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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. The State of Gujarat: The police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR in cognizable offences

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

General Principles
Dedication and Vesting
Trustees and Management
Breach of Trust
- Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees
Suits by or against Trusts
Law on Hindu Religious Endowments
Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques – General
- Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques
Constitutional Principles
Ayodhya and Sabarimala Disputes
General

Rejection of Plaint is a Procedural Termination, and Dismissal of Suit on Preliminary Issue is a Summary Decision on Merits

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Introduction

The following provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be invoked by a defendant, to seek rejection or dismissal of a suit, at the threshold, without a trial:

Order VII Rule 11, CPC – Rejection of plaint (on the specific grounds enumerated).
Order XIV Rule 2(2), CPC – Decision on preliminary issues, where the issue relates to –
(a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a statutory bar to the suit, and(c) such issues that can be decided as a pure question of law.
Section 151, CPC – Inherent powers of the court (exercised in exceptional cases where the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of the court or no specific provision in the CPC).

The following are the general provisions of law that may be invoked by a defendant for summary termination of a suit, without a full trial:

Section 9 CPC – Civil court jurisdiction expressly or impliedly barred

Section 11 CPC – Bar of Res judicata
Limitation Act, 1963 – Barred by limitation, apparent on the plaint
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Bar under Sections 14, 41, etc.
Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 69 – Suit by unregistered firm, to enforce contractual rights
Public Premises Act/ Rent Control Acts/ Land Reforms Acts – Statutory exclusion of civil jurisdiction.

Part I

Order VII rule 11 of the CPC

Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC is the specific provision for the rejection of the plaint. It reads as under:

“11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9″.

Rejection of Plaint under O. VII r. 11: Following are the Basic Principles

Rejection is a procedural termination (and not a dismissal on the merits).
A plaint is rejected only in the specific situations enumerated in Order VII rule 11 CPC.

Only plaint averments are looked into for determining rejection of plaint.
Defence pleadings or disputed facts cannot be looked into.
Rejection can be ordered at any stage. (Usually it is a threshold determination.)
A fresh plaint can be presented after curing the defects (if not barred by limitation or under any provision of law).

Grounds for Rejection

Following are the grounds for Rejection of Plain in Order VII rule 11 CPC:

No Cause of Action Disclosed [Order VII Rule 11(a)]
Relief Undervalued [Order VII Rule 11(b)]
Insufficient Court Fee [Order VII Rule 11(c)]
Suit Barred by Law [Order VII Rule 11(d)] such as:
- Limitation
- Res judicata (when evident on the plaint)
- Statutory bar (e.g., Section 69 of the Partnership Act for unregistered firms)
Duplicate Plaint Not Filed [Order VII Rule 11(e)]
Non-compliance with Rule 9 [Order VII Rule 11(f)]

Order VI rule 16

Order VI rule 16 provides for striking out pleadings at any stage. (It may not lead to dismissal of the entire plaint.) It reads as follows:

“16. Striking out pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading-
a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or
b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or
c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.”

Order 14 rule 2

Order 14 rule 2 CPC provides for the hearing of any preliminary issue, including the maintainability of the suit. It reads as follows:

“2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.
(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-
- (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
- (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in-force.
and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.”

Order 10 rule 1 CPC

Order 10 rule 1 CPC reads as under:

“Examination of parties by the court: 1. Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied.—At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain from each party or his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The Court shall record such admissions and denials.”

Part II

Inherent Powers Cannot be used for ‘Rejection’ of Plaints. But it can be used for “Dismissal” of Suits in Rare Cases.

A PLAINT cannot be rejected invoking Section 151 CPC (Inherent Powers of courts).
But, the court can dismiss a SUIT, at the threshold, in exceptional cases, invoking inherent powers.
Inherent powers are not invoked for the Rejection of the plaintiff, for it is a Statutory-Affair, and specific provisions are laid down in Order VII Rule 11. (It cannot be supplemented, expanded, or substituted, invoking Section 151. In such cases, the inherent powers stand excluded.)

Inherent Powers Not Used if in Conflict with Express Provisions

In Padam Sen v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218, our Apex Court found: “the Additional Munsiff had DO inherent powers to pass the order appointing a Commissioner to seize the plaintiff’s account books”.

It had been observed in this decision, as under:

“It is submitted for the State, that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, can adopt any procedure not prohibited by the Code expressly or by necessary implication if the Court considers it necessary, for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Section 151 of the Code reads:
- ” Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court “.
The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the puposes mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.”

In Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee, (1970) 1 SCC 732, the Apex Court cautioned as under:

“Under the inherent power of courts recognised by Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, a court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglected to avail himself of the same. Further the power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power.”

S. 151 is Not a Provision Conferring Power of Substantive Relief

It is held in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1, as under:

“Section 151 is not a provision of law conferring power to grant any kind of substantive relief. It is a procedural provision saving the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It cannot be invoked with reference to a matter which is covered by a specific provision in the Code. It cannot be exercised in conflict with the general scheme and intent of the Code. It cannot be used either to create or recognise rights, or to create liabilities and obligations not contemplated by any law.”

Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss the Suit) in the Following Situations

T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, is an authority to argue that inherent powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss a Suit) in the Following Situations:

Abuse of process of court
Fraud on court
Sham, vexatious, or illusory litigation
Re-litigation amounting to judicial harassment.

Order VII Rue 11 is not Exhaustive; Court can invoke Inherent Power

In K. Akbar Ali v. K. Umar Khan, AIR 2021 SC 1114; 2021-14 SCC 51 it is held as under:

“Moreover, the provisions of Order VII Rue 11 are not exhaustive and the Court has the inherent power to see that frivolous or vexatious litigations are not allowed to consume the time of the Court.”

Se. 151, Inherent Power to Dismiss a Suit – if ‘Abuse of Process of the Court’

The Courts have inherent powers to dismiss a suit that is an ‘abuse of their process’. It can also be invoked for rejection or setting aside a suit if an absolutely groundless suit is filed.

Re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. If the Court finds that there is an abuse of the process of court, and is satisfied that there is no chance of succeeding, the Court may exercise its discretion with circumspection, though only in rare situations.

In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, AIR 1998 SC 1297: 1998 (3) SCC 573, it is observed as under:

“32. Under Order 6 Rule 16, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding, order to be struck out, inter alia, any matter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Mulla in his treatise on the Code of Civil Procedure. (15th Edition, Volume II, page 1179 note 7) has stated that power under clause (c) of Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code is confined to cases where the abuse of the process of the Court is manifest from the pleadings; and that this power is unlike the power under Section 151 whereunder Courts have inherent power to strike out pleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings which are an abuse of their process.
In the present case the High Court has held the suit to be an abuse of the process of Court on the basis of what is stated in the plaint.”
(Quoted in: Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, AIR 2016 SC 1948; 2016 11 SCC 484;
Reddy Enterprises, Vijayawada v. Appellate Authority & Additional Commissioner (ST) Vijayawada, 2024-5 ALD 452;
Raahul Foundations Private Ltd. v. S. Chandrababu, 2019-2 LW 148; 2019-3 MLJ 321)

Where No express provision, Inherent Powers can be Invoked

In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 2554, while dealing with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, the Supreme Court held that where there is no express provision, inherent power can be invoked. The Court said as under:

“2. …It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code…..”

Part III

Manifestly Vexatious Suit – ‘Nipped in the bud’, Searchingly u/Or. 10, CPC

Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer: T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, held that on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint, if it is found that a manifestly vexatious suit is filed, it must be nipped in the bud searchingly under Order 10, CPC. The Court held as under:

“We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, be should exercise his power under Or. VII r. 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first bearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code (Ch. XI) is also resourceful enough to meet such men, and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too good.”

Fraud or Abuse of judicial process — May Invite Dismissal of Suit

It is trite law – Fraud vitiates all judicial acts (See: A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. (2007) 4 SCC 221. [Quoted in: Yashoda (Alias Sodhan) VS Sukhwinder Singh, AIR 2022 SC 4623; 2022-12 SCR 31; Smriti Madan Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra, AIR 2021 SC 5423]. Courts take suppression of material facts seriously, and if there is deliberate misuse of judicial process, courts may even dismiss the suit outright invoking inherent powers. (See: K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3SCC 573).

Fraud on Court and fraud on a party

In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550, referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, our Apex Court held as under:

“22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court’s business”.

In Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 289; 2024-5 SCC 481, it is held as under:

It is trite that fraud vitiates everything. It is a settled proposition of law that fraud avoids all judicial acts. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (Dead) through LRs, (1994) 1 SCC 1 (“S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu”), it has been observed that “fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” Further, “no judgment of a court, no order of a minister would be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. fraud unravels everything” vide Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasley, (1956) 1 all ER 341 (“Lazarus Estates Ltd.”).
It is well-settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and that the discretion must be exercised equitably for promotion of good faith vide State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 (“Prabhu”). This Court has further emphasized that fraud and collusion vitiate the most solemn precedent in any civilized jurisprudence; and that fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). This maxim has never lost its lustre over the centuries. Thus, any litigant who is guilty of inhibition before the Court should not bear the fruit and benefit of the court’s orders. This Court has also held that fraud is an act of deliberation with a desire to secure something which is otherwise not due. fraud is practiced with an intention to secure undue advantage. Thus, an act of fraud on courts must be viewed seriously.

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Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic)

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

General Principles
Dedication and Vesting
Trustees and Management
Breach of Trust
- Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees
Suits by or against Trusts
Law on Hindu Religious Endowments
Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques – General
- Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques
Constitutional Principles
Ayodhya and Sabarimala Disputes
General

Can a Plaint be Rejected Invoking the Inherent Powers of the Court?

Yes, But Only in Exceptional Circumstances.

Jojy George Koduvath.

Introduction

The following provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be invoked by a defendant, to seek rejection or dismissal of a suit at the threshold, without a full-fledged trial:

Order VII Rule 11, CPC – Rejection of plaint (on the specific grounds enumerated).
Order XIV Rule 2(2), CPC – Decision on preliminary issues, where the issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a statutory bar to the suit, and(c)such issues that can be decided as a pure question of law.
Section 151, CPC – Inherent powers of the court (exercised in exceptional cases where the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of the court or no specific provision in the CPC).

The following are the general provisions of law that may be invoked by a defendant for summary termination of a suit, without a full trial:

Section 9 CPC – Civil court jurisdiction expressly or impliedly barred
Section 11 CPC – Res judicata
Limitation Act, 1963 – Time-bar apparent on plaint
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Bar under Sections 14, 41, etc.
Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 69 – Suit by unregistered firm
Public Premises Act / Rent Control Acts / Land Reforms Acts – Statutory exclusion of civil jurisdiction.

Part I

Rejection of Plaint under O. VII r. 11: Following are the Basic Principles

Rejection is a procedural termination (and not a dismissal on the merits).
A plaint is rejected only in the specific situations enumerated in Order VII rule 11 CPC.

Only plaint averments are looked into for determining rejection of plaint.
Defence pleadings or disputed facts cannot be looked into.
Rejection can be ordered at any stage. (Usually it is a threshold determination.)
A fresh plaint can be presented after curing the defects (if not barred by limitation or under any provision of law).

Grounds for Rejection

Following are the grounds for Rejection of Plain in Order VII rule 11 CPC:

No Cause of Action Disclosed [Order VII Rule 11(a)]
Relief Undervalued [Order VII Rule 11(b)]
Insufficient Court Fee [Order VII Rule 11(c)]
Suit Barred by Law [Order VII Rule 11(d)] such as:
- Limitation
- Res judicata (when evident on the plaint)
- Statutory bar (e.g., Section 69 of the Partnership Act for unregistered firms)
Duplicate Plaint Not Filed [Order VII Rule 11(e)]
Non-compliance with Rule 9 [Order VII Rule 11(f)]

Order VII rule 11 of the CPC

Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC is the specific provision for the rejection of the plaint. It reads as under:

“11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9″.

