‘Each Party Must Succeed on the Strength of Its Own Title’: A Doctrinal Explanation of the Law of Rival Claims on Title – Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur

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Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract

•• Traditional Rule in a suit for recovery: Established jurisprudence in a suit for recovery of possession based on title dictates that ‘a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of its own case’, independent of the defendant’s shortcomings.

•• The Explanation of Law in Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur: In Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur (2026 INSC 983), the Supreme Court held that where both parties assert rival claims of ownership, “each party must succeed on the strength of its own title.”

•• Founded upon Principles of Substantive Justice: Compulsory judicial evaluation of rival claims is founded upon the principles of equity and substantive truth.

Introduction

In Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 INSC 983; 2026 KHC(Online) 6699; 2026 KLT(Online) 4549 (Prashant KumarMishra and Shree Chandrashekhar, JJ.), the Supreme Court held:

  • “Where rival claims of ownership are asserted, each party must succeed on the strength of its own title and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case.”

This pronouncement marks a significant doctrinal evolution. While earlier strict precedents emphasized that a plaintiff seeking a declaration or recovery of title must independently establish their case without exploiting weakness of the defendants, the Court, in Bhag Singh has crystallized a comprehensive framework governing competing proprietary claims.

Though a clear-cut pronouncement had not been made earlier as to the burden on either side when a rival claim of title is raised on a land, a long line of Supreme Court decisions paved the way for the present definitive proposition.

The March of Law in this Subject

Plaintiff Seeking Declaration of Title Must Establish His Own Case:

  • Moran Mar Basselios Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526.

Adverse Inference is drawn if a party withholds documents:

  • Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413.

Once the plaintiff creates a High Degree of Probability Onus Shifts to the defendant:

  • R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752.

Burden of Proof Loses Significance if both parties adduced evidence:

  • Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 673.

Burden of Proof Loses Significance if both parties adduced evidence, and it remains academic:

  • Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan v. Nawab Kazim Ali Khan, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1593.

Sec. 114 Evidence Act (Sec. 119 BSA) allows the Court to Presume certain facts.

  • State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar, AIR 2000 SC 2988

Court to Require the Facts to be Proved, in its discretion.

  • Balraj Taneja  v. Sunil Madan, AIR 1999 SC 3381; 1999 8 SCC 396

Even if no plea, Propounder has to Clear Suspicion, if any:

  • Sridevi v. Jayaraja Shetty, AIR 2005 SC 780, 2005-2 SCC 784.

The Courts consider the rival title set up by the defendants:

  • Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale, AIR 2007 SC 2577; (2007) 6 SCC 737

In recovery suit, the Court can examine the title of the defendant if she sets up defence as to her title.

  • Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan– v. Janakiamma 2024-3 SCR 383.

If Rival Claims, EACH PARTY to succeed on STRENGTH OF ITS OWN TITLE:

  • Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 INSC 983; 2026 KHC(Online) 6699; 2026 KLT(Online) 4549.

The Case Law on the Subject

1. The Decisions that Took Obdurate Stand – EACH PARTY TO SUCCEED ON STRENGTH OF ITS OWN TITLE

Plaintiff to Win Recovery Suit, on Strength of his Title.

Following are the often cited decisions on this subject:

  • Moran Mar Basselios Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526,
  • Brahma Nand Puri v. Neki Puri, AIR 1965 SC 1506,
  • City Municipal Council Bhalki v. Gurappa, 2016-2  SCC 200
  • Bajaranglal Shivchandrai Ruia v. Shashikant N. Ruia, (2004) 5 SCC 272
  • Vijay Pullarwar v. Shri Hanuman Deostan, (2019) 11 SCC 718,
  • Ratnagiri Nagar Parishad v. Gangaram Narayan Ambekar, (2020) 7 SCC 275.

Suit on Title & Weakness of the Defence

A Plaintiff has to win the title-suit on his evidence; not on the weakness of the adversary. See:

  • Baha Kartar Singh Bedi v. Dayal Das, AIR 1939 PC 201 (Referred to in: K. M. Paul v. K. Pradeep, ILR 2006-2 Ker 19),
  • Jagdish Narain v. Nawab Said Ahmed Khan, AIR 1946 PC 59 (Referred to in: Dinesh Jain v. Jeewanlal Lala, AIR 2013 MP 85)
  • Moran Mar Basselios Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 (ejectment suit must succeed on the strength of Plaintiffs’ own title)
  • Heera Devi v. Official Assignee Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 448.
  • Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira, AIR  1959 SC 31 (referred to in: Paturu Sundaraiah v. Suri Ranganayakamma, AIR 2022 AP 71),
  • Brahmanand Puri v. Nek Puri, AIR 1965 SC 1506.
  • Nagar Palika, Jind v. Jagat Singh, Advocate, (1995) 3 SCC 426.
  • Sayed Muhammed Mashur Kunhi Koya Thangal v. Badagara Jumayath Palli Dharas Committee, 2004-7 SCC 708.
  • Yamuna Nagar Improvement Trust v. Khairati Lal, (2005) 10 SCC 30.
  • Anil. Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558; City Municipal. Council, Bhalki v. Gurappa, (2016) 2 SCC 200),
  • Rangammal v. Kuppuswamy, (2011) 12 SCC 220
  • Union of India v. Vasavi Co-operative Housing Society Limited, (2014) 2 SCC 269,
  • Jagdish Prasad Patel v. Shivnath, (2019) 6 SCC 82,
  • Vijay Pullarwar v. Shri Hanuman Deostan, (2019) 11 SCC 718,
  • City Municipal Council Bhalki v. Gurappa, 2016-2 SCC 200,
  • Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 9,
  • P.  Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.  Patkar, 2024-1 CTC 547; 2023-4 CurCC(SC) 278,
  • Ratnagiri Nagar Parishad v. Gangaram Narayan Ambekar, (2020) 7 SCC 275
  • Kishan Chand v. Gautam Gaur Hitkarak Sabha, Kota, 2026 INSC 448

2. IF RIVAL CLAIMS, court is Also entitled to consider the title set up by the defendants

In Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak, AIR 2007 SC 2577; (2007) 6 SCC 737, it is observed –

  • “11. The suit is for recovery of possession on the strength of title. Obviously, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that title. No doubt in appreciating the case of title set up by the plaintiff, the court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants. But the weakness of the defence or the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these propositions.”

The Supreme Court’s observation that the ‘court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants‘ represented a notable doctrinal explanation in judicial approach.

3. Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 INSC 983

In Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, the Supreme Court expounded a shift in the law by explaining the burden of proof, comprehensively tracing the lineage of prior precedents on this issue. It is held as under:

  • “37. The present Appeal does not merely concern the extent of the interest conveyed under the sale deed. The real issue is whether the appellants established a better and superior title so as to defeat the respondents’ claim altogether. It is a settled principle that where rival claims of ownership are asserted, each party must succeed on the strength of its own title and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case.[See: Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale (Dead) and Others, (2007) 6 SCC 737 at Para 13.]”

Critical Appreciation of Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur (2026 INSC 983)

Facts

  • Suit was for declaration and injunction.
  • Plaintiff’s claim was founded upon a registered sale deed.
  • Principal defence raised by the defendants were –
    • 1. Suit property had been dedicated in favour of the Dera long before the execution of the sale deed.
    • 2. The vendors of the plaintiffs had only one-half share.
    • 3. The revenue entries showed possession with Attar Singh Chela Bhai Gulab Singh as “gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth”, signifying possession without payment of rent for religious purposes, and that such possession was held not in his individual capacity but on behalf of the Dera.
    • 4. The defendants claimed possession through the successive Mahants of the Dera.
    • 5. The Dera had remained in continuous, open and uninterrupted possession of the suit property for several decades and had acquired ownership thereof.

Findings of the Apex Court

1. The defendants/appellants sought title on two juristic bases (a) dedication/title and (b) adverse possession. Both proceed on different legal premises.

2. Doctrine of adverse possession is not attracted in this case [Relied on: T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570; Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 961]. For attracting adverse Possession –

  • (i) The claimant has to admit the title of the true owner, for it proceeds on the assumption that the title initially vested in another.
  • (ii) Mere long possession or an entry in the revenue records is insufficient.
  • (iii) Pleading of overt acts asserting hostility to the knowledge of true owners is necessary.
  • (iv) Pleadings and evidence as to the time (date) at which the title of the true owner was repudiated and a hostile assertion of ownership was raised in denial of his title (a lawful or permissive origin cannot be adverse merely by lapse of time) are also essential.
Note: 1. Without making a definite finding on the title of the plaintiff (whether the vendors of the plaintiff had only a one-half share), the Court considered the Adverse title claim raised by the defendants.
2. The Court formulated the legal doctrine: where rival claims of ownership are asserted, each party must succeed on the strength of its own title and not on the weakness of the opponent’s case.
3. The title dispute raised in this case is between (i) the alleged ‘true title holder’ and (ii) one who claimed title by adverse possession; and not between two claimants of ‘true title’. Because a plea of adverse possession concedes the opponent’s title, the Court emphasized: “The real issue is whether the appellants (defendants) established a better and superior title (by raising a claim of adverse possession) to defeat the respondents’ (plaintiff’s) claim altogether”.

3. Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, made a doctrinal explanation. It cast burden of proof on both plaintiff and defendant if a rival claim of ownership is raised over the suit land. It is held that ‘each party must succeed on the strength of its own title and neither can succeed merely pointing out the weakness of the opposite party’s case.

Supporting Precedents

The above Doctrinal Explanation as enunciated by the Court draws reflection from the following decisions:

  • 1. Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale, AIR 2007 SC 2577; (2007) 6 SCC 737: In this decision, it was held that while adjudicating a plaintiff’s claim of title, the court is entitled to consider any rival title set up by the defendants.
    • Note: It was further clarified: “But the weakness of the defence or the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these proposition.”
  • 2. R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752: The Supreme Court explained that once a plaintiff creates a high degree of probability sufficient to shift the onus, the burden shifts onto the defendant to establish their competing claim.
  • 3. Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413: The Apex Court established that an adverse inference may be drawn against a party who withholds vital documents in their possession, even if that party does not bear the burden of proof.
  • 4. Raghunathi v. Raju Ramappa Shetty, AIR 1991 SC 1040; 1991 Supp2 SCC 267; M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu, AIR 2011 SC 146; 2010-9 SCC 712: It was held that the question of the burden of proof loses its significance and remains purely academic once both parties have adduced evidence.

A Caution Worth Noting:

  • A defendant who simply denies the plaintiff’s title is differently situated from one who affirmatively asserts an independent title in himself (still, it may entail an adverse inference for withholding material documents).
  • The failure of the plaintiff’s case does not, by itself, establish the defendant’s title; equally, the failure of the defendant to establish an independent title does not, by itself, entitle the plaintiff to a decree.

Conclusion

Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur (2026 INSC 983) stands as a landmark decision in property law that advances the cause of substantive justice by ensuring that property rights are adjudicated on merits rather than procedural defaults.

The Supreme Court makes it clear that where competing claims of ownership are raised, neither party can rest merely on the weakness of the opponent’s case; instead, rival claims must be adjudicated upon the intrinsic strength of the evidence adduced by both sides—thereby safeguarding true ownership from being defeated by technical flaws and unsupported pleas. Ultimately, this ensures that the majesty of the law aligns with the demands of equity and substantive truth.



End Notes – 1

Decisions that Made a Shift in law

(i) Suit on Title – If High Degree of Probability Established, Onus Shifts.

In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003 SC 4548: (2003) 8 SCC 752, the law is stated in the following terms :

  • “In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff’s title.
  • … Being a civil case, the plaintiff cannot be expected to proof his title beyond any reasonable doubt; a high degree of probability lending assurance of the availability of title with him would be enough to shift the onus on the defendant and if the defendant does not succeed in shifting back the onus, the plaintiff’s burden of proof can safely be deemed to have been discharged. …”.
  • … A high degree of preponderance of probability proving title to the suit property was raised in favour of the appellant and the courts below rightly concluded the burden of proof raised on the plaintiff having been discharged while the onus shifting on the defendant remaining undischarged. ..”
  • (Quoted in: Anil. Rishi vs. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558; City Municipal. Council, Bhalki Vs. Gurappa, (2016) 2 SCC 200)

In Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 9,it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “31. …. Onus of proof, no doubt shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence, but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the onus on the defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and can be discharged only when he is able to prove title.[See R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami V.P. Temple and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 752.] ….”

(ii) Burden of Proof Loses Significance: Burden of proof loses its importance –

  • if both parties adduced evidence
  • if there is sufficient evidence on an issue.

In such a situation, the ‘burden of proof’ remains academic. See:

  • Seturatnam Aiyar v. Venkatachala Gounden, (1919)   47 IA 76,
  • Chidambara Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhigal v. Veerama Reddi, 49 IA 286 303: AIR 1922 PC 292
  • Kumbham Lakshmanna v. Tangirala Venkateswarlu, AIR 1949 PC 278;
  • Mohd.  Abdullah Azam Khan Vs. Nawab Kazim Ali Khan,(1976) 3 SCC 32
  • Raghunathi v. Raju Ramappa Shetty, AIR 1991 SC 1040;
  • Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 673,

(iii) When evidence has been led by both sides, “Onus” is out of place

In Kalwa Devadattam v. Union, AIR 1964 SC 880, it is held – where evidence has been led by the contesting parties, abstract considerations of onus are out of place and truth or otherwise must always be adjudged on the evidence led by the parties. The Court held as under:

  • “The question of onus probandi is certainly important in the early stages of a case. It may also assume importance where no evidence at all is led on the question in dispute by either side; in such a contingency the party on whom the onus lies to prove a certain fact must fail. Where however evidence has been led by the contesting parties on the question in issue, abstract considerations of onus are out of place; truth or otherwise of the case must always be adjudged on the evidence led by the parties.”

This decision is referred to in:

  • Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan v. Nawab Kazim Ali Khan, 2022-20 SCC 233
  • Vinod Kumar Dhall v. Dharampal Dhall, 2018-16 SCC 645
  • Bibi Sidique Fatima v. Saiyed Mohammad Mahmood Hasan, AIR 1978 SC 1362; 1978-3 SCC 299
  • Union of India v. Moksh Builders and Financiers Ltd. (1977) 1 SCR 967

(iv) Court Can Draw Adverse Inference If Important Documents are Withheld

In the important decision, Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v.  Mahomed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413, it is held as under:

  • “Even if a party to the suit has no burden, the Court can draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession.”

