answer to the qualms; and, ‘expediency’ justifies this unanimous decision.
Property of a society or a club is the ‘joint property’ held by its members. Usually, unlike a club, the property of a society is meant to be maintained for the benefit of its future members also. Therefore, the property of a society is encumbered with obligations as in a ‘trust’. Hence, such property cannot be dealt with by the members and administrators disregarding the objectives of its foundation.
Property of an Unincorporated Club Vests in Members.
A club is a compendium of its members. Property of an unincorporated club vests in its members. Or, in other words, the members thereof are the owners of its property. But, it is subject to its bye laws and the principles of its foundation.
“Unincorporated members’ clubs. – An unincorporated members’ club is a society of persons each of whom contributes to the funds out of which the expenses of conducting the society are paid. ……. Subject to any rule to the contrary, the property and funds of the club belong to the members of the time being jointly in equal shares.”
Enjoyment and Appropriation of Property of an Unincorporated Club
Property of a club is held by its members as ‘joint tenants’ (i.e., without a right to partition). If the bye laws of a club allow, it can distribute its property among its members, on dissolution.
Joint ownership of property is an incidence of membership when one joins the club, though the motivation of joining the club is not acquisition of wealth or sharing of profits as in the case of a partnership. It is also an incidence of membership that the property of the club will be distributed among the members,[3] on dissolution.
Members of a club are entitled to enjoy or use the club premises in accordance with the rules, so long as they duly pay the subscription and continue to be members. In an unincorporated Members’ club, the members for the time being are jointly entitled to all the property and funds; and it is only on a valid dissolution the individual interest of the members becomes capable of realisation.[4]
If the intention of the founders of an unincorporated club or an unregistered society, as expressed in the bye laws or otherwise, is to use the property obtained to it for the benefit of the present and future members, then the members of a particular time, even if sui juris or of one mind, are not entitled to put an end to the same and to appropriate the property by themselves. If no such intention is laid down by the founders, and the members are sui juris, they may be entitled to put an end and to appropriate the property by themselves. But, it is not open for the majority of an association to alter the fundamental principles upon which it is founded.[5]
Because members were joint owners of all the club property including the excisable liquor, the Gujarat High Court held in Sports Club of Gujarat Vs Commissioner of Sales Tax[6]that the supply of liquor to a member at a fixed price by the club could not be regarded as ‘sale’. The court referred various decisions of English courts[7] and Supreme Court.[8]
But a contrary view is taken by the Bombay High Court in Gondwana Club, Nagpur Vs. Sales Tax Officer[9] when it considered the question whether the provisions supplied by the Club to its members were the joint property belonging to all the members; and observed that, although the Club consists of members, the Club had an entity distinct from the entities of the members and that once the money was paid by the members and once the money passed into the coffers of the Club, the said money could not be said to belong to the members, and in these circumstances, it was difficult to accept the proposition that the property which was purchased by the Club was the property of the members of the Club.This decision is followed in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Gujarat, Ahmedabad Vs. Anil Co-Operative Credit Society[10] pointing out that the court had relied on the inclusive clause in the definition of “dealer” in the concerned Sales Tax Act.
Vesting of Property in a Registered Society
Sec. 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 speaks as to vesting of property, for administration, in registered societies. It reads as under:
"5. Property of society how vested: The property, movable and immovable belonging to a society registered under this Act, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body of such society, and in all proceedings civil and criminal, may be described as the property of the governing body of such society for their proper title."
‘If Not Vested in Trustees’: Connotations
Management and Vesting of Property may be Separate
Though the administrative affairs of the societies are carried on by its governing body, the properties of the same may be vested with (separate) trustees (like ecclesiastical authorities, in case of religious associations). It is obvious that this system of vesting of property in trustees and administration of affairs by governing body is primarily viewed in the So. Regn. Act of 1860 when it refers, ‘if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body’. It is definite that our law accepts the ‘wider’ or ‘general’ expression as to ‘trust’, used by the progressive jurists like Salmond and Halsbury; and the same principle is adopted in the So. Regn. Act. The progressive jurists preferred investing principles of trust in the matters of various fiduciary relationships under which one holds property on behalf of, or for the benefit of, others.[11]
Halsbury’s Laws of England defines ‘trust’ as a confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power, to the intent, that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object. Salmond brings-in principles of trust in the affairs of associations.
“Thirdly, it is expedient that property in which large numbers of persons are interested in common should be vested in trustees.”
It is held by the Supreme Court in RV Sankara KurupVs. Leelavathy Nambiar[13] that the property in the hands of the agent was for the principal; and the agent stood in the fiduciary capacity,as a trustee,for the beneficial interest he had in the property. The petitioner had acted as an agent as a cestui que trust was a trustee and he held the property in trust for the respondent in his fiduciary capacity as an agent or trustee and he had a duty and responsibility to make over the unauthorised profits or benefits he derived while acting as an agent or a trustee and properly account for the same to the principal. Therefore, the High Court was right in its holding that the petitioner was an agent and trustee acted in the fiduciary capacity on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff as General power-of-attorney.
A society can be formed for the administration of a trust.[14]
If a trust is created for the benefit of a religious society, such trust shall continue to exist and it would not cease to exist by the resolution of the society. Such ‘creation of trust’ is considered by our Apex Court in Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti[15] and held:
“The High Court has rightly observed that: ‘… the trust which has been created as public trust for a specific object and the charitable or the religious nature or for the bonafide of the Society or any such institution managed by such trusts for charitable and religious purpose shall continue to exist in perpetuity and it would not cease to exist by any such process of thinking or deliberation or the Resolution, which does not have any force of law’.”
In Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai[16] it is held that in terms of Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, the property would vest in the trustees, and that only in the absence of vesting of such properties in the trustees, the same would be deemed to have been vested for the time being in the governing body of such society.[17]
In Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[18] it is observed:
“If what is vested in the College Committee or its governing body is a right of management simpliciter, there is no question of the members of the society or the members of the governing body being beneficially interested in its property. It necessarily follows that by the fact of appointment of a treasurer, there can be no deprivation of the society of its rights in property. The consequence, which would flow on the appointment of a treasurer by the Government under the provisions of the Charitable Endowments Act, would be that he will take charge of the management of the properties held by the society. There is no divesting of the rights of the society in its properties. As already stated, what all the society is deprived of would be right of management which cannot be equated to any right in the property.”[19]
Members have no interest other than that of bare trustees
During the subsistence of a registered society, or on dissolution, the members do not have any proprietary or beneficial enjoyment/interest[20] in the property the society holds.[21] It is held in Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[22] as under:
“The Societies Registration Act, therefore, does not create in the members of the registered society any interest other than that of bare trustees. What all the members are entitled to, is the right of management[23] of the properties of the society subject to certain conditions.”
Underhill, in his treatise, ‘Law of Trusts and Trustees’, explained:
“However, the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the Association for the time being. The members for the time being cannot under the Association rules appropriate trust property for themselves for there would then be no property held on trust as intended by the testator for those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the Association for the time being.”[24]
Is Society a ‘Living Person’ under S. 5 of the TP Act
Can transfer of property be made to or by Associations
Sec. 5 of the TP Act reads as under:
5. “Transfer of property” defined: In the following sections “transfer of property” means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such act.
In this section “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals.
Existing Laws as to Transfer of Property, will Remain in Force
Two points are emphasised in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 5 –
First, all unregistered associations, whether incorporated or not, are ‘living persons’, so that transfer of property can be made.
Second, the qualifying second limb – ‘nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals‘ – makes it clear:
if any law regulates transfer of property to (or by) companies, associations or bodies of individuals, it will remain in force.
The accepted and authoritative view is that company, incorporated club,[25] statutory body etc. alone can be considered as legal persons.
It may also be pointed out that, “body of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act (transfer to – “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals) is wide in meaning; and it stands independent. It is broad enough to take-in Beneficiaries/Trustees of a Trust.
Note: Order 31 rule 1 CPC spells out – a trust is not a legal person. It enables to file a suit by (or be sued) a trustee concerning ‘property vested in trustees’.
Can ‘Law for the Time Being in Force’ Include ‘Common Law’
Our courts have unhesitatingly held: ‘law for the time being in force’ in Sec. 5, TP Act includes “common law”;[27] and sumptuously exhibit and refer to the deeds executed by or in favour of such entities as valid and binding documents;[28] and the registration/revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.
It is a reality: the common law of our country accepts as valid the ‘transfer of property’ made to or effected by well known institutions, organisations,[29]and associations attached to well reputed trusts,[30] institutions[31] etc., though they are not juristic persons in its strict sense. Our courts sumptuously refer to such deeds as documents executed by or in favour of such entities, when they are referred to as exhibits. For example:
Settlement deed by Ashramam–Swayam Prakash Ashramam Vs. G Anandavally Amma : AIR 2010 SC 622;
Settlement to trust – S N Mathur Vs. Board of Revenue: 2009-13 SCC 301;
Sale deed by unregistered society – Suresh s/o. Bhagwanrao Puri Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2016-3 AIR Bom R (Cri.) 603;
Gift to unregistered Association – Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna Satram: 1984-2 ALT 157;
Sale deed to an association – K. Kala Vs. Dist Registrar, Madurai: 2016 3 MLJ 50,
Sale deed to an association – State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 P&H 218.
Sale deed to an association – Asst. Commr. Vs. Shivalingawwa: ILR 2003 Kar 2855;
Lease deed by trust to school – TNP Mothoo Natarajan Vs. PV Ravi: 2015-2 MLJ (Cri.) 656;
Lease deed by a firm -2014-3 ALT 46;
Settlement deed to private trust –Kolli Venkata Raja Vs. Govt. of AP: 2014-1 ALT 155;
Lease deed to a public trust –Nadigar Sangham Charitable Trust, rep. by its managing Trustee, R. Sarathkumar Vs. S. Murugan:2013-1 MLJ 433;
Sale deed to Board of Trustees – Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chemists and Druggists Association Building Trust: 1995-215 ITR(Mad) 741;
Mortgage deed by a College – Sonar Bangla Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College: AIR 1960 Cal 450.
Similarly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.
Dedication can be made in favour of a Tank
It was held by our Apex Court in Kamaraju Venkata Krishna Rao Vs. Sub Collector, Ongole, AIR 1969 SC 563, that, under Hindu Law, a tank can be an object of charity and when a dedication was made in favour of a tank, the same was considered as a charitable institution. Without deciding whether that institution can also be considered as a juristic person, it was held that the same had to be registered in its name (ie., in the name of the tank) in the Inam register though it had continue to be managed by its Manager.
It is also noteworthy that Salmond on Jurisprudence reads: “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases.”
It is also noteworthy that Salmond on Jurisprudence[32] reads:
“Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases.”
How Can a Society or a Club Acquire Property and Enter into a Contract?
Companies Act and various Cooperative Societies Acts[33] confer juristic personality to the Companies and Cooperative societies. Such entities can enter into contracts in their own names and through its officers.
In view of the edict that even the societies registered under the So. Regn. Act are not legal persons capable of holding properties, as laid down in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi,[34] Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society[35] and Tata Vs. Tata,[36] the correct position emerges is that both registered and unregistered societies are not capable of contracting ‘in its own name’.[37]
The AP High Court has observed in N. Tyagaraju Vs. Narayanaswamy[38] that an unregistered entity was not a ‘living person’ under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act. Nevertheless it was held in this decision that the president of an unregistered club was entitled to enter into an agreement of sale for purchase of a property as the agreement would be one executed not in favour of an unregistered body, but it would be one in favour of its president who was an identifiable and a living person. It was further observed that the acquisition of property in the name of its president would also be valid.
In short, the proper way to execute contracts with respect to both registered and unregistered societies and unincorporated clubs is to enter into the agreements by the competent office bearer of the society or club, in his name for and on behalf of the society or club, as done by a trustee for and on behalf of a trust. It must also be according to the bye laws, or as approved by the general body or governing body. That is, it should be legal[39] and intra-vires;[40]and it should not be ab-initio void. And, in an appropriate case, the act of an office bearer can be ratified[41] by the general body or governing body, as the case may be.
Can the Members of a Society Convert the Society into a ‘Trust’?
Society and trust are two different concepts in the eye of law. The former is association of persons and the latter is a legal conception. But, in cases where the association, and the ‘trust’ expressly attached to the same, are inseparably related, the term ‘trust’ is used as synonym to the association. A society can be formed for the administration of a trust.[42]
Societies Registration Act (Section 14) provides special procedure for dissolution of societies. The left-behind-property of a Society, on dissolution, goes to another Society as determined by the members of the Society or by the court.
As shown above, the members of a registered society are trustees[43] for the future members who have to continue the aim and objects of the Society as envisaged by the founders or as manifested in the Rules or Bylaws;and the property of a society cannot absolutely vest in its members. Either during the subsistence of a society or at the time of its dissolution the members do not have beneficial enjoyment of its property.[44] Such property ‘shall continue to exist in perpetuity and it would not cease to exist by a resolution’ of the society;[45] and it cannot transfer its property to any other entity, or transform or vary its nature, disregarding the fundamental principles upon which the society is founded.
Vesting of Ownership of Trust/Association Property
The following propositions can be presented as to the vesting of ownership of the trust-property, and the property held by an association.
The terms of dedication (as revealed from the deed, if any, or other evidence) determine the person or body of persons in whom/which such property ultimately vest in.
If the ownership of the property of a trust vests in a legal person, such vesting is permanent (thereby it cannot be put to an end) and as representing or subject to the purpose envisaged by the founder.
If the property is that of an association and the members thereof are ascertainable (as in the case of a society or a mutt) the actual ownership of the property will be presumed to be vested with those members (from time-to-time), as joint owners (contra-distinct to ownership under tenants-in-common).
If the property is one dedicated to public so as to form a public trust and beneficiaries are unascertainable (as in the case of a political party or a church) the property ultimately vests with the entire members (of such Association or Church), from time to time, permanently(Thereby it cannot be put to an end.), subject to the trust and its objectives.
If the property is one dedicated to public at large by a known or unknown person and administered and maintained by persons volunteering themselves as trustees (as in the case of a waiting shed or a public well) the property permanently and ultimately vests with the entire general public or the State, subject to the trust and its objectives.
If the property is one acquired by a branch of a larger body or a parish of a church with various parishes, for the benefit of all persons/members of the larger body, the entire members of the larger body, from time to time, will be presumed to be the owners, subject to the trust impressed upon the property.
Vesting of Ownership of Property in Registered Societies
Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not state whether the vesting referred to therein pertains to ‘vesting of ownership’ or ‘vesting for administration’. If it refers to ‘vesting for administration’ a question will arise – in whom the ownership actually vests. If it is assumed that the word ‘vested’ is used to denote ownership, the same question may arise – beyond the deemed vesting in the governing body, in whom the property actually vests.