Order VI rule 16

Order VI rule 16 provides for striking out pleadings at any stage. (It may not lead to dismissal of the entire plaint.) It reads as follows:

“16. Striking out pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading-
a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or
b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or
c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.”

Order 14 rule 2

Order 14 rule 2 CPC provides for the hearing of any preliminary issue, including the maintainability of the suit. It reads as follows:

“2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.
(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-
- (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
- (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in-force.
and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.”

Order 10 rule 1 CPC

Order 10 rule 1 CPC reads as under:

“Examination of parties by the court: 1. Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied.—At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain from each party or his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The Court shall record such admissions and denials.”

Part II

Inherent Powers Cannot be used for “Rejection” of plaints. But it Can be used for “Dismissal” of Suits in Rare Cases.

A PLAINT cannot be rejected invoking Section 151 CPC (inherent powers of courts).
But, a court can dismiss a SUIT, at the threshold, in exceptional cases, invoking inherent powers.
Inherent powers are not invoked for the Rejection of the plaintiff, for it is a Statutory-Affair, and specific provisions are laid down in Order VII Rule 11. (It cannot be supplemented, expanded, or substituted, invoking Section 151. In such cases, the inherent powers stand excluded.)

Inherent Powers Not Used if in Conflict with Express Provisions

In Padam Sen v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218, our Apex Court found: “the Additional Munsiff had DO inherent power to pass the order appointing a Commissioner to seize the plaintiff’s account books”.

It had been observed in this decision, as under:

“It is submitted for the State, that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, can adopt any procedure not prohibited by the Code expressly or by necessary implication if the Court considers it necessary, for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Section 151 of the Code reads:
- ” Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court “.
The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the puposes mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.”

In Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee, (1970) 1 SCC 732, the Apex Court cautioned as under:

“Under the inherent power of courts recognised by Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, a court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglected to avail himself of the same. Further the power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power.”

S. 151 is Not a Provision Conferring Power of Substantive Relief

It is held in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1, as under:

“Section 151 is not a provision of law conferring power to grant any kind of substantive relief. It is a procedural provision saving the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It cannot be invoked with reference to a matter which is covered by a specific provision in the Code. It cannot be exercised in conflict with the general scheme and intent of the Code. It cannot be used either to create or recognise rights, or to create liabilities and obligations not contemplated by any law.”

Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss the Suit) in the Following Situations

T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, is an authority to argue that Inherent Powers Can be invoked (to Dismiss a Suit) in the Following Situations:

Abuse of process of court
Fraud on court
Sham, vexatious, or illusory litigation
Re-litigation amounting to judicial harassment

Order VII Rue 11 is not Exhaustive; Court can invoke Inherent Power

In K. Akbar Ali v. K. Umar Khan, AIR 2021 SC 1114; 2021-14 SCC 51 it is held as under:

“Moreover, the provisions of Order VII Rue 11 are not exhaustive and the Court has the inherent power to see that frivolous or vexatious litigations are not allowed to consume the time of the Court.”

Se. 151, Inherent Power to Dismiss a Suit – if ‘Abuse of Process of the Court’

The Courts have inherent power to dismiss a suit that is an ‘abuse of their process’. It can also be invoked for rejection or setting aside a suit if an absolutely groundless suit is filed.

In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, AIR 1998 SC 1297: 1998 (3) SCC 573, it is observed as under:

“32. Under Order 6 Rule 16, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding, order to be struck out, inter alia, any matter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Mulla in his treatise on the Code of Civil Procedure. (15th Edition, Volume II, page 1179 note 7) has stated that power under clause (c) of Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code is confined to cases where the abuse of the process of the Court is manifest from the pleadings; and that this power is unlike the power under Section 151 whereunder Courts have inherent power to strike out pleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings which are an abuse of their process.
In the present case the High Court has held the suit to be an abuse of the process of Court on the basis of what is stated in the plaint.”
(Quoted in: Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, AIR 2016 SC 1948; 2016 11 SCC 484;
Reddy Enterprises, Vijayawada v. Appellate Authority & Additional Commissioner (ST) Vijayawada, 2024-5 ALD 452;
Raahul Foundations Private Ltd. v. S. Chandrababu, 2019-2 LW 148; 2019-3 MLJ 321)

Where no express provision, Inherent Power can be Invoked

“2. …It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code…..”

Part III

Manifestly Vexatious Suit – ‘Nipped in the bud’, Searchingly u/Or. 10, CPC

“We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, be should exercise his power under Or. VII r. 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first bearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code (Ch. XI) is also resourceful enough to meet such men, and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too good.”

Fraud or Abuse of judicial process — May Invite Dismissal of Suit

Fraud on Court and fraud on a party

“22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court’s business”.

In Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, AIR 2024 SC 289; 2024-5 SCC 481, it is held as under:

It is trite that fraud vitiates everything. It is a settled proposition of law that fraud avoids all judicial acts. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (Dead) through LRs, (1994) 1 SCC 1 (“S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu”), it has been observed that “fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” Further, “no judgment of a court, no order of a minister would be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. fraud unravels everything” vide Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasley, (1956) 1 all ER 341 (“Lazarus Estates Ltd.”).
It is well-settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and that the discretion must be exercised equitably for promotion of good faith vide State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 (“Prabhu”). This Court has further emphasized that fraud and collusion vitiate the most solemn precedent in any civilized jurisprudence; and that fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). This maxim has never lost its lustre over the centuries. Thus, any litigant who is guilty of inhibition before the Court should not bear the fruit and benefit of the court’s orders. This Court has also held that fraud is an act of deliberation with a desire to secure something which is otherwise not due. fraud is practiced with an intention to secure undue advantage. Thus, an act of fraud on courts must be viewed seriously.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

General Principles
Dedication and Vesting
Trustees and Management
Breach of Trust
- Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees
Suits by or against Trusts
Law on Hindu Religious Endowments
Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques – General
- Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques
Constitutional Principles
Ayodhya and Sabarimala Disputes
General

Do the Plantation-Tenants have a Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land, beyond the Ceiling Limit (under Purchase Certificates)?

Are Such Tenants Entitled for Full Compensation if the Land is Acquired?

‘No’ is the Answer.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Contents in a Nutshell

1. Ceiling Limit: The maximum extent of land assignable under a Purchase Certificate is circumscribed by the ceiling limit, under Section 72B(1)(a) and (b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.
2. Plantation Exemption: Owners and tenants of plantations are permitted to retain plantation lands in excess of the ceiling limit by availing the ‘exemption’ provided under Section 81. However, the said exemption does not confer any absolute proprietary right over such land.
3. Exempted plantation (lease) land Vest in Government: Title/ownership of unassigned–exempted-plantation-lease-land is vested with the Government, under Section 72(1).
4. Tenant Cannot Claim Better Right than the Landowner: Section 72G provides for payment of compensation to the former landowner; consequently, the vesting of the land in the Government under Section 72 stands absolutely affirmed. In such a situation, the tenant cannot claim any right better than that which the landowner himself did not possess.
5. Tenants will be Deemed as Tenants of the Govt. Such tenants have to pay ‘Rent’ to the Government (Section 72E) for the unassigned–exempted-plantation-lease-land. The rent is fixed by the Land Tribunal [Section 72F(5)(h) ].
6 On Acquisition, No Land Value to Previous Owners or Tenants: If the land vested in Government under Section 72 is acquired, land-value will not be paid to the former land-owner or the tenant (Section 112(5A).
7. Exemption will be lost, if “Fragmented”:The exemption granted to a plantation will be lost if it is “fragmented” or the plantation-crop is abandoned (under Section 87).

Relevant Provisions of Law

1. Section 72(1), Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963: All right, title and interest of the land-owners held by cultivating-tenants as on 1.1.1970 entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 shall vest in the Government.
2. Section 72B: It deals with “cultivating tenants’ right to assignment” (of the land vested in Government under Section 72). Sub Section 1(a) and (b) of this Section direct that the assignment should be within the ceiling limit (mentioned in Section 82).
3. Section 72C: It deals with assignment of land, where the cultivating-tenant has not made application under Section 72B. All provisions of Section 72B, except sub section 3, are made applicable to Section 72C. The opening words of Section 72C (“notwithstanding anything contained in sub Section 3 of Section 72B”), indicate the nexus between Section 72B and Section 72C. Therefore, the purchase certificate can be issued, within ceiling limit alone, under Section 72C, as in the case of Section 72B.
4. Section 72E: As stated above, tenancy-lands vest in the Government, under Section 72. The tenants (under Government) of unassigned-exempted-plantation-land, etc., are liable to pay rent to the Government for the unassigned (over and above the ceiling limit).
5. Section 72F(5)(h): Land Tribunal fixes the rent for the said unassigned–exempted-land (under Section 81) .
6. Section 72G: For the land vested in the Government under Section 72, compensation is paid to the former landowner. Subsections (2) and (3) ensure the payment of substantial compensation. Consequently, the vesting effected under Section 72(1) stands duly justified and legally sustained.
7. Section 87(1) and its Explanations I and II: Only a limited right to continue; and, fragmentation is prohibited. The specified plantation-crop alone is permitted. The exemption is given subject to the condition – not to “convert” the land for any other use.
- In case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost, and the exemption may be withdrawn under Explanation II of Section 87(1).
8. Section 112 (5A): On acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Section 72.
9. Section 112 (5A)(a):The compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the land-owner shall be awarded to the Government.
10. Section 112 (5A)(b):The balance-compensation remaining after deducting the amount referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
11. Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India:The State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
- The provisions of the KLR Act, in this regard, are legislated following this proviso in Article 31A(1). It goes without saying – if no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.

Legal Right Conferred by the Statute
From the above, it is clear:

The unassigned land allowed to be occupied by a tenant (over and above the ceiling limit for which the tenant is liable to pay rent to the Government under Section 72E) can be termed as a “Legal Right conferred by the Statute”. It is not an absolute right that is conferred to some, including the BIG plantation tenants.

The Policy of the KLR Act
Section 83, lays down the policy of the Act – No person “be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” (Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State of Kerala v. Puliyangattu Krishnan Master, 2008(1) KLJ 571).

Unjustifiable to Confer Undue Benefits to Plantation-Tenants
Under Section 72A and Section 88, meagre compensation is paid to the land owners on vesting landlords’ rights in the Government and on surrendering the surplus land. It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits on the tenants or lessees (which is not given to the land owners) when their lease-hold-lands are acquired (the majority of such plantation-lessees are Companies).

Lands of the Maharaja of Travancore were taken

It is a matter of record that even the lands of the Maharaja of Travancore—191 acres situated within Thiruvananthapuram City, far in excess of the statutory ceiling of 7.5 acres, were taken over pursuant to the orders of the Land Board, Thiruvananthapuram, vide Order No. LB(B)2-18919/70 dated 15-01-1972. Equally, it is an indisputable fact that thousands of middle-class landowners were subjected to the rigour of the Act, and their excess lands were taken by the force of law.

Therefore, it would be wholly unreasonable to contend that the Legislature intended to confer any special or undue benefit upon plantation-tenants (benefits which were not extended to middle-class landowners, to other categories of tenants governed by the Act and even to the Maharaja of Travancore).

Any interpretation that elevates plantation-tenants to a privileged class, beyond the plain limits imposed by the statute, would be contrary to the scheme, object, and egalitarian ethos of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.