In National Insurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi v. Jugal Kishore, 1988-1 SCC 626, Our Apex Court stated the law as under:

  • “This Court has consistently emphasized that it is the duty of the party which is in possession of a document which would be helpful in doing justice in the cause to produce the said document and such party should not be permitted to take shelter behind the abstract doctrine of burden of proof.” (Quoted in: Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 673)

End Notes – 2

Non-production of the Sale Deed and the Principle of Burden of Proof

Question: A defendant claims title on a registered sale deed. Can the defendant argue – there should not be adverse presumption for not peoducing the sale deed , for the plaintiff can get a certified copy from the Sub-Registrar’s Office?

Answer:

  • The mere fact that the plaintiff could have obtained a certified copy of the registered sale deed from the Sub-Registrar’s Office does not, by itself, absolve the defendant of the consequences of withholding the document on which the defendant relies to establish title. The availability of secondary evidence to the plaintiff and the defendant’s failure to produce the deed are distinct matters.
  • However, even if no adverse inference is drawn against the defendant, the question remains: who must fail if neither party produces evidence sufficient to establish the fact in issue? The answer is governed by the fundamental principle of the law of evidence that the party who bears the burden of proof must fail if no evidence is adduced on the issue. As explained by the Supreme Court in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752, the initial burden of proof and the evidential burden that may shift during trial are distinct concepts.
  • Therefore, if the defendant asserts title under a registered sale deed but fails to produce it, the defendant cannot necessarily succeed merely by pointing out that the plaintiff could have obtained a certified copy. If the defendant’s title depends upon establishing the transaction evidenced by that deed, the defendant must prove the relevant facts in accordance with law. Conversely, if the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing his own title and fails to do so, the plaintiff cannot succeed merely because the defendant’s evidence is deficient.
  • Ultimately, the court must determine not merely against whom an adverse inference should be drawn, but also which party must fail if the evidence as a whole is insufficient to establish the title asserted by that party.

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Company, University, Society, etc. Act on ‘Resolutions’

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Jojy George Koduvath.

Introduction

A company is a legal entity. It can act in its own name. All acts of the companies are done under its ‘resolutions’ of its General Body or Director Board. The acts are carried on through its authorised persons – directors or persons authorised under its Memorandum or under the resolutions of its General Body or Director Board.

Similar is the position of University, Associations etc. also.

It is held in Vice Chancellor, Utkal University v. S.K. Ghosh (Vivian Bose, Mehar Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan, JJ.), AIR 1954 SC 217, to the following effect:

  • “Though an incorporated body like an University is a legal entity it has neither living mind nor voice. It can only express its will in formal way by a formal resolution and. so can only act in its corporate capacity by resolutions properly considered, carried and duly recorded in the manner laid down by its constitution.
  • If its rules require such resolutions to be moved and passed in a meeting called for the purpose, then every member of the body entitled to take part in the meeting must be given notice so that he can attend and express his views.
  • Individual assents given separately cannot be regarded as equivalent to the assent of a meeting because the incorporated body is different from the persons of which it is composed. Hence, an omission to give proper notice even to a single member in these circumstances would invalidate the meeting and that in turn would invalidate resolutions which purport to have been passed at it.”

Section 118 of the Companies Act, 2013 speaks about ‘Minutes’. It reads as under:.

  • 118:  Minutes of proceedings of general meeting, meeting of Board of Directors and other meeting and resolutions passed by postal ballot.
  • .(1) Every company shall cause minutes of the proceedings of every general meeting of any class of shareholders or creditors, and every resolution passed by postal ballot and every meeting of its Board of Directors or of every committee of the Board, to be prepared and signed in such manner as may be prescribed and kept within thirty days of the conclusion of every such meeting concerned, or passing of resolution by postal ballot in books kept for that purpose with their pages consecutively numbered.
  • (2) The minutes of each meeting shall contain a fair and correct summary of the proceedings thereat.
  • (3) All appointments made at any of the meetings aforesaid shall be included in the minutes of the meeting.
  • (4) In the case of a meeting of the Board of Directors or of a committee of the Board, the minutes shall also contain–
    • (a) the names of the directors present at the meeting; and
    • (b) in the case of each resolution passed at the meeting, the names of the directors, if any, dissenting from, or not concurring with the resolution.
  • (5) There shall not be included in the minutes, any matter which, in the opinion of the Chairman of the meeting,–
    • (a) is or could reasonably be regarded as defamatory of any person; or
    • (b) is irrelevant or immaterial to the proceedings; or
    • (c) is detrimental to the interests of the company.
  • (6) The Chairman shall exercise absolute discretion in regard to the inclusion or non-inclusion of any matter in the minutes on the grounds specified in sub-section (5).
  • (7) The minutes kept in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein.
  • (8) Where the minutes have been kept in accordance with sub-section (1) then, until the contrary is proved, the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly called and held, and all proceedings thereat to have duly taken place, and the resolutions passed by postal ballot to have been duly passed and in particular, all appointments of directors, key managerial personnel, auditors or company secretary in practice, shall be deemed to be valid.
  • (9) No document purporting to be a report of the proceedings of any general meeting of a company shall be circulated or advertised at the expense of the company, unless it includes the matters required by this section to be contained in the minutes of the proceedings of such meeting.
  • (10) Every company shall observe secretarial standards with respect to general and Board meetings specified by the Institute of Company Secretaries of India constituted under section 3 of the Company Secretaries Act, 1980 (56 of 1980), and approved as such by the Central Government.
  • (11) If any default is made in complying with the provisions of this section in respect of any meeting, the company shall be liable to a penalty of twenty-five thousand rupees and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of five thousand rupees.
  • (12) If a person is found guilty of tampering with the minutes of the proceedings of meeting, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees.

‘Minutes’ must be “Proved” by Producing the Original

From Sec. 118(8) it is clear that the ‘Minutes’ must be “proved” by a competent witness like signatory or a person who wrote or who has seen it recording.

There is no provision in the Companies Act or in any other Act which allows ‘extracts’ of the board minutes, or a certified copy to be given in evidence without producing the original. Therefore only way to prove a ‘resolution’ is to prove the ‘minutes’.

Only way to prove a resolution is “Proving” the Minutes

In Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos , (1991) 72 Comp Cas. 483 (Delhi); 42(1990) DLT 446, it is observed as under:

  • “(14) The manner in which such a resolution of the Board of Directors of Companies are to be proved, is clearly stated by Hardayal Hardy, J. in a judgment passed in Suit No. 469 of 1986 in M/s. Oberoi Hotels (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Observer Publications (P) Ltd. and others (Suit No. 469/1966: Delhi High Court decided on 26.11.1988). In this judgment it has been stated that “the ONLY WAYto prove that a particular resolution was passed at a meeting of the Board of Directors of a company is that the minutes book in which the said resolution was recorded as having been passed should be produced in Court as that alone can form evidence of the fact under section 194 of the Act”. Section 194 of the Companies Act reads as under :
    • “194. Minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of section 193 shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein”.
  • (Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos is referred to in: Havells India Ltd.  v. Dilip Rathi, 16 Feb 2018, Delhi High Court;  Manoj Kumar Kanuga v. Marudhar Power Pvt.  Ltd. , 23 Apr 2013, AP High Court).

Even when exhibit number is given, it cannot be treated as proved

In Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd., CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506, it is held as under:

  • “Section 194 of the Companies Act provides that the minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of section 193 shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein. However, no provision in the Companies Act is brought to my notice which provides that the certified copy or extract of the minutes would be admissible in evidence without proof of the original. Section 65(f) of the Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition and contents of the document when the original is the document of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence. As no provision from the Companies Act is brought to my notice under which the certified copy of the minutes of the meetings of the board of directors is admissible in evidence without proof of the original, it must be said that the copy of the minutes cannot be admitted in evidence directly unless the original is proved or the copy is admitted by opposite party. Therefore, even though that document is given exhibit number, it cannot be treated to have been proved unless the  complainant leads appropriate evidence to prove the minutes.”

Minute Books Not open for inspection to the Strangers

In Shri Kishan Rathi v.  Mondal Brothers And Co. (Private) Ltd. , AIR 1967 (Cal) 75, [1967] 37 Comp Cas 256, it is held as under:

  • “The minute books and the book of resolution of the board of directors are books of the company and are not open to strangers and outsiders. This was also within the special knowledge of the defendant company. If the defendant company was trying to prove that its manager and director had no authority to borrow money, then it was for the company to prove from its own books of minutes and resolutions that no authority was given to Naresh Chandra Mondal, its manager and director. Section 106 of the Evidence Act says that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. It is strange that neither the defendant company nor its witness, director Sambhu Nath Mondal, produced the minute book or the book of resolutions in this case. The only inference that can be drawn from such non-production on the facts and circumstances of this case is that, had they been produced, they would have shown that there was good authority and resolution in favour of Naresh Chandra Mondal. That presumption is irresistible in this case. Articles 103 and 114 of the articles of association of this company cast a mandatory duty upon the directors to record minutes of the proceedings of all meetings of the directors in the minute book. The defendant company or its director witness, Sambhu Nath Mondal, being in possession of such minute book and being in special knowledge of the contents of that minute book, it was their duty to produce them and not the duty of the plaintiff.”

It continued as under:

  • “Whether there was resolution by Board of Directors delegating such power again is a fact within the special knowledge of the defendant company and its Directors. They could have easily produced the resolution book or the minute book to show that there was no such delegation But they had not done so and therefore, an adverse inference must be drawn against them to the effect that had they produced them, they would have shown such delegation to the Manager, Naresh Chandra Mondal.” (Quoted in: Hoshiarpur Azad Transport Co. Ltd.  v. Sutlej Land Finance Pvt. Ltd., 2001-103 CC 969; 1995-109 PLR 506 (P&H).

It is held in Hoshiarpur Azad Transport Co. Ltd.  v. Sutlej Land Finance Pvt. Ltd. (P&H, Ashok Bhan, J.), 2001-103 CC 969; 1995-109 PLR 506, (quoting above passage in Shri Kishan Rathi v.  Mondal Brothers And Co. (Private) Ltd. , AIR 1967 (Cal) 75, [1967] 37 Comp Cas 256) as under:

  • “The petitioner-company did not produce its book of resolution. The minutes regarding the resolution passed are in possession of the company and are not open for inspection to the strangers. Since the petitioner had taken the stand that its general manager had no authority to borrow the money, it was for the company to prove from its own books of minutes and resolution that no authority was given to its general manager to borrow any money. The only inference which under the circumstances can be drawn from the non-production of these books would be that had these books been produced then the same would have shown that there was a resolution passed by the company authorising its general manager to borrow the money.”

Unpleasant and Inharmonious Judgment of Kerala High Court

Kerala High Court (Single Judge) in Sree Gokulam Chit & Finance Co.(P) v. P.R. Balakrishnan on 8 November, 2024,Crl. A No. 1029 of 2008, 2024: KER:82742, distinguished (i) Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos, (1991) 72 Comp Cas. 483 (Delhi); 42(1990) DLT 446, and (ii) Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd., CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506, saying as under:

  • “8. Learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 would contend that, Ext.P8 extract of the minutes is not admissible in evidence and the minutes has to be proved by producing the original. He would rely on a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Others reported in [CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506], to say that, Section 194 of the Companies Act provides that, the minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of Section 193, shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein. No provision in the Companies Act was brought to the notice of that court(see End Notes) which provides that, certified copy or extract of the minutes would be admissible in evidence, without proof of the original. Section 65(f) of the Evidence Act provides that, secondary evidence may be given, of the existence, condition and contents of the document, when the original is the document, of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India, to be given in evidence.
  • He would rely on another decision of the Delhi High Court in Escorts Ltd. v. Sai Autos and Others [1991 Company Cases Volume 72 Page 483] to say that, copy of resolution was not enough and the original of the minutes book, containing the resolution relied on, has to be brought to the court.
  • 9. Section 119 of the Companies Act, 2013 which corresponds to Section 196 of the Companies Act, 1956 says that, the books containing the minutes of the proceedings of any general meeting of a company or of a resolution passed by postal ballot shall be kept at the registered office of the company, and it shall be open for inspection by any member during business hours and if any member make a request, for a copy of the minutes, it shall be furnished within seven days, on payment of prescribed fees. So, Section 119 of the Companies Act provides for copy of the minutes, and moreover, learned counsel for the appellant would say that, copy of every resolution shall be sent to the Registrar for recording the same within 30 days of passing the same.
  • Moreover, as per Section 54 of the Companies Act, 1956, a document which requires authentication by a company may be signed by a director, the manager, the secretary or other authorised officer of the company, and need not be under its common seal. So, according to the appellant, Ext.P8 extract of the minutes, which contains the resolution authorising the Assistant Manager to file criminal or civil cases or to give evidence etc., signed by the director of Sree Gokulam Chit & Finance Co. (P) Ltd., was sufficient authority for PW1, to file the complaint and to give evidence, on behalf of the company.

The Single Judge took the stand – the requirement that some law must have been “permitted” to give certified copy in evidence, as provided in Sec. 65 (f), is satisfied (and a resolution or extract can be exhibited), for the Companies Act “provides for copy of the minutes” to “any member“. The stance is totally baseless. Because, a member’s right to to get copy of the minutes is different from the right to “be given“ in evidence the certified copy, as “permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India“.

  • The minutes is not a document “open for inspection to the strangers” as held by Ashok Bhan, J. in Hoshiarpur Azad Transport Co. Ltd.  v. Sutlej Land Finance Pvt. Ltd., 2001-103 CC 969; 1995-109 PLR 506).

And, the aforesaid legal position has no connection at all with Section 54 of the Companies Act, 1956, also.

In any event, if Sec. 65 (f) is attracted, “a certified copy of document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible”; and the certified extract or copy of “resolution” (other than the certified copy of the “minutes”) is insufficient.

