Author Archives: sajikoduvath

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

• Easement by ‘Implied Grant’ is a Well-Recognised Category of Easement.
• Implied Grant is an Independent Right (Alternative Way will Not Defeat it).
• Implied Grant can be Inferred from the Circumstances.
• No Express Consideration is Required for the Creation of an Easement by Grant and Implied Grant.
• Grant alone pleaded; Not, Implied Grant – The Supreme Court recognized and allowed the doctrine of Implied Grant (in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622).

Grant in Easements – Three Distinct Legal Connotations under Indian Law

• 1. Theoretical Basis of Every Easementary Right is Grant. The foundation of all easementary rights under Indian law is the concept of grant by the servient owner. Such a grant may be express, as provided in Sections 8 to 12 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882; implied, based on the circumstances of transfer by severance, as contemplated in Section 13; or presumed, from long and continuous use, as recognised under Section 15.
• 2. Implied Grant is a Judicially Recognized Easement. The common law in India recognizes implied grant—distinct from an easement of necessity—as a valid mode of acquiring an easement, even though it is not expressly codified under the Indian Easements Act. Such easements are inferred from the conduct of the parties or from the surrounding circumstances that indicate the intention to grant such a right. Indian courts have upheld this principle in several decisions, including Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, and L. Govindarajulu Chettiar v. V. N. Srinivasalu Naidu, AIR 1972 Mad 307.
• 3. Grant is inferred from Usage and Custom in Customary Easements: The Indian Easements Act also recognises customary easements, which are expressly discerned in Sec. 18 of the Act. In such cases, the right is not assumed to be founded on an express or implied grant in the conventional sense, but it is presumed as imbeded in the long and continuous reasonable use by a particular class of people within a specific locality. That is, the underlying presumption is that a reasonable grant must have once taken place, which now gives way to a valid and acceptable custom. An example would be a village pathway used by local inhabitants over a long time to form a custom. This principle has been upheld in several decisions, including Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89; Harendra Nath Chakraborti v. Asim Sindhu Chakraborty, AIR 1981 Cal 325; and Yohannan v. Mathai, 1991 (1) Ker LJ 605, 1991 KHC 571.

Easement by Implied Grant is a Well-Recognised Category of Easement

A grant may be either express or implied. The latter arises from the circumstances or conduct of the parties involved. Indian common law recognizes implied grant as a legitimate and acceptable mode for the acquisition of easements.

Sree Swayam Prakash Case: Supreme Court only Reaffirmed Previous Legal Position

In Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, the Supreme Court used the term implied-grant to refer to an easement of grant ‘arising by implication’. It is seen that the Supreme Court has only reaffirmed the legal position previously upheld by several High Courts.

• R. Sivanandan v. Rajammal, (1975) 1 Mad LJ 251,
• L. Govindarajulu Chettiar v. V. N. Srinivasalu Naidu, AIR 1972 Mad 307,
• Ratanchand Chordia v. Kasim Khaleel, AIR 1964 Mad 209,
• Annapurna v. Santosh Kumar, AIR 1937 Cal. 661 (referred to in the decision),
• Kuppakkal v. Mathan Chettiar, AIR 1924 Mad 834.

It was held in R. Sivanandan v. Rajammal, (1975) 1 Mad LJ 251, that the plaintiff could found his case on an implied grant of easement even if there was no express grant; and that the argument that the absence of an express grant would negative an implied grant was quite untenable.

In L. Govindarajulu Chettiar v. V. N. Srinivasalu Naidu, AIR 1972 Mad 307, the existence of a right of way was inferred from the words of the relevant documents. It was observed as under:

• “8. From all these documents Thiru D. Ramaswami Iyengar stated, it is clear that there is an implied grant of easement over the 30-ft. road. He cited Ratanchand Chordia v. Kasim Khaleel, AIR 1964 Mad 209, wherein a Bench of this Court has laid down the principles on which an implied grant can be inferred. The question whether a grant can be implied or not would only arise in a case where there is no express grant. To say the least, the contention that the absence of an express grant would negative an implied grant is quite untenable. It is from attendant circumstances and other documentary evidence that an implied grant has to be inferred. It is pity that the lower appellate Court has not bestowed its attention before it disposed of the appeal, on the aspect of spelling out an implied grant, which is recognised by law.
• 9. Annapurna v. Santosh Kumar, AIR 1937 Cal 661 also makes it clear that in law implied grant has to be inferred and lays down that grant can be presumed from the description of boundaries in the conveyance which mentions the same to be a common passage.”

In L. Govindarajulu Chettiar v. V. N. Srinivasalu Naidu, AIR  1972 Mad 307, the High Court also referred Kuppakkal v. Mathato n Chettiar, AIR 1924 Mad 834, where ‘a grant of an easement of way’ had been inferred from the words of a lease deed. 

‘Implied Grant‘ exists Independent of Sec. 13, Easement Act

R. Sivanandan v. Rajammal, (1975) 1 Mad LJ 251, addressed the issue with clarity holding as under:

• “Merely because the juristic basis of the easement of necessity (Section 13) is said to be an implied grant, the converse will not follow. In other words, where an easement is acquired by grant, either expressly or by necessary implication, it will not amount to an easement of necessity.”

K.S. Venkataraman, J., in this decision followed Peacock on Easements which reads as under:

• “An implied grant, in the sense here used, is a grant which arises by implication from the language of the particular instrument construable according to the ordinary rules of construction, one of which is that the circumstances existing at the date of the grant may be looked at in order to ascertain the intention of the parties.”

Easement by Implied Grant

It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

• “An easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties and it may have its own consideration. (B.B. Katiyar’s Commentaries on Easements and Licenses, p. 762).  It may be either express or even by necessary implication. Though easement of necessity will come to an end with the termination of necessity, easement acquired by grant cannot be extinguished on that ground as per section 13(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Therefore, even assuming that the plaintiff had an alternative pathway as contended by the defendants, it does not extinguish the right of easement of grant in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the Trial Court was justified in granting a relief of declaration of right of easement of grant over the `B’ schedule pathway. However, the declaration granted on the ground of easement of necessity was not justified.”

The aforesaid Supreme Court decision (Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622) arose from the Kerala High Court decision, Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. N. Gopala Pillai on 9 May 2006. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Kerala High Court held as under:

• “Theoretically all easements have their origin in some sort of grant by the servient owner. The grant may be express or it may be implied from the surrounding attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties or it may even be presumed from long user. In the case of an express grant of easement the limit thereof depends on the words used.”