Section 72, KLR Act – ‘Vesting of Ownership’ in Government

Section 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act speaks about ‘vesting of landlord’s rights in Government’. It pertains to –

“All right, title and interest of the land-owners and intermediaries … and in respect of which certificates of purchase… have not been issued, shall …. vest in the government”.

As compensation is paid to the former landowner under Section 72G, the vesting of the land in the Government under Section 72 is absolute.

Fixity of Tenure and Assignment under Kraya Certificate

Section 13 of the KLR Act, which declares Fixity of Tenure to the cultivating tenants, is dealt with under Chapter II that governs tenancies; whereas the provisions of ceiling (Section 82 and Section 83) come under Chapter III that governs restriction on ownership, ceiling area, etc. (Section 83 restricts holding land, excess of ceiling limits prescribed under Section 82.)

Fixity of tenure is assured in Section 13(1) “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage of contract, etc.”
The Fixity of Tenure (laid down under Section 13, in Chapter II) is not controlled by the ceiling provisions in Section 82 and 83 (in Chapter III). That is, the provisions as to Fixity of Tenure will prevail, without being affected by the ceiling provisions in Chapter III.
Note: (1) Section 13 (Fixity of Tenure) is controlled by Section 72 (in Chapter II itself) as to vesting in Government.
(2) The stipulations as to ceiling-limit were specifically brought into Sec. 72B (Chapter II) for the reason that Chapter II stands independent of Chapter III .

Therefore, land cannot be assigned under Section 72B and 72C, by the Land Tribunal, by Purchase Certificates, over and above the ceiling limit.

In sum, though a plantation-tenant will definitely have the right of ‘fixity’, those tenants will not have the right of assignment (under Section 72B and 72C) over and above the ceiling limit.

Tenants Obligated to Approach the LT for Availing Plantation Exemption

It is beyond doubt – the excess land in possession of a tenant, over which he has fixity of tenure under Section 13 (other than the lands exempted under Section 81), has to be surrendered. If the claimant of Plantation Exemption (under Section 81) is a tenant, he must have approached the Land Tribunal under subsection (3) of Section 85 – within the stipulated time (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations under different landlords), because:

(i) subsection (3) of Section 85 itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant under Section 72B (or for getting a Certificate to the effect that he is not eligible to purchase any more land, for he is already holding maximum within the limit prescribed under Section 82),
(ii) the Land Tribunal is the only authority to deal with tenancy in this regard (the Land Board or Taluk Land Board – deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues, etc. – cannot adjudicate on tenancy-rights),
(iii) Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11). Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).
In Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736; 1993 2 KLT 962, it is pointed out: “If there is dispute on any of these points necessarily the Land Tribunal has to go into the question of possession and the alleged tenancy”
(iv) the Land Board cannot accept the self-declaration that one is a tenant.
(v) It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government, for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.
- Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.

Note: 1. The entire tenancy-land being vested with the Government by virtue of Section 72, the tenants of the exempted-plantation-land (above the ceiling limit), will be the tenants under the Government liable to pay rent under Section 72E.

2. Under Section 72F(5)(h), the Land Tribunal fixes the rent for the unassigned-exempted-land.

3. These legal principles are adopted in Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, , 2018(3) KLT 283.

See: Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy’; TLB to Fix Plantation Exemption.

Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala, 2022 (4) KHC 97.

Following were the basic factual situation in Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala (supra) –

The land was leased out by landlords.
The lease-rights came in the petitioners (cultivating tenants) by transfer.

The following were the rival contentions or claims raised by the parties.

Contention of the Government

The tenant was a cultivating tenant. The land (absolutely) vested in the Government under Section 72 KLR Act.
- Hence, tenant would be entitled to get compensation for the improvements (alone) to be determined under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, in view of Section 20(1) of the KLR Act.

Contention of the Tenants

A cultivating tenant has absolute right to seek assignment (subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D). Therefore, vesting of rights in the Government under Section 72 is a legal fiction.

Claims of Land-Owners

In view of Section 3(i)(viii), if the extent of the plantation is above 30 acres, and if the land was a plantation (put up by the land owner) when it was leased, the tenant will not be entitled for ‘fixity’; and the land will return to the land owner after the lease-period. Therefore, the land owners (in one Writ Appeal) claimed that the land involved therein was such a land entitled to by them (after the lease period).
Land owners also claimed that Section 72BB(1) gives them a right (i) to apply for assignment to the tenant and (ii) for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A (as regards the property within ceiling limit).

The Division Bench Finding on Vesting Under Section 72

The contention of the Government that the land was (absolutely) vested in it was rejected and held –
- 1. the vesting in Government ‘is a legal fiction‘.
- 2. cultivating tenant ‘has an absolute right to seek assignment‘ subject to the payment of purchase price.

The Division Bench observed as under:

“41. On an indepth analysis of the aforesaid provision, we find that when Section 72 came into force on 01.01.1970, the cultivating tenant is entitled for the assignment of the land for possession, subject to the liabilities fixed under Section 72 of the Act, 1963 to pay the purchase price. As per Section 72C, if no application is filed by the cultivating tenant, the Land Tribunal shall subject to the Rules made by the Government ensure that the assignment is granted to the cultivating tenant, assigning such title and interest to the cultivating tenant entitled thereto, which rights, title and interest are vested with the Government by virtue of the legal fiction created under Section 72 of the Act, 1963.
42. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 72 of Act, 1963 would only deal with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants free from encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries. However, the legal provisions discussed above would make it clear that insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.”

Tanya Alice Stephen v. Manager, Perumal Smaraka Nidhi, 2025:KER:97401

In this case, the High Court held, on 17.12.2025, to the following effect:

Under Ext. P3, the Land Tribunal “restricted the purchase certificate to an extent of 12 acres and has rejected the claim regarding the balance extent out of 94.54 acres”.
The HC directed the Government on 18.3.2024 to file an affidavit “by the person who authored Ext. P3 explaining and referring to the reasons as to why the earlier decision of the Land Tribunal affirmed in the judgment of the Sub Court, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court and the Apex Court was not followed….”
Though a counter affidavit was filed “the affidavit does not explain why the relief was restricted to 12 acres”
It is stated in the affidavit that “the attempt to obtain purchase certificate is an attempt to defeat the KLR Act and to alienate the land vested in the Government and not to pay rent under Section 72E”.
The High Court observed “no such contention is available to the respondents in view of the categoric finding of this court that the lessees … …. are entitled to fixity of tenure”; and that “there is no explanation as to why the finding of this Court affirmed by the Supreme Court have not been followed…..”.

The High Court failed to advert to the following vital aspects:

Assignment effected under a purchase certificate issued by the Land Tribunal is statutorily independent of the concept of ‘fixity of tenure’. The two operate in distinct fields and cannot be combined.
Sections 72B and 72C of the Act explicitly mandate and regulate assignment, and unambiguously recognise that such assignment must be confined to land below the ceiling limit. Any interpretation to the contrary runs directly counter to the express statutory scheme.

The Line of Reasoning Put Forward in the above decisions is Inappropriate.

The interpretative approach adopted by the Bench (an absolute right is vested with the tenants to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D) appears to be too inappropriate; mainly, because–

Such lands vest in Government. The (former) tenants will be (deemed to be) tenants under the Government and they have to pay rent to the Government, by virtue of Sec. 72E.
Section 72B (Chapter II) spells out that the Purchase-Certificate can be given within the ceiling limit alone. The exemption provisions stand independent – in Chapter III. (That is why, the stipulations as to ceiling limit were specifically brought into Sec. 72B.)
On acquisition of the unassigned-exempted-plantation-land vested in Government, land-value will not be paid to the former owner or tenant under Sec. 112(5A)

It goes without saying that the plantation holdings typically extend to hundreds or thousands of acres, of which the assignable extent within the ceiling may be a negligible fraction (7.5 or 15 acres).

Therefore, extending the statutory right of assignment to the vast excess land will stand against the express provisions of the Statute. It will also annihilate the public interest well-visioned by the erudite legislatures considering the well-being of the generations to come, and the whole ecology of the nation.

The High Court failed to consider the Earlier Decisions

In K. Jayaprakashan v. State of Kerala, 2023-3 KLT 541, it is observed as under:
- “Section 72 of the Act deals with vesting of landlord’s rights in Government. As per sub-section (1) of Section 72 …. all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyiruppus and holders of karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 … shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon on the said date”.
In V.N. Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (P.T. Raman Nayar, T.C.Raghavan, K.K.Mathew, JJ.) , AIR 1971 Ker 98, it is held as under:
- “By Section 72 the rights of landlords whose rights have not been purchased by cultivating tenants vest in the Government free of all encumbrances on a date to be notified by the Government in that behalf -the date has been notified as the 1st January, 1970”
In Lakshmi v. Rama Iyer, 1992-1 ILR-Ker 398; 1991-2 KLT 897it is pointed out: “Consequently the title and interest of the land-lord would vest in the Government on the appointed day that is, on 1-1-1970. Then as per S. 72Q the land owner would be entitled to recover rent accrued till 1-1-1970 only”.
In Aru v. Nakunni (Padmanabhan, J.), 1987-1 KLT 177, it is held as under:
- “Under S.72 of the Act all the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of a holding held by a cultivating tenant entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 shall, subject to the various provisions of S.72, vest in the Government free of all encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries and subsisting on the date notified by the Government. ….. When once vesting has taken place there cannot be any further rights in any body. …. By assignment all such rights vest in the tenant”.

Land Reform Wearied Middle Class Landlords and Tenants

When Land Reform Measures were implemented in the State of Kerala, it wearied small and moderate landlords and tenants, on the bedrock of “ceiling limit”. But the Plantations were not “touched”, taking “the economy” into consideration. Still, the well-visioned legislators were particular to see that the ownership of this large extent of plantations (otherwise thick forest of the Western Ghats) remained with the State. It was based on the principles in Article 31A(1) of the Constitution, which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit’.

Conclusion

1. The exemption provisions confer only a limited and conditional right—namely, the right to continue the specified plantation crop alone. Upon conversion of the land or deviation from the permitted use, the exemption will be forfeited, and the land will become fully subject to the statutory regime.

2. It can be stated with legal certainty that:

(i) Where the landowner himself has no vested or proprietary right over land held beyond the ceiling limit, a tenant cannot claim any such right. To hold otherwise would be illogical, irrational, and contrary to settled principles of property law, as a tenant cannot acquire a higher or superior right than that of the landowner.
(ii) Statutory interpretation, particularly when constitutional principles are implicated, must advance the larger public interest, including the interests of the nation and future generations, and not operate to confer benefits on a select class.
(iii) It is wholly unjustifiable to confer disproportionate rights or benefits upon plantation tenants—many of whom are large corporate entities—when even the Maharaja of Travancore was denied retention of land beyond the ceiling limit. It is a sheer fact that thousands of middle-class landowners were divested of their lands under the rigorous operation of the Act.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

General Principles
Dedication and Vesting
Trustees and Management
Breach of Trust
- Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees
Suits by or against Trusts
Law on Hindu Religious Endowments
Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques – General
- Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques
Constitutional Principles
Ayodhya and Sabarimala Disputes
General

“Once a Mortgage Always a Mortgage”: Usufructuary Mortgage is ‘Always’ Redeemable; Limitation of 30 Years NOT Applicable.