End Notes I

Ashish C. Shah v. M/s. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd., CDJ 2011 BHC 339: 2011 KHC 6506, observed as under:

  • “15. Next comes the document No.1 – the certified true copy of the resolution dated 16.2.2009, whereby the complainant company had allegedly resolved to give consent of the Board of Directors to execute power of attorney in favour of Ashwin Sheth, Managing Director and/or Sharad Doshi, Executive Assistant to the Managing Director to institute or defend any suit or criminal proceedings. The learned trial Court observed in the impugned order that there is no clear-cut provision about issuance of certified copy of extract of minutes book but if sub-sec. (2) of Section 196 of the Companies Act is read, it may be stated that certified copy of the minutes can be given. The learned trial Court observed that the witness Sharad Doshi in his affidavit had deposed about the said document and thereby he has proved the genuineness of the document. Under Section 195 of the Companies Act, where minutes of the proceedings of any general meeting of the company have been kept in accordance with the 17 WP-40-11.sxw provisions of section 193, then, until the contrary is proved, the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly called and held, and all proceedings thereat to have duly taken place. Section 194 of the Companies Act provides that the minutes of meetings kept in accordance with the provisions of section 193 shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein. However, no provision in the Companies Act is brought to my notice which provides that the certified copy or extract of the minutes would be admissible in evidence without proof of the original. Section 65(f) of the Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition and contents of the document when the original is the document of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence. As no provision from the Companies Act is brought to my notice under which the certified copy of the minutes of the meetings of the board of directors is admissible in evidence without proof of the original, it must be said that the copy of the minutes cannot be admitted in evidence directly unless the original is proved or the copy is admitted by opposite party. Therefore, even though that document is given exhibit number, it cannot be treated to have been proved, unless the 18 WP-40-11.sxw complainant leads appropriate evidence to prove the minutes.”

In Escorts Limited vs Sai Autos, (1991)72 Comp Cas 483 (Delhi), 42(1990) DLT 446, it is observed as under:

  • “(16) The next question that arises is what amount is due from defendants No. to 3 to the plaintiff company. For this purpose, copies of accounts have been produced by the plaintiff company. Copies of the accounts produced by the plaintiff company deals with the transaction between the plaintiff defendants No. to 3. In none of the affidavits filed by the plaintiff, have these accounts been proved in accordance with the provision of section 34 of the Evidence Act, which sets out the manner in which any person can be charged with liability on accounts, and how the liability is to be proved.
  • (17) Section 34 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
    • “Entries in books of account regularly kept in the course of business are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to inquire, but each statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability”.
  • (18) In view of the provisions of section 34 of the Evidence Act, entries in the books of account are not alone sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability. Nor can copies of entries in the books of account be sufficient to charge any person with liability. The manner in which entries in the books df account are to be proved to charge any person with liability, has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in (Chandradhar Goswami & others v. Gauhati Bank Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1058), the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the entries in the books of account are not primary evidence of indebtedness. A plaintiff has to lead evidence in the shape of vouchers, bills etc. to prove the entries in the books of account.
  • (19) In this view of the matter, neither the copy of the ledger account, nor the ledgers themselves, in respect of account of defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 is enough evidence to charge them with liability, and no decree can be passed against the defendants on the basis thereof.”

End Notes

Section 193 in The Companies Act, 1956

193. Minutes of proceedings of general meetings and of Board and other meetings .-

(1) Every company shall cause minutes of all proceedings of every general meeting and of all proceedings of every meeting of its Board of Directors or of every committee of the Board, to be kept by making within [thirty][days of the conclusion of every such meeting concerned, entries thereof in books kept for that purpose with their pages consecutively numbered.

(1A) Each page of every such book shall be initialled or signed and the last page of the record of proceedings of each meeting in such books shall be dated and signed-

  • .(a) in the case of minutes of proceedings of a meeting of the Board or of a committee thereof, by the Chairman of the said meeting or the Chairman of the next succeeding meeting;
  • (b) in the case of minutes of proceedings of a general meeting, by the Chairman of the same meeting within the aforesaid period of thirty days or in the event of the death or inability of that Chairman within that period, by a Director duly authorised by the Board for the purpose.

(1B) In no case the minutes of proceedings of a meeting shall be attached to any such book as aforesaid by pasting or otherwise.] [ Substituted by Act 65 of 1960, Section 52, for sub-Section (1) (w.e.f. 28.12.1960).]

(2) The minutes of each meeting shall contain a fair and correct summary of the proceedings thereat.

(3) All appointments of officers made at any of the meetings aforesaid shall be included in the minutes of the meeting.

(4) In the case of a meeting of the Board of Directors or of a committee of the Board, the minutes shall also contain-

  • .(a) the names of the Directors present at the meeting; and
  • (b) in the case of each resolution passed at the meeting, the names of the Directors, if any, dissenting from, or not concurring in the resolution.

(5) Nothing contained in sub-sections (1) to (4) shall be deemed to require the inclusion in any such minutes of any matter which, in the opinion of the Chairman of the meeting,-

  • .(a) is, or could reasonably be regarded as defamatory of any person;
  • (b) is irrelevant or immaterial to the proceedings; or
  • (c) is detrimental to the interests of the company.

Explanation .-The Chairman shall exercise an absolute discretion in regard to the inclusion or non-inclusion of any matter in the minutes on the grounds specified in this sub-section.

(6) If default is made in complying with the foregoing provisions of this section in respect of any meeting, the company, and every officer of the company who is in default, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to [five hundred rupees] [ Substituted by Act 53 of 2000, Section 81, for ” fifty rupees” (w.e.f. 13.12.2000).].

Section 118 in The Companies Act, 2013

118. Minutes of proceedings of general meeting, meeting of Board of Directors and other meeting and resolutions passed by postal ballot.—(1) Every company shall cause minutes of the proceedings of every general meeting of any class of shareholders or creditors, and every resolution passed by postal ballot and every meeting of its Board of Directors or of every committee of the Board, to be prepared and signed in such manner as may be prescribed and kept within thirty days of the conclusion of every such meeting concerned, or passing of resolution by postal ballot in books kept for that purpose with their pages consecutively numbered.

(2) The minutes of each meeting shall contain a fair and correct summary of the proceedings thereat.

(3) All appointments made at any of the meetings aforesaid shall be included in the minutes of the meeting.

(4) In the case of a meeting of the Board of Directors or of a committee of the Board, the minutes shall also contain—

(a) the names of the directors present at the meeting; and

(b) in the case of each resolution passed at the meeting, the names of the directors, if any, dissenting from, or not concurring with the resolution.

(5) There shall not be included in the minutes, any matter which, in the opinion of the Chairman of the meeting,— (a) is or could reasonably be regarded as defamatory of any person; or (b) is irrelevant or immaterial to the proceedings; or (c) is detrimental to the interests of the company.

(6) The Chairman shall exercise absolute discretion in regard to the inclusion or non-inclusion of any matter in the minutes on the grounds specified in sub-section (5).

(7) The minutes kept in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein.

(8) Where the minutes have been kept in accordance with sub-section (1) then, until the contrary is proved, the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly called and held, and all proceedings thereat to have duly taken place, and the resolutions passed by postal ballot to have been duly passed and in particular, all appointments of directors, key managerial personnel, auditors or company secretary in practice, shall be deemed to be valid.

(9) No document purporting to be a report of the proceedings of any general meeting of a company shall be circulated or advertised at the expense of the company, unless it includes the matters required by this section to be contained in the minutes of the proceedings of such meeting.

(10) Every company shall observe secretarial standards with respect to general and Board meetings specified by the Institute of Company Secretaries of India constituted under section 3 of the Company Secretaries Act, 1980 (56 of 1980), and approved as such by the Central Government.

(11) If any default is made in complying with the provisions of this section in respect of any meeting, the company shall be liable to a penalty of twenty-five thousand rupees and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of five thousand rupees.

(12) If a person is found guilty of tampering with the minutes of the proceedings of meeting, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

‘LIMITATION’ Periods for Suits relating to Immovable Property

Jojy George Koduvath

The limitation periods for suits relating to immovable property under the Limitation Act, 1963 and starting points thereof are outlined below:

RECOVERY/POSSESSION, FORFEITURE, ETC.

1. Recovery of possession based on previous possession12 years — From the date of dispossession — Article 64
2. Recovery of possession based on title — 12 years — When the defendant’s possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff — Article 65.
3. Adverse possession/ extinguishment of owner’s right — 12 years — Article 65 (read with Section 27) — on expiry of the period limited for a suit for possession.
4 Possession after forfeiture or breach of condition — 12 years — When the forfeiture is incurred or the condition is broken Article 66
5. Landlord’s suit for possession from tenant after determination of tenancy — 12 years — When the tenancy is determined — Article 67.
6. Recovery of mesne profits — 3 years — When the profits are received — Article 51.
7. Vendor’s suit for unpaid purchase money of immovable property —3 years — Time fixed for completing sale, or relevant later date — Article 53.
8. Specific enforcement of right of pre-emption — 1 year — When purchaser takes possession, or, if possession is not delivered, when sale is registered —Article 97.
9.  Suit by person totally excluded from joint-family property to enforce his share —
12 years —When exclusion becomes known — Article 110.
10. Suit by Mitakshara son to set aside father’s alienation of ancestral property12 years — When alienee takes possession — Article 109.
11. Possession of hereditary office — 12 years — When defendant’s possession becomes adverse to plaintiff — Article 107.
12. Possession of public street/road by local authority 30 years — Dispossession or discontinuance of possession — Article 111.
13. Suit by Central/State Government — 30 years —When the period would begin to run against a private plaintiff — Article 112.
14. Cancellation of t Deed — 30 years —from the date of execution of the Sale Deed —Article 59.

Adverse Possession and Partition

  • Articles 64–67 specifically deal with adverse possession and forfeiture of lease.
  • Partition — particularly where the plaintiff’s right to seek partition is alleged to have been extinguished by adverse possession, ouster – 12 years

Lease / Rent

  • 1. Recovery of arrears of rent — 3 years — Article 52 — Time runs from when the arrears become due.
  • 2. Recovery of possession after forfeiture/breach of lease condition — 12 years — Article 66 — Time runs from when the forfeiture is incurred  or the condition is broken.
  • 3. Recovery of possession by landlord from tenant after determination of tenancy — 12 years — Article 67 — Time runs from when the tenancy is determined.

B. EASEMENTS

  • 1. Acquisition of Easement by Prescription — 20 years — Section 25, Limitation Act.
  • The easement must have been enjoyed:
    • peaceably;
    • openly;
    • as of right;
    • without interruption;
    • for 20 years.
  • 2. Where the servient property belongs to Government, the period is 30 years.

Important:

  • Section 25 itself says that this provision does not apply in territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 extends, by virtue of Section 29(4).

Suit concerning disturbance of an easement

  • A suit based upon a wrongful obstruction may attract an appropriate Article concerning the particular wrongful act, while a claim to establish a periodically recurring right may fall under Article 104 — 3 years from the first refusal.

C. MORTGAGE

  • 1. Redemption/recovery of possession by mortgagor — 30 years — Article 61(a)
  • 2. Recovery of mortgaged property transferred by mortgagee for valuable consideration — 12 years — Art. 61(b) — from when transfer becomes known
  • 3. Recovery of surplus collections by mortgagor — 3 years — Article 61(c)
  • 4. Enforcement of money secured by mortgage/charge 12 years — Article 62 — when money becomes due
  • 5. Foreclosure by mortgagee — 30 years — Article 63(a)
  • 6. Possession by mortgagee — 12 years — Article 63(b)

D. TRUSTS AND TRUST PROPERTY

  • 1. Section 10 can make certain suits against trustees not barred by any length of time, subject to its terms. Therefore, one must not simply put all trust-property claims under a limitation period.
  • 2. Recovery of immovable trust property transferred by trustee for valuable consideration —12 years — Article 92 — From when the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff.
  • 3. Recovery of movable trust property transferred by trustee for valuable consideration — 3 years — Article 93 — From when the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff.
  • 4. Setting aside transfer of immovable property of Hindu/Muslim/Buddhist religious or charitable endowment — 12 years — Article 94 — From when the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff.
  • 5. Setting aside transfer of movable property of such endowment — 3 years — Article 95 — From when the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff.
  • 6. Manager of Hindu/Muslim/Buddhist religious or charitable endowment seeking recovery of property transferred by previous manager for valuable consideration — 12 years — Article 96 —The starting point is linked to the death, resignation or removal of the transferor, or appointment of the plaintiff as manager, whichever is later.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Contemporary Indian Law: Adverse Possession is Not a Mere Inference on Inaction, But the Outcome of Proved Positive Hostile Acts

Mere ‘Nec Vi, Nec Clam, Nec Precario’ Not Enough.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Abstract

Present Indian Law crystallises:
 ••••  Adverse Possession = Admission + Denial + Dispossession

Admission — Admission that the true title vests in the Actual Owner.
Denial — Denial of the true owner’s title.
Dispossession — The Possession of the Claimant must be coupled with Animus to hold the Property as His Own.

Adverse possession is not a mere legal inference drawn from the true owner’s inaction—as was the position under the Limitation Act, 1908—but the direct consequence of positive, hostile acts affirmatively proved by the claimant.

Read also:

Part I

Introduction

Article 65 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 provides 12 years as the limitation period for recovery of immovable property on the basis of TITLE, starting from the period – “when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

When does Indian law Accept ‘Possession’ as “Adverse“?

  • 1. Actual dispossession of the true owner by an overt act on a specified date, coupled with the animus on the part of the claimant to dispossess the true owner, denying his title.
  • 2. The dispossession of the true owner by the claimant/trespasser must be sufficiently ‘adverse’ to put the true owner on notice/knowledge of the nature of such possession—namely, that it is hostile to the true owner’s title.
  • 3. Such hostile possession and denial must be after ‘admitting‘ of the true owner’s Legal Title.

Starting Point of Limitation Period

The Indian Limitation Act, 1963, stipulates that the ‘starting point of limitation’ period of 12 years is “when possession … becomes adverse“.
Therefore, there should be –

  • ‘hostile possession‘ followed by
  • an actual wrongful dispossession of the true owner
  •  DENYING the title of the true owner
  • fully knowing him and ADMITTING that true title vests in him,
  • coupled with the animus to dispossess, and
  •  to possess the land as its owner, so also
  • open and hostile possession to convey or impute knowledge of thereof to the true owner, and
  • maintained such “adverse” possession for over 12 years.

Legal Analysis

Adverse possession is not a mere legal inference drawn from the true owner’s inaction—as was the position under the Limitation Act, 1908—but the direct consequence of positive, hostile acts affirmatively proved by the claimant.

Resultantly, a suit for recovery based on title is never barred by limitation:
 ••••  (i) in the absence of a plea of adverse possession by the defendant; or
 ••••  (ii) even if the plaintiff admits that the defendant has remained in hostile claim of ownership for over 12 years.

Accordingly, the traditional adage ‘Nec Vi, Nec Clam, Nec Precario‘ (without force, without secrecy, and without permission) has been rendered virtually obsolete. Because, there is more emphasis to denial and intentional dispossession (than peaceful, open and continuous possession) and there will be no Adverse Possession in the present Indian Law if the defendant does not POSITIVELY –

  • (first) admits the true owner’s title and
  • denies the title of the true owner (which is hostile enough to give a reasonable notice to the actual owner) and
  • wrongfully dispossesses the true owner (i.e. with animus to dispossess) and
  • holds the Property as His Own.