‘Property Belonging to a Society’ & Property of a Company
The Society continues to exist and to function as such until its dissolution under the provisions of Act. The properties of the society continue to be vested in the trustees or in the Governing Body irrespective of the fact that the members of the society for the time being are not the same as they before; nor will be the same thereafter.
By reason of the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, once the society is registered the Registrar, by the filing of the memorandum and certified copy of the rules and regulations the Registrar has certified that the society is registered under the Act, it enjoys the status of a entity apart from the members constituting the same and is capable of suing or being sued. But the fact to be noted is that what different a society registered under the Act of 1860 a company incorporated under the Companies Act is that in the latter case the share -holders of company hold the properties of the company as their own whereas in the case of a society registered under the Act of 1860, the members of the society or the members of the governing body do not have any proprietary or beneficial interest; to the property the society holds.
Having regard to the fact that the members of the general body or the members of the governing body of the society do not have any proprietary or beneficial interest in the property of the society, it follows that upon its dissolution, they cannot claim any interest in the property of the dissolved society. The Societies Registration Act, therefore, does not create in the members of the registered society any interest other than that of bare trustees. What all the members are entitled to, is the right of management of the properties of the society subject to certain conditions.
As I have already stated, the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, provided that the conditions specified therein are satisfied, makes provision for the appointment of a treasurer, in whom certain powers are vested. Sub -section (4) of S. 4 contains a clear enunciation of the nature of that vesting. The said provision makes it clear that an order, vesting property in a treasurer shall not require or be deemed to require him to administer the property, or impose or be deemed to impose upon him the duty of a trustee with respect to the administration thereof.
Section 10 of the Charitable Endowments, Act contains a specific limitation of the functions and powers of a treasurer. It says that a Treasurer of Charitable Endowments shall always be a sole trustee, and shall not, as such treasurer, take or hold any property otherwise than under the provisions of the Act, or, subject to those provisions, transfer any property vested in him except in obedience to a decree divesting him of the property, or in compliance with a direction in that behalf issuing from the authority by whose order the property became vested in him.
Having regard to the specific limitation of the functions and powers of treasurer under S. 10 the treasurer shall not take or hold any property. He cannot dispose of property. He is a bare trustee as S. 8 of the Act makes it clear.
‘Property Belonging to a Society’: Comparable to Definition in Partnership Act
In Unani Tibia College case[46] the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that the expression ‘property belonging to a society’ does not give the society a corporate status and it ‘merely describes the property which vests in trustees or governing body’ and that the provisions of the Societies Registration Act did not give a ‘corporate status’ to a society ‘for the purpose of holding and acquiring property’. In this decision it is further held:
“….. Those provisions undoubtedly give certain privileges to a society registered under that Act and the privileges are of considerable importance and some of those privileges are analogous to the privileges enjoyed by a corporation, but there is really no incorporation in the sense in which that word is legally understood.”
“….. Thus something in the nature of perpetual succession is conceded by the provision that the society’s property is to vest in the trustees for the time being of the society for the use and benefit of the society and its members and of all persons claiming through the members according to the society’s rules, and further (and this is the most noteworthy provision) that the property shall pass to succeeding trustees without assignment or transfer.”
It can be seen that the expression ‘property belonging to a society’ is comparable to the definition of property of partnership in Section 14 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Referring to the definition in Sec. 14, Addanki Narayanappa Vs. Bhaskara Krishnappa[47]our Apex Court held as under:
“From a perusal of these provisions it would be abundantly clear that whatever may be the character of the property which is brought in by the partners when the partnership is formed or which may be acquired in the course of the business of the partnership it becomes the property of the firm and what a partner is entitled to is his share of profits, if any, accruing to the partnership from the realisation of this property, and upon dissolution of the partnership to a share in the money representing the value of the property. No doubt, since a firm has no legal existence, the partnership property will vest in all the partners and in that sense every partner has an interest in the property of the partnership. During the subsistence of the partnership, however, no partner can deal with any portion of the property as his own. Nor can he assign his interest in a specific item of the partnership property to anyone. His right is to obtain such profits, if any, as fall to his share from time to time and upon the dissolution of the firm to a share in the assets of the firm which remain after satisfying the liabilities set out in Clause (a) and sub-Cls. (i), (ii) and (iii) of Clause (b) of Section 48. ..”
Propositions as to Vesting of Ownership in Registered Societies
Five propositions are possible.
In members, jointly.
In society itself.
In governing body.
Legal title in the trustees or governing body and equitable title in the society.
In the members subject to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act and the basic principles upon which the society is founded.
I. Can Ownership of Property Vest in Members, Absolutely?
No.
Property of a Society being maintained for benefit of future members also, as held in Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[48], it cannot be dealt with by the members disregarding the objectives of foundation of the societies.
The property of a registered society cannot vest in its members in view of the various provisions of the Societies Registration Act. As per Sec. 13 and 14 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, on dissolution, the members of a society, even if sui juris, are not entitled to appropriate, by themselves, the property of a registered society.In Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State of Delhi[49] the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held as to beneficial enjoyment of property of a registered society as under:
“During the subsistence of a society, the right of the members is to ensure that the property will be utilised for the charitable objects set out in the memorandum and these did not include any beneficial enjoyment. Nor did the members of the society acquire any beneficial interest[50] on the dissolution of the society.”[51]
It is pointed out in Unani Tibia College case[52] that the vesting of legal ownership of the property of a society in the governing body is merely a method or mechanism permitted by the law.
II Can Ownership of Property Vest in Society itself?[53]
No.
Registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status.[54] It is unequivocally determined in Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society[55] that even a registered society is not a juristic person.[56] It is held:
i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20);
ii) A Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. (Para 21); and
iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name (Para 22). Vesting of (ownership of) property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf (Para 26).
For the society is not a juristic person, Section 6 of the Act lays down that the society may sue or be sued in the name of President, Secretary, etc. It (impliedly) bars filing a suit in the name of society, without reference to the President, Secretary, etc.
The view that Sec. 6 is an enabling provision and it does not affect the right of a society to sue or be sued in its own name[57]is not a good law in view of Unani Tibia College case[58] and Illachi Devi case.[59]
III. Can Ownership of Property Vest in Governing Body.
No.
The governing body is only a small group which represents a larger body; and therefore, the ownership of the property cannot vest in the governing body, unconditionally or absolutely.
Sec. 5 So. Regn. Act directs only deemed vesting of property in the governing body.
It is noteworthy that the vesting of property in the governing body is read along with the vesting of property in trustees. Under common law, actual title (other than legal title) does not vest in the trustees, and the trustees always hold the property for others. It is pointed out by our Apex Court, in Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai,[60] that, in terms of Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, only in the absence of vesting of such property in the trustees the same would be deemed to be vested for the time being in the governing body of a society.
IV. Can Legal Title Vest in Gov. Body, & Equitable Title in Society.
No.
The theory as to vesting of ‘equitable title’ in society (and ‘legal title’ in the trustees or governing body)[61] is, in-substance, endorses the view of vesting property in members of the society. Since the property cannot unconditionally vest in members of a society for their absolute enjoyment, as shown above, it is not proper to say that equitable title vests in society.
V. Can Ownership of Property Vest in Members, Conditionally.
Had it been so accepted by our system, the ownership of property of a society could have been vested in the society itself; but it is not so accepted.[62] In this eventuality, for propounding a theoretical proposition as to actual vesting of property of a regd. society we have to give effect to the following edicts of law:
1) Property of Unregistered Society Vests in Members
Property of an unregistered society is the joint property of the members of the society subject to the trust and obligations imposed by the founders or by the bye laws of the society.
2) Present members are Trustees.
The members of a society are trustees for the future members who have to continue the objects of the society as envisaged by the founders and as manifested in the Rules or Bye laws.[63]
3) Ultimate Administrative Authority is General Body.
Subject to the bye laws of the society, the ultimate authority with respect to the administration of a society is vested with the general body of the members; and the general body elects the trustees or governing body. This principle is affirmed in the provisions of the Societies Registration Act.
4) Management alone in Governing Body.
As per the Common law and also as per the definition of governing body in Sec. 16, and under Sec. 4, of the Societies Registration Act, governing body is entrusted with the management of the society alone.[64]
5) Governing Body administers for attaining the ‘aim and objects’.
The trustees or the governing body administer the property ‘of the society’ as per its bye laws so as to fulfill or attain the ‘aim and objects’ the founders viewed. They acquire and hold the property for and on behalf of the members of the society subject to the trust and obligations imposed by law and the bye laws or the fundamental principles[65] or trust[66] upon which it is founded.
6) A Registered Society is also an Association of Persons.
The registration will not make a society distinct from ‘association of persons’[67] and it is not a juristic person. It cannot own property also[68] though it has certain characteristics of a legal person.
7) ‘Property of the society’, “merely describes, property vests in Governing Body”
Expressions in the Societies Registration Act, ‘property belonging to a society’[69] and ‘property of the society’,[70] do not give the society a corporate status; and it “merely describes the property which vests in trustees or Governing Body”.[71]
8) Regn. Brings in Permanency; on Dissolution, Property Goes to Another Society
As per the Societies Registration Act, on dissolution, the left-behind-property of a society goes to another society as determined by the members of the society or by the court (S. 14) for being managed by some other charitable organisation and to be utilised for like purposes. Either during the subsistence of a society or at the time of its dissolution the members of a society do not have beneficial enjoyment of its property.[72]
9) Right of Dissolution Vested with Members.
A society is dissolved on determination of the members of the society with required majority, if so provided in the bye laws. If the rules of a registered Society do not lay down the rules for disposal and settlement of the property on dissolution, the governing body is authorized to do the same as it ‘finds expedient’ (S. 13).
VI. Conclusion: Property vests in the members subject to the contract and the fundamental principles upon which it is founded.
From the above, it can be legitimately concluded that the ownership of the ‘property of a society’ does not absolutely vest either in its members or in the governing body; but it vests in the members of the society[73] subject to the bye laws or contract, and the fundamental-principles or trust[74] upon which it is founded.[75] We can take cue (i) from the observations of our Apex Court in Addanki Narayanappa Vs. Bhaskara Krishnappa[76] that the property which is brought in by the partners when the partnership is formed or which may be acquired in the course of the business of the partnership becomes the property of the firm, and the partnership property will vest in all the partners since a firm has no legal existence;[77] and (ii) from the following erudite assertion of Dr. BK Mukherjea, J., on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts:[78]
“The idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests.”[79]
In case of Registered Societies, the vesting of ownership of the ‘property of a society’ is further subject to the provisions of the Act under which it is registered.
Vesting of Property in Various Kinds of Associations and Trusts
Club, Society and Company
No.
Nature of Association.
Right of Manage-ment or Vesting of Legal Ownership.
Vesting of actual/ultimate ownership
Whether permanent or not (so as to put an end to)
1
Club
Trustees or Gov. Body, as per Byelaws
Members, subject to the byelaws and objectives of foundation.
Legal ownership in Trustees; beneficial ownership – though not absolute – in Beneficiaries.
Permanent
7
Public Trust-Indian (common) Law
-do-
In trust/institution/ endowment itself. If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person –in public or section of public who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as revealed from the facts or from the deed of foundation or bye laws, if any.
Permanent
8
Public School, Public Library, etc.
Manager, Headmaster, Librarians, Gov. Body, etc.
-do-
Permanent.
9
Private religious or charitable trusts
Trustees
-do-
Presumed to be permanent.
10
Mosque, Church, Gurudwara, etc.
Trustees (by different names)
In trust/institution/ Church[82]/ endowment itself. If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person – in section of public who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as revealed from the facts or from the deed of foundation or bye laws, if any.
[3] Orient Club Vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax: 1982-10 TAXMAN 57 (Bom): 1982-29 CTR 117: 1982-136 ITR 697: Quoted in Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Mulam Club: 1991-191 ITR 370: 1991-1 Ker LT 762: 1991-58 TAXMAN 63
[4] Orient Club Vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax: 1982-10 TAXMAN 57 (Bom): 1982-29 CTR 117: 1982-136 ITR 697: Quoted in Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Mulam Club: 1991-191 ITR 370: 1991-1 Ker LT 762: 1991-58 TAXMAN 63
[5] Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao: AIR 1931 Mad. 12: Relied on: Milligan Vs. Mitchel: 40 ER 852; Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun: (1904) AC 515.
[6] 1975-36 STC 511: This decision is distinguished in: Bangalore Golf Club Vs. Assistant Commr. of Luxury Taxes: 1999-115 STC 338 (Kar); Government Medical Store Depot Vs. State of Haryana. 1977-39 STC 114 (P&H) .
[7] Hotel and Catering Industry Vs. Automobile Proprietary: ([1969] 1 WLR 697; Inland Revenue Commissioners Vs. Eccentric Club Ltd.: [1924] 1 KB 390.
[8] Safdar Jung Hospital Vs. KS Sethi: AIR 1970 SC 1407; Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Vs. Enfield India: [1968] 21 STC 317 (SC). Joint Commercial Tax Officer Vs. Young Men’s Indian Association: 1970SC1212
[19] Quoted in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. H Narasimhaiah: AIR 1991 Kar 392.
[20] That is, ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner.
[21] Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; DharamDutt Vs. Union of India: AIR 2004 SC 1295; Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of AP: AIR 1958 AP 773.
[22] AIR 1958 AP 773. See also: Raj Kumar Gaba Vs. State of UP: 2012-49 VST 252; Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Merchant Navy Club: 1974-96 ITR 261; Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee Vs. Jagmonan Singh: ILR 1971-2 Del 515.
[23] In companies, the share-holders hold the property as their own.
[24] Quoted in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001- Para 69.
[27] See:Kelans Son Kodakkat Kannan Vs. Tharakandi Kadissa: AIR 1971 Ker 61; Shantilal Ambalal Mehta Vs. M.A. Rangaswamy: 1977-79 BLR 633; Union of India Vs. Official Assignee of Bombay: 1971-73 BLR 623; Tan Bug Taim Vs. Collector of Bombay: AIR 1946 Bom 216.