Jojy George Koduvath

Legal Principles

1. In a usufructuary mortgage, the usufruct (profits) of the land are being adjusted towards interest on the mortgage amount.
2. Therefore, in a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagee continues to remain in possession of the mortgaged security, appropriating the usufruct of the mortgaged land towards the interest on the mortgaged debt till the mortgager makes the (re)payment of the mortgage money.
3. Accordingly, the right to seek redemption (i.e., recover possession) of a usufructuary mortgage accrues only on payment of the mortgage money, and the limitation period of 30 years is not related to (any) date of the mortgage.
4. For the above reason, the right of foreclosure (forcing sale through the court) will not accrue to the mortgagee till such time he remains in possession (appropriating the usufruct of the mortgaged land towards the interest).
5. The limitation of 30 years under Article 61(a) begins to run “when the right to redeem or the possession accrues” (that is, on the payment of the mortgage money).
6. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for a declaration that he had become an owner (merely) on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage.
7. The right to seek foreclosure is co-extensive with the right to seek redemption.
8. As shown above, the period of redemption will not start as long as the usufruct of the land is adjusted towards interest on the mortgage amount. In this situation, the principle is invoked: “once a mortgage, always a mortgage” and is “always redeemable”.

In Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, AIR 2014 SC 3447; 2014-9 SCC 185, the above propositions are laid down as under –

“15. We, thus, hold that special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P. Act to recover possession commences in the manner specified therein, i.e., when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by mortgagor. Until then, limitation does not start for purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for declaration that he had become an owner merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage. We answer the question accordingly.
16. On this conclusion, the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court will stand affirmed and contrary view taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Bhandaru Ram (D) Thr. L.R. Ratan Lal vs. Sukh Ram (supra) will stand overruled.”

This decision (Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, AIR 2014 SC 3447; 2014-9 SCC 185) is followed in –

Harminder Singhv. Surjit Kaur, 2022-3 CivCC 266; 2022-2 RCR(Civ) 859,
Bir Singh v. Ram Kanwar Singh, 2018- 5 RCR(Civ) 403; 2018-15 SCC 341,
Mohan Lal v. Mohan Lal, 2016-13 SCC 90.

How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLive’? Click here – “How to Subscribe free “

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

General Principles
Dedication and Vesting
Trustees and Management
Breach of Trust
- Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees
Suits by or against Trusts
Law on Hindu Religious Endowments
Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques – General
- Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques
Constitutional Principles
Ayodhya and Sabarimala Disputes
General

Contents of a Document are to be Proved in Court by Producing Original or Secondary Evidence

Jojy George Koduvath

Also Read: Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant

Abstract.

1. The contents of a document cannot be proved by oral evidence. The document itself must be produced. (Sections 61 and 62 of the Evidence Act).

2. Secondary evidence can be given if permitted under Sections 65 of the Evidence Act, read with Section 63.

3. Section 91 expressly bars oral evidence to prove the terms of a contract, disposition of property, etc., by oral evidence if they are reduced to writing.

4. Sec. 22 and 144 of the Evidence Act postulate that the oral admissions or assertions as to contents of documents are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under Sec. 65, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

5. If the original document is not produced, right to adduce Secondary Evidence is not automatic. Loss, non-availability, etc., are to be proved under Sec. 65; and no oral statement about its contents is inadmissible. Secondary evidence of a document’s contents cannot be admitted unless the non-production of the original is first accounted for.

6. Withholding the best evidence attracts adverse inference. When a party relies on a document but does not produce it, the Court must presume it would have gone against that party. A party in possession of the best evidence must produce it; otherwise, the court is entitled to draw ‘adverse inference’.

7. No amount of oral evidence can substitute documentary evidence, where the law requires the document itself to be produced.

8. A document which is not proved (even if produced) in accordance with law cannot be relied upon by the court for deciding the rights of the parties.

9. Documents which are not proved (even if produced) in accordance with the law cannot be taken into consideration.

PRODUCTION, ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

A document to be used in court has to pass through three steps. They are:

Production of documents in court
Admittance and exhibition
Proof (formal proof and truth of contents).

Modes of Proof of Documents

Modes of Proof of Documents (as to, both, ‘formal proof’ and ‘truth of the contents’) include the following:

Admission of the person who wrote or signed the document (Sec. 17, 21, 58, 67, 70).
Evidence of a person in whose presence the document was signed or written – ocular evidence (Sec. 59).
An attesting witness (Sec. 59).
Opinion of a person who is acquainted with the writing of the person who signed or wrote (Sec. 47).
Admission made by the person who signed or wrote the document made in judicial proceedings (Sec. 32, 33).
Evidence of a handwriting expert-opinion evidence/scientific evidence (Sec.45).
Evidence of a person who in routine has been receiving the document; or a document signed by such a person in the ordinary course of his business or official duty, though he may have never seen the author signing the document (Sec. 32, 34, 35 or 114).
Invoking (specific) presumptions under Sec. 79 to 90A.
Presumptions (general) under Sec. 114.
Circumstantial evidence: on probability or inferences (Sec. 114).
Court-comparison (Sec. 73).
Facts judicially noticeable (Sec. 56 and 57).
A fact of common-knowledge. (It does not require proof. See: Union Of India Vs. Virendra Bharti: 2011-2 ACC 886, 2010 ACJ 2353; Rakhal Chakraborty Vs. Sanjib Kumar Roy: 1998-1 GauLR 253, 1997-2 GauLT 705)
Internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document; a link in a chain of correspondence; recipient of the document. (Mobarik Ali Ahmed Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857)

Rule of Best Evidence

The Evidence Act project the ‘rule of best evidence’ and it directs that the contents of the document are to be proved by the original document itself, unless secondary evidence is provided under Sec. 65. (See: Bimla Rohal v. Usha, 2002-2 HLJ 745; 2002-2 Shim LC 341)

Oral Evidence on Contents of Documents

No Use, Unless Secondary Evidence Permitted

Sec. 22 and 144 of the Evidence Act postulate that the oral admissions or assertions as to contents of documents are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under Sec. 65, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22 emphasises that oral evidence as to contents of documents , even if adduced, will be of no use, as it will be ‘irrelevant’. By virtue of Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act, the adverse party may object to giving oral evidence as to contents of the same until such document itself is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.

Sec. 22 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

22. When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant.—Oral admissions as to the contents of a document are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under the rules hereinafter contained, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22A says as to oral admissions as to contents of electronic records as under:

22A. When oral admissions as to contents of electronic records are relevant
Oral admissions as to the contents of electronic records are not relevant, unless the genuineness of the electronic record produced is in question.”

Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

144. Evidence as to matters in writing.—Any witness may be asked, whilst under examination, whether any contract, grant or other disposition of property, as to which he is giving evidence, was not contained in a document, and if he says that it was, or if he is about to make any statement as to the contents of any document, which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to be produced, the adverse party may object to such evidence being given until such document is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.
Explanation.—A witness may give oral evidence of statements made by other persons about the contents of documents if such statements are in themselves relevant facts.
Illustration. The question is, whether A assaulted B. C deposes that he heard A say to D—”B wrote a letter accusing me of theft, and I will be revenged on him”. This statement is relevant as showing A’s motive for the assault, and evidence may be given of it, though no other evidence is given about the letter.

Documentary Evidence becomes meaningless if oral evidence Allowed

In Bhima Tima Dhotre v. The Pioneer Chemical Co. (1968) 70 Bom LR 683, it is observed as under:

“Documentary evidence becomes meaningless if the writer has to be called in every case to give oral evidence of its contents. If that were the position, it would mean that, in the ultimate analysis, all evidence must be oral and that oral evidence would virtually be the only kind of evidence recognised by law. That, however, is not the position under the Evidence Act. … Section 59 of the said Act enacts that all facts, except the “contents” of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. This provision would clearly indicate that to prove the contents of adocument by means of oral evidence would be a violation of that section.”

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The contents of a document are to be proved by producing it

To prove the contents of a document, it must have been produced before the court.

Sections 61 & 62 of the Evidence Act require proof of the contents of a document by the production of the document itself (or its secondary evidence).

If the document is not produced, its contents are legally non-existent for the Court. Following are the well-accepted principles in this regard:

Oral evidence cannot substitute documentary proof.
Court cannot decide rights on “assumed” contents

Principles of Law – in a Nutshell

The Principles of Law in this regard can be discerned from the following decisions of our Apex Court:

1. It is held in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595, that Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act bar amendment, variation, etc. of a document; oral variations—whether by the party or the opposite side—are barred. The Court laid down as under:

“Wherever written instruments are appointed, either by the requirement of law, or by the contract of the parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter them.”(Quoted in: Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., 2024-4 SCC 1; V. Anantha Raju v. T. M. Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)
“The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence are (i) to admit inferior evidence when law requires superior would amount to nullifying the law, (ii) when parties have deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory.” (Quoted in Placido Francisco Pinto v. Jose Francisco Pinto, 2021-10 SCR 676; V Anantha Raju v. T M Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)

2. In Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413, para 5, it is held that in a case where one party withholds a document, the court takes an adverse inference under Section 114(g). The Court said as under:

“Even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue..”

3. The Constitution Bench of our Apex Court laid down in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of N. C. T. of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 330; 2023-4 SCC 731, as under:

“47. Section 61 deals with proof of contents of documents which is by either primary or by secondary evidence.
When a document is produced as primary evidence, it will have to be proved in the manner laid down in Sections 67 to 73 of the Evidence Act.
Mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence. On the other hand, when a document is produced and admitted by the opposite party and is marked as an exhibit by the court, … (sic – no objection can be raised at any later stage with regard to proof of its contents).
The contents of the document must be proved either by the production of the original document i.e., primary evidence or by copies of the same as per Section 65 as secondary evidence.
So long as an original document is in existence and is available, its contents must be proved by primary evidence.
It is only when the primary evidence is lost, in the interest of justice, the secondary evidence must be allowed.
Primary evidence is the best evidence and it affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.
Thus, when a particular fact is to be established by production of documentary evidence, there is no scope for leading oral evidence.
What is to be produced is the primary evidence i.e., document itself. It is only when the absence of the primary source has been satisfactorily explained that secondary evidence is permissible to prove the contents of documents.
Secondary evidence, therefore, should not be accepted without a sufficient reason being given for non-production of the original.”
“48. ……. Once a document is admitted, the contents of that document are also admitted in evidence, though those contents may not be conclusive evidence.
Moreover, once certain evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence.
There is a prohibition for any other evidence to be led which may detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence and the court has no option to hold the existence of the fact otherwise when such evidence is made conclusive.”

Fraudulent or Void Transaction: Is ‘Declaration’ Required? The Supreme Court Says No (in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105).

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

A Seeming Conflict Between Two Decisions

1. Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)
2. Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)

In the earlier decision in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.), it was clearly opined, as regards an assailed instrument, as under:

“In a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, a declaration must have been sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff.”

However, in the subsequent decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105 (per Pardiwala and Mahadevan JJ.), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier position by holding that where the very character of a sale deed is assailed as fraudulent or bogus, the requirement of seeking a declaration stands implicitly satisfied. The Court said as under:

“In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”

As a result –

a void document need not be challenged by claiming a declaration (that the said instrument is not binding), as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.

It is also made clear –

A plaintiff who was not a party to the instrument need not seek its cancellation; and
Relevant article in the Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 65 (12-year period) and not Article 59 (3-year period).