Suit on Title – No Limitation Unless Defendant has Claim of Adverse Possession

  • No question of limitation arises unless the defendant substantiates his plea of adverse possession. This is because, after the significant change brought about by the Limitation Act, 1963, mere possession—however long—does not, by itself, become ‘adverse’.
Neelam Gupta v. Rajendra Kumar Gupta, AIR 2024 SC 5374,
Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 INSC 1021; 2024 KLT(Online) 3051,
K.J. Abraham v. Mariamma Itty, ILR 2016-3 Ker 98,
C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai, AIR 2008 SC 363; 2007-14 SCC 183,
Indira v. Arumugam, AIR 1999 SC 1549,
C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808.

The “knowledge” required is ‘that which is brought to the true owner‘

The words in Article 65 — ‘when the possession of defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff‘— necessarily imply or contemplate a “knowledge” on the part of the plaintiff. It is the ‘knowledge‘ that is –

  • acquired by the true owner, brought about by the claimant’s open and hostile acts asserting title.
T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570,
Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan, 2009-16 SCC 517
Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam, AIR 2008SC 346; 2007 14 SCC 308,
Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, 2010-14 SCC 316,

Adverse Possession Arises from a wrongful (with Animus) disposition of true owner

In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, AIR 2004 SC 2096; 2004-10 SCC 779, it is held as under:

  • “Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of true owner.”
  • “It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period.”
  • “Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in excluion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature.”

It is pointed out in this decision that a person who claims adverse possession should show-

  • “(a) on what date he came into possession,
  • (b) what was the nature of his possession,
  • (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party,
  • (d) how long his possession has continued, and
  • (e) his possession was open and undisturbed.”

Part II

Adverse Possession Requires Admission of the True Owner’s Actual Title, Denial of That Title; and Wrongful Dispossession of the True Owner

  • If one party to the suit (defendant or plaintiff) effectively pleads adverse possession (admitting the title of the other party), the other party need not prove his title (subject to the doctrine of primary onus), for the title of the alleged true owner can be taken as an ‘admitted fact’.

Claimant to admit the title of the true owner. Following decisions make it clear.

1. Dagadabai v. Abbas @ Gulab Rustum Pinjari, 2017-13 SCC 705

  • “21…. It is equally well-settled that such person must necessarily first admit the ownership of the true owner over the property to the knowledge of the true owner

2. Jagdish Sharma v. Tarun Gupta , SLP, Supreme(Online)(SC) 1473, 23-02-2026

  • “6. To claim adverse possession, a party raising such a plea has to first admit the opposite party as the true owner of the land and thereafter set up the hostile title by way of adverse possession.”

3. Michael v. The Midland Rubber Produce Co. Ltd., 2024 KER 76750

  • “12… It is settled law that the plea of adverse possession could be raised only if the defendant is admitting the title of the plaintiff.”

4. Mani v. Bhanumathi,  RSA No. 841/2013, 02-11-2015, High Court of Kerala (P. B. Suresh Kumar, J.)

  • “4. A person who does not admit the title of the real owner cannot claim adverse possession.”

5. Kunhumol Simon v. State Of Kerala, 2026 KER 37238

  • “6. The moment the plaintiffs assert title over the property by applying the principle of adverse possession, necessarily they will have to admit the title of the Government.”

6. Raghavan v. Devayani, 2024 0 KER 17079; 2024-2 KHC 417.

  • “19. Indubitably, in order to perfect plea of adverse possession, the person asserting the same should have to admit the title of the other party…”

7. M Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020 (1) SCC 1 (Ram Janmabhumi Temple case)

  • “747. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed.”

Claimant to DENY the title of the true owner

1. Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779

  • “11. … Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner.”

2. T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570

  • “14. … Adverse possession means a [hostile possession] which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner. …. The person who bases his title on adverse possession, therefore, must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i.e. possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. …”

3. Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao v.Galla Jani Kamma, [(2008) 15 SCC 150

  • “concurrent finding that … mere possession for some years was not sufficient to claim adverse possession, unless such possession was hostile possession, dening the title of the true owner…. ” is accepted.

4. Brijesh Kumar v. Shardabai, (2019) 9 SCC 369:

  • “Adverse possession is hostile possession by assertion of a hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner ….”

5. Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729

  • “The adverse possession requires requirements … adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. …”

6. Shri Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram, AIR 2020 SC 461; 2020-11 SCC 263 — The judicial precedents set out in cases (2) to (5) above are discussed and relied upon in this decision.

Drastic Changes Reflected by the 1963 Limitation Act – Dispossession

Till 1963, the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 governed the law on Adverse Possession. Under the provisions of the 1908 Act, the plaintiff had to file the suit for recovery of immovable property within 12 years of losing possession by a plaintiff. Drastic changes were made to the law by the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Article 65 introduced the following words to denote the starting point of limitation:

  • “when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff“.

These words emphasise two distinctive, yet interrelated, key elements:

  • First, ‘hostile possession‘ followed by an actual dispossession (start with wrongful dispossession) of the true owner, coupled with the animus on the part of the claimant/trespasser to dispossess the true owner and to possess the land as its owner; and
  • Second, knowledge of the true owner—the possession of the claimant must be open and hostile, and of such a character as to convey or impute knowledge of its adverse nature to the true owner.

1. Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, AIR 2004 SC 2096; 2004-10 SCC 779

  • “It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period.”

2. P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, 2007-6 SCC 59

  • “Importantly, intention to possess can not be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession.”
  • “Thus, there must be intention to dispossess. And it needs to be open and hostile enough to bring the same to the knowledge and plaintiff has an opportunity to object.”

3. Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai, 2019-13 SCC 324

  • “11. … it is important to assess whether such intention to dispossess is apparent to the actual owner or not.”

Conclusion

Contemporary Indian law on Adverse Possession requires far more than mere compliance with the traditional maxim (which applied under the Old Limitation Act of 1908):

  • ‘Nec Vi (without force),
  • Nec Clam (without secrecy),
  • Nec Precario (without permission)‘.

To successfully establish adverse possession today, the claimant must:

  • (i) Admit the legal title of the true owner;
  • (ii) Deny that title by asserting an open and hostile claim; and
  • (iii) Dispossess the true owner with the specific animus to dispossess and hold the property as their own.
Read Also
•  Adverse Possession: A Concise Overview
•  What is Adverse Possession in Indian Law?
•  Adverse Possession: Dispossession and Knowledge
•  Adverse Possession: Admission of Title of Other Party
•  Ouster and Dispossession in Adverse Possession
•  Does ‘Abandonment’ a Recognised Right in Indian Law?
•   Illegal or Fraudulent Regn. of Deed: No Adverse Possession
•   Does 12 Years’ Unobstructed Possession Precede the Suit?
•   Prescriptive Rights – Is it Inchoate until Upheld by Court
•  Sec. 27, Limitation Act: Right to Declaration and Recovery
•  Declaration & Recovery: Art. 65, not Art. 58 Governs
•  ‘Possessory Title’ in Indian Law
•  Possession: a Substantive Right Protected in Indian Law
•  Recovery Based on Title and on Earlier Possession
•  ‘Possession is Good Against All But the True Owner’
•  When ‘Possession Follows Title’; ‘Title Follows Possession’
•  Can a Tenant Claim Adverse Possession
•  Adverse Possession Against Government
•  Is Registration of a Deed, Notice to Govt. and Public?
•  Government of Kerala v. Joseph
•  Adverse Possession: UK and US Law and Classic Decisions
•   22nd Law Commission  Report
•  How to Plead Adverse Possession? 

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Law on Survey Commission in Civil Suits

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Taken from:
Powers and Duties of Commissioners to Make Local Investigations, Under CPC

Read Also:
➧••➧ Survey Plan and Area Calculation: A Cursory Look
➧••➧ Survey Records under Survey Act – Raises a Presumption of Correctness on Boundary; though Not Confer Title
➧••➧ Is it Mandatory to Set Aside the Commission Report – Where a Second Commissioner is Appointed?
➧••➧ Can a Commission be Appointed to Find Out the Physical Possession of a Property?

Power of Courts to Issue Commissions

Courts derive power to issue Commissions from Sec. 75 CPC. It reads as under:

Sec. 75. Power of Court to Issue Commissions

  • Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the court may issue a commission-
    • (a) to examine any person;
    • (b) to make a local investigation;
    • (c) to examine or adjust accounts; or
    • (d) to make a partition;
    • (e) to hold a scientific, technical, or expert investigation;
    • (f) to conduct sale of property which is subject to speedy and natural decay and which is in the custody of the Court pending the determination of the suit;
    • (g) to perform any ministerial act.

Commissions to Make Local Investigations

Order 26 rules 9 and 10 deal with appointment of Commissions to make local investigations. They read as under:

O 26 r 9. Commissions to make local investigations-

  • In any suit in which the Court deems a local investigation to be requisite or proper for the purpose of elucidating any matter in dispute, or of ascertaining the market-value of any property, or the amount of any mesne profits or damages or annual net profits, the Court may issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit directing him to make such investigation and to report thereon to the Court:
  • Provided that, where the State Government has made rules as to the persons to whom such commission shall be issued, the Court shall be bound by such rules.

O 26 r 10. Procedure of Commissioner-

  • (1) The Commissioner, after such local inspection as he deems necessary and after reducing to writing the evidence taken by him, shall return such evidence, together with his report in writing signed by him, to the Court.
  • (2) Report and deposition to be evidence in suit.
  • Commissioner may be examined in person-
  • The report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him (but not the evidence without the report) shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record; but the Court or, with the permission of the Court, any of the parties to suit may examine the Commissioner personally in open Court touching any part of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report, or as to his report, or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation.
  • (3) Where the Court is for any reason dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Commissioner, it may direct such further inquiry to be made as it shall think fit.

When serious dispute on Area or Identity, Issue a Survey Commission

The Supreme Court, in Shreepat v. Rajendra Prasad, 2000 (7)) JT 379; 2000-3 MLJ 84 ; 2000 KHC 4443, it is observed as under:

  • “In our opinion, this contention is correct. Since there was a serious dispute with regard to the area and boundaries of the land in question, especially with regard to its identity, the courts below, before decreeing the suit should have got the identity established by issuing a survey commission to locate the plot in dispute and find out whether it formed part of Khasra No. 257/3 or Khasra No. 257/1. This having not been done has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice.”

Advocate-Commissioner Appointed for demarcation even in injunction Suit

In Haryana Waqf Board v. Shanti Sarup, 2008(8) SCC 671, it is pointed out that, even in a suit for injunction, where there is a necessity for demarcation of land, an Advocate-Commissioner can be appointed. It has been held that if the controversy is regarding the demarcation of the land between the parties, the Court should direct the investigation by appointing a legal commission.

It is held as under:

  • “4. Admittedly, in this case, an application was filed under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was rejected by the trial court but in view of the fact that it was a case of demarcation of the disputed land, it was appropriate for the court to direct the investigation by appointing a Local Commissioner under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC.
  • 5. The appellate court found that the trial court did not take into consideration the pleadings of the parties when there was no specific denial on the part of the respondents regarding the allegations of unauthorised possession in respect of the suit land by them as per Para 3 of the plaint. Bu the only controversy between the parties was regarding demarcation of the suit land because the land of the respondents was adjacent to the suit land and the application for demarcation filed before the trial court was wrongly rejected.”

In Durga Prasad v. Praveen, AIR 1975 MP 196, 1975 MPLJ 801, it is held that in the case of encroachment, the appointment of a commissioner for demarcation is the proper course to determine the issue. It is held that the Court should order for appointment of a commissioner when there is a dispute of encroachment. The Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that in the absence of an agreed map, the appointment of a Commissioner is necessary. It reads as under:

  • “25. In cases where there is a dispute as to encroachment, the fact whether there is such an encroachment or not cannot be determined in the absence of an agreed map, except by the appointment of a Commissioner under Order 26,Rule 9 of the CPC. On 15.09.1996 the plaintiff, accordingly, applied for the issue of a commission to the Director of Land Records for a theodolite survey of the plaintiff’s leasehold area. The court by its memo dated 11-10-1966 enquired from Director of Land Records whether he was prepared to undertake the work. The Director of Land Records by his memo dated 01-12-1966 signified his willingness. The Collector’s memo dated 19-04-1969 shows that on the dates fixed for the purpose, neither the plaintiff nor any person authorized by him was present at the site. For reasons best known to the plaintiff, he did not press the application for commission vide order sheet dated 02-01-1979. The court accordingly, by its memo dated 10-01-1970 recalled the writ of commission issued to the Director of Land Records. The plaintiff,therefore rested his case on the plaint map, Ex.P-1,and his oral evidence. It is needless for us to stress that no finding as to the alleged encroachment can be reached on the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has not examined any witness to prove that he had surveyed the area, and found on actual measurements that the pit EFGH market in the plaint map, Ex.P-1, fell within his leasehold area.”

It is Incumbent upon the Court itself to issue a Survey commission

In Jaswant son of Kashi Ram Yadav v. Deen Dayal, 2011 (2) MPLJ, 576 it is observed as under:

  • “The moot question to be decided in this appeal is whether the property in question is of Plaintiff or Defendant. Both the parties are claiming ownership right on it. According to the Plaintiff he purchased the land vide registered sale deed Ext-P-2 from Deen Dayal and the suit property is a piece of that land but according to the Defendant it is part of the property which he purchased from Sudhir Shrivastava vide registered sale deed Ext-D-3. According to me, when there is dispute about demarcation of the property in question and its identity and both the parties are claiming it to be of their own on the basis of their document of title it was incumbent upon the Court itself to issue a commission by appointing an employee of revenue department not below the rank of Revenue Inspector to get it demarcated so that it can be identified. In the instant case my attention has been drawn by learned Counsel for Defendants to the application filed under Order XXVI, Rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure but the same has been rejected at the time of the consideration of temporary injunction application. To me learned trial Court erred in substantial error of law in rejecting the said application. The learned First Appellate Court has also committed the same error by not allowing the said application. Indeed, it was the duty of the Court itself to issue commission by appointing an employee of Revenue Department not below the rank of Revenue Inspector to get the land in dispute demarcated and for its identification no application is required for that purpose. In this context I may profitably place reliance on two decisions of Supreme Court
    • Shreepat v. Rajendra Prasad and Ors. (2000) 6 Supreme 389 and
    • Haryana Wakf Board v. Shanti Sharup and Ors. MANU/SC/7838/2008 : (2008) 8 SCC 671 and
    • the Division Bench of this Court in Durga Prasad v. Praveen Foujdar and Ors. MANU/MP/0037/1975 : 1975 MPLJ 801; 1975 JLJ 440.”