[28] Settlement deed by Ashramam–Swayam Prakash Ashramam Vs. G Anandavally Amma : AIR 2010 SC 622; Settlement to trust – S N Mathur Vs. Board of Revenue: 2009-13 SCC 301; Sale deed by unregistered society – Suresh s/o. BhagwanraoPuri Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2016-3 AIR Bom R (Cri.) 603; Gift to unregistered Association – Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna Satram: 1984-2 ALT 157; Sale deed to an association – K. Kala Vs. Dist Registrar, Madurai: 2016 3 MLJ 50, Sale deed to an association – State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 P&H 218. Sale deed to an association – Asst. Commr. Vs. Shivalingawwa: ILR 2003 Kar 2855; Lease deed by trust to school – TNP MothooNatarajan Vs. PV Ravi: 2015-2 MLJ (Cri.) 656; Lease deed by a firm -2014-3 ALT 46; Settlement deed to private trust –Kolli Venkata Raja Vs. Govt. of AP: 2014-1 ALT 155; Lease deed to a public trust –Nadigar Sangham Charitable Trust, rep. by its managing Trustee, R. Sarathkumar Vs. S. Murugan:2013-1 MLJ 433; Sale deed to Board of Trustees – Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chemists and Druggists Association Building Trust: 1995-215 ITR(Mad) 741; Mortgage deed by a College – Sonar Bangla Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College: AIR 1960 Cal 450.
[29] Such as well-known political parties, trade-unions, etc.
[30] Such as temple-related trusts, Wakfs, church-related trusts, etc.
[31] Such as libraries, universities, etc. See: Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna: 1984-2 ALT 157
[39] T S Thinnappa Chettiar Vs. Grajagopalan: AIR 1944 Mad 536
[40] Weavers Mills Vs. Balkis Ammal: AIR 1969 Mad 462. Murari Ganguly Vs. Kanailal Garal: AIR 2003 Cal 105; ValiPattabhiramaRao Vs. Ramanuja: AIR 1984 AP 176.
[42] Tata Memorial Hospital Workers Union Vs. Tata Memorial Centre: AIR 2010 SC 2943
[43] It is held in Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh: AIR 1958 AP 773. See also: Raj Kumar Gaba Vs. State of UP: 2012-49 VST 252; Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Merchant Navy Club: 1974-96 ITR 261; Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee Vs. Jagmonan Singh: ILR 1971-2 Del 515.
[44] Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458– Para 23.
[45] Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai: AIR 2005 SC 2544. Followed in Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti: (2013) 15 SCC 394.
[46] Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458.
[47] AIR 1966 SC 1300: Referred to in: Mohd. Laiquiddin Vs. Kamala Dev Mishra: 2010-2 SCC 407; Jagatram Ahuja Vs. Comner. of Gift Tax Hyderabad: AIR 2000 SC 3195; Sunil Siddharthbhai Sarabhai Vs. Comner. of Income Tax: AIR1986 SC 368; Malabar Fisheries Co Vs. Comner. of Income Tax Kerala: AIR1980 SC 176.
[48] Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of AP: AIR 1958 AP 773.
[56] Company is a juristic person. Property belongs to it. Bacha F Guzdar Bombay Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay: AIR 1955 SC 74; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1970 SC 564; Electronics Corporation Vs. Secretary Revenue Department AP: AIR1999 SC 1734.
[57] Shanti Sarup Vs. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha, Dayalbagh Agra: AIR 1969 All. 248; K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook, AIR 1970 Pat 163; Khiri Ram Gupta and Another versus Nana Lal: AIR 1964 Pat. 114; State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 (P&H) 218. Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay: AIR 1946 Bom. 516
[58] Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458.
[59] Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society: AIR 2003 SC 3397. See also Tata Vs. Tata: AIR 2010 SC 2943
[60] AIR 2005 SC 2544: 2005 (10) SCC 760. Relied on in Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti: 2013 AIR (SCW) 5782; (2013) 15 SCC 394.
[61] KC Thomas Vs. RL Gadeock: AIR 1970 Pat 163 (DB)
[62] See Notes above, under the heading: Can Ownership of Property Vest in Society itself.
[63] Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of AP: AIR 1958 AP 773. See also: Raj Kumar Gaba Vs. State of UP: 2012-49 VST 252; Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Merchant Navy Club: 1974-96 ITR 261; Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee Vs. Jagmonan Singh: ILR 1971-2 Del 515.
[64] Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1958 AP 773
[65] Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao: AIR 1931 Mad. 12: Relied on: Milligan Vs. Mitchel: 40 ER 852; Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun: (1904) AC 515. See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547.
[66] Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai: AIR 2005 SC 2544; Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti: (2013) 15 SCC 394.
[67] Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society: AIR 2003 SC 3397- Para 20; Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458 – Para 38, 42
[68] Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society: AIR 2003 SC 3397- Para 22.
[71] Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458 -Para 11.
[72] Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458 – Para 23
[73] As in a partnership: See notes above under the head: ‘Property Belonging to a Society: Comparable to Definition in Partnership Act’
[74] Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao: AIR 1931 Mad. 12: Relied on: Milligan Vs. Mitchel: 40 ER 852; Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun: (1904) AC 515. See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh (2007-4 Raj LW 3547).
[75] Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai: AIR 2005 SC 2544: Relied on in Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti: (2013) 15 SCC 394
[76] AIR 1966 SC 1300: Referred to in: MohdLaiquiddin Vs. Kamala Dev Mishra: 2010-2 SCC 407; Jagatram Ahuja Vs. Comner. of Gift Tax Hyderabad: AIR 2000 SC 3195; Sunil Siddharthbhai Sarabhai Vs. Comner. of Income Tax: AIR1986 SC 368; Malabar Fisheries Co Vs. Comner. of Income Tax Kerala: AIR1980 SC 176.
[77] See notes: ‘Property Belonging to a Society’: Comparable to Definition in Partnership Act
[79] Quoted in Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax: AIR 1969 SC 1089; Idol of Shri Radhaji Vs. State of MP: AIR 1979 MP 129; Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jogendra Nath Naskar: AIR 1965 Cal 570.
[80] Agreement (Bylaws) governs. If the objectives of foundation envisage benefit to future members also, the present members and administrators are trustees for future members.
[82] The properties of the (parish) churches are also vested in the Church (larger sense). See: Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.
[83] It is settled that in the matter of (secular) private trusts, English principles are followed in India which lay down that if the beneficiaries are sui juris and of one mind, the trust can be put to an end or use the trust fund for any purpose (they wish): Profulla Chorone Requitte Vs. Satya Chorone Requitte: AIR 1979 SC 1682.
1. Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:
5. Property of society how vested The property, movable and immovable belonging to a society registered under this Act, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body of such society, and in all proceedings civil and criminal, may be described as the property of the governing body of such society for their proper title. 6. Suits by and against societies – Every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the president, chairman, or principal secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society, and, in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion. Provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society, to sue the president or chairman, or principal secretary or the trustees thereof, if on application to the governing body some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant.
2. Introduction
Salmond reads:
“Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases”.[1]
‘Persons’ are of two kinds: human beings and legal persons.
The second class is the institutions and associations of persons upon which the law incorporates or attributes legal personality. They are formed either on registration under a statute like Companies Act, or under a particular enactment such as English East India Company, Municipal Corporations, Life Insurance Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, etc. Apart from companies, corporations etc. our system accept idols in temples also as legal persons. Though the legal personality of an unregistered association may not be a matter in dispute, the legal status of registered associations under Societies Registration Act remained as a potential question for quite long time.
The enquiry as to the legal personality of an association of persons is essentially the enquiry whether it has the right of perpetuity in its own name, apart from its members.The basic tests to be applied for determining the same are the following:
(i) Whether it can sue or be sued in its own name.
(ii) Whether its property vests in itself.
Applying these tests authoritative decisions have definitively held that even the registered societies are also not juridical persons in law.
3. Registered Society is not a Juristic Person:
Unani Tibia College Case: The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had unequivocally held in the celebrated Unani Tibia College Case[2] that a registered society was not a corporation and that the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 gave only certain privileges to a society registered under that Act. It is held that (i) the society, being unincorporated, is unable to sue or be sued in its own name and (ii) the phrase ‘property belonging to a society’in Sec. 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 did not give the society a corporate status as this phrase merely described the property which had been vested in trustees or governing body.It had been held by several High Courts earlier, giving undue importance to the expression ‘property belonging to a society’ in Sec. 5, that the registered societies possess juristic personality or status.[3] It was held in Unani Tibia College Case as under:
“We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the provisions aforesaid do not establish the main essential characteristic of a corporation aggregate, namely, that of an intention to incorporate the society. We may further observe that the scheme and provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 are very similar to those of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 (59 and 60 Vict. C. 25), as amended in certain respects by subsequent enactments. It is appropriate to quote here what Dennis Lloyd has said in his ‘Law relating to Unincorporated Associations’ (1938 Edn. at page 59) in respect of the provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 as modified by subsequent enactments. He has said:
‘The modern legislation still maintains the policy of the older Acts in withholding corporate status from friendly societies. Registration does not result in incorporation, but merely entitles the society so registered to enjoy the privileges conferred by the Act. These privileges are of considerable importance and certain of them go a long way towards giving registered societies…. a status in many respects analogous to a corporation strictly so-called, but without being technically incorporated. Thus something in the nature of perpetual succession is conceded by the provision that the society’s property is to vest in the trustees for the time being of the society for the use and benefit of the society and its members and of all persons claiming through the members according to the society’s rules, and further (and this is the most noteworthy provision) that the property shall pass to succeeding trustees without assignment or transfer. In the same way, though the society, being unincorporated, is unable to sue and be sued in its own name, it is given the statutory privilege of suing and being sued in the name of its trustees.’
We think that these observations made with regard to similar provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, correctly and succinctly summarise the legal position in respect of the several provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Those provisions undoubtedly give certain privileges to a society registered under that Act and the privileges are of considerable importance and some of those privileges are analogous to the privileges enjoyed by a corporation, but there is really no incorporation in the sense in which that word is legally understood.”
“…… Section 5, however, states that the property belonging to the society, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested in the governing body of the society and in all proceedings, civil and criminal, the property will be described as the property of the governing body. The section talks of property belonging to the society; but the property is vested in the trustees or in the governing body for the time being. The expression “property belonging to the society” does not give the society a corporate status in the matter of holding or acquiring property, it merely describes the property which vests in the trustees or governing body for the time being……..”
Century Club Vs. State of Mysore: It is held by the Karnataka High Court (KS Hegde, J.) in Century Club Vs. State of Mysore[4]that the Societies Registration Act did not say that the society could sue in its own name which would have been the position in the case of an incorporated society or in the case of a juridical person. Following questions were considered in this case:
(i) Do the registered clubs (registered under the So. Regn. Act) have legal personality of their own apart from their members,
(ii) do the registered clubs stand in the same position as the unregistered clubs as regards holding properties
(iii) can registered clubs sue or be sued and do they have competence to enter into agreement not only with outsiders but even with their own members and
(iv) are the clubs the legal owners of their properties and transfer the properties even to their members.
Referring to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, which (i) permits a registered society to sue or be sued in the name of the persons mentioned therein;(ii) provides for continuation of suits and proceedings despite the person suing or sued on behalf of the society, dying, or ceasing to hold the office, which he held at the time of the institution of the suit; (iii) prescribes that judgements passed in suits instituted have to be enforced only against the property of the society and not against the property of the person suing or sued; (iv) enables to sue its members in respect of the specified transactions;and (v) places the members in the same position as strangers as regards the offences mentioned therein, it was observed in this case as under:
“If a registered society is a complete legal entity or a juridical person, these provisions are wholly superfluous. … The very fact that the Legislature thought it necessary to enact these provisions shows, that registered clubs are not juridical persons or complete legal entities but they have been merely conferred with certain attributes of legal entities. … The weight of judicial authority, English and Indian, is against the view contended for by the learned Advocate-General.”[5]
Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society: The law on this point is further expounded by our Apex Court in Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society[6] as under:
i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
ii) A Society registered under the Societies Regn. Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. (Para 21)
iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22)
iv) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)
4. Legal Personality of Firms & Trusts
Under the general law, a firm is not a distinct legal entity or a juridical person like a body corporate; but a compendious name for all its partners;[7] but, firms are regarded as a quasi-independent entity,[8] or as legal personae for limited purposes.[9]By virtue of Order XXX, CPC a firm is enabled to sue and defend suits in the manner provided. Every partner of the firm is capable of representing the entire firm. He acts for all and is an agent as such.[10] If a partner dies, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the suit.[11]
Going by the definitions of trust, including that in the Indian Trusts Act,[12] 1882, it is clear that ‘trust’ is neither an institution nor an association of persons; but, it is an ‘obligation’ annexed to the ownership of property. Though, in the eye of law, trust is a concept and it cannot be a juristic person,[13] generally, while dealing with tax matters, such institutions administered by trustees are considered as juristic persons.[14]
Societies, both registered and unregistered, are also dealt with in the same manner.In Swami Satchitanand Vs. The 2nd Addl. IncomeTax Officer, Kozhikode[15]the Kerala High Court observed that, despite the fact that a Society is styled as an ‘association of persons’, tax imposed on a registered society is that on the society itself and not on its members.
8. Regd. Societies – Not Corporate Body & No Common Seal
A society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 is not a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal.[16]
9. Co-operative Societies are Juristic Persons & ‘Liability Limited’
Co-operative Societies Acts provide for juristic personality to Co-operative societies. In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana[17] our Apex Court held that ‘a co-operative society is a corporation as commonly understood’ inasmuch as the same has the status of a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold property, enter into contracts, institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purposes for which it is constituted.[18]
Co-operative societies being creatures of the statute, once a Co-operative Society is formed and registered, the rights of the society and that of its members stand abridged by the provisions of the Act. The activities of the societies are controlled by the statute. Therefore, there cannot be any objection to statutory interference with their composition or functioning merely on the ground of contravention of individual’s right of freedom of association by statutory functionaries.[19]
Ninety Seventh Amendment of our Constitution provided constitutional status to the Co-operative Societies and it has brought out radical changes in the concept of Co-operative Societies. Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a Co-operative Society.
10. How Can a Society or a Club Acquire Property and Enter into a Contract?
11. No Legal Impediment in Treating the Church as a Person
It is held by the High Court of Kerala in James Chinnamma Vs. Joseph Abraham[20], when a question came whether a Catholic church can claim to be “an agriculturist” under a Debt Relief Act, that the church being capable of holding property (of course, acting through human agency) there was no legal impediment in treating the church as a person and it can claim to be “agriculturist”. The judge considered the postulation whether the church could be a voluntary association. It also referred to the theory that the church was under the authority of a corporation-sole, either Vicar or Bishop.
Are Churches and Dioceses Juridic persons it being so accepted in Canon Law
As shown by Salmond and explained by the Supreme Court in Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass, the law may, if it pleases, regard a church, a hospital, a university or a library as a legal person.
In Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan (2016 AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51) it is observed that the (parish) church is a legal person.
But, in M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case – 2020-1 SCC 1) our apex Court held that Mosque is not a legal person. The Apex Court rejected the the contention that mosque was held to be a juristic person by the Privy Council in Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 P C 116. In the light of the Supreme Court decision on Mosque, legally it is difficult to support the the view that churches are juristic persons.