Subsequent Decision (Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi) Vividly Explained the Legal Position

In Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September 2025, made it clear – when a deed is fraudulent or a sham and bogus one, ‘it is not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that a document is void‘. It is held as under:

“25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. ….”
“28. In State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, reported in 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522, this Court held that as far as void and non-est documents are concerned, it would be enough for the plaintiff to file a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. …… Subsequently, the decision of this Court in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 186 … opined as follows:
- .i. First, the contention of the State that it is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that would apply, was rejected. It was held that the suit is primarily one for possession of property based upon title. It was observed that owing to the decision in Bhim Singhji (supra), the order dated 26.05.1976 along with the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 became void ab intio and without jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that they are void. The plea about their invalidity could be raised in the course of any proceedings. Therefore, it is Article 65, which deals with a suit for possession based on title, that would apply from the date on the which the possession of the defendant State became adverse to the plaintiff.
- ii. Secondly, though the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order dated 26.05.1976 and the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 were void, yet it was held that the same would be of no consequence insofar as the question of limitation is concerned.
The fact would still remain that the possession of the property was taken by the defendants via void documents. Therefore, such documents could be ignored and a suit for possession simpliciter, for which the period of limitation prescribed under Article 65, i.e., 12 years, could be filed. In the course of such proceedings, it could be contended by the plaintiff that the documents are a nullity.
…”
“29. This Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353, discussed the position of law as to when Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and opined as follows:
- .i. First, that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only encompass within its fold fraudulent transactions which are ‘voidable’ transactions and not those that are ‘void’. In other words, Article 59 would apply only where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to those instruments which are presumptively invalid.
- ii. Secondly, that when the document in question is void ab initio/or void, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary since such a transaction would be non-est in the eyes of law, owing to it being a nullity.
- iii. Thirdly, a fine distinction was drawn between fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ and fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘contents of a document’. It is only in the former situation that the instrument would be void and, in the latter, it would remain voidable. To put it simply, Article 59 would not govern the period of limitation in respect of a void transaction.
- iv. Lastly, that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was thereby void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder, i.e., he could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority.
- ….”
“30. In the decision of this Court in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, where one of us, J.B. Pardiwala J., was a member of the Bench, it was reiterated that a person who is not a party to an instrument would not be obliged in law to seek its cancellation. The reason being that such an instrument would neither be likely to affect his title nor be binding on him. However, such a plaintiff must at least seek a declaration that the said instrument is not binding on him or that is invalid insofar as he is concerned. ………

31. As per the dictum in Prem Singh (supra), this Court, in order to ascertain whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed. Both the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed therein. Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio. Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation. The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale deed. Consequently, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would find no application to the case in hand.
32. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury (supra), it was clearly opined that a plaintiff who is not a party to the instrument in question need not seek its cancellation. We are not oblivious to the fact that in a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, the said decision laid down a requirement that a declaration must be sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff. However, the said decision clarified that whether the plaintiff has sought such a declaration or not could be culled out from a holistic reading of the plaint along with the relief(s) sought. In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”
…..
“34. We may look at the matter from one another angle. Apart from the aspect of fraud, the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 18 SCC 489, while looking into whether the defendants had paid any sale consideration to the plaintiff while purchasing the plaintiff’s share in the property, held as follows:
- .i. First, that the sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future. If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
- ii. Secondly, that, in the said case, the defendants could not rebut the allegation of the plaintiff that no sale consideration was paid as no evidence was adduced to indicate – (a) the actual payment of the price mentioned in the sale deeds and, (b) that the defendants had any earning capacity at the time of the transaction such that the sale consideration could have been paid. As such the sale deed being void for want of valid consideration, could not be said to have affected the one-half share of the plaintiff in the suit properties nor have conferred any right of title on the defendants. In fact, it was held that the sale deeds were a sham and must be ignored.
- iii. Lastly, it was reiterated that a document that is void need not be challenged by seeking a declaration as the said pleas can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.”
“The relevant observations are thus:
- “……
- Thus, the sale deeds of 10-4-1981 will not confer any right, title and interest on Sudarshan Kumar’s wife and children, as the sale deeds will have to be ignored, being void. It was not necessary for the appellant to specifically claim a declaration as regards the sale deeds by way of amendment to the plaint. The reason being that there were specific pleadings in the plaints as originally filed that the sale deeds were void. A document which is void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
- …..”

End Notes I

A suit for (i) declaration of Title and (ii) Recovery – Art. 65 Governs; Not, Art. 58.

Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September, 2025, (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)	1. Crux of the issue: whether Article 65 or Article 59 2. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460 – void and non-est documents – a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 would apply 3. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 186 – Claim of title void ab initio and without jurisdiction – suit for possession based upon title – not necessary to claim any separate declaration that they are void. -invalidity could be raised in any proceedings. – Article 65 deals with.
N. Thajudeen v. TN Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641	declaration of title and recovery of possession – relief of declaration would only be an ancillary* one*
K. Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)	If the document ex facie reveals that the conveyer had no title, no specific declaration is needed.
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183	Suit for possession, as a consequence of the declaration, Article 58 will have no application
Prem Singh v. Birbal (2006) 5 SCC 353	1. Article 59 fraudulent transactions – ‘voidable’ not ‘void’. 2. Article 59 applies where an instrument is prima facie valid and not presumptively invalid. 3. Article 65 applies when the document is void ab initio or void 4. A decree for setting aside the document void ab initio or void would not be necessary since non-est. 5. Fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ would be void, not ‘contents’. Article 59 would not govern a void transaction.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460	The sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of the plaintiff having sought such a remedy to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply, and the limitation to file the suit will be 12 years.
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549	Once the title is established, the defendant has to prove adverse possession (Followed in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021)
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808	Declaration with a further relief* – Article governing such a suit will be that for such further relief*.
Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269	Declaration with possession – Article 65 would come into play, giving a 12-year period, not Article 58.
S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith: 2009 (4) KerLT 840	When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought, the consequential relief sought for is to be treated as the main relief governing the period of limitation. A declaration is unnecessary in such a case, and even if made, it needs only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition.
Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47	When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek cancellation of such a document.
K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.)	1. suit for recovery based on title, limitation arise only when adverse possession. 2. Recovery of possession on title – declaration is only subservient to the main prayer, possession. 3. Article 58 will apply only to a suit for declaration simpliciter.

End Notes II

Declaration of Title & Recovery: Article 65 of the Limitation Act Governs; Not, 58

To obtain any other declaration

Three years.

When the right to sue first accrues.

To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract.

Three years.

When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.

For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.

Twelve years.

When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

End Notes III

Earlier Supreme Court Decisions

1. Kizhakkevattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024-4 SCR 383; 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)

“If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence.”

2. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641

“In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

3. C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183

“If the plaintiff is to be granted a relief of recovery of possession, the suit could be filed within a period of 12 years. It is one thing to say that whether such a relief can be granted or not after the evidences are led by the parties but it is another thing to say that the plaint is to be rejected on the ground that the same is barred by any law. If the suit has been filed for possession, as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiffs title, Article 58 will have no application.”

4. Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, AIR 2002 SC 215; (2002) 1 SCC 178.

“Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding.”

5. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460, held as under:

“6. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji’s case _{(Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 166)}, Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj & Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi2 this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.”

6. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 808

In a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief.

The Kerala High Court, in Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

“When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

“39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

In Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 it is held as under:

“Article 58 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in a suit for declaration, but it has no application when the relief sought in the plaint is not for a mere declaration,but coupled with other reliefs like injunction, partition, possession etc. and Article 65 of the Limitation Act would come into play giving 12 year period. In the instant case, the relevant Article which can be applied is not Article 58, but Article 65 as the suit was filed not merely for a relief of declaration, but for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of immovable property.”

In S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith: 2009 (4) KerLT 840, it is held that Article 58 is not applicable for declaration that is sought only as an ancillary relief. It is held as under:

“When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought for that is which would not govern the period of limitation for the suit. The consequential relief sought for is to be treated as main relief governing the period of limitation for the suit. (See Mrs. Indira Bhalchandran Gokhale v. Union of India & Another-AIR 1990 Bombay 98). Therefore declaration prayed for in this case as relief Nos. 1 and 2 were unnecessary, and even if made, need only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition of immovable properties and the claim that appellant is entitled to get family pension.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

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Recovery of Possession:

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

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Did the Supreme Court Depart From its Earlier Position in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, in its Subsequent Decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

A Seeming Conflict Between Two Decisions

In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.), it was clearly opined, as regards an assailed instrument, as under:

“In a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, a declaration must have been sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff.”

However, in the subsequent decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105 (per Pardiwala and Mahadevan JJ.), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier position by holding that where the very character of a sale deed is assailed as fraudulent or bogus, the requirement of seeking a declaration stands implicitly satisfied. The Court said as under:

“In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”

As a consequence –

a void document need not be challenged by claiming a declaration (that the said instrument is not binding), as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.

It is also made clear –

A plaintiff who was not a party to the instrument need not seek its cancellation; and
Relevant article in the Limitation Act, 1963 is Article 65 (12-year period) and not Article 59 (3-year period)

Subsequent Decision (Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi) Vividly Explained the Legal Position

In Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September 2025, made it clear – when a deed is fraudulent or a sham and bogus one, ‘it is not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that a document is void‘. It is held as under:

“25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. ….”
“28. In State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, reported in 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522, this Court held that as far as void and non-est documents are concerned, it would be enough for the plaintiff to file a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. …… Subsequently, the decision of this Court in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 186 … opined as follows:
- .i. First, the contention of the State that it is Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that would apply, was rejected. It was held that the suit is primarily one for possession of property based upon title. It was observed that owing to the decision in Bhim Singhji (supra), the order dated 26.05.1976 along with the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 became void ab intio and without jurisdiction. Therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to claim any separate declaration that they are void. The plea about their invalidity could be raised in the course of any proceedings. Therefore, it is Article 65, which deals with a suit for possession based on title, that would apply from the date on the which the possession of the defendant State became adverse to the plaintiff.
- ii. Secondly, though the plaintiff sought a declaration that the order dated 26.05.1976 and the sale deed dated 23.08.1976 were void, yet it was held that the same would be of no consequence insofar as the question of limitation is concerned.
The fact would still remain that the possession of the property was taken by the defendants via void documents. Therefore, such documents could be ignored and a suit for possession simpliciter, for which the period of limitation prescribed under Article 65, i.e., 12 years, could be filed. In the course of such proceedings, it could be contended by the plaintiff that the documents are a nullity.
…”
“29. This Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353, discussed the position of law as to when Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and opined as follows:
- .i. First, that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only encompass within its fold fraudulent transactions which are ‘voidable’ transactions and not those that are ‘void’. In other words, Article 59 would apply only where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to those instruments which are presumptively invalid.
- ii. Secondly, that when the document in question is void ab initio/or void, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary since such a transaction would be non-est in the eyes of law, owing to it being a nullity.
- iii. Thirdly, a fine distinction was drawn between fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ and fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘contents of a document’. It is only in the former situation that the instrument would be void and, in the latter, it would remain voidable. To put it simply, Article 59 would not govern the period of limitation in respect of a void transaction.
- iv. Lastly, that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was thereby void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder, i.e., he could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority.
- ….”
“30. In the decision of this Court in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892, where one of us, J.B. Pardiwala J., was a member of the Bench, it was reiterated that a person who is not a party to an instrument would not be obliged in law to seek its cancellation. The reason being that such an instrument would neither be likely to affect his title nor be binding on him. However, such a plaintiff must at least seek a declaration that the said instrument is not binding on him or that is invalid insofar as he is concerned. ………