In G.L. Purusotham v. Y. Nagaraju, 2016 (1) CCC (AP) 3 it is held – when both parties are alleging encroachment on their respective properties, appointment of advocate commissioner with the assistance of Mandal Surveyor is proper.

In Rachakonda Nagaiah v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2013 (3) Civ. C.C. 107 (AP) the Court found it proper to have an application to survey the land for demarcation to adjudicate the dispute regarding boundaries.

In Prembai v. Ghanshaym, 2010 (3) MPLJ 345, relying on Haryana Waqf Board (supra) it has been held as under:-

  • “12. On going through the pleadings of plaintiff made in para 2 of his plaint, this Court finds that specifically it has been pleaded by him that adjoining to his plot there is an open land and thereafter defendants’ house is in existence. It has been rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiffs sale-deed (Ex. P/1) in which the description of his plot has been mentioned, in it also has been so described that on the northern side there is an open land and thereafter the house of Krishnagopal Mundra is in existence and, therefore, since plaintiff’s own case is that in between his plot and defendants’ house there is an open space, therefore, whether any cantilever is being projected on the plaintiffs plot or not, this was required to be ascertained by appointing a competent Commissioner by directing him to examine the spot and to give report as to whether any projection of cantilever covers any portion of the plaintiff’s property or not and similarly whether the doors, windows and the drains are Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHUBHANKAR trying to be opened by the defendants on the plaintiff’s property or not. Since this has not been done, according to me, the suit of plaintiff for injunction cannot be decreed. In this regard, the Division Bench decision of Durga Prasad (supra) placed reliance by the learned counsel for the appellants is quite relevant. There are two more decisions of Supreme Court on the point and they are Shreepat v. Rajendra Prasad, 2000 (6) Supreme 389 and Haryana Waqf Board v. Shanti Sarup, (2008) 8 SCC 671.”

In Ram Lal v. Salig Ram, JT 2019 (2) SC 106 , the Supreme Court said with regard to the necessity of the appointment of a Local Commissioner under Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC as under:

  • “18. In the totality of circumstances, in our view, for just and effectual determination of all the questions involved in the matter, the proper course is of issuing a fresh Commission and for direction to the Trial Court to decide the entire suit afresh on the issues as originally framed as also on the additional issues after taking the report of the Local Commissioner afresh and affording an opportunity to the parties to submit their objections, if any.”

Surveyor-Plan will not be ‘ipso facto’ Evidence

Surveyor-plan Attached to Commission Report will not be ‘ipso facto’ Evidence. If the commissioner could not vouchsafe its veracity, the surveyor should be examined.

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Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic)

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

A GRANT Must be Construed Most Strongly Against the Grantor

Jojy George Koduvath

Introduction

The general principles of interpretation of ‘grant’ is seen in the Privy Council decision -Basiram Saha Roy v. Ram Ratan Roy, AIR 1927 PC 117; 1926 54 Law Reports Ind.App. 196. It reads as under:

  • “A grant in respect of its amplitude is always construed (unless it be a Crown grant) against the grantor.”

Part I

Grant is controlled by the terms and conditions of the Grant

A right of easement by grant is controlled by the terms and conditions of the grant (C. Hirajee v. Suraj Bali – AIR 1929 Oudh 351). An inference is possible that the way was meant for vehicular traffic if the grantee owned a vehicle at that time.

F. Peacock in “Law Relating to Easements”, 3rd Edition at page 494, states that when the easement is by way of grant its extent and mode of enjoyment must, in conformity with the general rule, be ascertained from the terms of the instrument itself which are to be construed with reference to the circumstances existing at the date of the instrument. (See: C.H. Saraswathi Amma v. C.H. Seethamma, 2009 Supreme(Online)(KER) 10248, SA/136/1999, 18-11-2009 (Thomas P.Joseph, J.)

Where grant is silent about the extent of the user, construed against granter

The general accepted principle of law is that where the grant is silent about the extent of the user, the grant must be construed most strongly against the granter and a reasonable user in the circumstance of each case is to be interfered

In Bina Das Gupta v. Sachindra Mohan Das Gupta, AIR 1968 SC 39, followed the statement of law in Savill Bros. Ltd. v. Bethell (1902) 2 Ch. 523 at pp. 537, 538), by Stirling L. J. which held as under:

  • “It is a settled rule of construction that where there is a grant and an exception out of it, the exception is to be taken as inserted for the benefit of the grantor and to be construed in favour of the grantee. If then the grant be clear, but the exception be so framed as to be bad for uncertainty, it appears to us that on this principle the grant is operative and the exception fails.” (Quoted in: Delhi Development Authority v. Durga Chand Kaushish, AIR 1973 SC 2609; 1973-2 SCC 825.)

In Simon v. N. Jayanth , 1986 KLT 457, the Kerala High Court observed as under:

  • “……….Where, the grant however is silent about the extent of the user, the grant “must be construed most strongly against the grantor” and a reasonable user in the circumstances of each case is to be inferred. A right of way cannot be enlarged in such cases to extend the area of the right of easement; it cannot also be unduly restricted within that area either. If, therefore, the right of way admits the use of vehicles, that right cannot normally be refused and a right of way in such cases cannot be reduced to a mere footpath.”

The High Court quoted the following passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England, (Fourth Edition), Vol. 14, paras 149 to 151:

  • “If a right of way is claimed under an express grant which is actually existing, the nature and extent of the right depends upon the proper construction of the language of the instrument creating it. It is for the court to put the true construction upon the words used in the grant, guided, in the absence of any clear indication of the intention of the parties, by the maxim that a grant must be construed most strongly against the grantor.
  • The construction of the grant depends on the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument. Thus, a grant of a right of way per se and nothing else may be a right of footway or a general right of way or a right to any other kind of way, according to the circumstances of the case. Among these circumstances the nature and description of the land or buildings comprising the dominant tenement, and the nature of the place over which the right is granted as it existed at the date of the grant, are always very material considerations.”

After quoting the above passage it is held in Kumaran Nair v. Radha Bai, 2024 KER 43228 (C. Pratheep Kumar, J,) as under:

  • “Therefore, while considering the width of the grant, paramount consideration should be given to the intention of the grantor.”

In Mary Varghese v. Saju John, R.S.A. Nos. 2 & 3 of 2008, 25.5.2015, 2015 Supreme(Ker) 413, (A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J.), after referring Simon v. N.Jayanth , 1986 KLT 457, it is observed as under:

  • “13. It is true that the recitals in Ext.A3 are not cogent enough to clearly identify the starting point as well as the end point of the pathway. However, as it specifies that the lie of the pathway is along the northern boundary of DW2, the only possible inference that can be drawn is that it runs through the entire northern boundary of the aforesaid 21.250 cents of property covered by Ext.A3, starting from east and ending in the public road on the western side.”

Grant governed by the Terms; It can arise by Implication

The grant of easement may be express or even by necessary implication.

 In Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam and another Vs. G. Anandavally Amma, (2010) 2 SCC 689, the Supreme Court considered:

  • i) whether a case for easement of grant by implication can be raised?
  • ii) even if there are no pleadings in the plaint regarding easement by grant by implication, can such a question be decided?

The two questions were answered in affirmative. It was held that merely because the settlement deed in that case did not mention the right to use the way, that by itself will not mean that a grant by implication is not made out.

 It is observed in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam and another Vs. G. Anandavally Amma, (2010) 2 SCC 689

  • “22. The High Court quoted with approval Katiyar’s note to Section 8 of the Easement Act, which reads as follows:
    • “There are numerous cases in which an agreement to grant easement or some other rights has been inferred or more correctly has been imputed to the person who is in a position to make the grant, on account of some action or inaction on his part. These cases rest on the equitable doctrine of acquiescence, but they may be referred to, for the purpose of classification, as imputed or constructive grants. The party acquiescing is subsequently estopped from denying the existence of easement. It is as if such person had made an actual grant of the easement……It is the intention of the grantor whether he can be presumed to have been intended to convey to the grantee a right of easement for the reasonable and convenient enjoyment of the property which has to be ascertained in all the circumstances of the case to find out whether a grant can be implied. A description in a conveyance may connote an intention to create a right of easement. An easement may arise by implication, if the intention to grant can properly be inferred either from the terms of the grant or the circumstances”.
  • 23. Applying these observations to the facts of the case, the High Court held that though the original grant was by Yogini Amma that grant could not perfect as an easement for the reason that Yogini Amma herself was the owner of both ‘A’ schedule and ‘B’ schedule properties and consequently there was no question of ‘B’ schedule property becoming the servient tenement and ‘A’ schedule property becoming the dominant tenement. However, it was the desire of Yogini Amma that was implemented by her disciples by virtue of the settlement deed. Therefore, the right of the plaintiff to have ‘B’ schedule property as a pathway could not have been taken away by the very same deed. In fact, there was implied grant of ‘B’ schedule property as pathway as can be inferred from the circumstances, namely, i) no other pathway was provided for access to ‘A’ schedule property in the settlement deed and ii) there was no objection to the use of ‘B’ schedule as pathway.”

It was further held that even in the absence of any issue regarding the same, if the defendant is not able to show that plaintiff was using any other way it is difficult to negate such contention. It is held as under:

  • “23. We have heard Mr. T.L. Viswanath Iyer, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Mr. Subromanium Prasad, learned senior counsel for the respondents. We have carefully examined the impugned judgment of the courts below and also the pleadings, evidence and the materials already on record.
  • 24. It is not in dispute that the trial court as well as the First Appellate Court concurrently found on a proper appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case that the `B’ Schedule Property of the plaint was being used by the original plaintiff (since deceased) and thereafter, by the respondents even after construction of the building in 1940 in `A’ Schedule property of the plaint. The appellants also did not dispute the case of the original plaintiff (since deceased) that he was in continuous occupation of the building even after its construction in the year 1940. It is also not in dispute that the appellants were not able to establish that the original plaintiff (since deceased) was using any other pathway for access to `A’ Schedule Property of the plaint and the building therein, which was in the occupation of the original plaintiff (since deceased).
  • 25. The case of the appellants that since there was no mention in the deed of settlement enabling the use of `B’ schedule pathway for access to `A’ schedule property and the building therein, cannot be the reason to hold that there was no grant as the grant could be by implication as well. It is not in dispute that the fact of the use of the `B’ schedule property as pathway even after execution of Exhibit A1, the settlement deed in the year 1982 by the original plaintiff (since deceased) would amply show that there was an implied grant in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased) relating to `B’ schedule property of the plaint for its use as pathway to `A’ schedule property of the plaint in residential occupation of the original plaintiff (since deceased).
  • 26. In the absence of any evidence being adduced by the appellants to substantiate their contention that the original plaintiff (since deceased) had an alternative pathway for access to the `A’ schedule property, it is difficult to negative the contention of the respondents that since the original plaintiff (since deceased) has been continuously using the said pathway at least from the year 1940 the original plaintiff (since deceased) had acquired an easement right by way of an implied grant in respect of the `B’ Schedule property of the plaint.
  • 27. It is an admitted position that both `A’ schedule and `B’ schedule properties of the plaint belonged to Yogini Amma and her disciples and it was the desire of Yogini Amma that was really implemented by the disciples under the settlement deed executed in favour of the original plaintiff (since deceased). Therefore, the High Court was perfectly justified in holding that when it was the desire of Yogini Amma to grant easement right to the original plaintiff (since deceased) by way of an implied grant, the right of the original plaintiff (since deceased) to have `B’ schedule property of the plaint as a pathway could not have been taken away.
  • 28. In Annapurna Dutta vs. Santosh Kumar Sett & Ors. [AIR 1937 Cal.661], B.K.Mukherjee, as His Lordship then was observed (AIR p.663):
    • “………….There could be no implied grant where the easements are not continuous and non-apparent. Now a right of way is neither continuous nor always an apparent easement, and hence would not ordinarily come under the rule. Exception is no doubt made in certain cases, where there is a `formed road’ existing over one part of the tenement for the apparent use of another portion or there is `some permanence in the adaptation of the tenement’ from which continuity may be inferred, but barring these exceptions, an ordinary right of way would not pass on severance unless language is used by the grantor to create a fresh easement.”

In Velayudhan v. Padmanabhan, 1988 (2) KLT 417; 1988 KHC 461, it was held by the Kerala High Court that easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties and it may have its own consideration in some form or another.

In Hero Vinoth Vs. Sheshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, the Apex Court affirmed the above view and held that in the matter of grant the parties are governed by the terms of the grant and not anything else.

Easement of necessity and quasi easement are dealt with in Section 13 of the Act. The grant may be express or even by necessary implication. In either case it will not amount to an easement of necessity under Section 13 of the Act even though it may also be an absolute necessity for the person in whose favour the grant is made.

Part II

Grant should be construed most favourably to the Sovereign

In Mohsin Ali v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1518; 1975 2 SCC 122, it is observed that the State-Grants require a different interpretation. It is said as under:
  • “16. In England contrary to the ordinary rule applicable to grants by a subject, grants by the Crown are usually construed most favorably for the Crown. The rule in case of Royal Grants is that general words will not pass prerogative rights by implication.”

In Raja Rajendra Chand v. Mst. Sukhi, AIR 1957 SC 286, it was pointed out that the English rule that a grant should be construed most favourably to the Sovereign was subject to the exception that, in cases of grants made for valuable consideration, as is the position in the lease before us, the Sovereign s honour must take precedence over the Sovereign’s profit. This Court said (at page 292) there:

  • “It is, we think, well settled that the ordinary rule applicable to grants made by a subject does not apply to grants made by the Sovereign authority; and grants made by the Sovereign are to be construed most favourably for the Sovereign. This general rule, however, is capable of important relaxations in favour of the subject. It is necessary to refer here to such only of those relaxations as have a bearing on the construction of the document before us : thus, if the intention is obvious, a fair and liberal interpretation must be given to the grant to enable it to take effect; and the operative part, if plainly expressed, may take effect notwithstanding qualifications in the recitals. In case where the grant is for valuable consideration, it is construed in favour of the grantee, for the honour of the Sovereign: and where two constructions are possible, one valid and the other void, that which is valid ought to be preferred, for the honour of the Sovereign ought to be more regarded than the Sovereign s profit (see para 670 at p. 315 of Halsbury s Laws of England, Vol VII, Section 12, Simonds Edition).” (Quoted in: Delhi Development Authority v. Durga Chand Kaushish, AIR 1973 SC 2609; 1973-2 SCC 825.)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

COMMISIONS Under CPC

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Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

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Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

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Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

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Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

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Chinmaya Mission Educational & Cultural Trust v. Sree Hari R. Menon, 2026 KER 56668 (CR): A Suit Cannot be Rejected if there is a ‘Cause of Action’, for the Plaint discloses One ESSENTIAL FACT that Gives Rise to a ‘Right to Sue’

Read also:

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

Ratio Decidendi of Chinmaya Mission Educational & Cultural Trust, 2026 KER 56668: The High Court of Kerala (Syam Kumar V.M., J) considered what constitutes ‘Cause of Action’ under Order VII rule 11 CPC (plaint rejection).