‘Law may, if it pleases‘ being the basis for determining a body or entity as a legal person, it is definite that the dioceses can never be treated as a juridic persons even though the Canon declares so.
Even if a (parish) church can be taken as comparable to a temple or Gurudwara, as they are accepted by our law as juristic persons, a Diocese can never be taken as a juristic person; especially in the light of our Apex Court decision, Illachi Devi v. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397, which authoritatively held that even a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. Parish churches and trusts created for the benefit of a Church are public religious trusts.
Merely because Cannon law declares a church or a diocese as a legal person, it cannot be assumed that the courts that deal with the matters of those entities will be bound by the assertion. It is a jurisprudential issue reigned by the common law. In the light of the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School (AIR 1958 MP 362) it is illogical to go deep to search an authority to see whether the church or diocese is a legal person for it is so described in the Canon.
[2] Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & UnaniTibia College Vs. TheState: AIR 1962 SC 458.
[3] See: Benares Hindu University Vs. Gauri DuttJoshir AIR 1950 All 196. Also see: K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook: AIR 1970 Pat 163; Inder Chand Vs. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha: AIR 1977 Del 34.
[5] The court referred the following decisions: Queen’s Bench decision in Graff vs. Evans: (1882) 8 Q. B. D. 373; Metford Vs. Edwards ([1915] 1 K. B. 172 ); Trebanog Working men’s Club and Institute Ltd. Vs. Macdonald: [1940] 1 K. B. 576; [1940] 1 All E. R. 454; National Association of Local Government Officers Vs. Watkins: (1934) 18 Tax Cas. 499; Farrar’s case: (1888)40 Ch. D. 395. Indian Cases: Deputy Commercial Tax Officer Vs. Cosmopolitan Club: AIR1954 Mad 1144 , Young Men’s Indian Association Vs. Joint Commercial Tax Officer: AIR 1964 Mad 63; Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Club, Rajnandgaon Vs. Sales Tax Officer: [1957] 8 S. T. C. 781; Board of Trustees Vs. State of Delhi , AIR1962 SC 458; BoppanaRukminamma Vs. Maganti Venkata Ramadas: AIR 1940 Mad. 949; Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay: AIR 1946 Bom 516; Krishnan Vs. Sundaram: AIR 1941 Bom. 312: Rukminamma Vs. Venkata Ramadas: AIR 1940 Mad 949; NA Nannier Vs. Official Assignee, Madras: AIR 1951 Mad 875.
[6] Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society: AIR 2003 SC 3397; See also Tata Vs. Tata: AIR 2010 SC 2943.
[7] V Subramaniam Vs. Rajesh Raghuvandra Rao: AIR 2009 SC 1858, Murarilal Mahabir Prasad Vs. B R Vad: AIR 1976 SC 313, State Bank of India Vs. Simko Engineering Works: AIR 2005 P&H 63, Lieya Vs. Kaliappa Chettiar: AIR1996 Ker 218, Firm Narain Das Mangal Sen Vs. Anand Behari Mishra: AIR 1958MP 408.
[8] Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation Vs. AVK Traders:2012-115 AIC 677: 2012-2 CivCC 755; 2012-2 KerLJ 534: 2012-2 KerLT 332.
[9] Dena Bank Vs. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co: AIR 2000 SC 3654; Suwalal Anandilal Jain Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar: AIR 1997 SC 1279.
[10] G.P.C. Co-op. Union Vs. Krishna Rao: AIR 1974 Bom 52
[11] Sohan Lal Vs. Amin Chand: : AIR 1973 SC 2572; Upper India Cable Co. Vs. BalKishan, 1984-3 SCC 462; Anokhe Lal Vs. Radhamohan Bansal: 1996-6 SCC 730.
[18] Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana AIR 1985 SC 973, See also: R Jaivel Vs. State of Tamil Nadu: AIR 2006 Mad 215. State of Punjab Vs. Kesari Chand: AIR 1987 P&H 216; Sonepat Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd Vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court: AIR 1986 P&H 386; Mulshanker Kunverji Gor Vs.Juvansinhji ShivubhaJadeja: AIR 1980 Guj 62.
[19] AP Dairy Develpmt. Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.
The nexus between the branches and its central organisation has to be settled by the bye laws. Usually the upper body holds supervisory jurisdiction over the affairs of the branches; and, if the bye laws so provide, the property acquired by the branches may remain as the property of the whole/central organisation. When the parental body exercises its supervisory jurisdiction, in matters other than the formal administrative governance, it has to obey principles applicable to a quasi-judicial authority (ie., observing principles of natural justice, etc.).
The extent of autonomy or independence in administration of a branch is determined by the bye laws. Normally, so long the branches function within its jurisdiction, in conformity with the provisions of the bye laws, they can claim freedom from interference. When they violate the provisions of the bye laws and act in an arbitrary manner, their actions will be subject to the supervisory control of the central organisation.
Branches Contemplated In The Companies Act Are Not Separate Entities
In S.N.D.P. Yogam v. G. Krishnamoorthy, 2022-4 Ker HC 168, it is pointed out as under:
“The branches contemplated and provided for under the Companies Act, 1882 and its successor enactments are not independent or separate entities and in terms of the aforesaid statutes, company and its branches would constitute one single entity.”
Referring English Electric Co. of India Ltd v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, (1976) 4 SCC 460, it is observed in S.N.D.P. Yogam v. G. Krishnamoorthy, 2022-4 Ker HC 168, that a registered company can have Branches under the Companies Act and they are not independent or separate entities, and that the company and its branches constitute one single entity.
2. Does a Branch Regd. with a Regd. Society Get the Status as a Regd. Society?
An (unregistered) association which is registered with a registered-society will not get the status of a registered society.[1] Same will be the position as to a branch of a registered society. Section 4 of the Societies Registration Act provides for filing Annual List of Managing Body once in every year with the Registrar. Societies Registration Act does not envisage societies-with-branches.
In Kerala Vyapari Vyavasayi Vs. Kerala Vyapari Vyavasayi Ekopana Samithi[2] after considering the definition and character of the ‘Governing Body’ in the So. Regn. Act, so also the scheme of the Act, it is held that the committee of officers at the district level or unit level is not the ‘Governing Body’ under the Societies Registration Act.
3. Can a Branch Sue?
The Supreme Court, in P. Nazeer Vs. Salafi Trust, AIR 2022 SC 1580, held:
(i) A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is entitled to sue and be sued, only in terms of its byelaws.
(ii) The byelaws may authorise the President or Secretary or any other office bearer to institute or defend a suit for and on behalf of the society,
since section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, provides that ‘every society registered under the Act may sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society and,
in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion’.
(iii) Unless the plaintiff, which claims to be a society, demonstrates that it is a registered entity and that the person who signed and verified the pleadings was authorised by the byelaws to do so, the suit cannot be entertained
The fact that the plaintiff in a suit happens to be a local unit or a Sakha unit affiliated to a registered society is of no consequence, unless the byelaws support the institution of such a suit.
4. Fundamental Principles and Decision of a Branch to Sever
It being not open for the majority of the members of a society to alter the fundamental principles upon which it is founded, even the unanimous decision[3] of a branch (unless such a power is specifically reserved under the bye laws)[4] cannot sever the relation with the central body. This principle was expounded in Milligan Vs. Mitchel,[5]Atttorney General Vs. Anderson.[6] In Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun,[7] House of Lords (by a majority of 5-2) found that the minority, which adhered to the ‘principles of establishment’, was entitled to the assets of the Free Church. It was observed that when men subscribe money for a particular object, and leave it behind them for the promotion of that object, their successors have no right to change the object endowed. It was held that, by adopting new standards of doctrine (and particularly by abandoning its commitment to ‘the establishment principle’, which was held to be fundamental to the Free Church), the majority had violated the conditions on which the property of the Free Church.[8]
5. Can a Branch Dissociate?
A branch of a (central) organisation created under the provisions of bye laws, cannot (unless the Rules provide otherwise) lawfully sever its connections with its central body, as observed in John Vs. Rees[9], inasmuch as the act of severance will amount to violation of the rules or bye laws.
6. Merger of an Association with Another Association
If a voluntary association came into existence independently, and subsequently subjected itself as a branch of another association, such a ‘branch’ may have the right[10] to dissociate or disaffiliate from such association or ‘central body’; because, the ‘branch’, when came into existence, had all characteristics of an independent voluntary association with its own basic principles of foundation. The same will be the position of a voluntary association which merged or amalgamated[11] with another association.
If the conduct of the members of the merged association shows that their act amounted to unanimous or undisputed surrendering or abandonment of the identity of the former voluntary association, or they became an integral-whole with the association in which they merged, principles of acquiescence and estoppel will be a bar for dissociation.
7. Parallel Administration within a Church Not Allowable
In Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church [12] it is pointed out by our Apex Court that ‘running parallel governance’ at the cost of Church by creating factionalism within the constituent parish churches is not permissible. It is settled proposition of law that when a mode is prescribed for doing a thing, it can be done only in that manner and not otherwise.
[8] All these English decisions were referred to in Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao: AIR 1931 Mad. 12. See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547.
[9] John Vs. Rees: [1970] 1 Ch 345: [1969] 2 All ER 275.
[10] Unless principles of estoppel and acquiescence work against.
[11] Sec. 14A of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 provides powers to the Registrar to order amalgamation of societies. See: H Puttappa Vs. State of Karnataka: AIR 1978 Kar 148.
[12] Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.
1. Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:
3. Registration and fees: Upon such memorandum and certified copy being filed, the Registrar shall certify under his hand that the society is registered under this Act. There shall be paid to the Registrar for every such registration a fee of fifty rupees, or such smaller fees as [the State Government] may from time to time, direct; and all fees so paid shall be accounted for to [the State Government].
4. Annual list of managing body to be filed:- Once in every year, on or before the fourteenth day succeeding the day on which, according to the rules of the society, the annual general meeting of the society is held, or, if the rules do not provide for an annual general meeting, in the month of January, a list shall be filed with the Registrar of joint-stock Companies, of the names, addresses and occupations of the governors, council, directors, committee or other governing body then entrusted with the management of the affairs of the society.
20. To what societies Act applies: The following societies may be registered under this Act:– Charitable societies, the military orphan funds or societies established at the several presidencies of India, societies established for the promotion of science, literature, or the fine arts for instruction, the diffusion of useful knowledge, [the diffusion of political education], the foundation or maintenance of libraries or reading-rooms for general use among the members or open to the public or public museums and galleries of paintings and other works of art, collections of natural history, mechanical and philosophical inventions, instruments, or designs.
Section 8 (2) Companies Act, 2013 reads: The company registered under this section shall enjoy all the privileges and be subject to all the obligations of limited companies.
2. Introduction
India has a long history of collective community life. Ancient history of India manifested in oldest scriptures of Hinduism – Vedas – refers to then existed strong civil society. Voluntary organisations were originated for promotion of health, education and cultural activities. Religious organizations promoted charitable trusts with a philanthropic view. The Government recognised these voluntary organizations and trusts by various enactments. The oldest enactments in this regard include:
The Societies Registration Act, 1860,
The Religious Endowments Act, 1863,
The Indian Trusts Act, 1882,
The Charitable Endowments Act, 1890,
The Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920 and
The Trade Unions Act, 1926.
It is noteworthy that these enactments did not impose strong governmental control over various activities of the associations and the institutions.
3. So. Regn. Act does not Require Compulsory Registration
Because Article 19(1)(c) of our Constitution guarantees freedom to form associations.
Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not require compulsory registration of Societies. This position continues. No doubt, it is because Article 19(1)(c) of our Constitution guarantees freedom to form associations and unions. But, Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 directs compulsory registration of certain societies.
Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 Sec. 4 reads:
4. Compulsory Registration of Certain Societies –
(1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (3) and (4), every society formed on or after the date of the commencement of this Act, which has for its object any object mentioned in, or prescribed Under Section 3, and
(a) which consists of not less than twenty members, or
(b) whose annual gross income or expenditure in any financial year after the date of the commencement of this Act, is not less than ten thousand rupees, shall be registered under this Act within such period as may be prescribed.
(2) …..
(3) Nothing in this section shall apply to any society which has for its object the promotion of religion, athletics or sports (including indoor games).
(4) Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to require the registration under this Act of any society formed, established, registered or incorporated under any other law.
4. General Principles of Company Law Apply to Regd. Society.
The general principles governing rights of a member in a registered society, and the right of suit of a member, would be similar to that of an individual share holder’s rights in a company. The general principles as to the rights and responsibilities of the directors of a company also apply to the governing body members of a society.
Following are recognised as individual membership rights in a company.[1]
(i) Right to vote,
(ii) right to stand as a candidate for election as a director and
(iii) set-right illegal acts.
The general principles as to the rights and responsibilities of the directors of a company also apply to the governing body members of a society.
5. Registration of Societies Brings-in Certain Privileges
In Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi[2] the legal position is expounded by our Apex Court pointing out that by registration of a Society, perpetual succession is conceded inasmuch as the society’s property vest in the trustees for the time being of the society for the use and benefit of the society and its members and of all persons claiming through the members according to the society’s rules, and further (and this is the most noteworthy provision) that the property shall pass to succeeding trustees without assignment or transfer. In this decision it is observed as under:
“… The most important point to be noticed in this connection is that in the various provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, there are no sufficient words to indicate on intention to incorporate; on the contrary, the provisions show that there was an absence of such intention. ….. Section 5, however, states that the property belonging to the society, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested in the governing body of the society and in all proceedings, civil and criminal, the property will be described as the property of the governing body. The section talks of property belonging to the society; but the property is vested in the trustees or in the governing body for the time being. The expression “property belonging to the society” does not give the society a corporate status in the matter of holding or acquiring property, it merely describes the property which vests in the trustees or governing body for the time being……..”
“… Those provisions undoubtedly give certain privileges to a society registered under that Act and the privileges are of considerable importance and some of those privileges are analogous to the privileges enjoyed by a corporation, but there is really no incorporation in the sense in which that word is legally understood.”
In Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of AP[3] it was observed that if an association was not registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act it could not sue or be sued except in the name of all the members of the association. The registration of the Society confers on it certain advantages. The members as well as the Governing Body the Society are not always the same. Even though the members of the Society or the Government Body fluctuate from time to time, the identity of the society is sought to be made continuous by reason of the provisions of the Societies Registration Act.
Registering An Old Society Did Not Mean Forming A New Society,
In Noel Frederick Barwell v. John Jackson, AIR 1948 All. 146, the Court referred M’ Kenny v. Mayor and Corporation of Barnsley, (1894) 10 T.L.R. 533, and said as under:
“There the question was whether an unregistered society should be registered under the Friendly Societies Act, 1855, and dealing with the question whether the Society should or should not be registered, the Master of the Rolls observed:
“And in the absence of any special rule to the contrary, it seemed to be a general rule arising from the nature of things that, where a number of people joined together for some purpose and must for the carrying out of that purpose govern themselves, the only way in which they, could do so was by the will of the majority.”