31. As per the dictum in Prem Singh (supra), this Court, in order to ascertain whether Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed. Both the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed therein. Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio. Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation. The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale deed. Consequently, Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would find no application to the case in hand.
32. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhury (supra), it was clearly opined that a plaintiff who is not a party to the instrument in question need not seek its cancellation. We are not oblivious to the fact that in a situation where the plaintiff was not a party to the instrument, the said decision laid down a requirement that a declaration must be sought to the effect that the said instrument was not binding on the plaintiff. However, the said decision clarified that whether the plaintiff has sought such a declaration or not could be culled out from a holistic reading of the plaint along with the relief(s) sought. In cases where the character of the sale deed is assailed as being fraudulent, this requirement is implicitly satisfied since the very averment that the sale deed was fraudulent or a sham and bogus transaction by itself indicates that the plaintiff did not intend to be bound by it. Therefore, this requirement too, could be said to have been satisfied by the plaintiff in the present case.”
“34. We may look at the matter from one another angle. Apart from the aspect of fraud, the decision of this Court in Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others reported in (2022) 18 SCC 489, while looking into whether the defendants had paid any sale consideration to the plaintiff while purchasing the plaintiff’s share in the property, held as follows:
- .i. First, that the sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future. If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property.
- ii. Secondly, that, in the said case, the defendants could not rebut the allegation of the plaintiff that no sale consideration was paid as no evidence was adduced to indicate – (a) the actual payment of the price mentioned in the sale deeds and, (b) that the defendants had any earning capacity at the time of the transaction such that the sale consideration could have been paid. As such the sale deed being void for want of valid consideration, could not be said to have affected the one-half share of the plaintiff in the suit properties nor have conferred any right of title on the defendants. In fact, it was held that the sale deeds were a sham and must be ignored.
- iii. Lastly, it was reiterated that a document that is void need not be challenged by seeking a declaration as the said pleas can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.”
“The relevant observations are thus:
- “……
- Thus, the sale deeds of 10-4-1981 will not confer any right, title and interest on Sudarshan Kumar’s wife and children, as the sale deeds will have to be ignored, being void. It was not necessary for the appellant to specifically claim a declaration as regards the sale deeds by way of amendment to the plaint. The reason being that there were specific pleadings in the plaints as originally filed that the sale deeds were void. A document which is void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
- …..”

End Notes I

A suit for (i) declaration of Title and (ii) Recovery – Art. 65 Governs; Not, Art. 58.

Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) v. Jagan Devi, 2025 INSC 1105, on 12 September, 2025, (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan JJ.)	1. Crux of the issue whether Article 65 or Article 59 2. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460 – void and non-est documents – a simpliciter suit for possession to which Article 65 would apply 3. Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 186 – Claim of title void ab initio and without jurisdiction – suit for possession based upon title – not necessary to claim any separate declaration that they are void. -invalidity could be raised in any proceedings. – Article 65 deals with.
N. Thajudeen v. TN Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641	declaration of title and recovery of possession – relief of declaration would only be an ancillaryone
K. Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)	If Document ex-facie reveals- conveyer hadno title – No Specific declaration needed.
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183	Suit for possession, as a consequence of declaration – Article 58 will have no application
Prem Singh v. Birbal (2006) 5 SCC 353	1. Article 59 fraudulent transactions – ‘voidable’ not ‘void’. 2. Article 59 apply where an instrument is prima facie valid and not to presumptively invalid. 3. Article 65 apply when document is void ab initio or void 4. A decree for setting aside the document void ab initio or void would not be necessary since – non-est. 5. Fraudulent misrepresentation as regards the ‘character of the document’ would be void, not ‘contents’. Article 59 would not govern a void transaction.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460	The sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of *plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply*, and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years.
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549	Once the title is established, the defendant to prove adverse possession (Followed in: Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 20 Dec 2024, 2024 INSC 1021)
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808	declaration with a further relief* – Article governing -that for such further relief*
Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269	Declaration with possession – Article 65 would come into play giving 12 year period – not Article 58.
S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith: 2009 (4) KerLT 840	Article 58 is not applicable for declaration sought only as an ancillary relief.
Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47	Document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47) referred.
K.J. Abraham v. Mrs. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98 (Antony Dominic & Hariprasad, JJ.)	1. suit for recovery based on title, limitation arise only when adverse possession 2. recovery of possession on title – declaration is only subservient to the main prayer, possession 3. Article 58 will apply only to a suit for declaration simplicitor.

End Notes II

Declaration of Title & Recovery: Article 65 of the Limitation Act Governs; Not, 58

To obtain any other declaration

Three years.

When the right to sue first accrues.

To cancel or set aside an instrumentor decree or for the rescission of a contract.

Three years.

When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.

For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title.

Twelve years.

When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

End Notes III

Earlier Supreme Court Decisions

1. Kizhakkevattakandiyil Madhavan v. Janaki, 2024-4 SCR 383; 2024(2) KLT 789(SC)

“If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence.”

2. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 2024 SC 5641

“In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

3. C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; (2007) 14 SCC 183

“If the plaintiff is to be granted a relief of recovery of possession, the suit could be filed within a period of 12 years. It is one thing to say that whether such a relief can be granted or not after the evidences are led by the parties but it is another thing to say that the plaint is to be rejected on the ground that the same is barred by any law. If the suit has been filed for possession, as a consequence of declaration of the plaintiffs title, Article 58 will have no application.”

4. Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, AIR 2002 SC 215; (2002) 1 SCC 178.

“Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor s interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding.”

5. State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099; 2000-3 SCC 460, held as under:

“6. As already noticed, in Bhim Singhji’s case _{(Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 166)}, Section 27(1) insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area, has been held to be invalid. Thus, it has not been and cannot be disputed that the order dated 26th May, 1976, was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently, sale deed executed pursuant to the said order would also be a nullity. It was not necessary to seek a declaration about the invalidity of the said order and the sale deed. The fact of plaintiff having sought such a declaration is of no consequence. When possession has been taken by the appellants pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. When these documents are null and void, ignoring them a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of the suit it could be contended that these documents are nullity. In Ajudh Raj & Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi2 this Court said that if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non-existent in the eyes of law and is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The contention that the suit was time barred has no merit. The suit has been rightly held to have been filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.”

6. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 808

In a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief.

The Kerala High Court, in Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47, held as under:

“When a document is per se illegal, in the sense that it is void ab initio, a party need not seek for the cancellation of such a document. Suppose a person executes a sale deed in respect of a property on which he has no right or title and especially when title belongs to other person, the vendee will not get anything. At the same time, it cannot be said that the true title holder of the property should go for the cancellation of such a document. In such case, the document is void ab initio and, therefore, such a document is liable to be ignored, since it will not cause any cloud on title of the true title holder.”

In this decision (Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma v. Parappurath Unni Nair, 2017-2 KLJ 247; 2017-3 KLT(SN) 47) it is pointed out as under:

“39. In Sarojini vs. Ratnamma, 2015 (1) KLT 602, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a document is void, it is not at all necessary for the aggrieved person to get a declaration that it is void. But, if it is only voidable, it has to be set aside.
40. The very same dictum was laid down by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Gomathy vs. Kesavan Neelakantan, 2013 (3) KLT SN 43 (Case No. 47).”

In Gopakumar v. Kamalakshy Purushothaman, 2019-3 KHC 478; 2019-3 Ker LJ 269 it is held as under:

“Article 58 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in a suit for declaration, but it has no application when the relief sought in the plaint is not for a mere declaration,but coupled with other reliefs like injunction, partition, possession etc. and Article 65 of the Limitation Act would come into play giving 12 year period. In the instant case, the relevant Article which can be applied is not Article 58, but Article 65 as the suit was filed not merely for a relief of declaration, but for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of immovable property.”

In S. Krishnamma v. T.S. Viswajith: 2009 (4) KerLT 840, it is held that Article 58 is not applicable for declaration that is sought only as an ancillary relief. It is held as under:

“When a declaration regarding the void character of the document is sought for that is which would not govern the period of limitation for the suit. The consequential relief sought for is to be treated as main relief governing the period of limitation for the suit. (See Mrs. Indira Bhalchandran Gokhale v. Union of India & Another-AIR 1990 Bombay 98). Therefore declaration prayed for in this case as relief Nos. 1 and 2 were unnecessary, and even if made, need only be treated as ancillary to the main relief of partition of immovable prop

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/ Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

General Principles
Dedication and Vesting
Trustees and Management
Breach of Trust
- Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees
Suits by or against Trusts
Law on Hindu Religious Endowments
Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques – General
- Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques
Constitutional Principles
Ayodhya and Sabarimala Disputes
General

Pleadings are to be Considered as a Whole. When Lack of Pleadings Amounts to a Material Flaw?

Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract: Why ‘Particulars’ are Insisted in Pleadings

1. To give Notice to the other side.
2. To narrow down the controversy.
3. To give definiteness to the stance of parties in court.
4. Pleadings must be pregnant enough to produce an issue.
5. It is Court that draws inference as to ‘abstract’ propositions.
6. Pleadings constitute the skeleton that give shape to the case.
7. In the Absence of Pleading, Evidence cannot be Considered.

Classic Rulings on this Subject

Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067
Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260
Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Asstt. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137
Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555
Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, 1978 KHC 500: AIR 1978 SC 484
Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735

Fundamental Rules of Pleadings

The Supreme Court of India pointed out, in Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067, the fundamental rules of pleadings, as under:

The pleadings must be read as a whole,
The purport of proper pleadings is – caused no prejudice to the other side.
When a question arises as to a flaw in the pleadings, it must be considered in the light of the evidence.
Impropriety (or otherwise) of a lack of pleading is tested on the touchstone – whether it caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants (or not).

The Apex Court (Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067) explained the position vividly as under:

“17. A comprehensive look at the pleadings taken by the appellant along with the site-plan attached to the petition makes it evident that the appellant gave out a detailed description of the extent of accommodation available in the suit property as also the accommodation presently in her occupation and the nature and extent of her requirement. In the pleadings, it was indeed specified that the appellant was residing on the property bearing No. “C-586/587”. The pleadings taken by the appellant in paragraph 18(a)(ii) of her petition, of course, begin with the expression “as stated above” and there had not been any earlier mention of property bearing No. “C-586/587” but, there had been detailed description in the preceding paragraphs and the site plan was also attached to the petition. The appellant further made the position clear in her cross-examination that the building in question was constructed on Plot Nos.586 and 587 jointly and she and her sister-in-law were residing in the same building as one family.
18. Taking the pleadings as a whole and reading the same with the evidence, it is clear that there had not been any such mis-description of the property which would amount to a material flaw in the case of the appellant or which could have caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants.”

Object and Purpose of Pleadings

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, it was held as under:

“The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise.”

Order VI, rule 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 lay down the basics of pleading. They read as under:

Rule 1: Pleading: “Pleading” shall mean plaint or written statement.
Rule 2: Pleading to state material facts and not evidence:
(1) Every pleading shall contain, and contain only a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.
(2) Every pleading shall, when necessary, be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively, each allegation being, so far as is convenient, contained in a separate paragraph.
(3) Dates, sums and numbers shall be expressed in a pleading in figures as well as in words.

Pleadings should Receive a Liberal Construction

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, it was held as under:

“The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law, in such a case it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial.

Deficiency in Pleadings Doesn’t Matter if the Parties Knew the Case

In Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, 1966-2 SCR 286, the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court observed as under :

“If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is : did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another.”

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, relying on Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, 1966-2 SCR 286, it was held as under:

“Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.”

No Pedantic Approach and Hair Splitting Technicalities Permitted

In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Asstt. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137, it was held as under:

“15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hairsplitting technicalities.”(Quoted in: Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR 2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260)

In Augustine @ Mervin Alexander v. Josmy @ Geetha, 2022-5 KerHC(SN) 13; 2022-4 KerLT 966, it is held that it is well settled that pleadings should receive a liberal construction. The High Court continued as under:

“No pedantic approach is to be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Pleadings has to be construed reasonably. The contention of the parties has to be culled out from the pleadings by reading the same as a whole. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with the strict interpretation of the law. In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised, the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings. The court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues, upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of the deficiency in the pleadings, parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on the issues by producing evidence, it would not be open to a party to raise the question of lack of pleadings [See: Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College AIR 1987 SC 1242].”