It found –
• under Order VII rule 11 CPC:
••••  No mini-trial is conducted –
to test the veracity or
the likelihood of success.
••••  The court solely assess the plaint
(not written statement),
assuming it to be true, taken as a whole,
to see whether a prima facie cause of action, and
cannot embark on merits and legality of claim require evidence.

Facts in a Nutshell (Chinmaya Mission Educational & Cultural Trust Case)

  • A student filed the suit against school management.
  • He challenged fee increases and sought for formation of a PTA.
  • The school management argued – no cause of action and suit was vexatious.
  • The trial court dismissed the I.A under O. VII r. 11. Defendants challenged this order.

Arguments of the Defendant

  • Plaintiff had created an illusion of a cause of action.
  • Only a bogus cause of action.
  • Suit is liable to be struck down at the very inception.
  • Plaint did not disclose any cause of action.
  • Alleged failings regarding the conduct of the school did not constitute a ‘cause of action’.
  • The school had been run adherence to the norms of the CBSE, which is the authority vested with the power to supervise and regulate the running of the school.
  • Though arrayed as 3rd defendant, no relief had been sought against the CBSE. It reveals the lack of bona fides in filing the suit.
  • The suit is nothing, but an abuse of process of court.
  • Though there were 2011 students in the school, the respondent alone had challenged the policy decision of the management.
  • What had been put forth was not his individual grievance as a student. The suit, thus not having been filed on a representative capacity.
  • There is lack of good faith in filing the suit.
  • The petitioner school being a reputed institution.
  • It was to maintain high stands of education and to ensure that competent teachers are employed. It was inevitable that the fee structure of an institution must be drawn up keeping in mind the infrastructure and facilities as mandated by the CBSE.
  • It is the recognised principle of law that each institution must have the freedom to fix its own fee structure taking into consideration the need to generate funds to run the institution and to provide facilities necessary for the benefit of the students.

Decisions Relied on by the Defendants

  • Patasibai and others v. Ratanlal [(1990) 2 SCC 42];
  • T.Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and another [(1977) 4 SCC 467 and
  • Vinod Pathak v. Shankar Chaudhary [2025 (5) KHC SN 22].
  • M. Aamira Fathima and others v. Annamalai University and others [2018 KHC 6503] and
  • Nesammal and others v. Edward and others [1999 AIHC 470].
  • State of Kerala and others v. V.D.Vincent [2018 (3) KLT 677];
  • Prema Kumari C.V. v. C.V. Pavithran and others [2018 (5) KHC 943];
  • Anand Anoop v. Union of India and others [2014 (3) KLT 171] and
  • The Principal, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar Vidhya Mandir v. Sankara Narayanan and others (W.A.No.1662 of 2018 in W.P.(C) No.22249 of 2018 of this Court).

Arguments of the Plaintiff

  • The impugned order does not call for any interference.
  • It is on the well-settled principle that
    • cause of action needs to be prima facie seen as per the averments in the plaint itself and
    • no further enquiry regarding the cause of action is needed at the threshold.
  • The plaint averments prima facie reveals a cause of action.
  • It had also been concluded by the learned Munsiff – with regard to the applicability of Education Act, disputes as to the fee structure, prayer to constitute a parent-teacher association etc. are questions which cannot be decided at the threshold and-
    • they can be considered only after adducing evidence on both sides;and
    • they require tendering and appreciation of evidence.
  • The Munsiff had concluded that averments in the plaint itself reveal that the plaintiff had a cause of action of his own, which is not a cause of action applicable to each and every student of the school.
  • A specified amount has been received by the school from the plaintiff as donation on a particular date and he has been directed to pay the said amount.
  • Similarly a specified amount as fee in the increased rate within a prescribed period had also been claimed from the plaintiff by the school, against which he had sought a relief in the suit.
  • Such reliefs sought affect the individual only, even though similar reliefs could have been sought by some other students of the school too.
  • That no other student took up such a cause does not by itself render the suit to be maintained only in a representative capacity or in the nature of a representative suit.
  • Distinction between ‘ no cause of action’ and ‘the plaint does not disclose cause of action’: Reliance is placed on State of Orissa v. Klockner and Company [1996 KHC 1115 – SC] to highlight the distinction.

The Often Recurring Question on O. VII r. 11(a): What Constitutes a ‘Cause of Action’

The conscientious Judge began the Order with the following observation:

  • “The often recurring question as to what constitutes a ‘cause of action’ for the purposes of Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (C.P.C.) again comes up for consideration in this Civil Revision Petition.”

Findings in Brief

‘Cause of Action’ – EVERY ESSENTIAL FACT Gives Rise To A Right To Sue.

The Supreme Court and various High Courts have held –

  • For the purposes of Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a “cause of action” means the bundle of material facts which the plaintiff must plead and, if disputed, prove in order to obtain the relief claimed.
  • It comprises every essential fact that gives rise to the plaintiff’s right to sue, but does not include the evidence by which those facts are to be established.

The High Court referred the following decisions:

1. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India [(2004) 6 SCC 254]

It was held by the Supreme Court as under:

  • “6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the paint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily.”

2. Mohan Rawale v. Damodar Tatyaba [(1994) 2 SCC 392]

It was held as under:

  • “A reasonable cause of action is said to mean a cause of action with some chances of success when only the allegations in the pleading are considered. But so long as the claim discloses some cause of action or raises some questions fit to be decided by a Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out. The implications of the liability of the pleadings to be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action are quite often more known than clearly understood. It does introduce another special demurrer in a new shape. The failure of the pleadings to disclose a reasonable cause of action is distinct from the absence of full particulars.

3. Swamy Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam [(2005) 10 SCC 51]

It was held as follows:

  • “24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded.

The Next Question – When it could be said that the plaint ‘discloses a cause of action’

1. T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467]

Referring T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal it is observed by the High Court that the test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11, is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court held – what is required to be decided is to ascertain whether the plaint discloses a ‘real’ cause of action, or something purely illusory. It was held therein as follows:

  • “5. …The learned Munsiff must remember that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing …”

2. Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali [2020 SCC OnLine SC 562]

In Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, the Supreme Court has held that under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. It was further held as under:

  • “12.7 The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I & Anr., which reads as :
  • “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.”
  • In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact.”

3. Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas [2026 SCC OnLine SC 831]

In Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas [2026 SCC OnLine SC 831], after a reference to Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar [2025 SCC OnLine SC 793], held that the rejection of a plaint under the grounds mentioned under Order VII Rule 11 is essentially determinable on the basis of the averments contained in the plaint.

The High Court Explained the Decisions Relied on by the Defendants

In Chinmaya Mission Educational & Cultural Trust v. Sree Hari R. Menon, 2026 KER 56668, the Kerala High Court Explained the following decisions relied on thy the defendants:  

  • T. Arivandandam (supra)
  • Nesammal (supra)
  • M.A.Amira Fathima (supra)
  • The Principal, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar Vidhyala Mandir (supra)

Prema Kumari v. Pavithran [2018 (5) KHC 943]: A Note of caution on T. Arivandandam 

It is held in Chinmaya Mission Educational & Cultural Trust v. Sree Hari R. Menon as under:

  • “In Prema Kumari C.V. v. C.V. Pavithran [2018 (5) KHC 943] the Kerala High Court had cautioned the subordinate courts not to understand the principles laid down in T. Arivandandam (supra) to mean that under any and all circumstances, a plaint can be rejected for reasons not mentioned in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. It was held that it is the inviolable general rule that a plaint can be rejected only under the grounds of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, but at the same time, it should be borne in mind that the grounds of rejection stated in Rule 11 of Order VII are not exhaustive. It was thus clarified in Premakumari (supra) that a plaint can be rejected even for reasons not covered by Order VII Rule 11 of the Court if there are grave situations which may result in an abuse of the process of court or which may tend to promote frivolous, vexatious, and meritless litigations. This Court therein had further observed that it is only in extraordinary situations, that extraordinary remedies could be resorted to.”

Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [1986 (supp) SCC 315] – No Mechanical Application of Nesammal (supra)

It is held in Chinmaya Mission Educational & Cultural Trust v. Sree Hari R. Menon as under:

  • “It is trite that a plaint can indeed be rejected and ought to be rejected if found to be vexatious or, upon reading of the allegations therein, it is revealed that the same is an abuse of process of law. The said dictum settled in Nesammal (supra) and relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is no longer open to dispute. However, it is also settled that there cannot be a mechanical application of the said dictum. It would be apposite to reproduce the observations in Azhar Hussain V. Rajiv Gandhi [1986 (supp) SCC 315] reproduced in Nesammal (supra) explaining the power of rejection of a plaint vested in a civil court, which reads as follows:
  • “The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of democles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint if it does not disclose any cause of action. Or the power to direct the concerned party to strike out unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious parts of the pleadings, or such other pleadings which are likely to cause embarrassment or delay the fair trial of the action or which is otherwise an abuse of the process of law.”

M.A. Amira Fathima (supra) and Principal, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar Vidhyala (supra)

M.A. Amira Fathima (supra) and  The Principal, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar Vidhyala Mandir (supra)  are distinguished in Chinmaya Mission Educational & Cultural Trust v. Sree Hari R. Menon, pointing out to the following effect:

  • The question as to whether the educational institutions are entitled to fix their own fee structure, and each institute must have the freedom to fix its own fee structure, taking into consideration the needs to generate funds to run the institution and to provide facilities necessary for the benefit of the students and for the betterment and growth of that educational institution are –
  • aspects concern the merit of the matter, sustainability of which could only be decided after a trial.
  • They cannot be a reason to reject a plaint on the ground of lack of cause of action by invoking Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C.

Conclusion in Chinmaya Mission v. Sree Hari R. Menon

Chinmaya Mission Educational & Cultural Trust v. Sree Hari R. Menon concluded as under:

  • The learned Munsiff rightly proceeded on the settled principle that, while considering an application questioning the maintainability of a suit at the threshold, particularly one seeking rejection of the plaint, the Court is required to confine its examination solely to the averments contained in the plaint and the documents, if any, produced.
  • At that stage, the Court is neither expected nor permitted to embark upon an enquiry into the truthfulness, correctness, or evidentiary sufficiency of the allegations pleaded therein.
  • The existence of a cause of action is to be determined on a meaningful reading of the plaint as a whole, assuming the averments therein to be true for the limited purpose of deciding whether the suit is maintainable.
  • The Munsiff had unequivocally concluded that the plaint, on its face, disclosed a prima facie cause of action warranting adjudication through a regular trial.
  • The applicability of the provisions of the Education Act, the legality of the fee structure adopted by the institution, and the maintainability of the relief sought for issuance of a direction to constitute a Parent-Teacher Association, are all questions that involve disputed questions of fact as well as mixed questions of law and fact.
  • Such questions could not have been conclusively determined merely on the basis of pleadings at the threshold without affording the parties an opportunity to substantiate their respective contentions through oral and documentary evidence. All these matters could be  adjudicated after a full-fledged trial and upon appreciation of the evidence placed on record.
  • Premature adjudication of these issues at the stage of considering the maintainability of the suit would have amounted to conducting a mini trial, which is not permissible in law.
  • The learned Munsiff had rightfully forebeared from doing so.
  • The plaint having disclosed a prima facie cause of action, the suit was liable to proceed to trial, where the rival claims can be adjudicated on their respective merits in accordance with law.

End Notes:

In Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, AIR 2025 SC 2933 (J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan, JJ.), held to the following effect:

Under Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint –

••  Court examines averments in plaint alone
                          • on its face,
                          • without considering defence.
••  There will be No partial rejection.
                 •  If even one cause of action survives
                •  If any triable issue exists.
•Selective severance of reliefs is impermissible
                           • where different causes of action are independently pleaded
                   • and supported by distinct facts.

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Employees of Societies and other Autonomous Establishments

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Contents
•• 1. SUSPENSION
•• 2. DISCIPLINARY SUB-COMMITTEE
•• 3. FACT-FINDING ENQUIRY
•• 4. “SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE”
•• 5. CHARGES
•• 6. ENQUIRY
•• 7. PUNISHMENT
•• 8. APPEAL

Introduction

Indian courts consistently apply fundamental common law principles and natural justice to disciplinary proceedings against employees of societies and autonomous institutions. In Kerala, these general standards are statutorily embodied in Rule 198 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969. The key procedural requirements governing such actions, structured with reference to Rule 198, are outlined below.

SUSPENSION

Who has to suspend an employee ?

  • An authority competent to appoint the employee has to suspend him.
  • Usually, the Managing Committee is the appointing authority. When the Managing Committee has taken a decision, it can be issued by the President or the Secretary of the committee.
  • President’s Role: In urgent situations requiring immediate preventive action, the President may issue a suspension order in anticipation of subsequent ratification by the Managing Committee.  The President has general control over the affairs of the Society, as the chief executive of the Committee.
    • See: Prasanth Maroli v. Kannur Primary Co-operative Agricultural & Rural Development Bank Ltd. 2008 (4) KLT 451; 2008 (4) KHC 240);  Chandrikamma v. Assistant Registrar (General), Co-operative Societies, 2000 (3) KLT 940.
  • The bye-laws of the society may expressly confer disciplinary/ suspension power on the President or exclusively on the Committee. It has to be honoured.
Rule 198(6) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 provides as under:
“An authority competent to appoint an employee may suspend him pending enquiry into serious charges against such employee.”

What should be the period of suspension?

  • The period of suspension should be kept as brief as possible to ensure fairness and prevent unnecessary hardship.
Rule 198(6) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules is the relevant provision.  It reads:
“No employee shall however be kept under suspension for a period exceeding six months at a time. In no case an employee shall be kept under suspension for a continuous period exceeding one year without the prior approval of the Registrar.”