Upholding the view taken by the Kerala High Court, the Apex Court held as under:

• “In our view, therefore, the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as pathway by the original plaintiff (since deceased) at least up to 1982, when alone the cause of action for the suit arose.”

Grant: No Express ‘Consideration’ Required; TP Act has no application

In B. Shyamkumar v. Francis George, 2009-4 CTC 750; 2009-7 MLJ 835, the Madras High Court held unequivocally as under:

• “In case the easement was one acquired by grant, there was no question of consideration of the plea of easement of necessity.”

Gujarat High Court, in Hamir Ram v. Varisng Raimal, 1998 AIR Guj 165, has also held ‘grant’ can be gratuitous. It is said as under:

• “Easement by grant may be created by oral agreement. It may be gratuitous. It may also be for consideration. If the grant was for consideration it hardly requires registration because mere creation of easement is not compulsorily registrable. …. Further, the …. parties never intended to transfer ownership in respect of the land which was set apart for the purpose of common passage. Hence, it cannot be held to be a sale deed of immovable property having value more than one hundred rupees. For this reason also the agreement does not require registration.”

The incorporeal right of Easement, by itself, cannot be a subject-matter of sale. Following two legal provisions are relevant in this matter –

• 1. Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act
• 2. Sec. 8 of the Indian Easements Act.

Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act

Easement cannot exist independently of the dominant tenement; hence always remains appurtenant to land (that is, attached to, and passes with, the ownership of the dominant tenement). Sec. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:

• “6. What may be transferred– Property of any kind may be transferred, except as provided by this Act or by any other law for the time-being in force;
• a.… b….
• c. An easement cannot be transferred apart from the dominant heritage.”

In Musunoori Satyanarayana Murti v. Chekka Lakshmayya, AIR 1929 Mad 79, it was held – ‘the creation of a right of easement by grant is not such a transfer of ownership as is contemplated by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and therefore, provisions of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to the creation of easement. Section 6(c) of the Transfer of Property Act contemplates that an existing easement cannot be transferred apart from the dominant heritage. Therefore, prima facie, the deed of easement is a creation of easement and not a transfer of an existing easement. [See also: Saraswatibai Bishwambarlal Charity Trust v. Gopal Traders Pvt.  Ltd., 2023 BHC (AS) 34908 (Bom)]

Sec. 8 of the Indian Easements Act

Sec. 8 of the Indian Easements Act deals with express grant. It reads –

• “8. Who may impose easements – An easement may be imposed by any one in the circumstances, and to the extent, in and to which he may transfer his interest in the heritage on which the liability is to be imposed.”

This section simply says that a person who has the legal right to transfer an interest (i.e. to sell, lease, or mortgage) in an immovable property (‘heritage’) is legally capable of creating (i.e., imposing or granting) an easement over that property.

It is also clear –

• A life tenant (who has rights only for life) can grant an easement, but it ends with their interest.
• A co-owner cannot impose an easement on the entire property without consent of the others.

Law does not bar ‘imposition’ of easement accepting consideration

Though the transfer of an easement is not recognized under the provisions of Sec. 54, TP Act, it is noteworthy – the law does not bar ‘imposition’ of easement accepting consideration as pointed out in Saraswatibai Bishwambarlal Charity Trust v. Gopal Traders Pvt.  Ltd., 2023 BHC (AS) 34908 (Bom).

It is also important – though the provisions of the Easements Act address the creation of easements by grant, it is without an explicit requirement for ‘consideration‘, though consideration is a necessary element of a valid agreement under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Sec. 13 further elaborates on easements of necessity and quasi-easements, indicating that such easements can arise from the transfer or bequest of immovable property, again without an express requirement for consideration.

In Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, the Supreme Court observed that an ‘easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties’ (and it may have its own consideration); and that ‘the grant may be either express or even by necessary implication’.

In State of Punjab v. Brig. Sukhjit Singh, 1993-3 SCR 944, the Supreme Court held as under:

• “Payment of licence fee is not an essential attribute for the subsistence of a licence.”

It is pointed out in Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha and Anr v. Smt. Manharbala Jeram Damodar, AIR 2013 SC 2959, 2013-15 SCC 358, as under:

• “In Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, the word “license” means “a revocable permission to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful” and the word “licensee” means “one to whom a license is granted or one who has permission to enter or use another’s premises, but only for one’s own purposes and not for the occupier’s benefit.“
• Thus, it is seen that even in popular sense the word “license” is not understood to mean it should be on payment of license fee for subsistence of license. It also covers a “gratuitous licensee”, that is, a person who is permitted, although not invited, to enter another’s property and who provides no consideration in exchange for such permission.””

A Grant Deed with Consideration requires Stamp and Registration

In Subramanyam Chettiar v. Meyyammai Achi, AIR 1943 Mad 522, it was held that the consideration for the grant of the easement was a promise on the part of the grantee to do something of a like kind for the grantor; and the provisions of the Indian Registration Act were quite clear and it could not be doubted that such a deed required registration under Section 17 and so by virtue of Section 49 it could not be admitted as evidence of the creation of the easement.

Implied Grant is Independent Right ; Alternative Way will Not Defeat it

The existence of an alternative way will defeat easement of necessity and quasi-easement. But, it is pointed out in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma – alternative pathway ‘does not extinguish the right of easement of grant. It includes the claim of implied grant also. (See: John, S/o. Ulahannan v. P. Janaki, D/o. Late Vava, 2012, Kerala High Court.)

In Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, the Supreme Court held as under:

• “28. … Many easements acquired by grant may be absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant tenement in the sense that it cannot be enjoyed at all without it. That may be the reason for the grant also. But easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties. In the matter of grant the parties are governed by the terms of the grant and not by anything else. Easement of necessity and quasi-easement are dealt with in Section 13 of the Act. The grant may be express or even by necessary implication. In either case it will not amount to an easement of necessity under Section 13 of the Act even though it may also be an absolute necessity for the person in whose favour the grant is made.”

Easement by Implied grant and Quasi Easement can be pleaded Alternatively

Easement by (implied) grant and quasi easement can be pleaded alternatively, for they are not mutually destructive, and it is permissible to raise inconsistent pleas (but to confine either of the two at the time of evidence).