In the Absence of Pleading, Evidence cannot be Considered

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242; 1987-2 SCC 555, it was also pointed out as under:

“6. … It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it.”

Plea of Adverse Possession

In M. Siddiq (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1, on the question of Adverse Possession it is pointed out that the plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat rights of true owner and law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence and that the ingredients must be set up in pleadings and proved in evidence. There can be no proof sans pleadings and pleadings without evidence will not establish a case in law. (Paras 748, 751, 752, 754 and 755)

Pleadings and Future Damages

In Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735; 1966-2 SCR 286, it was held as under:

“Once it is held that the plaintiff is entitled to eject the defendant, it follows that from the date of the decree granting the relief of ejectment to the plaintiff, the defendant who remains in possession of the property despite the decree, must pay mesne profits or damages for use and occupation of the said property until it is delivered to the plaintiff. A decree for ejectment in such a case must be accompanied by a direction for payment of the future mesne profits or damages. Then as to the rate at which future mesne profits can be awarded to the plaintiff, we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the trial Court that the reasonable amount in the present case would be Rs. 300/- per month.”

Rejection of Plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and Pleading

In Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706, it is observed as under:

“10 … It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial.
This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557, in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under: (SCC p. 560, para 9)
- “9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.”
It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. vs. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184 and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. vs. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100.
It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, wherein while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in considering such application, this Court has reminded the trial Judges with the following observation: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
- “5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10, C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.”
It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer J., in the above referred decision, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code.”(Quoted in: Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260).

In Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174, the legal position is analysed as under:

“7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.” (Quoted in: Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, AIR2020 SC 2721; 2020-17 SCC 260.)

Why should crucial documents be produced along with the Plaint or WS?

1. To prevent surprise to the opposite side.
2. To substantiate and assure pleadings, and ensure fair play.
3. To enable the court and the opposite side to understand the case fully.
4. The CPC mandates it (Order VII Rule 14 & Order VIII Rule 1A).

CPC also mandates the production of all remaining documents before framing of issues (so that the court can frame proper issues).

Documents Are Not Pleadings; But, They Support Pleadings

Pleadings mean Plaint or Written Statement. They are statements of fact alone (Order VI Rule 1 CPC).
The documents cannot be used to supplement missing facts, and will not cure the defect of ‘not pleading’ a fact merely because the document is produced with the pleadings that contain the relevant fact.
The documents, even if produced along with the Pleadings, will not automatically become evidence.
The documents cannot be used as materials to introduce new facts (without making an amendment of the pleadings).

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Foundational or Crucial Documents Be Produced Along With the Plaint or WS. Why?

Order VII* Rule 14(3)* and Order VIII Rule 1A C.P.C Confer Power to Receive Documents if ‘Good Cause‘ is shown for the Late Production of the Documents

Jojy George Koduvath

PART I

Why should foundational or crucial documents be produced along with the plaint or WS?

1. To prevent surprise to the opposite side.
2. To substantiate and assure pleadings, and ensure fair play.
3. To enable the court and the opposite side to understand the case fully.
4. The CPC mandates it (Order VII Rule 14 & Order VIII Rule 1A).

CPC also mandates the production of all remaining documents before framing of issues (so that the court can frame proper issues).

Documents Are Not Pleadings; They only Support Pleadings

Pleadings mean Plaint or Written Statement. They are statements of fact alone (Order VI Rule 1 CPC).
The documents cannot be used to supplement missing facts, and will not cure the defect of ‘not pleading’ a fact merely because the document is produced with the pleadings that contain the relevant fact.
The documents, even if produced along with the Pleadings, will not automatically become evidence.
The documents cannot be used as materials to introduce new facts (without making an amendment of the pleadings).

Relevant Provisions in the CPC

Order VII Rule 14 CPC:

“Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies:

(1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
- (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
- (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
- (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiffs witnesses, or handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”

Order VIII Rule 1A CPC:

“Duty of defendant to produce documents upon which relief is claimed or relied upon by him

.(1) Where the defendant bases his defence upon a document or relies upon any document in his possession or power, in support of his defence or claim for set-off or counter-claim, he shall enter such document in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the written statement is presented by him and shall, at the same time, deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the written statement.
(2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the defendant, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the defendant under this rule, but, is not so produced shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
(4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to documents— (a) produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”

Order 13 Rule 1.

“Original documents to be produced at or before the settlement of issues

.(1) The parties or their pleader shall produce on or before the settlement of issues, all the documentary evidence in original where the copies thereof have been filed along with plaint or written statement.
(2) The court shall receive the documents so produced:
Provided that they are accompanied by an accurate list thereof prepared in such form as the High Court directs.
(3) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to documents—
(a) produced for the cross-examination of the witnesses of the other party; or
(b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”

Rule 4 of Order 18.

“Recording of evidence

.(1) In every case, the examination-in-chief of a witness shall be on affidavit and copies thereof shall be supplied to the opposite party by the party who calls him for evidence:
Provided that where documents are filed and the parties rely upon the documents, the proof and admissibility of such documents which are filed along with affidavit shall be subject to the orders of the court.
xxx”

Rule 27 of Order 41.

“Production of additional evidence in appellate court

“(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court. But if—
(a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted; or
(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed; or
(b) the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined.
(2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate court, the court shall record the reason for its admission….”

Documents Filed With the Pleadings Do Not Automatically Become Evidence

Though documents filed with the plaint or WS form part of the record, they do not automatically become evidence (that is, done at the evidentiary stage).

Requirement Of Production Of Documents Along With Plaint / WS

When deciding an application under Order VII, Rule 11 (i.e., for rejection of plaint). See: Gurmeet Singh Sachdeva v. Skyways Air Services (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3017,

Fundamental Rules of Pleadings

The Supreme Court of India pointed out, in Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067, the fundamental rules of pleadings, as under:

The pleadings must be read as a whole,
The purport of proper pleadings is – caused no prejudice to the other side.
When a question arises as to a flaw in the pleadings, it must be considered in the light of the evidence.
Impropriety (or otherwise) of a lack of pleading is tested on the touchstone – whether it caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants (or not).

When Documents Produced with the Plaint are Considered as Part of Pleadings

They are considered when an ambiguity arises as to pleadings. In Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh, AIR 2023 SC 3067, our Apex Court explained the position as under:

“17. A comprehensive look at the pleadings taken by the appellant along with the site-plan attached to the petition makes it evident that the appellant gave out a detailed description of the extent of accommodation available in the suit property as also the accommodation presently in her occupation and the nature and extent of her requirement. In the pleadings, it was indeed specified that the appellant was residing on the property bearing No. “C-586/587”. The pleadings taken by the appellant in paragraph 18(a)(ii) of her petition, of course, begin with the expression “as stated above” and there had not been any earlier mention of property bearing No. “C-586/587” but, there had been detailed description in the preceding paragraphs and the site plan was also attached to the petition. The appellant further made the position clear in her cross-examination that the building in question was constructed on Plot Nos.586 and 587 jointly and she and her sister-in-law were residing in the same building as one family.
18. Taking the pleadings as a whole and reading the same with the evidence, it is clear that there had not been any such mis-description of the property which would amount to a material flaw in the case of the appellant or which could have caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants.”

When Documents Produced With the Plaint are Treated As “Part Of The Plaint”

When deciding an application under Order VII, Rule 11 (i.e., for rejection of the plaint).

The Supreme Court observed in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajrat), (2020) 7 SCC 366, as under:

“23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.”(Followed in: Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 INSC 1025; 2024 KLT Online 3058).

PART II

Leave of the Court Necessary

The Supreme Court, in Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar, AIR 2020 SC 5486; 2020-10 SCC 706, held as under:

“Sub-rule (3), as quoted above, provides a second opportunity to the defendant to produce the documents which ought to have been produced in the court along with the written statement, with the leave of the court. The discretion conferred upon the court to grant such leave is to be exercised judiciously. While there is no straight-jacket formula, this leave can be granted by the court on a good cause being shown by the defendant.”

Court Should Take a Lenient View

Our Apex Court, in Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar, AIR 2020 SC 5486; 2020-10 SCC 706, further held as under:

“It is often said that procedure is the handmaid of justice. Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of the court while doing substantial justice. If the procedural violation does not seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party, courts must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violation. We should not forget the fact that litigation is nothing but a journey towards truth which is the foundation of justice and the court is required to take appropriate steps to thrash out the underlying truth in every dispute. Therefore, the court should take a lenient view when an application is made for production of the documents under Sub-rule (3).”

In Dewanti Devi v. Radheshyam Tiwary, 2019 SCC Online Pat 28, it is held as follows:

“6. Order 8 Rule 1A(3) of the CPC provides that the documents, which have not been produced along with the written statement, cannot be produced to the court later on without the leave of the court. Thus, if a document is to be produced by a defendant, the same is to be produced with the written statement. Subsequent production of document can be done only if the court is satisfied with the grounds explained for non-production of the documents at the time of filing of the written statement.”

Late Production & “Good Cause”

In S. Rathinaswamy v. S. Bhanumathi, AIR 2006 Mad 221; 2006-3 MLJ 593, R. Banumathi, J. found as under:

“18. The main object of Or. 7 R. 14(3) C.P.C conferring the power upon the Court to receive the documents in genuine cases is to receive the documents if good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for the non-production of the documents at the earlier stage. The Courts are expected to receive the documents and give an opportunity to the parties.”

Law on Sufficient Cause

In Kasthuri v. C. Mohan, 2007-1 (Mad) LW 560 (V. Ramasubramaniam, J.), pointed out the difference between the language in the provisions of Order VII Rule 14 Sub Rule 3, after the amendment by Act 46 of 1999 and the provisions of Order XIII Rule 1 and 2 (1), as under:

“13. But it is not so. The Amendment Act 22 of 2002 has introduced a new Sub-rule (3) to Rule 14 of Order VII, in the place of the Sub-rule (3) substituted by Amendment Act 49 of 1999. The new Sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 of Order VII, after the Amendment of 2002 reads as follows:
Substituted by Act 22 of 2002 w.e.f. 1.7.2002 – (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
Thus the deletion of the provision, enabling to production of documents “at any subsequent stage of the proceedings” under Order XIII Rule 2 as it stood before amendment, has been compensated by the introduction of Sub-rule (3) under Rule 14 of Order VII under Amendment Act of 2002. Therefore, the right of a party to file a document at the time of hearing of the suit, if he has not already filed such document along with the plaint, is retained by the Amendment of 2002. All that is required under such circumstances, is that the plaintiff should take “the leave of the Court“. Even the words “good cause” that appeared under Order XIII Rule 2(1) before the amendment are absent in the newly introduced Sub Rule 3 of Rule 14 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a matter of fact, even in the judgment cited by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Madanlal v. Shyamlal, 2002 (1) SC 535, the Apex Court observed that the power under Order XIII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure(before amendment) should be exercised liberally and that “good cause” requires lesser decree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. Therefore, in view of the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 14 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act 22 of 2002, the respondents were entitled to file the documents in question, with the leave of the Court, which is what they have done in this case. The power of the Court to grant leave for a plaintiff to file additional documents under Order VII Rule 14 (3) is not even circumscribed by words such as “good cause” that were found in Order XIII Rule 2 before Amendment.”