Is the suspended employee entitled to a subsistence allowance?

  • Yes. Because suspension is not a punishment.
Rule 198(6) of the Kerala Rules further reads: 
“An employee under suspension shall be entitled to subsistence allowance payable under the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 (27 of 1973).”

Is suspension a part of enquiry?

  • No. Suspension and enquiry are independent legal matters. It is not a step within the enquiry itself.

Is suspension a punishment?

  • No. Suspension is purely a temporary administrative measure to ensure a fair enquiry.

Can a suspended employee be reinstated pending an enquiry?

  • Yes. A suspended employee can be taken back into service pending an enquiry by revoking the suspension order if the competent authority later finds that continued suspension is unnecessary.

What are the grounds for revoking suspension?

  • ‘In the absence of any likelihood of the respondent to interfere with the enquiry or tampering with the evidence keeping the employee under suspension is unwarranted and cannot be justified.’ This principle is stated in K.K. Chandramathi v. Vadakkumpad Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., 1998 (2) KLT SN 37.

Who can revoke the suspension?

  • The same authority competent to suspend—normally the Managing Committee—may revoke the suspension and permit the employee to rejoin duty.

Can such employee be posted elsewhere?

Yes.

  • The Society may:
    • revoke the suspension;
    • assign the employee to another seat/branch/section;
    • restrict access to records connected with the enquiry; or
    • require the employee not to interfere with witnesses or documents.
  • Such arrangements are often adopted where the employee’s presence is not likely to prejudice the enquiry.

DISCIPLINARY SUB-COMMITTEE

Why is a Disciplinary Sub-Committee formed?

  • Ensuring a Genuine Right of Appeal: If the full Managing Committee were to conduct the initial inquiry or directly impose punishment, an employee would have no independent, unbiased body left to hear an appeal. Separating the initial disciplinary authority from the appellate body ensures that the Managing Committee can function as an impartial tribunal during the appeal stage.
  • Separation of Roles: Having a smaller, dedicated standing body to handle charge memos and inquiries prevents the members who judge the final appeal from having prejudged the facts or actively participated in the original penalty decision (nemo judex in causa sua).
The disciplinary sub-committee, envisaged under Rule 198(2A), is ordinarily to be constituted as a standing body, and it is not constituted on a case-to-case basis (Mattanur Co-Operative Rural Bank Ltd. v. The Co-Operative Arbitration Court (FB), 2023-5 KLT 312; 2023 KHC (Online) 541).

How many members can be included in a Disciplinary Sub-Committee?

  • The total number of sub-committee members must be kept low enough so that when they abstain or recuse themselves from hearing an appeal, the remaining members of the Managing Committee (Managing Committee members minus (-) Sub-Committee members) still form a clear majority to hear the appeal without institutional bias.
Rule 198 (2A) reads:
“The committee of a society shall constitute a disciplinary sub-committee consisting of not more than three of its members, of whom one shall be designated as Chairman ….”

Can the Disciplinary Sub-Committee suspend an employee?

  • No. Only the authority competent to appoint the employee (Management) holds the power to issue a suspension order.
  • Role of the Sub-Committee: The scope and authority of a Disciplinary Sub-Committee are strictly limited to issuing charge memos and inquiring into charges.
Rule 198(6) says –
“… an authority competent to appoint an employee may suspend him pending enquiry into serious charges.”

Can the President of the Society be the President of the Disciplinary Committee?

  • Better not to be. This is for the reason that the Appeal is to the Managing Committee, chaired by the President.
Rule 198 (2A) further reads:
“….. but the President of the committee of the society shall not be a member in the disciplinary sub-committee”.

Duties of Disciplinary Sub-Committee

  • The Full Bench in Mattanur Co-Operative Rural Bank Ltd. v. The Co-Operative Arbitration Court, 2023-5 KLT 312; 2023 KHC (Online) 541, has now made it clear that the Disciplinary Sub-Committee has a substantial statutory role. It can:
    • 1. inquire into the charges;
    • 2. issue the memo of charges;
    • 3. engage an external agency;
    • 4. conduct or arrange the disciplinary enquiry.

Can those (already constituted) Sub-Committee members participate in the Managing Committee’s decision to suspend?

  • No harm. Ordinarily, they should not participate (or vote) in the Managing Committee’s decision on suspension if they are acting as members of the Disciplinary Sub-Committee.

Can a member of the Disciplinary Sub-Committee participate in the Managing Committee in the disciplinary-action-decision-making process?

  • Being a member of the Managing Committee he does not, by itself, disqualify from attending a Managing Committee meeting.
  • But participating in the enquiry as a member of the Disciplinary Sub-Committee and then participating in the decision-making process concerning the same disciplinary matter raises a serious issue of institutional bias / nemo judex in causa sua.
  • This is particularly strong where the Sub-Committee has already formed an opinion regarding the charges or recommended disciplinary action.

PRELIMINARY FACT-FINDING ENQUIRY

Can there be a preliminary fact-finding enquiry before issuing a formal charge sheet?

  • Yes, it can be. It is not legally required. Such a procedure is not in Rule 198. Still, it may be useful, particularly where the facts are uncertain.
  • It is only a fact-finding exercise to decide whether further action is warranted. It does not legally bind the employee or formally start disciplinary proceedings. It is for the limited purpose of ascertaining the veracity of the allegation against the employee. (Girijan Co-operative Corporation Limited, Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana Rao, S.B. Sinha, Deepak Verma, JJ., 2010-15 SCC 322; 2010 KHC 5107)
  • In this action, the employee is not entitled to a formal hearing.

Can the preliminary fact-finding enquiry be done by the Disciplinary Sub-Committee

  • It is not a full-fledged ‘fact-finding’ procedure. It should not be done in a way so that it may cast prejudice to the minds of persons who may be associated with the ‘enquiry’ done after issuing a Charge Memo.
  • Therefore, it is proper to conduct the preliminary fact-finding enquiry through persons other than the members of the Disciplinary Sub-Committee.

Should opportunity be given to the employee to make his representation on the preliminary fact-finding enquiry report?

  • Not at all necessary. It is not even an ‘enquiry’ in its full sense.

SEPARATE “SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE” BEFORE ISSUING THE CHARGE-SHEET

Should there be a separate “show-cause notice” before issuing the charge-sheet?

  • Not necessary.  A separate “show-cause notice” before issuing the charge-sheet is not required in every case. Such a procedure is not in Rule 198.
  • But it is useful and may be a fair procedure to ask the employee to explain why disciplinary action should not be initiated, particularly where the facts are uncertain.

CHARGES

Is it necessary to issue Memo of Charges in disciplinary actions?

  • Yes.
Rule 198(2) reads:
“(2) No kind of punishment shall be awarded to an employee unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action against and he has been afforded an opportunity including a personal hearing to defend himself. ….”

What should be the contents of a Charge Sheet?

  • The grounds on which it is proposed to take action against the employee.
Rule 198(2) itself requires –
It should be capable of affording an opportunity to understand the matters upon which actions are taken against him and defend himself.

Who has to issue Memo of charges in disciplinary actions?

  • Memos of charges in disciplinary actions can be issued by the
    • disciplinary sub-committee or
    • the managing committee.
    • (Mattanur Co-Operative Rural Bank Ltd. v. The Co-Operative Arbitration Court (FB), 2023-5 KLT 312; 2023 KHC (Online) 541, analysing the Kerala Cooperative Societies Rule 198).
  • It is desirable to be done by a sub-committee – so that it may not cast prejudice to the minds of persons (other managing committee members) who may be associated with the ‘appeal decision’ that may be arisen in future.

Time of issue of Memo of charges?

  • Before starting enquiry.

Should an explanation be sought for from the employee when a Memo of charges is issued?

  • Yes, though not mandatory. It is not so specifically stated in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. If the employee admits the guilt, it may not be necessary, in the circumstances of the matter, to conduct an enquiry even.

Purpose of issuing a charge-sheet

  • It is a mandatory requirement apart from complying natural-justince.
Rule 198(2) provides — No kind punishment unless the employee has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action against.
  • Therefore, it is clear that the purpose of a charge sheet is precisely to tell the employee what he is required to meet. See: Saralakumari P.V. v. President, Kottayam Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd.

Should the charges be specific?

  • A vague allegation such as “you committed serious irregularities” is different from a charge identifying the particular act, date, transaction, document and rule allegedly violated. Vague charge is defective.

Whether the omission to make a charge-sheet (or improper charge sheet), vitiates the entire disciplinary proceeding?

  • Yes. The absence of a charge-sheet/memo of charges before that enquiry is a serious procedural defect and can vitiate the enquiry. Framing of the charge-sheet is the first step taken for holding enquiry into the allegations on the decision taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings. See:
    • Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, AIR 1991 SC 2010,
    • Union of India v. Anil Kumar Sarkar, 2013 (4) SCC 161, and
    • State of Andhra Pradesh v. C.H. Gandhi, 2013 (5) SCC 111.

ENQUIRY

Who has to enquire into the charges?

A sub-committee of the Managing Committee, or an outside agency like an Enquiry Officer. Usually an Advocate is appointed.

Rule 198(2B) reads as under:
“The disciplinary sub-committee so constituted shall inquire into the charges against the employee either by themselves or by engaging an external agency.”

Can an advocate can be engaged as an external agency/enquiry officer for the disciplinary enquiry?

  • Yes, an advocate can be engaged as an external agency/enquiry officer for the disciplinary enquiry.

Who has to appoint the advocate/enquiry officer?

  • The Managing Committee, if no specific By-law provision.
Rule 198(2B) provides:
“The disciplinary sub-committee so constituted shall inquire into the charges against the employee either by themselves or by engaging an external agency.”

Can the Managing Committee appoint the Advocate?

  • If the By-law does not provide anything as to this matter, the Managing Committee has to appoint the Advocate.
In view of Rule 198(2B), the Managing Committee should not simply bypass the Sub-Committee and appoint an Advocate to conduct the Rule 198 enquiry unless there is some separate statutory authority for doing so (such as a by-law provision).

Should there be a presenting Officer for Management?  

  • Yes. Normally it will be the Secretary of the Society.

What are the duties of a presenting Officer for Management?

  • Inspect documents or places;
  • collect evidence;
  • investigate particular factual matters for the Management;
  • submit sworn statement before the enquiry officer by himself or arrange a competent person or persons for the same.

Should the Sub-Committee analyse and adopt the findings (if they agree) of the advocate’s report?

  • Yes. If the advocate is engaged as the external agency, it should not be mechanically adopted the Committee or Sub-committee. It must consider the report, the materials/evidence relied upon, and the employee’s explanation/ objections, if any, and then arrive at its own independent finding on each charge.

Is the Advocate’s report the ultimate finding of disciplinary action?

  • No. The advocate’s report is not itself the disciplinary decision. The external agency (advocate) only conducts the enquiry. The advocate’s report is therefore a report/ recommendation arising from the enquiry; it does not automatically become the final finding of the statutory disciplinary authority.
Rule 198(2B) says that the Disciplinary Sub-Committee shall inquire into the charges “either by themselves or by engaging an external agency.”
  • The Disciplinary Sub-Committee is required to independently consider the enquiry report, the evidence on record and the defence of the delinquent employee, apply its own mind to each charge, and record its independent finding as to whether the charge has been proved.
  • A mechanical acceptance of the external agency’s report, without independent consideration and a reasoned finding by the competent disciplinary authority, would be vulnerable to under Rule 198.

Should opportunity be given to the employee to make his representation on the enquiry report and on the proposed finding of guilt/punishment?

  • Desirable; not mandatory under the Rules.

Must the employee receive the Advocate’s enquiry report?

  • If the disciplinary authority relies upon the report, the employee should ordinarily be furnished the report and given an opportunity to make a representation before the final decision.

Can the disciplinary authority disagree with the Enquiry Officer?

  • Yes—but the procedure becomes important. If the disciplinary authority proposes to disagree with a finding favourable to the employee, the employee should ordinarily be informed of the proposed disagreement and allowed to respond before the finding is finally recorded.

Should the findings be confined to the charges?

  • The authority should not punish the employee for an allegation which was never made a charge and on which no opportunity of defence was given.

Can a charge be held proved merely because the employee did not disprove it?

  • The disciplinary authority must assess the material establishing the misconduct; it should not simply reverse the burden onto the employee.

What is the standard of proof?

  • A departmental/co-operative disciplinary proceeding is generally governed by the preponderance of probabilities, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But the finding still has to be based on evidence/material on record.

PUNISHMENT

Who should impose the punishment?

  • The sub-committee, if so appointed. A sub-committee is desirable – for providing an appeal to the Managing Committee.
  • Under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, it is a matter that depends upon the employee’s category as shown in the table in Rule 198(3). It reads as under:
Rank of the employeeAuthority competent to impose
 Penalties under (a) to (c)Penalties under (d) to (h)
Secretary /Manager or other Chief Executive Officer and all employees holding posts higher than that of Sr. Clerk/Sr. Assistant/I Grade Assistant/Equivalent other employees with same or identical scale of pay      President /Chairman    Sub-Committee/ Executive Committee  
All other employeesSecretary /Manager or other Chief Executive Officer.President
  • Where the relevant penalty is one that the Disciplinary Sub-Committee is competent to impose under Rule 198(3), the Sub-Committee may impose it in the categories specified in Rule 198(3).
  • Where the Managing Committee is the competent penalty authority, however, the Sub-Committee’s role is different: it conducts the enquiry and records its findings, and the competent authority thereafter deals with the penalty in accordance with Rule 198.

Should opportunity be given to the delinquent to say his part as regards the proposed punishment?

  • Yes.
Rule 198(2) requires the employee to be informed in writing of the grounds on which action is proposed and given an opportunity, including personal hearing, to defend himself.

Should there be ‘Show-Cause Notice’ for Punishment

  • Yes. It is to comply doctrine of natutal-justice. “Communication of Enquiry Report and Opportunity to Submit Representation Against the Findings and Proposed Penalty” is desirable rather than: “Show-Cause Notice for Punishment”.

Is the Managing Committee the disciplinary/penalty authority?

  • If a Sub committee, No. The Managing Committee has to act as the appellate authority.
Under Rule 198(4), the Managing Committee is the appellate authority.
  • The President is the competent penalty authority for certain lower-level employees under the table in Rule 198(3), and the Executive Committee/Board was the appellate authority.
  • The Managing Committee cannot and should not subsequently “approve” or “confirm” the punishment if the Sub-Committee is the designated penalty authority.

What must the final punishment order contain?