The Allehabad High Court continued as under:
“68. His Lordship went on to hold that registering an old society did not mean forming a new society, nor did it alter it in any way. The observations must, therefore, be confined to the facts of that case that the natural law of the rule of the majority would govern only for the purpose of carrying out the object for which they had come together and formed the association, tout that does not justify the assertion that on all questions the majority have a right to impose their will on the minority. It cannot be said here that the resolution of 3rd September was for the carrying out of the purpose for which the club was founded. In the absence of that basic requirement the case cannot help the defendants.”
The Allehabad High Court thereafter referred another English decision, Oldhamour Lady’s Sick and burial Society v. Taylor, and said as under:
“69. The case in Oldhamour Lady’s Sick and burial Society v. Taylor, (1887) 3 TLR 472 has, to my mind, no relevance. That was-a case where after the registration of an unregistered society, which was registered by a vote of the majority the minority then having decided to secede, the question was whether the registered society could claim the money due to the unregistered society and it was held that it was the same society and there was a continuity of existence.”
Person who Signs Pleadings must be Authorised by the Byelaws
The Supreme Court, in P. Nazeer Vs. Salafi Trust, AIR 2022 SC 1580, held:
(i) A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is entitled to sue and be sued, only in terms of its byelaws.
(ii) The byelaws may authorise the President or Secretary or any other office bearer to institute or defend a suit for and on behalf of the society,
since section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, provides that ‘every society registered under the Act may sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society and,
in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion’.
(iii) Unless the plaintiff, which claims to be a society, demonstrates that it is a registered entity and that the person who signed and verified the pleadings was authorised by the byelaws to do so, the suit cannot be entertained
The fact that the plaintiff in a suit happens to be a local unit or a Sakha unit affiliated to a registered society is of no consequence, unless the byelaws support the institution of such a suit.
6. Registration Brings-in Certain Changes to the Character of its Property
A society or a club is a compendium of its members. Its property is the ‘joint property’ held by the members as ‘joint tenants’ (as differentiated to ‘tenants in common’, till a decision is taken for dissolution). If such property is maintained for the benefit of its future members also (and therefore encumbered with obligations as in a ‘trust’), it cannot be dealt with by the members disregarding the objectives of its foundation.
With respect to the property of a society which can be distributed among the members on its dissolution, by registration under the Societies Registration Act a sea-change occurs whereby the disposal of property is governed by the provisions of the Societies Registration Act; and a perpetual succession is conceded thereto.[4]
Benefits Brought About by Registration of Societies.
Legal recognition and Benefits of Entry in Public Document. The Societies Registration Act provides for registering its bye laws and filing annual list of managing body and accounts. It is subject to scrutiny of Registrar. The registration and renewal of the registration of the society is for the benefit of all the members and office bearers of the society[5]so also the persons who deal with the society. A registered society can open bank accounts and obtain registration under Income Tax Act.
Perpetual Succession. By registration of a Society, perpetual succession is conceded inasmuch as the society’s property vest in the trustees or its governing body, for the use and benefit of the society;or in its members and of all persons claiming through the members according to the society’s rules.[6]
And further (and this is the most noteworthy provision) that the property shall pass to succeeding trustees or its governing body without assignment or transfer.[7]
Enabling Provisions for Filing Suits. Suits with respect to registered societies can be filed without invoking the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 CPC;[8] and can be sued also in that way.
Fixity. During the subsistence of a registered society, or on dissolution, the members do not have any proprietary or beneficial enjoyment/interestin the property the society holds.[9] The Societies Registration Act, therefore, does not create in the members of the registered society any interest other than that of bare trustees. What all the members are entitled to, is the right of management of the properties of the society subject to certain conditions.[10]
Left-behind-property goes to another society: As per the Societies Registration Act, on dissolution, the left-behind-property of a registered society goes to another society as determined by the members of the society or by the court[11] for being managed by some other charitable organisation and to be utilised for like purposes.
Tax Exemptions. Registration of Societies permits certain tax benefits and exemptions as provided in various Tax Laws.
So. Regn. Act: Holding Annual General Meeting is Statutory; Election Not
Sec. 4 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 postulates holding of Annual General Meeting. These provisions (also the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the society) as to holding Annual General Meetings, are mandatory; and not directory (Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts & Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585). As per Sec. 2 of the Societies Registration Act the management of the affairs of a society is entrusted with the governing body. The rules of the society have to direct the details of such entrustment.
It is pertinent to note that the Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not specifically direct ‘election’ of the governing body. But various States’ amendments (and State-Acts) provide for the same. The mode and modalities of formation of the governing body is determinedly left, under Sec. 16, to the ‘Rules and Regulations of the society’.
Sec. 16 reads:
Governing body defined: The governing body of the society shall be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees, or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted.
A Religious-Society Can be Registered If it Carries on Secular Activities Also
Society formed for religious purposes can also be registered under the Societies Registration Act, as the society formed for religious purposes would also ordinarily be a Society for charitable purposes.[12] Though the expression charitable purpose generally takes-in religious purpose also, it is held by the Patna High Court in Md. Yunus Vs. The Inspector General of Registration[13] that the So. Regn. Act does not embrace purposes which are religious or predominantly religious.
9. How Can a Society or a Club Acquire Property and Enter into a Contract?
See Blog: Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs
10. Associations Regd. under S. 8(1) of the Companies Act, 2013
Incorporation of Clubs brings in Legal Personality
Section 8 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013, lays down that an association of persons with charitable objects can be registered under this Act. It should have ‘in its objects the promotion of commerce, art, science, sports, education, research, social welfare, religion, charity, protection of environment or any such other object’ and it should be one which ‘intends to apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects’.
Clubs incorporated under the Companies Act enjoy all the privileges of limited companies; and they are subject to all the obligations thereunder also. Section 8 (2) Companies Act, 2013 reads:
“(2) The company registered under this section shall enjoy all the privileges and be subject to all the obligations of limited companies.”
Privileges
exempted from requirement regarding minimum share capital.
exempted from requirement to mention its name and address as required in case of all other companies
free to determine the date, place and time of its Annual General Meeting according to their convenience and feasibility.
can call an Annual General Meeting at a short notice
can maintain books of accounts for a shorter period.
send the required documents at least fourteen days before the date of meeting instead of 21 days.
free to increase the number of its directors without seeking approval of central Government.
exempted from the applicability of Companies Auditor’s Report Order, 2003 (CARO).
Obligations
ensure that its profits and all other incomes are utilized only for the purpose of promoting its objects and not for any other purpose
ensure that its profits are not distributed as dividend among its members
cannot alter its objects clause in its Memorandum without seeking the written approval of central government
bound by such conditions and regulations imposed by Central Government
ensure that its objects are confined to those mentioned in section Section 8 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013.
Halsbury’s Laws of England[14] describe Incorporated Members’ Club as under:
“206. Incorporated Members’ Club. – A members’ club incorporated under the Companies Act, 1948, or earlier Companies Acts, enjoys the advantages incidental to incorporation as a company, especially that of suing and being sued as a legal entity. The company may be limited by shares or by guarantee, and in either case the liability may be merely nominal in amount. The most convenient method, when a members’ club is incorporated, is to register it as a company limited by guarantee, the members of the club for the time being constituting the company. If a members’ club is incorporated as a company limited by shares, the articles of association to some extent take the place of club rules, and may be supplemented by bye laws. If it is registered as an association limited by guarantee, the rules governing the relations of the members inter se are generally appended to the memorandum of association, and they together form the regulations of the company. In either case the objects of the club are set forth in the memorandum of association. The company is quite distinct from the club, the company merely being the proprietor; the relations of the members of the club inter se are governed by club rules or bye laws, as in the case of an unincorporated members’ club, and the rights and liabilities of the share-holders in the company depend upon the memorandum and articles of association, as in the case of an ordinary trading company.”
11. Registered Society is not a Juristic Person
See Blog: Is Registered Society a Juristic Person.
12. Regd. Societies – Not Corporate Body & No Common Seal
A society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 is not a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal.[15] But, a Co-operative Society, created by or under a statute,[16] is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to hold property; and it can enter into contracts.[17]
13. Societies Considered as Legal Persons While Deal Tax Matters
Generally, public institutions established with a philanthropic view and administered by trustees are described as ‘trusts’, especially while dealing with tax matters, though, in the strict legal sense, trust is a concept and it cannot be an organisation or a Juristic Person.[18]
In Swami Satchitanand Vs. The 2nd Addl. Income-tax Officer, Kozhikode[19] the Kerala High Court observed that a society registered under Societies Registration Act is a legal entity; and it is held that tax imposed on a Society, though it has been styled as an ‘Association of persons’ is still a tax on the society and not on its members, and that it is not possible, therefore, to say that the tax imposed on a Society is a tax imposed on the members of the Society.
14. Does a Society or Branch Registered with Another Registered Society Get the Status as a Registered Society?
If a dispute arises as to whom among the two sets were the lawful members of the Governing Committee, the Registrar has the power to decide upon such a dispute under the Societies Registration Act as an incidental or consequential power in itself. The Registrar has to prima facie satisfy from the materials and evidences. There may not be an elaborate enquiry. However, such an enquiry made by the Registrar and the decision taken from it does not become final and the aggrieved party can take up the matter before a competent court for a decision as to who are the members of the governing body.[20]
16. Jurisdiction of State and Registrar: Limited
The District Registrar has no power to interfere with the selection in the election process. The scope of exercising power under the Societies Registration Act is only to limited extent. The enquiry is not directed against election or selection but to find out the genuineness of the list.
The disputes are to be resolved by the Civil Court
Sec. 4 of the So. Regn. Act casts a duty on the persons concerned to file before the registrar an annual return containing the names, addresses and occupation of the members of the Executive Committee. But the law does not provide for the suspension or dissolution of the society because of failure to comply with Sec. 4. The Act does not vest any control or supervisory or disciplinary power or jurisdiction in the registrar to take action against a society. The disputes are to be resolved by the Civil Court.[21]
Once a list is furnished in accordance with the election, the scope of enquiry would come to an end, even if the selection is bad. The extent of enquiry is only to find out whether the list being furnished is not by way of any bogus claim or by fraudulent claim.[22]
17. Co-op. Registrar’s Powers Regulatory or Supervisory in Nature
A Co-operative society is an autonomous body and it has got a freedom of its own and such freedom can be interfered only when they violate the provisions of the bye-laws and act in an arbitrary manner. When they violate the provisions of the bye-laws and the Act in an arbitrary manner, or resort to activities prejudicial to the interest of the society, their actions will be subject to the supervisory control of the authorities under the Act.[23] Except supervisory role, the State has no administrative control over the day-to-day affairs of a Co-operative society.[24] It will not amount to dominating or interfering with the management or affairs of the Co-operative society so as to be controlled.The supervisory powers are given to the Co-operative Registrar and the executive powers are given to the Secretary with ‘a single object in view, namely, the better working of the Co-operative societies’[25]
AK Ganguly, J. in The Dakshinee Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Nayan Ranjan Das[26] has observed that democratic norms or democratic principles always presuppose regulatory measures since democracy cannot exist without moderation and that such provisions in the Act strengthen the larger interest of the co-operative movement in general.
Our Apex Court, in Thalappalam Ser. Co-op. Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala,[27] it is pointed out that the final authority of a society vests in the general body of its members and every society is managed by the managing committee constituted in terms of the bye-laws, and unequivocally held that the powers of Registrar of Co-operative Societies are only ‘regulatory or supervisory’ in nature and it ‘will not amount to dominating or interfering with the management or affairs of the society so as to be controlled’.
18. States’ Amendments/Acts Empower Registrar
Though the Central Act does not specifically empower the Registrar to enquire into the affairs of the society, various States’ Amendments/Acts provide for the same.
Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act
Considering Section 36(1) of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, it is held in CMS Evangelical Suvi David Vs. District Registrar[28] that the power of the Registrar to enquire into the affairs of the society was only to hold a summary inquiry for his own satisfaction. The said power cannot be construed as the power of appeal. Under Section 36, the Registrar has not been empowered to adjudicate upon the conflicting claims to represent the society based upon question of fact. A plain reading of Section 36 shows that the Registrar could look only the provisions of the Act and the Rules and prima facie materials to arrive at a conclusion either to believe or not to believe.
The power of the Registrar to call for information and explanation under Section 34 does not contemplate any power to examine witnesses or to allow opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses. The power is incidental and it is only for the purpose of maintaining correct records. As the power to conduct inquiry is only limited – in order to find out whether constitution of members are valid – the inquiry is limited only for the purpose of making entries in the register. However, the exercise of power must not be arbitrary as the orders passed or directions issued by the Registrar are amenable to challenge in the Writ Jurisdiction.[29]
19. Super-session of Governing Body by Government – M.P. Act
A few States, in their Societies Registration Acts, give power, to the Government to supersede societies. Section 32 of the MP Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, Registrar is authorised to hold an enquiry into the constitution and working and financial conditions of the society. Section 33 of the Act speaks of supersession[30] of the Governing Body by the State Government by removing the governing body and appointing a person or persons to manage the affairs of the society for a specified period not exceeding two years in the first instance.
Sec. 33 of the MP Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973 reads:
“33. Super-session of Governing Body.— (1) If, in the opinion of the Government, governing body of any State aided society—
(a) persistently makes default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under this Act, regulations or bye-laws of the society or by any lawful order passed by the State Government or Registrar, or is unwilling to perform such duties, or
(b) commits acts which are prejudicial to the interest of society or its members, or
(c) is otherwise not functioning properly, the State Government may, by order in writing, remove the governing body and appoint a person or persons to manage the affairs of the society for a specified period not exceeding two years in the first instance.
Provided that where it is proposed to remove the governing body of the society exclusively on the ground that election to the governing body were not held in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the regulations or bye-taws made thereunder, no action shall be taken under this sub-section unless the Registrar or an officer authorised by him in this behalf has convened a meeting of the General body for conducting the election thereto in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or the Regulations or bye-laws made thereunder but has failed to get the new governing body elected.
Provided further that the Registrar or the Officer authorised by him shall, for the purpose of conducting election, have all the necessary powers under the Act or the Regulations or bye-laws made thereunder.
(2) No order under Sub-section (1) shall be made unless the governing body has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed order and representation, if any, made by it, is considered.
(3) …. (4) ….. (5) …. (6) …. (7) …. (8) …..”