In Hindustan Unilever Limited, Chennai v. Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd., 22 Mar 2018(Mad), after referring to Kasthuri v. C. Mohan, 2007 (1) LW 560 (Mad), it was observed as under:

“8. The sum and substance of the conclusions of the learned Judge is that on a comparative reading of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, regarding the receipt of documents as they stood prior to the amendment in 1999 and after the amendment would show that the power of the Court to receive documents is much more wider and liberal than what it was prior to the amendment of the Code.
In S. Rathinaswamy v. S. Bhanumathi, reported in 2006 (2) CTC 491, this Court had considered the scope of Order VII Rule 14(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, again after referring to the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, introduced in the year 1999 and 2002, it was held that the main object of Order VII Rule 14(3), conferring the power of the Court to receive the documents in genuine cases is to receive the documents if good cause, is shown to the satisfaction of the Court, for the non-production of the documents at an earlier stage. It was also pointed out that after all the procedure is only a handmaid of justice and Courts should always attempt to do complete justice between the parties, based on the evidence that is produced and not shut out the evidence.”

Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Usha Kiran Saxena v. Amit Maheshwari, Jan 8, 2025 (Ramesh Phadke, J.) stated as follows:

“11. Whenever documents are sought to be adduced as a corroborative evidence in support of the claim made in the plaint rigor of the rules can be said to be relaxed. Order 7 Rule 14 (3) C.P.C. enables the Court to receive the documents which are not filed along with the plaint in genuine cases and obviously the reason behind this is to avoid delay and when the documents are necessary for adjudication of the matter in dispute then the application can be allowed even if it is belatedly filed.”

The Madhya Pradesh High Court relied on the Apex Court decision in the case of Rani Kusum v. Kanchan Devi Rani, AIR 2005 SC 3304; 2005-6 SCC 705, which laid down as under:-

“No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending, and if, by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. (See Blyth v. Blyth (1966 (1) All E.R. 524 (HL). A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. (See Shreenath and Anr. v.Rajesh and Ors. (AIR 1998 SC 1827) Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.”

Madhya Pradesh High Court, in a subsequent decision, Usha Kiran Saxena v. Amit Maheshwari (Anand Pathak, J.), July 27, 2023, held as under:

“7. …. Although documents were filed but not accompanied with the application under Order VII Rule 14(3) of CPC. Objection was raised by the petitioner but once the trial Court allowed the application preferred by respondent No.1 under Order VII Rule 14(3) of CPC then objections of petitioner were impliedly considered and rejected. Even otherwise, it is bi-parte order, therefore, all the parties were given opportunity to advance arguments.
8. Procedures are handmaid to Justice and not Master of it and taking such hyper technical approach does not lead to justice.”

The Delhi High Court in Pradeep Bailey v. Gilma Daniel (18 June, 2025, Ravinder Dudeja, J.) after quoting Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, said as under:

“11. A plain reading of Order 7 Rule 14 CPC makes it clear that plaintiff has to present the relevant documents with the plaint. Subsequently, such documents cannot be presented without the leave of the court. The provision thus creates a bar on production of additional documents if the same have not been mentioned in the list of documents annexed to the plaint and produced at the time of filing the same, unless the leave of the court is sought. This principle was reiterated by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Polyflor Limited Vs. Sh. A. Goenka & Ors. in OA No. 84/2016 CS (OS) 504/2016.
12. The Coordinate Bench of the this Court in Haldiram (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held that it is a discretionary power of the court to allow belated filing of a document. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:
“21. In any event, both under the old Order 7 Rule 18 sub-rule (1) and new Order 7 Rule 14 sub-rule (3) CPC a new document can certainly be produced on behalf of plaintiff at the final hearing of suit, but the same has to be done with leave of the Court. It is not that the plaintiff has a legal vested right to file a document at a belated stage i.e. at the final hearing of the suit. The said provision gives a discretionary power to the Court, which needless to say has to be exercised in a reasonable and legal manner. In fact, this power has to be exercised sparingly and for some overpowering reason and not as a matter of routine. If petitioners‟ interpretation of Sub Rule 3 is accepted, it would make it impossible for the trial court to conclude the hearing of any suit.”
13. It is no more res-integra that the rules of procedure are handmaid of justice and should not come in the way of delivering substantial justice. In the case of Sugandhi (dead) by Lrs. & Anr. Vs. P. Rajkumar, represented by his power agent Imam Oli(2020) 10 SCC 706, the Apex Court discussed the factors which must be considered while granting permission to produce additional documents under Section 8 Rule 1-A CPC. It was observed that procedure is handmaid of justice. If the procedural violation does not cause prejudice to the adversary party, procedural and technical hurdles should not come in the way of the courts while doing substantial justice. Thus, the courts should take a lenient view while deciding an application under Order 8 Rule 1-A CPC.
14. In Mrs. Nalini Lal Vs State of NCT of Delhi & Others, TEST.CAS.22/2009, a Coordinate Bench of this Court while allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 14 of CPC, held that the said provision allows for the submission of additional documents if the Court grants leave and if such documents are necessary for resolving the real issues between the parties. It was again emphasized that procedural rules should not hinder substantive justice.
15. In the case of Mohanraj Vs. Kewalchand Hastimal Jain &Ors. AIR 2007 Bom. 69, the Bombay High Court discussed the object of Order 7 Rule 14 CPC and observed that the provision is enacted to assist the parties and the courts in the manner of production of documentary evidence while adjudicating the disputes, to arrive at an appropriate decision on the matter. In this regard, the provision is to be construed liberally and a pedantic approach should not be taken while enforcing the provision of law. A documentary evidence which is relevant and material for the just and appropriate decision should be allowed to be produced and merely because the party failed to enter the same in the list annexed to the plaint, it should not be ignored unless the plaintiff can show that there would be real prejudice caused if such permission is granted.

Finally the High Court held as under:

“21. The documents referred to in the application under Order 7 Rule 14 CPC are for the purpose of showing that petitioner was not sitting idle and was indulging in work and was earning income, as also for showing that he has been making the payment of house tax of the property since after its purchase and was making payment of electricity and water bills and was also looking after his mother. The trial court failed to appreciate that additional documents sought to be placed were relevant to counter the averments of the respondent, as mentioned in the written statement. Undisputedly, the documents are relevant. Some of the documents are, in fact public documents. The authenticity and genuineness of the documents can be considered after granting an opportunity to the petitioner to prove the same. The contention of the petitioner that Wills dated 19.09.2000 & 24.08.2000 were not in his possession and he received them from his sister in law at a later stage, and therefore, being filed belatedly, cannot be disbelieved at this stage. The learned trial court disbelieved the argument of the petitioner that documents could not be filed due to negligence of the previous counsel of the petitioner. Be that as it may, even if it was a mistake on the part of the petitioner, as per the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Nishant Hannan (supra), the parties do make the mistakes in the conduct of their cases and therefore such mistakes should be allowed to be corrected unless there is a great prejudice to the other side. The trial is still at an initial stage. The parties are yet to lead evidence, and therefore, no great prejudice shall be caused to the respondent in case the documents are allowed to be taken on record.
22. The procedural rules under the CPC are intended to ensure substantive justice and exclusion of the documents in the present case would amount to elevating procedural technicalities over substantive justice, thereby, defeating the very purpose of fair adjudication.
23. In view of the above, I find that the impugned order suffers from gross illegality and perversity in disallowing the petitioner/plaintiff from filing the additional documents by dismissing the application of the petitioner/plaintiff.”

Pleading and Evidence

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242, 1987-2 SCC 555, it was held as under:

“6. … It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. To have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should settle the essential material facts so that the other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words that may not expressly make out a case in accordance with a strict interpretation of the law. In such a case the court must ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead, the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings; instead, the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings, parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal….” (Quoted in: Mohammed Abdul Wahid v. Nilofer, 2023 INSC 1075, (2024) 2 SCC 144); Mohan Hirachand Shah v. Geeta Kumarchand Shah,19-03-2024)

It is also pointed out in this decision:

“Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead; the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.
In Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul, [1956] 1 SCR 286 a Constitution Bench of this Court considering this question observed:
“If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is: did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to reply upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another.”

Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal (2008) 17 SCC 491:

“10(i). No amount of evidence can be looked into, upon a plea which was never put forward in the pleadings. A question which did arise from the pleadings and which was not the subject matter of an issue, cannot be decided by the court.” ….” (Quoted in: Mohan Hirachand Shah v. Geeta Kumarchand Shah,19-03-2024)

Biraji @ Brijraji v. Surya Pratap (2020) 10 SCC 729:

“8. …It is fairly well settled that in absence of pleading, any amount of evidence will not help the party….” (Quoted in: Mohan Hirachand Shah v. Geeta Kumarchand Shah,19-03-2024)

Delhi High Court, in Brij Praksh Gupta v. Ashwini Kumar, on 6 February, 2020, Prathiba M. Singh, J., observed as under:

“A party to the suit cannot be permitted to travel beyond his pleadings. If any evidence is tried to be adduced which has no foundation in the pleadings, the Court always has a power to discard such evidence while finally deciding the suit or proceeding.”

Sikkim HC held in Surja Narayan Pradhan v. Jumden Lepcha (May 11, 2022) 03 SIK CK 0021, as under:

“It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered and no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings.”

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The Doctrine of ‘Prima Facie Case’ in Criminal Cases

Jojy George Koduvath.

Preface

The term ‘prima facie’ has been authoritatively explained by the Supreme Court in Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2023 SC 5551, wherein the Court laid down the meaning and scope of the words as under:

“The Latin expression prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first view”, or “based on first impression”. According, to Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”.
In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, or if an opposing party introduces contradictory evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties.”

Introduction:

The doctrine of ‘prima facie Case’ arises for consideration in various stages of criminal proceedings, as under:

For Ordering Investigation under [Section 156(3), CrPC ] and Taking Cognizance & Issuing Process [Sections 190 & 204 CrPC]:
What is required is the Prima Facie existence of sufficient ground to proceed. At this stage, the Magistrate needs only to be satisfied that the complaint discloses a cognizable offence warranting investigation.
For Quashing of FIR [Section 482, CrPC ] :
The test is whether the allegations in the FIR Prima Facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or Article 226 of the Constitution, is not required to assess the merits of the allegations or examine the probability of conviction.
For Framing of Charge / Discharge [Sections 227 to 239 CrPC]:
The Court must examine whether the materials in the charge sheet and accompanying documents Prima Facie disclose sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. At this stage, the standard of proof required for conviction is not applicable—what is required is only a Prima Facie, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Grant or Refusal of Bail:
While deciding bail applications, courts examine whether a Prima Facie case exists against the accused.

1. S. 156(3) – Prima Facie ‘EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT GROUND TO PROCEED’

It is held in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of Karnataka as under:

“38. In the background of the factual position, the JMFC’s Order dated 18.01.2018 cannot be faulted. Enough material is available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police. The JMFC, to our mind, had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a prima facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC.
xxx
40. The … JMFC had referred the matter to police under Section 156(3) of the Code, and the usage of ‘further’ was not in the context of Section 173(8) of the Code, which fine distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over. The case(s) at hand, in our considered view, demonstrate material showing the commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of it, which would merit police investigation. Therefore, interdiction of the Impugned Orders is necessitated.”

Order VII Rule 14(3) and Order VIII Rule 1A C.P.C Confer Power to Receive Documents if ‘Good Cause‘ is shown for the Late Production of the Documents

Order VII* Rule 14(3)* and Order VIII Rule 1A C.P.C Confer Power to Receive Documents if ‘Good Cause‘ is shown for the Late Production of the Documents