  • It should ideally contain:
  • charges,
  • employee’s defence,
  • enquiry findings,
  • consideration of objections to the report,
  • independent findings of the competent authority,
  • reasons for accepting/rejecting material contentions,
  • finding on each charge,
  • reasons relevant to the penalty,
  • penalty imposed,
  • right of appeal and appellate authority.

Should the punishment be proportionate?

  • Even if misconduct is proved, the proportionality of the penalty can be challenged in appropriate circumstances.

APPEAL

Who is the appeal authority?

  • Usually, the Managing Committee is the appellate authority. It is so under Rule 198(4). It provides as under:
Rank of the employeeAuthority competent to impose
 Penalties under (a) to (c)Penalties under (d) to (h)
Secretary /Manager or other Chief Executive Officer and all employees holding posts higher than that of Sr. Clerk/Sr. Assistant/I Grade Assistant/Equivalent other employees with same or identical scale of pay  Executive Committee or Board of Management      Board of Management    
All other employeesPresidentExecutive  Committee/ Board of Management

Can members of the Disciplinary Sub-Committee subsequently participate in the Managing Committee’s decision on appeal?

  • Not Desirable. This raises the bias/nemo judex issue, especially if those members have already considered the evidence and formed an opinion about guilt.


End Notes:

Rule 198 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules

Rule 198. Disciplinary action.— (1) Any member of the establishment of a cooperative Society may, for good and sufficient reasons, be punished by imposing any of the following penalties, namely:

  • (a) Censure;
  • (b) Fine (in the case of employees in the last grade);
  • (c) Withholding of increments with or without cumulative effect.
  • (d) Withholding of promotion;
  • (e) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the society, by negligences or breach of orders or otherwise;
  • (f) Reduction to a lower rank;
  • (g) Compulsory retirement;
  • (h) Dismissal from service.

(2) No kind of punishment shall be awarded to an employee unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action against and he has been afforded an opportunity including a personal hearing to defend himself. Every order awarding punishment shall be communicated to the employee concerned in writing stating the grounds on which the punishment has been awarded.

 (2A) The committee of a society shall constitute a disciplinary sub-committee consisting of not more than three of its members, of whom one shall be designated as Chairman, but the President of the committee of the society shall not be a member in the disciplinary sub-committee.

(2B) The disciplinary sub-committee so constituted shall inquire into the charges against the employee either by themselves or by engaging an external agency.

 (3) The authority competent to impose the various penalties on different categories of employees shall be as shown in the table below:

Rank of the employeeAuthority competent to impose
 Penalties under (a) to (c)Penalties under (d) to (h)
Secretary /Manager or other Chief Executive Officer and all employees holding posts higher than that of Sr. Clerk/Sr. Assistant/I Grade Assistant/Equivalent other employees with same or identical scale of pay      President /Chairman    Sub-Committee/Executive Committee  
All other employeesSecretary /Manager or other Chief Executive Officer.President

(4) An appeal shall lie against every order imposing a penalty to the competent appellate authority, shown in the table below:-

Secretary /Manager or other Chief Executive Officer and all employees holding posts higher than that of Sr. Clerk/Sr. Assistant/I Grade Assistant/Equivalent other employees with same or identical scale of pay      Executive Committee or Board of Management          Board of Management Executive      
All other employeesPresidentCommittee/Board of Management

 (5) No appeal shall be entertained if it is not preferred within a period of three months from the date of the order imposing the penalty. Provided that where the penalties are imposed on employee by an administrator or an administrative committee, such employees can file appeal before the forthcoming elected committee and in such cases the restriction of three months shall not be applicable.

 (6) An authority competent to appoint an employee may suspend him pending enquiry into serious charges against such employee. No employee shall however be kept under suspension for a period exceeding six months at a time. In no case an employee shall be kept under suspension for a continuous period exceeding one year without the prior approval of the Registrar. An employee under suspension shall be entitled to subsistence allowance payable under the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 (27 of 1973).

 Provided that an employee not coming under the purview of the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972 (27 of 1973) shall be entitled to subsistence allowance at the rate admissible to State Government Employees as prescribed under the Kerala Service Rules.

 (7) In the event of any pendancy of disciplinary proceedings against any employee of a co-operative society or any co-operative institution pursuant to any charge of grave misconduct, irregularity, corruption or other charge involving moral turpitude, no retirement benefits shall be sanctioned to such employee or retired employee and in case of sanctioning of any retirement benefits to any such employee or retired employee, the name and designation of the sanctioning authority together with the reason for such sanctioning shall be recorded by the sanctioning authority by himself and such authority shall be held responsible for any loss to the society owing to such sanctioning of retirement benefits if found that such sanctioning was unwarranted.

 (8) In respect of all employees save the Chief Executive Officer of a society, no retirement benefits shall be sanctioned and disbursed until after the due issuance of a nonliability certificate by the Chief Executive Officer and approval of the same by the committee of the society within thirty days from the date of retirement of such employee. In the event of the retirement of the Chief Executive Officer, the non-liability certificate shall be issued by the committee of the Society. For any loss to the society due to the non-adherence of the forgoing procedure, the Chief Executive Officer along with the committee of the society shall be held responsible collectively and severally in respect of the issuance of Non-liability Certificate to any employee other than the Chief Executive Officer and the members of the committee shall be held collectively and severally responsible for the issuance of Non-liability Certificate to the Chief Executive Officer.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Civil Court to Adjudicate Title; Land Tribunal to Fix Tenancy; Taluk Land Board to Determine Plantation Exemption

Abstract

  • Civil court alone to find disputes on title.
  • A tenant cannot declare himself to be tenant.
  • Land Tribunal is the sole authority to determine Tenancy.
  • The TLB alone deals with exemption and land to be surrendered.

Civil court alone to find disputes on title

It is observed in M/S Radha Krishan Industries v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 334, that where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition (Art. 226); and it is pointed out that this principle have been consistently upheld by the Apex Court in

  • Seth Chand Ratan v Pandit Durga Prasad, (2003) 5 SCC 399,
  • Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706 , and
  • Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 632, etc.

The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Harrisions Malayalam Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(2) KLT 369, held that even the High Court cannot adjudicate on title. It is held as under:

  • “141. …Title, we reiterate, in this context, we have not found on the petitioners, which we are incompetent to do in the present (Writ) proceedings……”.

Title to the Property is not Ajudicated by the Taluk Land Board.

In K. Jagadeesachandran v. E.K. Manomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584, it was held with respect to title of a plantation property as under:

  • “As rightly argued by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the company such issue (with respect to title) is wholly outside the realm of the TLB proceedings … . Nor did the TLB have the jurisdiction to enter a finding on any such contention.”

In Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44; 2013 (1) KHC 847 (Para 9), it was held as under:.

  • “Title to property is not what is decided in the Land Board proceedings in a ceiling case as between the declarant and the State, though such issues may be germane while exemptions or identification of excess, are to be decided by the Land Board, as between the declarant and other parties appearing before the Land Board. If the Government have the case that the paramount title to the land rests with them, they would be at liberty to initiate action in accordance with law.”
  • Both Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9), Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Manomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11) were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).  

A Tenant Cannot Declare Himself to be a Tenant and Avail Benefits under KLR Act

  • The competent statutory authority to determine tenancy under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.
  • Land Board or Taluk Land Board deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues etc. It cannot adjudicate on tenancy right or title.

Land Tribunal to go into the question of tenancy

In Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736

  • “If there is dispute on any of these points necessarily the Land Tribunal has to go into the question of possession and the alleged tenancy”.

Balanoor Plantations Case – Based on the Principle LT to fix Tenancy’; TLB to Fix Plantation Exemption.  

In Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it is pronounced that the tenants who have not approached the Land  Tribunal and established rights as “cultivating tenant” are not entitled to avail benefits on “Fixity of Tenure”, under Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

It is pointed out – when a title claim is raised by the Government or the Devaswom, the person who claims to be a cultivating tenant –

  • “will have to first prove their claim of being a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, under the provisions of the KLR Act through a proper process of law.“

It is held as under:

  • “This is pertinent because, under Section 72B(3) of the KLR Act, it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant, entitled to assignment of right, title and interest in respect of any property, to apply to the Land Tribunal, within whose jurisdiction that the property is situated, within two years from the date of vesting of such title and interest.”

It is based upon the following principles of law:

  • It is for adjudicating the ‘tenancy right’, by the Land Tribunal – for, the Land Tribunal is the only authority that can decide on the “tenancy right.” (It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case.)
  • Note: A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and avail benefits – the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.
  • Land Board or Taluk Land Board (deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues etc.) cannot adjudicate on tenancy right.

Cultivating Tenants (‘Entitled to Assignment’) are Obligated to Apply LT

Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it was laid down that only cultivating tenants, entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, would be “entitled to hold possession over the property and to resist action under the KLC Act”.

Sec. 72B provides for cultivating tenant’s rights to get an assignment by purchase certificate (through LT) – within the ceiling area. A Tenant was “obligated to apply” for the purchase certificate within 2 years from 1-1-1970.

Sec. 73B(3) reads as under:

  • “(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

Referrence to the Land Tribunal, under Section 125(3)

On the basis of the Full Bench decision in Lissy v. Kuttan, 1976 KLT 571, it was argued in Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala that a person who claims to be a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 of the KLR Act, the Civil Courts are prohibited from considering such issues and the matter has to be referred to the Land Tribunal, under Section 125(3) of the KLR Act. It is pointed out in this decision that the judgment in Lissy v. Kuttan had been overruled by a Larger Bench in Kesava Bhat v. Subraya Bhat, 1979 KLT 766. It was held in Balanoor Plantations as under:

  • “11…. Unless the question actually “arises” for consideration, there is no obligation under S. 125 (3) to make a reference to the Land Tribunal. The mere incorporation of an unnecessary or irrelevant plea of tenancy into the written statement which has no relation whatever to the material averments and the reliefs sought in plaint, cannot attract the bar of S. 125 (1), or the provisions of S. 125 (3 ). …..  It is only if the question arises for consideration that the obligation to refer under S. 125 (3) also arises. …..”

Read Also

•• Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy in a Nutshell
•• Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell
•• Exempted Plantation Land – In whom Ownership Vests
•• Plantation-Exemption Does Not Confer Ownership over the Land
•• Can the Ownership of (Exempted) Plantation (Above Ceiling Limit) be Changed? Can Plantation be Fragmented?
•• Do the Plantation-Tenants have a Right to Seek ‘Assignment’ of the Entire Plantation-Tenancy-Land, beyond the Ceiling Limit (under Purchase Certificates)?
•• Government is the OWNER of All Leasehold-Plantation-Lands in Kerala.
•• Liability of Certain Plantation Tenants to Pay Rent To the Government: New Rules can be Made for its Effective Implementation
•• Law on Acquisition of Private (Leasehold) Plantation Land in Kerala
•• Glen Leven Estate v. State of Kerala: Not Correctly Decided?
•• Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board
•• Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy; TLB to Fix Plantation-Exemption
 •• Acquisition of (Exempted) Plantation Property: Should the Govt. Pay Full Land Value to Land-Owners/Tenants?
•• Civil Court to Adjudicate Title; Land Tribunal to Fix Tenancy; Taluk Land Board to Determine Plantation Exemption
•• Relevant Provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act – on Purchase Certificate,  Plantation Exemption & Ceiling Area – in a Nutshell

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Registration of a Document Relates Back to the Date when it was Executed

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Section 47 of The Registration Act, 1908 reads thus:
“47. Time from which registered document operates – A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration.”

Legal effect of Section 47 Registration Act

The Constitution Bench in Ram Saran Lall v. Domini Kuer, AIR 1961 SC 1747 considered Section 47 of The Registration Act and observed to the following effect:

  • A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been made. That is, it has nothing to do with the completion of the registration.
  • It applies to a document only after it has been registered.
  • In the same way it has nothing to do with the completion of the registration, it has nothing to do with the completion of a sale when the instrument is one of sale.
  • A sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed, cannot be said to have been completed earlier.

The Supreme Court held as under:

  • “8. We do not think that the learned Attorney-General’s contention is well founded. We will assume that the learned Attorney-General’s construction of the instrument of sale that the property was intended to pass under it on the date of the instrument is correct. Section 47 of the Registration Act does not, however, say when a sale would be deemed to be complete. It only permits a document when registered, to operate from a certain date which may be earlier than the date when it was registered. The object of this section is to decide which of two or more registered instruments in respect of the same property is to have effect. The section applies to a document only after it has been registered. It has nothing to do with the completion of the registration and therefore nothing to do with the completion of a sale when the instrument is one of sale. A sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed, cannot be said to have been completed earlier because by virtue of Section 47 the instrument by which it is effected, after it has been registered, commences to operate from an earlier date. Therefore we do not think that the sale in this case can be said, in view of Section 47, to have been completed on January 31, 1946. The view that we have taken of Section 47 of the Registration Act seems to have been taken in Tilakdhari Singh vs. Gour Narain, AIR 1921 Pat. 150. We believe that the same view was expressed in Nareshchandra Datta vs. Gireeshchandra Das, (1935) ILR 62 Cal. 979 and Gobardhan Bar vs. Guna Dhar Bar, ILR (1940) II Cal. 270.”

In Kanwar Raj Singh v.  Gejo, AIR 2024 SC 238; 2024-2 SCC 416, it is observed as under:

  • “6. On plain reading of Section 47, it provides that a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof was required. Thus, when a compulsorily registerable document is registered according to the Registration Act, it can operate from a date before the date of its registration. The date of the operation will depend on the nature of the transaction. If, in a given case, a sale deed is executed and the entire agreed consideration is paid on or before execution of the sale deed, after it is registered, it will operate from the date of its execution. The reason is that if its registration was not required, it would have operated from the date of its execution.”

In Vasudha Gupta v. Delhi Development Authority, 215 (2014) DLT 711, it is pointed out as under:

  • “Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908, clearly lays down that a document which is required to be registered must be done so within a period of four months.
  • Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, lays down that once the registration of a document takes place, it relates back to the date when the document was executed meaning thereby that in the instant case, although the document was registered on 13.10.2011, but it could not be said that the document became operative only on 03.10.2011. On the contrary, a combined reading of the aforesaid two sections will clearly show that not only the executants of a document is given four months time to get the document registered with the Sub Registrar but also that once the said document is registered, it relates back to the date when the same was executed.”

Read Also:

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Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic)

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 –  Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession:  

Survey, Revenue Records, Mutation

Adverse Possession

Land Laws/  Transfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Specific Relief Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Natural Justice/Disciplinary Action

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No.  2:  A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No.  3:  Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No.  4:  Common Law of TRUSTS in India