It is held in Suresh Vs. State of MP[31] that the power of supersession was not an administrative power but was a quasi-judicial in nature. In Indian National Congress Vs. Institute of Social Welfare[32] it is observed by the Supreme Court, when it considered as to what constitutes exercise of quasi judicial power, as under:
“24. The legal principles laying down when an act of a statutory authority would be a quasi-judicial act, which emerge from the aforestated decisions are these: Where
(a) a statutory authority empowered under a statute to do \any act
(b) which would prejudicially affect the subject
(c) although there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and subject and
(d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi-judicial.”
20. Power to Grant Interim Orders by Registrar – Karnataka Act
Section 25 of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act provides for an enquiry into the constitution and working of the registered society by the Registrar on his own motion or on the application of the majority of the members or on the complaint given by 1/3rd members of the society. The Act further gives power to the Registrar to issue notice for general body meeting of the society and require the governing body of the society to call a general meeting and to determine such matters as may be directed by him. The Registrar has the ancillary powers to summon any person and examine him.
It is held in Advocates Association Vs. District Registrar and Registrar of Societies[33] that if certain material irregularities were brought to the notice of the registrar and if he was of the opinion that granting of an interim order pending disposal of the enquiry was in furtherance of final order to be passed, the power can be traced under Section 25 itself regarding enquiry. It was observed that the authority which was supposed to hold an enquiry would have the power to grant an interim order, in aid of the final relief, even though it may not be traced to any of the provisions of the Act.
21. Powers of Registrar to Direct Election – Karnataka Act
Following Kodava Samaj, Bangalore Vs. District Registrar of Registration of Societies, Bangalore[34] it is held in Advocates Association Vs. District Registrar and Registrar of Societies[35] that under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act the Registrar has power to direct the society to hold an election, because an enquiry into the constitution and working of the registered society would include the enquiry into the propriety of continuation by a Working Committee and the need to elect a new committee if the existing working committee functions contrary to the bye-laws of the society. Section 25 (2) (c) should be read so as to include a power in the Registrar to direct the holding of the election to the general body if the occasion demands.
Registrar under the Manipur Societies Registration Act has locus standi to file a Writ Petition challenging election of Managing Committee on behalf of a society though the Regulation of the society empowers secretary to file suit on behalf of the society.[36]
22. Powers of Registrar Do Not Bar Civil Court Jurisdiction
The regulatory powers as to registration of a Society vested with the Registrar do not confer any authority on the Registrar to interfere with the affairs, including the election process, of the Society. The scope of exercising power under Section 4 of the Societies Registration Act is only to the limited extent of examining whether the list furnished is false or bogus. The above referred limited purpose is fulfilled the moment the list is furnished pursuant to an election. If the parties have any grievance against selection, they are free to approach the civil court.[37] When more than one return is filed, the Registrar has got the power to find out as to which one he should accept. There may not be an elaborate enquiry. Prima facie he has to satisfy as to which return is to be accepted. Such an enquiry made by the Registrar and the decision taken from it does not become final. The dispute can be taken up before a competent court as to who are the members of the governing body.[38]
23. Powers of Registrar: Only Enabling Provision
Several State-Societies-Registration-Acts and Amendments to the Societies Registration Act provide for enquiry by Registrar into the constitution, working and financial conditions of the society. In D Dhanapal Vs. D David Livingstone[39] it is held that the suit filed for declaration that the plaintiff continues to be the Secretary of the Society is maintainable. Section 36 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act does not reveal any express bar to the Civil Courts. Section 36 is merely an enabling provision. If the aggrieved party approaches the Registrar or the Registrar acts on his own motion, then, it shall be lawful for the Registrar to conduct an enquiry and communicate the report of the enquiry. It does not mean to deem it as a bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. There must be at least some implication to show that the Civil Court cannot entertain such suits.
24. Powers of Registrar on Defunct Society: May Cancel Registration
Certain state enactments and state amendments to So. Regn. Act empower the Registrars of Societies to cancel[40] the registration of societies for violation of the provisions under Sec. 4 of the So. Regn. Act.
It is held in CMS Evangelical Suvi David Vs. District Registrar[41] that the intention of the Legislature was not to confer a power of supersession of the Committee on the Registrar as, such power was vested only in the Government;[42] and even when the Registrar was satisfied after enquiry[43] that the society which had contravened any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder, or the society was insolvent or the business of any such registered society was conducted fraudulently or not in accordance with the bye-laws or the objects specified in the memorandum filed with the Registrar, he may only cancel the registration.
From the object and scheme of the Societies Registration Acts it is legitimate to state that even if the registration of a society can be cancelled by the Registrar for it becomes defunct[44] the same would not set free the society, once registered, from the provisions as to dissolution in the Societies Registration Act. As per the Societies Registration Act, on dissolution, the left-behind-property of a society goes to another society as determined by the members of the society or by the court (S. 14) for being managed by some other charitable organization and to be utilised for like purposes.[45]
25. No power to Registrar to Direct Fresh Election
It is with Civil Court
Registrar has no jurisdiction to meddle with election disputes.[46] It is also held in CMS Evangelical Suvi David Vs. District Registrar[47] that the power under Sub-Section (9) of Section 36 cannot be stretched to a power on the Registrar to direct the registered society to hold fresh election. A direction to hold fresh election would amount to indirectly setting aside the earlier election and such power is not conferred on the Registrar under any of the provisions of the Act. So long as the election is not declared invalid in the manner known to law, no direction for fresh election could be ordered. Validity of the election could very well be decided only by the competent Civil Court as the parties are entitled to let in their evidence to sustain their respective claims. In the event the Registrar satisfies himself as to the particulars furnished in Form VII as correct, he should enter the names in the register maintained for that purpose. In the event if he does not satisfy as to the particulars and thereby does not accept Form VII, he has to issue a direction relegating the parties to approach the Civil Court for appropriate orders.
26. Effect of Failure to File Documents u/s 4 or of Becoming Defunct
Non-renewal does not infer, society is defunct.
Non-renewal of the registration of a society may be a bar to avail the benefits offered to registered societies, but the same by itself will not lead the inference that the society is not in existence.[48] Burden will be with those who wish to rebut the presumption; and, in any case, such a society can no more be regarded as a registered society.[49]Several State-amendments[50] to the So. Regn. Act, 1860 and State-Societies-Registration-Acts[51] also made specific provisions for imposing fine on the societies (or its office bearers) which make default in complying with the requirements of Sec. 4.
In Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate[52] it is held by Our Apex Court that in the event of becoming a society defunct, or failure to file documents under Sec. 4 of the So. Regn. Act, there is no bar to revive its activities and to conduct the election of the office bearers. It is held in this decision as under:
“A society need not necessarily be held to have become defunct only because certain statutory provisions have not been complied with by it.”
It was further observed that the courts cannot set aside such elections on the sole ground that certain statutory provisions have not been complied with by it. Right to contest an election of an office-bearer of the society is a statutory right of the member thereof. Such a right also exists under the bye-laws of the society. If a society fails to file with the Registrar the documents required under Sec. 4, a presumption may arise that it is defunct.
But, it was held by our Apex Court in Nand Deo Pandey Vs. Committees of Management[53] that properly constituted committee of management was required to continue the proceedings of inquiry against the Principal of a Vidyalaya. The Managing Committee was held to have ceased to be valid due to non-renewal of the registration of the society and non-holding of periodical elections under the provisions of the Societies’ Registration (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960. In Parshvanath Jain Temple Vs. LRs. of Prem Dass[54] it was observed by the Rajasthan High Court that irregularity, if any, on account of non-registration of the Trust under the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act at the time of institution of the suit could be cured with the registration of the Trust. It was held that the bar under Section 29 of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act was only against the hearing and final decision of the suit and not against the institution of the suit itself.
27. States Usually Insist Registration for Its Assistances
Usually, for extending State’s assistances, especially financial, registration of societies under a proper Act is insisted, for it ensures supervision of officials.
[1] NagappaChettiar Vs. Madras Race Club AIR 1951 Mad 831.
Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj: AIR 1946 Bom 516;
Shridhar Misra Vs. Jaihandra: AIR 1959 All 598;
CL Joseph Vs. Jos: AIR 1965 Ker 68;
Star Tiles Works Vs. N. Govindan AIR 1959 Ker 254.
[44] Sub-section (2) of Section of M.P. Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973 deals with the power of Registrar to dissolve the society if a society has become defunct or has been persistently making default in the observance of the provisions of the Act, or the regulations or byelaws made thereunder.
[45] Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458: Para 23.
Dadar Ashram Trust Society Vs. Mahathma Gandhi KakshiVidyapeeth: AIR 2017 All. 60
[46] All. Muslim Welfare Society Vs. Asst. Registrar: AIR 1992 All. 43;
All India Council Vs. Asst. Registrar: AIR 1988 All. 236 .
[48] Committee of Management Vs. Commissioner, Kanpur Region: 2008 -1 AWC 695; 2008 -1 ADJ 706; 2008-70 All LR 368.
[49] In Mrigan Maity Vs. Daridra Bandhab Bhandar: 2011-4 Cal LT 226 it is observed that though only a few members of the society have shown any interest in matters pertaining to the society for 36 years or so, it might still not be presumed that the society was defunct that would warrant dissolution under the So. Rgn. Act.
[50] Assam, Orissa, Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Nagaland, Pondicherry, etc. Maharashtra Amendment to Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Sub Sec. 5 of Sec. 3A) lays down that a society which fails to get its certificate of registration renewed in accordance with this section with one year from the expiration of the period for which the certificate was operative shall become an unregistered society.
[51] Karnataka, MP, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Travancore-Cochin, etc.
[52] AIR 2007 SC 1337. Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Netaji Cricket Club [(2005) 4 SCC 741: AIR 2005 SC 592] referred to in this decision.
Clubs and Societies are voluntary associations of persons. Article 19(1)(c) of our Constitution guarantees freedom to form associations and unions. It includes in itself the right of effective functioning so as to achieve its lawful objectives.[1]
The Clubs and Societies, as understood in our legal system, are identified in English Common Law as ‘Members’ Clubs’ and ‘Friendly Societies’.
2. Differentiating Features Between Clubs and Societies
It is difficult to pinpoint the differentiating features. Nomenclature of an Association, as Club or Society, by itself, may not be a decisive factor. For distinguishing Clubs from Societies, following characteristics, seen generally attached to Clubs, can be relied on.
(i) Recreation, or social interaction for mutual benefit of the members, is prime object.
(ii) Funded by equal contribution of members, as membership-fee and subscriptions.
(iii) Property is joint property of the members, and not encumbered with obligations of ‘trust’ so as to benefit outsiders; and, therefore, they are freely dealt with by the members as they wish (subject to the bye laws).
(iv) Interaction between members being higher, compared to Societies, new membership is given on a serious scrutiny. The membership fee and rate of subscriptions are comparatively high.
(v) Usually registered under the Companies Act, for getting legal identity.
General features of Societies can be summarised, for the purpose of distinguishing them from Clubs, as under:
(i ) Societies are formed for accomplishing social, charitable or benevolent objectives.
(ii) They are funded, mainly, on voluntary donations from members or outsiders.
(iii) Property of a Society (though theoretically joint property of the members) is maintained for benefit of persons other than the members also (and therefore encumbered with obligations pertaining to ‘trust’).
(iv) Acquisition of membership in Societies will be easier and membership fee and rate of subscriptions thereof will be comparatively low.
(v) Societies are registered under the Central or State Societies Registration Act, for acquiring legal identity and recognition.
3. Club: Definitions
Halsbury’s Laws of England: ‘Club’ is defined in the Halsbury’s Laws of England[2] as under:
“A club, except a proprietary club or an investment club, may be defined as a society of persons associated together, not for the purposes of trade, but for social reasons, the promotion of politics, sport, art, science or literature, or for any other lawful purpose; but trading activities will not destroy the nature of a club if they are merely incidental to the club’s purposes.”
Black’s Law Dictionary
In the Black’s Law Dictionary club is expounded as ‘a voluntary, incorporated or unincorporated association of persons for purposes of a social, literary, or political nature, or the like.’[3]
Daly’s Club Law
Daly’s Club Law[4] describes a club as ‘essentially an association of individuals in a way that involves to some degree the factors of free choice (which connotes a power of exclusion), permanence, corporate identity and the pursuit as a common aim of some joint interest other than the acquisition of gains.’
4. Members’ Club and Proprietary Club
Clubs are categorised into two main classes: ‘Members’ Club’ and ‘Propriety Club’.
Members’ Club: A ‘Members’ Club’ is a voluntary association of persons joining together in accordance with the rules and bye-laws of the club fundamentally for enjoying certain facilities or for availing specified mutually beneficial objectives and purposes.
Halsbury’s Laws of England[5] describes Members’ Club as a society of persons each of whom contributes to the funds out of which the expenses of conducting the society are paid. The contribution is generally made by means of membership fees or subscriptions, or both.
In Members’ Club, subject to any rule to the contrary, members of the time being are joint owners, in equal shares, of all the properties of the Club. The relationship between the Club and the members is governed by the doctrine of mutuality; every member is a shareholder and every shareholder is a member.[6]
On the dissolution of a Members’ Club the property and assets are sold and realised, and after the discharge of the debts and liability of the club the surplus is divisible equally amongst the members for the time being, other than the honorary members, subject to any provision in the rules to the contrary.[7]
Proprietary Club: Propriety Club is controlled and administered by proprietor. The members are customers of proprietor; and they are not the owners of or interested in the property of the club.[8] The proprietor utilizes surplus income as profit and appropriates the same for his own benefit. There are wide variation in the nature and activity of propriety club and many of them are purely commercial undertakings. In India, Proprietary Clubs are usually seen established by Companies.
5. Unincorporated and Incorporated Clubs
Clubs can be incorporated under the Companies Act;[9] and on that basis, there are two classes: Unincorporated Clubs and Incorporated Clubs.
An incorporated company has a separate existence and the law recognises it as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. This new personality emerges from the moment of its incorporation and its rights and obligations are different from those of its shareholders. The company is holding its property and carrying on its business is not agent of its shareholders.[10]
Sec. 8 of the Companies Act, 2013 deals with companies with charitable objects, etc. It reads:
8. Formation of companies with charitable objects, etc
(1) Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Central Government that a person or an association of persons proposed to be registered under this Act as a limited company—
(a) has in its objects the promotion of commerce, art, science, sports, education, research, social welfare, religion, charity, protection of environment or any such other object;
(b) intends to apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects; and
(c) intends to prohibit the payment of any dividend to its members, the Central Government may, by licence issued in such manner as may be prescribed, and on such conditions as it deems fit, allow that person or association of persons to be registered as a limited company under this section without the addition to its name of the word “Limited”, or as the case may be, the words “Private Limited” and thereupon the Registrar shall, on application, in the prescribed form, register such person or association of persons as a company under this section.