Implied Grant can be Inferred from the Circumstances

Grant alone Pleaded ; Not, Implied Grant – Apex Court, allowed Implied Grant

It is held in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, Easement of implied grant can be granted in a suit even though “Grant” alone was claimed (Alternatively to easement of necessity). Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are the following –

• Plaintiff, owner of A-schedule property (dominant tenement), claimed “easement of necessity or of grant” in B-schedule property (servient tenement).
• “Implied grant” was not specifically pleaded (only ‘grant’ was pleaded).
• Dominant tenement had been separated from the servient tenement.
• Plaintiff has been using the way in B-schedule property for a long period (about 50 years).
• The trial court observed that the plaintiff claiming easement by grant or easement of necessity has only a primary burden to prove the absence of any alternate pathway (these findings were accepted by the Apex Court).
• Defendant alleged that two alternate pathways existed. But, No evidence of any other way to A-schedule property (dominant tenement).
• The High Court found that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway.

The Supreme Court upheld the view of the High Court and the Trial Court and held as under:

• “… the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that
  • (i) no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and
  • (ii) there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property …”

It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

• “In Annapurna Dutta vs. Santosh Kumar Sett & Ors., AIR 1937 Cal.661, B.K. Mukherjee, as His Lordship then was observed:
  • “There could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent. Now a right of way is neither continuous nor always an apparent easement, and hence would not ordinarily come under the rule. Exception is no doubt made in certain cases, where there is a ‘formed road’ existing over one part of the tenement for the apparent use of another portion or there is ‘some permanence in the adaptation of the tenement’ from which continuity may be inferred, but barring these exceptions, an ordinary right of way would not pass on severance unless language is used by the grantor to create a fresh easement.”
• 26. In our view, therefore, the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as pathway by the original plaintiff (since deceased) at least up to 1982, when alone the cause of action for the suit arose.”

In this decision our Apex Court has also quoted the following from Katiyar on Law of Easements and Licences –

• “… It is the intention of the grantor whether he can be presumed to have been intended to convey to the grantee a right of easement for the reasonable and convenient enjoyment of the property which has to be ascertained in all the circumstances of the case to find out whether a grant can be implied. A description in a conveyance may connote an intention to create a right of easement. An easement may arise by implication, if the intention to grant can properly be inferred either from the terms of the grant or the circumstances“.

Implied Grant and Quasi Easement

The question of implied grant arises only if the easement is apparent and continuous (that is, there should be a ‘formed road’)

• Easement of Necessity: even if – no visible sign (not apparent); and even if – never used before (not continuous). E.g., a foot path to a landlocked plot.
  • But, there should have strict necessity.
• Quasi Easement – must be visible (apparent) and must be functioning without repeated human action (continuous). E.g., water flowing through a pipe or a drainage system.
  • It is based on prior use before land division.
  • It requires only reasonable necessity, not strict necessity.

Implied Grant and Quasi-Easement

• The question of implied grant (or quasi-easement) arises only if the alleged easement is:
  • Apparent (i.e., visible upon reasonable inspection), and
  • Continuous (i.e., functions without repeated human intervention)
• E.g., Water flowing through a pipe, A drainage trench, Overhead electric cables.

Conclusion

• It is the fundamental principle of easement law that every easement is, in theory, rooted in a grant.
• Indian law clearly permits the acquisition of easements by implied grant. That is, an easement may arise by implication, and the intention to grant can be inferred either from the terms of the grant or from the surrounding circumstances.
• Though easement by grant is (generally) said to have arisen from a ‘contract’, the provisions of law that deals with the matter do not specifically require ‘consideration’ in the creation of easements by grant.

End Notes 1

Customary Easements under S. 18 of the Easement Act

Section 18 of the Easement Act reads as under:

• “18. Customary easements. An easement may be acquired in virtue of a local custom. Such easements are called customary easements.”

Both custom and easement are involved in customary easement. In other words, when customary easement is claimed, elements of both custom and prescriptive easement (long user) are to be proved. [Lachhi v. Ghansara Singh, AIR 1972 HP 89.]

Customary easement includes the right to take water and earth from a tank, use water for cattle from a tank,  graze cattle [Illustration (a) to sec. 18], to take earth for building and repairing their houses etc.[Jugal Kishore v. Umrao Singh, AIR 1949 All 272. ] These are rights of people of a locality; and not a public right.

End Notes 2

It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam v. G. Anandavally Amma, AIR 2010 SC 622, as under:

• “17. The High Court limited itself to the issue whether the decree of the first appellate court granting the original plaintiff (since deceased) right of easement over ‘B’ schedule property by way of grant concurring with the findings of the trial court was sustainable.
• 18. Before the High Court, the defendants pleaded that there had been no appeal or cross objection filed by the original plaintiff (since deceased) against the order of the Appellate Court which disallowed the claim of easement of necessity and, therefore, the finding that there existed no easement of necessity in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased) over the ‘B’ schedule property stood confirmed. Further they contended that the alternative pathway on the western side of the ‘A’ schedule property was rendered inconvenient by the very act of the original plaintiff (since deceased) who sold that portion of the property to a third party who began digging that pathway resulting in the difference in level. The High Court, on consideration of these contentions, held that though the claim of right of easement by way of necessity over ‘B’ Schedule property may be affected by the subsequent sale of the said plot by the plaintiff in 1983, the claim of right of easement by way of grant over ‘B’ schedule property stood unaffected by the said conduct.
• 21. The High Court relied on a number of observations in Katiyar’s Law of Easement and Licences (12th Edition) on law with respect to “implication of grant of an easement.” It may arise upon severance of a tenement by its owner into parts. The acquisition of easement by prescription may be classified under the head of implied grant for all prescription presupposes a grant. All that is necessary to create the easement is a manifestation or an unequivocal intention on the part of the servient owner to that effect.
• 23. Applying these observations to the facts of the case, the High Court held that though the original grant was by Yogini Amma that grant could not perfect as an easement for the reason that Yogini Amma herself was the owner of both ‘A’ schedule and ‘B’ schedule properties and consequently there was no question of ‘B’ schedule property becoming the servient tenement and ‘A’ schedule property becoming the dominant tenement. However, it was the desire of Yogini Amma that was implemented by her disciples by virtue of the settlement deed. Therefore, the right of the plaintiff to have ‘B’ schedule property as a pathway could not have been taken away by the very same deed. In fact, there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway as can be inferred from the circumstances, namely,
  • i) no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property in the settlement deed and
  • ii) there was no objection to the use of ‘B’ schedule as pathway.
• 25. We have heard Mr. T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Mr. Subramanium Prasad, learned senior counsel for the respondents. We have carefully examined the impugned judgment of the courts below and also the pleadings, evidence and the materials already on record. It is not in dispute that the trial court as well as the First Appellate Court concurrently found on a proper appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case that the ‘B’ Schedule Property of the plaint was being used by the original plaintiff (since deceased) and thereafter, by the respondents even after construction of the building in 1940 in ‘A’ Schedule property of the plaint. The appellants also did not dispute the case of the original plaintiff (since deceased) that he was in continuous occupation of the building even after its construction in the year 1940. It is also not in dispute that the appellants were not able to establish that the original plaintiff (since deceased) was using any other pathway for access to ‘A’ Schedule Property of the plaint and the building therein, which was in the occupation of the original plaintiff (since deceased). The case of the appellants that since there was no mention in the deed of settlement enabling the use of ‘B’ schedule pathway for access to ‘A’ schedule property and the building therein, cannot be the reason to hold that there was no grant as the grant could be by implication as well. It is not in dispute that the fact of the use of the ‘B’ schedule property as pathway even after execution of Exhibit A1, the settlement deed in the year 1982 by the original plaintiff (since deceased) would amply show that there was an implied grant in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased) relating to ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint for its use as pathway to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint in residential occupation of the original plaintiff (since deceased). In the absence of any evidence being adduced by the appellants to substantiate their contention that the original plaintiff (since deceased) had an alternative pathway for access to the ‘A’ schedule property, it is difficult to negative the contention of the respondent that since the original plaintiff (since deceased) has been continuously using the said pathway at least from the year 1940 the original plaintiff (since deceased) had acquired an easement right by way of an implied grant in respect of the ‘B’ Schedule property of the plaint. It is an admitted position that both ‘A’ schedule and ‘B’ schedule properties of the plaint belonged to Yogini Amma and her disciples and it was the desire of Yogini Amma that was really implemented by the disciples under the settlement deed executed in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased). Therefore, the High Court was perfectly justified in holding that when it was the desire of Yogini Amma to Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam & Anr vs G.Anandavally Amma & Ors grant easement right to the original plaintiff (since deceased) by way of an implied grant, the right of the original plaintiff (since deceased) to have ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as a pathway could not have been taken away.
• In Annapurna Dutta vs. Santosh Kumar Sett & Ors. [AIR 1937 Cal.661], B.K. Mukherjee, as His Lordship then was observed:
  • “There could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent. Now a right of way is neither continuous nor always an apparent easement, and hence would not ordinarily come under the rule. Exception is no doubt made in certain cases, where there is a ‘formed road’ existing over one part of the tenement for the apparent use of another portion or there is ‘some permanence in the adaptation of the tenement’ from which continuity may be inferred, but barring these exceptions, an ordinary right of way would not pass on severance unless language is used by the grantor to create a fresh easement.”
• 26. In our view, therefore, the High Court was also fully justified in holding that there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway, which can be inferred from the circumstances for the reason that no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property of the plaint and there was no objection also to the use of ‘B’ schedule property of the plaint as pathway by the original plaintiff (since deceased) at least up to 1982, when alone the cause of action for the suit arose.”

In this decision our Apex Court has also quoted the following from Katiyar on Law of Easements and Licences –

• “There are numerous cases in which an agreement to grant easement or some other rights has been inferred or more correctly has been imputed to the person who is in a position to make the grant, on account of some action or inaction on his part. These cases rest on the equitable doctrine of acquiescence, but they may be referred to, for the purpose of classification, as imputed or constructive grants. The party acquiescing is subsequently estopped from denying the existence of easement. It is as if such person had made an actual grant of the easement… … It is the intention of the grantor whether he can be presumed to have been intended to convey to the grantee a right of easement for the reasonable and convenient enjoyment of the property which has to be ascertained in all the circumstances of the case to find out whether a grant can be implied. A description in a conveyance may connote an intention to create a right of easement. An easement may arise by implication, if the intention to grant can properly be inferred either from the terms of the grant or the circumstances“.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

• Order IX Rule 9 CPC: Earlier Suit for Injunction; Subsequent Suit for Recovery & Injunction – No Bar
• H. Anjanappa v. A. Prabhakar: An ‘Aggrieved’ Stranger or a ‘Prejudicially Affected’ Third-Party (also) Can File Appeal with the ‘Leave of the Court’.
• Replication, Rejoinder and Amendment of Pleadings
• Can a Suit be Withdrawn in Appeal, on the Ground that Appeal is Continuation of the Suit?
• Does Registration of a Document give Notice to the Whole World?
• Suit under Sec. 6, Specific Relief Act – Is it a ‘Summary Suit’ under Order XXXVII CPC?
• Is it Mandatory to Lift the Attachment on Dismissal of the Suit? Will the Attachment Orders Get Revived on Restoration of Suit?
• Will Interlocutory Orders and Applications Get Revived on Restoration of Suit?
• Can an ‘Ex-parte’ Defendant Cross Examine Plaintiff’s Witness?
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Civil Rights and Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
• Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata
• Order II, Rule 2 CPC – Not to Vex Defendants Twice
• A Land Mark Decision on Order II rule 2, CPC – Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd., Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 73
• Order I rule 8, CPC (Representative Suit) When and How? Whether Order I rule 8 Decree is Enforceable in Execution?
• Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
• Pleadings in Defamation Suits
• Previous Owner is Not a Necessary Party in a Recovery Suit
• UNDUE INFLUENCE and PLEADINGS thereof in Indian Law
• PLEADINGS IN ELECTION MATTERS
• Declaration and Injunction
• Law on Summons to Defendants and Witnesses
• Notice to Produce Documents in Civil Cases
• Production of Documents: Order 11, Rule 14 & Rule 12
• Sec. 91 CPC and Suits Against Wrongful Acts
• Remedies Under Sec. 92 CPC
• Mandatory Injunction – Law and Principles
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• Interrogatories: When Court Allows, When Rejects?
• Decree in OI R8 CPC-Suit & Eo-Nomine Parties
• Pecuniary & Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Doctrine of Substantial Representation in a Suit by or against an Association
• Who are Necessary Parties, Proper Parties and Pro Forma Parties in Suits
• What is Partnership, in Law? How to Sue a Firm?
• ‘Legal Representatives’, Not ‘Legal Heirs’ to be Impleaded on Death of Plaintiff/Defendant
• Powers and Duties of Commissioners to Make Local Investigations, Under CPC
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Burden on Plaintiff to Prove Title; Weakness of Defence Will Not Entitle a Decree
• Is it Mandatory to Set Aside the Commission Report – Where a Second Commissioner is Appointed?
• Can a Commission be Appointed to Find Out the Physical Possession of a Property?
• Withholding Evidence and Adverse Inference
• Pendente Lite Transferee Cannot Resist or Obstruct Execution of a Decree
• Family Settlement or Family Arrangement in Law
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Will Findings of a Civil Court Outweigh Findings of a Criminal Court?
• Relevancy of Civil Case Judgments in Criminal Cases
• Waiver and Promissory Estoppel
• Can a Christian Adopt? Will an adopted child get share in the property of adoptive parents?
• Principles of Equity in Indian Law
• Thangam v.  Navamani Ammal: Did the Supreme Court lay down – Written Statements which deal with each allegation specifically, but not “para-wise”, are vitiated?
• No Criminal Case on a Dispute Essentially Civil in Nature.
• Doctrine of Substantial Representation in Suits
• Order I rule 8, CPC (Representative Suit) When and How? Whether Order I rule 8 Decree is Enforceable in Execution?
• Appointment of Guardian for Persons Suffering from Disability or Illness: Inadequacy of Law – Shame to Law Making Institutions
• Can Documents be Marked In Cross Examination, If Witness Admits Them?