6. Societies Registered under Societies Registration Act
Societies predicated in the Societies Registration Act, 1860 are the ‘associations of persons for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose’; and no recreation club can be registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Acts.
A society formed for religious purposes can also be registered under the Societies Registration Act as the society formed for religious purposes would also ordinarily be a Society for charitable purposes.[11] But, it is held by the Patna High Court in Md. Yunus Vs. The Inspector General of Registration[12] that the Societies Registration Act does not embrace purposes which are religious or predominantly religious. It is explained in Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate by our Apex Court that when the Church, indisputably, carries on secular activities also, keeping in view the interest of the general public, there is no reason as to why in a case of mismanagement of such (registered) charitable organisations, although run by minorities, the Court cannot oversee its functions.[13]
Sec. 1 and 20 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 deal with registration of societies, etc. It reads:
1. Societies formed by memorandum of association and registration
Any seven or more persons associated for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose, or for any such purpose as is described in section 20 of this Act, may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association, and filing the same with Registrar of Joint-stock Companies form themselves into a society under this Act.
20. To what societies Act applies–
The following societies may be registered under this Act: Charitable societies, the military orphan funds or societies established at the several presidencies of India, societies established for the promotion of science, literature or the fine arts, for instruction, the diffusion of useful knowledge (the diffusion for political education), the foundation or maintenance of libraries or reading-rooms for general use among the members or open to the public museums and galleries of paintings and other works or art, collections of natural history,
7. Can a Literary/Charitable Club be Registered under So. Regn Act
Sec. 14 of the So. Regn. Act provides the provisions for dissolution. It lays down that upon the dissolution of a society registered under this Act, the property of that society shall not be distributed among the members, but shall be given to some other society, as directed in this Section. In the proviso to this Section, it is stated:
“Clause not to apply to Joint-stock Companies: Provided, however, that this clause shall not apply to any society which has been founded or established by the contributions of share-holders in the nature of a Joint-stock Company.”
It is clear from the Proviso to Sec. 14 of the So. Regn. Act that Associations ‘in the nature of a Joint-stock Company’ can also be registered under the So. Regn. Act. Therefore, it is legitimate to state that an Association in the nature of a club – not for recreation but, ‘for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose’ (and not encumbered with obligations of ‘trust’ so as to benefit outsiders) too can be registered under the Societies Registration Act. Property of such an Association/society is the joint property of the members; and, therefore, they are entitled to freely deal with the same as they wish (subject to the bye laws).
8. Unincorporated Clubs and Unregistered Societies
General principles as to the individual membership rights (so also the rights and responsibilities of the governing body members) of unincorporated clubs and unregistered societies are similar. Halsbury’s Laws of England describe Unincorporated members’ club as under:
“205. Unincorporated Members’ Clubs. – An unincorporated members’ club is a society of persons each of whom contributes to the funds out of which the expenses of conducting the society are paid. The contribution is generally made by means of entrance fees or subscriptions, or both. The society is not a partnership, because the members are not associated with a view to profit, nor, for the same reason, is it an association requiring registration as a company. It is not recognised as having any legal existence apart from the members of which it is composed. Subject to any rule to the contrary, the property and funds of the club belong to the members of the time being jointly in equal shares; and if provisions are supplied to a member, at a given price, this does not constitute a sale, but is in effect a release by the other members of their interest in the goods supplied. The transaction is not of a commercial nature and, consequently, is not controlled by the provisions of the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968. The peculiar nature of the transaction is of particular significance in relation to the supply of intoxicating liquor.”
9. Guarantees of Freedom to Form Associations, not Absolute
Right to form associations or unions is guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. But, it is subjected to the restrictions in clause (4) of Article 19.[14]
Article 19 lays down:
Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. –
(1) All citizens shall have the right-
(a)…. (b) ….
(c) to form associations or unions, co-operative societies;
(d) … (e) … (f) … (g) . …
(2) …. (3) …
(4) Nothing in Sub -clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause.
(5) … (6) ….”
10. Enactments Governing Trusts, Societies and Clubs in India
‘Trust and Trustees’ and ‘Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions’ are subjects of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, under Entry No.10 and 28, respectively; thereby both the Centre and the States are competent to legislate on these subjects. A non-profit association can be formed under Section 8 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013.
The legal form of a charitable institution is identified by the nature of business it undertakes. Charitable organisations in India are registered, mainly, under three laws:
Societies Registration Act
(State) Public Trusts Act
Companies Act, 2003.
The Societies Registration Act, 1860 and various State-Societies-Registration-Acts (Rajasthan, Karnataka, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Jammu – Kashmir) do not require compulsory registration of Societies.Nevertheless, Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 requires compulsory registration of certain societies.
All public charitable trusts in the state of Maharashtra are governed by the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. States like Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh etc. also have Public Trusts Act. Several other states in India have no Trust Act at all. Wakf Acts and Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Acts also govern various religious public organisations.
11. Associations Attracted S. 8(1) of the Companies Act, 2013
Section 8 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013, lays down that an association of persons with charitable objects can be registered under this Act. It should have ‘in its objects the promotion of commerce, art, science, sports, education, research, social welfare, religion, charity, protection of environment or any such other object’ and it should be one which ‘intends to apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects’.
12. Unlike a Company, a Registered Society is not a Juristic Person[15]
‘Persons’ are of two kinds: human beings and legal persons. The second class is the institutions and associations of persons upon which the law incorporates or attributes legal personality. They are formed either on registration under a statute like Companies Act, or under a particular enactment such as English East India Company, Municipal Corporations, Life Insurance Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, etc. Apart from companies, corporations etc. our system accept idols in temples also as legal persons.
A Company is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold property. It is held by our Apex Court in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi[16] that the vesting of legal ownership of the property of a society in the governing body is merely a method or mechanism permitted by the law; and, it was pointed out that the very resort to the machinery of trustees or the governing body for the time being acquiring and holding the properly showed that there was no intention to incorporate the society or union so as to give it a corporate capacity for the purpose of holding and acquiring property and that they confer certain privileges on a registered Society, which would be wholly unnecessary if the registered society were a corporation.
The members of a club or society, both registered and unregistered, are bound by the memorandum of association and its rules and regulations. The bye laws bind its members as a contract. Even the formation of a society itself is based on a contract. When a person becomes a member of the society, he would have no independent rights, and lose his individuality qua the society except those that are given to him by the statutes concerned and bye laws; and the rights of members merge in the rights of the society. In State of UP Vs. CD Chheoki Employees Co-operative Society, AIR 1997 SC 1413, our Apex Court explicated it with the analogy that the stream cannot rise higher than the source. It reads:
“Thus, it is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) to become a member of a Cooperative Society. His right is governed by the provisions of the statute. So, the right to become or to continue being a member of the society is a statutory right. On fulfillment of the qualifications prescribed to become a member and for being a member of the society and on admission, he becomes a member. His being a member of the society is subject to the operation of the Act, Rules and bye-laws applicable from time to time. A member of the society has no independent right qua the society and it is the society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, Rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, Rules and the bye-laws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot rise higher than the source.”
(Quoted in Zoroastrian Co-op. H. Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar: AIR 2005 SC 2306; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774; Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. Devinder Singh: AIR 2007 SC 1723.)
Acts Reasonably Ancillary or Conducive to the Objects
An act beyond the powers conferred by law, or an act violative of the objects envisaged in the foundational document or memorandum of a company, an association or a trust, is termed ‘ultra vires’ act. But, if the act done by a company, association or trust is fairly incidental or reasonably ancillary to its main business or conducive to the statement of the objects of the company, association or trust, unless such an act is expressly prohibited, cannot be held to be ultra vires.
No Alteration of Fundamental Principles of Foundation and Trust
It is not open for the majority of the members of an association to alter the fundamental principles upon which it is founded, unless such a power is specifically reserved. This principle explained in Prasanna Venkiaesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao. (AIR 1931 Mad. 12; Relied on: Milligan Vs. Mitchel: 40 ER 852; Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun: (1904) AC 515. See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh (2007-4 Raj LW 3547).
In Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun, House of Lords (by a majority of 5-2) found that the minority was entitled to the assets of the Free Church. It was observed that when men subscribe money for a particular object, and leave it behind them for the promotion of that object, their successors have no right to change the object endowed. It was held that, by adopting new standards of doctrine (and particularly by abandoning its commitment to ‘the establishment principle’, which was held to be fundamental to the Free Church), the majority had violated the conditions on which the property of the Free Church was held.
Ultra Vires Acts are Void
Though the configuration of a society differs from that of a company, general principles as to various administrative affairs of a registered society are similar to that of a company.
A company is a juristic person. The actions and functioning of a company differ from that of a natural person who is free to act on his whims and fancies. The actions and functioning of a company are limited by the Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of Company. A corporation or a company has no inherent common law rights. Any act of a company (save a case of indoor management) ultra vires its Memorandum and Articles of Association, even if backed by the Resolution of the Board of Directors, is void and not enforceable. A contract made by the Directors of a company upon a matter not included in the Memorandum of Association is ultra vires and is not binding on the company. Such a contract does not become binding on the company even though afterwards expressly assented to at a General Meeting of shareholders, being void in its inception. A company is competent to carry out its objects specified in the Memorandum of Association and cannot travel beyond the objects. An ultra vires contract by a company is analogous to and stands on the same footing as a contract by an infant or a minor and in which case there is total incapacity. Just like a consent decree founded on the incompetency of an infant or minor is void and a nullity, a contract founded on the incompetency of the company is void and a nullity. These principles are recapped in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. Vs. Riche.
The principles in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. Ltd. Vs. Riche have been followed in A. Lakshmana-swami Mudaliar Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India, In Re – Steel Equipment and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. etc.
13. Co-Operative Societies, Creatures of the Statute
Co-operative Societies Acts provide for juristic personality to Co-operative societies. In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana[18] our Apex Court held ‘a co-operative society is a corporation as commonly understood’ inasmuch as the same has the status of a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold property, enter into contracts, institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purposes for which it is constituted.[19]
Co-operative societies being creatures of the statute, once a Co-operative Society is formed and registered, the rights of the society and that of its members stand abridged by the provisions of the Act. The activities of the societies are controlled by the statute. Therefore, there cannot be any objection to statutory interference with their composition or functioning merely on the ground of contravention of individual’s right of freedom of association by statutory functionaries.[20]
But, when the association has an option/choice to get it registered under a particular (Co-operative Societies’) statute,[21] if there are more than one statute operating in the field, the State cannot force the society to get itself registered under a statute for which the society has not applied. If the State does so, it will ‘violate Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India’.Ninety Seventh Amendment of our Constitution provided constitutional status to the Co-operative Societies and it has brought out radical changes in the concept of Co-operative Societies. Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a Co-operative Society.
Vesting of property
In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India,[17] reiterating the earlier view, it is held by our Apex Court that a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate,and that the mere fact of registration of a Society under the Societies Registration Act will not make the said Society distinct from association of persons.In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. A society, whether registered or unregistered, is not capable of owning any property or of suing or being sued in its own name.
14. Regd. Society: Members do not have any Beneficial Interest
Members have no interest other than that of bare trustees
During the subsistence of a registered society, or on its dissolution, the members do not have any proprietary or beneficial enjoyment/interest (that is, ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner) in the property the society holds.[22] But, in companies, the share-holders hold the property as their own.
In Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[23] it is held as under:
“The Societies Registration Act, therefore, does not create in the members of the registered society any interest other than that of bare trustees. What all the members are entitled to, is the right of management of the properties of the society subject to certain conditions.”
Underhill, in his treatise, ‘Law of Trusts and Trustees’, explained:
“However, the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the Association for the time being. The members for the time being cannot under the Association rules appropriate trust property for themselves for there would then be no property held on trust as intended by the testator for those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the Association for the time being.” [24]
15. Formation of Associations and Running Business
A fundamental right to form the association cannot be coupled with the fundamental right to carry on any trade or business.[25] The right of the citizens to form the association is different from running the business by that association. Therefore, right of individuals to form a society has to be understood in a completely different context.
Expulsion of a Member from Society or Club
The associations have the right to manage their affairs by themselves. They have the right to enforce the internal discipline even by expelling an erring member. Since expulsion of a member from society or club visits him with harsh adversities, it will always be an exceptional decision and it has to be taken only in exceptional circumstances. It has to be done cautiously and after due considerations. And, it should also be strictly in accordance with law.
‘Suit By or Against a Regd. So.’ is Virtually Suit By or Against Entire Members
A society or a club, both registered and unregistered, is the compendium of its members. When it sues or is sued all its members should be made parties. Registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status. The common expression, ‘suit by or against a society’, legally and virtually denotes suit by or against its entire members.
From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act, that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ “as” President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees.
Civil Courts’ Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs of a Society or Club
Unless by express mode or by necessary implication barred, civil courts’ jurisdiction permeates into every civil matter including that of the private associations and even clubs. When the affairs of such institutions, associations etc. are governed by statutes, the courts test the validity of their actions on the touch stone of such statutes. If such bodies are not directly governed by any statute but being administered under their own rules, bye laws etc., their impugned actions are tested in the light of those rules or bye laws. The courts enquire whether their acts were in conformity with those rules and bye laws, and following the principles of natural justice. See Blog: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs
How to Sue Societies, Clubs
An unregistered society or a club is not a legal person; and therefore, it has to sue or be sued only in the name of all its members. It can be done invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC which enables one or more of ‘numerous’ persons having common interest to sue or be sued in a representative character.
When a suit is filed by a member seeking reliefs concerning the society or a club, relating to a matter common to all members, he has to file it (also) as representing other members of the society other than the defendants (usually office-bearers of the society or club); and if it is a personal matter of the plaintiff, seeking relief against all other members, the plaintiff has to sue against one or two members (usually office-bearers) as representatives of others.
Suit Against Regd. Societies shall be in the Personal Name of President, Chairman, etc.
Suing entire members of the society, either in person or invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC, is the normal rule. But, Sec. 6 enables to sue or be sued every registered society in the name of its president, secretary, etc., as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society (or through such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion).
From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ as President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees. See Blog: How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies
16. General Principles in Company Law Apply to Regd. Society.
The principal difference between a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and a company corporate is that a company is a juristic person by virtue of it being a body corporate, whereas the society, even when it is registered, is not possessed of these characteristics.[26]
The general principles governing rights of a member in a registered society, and the right of suit of a member, would be similar to that of an individual share holder’s rights in a company. Following are recognised by Courts as individual membership rights in a company: (i) Right to vote, (ii) right to stand as a candidate for election as a director and (iii) set-right illegal acts.[27] The general principles as to the rights and responsibilities of the directors of a company also apply to the governing body members of a society.
17. Role of Societies in society
After laying down the legal status of the Societies, our Apex Court observed in Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India[28] that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act play an important role in society. They discharge various functions which are beneficial to the society. They run educational and other institutions. They sometimes work in public interest and act in aid of State functions. They have their own accountability. They sometimes incur liabilities. Public interest litigations filed by Societies are galore.
[1] AP Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298;
Under English law of trusts, there is ‘duel ownership’ over the trust property.
First is the ‘legal ownership’. It is vested with trustees.
The other is the ‘equitable or beneficial ownership’. It is vested with the beneficiaries.
Indian law on trusts differs from English-Trust-Law on the doctrine of ‘duel ownership’. Because, under Indian law:
Trustee is the ‘sole’ (legal) owner of the trust property.
Beneficiaries do not have ‘beneficial ownership’; they have only ‘beneficial interest’.
Trustees only ‘hold’ the trust property, and it is for mere administration.
Trustees hold the trust property for the ‘benefit of the beneficiaries’; not ‘on their behalf‘.
Since the trustees only ‘hold’ the properties for the beneficiaries, no legal ‘title’ vests with the trustees, though they have legal ‘ownership’.
2. Salmond Propounds doctrine of ‘Duel Ownership’
Under English law, when the author of the trust creates a trust, by the dedication of the endowed property, he transfers the ‘legal ownership’ on the trust-property to the trustees and ‘beneficial ownership’ to the beneficiaries. Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th Edition, page 256) refers these propositions as under:
“A trustee is the legal owner of the property, the actual owner thereof having lost title thereto by the creation of a trust. The equitable ownership in the trust property vests in the beneficiaries. The trust is thus an incident of dual ownership in which the creator of the trust no longer figures.”
3. Doctrine of ‘Duel Ownership’ has no Universal Acceptance.
Doctrine of duel-ownership on trust property is peculiar to English law. It has no universal acceptance.
In The I Congresso Del Partido [(1977) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 536 ] the Queen’s Bench Division (Admiralty Court) pointed out that the trust-concept ‘involving a dichotomy between legal and equitable ownership is unknown tosome, and perhaps most, other jurisdictions’. [Referred to in Owners and Parties Interested in the Vessel M.V. “Dong Do” v. Ramesh Kumar, (2000) 1 Cal LT 367 ].
Definition of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882
Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 defines trust as under:
“Trust: A ‘trust’ is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner:
From the definition it is clear that ‘Trust’, in law, holds the following conceptions:
Trust is ‘an obligation’ upon the trustee.
It is to administer the endowed property.
The administration must be done by the trustee as if he is the owner.
It must be done by him accepting the desire of the author.
And, the same must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
4. ‘Trustee’is the Sole ‘Owner’ According to the Definition of ‘Trust’
From the definition of ‘trust’ in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 it is clear that the Act does not recognise ‘beneficial ownership’ in the beneficiaries. It recognises ‘ownership in trustee’ alone.
The definition of trust in Sec. 3 can be analysed as under:
(i) A ‘trust’ is an obligation-
annexed to the ownership of property (to administer), and
(i) arising out of a confidence reposed in (trustee, by the author) and accepted by the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner), or (ii) declared and accepted by him(that is, trustee),#
for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner (that is, trustee, the legal owner).
#the obligation that is declared and accepted by the same person. This situation comes-up when the the author himself declares to act as trustee. See notes below under the head: ‘Obligation … Declared And Accepted By Him’.
(ii) Confidence is ‘Reposed’ by the Author
Trust is defined to be an obligation arising out of a confidence ‘reposed in’ (the owner/trustee). When the ‘author of the trust’ is defined, it is stated:
“The person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the ‘author of the trust’.”
Therefore, it is definite that the words, ‘confidence reposed in the owner’, denote the confidence that is ‘reposed’ by the author ‘in the owner’. (Allahabad Bank Vs. IT Commr.: AIR 1953 SC 476; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460; Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.)
(iii) The ‘Owner’ in whom the Confidence is ‘Reposed’, is Trustee
As stated above, it is the author who ‘reposes’ the confidence; and the confidence is ‘reposed in’ the ‘owner‘. Then, who is the ‘owner’?
It is trustee. (Khairul Bashar Vs. ThannuLal: AIR1957 All 553; Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co Vs. CIT: 1966-61 ITR 572 (Bom); Christopher Karkada VS Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725; Chockalinga Sethurayar Vs. Arumanayakain: AIR 1969 SC 569; Rajah SagiJanaki Vs. Appururu Bhukta: 1976-2 AndWR 117, 1976-1 APLJ 312; Special Secy. Govt of WB Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; CIT Vs. K Shyamaraju: 1991-1 KantLJ 233; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460.)
The nexus between owner and trustee is clear from the definitions of ‘trust’ and ‘trustee’.
When ‘trust’ is defined, it is stated:
the confidence is ‘accepted by the owner’;
When ‘trustee’ is defined, it is stated:
the confidence is ‘accepted by the trustee’.
According to the definition of trust, the ‘obligation’ stands ‘annexed to the ownership’ of the trust-property. Sec. 6 of the Trusts Act makes it clear that ‘a trust is created when the author of the trust transfers the trust property to the trustee’. Therefore, the ‘obligation’ upon the trustee casts a duty upon him to administer the trust-property as (if) he is its ‘owner’.
(iv) The definition of Trust can be explained as under:
A trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property,
Trust is an obligation (upon trustee to administer the trust-property as its (legal) owner. (Sec. 11 of the Trusts Act casts duty on the trustee to execute the trust, by fulfilling ‘the purpose of the trust’, and obeying ‘the directions of the author of the trust’.) (Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; State Bank of India Vs. Spl. Secretary: 1995-Supp. 4 SCC 30; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr. Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152,2002-255 ITR 529)
and arising out of a confidence
Duty of a Trustee is fiduciary in nature. (R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Edl Trust: 1982-21 DLT 46: ILR 1982-1Del 801; Gobinda Chandra Ghosh Vs. Abdul Majid: AIR1944 Cal 163)(Paru Vs. Chiruthai: 1985 KerLJ 480, 1985 KerLT 563: Referred: UN Mitra’s Law of Limitation and Prescription, 9th Edn., Vol. II, at page 1574, Para 66; Bhavna Nalinkant Vs. Commr Gift Tax: 2002-174 CTR 152: 2002-255 ITR 529; CBSE Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay: AIR 2011 SCW 4888: 2011-8 SCC 497; Reserve Bank of India Vs. Jayantilal N. Mistry: AIR 2016 SC 1.) It is moral as well as legal. (Dinshaw Rusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557.)
reposed in
Confidence is reposed in Trustee (by the Author). (Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW(Raj) 273; Canara Bank Vs. State of Kerala: AIR 1982 Ker 1: ILR 1981-2 Ker 649; R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR 1982-1 Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460.)
and accepted by the owner,
Trustee the (legal) owner, must have accepted the confidence (reposed in by the author).(Mysore Spinning Vs. Commr of IT: ITR 1966-61 572 (Bom); R P Kapur Vs. Kaushalya: 1982-21 DLT 46; ILR 1982-1Del 801; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460; DinshawRusi Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2017 SC 1557. Trustee is the owner: Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram Shah: AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887; Khairul Bashar Vs. Thannu Lal: AIR1957 All 553; Ramdass Trust Vs. Damodardas: 1967 RLW (Raj) 273; Quoted in: Sagar Sharma Vs. Addl. CIT: 2011-239 CTR 169: 2011-52 DTR 89. Benafasilal Rajgorhia Vs. Central Bank of India: 1971-76 Cal WN 807; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993 BCR 301; Chikkamuniyappa Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka: ILR 1997 Kar 2460.)
or declared and accepted by him
Trustee (when author himself is the truste) (Heeralal Vs. Firm RatanlalMahavir Prasad:1964 RajLW 33) can ‘declare and accept’ the ‘confidence’.
for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner.
Author creates trust for the benefit of others. Trustee can be one among the beneficiaries.
5. Indian Law Recognises ‘Legal Ownership‘ on Trustees; Not ‘Title‘
The Privy Council, in Chhatra Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram (AIR 1931 PC 196) held as under:
“The Indian Law does not recognise legal and equitable estates. By that law, therefore, there can be but one owner; and where the property is vested in a trustee, the owner must, their Lordship think, be the trustee. This is the view embodied in the Indian Trusts Act: See Sec. 3, 55, 56, etc. … ” (Quoted in Special Secy. Govt of W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar. 72; Raja Sir Muthiah Chettiar Vs. Commissioner of IT: 1984-38 CTR 76: 1984-17 TAXMAN 142: 1984-148 ITR532: Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Ganga Properties Ltd: 1970-77 ITR 637; Sardarilal Vs. Shrimati Shakuntla Devi: AIR 1961 P&H 378.)
Inasmuch as Indian Law does not recognise legal and equitable estates (‘ownership’) (Chhatra Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196.) and trustee alone has ownership (legal ownership), this ‘ownership’ of trustees is not the ‘legal (or trust) ownership’ that is understood in English law.
In English law, when ‘legal ownership’ is referred to, it denotes ‘legal estate’. It is one component the duel-ownership. It confers a ‘title’ upon the trustee. But, in Indian Law, the trust properties ‘vest’ in the trustees for the limited purpose of administration or management; and the trustees only ‘hold’ the properties. (Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam Vs. Comner. IT, Madras: AIR 1964 Mad 483).
6.Indian Law Does Not Recognise Equitable Ownership (Estate) of Beneficiaries
Similarly, the Indian Trusts Act does not refer to ‘beneficial ownership’; it refers merely to ‘interest’ or ‘beneficial interest’ of the beneficiary. (See: Ram Bharose Sharma Vs. Mahant Ram Swaroop: 2001 AIR- SCW 4062: Mitar Sain Vs. Data Ram: AIR 1926 All 7; Urshottam Vs. Kanhaiyalal: AIR 1966 Raj 70.) It is clear from the following affirmations in the definition of ‘trust’ in Sec. 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882:
(i) “A ‘trust’ is an obligation … arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner… for the benefit of another….”
(ii) “(T)he ‘beneficial interest’… is his (beneficiary’s) right against the trustee as owner of the trust property.”
In English law, when ‘beneficial interest’ is referred to, it denotes – ‘beneficial ownership’ or ‘beneficial estate’, the second component among the duel ownership.
The courts in India have followed the principles in Trusts Act, as to legal ownership of trustees and beneficial interest of the beneficiaries, in Common Law of Trust; and disfavoured doctrine of ‘duel ownership’ (Chhatra Kumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram Shah: AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887; Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Kripashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463, Bai Dosabai Vs. Mathuradas: AIR 1980 SC 1334; Bomi Munchershaw Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op H. Society: 1993-2-BCR-301; Hem Chandra Vs. Suradham Debya: AIR 1940 P.C. 134; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106. Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar: AIR 1957 SC 133; Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73).
Thus, under the Law of Trust in India, trustee holds the trust property as its sole (legal) owner, subject to the obligation to use this ownership for the benefit of the beneficiaries (Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin Vs. Trustees, Maniar Jamat: AIR 1968 Guj 184).
The legal entitlement of beneficiaries in a trust (that is, beneficial interest) is legibly stated in The Province of Bihar v. FR Hayes, 1946-14 ITR 326 (Patna), by Fazl Ali, CJ (as he then was) while interpreting Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act, 1938, referring the definition of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, as under:
“The framers of the Act must be assumed to have known the accepted legal meaning of the expression and also known that the term ‘beneficiary’ in law is not generally used with reference to a full legal owner but with reference to a person who has ‘beneficial interest’ in some property which is usually in the possession and control of another person. The distinction between beneficial interest and legal ownership is one of the most notable features of a trust and in my judgment ‘beneficiaries’ referred to in Section 11 are those persons who have merely beneficial interest in a property while the legal ownership of the property vests in a person or persons who hold the property for their benefit.”
7. Trustee Holds ‘For the Benefit Of’; Not ‘On Behalf Of’ the Beneficiaries
The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 repeatedly lays down – trustees are ‘holding’ trust property (Sec. 10, 29 and Chap. IX: Sec. 80 onwards). It is subject to the obligation to use his ownership ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.
Sec. 10 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:
10. Who may be trustee.—Every person capable of holding property may be a trustee; but, where the trust involves the exercise of discretion, he cannot execute it unless he is competent to contract.
Sec. 29 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:
29. Liability of trustee where beneficiary’s interest is forfeited to Government.—When the beneficiary’s interest is forfeited or awarded by legal adjudication to the Government, the trustee is bound to hold the trust property to the extent of such interest for the benefit of such person in such manner as the State Government may direct in this behalf.
In WO Holdsworth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1957 SC 887; See also: Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106) it is laid down by our Apex Court as under:
“23. Whatever be the position in English Law, the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882) is clear and categoric on this point. … These definitions emphasise that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneficiary only has a right against the trustee as owner of the trust property. The trustee is thus, the legal owner of the trust property and the property vests in him as such. He, no doubt, holds the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries but he does not hold it on their behalf. The expressions ‘for the benefit of’ and ‘on behalf of’ are not synonymous with each other. They convey different meanings.”
Our Apex Court observed in Comm. Wealth Tax Vs. Kirpashanker Dayashankar, AIR 1971 SC 2463, that the trustee holds the trust property ‘on his own right’ and not ‘on behalf of’ someone else though he holds it ‘for the benefit of’ the beneficiaries.Obligations are casted upon trustees, only to manage the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries. It is beyond doubt that the trustee has no ‘proprietary interest’ inasmuch as the beneficial interest is ‘carved out’(Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725; Ramabai Govind Vs. Raghunath Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Special Secy. Govt. of W B Vs. State Bank of India: AIR 1989 Cal 40) in the property itself. (It is not a mere ‘right’ similar to ‘right of easement’ for the dominant owner; but, it is an ‘interest’.) In dealings with the world at large, the trustee personates or represents as the owner of the property (Govardhandhari Devsthan Vs. Collector of Ahmednagar: AIR 1982 Bom 332. Kapoorchand Rajendra Kumar Jain Vs. Parasnath Digambar: 2000-1 MPJR 199).
8. View of Salmond Adopted in Societies Registration Act
While dealing with the chief classes of persons on whose behalf the protection of trusteeship is extended, Salmond on Jurisprudence lays down (12th Edition, page 257) as under:
“Thirdly, it is expedient that property in which large numbers of persons are interested in common should be vested in trustees.”
This ‘wider’ or ‘general’ principle is accepted in the Societies Registration Act when it refers to ‘trustees’ in Sec. 5. It reads as under:
“5. Property of society how vested – The property, movable and immovable, belonging to a society registered under this Act, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body of such society, and in all proceedings, civil and criminal, may be described as the property of the governing body of such society for their proper title.”