Principles and Procedure

• BURDEN of PROOF: Initial Burden and Shifting the Onus in Indian and English Law
• H. Anjanappa v. A. Prabhakar: An ‘Aggrieved’ Stranger or a ‘Prejudicially Affected’ Third-Party (also) Can File Appeal with the ‘Leave of the Court’.
• Our Courts Apply Different ‘STANDADARDS of Proof’
• Ratio Decidendi (alone) Forms a Precedent, Not a Final Order
• BNSS – Major Changes from CrPC
• Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Important Changes from the Indian Penal Code
• Substantive Rights and Mistakes & Procedural Defects in Judicial Proceedings
• Can Documents be Marked In Cross Examination, If Witness Admits Them?
• Will Boundaries of Properties (Always) Preferred Over Survey Number, Extent, Side Measurements, etc.?
• All Illegal Agreements are Void; but All Void Agreements are Not Illegal
• Doctrines on Ultra Vires, Rule of Law, Judicial Review, Nullification of Mandamus, and Removing the BASIS of the Judgment
• Can an ‘Ex-parte’ Defendant Cross Examine Plaintiff’s Witness?
• Will – Probate and Letters of Administration
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence
• Effect of Not Cross-Examining a Witness & Effect of Not Facing Complete Cross-Examination by the Witness
• Suggestions & Admissions by Counsel, in Cross Examination to Witnesses
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
• Declaration and Injunction
• Pleadings Should be Specific; Why?
• Does Alternate Remedy Bar Civil Suits and Writ Petitions?
• Void, Voidable, Ab Initio Void, and Sham Transactions
• Can Courts Award Interest on Equitable Grounds?
• Natural Justice – Not an Unruly Horse
• Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State Of M.P, 29 January, 2025 – Law on Natural Justice Revisited
• ‘Sound-mind’ and ‘Unsound-Mind’
• Prescriptive Rights – Inchoate until the Title thereof is Upheld by a Competent Court
• ‘Title’ and ‘Ownership’ in Indian Law
• Can a Party to Suit Examine Opposite Party, as of Right?
• Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
• Doctrine of ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Indian Law
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Cheating and Breach of Contract: Distinction – Fraudulent Intention at the time of Promise.
• Declaration of Title & Recovery of Possession: Art. 65, not Art. 58, Limitation Act Governs
• What is COGNIZANCE and Application of Mind by a Magistrate?
• Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle: Rejection of Plaint on ‘Bar of Limitation’ on Plea of Fraud.
• Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. The State of Gujarat: The Police have No Discretion to conduct a Preliminary Inquiry Before Registering an FIR in Cognizable Offences

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

• ‘Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet’
• Section 27, Limitation Act Gives-Rise to a Substantive Right so as to Seek Declaration and Recovery
• Sale Deeds Without Consideration – Void
• Tenancy at Sufferance in Indian Law
• Revenue Settlement Registers of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters
• Recovery of Possession: Recovery of Possession Based on Title and on Earlier Possession
• Declaration of Title & Recovery of Possession: Art. 65, not Art. 58, Limitation Act Governs
• Title and Ownership and Possessory Title in Indian Law
• Does Registration of a Document give Notice to the Whole World?
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• POSSESSION is a Substantive Right in Indian Law
• 22nd Law Commission  Report on ‘Law on Adverse Possession’
• Adverse Possession Against Government
• Government of Kerala v. Joseph – Law on Adverse Possession Against Government
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?
• Ultimate Ownership of All Property Vests in State; It is an Incident of Sovereignty.
• ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’
• Preemption is a Very Weak Right; For, Property Right is a Constitutional & Human Right
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Family Settlement or Family Arrangement in Law
• INJUNCTION is a ‘Possessory Remedy’ in Indian Law
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Kesar Bai v. Genda Lal – Does Something Remain Untold?
• Grant in Law
• Termination of Tenancy (& Grant) by Forfeiture (for Claiming Title)
• Survey under Survey Act – Raises a Presumption on Boundary; though Not Confer Title
• SUIT on TITLE: Landlord can Recover Property on GENERAL TITLE (though Tenancy Not Proved) if Defendant Falsely Claimed Independent Title
• Even the Rightful Owner is NOT entitled to Eject a Trespasser, by Force

Adverse Possession

• What is Adverse Possession in Indian Law?
• Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta (October 14, 2024) – Supreme Court Denied the Tenant’s Claim of Adverse Possession
• Adverse Possession: How to Plead Adverse Possession? Adverse Possession: An Evolving Concept
• Adverse Possession Against Government
• Adverse Possession: Burden to Plead Sabotaged
• Does ‘Abandonment’ Give rise to a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
• When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’?
• Government of Kerala v. Joseph – Law on Adverse Possession Against Government
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• Ouster and Dispossession in Adverse Possession
• Declaration of Title & Recovery of Possession: Art. 65, not Art. 58, Limitation Act Governs
• Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021, Composite Suit (Cancellation & Recovery) – Substantive Relief Determines Limitation  

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

• Travancore Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 (1865 AD) and 1061 (1886 AD), And 1922 Devaswom Proclamation
• Revenue Settlement Registers of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters
• Tenancy at Sufferance in Indian Law
• Freehold Property in Law
• What is Patta or Pattayam?
• Does ‘Pandaravaka Pattom’ in Kerala Denote Full-Ownership?
• Transfer of Property with Conditions & Contingent Interests
• Previous Owner is Not a Necessary Party in a Recovery Suit
• Recovery of Possession Based on Title and on Earlier Possession
• Vested Remainder and Contingent Remainder
• Vested interest and Contingent Interest
• Ultimate Ownership of All Property Vests in State; It is an Incident of Sovereignty.
• Land Acquired Cannot be Returned – Even if it is Not Used for the Purpose Acquired
• ‘Mutation’ by Revenue Authorities & Survey will not Confer ‘Title’
• FERA, 1973 And Transfer of Immovable Property by a Foreigner
• Marumakkathayam – A System of Law and Way of Life Prevailed in Kerala
• Land Tenures, and History of Land Derivation, in Kerala
• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
• Sale Deeds Without Consideration – Void
• Law on SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE and LEGAL HEIRSHIP CERTIFICATE
• Sec. 7 Easements Act – Natural Advantages Arising from the Situation of Land & Natural Flow of Water
• Grant in Law
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• Survey under Survey Act – Raises a Presumption on Boundary; though Not Confer Title

Land Reform Laws

• Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land Owners?
• Relevant provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act in a Nutshell
• Land Tenures, and History of Land Derivation, in Kerala
• Should the Government Prove Title in Recovery Suits
• ‘Janmam’ Right is FREEHOLD Interest and ‘Estate’ in Constitution – By Royal Proclamation of 1899, The Travancore Sircar became Janmi of Poonjar Raja’s Land
• Government is the OWNER of (Leasehold) Plantation Lands in Kerala.
• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
• Law on Acquisition of Private Plantation Land in Kerala
• Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell
• Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy
• Grant in Law
• Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy’; TLB to Fix Plantation Exemption.  
• 1910 Settlement Register of Travancore – Basic Record of Land Matters

Power of attorney

• M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula: Mere Word ‘Irrevocable’ Does Not Make a POWER OF ATTORNEY Irrevocable
• Can a Power of Attorney file a Civil Suit? Is there any bar by virtue of Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024-6 SCC 130?
• No Adjudication If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney Sufficient for Registration
• Notary-Attested Documents and Presumptions
• Permission when a Power of Attorney Holder Files Suit
• If Power of Attorney himself Executes the Document, S. 33 Registration Act will NOT be attracted
• Should a Power of Attorney for Sale must have been Registered –
• Is Registered Power of Attorney Necessary for Registration of a Deed? No.

Evidence Act – General

• Newspaper Reports are ‘Hearsay Secondary Evidence’
• Major Changes in the Evidence Act by Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Sec. 27 Recovery/Discovery in Evidence Act and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Evidence in Court – General Principles
• Expert Evidence and Appreciation of Evidence
• How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
• Withholding Evidence and Adverse Inference
• Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law
• What is Collateral Purpose?
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence
• Effect of Not Cross-Examining a Witness & Effect of Not Facing Complete Cross Examination by the Witness
• Suggestions & Admissions by Counsel, in Cross Examination to Witnesses
• Proof of Documents – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Public Documents: Proof and Presumption
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• Significance of Scientific Evidence in Judicial Process
• Polygraphy, Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping Tests
• What is Section 27 Evidence Act – Recovery or Discovery?
• How ‘Discovery’ under Section 27, Evidence Act, Proved?
• Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witnesses Theory
• Sec. 35 Evidence Act: Presumption of Truth and Probative Value
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act

Sec. 65B

• Sec. 27 Recovery/Discovery in Evidence Act and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Sec. 65B (Electronic Records) and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
• Sec. 65B, Evidence Act: Arjun Paditrao Criticised.
• Sec. 65B Evidence Act Simplified
• ‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be proved by ‘CERTIFICATE’ u/s. 65B
• Sec. 65B,  Evidence Act: Certificate forms
• Certificate is Required Only for ‘Computer Output’; Not for ‘Electronic Records’: Arjun Panditrao Explored.
• How to Prove ‘Whatsap Messages’, ‘Facebook’ and ‘Website’ in Courts?

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

• ‘Admission’ in Indian Law
• Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title
• Judicial Admissions in Pleadings: Admissible Proprio Vigore Against the Maker
• Document Exhibited in the Writ Petition as ‘True Copy’ – Can it be Used in a Civil Suit as ‘Admission’?
• Modes of Proof of Documents
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Should Objection to Marking Documents be Raised When it is Admitted; Is it Enough to Challenge them in Cross-Examination?
• Burden of Proof – Initial Burden and Shifting Onus
• Burden on Plaintiff to Prove Title; Weakness of Defence Will Not Entitle a Decree
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence
• Production, Admissibility & Proof Of Documents
• Proof of Documents – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Can Documents be Marked In Cross Examination, If Witness Admits Them?
• Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting 
• Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Relevancy of Civil Case Judgments in Criminal Cases
• Prem Raj v.  Poonamma Menon (SC), April 2, 2024 – An Odd Decision on ‘Civil Court Judgment does not Bind Criminal Court’

Law on Documents

• Public Documents: Proof and Presumption
• Public Documents Admissible Without Formal Proof
• Admitted Documents – Can the Court Refrain from Marking, for no Formal Proof?
• Does Registration of a Document give Notice to the Whole World?
• Production, Admissibility & Proof Of Documents
• Relevancy, Admissibility and Proof of Documents
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Effect of Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Stand Proved?
• Time Limit for Registration of Documents
• Registration of Documents Executed out of India
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• Are RTI Documents Admissible in Evidence as ‘Public Documents’?
• Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Notary-Attested Documents and Presumptions
• What is Collateral Purpose?
• No Application Needed for Filing or Admitting Copy
• Presumptions on Documents and Truth of Contents
• Presumptions on Registered Documents & Truth of Contents
• Notice to Produce Documents in Civil Cases
• Production of Documents: Order 11, Rule 14 & Rule 12
• Modes of Proof of Documents
• Secondary Evidence of Documents & Objections to Admissibility – How & When?
• Should Objection to Marking Documents be Raised When it is Admitted; Is it Enough to Challenge them in Cross-Examination?
• 30 Years Old Documents and Presumption of Truth of Contents, under Sec. 90 Evidence Act
• Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
• Adjudication as to Proper Stamp under Stamp Act
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Settlement Deeds & Powers of Sub-Registrar in cancelling Deeds
• Cancellation, Avoidance or Declaration of a Void or Voidable Deed
• Can the True Owner Seek Cancellation of a Deed, Executed by a Stranger to the Property
• Substantive Documents, and Documents used for Refreshing Memory and Contradicting 
• How to Contradict a Witness under Sec. 145, Evidence Act
• Visual and Audio Evidence (Including Photographs, Cassettes, Tape-recordings, Films, CCTV Footage, CDs, e-mails, Chips, Hard-discs, Pen-drives)
• Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witnesses Theory
• No Adjudication Needed If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance
• Impounding of Documents – When Produced; Cannot Wait Till it is Exhibited
• Sec. 35 Evidence Act: Presumption of Truth and Probative Value
• How to Prove Resolutions of a Company; Are Minutes Necessary?

Documents – Proof and Presumption

• Public Documents: Proof and Presumption
• Can the Court Refuse to Mark a (Relevant and Admissible) Document, for (i) there is No Formal Proof or (ii) it is a Photocopy?
• Marking of Photocopy and Law on Marking Documents on Admission (Without Formal Proof)
• Proof of Documents – Admission, Expert Evidence, Presumption etc.
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Modes of Proof of Documents
• ‘Admission’ in Indian Law
• Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Proved
• Proof on ‘Truth of Contents’ of Documents, in Indian Evidence Act
• Admitted Documents – Can the Court Refrain from Marking, for no Formal Proof?
• Admission of Documents in Evidence on ‘Admission’
• Effect of Marking Documents Without Objection – Do Contents Stand Proved?
• Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?
• Should Objection to Marking Documents be Raised When it is Admitted; Is it Enough to Challenge them in Cross-Examination?
• Presumptions on Documents and Truth of Contents
• Presumptions on Registered Documents & Truth of Contents
• Secondary Evidence of Documents & Objections to Admissibility – How & When?
• 30 Years Old Documents and Presumption of Truth of Contents, under Sec. 90 Evidence Act

Interpretation

• Interpretation of Documents – Literal Rule, Mischief Rule and Golden Rule
• Golden Rule of Interpretation is Not the Application of Plain Meaning of the Words
• Interpretation of Wills
• Appreciation of Evidence by Court and ‘Preponderance of Probabilities’ & ‘Probative Value of Evidence

Contract Act

• Godrej Projects Development Limited v. Anil Karlekar, 2025 INSC 143 – Supreme Court Missed to State Something
• ‘Sound-mind’ and ‘Unsound-Mind’ in Indian Civil Laws
• Forfeiture of Earnest Money and Reasonable Compensation
• Who has to fix Damages in Tort and Contract?
• UNDUE INFLUENCE and PLEADINGS thereof in Indian Law
• All Illegal Agreements are Void; but All Void Agreements are Not Illegal
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance
• Cheating and Breach of Contract: Distinction – Fraudulent Intention at the time of Promise.

Law on Damages

• Law on Damages
• Who has to fix Damages in Tort and Contract?
• Law on Damages in Defamation Cases
• Pleadings in Defamation Suits
• Godrej Projects Development Limited v. Anil Karlekar, 2025 INSC 143 – Supreme Court Missed to State Something

Easement

• Easement Simplified
• What is Easement? Does Right of Easement Allow to ‘Enjoy’ Servient Land After Making Improvements Therein ?
• “Implied Grant” in Law of Easements
• Implied Grant: A Valid Mode of Creation of Easement under Indian Law
• “Title Thereto” in the Definition of ‘Prescriptive Easement’ in Sec. 15 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882
• Prescriptive Rights – Inchoate until the Title thereof is Upheld by a Competent Court
• Will Easement of Necessity Ripen into a Prescriptive Easement?
• What is “period ending within two years next before the institution of the suit” in Easement by Prescription?
• Is the Basis of Every Easement, Theoretically, a Grant
• Extent of Easement (Width of Way) in Easement of Necessity, Quasi Easement and Implied Grant
• Easement of Necessity and Prescriptive Easement are Mutually Destructive; But, Easement of Necessity and Implied Grant Can be Claimed Alternatively
• Can Easement of Necessity and of Grant be Claimed in a Suit (Alternatively)?
• Can an Easement-Way be Altered by the Owner of the Land?
• Village Pathways and Right to Bury are not Easements.
• Custom & Customary Easements in Indian Law
• ‘Additional Burden Loses Lateral Support’ – Incorrect Proposition
• Grant in Law
• Right of Private Way Beyond (Other Than) Easement
• Easement – Should Date of Beginning of 20 Years be pleaded?
• What is Easement, in law? Right of Easement Simplified
• One Year Interruption or Obstruction will not affect Prescriptive Easement
• Should the Plaintiff Schedule Servient Heritage in a Suit Claiming Perspective Easement?
• Necessary Parties in Suits on Easement
• Easement by Prescription – Grant or ‘Acquiring’ by “Hostile Act”
• Sec. 7 Easements Act – Natural Advantages Arising from the Situation of Land & Natural Flow of Water

Stamp Act & Registration

• Sub-Registrar has no Authority to Ascertain whether the Vendor has Title
• Title Enquiry by the Sub Registrar is Illegal
• Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Settlement Deeds & Powers of Sub-Registrar in Cancelling Deeds
• Time-Limit For Adjudication of Unstamped Documents, before Collector
• Time Limit for Registration of Documents
• Presumptions on Registered Documents & Truth of Contents
• Registration of Documents Executed out of India
• LAW ON INSUFFICIENTLY STAMPED DOCUMENTS 
• Adjudication as to Proper Stamp under Stamp Act
• Unstamped & Unregistered Documents and Collateral Purpose
• Can an Unregistered Sale Agreement be Used for Specific Performance
• Impounding of Documents, When Produced; Cannot Wait Till it is Exhibited
• No Adjudication Needed If Power of Attorney is Sufficiently Stamped
• Notary Attested Power-of-Attorney Sufficient for Registration

Divorce/Marriage

• Presumption of Valid Marriage – If lived together for Long Spell
• Validity of Foreign Divorce Decrees in India
• Is ‘Irretrievable Brake-down of Marriage’, a Valid Ground for Divorce in India?
• Foreign Divorce Judgment against Christians having Indian Domicile

Negotiable Instruments Act

• Does Cheque-Case under Sec. 138, NI Act Lie Against a Trust?
• Sec. 138 NI Act (Cheque) Cases: Presumption of Consideration u/s. 118
• Even if ‘Signed-Blank-Cheque’, No Burden on Complainant to Prove Consideration; Rebuttal can be by a Probable Defence
• “Otherwise Through an Account” in Section 142, NI Act
• Where to file Cheque Bounce Cases (Jurisdiction of Court – to file NI Act Complaint)?
• Cheque Dishonour Case against a Company, Firm or Society
• What is ‘Cognizance’ in Law
• What is COGNIZANCE and Application of Mind by a Magistrate?

Criminal

• Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. The State of Gujarat: The police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR in cognizable offences

Arbitration

• Seesaw of Supreme Court in NN Global Mercantile v. Indo Unique Flame
• N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. and Ground Realities of Indian Situation
• What are Non-Arbitrable Disputes? When a Dispute is Not Referred to Arbitration in spite of Arbitration Clause
• Termination or Nullity of Contract Will Not Cease Efficacy of the Arbitration Clause
• No Valid Arbitration Agreement ‘Exists’ – Can Arbitration Clause be Invoked?

Will

• Witnesses to the Will Need Not See the Execution of the Will
• Interpretation of Wills
• Interpretation of Inconsistent Clauses in a Will
• Will – Probate and Letters of Administration
• Executors of Will – Duties & their Removal
• How to Prove a Will, in Court?Is Presumption enough to Prove a Registered Will?
• How to Write a Will? Requirements of a Valid Will
• When Execution of a Will is ‘Admitted’ by the Opposite Side, Should it be ‘Proved’?
• A Witness to Hindu-Will will not Lose Benefit

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

• Judicial & Legislative Activism in India: Principles and Instances
• Can Legislature Overpower Court Decisions by an Enactment?
• Separation of Powers: Who Wins the Race – Legislature or Judiciary?
• Kesavananda Bharati Case: Never Ending Controversy
• Mullaperiyar Dam: Disputes and Adjudication of Legal Issues
• Article 370: Is There Little Chance for Supreme Court Interference
• Maratha Backward Community Reservation: SC Fixed Limit at 50%.
• Polygraphy, Narco Analysis and Brain Mapping Tests
• CAA Challenge: Divergent Views
• FERA, 1973 And Transfer of Immovable Property by a Foreigner
• Doctrine of ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Indian Law
• Doctrines on Ultra Vires and Removing the BASIS of the Judgment, in ED Director’s Tenure Extension Case (Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India)
• Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India – Mandamus (Given in a Case) Cannot be Annulled by Changing the Law
• Art. 370 – Turns the Constitution on Its Head

Religious issues

• Secularism and Art. 25 & 26 of the Indian Constitution
• Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
• ‘Ban on Muslim Women to Enter Mosques, Unconstitutional’
• No Reservation to Muslim and Christian SCs/STs (Dalits) Why?
• Parsi Women – Excommunication for Marrying Outside
• Knanaya Endogamy & Constitution of India
• Sabarimala Review Petitions & Reference to 9-Judge Bench
• SABARIMALA REVIEW and Conflict in Findings between Shirur Mutt Case & Durgah Committee Case
• Ayodhya Disputes: M. Siddiq case –Pragmatic Verdict

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

• General
  • General Features
  • Bye Laws Fundamental
  • Effect of Registration of Societies and Incorporation of Clubs
  • Societies and Branches
• Property & Trust
  • Vesting of Property in Societies and Clubs
  • Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies
  • Juristic Personality of Societies and Clubs
  • Legal Personality of Trustees and Office Bearers
• Suits
  • Suits and Criminal Complaints By and Against a Company
  • Suits By or Against Societies, Clubs
  • Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs
  • How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies
  • Members of a Charitable Society which Runs a College are Tractable to Prevention of Corruption Act
• Amendment and Dissolution
  • Amendment of Bye laws of Societies and Clubs
  • Dissolution of Societies and Clubs
• Rights and Management
  • Rights & Liabilities of Members of Clubs and Societies
  • Individual Membership Rights in Societies & Clubs
  • Management – Powers of General Body and Governing Body
  • Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers
  • Law on Meetings: An Overview
  • How to Prove Resolutions of a Company; Are Minutes Necessary?
• Election
  • Election & Challenge in Societies and Clubs
  • Court Interference in Election Process
• State Actions
  • State-Interference in Affairs of Societies & Clubs

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

• General Principles
  • What is Trust in Law?
  • Classification of Trusts
  • Public & Private Trusts in India.
  • Trust is ‘An Obligation’; Not a Legal Entity
  • Indian Law Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership
  • Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab, 2024-2 SCR 847
• Dedication and Vesting
  • Dedication of Property in Public Trusts
  • Vesting of Property in Trusts
  • Incidents of Trust in Clubs and Societies
  • What is Munambam Wakf Land Issue? If there is No Permanent Dedication, there will be No Wakf.
• Trustees and Management
  • Trustees and Administration of Public Trusts
  • Alienation of Public Trust Property
  • Extinction, Discharge, Revocation, etc. of Public Trusts
  • Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920: Provisions as regards opinion, advice or direction of the Court.
• Breach of Trust
  • Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees
• Suits by or against Trusts
  • Suits By or Against Trusts and Trustees
  • Remedies Under Sec. 92 CPC
  • Does Cheque-Case under Sec. 138, NI Act Lie Against a Trust?
• Law on Hindu Religious Endowments
  • Philosophy of Idol Worship
  • Is an Idol a Perpetual Minor?
  • Hindu Temples & Law of Trusts
  • Law of Mutts and Other Hindu Endowments
  • Shebaits & Mahants and Law of Trustees
• Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques – General
  • Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques
• Constitutional Principles
  • Secularism and Art. 25 & 26 of the Indian Constitution
  • Secularism & Freedom of Religion in Indian Panorama
  • ‘Muslim Women: Ban to Enter Mosques, Is it Unconstitutional
  • Parsi Women Excommunication, Unconstitutional.
  • Knanaya Endogamy & Constitution of India
  • State & Court – Protectors of All Charities
• Ayodhya and Sabarimala Disputes
  • Ayodhya Disputes: M. Siddiq case – Pragmatic Verdict
  • Sabarimala Review Petitions & Reference to 9-Judge Bench
  • SABARIMALA REVIEW and Conflict in Findings between Shirur Mutt Case & Durgah Committee Case
• General
  • Public Trusts and (State) Endowments/Trusts Acts
  • Public Trusts and Indian Trusts Act – An Overview
  • Business by Charitable Trusts & Institutions